Good morning and welcome. My name is Carla Copel and I'm a vice president here with the United States Institute of Peace and proudly chair The board that oversees the resolve network. I will say on coming in this morning into this room I said this is the bubbliest pre 9 a.m. Crowd I've ever seen So you're you know enthusiastic energetic and engaged either that or you're just morning people and we're benefiting from that Thank you all for joining us. It's great to see so much interest Focused on a really important topic and to have so many old and new friends here some of the Folks who are in the room or people haven't seen for over a decade. So it was wonderful to be reconnected with all of them Hopefully you know but if you don't the United States Institute of Peace is an independent National Institute That was founded by Congress over 30 years ago And is dedicated to the proposition that a world without violent conflict is essential to us and global well-being We believe peace is not only possible, but also practical and for over 30 for over 30 years We've worked with partners in conflict zones around the world to prevent and resolve and end conflict Violent extremism began to take center stage for US IP as we launched programs on the ground Particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan following the 9-11 attacks We saw in real-time communities in Kabul and Baghdad struggle to stabilize in the face of political and sectarian violence But over time we've also seen groups like al-Qaeda more fracture reform and emerge in places far beyond the Middle East and South Asia and The emergence of ISIS or Daesh has emboldened other more locally Based groups like Boko Haram and the Taliban and that's required shifts in strategy We've learned lessons about the implications of the repression of political dissent and what happens when counterterrorism strategies go wrong We're also witnessing tremendous resilience and a growing willingness Across the international community and in local communities around the world to push back and to build pathways for individuals and groups to exit violence We know now better than ever the importance of local engagement to the success of efforts to counter violent extremism Over the last couple of years We've worked closely with our partners to lay foundations for a network of local researchers who can advance data-driven policy responses To violent extremism because we believe that that local information knowledge and data Crossed with a global sharing of that information is really essential to taking on the challenge Two years ago resolve was a little more than a twinkle in the eye of a handful of adventurous researchers Candice are you a adventurous researcher whose eye twinkle was critical in this? I think so We started out with just six partner organizations, but today there are 24 partner organizations They met yesterday. They are all firmly committed to the president at the premise that research on violent extremism Will have the greatest impact if it's empirically driven and locally defined And we also know as I've said that broad global collaboration will be essential Particularly as movements morph and move and to maximize the likelihood of success in preventing and addressing violent extremism Our partners operate networks in networks across six regions of the world Balkans across North Africa the Sahel Middle East Horn of Africa South Asia and Southeast Asia Many of them are in the room today It is also a credit To the incredible resolve team that we're all here today led by Candice Rondo Along with Megan Loney Bethany began Kat Ardina John and others across US IP who have tried to be helpful in incubating resolve The resolve team is proudly graduating its first crop of local researchers from Bangladesh Who you will hear from some of them today and you will have seen some of their research outside and This is the first networks lay research leadership fellowship program We're poised to bring in a new group from the Lake Chad Basin and we hope that this is the beginning of crops of researchers in Being brought into the fold and integrated into this global network in moving forward Much of our success to date has been due to steadfast support We've had from partners at the State Department and that's why it gives me great pleasure to introduce your next Introduction in your next welcoming speaker Acting assistant secretary Tom Hushack for those who don't know Tom. It's worth mentioning He's no stranger to tough lessons in hard places and I have to say when I got this I thought it was funny and I mentioned this to Tom, so I'll mention it to all of you as well He is before taking before beginning at CSO. He served in hard places, but most recently in Vienna Which I thought was a funny juxtaposition as Juppie chief of mission for international organizations But he also served several tours in Afghanistan In leading provincial and capital-based reconstruction and rule of law efforts Was the director for Central Asia and helped post in Moscow Dushan Bay and Khartoum He was not in the cast of spies like us Few people are better positioned to talk about implementing policies and programs to address violent extremism And few people are better equipped to talk a little bit about The course of the path that the resolve network has taken and where we want to see it moving forward Thank you for joining us this morning. Thanks to all of you for joining us this morning and to those who are watching online I'm looking forward to an energizing an important discussion involving all of you and an excellent group of experts We've have gathered here today. That was a nice introduction So thank you Carla and thank you very much to USIP for your role in nurturing resolve into this This great partner and a partner. We rely on already quite a lot in in The State Department. It's exciting to see resolve now producing and sharing and discussing actionable research This is an important milestone in the network and helps all of us policymakers and Practitioners put evidence at the center of our collective CDE efforts putting research into action is a main mission of the Bureau I've been fortunate to lead this last year the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations at the State Department For three years or so. We've been Supporting research and analysis to unpack what drives violent extremism and we're happy to be able now to partner with resolve And draw from resolves growing body of research for our own analysis CSO is known within the State Department for using advanced analytics to test assumptions and explore correlations that have helped shape the Department's discourse on violent extremism in general for example our work with Terrorism data suggests countries with above-average levels of state-sanctioned violence and abuse double their risk of violent extremist organizations emerging and Countries with the very highest levels of state-sanctioned violence and abuse quadruple the risk What this means is that government simply cannot use human rights abuse Cannot excuse human rights abuses by their security services if they want to defeat terrorist groups for the long term In fact ensuring that security services respect human rights is central to reducing grievances and recruitment into terrorist organizations The link this link was highlighted by Secretary Tillerson Last week at the community of democracies ministerial where he initiated a high-level Discussion on how democratic governance and democratic values counter terrorism We're now translating this into Interaction for example last month CSO and the Bureau of International Law Enforcement Narcotics and law enforcement outlined potential Incremental steps to lay the foundation for community policing efforts in in Afghanistan for the US Embassy in Kabul We compiled this plan from the best practices of law enforcement experts in academic research the research suggests that success of community policing hinges on shifting law enforcement from over reliance on arrests and strict enforcement to to more traditional Community focused police work such as patrolling investigating crimes even Conducting traffic stops in a in a kind of organized way so So With this more proactive the research has shown us that this more proactive Policing approach would be much more Beneficial to to tamping down the emergence of more extremist organizations a US government community policing training program in Tajikistan Based on similar Principles as established a sustainable and collaborative Collaborative partnership between police officers local governments religious and civil society leaders and members of the community And so there are a lot of places where we know that this approach will work in addition To law enforcement this work builds capacity to prevent radicalization and violent extremism Any effort must be tailored to the political and security environment. That's in the particular locality But across contexts Successfully utilizing community policing as a CVE tool requires law enforcement Commit to reform and engage in extensive trust building with civil society So in addition to community policing approach another related finding from our work is that individuals Who have been forced to pay bribes for basic services were more likely to support violent extremism? So this suggests that it's the personal experiences with corruption rather than a general perception of Corruption as a national issue which contributes to violent extremism This calls for a focus on addressing corruption at the very local level As it affects people's daily lives where people feel it the most Rebuilding trust in government can help stem recruitment into terrorist organizations There are other lessons learned that I'd like to share with you I've brought some copies of a new joint document that CSO and USAID have just finalized It's out on the table with the other handouts It's a two-page preview a teaser of sorts of a larger paper that should be published by state and USAID in the next couple of months on Gathering up lessons learned on CVE policies and programs So please take a look at that We know violent extremism is context specific a combination of national structures community level Social factors and of course very personal factors. We must Amplify our impact by working with partners around the world to collectively be collectively identify and analyze especially these local factors These combine in different ways in different places This was in part. This was in part our Recentral assumption and launching resolve two years ago, which was research on the local dynamics of Violent extremism Conducted by local researchers is essential to more effectively and sustainably preventing radicalization and recruitment into violent extremist organizations and that work And that is work. No single organization or sector can do alone. It will take all of us working collectively By grounding our understanding and policy in empirical evidence and at the very local level The resolve network can help save people and communities from the heartbreak of violent extremism By short circuiting terrorism with interventions grounded in local realities I'm using that word local a lot on purpose Interventions that are aren't attuned to these local factors risk breeding new recruits and Generations of support for violent extremism Looking ahead though And this is a theme Carla also brought up. We're looking forward to results continued research Focusing equally on mapping risk factors as we have discussed Already and on uncovering resiliencies in communities. So in some ways understanding the social resiliencies applicable to cve is much harder than knowing what the risks and drivers of violent extremism are But we know every society has its own exceptional elements that can be harnessed for prevention For example, a women's networks connected through tribal intermarriage in Somalia can facilitate awareness about radicalization Societies are not always consciously aware of their resiliencies So thoughtful surveying and research can uncover and validate Existing social practices and mobilize them for cve efforts This is one of the best ways we can be prepared to confront the next wave of radicalization around the world Resolve with its commitment to capacity building and local networks can become a source of resilience in itself And to this end one of the activities i'm most excited to To have you hear about today Is the development of a curriculum to build build the capacity of local researchers Resolve secretariat and the university of san diego's jone b croc Institutes for peace studies piloted a capacity building program this month for researchers in bangladesh And i hope it will become a model for other resolve Partners to undertake capacity building and research programs in their regions and countries of interest One research area related to conflict and cve that the network could explore is the other side of radicalization and recruitment to violent extremism Looking at how to encourage How to encourage defections and disengagement of fighters from from armed groups This summer at the state department We hosted a symposium on engaging defectors deserters and disengaged fighters in modern conflicts A long title but a very Interested group of participants We can we convene practitioners to discuss civilian approaches to encourage Fighters to leave the battlefield including those who have joined violent extremist organizations such as boko haram CSO launched multi national has since launched a multinational community of interest on the topic Which now supports the department's efforts to encourage defections from violent extremist organizations and other non-state armed actor Groups by sharing lessons learned and best practices on how this is being carried out So we've tried to take the same approach taking local lessons We've learned from one place such as encountering the lord's resistance army and applying them in other places such as Countering boko haram and and encouraging defections from in the lake chad region So this new group is itself becoming a network of resiliency in vulnerable places where some of these practitioners work most actively so this is As this vital research comes together Resolved partners will need to help practitioners creatively transform this good research into actionable politically feasible policy recommendations and programs for both local and national government leaders The work of our partner researchers will touch the lives of vulnerable communities in Insofar as that identifies opportunities for effective policies that governments With whom we work around the world can put into place We have the opportunity to increase the impact of resolves research on government policies If we are intentional in pursuit of greater collaboration and dialogue between governments and Between governments and researchers as represented by the resolve network So similarly as resolve partners, we should bring our private sector implementers into conversations That incorporate their lessons learned Some of their work may be proprietary. I'm speaking of Contractors that we employ as implementing partners But but funders for resolve projects should include a requirement for some of the research That they conduct to be shared through the resolve network To benefit the wider community. So that's one of our aims in cso and I hope it is of other funders as well Shared research and a shared research agenda is what will strengthen our common work with resolve as an institution So a prime example of resolves online a prime example of this collaboration is Resolves online platform, which is connecting local voices to global conversations on violent extremism this collaboration among local researchers And and between local researchers practitioners and policy makers As the as the collaborative platform expands Um, we'll help policy makers and practitioners around the globe Amplify the the research that resolve is doing And employ it in our own analysis and programming So cso has already benefited extensively from the great research conducted by resolve and in recent a recent example The latest collaborative publication by resolve network partners the governance nexus Challenges us to focus on nonviolent tactics employed by violent extremist groups and their supporters To figure out when governance failures begin to have salience to the broader Community so this period may represent the tipping point between Prevention and reaction that may require us to calibrate our our activities And hopefully get more onto the preventive side than the reactive side After violent extremism emerges Cso is thinking through this problem and our future programs and policies will be stronger and more effective as a result of the Incredible research that resolve is making available to all of us. So once again, thank you kandis and your team Karla and usip. I know there are other people from here as well from usip For bringing us together for what I hope will be a frank exchange On the challenges we face and that our societies face from the threats of violent extremism And and I wish you the best of luck in the next program over the couple days And of course in the in the year to come with resolve. Thanks. You hear me. Okay Thanks tom and karla for for those Nice welcoming remarks. I want to welcome you all here. This is the second time around for the resolve network Putting on our our great big show We have a lot of folks from around the world here today as was mentioned by our opening speakers Including of course our panel who I'll introduce in due course In particular, I just want to point out that, you know, we have some folks from Bangladesh here who Really marked this sort of the beginning for us Of a journey that we hope will continue And there are some of them here are in the front row, but you'll be able to see them later today And hear a little bit about their experience of trying to dig down deep on some of the drivers of violent experience extremism in their own country where they're, you know, really big challenges With social change and social dislocation Polarization around religion And the role of the state And citizenship It's been for us as a team a real experience Just to get an eye full of what it looks like Outside of the, you know, the context of cnn And all the sort of news coverage, but to see the real day to day struggles that researchers in in these countries really confront When they're trying to do to open up the dialogue on violence in their own countries It's very difficult and very dangerous work And we are committed to making sure that Researchers who do this work in places like Bangladesh, Pakistan, Afghanistan You know, Kenya can do so safely and that they feel that they have a community So a lot of the people that you see here today at the various panels Will be able to tell you about that We really encourage you to go online Look up their work Exchange views with them contact them. They're a great resource and that's why we've built this network I'd also sort of talk to you want to talk to you a little bit about sort of my pathway here Before introducing the panelists who also have taken a long journey here I think what we all share in common actually is We probably have been doing this now for good 16 17 years sometimes more I think in some cases Each one of us, you know has had The great privilege and also I think the great struggle of tracing the evolution of You know, certainly u.s counterterrorism policy the evolution of violent extremism As we knew it back in 1998 to 1999 I started on this journey as a cub reporter with the new york daily news working with the investigative team there My second day on the job was 9 11 And I was a little confused and a little scared But that really started me on this journey to better understand not only Really as a reporter but as a new yorker Who saw Great destruction in the city. I spent Day after day at ground zero attending to some of the first responders there as well as You know spending time at funerals For those who were killed In the world trade center. So I know well, I think The the deep impact that can have on a community how it can Really tear a community apart when big violent events occur And how difficult it is to find your way back to peace But I spent a lot of my life trying to Connect with people who are committed to that return to peace And I think we have that here today with our panelists First I want to introduce of course, jenny of ebdo. Some of you may know her She's been around the circuit for a long time Geneve Is actually now a lecturer at the elliott school at george washington university But she's probably more well known for the work that she's done tracing You know social change and shifts around religion and particular political islam in the middle east She's the author of a number of books one of which i'm reading right now Main street in mecca That really traces the the the journey of american muslims After 9 11 and all the challenges i think that the muslim community in the united states has has faced You know with the sort of retrenchment against Islam and islamophobia the rise of islamophobia in response to To some of the events after 9 11 I'm pleased to have you here with us today jenny of course ali sufan You may know him from his many appearances in many books not the least of which of the looming towers He's sort of a featured character, but he's also the ceo of the sufan group Which brings us analysis and intelligence from from the field on the current state of terrorism and security around the world He of course is a former fbi agent who really began tracing, you know al qaeda from from the beginning Investigating the attacks on the embassies in tanzania and kenya first and then uss as coal And then of course the attacks on 9 11. I'm very glad to have you here today And sahara z's Recently moved from taxes to the great state of new jersey Where she is a law professor at rutgers university Also a profoundly prolific Writer who spent a lot of time actually taking on the critical challenge of the intersection of race and religion And responses to the the national security crisis that we find ourselves in even 16 years later after the attacks on 9 11 Sahara has also written a book on the muslim menace, which i'm just beginning to read I'm trying to do my homework. There are other books as well and other reports We're going to talk a little bit today just about sort of their experience And and try and sort of understand where we are the title of this this panel is after raka Um confronting the the new wave of violent extremism Um, and I sort of was you know casting around looking for catchy titles But it occurred to me that uh, what's happening today, uh in the middle east is I think two big tectonic shifts One is uh, obviously this sort of the loss of of territory for daish in in iraq and syria So, you know, this is sort of a a battlefield Tactical change that we've seen Over time that has very big implications for the communities in places like raka in places like mosul That are now trying to rebuild So that's one tectonic shift and I think it also probably has implications strategically For the way we see daish more of over time And so we want to talk a little bit a little bit about that But also there's this other shift that has occurred over the last year and a half two years that I think we've seen which is The the crisis in iraq and syria has driven so many people Also afghanistan has driven so many people out of the country Into the arms of europe and other Refuge refuge locations around the world, but in particular in europe, of course, we've seen a real reaction there And that reaction, um, I think has given rise to deep-seated Anti-muslim and anti-immigrant Sentiment that has also begun to kind of manifest itself in the rise of populist rhetoric As well as I think in some ways helped some authoritarian Leaning parties and even governments in the middle east Really consolidate their hold on power So, you know interestingly, you know, you have these two dynamics You know coming into play You know the question is so what does this mean, you know, what can we anticipate? Um, I will start with you genive, uh, you know from these two shifts In terms of how communities respond to violent extremism and how governments should be responding to it Well, those are two huge questions, of course, but um the work that i've been, um Conducting in the region Since 2013 really focuses on the shiasuni issue and the violence that's occurred there and the causes for that And so I think that if we sort of narrow the discussion You know isis has been largely responsible For a lot of the sectarianism that's happened because it has polarized these two communities in a way that we hadn't seen before before the the sort of emergence of isis as we know it today And um, the reason for that is is primarily because A lot of their violence was Perpetuated on a sectarian agenda. So that's sort of how they justified their violence Um against the the shia anyway and how they justified To some degree the even the establishment of the so-called islamic state that this was supposed to be a purest islamic state They had a monopoly on religious interpretation And so and that's to some degree why it was successful in these two countries that they where they occupied territory So the challenge now after isis is That this kind of religious animosity has emerged and it's hard to Retreat back to pre isis the pre isis era Because it's not only affected extremists, but it's affected general populations So if you look at iraq for example, a lot of the sunnis were displaced By isis from some of the territories that they occupied and weren't allowed to return And the sunnis of course in iraq some of them at least some of the tribal leaders supported isis Because they were marginalized by the shia government in iraq So these this kinds of institutionalized marginalization is very hard to reverse post isis so that's to me that's the Long-term effect of a group like isis is that you can defeat them militarily you can defeat you can you know Reconquer their territory, but on a social and societal level The the ramifications I think are very long term and that's what's unfortunate even after The defeat of isis in some areas in the Middle East So ali no way back. I mean There's no post isis future here where we can reconcile absolutely. I think we're going to find a lot of Post isis now how the post isis is going to be That's yet to be seen But I agree with with what we heard today. I would like to put it also in a geopolitical context Um sectarianism and what isis did was a symptom of a disease that existed in the middle east And that's a geopolitical disease sectarianism is being used as a tool Of geopolitical influence between two regional countries that's looking to expand their influence in the region iran and saudi arabia And as long as we're using sectarianism as a geopolitical tool Supported by petrodollars from these two countries We're going to have That system that exists that it creates it creates a group like isis and creates group like al-qaeda when we have Some kind of an agreement on who will have what piece of a pie between iran turkey and saudi arabia The environment that create groups like isis and al-qaeda Will basically cease to exist and you will start seeing people moving away from that This is all a manufactured A crisis between regional powers funded by regional powers supported by regional powers influenced by regional powers And we see that now not only in iraq and syria We see it in yemen and what's happening between the zedis and the sunnis I mean the zedis and the sunnis have been living together in yemen forever Nobody knows who zedis and who sunnis i mean and and now you have a civil war that's dividing the country and the only people who are literally Benefiting from that civil war in yemen or al-qaeda in the arabian peninsula before the saudi war in yemen al-qaeda and the arabian peninsula were Were less than 1,000 now the numbers is five to six thousand and this is official numbers I think the number is way higher than that I think what we see today if you want to go back to the tactical to the terrorism elements of it to al-qaeda and isis You know isis started as a terrorist an underground terrorist organization And then it went to an insurgency and then it created a protostate And now with everything that we see in mosul and rakha and other places It's going back to be an underground terrorist organization. So they're going to find themselves Exactly where al-qaeda found themselves after 9 11 when they lost their base of operation in afghanistan Isis is going to be stateless states the islamic state the so-called islamic state is going to be Stateless, and if there is no caliph they're going to be looking for a new leader One of the things the united states did and the coalition did very very well Basically killing every number two isis has isis Basically, we don't even know who's a number two now because everyone who has assigned us a number two has been killed So you're going to have an ideology and you're going to have a narrative And how are we going to find this ideology and find this narrative isis's power Is not only a state and rakha or musul isis's power in an ideology that that they use social media and they use Social networks in in different communities to include in europe to promote that to recruit that friends getting together and joining the islamic state Looking for identity looking for something, right? So all these guys now We're going to be dealing with with a problem where the islamic state realize or the so-called islamic state dash Realize that they are not remaining and expanding as was the motto of the state when it started But now they are trying to move from a state to a terrorist organization and isis comes from the same salafi jihadi movement as al qaeda After 9 11 al qaeda changed their approach and that's uh after 9 11. Sorry after the arab spring al qaeda changed their approach Osama bin laden actually one of the last orders he gave To his commanders before the navy seals bullets took him down Was just not do not focus on the united states and the west anymore Try to create vacuums In areas that's affected by the arab spring and prevent anyone else From filling that vacuum Because anyone who's going to fill that vacuum they're going to be the new american agents there And they did a great job in doing that in places like yemen in places like syria in other places and we see now Al qaeda is not only in afghanistan al qaeda in They are in syria. We see syria probably is a backbone of al qaeda organization. They are in yemen They are in the islamic maghrib and in as sahel. They were able to unify You know across ethnic and tribal lines under the leadership of an algerian abdul musab abdul wadud and They they have relationships with many different groups like j.i. That's building the network again in southeast asia And also, you know ashabab is still operating in sumalia So we have an environment when everybody is looking at isis. This is like the the the the big thing that we're looking at but however the The tree that isis came from is growing and it's spreading around the middle east And it's all fine and dandy until they decide to go back to attack the united states and the west And to go back to the ways they used to be before the arab spring But but it's it's roots if you talk about the tree but you talk about the roots and I think it's a hard I think it's very well positioned to talk about this I mean, you know what makes narratives appealing is sometimes there's a kernel of truth in the story, right? And one of the narratives is that, you know You know, kairu is corrupt You know sanat is corrupt and these governments, uh, you know our Um, you know crumbling from within So so I just want to start by saying that countering vion extremism Is not going to be effective if there is no alternative non violent way to express dissent Or to oppose the status quo and that applies in the united states as well as in the middle east And so for those who are genuinely interesting interested in countering vion extremism Which presumably everybody in the room is You have to take seriously people's grievances because what some of the studies have shown including a recent report by csis That was you know based on on a commission of experts is that grievances drive a search for Violence justifying ideology It's not that violence justifying ideology search for grievances per se or that's not the first order problem And that's why many people who are muslims or who understand islamo may not be muslims will tell you this is not about islam Because 30 or 40 years ago. It was arab nationalism or socialism or some other Ideology that was used by people who thought they had a just cause and felt that they needed to use violence in order to um, you know to Fight repression whether it was the colonialists or others So when we're talking about the sectarianism I mean not to speak about it per se in iraq or in syria or in other countries Bahrain because I think it's very locally focused But it's something that we can learn here is When resources are allocated and people are treated in ways based on their Identities particularly if they're immutable and I consider religious identity to be immutable at least quasi immutable Then you are going to have wedges that groups states or non-states can drive to create those divisions in society that can start out With protesters who drive over people To people who have guns and militant groups and start fighting with each other And I raise that because I think this is a serious problem that we have here in this country That hopefully will never escalate to that level But when you think of islamophobia or antisemitism or or racism against certain groups You know be cognizant that if certain groups start to be if particularly if state power is used To disparately allocate resources Who gets a job who doesn't who gets a high quality education who doesn't Who is disparately disproportionately? Harmed in the criminal justice system, which is oftentimes if you ask people In egypt if you ask coptics or in iraq or in bahrain or in syria and other player lebanon Obviously it's to bearing degrees But oftentimes there are grievances. We're treated inferiorly by the state and then that legitimizes our Co-citizens to treat us inferiorly and then that's where things start to be vulnerable to exploitation So and I agree with geneva and with ali in terms of The regional and I would say not just regional geopolitics. I would say international Geopolitics and I think this is something that many of us in the room appreciate although I don't think we've done a good job of Acting on it Which is american foreign policy and european foreign policy in the middle east is a very active component of what's happening in the region We can't we can't I think it's disingenuous of us and people in the region think it's disingenuous of us To go and be very concerned with vion extremism as we should be But not take the responsibility that our government and our taxpayer money is in the game And so as long as we do that we're not going to be credible actors incredible voices So I just want to to highlight that and That relates to kind of the second point which we can talk about further is The our role in supporting authoritarians and our role in you know ask yourself What did we do when the egyptian people did something that many of us thought was impossible I was amazed I was Just completely. I thought I was reading a book not seeing something live, which was that Citizens non violently in the millions overthrew a very repressive regime very repressive Read the human rights watch report under about cc right now. That's called we do unreasonable things here about torture in egypt This has been going on for decades. Mubarak did it said that did it and also did it cc's doing it Imagine living in a society like that and being able to non violently overthrow it and what did we do? What was our response? Well, we don't want to interfere Well, it's their business, which it's true. I mean we do have to respect sovereignty But then when cc wants military aid and when cc wants counterintelligence And support and counterterrorism support We say well we'll help you and then decide well. Why is there's why is ices? You know why is synih falling apart? Why is ices getting stronger in synih? Why isn't there a non violent? political opposition movement in egypt after a law they just passed to Denaturalize and strip individuals of their citizenship if they are political dissidents There's a new law that just got passed in egypt should pay attention to it And you know if you criticize them what they're going to say Well, isn't that what you all do? Don't you take doesn't Europe now take citizenship away from people accused of being foreign fighters Didn't you all send us your people during the extra the extraordinary rendition? Didn't you all waterboard? Don't you all have guantanamo bay? So we need to connect those dots if we're going to be very if we're serious about countering violent extremism So ownership let's let's talk about ownership of this very complex Policy framework called countering violent extremism So so how are you pointed out something, you know, they're apparently you know fine people on all sides You know, we don't know But real deal is right right wing extremism Has a has a narrative too that narrative is you know predominantly white and christian and european And yet for some reason That doesn't always sort of make it into the center of the conversation when it comes to policy prescriptions And it it does I think erode the credibility In on some on some level of this policy framework But the second piece which you point out and I want to hear from both of you a little bit about this is you know credibility around us and european support for You know governments led by people like cc You know, here's a man who has been At the forefront of repressing dissent For the better part of you know a decade and now is actually, you know You know in a position to do that What does that mean what message does it send when we send, you know, sort of the toys And the and the guns Without without conditions I mean should part of the policy framework for countering violent extremism on some level You know engage with that Take responsibility for it. Is that part of countering violent extremism making sure that You know that governments that are repressive and in the way they Execute the rule of law are in some ways barred from using You know european or american funds in order to suppress their own people I mean, that's you know, that's a question that that you know, washington has been grappling with for for decades And I think that the view from the region as sahar said so eloquently is that You know american policy is very duplicitous. I mean Even if you take I mean if we can just sort of narrow the conversation Even if you consider I mean forget about the ambivalence when mubarak on the days of the eve of mubarak's overthrow You know how we people were getting sort of mixed messages From the united states whether the obama administration was supporting his ouster whether they weren't But then when the muslim brotherhood came to power I mean this was like it or not a democratically elected government I'm not going to get into the I wrote a book once about the muslim brotherhood But I won't get into the details about the brotherhood. It's a very controversial subject now in washington But in any case this was a democratically elected government and again ambivalence Because The united states and the europeans as well less so the europeans, but couldn't they they didn't know what the position should be The brotherhood became a repressive government as well to some degree Because I mean for a lot of reasons, but one of which was that they didn't know how to govern They had been a banned opposition movement since their inception in 1928 so So, you know, did they know how to govern? No, did they make errors? Of course But nonetheless they were a democratically elected government the first in egypt in modern history so When there is ambivalence at these critical moments in time The way it's viewed from the region as as sahar pointed out is that It's it's hypocrisy and it's not only on a sort of massive policy level. I mean, I'll just give you an example every few months for example Bahrainis come here who are part of the banned opposition in Bahrain And they they're, you know, they try to have conversations with people in the white house with people in the state department about the human rights situation of Bahrain Which should be noted by this government It's another post-arabra uprising situation where, you know, the opposition has been marginalized their clerics are in prison or under house arrest There's basically not, you know, the the opposition has been banned Descent has been crushed But they can't get a hearing with anyone in the us government of any importance And so they go to congress and they try to lobby congress and so i'm just trying to give you specific examples So when they go back to the region And they go to a rock which they do because they're now I mean the other thing that we have to keep in mind is that post-arabra uprisings There are transnational networks now, you know, what happens in iraq doesn't stay in iraq what happens in syria doesn't stay in syria And a lot of the opposition movements Have networks now throughout the region There are Bahraini groups now based in lebanon in beirut opposition groups because they can't operate freely in Bahrain So They go back to the region and they say well, we didn't get a hearing in washington Um, you know, nobody's interested in human rights. This is the i'm just telling you this is the perception people aren't interested in human rights Because it isn't in the best interest of us policy So this country that we you know boast is concerned about humanity about Human rights about racial rights Somehow the message that's received is that the united states is much more concerned about security issues So in Bahrain, there's a base a naval base in another country There are other security issues and the same has been true about egypt And so I think that just generally speaking The narrative we have to get away from is to view these countries now, especially post-arabra uprising as a choice between Islamists and dictators Because that has always been sort of the narrative through which americans have viewed these countries and Generally speaking People have come down on this with the dictators as the preferred alternative to islamist and you know, I think that I mean because i've spent so many years writing about islamist, but not necessarily the The the ultra extremists, but I think we have to understand post-arabra uprisings that there are islamists of many many stripes They're not all violent They're not all they're certainly not democratic But we've got to stop viewing these people as cartoon characters Who behave only a certain way and who are not have no constituency because they have as holly pointed out A lot of people support them for various reasons And so we have to become much more sophisticated about our understandings of the effects of dictators And the different stripes of extremists And it's time to view the region in my opinion In the multiple layers that it exists and in the complexities that exist because it's not It's not it's no longer if it ever was which it wasn't a choice between the us siding with dictators or islamists um And so I think that's that was particularly true in the narrative about egypt is that One of the reasons I think that so many mistakes were made when the muslim brotherhood came to power Is that despite all these years of existence of the brotherhood and I lived in egypt for many years in the 90s So I saw Sort of the rise of the brotherhood during those very important and critical years and they're Really what I think was a social transformation of egyptian society But the united states didn't understand that because no one talked to the brotherhood or they did on rare occasions No one really took the movement all that seriously And that's true of a lot of movements whether they're extremists whether they're Moderate islamists And so I think there also has to be some sort of reeducation Of the foreign service in this country because there seems to be An allergy toward taking religion seriously So it's not you know, there is a religious component and maybe my colleagues will disagree But there is a religious component to these movements. They don't they're not just about violence. Okay, and that's To some degree Why they have such resonance within populations.  I mean that's not it's it's a lot more complicated than that So what they're promising is something I think also It's an alternative. It's an alternative. They're promising an alternative I mean in iraq they promised an alternative because As was pointed out earlier The states are dysfunctional. They're collapsing if not weakening states That don't provide for people what they believe they should have and to your point kandis citizenship So it is about citizenship and I think that what has fundamentally changed at least in some Arab societies is that people don't identify Don't have a national identity or at least they have less of a national identity than they had pre-arab uprisings Now, you know, they're shia or they're sunni or they're christians or they're some they have some other identity They're not necessarily iraqis. They're not necessarily egyptians. That's a reflection on on the governments But I think you know, you see that in south asia too.  These are big questions before we get into we have about five minutes. I think maybe before audience q&a But ali, I want you to respond to some of what you heard but also ask you a question You've been on the inside. Okay, you've you've interrogated. Um, you know Members of al-qaeda, you know their journey. You understand sort of what they're about You know, that's sort of that first hand sort of evidence-based approach that we often talk about Instead of this fantasy, but this is a real challenge, right? The dichotomy between, you know security And then kind of dealing with social transformation What's behind that from a law enforcement perspective? How do you cope with that in a fair and just way? Well, I think you know We can discuss al-qaeda. We can discuss isis tomorrow. We'll probably discuss a different group. We're fighting an ideology, you know Let's go, you know, I I don't like to focus on specific groups, right? We're focusing on ideology and this ideology is creating What we call violent extremism or whatever term we're going to be using for it today But where is that ideology coming from? Yes, it takes many different shapes and forms You know, it can be a knife attack in paris or a bomb in london or weaponizing a truck in knees or Even using a car as a missile in charlottesville, virginia, right? But i'm just going to focus on the jihadi Salafi element of it as it relates to the middle east and i won't be discussing, you know, the domestic Elements of the rise of white supremacy and neo nazi groups in the u.s That ideology comes partly from religion Now what kind of religion it's religion that is being promoted by our friends and by our allies Specifically, yes, saudi arabia When isis talk about the rawafid and ashiah and then you need to kill them You see that in saudi arabia textbooks when the imam of the haram in saudi arabia say, may god Give us control over the necks of the christians and the jews and the rawafid What does that mean? And you see somebody from isis beheading somebody You cannot say that that is not the religion. This is an idea of A government that's trying to use sectarianism in its extreme form as a geopolitical tool against its enemy As a geopolitical tool to expand its influence in the region We see that we saw that in the 80s because they were fearful of comedies expanding the iranian revolution and we supported them with that They established radical madrasas all over the place not only in afghanistan and pakistan But also in indonesia and malaysia in the philippines and africa and from these madrasas We had al qaeda many of these people who join al qaeda everyone almost who was involved in some You know some form of terrorism in the east africa embassy bombing in the uss call had access to these madrasas that were funded from our friends Right Many of the people that i talked to had access for these madrasas or the ngo's that operated at the time Some of it was still remnants of the afghan jihad some of it from bazenia But it the money and the ideology all came from one place and today we see the same thing We're talking about cc. Well cc just happened yesterday. This is a problem is a generational problem You know, we've we've seen what's happening today in yemen and the massacres that's happening in yemen and guess what when you talk to the yemenis Yes, the saudi's are bombing them, but it's american planes and it's british missiles and towards the end We're gonna pay for it We're gonna be handing we're gonna be holding that back Right, you know, we have 15 hijackers came from one country And the only thing we did You know, we're selling them more weapons and giving them more green cards due to whatever they want in in the region Right imagine at least 15 hijackers imagine if two of the hijackers were from iran We'll be invading tahran by then right So this is where The problem with our policy is the problem with our policy agree with sahar There is some kind of a hypocrisy And and that hypocrisy caused the situation in egypt with the cc. Remember At the time the united states Government and state department. I have to be fair for them. They supported the Mercy government they supported the government because it was democratically elected Right, but the saudi's and the emirates were really upset that the muslim brotherhood now is ruling egypt So they started a campaign in washington to convince the united states to at least sit on the side When they take back egypt because they were fearful that the muslim brotherhood is a social and a political organization That might probably force for change in the gulf states And you know what at the time We want them to be happy We want to give them what they want because we wanted to sign that deal with iran So we gave them carte blanche in yemen. We gave them carte blanche And other places even you know if you want to say in libya later after that we gave them that and the region is a mess So we have a lot of vacuums now We have a lot of problems and we have a lot of big messes in syria and in yemen and other places And to where is the end? Let me tell you the united states government and the american people have to pay for all these things because these guys When they recruit they are not recruiting against saudi arabia. They are not recruiting. They will recruit Against the united states, you know, they will Summa bil laden for example a few times Mentioned saudi arabia in his 1996 declaration of jihad But most of his terrorist attacks were against the west and the united states You know towards the end they know where the money is coming from and they don't want to upset People government or non-government who are giving them money. So when we talk about the ideology That's creating terrorism this ideology is going to continue As long as it's funded as long as it is being utilized as a geopolitical tool as long as it is Being utilized to control societies and as long as we are silent about it and we're not pushing These governments to change their ways Unfortunately, we can talk about counter violent extremism. We can talk about stopping the ideology We can talk about moderate islam All the things means nothing As we speak today Billions of dollars is being spent in southeast asia. I'll give you for example, indonesia at the time of bali The bali bombing in indonesia. They had about 30 School madrasas radical madrasas, right today 63 They operated by ji nobody is focusing on that because that thing in south philippine is very sexy. It's isis So let's focus on that Right. They are building the network They are building the network and they they repeat the same thing again and again and again Expecting different results. Guess what? We're not going to have a different results It's going to be the same thing. You think you can control these people And then you won't be able to control these people and we've seen that in syria We've seen that in iraq and we've seen that in so many different places across the region We are fighting an ideology. We're not fighting organizations. This organization will change tomorrow They will have a different name Some of them maybe will rejoin al qaeda under the leadership of hamza bin laden bin laden son When i have won al qaeda leadership decides that he is that he is You know, it's time for him to take over But at the same time we're going to be we're fighting We're fighting a social network now that look into this ideology as an identity It gives them a sense of adventure and give them a sense of belonging And it gives them a sense that they are challenging the world order that they feel is unjust and as long as we don't deal with these issues We're going to be talking about this for many many years to come So hara wants to jump in i'm going to let you jump in but then we're going to open it up to the audience so I want to respond a little to janeve and ali's insightful comments agree and some and disagree on some points So first is to say an islamist is a terrorist is like saying a republican is a white supremacist I mean that's really what i think and that's how i interpret and i think janeve is is correct Yes, there are some people who self-identify as islamists, which i define as a political actor who Self proclaims that their religion Is the basis for their political platform and it informs the policies and societal structures that they seek in their particular country Some of them will interpret it in a way that will justify Violence like white supremacists who do use very conservative beliefs That may overlap with some republican beliefs, but by but doesn't mean that all republicans support what they do It's kind of like concentric circles And to say that i realize some republicans will go that's so offensive Well, that's what a lot of political islamists will say when you call them terrorists Is this just because someone claims they have they use religion and i also use religion in my world view of my politics Doesn't mean that i'm an extremist as they are The second point and this is where Getting back to your question about White supremacy and christians vis-a-vis the rise of the alt right and other extremist groups Why aren't we as americans or why isn't europe because it also has a very serious problem I think it's a problem with the far right movement turning extreme Why don't we associate that with whiteness or christianity or their immutable characteristics, which they do have in common I think the answer is simple because they're human beings to us We humanize them we see them as members of our political community as our in group And so we have the sophistication and and and understanding to be nuanced about it individualize the problem understand There's a politics to it understand their socioeconomics to it the historical background And so we can intellectualize it and our inability to do that on issues related to political islam confounds me Until this day i cannot i understood it may be the first year two three four after 9 11 People needed to catch up there was there's a shortage as ali says and junef says of experts real experts on the middle east But it's been 16 or 17 years later So i'm not i don't think we really have much of an excuse beyond admitting that maybe we're just prejudice I mean maybe we're just prejudiced and we cannot accept That people from that country are human beings and to understand there the conflicts there the way we Understand or analyze the conflicts in the west and then that's a whole different problem We have to deal with i mean then finally i just want to talk about the role of religion And and when you use the term ideology as opposed to groups So some of you may know about the letter to berdadi which was signed by hundreds If not maybe even a thousand over a thousand Imams and religious leaders some of whom are formally Qualified or or experts where they went to al-azhar or they went to a Islamic institution to to get an education some of whom are imams by virtue of their community reputation and constituency They all And they went and it was theological they went go and look it up. It's online and it's translated into english And they took on isis's or dash's Ideology on the merits on the theological merits and said no we interpret it differently Because the truth is religion can be interpreted in many different ways and it's been used to Support the crusades and it's also been used to You know support peace Religion is i see it as a vessel that can be used for can be filled with many different things from love hate Peace violence. So I think we need to also acknowledge that even though Yes, they are using the theological Disputes that go back centuries that created what we now know as shia and sunni That that whether it's state and non-state actors and there's a reason why Saudi Arabia Portrays shiites in a negative light one is geopolitical because it wants to weaken iran and it was very afraid of the 1979 Islamic revolution because they saw it as a shia revolution and they saw it as a geopolitical Shift in the region's you know power structure But also because they have a significant number of shia in their countries who are mistreated and discriminated against And they need to justify that just like we have to justify Some people will justify our very Racialized criminal justice system by implicitly or explicitly stating that there's something wrong with the black community in America And therefore it explains why mass incarceration exists such that most people in jail are black Well, there just must be it's them not the system So this happens in every country and and so even though yes religion is relevant I still don't agree that it is about religion per se. I think it's about power I think it's about Control and dominance and yes the dashes of the world and the al-qaidas and whoever else is going to come out of the Syrian conflict which there will be groups as we know They are going they do seek a change to the world order whether it's a pan islamic state or They are challenging the wasphalian nation state order. That's true and they're using religion to justify it But you can use religion to justify anything else. So that's where I just I want to add that nuance because we have not in the west Been able to overcome this very fundamental intellectual analytical process Of looking at the middle east and central asia and muslim majority countries the way we would look at our own country and understand that if some president came in And start and try to reignite the catholic protestant conflict, which is very real and killed many hundreds of thousands of people So that's a fault line that we can play You know the the jewish christian divide there's a history to that But does that mean that we all have to fall for that? No So I see it more as a fault line in a wedge that's being played But not one that is inevitable and irreconcilable Well, let let me open up to the floor. What's great about this is you have three people Who actually share a lot of similar world views But very distinct and very subtle nuances in in how you view the problem set. I'm sure that's the case in the audience And so I want to open it up to the floor A lot of thought provoking commentary up here And I hope we'll get some from you if we have um mics Are there questions for our panelists comments thoughts this gentleman back here with the blue tie Hasan My question is actually about what seems to me a focus on the push element in promoting the ideology and often At the detriment of the pull element, which I have the impression has not at least so far Been sufficiently covered when we say for example, then that the the Saudi Wahhabi establishment is Spreading madrasas all over the globe Well, that might may be true and actually it is true, but why are these madrasas being welcome? Why is it that for example the efforts on the part of the malaysians? To spread another version of proselytic Islam that is more geared towards business Not as attractive in places such as Cambodia such as indonesia such such as the philippines. I I think we ought to Not fall into the trap of thinking that if we dry up the the source of this ideology The the radicalism that is being circulating will will simply subside Because it's as much a pull as as it is A push I'd like your comments on that I'm gonna collect one or two more questions or comments. Um, and actually so I don't forget Just kind of keep track a little bit gentlemen here in the blue shirt Uh, this will also you raise your view. Um, this was a great discussion a great panel Um, I think I like to call the us in the region as somebody that works behind the scenes Especially since the u.s. Does support repressive governments and the gulf You know and throughout the Middle East My question does refer to how We should view the war on terror, especially since we're 16 17 years into this phenomena and Do you think this we have to maybe be credible for some of these vacuums? Especially and yaman and libya Afghanistan or rocks area Um, would you consider the war on terror to be a failure of Provocative Should we take one more? Um, can I can I yeah, please Ali? Sorry for interrupting My name is aliyaz. I have two points or rather two questions One Ali Sufan that you have mentioned about the madrasas Unfortunately or unfortunately I've been trying to walk on the Particularly in South Asia. I understand Your concerns and some of the things that you've mentioned with respect to the Saudi funding and of course there are number of them that have been If not the the incubator of the earth, of course they have connections to But painting them in the broad brush Does that help us or does not that help? My my own experience of understanding the south asian madrasas There are other things that they have done and take before 1979. Why didn't we see any madrasa being so radical? They were not rough definitely But prior to 1979 we haven't seen madrasa as an incubator of the earth and to date if I if I Correct an understanding even in terms of numbers Are they more that are producing this militants or As for transnational terrorists at least in south asia. This is very small Maybe engineers are more than you know more engineers have become transnational terrorists That's why that part that I want to you know highlight and I think In painting in broad brush might actually doesn't it would not help us Rather it would be counter in a productive That's my first point and the second point that what I would like to bring in When we are at what point We talk about violent extremism In this town meaning that Has it Will it be only when it becomes threat to the u.s. Interest or is it before that? Should we only focus that it should be on yemen and and and maybe Indonesia but not definitely not in india, you know Because the veneer of the democracy in india Does it prevent us from talking about violent extremism? Because it's not about the religion only there are and it is not only strong We know that we have talked long time about it. It's not about So at what point violent extremism which has not been associated with Islam Or muslim majority countries at what point we are going to talk about that So three very, um Thought-provoking questions challenging questions on some level the first. Um, just to recap What about the pull factors, right? I mean we've been talking a lot about governments and their you know, sort of reactive suppression of dissent What is it that is drawing people back to a more religious Kind of point of view of the world That draws them to that as a as a way to Center themselves in thinking about social justice. What what what is that about? I think And what does that mean, you know, how do you treat that policy-wise? And I think that goes to the earlier, you know, sort of conversation we're having here about, you know, okay Political Islam has elements, uh, you know, obviously of ideology that can be poisonous in some quadrants But it is also a political and social movement That represents A craving In citizens to to get back to the roots of what they know as justice What they understand, you know, maybe from childhood as justice So that's question number one and then two is the war on terror terror failure I am not supposed to answer that question. I will just say it hasn't been going very well. That's my own perspective And maybe we can talk a little bit about that But Ali's point is a very good one and I think that, you know Our experience in this last year in doing research in Bangladesh And I think, you know, even the work that we're going to be now launching in Lake Chad Mason looks expressly outside of the madrasa framework because the reality is On university campuses in a lot of places where you have authoritarian structures That's the last bastion of political open public political discourse And, you know, the the conversation about religion and and citizenship isn't just Taking place in the drosses. In fact, it may not be taking place there at all So, you know, to Ali's point, what good does it do us to look at the problem that way? Good question Let me start with one two three The first one first of all, I wanted to also Hint a little bit on something my colleague Sahar said Look, I'm proud muslim when I talk about the ideology. I'm not talking about Islam I just wrote a book called anatomy of terror and I talk about all the different incubating factors that's feed into radicalization and feeds into terrorism In the book, I basically defended groups that shouldn't be defended according to many people. You're like the muslim brotherhood I talk about political Islam and the different strains of political Islam So this is all fine and dandy when we're talking about Salafi jihadism That is causing the problems around the world We're talking about an ideology that's come from one specific place Man has been like this way before Iran It has been like this where before they found oil in the eastern province of saudi arabia where the shia lives This is a third saudi kingdom. The first kingdom was destroyed by the ottomans sunnis Muhammad Ali Basha sent his son ibrahim Basha Leading an army to basically get rid of Wahhabism in Mecca and Medina Because the muslim world were going crazy with the stuff that they were doing They went all the way to southern iraq. They destroyed the shia shrines in iraq They slaughtered sunnis who didn't believe in what they believed in So the ottoman empire at the time sent an army To stop that ideological narrative that that was considered by al-Azhar at the time Which is the major sunni university for theology the most renowned entity in the world as as heresy So let's you know i'm going to put it within a context The establishment now in the government of saudi arabia is an alliance between the radical ikhwan Not the muslim brotherhood don't consider them the the radical wahabis ikhwan was the house of saudi The radical wahhabism gives legitimacy to the house of saudi And that's why sometimes you see a lot of tension between the government and between the scholars in saudi arabia Sometimes the government want to reform the scholars push back. They don't want to reform, but this is part of it So when i talk about this i talk specifically about a narrative that does not recognize anyone else It does not recognize you if you're a shia It does not recognize you if you're muslim brotherhood if you see who destroyed the sanaha Because they didn't want it to be in the hand of the muslim brotherhood. It wasn't the west It was that narrative Okay, so i'm talking about specific narrative So when i talk with the gentleman with the blue tie since she called you the gentleman of the blue tie When i talk about these kind of things I put it within that context now why malaysia can't do it why indonesia can't do it. They don't have the billions It's a lot of money Why didn't happen until 79 as i said It created a lot of fear internally and i spoke about the geopolitical tension with komeini trying to export his version Of shia radicalism around the middle east So there is there is a reason why they tried to do that, but we've seen That they haven't been able to control that So when all these radical guys go and start establishing madrasas and preaching an ideology and a narrative That is not known to the muslims who live in that area Just the other day Okay in singapore an imam from india who studied in Medina He's giving a lecture On friday and he started praying for god to kill all the jews and all the christians in a place like singapore multi ethnically place So they got him the singaporeans arrested him immediately and he said hey, that's what they say in medina. That's islam. They said no, that's not islam We said the the minister himself said show me any scripture in the quran that said god kill all the christians and the jews That's not islam So they had him go and apologize To the synagogues and to the christian churches in singapore for what he did and they published it in the newspapers How he apologized this is I am all fine and dandy in establishing madrasas in schools It's not about the madrasas ali.  That's what we're talking about. This is not islam Islam has so I mean anybody who can say oh that islam is it's like a rainbow There are so many different schools of thoughts and theologies and sects and ideologies and beautiful stuff Islam came with literature on poetry and science Not isis and dash You're just sitting to the left One in doubt always go left It's an FBI agent in the room.  Yeah The only thing I just want to offer a cautionary note Which is that we've spent a lot of this discussion Sort of identifying the suni world as the culprits And I want to draw your attention to the fact that as ali said one of the principle principles and objectives of the iranian revolution in 1979 was to spread a certain type of religious interpretation in the region The arab uprisings have allowed iran to do that many many years later So it's one thing to talk about suni governments being responsible suni groups being responsible, but There is also a lot of violence being committed by shia groups in the region And some of them are militias. They operate Fairly freely in iraq and syria. They're funded by the iranians. And so it's very important not to I mean to see this conversation You know in both respects not just as as a problem that the sunis have created because the shia on the other side Are doing all sorts of things in the middle east that really go Pretty much unrecorded because there's so much focus on the suni side. There's focus on suni salafist There's focus on suni extremist groups, but the iranians the the arab uprisings just to be Simplistic about it. We're a great gift for the islamic republic So I just want I'm not an expert on them addresses But I have read some You know reports and I wanted to mention them because I do think there's some truth to it Which is that when you're talking about the pull factors My understanding in places such as pakistan and other places where madrasas are numerically, you know higher Is that they're similar to the concept of charter schools in the us in terms of its parents who either have Well in the us of e parents who have only access to very very inferior quality of education because the public school system To which they have access to is Just unacceptable and so these madrasas are an alternative to which they don't necessarily know Is may ultimately indoctrinate some of their children to do things that are illegal right or violent Um or in other places. There's just no public schools So it's no coincidence that many of the kids based on my understanding that go there are from very poor Areas and so this gets back to the human rights the human development And all of these other underlying Circumstances that make it much easier to recruit and indoctrinate Young people frequently whether they're Miners or whether they're 18 to the mid 20s, which is what many of these you know foreign fighters fit Under but also those who are local. So when we talk about these issues, we need to be thinking about When these madrasas if there was a Social service provided by the state that was of decent quality Then people wouldn't be as interested in attending or sending their kids there. I'm not saying it's a full proof method If you have an issue with political islam because maybe you would just have a very strong view of the separation of religion and public life Which is a very american view And there are many egyptians who have that view I tell those egyptians Well, why don't you work towards making sure that public education and food and poverty is alleviated? There's food available.  They actually were much more moderate than than their replacements So and then in terms of the war on terror who it depends on who you are Whether it's a failure or a success If you're the fbi, it's I think it's quite a success. You're See that's the problem with the left they make stuff up and they keep going with it It is a disaster dude disaster Let me make my point. It's somewhat of a sarcastic point, but I think it's a point that we as americans need to need to keep in mind One I think the authorities the law enforcement authorities to surveil to investigate to prosecute have expanded Quite a bit for law enforcement in the united states which affects adversely our civil liberties The budget for counterterrorism is quite high. I read something from the csis report that said and I I question it's accuracy, but maybe I mean it's something around two billion dollars for counterterrorism in 2016 for the fbi which sounds quite high But the budgets have increased exponentially for counterterrorism So if you're in the business of counterterrorism Including being private contractors improving being people who sell military weapons The industrial comp industrial complexes is you know is booming So the war on terror has created business for many people including the dictators because now anytime you criticize CC or whomever, you know, whatever leader they say look I Safety and security and stability and I need this in order to keep so I'm not serious so they don't end up like iran So it depends on where you stand. I think that if you stand from Human rights perspective from a human development from a good governance from a democratization perspective And from a long-term stability perspective, I would say it was a failure in that regard So where we stand right now is between this audience and coffee, I believe So and I don't want to do that. You guys look dangerous Thank you so much for coming here today and and really helping us think through these things Really appreciate the thought-provoking nature and also the nuanced fisticuffs up here. Thank you for It's marked, okay That's fair true Yeah, it's interesting Yeah, ahead of counters and policy and strategy Which included also more practical things Until see we're now 17 December 12. No, no, sorry 2012 December 2012 and I did that for more than five and a half years Before that I was responsible for reforming our whole integration civic integration system and policy So it's a cve relevant topic I worked a lot before that on social cohesion in risky neighborhoods in the big cities Actually at the time also in a way negatively inspired by Uh, the suburbs of Paris Already at the time. So there was a political question What is it that we should do? to avoid certain neighborhoods to completely Uh, basically disengage from that society Become a world on its own At the time, of course, the main as you know, the main concern was not at all terrorism or radicalization. It was crime Sam Oh, yeah, I didn't know that I must say when I look at what our congressmen do in the rare occasions when they leave office Is to learn that after years of service All cities are built for bicycles In a way And it's not in the mindset of the car drivers to reckon at all with The fact that you might suddenly See Sorry Yeah, yeah, sorry Good morning, everybody Good morning, um And welcome to the second session of this of this conference My name is Eva of in camp. I'm the deputy executive director of hedaya The international center of excellence for countering violent extremism Um and this session will be on the topic of violence And more specifically Entering violence. What is it? That make people at the end of the day decide that they are willing And able to use violence and when we talk about violent extremism, of course I'm talking about violence against innocent people primarily But also the other question What about exiting violence And of course from let's say a law enforcement counter terrorism cv perspective This was always a part of the core of what we were looking at Apart from ideologies things that we discussed also in the first panel The main concern was what is it that actually make people An individual take it to the next level and commit an act of violence Uh, and even now what we discussed this morning if if which it looks like will happen The military fight against dash in iraq and syria will be in military ways a success Of course, there are still many questions Related to what is next? What's the game after that? What about violence or peace and stability in iraq in syria? What about dash moving to other places? It was mentioned before the philippines, but maybe they are preparing in other parts of southeast asia like indonesia Libya they tried not really a success, but of course This question of what is it that we should understand In terms of why people actually join and support the violent fight Is still very relevant The whole idea The whole ideology the message that was sent by dash Of course is not gone by their military defeat on the ground And so probably the people who were at the time attracted to them Will still be attracted to them and if it's not them What will come after that I still remember I had discussions with colleagues in my former positions on al-qaeda seems to be almost gone Are we now entering a safer world or not? But there's also the other element and that's why this this topic is very relevant also right now Since the military fight is becoming in military terms a success more and more people will actually leave Leave syria and iraq And will either go to the new theaters or we'll go back We'll go home And then the question is what is it that we can and want to do with those people We can all put them in jail forever Might in many cases in legal terms Not be possible because you need the legal evidence to put people in prison Or you cannot put them in prison forever and at some point of time they will come out again And they will go back to our your communities to our communities Or if we cannot put them in prison because we are lacking evidence what to do with them And so there again this question of is there a possibility to at least at least to work with them And their communities and their families and their friends and their peers To make them Leave the opinion that violence is justified and should actually be out And i'm very happy and also really honored that we will Have a discussion on this very intriguing topic And that's the other part violence for many people of course Unfortunately is also a reason why they want to join Violence for governments, but also for terrorist organizations. Sometimes is the ultimate sign of authority and power And so young people some young people Because of the atrocities that they see online In other forms of media because of the violence that was exercised by this Actually wanted to join because this was the sign of the leader the strong leader that they wanted to join But i will not go into more detail on the topic because we have the true experts sitting on the left side of me And i will start with dr. Dale Ackerman Who is the rulf and richard lecerus professor of anthropology And human relations at darmath college And since 1968, which is the year that i was born He traveled Extensively in the middle east Including long-term field research in morocco and oman And one of his most recent books are muslim politics And the middle east and central asia and anthropological approach It's a great honor to have you here Um Next to him is dr. John worgan Who is a professor in the global studies institute and department of psychology at georgia state university Dr. John has a phd in applied psychology And his research focuses on understanding psychological Qualities of the pathways in two through and hopefully also out of terrorism And he is one of the leading world experts on terrorist psychology And he is currently also focusing on the psychology of religious conference because the percentages of people at least in the western context Who join uh, uh dash who are actually religious conference is very is high And um, he also is uh, researching the process by which children Became involved in terrorist organizations Um, and he is also, uh, a non-resident research fellow of of my organization hadaya and by the way Talking about the reintegration what to do with people who are returning from isle In syria and iraq returning to their home countries of course There's also now a growing concern what to do not only with those who actually joined the fight or decided to travel to join the fight But what about their family members their wives, but also the children Children can be victims, but they may have even become part Uh, of the fight because we know that of course part of the modus operandi is also to use Children so what to do with them. So I think it's a very Again a relevant topic looking at the many challenges that we face nowadays And then, uh, finally on my far left, uh, dr. Mark sageman Who is a senior fellow fellow in the foreign policy research institute center for the study of terrorism And also, uh, the founder of sageman consulting And after a year at the u.s. Secret service, he was the new york police department's first scholar in residence for over One year and then for three and a half years He was the special advisor to the u.s. Army deputy chief of staff On the insider threats, which included terrorists and spies Uh, and also dr. Sageman of course has, uh Offered many, uh, very well known and outstanding research publications The latest one, uh, I think was also about turning to political violence And with that, I think We have set the stage for for a good Discussion the last thing that I was actually asked to also mention to you is that Two of you are also participating in the international panel on exiting violence Which is an initiative that was launched mid Uh, mid 2016 Which is an initiative that actually is about building a community of, uh, uh Outstanding scholars and researchers to study the topic that we are going to talk about today So what is it that triggers somebody into violence? And what is it that we know and understand about the possibilities to actually leave violence behind Um On the topic of of violence and I already mentioned several things. It's one of the most I think complex and intriguing Uh, topics. Uh, there's a lot of violence. There's violence used by states There's violence used by individuals in their own social setting. There's crime And then there's of course violence that is, uh, exercised by terrorist and violent extremist organizations Now there has been A lot of research on trying to understand better Um Both ways going in and going out but even in the process of being a terrorist. How does it work? Uh, but my main first question to to all of you From a strictly scientific, uh, point of view What is it that we do not yet Fully understand or not yet understand enough to also be able to, uh, uh develop practices and policies That should then actually drive, uh, reducing the threats that come from Those people and also the understanding of the process because I think normally speaking It's not that somebody knocks at your door and then when you open this person says well, uh, I'm asking you to join me To kill innocent people It's normally a process Uh, it starts somewhere And then, uh, at some point of time you are in a room and the only possible next step seems to be That you have to use violence against other people Once you're in you cannot leave So this whole process and the good news is we can look at this from The perspective of an anthropologist From psychologist and then from let's say law enforcement security perspective So please what are the main gaps That we are still facing besides me? I'm from law enforcement. I'm a psychiatrist. I'm a sociologist. Sorry I'm not a cup. Sorry Please, uh, can I start with you? Well, that we have a rather broad Uh, range of things that that have been named and since your last phrasing Uh, suggested a number of discreet academic disciplines combined then with law enforcement and Uh, possibly because you're dutch very politely not mentioning political intelligence In a public room I would suggest that one of the great divides In understanding what's going on Is not between the academic disciplines where I think we all agree That like the blind men feeling the sides of the elephant We're pretty good at listening to one another But the great divide is between The world doing law enforcement, especially political intelligence, and I'll give an example or two And uh, and then uh, the people who are trying to understand things let me give an example In 1982 usually anthropologists don't want to deal with government people, but uh, I Got permission from a very very Senior level in the Sultanate of Oman To look at the intelligence documents up to a certain prior year Which amazed me I wrote a one page letter to the very senior person And that person wrote five words Which I never saw the five words written, but I've heard them by several Intelligence officers directors since give him what he wants And apparently in top-down organizations If somebody at the top says give him what he wants nobody asks what the limits are So I had very good conversations and could speak With ex rebels or intelligence people through The early 1970s it was quite interesting thing that came about which even intelligence officers would agree with is When communities Stopped talking To government officers Because they didn't know what was going to come next or the government was incapable That was one of the most clear predict predictors that very bad things were about to happen Or if people were were uh, if people Suddenly stopped talking or would be ambiguous Well a land rover a tribal leader would say went through Roasis last night, but it was dark. I didn't know whether it was an intelligence person or somebody else. I don't know You'd report but not report anything useful I thought of that when because I've worked in morocco since the year of your birth When in 2003 where some moroccan say whenever i'm in the country, they know something bad is going to happen And in this case, there were major terrorist attacks against jewish Uh targets and others in casablanca At a certain time not as much damage as the terrorists wanted because They misunderstood How jews use certain high holy days and when they would congregate so they ended up not being very effective But the activities were less bad than they could have been Because even people in the most deprived Meadon veals or shanty towns around casablanca where the main contact with police Was extortion at that time People saw that it would be worse If for them if they allowed the the Terrorists to take over and they would go to the authorities and talk When you have that sort of rapport when you have an overall sense of community, it can be better Final example, but the reason of the examples is simply to give a concrete sense of how we might learn something Would be marrakesh bombings in 1992 if i remember correctly 93 Okay, good. Thank you where Where somebody in tanjir Missed an appointment with me and the man said he was the head of the deputy head of the mosque greek mosque of tanjir He said i'm sorry. I was with the police and i said are they bothering you again No, he said i am in charge of all the i'm the the Amin of the jewelers i went with the list of all possible algerians and foreigners who are Getting authorization to sell gold recently in other words to finance something and uh and uh And i said but i thought that you were very against working Co-operating with the police. Oh no, he said this is nothing political. This is national This is a national event. So once again a strong sense of community now can work the other way 2004 in antocha That this time i'm getting my year right That's correct In spain where i was at the time see it so it works for spain too. I come there then something bad happens the the spanish police Refused to talk to the morocans because they said oh they only torture so they don't know anything And this might be an older notion of morocan police and security methods And so even the head Of the the antocha bombings later discovered who was a phd student from tunisia Studying at the university that otono mande madrid Nobody from the spanish police bothered to speak with his thesis supervisor Fluent in arabic to see whether he might have something to contribute about the personality or background of the individual It was the morocans who with the names were looking at the extended families of people in morocan offering to cooperate Fortunately now there is such cooperation But each time one thing i would look at in what we're trying to do is not just at psychological things prance invested lots of money In figuring out Psychological ways of dealing with people i let my esteemed colleagues talk about the success of that Don't blame psychology for that. Thank you. I want I want just the contractors In this case, but but the uh the the the more important thing is being open And not having everybody work for long at law enforcement Purposes but looking at signs of healthy communities. When do people in a community? monitor one another And recognize the damage to the community When you allow violence to take hold because sometimes that might be morally justifiable at other times As in anti-colonial struggles, but at other times it might not be So that's it But but the one takeaway that I would suggest is when you figure out how to work with communities And uh, and it's going to come and go. It's tricky. It's a kind of a moving sort of target But when it works, then you're in a good situation Okay, thank you. So this is about the crucial role of communities. I presume also in terms of if you want to Uh Get people away from violence again, you need to communities Build good relationships of trust and don't only use them as a security resource But empower them and give them room To do what only they can do best which is to protect their own community If I'm a suture, please Please dr. Sure. Um, hi everyone I'm going to offer a Different kind of answer There's a different kind of answer There are there's a lot we know about how why when where people turn to Bond extremism and to specifically answer your question from a scientific perspective. There's also Quite a few things we don't know Let's begin with what we know Four decades of social science research on terrorism has taught us two things there's No clear profile and there probably isn't Going to ever be one We do know however that people become involved in violent extremism for a bunch of reasons Those reasons are not that difficult to identify Good research will make those reasons clear Now there are a few different ways in which we can Group those reasons we can talk about push and pull factors We can talk about big issues little issues, but but there's a pretty identifiable Constellation of factors or or shopping list of factors we can identify Some of the bigger reasons would include things like grievances One common theme among People who become involved in terrorism is that they are fueled by moral outrage against something They come to believe that there is gross or grave injustice being done And that it is up to them either individually or as part of a group to act In one very particular way to redress that injustice Sometimes they acquire that view themselves. Sometimes they have to learn it. They have to learn it either through With the help of an ideology with the help of a recruiter With the help of a friendly bunch of guys that can that can help propel them along this process that they themselves might not even be too sure about Ideology plays a an important, but I think frequently misunderstood role in this One of the narratives that's quite popular in in thinking about terrorism is that Somebody first becomes ideological and that then propels them along some kind of Pathway or conveyor belt. I don't see very much empirical evidence for that at all I actually see far more evidence for people becoming Ideological as a byproduct of some kind of involvement So it's quite a quite a counterintuitive idea the the idea that actually you become more radical in an ideological sense The more time you spend committed to this kind of activity Ideology can be intoxicating. It can be so Powerful as a sustaining force and comforting to someone who is trying to make sense of otherwise Fairly low-level and tawdry activity Don't underestimate the role of the little factors in this Adventure excitement camaraderie the thrill of the chase The the personal benefits the lures that very often So-called formers or tend to be reluctant to talk about because they fear it might make them look bad They feel it might reduce their their their their motivation to something not quite respectable so When I could speak about this for at some length my point is to say that We know what these influences are we know what these factors are Where things become a little bit tricky is in appreciating that these same influences can change over time As somebody spends a little bit more time with any of these groups For example, they may become more ideological like I said that For us might mean that the way in which they explain their behavior might change So it can be very very difficult to actually ascertain what what drove them into the group in the first place That's the challenge From a scientific perspective. It's one thing to identify this constellation of of of what some would call risk factors It's a whole another ballgame to try to Figure out how we can harness the predictive value of that And let me tell you the science is nowhere near Allowing us or enabling us to do that My learned colleague to my left here wrote a terrific book recently called a turn to political violence Which I think is a scientifically more accurate way of describing what we've In shorthand referred to as the so-called radicalization process There's a lot we know but at an individual level. I think we tend to lose all sense of prediction here and A lot of stumbling blocks I have to put on my academic hat for a second and say The scientific and academic community writ large is just not yet sufficiently engaged with the study of these issues We're just not there yet. There's a resourcing issue But but academia writ large needs to engage with this far more systematically and rigorously than we have done and That is the rate limiting factor. I think in uncovering or discovering Are making known this this this complicated process Okay, I like to say to my students. It's not rocket science It's it's a lot harder than rocket science, but unless we get behind it and have a plan We're going to be having these same discussions 20 30 years from now just like we're doing right this second Okay, thank you Dr. Mark. She's well, uh Hello Talking is not the best medium for me to convey my ideas. I write and If you want to really understand what I'm trying to say Read what write a write as opposed to what I say I've been just reading and writing the last Half dozen years almost And so I haven't really been speaking publicly But in terms of this question The problem is not what we know when we don't know We actually do know a lot. I agree with john What we are missing is a conceptual framework In which we can understand what we know put things together Unfortunately, we are prevented from doing this and we are preventing from doing this By the concepts we use every day like violent extremism.  You know, I've been looking at violence for gosh 40 years now And I still not know what violent extremism means So, you know countering violent extremism kind of You know the role of ideologies is over cognitive view of things as uh john just described that we have ideas and we're going to Follow them through as a psychiatrist. I wish it were true You know, I had patients who never wanted to do all those pathological behavior that they you know perform and and they understood why but they couldn't help themselves so How do we conceive of this and uh The first thing is that most research On this topic is funded by the state And that creates a real problem because that that Gives you a certain blindness As to the role of the state in contributing to violence I was actually shocked this morning when I heard the panelists You know outline how the states whether it's an american state or the saudi states or the iranian states or the iraqi the syrian state Uh contribute to violence it does but the problem is that if you fund it by the state, you're not going to Dwell too much about that. Otherwise your funding will Will end and this leads to stagnation in in research because there is a big taboo about looking at the state So I've been looking not only at islamic violence Uh, you know at these panels not just this panel, but so far For about two and a half hours. We've been obsessed with islam. It turns out violence Is not limited to islam You know, I wish it were you know like that, you know, just forget about those guys and no violence It's you know, it it's heaven everywhere else Well, that's not the case and never was the case And so what I did is I looked at history in four continents over 240 years two and a half centuries and tried to look At the process as you outline of Turning to violence And that's the topic of Of the book and try to see what's common to all of them and what's different to really try to understand What's common and the first thing that I realized is that the process is actually a fairly simple process And I disagree with john. There is a profile. The problem is that it is not an objective profile with indicators It's a subjective profile Every so-called terrorist is a soldier protecting his community. That's how he thinks of himself you know, so basically Soldiers for any state if viewed from the other side could be labeled the terrorist like American Americans are labeled terrorists in the Middle East because we kill people Just as you know, when we see the people who kill us here, we call them terrorists if they're non-state actors So what is this process? This process is very simple The first is an acquisition of a politicized social identity and the collection of those people really create an imagined community a political protest community and under three condition That community some people in that community will become violent The first one is an escalation of conflict between the state and that community and you have to analyze violence in a dialectical way You know, we've known that forever except for terrorism and terrorism you just focus on the terrorist and you forget about anything else There is no context to terrorism. Sorry. That's not how people think of themself or Or behave so you have an escalation of conflict between those two Including a verbal escalation Talking about war war metaphors. I mean just What you see right now in the last week or so between our great leader and the north korean leader It is not conducive to peace Anybody who thinks that is out of his mind So the first is the first condition is an escalation of conflict between those two entities The community that's been stigmatized and the state The second is a disillusionment by people in that community that they can address the grievances through legal means And the third is as john just stole my funder is absolute moral outrage at the egregious attack by the state on one's community Under such condition a few people in that community will volunteer to become soldiers to protect their community And this leads to violence and after you know, the threshold of violence is Is breached Then you have a whole dynamic which of Unfortunately favors more and more violence. So how do you break from that cycle? I'll answer that in the next round of question One one So that That profile is there. It's being a soldier.  The profile is there It's a subjective profile. So yeah, there is a profile, but It's subjective and so all those indicators are worthless Well, those are two different Those are two different points. Um saying that the indicators are worthless Is fair if you're trying to use the indicators in a way that Can't be used but but there is no meaningful valid scientifically worthwhile profile Part of I mean, there's a couple reasons I can give you for that But the one that I want to focus on is your issue that the argument that they're soldiers That for me is a mindset or a mentality But not everyone becomes involved for the same reasons not everyone wants to be a soldier No, but the profile he said is the soldier that that's universal among all of them Show me one example of a guy who actually was one who did not think of himself as a soldier for his community Just one and I give up my ideas That's that's that's a I'm not asking you to give up your ideas, but that's a separate argument again the effectiveness Two or three years ago of the islamic state recruitment narrative was when they very explicitly said to people There's a role for everybody They acknowledged and they embraced the fact that that that some potential recruits out there would look and and think Well, well, this is this is involvement. It is it is it is literally becoming a soldier and a lot of people were turned off by that they switched the narrative and recruitment escalated and increased exponentially We need doctors nurses soldiers teachers Are they all soldiers? They are part of the project They are all as equally committed to it But they they go to it for different reasons with different expectations and have different Feedback if you like from those roles So so I argue all you want about a profile, but I want to see the evidence for it Well, the evidence very strong actually if you Interview those people I can't have you know who have gone and come back and they They don't really You know recruitment is another notion that's totally worthless people were not recruited They volunteered to go to iraq.  And when you live in debaulieu in paris around paris around a lot of the cities in france Where you have no job nothing no future and then your friend tweets A picture of himself In a nice villa, you know North of Aleppo with a swimming pool and then calve a four by four in which he drugs bodies You know people say wow, that's cool. That's jihadi cool. You know, I'm going to go over there and I'm going to become a soldier Yes, they are a few that uh went there for humanitarian reason But again, they went there because they saw their community being endangered And they went there to try to help the community either by fighting or by You know becoming Healthcare or humanitarian thing in a sense. I mean The people who went to syria The physician have not come back home and count blown up people They they've gone there and the reason they come there. It's to really help the community. It's exactly my argument We have five more minutes before I go to the to the floor and I had one question indeed on exiting Violence so and as I said it's more and more even now a very substantial challenge for all of us Uh, are there is there any by the way real scientific research that shows? How that works and what triggers it is it possible? I presume there is but can you elaborate on that and also All of you have worked and researched in different countries and communities also I was also wondering related to the first question Um What about are there and I presume there are cultural differences Uh Between communities between countries that either make this more easy or more complicated That should be taken into account If we try to understand and again from a scientific point of view also as a driver for what to do And I'm talking about cultural values concepts of honor respect shame Uh, how how how does it work within a person? Or the community the family so you have a son who joined the fight now is coming home So what will your neighbors think what is your family thinking? What does your community think? Will you accept him back?  So how does it Work and I think looking at what's happening now already in some at least European countries These are one of the challenges that people are facing and also of course the broader community One's a terrorist always a terrorist. You're either a good guy or a bad guy.  Yeah, but you are here So please again from From your scientific point of view. What is it that you can share with with us? Good since I'm an anthropologist We always are told that we're the specialists in quote honor But to keep that honor let me step back one thing because one thing that both mark and John have emphasized very much. I think Is how quickly the questions change and how adaptive and skillful the Al Qaeda has been in reaching an audience And in adapting perhaps quicker than states to figuring out what is going on And included in that is is something that I've picked up From a lot of mark's work And and which one has seen at various times in turkey in the last 30 years It's when a state goes after a formal organization as you'd have in a good Marxist group the best defense is not to have a clear Organization to go by networks of influence in which it's never clear What the finances are this is very professional and a lot of organizations specialists say This is the way a lot of modern enterprises that are not terrorist organizations Such as pharmaceutical companies Well Work at the same time, but for me a cue clue Is looking at the nashaid the the you know the kind of the chance that Al Qaeda does in very beautiful ways at various times of saying You know give me my backpack give me my arms My brother you don't have to follow me Just you kind of kind of watch in my back You know in other words, I'm the one that's going to go out and defend you You don't have to do the same thing will do others very mainstream sorts of arguments That do not emphasize the killings and beheadings that's a different specialized Sort of thing to do but for me the important thing Is looking at these changing notions including when the sense of honor for whatever community is or something else is going on But the temporal part of how quickly Groups can change and objectives to reach An audience is very important or in this country now we find major policy breakthroughs coming by tweets Which to me is astonishing And leaving people then to decipher decipher tweets. Well, maybe this is learned from Al Qaeda I don't know but I hope we get beyond it I still want to really give also the audience the the opportunity to ask questions. So if you could please keep your answer Relatively short. I know you again we can talk about this for days, but I want a very quick answer to your question One inevitable consequence of getting involved in terrorism or violent extremism, whatever we want to call it Is disillusionment You will become disillusioned Sooner later it depends on your individual circumstances and for all kinds of reasons One of the big issues that new recruits in particular struggle with is the gaping chasm between the the Fantasies that were either acquired or imagined or or sold at the the recruitment or the becoming involved stage When they were flirting with the idea of what it might mean to be involved versus the on the ground harsh reality Now how you cope with that disillusionment again can vary Some acquiesce. They just uh, you know, whatever metaphor they they double down They they bite their lip and they just get on with the business at hand Sometimes they have to work even harder to justify to themselves What they're doing as a result of that others don't They find it very difficult to cope They seek a way out. Sometimes that way out is open to them. Sometimes it isn't Two main sets of reasons as to why people disengage from these organizations is our movements They either want to get out and they can voluntarily leave or You know fiery death is rained on them from above or somebody breaks their door down and they get caught voluntary versus involuntary disengagement The de-radicalization part of that, which is a whole another issue, which I don't think we're going to have time to get into Um is a related but distinct issue There are at least by my count 45 46 known initiatives around the world now that try to Harness knowledge about the disengagement process to figure out. Well, okay. Why exactly are people leaving? And what can we do? You know, can we can we make known the reasons people get disillusioned And can we do that? Can we use that for two things? Can we either Use that information to try to facilitate disengagement and or Is there any inherent preventative value in making those kinds of stories those kinds of narratives? No, I think there is I think our execution leaves a lot to be Um There's a lot to be said about how poor our execution is there, but the principles I think are sound. That's all I'll say for now Thank you. Dr. Sesson just a very small point one Dale hinted at it In France, which now has probably the largest de-radicalization Project in Europe and the world probably Um They under misconception They think that terrorism is a mental illness And therefore the highest psychology psychiatrists to talk to them to get them out of this illness to cure them from this illness This is complete nonsense political violence is first and foremost political And yet nobody ever wants to talk about politics politics is a key to it. It is political violence now John talked about Individual disengagement and I think it may be important But a lot of people are very committed and engaged in in their fight To me the the real challenge is the people are violent a small small minute Minority in the larger political protest community What you really don't want is that community to become violent all of them So you have to prevent that. So how do you do that? Uh, that that's really extremely important. You need to distinguish The people are violent from the larger community Which is not yet violent but has a potential to become violent You try to isolate, uh, the people are violent and then you try to encourage this community to really Uh, disavow the violence that as ineffective or really not And try then to bring them back to reintegrate them into society To uh, bring them back to the fold And this is exactly the opposite of what every single government that I know with the exception of the Danes perhaps Is doing right now It's the exact opposite Distigmatize that communities they try to put everybody in prison They're trying to come put them through de-radicalization program like in England or France This is the opposite of what you want to do. You want to come Create a sense of social identity that transcend that small narrow parochial community and you know, I'm not saying it's easy But that's really the major strategy and they have to really come start looking at that to to try to Uh, de-emphasize the violence within that community and bring it back to to uh, to society Thank you. So this is another example of how Actually, the community is part of the solution. Well, absolutely So by securitizing that community as such you lose one of your main Tools to actually try to work on the individual That's how I understand what you are saying. That's correct. Um, then the floor is open for discussions Oops, a lot of questions Yeah, again the gentleman with the blue tie. I I can't help it seemed to be the favorite color of today But you were first Hassan, I'm namely police institute. I I take the point about The The idea of defending the community But we live in a world and actually I think that to a large extent whether it is Al Qaeda but far more so the islamic state Has understood completely that the possibility of redefining the community into becoming a virtual one And therefore enhancing the process of alienation That the individual self-recruit will go through And the under actually I would add to that is the notion that Understanding the life cycle of alienation all the way to the point of Disillusionment and actually capitalizing and trying to exploit the recruit Up to the point before The disillusionment and maybe provide outlets before the disillusionment in order for the recruit to remain useful In particular suicide missions. I mean that the be here. I'd like to point to and maybe that addresses the issue of Show me one who's not a soldier Many and I'm talking about dozens of those who joined the islamic state as doctors as engineers as Technicians in order to build a new caliphate Were sent on suicide missions and were actually documented bragging and Boasting about the fact that they're now going on a suicide mission So that this is a process maybe of bait and switch But what it underlines is that Whether it's the islamic state in particular or other jihadist organizations Are very much so aware of the science that is evolving Behind the process of indoctrination the process of exploitation and are trying to do their best Their nashid their anashid are full of individual tidbits that are attractive to various audiences sometimes it's about justice sometimes it's about A feeling of complete alienation sometimes it's about the afterlife But effectively ultimately this is thrown into the public sphere into the public domain and the recruits choose pick and choose What end up being the self recruitment and start the process? So what I'm what I'm Really here offering to you is that We seem to be proceeding with the science of trying to de-radicalize but The enemy is also proceeding with the same science in order to exploit it to the maximum and in trying to radicalize Thank you. So I will take two more Questions and please also due to time. Can you keep it short? And please also really ask a question or say that you have just one comment Yeah, the lady with black and Red side. Yeah, thank you. A banita data usaid Just a quick nuance to mark's point There are governments and communities Which are not throwing the baby away with the bathwater like the nijerians Who are accepting the government governors of nijer are accepting the errant suns back and doing a full-fledged community Reintegration program. So it's not one size fits all in this particular narrative. Thank you Now I will change directions a little bit for diversity reasons We'll go to the gentleman in the front Yeah, the mic is coming I'm in tiaz Ahmed from talk university My my question is similar to the one the the first question that was raised and this is addressed to mark Uh, I can see The soldier profile But then when you profile a soldier you still are using reason But the moment you are talking about suicide terrorist, uh, is it a different ball game altogether? Because there the reason doesn't work And and and it reminds me of of albea kamu's, you know, fantastic statement that the only philosophical problem is suicide The rest can be handled now with suicide Does profiling work because this is the person You know protecting his he or she is ready to kill himself To to do what doesn't see beyond say aren't we going beyond reason? Because once you say profiling once you once you put something there you're still using reason and it looks like Things have gone beyond reason Last question and then I will give the panel the opportunity to the gentlemen on the left in front Yeah Yeah, I think the good news and this echoes venita's comment a little bit is that uh, there are many folks in government And I would say in governments around the world that are actually active consumers of the research of the folks that are on this stage as well as many others and I think that the level at which Those people are actually drawing on the research To inform thinking Program design and this sort of thing Is actually perhaps markedly higher than is often acknowledged Thank you. So we have several questions one relates to well suicide What about reason some people say there are different types of rationalities that people use it's still reasoning But from a different point of view community is virtual I personally think one of the challenge of course was also that the message from this was not Your community that you're actually living in but you're part of a bigger community That's outside of your own So you have to protect the broader community The reassuring at least notice from one government official that actually your research Is being read and also is is a very important evidence base for translating that into policy The lady on the top What are you man? You don't have to of course reply to all of them But what are the things you want to I will now start with dr. Sageman Please the book is albergue a new the myth of the syphus That's the one that you talked about There's on philly. There's only one philosophical question The rest is you know, that's it now What you have is that you have people self-sacrificing For their friends their community and the cause and self-sacrifice is rational What you're talking about is rational choice theory and there I agree with you Talking about self-sacrifice suicide within a rational choice theory doesn't make sense But yet most government use rational choice theory to deal with this This is about self categorization and And cognitive heuristics that I'm talking about you have to have start reading the latest development in social Sciences including process tracing fuzzy set theory and someone and try to apply it to this, you know You can't really just rely on what the rent corporation generated in 1950s namely rational choice theory to understand this And I'm very glad that people read some Contrarian as people call me work But Unfortunately, the result of your policy is nonsense And I I'm sorry To have contributed to it if that's the case Trying to figure out what I should be responding to Here's another reason why you're wrong about pro sorry Keep trying Just because Just because you don't believe in the research doesn't mean it's not right I mean, I probably I'm as familiar as the research as you are and probably more so as you probably saw in my last book Profiling is junk science Yes, and we have been here before And and and I understand from a policy and administrative perspective why it's attractive because it is simplifying An enormously freaking complicated problem into something more manageable. It doesn't mean that it's scientifically accurate I say this to my students all the time. I really don't care What you believe about Terrorist motivation I don't care and nor you should nor should you care about what I think the only thing that matters is evidence There is no profile. We can't even find a solid reliable static profile within groups let alone across them John we agree if you say objective profile, I completely agree with you There's no objective profile and all that subjective profile is a nonsensical idea It's a conceptual idea because you cannot reach a subjective profile because you cannot read people's mind And so yes, there is a profile. It happens to be subjective But all that you know in terms of your objective Indicators that is nonsense. I agree with you It we just using the word a little differently, but I think we fundamentally agree on this I guess you saw in my book misunderstanding Terrorism I have a whole chapter showing that the no-fly list which is based on 10 criterion is absolute nonsense because it has sensitivity and specificity of almost zilch No argument from me there, but but but but to use your own language these words have meaning so so, okay It's one thing to identify common themes in narratives and I'm all for that and that's what we are doing But to to use words like you know risk indicators that then projects the idea that we can reverse engineer this We can't the science is again use risk indicators and I'm with you on that I'm not sure where we are anymore I will give the floor to my I was intrigued by the distinction that you made between Street fighters versus soldiers and I would argue that often it's a gray area between them But immediately like marcos back 250 years. Let me just go back to world war two Where uh edward shills Very well known now dead of not of terrorism The sociologist Was once part of a group of people to figure out that if you wanted to incapacitate Different military units. Who do you kill? And they figure out for the soviets You would kill the lieutenant in a small group for the germans It would be the sergeant once he's dead the fighting unit couldn't do anything For the americans, although mr. Schills was on the allied side You killed the corporal Because that's the level and I will spare you anything I'd think about what we know about Vietnam and what people were fighting for Clue it wasn't democracy It was something much more basic in terms of people involved in fights But then my question would be Is The street fighter part all different. I wouldn't say if the street fighter is coming from a quasi criminal Sort of thing drug grinding or the things you have to do to make ends meet in an economy, which is very frail What are your loyalties to whom and to whom can you make things happen? What we know what mark knows better than myself when you're looking at places like Afghanistan or pakistan the line between the police And the people who are supposed to be policed in tribal areas, especially Is very very gray and they depend upon one another And they don't depend necessarily on the center and the more you can understand the local part of this You might get closer to understanding things and I would like I think like mark each time mark speaks. I'm not sure I know for sure That that the answer is not going to be a universal one Somebody in a part of the american government that Dare not speak its name Once said to me we're getting close to having a universal dna understanding of how tribes work So then we don't have to we don't have to go into specifics anywhere And I thought we were just getting involved again in never mind Let's let's just say i'm sure that somebody is still working on that dna But i'm never going to work on that dna But your question raises the question To me of just what are the units of organization we should be looking for and I am inspired By both john and mark as I understand them at least saying maybe the best way is not by What was your term? Securitizing an entire community such as the shia of Saudi arabia Stigmatizing stigmatize. Okay. Thank you. Maybe maybe I was eliding into the other but but I blame you for that because you asked whether The french project was about exciting violence rather than exiting violence and I I think I signed on for exiting Okay I think there's time for one last Round of questions from the floor the lady with the yellow was already Waiting quite not okay. Yeah. Yeah, that's true So i'm i'm chris fair from georgetown actually I had to I had to point out there was some irony and you started telling us that we need to be Locally knowledgeable when you were talking about the police and fata. There's no police and fata. That's part of the problem But to a more general point I think one of the biggest problems I have with your work professor sageman Is that it's a good old-fashioned dependent variable selection bias and you know that and everyone else knows it And I think this is why I have such problems with you drawing so much relevance from the various Uh biographies that you've assembled is that we we only see the people that we see And we can make therefore some inferences about What they look like as a pool, but we can't speak And we can't say anything about the entire population of people that want to be terrorists And there's nothing that you've ever done in your work that fundamental even attempts to take care of this dependent variable selection bias And this is the kind of stuff that we all as graduate students are are really warned Sometimes we have to do it but you have to be really cautious and in what you do with with data that is so Fundamentally crippled by this kind of bias that you can't do anything to fix Thank you for that observation. There was one gentleman. Yeah, that's a fair point with the gray Yeah, that's you. Yeah Gentlemen, thanks. My name is kyle detrick from equal access And so I I have a question, you know, despite all Of the efforts of everyone in this room I still describe cve as an impoverished space At the same time, I would say ve is an empowered space And so when we look at our approaches to countering preventing transforming I think we're still very driven by A deficit mindset or a deficit framework that we Fundamentally lack of vision For what we want things to look like And a lot of other issues we've we fail to acknowledge our contribution to the problem institutionally personally But as we look or I look as as a practitioner and researcher both How to create programs that not only try to prevent or counter But almost to re radicalize individuals this idea of disillusionment and disengagement I think de radicalization is largely unproven to work I I understand it in a in a post world war two germany setting and other settings But in this setting, I think we need more empowered Off ramps or alternative approaches for engaging people where they are And so I wanted to know from your experience Is there any evidence that that is possible or that those have worked or been effective and if so where thanks Yeah, thank you. That