Welcome to a Lowy Institute virtual event today on the centenary, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai in 1921. In China, this is a big deal, a moment that's marked by and celebrated, I should say, with grand parades, TV shows, books, study sessions, wall-to-wall media coverage and so forth. They've also been in the lead up to this event, multiple pronouncements on history from Xi Jinping. You might call the whole event a teachable moment with Chinese characteristics. Now joining me today to try to make sense of this event is a stellar cast of genuine China experts. Melinda Liu in Beijing where she heads the Newsweek Bureau. Steve Tsang in London where he heads the China Institute at SOAS University. And finally Chris Buckley, the New York Times China correspondent who is working out of Sydney at the moment as a result of US-China tensions over the media. Now Melinda, let's start with you. You've lived in Beijing on and off for decades. You've witnessed many a big day. I think the last big one was the 70th anniversary, the founding of the PRC in 2019. Give us a sense of the mood of the city and your sense of the preparations for the July 1 event. Well, it's sort of a combination of the 2008 Olympics. Combined with, if you can imagine it, the actual founding of the People's Republic in 1949, there is great pomp and circumstance and intense security presence. There are so many volunteers and security people and traffic cops and everyone around. It's hard to miss that something really special is going to happen. However, I do think that it's going to be largely a made for TV moment because this also happens to be following a global pandemic where for a year and a half various concerns, lockdowns, jitters and anxiety have been besieging China on and off in various places. So it's like a lockdown within a crypto lockdown. I mean, there's lots of going on, people who hadn't been checking your health apps for your vaccines and signs of and your negative COVID tests are checking them now. And of course, everyone who takes part in person in the festivities will all have had COVID tests, which have to show negative and ideally, that's proof of vaccination. So it's a, it's, it's a pretty major event here. And you can you can feel it. So you're not only being screened for political viruses, but real viruses as well. Yeah. And of course, everyone expects that, you know, the real, the real party will be will be the viral part that social media, television, everything you can see, unlike past national days and military parades, there will be no, no military parade. We're not going to see tanks in the streets. How I knew that actually 10, 10 days ago, why? Because when they do put out the tanks, they tell everyone who lives along the parade route, you've got to close your windows, draw your curtain, stay inside and don't peek out. They didn't tell us that this year. And indeed, there is no parade, but they will have fly pasts. 10 days ago, there was a, you know, the sound of very loud helicopters, very close to Tiananmen Square, which has got to be among the world's most controlled bits of airspace in the world. And they had like migs with colored smoke trails flying down the main drag. So those we can see those are happening hype in the air. But I think there'll be lots of fireworks, lots of TV coverage. But not as much sort of ordinary people on the street as during some past anniversaries. Okay, Steve, now it's important to watch not just what Beijing celebrates, but how they celebrate different events. Is anything stuck out to you and the lead up to July 1, any themes, any particular emphasis on policy and the like? Well, what strikes me is that this is the 100th anniversary of the founding of the PL, of the CCP. The impression I get is that they are probably more looking forward, looking ahead, rather than looking back to celebrate. This is, I think, something which carries a strong political message, which is that Xi Jinping is ushering in a new era for the Communist Party, and therefore for China. I think what we need to bear in mind is that when the Chinese socialism under Xi Jinping in the new era was being introduced in the 19th Party Congress in 2017, it's meant to be preparing for this date and next year, when we will see a real confirmation that this is not a rhetoric, that Xi Jinping's new era, that Xi Jinping thought is not like the like of the three percents or the scientific outlook. They are not for the personal gratification of the leader himself. It is for real. Xi Jinping thought is meant to be the new guiding ideology for China in the foreseeable future. Xi Jinping is going to be the leader for China, shaping its future in so far as we can see. If we don't recognize that we may well be missing what it is really about for China today and moving forward. So it sounds like to you a dividing line is at work. Can you explain very briefly for general lay people watching this. What do you mean by Xi Jinping thought? Well, Xi Jinping thought I think is now being presented as the most up to date, modern and totally Chinese interpretation of Marxism, Leninism. There is no more need to talk about the further signification of Marxism, Leninism, but Marxism, Leninism, it is just under the interpretation of Xi Jinping, which will now tie it completely to China's history and tradition and civilization. Marxism, Leninism and the Communist Party are the organic development of China's culture and civilization. It is the ultimate manifestation of the merging of Marxism, Leninism with Chinese culture in perhaps the way that Buddhism in China was not seen as an import from India any longer, but a Chinese religion. I think Xi Jinping has embraced that. And this is something which people in China will have to learn to embrace. The ideology is back. That sounds very much like an ideological apex if you like. Chris, I want to come to you. I mean that brings us to this point outwardly at the moment China seems to be in a moment of great confidence the economy relatively speaking is bounced back. There was a slogan earlier this year which was very prevalent about the the East is rising the West is declining. But you might have noticed noticed in Canberra last week the outgoing head of the Foreign Affairs Department in Australia Francis Adamson talked about the party state the government being insecure. So, can you be very confident and insecure at the both at the same time. The Chinese Communist Party leadership repeats these messages of both confidence and insecurity so often and with so much firmness that in a sense they must be true for party leaders. I think the way in which we can square the circle of making sense of how they fit together is to go back to what Steve is partly saying here which is about this theme of China entering a new era, a new era of strength and also implicit of consolidation as well. So this idea that China is entering a time when there's great opportunity to consolidate its prosperity it's standing in the world. Consolidate the standing of the Communist Party, but also this underlying conviction that this process of rising consolidation faces dangers and sometimes outright enemies from all sides. So that's where I think the two come together this idea that China is sort of, I think she has said it quite vividly himself sometimes it is the higher it rises the greater the dangers are overfall. And so I expect part of the theme on July one is going to be this theme. There's come through repeatedly in Xi Jinping speeches about requiring vigilance and also sacrifice to ensure this time of opportunity and also danger that people, the party the nation remains unified. So in that respect is a sense of insecurity a kind of strengthening mechanism. Yes, I think that's a very good way of putting it and it's certainly a way of rallying people around this idea that one of the reasons why the party should remain in power is that is this argument that it provides security and unity for China at a time when the world is looking increasingly insecure and disunified if that's still a word in English. But at a time when the world is looking increasing uncertain part of the message here is that is the party that can rally people around that can provide that unit in also that security which as, as Linda said is on abundant display in the streets of Beijing in the past few days. Now, earlier this last week I wrote something for the observer in London London part of the Guardian group about sort of 10 points in the hundred year history of the party. And I was criticized which is fair enough for ignoring various moments of the push for democracy. Like charter await the petition which was set around before the Olympics so I might get you to all comment on this starting with you Melinda. What is the state of alternative political movements to the party at the moment and is there any ability inside China to express themselves. Well, first of all, I think that one of the very iconic facts about Xi Jinping's administration is that if we thought it was opaque before think again it's even more opaque now, I have to confess that there's not a whole lot of transparency into what what's going on inside even even just ordinary bureaucracy, people don't talk the way they used to talk. I mean, we thought they were already closed mouth before but but this is really deafening silence people are afraid to talk to foreigners in some cases, or they just, they just don't want to don't want to. Of course and there's been a pandemic so they're not, you know, there's also a kind of a feeling of being sort of more self contained, you know, there's been psychological isolation as well as real isolation. We don't really know, but there are definitely signs of people yearning with with some nostalgia for a time of greater openness and especially a time of greater, shall we say, market oriented reform greater interaction with expats maybe you know, these are all topics that are okay to talk about so what do I mean. I mean, you know, there might be officials at a very low level say district level officials in Beijing and Chaoyang district where I live, who talked to business people and say, Oh, we've a lot of expats have left and there are a lot of empty offices in the district. So now let's have a project to build wait for this one low income housing that it's expats can actually afford in Beijing so that they'll come back and take part in building our economy. Okay, first of all, it's true. A lot of people can't afford to live in Beijing both Chinese and expats, but the idea that somehow let's get expats back I've heard I've heard that for more than one direction also in Shanghai. There are local level people saying there used to be our population used to be 7% foreigners and now because of the pandemic and other reasons, it's down to 1% but but our most innovative moment was when we had sent 7% and now we'd like to get back to 7% These things are okay to say there are many other things that are not okay to say, but some analysts have talked about the politics of funerals there have been a couple of milderly and prominent somewhat relatively liberal people who passed away at an advanced age, and the sorts of commentaries that have been aired about them, people go who have gone to their funerals or sent wreaths to their funerals and they say on those wreaths, there seems to be some kind of slight feeling of a bit of nostalgia for a more open sort of market oriented era of the past. Steve do you have any thoughts on that I guess from your first answer about the firmness of Xi Jinping thought do you see any avenues for expression of alternative views of China's future. Well, I think alternative views for China's future exist in China is an enormous country with huge amount of diversities among people. The truth is whether they're articulated and how they're articulated. Here I think we have to get back into a reality that after the Tiananmen, Mexico of 1989, the Communist Party did steadily increase the scope for internal policy at the top echelon of the party. And that was largely closed down after the 19 Party Congress of 2017. And now we are not really seeing much scope of internal policy debates at the upper echelon of the Communist Party. So if the top leaders within the party. There's no knowledge that you don't rise to the top of the Communist Party for being incompetent with by and large you're talking about very, very able people who have enormous experience and ideas of how to steer China to the best destination. It can be, and they are being. Intermediated to stay silent. That means that in the wider society in civil societies and elsewhere, people are no longer able to articulate their alternative models for China, because if you try to do that, you will almost certainly commit the historical nihilism. Because if you say anything about the party's history, if you go back to the party's history and say that the 1980s was a wonderful time when people were able to talk about all kinds of alternatives. Even under leadership of Dong Xiaoping, we were talking about whether the party and the state should be separated. Now that's no longer acceptable. It's something which, if you go back 10 years, people will speak very freely about and would debate whether that was the right approach or the wrong approach. Now there is only one right approach. You follow the leader, you follow the narrative, or you take very serious personal risk of what may then happens to you. Yes, what is your sense, you of course would remember clearly the charter await and various democracy movements in China. Is there any outlet for them at the moment. Well, just as Steve and Melinda were talking, I was just thinking, you know, July 1 Thursday is another anniversary, which has a great bearing on this which is the imposition, the introduction of a national security law into Hong Kong. So in so far as Hong as China's had an alternative future open to it. An example of what that alternative future might be it's always been there in Hong Kong. And the fact that over the past year, the Chinese government and its ancillary government in Hong Kong have acted so swiftly, so aggressively to use the national security law to bring in this fundamental transformation of politics in Hong Kong with the eradication of opposition voices. I think that does speak to know the other side of this argument Richard, which is at the same time is that there's been the silencing of these, what you could call liberal voices. There's been this growing sense of confidence of expansiveness of these voices within the party encouraged by Xi Jinping emboldened by Xi Jinping's era, who are pushing for a much more confidently authoritarian view of China's future. And that's a view of future that I think many people outside of China find difficult to understand and even find repugnant. But I think it's also a future that does have at least some constituency in China some some basis of support and the basis of that support. It's partly an appeal to nationalism but it's also partly appeal to that sense of security that we were talking about before about this firm paternalistic authoritarian government, which can bring the country together, but also withstand domestic and external differences. So, you know, in a sense those, at the same time those liberal voices as those alternative views have been still I think we've seen these more authoritarian voices become emboldened and more influential as well. So one area where there has been debate of course that has surfaced slightly into public is about Chinese diplomacy and the so called wolf warriors, and whether in fact they help China or hurt China. You know, within China they seem to be very popular outside of China people think it's a disaster. Melinda what's your sense of the debate inside China about the wolf, about wolf warrior diplomacy. Yeah, that's that's that's fascinating it's a sort of Jacqueline Hyde on a state level. I think part of the problem is that Chinese officialdom. Especially the communist regime, they're accustomed to being the underdog they've actually waged that battle very successfully otherwise they wouldn't have survived for for a century. The underdog they do, they can do and they know how to do it. They don't know how to do top dog they don't, it's not too clear how you're supposed to act if you are number one, you know, and of course now we're getting to the point where people see China as aspiring to number one but they don't know their models for how you act as number one is, you know, written 100 years 100 200 years ago, or the United States they seem to see them as very aggressive and very assertive and very exploitative or colonialist. So, underdog top dog equals, that's, that's why we have wolf warrior, the wolf warrior tone and diplomacy. It's a, it's a, it's a sort of a sort of mistaken equation between an aggressive tone and an actual strength, you know, like if I talk strong and talk big that means I am strong and I am big. Well, no it doesn't it actually often means quite the opposite or, or at least reveals a deep insecurity. And I think there's actually some experimentation with this because some of these officials who are today's wolf warriors and they were not always wolf warriors not by any means. And it just, I think some of them see it as a, you know, a means to fast promotion a way to gain attention. Just like sometimes diplomats in Western countries do but it's not of course it's, it's much different when you're, when you're in China, and it's all very new. I don't, I think there is discussion. I think. And also the other thing we have to keep in mind is, we place a lot of weight on what the diplomatic tone is but in the broader picture of the Chinese government, the foreign ministry in particular is a rather weak player when you compare it to other ministries. So we might be putting a lot of weight on the wolf warrior rhetorical tone, when in fact there's a lot of other stuff going on that we don't see and we don't hear. So in your sense of this debate, is it important. And what does it tell you about China at the moment. Well the event of the wolf warriors I think is important, because I think any objective observer would see that as hugely damaging to Chinese efforts to build soft power, and to gain international respect and admiration, which is what he wants to do. But the event of I think wolf warriors is perhaps very difficult to avoid if not inevitable, given the way House Xi Jinping is running China, he's put in the incentive system. He focused much more than his predecessor who already did it on what I would call party centric nationalism, and in this focus on the party centric nationalism in this construction or reconstruction of history. What I would say is changing the day facto social contract that existed between people and the party stage in China since 1989. The day facto social contract was always previously about the party monopolizing its power in the return for each delivering a better tomorrow to people in China, better living standards and better living conditions. To modify it upgraded the social contract to one that is going to make China powerful and strong. So it is necessary for the party state to present to people that China is strong and powerful, and can go out and command respect. And that is the conditions where diplomats are being incentivize to go out and behave like wolf warriors, because their five primary objective is no longer to work with the host country, but to be assessed by domestic opinions, both country at large, and in the party upper echelon. And for all the Xi Jinping said about we need to modify it a bit to make China's diplomacy credible and lovable. No wolf warrior has ever been demoted or punished. So the incentive is clearly in place that if you want to move upwards and forward in your career as a diplomat, be a strong wolf warrior. So we get into this track of China coming out in his diplomacy in his diplomacy, which is counterproductive to his diplomacy, even though is very professional diplomats understand and know that. Chris, I remember about 1015 years ago a professor whose name I've forgotten from Sun Yat-sen University in Guangdong complained about aggressive nationalistic language and he said young people were being brought up and being fed wolf milk. This is the wolf warriors have grown up after being fed wolf milk and the like. I mean, what is your sense of this is that, you know, popular at home, unpopular aboard or just unpopular amongst Western countries, Southeast Asian countries might have a different view of it. And what do you see it as reflective of. I think Steve hit the nail on the head about many of the motivations within the Chinese system for this much more of them and rhetoric when it comes to foreign criticisms, this fusing of party and government. Party and government means that, you know, the party's propaganda and ideological imperative so felt much more directly on the diplomatic system. And throughout the foreign ministry than perhaps they used to be. I would I would just point out another element here which comes into play. And I think it's important for understanding what is happening which is, you know, the fact is over the past four or five years, four or five years, certainly over the past couple of years, some of the most contentious issues in Chinese foreign policy and in Chinese railings with foreign journalists have been about the these these human rights issues in Xinjiang, to some extent in Tibet, in Hong Kong as well, that have a slightly different cast or somewhat different cast from those tensions of the past so you know when when China is presented with criticism or critical reporting of its policies across an entire region and entire territory with that's Hong Kong or Xinjiang. That touches on these nerves that are very important within the party about territorial sovereignty about the integrity of the Chinese nation state in a way that individual human rights cases and more localized human rights abuses in the part didn't touch on. You know, often in so far as you see that Wolf Warrior rhetoric coming into the for its on these very sensitive and intense issues about China's periphery. And also on this big issue of course about covert as well. So I think that is one issue and your other question Richard was about how this is playing in China. I think Melinda can probably best speak to that. I suspect inside the Chinese system, perhaps even quite high up in the Chinese system. There would be people who would wish that, you know, some of the loudest voices in the Chinese Foreign Ministry in global times and so on, would just tone it down a bit. And I think what you do see from time to time is that the, you know, sometimes that message gets through. It gets through the calibrations when the rhetoric dies down a bit. But then the incentives for being, let's call them Wolf Warriors Wolf Warrior is so baked in as Steve says that they're back roaring pretty quickly. I'm going to move on to ask you a separate question each now starting with you Melinda that we've seen a crackdown on China's tech titans they're almost entirely private businessmen entrepreneurs. That's on top of the jailing of a number of other private or and also disciplining of a number of other private entrepreneurs in recent years. Is there a concerted effort to actually transform the private sector and make it much more a political base for the party or is this just, you know, a sort of cyclical disciplining of the sector to make sure that they behave. I think it's a somewhat of a combination of both. But I think you pointed out a very important fact also which is that we might have once upon a time thought of the Chinese Communist Party as you know dominated by the proletariat workers and peasants and the downtrodden in society who who brought down a capitalist and bourgeois ruling system. But today, those rich people are the party. You know what it came home to me when I saw a lot of this, you know, the armies of street sweepers who are out there on the street with you know the bus drivers all the policemen all the security, you know, they're quite happy to do everything they can do to make this party for the party be a big one. Um, but more and more the party people are themselves. Well to do. They use the party for networking. They see it as a fast track to a good career and a good life. And I, I, I think it's, I think it, I think there is a an idea that you can't let private entrepreneurs get too far ahead of things because once you have economic power then maybe you'll want a bigger political say. And, you know, I think it's kind of fascinating that Jack Ma, you know, of course, who is now invisible, having a lot of issues in his once former corporate empire. For a long time he didn't want to say that he was a party member and then eventually it came out that he was you know not that he was a typical one, but I think now we're seeing you know, I think we're seeing tech titans encountering regulatory and other kinds of obstacles and setbacks, but the ones who will survive are the ones who find the way to be both entrepreneurially successful and to work with the party or even to be a staunch party member. I mean, yeah. It's a new ball game in that in that respect to me and in the West of course we complain about the cancel culture but the cancel culture in China is quite something when you look at what's happened to Jack Ma. Steve, I want to go to another topic now for you. You've done a lot of work over the years on Taiwan has been a lot of discussion about Beijing increasingly willing to gamble with military action on Taiwan if not today then maybe about by 2025. Do you think there's there's been a change of tone on Taiwan and in what and and what does it mean. What we have to bear in mind with Xi Jinping is that when he is finally finished. He expect China to be one united country. One strong powerful united country respected by all for which he will have to bring Hong Kong tightly into his phone and to bring Taiwan into China's phone. I don't think he is in a desperate hurry to get this done in the next five years or so, but he will not leave it unaccomplished before he is ready to hand over to somebody else. The reality with Xi Jinping is of course that when he hand over, it will be a result of a biological clock ticking and not his personal choice of funding and a knowledge successor and handing over power that way. So I think we are looking at something more like perhaps like 20 years, the man is 68. Past the 10 year mark from today, I think the risk that the PLA maybe orders to do something would increase significantly year by year. Xi Jinping is a risk taker. Particularly in contrast to his two immediate predecessors, but he is not reckless. He is not somebody who is likely to want to embark on an operation over Taiwan. Because he knows if that operation should fail, it could fundamentally destabilize his hold to power within the party and therefore in China. So he wouldn't want to take a risk like that. He will only do so when he feels that China has the capability to take Taiwan and to deter the Americans from interfering so that he can actually get Taiwan or force Taiwan to accept unification with the mainland. Very interesting. Chris, I wanted to ask you about the Uighurs. This has been, I think we're about three, four years now into the construction of the reeducation camps. So long in fact that China says many Uighurs have graduated from these camps and have gone into work in various factories or gone home and the like. Can you give us a sense of where we are on the Uighur issue right now? Is there any sense of all at all? Obviously, outwardly China has been absolutely firm in rejecting any criticism and the like, even as pressure and criticism from the west has been ratcheted up. Where are we at on that issue? Are the camps still there? Are they being wound down? Is there any sense of a debate inside China on this issue? Unfortunately, I haven't, I'm not in China now, of course, but I haven't been able to visit Xinjiang since 2018. So that direct sense about what is happening on the ground now is very indirect for me. And only from what I hear from other people who have visited more recently, it does sound like over the past couple of years a couple of changes have been taking place in Xinjiang. First of all, it does seem that the leadership of the region and the leaders in Beijing feel confident enough about their control over Xinjiang that they've taken away some of the most egregious aspects of security that really stood out for you when you visited Xinjiang, certainly up until later in 2018. So, you know, the, the, the, the nests of barbed wire that were around every public building and schools and so on. The checkpoints that were everywhere, especially for Uighurs and other national minorities there are the constant surveillance and the police patrols everywhere. All of that certainly hasn't receded, but it sounds like, at least in a good many areas, it's been calibrated a bit so the region doesn't feel under that oppressive state of near martial law that it felt like for a couple of years there. At the same time is big question about how many people remain in confinement. Just how many people remain in reeducation camps and other other forms of detention I think is is one that experts and observers are still puzzling through. It's difficult to say just how many people have been released from the camps. I think we can say with much greater confidence so that the population, which has been put under into prisons after conviction is, is extraordinarily high, certainly compared to other areas of China, and it's likely to remain high for some time to come. So it is plausible that while, you know, while a number of the people who were in indoctrination camps have been released, if not into back to their families then into other forms of confinement or labor. It's also quite probably true that at least a segment of that that camp population has now been put through the judicial system and is serving prison terms. Not the rethink is on their own policy. I think we're still trying to puzzle that out. Quite recently the party did hold a work conference on Xinjiang policy that did begin to offer some signs about not necessarily the moderation of policy but an extension of policies there. I think what we're waiting to see now is how those policies unfold in the next few years, especially if it seems likely there's a change in the regional in the leadership of of Xinjiang in in in the coming period. So I think for the party secretary who presided over the enormous wave of detentions there is getting pretty due for replacement fairly soon. So I think that will be something else we'll be looking at. Thank you now I'm going to ask some of the low Institute members and the like questions which were emailed in. I'm going to try and keep this related to the party itself. But Linda, starting with you from Andrew Bain. Any chance of a woman standing committee member, I think there's one woman Politburo member and to my memory there's not been a member of the standing committee that is the inner circle of the Chinese leadership ever since 1949. Of course, if you look at people coming up through what is a hierarchical system there are very few coming up through the system as well it's really amazing if you think about it. Have you looked at that issue recently do you see any women who are likely to be promoted. I haven't actually looked at the issue in terms of the, the Politburo standing committee, but overall over the past few years. I haven't been looking at it much because it's all bad news for women in politics, particularly at that that high level. One could not have thought this would be possible but things have actually gone backwards. In other words, as we, as we became more modern they became fewer women in those higher levels of course in the past, many of them were probably what we would call token token women or women placed in high positions due to family or other connections in a sort of princely type connections. Nonetheless, it's been very disappointing I think that the current the current regime has has has gone so far backwards. You know this whole thing is kind of unusual. I would never in my life have thought there would be nostalgia for Jung's a man, but there is some of that in some circles. It just just never occurred to me that things would go backwards like this. I've got a question from Michael Wadley for you Steve as an unparry phrasing this is lots of talk in recent years about China exporting its system, I guess, or aspects of it is very hard to export the system. I don't think China is flawless because it's quite unique, but but certainly the conversation about this has changed within China. What do you think China wants to do in promoting its system overseas and does that mean exporting it. I think China is planning to export is particular system to any part of the world. It is not the same as the Cold War era when they were trying to export revolution. What they are trying to do, and I think they do to get very seriously is to make the world save for authoritarianism. Democracy is not the only narrative that democracy is not the only direction of trouble for governments to develop and making the world save for authoritarianism is ultimately to serve the best interests of the Communist Party in China itself. A world safe for authoritarianism is a world that cannot have a color revolution that's spread to China and undermine the authority of the Communist Party. So that is pretty basic. A world that is safe for authoritarianism is also a world that is more welcoming to China playing a more assertive and stronger and influential road in global affairs. It will be a world that will counter the dominance of the Western powers led by the United States. And I think this is really what we are seeing in terms of the Chinese government's objective by his foreign policy, rather than exporting his particular political model for other countries to copy China. After all, from their perspective, the Communist Party and Xi Jinping are pretty extraordinary. Yes, I always. Yeah, when people talk about exporting the Chinese system I often ask them, I mean, could you have an organization department in the Democratic Republic of Congo and obviously the answer is you couldn't and so I don't think it is really exportable as a single unit. Now Chris for you from Nicola Sabadini. She's asked about the serious points of tension within the party we've sort of talked about this but in asking you that I'd like you to think not just about, you know, the sort of binary often gets stuck in about you know Democratic impulse versus the strong party what about within the ruling group within those sorts of people who you know are making the case for the need for a strong party to rule China. What are the points of difference there. That's a very good question Richard I'm not sure I have an easy answer to that so within the ruling elite what are the different points of perhaps debate or difference that that that we may see emerging in some for or more another. You know what they are I do think one point of I wouldn't sort of call it a debate but I think a point of pressure that the party leadership and party elite is going to feel more acutely going into next year and beyond. Is this question of political succession and transformation under Xi Jinping. Assuming that he remains in power for at least another five years, I think almost inevitably within the party elite, even within levels, you know parts of the leadership. There's going to be questions that arise about what is the game plan for China's process of succession and transition going forward. So what we're going to see is those points of pressure. If Xi Jinping doesn't offer a clear roadmap say at the next party Congress, either a particular successor or cohort of potential successors, or at least an idea of where the country is headed in terms of the next transition. I think we're going to see some uncertainty there. And that's why it's a pressure about, you know, what is Xi Jinping going to offer us, you know, what does happen if, you know, if Xi Jinping's health runs into trouble, or there's a need to for considering who the next leadership will be. I think that's one broader issue that's going to come up. I think possibly the other issue that becomes a point of contention, even among among officials who are not necessarily self described liberals. So what is this question about the future of the economy as well. No, it's, it's, it's an enormous country of course 1.4 billion people, each province is is the size of a very large European country. And so each province has its own motivations, its own interests its own demands when it comes to know the priorities for economic development resources to be allocated from the central government. So some of those points of difference also for example between say officials on the Eastern seaboard who are still in some ways very much more wedded to an export oriented form of growth. And those officials from inland provinces of China, you're quite happy to see the central leadership signaling that it's much more focused on domestically driven forms of growth. So that may be another source of potential debate that we see, at least continuing in China in the next few years. Yes, well Linda on that point about the succession issue which I think is a big issue. You know somebody asked me the other day on a webinar to, you know, if I, for me to look into the black box of Chinese politics and say what was going to happen with succession. The problem is when you open the black box it's still dark inside and you can't really see, but but Chris makes an interesting point for people who are critics of she for people who are supporters of she. Do they necessarily want him to stay on in perpetuity and is that a potential source of tension in the years ahead. I think Chris made really good points there I think the question of succession, it has to be watched because even if you love everything that Xi Jinping did, he's he's mortal, and he will not be here forever. There is no plan for when he's no longer here that itself is destabilizing and of course, you know, not not many political parties last as long as a century or dynasties for that matter and succession has always been a really tricky wicket and for those who care about lasting beyond the lifetime of one person. Yes, it is, and it's going to be a big, a big focus, particularly if things remain opaque and unclear for longer than what people find comfortable. And then the other I also agree that in the economy there's some there's some potential fissures, and one of them which cuts in very unusual ways, non traditional ways is the question of okay we're now supposed to be green we're supposed to be green we supposed to use clean energy get away from fossil fuel, save the world climate change you know only China can do it, or, you know during the Trump era it looked like only China could, could make that commitment and not now Biden is back. However, there are some very very serious issues like how, how deeply can the ruling, the ruling team cut into its own power base by telling the coal bosses, hey look you guys, you know, you got to clean up your act, we're going to shut you down. We've actually seen some major coal mines being shut down. And people were wondering oh you know as this is, is this green thing for real, but I went when you start weighing the cost in terms of political support. That's going to be a very very difficult situation, particularly because the rhetoric has been pretty green you know pro green or at least. Aspects of it at this at the top level, it's the implementation that will be a really big problem. And then you know I, I, I, I just worry that the, the lesson learned during the Olympic period is going to have is deeply imprinted and is going to still be there for many many years, which is that nationalism trumps everything. I recall that when the before the summer Olympics Beijing summer Olympics there was a very controversial torch relay that went all over the world and there were protests and against China in many countries. Some of them were for you to bet, you know, Tibetan independence protesters or other kinds of protesters. And I think the Chinese organizers felt almost betrayed in a way they were like, hey wait this, you know, we're trying to be part of the world here and have a good games and why are you beating up on us. But the thing that they learned is that when these protests took place overseas at home public opinion was very united behind the government. And the lesson was, hmm, you know, if there was ever any question about how we want to keep people behind us at home. Nationalism will do it. And I just worry that that will become a very reflexive thing as we go further into this key transitional period. Yes, you make good points I think especially on coal everybody says that even with the 2060 target for carbon neutrality in China that is extremely difficult and we've seen some big public fights in China recently over how to get to that target and how to sort of get coal out of the system. Steve, on the you mentioned on the issue of the Xi Jinping succession you talked about it in passing there, and you seem pretty convinced that he's going to stay for as long as he can which means you really don't expect to see any nod for a successor at the party Congress at the end of next year. You're correct. I don't see a successor being named in the 20th Party Congress. If you were in the in the political and about to be promoted to the political standing committee at the 20th Party Congress, would you like to be named as the successor to Xi Jinping. It's probably just most vulnerable politically vulnerable positions you could get in the current political setup in China, the name successor will be the number one target for problems is the whole thing's been changed previously to be named successor you have been given a five year apprenticeship to become the next top leader. So you are going to be named as the person who potentially is going to be taken down by Xi Jinping because you pose a threat to him. I don't think there's going to be a huge amount of lobbying amongst the seven or so people six or so people who will be named to the political standing committee at the 20th Party Congress to be identified as Xi Jinping's successor. People get that in the 19 party Congress, which was smart enough to make it clear that he was quite happy staying way, where he was in the bullet Bureau, and we'd rather not be promoted to the political standing committee, knowing perfectly if he were given his background and his age and topic expectation if he were in the political standing committee, he would be seen as a potential successor that would make him extremely vulnerable for personal political survival he didn't do that. I think most of your people who will be promoted will be smart enough to learn that lesson. I love that comment on the poison chalice the most dangerous position in China is to be number two to Xi Jinping. So a final question, which is a little bit theoretical but I kind of like this from one of the low Institute members Graham Shaw. He talks about the Minsky moment as applied to Chinese politics. Does stability inevitably breed instability now this is a financial markets theory he's trying to apply it to Chinese politics. I'll ask you first Chris once again I've given you absolutely no notice one minute each from both from all of you on this starting with you Chris does stability breed instability. Luckily Steve has already given half of the answer which is this conundrum which is going to get different Chinese politics of an extraordinary strong incumbent leader Xi Jinping, who is so powerful that it's almost it's going to be very difficult for any potential successor, not merely to emerge but also to amass the authority and influence to become a confident successor. When the day come when Xi Jinping passes on the on the baton.  But there is a kind of a structural issue here that has nothing to do with the horse race about who the particular leader is, but about this contradiction between the power that Xi Jinping is has amassed and institutionalized through the positions of the primary general secretary ship through the Central Military Commission chairmanship, and even in the sense through the presidency. How he's institutionalized all of that power and himself, and the difficulty that creates for them passing on to a successor in some form. I do think it's going to be an extraordinarily difficult navigation effort to smoothly crossover into a smooth into a new leadership. Melinda, do you have any comment as in stability breed instability. In my mind. I think it depends on the toolkit for stability. I think that in general, an obsession with stability is about the most deep destabilizing thing you can have, but I've been, I've been. It's not a simple paradigm and I've been wrong. And I've been wrong regarding a Chinese society and that was Taiwan where I lived in the 1970s, which were dark, dark martial law days. I mean you talk about repression. That was bad. I was a journalist. I was followed at one point I was banned. Lots of things were happening. I was banned. I'll just say one word I won't talk about the mince key moment because I don't know, you know, I'm not very familiar with that but the thing I am familiar with is the jumping wall conundrum and solution. We all thought that here he was the son of John Kasek, you know, of course he's going to be just like his father, iron fist, Leninist type party. It's been a few years of heavy hand, quiet, but you know tension under the surface. And then to his credit mid 80s, he said okay, we're lifting martial law, we're democratizing and lo and behold it actually happened. I would never have thought that that could happen. So he had tools that are and a scale that are not today's China, but it's not impossible for this to happen, even in a even in a Chinese society that started out as a very by the book Leninist style party, which was the guamidong party in the 70s. Stay final word to you very quickly on that point. I would just like to remind us that for all his scenes. Put your towel in his decade of in China was moving the communist party into a very unusual way. He was beginning to accept some element of mothering. And under Xi Jinping, completely reversed that everything has to be done right, and the party will see to it that everything are being done right at his race public expectation. So under Xi Jinping, everything has to get it right. The party must get it right every time, all the time. And the moment comes, when the party state stops to be able to do that, either because of the leadership change or whatever. I think it will be very, very difficult for the party state to try to muddle through and survive that way, it will have to get things right again. Unless China is extraordinarily lucky to suddenly have a successor to Xi Jinping, who will be able to deliver the same kind of strong leadership and making sure the party is getting it right. That may be the moment we have to be watched as a very difficult moment, we won't get much money from that point. Thank you very much and we'll finish on that note. Steve sang from London. Thank you by the way for wearing red I don't know whether you did that deliberately Chris Buckley in Sydney. Thank you so much for being in Beijing and thanks to Andrea Pollard and just got in for getting this event together at short notice. Thank you very much I'm Richard McGregor and I hope you've enjoyed the broadcast.


Next question is from Colton Marshall. What supplements should not be taken together? You know what okay, so I know the question is like basically do they negate like what supplements negate each other's effects? Well, okay, I'll start with that if you're taking an amino acid Specifically to let's say increase nitric oxide, right? Then you probably don't want to take it with protein or with a lot of amino acids because now it kind of loses its effect So like if I take citrulline for example by itself pre-workout to boost nitric oxide But I take it citrulline and protein powder now I've got all these amino acids a lot of them are competing and it's not going to produce You know those kind of facts wouldn't you say the same thing goes for if you're taking Protein powder and then a branched chain amino acid waste the time unless your protein intake is low in which case spiking branched Branched chain amino acids make sense But yeah, I think generally speaking branched amino acids are a waste of money again unless your protein intake is below that high amount Now here's what you really should pay attention to and this is what I this is the lesson that I've learned probably a handful of times What you don't want to do is combine supplements that Augment each other because sometimes one plus one equals five and what I mean by that is like if I combine Caffeine and caffeine like if I take a hundred milligrams caffeine a hundred milligrams caffeine Then the effect I'm gonna get is 200 milligrams caffeine That doesn't always work with stimulants sometimes you take a hundred milligrams caffeine and a little bit of ephedra or Yo hembi or sinifrin and it's not like that They amplify each other and you get this kind of dangerous runaway, you know stimulant effect So that would be the big thing I would say pay attention to don't combine stimulants unless you really know what you're doing because The additive effects can be kind of nasty and a bit, you know dangerous What about some of these supplements that are labeled as a fat burner and then a muscle builder? Oh I hear what you're saying On a calorie surplus, right? I just I imagine that that's where this question is probably coming from I doubt it's down to the Individual chemical level where you're going and it's probably more generic like could I take a muscle builder supplement and a fat loss? Supplement at the same time that seems like a more common question that you would yeah What's funny about that is the their muscle builder fat loss supplements. Do they compete with each other not really? But your diet and your training or what make the biggest difference you take all the fat burners you want you're in a calorie surplus It's good to complete Waste of time, you know the thing that's really interesting the same goes for a muscle bill You could be taking all the muscle bill or something as you want But if you're in a caloric deficit, you can have a hell of a time totally and it can happen You know what you know what what this makes me think of is and this is the supplement industry is really good at this is Any they still do this They'll be like a supplement that's like for the pump or for muscle building or for libido or for sleep And you'll turn around the label and it has everything you've ever read about that's supposed to help for that particular thing And you'll look at it and be like oh, this is for sleep And they'd be like tryptophan Melatonin Theanine Gabba and you're like oh this has everything that means it must be more effective What typically what's typically happening there is that none of those things have efficacious doses They just have a tiny bit of everything in there To get or they'll have efficacious dose of one thing like three milligrams of melatonin and everything else is like this tiny amount Yeah, so you know what you want to do is you want to look at efficacious doses the right form and then that's the thing you pay attention to not just whether or not it's listed like I remember in the 90s there was a supplement called hot stuff and It was popular because Said nice and probably loaded in it.  Hello good.  I'm just sitting here and my armpits are sweating right now I've done anything this stuff is really working Yeah, with a kicker with supplements pre-workout the pre-workout space figure this out If we could put something in there the person can feel yeah, even if it doesn't do anything for the goal Long as they could feel it. We're gonna sell a lot. So beta alanine although. There's some benefit It makes your skin tingle so that kind of makes it feel like it's our itchy something's working By the way, you know, they I wouldn't be surprised if they borrowed that from other markets like toothpaste and shampoo Oh, definitely shampoo. I mean all those like dandruff commercials like I can tangle. It's working Yeah, or do you know that the fact that you know, it's crazy is I'm aware of that And it still works on me.  It's more effective But how crazy the psychology of that it's I know it and yet I still want it Do you want lessons still works for me? Would you want to use soap that didn't lather like what if it just like Right, and then you're interested right and that's it That's another example that which by the way when you do some of this like organic all-natural soap You'll notice it doesn't lather up the same and so you feel like you're like God I've been scrubbing my arm for like three minutes now. It's not lathering up You know, what's a good I'll tell you what a good good interesting combinations Here's a good a classic example Theanine is an amino acid that's been shown to cause a calming effect in the body right caffeine is a Stimulant I love that together when you introduced us. Well now you you think to yourself well That would be counteracting but what happens is the theanine actually reduces the negative effects of caffeine But doesn't take away the energy producing effects. So what you get from it is this really smooth You know focus that just feels like the high without less jittery. Yeah, yes You can do this with ashwagandha. Does that really well with caffeine?


That's the Bronx bubble, man. That's the one that the Yankees made famous. The late great George Steinbrenner wouldn't let his team take the field without a Yankee starter jacket. And then also too, how can you go wrong with the gray? If you find pictures of Joe Tory, he was rocking the gray Yankee's jacket. Starter has been a part of all American major sports and it's part of the fabric of making fandom fashionable. It wasn't before the brand, so we're just continuing the legacy.


All right, you guys we have for this hot oil treatment. I love very juice. I'm going to be putting in a spray bottle We have sweet almond oil, olive oil, vinaigrette oil and Then we have Jamaican black castor oil. I'm going to be put it in the applicator jar. Hey you guys So I'm back today with a new hair related video. I know it's well overdue if you hear anything My laundry room is possessed Oh, you guys saw the video clip of the different hair oils that I'm going to be using for this pre-poof slash hot oil treatment And I did put it in this applicator jar. There's some hair here I put it in this applicator jar to make it easier.  We have olive vera juice in the spray bottle here My hair is very old. I don't know how old it is But she old and she dirty. I did this Victorian like roll-up for a long time child.  Oh, that's cute you guys as I am taking down my hair I'm gonna go over some of the many benefits of a hot oil treatment now when I was growing up My mother used to do a hot oil treatment on a monthly basis since I've been natural It's something that I typically don't do as much And I think it's because I often use oil to help seal in the moisture of my hair But nonetheless hot oil treatments are great in helping to prevent split ends and frizz It also helps with dandruff dry scalp and makes your hair more manageable. Okay, because it it's It can make your hair softer depending on the type of oils you are using Okay, it helps to soothe the scalp it promotes hair growth and most importantly It helps with providing moisture in breakage So it's something that I have been doing for the past two or three washes and I do Use it as a pre-poo I typically would not do this. However, I'm trying to speed up time when it comes with taking care of my hair I like most of us do So I'm just gonna even though this footage is fast forward I am taking my time to unwrap on my hair because my hair is dry And I want to prevent as much breakage as possible Okay, so now I'm spraying my hair with the a la vera juice. I absolutely love a la vera juice You guys it is great for helping to detangle your hair I'm going to slightly finger detangle the hair and then I'm going to go in with the oil Now depending on the types of oils It really my opinion you at least need to have olive oil in your oil mixture I will be having everything listed below in the description box and I do apply the oil to the ends of my hair Smoothing it down from root to shaft.  Are you guys? Let's check this out Normally I would have set up underneath um The dryer but since I'm going to be blow drying my hair Do a flat iron sometime. I don't know probably just blow blow it out Let's see what one of these look like. Okay. It feels good already feeling good Throw it out the way Yeah, this feels really good you guys my hair has this Cottony like texture. Look at the close-up. It has a cottony like feeling texture to it. So Yes, it feels really good. So all I'm going to do at this point is jump in the shower And I'm going to wash my hair like I normally do and I I typically do wash my hair in twists I know sometimes when I do my wash day videos my hair is loose girl. That's just for y'all But I typically do wash my hair in twists. So That is it everyone try this out. I've been doing this for the past um three two or three washes Yeah, and so it's just Something else I've been doing. I normally don't even do hot oil treatments to be quite honest But it's just something I've been doing for the past two washes and my hair has been feeling really good since then Okay, thank you so much for watching. Take care. Bye


You need to find this portal as fast as possible, or you might never leave this backroom's level. Hey y'all, Broogly here, and today I'm gonna be explaining one of the most incredible backroom's levels of all time, level 234. This one is extremely insane, and it's probably the craziest one I've done in a hot minute. It's pretty much a giant intergalactic prison that is collided with the backrooms somehow. Anyways, I hope you enjoy it, I think it will. Let's dive right into it, shall we? So the entry starts with a warning from the author. Warning, warning, warning. Hey, I wonder if there's a warning. This is a top priority message. Glitches in no clipping have resulted in a disproportionate number of people being sent to a particular location on level 234. So yeah, pretty much the entire no clipping part of the backrooms has been glitching, and it's caused a ton of people to be sent to this level. It's pretty weird, but it gets weirder. So this level is a very newly discovered one, but we do have a pretty basic description of what it looks like. It's been described as a jigsaw puzzle of ecosystems that have been glued together with liminal overload, which in simple terms means that there's a bunch of environments that have been melted together, and they all feel familiar or liminal in some way. Some people have described this level as being horribly wrong, and just feeling off in your brain.  This level is actually thought to be a multiversal prison of some kind. I mentioned it earlier, but you'll see what I fully mean in a second. On the surface of the level, the landscape is actually pretty flat, and you might see thorny fields and deserts and ever-expanding desert-type places, along with some old-looking forests that are empty and decaying and lakes that are shallow. There's also a bunch of very weirdly-shaped trees. Just think of the strangest environments that you can imagine, and then shove them all together, and that's what this level looks like. Around the level, there are also huge domes. There are glass domes, and they can just barely be seen through, and it's thought that you can just slightly see something moving around inside of the domes. Spoiler alert, there's definitely something inside the domes. There's also thought to be different levels of existence inside and under the level. These planes of existence were supposedly created in order to keep dangerous criminals and entities across the multiverse and universes together and contained. And it just so happens that the level 234 underground areas are broken off parts of those planes of existences. So pretty much there was like this prison somewhere in the universe, and it seemed to break off and melt together with the back rooms. These planes of existence are subterranean and underground, and they're all classified as Class Omega. The basic understanding of these places is that they exist outside of normal space and time, which might be what makes up the back rooms too, but the entire level 234 is made up of one outside layer on the surface, and three subterranean layers underground. The surface part is where the prisoners and entities are mainly kept in their cells.  The first underground layer is where the security systems for the surface cells is located, and it looks like these weird square area, almost like the inside of a computer, but way bigger. The second underground part is a really anomalous zone that creates all the nourishment and food and necessities for the inmates that are kept in the glass and square prisons on the surface. It does this by an unknown means. We have no idea how it works, but whatever. It's the back rooms. The deepest underground part is where all the weird engines on this level come from.  So there are actually also some level exclusive entities that are extremely unique to this level. Of course, since it's an intergalactic prison, I would say so. The first to see has been nicknamed the Murr, and they're pretty much a race of pure gold rings that levitate around the level and seem to have psychic abilities somehow, and they can move things with their mind. They seem to have a spiritual existence and are completely sentient, and there's only about nine of them that have been seen to control the entire level. No one knows who created them, or if they created the level. We don't know. They're pretty cool though. Another entity found in the cells of the level are these werewolf things called the Vrags. These creatures are just huge upright cryptids with darkish gray fur. They're supposed to be really good hunters, and most of them are apparently bounty hunters. I don't know how we know that, but we do. Then there's an entity that has no name in English, and each time someone tries to say the original name, they start choking and going crazy for a little bit. They seem to be around four and a half feet tall, or 138 centimeters, and they have huge wings. On top of that, they're very aggressive, and they can actually go invisible for a short amount of time to hunt prey. Some people call them demons, so that's what they normally go by. I'm glad these things are locked up in cages. Another creature locked up here is called the Tatats, which are just tall, frog-looking, ninja turtle-type things with poisonous skin. And the last type of creatures that have been seen here on this level are called alocks, or shapeshifters. So these entities are capable of literally replicating human beings to look just like them, but they aren't really biological in a way. They're kind of just a mist that can form into humanoids. No one knows why they exist, what their purpose is, or what they want to do, but they're locked up in this prison, so they must be dangerous. If you get sent to this level, you're gonna need to find an exit as fast as possible. That way you make it out unscathed and alive, or you might end up in a prison cell. And exit, you can find a portal like this on the surface layer that will send you out to another one, but there are also some other exits as well. Check the link in the description if you want to see all of them. So a wanderer can only enter this level by no clipping in general. Like you just can no clip anywhere in the back rooms, and you might be sent here because it's been really glitchy and no one knows why it's happening or how this level messes up the no clipping thing, but it seems like people don't have a choice when they're sent here. So what do you think about this level? Let me know in the comments below who runs the prison, who created it, what galaxy it's from, and how it interconnected with the back rooms. I think it fits pretty well inside the lore, and I think it's really insane, but I'm interested to see what you all think. That's it for the video. Thank you so much for watching. Check the links below for anything you need, like my vlog channel, which is my second channel. I vlog on there my day to day life, that kind of deal. We get personal over there. If you want more, just open side of me, check that channel. Also comment below any ideas you have for videos. I'm open to anything. I love and appreciate all of you. Thank you so much for your support. The channel's just growing absurdly fast. We're literally on the road to 1 million subscribers. I can't even believe I'm saying that, but we are. Thank you so much for everything. I love you, and I will see you in the next video. Peace. And if you are still watching this video, comment the keyword 234brogli. That way I know that you're a real one for watching until the end. And if you are, like I said, thank you so much. You all mean the most to me, and I'm just super glad I get to talk about this amazing creepypasta that we have been given. Like I said earlier just now, I want to get this channel to a million subscribers by the end of the year. And I would also like to get my second channel, my vlog channel, to 100K. That would mean a lot. And if you do want to support me, that's the best way to do that. Thank you so much for everything, and I'll see you later.