Good morning, and welcome to our panel on Fighting Shadows. My name is Jonathan Zittrin. I teach on internet and law at Harvard University. I want to first alert and warn you all that we are as on the record as on the record could be. If our stage did not already convey that impression, we are even live streaming. So anything you say will be tweeted and the Chatham House rule is firmly broken. And I wanted to introduce each of our panelists through conversation. And then as quickly as possible, open it up to the full room for discussion. So I wanted to open with Jean Kaspersky. Jean, 1989, you wrote an antidote to the cascade virus, and you have not looked back. I'm curious, the current tactical state of affairs for an individual member of this audience, what are the odds, for example, that that person's primary means of digital communication, telephone or laptop, is in fact compromised? Well, you mentioned the story which happened 25 years ago when my computer was infected. Actually, it's a big difference with the present situation. Those times there was MS-DOS. If you remember, Microsoft Disk Operating System. I'm sure Brad remembers that. I remember. So actually, that was quite a primitive thing. That was before internet, by the way. The computer malware was traveling with the floppy disks. Floppy disks. OK, now the situation is completely different than telecommunication devices. Internet of things, as you name it, internet of threats, as I do. Internet of threats, you say? Internet of threats. So you're saying things have gotten a little worse on the security front? Unfortunately, it's getting more complicated. I don't want to say worse, because at the same time, the cybersecurity is getting better and better. But unfortunately, we have much more work to do, because in the past, it was only consumer devices, consumer computers to protect now, mobile phones, tablets. Next, I'm afraid, smart TV. We also need to protect the enterprise networks, the industrial systems, SCADA. So this is another way of saying business is good if you're the head and founder of one of the largest computer security companies in the world. But I just want to hear, are you keeping up? Yes, unfortunately, my business is very good. Yes. But I don't mean are you keeping up with orders.  If I've got Kaspersky installed on my machine, can I rest easy? And I realize this sounds like a softball question, but I mean, for real, are you able to program the definitions as quickly as the bad folks are programming the viruses? Definitely, yes. I use my product on my PC, so I'm absolutely protected. To be serious, of course, it's not enough to have systems really protected, the consumer systems. There have to be a few things done. First of all, you have to have good enough security.  Well, that sounds not like a good, I mean, that's worrisome for most of us. Well, actually, the reality is if you visit just few websites which are well trusted, if you exchange the data with a few people and you have the security installed on your computer, that's you're absolutely almost 100% protected. And almost none of those conditions. But if it is never the case that all of those conditions are met. But there are many people, they don't do that. Of course, there are journalists. They travel through the internet. Of course, they visit many sites. So the right behavior is. You make it sound like Marco Polo. All of us visit many sites. So you have to have better security installed. Uh-huh. Come to me. Well, that leads to a follow-up question. If I have Symantec antivirus installed on my machine, have I installed the United States government along with it? And if I have Kaspersky installed on my machine, have I installed President Putin along with it? Definitely not. I'm absolutely sure that we are not internet company. We don't collect any private information from the computers. Is there any way for an outsider with respect to any of the antivirus software that, of course, to do its work needs to be installed at the fundamental levels of the operating system in the Bios? So it's got the keys to the kingdom. Is there any external way for somebody who's feeling paranoid to validate that it's only doing what it's supposed to do? Definitely, yes. And actually, if you're individual, you can check the traffic, which is coming from the software. If you're state, welcome to my company, we will show the source code. So actually, we as a security company, we must be very 100% transparent. Yes. That's all well, welcome. Yes. Welcome to check it. OK, so we'll offer tours of Kaspersky labs to anybody who... Well, actually, one... Kind of like the Ben and Jerry's tour in America. You get a full free ice cream. Well, we are not internet company. We're security company. So we don't have access to all the data which is in the internet. Last question for our introduction. In the enterprise space, of course, in the past few months, we've seen the American company, Sony, treated to many of its secrets, spilled out over the internet. Is this an example of a company that simply failed to install software like yours in a consistent way? Or is it more demonstrative of it's really hard at the enterprise level to secure your stuff? I think it's both are true. Well, actually, as far as I understand, as far as I know, the attack wasn't really complicated. It seems that the enterprise wasn't protected in a right way. It was protected, but it seemed that they didn't pay enough attention to the IT security. But at the same time, there are incidents with many well, very well-protected organizations like banks, which are badly hacked. They invest a lot into IT security. They have perfect engineers, but anyway, from time to time, they're victims of a very complicated... Well, the reality is that the cyber criminals, like in the past 10, 15 years ago, they were just individuals developing some... Well, some kind of malware, not really complicated, and they were attacking victims which were consumers. And a few years ago, I was talking about the level of the complexity, and I was talking like, okay, so there is a criminal malware, and there is a state-sponsored malware. And the difference, like a car is a space shuttle. And now I say that... Now they've converged on to a helicopter. Many criminals, unfortunately, the evolutionists of the crime came to this situation when they are very professional. And they developed extremely complicated, high-professional attacks, and that makes my work more difficult. Yes, very good. President Ilvas, anything surprising so far in what Gene has said? No. And as a... Which is good, it would be good that they're on the same page so far. But given that you've put Estonia at the forefront of the digital world, you've tried to integrate digital within the state, and you've got your own pedigree of having started programming at age 13, what's the sense of defending the state? And the state systems, we have consumer enterprise state. How is it up at that third tier? Harder, easier, same? Well, some things are easier, some are more difficult. I would say that it really depends on the degree of IT integration in your country. Okay, I mean, jump ahead, you didn't ask me, but 2007 Estonia went through these... You knew I was about to... Distributed denial of service or DDoS attacks. At the time, I did say that there are countries where if this happened, they would never know because they aren't simply using things, and we had by that time a fair degree of use of IT for government services and so on. But the thing that people don't understand, it is a very primitive low-level kind of attack. It basically means that you swamp a server. No one has the key to get into your door, they're just all in front of you when you can't get to the door to go in here. That's the phrase denial of service. Right, and so it's... It's like a long line outside the Congress Center. Yeah, one of those, right. Though you don't necessarily get in at the end. But anyway, so that was... I mean, the interesting thing about it, which is an aspect we should consider is that these are run by organized crime. They are basically, it's your Viagra spam in reverse.  And so in the other interesting thing about it, aside from the fact that it was at scale at the time, was that it was for political reasons.  I mean, some of them are for political reasons. But also, I mean, to extort small or medium-sized companies, we're gonna, your business, you have a business based on the internet, selling stuff. None of your customers can buy your products because we've blocked your site. But that is really, I mean, what we're looking at today and more generally what is far more sophisticated and that's getting in. Now, I don't know about the details of the Sony case, but I mean, I know of other cases where you have a secretary and she has a file that has all of the passwords of the executives and it says passwords. Maybe that's not a smart idea. Newsweek and news, yes.  I said, you know, tape over the camera on your computer. I said that. It's like, yeah, wow. Gene, do you tape over the camera on your computer? I have my software to protect it and it's, we have a special functionality in the product to check that the camera is really off. So you don't tape over the camera. He depends on, Brad, do you tape over the camera? Why don't, tape. I smile, I smile to the camera. I'm with President Ilvis, I tape over the camera on my computer. I just, huh.   You don't put your store, your passwords in a file that says password. Right, right, right. But I wanted to go back to the denial of service and the attacks for a moment of 2007, they lasted exactly 24 hours, as you've said. And you had hypothesized, maybe it's cause the money ran out, whoever was paying the bad folks to engage in the attacks. Well, it was interesting because basic, okay, there was a low level of attacks, but then it sort of peaked on 0000 GMT on the 9th of May. So then it was like, it's up here and then it continues like this. And then at 2400, it drops down. And I said, well, why is it not a normal or Gaussian curve? And so the head of the cert, which is the response team that does these things, if you don't know what that, every country, every county should have a cert. And he said, the money ran out. I said, what do you mean the money ran out? He said, well, you know, I mean it's, you rent it for, they rented it for 24 hours. So I'm just saying, if the bad folks happened to have 365 times as much money as they had, would you have a year-long denial of service attack? Yeah, well, I mean, you would then find all kinds of ways to get around it. In fact, when Georgia, a year later, was subjected to similar attacks because we already had sort of done things. We had mirror sites, so they were, it lessened considerably the, and of course, then you can go get the people. If they could do it for too long, you can figure out where it's moving. So that's, it's probably, you know. Got it. It's like hanging around the bank for too long a time after you've robbed it. Got it. So I hear then, so far in half our panel, a tone of not much to see here folks in 2015. If you install the right software, do the right hygiene. I just haven't gotten to the other problems. Ah, we should be quick. Tell us about the other problems. Well, I think a large part of it is really is, there are things you need to do, and I'm sure Eugene knows more, he knows far more about this, but I mean, if you have legacy technology, if you have Windows 6B and you haven't replaced it, you're in trouble, right? I mean, holes, Swiss cheese, holes all over the place. So you need to keep- And you're not calling out Windows XP specifically, you just mean old software. Yeah, yeah. Well, we've even said it's, if you have Windows XP, which came out in 2001, it's 14 years old. Brad is calling out Windows XP. It's time to update. It's time to update specifically. Well, he wants to sell, he wants to sell new software, right? I mean, I would say so. I get my cut later. No, but my point is that you know, you have, I mean, this is a serious problem, especially in infrastructure, in critical infrastructure, countries maintain legacy technology. They always, we'll do it next year, we don't have enough money. And so that's really dumb. Well, it's so fascinating, by the way, talk about a Gaussian curve you have at the historic end, a bunch of old stuff that if you don't replace it remains vulnerable. And then you had Gene referring to the internet of things being the internet of threats, which is to say all the new stuff can be a problem and embedded, I guess it's much harder to replace the firmware on my T-Kettle, if my T-Kettle is internet aware. How do we think about that? Not only that this there, also there's somewhere a firmware under the water at the oil stations and also the firmware in the space. You're worried about that? Well, actually this is one of the major security issues in the modern world, security for the critical infrastructure, security for the physical systems, everywhere around us. And would it be helpful if all of that infrastructure ran on a common platform so that it could be secured in a common way, or is that a form of monoculture that better to have the stuff in space running on systems that are utterly distinct from what we do? There's no difference because if someone really wants to damage, say, power plant, doesn't matter which system is installed there. Is it there, some specific system or is it just someone one? But for the critical infrastructure, I think that the concept of security must be changed because we have the standard operating systems and the security on the top of that. Yes. Like the endpoint security or any other kind of encryption and et cetera, et cetera. It's on the top. I think that the critical infrastructure must be protected based on the secure platform so the security as a platform for the applications which run power plants. Got it. Regardless of what's underneath, you're either equally secure or equally insecure, as it were. Before we move on, President Dibbles, I wanted to let you finish on the threats we haven't thought about. Well, a couple of things. One is there are basic things you can do, not just updating your software, but hygienic behaviors that you can follow. I mean, I would say that two-factor authentication, which we offer all of our residents in the center. So you've got your password and then you've got another object like your phone and they send the separate code. Right. I mean, that is kind of, I would say, that's a sine qua non. If you're just using regular email, which I do. But I mean, I figure, well, someone's reading it. Yes.  If there's anything sensitive, at least you need to have something like this. And the other thing is just basically, as Eugene said, basically nothing is really safe. But again, we need more awareness. I mean, after 2013, June 6th, everyone is very, very upset about privacy, which is rightfully so. You're referring to the date that Snowden's first revelations came out? Yeah. Right. Or he showed up, I don't know. Anyway. Showed up in Moscow, I don't know. I don't know why we're looking at Jean, as if he's responsible for it. I'm not looking at Jean, I think. I know, but I mean, what people have forgotten is that we're rightfully obsessed with privacy. But consider now that this is another side that's even more important. I mean, it's the privacy versus integrity of data. And that's a technical term, perhaps. But what it means is, privacy is, I know what your blood type is. And your RH negative. I can see that from some medical records. Integrity is if I go change it to RH positive. And that's the problem that people should worry much more about. The folks at Sony should worry less about the documents going out, and worry more about, I wonder if all of our spreadsheets say what we thought they said. And how would you possibly go in and validate that? As we say, I don't want people to see my bank account. But on the other hand, I don't want them to change my bank account at least in the wrong direction. Unless it's in the right direction.  If you're Sony, the gate has been opened, you're doing your assessment. It looks like a number of your systems have been compromised. And Sony is a stand in for nearly anybody, consumer, firm or state. How do you check the integrity of all of the stuff? There's actually software that goes with it. I mean, there's an Estonian company that hasn't used all over the world, but I won't do it. It's a great form of native advertising. We've got these other people doing Microsoft, Kuspersky Labs. I might as well say our company, sort of in Estonia, I mean, it's kind of like a telemer. Every data point has a signature on it, small signature. But you know that it has not been temporary. Kind of like on a Wikipedia page, you can go to the history and see the changes made successively to an article. So Jonathan, I think the 401 goes beyond that. It's worth underscoring the importance of this point about two-factor or multi-factor authentication, because I think it's one of these things that's well understood technically within the industry. But the rest of the world probably hasn't had the opportunity to appreciate it yet. Because before you get to the file that has the spreadsheet that has all the passwords, which perhaps shouldn't exist, you've got to get into the network itself. And I think all of us as users have gotten very comfortable with this notion of course you can't access your email without a password. And we've gone through this sequence in our lives where we were told to develop stronger passwords. We were told to change our passwords periodically. But what you often see in these attacks is this common origin, which is different techniques to separate people from their passwords. And you get an email, you click on a link, it looks real, et cetera. So I think over the next few years, every institution, every individual will become comfortable with this notion of two-factor authentication, meaning, OK, I have a password. But if I sign on, even with my password from a device that I've never accessed that service from before, the service is going to send me something, yes. And it's the code to your phone. And the thing that's worth everybody knowing, look, if you're using LinkedIn or Facebook or Twitter or Outlook.com, these exist today. You just go to the service, do a quick search for two-factor authentication. And it will tell you how to install it. And I think you can safely bet that if we're back here in three years, if you work for a government, if you work for a company, this is how you're going to be accessing your content. And it will at least be the next layer of protection. And then we'll deal with the next challenge after that. Got it. Now there are two ways in which we might take our title of Fighting Shadows. I've been talking about one of them, which is defending our infrastructure against attackers that are often hard to identify. I want to shift to a second possible definition, which has to do with the use of the internet by those who operate on the margins and are often up to no good and want to exact physical harm. And for that, Director LeBord, it seems great to turn to you. You're the director of the counter-terrorism section for the United Nations. And you've been a Supreme Court judge in France and are trying to think about a strategy that may involve a legal or policy response among nations rather than the tactical technical responses we've been talking about for the first kind of threat. So maybe you can tell us a little bit about that. Well, there are two aspects in this conversation, I think. The first one is, of course, the attacks that we just spoke about. And I was just thinking, Steve, to close this chapter, that we have also to have a, we should have in the Security Council, since I work in the Security Council of the UN, we should have an answer to bring these terrorist organizations or criminal organizations that you mentioned, President, to justice somewhere. Because I think that there is a point of impunity there. Because if we continue to have impunity, OK, you have security, but you have to have impunity. At the moment, there is a lot, I would like to say, of impunity for the hackers, whatever. I mean, the people who are breaking the system. So there is something here that should be done, very difficult, very complicated, because you have issues of jurisdiction, what kind of jurisdiction, et cetera. And in the same time, also, if we go against impunity, we have also to protect the freedom of speech, freedom of expression, et cetera. But still, I mean, this issue has to be somewhere. And how would you rate how we're doing on that so far? It's something that we have to bring to the international community. Because you cannot do that without an international cooperation. Otherwise, it doesn't mean anything. So it's not easy. It's even more than what I said. It's extremely difficult.  That's something that I feel is important. But the problem here is that you have to get countries to agree. And we, in fact, have the Budapest Convention, which is a convention on bringing cybercriminals to justice. It's just that two countries that do most are the home of, I'm not saying the countries do it. No, no, no. That's a good point. But the home of two of the biggest of the most or greatest sources, cybercrime, cyberattacks, refused to sign the convention or ratified, which means the. Which two countries are those? No, no, no. Well. Russia and China. Well, it's. Why do you ask me? You know that. Well, I was thinking of the benefit of those on the live stream. No, wait. What about Brazil? What about Ukraine? Well, no, they should. I mean, the point is that they are immediate, I'm just saying, but they're not the largest source. There is still one point. President, you said two countries. I was thinking two out of five, which were two out of five. Well, our cup runneth over. But Director Lagarde, yes. I mean, since I had the privilege to be a judge in my country in the judicial Supreme Court, I would like to say still we can still institutionalize somewhere something around the universal jurisdiction. So you don't have in this case to go to the jurisdiction of the country. So let's discuss that. No, but I wanted to have something which is for the people can be clear, open, transparent, and also involving the civil society, which is also a component of what we are speaking about. Coming to the second point, because it is a very difficult one, but still I wanted to mention it. The second point is I would like to say the use of internet by terrorist organizations. I don't even say by terrorist now. So for example, Daesh is promoting its own, let's say, actions, and very well, let's say, asking the so-called foreign terrorist fighters to come and to be part of, let's say, something very nice, actions which can really be not only an adventure, but glory, et cetera. First, we are very bad in countering this type of narrative. The counter narrative is not done well, either at the state level or the media level or the civil society level. That's something which has to be done. And the phenomenon, it's extremely important. You have actually more than 15,000 people as foreign terrorist fighters in these areas, and 3,000 coming from Europe, others coming from Russia, and wherever. And from the vantage of your office, what do you see as steps that can be taken? The steps is first to work more with, let's say, the private companies too. And we will have something in the very soon seminar in the New York University plus a seminar in Miami with Microsoft on these issues in order to see how we can really elaborate the counter narrative on that. But there is a second point also. I see it is very difficult to criminalize, again, on the legal issues. It's very difficult to trigger international cooperation in criminal matters with these issues. And finally, it's also we are not good at all, as I said from the very beginning in the counter narrative. That's probably the most important. For example, to show to these young people who are, let's say, lack of employment, lack of perspective in life, et cetera, to show that there is nothing good there. I mean, the first acts that they are requested to do is, for example, barbarian acts in order to put them completely under the authority of these organizations. So this is something that we have really to take into consideration. Now, second point to come back to the issue of security. They even attack now. We have seen that in a very low key way. But still, we have seen that they even attack now the police infrastructures in order to block the police action against them when they are performing their terrorist actions outside of their territories. So this is what I wanted to underline. One of the things I should also point out is that it's not just criminals. It's not just states. It's also in between. I mean, the unique public-private partnership form that we see where states will pay criminal groups. I also would call it the little green menization of the cyberspace, right?  They just bought their, you know. Which might complicate the desire to bring to justice, because whether it's a law enforcement issue for subject international cooperation or whether it's a state-to-state issue, you're saying is somewhere in the middle. Well, I mean, go back to the Barbary pirates, right? I mean, they had the Sultan sort of got his take. And he said, you know, stay away from the Barbary coast. And finally, so many people had been. Has the international order improved since then? Or are we still? I think we're, I mean, every time you get a new area like that, I mean, then you find there is no order. And what happened with the Barbary pirates, you know, from the halls of Montezuma to the shores of Tripoli?  So, I mean, which is the thing I just think we should mention somewhere here is that the offensive side against people who have attacked you. And I think that- Does Estonia have a policy on that? Will Estonia- We all have a policy that we don't do those things, but how do you define it? Is something which is defending you offensive or not? And it's hard to find where it is. How do you define that? What I wanted to get to, to the law professor, my point was to get to that, which is that where it becomes interesting is, I mean, first of all, attribution and in what is- And by attribution, you mean figuring out who's behind. Right, and it is, I mean, is it an act of war or not? This is one of the things that we grapple with in the NATO Center at Tallinn, is what is an act of war? I mean, if you have a missile and you can track it, it comes in, it hits a power plant and it came from over there. That's the easy case. And then you say, well, then, and then the NATO or some, or national, whatever. We think that's- Well, you say a proportion, you don't start a nuclear war over a missile, but if it's a nuclear missile, then you start a nuclear war proportion. Right, so it's proportion and attribution. Now, the same effect can be achieved via a cyber missile that takes out the plant. Now, who did it? First of all, you don't know what who did it. In general, cyber forensics, you can finally figure out who did it. I mean, it takes a long time. And then what is the appropriate response? And for the question of how do you respond in a cyber way? Well, the U.S. Department of Defense that I think already three, four years ago, we need not answer a cyber attack with a cyber realm. We can use what is now known as a kinetic attack. Or you could expel a diplomat. There's all sorts of ranges.  Yes, but the point is what is the response and where is an act of war? What is an act of terrorism? Who is responsible? What do you do back? What we can do also, this is the final point I want to make in connection with what was said, is now more and more connection, and we had a discussion in the Security Council in December on that, more and more connection between organized crime and terrorist organizations. Because if I come back to territories which are under the authority of terrorist organizations like Daesh or Bokora, now you have a lot of connections between organized crime and terrorist organizations, which was not the case in the past. Now it is quite clear. So what you said about the state's connections with organized crime can also be reported to these, let's say, non-state actors, which are really organized crime on one side and terrorist organization on the other side. Well, it certainly gets back to President Ilves' point of a spectrum of actors that can be from organized crime to state motivated by very different things, ideology or money. Because if you're talking about actors, don't forget about traditional crime. It's used and the traditional crime is entering cyber space. They are not cyber criminals. Cyber criminals, they steal data. Traditional crime, they do traditional crime with the help of cyber systems. They hack, for example, industrial system, they hack transportation. Two, well, there was one example. The Latin American drug cartels, they hacked Antwerp's seaport and they were unloading containers with coca-e into the safe space. This is example of the traditional crime. So it's a cyber crime, traditional crime, terrorists in states. Let me bring Brad Smith into our conversation. Brad, you've been thinking a lot about how new legal regimes might apply to this digital space to solve both sides of the fighting shadows equation we've been talking about and I wanted to invite you to talk about it. I think there's three things, Jonathan, that are worth thinking about. First, I think it's just worth reflecting on the multifaceted role that the internet is playing in this context. Think about the Sony entertainment issue. The internet was, in effect, the weapon that was used to attack free expression by attacking Sony's network. It was also the tool that was used to defend free expression. When Google and Microsoft and Sony together agreed that we'd distribute the film online. Think about these issues that we've seen in France. The internet is being used to recruit terrorists. The internet is also used lawfully by the French authorities to go obtain the evidence needed to identify where the suspects were. Think about the role social media played in enabling the people of France to come together and put an unprecedented number of people standing together on the streets to defend free expression. So this is something that is precious. It is a threat and it is one of our greatest assets. And now Director LeBord has, I think, hinted at the idea that there might need to be or there's desired to be some work with the companies to try to ferret out some of the bad stuff that's going on. That video that might be distributed that's a recruitment video and it contains terrible acts within it that the companies, he might say, I don't wanna put words in your mouth, but he might say shouldn't be allowing to propagate over their platforms versus we're so glad we have these distributed platforms so that if Sony gets attacked it can distribute it. Do you see that the law is going to be able to distinguish safely between the two? It's a challenge, but I think the first thing we should recognize is that we are dealing with a situation where you have fundamental societal values in tension with each other. We have keeping the public safe, that's critical. We have freedom of expression that fundamentally defines societies across the Atlantic. We have personal privacy. And so we need solutions to strike the balance. Now in a sense, I think the first question one needs to ask is who should strike that balance? When government officials exhort through speeches, technology companies asking them to do more, it makes me nervous because people are asking us to draw a line between these values. We're just a country software maker. It's the rule of governments to say. Exactly, no one elected us. Isn't this the kind of decision that the members of the United States Congress or the French National Assembly are elected to make? So when new lines need to be drawn, I think the first approach should be for governments to draw them. For people in the private sector to have a voice, we'll have an opinion, and then we'll comply with the law. But to put us in the line drawing business independent of the law, I think is a very difficult proposition. Now I know you've got two other points you wanna make. I already made the second one. Oh, wonderful. You wanna put the third one on the table and then I also wanna make sure we open it up to broader discussion. Yeah, and the last one very briefly is then what this means is we do need new law. And at times it's gonna mean new domestic law, but it really goes to the question you heard. We need new international norms. And in part, this requires that we create new mechanisms so governments can work across together, across borders, without unilaterally stepping on each other's sovereignty. We need to improve processes. We're gonna need some new agreements, whether it's an expansion of what exists today or new instruments altogether. So if people who want to get in can raise hands and we can get a microphone over to you, while that happens, let me ask President Ilves, how sanguine are you about the prospect of international agreements of the sort Brad just described? I think these are possible. My worry is that on a lot of issues, our lawmakers, legislators are often people who are not that up to speed on the level of, I mean, what is possible good and bad when it comes to the digital world. And I've had some pretty strange experiences talking to people that don't really get it at all, who are in a position to make major changes in the legislation even at the European level. So where should we place the hot potato? Well, I think that we ought to mash it up and distribute it evenly, but... Good extended metaphor. But block that metaphor, right? I mean, when people say don't get it at all and then they start, I mean, we saw this after Snowden, there were some pretty ridiculous things by people who don't understand the digital world at all, saying we ought to do this, we ought to do that, and you can go, wait a minute, I mean, this is, let's educate ourselves a little bit. We need, we have gotten beyond Aristotelian physics when it comes to most countries and most legislators and do believe at least Newton. But, you know, when it comes to cyber, it's often that people have no clue whatsoever. And I would, for example, I mean, just to keep it a little less abstract. I mean, there are, people wanna stay in a paper world with just a metal lock and key because of cyber. But in fact, you have far better security than paper if you do it right. Using digital. But this sounds like a somewhat of a pay-on to abstention at the legislative level. Don't hasten in with ill-advised agreements. Well, I thought a lot of the stuff that came out after Snowden was fairly ill-advised. And it has concrete ramifications for all kinds of things, including the future of the internet.  And then we're gonna keep them out. Well, okay, so what are you gonna do? Like stay in the 19th century? I mean, so I think one of the problems I mean is that the executive level of people are sophisticated enough to get it or at least read a book. But it is interesting too that it points out there could be legal agreements about restrictions and cyber crime and sort of enforcement, but there could also be legal agreements that are facilitating cross-border data trade. But I actually think, Jonathan, that the president is raising an issue that is even more fundamental than that. Yes. All the time you hear, sometimes in the tech sector, sometimes you hear it elsewhere, oh, these people in government don't understand these issues. Well, look, we live in a complicated world that's changing rapidly. You know, we say to the students in our schools that they need to learn to code. So what do we do? We teach them to code. We don't take away their computers. People in government, frankly, I think are learning more every day. If they need to learn more, we should share the information with them, not eliminate their responsibility to enact new laws. We have a cyber boot camp we can do. Let me tell you how this international cooperation really works. Yes? I have an email to my lab from the cyber police from country A. Hey Eugene, do you have contact with the country B? I say, hey, guys, you're both country from the West. Why don't you call each other? Hey, Eugene, it's too bureaucratic. You're a very shortcut way. OK, guys, OK, this contact from country B, OK, work together. You can just conference column together. Yeah, that's exactly my point. So this is the way it really works from time to time. First of all, the responsibility of the people in charge at the governmental level and the discussion with, let's say, the private companies is essential. And then you can perhaps get the balance between freedom of expression and the action of the criminal justice system. What I want also to say, I am not dreaming about an international agreement which was not. What has to be done is to probably, and this is what you say, colleague, is that, I mean, the people who are in charge, exactly the law enforcement, the prosecutors, and the judges, have to be aware, if we want to avoid impunity, have to be aware how to work against these actions. And for that, they have to work with the private companies. This is why we organize this. With the speed of the internet. Yes, with the speed of the internet and also the legislator. At the end of the day, they have to know. They have to live in these words. Let me take it to whoever has managed to seize a microphone around the periphery. Has it found a home somewhere? Ah, here's, so who wants to speak, though? Question, comment, over here. You can get the microphone connected. Ah, there we are. And feel free to tell us who you are. Christian Momentaler from Switzerland, Switzerland. I was wondering, we have a lot of experts here, and we need to think about the risks, threats, and ours for the world, right, for society. And I was wondering, in your mind, in your head, what are the one or two biggest large-scale scenarios you're most worried about that would potentially include loss of life? So is it attack on hospital or power networks? And is this kind of like asking for a friend, or is this an insurance company saying, I'm going to take some notes? Don't worry, this is nothing, it's not insured, but I just wonder more as a citizen, right? What would be, what are the things you're most worried about, and it is a combination of probability and severity, yeah? Fair enough. So the worst of the worst, that's a scenarios of attacks on a critical infrastructure. First of all, it's a power plants and power grid. If you don't have power, the rest of the world doesn't work. Second, telecommunication. If you don't have telecommunication, the rest doesn't work, but the power plants still work. Then financial system. If the financial system is out of the order, telecommunication work, power plants, they work, but the rest... That's already, that's a good start, top three, but... And, yeah, top three, and the rest of everything. But for those top three, how would you assess the degree of risk? If President Ilva is purely hypothetically truly, we're to order his crack cyber team to take out that power plant, that telecommunications system, that kind of thing as a way of responding to some attack that he's experiencing, how readily could that be done? It's a very, very good question, and actually it's very difficult to answer the question. And this is the risk balance for the nation. It's a very complicated issue. Let's say that Mr. President locates one billion year for the cybersecurity to protect critical infrastructure, but the next 10 years, it never happens. So the citizens, they ask, hey, Mr. President, why did you spend such a big money to protect from the threats? Where's the disaster that was averted, yes. Oh, there's another case. Mr. President decides not to do that. And the next year, the country is spitting all the huge scale attack, and the citizens ask it, hey, Mr. President, why didn't you do that? So the balance, have to find this balance, I don't know. Yeah, the problem is that when you, those I agree with Eugene are the top level. But I mean, you can wreak havoc in all kinds of ways. I mean, a couple of years ago, software engineers or anything, saw people doing the software of the Los Angeles traffic system went on strike, but it wasn't enough to sort of strike. They sort of turned lights red. Los Angeles is paralyzed. And imagine if they'd done even more paralyzed. But imagine if they'd done the next thing, which is turn all of the lights at the same time green. Right, I mean, so then what do you have? Or imagine that in Manhattan. That's full. So if you have that, I mean, what is, this is an example of how. Which means that in a highly leveraged, tightly coupled technological environment, finding a point of vulnerability need not be at the very top level. It could be a very nice fulcrum point that you would get. And I was just wondering, as long as we're elucidating threats and modalities, there we had another session at the forum on Bitcoin. And I understand the enthusiasts there were not so much focusing on Bitcoin as a cryptocurrency, but it's underlying technology of the ledger as a form of providing for distributed contracts, for example, where you could say, if A happens, then B money will flow over to here and understand that the system will enforce that without needing anybody to actually change hands. Does that mean we could see a bounty simply appear online that says $100 million will flow at the moment that all those lights in Los Angeles turn green, and everybody is just waiting to see if that happens, at which point the money goes from one account to another. And we're left trying to figure out how to chase the people and hold them accountable. I mean, yes and no, because if you see that threat, then you go, aha, it's not. Now we know at least what they're going to attack. I mean, so they're not going to go attack the dam that's going to break and all the water is going to come down. They're going to go after that. He's probably not a good idea to warn ahead. I mean, let's be from a military tactical point of view. This is news for other people to use. Make your threat more nonspecific. So yes and no, but OK. I mean, we can come up with more and more scenarios on bad things that can happen. We need to focus on things as to how to protect yourself insofar as you can. And they begin with the individual's personal hygiene and then corporate hygiene and then national. And one last question to Jane. You pointed out how it can be hard to be incented properly to spend money on security because if the threat doesn't materialize, it looks like wasted money. Would you be supportive of government requiring people to have to take certain minimal steps to secure themselves? You would. Yes, well, I definitely, I'm still dreaming about even the book, Cyber Security Strategy for Dummies to explain it in a very simple words. If I were government, if I were some power on government, I will force them to split cybersecurity issues in the three categories. Individual, small businesses, enterprises and critical physical infrastructure and implement different policies. For individual, small businesses, very light policies. There is a list of them. And very strict regulation, government control on a critical infrastructure. Then what to do? The most important, the most critical is infrastructure. Start to redesign it in a safe way, in a secure way. Because of course, it's huge. It must be huge investment into redesigning the system if you wanted to have it next year. There is no nation in the world which has enough of resources. I don't mean money. I mean brains and hands. To redesign critical systems within a very short period of time. But at least start to design new systems in a safe way. Well, I would say a couple of things. I think about the private sector. Let's find the next question too. We'll get the mic from the subject. The private sector, especially if you're dealing with insurance and governments. Governments need to say, you are not allowed banks or whatever to deduct as a business expense something which is the result of poor hygiene hunts.  So if you have to do cleanup after a cyber attack that you could well have prevented, don't expect to deduct the expenses of that cleanup. And the other thing which, I mean, in the US is called an act of God. In Europe we call it force majeure, being a little more atheist. Is it possibly a little more atheist? The point is that if you have a power plant, is taken out because of a cyber incident, then it doesn't go to the insurance company and say, look, we had this accident. Act of God, force majeure. The insurance company said, look at your money back because of that. That's how you incentivize from critical infrastructure to banks. So lighter regulation rather than sort of command and control. Well, it depends on your country. That's what I was thinking. From this discussion, what could perhaps do is to have a kind of a wise leadership or something like that with all of us, a kind of practical guide. That's much more what we should do. And you have almost designed the structure of the guide. So this is something which could come out of this. Well, I love it. It's like setting the agenda for the Global Agenda Council on Cybersecurity, for which most of you are members. I really feel that soft law is even more important than hard law on that. One last point from Brad, and then we'll go to Professor Jarvis. And the concept's not new. I mean, when your colleagues teach tort law, basically people owe a duty of care to their customers, to people who rely on them. It will reflect to some degree the nature of the risk. As you point out, you probably have a different duty of care for critical infrastructure than something for which the consequences of failure would be small. So societies worked through this many times before, and these are the kinds of tools that almost certainly we'll use again. Yes. Jeff Jarvis. Jeff Jarvis from City University of New York. I'm not a real professor, I teach journalism. After Edward Stodden's revelations of tapping into the main pipes of the net and taking stuff, encryption seems a very sane response. And encryption seems a very sane response. But there's a tension here, obviously. Here from Cameron a week ago trying to basically outlaw encryption by creating backdoors. From a consumer's perspective, it's not easy. It's still too hard. And then finally, there's a fear for us in media that if the web goes dark and entirely encrypted, then it's hard to do things that will benefit us and the users in terms of targeting content and advertising and so on and so forth. So I'd just like to hear your views on that tension around encryption as a good necessity or as something bad. I wonder, Brad, if you shouldn't be the first to take that up. Sure. Well, first of all, I think that encryption plays a fundamentally important role in keeping information secure. And that's secure from all kinds of actors who should not have easy or any access to it. And so you have seen across the industry widespread strengthening of end-to-end encryption. Now we're being asked again, does that make sense? We've been hearing these requests for backdoors and the like.  And that's your message to David Cameron. Yeah, you should not ask for backdoors. That compromises protection for everyone against everything. What we do need is to live in a world when governments pursuant the lawful process and protection of human rights can get access to the information they need. That's a more complicated question. But I think it's a more constructive conversation to have. But of course, Cameron's proposal is in response to some companies that are doing their best not to themselves be able to access their own customers' data. And that will be part of the conversation that will unfold. But I think we have to start by recognizing that encryption is a fundamental tool to keep information secure. I also think we need to think about another point that Jeff made, part of what led everyone to encrypt in the first place was this story in The Washington Post in October of 2013 that suggested that either the NSA or another agency had tapped into cables for Google or Yahoo without any legal process. And if we're going to live in a world where governments preserve for themselves the right to tap in without going through legal process without respecting the rule of law, then we're in a place where it becomes very difficult to have this dialogue. Because fundamentally, there's only two ways to keep people's information private, better laws or better technology. Well, if you don't want people to deploy technology, then let's get a consensus around what the law should be. Yes, yes. Trump power and then President Melviz? No, I fully agree with what Brad said. I have nothing to add. Really? It's really a beautiful thing for my ears. Made a couple of comments. Well, actually talking about cryptographic system, it's not easy to make them forbidden. Remember the PGP story? And the United States government was fighting with PGP? No way. And second, but what about France, for example? In France, the consumer's cryptographic systems, they must have very short key. So it makes them very easy to hack. Yes. So they have to increase the... Come on, it's in France, it's reality for years. I'm waiting for the demonstration in France for longer keys. Please, give us longer keys. Okay, that's a little bit... We have a completely different approach. We offer all residents, and now non-residents, a RSA 2048 binary key code, public key, private key, form of encryption. And we, in fact, say, who's this? And it's, I mean, this is with the authentication of every ID done by a consortium of banks and so forth. So, I mean... And just quickly, by implication then, this panel appears just to be an agreement that David Cameron is wrong. Well, I mean, it's fine if you're in the UK. I mean, it's a different country, but if you... He's free to be wrong is what you're saying. But I think we offer it because we think that is a service the government can provide and should provide to its citizens and everyone who, not only any resident, and soon you'll be able to be a resident without being a resident. Even if it reduces the surveillance services that you can provide. In what sense? That we don't offer a surveillance service. Encryption services. And the point is that... Surveillance as a service, yes. That's right. And I wanted to... And the cost to you is nothing. The reason I mentioned RSA 2048 is that RSA 512, which was offered by LavaBit, could not be broken by NSA. So, you know, and we're sort of, you know, this 1024, 2048, we're up there. It can't be broken, so I often make a joke. You could store your data on NSA servers and they couldn't get in. We don't really offer that service. But the point is that... Has a bring it on quality. Instead of having this paranoid view of, oh my God, they're always looking at it and say, well, in fact, maybe you can reverse the whole view and say government today should offer citizens the... I mean, should offer citizens the ability to have encrypted communication. And that's part of a modern day society, is that that's one of the... It is better to have the government offer that than privacers. Now, you could say, well, the government's gonna go in there. Well, at least you have the guarantee that if a government is doing it, it can only go in there with a court order. Whereas if it's a commercial thing, well, who knows, right? Well, this really has had a theme emerge from our hour together, which is historically speaking, possibly back to the Barbary pirates, we've had technology as one of our main means of defense against a technological enemy and have had merchants trying to help those who wanna protect themselves in various ways. Technologists and knowledge. And knowledge, exactly, education. But we've also seen among the panel discussions of the ways in which law and legislation and international cooperation may be trying to set a framework of some kind over the next interval, so that we have front doors rather than back doors. And when they're opened, we know and it's done under the rule of law. This is an aspiration, at least within this panel. And it also sounds like some homework for the Global Agenda Council on Cybersecurity. I'd like to just ask people to please thank our panelists for a very spirited and interesting discussion. And of course, thank the panel leader for wise leadership. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Thank you.


What's up y'all is Debbie and I'm back with a video that I've been thinking about doing for a long time It's really a passion of mine, and that's helping y'all become better defensive players I see a lot of tips on YouTube that are just garbage send five people get one free 30% of the time or send six get one free against five wide and to me personally that stuff That's not gonna help you become a better defensive player You know just cuz you have a blitz that might work from time to time or you know They don't block anybody somebody will come free all the way around the edge That's not gonna get you better what's going to get you better is understanding how to play defense Understanding what the offensive player wants to do and trying your best to take that away What I'm gonna do in this series is break down what I think defensively against every formation and every game situation Help y'all get a better mind of what makes me an effective defensive player I've always been a decent defensive player and I've never really relied on a blitz that was unblockable or unslideable Or it can't ID the mic. I've never relied on anything like that I've always used you know my smarts and anticipation and you know reaction to become you know a great defensive player So what I'm gonna do in this is go ahead and break down What you need to be looking for verse every formation and the first one Go ahead and start with is split close split close has been good and mad and it's been a real basic offense For a couple years now you'll see anybody try to run it You know from the bazooka Joes of the world to even the elite players will mix it into their scheme Because it is effective. It is compressed and it does have a good run package So I mean it's an offense that a lot of people use and obviously when people come out of the huddle in the split close Defensively you see here. I'm just any play I'm not gonna necessarily show y'all a play or show y'all, you know do this through this exactly will lock up everything But what I want to show you guys is what exactly I want to do and what the offense player wants to do So when I see split close if someone comes out in this say, it's the first play of the game All the time when someone runs split close what they want to do is hit this post route to X That's what they want to do They want to hit X on a post route for a big play X has always been the player you have to watch You know that obviously there's flat routes to both sides There's a corner route there could be a little short drag routes and routes But X is the person that's gonna one get 10 plus yards or to make a touchdown out of nowhere If you don't pay attention to X and you have to think as often as a player He wants to do that. He wants a big play It takes an elite elite elite man player to be satisfied getting three or four, you know five yards of play Most kids that pick up man, they want the touchdown They want to hit the two routes that are 10 yards plus as a defensive player I've always had a rule do not give up a 10-yard play anything under 10 yards You can live with because one it's not gonna kill you to you can hit them fumble three They can door in completion. They could back up, you know, they could have a negative play But if you allow your opponent to get 10 plus yards, that's not good And it's gonna make their life real easy and they can score in five six plays and not necessarily give you an opportunity From fumble a sack a fluky black shed a fluky tip pick and that's what you want as defender The more you make someone work the more likely you are to make mistakes and by giving up the big plays You will not make them work. So essentially that's what I do. So we'll see I'm in just a cover three right here So ideally what I want to do is take away X. That's what I want to do If I come out of the huddle, I want to take away X I can move my safety down here to try to take away the post and help out I Can always do something like this cross man X over there But more often than not if I'm in a cover three or a cover two I'm going to tend to lurk From the middle you're gonna have one guy coming over here short most people slant They'll do a little slant over the middle and I'll probably lurk, you know from B to X That's ideally what I want to do I want to stop this X route and obviously I want to stop the corner out I rarely ever on this right side against split close rarely ever go Just hard flat if I put a hard flat on the right It's normally accompanied with a curl flat or something to stop the corner out Because other than the deep post with the other play that's gonna hurt you in this main play Which is had back wheel is the deep corner out So ideally you want to make sure you account for a post either with your user moving the safety down or manning up the post And also account for the corner out You know with a cloud flat or a purple zone or something like that A lot of people do like to go to short running back route if they start killing you with that I'll man him up or something like that. So that's the main play you have to worry about in split close Obviously, there's other plays I'm on with it. We'll take a look at a couple other plays that people like to run in In split close, so we'll go home run covered to this time Obviously half back will is probably the main play that you know most regular players are gonna run But this is the other one it was good last year and once again, it's good this year and that's that's PA slot It's good because it attacks both flats You have it out most people will streak X like this once again X is always a guy's home get a big play But when they run slide what they're looking for is the a post route once again a post route over the middle of the field Because that if you look at this play art like this a Is the only route on the field that's once again is one get you over 10 yards and giving up 10 yards plays are not What we want to do so between these two plays you got to worry about if they run the PA slide You got to worry about a so once again, we can go ahead and bring these safeties down a little bit to try to stop the post Or you can man up a but most of the time with this I'll go ahead and just lurk the a route if I see PA slide So between half back will post and the PA slide post Those are the two plays that are gonna kill you in this formation if you can limit those plays Limit those two big play opportunities You're gonna make your opponent check down a lot throw to the running backs And that's gonna give you an opportunity to get a turnover or most of the time they're gonna make a mistake They're gonna force these big plays because that's what they want to do You know by taking away the big play You're gonna make most these kids make mistakes because they're not used to consistently hitting drags hitting flats and Taking what the defense gives them, you know You have to make your opponent make a mistake and that's the best way to do it This is how most of time what I think about when I defense split close Tell me what you guys think if this is a series y'all want me to continue on different formations and You know what I do defensively to slow them down I'm never been a person has been you know, you're never getting a first down on me But my goal is to slow people down essentially been but don't break, you know And by taking away the big plays you will not break So I'm gonna show you, you know multiple formations that people use a lot early man 18 Like once tight end any type of trips tight end with three wide receivers to the left ace twins doose close Whatever you guys are having trouble defending I'll give you an idea what I do defensively against them and what my main goal is Against these formations. So hit the like button. Please if I get a hundred likes I'll go ahead and do another formation what I do defensively versus and Hit the sub make sure I'm almost over 2,000 subs and mean the world to me to get over that I appreciate it y'all go ahead. Let me know what formations y'all want help defending and I'll tell you what goes through my mind All right y'all need


In a moment, you'll hear James Stewart as the six-shooter, just one of the many fine programs brought to you Sundays on NBC. Later this evening, listen to the NBC Star Playhouse with one of your favorite stars. Here, meet the press, America's number one news-making program, and be sure to keep tuned for the dramatic story of communism in America on Last Man Out. It's a wonderful lineup of great programs, all of them heard only on NBC. James Stewart as the six-shooter. The man in the saddle is angular and long-legged. His skin is sun-died brown. The gun in his holster is gray steel and rainbow mother of pearl. Its handle unmarked. People call them both the six-shooter. The NBC radio network presents James Stewart as the six-shooter, a transcribed series of radio dramas based on the life of Britt Ponsett, the Texas Plainsman who wandered through the western territories, leaving behind a trail of still-remembered legends. It's been about four o'clock in the afternoon when I rode out of the Saucer Mountains and hit the flat, and the scar stretched his leg and went into a high lope. It seemed real anxious to get across the eight miles of prairie between the hills in Clay City. Easy, boy. Easy now. Hey, what's your rush? Maybe he was hungry and maybe he was thirsty or maybe... Oh, no. No, no, he couldn't be that. Why, it was over six months since our last visit at Clay City. Scar couldn't still be remembered on the filly from the livery table, not after all that time, no. Besides horses don't have memories, at least not as good as... Now, you just slow down, boy, now. Quit. It wasn't anything I could do except just keep a tight rain on him, yes. I'm sure it was spur and scar along, whatever it was, it was important, at least was it him. Well, we'd covered about half the distance to town when I noticed a couple of dark specks, oh, maybe a mile or so ahead of us. And the way they were shaped and the way they were barely moving, well, they just about had to be packed bros. But it wasn't until we almost caught up that I spotted Hiram and he was beating one of those birds with a cottonwood switch and giving it such a cuss and he didn't even hear us riding up toward him. Easy, Scar. Easy, no. You start traveling, I'll set fire. You're such a burner that you won't be able to... A second there, you kind of startled me. I didn't know you was on my tail. The birds been acting up, Hiram? Oh, they're just being themselves, Brett. That's the trouble, they're just being themselves. Yeah, I sure know what you mean. Were you heading, Clay City? That's right. I heard you was riding herd for the Circle G. Last time I was in get some supplies, it told me. Are you going to town on business? No, no, ranch gave me a day off tomorrow being 4th of July. 4th of July? Well, I'll be cussing 4th of July. I've been out on the hill so long I lost all track of time. I didn't even know what month it was, not for certain. Oh, gee, I'm going to do a little celebration here. Well, I just thought... Come to think of it, I got me something to celebrate too. And it's more than just independence, Dave, Brett. It's a dine side more. Is that so? Yes. If these critters don't stop barking, it'll be Christmas before we ever get to Clay City. All right, Pierre, come on, start moving.  That's it. Now, you two event, both of you.  What was that you called them, huh? Yeah, what's that? Well, it sounded like Pierre. Sure, sure, sure, sure. That's your name, Pierre. Oh, no. What's the matter? They're perfectly respectable names. I seen a show once in Denver called the Paris Review. That was the title of it from Paris, France. And there was a couple of dances. Well, sir, if they didn't put on a jig, I'm telling you, Brett, it sure was something. The fella, he just picked up this gurney through every rich way. I thought she was going to land right in my lap. Oh, Lord, we get dead. Yeah, that's the truth everywhere. And this year, a girl danced with him. She kept coming back for more like she enjoyed being used for a lasso. Yeah, it's Pierre and he vet. That's what they always call it. It was on a sign out in front of the Table Grand Opera House. Those names always kind of stuck with me. So when I bought these birds, you know, bears, they're very particular about what you call them. Now, you just keep moving, Pierre. Come on, keep moving. That's quite a load you're carrying there, Harm. Yeah, it sure is. Well, I guess I'll ride on, maybe see you in town. Hold up a minute, Brett. Aren't you going to ask me what's in them bags? Well, no, I just figured it wasn't any of my business. Well, I'm going to tell you anyhow. If I don't tell somebody, I'll bust. I know I can trust you. Hmm? Brett, I've struck it. I've made a strike the life of which I've never even dreamed of it. Oh, easy, easy scar. You see this here sack right here? If it don't assay out to over $1,000, and that ain't the half of it, there's plenty more where this come from. Well, that sure sounds good, Harm. It is good. Well, I just bet the vein I find delivers more gold in the year than they ever took out of California. Is that so? Well, you sure are entitled to a strike, Harm. You've been prospecting for quite a spell. Yeah, 45 years, Brett. 45 years, come with me. But I ain't got no regrets. Not now, I ain't. I told them in Clay City. I told them all there was gold in the Saucer Mountains. Oh, I could smell it. Just the way my birds sniff water. No, they said old Harm was tetched. Then I'd never find nothing but yellow-colored rocks. Yeah. Let's start singing a different song now. Oh, you're sure it's gold, you found. Oh, you think I don't know it when I see it? You mark my words. Old Harm has turned up the real thing. Of course you mustn't let the news out. Oh. Not until after I get my assay report and file my claim. Oh, sure, sure. Uh, but I just wish there was some other assay office round here. What's that? Well, that Enoch Wilson. He would know a gold nugget from a teacatter. And what's more, I don't trust him. I don't trust him better. Well, no, Harm, you know... Some of the samples I brought him in before looked mighty good to me, but not to Enoch. I don't think he even tested him. Just let him try to say that this batch is worth it. Yeah, just let him try to say that. I don't know what's the matter with Scar. He sure is a wrestler. Just go on ahead, Brit. Just go on ahead. Well, I guess I might as well. Easy, boy. Easy. I hope everything works out the way you expect, Harm. Don't you worry yourself about that. Ah, nice running into you. Mutual, Brit. Mutual.  You can't eat that cactus. Get your nose out of there. The sun was just going down and we got to Clay City. I figured on stopping at the hotel first, making sure of the bed, but Scar had other ideas. He headed right straight for the livery stable. There just wasn't any doubt about it. He'd remembered that filly. Yes, sir. And mind you, I'm not saying that a horse can really get a disappointed expression on his face, but I'll tell you this much. Scar gave a pretty good imitation of it when he saw a big, ruined stallion occupying what had been that filly stall. Well, I left him there anyway, and I got myself supper in a room. And about nine o'clock I started feeling sleepy, you know. Oh, yeah, he pulled off my boots. Oh, yeah. That man sure does get tired and stays up late. Holy smoke. What's that? All those shots right outside my window. I grabbed my gun and I... Oh, and then I saw I wouldn't be needing the gun. A couple of kids shooting off Chinese firecrackers didn't look like I was going to get much sleep that night. And the way things worked out, I sure did. Well, yeah, who is it? I've got to talk to you. It's important. Well, come on in. Oh, thanks, Britt. Thank you. What's the matter? You look like you're getting ready for a real hard winter. You knock, Wilson. That's what's the matter. Remember, Britt, I told you I didn't trust him. Do you remember that one? Yes, well, I got me some cookies. Oh, no, it's just some firecrackers harm. Enoch, he... What, he said you haven't found gold. No, no, no, no, no. He said nothing one way or the other. By the time I got the birds into town tonight, it was almost seven o'clock. Enoch was just closing up the assay office. Uh-huh. But I'd given them sacks of gold, you see. And I said I wanted a report as soon as possible. And you know what he told me? Oh, he can't say as I do. Oh, Friday. I couldn't have no word because... he says I couldn't have no word before late Friday. Why, Britt, that's two days off. Well, tomorrow being a holiday. But that's the excuse he tried to hand me to. Oh, that lion scum. Oh, no, no, no. You know, the 4th of July is a pretty important occasion. Well, I don't give him the right to tell me a whole pack of lies, does it? No, no, no. Well, of course it does. Anyhow, I had to leave my gold with him. I didn't have no choice. I went to Brian's café and then I went back to see about the burrows. And that's when I noticed the light in Enoch's office. Oh. So naturally, I was kind of suspicious. So I snuck up and I peeked through the window. You know what I saw, Britt? I haven't the faintest idea. He was just sitting at the desk, Enoch himself getting ready to do some assing. And if those weren't my three sacks of gold in front of him, I'd trade you a whole hog for a slice of bacon. That's what I'll do. Enoch was testing you or that doesn't prove anything. Don't you see, Britt, he's fixing to take my law for himself. And once he makes up his mind how valuable it is, he'll do little substituting. And I'll wind up with three bags of rocks when I come in to see him on Friday. Oh, no. Probably aims to find out where I got it too. Oh, yes. File the claim himself. No, no, that doesn't sound very likely. Then why did he say it'd be Friday before he'd know anything? Why did he tell me that if he was planning to work tonight? Well, if you're so upset about it, you should have just come right straight out and asked. I'm going to ask you, Britt. That's just what I'm going to do. I'm going to ask you. But I want you there when I confront him. Me? Enoch's already lied to me once today. But if you're with me, if he sees you're my friend, maybe he'll think twice before he tries anything funny.  Well, I'm afraid I don't understand where I come in. Enoch knows you, don't he? Who's it? You're the six-shooter? Well, we've met up a couple of times. Yes, well, come on in. But let's get over there while we can catch him. No, wait a minute. Hold on. Britt, you know how much this strike means to me. You ain't got to let anybody swindle me out of it. No, no, no. We ain't got all night. All right, all right. Just give me a chance to tuck in my shirt tail. Now, you just remember one thing, Hiram. This wasn't my idea. Remember that. And Britt punts it with me, too. So you better get this door open. No, Hiram. Come on in, Britt. What's the trouble? Well, I, uh... There you are, Britt. There you are. You see right there? See? They were my sacks. Of course they're your sacks, honey. You see him? You see, he ain't denied it, is he? Hiram, are you going loco or something? I'll do the askin', Enoch. You'll do the answerin' from now on.  Huh? I thought you said you wasn't going to be able to assay this horror for Friday. What if I did? It appears like you changed your mind, don't it? Well, Britt wants to know the reason. Well, it was just that you were kind of anxious, that's all.  Would I tell you, Britt, yeah? Would I tell you? He knew it was good. I said it looked promising, Hiram. Promising enough so you'd try to cheat me out of it, eh? Well, you're not gettin' away with it, Enoch. The sick shooter here will see to that. No, no, just hold on. Hiram Grover, I oughta throw you right out of my office.  You just, you the... You sent word? You just asked Michael Bryan. I was over at his cafe lookin' for you. You'd already left, though. I told him if he saw you to give him the message. You, uh, you told Mike? Well, Hiram? Well, doggone it, but how was I to know?  Real strike? Well, ain't part of it yet, Britt, but some of the samples are mighty encouraging. A couple more tests. Evening, gentlemen. Who are you? Don't turn around. Just grab the some air. All three of them. Well, no, you just wait a minute. Come on, do a little stretchin' before we... That's better. Consider it of you to stay open tonight, mister. Saved us the trouble of breakin' it. All right, then. Let's start loadin' up. We'll return to James Stewart as the six-shooter in just a moment. Our religious institutions are strongholds of the American way of life. Our country was founded by men who had faith in God and who were willing to endure hardship and sacrifice for the sake of that faith. Today, the religious institutions in your community need your interest and support, so take an active part in religious affairs.  To face the problems of the future, America must be morally strong, and that moral strength comes through worship and faith. Go to church this week and take someone with you. Act two of the six-shooter, starring James Stewart as Britt Ponsett. There were two of them, young fellas. Both were on Levi's and leather jackets, both carrying 45s. They're about the same bill, same color, and looking up like big brothers. They hadn't bothered covering their faces. That meant that they weren't worried about being recognized. Probably didn't come from Clay City. The tall one gave most of the orders. Who's running this office? Will somebody speak up? I... I... I do the ass, then. That's more like it. And you'd be the fellow who'd know how to open this safe. Well, uh... There ain't really nothing worse. Cut out the stalling, mister. Get over here. Move. Oh, okay, okay, okay. You know, Xayah, he didn't have much choice. So he bent down in front of the cast iron safe. He started fiddling with the dial. And the other outlaw, the short one, he was standing beside the desk. He reached out his free hand. He picked up on a harm's or sax. I hear something, man. Feels pretty heavy, too. Can you let that alone, mister? All right, take it easy. That error belongs to me. You ain't got no right to it. I guess you don't hear so good. I told you to take it easy. He didn't think he could bully me just because you're holding a 45. No harm. Yeah, you've got another thing coming, young fella. I spent most of my life on that gold. And he ain't gonna walk in here and swipe it. You just let it be, uh... The next time I knew Hiram gave a leap forward, I tried to stop him, but it was too late. For a second, he just kept on moving. Oh, a stubborn two. Then his legs buckled and he grabbed the edge of the desk. But his fingers couldn't hold the grip. Both the outlaws were staring at Hiram. They weren't watching me. Get down, Enoch. My bullet hit the short one in the arm. The gun flew halfway across the office. The other one spun around and knocked over the kerosene lamp. I got off a second shot. It was so dark I wasn't sure I'd hit anything or not. For a couple of minutes, there wasn't a sound. Nothing but heavy breathing. I stretched out my hand and I fell to chair. I waited a second and then I gave it a good hard push. I sure had good ears. The bullet splintered into the chair before it even toppled over. But the flash of his gun showed me where he was. Crouch right behind the safe, out of range. I edged over to the right. If the window without him seeing me. I made a dodge and fired. Enoch lit up another lamp. The boy that was shot in the arm, he hadn't passed out. He was lying there staring at me. Looking even younger than he had when he first came into the office. The other fellow, he'd taken the bullet in the shoulder and he was bleeding pretty bad. But hire him, he was worse off than either of them. He was flat on his back, gasping for breath.  It's a good thing Doc Nibble's house was in the next block. Well Doc, there's too early to tell anything yet, but I'll let the bullet out when he's still hemorrhaging. I see. Them other two, they'll be as good as ever in a week or so. Good enough for a hangin' if I hire him, don't pull through. Oh no, no, he's just got to pull through Doc. He's an old man, Brent. I've seen fellas a lot younger. Yeah.  It's almost 4 a.m. Well, I thought maybe I might... There's nothing you can do here. Ain't a chance of him coming too far morning. I was standing right beside him when it happened. I could have drawn maybe and then... Maybe then you would both be sure to... And I'll see you in the morning, Brent. Hotel, but I just couldn't sleep. Well, I'm about 6.30, I gave up trying. I figured it was too soon to find out how a hiring was done, so I went for a little walk around town. I wasn't very hungry, but as long as Mike's cafe was open, I thought I'd just might as well stop in for a cup of coffee. I was just going through the door when Enoch Wilson came up and runnin'. Brent! Yeah, yeah, good morning, Enoch. I was hopin' I'd run into you. Stopped by the hotel, but they said you was out. Yeah, I started lookin' the town over. I just left hire him. Oh, well, he's not... No, no, no, no. He sure don't look good. Doc Nibble says he's got a good, strong constitution for a man his age. He'd have a pretty fair chance, but the hire him just don't seem to have any fight left in him. He ain't even tryin' to live. Well, how's he come to? Yeah, about an hour ago. I happened to be there. I went back to the office after that gunfight last night and finished up the hire him's assay. Well, I thought maybe it turned out to be somethin' good. Well, I wanted him to hire him to know about it before he... Oh, yeah, well, that was mighty thoughtful of you, Enoch. Yeah, and it is good, Brent. A real strike. Well, didn't you tell the hire him? Oh, sure, sure. But it didn't seem to make no difference to him. Not it, and sorta dozed off like he didn't even care. Is that so? Doc don't understand it neither. You'd think if anything it'd make him want to live. No one he'd found gold, sure turned a trick. Yeah, yeah, you sure would. Maybe he figures I'm lyin' to him because he's so bad off. Uh-huh. Well, I guess it could be that. Yeah, yeah, so we thought, Doc and me, we thought, well, maybe if he used to hear it from you, well... Oh, sure, sure, Enoch. I'll go right over there, sure. Graham, how ya feelin'? Pretty good, baby. Pretty good. Oh, well, that Doc says you're gonna be all right real soon, too. Yes, yes, yes. Sure, sure. Of course, you've gotta help him along some, you know. He can't cure you single-handed, you know. Oh, don't, it don't matter, bro. Just don't matter. Oh, now what are you talkin' about, Hiram? Well, I figured you'd be jumpin' up and down, fightin' your way out of bed when you heard the news. You mean about the gold? Sure, sure. Enoch said he told you. Yeah, he told me.  Well, I shouldn't have believed him. I knew it was the real thing when I first found it. I knew it was real. Still, maybe, maybe that was a sign. The sign? That my life's over. Forty-five years I spent lookin' for that yellow stuff. Well, no, I finally found it. I ain't got no reason to go on lookin' for the reason at all. I finally found it. I'm all tired, bro. I'm all tired, man. Well, you're gonna be a rich man, Hiram. Well, I wasn't. Oh, because it was makin' me rich, bro. Or maybe when I was younger, that was the reason. But lately, these past few years, I just wanted to prove to folks that I knew what I was talkin' about. That I wasn't touched, like they thought. Oh, of course you are. Knows or samples prove it, bro.  Ain't gonna be hard at all. I've done what I set out to do, so I reckon I'm luckier than most men. Well, I... That's one way of lookin' at it, I guess. Yeah, if this goes, you'll see, things work out for the best, bro. For the best. Well, maybe, you know, I did the right thing, after all, so... Oh, nothin', nothin', Hiram, nothin'. No, you better get some rash, too. You started to say somethin' about Enix. Did I? Yes, I finished it up, bro. What was that you were gonna say? What I was gonna say.  I wouldn't want to get you all upset. All upset? What are you drivin' at, bro? Weak and feeble, and... It wasn't my idea, of course. Well, you don't mean that Enoch was lyin' to me that that oar wasn't full of gold? Uh... Now, I didn't say that. I knew Enoch Wilson couldn't be trusted, so it ain't true, uh, about my strike. Now, uh... So they figured I was gonna die, didn't they? Then they'd all have to laugh on me. I ain't gonna be that obliged, and I'll get well if it kills me. And I'll find gold, too, right out there in those mountains where I always said I'd find it. Oh, they think they're gonna soft-silt me into kickin' a bucket, don't they? Oh, they do. Well, Britt, you just tell them different. I'd be glad to, Hiram. I sure would be glad to. Well, by the time Hiram got well and found out he was responsible for a genuine gold rush, I just thought much he could do about it. And the way the money poured in, and faster than Hiram could spend no matter how hard he tried, he sure went in for some fly-by-night schemes, too. Like that was that organizing a prospect and expedition to go up to Alaska in some place called the Kondike, I think it was, something like that. Everybody knew he'd never find gold up in a place like that, because they're all expecting him to come back any day now. It meant that it was just a wild goose chase. But he hasn't shown up the last time I was through Clay City. Folks are beginning to wonder what's keeping them. The Six Shooter is a transcribed NBC radio network production in association with review productions. It is based on a character created by Frank Burtz and is written by him. Mr. Stewart may soon be seen in the Universal International Picture, the Glenn Miller story. Others in the cast were Herb Bygren, Bill Johnstone, Barney Phillips, Tony Barrett, and Howard McNeer, who played Hiram. Special music for this program was by Basil Adlam, and the entire production is under the direction of Jack Johnstone. All characters and incidents were fictitious and any resemblance to actual characters or incidents is purely coincidental. This is Hal Gibney speaking. This is the NBC Radio Network.