identification to signatures, tightly, a framework and generic transformations. The speaker is Bertram Potrin. Now, yes. Okay, I'm talking today about identification schemes, about signature schemes and how to build the one from the other. What I present today is joint work with Mia Bellari from UCSD and with Douglas DeBilla from McMaster University in Hamilton, Canada. So, I start with a brief introduction of what signature schemes is. I guess all of you know what this is and we have seen it a couple of times on this conference already. So this is just to fix the syntax. We have a signing algorithm and it outputs a signature which I denote with sigma. It gets a secret key, a signing key. It gets the verification algorithm is C on this side. It gets a verification key and it gets a signature and it will indicate with 0 or 1 whether a signature on M is considered valid or not. Everything depends on signature schemes. Nowadays, there's uncountable examples. For example, TLS, e-commerce and so on. And signature schemes are also widely standardized. So these two are, for example, RSA-based signatures and these are discrete lock-based signatures that appear in the one or the other standard. So this is actually a standard. If we focus at the letter four here, they have something in common, namely at least two of them come from the future mere transform of some identification scheme into a signature scheme. So this is a general principle for signatures to have a conversion from here to this side. The future mere transform was proposed 86 and it's quite versatile because it takes a lot, a big class of identification schemes and make signature schemes out of them. We have signatures based on factoring on RSA on discrete logarithm problem. It's all there. And this also holds for the very efficient ones that were standardized. So for example, these two are directly instantiations of this and just in a different elliptic, in different discrete logarithm groups. This one is grayed out because actually DSA and ECDSA are not really from the future mere transform but the same way of thinking behind this. What I put down here on the slide is a brief history of the security arguments for future mere transform when it was proposed in 86. There was just a hope for security. The security was not understood. This started with PS in 96, 95 about. And then this is the early 2000s where the reductions were made to the security properties of ID schemes. In a principle, we try to extend here to a fourth bullet point. What's this paper about in this setting? So the future mere transform is there but it has a big problem somewhat. Namely, the security reduction is inherently untied. So we always lose a factor, a huge factor of two to the 60 or something. So this is the number of random oracle queries that we allow. There's some exceptions though, if you have lossy identification schemes. But in general, we have untightness and this is due to the forking lemma or the reset lemma, whatever the paper used that you consulted, it's very similar.  If you, unless you disregard tightness completely but we don't do it for this talk at least. There's an exception though, there is a scheme or a conversion or more scheme that's called swap. This appears in a journal paper of Mikali and Raisin, also in the early 2000s and that one is factoring based. And it has a tight reduction. However, it does not follow from the future mere transform. So this is somewhat the setting that we started with and then we have the following three contributions. First, we extend the class of identification schemes that can be considered for this trend transformations by adding another functionality. This is these schemes with trap tours and there is a couple of instantiation for this. The second part is that we didn't take these class of identification schemes and we propose new transforms that will turn them into signature schemes. So this is four new transforms that we propose. Importantly, they are the reductions in all four cases are tight. And then the third point is we look, go back to the swap scheme and try to re-understand it then in that framework. Because so far, swap I consider ad hoc. So the first step is to look more into security of signature schemes. So far I gave you the syntax. Security definitions, we also, first of all, you know it. And second, we just saw it in the last talk. The most common security notion is existential unforgability on the chosen message attack, which we denote with just this UF. There you have the adversary that needs to forge on any message. And it has an oracle, a signature oracle that signs any message that it provides. Then there's a second notion. It's a more technical one that we need in this paper. Namely, this is we called unique unforgability. And it's very similar to standard unforgability. But there's one exception. Namely, this signature oracle can be queried at most once on each message. So the adversary can say, sign the string Alice. But it cannot say the second time, sign the string Alice for me. So that's the only difference. Of course, the second one is more restricted than the first one. So there's an implication from here to this one. One can also show that this implication is strict. The question is then, sorry, do we have transforms that bring the weak notion to the strong one? And I'm showing two transformations for this on just the next slide. Importantly, these transforms have tight reductions and because our overall goal is to go from identification schemes to signature schemes with UF security, then from now on, the goal will just be to go from identification to UUF. This will be sufficient because we can then just run one of these transforms afterwards. So how do these two transforms look like? In principle, both of them can be considered full glory because they appeared somewhere else, but not with a security analysis. And more importantly, not with checking whether the reductions were tied and so on, so I just repeat them here. So the two transforms go into take two very different paths to achieve the goal. The first one, which we call DR, works by removing randomness from the scheme. So this is the standard thing of de-randomizing the signing algorithm by deriving the randomness that it will use using a PRF from the message. And because our paper is full of random articles anyway, we actually write just, we use another random article, an independent one of the other one, and plug in the signing key of the scheme and the message, and then this is our PRF construction. An advantage of this transform is that the signatures stay the same by the format and also the verification because we just de-randomize the signing algorithms, the disadvantages that we need one more random article. The second technique is adding randomness and here we just add a salt to the message. So instead of signing a message, what we do is we pick a salt of 160 bits or something and we concatenate it to the message and assign the whole thing. This does not prevent absolutely that I never sign messages twice, but effectively it does because if the salt does not repeat, then M concatenate will always be different. This will also work. The disadvantage is that the signature will have the salt appended, so I need to spend another 160 bits. On the other hand, this is standard model secure, whatever, like pick your choice. I think this one is more interesting because the signatures are shorter. Importantly, in both cases, we have type reductions. So from now on, we use UUF as our main goal to achieve in our transforms from identification schemes. Identification schemes, what's that? This slide or a similar one, I've seen at least twice yesterday in two talks. This is the standard syntax of identification schemes in the decades. What we do have is we look at this three move identification scheme. There's one prover here on the left, there's a verifier on the right. The three messages are called commitment, challenge, and response, and we didn't note the commitment with uppercase Y, the challenge with C and the response with Z. The commitment is sampled using a commitment generation algorithm that we did note, CMT, and it will output the commitment itself that is made public then, and it will output some local state of the prover little Y, and this Y goes into the response algorithm that outputs the response, given also the challenge that is contributed by the verifier, and then this is the protocol how it is generated. This, the concatenation of Y, C, and Z, we call the transcript, and that one is verified by the verifier in the end. Okay, that's standard. What we want to look at in this talk is also about these identification schemes with straptors, so what's that? So look here that the commitment currently is generated, the commitment and the local state here, the secret state are jointly sampled. In a trapdoor commitment, in a trapdoor identification scheme, this is replaced. So I go back, this one algorithm is replaced by two, namely the first one is one just samples the commitment from the commitment space, so this is not an algorithm, this is just a set commitment space, and then, given some trapdoor with a special algorithm, one can compute this local state from the commitment. So only the prover can do it because only the prover has TK. So imagine SK and TK being the same thing, this design key, the identification secret key. The remaining parts stays the same here, and what I want from the trapdoor property is, well, correctness as before, but also that these values YY generated in this new method have the same distribution as the old ones. So that's an identification scheme with trapdoor. Now we need security notions for identification schemes. The ones that I propose here are independent of the trapdoor property or not. So the standard one, also known since a long time, is impersonation resilience. Basically, the adversary tries to impersonate the prover to an honest verifier, so the verifier remains honest, and in such an attack, the adversary gets public information, this would be the public key. So all the information that the verifier has, it gets a transcript oracle that simulates just the honest execution of this protocol, so it generates Y, C and Z, and gives this transcript to the adversary, and a challenge oracle. And in challenge oracle, this is the impersonation steps. On the challenge phase, the prover comes up with any commitment it likes and sends it to the honest verifier, which then samples uniformly it randomly on the challenge, sends it back, and it expects a good answer for that one that verifies correctly. The transcript oracle models passive attack, so the adversary first sits there and observes how people are communicating, and, well, then in the end, he or she will achieve the one. This has been formalized in this paper by Abdallah et al. The notion is called Impersonation Against Passive Adversaries. Importantly, in that paper, there is only one challenge query to be done, so that the adversary can only try once to convince the verifier. How can we build signatures from this notion? Well, we are the Fierce Immune Transform. This is also well known. The reduction is not tight. It loses a big factor. The question is now, if you lean back a bit and ask yourself, why is it not tight? Then a couple of reasons are there. The first one is a technical one, and the MPA notion is only the single challenge query, which is not helpful. A couple challenge queries, then the situation would be better here. The second is that the adversary has the free choice of the commitment.  The question that we want to ask ourselves here in this paper is, are there alternative security notions for identification schemes that would allow for tight reductions to signature schemes? We propose some. Actually, we propose four, and this is why we call this a framework of notions. We call this constrained impersonation because we constrained the adversary in some more or less artificial way. The four notions are called SIMP, CC, SIMP-CU, SIMP-UC, and SIMP-UU. So this is the four notions. This is identifiers for the four notions. In our setting, the adversary has, again, access to the public key. It has access to a transcript oracle, which it can ask multiple times to generate fresh transcripts, and it has access to a challenge oracle as before, but now the challenge oracle, what it does, depends on the exact type that you want to have here. So there's four different challenge oracles that I will tell you how they work in a second. The goal of the adversary is, again, forging a signature, forging a transcript, sorry, and, importantly, in this framework, multiple queries are allowed to both oracles. So in the MPA of before, there was only one for the challenge oracle. Now this is unlimited. So now I'll tell you what these combinations, CC, CU, UC, and EU, stand for. They stand for the restrictions that we pose on the commitment and on the challenge in the attack phase, so in the impersonation phase. So the first letter tells us about the commitment, and a C stands for chosen, chosen by the adversary, and a U stands for unchosen by the adversary. So, for example, if you look at the case CU, then this means that the commitment is chosen at will by the adversary, but the challenge, so the little C, the challenge is picked honestly at random. And this notion, since CU, is actually exactly like MPA as before, just that we have the unlimited number of challenge queries. The other notions are somewhat all new, basically. Now this was likely a bit to abstract. What does it mean to choose by the adversary or reused from an honest transcript? So I'll give you the game definitions here in this slide. This is the main body, the simple experiment. It's, as you expect, like key generation of the identification scheme. The adversary is invoked, it gets the public key, and it gets two oracles, the transcript oracle that's here. That's common for all the four notions. The transcript oracle generates a transcript, gives the transcript to the adversary. That's fine. And then there is the challenge oracle. And the CU notion, that's the one from before that is close to imp, has this challenge oracle here, and you see here that the adversary calls it, but it will specify a commitment. And then uniform challenge is picked, and then the oracle returns this partial transcript. So this Y value, this C value, and a place to be filled by the response that the adversary has to output. The adversary can query this many times, so there will be a lot of partial transcripts, and it wins. The adversary wins if it can answer any, if it can fill this gap for any of these partial transcripts. A second one I want to walk you through is the UC notion. In the UC notion, the adversary actually first has to invoke the transcript oracle a couple of times, and this will establish some Y values that are honestly sampled. And then when calling the channel oracle, it just specifies an identifier I here, a counter. This I will just point to one of these Ys that were established here, and then that one is used in this transcript that has to be filled. On the other end, so this means the U unshows and stands for the commitment. The challenge, however, this one is freely picked by the adversary. Well, and then we have the U and the CC case in the work as you expect. So here both of them are sampled honestly, and here both of them are provided by the adversary. Now we have four notions, and of course there's relations between them, and they are, as you might expect. So this one is the strongest one where the adversary picks everything by himself.  They are uncomfortable. All the green arrows here, the implications mean strict implications. This structure, how they relate to each other will somehow be important for the upcoming slides. So I add this little diamond, which is just this figure rotated by 45 degrees. So this one will stay on the top right corner on all slides for now, so that we can refer to it. And now that we have this notion, we can start building signature schemas from it, and for each of these notions, I will give you one construction. The first one is building on CU. CU is the standard one that you know with this impersonation, where the prover is impersonated by the adversary, and the adversary picks any commitment of its choice. The scheme to build the signature, to transform, to build the signature scheme from this is the well-known Fiat-Chemier transform. So here you see it. This is standard. There's nothing new. This is the standard version in 1986, basically. What we see, however, is that in the forgery, this structure here, these lines of code already show that the adversary has three possibilities to pick the commitment. However, with the challenge, it's very limited, because it will have to be the output of the random oracle. This naturally relates to the CU notion, where the first, the commitment is chosen by the adversary and the other one is not. So this scheme now, because we have basically the multiple challenge queries, we now have this result, a security result, unforgeability, tightly reduces to SIMCU. The second scheme, yet this is not too interesting. So this improves on the prior result by giving the right notion for the identification scheme to get tight security, however, it's the same transform as before. Now it gives you something new. Now we switch to the UC setting. In the UC setting, the commitment was not chosen at free by the adversary, but the challenge was. So here's the signature scheme, and you see this is reflected. Now the commitment comes from a random oracle. So the adversary in a forgery cannot freely pick it. It has to coincide with the output of the random oracle. But the challenge it can pick as it likes. And for this scheme, now against this new notion here on the right, we have again tight security. Here we see an example where only this weaker notion, UUF, is implied. And naturally, like if you do the exercise, you will see that UF is not implied. There's a trivial attack against that. So that would be the second scheme here for that one. The third one is for the UU notion. That's the weakest one. We see now that the adversary has, sorry, that the scheme has now one random oracle for the commitment and the second independent random oracle for the challenge. So the adversary, when forging, can either control the one nor control the other. What you see also is that we have the cuts one bit or magic bit as I just learned it is called. This is very short signatures. Again, we get UUF with tight reductions from this notion here. And now we go for the upper notion here, CC. Well, you might wonder why is it actually, why isn't, why is there point to have something from CC anyway if this is the strongest notion in the first place because we can just use this or this or this transform? Well, the advantage is that the others, some of the others use the trapdoor property, which kind of is a restriction on the identification scheme while this one does not. So for this transform that comes from CC, we don't use this trapdoor property. We get longer signatures though. Again, we have tight reduction to the CC property. Well, and that's cool. We have now tight reductions for, so we have tight signature schemes from identification schemes. However, if you just believe it as I said it, then I successfully cheated you because I didn't tell you whether these notions for ID schemes are actually naturally achievable. And there I have this slide too about, so how do we, how can we achieve these notions for ID schemes? Well, we have this theorem first. If we look at ID schemes that are honest, verifies your knowledge and extractable. And this would be the standard case also in the future me transform. And we look at some security property of the ID scheme, which we call key recovery resilience. That means you give the adversary just a public key and it will output just a secret key and it doesn't have anything else, no oracle and so on. Then we get already UC for free. So this one we get for free and so we get this one. On this side for the CU, however, we lose a factor of QCH. And so overall the future me transform, if you start with, for example, DLP based zero knowledge proof, we lose exactly the same factor as the prior papers. What we are better with is this and this notion where we don't lose the tightness to the number theory assumptions, don't you? The fourth notion, CC, the one here on the top, recall this was the one where the adversary freely chose the commitment and the challenge. And this cannot be achieved in this world which is honest verifies your knowledge. Why? Because honest verifies your knowledge means that it's for everybody, it's possible to just simulate transcripts and so this would make it easy to forge one. This does not mean that CC cannot be reached in this setting, is that there is no identification scheme that reaches CC. I give you one here. Just what we know is that these identification schemes wouldn't be honest verifies your knowledge. So effectively I give you some scheme here that reaches MC trivially. However, I have to also say there is a limitation in the sense that these identification schemes, a scheme we constructed using a signature scheme. So actually then the overall construction would be take a signature scheme, build an ID scheme and you get a signature scheme, yeah. Cool. This is just a construction, this does not mean that any CC identification scheme needs a signature scheme by itself. So this might be replaced by something we can. In practice however, a standard example for a trapdoor ID scheme, so an ID scheme that also has a trapdoor and gives you these notions here is the old one from Guillieu Kiskater which recalls this commitment usually in Guillieu Kiskater, you compute, you sample a lowercase y value from that an and you raise it to the E. E is an RSA exponent. Well, and this is trapdoor because if you know D, you can also go the other way around. You sample this value first to compute this state by raising to the D. How much time do I have? One minute, okay. The last thing I wanted to talk and I'm not going to talk about is to recognize web in our constructions. So effectively, if we take the one transform that I proposed to turn an identification scheme into a signature scheme and then I use this technique transform to turn the signature scheme which was only UUF secure until UF, so this is just a composition of two conversions that I showed you. Swap is this and the only difference that you see here is that the salt value used for the second transform and the C value, the challenge used for the first transform is the same. So it's the same value sampled. Beyond that, this is the same thing so basically this is an optimization of this and I think this gives a very clear understanding of what the principles behind swap are. If you combine other transforms of us you get the same result but better. You get weaker security notions and you get smaller signatures so this is just one bit beyond that. So actually by combining the right things we get better than swap. And with this I conclude, thank you. Do we have a short comment or a question? Thanks for your talk. My question is about if you have a trapdoor commitment scheme like this, can't you get a tight signature from a hash and sign construction? Sorry? If you have a trapdoor function you can get a signature sign and you can get signatures from that. If you have a trapdoor permutation you can have tight security, tight signatures from that. But this wouldn't follow this identification, the pass through identification schemes. So this contribution is more about understanding the connections about ID schemes and signatures. This is the first place to build in this setting, swap in the factoring base setting a new signature scheme. Like we do but there is no point in it because other constructions are known since 20 years. Okay, so let's thank the speaker again. So the last paper in this session is how to obtain fully secure preserving automatic signatures from structure preserving ones and the speaker is Yu Yu Wang.


And now stay tuned for the mystery program that is unique among all mystery programs because even when you know who is guilty You always receive a startling surprise at the final curtain in the signal oil program the Whistler Signal the famous go farther gasoline invite you to sit back and enjoy another strange story by the Whistler I'm a whistler and I know many things for I walk by night. I Know many strange tales hidden in the hearts of men and women who have stepped into the shadows Yes, I know the nameless terrors of which they dare not speak And now for the signal oil company the Whistler strange story man in a corner It began with little things didn't advance Yes, little bits of conversation that were cut short abruptly changed whenever you appear Telephone calls that made you think of the old joke if a man answers hang up Only it isn't any joke. Is it bad? Not when you find yourself in a corner Wondering about your beautiful beautiful wife Lydia and your business partner Frank Paris The big trouble is they've been so clever about it You're forced to wonder whether there really is anything between them or whether it's all a mistake a product of your own Overactive imagination Because outwardly they've given you no sure sign no conclusive evidence and at an informal get-together at your home in Malibu Frank's actions are as natural and casual as a friend and business partner should be While Lydia conducts herself with a calm and reserved that leave you completely confused Your friends also enjoy your company look upon her as the perfect wife and upon you as luckiest man in the world That's what you are Vance. I guess I am pretty lucky at that I've been telling him that for years ever since we've been in business together. I envy you Vance Well, I like that Lydia may be my dearest friend, but I don't exactly crack a whip over you Jim Vanton Not exactly Ruth, but oh now that wait a minute.  He's not only smart He's a diplomat too. Oh, that's smart enough to find me a wife like Ruth. Oh, Lydia. You see what I mean diplomat Conversations getting too serious Besides, I'll admit. I'm a lucky woman to have Vance. Now you see why don't I get answers like that? Because it's time to go home and if I start treating you too perfectly you'll want to stay for one for the road But it's still early. Oh seriously Jim's got an important meeting in the morning. We wouldn't have come at all except that Well, who turns down Vance and Lydia Lawrence? Why sure most wonderful little couple in the world successful Beautiful but your coat on. Oh, yeah.  Good night. Good night. I'm gonna run to good night, Lydia. Good night, Frank I'll see you at the office in the morning. That's right Frank. Good night nice couple the Benton's Lydia Yes Are we that perfect couple they spoke about? What do you ask? Oh, I don't know. I Skip it, huh? I think so I'm tired. Did you mind if I don't know go ahead? and Think I'll go out for a breath of air Good night. Good night It's there and it isn't you wonder what to do about it Don't you that how to make sure how to satisfy in your own mind what it's all about if it's about anything at all Walking along the beach alone with only the roar of the surf for company you get an idea and the next time Lydia is in town away from the beach out You begin to carry out your plan. Where do you want the extension for mr. Lawrence here in the workshop? Yes It's been a terrible inconvenience running up into the house every time I get a call It seems like people always want you just when you're getting started at something seems so all right This workshop doesn't look as if you use it much though. Oh No, I haven't lately, but I'll be getting going on my hobby again things are easing up the office Wish I could say the same Right here on the work bench. Okay for the phone mr. Lawrence No, it'll be in the way perhaps inside one of these cabinets anywhere you say Now just how does this work? I won't get a ring down here. Will I know not if we hook a cutout switch on this phone You'll hear it on the phone in the living room anyway, and you can just pick it up here fine It'll be handy for you. All right. Oh, yes, it's going to be very handy Going out again then these nightly strolls seem to be becoming a habit. I won't be long Lydia about 12 minutes You almost had a schedule Really? I wasn't aware of it. I Guess that's about how long it does take me. I always walk down to the inlet and back Oh Strange that she'd know exactly how long you take each night isn't it? Because so far you haven't caught anything out of line No calls from Frank since you have the extension put in Your certain Lydia doesn't suspect that you've been in your workshop these past four nights instead of out walking Yes in the workshop waiting listening for her to get a call Four nights and no luck or maybe you're in luck Perhaps you've been entirely wrong about Frank and Lydia Stare at the phone wonder if it will ever ring if Frank will ever call And then it hits you Perhaps he won't have to call Lydia. Yes, then now that Lydia thinks you're safely out of the house She might call him your hand jerks out compulsively to the phone Quietly you lift the receiver and I just this minute remember the party darling. I'm terribly sorry I'm sure I'm not glad that you just forgot about it shameless I know roof actually Vance seemed a little tired when he got home from the office this evening and I Guess my concern over him just about pushed everything else from my mind. We is an ill I hope virus or anything Lydia. Oh, no, it isn't anything like that. I'm sure in fact right now He's taking his constitutional walking along the beach and you're not with him. I didn't think you two could stand to be separated even that long I Permit him a few minutes to himself every once in a while. How's the party going down there now? It's taking on form. Oh, I am sorry. You couldn't make it. I am too really and do please forgive me for not calling sooner I don't quite understand it myself, but I want you to of course We'll make it another time soon. I hope my best thank you dear. Good night. Good night You're embarrassed aren't you van almost ashamed that you eavesdropped on an innocent conversation between Lydia and Ruth Benton And you wonder again if you just imagine that a romantic attachment existed between your business partner Frank in your wife, Lydia You think about it through the next day Can't get the idea out of your mind So once again the following night to leave Lydia for your nightly a walk along the beach and take up your vigil instead by the extension phone in your workshop You haven't been there long when There it is. Yes, Frank. Oh funny. I just want you alone He's out walking on the beach. I told you it'd be safe. I'll just hang up as he comes back What have you found out? I still haven't got anything we could use on him. I've gone over all our back record tax statements No way you can find out about that deal in Miami. I know it was questionable It's been unfortunately he pulled that one before we became partners if I could dig up something Conclusive on that day you could tell him you're through and I could tell him that his share of the business is mine Or he'd go to jail chef Frank how long do we have to wait like this? Oh, Lydia? I'm as impatient as you are. I hate Vance every bit as much We've nothing to nail. Well, maybe I could help people to other crooked deals, too Yeah, but all before I was in business with him. There's got to be proof Lydia We'll come out of this with nothing that we can't really threaten nothing but for each other Yeah, I know I know Lydia. I don't like this way. You're right Frank. We must be practical We should have many years together We both like money Let's not wait too long. We're just long enough to get what we want We need evidence that will force fans to give you your freedom me Well, it's all ownership of the business You're cruel darling But you know from you, I like it Good night Lydia. I won't call like this anymore. It's too risky. I hope you won't have to very long darling Is that why? Good bye. You're right both of you It is going to be Goodbye Engineware it's one of the principal reasons drivers have to spend big sums of money having their motors overhaul Engineware it's one of the principal reasons motors lose pep and power get fewer miles per gallon of gas Engineware it's one of the principal reasons cars gradually use more and more oil until eventually they become oil eaters No wonder automotive and petroleum engineers for years have sought ways to reduce engineware And now at last signal reports startling success with an amazing new motor oil that reduces by 50 percent Engineware due to lubrication That means your car can now keep its like new pep and power twice as long It means you can now enjoy low oil consumption twice as long if your car isn't already an oil eater So if you want to be good to your car and your pocketbook, too Drain out that lazy old motor oil have a signal dealer refill your crankcase this week with signal premium The amazing new signal oil that reduces engineware due to lubrication 50 percent Engineware engineware engineware Well then you're in a terrible corner aren't you? The phone extension you had installed has served its purpose You finally discover the truth about your wife lydia and your partner frank paris And it's even worse than you'd imagine Frank suspects about some of your past shady deals, particularly one in miami florida If he can learn the facts, he'll be able to take more than lydia away from you, won't he? Yes, he'll be able to force you to sign over your share of your mutual holding Only he hasn't any facts and if you move fast enough, he'll never uncover them Walking along the ocean front that very same evening you get another inspiration This one from a chance conversation with lieutenant matt engel of the sheriff's squad Hello, lieutenant Oh, it's you mr. Lawrence. What's trouble? Sorry, mr. Lawrence. We've just been edgy lately You know since that killer's been reported seen in the beach area killer seen around here Oh, it seems like I did read something about it You didn't think that I'm no harm in jacking say how've you been? fine fine lieutenant busy, you know, but um Lieutenant, you don't suppose there's anything to this report. Oh could be I didn't mean to worry you though I was thinking about my wife Really, I shouldn't leave her alone in the house. Well, no, it isn't the best idea And I've got to run up to san francisco soon I wouldn't want to think now look we patrol pretty carefully and I know you do But if anything happened to her, I'm sorry even brought it up mr. Lawrence gosh I heard all you folks feel about each other, but this prowler If you hear any more you'll let me know won't you certainly I appreciate your concern But you can count on us the boys are careful. Oh, I'm sure of it lieutenant I know I can count on you You've put my mind at ease already It's done isn't it Ben? You've made the lieutenant well aware of your concern about the danger which lurks close by And now you're ready for the next step The very next night you arrange for your partner frank peris to stop by the house at malibu for cocktail and small talk Talk which they believe they're carrying off very well. Oh, it's a wonderful story frank. Really? Well, so help me it's true that they tell me it's that old man simpson back $5,000 Oh, no frank come come really that's so help me You mean to tell me a man like simpson would fall for an old gag like that Good heavens that spanish prisoner routine is as old as the con game itself could be but but apparently it all sounded brand new to simpson And I thought he was one of the smart men in town Well, it just goes to show vance.  I don't know frank I don't know about that um Darling, we're running out of martini But Oh, yes, of course Excuse me As lydia and frank go on chatting you stroll back to the kitchen Then quickly you slip out into the hall hurry to the closet You find what you're looking for in the pocket of frank's overcoat. Yes One of his gloves Exhibit a vance A few minutes later you're back in the living room with more cocktails sipping your drink And then an idea occurs to you as frank opens his cigarette case Offers it to lydia. Oh, thank you. Thanks. Oh, yeah. Now as I was saying this cocky chap turns to the sailor Um, may I what? One of your cigarettes frank. I've heard so much about that special brand of yours You smoking a cigarette vance. I just thought I'd like to try one. That's all of course There you are. Oh, man. Thanks But go on with your story frank. I didn't mean to interrupt. Oh, yeah. Well, anyway Now this cockney chap wheels around and faces the sailor. Here here, my lad. He says You like the cigarette take a few puffs and leave it in the ashtray Exhibit be that The evidence against frank paris is building isn't and there's more Yes, the glass he holds in his hand the cocktail glass with his fingerprints on it You'll want that too. Won't you van? After frank leaves you go to your workshop open a cabinet look at the evidence it contains Evidence against your partner frank paris A half smoke cigarette his special brand vance And a glove his glove And a cocktail glass with his fingerprints on it Yes, it's all the evidence you'll need isn't it? You close the cabinet and lock it Now you're ready for the next step the next move You make it the following day with a call to the airline's office And then late the same afternoon you hurry back to the house You're in the bedroom when you hear the front door close And shortly after that lydia makes her appearance. What darling you're home early Oh packing. Yes. I've got to run up to san francisco Got a call a while ago on the clock account. I think I can save it if I see clocked personally Phone frank and tell him will you? Oh, sure. My plane leaves in 45 minutes Drive me on go Um, how long will you be gone? Oh several days Going to miss me dreadfully Oh, but I will darling of course lydia Of course You board the plane at burbank unscheduled and then your airborne Arriving at the san francisco airport a few minutes before six There you immediately arrange for a reservation aboard the eight o'clock plane back to los angeles Then ride into town and register at the willows hotel I'll have the boy take your bags up mr. Lawrence. Thank you Oh, I want to leave a call for the morning 10 o'clock very well, sir I don't want to be disturbed until then.  It's tedious, but it's safer isn't it van? As you approach the house you see a light burning in the living room Lydia is home isn't she van as you knew she would be You slip into the house to the workshop I've tried to reach you since early evening frank I wondered if you'd call my business with a client and pasadena today ended up by letting him buy my tenor tonight But what's the idea of calling me all evening? Lydia isn't that a little risky? Not when vance is in san francisco darling San francisco when why he left on the late afternoon plane What funny didn't talk it over with me. Are you sure? Of course i am frank I drove him out to the airport myself. So i saw him get aboard the plane even stayed to waze him out of sight. What's strange? This isn't quite the reaction. I expected you to have darling. Oh, what do you mean? Well Aren't you coming over? Oh Was sure Sure, I am of course I'll be there in about half an hour. That's better and do stop worrying. I told you vance is in san francisco Okay, okay, but still seems funny. He didn't talk it over with me Apparently it came suddenly a call from some client up there. I can't remember the name He said you weren't at the office. Oh, that's right. I was in pasadena most of the afternoon. Well, then it couldn't have talked to him You've heard enough. Haven't you vance the time has come You hurry quietly to the living room Wait outside the door and the lady has completed her call. All right, then you step into the room Vance surprise lidion What are you doing here? I thought that you It's all a trick wasn't it? You've known all along You've heard everything I said. Yes I've known for some time lidion. All right. What are you going to do about it?  I have been a fool lidion. No vance. No It's all over very quickly isn't it vance lidion is dead and now you've got to move carefully Arrange everything just as you planned it to throw suspicion on your partner frank paris The sound of the front doorbell startled you doesn't advance. You wonder who could be Certainly not frank. He couldn't have arrived this soon You move down the hall to the front door and listen. Well ring again, sweetheart They must be home. There's a light out in the living room Well, they could have gone all forgotten.  Yes the Benton friends of lidion They would have to pick this night to come calling. They went down to the grotto for dinner, huh?  I hadn't thought of that. I suppose we could go down there Well, let's see. No, it's almost 10 o'clock and should be back soon. Well Let's wait a while. Okay, but let's wait in the car. It's cold out here. All right.  You push the glove in between the sofa pillows Drop the cigarette into an ashtray Place the glass on the end table Then you proceed to disarrange the furniture evidence of a struggle. That's important too. Isn't it Vance? It takes you some time to set the scene perfectly Finally you're satisfied That should do it lidion that should take care of your darling frank very well Very well indeed Engine wear engine wear engine wear Is engine wear causing your expensive motor to wear out twice as fast as necessary It is if you're still using lazy motor oils that merely lubricate. Here's what I mean In amazing new signal premium motor oils special properties are engineered into the oil through the marvels of modern chemistry As a result new signal premium not only reduces engine wear due to lubrication 50 percent But also protect your motor in all these important extra ways One keeps oil rings clean and free two controls and reduces harmful engine deposits such as carbon gum and varnish Three prevents sticking of hydraulic valve lifters four stops acid corrosion and rust Best of all new signal premium motor oil gives you all this extra protection at no increase in price Good reason to get your next oil change at a signal service station Signal service station change this week to the amazing new signal oil that reduces engine wear due to lubrication 50 percent Engine wear engine wear engine wear It's perfect isn't it Vance? Yes, you've carefully set the scene to trap your partner frank peris for the murder of your wife Now all you have to do is catch a plane back to san francisco flip back into your hotel You look over the living room once more to make certain that everything is just as you want it to be And as you do an idea occurs to you The cocktail glass vans It certainly would have been knocked over in the struggle You place it carefully on the floor near your wife's body Turn the end table over on its side Then as you step back. Hello, mr. Lawrence. Well Lieutenant But you were in san francisco.  Lawrence I've been watching you for the past five minutes Quite a little scene setter aren't you look if you'll let me explain like I said save it for your lawyer You'd better be a good one What are you doing here? Why did you come just keeping an eye on things you wanted me to remember You were so concerned about your wife's safety And I learned you were in san francisco. I decided I'd stop by and make sure everything was okay I called her on the phone a little while ago, but the line was busy you called yeah several times But the line was busy so long. I thought I better come out and investigate It's a deadly I came into the house through your workshop And I found out why I couldn't get through on the phone. Well What do you mean that extension phone you have in your workshop vans Someone left it off the hook Let that whistle be your signal for the signal oil program the whistler each sunday night at this same time Signal oil company has asked me to remind you that you get the most pleasure out of driving when you drive at sensible speeds Observe traffic regulations and don't take chances. You may even save a life Possibly your own Featured in tonight's story were bill foreman les Tremaine betty lou gerson elizabeth roof Hi ever back larry dobkin and herbert lytton The whistler was produced and directed by george w allen with story by joel malone music by wilbur hatch And was transmitted to our troops overseas by the armed forces radio service The whistler is entirely fictional and all characters portrayed on the whistler are also fictional Any similarity of names or resemblance to persons living or dead is purely coincidental Remember to tune in at the same time next sunday when the whistler will tell you how the strange things a young boy sees on his first train trip alone Help solve a murder Marvin miller speaking for the signal oil company Stay tuned now for our miss brook starring eve arden which follows immediately over most of these stations This is cbs the columbia broadcasting system


trying to finish up peanut harvest today. We're still a couple of days out but we're down to that last couple hundred acres so feeling pretty good today. Conditions are good today. Overall we've had a pretty good harvest. It's been a with peanut harvest it's always slow and it's not being as slow as some years but it's still pretty slow. There's very little crop in the field at this point everybody's got most of the crop out. You see a few scattered fields here and there but for the most part I think everybody's going to get close to being finished up by this time this rain hits. It's been a good harvest. We've been really really blessed. The way peanut harvest starts sometime in September middle to the end of September we go to start checking maturity on the on the peanuts. You walk out here in the field at that point and it's solid green. It's a pretty green carpet and we've decided the maturity is right we start digging. At that point we have to let it set for anywhere from five to ten days depending on the weather for those vines and the peanuts themselves to dry out. At that point we'll start running combines to the field like you see behind us. Those combines pick up those vines and nuts and they use spring fingers to separate those peanuts in shell off the vine and they get blown up in those baskets to dump them in the duff cart and they get eventually put into a semi-trailer. Our peanuts go to Pocahontas first they eventually get taken to Jonesboro to be shelled. These peanuts will be shelled by Delta Peanut Company and ours are Hyalelat peanuts which is a special longer shelf life variety peanut and those peanuts are used in peanut butter and your candies are peanuts M&M Mars by some for a certain size to go in peanut and M&M's and so if you eat peanut and M&M's there's a chance that you're eating peanuts grown right here in Arkansas.