To life to life la hayam la hayam la hayam to life Make your good fortune never come here to whatever Drink lahoyum. I'm gonna do the whole song don't you?  Fermented in the butts of monks.  Sorry That'd be a fun name for a drink. It's one of the only things.  No, but in your last hit our senior lesson time Anyways, but uh read this all I'll be those Ragdabari played by Urshad Khan on Surbhaar the time of this raga is midnight from 12 p.m. The 3 a.m. The third Prahar of the night Dabari is a grave raga Played deep into the night considered to be one of the more difficult to master and with the potential for profound emotional impact Jorang Jala Jor is a formal section of composition in the long elaboration a lap of a raga that forms the beginning of a performance It comes after a lap and precedes Jala the climax Jor is the instrumental equivalent of Namfum in the Drupal vocal style of Indian music both have a simple pulse, but no well-defined rhythmic cycle Jala is a term in Hindustani classical music which denotes the fast-paced conclusions of classical compositions a raga It's often characterized by the overwhelming of the melodic component by the rhythmic component This is sometimes affected by the rapid striking together of the jikari between notes. Thank you for that Elaboration yes, and it's a debar festival thing. So it's gonna be incredible. I hope this is gonna be great I hope one day we are actually able to go to this gets me to these are always some of our favorite videos They reach out to us one year, but that was right. It's right before it started right before COVID Hopefully one day good shot of next year if they do it a really good shot. We could go next year. That'd be great I would love to me. Yeah, absolutely. Here we go. I was just I was literally just gonna do that, too Yeah I Bless you Still leave that really makes you question your talent. I Know we have different talents, but not damn and he was doing that thing Like Zaki who saying does only like legends of their crafts do where they're like they're doing something incredible And they're just like it looked like they're thinking about what they're gonna have for lunch seriously This hand was a blur Yeah, like the hurt the hurts weren't fast enough.  It'll be good and what what In and guitar strings there's gauges for strings and You can get like gauge medium gauge heavy gauge and it depends on what you want for the sound of the guitar But also how flexible you want the strings to be so Lighter gauge strings are easier to bend heavy gauge strings are really hard to bend and the harder on the fingers Those look like they're lighter gauge. I don't know if there's just a one-size-fits-all for that kind of instrument but what it is but What are you doing? You're doing that because it happens a lot with guitar solos. What happens if you're playing you break a string Yeah, I wonder I had it. I just That is they have an extra one That's just otherworldly He's craftsmanship and artist absolutely amazing all the gauge to bars are always amazing and I didn't realize how much I was being I Like about a word controlled Because whenever he shifted I realized I shifted like when he was going really Phonetically and then he'd stop and it would breathe for a second. I found myself almost physically going. Oh Like I was on a ride. Yeah, and the rollercoaster slows down for a second. It's like man. Totally Yeah, he grabbed it didn't seem like it was just not at all video of watching somebody play sitar that was That was amazing. Yeah, absolutely incredible. Please let us know more videos from him That we can react to because he was playing the sitar We've heard many videos with sitar playing and was that that looked like a different kind of sitar than One that we've seen robin's car and it sounded different than any other It didn't look the strings had similarities to it It was like there were the smaller strings that are constantly making the chord sound that's resonant throughout with soloing things and For lack of a better term the fret that's up so high that That all looked the same, but there was a lot about it that didn't look like a sitar Yeah, um, I've always wanted to do maybe I'll get to it at some point I obviously was put off because of covet but I I wanted to find a sitar player here Yes, I could kind of do like a basic like a basic lesson like just just show us idiots Like what what to do? Yeah, exactly just and like you know like a 15 20 minute video show us What to do kind of like the cricket video? Yeah, but obviously I wanted to do that, but obviously cove it happened and it's Stuck around we talked about that a while ago, but uh, maybe I'll try to reach out again to Well and for singing, you know, I know he's probably got nothing else to do Just call up my hesh kale asking me if he'll teach us some vocal lessons.


Chapter 5.1 of the 9-11 Commission Report. Al Qaeda Ames at the American Homeland 5.1 Terrorist Entrepreneurs By early 1999, Al Qaeda was already a potent adversary of the United States. Menladen and his chief of operations, Abu Hafz Al-Mazari, also known as Muhammad Atef, occupied undisputed leadership positions atop Al Qaeda's organizational structure. Within this structure, Al Qaeda's worldwide terrorist operations relied heavily on the ideas and work of enterprising and strong willed field commanders who enjoyed considerable autonomy. To understand how the organization actually worked and to introduce the origins of the 9-11 plot, we briefly examined three of these subordinate commanders, Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, KSM, Ridwan Issamuddin, better known as Humbali, and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri. We will devote the most attention to Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, the chief manager of the plane's operation. Detainee Interrogation Reports Chapters 5 and 7 rely heavily on information obtained from captured Al Qaeda members. A number of these detainees have firsthand knowledge of the 9-11 plot. Assessing the truth of statements by these witnesses, sworn enemies of the United States, is challenging. Our access to them has been limited to the review of intelligence reports based on communications received from the locations where the actual interrogations take place. We submitted questions for use in the interrogations, but had no control over whether, when, or how questions of particular interest would be asked. Nor were we allowed to talk to the interrogators so that we could better judge the credibility of the detainees and clarify ambiguities in the reporting. We were told that our request might disrupt the sensitive interrogation process. We have nonetheless decided to include information from captured 9-11 conspirators and Al Qaeda members in our report. We have evaluated their statements carefully and have attempted to corroborate them with documents and statements of others. In this report, we indicate where such statements provide the foundation for our narrative. We have been authorized to identify by name only 10 detainees whose custody has been confirmed officially by the U.S. government. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed No one exemplifies the model of the terrorist entrepreneur more clearly than Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the principal architect of the 9-11 attacks. KSM followed a rather tortuous path to his eventual membership in Al Qaeda. Highly educated and equally comfortable in a government office or a terrorist safe house, KSM applied his imagination, technical aptitude, and managerial skills to hatching and planning an extraordinary array of terrorist schemes. These ideas included conventional car bombing, political assassination, aircraft bombing, hijacking, reservoir poisoning, and ultimately the use of aircraft as missiles guided by suicide operatives. Like his nephew, Ramzi Yousef, three years KSM's junior, KSM grew up in Kuwait, but traces his ethnic lineage to the Balakistan region straddling Iran and Pakistan. Raised in a religious family, KSM claims to have joined the Muslim Brotherhood at age 16 and to have become enamored of violent jihad at youth camps in the desert. In 1983, following his graduation from secondary school, KSM left Kuwait to enroll at Chowen College, a small Baptist school in Murfreesboro, North Carolina. After a semester at Chowen, KSM transferred to North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University in Greensboro, which he attended with Yousef's brother, another future Al Qaeda member. KSM earned a degree in mechanical engineering in December 1986. Although he apparently did not attract attention for extreme Islamist beliefs or activities while in the United States, KSM plunged into the anti-Soviet Afghan jihad soon after graduating from college. Visiting Pakistan for the first time in early 1987, he traveled to Peshawar where his brother Zahid introduced him to the famous Afghan Mujahid, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, head of the Hezbollahat El-Islami Islamic Union party. Sayyaf became KSM's mentor and provided KSM with military training at Sayyaf's Sada camp. KSM claims he then fought the Soviets and remained at the front for three months before being summoned to perform administrative duties for Abdullah Azam. KSM next took a job working for an electronics firm that catered to the communications needs of Afghan groups, where he learned about drills used to excavate caves in Afghanistan. Between 1988 and 1992, KSM helped run a non-governmental organization, NGO, and Peshawar in Jalalabad. Sponsored by Sayyaf, it was designed to aid young Afghan Mujahideen. In 1992, KSM spent some time fighting alongside the Mujahideen in Bosnia and supporting that effort with financial donations. After returning briefly to Pakistan, he moved his family to Qatar at the suggestion of the former Minister of Islamic Affairs of Qatar, Sheikh Abdullah bin Khalid bin Hamad al-Thani. KSM took a position in Qatar as Project Engineer with the Qatari Minister of Electricity and Water. Although he engaged in extensive international travel during his tenure at the ministry, much of it in furtherance of terrorist activity. KSM would hold his position there until early 1996, when he fled to Pakistan to avoid capture by U.S. authorities. KSM first came to the attention of U.S. law enforcement as a result of his cameo role in the First World Trade Center bombing. According to KSM, he learned of Ramzi Yousef's intention to launch an attack inside the United States in 1991 or 1992, when Yousef was receiving explosives training in Afghanistan. During the fall of 1992, while Yousef was building the bomb he would use in that attack, KSM and Yousef had numerous telephone conversations during which Yousef discussed his progress and sought additional funding. On November 3, 1992, KSM wired $660 from Qatar to the bank account of Yousef's co-conspirator, Muhammad Salama. KSM does not appear to have contributed any more substantially to this operation. Yousef's instant notoriety as the mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing inspired KSM to become involved in planning attacks against the United States. By his own account, KSM's animus toward the United States stemmed not from his experiences there as a student, but rather from his violent disagreement with U.S. foreign policy favoring Israel. In 1994, KSM accompanied Yousef to the Philippines, and the two of them began planning what is now known as the Manila Air or Bojenka Plot, the intended bombing of 12 U.S. commercial jumbo jets over the Pacific during a two-day span. This marked the first time KSM took part in the actual planning of a terrorist operation. While sharing an apartment in Manila during the summer of 1994, he and Yousef acquired chemicals and other materials necessary to construct bombs and timers. They also cased target flights to Hong Kong and Seoul that would have onward legs to the United States. During the same period, KSM and Yousef also developed plans to assassinate President Clinton during his November 1994 trip to Manila and to bomb U.S.-bound cargo carriers by smuggling jackets containing nitrocellulose on board. KSM left the Philippines in September 1994 and met up with Yousef and Karachi following their casing flights. There they enlisted Wali Khan Amin Shah, also known as Usama Asmuri, in the Manila Air Plot. During the fall of 1994, Yousef returned to Manila and successfully tested the digital watch timer he had invented, bombing a movie theater and a Philippine Airlines flight en route to Tokyo. The plot unraveled after the Philippine authorities discovered Yousef's bomb-making operation in Manila, but by that time KSM was safely back at his government job in Qatar. Yousef attempted to follow through on the cargo carriers plan, but he was arrested in Islamabad by Pakistani authorities on February 7, 1995 after an accomplice turned him in. KSM continued to travel among the worldwide jihadist community after Yousef's arrest, visiting the Sudan, Yemen, Malaysia, and Brazil in 1995. No clear evidence connects him to terrorist activities in those locations. While in Sudan he reportedly failed in his attempt to meet with Bin Laden, but KSM did see Atef who gave him a contact in Brazil. In January 1996, well aware that U.S. authorities were chasing him, he left Qatar for good and fled to Afghanistan, where he renewed his relationship with Rasul Sayef. Just as KSM was re-establishing himself in Afghanistan in mid-1996, Bin Laden and his colleagues were also completing their migration from Sudan. Through Atef, KSM arranged a meeting with Bin Laden and Torah Bora, a mountainous redoubt from the Afghan war days. At the meeting KSM presented the Al Qaeda leader with a menu of ideas for terrorist operations. According to KSM, this meeting was the first time he had seen Bin Laden since 1989. Although they had fought together in 1987, Bin Laden and KSM did not yet enjoy an especially close working relationship. Indeed, KSM has acknowledged that Bin Laden likely agreed to meet with him because of the renown of his nephew Yousef. At the meeting, KSM briefed Bin Laden and Atef on the First World Trade Center bombing, the Manila air plot, the cargo carriers plan, and other activities pursued by KSM and his colleagues in the Philippines. KSM also presented a proposal for an operation that would involve training pilots who would crash planes into buildings in the United States. This proposal eventually would become the 9-11 operation. KSM knew that the successful staging of such an attack would require personnel, money, and logistical support that only an extensive and well-funded organization like Al Qaeda could provide. He thought the operation might appeal to Bin Laden, who had a long record of denouncing the United States. From KSM's perspective, Bin Laden was in the process of consolidating his new position in Afghanistan while hearing out others' ideas and had not yet settled on an agenda for future anti-U.S. operations. At the meeting, Bin Laden listened to KSM's ideas without much comment, but did ask KSM formally to join Al Qaeda and move his family to Afghanistan. KSM declined. He preferred to remain independent and retain the option of working with other Mujahideen groups still operating in Afghanistan, including the group led by his old mentor Syef. Syef was close to Ahmed Shah Masoud, the leader of the Northern Alliance. Therefore, working with him might be a problem for KSM because Bin Laden was building ties to the rival Taliban. After meeting with Bin Laden, KSM says he journeyed onward to India, Indonesia, and Malaysia, where he met with Jamal Islamayah's Humbali. Humbali was an Indonesian veteran of the Afghan war looking to expand the Jihad into Southeast Asia. In Iran, KSM rejoined his family and arranged to move them to Karachi. He claims to have relocated by January 1997. After settling his family in Karachi, KSM tried to join the Mujahideen leader, Ibn al-Qaqab in Chechnya. Unable to travel through Azerbaijan, KSM returned to Karachi and then to Afghanistan to renew contacts with Bin Laden and his colleagues. Though KSM may not have been a member of Al Qaeda at this time, he admits traveling frequently between Pakistan and Afghanistan in 1997 and the first half of 1998, visiting Bin Laden and cultivating relationships with his lieutenants, Atif and Saif Al-Adal by assisting them with computer and media projects. According to KSM, the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es-Salam marked a watershed in the evolution of the 9-11 plot. KSM claims these bombings convinced him that Bin Laden was truly committed to attacking the United States. He continued to make himself useful, collecting news articles and helping other Al Qaeda members with their outdated computer equipment. Bin Laden, apparently at Atif's urging, finally decided to give KSM the green light for the 9-11 operation sometime in late 1998 or early 1999. KSM then accepted Bin Laden's standing invitation to move to Kandahar and work directly with Al Qaeda. In addition to supervising the planning and preparations for the 9-11 operation, KSM worked with and eventually led Al Qaeda's media committee.  At this point, late 1998 to early 1999, planning for the 9-11 operation began in earnest. Yet, while the 9-11 project occupied the bulk of KSM's attention, he continued to consider other possibilities for terrorist attacks. For example, he sent Al Qaeda operative Issa Albertani to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, to learn about the Jihad in Southeast Asia from Humbali. Thereafter, KSM claims, at Bin Laden's direction in early 2001, he sent Bretani to the United States to case potential economic and Jewish targets in New York City. Furthermore, during the summer of 2001, KSM approached Bin Laden with the idea of recruiting a Saudi Arabian Air Force pilot to commandeer a Saudi fighter jet and attack the Israeli city of Alat. Bin Laden reportedly liked this proposal, but he instructed KSM to concentrate on the 9-11 operation first. Similarly, KSM's proposals to ATEF around this same time for attacks in Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Maldives were never executed, although Humbali's Jemaah-Islamaya operatives did some casing of possible targets. KSM appears to have been popular among the Al Qaeda rank and file. He was reportedly regarded as an effective leader, especially after the 9-11 attacks. Co-workers describe him as an intelligent, efficient, and even-tempered manager who approached his projects with a single-minded dedication that he expected his colleagues to share. Al Qaeda associate Abou Zubaita has expressed more qualified admiration for KSM's innate creativity, emphasizing instead his ability to incorporate the improvements suggested by others. Nasheri has been similarly measured, observing that although KSM floated many general ideas for attacks, he rarely conceived a specific operation himself. Perhaps these estimates reflect a touch of jealousy. In any case, KSM was plainly a capable coordinator, having had years to hone his skills and build relationships. Humbali Al Qaeda's success in fostering terrorism in Southeast Asia stems largely from its close relationship with Jemaah-Islamaya, J.I. In that relationship, Humbali became the key coordinator. Born and educated in Indonesia, Humbali moved to Malaysia in the early 1980s to find work. There he claims to have become a follower of the Islamist extremist teachings of various clerics, including one named Abdullah Sunkar. Sunkar first inspired Humbali to share the vision of establishing a radical Islamist regime in Southeast Asia, then furthered Humbali's instruction in Jihad by sending him to Afghanistan in 1986. After undergoing training at Rasul Sayef's Sada camp, where KSM would later train, Humbali fought against the Soviets. He eventually returned to Malaysia after 18 months in Afghanistan. By 1998, Humbali would assume responsibility for the Malaysia-Singapore region within Sunkar's newly formed terrorist organization, the J.I. Also by 1998, Sunkar and J.I. spiritual leader Abu Bakr Bashir had accepted bin Laden's offer to ally J.I. with Al Qaeda in waging war against Christians and Jews. Humbali met with KSM and Karachi to arrange for J.I. members to receive training in Afghanistan at Al Qaeda's camps. In addition to his close working relationship with KSM, Humbali soon began dealing with Atef as well. Al Qaeda began funding J.I.'s increasingly ambitious terrorist plans, which Atef and KSM sought to expand. Under this arrangement, J.I. would perform the necessary casing activities and locate bomb making materials and other supplies. Al Qaeda would underwrite operations, provide bomb making expertise, and deliver suicide operatives. The Al Qaeda-J.I. partnership yielded a number of proposals that would marry Al Qaeda's financial and technical strengths with J.I.'s access to materials and local operatives. Here, Humbali played the critical role of coordinator as he distributed Al Qaeda funds earmarked for the joint operations. In one especially notable example, Atef turned to Humbali when Al Qaeda needed a scientist to take over its biological weapons program. Humbali obliged by introducing a U.S. educated J.I. member, Yazid Sufett, to Aiman El-Zawahiri in Kandahar. In 2001, Sufett would spend several months attempting to cultivate anthrax for Al Qaeda in a laboratory he helped set up near the Kandahar airport. Humbali did not originally orient J.I.'s operations toward attacking the United States, but his involvement with Al Qaeda appears to have inspired him to pursue American targets. KSM and his post-capture interrogations has taken credit for this shift, claiming to have urged the J.I. operations chief to concentrate on attacks designed to hurt the U.S. economy. Humbali's newfound interest in striking against the United States manifested itself in a spate of terrorist plans. Fortunately, none came to fruition. In addition to staging actual terrorist attacks in partnership with Al Qaeda, Humbali and J.I. assisted Al Qaeda operatives passing through Kuala Lumpur. One important occasion was in December 1999 through January 2000. Humbali accommodated KSM's request to help several veterans whom KSM had just finished training in Karachi. They included Tafiq bin Atash, also known as Qalad, who later would help bomb the USS Coal, and future 9-11 hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Madar. Humbali arranged lodging for them and helped them purchase airline tickets for their onward travel. Later that year, Humbali and his crew would provide accommodations and other assistance, including information on flight schools and help in acquiring ammonium nitrate, for Zarkarius Masawi, an Al Qaeda operative sent to Malaysia by ATEF and KSM. Humbali used bin Laden's Afghan facilities as a training ground for J.I. recruits. Though he had a close relationship with ATEF and KSM, he maintained J.I.'s institutional independence from Al Qaeda. Humbali insists that he did not discuss operations with bin Laden or swear allegiance to him, having already given such a pledge of loyalty to Bashir, Sungar's successor as J.I. leader. Thus, like any powerful bureaucrat defending his domain, Humbali objected when Al Qaeda leadership tried to assign J.I. members to terrorist projects without notifying him. Abid al-Rahim al-Nashiri. KSM and Humbali both decided to join forces with Al Qaeda because their terrorist aspirations required the money and manpower that only a robust organization like Al Qaeda could supply. On the other hand, Abid al-Rahim al-Nashiri, the mastermind of the coal bombing and the eventual head of Al Qaeda operations in the Arabian Peninsula, appears to have originally been recruited to his career as a terrorist by bin Laden himself. Having already participated in the Afghan Jihad, Nashiri accompanied a group of some 30 Mujahideen in pursuit of Jihad in Tajikistan in 1996. When serious fighting failed to materialize, the group traveled to Jalalabad and encountered bin Laden, who had recently returned from Sudan. Bin Laden addressed them at length, urging the group to join him in a Jihad against the Americans. Although all were urged to swear loyalty to bin Laden, many, including Nashiri, found the notion distasteful and refused. After several days of indoctrination that included a barrage of news clippings and television documentaries, Nashiri left Afghanistan, first returning to his native Saudi Arabia and then visiting his home in Yemen. There, he says, the idea for his first terrorist operation took shape as he noticed many U.S. and other foreign ships plying the waters along the southwest coast of Yemen. Nashiri returned to Afghanistan, probably in 1997, primarily to check on relatives fighting there and also to learn about the Taliban. He again encountered bin Laden, still recruiting for the coming battle with the United States. Nashiri pursued a more conventional military Jihad, joining the Taliban forces in their fight against Ahmed Massoud's Northern Alliance and shuttling back and forth between the front and Kandahar, where he would see bin Laden and meet with other Mujahideen. During this period, Nashiri also led a plot to smuggle four Russian-made anti-tank missiles into Saudi Arabia from Yemen in early 1998 and helped an embassy bombing operative obtain a Yemeni passport. At some point, Nashiri joined al-Qaeda. His cousin, Jihad Muhammad Ali al-Makai, also known as Azam, was a suicide bomber for the Nairobi attack. Nashiri traveled between Yemen and Afghanistan. In late 1998, Nashiri proposed mounting an attack against a U.S. vessel. Bin Laden approved. He directed Nashiri to start the planning and send operatives to Yemen, and he later provided money. Nashiri reported directly to bin Laden, the only other person who, according to Nashiri, knew all the details of the operation. When Nashiri had difficulty finding U.S. naval vessels to attack along the western coast of Yemen, bin Laden reportedly instructed him to case the port of Aden on the southern coast instead. The eventual result was an attempted attack on the USS the Sullivan's in January 2000, and the successful attack in October 2000 on the USS Cole. Nashiri's success brought him instant status within al-Qaeda. He later was recognized as the chief of al-Qaeda operations in and around the Arabian peninsula. While Nashiri continued to consult bin Laden on the planning of subsequent terrorist projects, he retained discretion in selecting operatives and devising attacks. In the two years between the coal bombing and Nashiri's capture, he was supervised several more proposed operations for al-Qaeda. The October 6, 2002 bombing of the French tanker Limburg and the Gulf of Aden also was Nashiri's handiwork. Although bin Laden urged Nashiri to continue plotting strikes against U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf, Nashiri maintains that he actually delayed one of these projects because of security concerns. Those concerns, it seems, were well placed as Nashiri's November 2002 capture in the United Arab Emirates finally ended his career as a terrorist. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to find out how you can volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Leanne Howlett. The 9-11 Commission Report, Chapter 5.2. The Plains Operation According to KSM, he started to think about attacking the United States after Yusef returned to Pakistan following the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Like Yusef, KSM reasoned he could best influence U.S. policy by targeting the country's economy. KSM and Yusef reportedly brainstormed together about what drove the U.S. economy. New York, which KSM considered the economic capital of the United States, therefore became the primary target. For similar reasons, California also became a target for KSM. KSM claims that the earlier bombing of the World Trade Center taught him that bombs and explosives could be problematic and that he needed to graduate to a more novel form of attack. He maintains that he and Yusef began thinking about using aircraft as weapons while working on the Manila Air Bojenka plot and speculated about striking the World Trade Center and CIA headquarters as early as 1995. Certainly KSM was not alone in contemplating new kinds of terrorist operations. A study reportedly conducted by Atef, while he and Bin Laden were still in Sudan, concluded that traditional terrorist hijacking operations did not fit the needs of Al Qaeda because such hijackings were used to negotiate the release of prisoners rather than to inflict mass casualties. The study is said to have considered the feasibility of hijacking planes and blowing them up in flight, paralleling the Bojenka concept. Such a study, if it actually existed, yields significant insight into the thinking of Al Qaeda's leaders. One, they rejected hijackings aimed at gaining the release of imprisoned comrades as too complex because Al Qaeda had no friendly countries in which to land a plane and then negotiate. Two, they considered the bombing of commercial flights in midair as carried out against Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, a promising means to inflict massive casualties. And three, they did not yet consider using hijacked aircraft as weapons against other targets. KSM has insisted to his interrogators that he always contemplated hijacking and crashing large commercial aircraft. Indeed, KSM describes a grandiose original plan, a total of ten aircraft to be hijacked, nine of which would crash into targets on both coasts. They included those eventually hit on September 11th, plus CIA and FBI headquarters, nuclear power plants, and the tallest buildings in California and the state of Washington. KSM himself was to land the tenth plane at a U.S. airport, and after killing all adult male passengers on board and alerting the media, deliver a speech excoriating U.S. support for Israel, the Philippines, and repressive governments in the Arab world. Beyond KSM's rationalizations about targeting the U.S. economy, this vision gives a better glimpse of his true ambitions. This is theater, a spectacle of destruction with KSM as a self-cast star, the super-terrorist. KSM concedes that this proposal received a lukewarm response from Al Qaeda leaders, skeptical of its scale and complexity. Although bin Laden listened to KSM's proposal, he was not convinced that it was practical. As mentioned earlier, bin Laden was receiving numerous ideas for potential operations. KSM's proposal to attack U.S. targets with commercial airplanes was only one of many. KSM presents himself as an entrepreneur seeking venture capital and people. He simply wanted Al Qaeda to supply the money and operatives needed for the attack while retaining his independence. It is easy to question such a statement. Money is one thing. Supplying a cadre of trained operatives willing to die is much more. Thus, although KSM contends he would have been just as likely to consider working with any comparable terrorist organization, he gives no indication of what other groups he thought could supply such exceptional commodities. KSM acknowledges formally joining Al Qaeda in late 1998 or 1999 and states that soon afterward, bin Laden also made the decision to support his proposal to attack the United States using commercial airplanes as weapons. Though KSM speculates about how bin Laden came to share his preoccupation with attacking America, bin Laden in fact had long been an opponent of the United States. KSM thinks that Atef may have persuaded bin Laden to approve this specific proposal. Atef's role in the entire operation is unquestionably very significant but tends to fade into the background, in part because Atef himself is not available to describe it. He was killed in November 2001 by an American airstrike in Afghanistan. Bin Laden summoned KSM to Kandahar in March or April 1999 to tell him that Al Qaeda would support his proposal. The plot was now referred to within Al Qaeda as the planes operation. The plan evolves. Bin Laden reportedly discussed the planes operation with KSM and Atef in a series of meetings in the spring of 1999 at the Almatar complex near Kandahar. KSM's original concept of using one of the hijacked planes to make a media statement was scrapped but bin Laden considered the basic idea feasible. Bin Laden, Atef and KSM developed an initial list of targets. These included the White House, the U.S. Capitol, the Pentagon and the World Trade Center. According to KSM, bin Laden wanted to destroy the White House and the Pentagon. KSM wanted to strike the World Trade Center and all of them wanted to hit the Capitol. No one else was involved in the initial selection of targets. Bin Laden also soon selected four individuals to serve as suicide operatives, Khalid Al Medar, Nawaf Al-Hazmi, Khalad and Abu Bar Al-Yamini. During the Almatar meetings, bin Laden told KSM that Medar and Hazmi were so eager to participate in an operation against the United States that they had already obtained U.S. visas. KSM states that they had done so on their own after the suicide of their friend Azam, Nashiri's cousin, and carrying out the Nairobi bombing. KSM had not met them. His only guidance from bin Laden was that the two should eventually go to the United States for pilot training. Hazmi and Medar were Saudi Nationals born in Mecca. Like the others in this initial group of selectees, they were already experienced Mujahideen. They had traveled together to fight in Bosnia in a group that journeyed to the Balkans in 1995. By the time Hazmi and Medar were assigned to the plane's operation in early 1999, they had visited Afghanistan on several occasions. Khalad was another veteran Mujahide, like much of his family. His father had been expelled from Yemen because of his extremist views. Khalad had grown up in Saudi Arabia where his father knew bin Laden, Abdullah Azam, and Omar Abdel Rahman, the blind shake. Khalad departed for Afghanistan in 1994 at the age of 15. Three years later he lost his lower right leg in a battle with the Northern Alliance, a battle in which one of his brothers died. After this experience he pledged allegiance to bin Laden, whom he had first met as a child in Jeddah and volunteered to become a suicide operative. When Khalad applied for a U.S. visa, however, his application was denied. Earlier in 1999, bin Laden had sent Khalad to Yemen to help Nashiri obtain explosives for the planned ship bombing and to obtain a visa to visit the United States so that he could participate in an operation there. Khalad applied under another name, using the cover story that he would be visiting a medical clinic to obtain a new prosthesis for his leg. Another al-Qaeda operative gave Khalad the name of a person living in the United States, whom Khalad could use as a point of contact on a visa application. Khalad contacted this individual to help him get an appointment at a U.S. clinic. While Khalad was waiting for the letter from the clinic confirming the appointment, however, he was arrested by Yemeni authorities. The arrest resulted from mistaken identity. Khalad was driving the car of another conspirator in the ship bombing plot, who was wanted by the Yemeni authorities. Khalad was released sometime during the summer of 1999, after his father and bin Laden intervened on his behalf. Khalad learned later that the al-Qaeda leader, apparently concerned that Khalad might reveal Nashiri's operation while under interrogation, had contacted a Yemeni official to demand Khalad's release, suggesting that bin Laden would not confront the Yemenis if they did not confront him. This account has been corroborated by others. Giving up on acquiring a U.S. visa and concern that the United States might learn of his ties to al-Qaeda, Khalad returned to Afghanistan. Travel issues thus played a part in al-Qaeda's operational planning from the very start. During the spring and summer of 1999, KSM realized that Khalad and Abu Barra, both of whom were Yemenis, would not be able to obtain U.S. visas as easily as Saudi operatives like Medar and Hasmi. Although Khalad had been unable to acquire a U.S. visa, KSM still wanted him and Abu Barra as well as another Yemeni operative from bin Laden's security detail to participate in the plane's operation. Yet because individuals with Saudi passports could travel much more easily than Yemeni, particularly to the United States, there were fewer martyrdom opportunities for Yemenis. To overcome this problem, KSM decided to split the plane's operation into two components. The first part of the plane's operation, crashing hijacked aircraft into U.S. targets, would remain as planned with Medar and Hasmi playing key roles. The second part, however, would now embrace the idea of using suicide operatives to blow up planes, a refinement of KSM's old Manila Airpot. The operatives would hijack U.S. flagged commercial planes flying Pacific routes across East Asia and destroy them in midair, possibly with shoe bombs instead of flying them into targets. An alternate scenario apparently involved flying planes into U.S. targets in Japan, Singapore, or Korea. This part of the operation has been confirmed by Khalad, who said that they contemplated hijacking several planes, probably originating in Thailand, South Korea, Hong Kong, or Malaysia, and using Yemenis who would not need pilot training because they would simply down the planes. All the planes hijacked in the United States and East Asia were to be crashed or exploded at about the same time to maximize the attack's psychological impact. Training and Deployment to Kuala Lumpur In the fall of 1999, the four operatives selected by bin Laden for the plane's operation were chosen to attend an elite training course at Al-Qaeda's Mez Anak Camp in Afghanistan. Bin Laden personally selected the veteran fighters who received this training, and several of them were destined for important operations. One example is Ibrahim Al-Thawar, or Nibras, who would participate in the October 12, 2000 suicide attack on the USS Cole. According to KSM, this training was not given specifically in preparation for the plane's operation or any other particular Al-Qaeda venture. Although KSM claims not to have been involved with the training or to have met with the future 9-11 hijackers at Mez Anak, he says he did visit the camp while traveling from Kandahar to Kabul with bin Laden and others. The Mez Anak training camp was located in an abandoned Russian copper mine near Kabul. The camp opened in 1999 after the United States had destroyed the training camp near Kaus with cruise missiles in August 1998 and before the Taliban granted Al-Qaeda permission to open the Al-Farouk camp in Kandahar. Thus, for a brief period in 1999, Mez Anak was the only Al-Qaeda camp operating in Afghanistan. It offered a full range of instruction, including an advanced commando course taught by senior Al-Qaeda member Saif al-Adal. Bin Laden paid particular attention to the 1999 training session. When Salah al-Din, the trainer for the session, complained about the number of trainees and said that no more than twenty could be handled at once, Bin Laden insisted that everyone he had selected received the training. The special training session at Mez Anak was rigorous and spared no expense. The course focused on physical fitness, firearms, close quarters combat, shooting from a motorcycle, and night operations. Although the subjects taught differed little from those offered at other camps, the course placed extraordinary physical and mental demands on its participants who received the best food and other amenities to enhance their strength and morale. Upon completing the advanced training at Mez Anak, Hasmi, Khalad, and Abu Barah went to Karachi, Pakistan. Their KSM instructed them on western culture and travel. Much of his activity in mid-1999 had revolved around the collection of training and informational materials for their participants in the planes operation. For instance, he collected western aviation magazines, telephone directories for American cities such as San Diego and Long Beach, California, brochures for schools, and airline timetables, and he conducted internet searches on U.S. flight schools. He also purchased flight simulator software and a few movies depicting hijackings. To house his students, KSM rented a safe house in Karachi with money provided by Bin Laden. In early December 1999, Khalad and Abu Barah arrived in Karachi. Hasmi joined them there a few days later. On his way to Karachi, Hasmi spent a night in Qedah at a safe house where, according to KSM, an Egyptian named Muhammad Atta simultaneously stayed on his way to Afghanistan for Shihad training. Medar did not attend the training in Karachi with the others. KSM says that he never met with Medar in 1999, but assumed that Bin Laden and Attef had briefed Medar on the planes operation and had excused him from the Karachi training. The course in Karachi apparently lasted about one or two weeks. According to KSM, he taught the three operatives basic English words and phrases. He showed them how to read phone books, interpret airline timetables, use the internet, use code words and communications, make travel reservations, and rent an apartment. Khalad adds that the training involved using flight simulator computer games, viewing movies that featured hijackings, and reading flight schedules to determine which flights would be in the air at the same time in different parts of the world. They used the game's software to increase their familiarity with aircraft models and functions and to highlight gaps in cabin security. While in Karachi, they also discussed how to case flights in Southeast Asia. KSM told them to watch the cabin doors at takeoff and landing, to observe whether the captain went to the lavatory during the flight, and to note whether the flight attendants brought food into the cockpit. KSM, Khalad and Hasmi also visited travel agencies to learn the visa requirements for Asian countries. The four trainees traveled to Kuala Lumpur. Khalad, Abubara, and Hasmi came from Karachi, Medar traveled from Yemen. As discussed in Chapter 6, U.S. intelligence would analyze communications associated with Medar whom they identified during this travel, and Hasmi whom they could have identified but did not. According to KSM, the four operatives were aware that they had volunteered for a suicide operation either in the United States or in Asia. With different roles, they had different tasks. Hasmi and Medar were sent to Kuala Lumpur before proceeding to their final destination, the United States. According to KSM, they were to use Yemeni documents to fly to Malaysia, then proceed to the United States using their Saudi passports to conceal their prior travels to and from Pakistan. KSM had doctored Hasmi's Saudi passport so it would appear as if Hasmi had traveled to Kuala Lumpur from Saudi Arabia via Dubai. Khalad and Abubara went to Kuala Lumpur to study airport security and conduct casing flights. According to Khalad, he and Abubara departed for Malaysia in mid-December 1999. Hasmi joined them about ten days later after briefly returning to Afghanistan to attend to some passport issues. Khalad had originally scheduled his trip in order to receive a new prosthesis at a Kuala Lumpur clinic called Indolight, and bin Laden suggested that he use the opportunity to case flights as well. According to Khalad, Malaysia was an ideal destination because its government did not require citizens of Saudi Arabia or other Gulf states to have a visa. Malaysian security was reputed to be lax when it came to Islamist jihadists. Also, other Mujahideen, wounded in combat, had reported to receive treatment at the Indolight clinic and successfully concealed the origins of their injuries. Khalad said he got the money for the prosthesis from his father, bin Laden, and another Al-Qaeda colleague. According to Khalad, when he and Abubara arrived in Kuala Lumpur, they contacted Humbali to let him know where they were staying since he was to be kept informed of Al-Qaeda activities in Southeast Asia. Humbali picked up Khalad and Abubara and brought them to his home, enlisting the help of a colleague who spoke better Arabic. Humbali then took them to the clinic. On December 31st, Khalad flew from Kuala Lumpur to Bangkok. The next day he flew to Hong Kong aboard a U.S. airliner. He flew in first class, which he realized was a mistake because this seating assignment on that flight did not afford him a view of the cockpit. He claims to have done what he could to case the flight, testing security by carrying a box cutter in his toiletries kit onto the flight to Hong Kong. Khalad returned to Bangkok the following day. At the airport, the security officials searched his carry-on bag and even opened the toiletries kit, but just glanced at the contents and let him pass. On this flight, Khalad waited until most of the first class passengers were dozing, then got up and removed the kit from his carry-on. None of the flight attendants took notice. After completing his casing mission, Khalad returned to Kuala Lumpur. Hazmi arrived in Kuala Lumpur soon thereafter and may even have stayed briefly with Khalad and Abu Barah at Indolight. Midyar arrived on January 5th, probably one day after Hazmi. All four operatives stayed at the apartment of Yazid Sufat, the Malaysian J.I. member who made his home available at Humbali's request. According to Khalad, he and Hazmi spoke about the possibility of hijacking planes and crashing them or holding passengers as hostages, but only speculatively. Khalad admits being aware at the time that Hazmi and Midyar were involved in an operation involving planes in the United States, but denies knowing details of the plan. While in Kuala Lumpur, Khalad wanted to go to Singapore to meet Nibras and Fahd Al-Qasso, two of the operatives in a Shiri's ship-bombing operation. An attempt to execute that plan by attacking the USS of the Sullivan's had failed just a few days earlier. Nibras and Qusso were bringing Khalad money from Yemen, but were stopped in Bangkok because they lacked visas to continue on to Singapore. Also unable to enter Singapore, Khalad moved the meeting to Bangkok. Hazmi and Midyar decided to go there as well, reportedly because they thought it would enhance their cover as tourists to have passport stamps from a popular tourist destination such as Thailand. With Mbali's help, the three obtained tickets for a flight to Bangkok and left Kuala Lumpur together. Abu Bara did not have a visa permitting him to return to Pakistan, so he traveled to Yemen instead. In Bangkok, Khalad took Hazmi and Midyar to one hotel, then went to another hotel for his meeting on the maritime attack plan. Hazmi and Midyar soon moved to that same hotel, but Khalad insists that the two sets of operatives never met with each other or anyone else. After conferring with the ship-bombing operatives, Khalad returned to Karachi and then to Kandahar, where he reported on his casing mission to Bin Laden. Bin Laden canceled the East Asia part of the planes operation in the spring of 2000. He evidently decided it would be too difficult to coordinate this attack with the operation in the United States. As for Hazmi and Midyar, they had left Bangkok a few days before Khalad and arrived in Los Angeles on January 15, 2000. Meanwhile, the next group of al-Qaeda operatives destined for the planes operation had just surfaced in Afghanistan. As Hazmi and Midyar were deploying from Asia to the United States, al-Qaeda's leadership was recruiting and training four Western-educated men who had recently arrived in Kandahar. Though they hailed from four different countries—Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Lebanon and Yemen—they had formed a close-knit group as students in Hamburg, Germany. The new recruits had come to Afghanistan aspiring to wage jihad in Chechnya, but al-Qaeda quickly recognized their potential and enlisted them in its anti-U.S. jihad. Although Bin Laden, Atef and KSM initially contemplated using established al-Qaeda members to execute the plane's operation, the late 1999 arrival in Kandahar of four aspiring jihadists from Germany suddenly presented a more attractive alternative. The Hamburg group shared the anti-U.S. fervor of the other candidates for the operation, but added the enormous advantages of fluency in English and familiarity with life in the West based on years that each member of the group had spent living in Germany. Not surprisingly, Muhammad Atta, Ramzi Ben-Al-Shib, Marwan Al-Qaeda, and the other four men of the group had come to Afghanistan to participate. Not surprisingly, Muhammad Atta, Ramzi Ben-Al-Shib, Marwan Al-Shahi, and Zayed Jarrah would all become key players in the 9-11 conspiracy. Muhammad Atta Muhammad Atta was born on September 1, 1968 in Kafr al-Sheikh, Egypt, to a middle-class family headed by his father and attorney. After graduating from Cairo University with a degree in architectural engineering in 1990, Atta worked as an urban planner in Cairo for a couple of years. In the fall of 1991, he asked a German family he had met in Cairo to help him continue his education in Germany. They suggest that he come to Hamburg and invited him to live with them there, at least initially. After completing a course in German, Atta traveled to Germany for the first time in July 1992. He resided briefly in Stuttgart, and then in the fall of 1992, moved to Hamburg to live with his host family. After enrolling at the University of Hamburg, he promptly transferred into the city engineering and planning course at the Technical University of Hamburg, Harburg, where he would remain registered as a student until the fall of 1999. He appears to have applied himself fairly seriously to his studies, at least in comparison to his jihadist friends, and actually received his degree shortly before traveling to Afghanistan. In school, Atta came across as very intelligent and reasonably pleasant, with an excellent command of the German language. When Atta arrived in Germany, he appeared religious, but not fanatically so. This would change especially as his tendency to assert leadership became increasingly pronounced. According to Ben Al-Shib, as early as 1995, Atta sought to organize a Muslim Student Association in Hamburg. In the fall of 1997, he joined a working group at the Kuds Mosque in Hamburg, a group designed to bridge the gap between Muslims and Christians. Atta proved a poor bridge, however, because of his abrasive and increasingly dogmatic personality. But among those who shared his beliefs, Atta stood out as the decision maker. Atta's friends during this period remember him as charismatic, intelligent, and persuasive, albeit intolerant of dissent. In his interactions with other students, Atta voiced virulently anti-Semitic and anti-American opinions, raging from condemnations of what he described as a global Jewish movement centered in New York City that supposedly controlled the financial world and the media, to polemics against governments of the Arab world. To him, Saddam Hussein was an American stooge set up to give Washington an excuse to intervene in the Middle East. Within his circle, Atta advocated violent jihad. He reportedly asked one individual close to the group if he was ready to fight for his belief and dismissed him as too weak for jihad when the person declined. On a visit home to Egypt in 1998, Atta met one of his college friends. According to this friend, Atta had changed a great deal, had grown a beard, and had obviously adopted fundamentalism by that time. Ramzi Ben-Al-Sheeb Ramzi Ben-Al-Sheeb was born on May 1, 1972 in Gale-Bawazir, Yemen. There does not seem to be anything remarkable about his family or early background. A friend who knew Ben-Al-Sheeb in Yemen remembers him as religious but not too religious. From 1987 to 1995, Ben-Al-Sheeb worked as a clerk for the International Bank of Yemen. He first attempted to leave Yemen in 1995 when he applied for a U.S. visa. After his application was rejected, he went to Germany and applied for asylum under the name Ramzi Omar, claiming to be a Sudanese citizen seeking asylum. While his asylum petition was pending, Ben-Al-Sheeb lived in Hamburg and associated with individuals from several mosques there. In 1997, after his asylum application was denied, Ben-Al-Sheeb went home to Yemen but returned to Germany shortly thereafter under his true name, this time registering as a student in Hamburg. Ben-Al-Sheeb continually had academic problems, failing tests, and cutting classes. He was expelled from one school in September 1998. According to Ben-Al-Sheeb, he and Atta first met at a mosque in Hamburg in 1995. The two men became close friends and became identified with their shared extremist outlook. Like Atta, by the late 1990s, Ben-Al-Sheeb was decreeing what he perceived to be a Jewish world conspiracy. He proclaimed that the highest duty of every Muslim was to pursue Jihad and that the highest honor was to die during the Jihad. Despite his rhetoric, however, Ben-Al-Sheeb presented a more amiable figure than the Osteer Atta and was known within the community as being sociable, extroverted, polite, and adventuresome. In 1998 Ben-Al-Sheeb and Atta began sharing an apartment in the Harburg section of Hamburg, together with a young student from the United Arab Emirates named Marwan Al-Shehee. Marwan Al-Shehee was born on May 9, 1978, in Ras al-Kamah, the United Arab Emirates. His father, who died in 1997, was a prayer leader at the local mosque. After graduating from high school in 1995, Shehee joined the Emirati military and received half a year of basic training before gaining admission to a military scholarship program that would fund his continued study in Germany. Shehee first entered Germany in April 1996. After sharing an apartment in Bonn for two months with three other scholarship students, Shehee moved in with a German family with whom he resided for several months before moving into his own apartment. During this period he came across as very religious, praying five times a day. Friends also remember him as convivial and a regular guy, wearing western clothes and occasionally renting cars for trips to Berlin, France, and the Netherlands. As a student, Shehee was less than a success. Upon completing a course in German, he enrolled at the University of Bonn in a program for technical, mathematical, and scientific studies. In June 1997 he requested a leave from his studies, citing the need to attend to unspecified problems in his home country. Although the university denied his request, Shehee left anyway and consequently was compelled to repeat the first semester of his studies. In addition to having academic difficulties at this time, Shehee appeared to become more extreme in the practice of his faith. For example, he specifically avoided restaurants that cooked with or served alcohol. In late 1997 he applied for permission to complete his coursework in Hamburg, a request apparently motivated by his desire to join Atta and Ben Al-Sheeb. Just how and when the three of them first met remains unclear, although they seem to know each other already when Shehee relocated to Hamburg in early 1998. Atta and Ben Al-Sheeb moved into his apartment in April. The transfer to Hamburg did not help Shehee's academic progress. He was directed by the scholarship program administrators at the Emirati Embassy to repeat his second semester starting in August 1998, but back in Bonn. Shehee initially flouted this directive however and did not re-enroll at the University of Bonn until the following January, barely passing his course there. By the end of July 1999 he had returned to Hamburg, applying to study shipbuilding at the Technical University and more significantly residing once again with Atta and Ben Al-Sheeb in an apartment at 54 Marion Strauss. After Shehee moved in with Atta and Ben Al-Sheeb, his evolution toward Islamic fundamentalism became more pronounced. A fellow Emirati student who came to Hamburg to visit Shehee noticed he no longer lived as comfortably as before. Shehee now occupied an old apartment with a roommate, had no television, and wore inexpensive clothes. When asked why he was living so frugally, Shehee responded that he was living the way the Prophet had lived. Similarly, when someone asked why he and Atta never laughed, Shehee retorted, How can you laugh when people are dying in Palestine? Born on May 11, 1975, in Mazra, Lebanon, Zayed Jarrah came from an affluent family and attended private Christian schools. Like Atta, Ben Al-Sheeb, and Shehee, Jarrah aspired to pursue higher education in Germany. In April 1996, he and a cousin enrolled at a junior college in Greifswald in northeastern Germany. There, Jarrah met and became intimate with Isle Senguin, the daughter of Turkish immigrants who was preparing to study dentistry. Even with the benefit of hindsight, Jarrah hardly seems a likely candidate for becoming an Islamic extremist. Far from displaying radical beliefs when he first moved to Germany, he arrived with a reputation for knowing where to find the best discos and beaches in Baruch, and in Greifswald was known to enjoy student parties and drinking beer. Although he continued to share an apartment in Greifswald with his cousin, Jarrah was mostly at Senguin's apartment. Witnesses interviewed by German authorities after 9-11, however, recall that Jarrah started showing signs of radicalization as early as the end of 1996. After returning from a trip home to Lebanon, Jarrah started living more strictly according to the Koran. He read brochures and era book about Jihad, held forth to friends on the subject of Holy War, and professed his affection with his previous life in a desire not to leave the world in a natural way. In September 1997, Jarrah abruptly switched his intended course of study from dentistry to aircraft engineering at the Technical University of Hamburg, Harburg. His motivation for this decision remains unclear. The rationale he expressed to Senguin, that he had been interested in aviation since playing with toy airplanes as a child, rings somewhat hollow. In any event, Jarrah appears already to have had Hamburg contacts by this time, some of whom may have played a role in steering him toward Islamic extremism. Following his move to Hamburg that fall, he began visiting Senguin in Greifswald on weekends until she moved to the German city of Bochum one year later to enroll in dental school. Around the same time, he began speaking increasingly about religion, and his visit to Senguin became less and less frequent. He began criticizing her for not being religious enough and for dressing too provocatively. He grew a full beard and started praying regularly. He refused to introduce her to his Hamburg friends because he told her they were religious Muslims and her refusal to become more observant embarrassed him. At some point in 1999, Jarrah told Senguin that he was planning to wage a jihad because there was no greater honor than to die for Allah. Although Jarrah's transformation generated numerous quarrels, their breakups invariably were followed by reconciliation, forming a cell. In Hamburg, Jarrah had a succession of living accommodations, but he apparently never resided with his future co-conspirators. It is not clear how and when he became part of Ata's circle. He became particularly friendly with Ben-Al-Shib after meeting him at the Kud's Mosque in Hamburg, which Jarrah began attending regularly in late 1997. The worshippers at this mosque featured an outspoken flamboyant Islamist named Mohammed Hadar Zamar. A well-known figure in the Muslim community and to German and U.S. intelligence agencies by the late 1990s, Zamar had fought in Afghanistan and relished any opportunity to extol the virtues of violent jihad. Indeed, a witness has reported hearing Zamar press Ben-Al-Shib to fulfill his duty to wage jihad. Moreover, after 9-11, Zamar reportedly took credit for influencing not just Ben-Al-Shib, but the rest of the Hamburg group. In 1998, Zamar encouraged them to participate in jihad and even convinced them to go to Afghanistan. Owing to Zamar's persuasion or some other source of inspiration, Ata, Ben-Al-Shib, Shahi and Jarrah eventually prepared themselves to translate their extremist beliefs into action.  This final stage in their evolution toward embracing Islamist extremism did not entirely escape the notice of the people around them. The foursome became core members of a group of radical Muslims, often hosting sessions at their Marian Strauss apartment that involved extremely anti-American discussions. Meeting three to four times a week, the group became something of a sect whose members, according to one participant in the meetings, tended to deal only with each other. Ata's rent checks for the apartment provide evidence of the importance that the apartment assumed is a center for the group, as he would write on them the notation Dar-Alan-Sar or House of the Followers. In addition to Ata, Ben-Al-Shib, Shahi and Jarrah, the group included other extremists, some of whom also would attend Al-Qaeda training camps, and in some instances would help the 9-11 hijackers as they executed the plot. Said Bahaji, son of a Moroccan immigrant, was the only German citizen in the group. Educated in Morocco, Bahaji returned to Germany to study electrical engineering at the Technical University of Hamburg, Harburg. He spent five months in the German army before obtaining a medical discharge, and lived with Ata and Ben-Al-Shib at 54 Marian Strauss for eight months between November 1998 and July 1999. Described as an insecure follower with no personality and with limited knowledge of Islam, Bahaji nonetheless professed his readiness to engage in violence. Ata and Ben-Al-Shib used Bahaji's computer for internet research, as evidenced by documents and disquets seized by German authorities after 9-11. Sakaria Es-Habar, a Moroccan citizen, moved to Germany in February 1997 and to Hamburg in 1998, where he studied medical technology. Soon after moving to Hamburg, Es-Habar met Ben-Al-Shib and the others through a Turkish mosque. Es-Habar turned extremist fairly suddenly, probably in 1999, and reportedly pressured one acquaintance with physical force to become more religious, grow a beard, and compel his wife to convert to Islam. Es-Habar's parents were said to have made repeated but unsuccessful efforts to sway him from this lifestyle. Shortly before the 9-11 attacks, he would travel to Afghanistan to communicate the date for the attacks to the Al-Qaeda leadership. Manur El Matasadek, another Moroccan, came to Germany in 1993, moving to Hamburg two years later to study electrical engineering at the Technical University.  One of Matasadek's roommates recalls him referring to Hitler as a good man and organizing film sessions that included speeches by bin Laden. Matasadek would help conceal the Hamburg group's trip to Afghanistan in late 1999. Abdelgani Mazzudi, also a Moroccan, arrived in Germany in the summer of 1993 after completing university courses in physics and chemistry. Mazzudi studied in Dortmund, Bochum, and Munster before moving to Hamburg in 1995. Mazzudi described himself as a weak Muslim when he was home in Morocco, but much more devout when he was back in Hamburg. In April 1996, Mazzudi and Matasadek witnessed the execution of Atta's will. During the course of 1999, Atta and his group became ever more extreme and secretive, speaking only in Arabic to conceal the content of their conversations. When the four core members of the Hamburg cell left Germany to journey to Afghanistan late that year, it seems unlikely that they already knew about the plane's operation. No evidence connects them to Al-Qaeda before that time. Witnesses have attested, however, that their pronouncements reflected ample predisposition toward taking some action against the United States. In short, they fit the bill for bin Laden, Attaf, and KSM. Going to Afghanistan. The available evidence indicates that in 1999, Atta, Ben-Al-Shib, Shahi, and Jarrah decided to fight in Chechnya against the Russians. According to Ben-Al-Shib, a chance meeting on a train in Germany caused the group to travel to Afghanistan instead. An individual named Khalid al-Masari approached Ben-Al-Shib and Shahi because they were Arabs with beards, Ben-Al-Shib thinks, and struck up a conversation about Jihad in Chechnya. When they later called Masari and expressed interest in going to Chechnya, he told them to contact Abu Masab and Duisburg, Germany. Abu Masab turned out to be Muhammadu al-Slahi, a significant Al-Qaeda operative who even then was well known to U.S. and German intelligence, but neither government apparently knew he was operating in Germany in late 1999. When telephoned by Ben-Al-Shib and Shahi, Slahi reportedly invited these promising recruits to come see him in Duisburg. Ben-Al-Shib, Shahi, and Jarrah made the trip. When they arrived, Slahi explained that it was difficult to get to Chechnya at that time because many travelers were being detained in Georgia. He recommended they go to Afghanistan instead, where they could train for Jihad before traveling onward to Chechnya. Slahi instructed them to obtain Pakistani visas and then return to him for further directions on how to reach Afghanistan. Although Atta did not attend the meeting, he joined in the plan with the other three. After obtaining the necessary visas, they received Slahi's final instructions on how to travel to Karachi and then Khetta, where they were to contact someone named Umar al-Masari at the Taliban office. Following Slahi's advice, Atta and Jarrah left Hamburg during the last week of November 1999 bound for Karachi. Shahi left for Afghanistan around the same time. Ben-Al-Shib about two weeks later. Ben-Al-Shib remembers that when he arrived at the Taliban office in Khetta, there was no one named Umar al-Masari. The name apparently was simply a code. A group of Afghans from the office promptly escorted him to Kandahar. There Ben-Al-Shib rejoined Atta and Jarrah, who said they already had pledged loyalty to bin Laden and urged him to do the same. They also informed him that Shahi had pledged as well and had already left for the United Arab Emirates to prepare for the mission. Ben-Al-Shib, soon met privately with bin Laden, accepted the al-Qaeda leader's invitation to work under him and added his own pledge to those of his Hamburg colleagues. By this time Ben-Al-Shib claims, he assumed he was volunteering for a martyrdom operation. Atta, Jarrah and Ben-Al-Shib then met with Atta, who told them they were about to undertake a highly secret mission. As Ben-Al-Shib tells it, Atta instructed the three to return to Germany and enroll in flight training. Atta, who bin Laden chose to lead the group, met with bin Laden several times to receive additional instructions, including a preliminary list of approved targets—the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and the U.S. Capitol. The new recruits also learned that an individual named Rabia al-Maqi Nawaf al-Hazmi would be part of the operation. In retrospect, the speed with which Atta, Jarrah, and Ben-Al-Shib became core members of the 9-11 plot, with Atta designated its operational leader, is remarkable. They had not yet met with KSM when all this occurred. It is clear, then, that bin Laden and Atta were very much in charge of the operation, that these candidates were selected so quickly, before comprehensive testing in the training camps or in operations demonstrates that bin Laden and Atta probably already understood the deficiencies of their initial team, Hazmi and Medar. The new recruits from Germany possessed an ideal combination of technical skill and knowledge of the original 9-11 operatives, veteran fighters though they were, lacked. Bin Laden and Atta wasted no time in assigning the Hamburg group to the most ambitious operation yet planned by Al-Qaeda. Bin Laden and Atta also plainly judged that Atta was best suited to be the tactical commander of the operation. Such a quick and critical judgment invites speculation about whether they had already taken Atta's measure at some earlier meeting. To be sure, some gaps do appear in the record of Atta's known whereabouts during the preceding years. One such gap is February through March 1998, a period for which there is no evidence of his presence in Germany and when he conceivably could have been in Afghanistan. Yet to date, neither KSM, Ben Al-Shib, nor any other Al-Qaeda figure interrogated about the 9-11 plot has claimed that Atta or any other member of the Hamburg group traveled to Afghanistan before the trip in late 1999. While the four core Hamburg cell members were in Afghanistan, their associates back in Hamburg handled their affairs so that their trip could be kept secret. Matasadek appears to have done the most. He terminated Shahi's apartment lease, telling the landlord that Shahi had returned to the UAE for family reasons and used the power of attorney to pay bills from Shahi's bank account. Matasadek also assisted Jarrah, offering to look after Isle Singhwan in Jarrah's absence. Said Bahaji attended to similar routine matters for Atta and Ben Al-Shib, thereby helping them remain abroad without drawing attention to their absence. Preparing for the operation In early 2000 Atta, Jarrah, and Ben Al-Shib returned to Hamburg. Jarrah arrived first on January 31, 2000. According to Ben Al-Shib, he and Atta left Kandahar together and proceeded first to Karachi, where they met KSM and were instructed by him on security and on living in the United States. Shahi apparently had already met with KSM before returning to the UAE. Atta returned to Hamburg in late February, and Ben Al-Shib arrived shortly thereafter. Shahi's travels took him to the UAE, where he acquired a new passport and a U.S. visa, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and one or more other destinations. Shahi also returned to Germany, possibly sometime in March. After leaving Afghanistan, the hijackers made clear efforts to avoid appearing radical. Once back in Hamburg, they distanced themselves from conspicuous extremists like Zamar, whom they knew attracted unwanted attention from the authorities. They also changed their appearance and behavior. Atta wore western clothing, shaved his beard, and no longer attended extremist moths. Jarrah also no longer wore a full beard, and, according to Singhwan, acted much more the way he had when she first met him. And when Shahi, was still in the UAE in January 2000, held a belated wedding celebration, he actually had been married in 1999, a friend of his was surprised to see that he had shaved off his beard and was acting like his old self again. But Jarrah's apparent efforts to appear less radical did not completely conceal his transformation from his Lebanese family, which grew increasingly concerned about his fanaticism. Soon after Jarrah returned to Germany, his father asked Jarrah's cousin, a close companion from boyhood, to intercede. The cousin's ensuing effort to persuade Jarrah to depart from the path he was taking proved unavailing. Yet Jarrah clearly differed from the other hijackers and that he maintained much closer contact with his family and continued his intimate relationship with Singhwan. These ties may well have caused him to harbor some doubts about going through with the plot, even as late as the summer of 2001, as discussed in Chapter 7. After leaving Afghanistan, the four began researching flight schools and aviation training. In early January 2000, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, a nephew of KSM living in the UAE, who had become an important facilitator in the plot, used Shahi's credit card to order a Boeing 747-400 flight simulator program and a Boeing 767 flight deck video, together with attendant literature. Ali had all these items shipped to his employer's address. Jarrah soon decided that the schools in Germany were not acceptable and that he would have to learn to fly in the United States. Ben Al-Shib also researched flight schools in Europe, and in the Netherlands he met a flight school director who recommended flight schools in the United States because they were less expensive and required shorter training periods. In March 2000, Atta emailed 31 different U.S. flight schools on behalf of a small group of men from various Arab countries studying in Germany, who, while lacking prior training, were interested in learning to fly in the United States. Atta requested information about the cost of the training, potential financing, and accommodations. Before seeking visas to enter the United States, Atta, Shahi, and Jarrah obtained new passports, each claiming that his old passport had been lost. Presumably they were concerned that the Pakistani visas in their old passports would raise suspicions about possible travel to Afghanistan. Shahi obtained his visa on January 18, 2000, Atta on May 18, and Jarrah on May 25. Ben Al-Shib's visa request was rejected, however, as were his three subsequent applications. Ben Al-Shib proved unable to obtain a visa, a victim of the generalized suspicion that visa applicants from Yemen, especially young men applying in another country, Ben Al-Shib, first applied in Berlin, might join the ranks of undocumented aliens seeking work in the United States. Before 9-11, security concerns were not a major factor in visa issuance unless the applicant already was on a terrorist watch list, and none of these four men was. Concerns that Ben Al-Shib intended to immigrate to the United States doomed his chances to participate first hand in the 9-11 attacks. Although Ben Al-Shib had to remain behind, he would provide critical assistance from abroad to his co-conspirators. Once again the need for travel documents dictated Al-Qaeda's plans. Travel. It should by now be apparent how significant travel was in the planning undertaken by a terrorist organization as far flung as Al-Qaeda. The story of the plot includes references to dozens of international trips. Operations required travel, as did basic communications and the movement of money. Where electronic communications were regarded as insecure, Al-Qaeda relied even more heavily on couriers. KSM and Abu Zubayda each played key roles in facilitating travel for Al-Qaeda operatives. In addition, Al-Qaeda had an office of passports and host country issues under its security committee. The office was located at the Kandahar airport and was managed by Atef. The committee altered papers, including passports, visas, and identification cards. Moreover, certain Al-Qaeda members were charged with organizing passport collection schemes to keep the pipeline of fraudulent documents flowing. To this end, Al-Qaeda required jihadists to turn in their passports before going to the front lines in Afghanistan. If they were killed, their passports were recycled for use. The operational mission training course taught operatives how to forge documents. Certain passport alteration methods, which included substituting photos and erasing and adding travel caches, were also taught. Manuals demonstrating the technique for cleaning visas were reportedly circulated among operatives. Muhammad Atta and Zakariya Eshabar were reported to have been trained in passport alteration. The purpose of all this training was two-fold, to develop an institutional capacity for document forgery and to enable operatives to make necessary adjustments in the field. It was well known, for example, that if a Saudi traveled to Afghanistan via Pakistan, that on his return to Saudi Arabia, his passport, bearing a Pakistani stamp, would be confiscated. So operatives either erased the Pakistani visas from their passports or traveled through Iran, which did not stamp visas directly into passports. End of Chapter 5.3. Recording by Leanne Howlett. Laden and his aides did not need a very large sum to finance their planned attack on America. The 9-11 plotters eventually spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. Consistent with the importance of the project, Al Qaeda funded the plotters. KSM provided his operatives with nearly all the money they needed to travel to the United States, train, and live. The plotters' tradecraft was not especially sophisticated, but it was good enough. They moved, stored, and spent their money in ordinary ways, easily defeating the detection mechanisms in place at the time. The origin of the funds remains unknown, although we have a general idea of how Al Qaeda financed itself during the period leading up to 9-11. General Financing. As we explained in Chapter 2, Bin Laden did not fund Al Qaeda through a personal fortune and a network of businesses in Sudan. Instead, Al Qaeda relied primarily on a fundraising network developed over time. The CIA now estimates that it cost Al Qaeda about $30 million per year to sustain its activities before 9-11, and that this money was raised almost entirely through donations. From any years, the United States thought Bin Laden financed Al Qaeda's expenses through a vast personal inheritance. Bin Laden purportedly inherited approximately $300 million when his father died, and was rumored to have had access to these funds to wage jihad while in Sudan and Afghanistan and to secure his leadership position in Al Qaeda. In early 2000, the U.S. government discovered a different reality. Roughly from 1970 to 1994, Bin Laden received about $1 million per year, a significant sum to be sure, but not a $300 million fortune that could be used to fund jihad. Then, as part of a Saudi government crackdown early in the 1990s, the Bin Laden family was forced to find a buyer for Osama's share of the family company in 1994. The Saudi government subsequently froze the proceeds of the sale. This action had the effect of divesting Bin Laden of what otherwise might indeed have been a large fortune. Nor were Bin Laden's assets in Sudan a source of money for Al Qaeda. When Bin Laden lived in Sudan from 1991 to 1996, he owned a number of businesses and other assets. These could not have provided significant income, as most were small or not economically viable. When Bin Laden left in 1996, it appears that the Sudanese government expropriated all his assets. He left Sudan with practically nothing. When Bin Laden arrived in Afghanistan, he relied on the Taliban until he was able to reinvigorate his fundraising efforts by drawing on ties to wealthy Saudi individuals that he had established during the Afghan war in the 1980s. Al Qaeda appears to have relied on a core group of financial facilitators who raised money from a variety of donors and other fundraisers, primarily in the Gulf countries and particularly in Saudi Arabia. Some individual donors surely knew, and others did not, the ultimate destination of their donations. Al Qaeda and its friends took advantage of Islam's strong calls for charitable giving, zakat. These financial facilitators also appear to rely heavily on certain imams at mosques who were willing to divert zakat donations to Al Qaeda's cause. Al Qaeda also collected money from employees of corrupt charities. It took two approaches to using charities for fundraising. One was to rely on Al Qaeda sympathizers in specific foreign branch offices of large international charities, particularly those with lax external oversight and ineffective internal controls, such as the Saudi-based Al Haramine Islamic Foundation. Smaller charities in various parts of the globe were funded by these large Gulf charities and had employees who would siphon the money to Al Qaeda. In addition, entire charities such as the Al Wafa Organization may have wittingly participated in funneling money to Al Qaeda. In those cases, Al Qaeda operatives controlled the entire organization, including access to bank accounts. Charities were a source of money and also provided significant cover, which enabled operatives to travel undetected under the guise of working for a humanitarian organization. It does not appear that any government other than the Taliban financially supported Al Qaeda before 9-11, although some governments may have contained Al Qaeda sympathizers who turned a blind eye to Al Qaeda's fundraising activities. Saudi Arabia has long been considered the primary source of Al Qaeda funding, but we have found no evidence that the Saudi government as an institution or senior Saudi officials individually funded the organization. This conclusion does not exclude the likelihood that charities with significant Saudi government sponsorship diverted funds to Al Qaeda. Still, Al Qaeda found fertile fundraising ground in Saudi Arabia, where extreme religious views are common, and charitable giving was both essential to the culture and subject to very limited oversight. Al Qaeda also sought money from wealthy donors in other Gulf states. Al Qaeda frequently moved the money it raised by Hawaullah, an informal and ancient trust-based system for transferring funds. In some ways, Al Qaeda had no choice after its move to Afghanistan in 1996. First, the banking system there was antiquated and undependable, and second, formal banking was risky due to the scrutiny that Al Qaeda received after the August 1998 East Africa Embassy bombings, including UN resolutions against it and the Taliban. Bin Laden relied on the established Hawaullah networks operating in Pakistan, in Dubai, and throughout the Middle East, to transfer funds efficiently. Hawaulatars associated with Al Qaeda may have used banks to move and store money, as did various Al Qaeda fundraisers and operatives outside of Afghanistan, but there is little evidence that Bin Laden or core Al Qaeda members used banks while in Afghanistan. Before 9-11, Al Qaeda spent funds as quickly as it received them. Actually, terrorist operations represented a relatively small part of Al Qaeda's estimated $30 million annual operating budget. Al Qaeda funded salaries for jihadists, training camps, airfields, vehicles, arms, and the development of training manuals. Bin Laden provided approximately $10-12 million per year to the Taliban in return for safe haven. Bin Laden also may have used money to create alliances with other terrorist organizations, although it is unlikely that Al Qaeda was funding an overall jihad program. Rather, Bin Laden selectively provided start-up funds to new groups or money for specific terrorist operations. Al Qaeda has been alleged to have used a variety of illegitimate means, particularly drug trafficking and conflict diamonds, to finance itself. While the drug trade was a source of income for the Taliban, it did not serve the same purpose for Al Qaeda, and there is no reliable evidence that Bin Laden was involved in or made his money through drug trafficking. Similarly, we have seen no persuasive evidence that Al Qaeda funded itself by trading in African conflict diamonds. There also have been claims that Al Qaeda financed itself through manipulation of the stock market based on its advanced knowledge of the 9-11 attacks. Exhaustive investigations by the Securities and Exchange Commission, FBI, and other agencies have uncovered no evidence that anyone with advanced knowledge of the attacks profited through securities transactions. To date, the U.S. government has not been able to determine the origin of the money used for the 9-11 attacks. Ultimately, the question is of little practical significance. Al Qaeda had many avenues of funding. If a particular funding source had dried up, Al Qaeda could have easily tapped a different source or diverted funds from another project to fund an operation that cost $400 to $500,000 over nearly two years. The funding of the 9-11 plot. As noted above, the 9-11 plotter spent somewhere between $400 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by Al Qaeda either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign government or foreign government official supplied any funding. We have found no evidence that the Hamburg cell members, Atta, Shehi, Jarrah, and Bin El-Sheeb received funds from Al Qaeda before late 1999. It appears they supported themselves. KSM, Bin El-Sheeb, and another plot facilitator, Mustafa Al-Havsavi, each received money in some cases, perhaps as much as $10,000 to perform their roles in the plot. After the Hamburg recruits joined the 9-11 conspiracy, Al Qaeda began giving them money. Our knowledge of the funding during this period, before the operatives entered the United States, remains murky. According to KSM, the Hamburg cell members each received $5,000 to pay for their return to Germany from Afghanistan after they had been selected to join the plot, and they received additional funds to travel from Germany to the United States. Financial transactions of the plotters are discussed in more detail in Chapter 7. Requirements for a successful attack As some of the core operatives prepared to leave for the United States, Al Qaeda leaders could have reflected on what they needed to be able to do in order to organize and conduct a complex international terrorist operation to inflict catastrophic harm. We believe such a list of requirements would have included leaders able to evaluate, approve, and supervise the planning and direction of the operation, communication sufficient to enable planning and direction of the operatives, and those who would be helping them, a personnel system that could recruit candidates, vet them, indoctrinate them, and give them necessary training, an intelligence effort to gather required information and form assessments of enemy strengths and weaknesses, the ability to move people, and the ability to raise and move the necessary money. The information we have presented about the development of the planes operation shows how, by the spring and summer of 2000, Al Qaeda was able to meet these requirements. By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States. Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive. End of chapter 5.4


think you guys know how I feel about these task forces when Bernie Sanders initially came out with his Joe Biden endorsement and announced the formation of these unity task forces I mean I wasn't very keen on them right I think that it's largely pointless it's not going to lead to anything but I wasn't necessarily of the belief that these task forces could some way be harmful to the left because why would they they're pointless but I actually have kind of changed my mind I think they could actually be harmful because I think it could be a way of placating the left or at least getting us to be silent being less critical of Joe Biden if he is some way able to convince us that we were heard and he adopted some of our policies I don't know if you've ever like had a younger brother or sister or a cousin or a nephew in my case and you really want to play video games and they want to play too but you don't want to let them have a turn so you unplug the controller from the console and you give that to them while you play and you know it seems like they're doing something they think that they're winning but it really it's you this is how the task forces feel to me it feels like you know Joe Biden and Democrats unplugged the controller from the console and they handed it to us and they're trying to make it seem as if we're doing something we're steering we're making a difference but in actuality we're not really gonna make a difference and that's the least of my concerns my concern is that we get duped in the thinking that these helped us and we kind of let our foot off the gas so before I kind of dive into more of my opinion on this we did get some news about the makeup of these task forces and as Bloomberg's Jennifer Epstein points out knew this morning Biden and Sanders roll out the members of the six unity task forces that will offer recommendations to the DNC platform committee and to Biden and on these six task forces there's some good names right these are people who I admire and respect but not all of them so on the climate change committee you have AOC as one of the co-chairs and the other co-chair for whatever reason is John Kerry I don't think anyone on the left cares about what he has to say nonetheless he's a co-chair but you know I like AOC I like that there is Sunrise movements of Varshini Parkash included I think she's a great voice on the criminal justice reform task force you have Stacy Walker on the economic task force you have Stephanie Kelton on the health care task force you have Dr. Abdul al-Sayed along with Pramila Jayapal so I mean these are big names these are people who I respect but notably absent from the list of names is of course Nina Turner Nina Turner is an icon to the progressive left and socialists everywhere we respect her we trust her the fact that she was excluded that really says something and I can't play the clip but in an interview with the breakfast club recently she said she wasn't wanted it was clear to her that she wasn't wanted so these task forces in and of themselves I don't think that they're going to amount to anything but the fact that they wouldn't even include her for a largely symbolic task is it's disgusting it shows you that they really don't think too highly about the progressive left now after this list became public AOC actually responded about her decision to join this task force tweeting after conferring with grassroots activists and climate allies I'm accepting Bernie Sanders nomination to co-chair the climate change unity task force with secretary John Kerry I have always believed that real change happens not with a panel or task force but in everyday people organizing mass movements to demand change yet we should also commit to showing up everywhere every space where there are decisions and formative conversations with movement voices now you can you can kind of hear the reluctance in her voice or see it in her words in these tweets and I don't blame her for her for being reluctant if Bernie Sanders ever asked me he wouldn't to be on one of these task forces but if he asked me I would say no absolutely not because I will not be placated I will not be duped into believing that I'm doing something when in actuality I'm accomplishing nothing now the point of these task forces ostensibly is to basically bring together both wings of the party Joe Biden supporters and Bernie Sanders supporters so they can come up with collective agreement around certain issues you know the economy criminal justice healthcare but I don't know why we're debating these things the Democratic Party has already sided with the progressive left even people who voted for Joe Biden they want Medicare for all this is what the polls showed so these conversations in my view are outdated we already have the policy prescriptions we have solutions to these problems there's no need to discuss it further it's just a matter of will we or will we not be cowards and will we fight for it so that's why I'm against these task forces but when I learned what specifically the Bernie side will be pushing for it led further to my skepticism in these task forces so as politico's Holly Otter being tweeted out among the items Sanders allies will likely be pushing for on the health care task force lowering the Medicare eligibility age to 55 and creating a universal health care insurance program for children so what is the point of having Bernie voices on this task force if they're not going to be pushing for Medicare for all like they support Medicare for all but maybe they feel as if that's not something that is realistic the party won't adopt it so they're pushing for Medicare 55 so we're asking Joe Biden to adopt where the party was two years ago with Hillary Clinton and I guess hoping for some type of souped-up version of the children's health insurance program what is the point of this again there's no point and it's not just that these task forces are pointless even if let's say hypothetically Bernie's wing is able to be successful and convince the Democratic Party to adopt certain things that they want on the platform what good does the platform do parties put out these types of manifestos and largely ignore them do you think that Joe Biden will follow through with whatever the national Democratic Party's platform is no so it's pointless and it could be harmful if these people on these panels are satisfied and they believe that they did something and I say that knowing that you know you have to do whatever you can to get a seat at the table but in 2016 we had the DNC Unity Reform Commissions these were actually conducive to good right we had to bargain it with Hillary Clinton supporters and individuals who Tom Perez appointed so they were at this disadvantage in terms of Bernie delegates versus Hillary delegates but they still managed to fight really hard and get the DNC to adopt some changes so they didn't get rid of superdelegates entirely which they should have but they didn't make a pretty big difference this however is not going to amount to anything and I don't like saying things like this because I don't want people to think that I'm a downer if they're able to influence the task forces then that's good but as I lay out in a tweet earlier this is what I think is going to happen if you're Joe Biden step one you announced Medicare at 60 step to let progressives think they've won when you decide to let them talk you down to Medicare at 55 step three use previous negotiation as example of how you're quote unquote listening to the left and adopted quote unquote their policies i.e. Medicare 55 step four be as shitty as you've always been but be criticized less for it by these progressives because they don't want to quote unquote lose the quote unquote concession that you gave to them and finally step five don't actually lower the Medicare age at all if you're elected so it's a way to placate progressives it's a way to silence some of his biggest critics like AOC and that worries me you should never ever be silent when it comes to what you believe is right and what you believe is wrong however I don't necessarily feel confident that progressives congressional progressives specifically are you know saying everything that they feel about Joe Biden how many of them have spoken out about Terry Bernie hasn't said much and that's really disappointing because these are leaders who I look to for guidance these are people who I thought you know believed in these things and I genuinely do believe that Bernie believes tar read and AOC believes tar read but they don't necessarily want to say anything because they know that they would rock the boat and they don't want to be blamed for Donald Trump getting reelected right so I understand the position that they're in it's a lot of pressure and I don't want to be too down but at the end of the day I want progressives and the left generally speaking to get a lot more savvy be a lot more ruthless and even be a little bit of you know Machiavellian politicians if they have to be because at the end of the day we're fighting for what's good we're on the right side of history and they're on the wrong side of history like it or not there's gonna be a time where the current Democratic Party establishment will be a relic of the past because future generation younger people they side with Bernie Sanders and his progressive policy proposals so it's just a matter of time at this point I feel like we're delaying the inevitable hopefully it's not too late when it comes to issues like climate change but nonetheless who's in power right now they're not gonna be there forever the current power apparatus will at some point go the way of the dodo and a new generation will come and usher in I think hopefully a new era of progressive politics I'm trying to be optimistic but things like this I don't think it's helpful to that long-term goal I just I just I don't because it's trying to get you to think that we have a say we have power we have a seat at the table we have influence when we don't and I think that we have to be realistic about our standing the left-lost the people who we have in Congress are marginalized they're getting steamrolled by Nancy Pelosi and leadership and we can't delude ourselves into thinking they're giving us a seat at the table when this is nothing more than window dressing it's not going to amount to anything so you know I don't necessarily like I don't want to be down on AOC for taking this position you know I think that people would have been angry if she didn't take this position but for me I want the left to really really be strategic and I think that that's one thing that we've lacked we have kind of just rode on our principles right we talk about Medicare for all we're policy focused and that's all we need but we've got to learn how to play politics we've got to learn how to market ourselves and how to create a narrative not a false narrative but we've got to tell people what's going on and that means we have to be a little bit brave people in Congress who are progressive have to call out leadership because if you don't you're gonna get placated you're gonna get steamrolled and nothing will get accomplished so I'm sorry I'm down on these task forces but I genuinely find it insulting because it's like don't piss on my leg and tell me it's raining don't you know give me a turd and tell me it's chocolate I know what this is I know when I'm being deceived this is deception and even though these names on you know these task forces are good people I don't want them to be you know used for Joe Biden's disgusting pro-corporate neoliberal agenda and the fact that they wouldn't even include Nina Turner on these symbolic task forces it tells you how little you know they care about the progressive agendas so you know I'm I'm not too keen on these task forces but if Bernie genuinely believes that um they're gonna make a difference um I mean I'll trust him to an extent but I think there's better things he can do to influence Joe Biden if he does believe that Joe Biden is influenceable if that's a word at all uh and I I don't know I don't think that he is I think the best you'd get out of a Joe Biden administration is him replacing Ruth Bader Ginsburg but any policies he you know implements they're most likely going to be via executive order which will just be undone by the next republican president and you know we're going to be back to square one so long term we've got to really think through what we do as lefties to increase our bargain in power to make better use of the leverage that we have and we did have leverage and things like this these types of task forces it's not a good use of our time and you know if it were me if I had to say I would encourage all of these well-intentioned good people to boycott these task forces because at the end of the day they're not going to lead to us getting the policies that you want they're just an attempt to pretty obvious attempt I think to satisfy us without doing anything