Well, ladies and gentlemen, welcome to our third and final session for the 26 Japan update. My name is Amy King and I'm a lecturer in the Strategic and Defence Study Centre at the A&U and a fellow of the Australia Japan Research Centre. I'm really delighted to bring what is an all-star panel here this afternoon to talk about Japan's national security and foreign policy and to think about Japan in the wider regional context. Rather than sort of a lecture-style presentation, we're going to mix things up a little bit in this final session this afternoon. I know that there are lots of questions in the audience, I've already heard from various people today, so we want to make sure there's plenty of time for Q&A. And what our three speakers are going to do is to offer us a few minutes, five minutes or so of remarks on various aspects of this issue of national security and foreign policy. I'll then throw some questions to our speakers, but that'll be the opportunity for you to start thinking about your questions because we're going to leave plenty of time for that. So in the order in which they are going to speak to you today, let me now introduce our three speakers. First up is Professor Penendra Jayne from the University of Adelaide, a ways professor in the Department of Aging Studies. Professor Jayne has been president formally of the Aging Studies Association of Australia and the Japanese Studies Association of Australia and is an expert on Japanese politics and foreign policy as well as wider regional agencies of security issues. Our second speaker from Japan is Professor Nori Yamaguchi, who's also a retired Lieutenant General, not working, Noris, from the Ground Self-Defense Forces of Japan. Professor Yamaguchi is now a Vice President of the International University of Japan and Dean of the Graduate School of International Studies and is previously served as a Japanese Defence Attaché in the United States. And finally, Professor Jerry Curtis, who was with us, of course, this morning with a terrific keynote lecture. Professor Curtis is the emeritus, sorry, Professor of Political Science from Columbia University and although emeritus, I understand, is busier than ever, former director of the Weatherhead East Asia Center at Columbia University and an eminent speaker on Japanese politics, electoral processes, foreign policy and wider questions of Japan's place in the world. So without any further ado, could I please hand over to Penendra to kick us off. Thank you very much. And I'd also like to thank the organizers for inviting me to this Japan update. Well, I have been asked to kick off and also I was told that I have about five minutes to start with and then we will enter into Q&A later on. I want to actually I just want to start with my borrowing two terms from the world of business. One of them is what we call disruption in a rate of disruptions. How companies like Apple, they have disrupted the traditional market. Two, the other term I want to borrow is networking, again, from the world of business, the network and I want to relate these two terms to what's happening with Japan's security and the strategic policy and how Japan has been strategically challenged because of these strategic disruptions and how Japan is dealing with those strategic disruptions and one of the explanations which I have followed or written and trying to follow it with more than explained is by creating what I call networks, international, global networks. So what are these strategic challenges of disruptions which Japan is currently facing? We all know and we have heard so much about China. We have heard about North Korea, but they are not the only disruptions which Japan is facing. There are others, for example, Japan's view that the US is weakening and this is kind of one view in terms of his economic influence and to a certain degree is diplomatic and political influence. Then there are a rise of others. For example, here I want to bring India in the picture in the equation. So all these things, if you put them together, Japan has never faced this kind of challenges, these kinds of challenges which Japan is facing now. I mean, Japan used to be in the 1970s and 80s, the leader, the regional leader, but Japan has become kind of a regional player and in this region we have got so many other players and some are of greater consequences than what Japan quote is about. And this Japan is trying to deal with, as I said, through forming networks. And I just had a look at the number of countries which Mr. Abe has visited since he became Prime Minister. It's just amazing. About 50 different foreign visits with up close to 90 countries which he has visited in the last three years or so, three and a half years since he became Prime Minister. And you may remember in the early 1960s when Prime Minister Ikeda went to Europe or he was traveling throughout the world, famously or infamously, the president of France branded him as a transistor salesperson. And then Japan was characterized as an economic animal. And I was just thinking, what Mr. Abe is trying to say, what Mr. Abe is trying to do through his visits to these many countries around the world and to almost all the continents, Abe is trying to set his diplomacy and this diplomacy through selling this diplomacy, he is trying to create these what I call diplomatic networks. And now I give you some examples. For example, as you said that, you know, US, as Professor Gerteson morning, he mentioned that, you know, the US expects now its allies to do more and perhaps it will expect the allies to do more, even further. So what Mr. Abe or the LDP or government has done, if you look at the kinds of strategic networks which Japan is building, and, you know, for the first time in 2007, there was a security agreement with Australia, for example. One year after that, there was a security agreement with India, and there are so many strategic partnership agreements which Mr. Abe recently has signed that I have lost count. So he is creating that kind of strategic network. And India and Australia, I give you two examples. The other aspect, perhaps we don't hear much or we heard in the past, which has become very important in my analysis particularly, is Japan's foreign aid. In the late 1980s, Japan was kind of dubbed aid superpower. Japan no longer is aid superpower because Japan doesn't have, we have heard from panel experts previously about how the Japanese economy is stagnating or not performing very well, and the budget is shrinking, so Japan doesn't have that kind of money to throw around on its foreign aid. But what one could see very clearly that the aid money is being utilized very strategically, and this strategic aid or the characteristic of aid, which is becoming very strategic, one could see very clearly through many examples. One of them perhaps maybe well known is that how Japan is using its aid money to provide patrol boats of surveillance aircraft to countries like Vietnam or to Philippines and so on and so forth. But since my origin is India, I always follow what's happening in Japan and India as well. Very recently, Mr Abe not only committed 10 billion dollars towards a bullet train project in India, but actually he has signed other kinds of agreements which are very strategic in nature. And one of the examples is India's northeast, part northeast which is especially the state of Arunachal Pradesh, which China claims as its own territory. And now Japan is trying to help build infrastructure growth, connecting India's northeast to Southeast Asia through Myanmar and so on and so forth. So if we look at some of these examples, what Mr Abe, particularly the last three years and also in his previous position as prime minister in 2006-2007, if you look at all those things, it's very clear that Japan is trying to create these kind of strategic networks. And that brings me one more point I know my time has run out. If you look at only this month actually, it's called HICAC, which is the Tokyo International Conference on African Development. Which Japan started in 1993 way back before China or India thought about engaging Africa. So Japan started that way back in 1993. You remember it was kind of just after the first World War and, you know, nations were struggling with their economies and so on and so forth. And Japan decided to engage Africa. Now for the first time in its history since 1993, what Mr Abe did was to take Thai, Thai, Thai care from Japan to Africa. So for the first time it was held on African soil. And this move is in my analysis is very, very strategic because and he committed 30 billion, 30 billion US dollars in public and private capital to help Africa's development. And this was to match Xi Jinping's 60 billion dollars which Xi Jinping last year had committed to Africa. But the point is that Mr Abe's strategy is not about what the Chinese are doing, but what Abe is saying that it is about partnership. It is about developing Africa as a partner. So the term which I use is Mr Abe is creating a horizontal network. It's not kind of vertical networks which Japan created in the past or which Japan remains in that kind of vertical network with the US. So Japan is trying to create this more kind of horizontal network. And Abe has emphasized about quality, quality infrastructure and quality infrastructure such as bullet train in India, quality infrastructure for Africa. And all these things and if you put together the final point I want to make is how Mr Abe is trying to give some flesh to the balls of his strategic engagement is the project is to change the constitution, and the change in constitution means change Article 9 of the constitution to make it more formal what Japan is doing or what Japan intends to do. But I think that's the point which we can come back on about the changing amendment of the constitution. Thank you very much. I mean a terrific start I think to think about those sort of strategic disruptions to Japan and its policies in the region and some of the sort of signature moves that Abe is making in terms of networking, use of foreign aid and some of the ways in which that is differing from China. Yamaguchi-san, over to you. Does it work? Yes. Is it working? Okay, thank you. First of all, I have to apologize for my voice. I'm recovering from the slight surgery of my throat a couple of several weeks ago. My voice, original voice much nicer. I have been learning a lot from this morning from optimistic side to very pessimistic side and I belong to the former. I was trained as a helicopter pilot to be optimistic. So I never thought my plane was going to have engine failure. Even if I had engine failure, I thought I was going to save the plane by auto rotation, force landing. If I was not able to save the plane, I want to be injured. Even if you got injured, I won't be killed. When I got killed, I don't realize it. So I'm basically optimistic and today I'm going to have a very daunting task, very much daunting in five minutes. I'm going to talk about new legislation about Japanese security policy and March 29th of this year, a new set of new laws came to effect. This is a very drastic change of the national security policy based on the laws and 10 laws are amended and one new law was enacted. Don't worry, I'm not going to say all the 10 laws and new laws, but even the title may take five minutes. But basically what I'm saying is we expanded the mission areas of the self-defense process by putting something within the existing, the old set of laws and policy set. And while amending the change in the interpretation of the constitution, by adding very, very little part, let me start with putting what I call my generation knows that Tom and Jerry, Captain Rand, Jason Rand, and I keep telling my students that the new laws put something in the openings within the cheese, Swiss cheese with holes in the meantime, putting a little bit of cream maybe on top. And the putting, putting things in the hole includes expanding, expanding the right authority to use weapons. And even under all the interpretation, SDF members were allowed to use weapons to protect our weapons because bad guys take it, it is very, very dangerous and weapons are expensive, so we are allowed to protect those weapons. And this was expanded to include the use of weapons to protect other countries' weapons, the weapons system that might be used for protection of Japanese population. For instance, US forces, the weapons in Japan or any other forces that might be protecting us, we can use weapons to protect them under even the peacetime conditions. And another point is that we expanded, expanded mission areas in terms of international missions by, by loosening or by lifting some of the limits. For example, we were not allowed to do what we call Kaketsuke Keigo, that means we can use weapons to protect me and protect you if you are working with me for UN peacekeeping operations from the beginning in 1992. But if the next guy, the people are asking me to help, I was not able to allow to go and help. So therefore, those kinds of missions which might cause that kind of situation is what we, the government of Japan, did not take because, you know, if I am asked if I have to say no, it is embarrassing and it is, it may have negative, negative impact. So we were a little hesitant to take that sort of mission, but now we can do that several other cases included. In addition, you know, a little bit clean top of the cheese is a new interpretation of constitution which allows us to, to exercise, exercise right on collective self-defense in the very, very limited case. Up until the last, last March, Japan was supposed to use force for just only for individual self-defense, for defense of Japan. But now if something happens next to us and if Japan lets it go as it is, Japan might be in serious danger of existence. In such a case, even before, before being attacked, we can use force to, to, to save others. I'm not representing the government anymore. I used to be the part of the government for 45 years. I decided it was long, long enough. I'm now a private citizen, I was a full-fledged freedom of speech. So I can say this, that station, that, that cheese, maybe, cream on top of the cheese, maybe the case, something like September, 1950, after several months, after the Korean War broke out, Putin, Perimeter was almost two-four. If that happens again, and if Putin, Perimeter, falls, Japan's future is going to be the front line, and Japan will be under the very, very serious situation. So in such a case, we might, we might be able to, to, to participate in international efforts to, to save the sort of situation. Then my conclusion is very simple. As simple as soldiers. We have, since 1992, when we dispatched first-ever peacekeeping operations missions to Cambodia, up until now we have come a very, very long way, but still we have a long way to go. One example is new legislation does not touch upon the what we call collective security. That means under the UN Charter, Charter 7. Chapter 7, if somebody is doing something really nasty, everybody is going to standing up against, against him or her. That is collective security.  But you know, if that, that, that has, that comes to, in other words, if UN force, UN, United Nations force is organized to do, to do good thing for the world. The international community should work very, very hard. But the new legislation does not touch upon this. In the future, we might have to, to look at that area as, as well. Thank you very much. Yep. I think that's really highlighted, uh, helpfully some of the specifics around the new security legislation. And you've opened up, I think, some areas that we'll want to discuss further about where Japan might go next. Jerry, do you want to finish us off with some thoughts? Well, I don't really don't, because it's kind of difficult. I, I don't want to repeat what I said this morning, and I don't want to repeat what these two gentlemen have said now with, with, which I agree. So I won't, I don't, maybe I won't even need the, the five minutes, but I, I want to sort of build a little bit on something I said this morning, which was when we think about Japanese security policy, we have to understand it's not Prime Minister Abe so much that's driving the policy. It's the changes in the international system that the end of bipolarity, the end of that time we thought was America's unipolar position as the, as the, is the only superpower. Now that's gone. And where we've entered a fluid, uncertain, dangerous phase of transitioning towards some sort, some new form of, of a multilateral system in East Asia. And we have to think about how that is changing the dynamics of Japanese security policy thinking. Now, particularly from my perspective, how it's changing the U.S.-Japan relationship. So it's on that latter point, I want to say a few words really about how it's changing, I think U.S. thinking, there is no one U.S. thinking about Japan, but in the United States, there are trends about thinking about our relations with allies and our relations with Japan in particular that are different, that are new to the relation, to the, to our relationship. And I am concerned that policymakers in Washington don't necessarily get it and that actions that they take may come up against the fact that what worked in the past isn't necessarily going to work now in the president. So there are two points in particular I want to make. One relates to the so-called free ride. Ever since John Foster Dulles negotiated the San Francisco peace treaty with Prime Minister Yoshida and Japan adopted its post-war constitution with an article that prohibits it from having a military, Americans have complained about Japan getting a free ride. We have a nice symmetrical security relationship in which we're obligated to come to Japan's defense. And even though there's been some very significant progress made in terms of Japanese commitments through the new guidelines, the adoption of the reinterpretation of the constitution to permit collective defense, from the point of view of a lot of Americans, Japan is still getting a free ride. And when Donald Trump said on TV that we have an alliance with Japan where we're obligated to to come to Japan's assistance if it's attacked. And if we're attacked, Japanese can sit and watch it on their Sony TV. This resonated with a lot of people in the United States. So the idea that Japan should do more now has a lot to do with the fact that Americans feel we're being stressed because we're asked to do so much when other countries now have the ability to do more and that if the Japanese have a security concern, they should be stepping up to the bat more. I don't want to exaggerate it. I don't want to exaggerate it. But it's an important shift. I think the pressure, as I said earlier, on Japan to do more to contribute to the alliance, not only in terms of money, but in terms of roles and missions. You know, when Prime Minister Abe was in Washington in April of last year, the time of the guidelines, the new guidelines be adopted when he spoke at Congress, he was very bullish about what the reinterpretation of the Constitution and the new guidelines meant for Japan's role, potential military role. And Secretary Kerry, very enthusiastically, said at a press conference while Abe was still in town, Japan is now committed to come to the defense of American territory. So Japan's committed to defend us as we ought to defend them. And then Abe walked us back a lot to get the bill through the diet, because the political support was not there. So how we manage this relationship from here on forward requires some different thinking than I think it did in the past. We want Japan to do more, I think that's a general feeling in the U.S., but we want Japan to do more of what we want Japan to do. And it's not necessarily the case that Japan will want to do what we want to do, and they might want us to do what they want us to do. And we have not much experience with having to respond to doing, to figure out whether we're going to do what Japan wants us to do, or with the Japan that's doing things that we don't necessarily want them to do. Like Abe's, what I think is a good initiative towards Russia. So just keep these, I think we have to keep these things in mind, and I hope American policymakers keep them in mind. And just one particular point about what we want Japan to do, and because I'm interested in reactions from some of the security specialists in the audience. The concern over China's aggressive bullying behavior in the South China Sea and the East China Sea is a major concern for all of us. And the U.S. has been not, I don't think doing enough, but it has been doing a frame of navigation operations around these islands, the artificial islands that Chinese have created in the South China Sea. But do we want Japan to join an FON operation? There's a lot of people in the United States who think, yeah, you know, Japan, these sea lanes are important to Japan, Japan too. I think it's very dangerous. It's very dangerous. And you know the Chinese will try to find out where is the weak link, if there's multilateral efforts to do these FON operations in South China Sea. And they may well conclude that the weak link is the Senkaku Islands. And you can see the Chinese responding to Japanese participation in a frame of navigation operation in the South China Sea by upping the anti vis-a-vis the Senkaku Islands. Then what is the U.S. going to do? These issues need to be thought through in ways that we haven't thought about before. The second point I want to stress is this. You know, after the war, and actually until through the debate and the diet over the security legislation, the Japanese had a great concern, which was that alliance with the United States raised the danger of entanglement. The Americans would do something and drag the Japanese into it when they didn't want to be part of it. So you know, in this alliance theory, there's the danger of entanglement, there's danger of abandonment. I don't think the Japanese ever worried that we would abandon Japan, but they did worry about getting, that they would get entangled by our actions. For the U.S., we didn't worry about either. We didn't really count on the Japanese to do very much. So it was a question of being abandoned and the Japanese weren't doing anything that was going to entangle us. But this has changed. This is something that's very important to understand. When Abe visited Yasukuni, the end of 2013, the U.S. government issued a statement, the State Department issued a statement of disappointment. Our disappointment was not the disappointment of the Koreans and the Chinese. We're angry, not disappointed, angry that Abe visited a shrine that paid, that enshrined the souls of convicted walker mouths. It's not a big issue for Americans. The big issue for the Americans was that Abe did something that raised tensions in East Asia and raised the danger of entangling us in a conflict that we don't want any part of if we can avoid it. So it's very critical that... So this danger of entanglement is no longer only a Japanese concern. It is an American concern. And as the Japanese are asked to do more and do do more, they will want to do more about deciding what it is that we do jointly. And as they do so, it raises the possible dangers that will be asked to do things we don't necessarily want to get involved in. All I'm trying to stress here is that this relationship requires... The U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship requires a level of attention and knowledge and from the top levels of American decision-makers that I don't think we have ever had to deal with. And I don't think we're prepared to deal with it. I don't believe, frankly... Well, God only knows that Donald Trump is the last person you want to be in a position of responsibility to have to deal with it. But I don't think Hillary Clinton gets it either. That's my... That's my sense. Well, there's other things to talk about. I mean, I'm going to stop there and let's get the audience to get involved. Terrific. Thank you. I might start with you, because what you've just said prompt some questions, but then I'm going to turn to H. L. Penendra and Yamaguchi-san with some questions based on their presentations as well. But, Jerry, this morning you talked about public opinion, perhaps being the last real... The last real check and balance on are they in terms of some of the national security policies and constitutional revision that he is taking. The opposition is not that constrained along the media, perhaps not that constrained. So public opinion has been more constrained. But there's also another constraint, I guess, on Japan doing more in security in terms of what the US might want and that is China and perhaps still extent South Korea. They don't see Japan doing more in a security sense as being perhaps legitimate. How are they going in managing those two sets of constraints, the public opinion one and the two most important retail neighbours question? Do you think he is doing what he needs to do to engage the neighbours and public opinion to manage that national security direction that he wants to take the country in? That's a good question. I would say there's a third constraint which is obvious perception of what is... His perception of what's in Japanese interest is itself a constraint because he does not perceive it to be in Japan's interest to do things that will raise tensions with China unnecessarily. And I think so far on the point I mentioned earlier about the freedom of navigation operations, the Japanese government has not expressed any intent of participating and I hope they continue with that position. What China thinks, I don't think is a constraint on Japan. What China is and what it's capable of doing is a constraint. But I think Abe compared to the Abe I have known in the past, I once had a TV debate with Abe about China politics. This is what he was I think maybe between his times as the first time as Prime Minister and the second. And he was so hawkish and so hard-line and when the debate, when the TV program ended and went back to the makeup room, take off our makeup, we continued to have a rather heated discussion. And he, which ended with him saying to me, you know Japan has never cow-towed to China and it never will. And we will defend ourselves. And that is what he believes. But over the last two years he has been very cautious in dealing with the Chinese I think. He's been very firm about the Senkaku Islands. But he's also been enthusiastic about having face-to-face conversations with Xi Jinping about encouraging greater Chinese tourism into Japan, which is huge, about trying to develop a more economic relation. So I don't think it's what, so I think Abe is dealing with it that they do it the Chinese that way. So the major constraints on what he, what he does, it's not what Chinese think. South Korea, I think, actually, despite all the bad rhetorics between the two, increasingly are their own concerns about China. And I think our, see, as long as Japan is closely tied to the U.S. in its security policy that more, a larger Japanese role and greater multilateral activities, including with Australia and so on, I don't think South Koreans have a problem with that. So yes, the major constraint, our major constraint is public opinion. But you know, Japanese public opinion on this issue has changed in a very important way. If you look at the numbers, yes, most people oppose the reinterpretation of the Constitution about collective defense, don't want to see revision of Article 9. They didn't like the Classified Secrets Act. But compared to the past, compared to 1960, at the time of the security treaty crisis, when people came out in large numbers, in massive demonstrations, some violent demonstrations, to try to stop this from happening. Do you see that the intensity of the opposition any more? No, the intensity is not there. So what you have now in public opinion is a lot of acquiescence. People didn't like the Classified Securities Act. And Abe's popularity went down when it passed. A month later, it was back up to where it was before. They didn't like the collective defense reinterpretation Constitution. And the same thing happened. He's up there somewhere in the high 50s in terms of popularity, in spite of having done all of this. So I don't think public opinion is as much of a constraint on what the Prime Minister, what the Japanese government does. The key issue is how sophisticated the leadership is in trying, in figuring out a strategy to deal with this fluid, multilateral transition, systemic transition in East Asia. I think so far, so good is my conclusion. Thank you. Yamaguchi-san, on this question about public opinion, and you sort of said that we'd gotten somewhere with the collective security legislation, but there was a lot further to go. How do you see that changing? What could change the public attitudes towards these new operations for yesterday? They actually expanded the mission area more active. In South Sudan, we have troops, a couple of hundred troops, along with Chinese and Koreans. Now, we are doing the same job for the first time, has sent combat unit, for the first-ever combat infantry unit to South Sudan for protection of those activities. In such cases, we need to work harder. And in such cases, our soldier and soldier relations are really good. Koreans and Chinese, we got along with quite well. Since 1992, we started peacekeeping operation in Sudan. We have tension over Senkaku, differences in the political position of international rules. But we have common things, too. So in that sense, we may have to have wider views on the relations with neighbors. And as to Koreans, Japanese and Korean, Koreans, I'm a private citizen, so I can say this, that both Japanese and Koreans have got tired of beating each other. So basically, we are ready to work together again. That is my feeling. During the time that Korean-Japanese relations were not good in the last maybe three, four years, I never declined any opportunity to be invited to Seoul or Beijing. And I tried to do my best with my colleagues in Korean and Chinese. And now, no, the reaction of Chinese, Chinese media, Korean media, are totally different from two, three years ago. So we may have to find common things while we may have to be clear that we have differences and we cannot tolerate, tolerate the violation of common international rules and so on. But it's a sort of complicated world which we are facing. And this is not my mission to think about the future, that it's a younger generation's mission. We trust you. Thank you. Penendra, I mean, one of the ways in which Abe is trying to deal with this more complicated world is he's set this network approach and sort of he's going around the region selling his new diplomacy networks. Does the region want what he's selling and particularly in Southeast Asia? And are there limits to what Abe is trying to do? Yeah, I mean, what the narrative of Abe's sense ofmanship is still pacifism. And we know that Japan moved from passive pacifism to active pacifism. And that narrative of active pacifism has become proactive contribution to peace. So this is what Abe is trying to do. He's trying to project. And it's not just selling to the foreign audience but also to his domestic audience. What Abe is saying that, look, whatever we are doing is to preserve peace. And whether it is collective security, whether it is rescue operations, whether it is through ODA or giving rescue boats or weapons aircraft, these all kinds of activities are put in the context of Japan's pacifist peaceful ideas. So he's not saying so in other words, there are takers of this. That's one point. The other point is that we have already talked about it and I think this point will come up in Q&A that many of the Southeast Asian nations, if not all, they want some kind of balance in the region. And they see China's influence being too pervasive, too strong. So how to moderate that influence of China? And they see Japan as the best possible country which can bring that kind of moderation. So yes, I think through my travels, I have talks with my colleagues in Malaysia, in the United States, who I get this impression that is strongly that they, more or less, they are the support of what Japan is trying to do OK. Well, I think just to add to what I've just said. I'll be probably could write a thank you note to Xi Jinping for having, for helping him so much to improve relations with the countries in Southeast Asia. Because it's because of everybody's concern about Chinese behavior that that Japan is not only expanding its economic and cultural political relations, but it's expanding security relations with Vietnam, with the Philippines, with Australia. Japan is a popular country in Southeast Asia. You know, the historical, this problem of history that has bedeviled Japan's relations with China and South Korea, bedeviled relations with Korea and China and South Korea. But when you get beyond that into the rest of Asia, it's not that people don't have memories of what happened in the war, but it's not the same. When you go as far as India, you know, it's not an issue at all. But China is the issue. China is the issue. And so the countries in the region are looking, I think, to Japan. And I may phrase it as, you know, pacifist or peaceful, positive contribution and so on. Look, he wants Japan to be more of a so-called normal country and have security relationships with countries that are on China's periphery or that can help him be sure that a balanced in East Asia can be maintained, even if the U.S. role in it declines somewhat. So this is what he's about. And so we're seeing kind of a new honeymoon in Japan's relations with a lot of countries in Southeast Asia. Now, I want to make sure we have plenty of time for your questions. So I'm going to hand over to the floor now. I'll take as many as we possibly can. But if you want to grab my attention, I'll try to keep a bit of an eye out. So please identify yourself. So your name and where you're from is also be helpful. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you for the presentation. My name is Rukor. I'm a master's student. My question is to Professor Jen. Can you give us insights into Prime Minister Awe's diplomatic groups in Central Asia? Especially after they were drawn of the U.S. troops in America, I think Japan has been trying to get the HCO member-ship for long. Can you give us insights? Okay. I mean, Japan is certainly now, as we have heard from Spain as well. I mean, it's expanding its partnership and friendship and what I call networks. And Central Asia comes very much in that picture.  And India's influence is long. I mean, it's not weak. So China and India have been two players and a lot of them are Russian so much. But Japan's interest is in Central Asia, is rising. And this is because of, I call it a number game. Mr. Awe is after having as many friends, as many interlocutors as possible. And Central Asia comes very much in that context. But more than Central Asia, actually I think we should think more of Central Asia here because, you know, we have heard this explanation about the stream of worlds around the human subcontinent, influence of China, in Pakistan, influence of China, in Sri Lanka and Nepal. And there, we see that India has has become a very important partner of Japan. I mean, in 1998, when India tested its nuclear device, Japan was one of the strongest critics of India's act and put sanctions on India. But two years later, three years later, it started with exchange of not only with prime ministers, but also defense level initiatives. This never happened in the past. So one can see very clearly that it's not just Mr. Awe, I'm talking about Mr. Modi as prime minister at that time. Hope to be so initially about to engage India. And I think besides very clear that they regarded that South Asia, India in particular, is a very important, going to be a very important player. And that's why we see there is more of a strategic security, defense kind of partnership with India than with economics and trade and investment, which is quite unusual. You see kind of bilateral engagement, more economic and more trade and investment, all of these kinds of things, tragic change in the age band or as it has been. I'm not sure if to answer your question, your simulation has become very important in terms of work with you. Next, so we'll go to Murray and then what I might do is take a couple of questions from Murray and then we'll go to Manuel. Peter. Actually, I was going to believe just going to make a comment, particularly, leading particularly from what Jared said but also from what Professor Jain also said earlier. And that is really, I completely agree that it's very unusual for a Japanese prime minister to have visited so many countries and he's got out there very deliberately to ensure that Japan's faces there in Southeast Asia and more broadly, of course, in Africa and elsewhere. And that's all very important from Japan's own self-respect, its own image generally and all the rest. And Japan will be able to continue to do that in spite of the increasing weight of China region which is really what I'm about to get on to and that is essentially, I think that all of this is very nice. India is to a certain extent doing some of the same thing and that's important. I think China is really playing a long game. They're playing the game that really is to diminish the influence of the United States and its allies generally in the region and they don't really care how they are seen. They are seen as thumb power in the region. That's what they want to be. If you go back in history, obviously, they have had tributary states in Indochina and elsewhere and that's actually how they'd like things to be in the long term. And the situation, therefore, I think, is one where they will put up with some rough rides, say from Vietnam or the Philippines under the former president, but under the current one. And as long as they, using effectively 19th century gun mode style diplomacy to establish their position as a thumb power, the greater influence in the region and preferably even the United States. And I think that's really what they're on about and they really care about South East Asia and the others think because they will, they believe that with their economic might and increasing military projection that they can achieve that outcome. So that's just my take on the situation. Sorry to be optimistic. It's cold, I'm realistic though.  Hi, Manuel and Giotopoulos. This is primarily to Jerry, based on your speech this morning, which is fantastic. One of my 45 questions, I guess, I'd say that the word that most has been most frequently used today from the morning till now is Abe. And I'd like you to tell me what you think would happen. You've completely unexpectedly, Mr. Abe, was removed from the political scene tomorrow. What would happen in Kante? What would happen in the LTP? What would happen? Me and Peter. My question is on a different tank, really, but I want to get back to the last session and connect it with this session because I think pretty obviously political security outlook for Japan and strategy must be connected to it with the economic outlook for Japan. And what we took away from the last session on the economic outlook was, well, the most optimistic outlook we took away from Lyoko and Bytes was that we've got an economy which is facing a very, very low potential rate of growth. Abe was sanguine about the risks either of an inflation breakout or a recession in the medium to long term. But they're not inconsiderable risks. Japan is not good for Japan, not good for Japan's friends in Asia, and not good for the region. And if the more optimistic conclusion is a genteel decline, it really means that in relative terms, but also absolutely, Japan's cloud and standing in political terms and security terms is diminished. So I want to put a question to Jeremy, to the others, too, about what that means for Japan's foreign and security policy options and the conduct of its foreign and security policies, especially in the region. When the flip side of the conclusion from the last session is that the increased importance of GNP or GNI means that Japan's stake in the multilateral system is bigger and bigger and bigger. So if you're the new leader of the DP in Japan, Jerry, how would you define a foreign policy strategy that's attractive to the Japanese electorate, however it's shifting over time, that could carry the persuasive case of meeting those circumstances, not only in Japan, but in the international scene that it has to come from? So we've had a question, obviously, on how we manage a Japanese foreign and security policy, given those economic circumstances, one on what happens if no more are there and perhaps a response to this idea that China is playing a game that Japan is not really up to right now in terms of a more China-centric order and whether our base strategy can actually handle that. So, Jerry, I might start with you. I'd like to give Nindra, I know we just have a sudden opportunity to respond as well. Okay, well, I'll read your questions and talk about your answer. First, about basically China playing a long game to dominate the region in various ways. Well, I think that's true, but I don't want to be as pessimistic as you are. After all, the Chinese have played a long game, their economy has to be competitive, and that's very difficult to imagine if they have a bad relationship with both the United States and with Japan, two majors of investors and trading partners. And what the Chinese are trying to do the last couple of years... That's funny, are you looking for something there, Nindra? I'm just sitting there like that. Thank you, Nindra. So, where was I? Well, I actually do remember where I was. So, I think the Chinese tried to play a game of driving a wedge between the U.S. and Japan, and isolate Japan. And they were helped by this history issue and by Abe's visit to Yasukuni. But once Obama went to Tokyo on his way to China, actually, and said in Tokyo what has been American policy all along, but said it in Tokyo that the Senkaku Islands comes under Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. In fact, don't mess with the Japanese on this issue because you'll have to mess with us. I think that did a lot to convince the Chinese that this wedge strategy wasn't going to work. So, I think if we coordinate, and more broadly than just U.S.-Japan, but U.S.-Japan, Korea, Australia, and other countries, in trying to impress on the Chinese, if they want to be successful economically, they have to get along with us. And if they keep on playing the game they're playing now, it will not serve their interests. We're obviously not making a lot of progress in getting that message across, but that is the message to continue to give. And to hope that if we can play for time, over time, China will evolve. That all these Chinese who are studying here and in Japan and the United States, where they're going back and when they're in their 30s and 40s and have influence in the country, that you can hope that what we saw happen in Taiwan, what we saw happen in Korea, what we've seen happening in this part of the world in terms of the evolution of political systems, it's not gonna, I don't wanna be optimistic, but I wanna be hopeful. So, I think that's where that is. Now, what happens if Abe would to go tomorrow? One reason why he's likely to get a third term as Prime Minister is Japanese don't wanna think about what would happen if he goes, because he's a known quantity. People are pretty comfortable, I think, now with Abe, unlike three years ago, when there's a lot of nervousness about him. I think a lot of that is gone. But as I said this morning, if he were to go, the next person might not be as effective, at least not initially, but I don't see any fundamental change in what this foreign policy strategy would be. I think this, what you see is what you're going to get for some time to come. And if by chance, the Democratic Party came to power, which is really, as I said, the only thing more inconceivable than coming to power, I hope is Trump coming to power, but even if that would happen and someone like Prime Minister Noda were back in an important position, it would be very much the same because this is being driven by national interests. Japan's national interests is not to let the Chinese dominate the region if they can help it. They can't do as much about it on their own, but they're surely trying hard to do it together with the US and with other countries in the region. But there will be some differences to be certain. Well, I don't want to say I can talk about individuals, but there's no point at this point doing that now. But it's the same point about the point that Peter raised about, you know, so what would you do if I were the head of the opposition party given Japan's economic stake in the multilateral order and so on? I would do what Abe is doing. And I think that's what the Democratic Party would do. I don't see, I don't see on the foreign, I think on the foreign policy side, there's much more of a bipartisan consensus that people are willing to admit. And I thought what was really so disappointing about the diet debate over the national security legislation was that the Democratic Party didn't want to debate the foreign policy issues, they wanted to debate Article IX rather than what national security, what national interests would require because I think they pretty much agree with Abe about that. So I don't see big changes even if you had a change of leadership in the country. And then, do you want to comment on any of those? Yeah, just about Peter's comment on the relationship between economic and strategic orientation of Japan. You are absolutely right there. But I don't, I mean Japan has got, in my view, a strength in the region, which still many other countries don't have. And Japan is still, is the region's second largest economy, world's third largest economy. And it's technological superiority and it's still, I mean we heard that Japan's not innovating but there is a lot of innovation happening in Japan. And countries around the region, they are very much after Japan's, not just capital, but technology transport for example and they see Japan as a source of that. So I do not see Japan like declining in a way that is cloud will decline to the extent that regional players will look away from Japan. So it's still, they will remain engaged with Japan for obvious reasons that Japan has got a strength. And those strengths are economic, technological. As well as in a sense, sort by a strength as well because the region really want to engage with Japan partly because of China's role in the region. So for those reasons, I think I do not see how Japan is going to deteriorate to an extent that it will have, it will lose its cloud. I think its cloud will, if at all it might grow a little bit more as China tries to assert more and more rather than Japan's cloud declining in the region. That's my take on that issue. About post-Abe, as Jerry said, when Abe resigned in 2007, no one thought everyone kind of said, oh Abe thought that he has gone into the same. And he came back, as he said in one of his speeches in the U.S. that Japan is back and I'm back, so he's back. And so for the last three, three and a half years he has made an impact. And certainly for some reason Abe is out of, he goes, I think there are options for any party. So we know, I don't want to talk too much about individuals, but recently Mr. Ishiba, he resigned from his, or he didn't accept the official or any party in the ministerial position simply because he wants to prepare himself because of course I'm a possible prime minister. And there are many others we hear about, in other now as young upcoming women, female politicians, then of course Kishira is a possibility again. So I don't think there will be a huge political turmoil in Japan for some reason. Abe goes on a suddenly normal expectant. Yamalishita. Yes, from strictly Japanese security or defense policy point of view, I have two concerns. One is China's rights and second is U.S. commitment. China's rights is a fact and we have to admit. And China's rights, how nice or how aggressive China will become in the future is a concern. And how strong the U.S. commitment to the Asia Pacific, maybe Australian friends agree with me. This stronger commitment is better for Japan. So better, the stronger commitment of U.S. and nicer rise of China. That combination is an ultimate goal. If it takes 100 years, we need to start today. And for doing so, I want to point out three considerations. One, China is not Soviet Union at all. During the Cold War, one day, Soviet is gone. Nobody was so much worried. Nobody could have any problem at all. But now, if when China sneezes, some countries get cold. So we are not living in such simple world. And secondly, this is the first time for the Chinese to face real international relations with a similar height of major powers. China used to be central, center of the empire for thousands of years and after that, what they call 100 years of humiliation. Now it is the first time for the Chinese to face the similar height of major powers in the world. In other words, this is the first time for them ever to face other countries with borders. So that is second thing, something U.S.-Japan alliance. I'm a religious believer of U.S.-Japan alliance. But in the future, the strong alliance, strong alliance does not mean everything we agree. We may have differences in opinion or in policies international security or international politics. That is not necessarily bad. There may be things Japan want to do but politically cannot do which can be done by the U.S., politically can be done by the United States. There may be things the U.S. may not be able to do politically, perhaps a congressional register sort of thing. And Japan can do. In such a case, Japan can do. It's sort of complement relations. The Russian policy. Our policies vis-à-vis Russia are different but differences are not necessarily bad always. So just one thing, you know, if we can make the difference to let things go better. Japan's better relationship with Russia in comparison with U.S.-Japan relationship may help Russians to look at Asia-Pacific region through Japanese lens, not only the Chinese lens. As such, we can help each other from a different point of view. Thank you. Thank you very much. I mean, there is obviously one immediate response to your sort of the two dilemmas question for Japan is are they mutually incompatible? Would China's rise be nicer at the same time as the U.S. commitment to Japan be absolutely guaranteed or would the Chinese always see that U.S. commitment to Japan as fundamentally a problem? Before I ask you to respond to that question, let me see if there are more questions from the floor. Carrie? I'm Carrie, I'm a PhD student in the Department of International Relations here at ANU. I just want to thank all three of you for your wonderful, thoughtful comments. They're really useful today. My question to Professor Curtis, following on from something you mentioned in this morning's session when you were talking again about Okinawa and how you would suggest that the U.S. intervention has taken a new approach to what's happening there. I studied Okinawa and U.S. basic relations there and I mean, the way the media presents it is probably a bit less, it's a bit more complex than how the media presents it there. For example, even though they've covered the protests most often, like even when the U.S. has a lot of elements that don't want, for example, a large reduction in the U.S. military presence in Okinawa immediately or perhaps even in the long run for economic reasons, but on the flip side then you have the strategic concerns such as if you do greatly reduce the number of Marines or reduce the U.S. presence in Okinawa, it might be seen as an invitation to China, for example, to become more aggressive in around the south China Sea. So I was just wondering if you could comment a bit further on that and what your suggestion for a new approach might be considering all of these constraints, all of these concerns. I might just see if there's any other final questions that we want to take at this stage. Yeah, Ben? Ben Ashliono, I was a PhD student here at the ANU and we've been talking a lot about, like, in that session just now about domestic constraints on foreign policymaking and so in that regard I would like to ask anyone who could elaborate more on how they see the role of the LDP's junior coalition parliament. The comment or, as how critical a factor was that in shaping the final outcome of the new security laws. Thank you. And Ben, if I could ask you to pass the microphone towards your right, thanks. I had a question, sorry, I need a print of a line from the defence. I had a question particularly for Professor Curtis. Following on from what you were saying about the potential for Japanese engagement with South East Asian nations, what do you think is the potential for Japan to engage with Taiwan, particularly given that Taiwan is also a claimant to the Senkaku Islands but they have a new president who's potentially more sympathetic to them? Thank you. Great, those are particularly the last question I'm particularly interested in so I'll talk about first. So let me be brief. So on Okinawa, no, I don't think anybody, I don't think the, I wasn't advocating that we withdraw from Okinawa but we have too much, we occupy too much land, we have too many troops and the marines that are at the air base at Fatema should be relocated to Guam, come to Darwin, there's lots of, get beyond boats, there's lots of ways to get them out of Okinawa without building a new base in Henoko in my view. But also, you know, when, in the years immediately following the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty, American, the contribution of American military personnel in Okinawa to the Okinawan economy was roughly around 15, 16% of Okinawan prefectural income. Now it's down to about 6%, tourism is way up and tourism would be up much further if there was, if there were less troops there. And as I said this morning, I think the strategic, the changing technology of warfare, the fact that in a sense Kudena is a sitting duck for Chinese ballistic missiles, hardening these bases and having so much firepower concentrated in this land area seems to me to be very problematic. So I think we can have a rational policy of reducing the American presence in Okinawa that would not stimulate the idea, that would not make the Chinese think that it's less of a commitment to the region. It actually strengthens our, it can strengthen our commitment to the region. Also it seems to me, but I'm particularly concerned about the political fallout from all the incidents that happen in Okinawa and the sense, you know, this is a domestic Japanese problem in some ways more than it is a US-Japan issue because the real concern about Okinawa is that they're so discriminated against by the rest of the country. Japanese want American bases in Japan, but nowhere, but they don't want them in their own prefecture, you know, it's not in my backyard kind of thinking, so Okinawa then ends up being the place where it all happens. About the Komito, I think its role was very important in defining what the reinterpretation of collective defense was to be, and it was much less, it was much more constraining than what Prime Minister Abe had set out to get, and the chairman of the Komito said just the other day, they will not be revision of Article 9 as long as the Komito is in the ruling coalition, and he means it, and it won't happen. So unless Abe replaces the Komito with some other party that's more amenable to constitutional revision, its role is very big. Now on Taiwan. I think the, you know, Taiwan is trying to diversify its trade relations, so it's not so dependent on China as it is now, and Japan is a very important country as far as the Taiwanese economy is concerned, both in terms of trade and investment. We've seen, we've seen, you know, Taiwan investment increasing in Japan, buying sharp, the Chinese, the Taiwan Company buying sharp and so on, but there's a real danger in the Japan-Taiwan relationship, which is that even though the DPP is sort of to the left in Taiwan politics, its best friends in Japan are on the right, and when Tsai-Enwen came to Japan, just before she became elected as president, had met with Japanese here, it was the LDP right that fed it her, and that want to see Japan develop some kind of security relationship with Taiwan. This would be very dangerous in my view. You do not want to provoke the Chinese by making it look as though Japan is trying to develop a security relationship with Taiwan. So I think this is an issue that the Japanese need to be extremely cautious about, and that the Taiwanese need to understand does not serve their interests, it does not serve their interests to have relations between China and Japan become more tense because of Taiwan. That would be disastrous, so I'm concerned about the Taiwan relationship. Just one point about Komeito, I especially wanted to comment on that because I had about an hour, one-on-one conversation with Mr. Yaomichi recently. Initially his secretary said ten minutes, but the conversation went for more than an hour. His secretary was knocking on the door that is another point. But the point I want to make here is this. I agree what Professor Curtis has said about Komeito's take on the amendment of the constitution. But they have been a partner in incremental changes in what Japan's SDF and Japan's SDF role. They are happy to do that, but they are not willing at this stage to change the constitution to the point what the LDP Committee has recommended. 2013 LDP Committee on Constitutional Change. But the point I want to say, which you said that perhaps if Abe finds another partner, it is very difficult for the LDP to find another partner and be a winning party because, you know, still Sokabe Kai has got, it mobilizes its members to deliver votes. And the LDP is very, very aware of this fact under the revised electoral system, which is first passed before system, where the role of Komeito becomes very, very important in delivering votes to the LDP. So my take is that the LDP is not going to commit suicide, brutal suicide by safe ring crystallization of Komeito, and that's going to continue. And that puts a constraint on the LDP, whether Mr. Abe or anyone else, to change the constitution despite the fact that Japan has got a two-thirds majority in both houses. Thank you. I'd like to touch upon two points. First, Japan's dilemma between China and the U.S. Another one is Okinawa. And as to the dilemma between China and the U.S. for Japanese, my position has been the same. In the late 1990s, there used to be argument between a dragon three years and panda haggars. And at that time I used to say, I want to clinch the dragon. In order to clinch the dragon, I need to have strong arms, and if a big guy pushes my back towards the dragon, it is easier to clinch or hug the dragon. That is the only solution for the better for all. And in this sense, I'd like to agree with Professor Curtis on the Taiwan issue. We never want insecurity of China. So in that sense, the Japanese policy vis-à-vis China, the Taiwanese policy vis-à-vis the Taiwanese-Japanese security cooperation should be very, very careful. We don't like insecure China at all. And secondly, Okinawa, the two points. Okinawa is located at a very strategically important point. Many of you may have heard about the anti-access area denial capability of China in which China may diffuse US-mainly naval access towards the Asian continent by using mainly strategically defensive weapons. China may have enough capability, denial capability, even Japan has denial capability too. And if we have denial capability on Okinawa, it may help US forces reinforce us. It's easier for the US forces to come to Okinawa and other places, close to Okinawa, and if US forces come to those places, area denial capability will become much stronger. So Okinawa is very located at a very important point. And secondly, Okinawa has 1.4 million population among within which in comparison with only 20,000 US military personnel in Okinawa, the visibility is too far high than the reality. And this is simply because in Okinawa, there was a land combat ground battle, so everything was flat. And after the battle of Okinawa, US was preparing for the landing invasion of main islands of Japan. So US Air Force, Army Air Force Navy and Army occupied the flat and easy access to road and ports. That means easy for the population to gather. After that, for instance, is located in a sort of choke point, most choke point of the populated areas. So it is far more visible than necessary. If you go to Okinawa, you land on Nahaya boat and right to Nahaya boat there is a port facility, US port facility. Right next to the very, very busy road and green, very beautiful facility. And after going through the traffic jam in Nahaya city, you will see either right or left side the fence of US bases. It's not necessary. So if we put half the amount to other places that exist in place, visibility will become much, much lower close to the reality of 20,000 to the military personnel as opposed to 1.4 million Okinawans. Well ladies and gentlemen, I'm afraid we are now out of time. We've had an extremely rich final panel that I think has touched on some important domestic issues, the wider regional context and then some of these sort of continually thorny issues in the US-Japan relationship such as Okinawa. Would you please join me in thanking our panel.


Students about to get off a Brainerd school bus escaped the injury after a truck rear ended their bus yesterday. The driver is being praised by the district for his alertness behind the wheel. According to a state patrol report, the incident happened on Highway 210 in Sylvan Township about 11 miles west of Brainerd around 4 p.m. Monday. The school bus was traveling westbound when it began to stop to allow children off the bus. A representative from the Brainerd school district tells Lakeland News that school bus driver 21-year-old Andrew Lawrence Dusset of Brainerd was very heads up and noticed that the Ford truck behind the bus was not going to stop in time. Dusset did not let the students get off the bus while at the stop. The truck driven by 61-year-old Scott Lee Hudson of Motley hit the back of the bus. The Brainerd school district representative said the five children on board were not injured in the accident. Hudson was taken to St. Joseph's with non-life-threatening injuries. He was wearing his seatbelt and alcohol does not appear to be a factor in the crash. If you've enjoyed this segment of Lakeland News, please consider making a tax-deductible contribution to Lakeland Public Television.


Hi, hello, and welcome back to the program analysis course. This is the lecture on program slicing, and we're in the second video where we look at particular kind of slicing approaches, namely static slicing approaches. So what these approaches basically do is to look at the program source code and then try to compute a slice without really executing that code. This general idea of slicing has been introduced by Mark Weiser in 1984, and he also proposed a static technique to compute a program slice. In general, there are of course many different algorithms that you can use to compute a slice, and many of them are static. So here we focus on the one that Mark Weiser has introduced in 1984, which essentially reduces this problem of computing a slice to the problem of graph reachability on a program dependence graph. So what the approach does is to compute a graph that models the source code of the program, and then on this graph asks which nodes are reachable from which other nodes, and by doing this gives an answer to the slicing problem. So let's start by looking at what this program dependency graph actually is. So a program dependency graph is a directed graph, so basically the edges have a direction that represents the data and control flow dependencies between statements of a program. So the nodes in this graph either represent statements or predicate expressions, so basically the boolean predicates that determine whether we're taking this or that branch if there's some kind of branching construct in the program. And then the edges in this graph can represent two things. One is that can represent data flow dependencies where basically a value that is written somewhere is read somewhere else, and here we will have one edge for each such relationship, which is called the definition use pair, and we will define what exactly that is on the next slides. Furthermore, we also have control flow dependencies modeled as edges, which we'll also look at in a few slides, but basically the idea is that we can say that a particular node is only reached because of a particular other node, and this relationship is expressed as a control for dependency through an edge in the program dependency graph. So let's at first look in more detail into these data flow dependencies. And to do this, we first need to define what variable definitions and variable users actually are. So given a program that you can represent as a control flow graph where the nodes are basic blocks, which is something we've explained, I think in the introduction lecture very early on in this course, a variable definition for a particular variable v is a basic block that assigns something to this variable v. So v can not just be a variable in a classical sense, but it can be any location that holds some value. So in particular, it can be a local or a global variable, but it could also be the parameter of a function or a property of a field and an object oriented language. And any basic blocks, basically any consecutive list of statements in a program that is always executed together. So any basic block that writes something into this variable that assigns something to this variable v is called a variable definition. And then the counterpart of these variable definitions are variable uses. So for a variable v, this is a basic block that reads the value of v. And this can be different things that basically reads the value written in a variable. For example, any condition when this variable is used or in some computation where some complex expression makes use of this variable v, or for example, to write something to the console. Any kind of use that reads the variable is called a variable use. So now that we have labeled some nodes in our control flow graph as variable definitions and some others as variable uses, we can define definition clear paths. So these are basically paths through the control flow graph where you have a definition somewhere and then use later on. And you know for sure that this use uses the value that is defined at this variable definition. So bit more formally, such a definition clear path for some variable v is a path that is basically a sequence of nodes in our control flow graph and one to nk, where n1 is a variable definition for our variable v and nk is a variable use of this variable v. And now in between these two nodes, there's no other node ni that is also a variable definition for v. So basically we know for sure that the variable use at nk is actually making use of the value that is defined at n1 simply because there's no other definition in between. Note that this last node nk in the path may also be a variable definition. So it may first use the value that was written and then also define that variable again that doesn't contradict the definition. But what is important here is that this reassignment to v occurs after it's being used. So this is kind of a corner case and we'll see examples where this matters. Also please note that this definition of a depth clear path is different in the sense yes, different from the earlier definition of path that we've seen in the sense that it does not go from the entry of the method to the exit, but instead just goes from a variable definition to a variable use. So finally, after having defined what this definition clear path is, we can define what a definition use pair is. So a definition use pair or very often also called du pair for a particular variable v is a pair of nodes d and u such that there is a definition clear path that starts at d and then may have some nodes in between and then ends in u in the control graph. So basically each of these pairs means that at node d we are defining a value and at node u this value is then used. Let's now illustrate this idea of data flow dependencies using a concrete example. So you see here the same code that you've already seen early on where we have this read of some value that we store in N and where we then compute the sum and the product based on this value N. And the first thing I'm going to do is to label each of the statements that we have in the code here. So each of them just gets a number. And as you can see, I'm labeling individual statements because we're going to compute the data flow dependencies for individual statements. We could also do it on the level of basic blocks where it's essentially the same idea just that now we use a control flow graph that has nodes that represent individual statements and the other option would be to have a control flow graph where the nodes represent basic blocks. So now what we want to do is basically write down all the pairs of statements that define something that is then used somewhere else. So I'm going to have all the potential def nodes here and all the potential use nodes there. And then of course we should have all the numbers here and the same here. And now the question is which node define something that is right somewhere else. So for example this variable N here which is defined at statement number one is going to be used here. And this is why we'll have a def use relationship between statement one and statement five. So I just put across here to indicate that. Now we can do the same for statement two which is defining this variable I which is used here and here and also here and also here. And because of this I'm putting crosses here because statement two defines something that is used at statement five and also at statement six and statement seven and statement eight. Now moving down in our code we can do the same for statement three where we look at this definition here and where it's used and then what you'll see is that what is defined at statement three may be used here at statement six and here at statement nine. So let me just put the corresponding crosses. More or less the same idea also for the variable broad broad which is defined at statement four and maybe used at statement seven and also at statement 10. Next we're looking at line five which is computing some value by combining I and N in this Boolean expression but this is not written in any variable so there's no assignment here no definitions or nothing to do for line five. It's different for line six which is assigning this to this variable sum so we have a definition here which may be used here and which may also be used here when this loop is taking another iteration. So in one iteration this variable sum is written and then in the next iteration the same variable is read and therefore we'll have a diffuse pair between six and six and also between six and nine. For line seven it's more or less the same story just that numbers move by one so whatever is written at line seven may be used here again in the next iteration or down here when the loop has exited so there's a diffuse pair then between seven and seven and also between seven and ten. Next let's move on to line eight where we are defining this variable I which may then be used in the next iteration here for the conditional check and also here to compute the next value for sum and the same here to compute the next value of broad and then also here to compute the next value of I itself. So there are four diffuse pairs one for eight and five, one for eight and six, one for eight and seven and another one for eight and eight. And as this example illustrates diffuse pairs of course can also go backward in a sense in the source code because of loops and also other constructs where you're writing something at one line which is then used at a line that maybe above the line where the variable was written. And then finally we can look at the remaining lines so at statement nine there is just a use of sum but nothing is assigned to so we do not have to make any entries here and the same for line ten so this table basically contains all the data flow dependencies all the diffuse pairs that exist in this little program. So now that you've seen what data flow dependencies are we can next have a look at control flow dependencies in order to define what these control flow dependencies are we will first define a little helper concept and this is this idea of a post-dominator. So given a control flow graph we say that a node N2 post-dominates another node N1 if every path in our control flow graph that starts at N1 and ends at the exit node of the control flow graph also contains N2 so intuitively basically means in order to get out of N1 we have to go through N2 and if this other node N2 is different from the first node N1 then we say that N2 strictly post-dominates node N2. So let's again illustrate this idea using the same example that we've seen before so as before you see the code here and as before I've given every statement some label and now the first thing we will do is to compute or write down all the strict post-dominators. So I'm essentially going to fill a table that again indicates for two nodes whether one is a post-dominator of the other one so here I will have the nodes N1 and N2 so now the definition of post-dominators talks about paths through the control flow graphs so in order to fully see why one node is a post-dominator of another you of course want to look at this graph because we've drawn a lot of control flow graphs already in this lecture I leave this as a little exercise to you to actually draw the graph and instead just show you the post-dominators here so for example for node 1 so the first statement every path that starts at node 1 and goes to the exit of the control flow graph needs to go through node 2 and 3 and 4 and 5 it does not have to go through node 6, 7 and 8 because it's not certain that we will enter this Y loop but it will definitely go through node 9 and 10 so that basically means that that N2 is a strict post-dominator or node 2 is a strict post-dominator of node 1 the same for node 3 and 4 and 5 and then also again for 9 and 10 for nodes 2, 3 and 4 it's very similar just that of course the nodes above it are not its post-dominators so for 2 we have 3 and 4 and 5 because they are definitely executed after 2 before reaching the exit and also 9 and 10 for node 3 it'll look like this and for node 4 we know that definitely 5 is executed afterwards we do not know anything about 6, 7 and 8 but 9 and 10 again will definitely be executed afterwards for node 5 we do not know whether the execution of your what the whether the check whether we go into the Y loop is followed by the Y loop bodies so 5 only has post-dominators 9 and 10 and now let's have a look at the nodes inside this loop so if we have reached node 6 then we know for sure that 7 and 8 will also be executed because we have entered the body of the loop and there's nothing like a break or so in between so for 6 we have 7 as a strict post-dominator and also 8 we also know for sure that the program will get back to checking the loop condition to figure out whether it'll have to go through another iteration of this loop and that means that 5 is also a strict post-dominator of 6 and then of course at the end we'll definitely execute 9 and 10 so they are also strict post-dominators now for statement 7 and 8 it looks very similar so for 7 we also know for sure that we will get back to the loop condition we know that after 7 8 will be executed and we know that eventually 9 and 10 will be executed and for node 8 we also know that we'll go back to this loop condition we know for sure that 9 and 10 are executed eventually and that is it for node 8 and now finally let's have a look at the last two statements 9 and 10 where for node 9 we know that 10 follows afterwards so there's one post-dominator and for node 10 there's actually no post-dominator because that's the last statement in the program so now with this concept of post-dominators in our hands we can formally define what it means that we have a control dependence informally given two nodes in our control flow graph and one and and two a control dependence means that and two is executed depending on a decision made at n1 so for example if you have an if somewhere and then something that may execute if this if evaluates to true then this means that the statement that may get executed and two is control dependent on the conditional n1 a bit more formally we say that a node n2 is control dependent on a node on a different node n1 if two conditions are true the first is that there is a control flow path p that starts at n1 and ends at n2 where n2 post-dominates every node in this path excluding the first node n2 and the second condition is that n2 itself does not post dominate n1 which basically means that it's not sure that n2 gets executed after n1 but instead n1 determines whether n2 is executed or not so let's illustrate this again using our example where now as a second step we are going to write down the control dependencies so there are three of them in this example and I'll first just tell them what they are and then we can have a look at the definition again to see why they actually are because of the definition so one of them is that node six is control dependent on node five and the reason simply is that six is executed depending on a decision that is made in five and now the same is of course also true for seven and eight so seven is also control dependent on five and the same for node eight now let's check at least for one of these three that this also matches our definition let's take the one in the middle so seven is control dependent on five so n1 is five and n2 corresponds to node seven and now let's look at the two conditions here so there is a control flow path from node five to node seven yes where n2 post dominates any node in this path excluding n1 itself which basically means that seven post dominates everything between five and seven except for apart from seven so that practically here means that seven post dominates six and now looking at the table above we see that this is actually the case because of this little cross that we've made here and now let's have a look at the second condition and two does not post dominate n1 meaning that seven does not post dominate n1 and does not post dominate five and this is true because we do not have a cross here simply because it's not for sure that seven gets executed just because five is executed good so now you know exactly what data flow dependencies and control for dependencies is and the reason why we talk about this is because you wanted to represent all of this in a graph the program dependence graph where as i said earlier the nodes correspond to statements and conditionals and the edges correspond to either data flow dependencies or control for dependencies and now given such a graph and a particular slicing criterion for a program that the graph is describing we cannot use this graph to compute the slice so let's say that the slicing criterion consists of a node in this graph n and some set of variables v which happens to be the set of all variables defined or used at this statement n then to compute the slice for this slicing criterion we basically have to look at all the statements on which this graph n depends and another way to express this is to say that we have to look at all statements from which n is reachable and that essentially means that we are phrasing this problem of computing the slice as a graph reachability problem which is a very well known problem with many algorithms to compute a solution so let's illustrate this idea one more time using our example from the beginning so what i'm going to do now is to draw this program dependence graph and then based on it compute the slice for a particular slicing criterion so to draw the graph we basically have to put one node for every statement here and to make the drawing a little easier it's a good idea to think a little bit before you draw it how you would lay out the graph so in this example i will just put all the nodes one two three four five and also nine and ten up here and then six and seven and eight down here and then i wanted then what i want to do next is to add these two kinds of edges into our graph that we have namely the data flow dependencies and the control flow dependencies so let's start with the data flow dependencies and now we basically copy the matrix that i had earlier in this example into this graph by for example saying that n is defined at node one and is then used at node five which means that we'll have an edge that goes from one to five two is defining i which is used at five six seven and eight so we'll have one edge like this and then three more like that for node two we have a use at six and a use at nine sorry for node three so that's one of them and that's the other one and similarly for node four we have a use at node seven and another use at node 10 five doesn't define anything and then for six seven and eight we have always these yeah edges to the same node again because in the next iteration the value that is defined may be used again but we also have more dependencies here so whatever is written at line six will then be used at line nine so we have an edge like this and what is written at line seven is used at line 10 so another edge like that and then we also have this definition of i at line eight which of course is used at eight again so we already have that but it's also going to be used at five six and seven so there's one edge like this one like that and another one like this and now in addition to the data flow dependencies we also have to control flow dependencies which is a second kind of edge in our pro-con dependence graph so let me just put those into the graph as well and as we have seen earlier when we thought about control flow dependencies in this example there are three of them here one from node five to node six another one from five to seven and finally one from five to eight and now finally we can have a look at how to compute a slice based on this control flow graph by just looking at the reachability of the graph so let's for example say that we care about the slice of statement nine and the set of variables that includes this variable sum then this contains basically every node n for which there is a way from n to node nine so basically everything that can reach our node nine and now just looking at the graph we can figure out which nodes those are namely node one two three five and six and eight and nine and this magically happens to correspond to the slice that I've also shown you earlier because those are the statements that are really relevant for computing the value of sum at our statement nine all right so now to double check that you've actually understood this I give you a second small program which you see here on the slide for which the task for you is to compute these data dependencies and control dependencies and then draw the program dependency graph and then based on that graph compute the slice of statement five so the last line and the variable z which will be some subset of this full program and then to double check that you've done the right thing you may actually want to post your solution in elias and give the sum of the number of nodes the number of edges and the number of statements in the slice as a kind of checksum so that other people can compare that with their own solution all right and this is already the end of this second video in this lecture on slicing so you now hopefully know what static slicing is and in particular you know about this algorithm by mark wiser that uses graph reachability as a way to compute the slice of a program thank you very much for listening and see you next time


Our healthcare system is downright dangerous. Why? Because it's built on a reactive model that's akin to waiting for a bomb to explode before attempting to diffuse it. This isn't healthcare, it's disaster control. Peter Diamandis founded a company to change that, employing modern technology, scans, tests, and AI capable of finding and preventing many diseases long before symptoms appear. But the current healthcare landscape in the U.S. is the biggest roadblock for this type of medical care. In this video, I'll show you the vision, the obstacle, and the potential solution for upending the status quo and challenging the constraints of our current healthcare system and creating a future where the focus is on extending our health span, our lifespan, and where aging is treated as a preventable disease rather than an inevitable decline. Let's create a vision for reshaping the healthcare system and more than that, how we live our lives. Let's start with the exciting and potentially controversial stuff, rich people investing in immortality. This is the killer app. Maximize your physical potential. Live, well, not forever. Why not forever? Well, sure. If not forever, live more forever. Pitchbot, is it dope? It's kinda dope. It's kinda dope. Like a robot, please. Pitchbot. It's kind of dope. Okay, I get it. It's easy to be suspicious of rich people and criticize their longevity startups as somehow selfish or unfair or immoral even, but I'm not gonna talk about any of that because mostly I just think it's bullshit, okay? I mean, who are these critics and who would they rather have trying to solve aging people with no money? How's that gonna work? Whatever your opinion is of Jeff Bezos, Sergei Brin, Craig Venter, David Koch, or Peter Thiel, you may one day have them to thank for your actual life. I'll probably do a video at some point on why billionaires are an essential ingredient in the cure for aging, but in the meantime, if you wanna check out a few videos we've already done on that topic, they'll be linked in the description. And by the way, Living Plus did actually sound pretty great. Anyway, ex-prize founder and CEO, futurist and best-selling author Peter Diamandis is putting his investor's money where his mouth is and he was recently on Impact Theory with Tom Bill Yu talking about how he's using AI to find patterns in complex health data. This is where this gets really interesting. So I know you have another company, Fountain Life, you guys are using AI, are you open to talking about this? Yeah, I'm sure. So longevity, I couldn't be more obsessed with the idea and so as you were talking about it, my first question is, how are you guys going to start getting the patterns down? Because to me, this is the big thing. You talk to somebody like Peter Atia and he's like, look, it is just next to impossible to do really good studies on diet and nutrition, what works, what doesn't work, there's just too many confounding variables. And I was like, AI is gonna answer that. Like it can pull a pattern, anything that can be reduced to a pattern, they can figure it out. Regardless of like amount of variables, if there is a pattern to be had, it will suss it out. And given that we have some people that live to 120 and some that don't, there is a pattern. Yeah, yeah, and I'll put it this way. You, there's a lot of interesting things, not only are there some people who live to 120 and some people who make it to just 65, there are large species on this planet, like the bowhead whale that lives to 200 years or the Greenland shark that lives to 500 years. And my question is, if they can live that long, why can't we? And I said it's either a hardware problem or a software problem, all right? And we're gonna understand that. This decade is the decade we're gonna understand that. It's gonna be AI and quantum technologies that give us that insight. So Fountain Life, just fountainlife.com, we have these 10,000 square foot facilities. We have four of them right now. We have a waiting list of like 50 that we'll build out globally. And you come and we digitize you. It's a full body, 150 gigabyte upload of you.  And then we do this year on year. This is not a one and done, right? So the first time you do it, we're gonna see is there anything going on that you should worry about? Most of us are optimists about our health and we don't actually know what's going on inside our body.  And by the way, the body's really amazing at hiding disease. Yeah, I'm gonna put myself back, can I go right?  Dude, that one freaks me out that what the first symptom of heart disease in most men is death. What? Is that true? Excuse me, I have to go shotgun a bottle of baby aspirin. We screen people first and then every year upload you every year. And it's looking for the patterns and what medicines and we have a large corpus of data and the AI ability to analyze that to say with your genome, with your microbiome, with these meds, with this, there's gonna be huge learnings out of this. A clinic that focuses on preventative care and uses AI to find patterns no human can see. This is a good time to mention a video we made recently on how generative AI is already being used to make the healthcare system better, faster, cheaper. Check that video out right here or in the description. I assume most people that are watching this video are like me and they'd love to get all the preemptive scans and tests that they can afford, but I mean, barring a colonoscopy. I'm looking forward to these pill-sized cameras going mainstream. Can we get some billionaires on the pill-sized camera situation? Membership at Fountain Life ranges from 11,700 for the Precision Diagnostics membership to 19,500 for the Apex-Cossierge option which includes unlimited access to a team to optimize your health on an ongoing basis. It's kind of like what Brian Johnson is doing for himself with Blueprint and he's apparently spending 2 million a year, so compared to that, Fountain Life is a steal. Fountain Life is one of a handful of other companies popping up in the space like Forward Health, Prenuvo, and Next Health, which are all sort of boutique, concierge health clinics whose service is very quite a lot, but the running theme is they're quite expensive which is why I actually got even more excited when I heard Peter talking about the development of a health insurance plan to go along with Fountain Life. This is a fun part about Fountain Life. We're building a brand new health insurance company on top of it. So if you get Fountain Life Insurance which is available today, your employees, insurance is a perverse business.  What we've done instead is when you sign up, your employees go through a set of pre-testing for us to discover any kind of disease and prevent it from a big payout later down the stream. So it's keeping your employees healthy. And what we wanna do- Wait, wait, wait, wait, how does that model work though? So is the employee paying roughly what they would pay well? They're paying exactly the same or less. The numbers are the same. And the insurance company is actually saying we're gonna do preventative scanning. We're doing preventative testing. Yes, preventative testing. And so here's what we're doing. One of the interesting things is there's a number of expensive tests we can do and a number of cheap tests we can do. And one of the things we're doing with AI is correlating which of these lower end tests correlate highly to the expensive tests. So you'll do the lower end cost test to find a signal in the noise and then you'll verify with the expensive test. So here is the Fountain Health website. If you're an employer, you can apparently get this for your employees today. If you'd like more information about Fountain Health, maybe a video that does a deep dive into everything Fountain Health offers and how it stacks up to present day insurance plans. Let us know down in the comments and we'll see what we can do. Maybe we can talk to Peter and give you a walkthrough. No promises, but let's just see how much interest there is down in the comments. The big question I have when I see this chart though is yeah, I see how for a time perhaps while extending lifespan, the money savings would seem to work out. But until we actually have a cure for death, I mean, eventually the procedures are going to get more and more extreme and desperate and therefore expensive near the end of life. So I'm still curious if there is in fact, cost savings over a person's entire life. Not because it wouldn't still be worth it to extend health span, but how do we incentivize insurance companies to do the right thing? Peter Atia, he's a medical doctor. He founded Early Medical. It's another prevention focused clinic with the goal of lengthening lifespan and improving health span. He's also the author of the number one New York Times bestseller Outlive, The Science and Art of Longevity. Peter was recently on the Rich Role podcast talking about the problem facing preventative care in the US. There's almost nothing about Canada's healthcare that I think is better than the US's as broken as the US's is because the Canadian system has got more problems. But there are two things that Canada or a single payer system does better. The first is it actually provides healthcare for all. And we don't need to get into that discussion here, but it's a tragedy that the number one driver of personal bankruptcy in the United States is healthcare related cost. That's unacceptable. So nobody should be without healthcare. But the second thing that a single payer system does very well, and this gets to the heart of what you're asking about, Rich, is the payer owns the risk for life. So there is an incentive to prevent. Right now, my health insurance is Aetna. Two years ago, it was Blue Cross. Three years from now, it's gonna be united. What incentive does Aetna have today to care about spending a dollar on me when they are pretty much positive, they will not own my risk in 20 years when the chickens come to roost, right? Like that's the fundamental problem. It's the portability of risk. And I don't, I mean, I've thought about this problem so much, but until you fix that problem, until there is true risk ownership between the patient and the payer and the provider, and that is carried out over the course of your life, there is no incentive for them to carry any of that risk. Okay, great. So a single payer system would shift the incentive, but we'll need to watch out for other problems Canada's single payer system has that we'll save for another video. But what about stopping age related diseases by attacking the root cause? Aging, how do we get insurance companies in the US and our government to incentivize this without nationalizing healthcare? Here's bioethicist and author of Hacking Darwin, Jamie Metzl, with one idea. And would it help to classify aging as a disease? We just right now, we have the reimbursement codes and this whole mechanism that when you have a disease or you get some kind of procedure, then we have, we open the floodgates of money, but if there's something that will enhance individual health or public health, we're very stingy. Should aging be considered a disease? So, you know, my effort is to go to the FDA and get indication. Neither me representing the scientists, not the FDA wants to call aging a disease. First of all, not everybody who's aged has disease. And there's ageism, you don't wanna, and so what we're trying to do is to say, oh, we wanna prevent the diseases of aging, right? And that will be a target. I don't think we need to call aging a disease in order to make progress. That's what I feel, that's what the FDA is telling me. Yeah, yeah. It's not to make progress, it's just to get money. Unfortunately. Money is required to make progress and money from insurance companies to pay for age-related preventative care could be unlocked if aging was classified as a disease. So, I do feel like we should push harder on that issue. And by the way, links to the full videos I've referenced will be in the show notes. Lifespan has a few articles on the subject of classifying age as a disease, so please go check those out as well. But just think about what it would mean if the FDA classified aging as a disease. This reclassification would potentially revolutionize research and create significant commercial opportunities. It would inspire scientists to explore solutions, accelerate the approval process for age-targeted treatments. And crucially, with more money flowing in, you'd have larger pharmaceutical and biotech companies setting their sights on it. I mean, an entire new field of age-related disease would present quite an appealing opportunity, especially given the potential market size of everybody. Can we get there without classifying age as a disease? Yeah, probably. And over at lifespan.io, we have an article on that very topic. But in your host's humble opinion, this change could democratize access to preventative care and treatments to millions, extending the benefits of scientific advancement to all corners of society. And I have personally created a change.org petition so you can urge the FDA to take this transformative step to reclassify aging, not as an unchangeable fact of life, but as a disease. So if you're interested in adding your name to that, the link is in the description. And there is hope even for the aged, yours truly included, because maybe if we can hold on for another decade, that could be enough. When will a set of treatments exist that might allow age reversal and be accessible to some segment of the general public? All right, 10 years. 10 years, beautiful. Would you pay extra to potentially save yourself a lot of money and prolong your life? Are you dedicated to what Peter Atia calls the most effective longevity treatment exercise? Would you like us to do a more in-depth video on Fountain Life or any of the companies mentioned in this video? Let us know in the comments. And if you'd like to hear about another billionaire spending his money on curing aging, you're gonna definitely wanna check out this video right here. And if you enjoyed this video, please tap that thumbs up for the algorithm and share this on Twitter or Reddit or maybe on the new one. What's the threads or something? Yeah, hook it up with a thread. And they need content over there. That's it for this video. Have a great day. Do something healthy, live long and prosper. And I'll see you back here for the next one.