Question 86 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde, Triatis on the Cardinal Virtues, The Virtue of Justice. This is the LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde, Triatis on the Cardinal Virtues, The Virtue of Justice by St. Thomas Aquinas, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 86 of Oblations and First Fruits in four articles. We must next consider Oblations and First Fruits. Under this head, there are four points of inquiry. First, whether any Oblations are necessary as a matter of precept. Second, to whom are Oblations due? Third, of what things should they be made? Fourth, in particular as to First Fruits, whether men are bound to offer them. First article, whether men are under a necessity of precept to make Oblations. Objection one, it would seem that men are not bound by precept to make Oblations. Men are not bound at the time of the Gospel to observe the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law, as stated above in the Pars Prima Secunde, question 103, articles 3 and 4. Now the offering of Oblations is one of ceremonial precepts of the Old Law, since it is written in Exodus 23, verse 14, three times every year you shall celebrate feasts with me. And further on in Exodus 23, verse 15, thou shalt not appear empty before me. Therefore, men are not now under a necessity of precept to make Oblations. Objection two further, before they are made, Oblations depend on a man's will, as appears from our Lord's saying in Matthew 5, 23, if thou offer thy gift at the altar. As though this were left to the choice of the Offer. And when once Oblations have been made, there is no way of offering them again. Therefore, in no way is a man under a necessity of precept to make Oblations. Objection three further, if anyone is bound to give a certain thing to the church and fails to give it, he can be compelled to do so by being deprived of one of the church's sacraments. But it would seem unlawful to refuse the sacraments of the church to those who refuse to make Oblations according to a degree of the Sixth Council. Let none who dispense Holy Communion exact anything of the recipient, and if they exact anything let them be disposed. Therefore, it is not necessary that man should make Oblations. On the contrary, Gregory says in a Canon, Let every Christian take care that he offer something to God at the celebration of Mass. I answer that, as stated above in Question 85, Article 3, Third Reply. The term Oblation is common to all things offered for the Divine Worship, so that if a thing be offered to be destroyed in worship of God as though it were being made into something holy, it is both an Oblation and a Sacrifice. Wherefore it is written, in Exodus 29, verse 18, Thou shalt offer the whole ram for a burnt offering upon the altar. It is an Oblation to the Lord, a most sweet savor of the victim of the Lord. And in Leviticus 2, verse 1, When any one shall offer an Oblation of Sacrifice to the Lord, his offering shall be a fine flower. If on the other hand it be offered with a view to its remaining entire and being deputed to the worship of God or to the use of his ministers, it will be an Oblation and not a Sacrifice. Accordingly, it is essential to Oblations of this kind that they be offered voluntarily. According to Exodus 25, verse 2, Of every man that offereth of his own accord, you shall take them. Nevertheless, it may happen in four ways that one is bound to make Oblations. First, on account of a previous agreement, as when a person is granted a portion of church land that he may take certain Oblations at fixed times, although this has the character of rent. Secondly, by reason of a previous assignment or promise, as when a man offers a gift among the living or by will bequeathed to the church something whether movable or immovable to be delivered at some future time. Thirdly, on account of the need of the church, for instance, if her ministers were without means of support. Fourthly, on account of custom, for the faithful are bound at certain solemn feasts to make certain customary Oblations. In the last two cases, however, the Oblation remains voluntary as regards to it the quantity or kind of the thing offered. Reply to Objection 1. Under the new law, men are not bound to make Oblations on account of legal solemnities, as stated in Exodus, but on account of certain other reasons, as stated above. Reply to Objection 2. Some are bound to make Oblations, both before making them, as in the first, third, and fourth cases, and after they have made them by assignment or promise, for they are bound to offer in reality that which has already been offered to the church by way of assignment. Reply to Objection 3. Those who do not make Oblations they are bound to make may be punished by being deprived of the sacraments, not by the priest himself to whom the Oblations should be made, lest he seem to exact something for bestowing the sacraments, but by someone superior to him. Second Article. Whether Oblations are due to priests alone. Objection 1. You would seem that Oblations are not due to priests alone, for chief among Oblations would seem to be those that are deputed to the sacrifices of victims. Now whatever is given to the poor is called a victim in Scripture, according to Hebrews 13.16. Do not forget to do good and to impart, for by such victims God's favour is obtained. Much more therefore are Oblations due to the poor. Objection 2 further. In many parishes, monks have a share in the Oblations. Now the case of clerics is distinct from the case of monks, as Jerome says in one of his letters. Therefore Oblations are not due to priests alone. Objection 3 further. Lay people with the consent of the church buy Oblations such as loaves and so forth, and they do so for no other reason, that they may make use thereof themselves. Therefore Oblations may have reference to the laity. On the contrary, a canon of Pope Damasus says, None but the priests whom day by day we see serving the Lord may eat and drink of the Oblations which are offered within the precincts of the Holy Church. Because in the Old Testament the Lord forbade the children of Israel to eat the sacred loaves with the exception of Aaron and his sons. Leviticus 24 verses 8 and 9. I answer that. The priest is appointed mediator and stands, so to speak, between the people and God as we read in Moses. Confer Deuteronomy 5.5. Wherefore it belongs to him to set forth the divine teachings and sacraments before the people. And besides, to offer to the Lord things appertaining to the people, their prayers, for instance, their sacrifices and Oblations. Thus the apostle says in Hebrews 5 verse 1, Every high priest taken from among men is ordained for men in the things that appertain to God, that he may offer up gifts and sacrifices for sins. Hence the Oblations which the people offer to God concern the priests, not only as regards their turning to them to their own use, but also as regards the faithful dispensation thereof by spending them partly on things appertaining to the divine worship, partly on things touching their own livelihood, since they that serve the altar partake with the altar according to 1 Corinthians 9.13. And partly for the good of the poor, who as far as possible should be supported from the possessions of the church, for our Lord had a purse for the use of the poor as Jerome observes on Matthew 17 verse 26, that we may not scandalize them. Reply to Objection 1. Whatever is given to the poor is not a sacrifice properly speaking, yet it is called a sacrifice insofar as it is given to them for God's sake. In like manner, and for the same reason, it can be called an oblation, though not properly speaking, since it is not given immediately to God. Oblations properly so called fall to the use of the poor, not by the dispensation of the offers, but by the dispensation of the priests. Reply to Objection 2. Monks or other religious may receive oblations under three counts. First, as poor, either by the dispensation of the priests or by ordination of the church. Secondly, through being ministers of the altar, and then they accept oblations that are freely offered. Thirdly, if the parishes belong to them and they can't accept oblations, having a right to them as rectors of the church. Reply to Objection 3. Oblations, once they are consecrated, such as sacred vessels and vestments, cannot be granted to the use of the laity, and this is the meaning of the words of Pope Damasus. But those which are unconsecrated may be allowed to the use of layfolk by permission of the priests, whether by way of gift or by way of sale. Third article, whether a man may make oblations of whatever he lawfully possesses. Objection 1. It would seem that a man may not make oblations of whatever he lawfully possesses. According to human law, the horrors is a shameful trade in what she does, but not in what she takes. And consequently, what she takes she possesses lawfully. Yet it is not lawful for her to make an oblation with her gains. According to Deuteronomy 23 verse 18, thou shalt not offer the hire of a strumpet in the house of the Lord thy God. Therefore it is not lawful to make an oblation of whatever one possesses lawfully. Objection 2 further. In the same passage it is forbidden to offer the price of a dog in the house of God, but it is evident that a man possesses lawfully the price of a dog he has lawfully sold. Therefore it is not lawful to make an oblation of whatever we possess lawfully. Objection 3. Further, it is written in Malachi 1.8. If you offer the lame and the sick, is it not evil? Yet an animal, though lame or sick, is a lawful possession? Therefore it would seem that not every lawful possession may one make an oblation. On the contrary, it is written in Proverbs 3 verse 9. Honor the Lord with thy substance. Now whatever a man possesses lawfully belongs to his substance. Therefore he may make oblations of whatever he possesses lawfully. I answer that, as Augustine says in one of his homilies, Shouldst thou plunder one weaker than thyself and give some of the spoil to the judge, if he should pronounce in thy favor, such is the force of justice that even thou wouldst not be pleased with him. And if this should not please thee, neither does it please thy God. Hence it is written in Ecclesiasticus 3421. The offering of him that sacrificeeth of a thing wrongfully gotten is stained. Therefore it is evident that an oblation must not be made of things unjustly acquired or possessed. In the old law, however, wherein the figure was predominant, certain things were reckoned unclean on account of their signification, and it was forbidden to offer them. But in the new law, all God's creatures are looked upon as clean, as stated in Titus 115. And consequently, anything that is lawfully possessed, considered in itself, may be offered an oblation. But it may happen accidentally that one may not make an oblation of what one possesses lawfully. For instance, if it be detrimental to another person, as in the case of a son who offers to God the means of supporting his father, which our Lord condemns in Matthew 15.5, or if it give rise to scandal or contempt or the like. Reply to Objection 1. In the old law it was forbidden to make an offering of the hire of a strumpet on account of its uncleanness, and in the new law on account of scandal, lest the church seem to favor sin if she accept oblations from the prophets of sin. Reply to Objection 2. According to the law, a dog was deemed an unclean animal. Yet other unclean animals were redeemed and their price could be offered, according to Leviticus 2727. If it be an unclean animal, he that offereth it shall redeem it. But a dog was neither offered nor redeemed, both because idolaters use dogs in sacrifices to their idols, and because they signify robbery, the proceeds of which cannot be offered in oblation. However, this prohibition ceased under the new law. Reply to Objection 3. The oblation of a blind or lame animal was declared unlawful for three reasons. First, on account of the purpose for which it was offered, wherefore it is written in Malachi 1 verse 8, if you offer the blind in sacrifice, is it not evil? And it behooved sacrifices to be without blemish. Secondly, on account of contempt, wherefore the same text goes on in Malachi 1 verse 12, you have profaned my name in that you say, the table of the Lord is defiled, and that which is laid thereupon is contemptible. Thirdly, on account of a previous vow, whereby a man has bound himself to offer without blemish whatever he has vowed, hence the same text says further on in Malachi 1 verse 14. Cursed is the deceitful man that hath in his flock a male and making a vow offereth in sacrifice that which is feeble to the Lord. The same reasons avail still in the new law, but when they do not apply, the unlawfulness ceases. Fourth article, whether men are bound to pay first fruits. Objection 1. He would seem that men are not bound to pay first fruits. After giving the law of the first born, the text continues in Exodus 13.9, it shall be as a sign in thy hand. So that, apparently, it is a ceremonial precept. But ceremonial precepts are not to be observed in the new law. Neither, therefore, ought first fruits to be paid. Objection 2. First fruits were offered to the Lord for a special favour conferred on the people, wherefore it is written in Deuteronomy 26 verses 2 and 3. Thou shalt take the first of all thy fruits, and thou shalt go to the priest that shall be in those days and say to him, I professed this day before the Lord thy God, that I am come into the land for which he swore to our fathers that he would give it to us. Therefore other nations are not bound to pay first fruits. Objection 3. That which one is bound to do should be something definite. But neither in the new law nor in the old do we find mention of a definite amount of first fruits. Therefore one is not bound of necessity to pay them. On the contrary, it is laid down in a canon. We confirm the right of priests to tithes and first fruits, and everybody must pay them. I answer that first fruits are a kind of oblation because they are offered to God with a certain profession, conferred Deuteronomy 26. Where the same passage continues, The priest taking the basket containing the first fruits from the hand of him that bringeth the first fruits, shall set it before the altar of the Lord thy God. And further on in verse 10 he is commanded to say, Therefore now I offer the first fruits of the land which the Lord hath given me. Now the first fruits were offered for a special reason, namely, in recognition of the divine favor, as though man acknowledged that he had received the fruits of the earth from God, and that he ought to offer something in God to return. According to the instruction, we have given thee what we received of thy hand. And since what we offer God ought to be something special, hence it is that man was commanded to offer his first fruits as being a special part of the fruits of the earth. And since a priest is ordained for the people in the things that appertain to God, according to Hebrews 5.1, the first fruits offered by the people were granted to the priest's use. Wherefore it is written in Numbers 18.8, The Lord said to Aaron, Behold, I have given thee the charge of my first fruits. Now it is a point of natural law that man should make an offering in God's honor out of the things he has received from God, but that the offering should be made to any particular person, or out of his first fruits, or in such or such a quantity, was indeed determined in the old law by divine command. But in the new law it is fixed by the declaration of the church, in virtue of which men are bound to pay first fruits according to the custom of their country and the needs of the church's ministers. Reply to Objection 1. The ceremonial observances were properly speaking signs of the future, and consequently they ceased when the foreshadowed truth was actually present. But the offering of first fruits was for a sign of past favor, which arises the duty of acknowledgement in accordance with the dictate of natural reason. Hence taken in a general sense, this obligation remains. Reply to Objection 2. First fruits were offered in the old law, not only on account of the favor of the promised land given by God, but also on account of the favor of the first fruits of the earth, which were given by God. Hence it is written in Deuteronomy 26 verse 10, I offer the first fruits of the land which the Lord hath given me, which second motive is common among all people. We may also reply that just as God granted the land of promise to the Jews by a special favor, so by a general favor he bestowed the lordship of the earth on the whole of mankind, according to Psalm 113 verse 24, the earth he has given to the children of men. Reply to Objection 3. As Jerome says in his commentary on Ezekiel 45-13, According to the tradition of the ancients, the custom arose for those who had most to give the priests a 40th part and those who had least one 60th in lieu of first fruits. Answer would seem that first fruits should vary between these limits according to the custom of one's country. And it was reasonable that the amount of first fruits should not be fixed by law, since, as stated above, first fruits are offered by way of ablation, a condition of which is that it should be voluntary. End of question 86, read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC. Question 87 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde. Triaties on the Cardinal Virtues. The Virtue of Justice. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde. Triaties on the Cardinal Virtues. The Virtue of Justice. By St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by the fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 87 of Tithes in four articles. Next we must consider tithes. Under which head there are four points of inquiry. First, whether men are bound by precept to pay tithes. Second, of what things ought tithes to be paid. Third, to whom ought they to be paid? Fourth, who ought to pay tithes? First article. Whether men are bound to pay tithes under a necessity of precept. Objection one. You would seem that men are not bound by precept to pay tithes. The commandment to pay tithes is contained in the old law in Leviticus 27 verse 30. All tithes of the land, whether of corn or of the fruits of trees, are the lords. And further on, in verse 32, of all the tithes of oxen and sheep and goats that pass under the shepherd's rod, every tenth that cometh shall be sanctified to the Lord. This cannot be reckoned among the moral precepts, because natural reason does not dictate that one ought to give a tenth part rather than a ninth or eleventh. Therefore, it is either a judicial or a ceremonial precept. Now it is stated above in the parts Prima Secunde question 103 article 3 or question 104 article 3. During the time of grace, men are bound neither to the ceremonial nor to the judicial precepts of the old law. Therefore, men are not bound now to pay tithes. Objection two further. During the time of grace, men are bound only to those things which were commanded by Christ through the apostles according to Matthew 28 verse 20, teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you. And Paul says in Acts 20 verse 27, I have not spared to declare unto you all the counsel of God. Now neither in the teaching of Christ nor in that of the apostles is there any mention of the paying of tithes. For the saying of our Lord about tithes in Matthew 23, 23, these things you ought to have done seems to refer to the past time of legal observance. Thus Hilary says in his commentary on Matthew, the tithing of herbs which was useful in foreshadowing the future was not to be omitted. Therefore, during the time of grace, men are not bound to pay tithes. Objection three further. During the time of grace, men are not more bound to the legal observances than before the law. But before the law tithes were given by reason not of a precept but of a vow. For we read in Genesis 28 verses 20 and 22 that Jacob made a vow saying, If God shall be with me and shall keep me in the way by which I walk, of all the things that thou shalt give to me, I will offer tithes to thee. Neither, therefore, during the time of grace are men bound to pay tithes. Objection four. Further, in the old law, men were bound to pay three kinds of tithes. For it is written in Numbers 18 verses 23 and 24, The sons of Levi shall be content with the oblation of tithes which I have separated for their uses and necessities. Again, there were other tithes of which we read, as in Deuteronomy 14 verses 22 and 23, Every year thou shalt set aside the tithes of all thy fruits, That the earth bringeth forth year by year, And thou shalt eat before the Lord thy God in the place which he shall choose. And there were yet other tithes of which it is written in Deuteronomy 14 verse 28. The third year thou shalt separate another tithe of all the things that grow to thee at that time, And shall lay it up within thy gates, And the Levite that hath no other part nor possession with thee, And the stranger, and the fatherless, and the widow, That are within thy gates shall eat and be filled. Now, during the time of grace, Men are not bound to pay the second and third tithes. Neither, therefore, are they bound to pay the first. Objection five. Further, a debt that is due without any time being fixed for its payment must be paid at once under pain of sin. Accordingly, if during the time of grace men are bound under necessity of precept to pay tithes in those countries where tithes are not paid, they would all be in a state of mortal sin, and so would also be the ministers of the church for dissembling. But this seems unreasonable. Therefore, during the time of grace men are not bound under necessity of precept to pay tithes. On the contrary, Augustine, whose words from a homily are quoted in Canon 16, Decime says, It is a duty to pay tithes, and whoever refuses to pay them takes what belongs to another. I answer that, In the old law tithes were paid for the sustenance of the ministers of God. Hence it is written in Malachi 310, Bring all the tithes into my storehouse, that there may be meat in my house. Hence the precept about paying of tithes was partly moral and instilled in the natural reason, and partly judicial, deriving its force from its divine institution. Because natural reason dictates that the people should administer the necessaries of life to those who minister the divine worship for the welfare of the whole people, even as it is the people's duty to provide a livelihood for their rulers and soldiers and so forth. Hence the apostle proves this from human customs saying in 1 Corinthians 9-7, who serveth as a soldier at any time at his own charge, who planteth a vineyard and eateth not of the fruit thereof. But the fixing of the proportion to be offered to the ministers of divine worship does not belong to the natural law, but was determined by divine institution in accordance with the condition of that people to whom the law was being given. For they were divided into twelve tribes, and the twelfth tribe, namely that of Levi, was engaged exclusively in the divine ministry, and had no possessions whence to derive a livelihood. And so it was becoming ordained that the remaining eleven tribes should give one tenth part of their revenues to the Levites, as referenced in Numbers 1821, that the latter might live respectably, and also because some through negligence were disregard of this precept. Hence, so far as the tenth part was fixed, the precept was judicial, since all institutions established among this people for the special purpose of preserving equality among men, in accordance with this people's condition, are called judicial precepts. Nevertheless, by way of consequence, these institutions foreshadowed something in the future, even as everything else connected with them, according to 1 Corinthians 12. All these things happened to them in figure. In this respect, they had something in common with the ceremonial precepts, which were instituted chiefly that they might be signs of the future. Hence the precept about paying tithes foreshadowed something in the future. For ten is, in a way, the perfect number, and therefore he that gave a tenth, which is the sign of perfection, reserving the nine other parts for himself, acknowledged by a sign that imperfection was his part, and that the perfection which was to come through Christ was to be hoped for from God. Yet this proves it to be not a ceremonial, but a judicial precept, as stated above. There is this difference between the ceremonial and judicial precepts of the law, as we stated above in the Pars Prima Secunde, Question 104, Article 3, that it is unlawful to observe the ceremonial precepts at the time of the new law, whereas there is no sin in keeping the judicial precepts during the time of grace, although they are not binding. Indeed, they are bound to be observed by some, if they be ordained by the authority of those who have power to make laws. Thus it was a judicial precept of the old law that he who stole a sheep should restore four sheep, as referred to in Exodus 22 verse 1, and if any king were to order this to be done, his subjects would be bound to obey. In like manner during the time of the new law, the authority of the church has established the payment of tithe, thus showing a certain kindliness, lest the people of the new law should give less to the ministers of the New Testament, than did the people of the old law to the ministers of the Old Testament. For the people of the new law are under greater obligations, according to Matthew 5.20, unless your justice abound more than that of the scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven. And moreover, the ministers of the New Testament are of greater dignity than the ministers of the Old Testament, as the Apostle shows in 2 Corinthians 3 verses 7 and 8. Accordingly, it is evident that man's obligation to pay tithes arises partly from natural law, partly from the institution of the church, who nevertheless, in consideration of the requirements of time and persons, might ordain the payment of some other proportion. This suffices for the reply to the first objection. Reply to Objection 2. The precept about paying tithes, in so far as it was a moral precept, was given in the Gospel by our Lord when he said in Matthew 10.10, Translators note, the words as quoted are from Luke 10.7, Matthew has meat instead of hire. End of note. The workman is worthy of his hire, and the Apostle says the same in 1 Corinthians 9 verse 4 and following. But the fixing of the particular proportion is left to the ordinance of the church. Reply to Objections 3. Before the time of the Old Law, the ministry of the divine worship was not entrusted to any particular person, although it is stated that the first born were priests, and that they received a double portion. For this very reason, no particular portion was directed to be given to the ministers of the divine worship. But when they met with one, each man of his own accord gave him what he deemed right. Thus Abraham, by a kind of prophetic instinct, gave tithes to Melchizedek, the priest of the Most High God, according to Genesis 14.20, and again Jacob made a vow to give tithes in Genesis 28.20. Although he appears to have vowed to do so, not by paying them to ministers, but for the purpose of the divine worship, for instance, for the fulfilling of sacrifices, hence he said significantly, I will offer tithes to thee. Reply to Objection 4. The second kind of tithe, which was reserved for the offering of sacrifices, has no place in the New Law, since the legal victims had ceased. But the third kind of tithe which they had to eat with the poor is increased in the New Law, for our Lord commanded us to give to the poor not merely the tenth part, but all our surplus, according to Luke 11.41, that which Romaineth give alms. Moreover, the tithes that are given to the ministers of the church should be dispensed by them for the use of the poor. Reply to Objection 5. The ministers of the church ought to be more solicitous for the increase of spiritual goods in the people than for the amassing of temporal goods, and hence the apostle was unwilling to make use of the right given him by the Lord of receiving his livelihood from those to whom he preached the gospel, lest he should occasion a hindrance to the gospel of Christ. Confer first Corinthians 9.12. Nor did they sin who did not contribute to his upkeep, else the apostle would not have omitted to reprove them. In like manner the ministers of the church rightly refrain from demanding the church's tithes when they could not demand them without scandal, on account of their having fallen into destitute or for some other reason. Nevertheless, those who do not give tithes in places where the church does not demand them are not in a state of damnation, unless they be obstinate and unwilling to pay even if tithes were demanded of them. Second article. Whether men are bound to pay tithes of all things. Objection one. It would seem that men are not bound to give tithes of all things. The paying of tithes seems to be an institution of the old law. Now the old law contains no precept about personal tithes, notably those that are payable on property acquired by one's own act, for instance by commerce or soldiering. Therefore no man is bound to pay tithes on such things. Objection two further. It is not right to make oblations of that which is ill-gotten, as stated above in question 86 article 3. Now oblations being offered to God immediately seem to be more closely connected with the divine worship than tithes which are offered to the ministers. Therefore neither should tithes be paid on ill-gotten goods. Objection three further. In the last chapter of Leviticus, chapter 30 verse 32, the precept of paying tithes refers only to corn, fruits of trees, and animals that pass under the shepherd's rod. But man derives a revenue from other smaller things, such as the herbs that grow in his garden and so forth. Therefore neither on these things is a man bound to pay tithes. Objection four further. Man cannot pay except what is in his power. Now a man does not always remain in possession of all his profit from land and of stock, since sometimes he loses them by theft or robbery. Sometimes they are transferred to another person by sale. Sometimes they are due to some other person. Thus taxes are due to princes and wages due to workmen. Therefore one ought not to pay tithes on such like things. On the contrary, it is written in Genesis 28 verse 22, Of all things that thou shalt give to me, I will offer tithes to thee. I answer that, in judging about a thing we should look at its principle. Now the principle of the payment of tithes is the debt whereby carnal things are due to those who sow spiritual things, according to the saying of the apostle in 1 Corinthians 9 11. If we have sown unto you spiritual things, is it a great matter if we reap your carnal things? Thus applying, that on the contrary, it is no great matter if we reap your carnal things. For this debt is the principle on which is based the commandment of the church about the payment of tithes. Now whatever man possesses comes under the designation of carnal things. Therefore tithes must be paid on whatever one possesses. Replied to Objection 1 In accordance with the condition of that people, there was a special reason why the old law did not include a precept about personal tithes. Because to wit, all the other tribes had certain possessions wherewith they were able to provide a sufficient livelihood for the Levites who had no possessions. But were not forbidden to make a profit out of other lawful occupations as the other Jews did. On the other hand, the people of the new law are spread about throughout the whole world, and many of them have no possessions but live by trade, and these would contribute nothing to the support of God's ministers if they did not pay tithes on their trade profits. Moreover, the ministers of the new law are more strictly forbidden to occupy themselves in money-making trades, according to 2 Timothy 2.4. No man being a soldier to God entangleth himself with secular business. Wherefore in the new law, men are bound to pay personal tithes according to the custom of their country and the needs of the ministers. Hence Augustine, whose words are quoted in the canon 16, Decime says, tithes must be paid on the profits of soldiering, trade, or craft. Reply to Objection 2. Things are ill-gotten in two ways. First, because the getting itself was unjust. Such, for instance, are things gotten by robbery, theft, or usury, and these a man is bound to restore and not to pay tithes on them. If, however, a field be bought with the profits of usury, the usurer is bound to pay tithes on the produce, because the latter is not gotten usuriously, but given by God. On the other hand, certain things are said to be ill-gotten, because they are gotten of a shameful cause, for instance of hordom or stage-playing and the like. Such things a man is not bound to restore, and consequently he is bound to pay tithes on them in the same way as other personal tithes. Nevertheless, the church must not accept the tithes so long as those persons remain in sin, lest she appear to have a share in their sins. But when they have done penance, tithes may be accepted from them on these things. Reply to Objection 3. Things directed to an end must be judged according to their fittingness to the end. Now the payment of tithes is due not for its own sake, but for the sake of the ministers, to whose dignity it is unbecoming that they should demand minute things with careful exactitude, for this is reckoned sinful according to the philosopher in Ethics 4-2. Hence the old law did not order the payment of tithes on such like minute things, but left it to the judgment of those who are willing to pay, because minute things are counted as nothing. Wherefore the Pharisees who claimed for themselves the perfect justice of the law paid tithes even on these minute things, nor are they reproved by our Lord on that account, but only because they despised greater, that is spiritual precepts. And rather did he show them to be deserving of praise in this particular when he said in Matthew 23-23, These things you ought to have done, that is, during the time of the law, according to Chrysostom's commentary. This also seems to denote fittingness rather than obligation. Therefore, now too, men are not bound to pay tithes on such minute things, except perhaps by reason of the custom of one's country. Reply to Objection 4. A man is not bound to pay tithes on what he has lost by theft or robbery before he recovers this property, unless he has incurred the loss through his own fault or neglect, because the church ought not to be the loser on that account. If he sell wheat that has not been tithed, the church can command the tithes due to her both from the buyer who has a thing due to the church and from the seller because so far as he is concerned, he has defrauded the church. Yet if one pays, the other is not bound. Tithes are due on the fruits of the earth insofar as these fruits are the gift of God, wherefore tithes do not come under a tax, nor are they subject to workmen's wages. Hence it is not right to deduct one's taxes on the wages paid to workmen before paying tithes. The tithes must be paid before anything else on one's entire produce. Third article. Weather tithes should be paid to the clergy. Objection 1. He would seem that tithes should not be paid to the clergy. Tithes were paid to the Levites in the Old Testament, because they had no portion in the people's possessions according to Numbers 18 verses 23 and 24. But in the New Testament the clergy have possessions, not only ecclesiastical, but sometimes also patrimonial. Moreover they receive first fruits and oblations for the living and the dead. Therefore it is unnecessary to pay tithes to them. Objection 2. Further. It sometimes happens that a man dwells in one parish and farms in another, or a shepherd may take his flock within the bounds of one parish during one part of the year, and within the bounds of another parish during the other part of the year, or he may have his sheep fold in one parish and graze sheep in another. Now in all these and similar cases it seems impossible to decide to which clergy the tithes ought to be paid. Therefore it would seem that no fixed tithe ought to be paid to the clergy. Objection 3. Further. It is the general custom in certain countries for the soldiers to hold the tithes from the church in fee, and certain religious receive tithes. Therefore seemingly tithes are not due only to those of the clergy who have the care of souls. On the contrary it is written in Numbers 18 verse 21, I have given to the sons of Levi all the tithes of Israel for a possession, for the ministry wherewith they serve me in the tabernacle. Now the clergy are the successors of the sons of Levi in the New Testament. Therefore tithes are due to the clergy alone. I answer that two things have to be considered with regard to tithes, namely the right to receive tithes and the things given in the name of tithes. The right to receive tithes is a spiritual thing, for it arises from the debt in virtue of which the ministers of the altar have a right to the expenses of their ministry, and temporal things are due to those who sow spiritual things. This debt concerns none but the clergy who have care of souls, and so they alone are competent to have this right. On the other hand the things given in the name of tithes are material, wherefore they may come to be used by anyone, and thus it is that they fall into the hands of the laity. Reply to Objection 1. In the Old Law, as stated above in Article 1, Fourth Reply. Special tithes were earmarked for the assistance of the poor. But in the New Law, the tithes are given to the clergy not only for their own support, but also that the clergy may use them in assisting the poor. Hence they are not unnecessary. Indeed, church property, oblations, and first fruits, as well as tithes, are all necessary for this same purpose. Reply to Objection 2. Personal tithes are due to the church in whose parish a man dwells, while predial tithes seem more reasonably to belong to the church within whose bounds the land is situated. The Law, however, prescribes that in this matter a custom that has been obtained for a long time must be observed. The shepherd who grazes his flock at different seasons and due parishes should pay tithe proportionately to both churches. And since the fruit of the flock is derived from the pasture, the tithe of the flock is due to the church in whose lands the flock grazes, rather than to the church on whose land the fold is situated. Reply to Objection 3. Just as the church can hand over to a layman the things she receives under the title of tithe, so too can she allow him to receive tithes that are yet to be paid, the right of receiving being reserved to the ministers of the church. The motive may be either the need of the church, as when tithes are due to certain soldiers, through being granted to them in fee by the church, or it may be to the sacrament of the poor. Thus certain tithes have been granted by way of alms to certain lay religious, or to those that have no care of souls. Some religious, however, are competent to receive tithes because they have care of souls. Fourth article. Whether the clergy also are bound to pay tithes? Objection 1. It would seem that clerics also are bound to pay tithes. By common law the parish church should receive the tithes on the lands which are in its territory. Now it happens sometimes that the clergy have certain lands of their own on the territory of some parish church, or that one church has ecclesiastical property on the territory of another? Therefore it would seem that the clergy are bound to pay predial tithes. Objection 2. Some religious are clerics, and yet they are bound to pay tithes to churches on account of the lands which they cultivate even with their own hands. Therefore it would seem that the clergy are not immune from the payment of tithes. Objection 3. In the eighteenth chapter of Numbers it is prescribed not only that the Levites should receive tithes from the people, but also that they should themselves pay tithes to the high priest. Therefore the clergy are bound to pay tithes to the sovereign pontiff, no less than the laity are bound to pay tithes to the clergy. Objection 4. Further tithes should serve not only for the support of the clergy, but also for the assistance of the poor. Therefore if the clergy are exempt from paying tithes, so too are the poor. Yet the latter is not true. Therefore the former is false. On the contrary, a decretal of Pope Pascal says, It is a new form of exaction when the clergy demand tithes from the clergy. I answer that the cause of giving cannot be the cause of receiving, as neither can the cause of action be the cause of passion. Yet it happens that one and the same person is giver and receiver, even as agent and patient, on account of different causes and from different points of view. Now tithes are due to the clergy as being ministers of the altar and sowers of spiritual things among the people. Therefore those members of the clergy as such, that is as having ecclesiastical property, are not bound to pay tithes. Whereas from some other cause through holding property in their own right, either by inheriting it from their kindred or by purchase or in any other similar manner, they are bound to the payment of tithes. Hence the reply to the first objection is clear, because the clergy like anyone else are bound to pay tithes on their own lands to the parish church, even though they be the clergy of that same church, because to possess a thing as one's private property is not the same as possessing it in common. But church lands are not tithable, even though they be within the boundaries of another parish. Reply to objection two. Religious who are clerics, if they have care of souls and dispense spiritual things to the people, are not bound to pay tithes, but they may receive them. Another reason applies to other religious, who though clerics do not dispense spiritual things to the people. For according to the ordinary law they are bound to pay tithes, but they are somewhat exempt by reason of various concessions granted by the Apostolic See. Reply to objection three. In the old law, first fruits were due to the priests and tithes to the Levites, and since the Levites were below the priests, the Lord commanded that the former should pay the high priest the tenth part of the tenth, instead of first fruits, confer numbers 1826. Wherefore, for the same reason, the clergy are bound now to pay tithes to the sovereign pontiff if he demanded them. For natural reason dictates that he who has charge of the common estate of a multitude should be provided with all goods, so that he may be able to carry out whatever is necessary for the common welfare. Reply to objection four. Tithes should be employed for the assistance of the poor through the dispensation of the clergy. Hence the poor have no reason for accepting tithes, but they are bound to pay them. This is the LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde, Treaties on the Cardinal Virtues, The Virtue of Justice, by St. Thomas Aquinas, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. We must now consider vows whereby something is promised to God. Under this head there are twelve points of inquiry. First, what is a vow? Second, what is the matter of a vow? Third, of the obligation of vows. Fourth, of the use of taking vows. Fifth, of what virtue is it an act? Sixth, whether it is more meritorious to do a thing from a vow than without a vow? Seventh, of the solemnizing of a vow. Eighth, whether those who are under another's power can take vows? Ninth, whether children may be bound by vow to enter religion? Tenth, whether a vow is subject to dispensation or commutation? Eleventh, whether a dispensation can be granted in a solemn vow of continence? Twelfth, whether the authority of a superior is required in a dispensation from a vow? First article, whether a vow consists in a mere purpose of the will? Objection one. You would seem that a vow consists in nothing but a purpose of the will. According to some, for example William of Exair or Albert Maneuse, a vow is a conception of a good purpose after a firm deliberation of the mind, whereby a man binds himself before God to do or not to do a certain thing. But the conception of a good purpose and so forth may consist in a mere movement of the will. Therefore, a vow consists in a mere purpose of the will. Objection two further. The very word, vow, seems to be derived from voluntas, will. For one is said to do a thing, proprio voto, by one's own vow, when one does it voluntarily. Now to purpose is an act of the will, while to promise is an act of the reason. Therefore, a vow consists in a mere act of the will. Objection three further. Our Lord said in Luke 9 verse 62, No man putting his hand to the plow and looking back is fit for the kingdom of God. Now from the very fact that a man has a purpose of doing good, he puts his hand to the plow. Consequently, if he look back by desisting from his good purpose, he is not fit for the kingdom of God. Therefore, by a mere good purpose, a man is bound before God, even without making a promise. And consequently, it would seem that a vow consists in a mere purpose of the will. On the contrary, it is written in Ecclesiastes 5 verse 3. If thou hast vowed anything to God, defer not to pay it. For an unfaithful and foolish promise displeaseth him. Therefore, a vow is to promise and a vow is a promise. I answer that a vow denotes a binding to do or omit some particular thing. Now when man binds himself to another by means of a promise, which is an act of the reason to which faculty it belongs to direct. For just as a man by commanding or praying directs in a fashion what others are to do for him, so by promising he directs what he himself is to do for another. Now a promise between man and man can only be expressed in words or any other outward signs, whereas a promise can be made to God by the mere inward thought, since according to 1 Kings 16 7, man seeth those things that appear, but the Lord beholdeth the heart. Yet we express words outwardly sometimes, either to arouse ourselves, as was stated above with regard to prayer, in Question 83 Article 12, or to call others to witness, so that one may refrain from breaking the vow, not only through fear of God, but also through respect of men. Now a promise is the outcome from a purpose of doing something, and a purpose presupposes deliberation, since it is the act of a deliberate will. Accordingly, three things are essential to a vow. The first is deliberation, the second is purpose of the will, and the third is a promise wherein is completed the nature of a vow. Sometimes however, two other things are added as a sort of confirmation of the vow, namely, pronouncement by word of mouth, according to Psalm 65 13, I will pay thee my vows which my lips have uttered, and the witnessing of others. Hence the Master says that a vow is the witnessing of a spontaneous promise and ought to be made to God and about things relating to God, although the witnessing may strictly refer to the inward protestation. Reply to Objection 1 The conceiving of a good purpose is not confirmed by the deliberation of the mind unless the deliberation leads to a promise. Reply to Objection 2 Man's will moves the reason to promise something related to things subject to his will, and a vow takes its name from the will for as much as it proceeds from the will as first mover. Reply to Objection 3 He that puts his hand to the plow does something already, while he that merely purposes to do something does nothing so far. When however, he promises, he already sets about doing, although he does not yet fulfill the promise. Even so, he that puts his hand to the plow does not plow yet, nevertheless he stretches out his hand for the purpose of plowing. Second Article Whether a vow should always be about a better good Objection 1 It would seem that a vow need not be always about a better good. Reply to Objection 2 A greater good is one that pertains to super-erogation. But vows are not only about matters of super-erogation, but also about matters of salvation. Thus in baptism, men vow to renounce the devil and his pumps, and to keep the faith as a gloss observes on Psalm 75 verse 12. Vow ye, and pay to the Lord your God. And Jacob vowed in Genesis 28-21 that the Lord should be his God. Now this above all is necessary for salvation. Therefore vows are not only about a better good. Objection 2 Further Jephter is included among the saints in Hebrews 11-32. Yet he killed his innocent daughter on account of his vow confer judges 11. Since then the slaying of an innocent person is not a better good, but is in itself unlawful, it seems that a vow may be made not only about a better good, but also about something unlawful. Objection 3 Further Things that tend to be harmful to the person or that are quite useless do not come under the head of a better good. Yet sometimes vows are made about immoderate vigils or fasts which tend to injure the person, and sometimes vows are about indifferent matters and such as are useful to no purpose. Therefore a vow is not always about a better good. On the contrary, it is written in Deuteronomy 23 verse 22. If thou wilt not promise, thou shalt be without sin. I answer that, as stated above in article 1, a vow is a promise made to God. Now a promise is about something that one does voluntarily for someone else, since it would be not a promise, but a threat to say that one would do something against someone. In like manner, it would be futile to promise anyone something unacceptable to him. Therefore as every sin is against God, and since no work is acceptable to God unless it be virtuous, it follows that nothing unlawful or indifferent but only some act of virtue should be the matter of a vow. But as a vow denotes a voluntary promise, while necessity excludes voluntariness, whatever is absolutely necessary, whether to be or not to be, can no wise be the matter of a vow, for it would be foolish to vow that one would die or that one would not fly. On the other hand, if a thing be necessary, not absolutely, but on the supposition of an end, for instance, if salvation be unattainable without it, it may be the matter of a vow insofar as it is done voluntarily, but not insofar as there is a necessity for doing it. For that which is not necessary, neither absolutely, nor on the supposition of an end, is altogether voluntary, and therefore is most properly the matter of a vow. And this is said to be a greater good in comparison with that which is universally necessary for salvation. Therefore, properly speaking, a vow is said to be about a better good. Reply to Objection 1. Renouncing the devil's pumps and keeping the faith of Christ are the matter of baptismal vows, insofar as these things are done voluntarily, although they are necessary for salvation. The same answer applies to Jacob's vow, although it may also be explained that Jacob vowed that he would have the Lord for his God by giving him a special form of worship to which he was not bound, for instance, by offering tithes and so forth as mentioned further on in the same passage. Reply to Objection 2. Certain things are good whatever be the results, such are acts of virtue, and these can be, absolutely speaking, the matter of a vow. Some are evil whatever the result may be, as those things which are sins in themselves, and these can no wise be the matter of a vow. While some considered in themselves are good, and as such may be the matter of a vow, yet they may have an evil result, in which case the vow must not be kept. It was thus with the vow of Jephthah, who as related in Judges 11, verses 30 and 31, made a vow to the Lord saying, If thou wilt deliver the children of Amen into my hands, whosoever shall first come forth out of the doors of my house, and shall meet me when I return in peace, the same will I offer a holocaust to the Lord. For this could have an evil result if, as indeed happened, he were to be met by some animal, for which it would be unlawful to sacrifice, such as an ass or a human being. Hence Jerome says, In vowing he was foolish, through lack of discretion, and in keeping his vow he was wicked. Yet it is premised in Judges 11, 29 that the Spirit of the Lord came upon him, because his faith and devotion which moved him to make that vow were from the Holy Ghost. And for this reason he is reckoned among the saints, as also by reason of the victory which he obtained, and because it is probable that he repented of his sinful deed, which nevertheless foreshadowed something good. Reply to Objection 3. The mortification of one's own body, for instance by vigils and fasting, is not acceptable to God except insofar as it is an act of virtue. And this depends on its being done with due discretion, namely, that concupiscence be curbed without overburdening nature. On this condition such things may be the matter of a vow. Hence the Apostle says, after saying in Romans 12 verse 1, Present your body's a living sacrifice, holy, pleasing to God, adds your reasonable service. Since, however, man is easily mistaken in judging of matters concerning himself. Such a vows as these are more fittingly kept or disregarded according to the judgment of a superior. Yet so that should a man find that without doubt he is seriously burdened by keeping such a vow, and should he be unable to appeal to his superior, he ought not to keep it. As to vows about vain and useless things, they should be ridiculed rather than kept. Third article. Whether all vows are binding. Objection 1. It would seem that vows are not all binding. For man needs things that are done by another more than God does. Since he has no need for our goods. Now according to the prescription of human laws, a simple promise made to a man is not binding, and this seems to be prescribed on account of the changeableness of the human will. Much less binding, therefore, is a simple promise made to God, which we call a vow. Objection 2. Further, no one is bound to do what is impossible. Now sometimes that which a man has vowed becomes impossible to him, either because it depends on another's decision, as when for instance a man vows to enter a monastery, the monks of which refuse to receive him, or an account of some defect arising for instance, when a woman vows virginity, and afterwards is deflowered, or when a man vows to give a sum of money, and afterwards loses it. Therefore a vow is not always binding. Objection 3. Further, if a man is bound to pay something, he must do so at once. But a man is not bound to pay his vow at once, especially if it be taken under a condition to be fulfilled in the future. Therefore a vow is not always binding. On the contrary, it is written in Ecclesiastes 5 verses 3 and 4. Whatsoever thou hast vowed, pay it. And it is much better not to vow than after a vow not to perform the things promised. I answer that, for one to be accounted faithful, one must keep one's promises. Wherefore, according to Augustine, faith takes its name from a man's deed agreeing with his word. Now man ought to be faithful to God above all, both on account of God's sovereignty, and on account of the favors he has received from God. Hence a man is obliged before all to fulfill the vows he has made to God. Since this is part of the fidelity he owes to God. On the other hand, the breaking of a vow is a kind of infidelity. Wherefore Solomon gives the reason why vows should be paid to God, because an unfaithful promise displeases him. Ecclesiastes 5.3 Reply to Objection 1. Honesty demands that a man should keep any promise he makes to another man, and this obligation is based on the natural law. But for a man to be under a civil obligation through a promise he has made, other conditions are requisite. And although God needs not our goods, we are under a very great obligation to him, so that a vow made to him is most binding. Reply to Objection 2. If that which a man has vowed becomes impossible to him through any cause whatsoever, he must do what he can, so that he have at least a will ready to do what he can. Hence if a man has vowed to enter a monastery, he must endeavor to the best of his power to be received there. And if his intention was to chiefly bind himself to enter the religious life, so that in consequence he choose this particular form of religious life for this place, as being most agreeable to him, he is bound, should he be unable to be received there, to enter the religious life elsewhere. But if his principal intention is to bind himself to this particular kind of religious life, or to this particular place, because the one or the other pleases him in some special way, he is not bound to enter another religious house if they are unwilling to receive him into this particular one. On the other hand, if he be rendered incapable of fulfilling his vow through his own fault, he is bound over and above to do penance for his past fault. Thus if a woman has vowed virginity and is afterwards violated, she is bound not only to observe what is in her power, namely perpetual continency, but also to repent of what she has lost by sinning. Reply to Objection 3. The obligation of a vow is caused by our own will and intention, wherefore it is written in Deuteronomy 2323, That which is once gone out of thy lips, thou shalt observe, and thou shalt do as thou hast promised to the Lord thy God, and hast spoken with thy own will and with thy own mouth. Wherefore, if in taking a vow it is one's intention and will to bind oneself to fulfill it at once, one is bound to fulfill it immediately. But if one intend to fulfill it at a certain time, or under a certain condition, one is not bound to immediate fulfillment. And yet one not ought to delay longer than one intended to bind oneself, for it is written in Deuteronomy 23 verse 21, When thou hast made a vow to the Lord thy God, thou shalt not delay to pay it, because the Lord thy God will require it. And if thou delay, it shall be imputed to thee for a sin. Fourth article. Whether it is expedient to take vows. Objection 1. You would seem that it is not expedient to take vows. It is not expedient to anyone to deprive himself of the good that God has given him. Now one of the greatest goods that God has given man is liberty, whereof he seems to be deprived by the necessity implicated in a vow. Therefore you would seem inexpedient for a man to take vows. Objection 2 further. No man should expose himself to danger. But whoever takes a vow exposes himself to danger, since that which before taking a vow he could admit without danger, becomes a source of danger to him if thou should not fulfill it after taking the vow. Hence Augustine says, Since thou hast vowed, thou hast bound thyself. Thou canst not do otherwise. If thou dost not what thou hast vowed, thou wilt not be as thou wouldst have been, hattest thou not vowed. For then thou wouldst have been less great, not less good, whereas now if thou breakest fault with God, which God forbid, thou art the more unhappy, as thou wouldst have been happier, hattest thou kept thy vow. Therefore it is not expedient to take vows. Objection 3 further. The Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 4-16, Be ye followers of me as I also am of Christ. But we do not read that either Christ or the Apostle took any vows? Therefore it would seem inexpedient to take vows. On the contrary, it is written in Psalm 75 verse 12, Vow ye and pay to the Lord your God. I answer that as stated above in articles 1 and 2, a vow is a promise made to God. Now one makes a promise to a man under one aspect and to God under another. Because we promise something to a man for his own profit, since it profits him that we should be of service to him, and that we should at first assure him of the future fulfillment of that service. Whereas we make promises to God not only for his, but for our profit. Hence Augustine says, He is a kind and not a needy exactor, for he does not grow rich on our payments, but makes those who pay him grow rich in him. And just as what we give God is useful not to him, but to us since what is given him is added to the giver, as Augustine says in one of his letters. So also a promise whereby we vow something to God does not conduce to his profit, nor does he need to be assured by us, but it conduces to our profit. Insofar as by vowing we fix our wills immovably on that which is expedient to do. Hence it is expedient to take vows. Reply to Objection 1. Even as one's liberty is not lessened by one being unable to sin, so too the necessity resulting from a will firmly fixed to good does not lessen the liberty as instanced in God and the blessed. Such is the necessity implied via vow, bearing a certain resemblance to the confirmation of the blessed. Hence Augustine says, again in his letter, that happy is the necessity that compels us to do the better things. Reply to Objection 2. When danger arises from the deed itself, this deed is not expedient, for instance that one cross a river by a tottering bridge. But if the danger arise through man's failure in the deed, the latter does not cease to be expedient. Thus it is expedient to mount on horseback. Though there be the danger of a fall from the horse, hence it would behoove one to desist from all good things that may become dangerous accidentally. Wherefore it is written in Ecclesiastes 11.4, He that observeth the wind shall not sow, and he that considereth the clouds shall never reap. Now a man incurs danger not from the vow itself, but from his faults when he changes his mind by breaking his vow. Hence Augustine says, Repent not of thy vow, thou shouldest rather rejoice, that thou canst no longer do what thou mightest lawfully have done to thy detriment. Reply to Objection 3. It was incompetent for Christ by his very nature to take a vow, both because he was God and because as man his will was firmly fixed on the good, since he was a comprehensor. By a kind of similitude however, he is represented as saying, in Psalm 21 verse 26, I will pay my vows in the sight of them that fear him, when he is speaking of his body, which is the church. The apostles are understood to have vowed things pertaining to the state of perfection when they left all things and followed Christ. Fifth article. Whether a vow is an act of latteria or religion. Objection 1. He would seem that a vow is not an act of latteria or religion. Every act of virtue is matter for a vow. Now he would seem to pertain to the same virtue to promise a thing and to do it. Therefore a vow pertains to any virtue and not to religion especially. Objection 2 further. According to Tully in Uninvention 253, it belongs to religion to offer God worship and ceremonial rights. But he who takes a vow does not yet offer something to God, but only promises it. Therefore a vow is not an act of religion. Objection 3 further. Religious worship should be offered to none but God.  Therefore a vow is not an act of religion. On the contrary, it is written in Isaiah 1921. The Egyptians shall worship him with sacrifices and offerings and they shall make vows to the Lord and perform them. Now the worship of God is properly the act of religion or latteria. Therefore a vow is an act of latteria or religion. I answer that, as stated above in Question 81, Article 1, First Reply. Every act of virtue belongs to religion or latteria by a way of command, insofar as it is directed to the reverence of God which is the proper end of latteria. Now the direction of other actions to their end belongs to the commanding virtue, not to those which are commanded. Therefore the direction of the acts of any virtue to the service of God is the proper act of latteria. Now it is evident from what has been said above in Articles 1 and 2 that a vow is a promise made to God and that a promise is nothing else than a directing of the thing promised to the person to whom the promise is made. Hence a vow is a directing of the thing vowed to the worship or service of God and thus it is clear that to take a vow is properly an act of latteria or religion. Reply to Objection 1. The matter of a vow is sometimes the act of another virtue, as for instance keeping the fast or observing continency, while sometimes it is an act of religion as offering a sacrifice or praying, but promising either of them to God belongs to religion for the reason given above. Hence it is evident that some vows belong to religion by reason only of the promise made to God, which is the essence of a vow, while others belong there too by reason also of the thing promised, which is the matter of the vow. Reply to Objection 2. He who promises something gives it already in as far as he binds himself to give it, even as a thing is said to be made when its cause is made, because the effect is contained virtually in the cause. This is why we thank not only a giver, but also one who promises to give. Reply to Objection 3. A vow is made to God alone, whereas a promise may be made to a man also, and this very promise of good, which is made to a man, may be the matter of a vow and insofar as it is a virtuous act. This is how we are to understand vows whereby we vow something to the saints or to one superiors, so that the promise made to the saints or to one superiors is the matter of the vow insofar as one vows to God to fulfill what one has promised to the saints or other superiors. 6. Article Whether it is more praiseworthy and meritorious to do something in fulfillment of a vow than without a vow? Objection 1. He would seem that it is more praiseworthy and meritorious to do a thing without a vow than in fulfillment of a vow. Prosper says in On the Contemplate of Life 2, We should abstain or fast without putting ourselves under the necessity of fasting, lest that which we are free to do be done without devotion and unwillingly. Now he who vows to fast puts himself under the necessity of fasting. Therefore it would be better for him to fast without taking the vow. Objection 2 further The Apostle says in 2 Corinthians 9-7 Every one as he hath determined in his heart not with sadness or of necessity, for God loveth a cheerful giver. Now some fulfill sorrowfully what they have vowed, and this seems to be due to the necessity arising from the vow. For necessity is a cause of sorrow according to Metaphysics 5. Therefore it is better to do something without a vow than in fulfillment of a vow. Objection 3 further A vow is necessary for the purpose of fixing the will on that which is vowed, as stated above in Article 4. But the will cannot be more fixed on a thing than when it actually does that thing. Therefore it is no better to do a thing in fulfillment of a vow than without a vow. On the contrary, a gloss on the words of Psalm 75 verse 12, vow ye and pay, says, Vows are counseled to the will, but a counsel is about none but a better good. Therefore it is better to do a deed in fulfillment of a vow than without a vow, since he that does it without a vow fulfills only one counsel, notably the counsel to do it, whereas he that does it with a vow fulfills two counsels, notably the counsel to vow and the counsel to do it. I answer that, for three reasons it is better and more meritorious to do one and the same deed with a vow than without. First, because the vow, as stated above in Article 5, is an act of religion which is the chief of the moral virtues. Now the more excellent the virtue, the better and more meritorious the deed. Wherefore the act of an inferior virtue is the better and more meritorious for being commanded by a superior virtue, whose act it becomes through being commanded by it. Just as the act of faith or hope is better if it be commanded by charity. Hence the works of the other moral virtues, for instance fasting, which is an act of abstinence, and being continent, which is an act of chastity, are better and more meritorious if they be done in fulfillment of a vow, since thus they belong to the divine worship, being like sacrifices to God. Wherefore Augustine says in On Virginity 8 that not even is virginity honorable as such, but only when it is consecrated to God and cherished by godly continents. Secondly, because he that vows something and does it subjects himself to God more than he that only does it. For he subjects himself to God not only as to the act, but also as to the power, since in future he can do something else. Even so he gives more who gives the tree with its fruit than he that gives the fruit only, as Anselm observes. For this reason we thank even those who promise, as stated above, in Article 5, Second Reply. Thirdly, because a vow fixes the will on the good immovably, and to do anything of a will that is fixed on the good belongs to the perfection of virtue according to the philosopher in Ethics 2.4, just as to sin with an obstinate mind aggravates the sin and is called a sin against the Holy Ghost, as stated above in Question 14, Article 2. Reply to Objection 1. The passage quoted should be understood as referring to necessity of coercion, which causes an act to be involuntary and excludes devotion. Hence he says pointedly, lest that which we are free to do be done without devotion and unwillingly. On the other hand, the necessity resulting from a vow is caused by the immobility of the will, wherefor it strengthens the will and increases devotion. Hence the argument does not conclude. Reply to Objection 2. According to the philosopher, necessity of coercion, insofar as it is opposed to the will, causes sorrow. But the necessity resulting from a vow, in those who are well disposed, insofar as it strengthens the will, causes not sorrow, but joy. Hence Augustine says, Repent not of thy vow. Thou shouldest rather rejoiced, that thou canst no longer do what thou mightest lawfully have done to thy detriment. If, however, the very deed considered in itself were to become disagreeable and involuntary after one has taken the vow, the will to fulfill it, remaining with all, is still more meritorious than if it were done without the vow. Since the fulfillment of a vow is an act of religion, which is a greater virtue than abstinence, of which fasting is an act. Reply to Objection 3. He who does something without having vowed it, has an immovable will as regards the individual deed which he does and at the same time when he does it. But his will does not remain altogether fixed for the time to come, as does the will of one who makes a vow. For the latter has bound his will to do something, both before he did that particular deed, and perchance to do it many times.


Hi, everyone. This is Zheng Cheng from Easy Stack in China. And this is my colleague, Wang Bo. And we will give you a next generation of our product ES Cloud, Open Stack Cloud as a service in minutes. So after a brief description of what our product is and what Cloud as a service is, there will be a live demo here. So let's focus. Now let's talk about what is Cloud as a service. We all know the Cloud is not commodity. So there is private Cloud. There are many enterprise provide private Cloud as a service. But you will concern about the scalability. Now there is public Cloud. Public Cloud like the AWS and something else. You will concern about your data security. Now there are companies who care about this to use a hybrid Cloud, connect them together. And like Redspace, like Bluebox, they provide a whole seed on Promise Cloud. We mean what is Cloud as a service. You can have all this Cloud, all this kind of Cloud together with ES Cloud, we resharping Cloud computing by offer, private data host data, public Cloud, and hybrid Cloud in a single platform based on horizon with AngularJS simultaneous and instantly. Of course, it's all based on Open Stack. So you can use all the Open Stack features like a federated identity and so on. Now let's talk about the features. Cloud as a service first, we need more flexibility. We provide a mix of bare metal and the virtual resources pool. You can take whatever you want to build up, spin up, you on Promise Cloud in seconds and do your business. You will never care about the Cloud scalability because you can add a compute node, you can add a storage pool, and you can adjust your network assessment. And with per host billing strategy, you will pay for what you truly use. The second thing is about control. We have multiple Cloud care and multiple hypervisor storage pool twice, like KVM, OneWare, and PowerBn. You have SAF, we have Enterprise Storage, and with ES Cloud, you can see this. We have a Cloud create in minutes with OneWare, SAF, Enterprise Storage for your business. And if you want to develop a Cloud, you can have KVM with SAF. You even have your business Cloud to storage some very important storage information, so you have PowerVM here. And you can use the software-defined network and the network function virtualized to connect this Cloud together and transform this Cloud from private to the public. Now, the important thing is the security. Security is a multi-dimensional thing, so let's talk about from the beginning the hardware isolation. What is hardware isolation? You can have your compute node in different rack if you want. You can have your storage pool. There is no noisy neighbors data in your disk, in your per-disk. You can have your isolate network. You can get internet access separately. That's the basic thing to ensure your entire Cloud is secure. Like graphic, there are Cloud Beijing and Cloud Tokyo. Maybe they are in the different Internet data center, and you can manage it with ES Cloud in a single platform. Now, let's welcome my colleague Wang Bo to give us a demo to create an open-side Cloud in minutes. OK, now let me give you a live demo about Dedicated Cloud. Log into the dashboard. Here, I use the created user. Currently, you can read as a new user here. OK, this is an overview page of public Cloud. You can see the user info, the bidding info, and the recent operation logs. On the left side, here are the instance volumes and other panels. Here, you could create products and set product quotas. Also, you could create users and associate users to the product. These two buttons, you can switch between public Cloud and Dedicated Cloud. Now, I switch to Dedicated. OK, this is the initial page. It introduce you what is Dedicated Cloud. It includes three type of physical dedicated computer hosts here, and the two hosts was selected. Second, create your story reports. Here, we have HDD SSD 2 tabs. And you can input the story process and other one. Here, we use CIF in our environment. Next, I need to make sure. OK, the last step, you can apply for public IPs and network controller backups. Here, I want three public IPs. OK, a supplement. Here, we can wait to see how long it takes to build a Dedicated Cloud. With the resources, the deployment is running. Normally, it takes 10 to 40 seconds in our test. Wow, it's done. Let me refresh it. OK, sorry, the network issues. OK, till now, the public, the Dedicated Cloud has been set up. This page shows the detailed inference about the resource. Here, you can see the computer hosts, the host name, the configurations, and the storage tab, storage size, and the network controller hosts. Now, you can create virtual resources like what we do in public. Firstly, I can apply for floating IPs. OK, choose the resource pool and give you a bandwidth here. Give three, three, four is OK. We need more floating IPs. And the next one, you can see the warning info because we only applied for three public IPs in the last step. You remember that? So this is a warning info. Next, go to the router page. Here is the router. We can associate a floating IP that says set gateway. And choose the floating IP we just applied. OK, then we need to make sure the network, the network will be used for instance, could be, should be connected to the router. Let me check it. There it is. Let me check if we have networks yet. OK, this is a network has been created for test. Go back to the router and connect it. OK. Now, we can create instance, create volumes, and use the floating IPs. Create an instance. Give the instance name and select image, the flavor. We can use the smallest one to test the networks and the password. Just for test, OK, that's the instance. It's building. We go to the volumes link to create a volume. Here, we can see the volume type. This is just we applied HDD. Give a storage name and the size. And we can attach the volume to the instance we just created. OK, this is the instance we created. We have lots of steps. Go back to the instance and associate a floating IP. Choose the link and choose the floating IP. We can see the instance details here. And we can log into the console. Let me try again. Give me. OK, you can do it. You can see the volume we just created. And we can pin the public IP if you want. OK, let's. Sorry, I'm not familiar with the computer. It's not mine. Now we can go to the overview page in Dedicate. Here, we can see that the storage process has been used by the volumes we just created. And the CPU resource and memory. Now we can switch back to the public. I need to mention that here, we charge for virtual instance, virtual resource in public. But in Dedicate, we could do the same thing. But we can also charge for physical resources. Last, I log out and re-log with the administrator user. We can check all the instances in public and in Dedicate. Here, we can see the instance from Dedicate. It's on host node 7. This is a host in Dedicate. And other public instance are hosted on the public hosts. OK, this is the deployment of Dedicate Cloud in minutes. Thank you. Thanks, Bo. OK, let me continue the topic here. Now, you have the cloud that you will concern about the performance. We have multiple performance strategy to ensure your cloud has a better status. Like, you have multiple CPU memory combination and virtualization ratio. You have a lot of limited storage space. You can spin up your storage pool. You can have multiple SSZ plus HDD storage strategy. And you have multiple high availability pattern of your internet access. And you can set the float IP bandwidth to control your internet access. And now, you have private cloud. You have public cloud. Now, you are concerned about how to connect them together and in a single platform. So we have a ES connector. You can connect the private public, even the hosted cloud, together. So you have your business on your own dimension. You have your business on the public cloud. You can connect them together. And we will hybrid every cloud in our platform. And the last, for the enterprise workload, what we need a dedicated cloud as a service to do, we have to run our business. So we have multiple platforms to support, like data analysis, Hadoop, Spark, or Storm. We have containerized service because you have an isolate cloud as a service. So you can run a containerized service on this specific cloud. So you don't worry about the security issue. And we have WebLogix, WebSphere, and Oracle React to run the data analysis with OpenStack and EasyStack. We will support the financial retelling, manufacture, and banking, all of the stuff. We have all customers to not worry about you as platform. It's just concern about your business. That is all right. That's the ES cloud, the next generation. And we provide the cloud as a service here. And the CRC in the TE29, if you want. If you have any questions, OK. Thank you. Thank you.


So I'm afraid that my speech will be a little bit anti-climactic. I come back to a topic that occupied me first some 40 years ago. And in the course of time I have come back occasionally to this topic. And I'm not even sure if I didn't even talk about these sorts of things. Also at some point here before. But there I have the same experience that Tony Daniels mentioned. That sometimes I don't even remember what I already said at what places and at what times. There are two strands of social thought. One can be described as trying to humanize the material world including animals and plants. To interpret the behavior of plants and animals in terms that we only apply normally to humans. To anthropomorphize the rest of the world. I think that approach is sometimes quite interesting to read. Nice books on this subject. But by and large I tend to think that that is all metaphors that we use that do not strictly apply to the material that they consider. I want to criticize here and show the failure of the opposite view. Which is usually endorsed by more tough-minded people. Who think that men can be explained entirely in natural science terms. That maybe we cannot do that now already but with a little bit more progress in the natural sciences. Eventually men will be reduced entirely to causal laws and causal explanations. Now I will not deny that we can give descriptions of men and his behavior in terms of naturalistic terms. All I want to show that is never all that is sufficient. It is certainly possible to describe and explain in naturalistic terms in the same way as we describe and explain stones and plants and animals. Namely in men described in the language of physics and chemistry and biology and genetics and neurology. There is nothing wrong with any of that. But a purely naturalistic account of humans, of men. While it is entirely legitimate and even if it is entirely true what physicists and chemists and neurologists say about men. An account of men only in those terms must fail to capture the uniqueness of men. The essence of men. What makes men different and distinguishes him from all other things. That is from stones and plants and animals. In fact any such purely naturalistic description of men would fail in the same way as a description of a painting. For instance in terms of physics, chemistry and so forth. We can describe a painting in purely physical terms. But what this description would leave out would be the essence of a painting as a painting. As something that was purposefully created and has some meaning. Now that is the case. We can easily recognize when we ask ourselves what it is that I am currently doing when I discuss this question. Namely the nature of men or any other question for that matter. And the answer is I now here speak to you in meaningful words and sentences. That I try to communicate with you with other persons. More specifically here what I do here is not merely wish you to understand what I am saying. In which endeavor of course I may fail or may succeed. That depends I might find out afterwards that I failed entirely. But at least that is my intention. But even more so I want to communicate with you and make a special form of communication. Namely I want to argue with you. I present arguments to you with a specific purpose. Namely to persuade you of the fact that what I am saying is right. Or at least not wrong. And again I can succeed in this task or I can fail in this task to persuade you of the truth of something merely by the use of words. We argue with the purpose of argumentative success. Of reaching agreement regarding the truth of some proposition or the validity of some argument. And in this endeavor I can again be successful or I can fail. Just as I can be successful or fail in simply making myself understood without the truth question entering the situation.  Namely of meaningful words, of sentences, of arguments, of intentions, of purposes, of truth and falsehood and of success and of failure. Now to be sure we can give a naturalistic account of some aspects of the phenomenon of communication and argumentation. In the same way as we can also give a naturalistic account of a painting. There are vocal chords, there are sounds, there are scribbles on paper, there are brain activities, there are bodily movements and so forth involved. But there is nothing to be found in any such naturalistic account that would allow us to conclude that these movements, sounds, scribbles, nerves and so on have any meaning. And are used by a speaker or a writer as means for the purpose of communicating or arguing, whether successfully or not, with some other person. In nature there is nothing purposeful, there is nothing meaningful, there is nothing true or false, there is nothing successful or unsuccessful. We, we have purposes dealing with nature and we purposefully transform nature into artifacts as means for the attainment of further purposes. But nature itself has no purpose. Nature and the laws of nature are simply what they are and they work the way they do, unchangingly and unfailingly. Only of man-made artifacts can it be said to be right or wrong, successful or failing, given a human purpose. And only of man-made words, propositions and arguments produced for the purpose of interpersonal communication can it be said to be meaningful and understood or not, successful or not, true, false or indeterminate. In a most fundamental sense then, all means, things used to reach ends, all meanings and all truths are means, meanings and truths for men, for our purposes rather than means, meanings and truths an sich. Now accordingly, now every natural scientist, whether he's a biologist, a physiologist, a chemist, a geneticist or neurologist, anyone of these who claims that men can be reduced and causally explained to nothing else and by nothing else, but nature becomes entangled in an obvious contradiction and I want to just explain what that contradiction is. On the one hand, the men that this scientist speaks and writes about, that is men only seen as a piece of nature, which of course he claims this person who is committed to ontological naturalism, which he claims to be the only men there is. There is nothing else but men as a natural object that can be explained in terms of natural sciences. On the one hand, this person, he must admit this man has no purpose and no meaning and nothing about the inner workings of men is true or false, successful or failing. Everything in men, physically speaking, works the way it does in accordance with unchanging and unfailing causal laws. Even life and death have no meaning from the point of view of a natural scientist. Death and bodily decay, for instance, do not falsify any causal laws, nor does life confirm any causal laws. The same laws of nature hold for life and for death equally. Life and death are not a success or a failure from the point of view of nature. As far as men as nature is concerned, they are just normal events, death just as normal as life, health just as normal as illness. All of these events are simply morally or valuationally neutral or natural events. And yet, on the other hand, this natural scientist, who obviously counts himself as a member of the class of men, follows a purpose in conducting his research on men as nature. And he conducts purposeful operations and uses artifacts as means, various instruments and so forth. As means to reach some end that he wants to find out as a researcher. And he must obviously employ meaningful sentences to describe his own methods and to describe his own results of his research concerning, in and of itself, meaningless natural materials. Meaningless phenomena, meaningless processes. He claims that these methods are the correct methods rather than incorrect ones. And his results to be true or to be false or inconclusive. And for him, for the researcher, for the natural scientist who engages in researching about men. In contrast to men as nature, for him, death and bodily malfunctions do have a meaning and are indeed failures and malfunctions. Yet they have meaning and are failures or malfunctions only insofar as they are related to a human purpose. Namely, the purpose of wanting to preserve life, valuing life and health as something that is good and to prevent illness and death as something that is for him bad. Hence, we can conclude then that the naturalistic account was a naturalistic research program according to which men can and is to be exhaustively and completely described and explained in terms of natural sciences and natural causes could not even be formulated and expressed in words and sentences claiming to be meaningful and true without running into some inescapable contradiction. So I think all of these tough minds that people who say we can explain everything that humans do by whatever observing neurological processes, they make an elementary mistake. It has never, it is absolutely impossible from the observation of whatever things that go on in our brain what sentences will come out of it. Because the sentences that come out of it, he can only say after they have already been spoken, not at the moment when he just observes what goes on in our brain. This is just an absurdity and this problem can never be overcome regardless of what the progress of the natural sciences ever will be. So what we must do, we must recognize that there is an aspect of men that we might call the cultural aspect of men that is cannot be reduced to a naturalistic aspect. We must all our descriptions, all our explanations of human activities must contain causal elements, but they must be supplemented also by what we might call teleological elements. Now I want to say at least a few words about the cultural achievements of men. What cannot be reduced to natural science considerations? These things of course include material things such as cars and airplanes for instance. How can we give a naturalistic explanation for the existence of cars and airplanes? Those are things, they are material objects but nevertheless they were created for a certain purpose.  We can never describe that as a car. But I don't want to just concentrate on these material manifestations but I want to concentrate for a moment just on what we might call the foremost cultural achievement and aspect of mankind. That is language as a means to communicate with other persons and to coordinate our actions with the actions of other people or to use the title, the phrase from a famous book. I want to show how we get things done by words, how to do things by words. There is obviously no human culture without language and there certainly is no such thing as philosophy and philosophizing without making some use of language. And what I want to indicate now is that we only become persons, responsible persons in the sense that we refer to each other by and in learning a language. Ludwig Wittgenstein has described this very nicely. Language does not spring up naturally but is a man-made artifice designed for a specific purpose, namely the purpose of successful communication, successful coordination of our activities. We know of course that newborn babies can make noises but they cannot speak and that their first movements are bodily movements that can be causally explained but they are not purposeful actions for which an individual baby could be held in any way responsible. But simply behavior that can be fully and exhaustively described and explained in naturalistic terms. It takes time for babies to grow up and learn in playful exercises Wittgenstein calls that language games. With adults how to successfully act and speak so as to gradually then become an adult that is a person that shares common words and a common perception of all the stuff making up our everyday lives with other persons. And that is and is held to be personally accountable and responsible for his actions and words vis-a-vis other speakers, other persons. Through the presentation of examples and counter examples and by demonstration, by repetition and imitation the adult gradually teaches a child the common or communal use and meaning of words and actions. In these exercises the adult controls, tests and possibly corrects the child's understanding of specific words by its performance or non-performance of appropriate actions and of the specific actions by appropriate words. So words and actions correct each other by observing actions and what is spoken we gradually learn what it is to act in the right way and so forth and what the right use of words is and what the right way of acting is. And in so doing then the child gradually learns the common use and meaning of such words or concepts as yes and no and the right and wrong of success and of failure of truths and of false and also of course the meaning of lying which implies that you know what is right and deliberately don't say what is right. But obviously the baby cannot give an account of this transition which is to confirm again that any naturalistic explanation of the transition from behavior and noise to acting and meaningful speech is impossible. Rather this transition can only be reconstructed after the event, after we already know what it is to act and to make meaningful statements. Now interestingly Wittgenstein has also some interesting insights relating to the very purpose of language. I said that the purpose of language is obviously to successfully communicate with other people. Wittgenstein analyzes the question can there be such a thing as a private language, a private language would obviously be a language that is not designed for the purpose of communication. And there he says something like this when he tries to make the point that no all languages have to be public languages, languages that other people can also understand nothing only for ourselves. So Wittgenstein argued of course one can say for instance that my pain is private in the sense that only I and no one else can experience my pain. But this is simply a statement about the grammar or the semantic of the term pain, private and I. These terms pain, private and I are not private terms, they are public terms and that we speak about inner things that only we experience is speaking in a public language. Similarly Wittgenstein pointed out that one can of course say for instance the meaning of the sign E is some particular inner privately felt emotion. However this requires that one must already know the meaning of meaning and the meaning of sign. And yet this an understanding of the meaning of meaning and of sign again presupposes the existence of a public or communal language, something that we learn by becoming socialized. And the same result we reach that is about the impossibility of a private language and the recognition of the fact that all language is designed to make cooperation, coordination and things like that possible. So the same insight we reach by the following consideration, an infant that is abandoned by his parents and let's say miraculously survives and is reared by animals, whether wolves or monkeys will, should it re enter human society later on, will not come back with a language, he will come back speaking no language at all. Nor will he be able of course to speak the language of wolves and monkeys because they don't speak any languages. This is just a metaphor that we just ascribe to them, but there's no scientific basis for that whatsoever to say that they speak, that they speak a language or communicate in meaningful terms with with each other. Which again belies all talk about a language instinct or of the brain creating language, rather provided his cognitive development has not been stifled for too long by the absence of any human society to be still capable of doing so, he will have to slowly and painstakingly learn a language to turn from the human animal that he has become into a human person. And the language he will have to learn is not and has never been for anyone who ever learned speaking and language, some universal language generated by some underlying universal grammar as the natural or naturalistic instinct or brain theory of language would lead one to expect. But it will be and always has been a particular language, German, English, whatever it is, spoken by a particular community of native speakers, which again once again confirms the insight that I already reached before, namely that meaningful speech and language are the products of human culture and decidedly not of nature, even if one is readily to admit of course that there would be no distinct human cultures with distinct human languages without some common underlying universal human nature, namely some universal physiology, brain structure and so forth that are characteristic for the entire human species. So that should conclude my point and I hope not only that you have understood what I said, but I have also persuaded you of what I said, then my speech would have been successful. I will not ask you all of you if it was successful or not, but if it wasn't, then you can be pretty sure that there will be future occasions arising when I bother you with this type of topic again. Thank you very much.


Well, yeah, why don't we go there in the chairs after the decorator's association and the president's from New Mexico? Thanks, thank you Thank you First I want to tell you I'm so proud of you on this very yellow thing Well, thank you You did right Well, they finally came around Yeah, and frankly, I think it's been released from there Vice President, because if they had to do it, it would go through a couple minutes of torture Because they'd say you change policies, you know, if you all could But you know what was it? We stood here and said this is where our demand is Well, finally, after fudging around and trying to pretend they were doing it And fudging things up and all that And nobody thinks that the airport's in great shape, you know, the guys in the bomb But I think we've got to try it Yeah I've got to try it I wanted to do two things first