Good morning and welcome to the 36th annual Norse and Marjory Bendits and Epic International Symposium, China and the World. My name is Daniel Lee Giovanni. I'm a current fourth year at Tufts studying economics and international relations. Thank you for joining us for our first panel on China US Russia multi polarity or polar opposites. On behalf of the Institute for global leadership, I would like to welcome the delegations of students from Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, Ireland, Israel, Kenya, Russia and Singapore, as well as from the US Air Force Naval and Military As Santa US relations continue to progress, a debate has unfolded as to whether the two major powers are edging closer towards a new Cold War. However, this increasingly adversarial relationship between Washington and Beijing will likely manifest itself within a multi polar order with Russia occupying the third pole. Unlike the perspective formation of dual superpower blocks a tripolar arrangement between the US China and Russia promises to be highly variable. As international relations scholar Kenneth Waltz once asserted tripolarities often characterized by profound instability and rapid aggressions to bipolar as any two nation coalition will naturally isolate the third pole. Recent headlines about Russian Chinese cooperation on a lunar station may demonstrate that. In the last 30 decades Beijing and Moscow have converged within the realms of security and economy, a non confrontational and mutually beneficial relationship buttressed by shared opposition to the United States. In many regards this considerable Sino-Russian report manifested in a lucrative energy trade security collaboration and harmonious regional policies in the Middle East, Central Asia and Korean Peninsula has defied the expectations of many. It is abundantly unclear how long this rapprochement will last China has been regarded by some as a system player vested in an international order that Russia may not be posing a challenge for their relationship. The following expert panel will examine the short and long term outlook for collaboration and conflict potential for instability within the US China Russia tripolar arrangement and the predominant geopolitical and regional policy ramifications of this evolving dynamic. Before I introduce our panelists, I would like to explain how the panel will run for the purposes of encouraging as much discussion as possible. Each panelist has been asked to give opening remarks of five minutes, we will then open the panel the discussion amongst our speakers and subsequently open the panel to the audience for questions and answers. First I would like to introduce Minister counselor Piao Yang Fan, the chief of the political section of the People's Republic of China Embassy in the United States. Welcome Minister counselor. Hi. You have the floor. Okay. Hi, it's a pleasure to take part in this webinar, and thank you for the invitation. I'd like to make following points. One, the development of China attracts attention of the world. I'd like to point out that the fundamental purpose of the China's development is to enable the Chinese people to lead a better life. Our country is still a developing one. And there is a long way to go before we can achieve modernization. China goes along the path of peaceful development, which is written in the constitution. We hope that other countries will choose the same path as well. Number two, the development of China provides enormous opportunities for other countries. For instance, in the past seven years, since we launched the Belt and Road Initiative, China's trading goods with partner countries surpassed $7.8 trillion and direct investment in those countries topped $110 billion. All this has been helpful for local employment and economic growth. We believe China harbors no intention to threaten or challenge somebody else, but has legitimate rights to safeguard its interests. Some people perceive the development of China as threat or challenge. I think it's the result of the usual some game thinking. Other countries can and should live in peace together, evolve together, and lift up each other. For one to succeed is not necessary to hope others to fail. Great powers competition and rivalry is an outdated mindset. The world is facing multiple global challenges and threats, such as climate change, infectious diseases, and terrorism, so on so forth. All the countries are in the same boat and should make every effort to build up a community of shared future for the mankind. Cooperation is the only right choice. Number four, China, the US, and Russia as major countries of the world and the permanent members of the UN Security Council show their special responsibility. It would be a good news for the world if the three countries could respect each other, treat each other on the basis of equality and noninterferies in internal affairs. Diversity is an integral feature of human civilization and differences in system should not be the ground for antagonism or confrontation. Democracy is a common value of humanity, but there is no fixed model. True democracy must be rooted in the realities of a country and endorsed by its people, smear and slander a different system, or even for the sake of realization of one's geopolitical interests is acceptable. Number five, China and the US both stand to gain from cooperation and lose from confrontation. Naturally, the two countries would have differences. It's important that we manage them effectively through candid communications to avoid strategic misjudgments, conflict and confrontation. As to biggest economies, it's normal that China and the US compete sometimes while their interests converge with each other. What matters most is to conduct the benign competition on the basis of justice and fairness, but not attack each other or play zero some game. In 2020, despite the pandemic, the trading groups between China and the US achieved over 580 billion US dollars growing by 8%. The report of the US-China Business Council shows that 91% surveyed American enterprises said that their operations on the Chinese market in 2020 were profitable, and 87% enterprises said that they will not leave China. In one word, decoupling between China and the US is impossible. Number six, China and Russia share the borderline of more than 4300 kilometers. The two sides have enjoyed close historical and cultural ties, economic complementarity, high level of political and strategic trust. The two countries take similar or identical approaches to the major international and hot sports issues. Cooperation in various areas between the two countries have been broadened, enhanced and deepened over the past years. China and Russia characterize their relations as comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination, which set an example for the new type of relations between major countries and play constructive role for the world peace and common development. China-Russia relations are not allied and not directed against a third party. In the international relations, we should abide by the principle of openness and inclusiveness, instead of closeness and exclusiveness. To foster small circles against some specific countries is group politics. Cooperation between relevant countries should not damage the interests of a third party. Number seven, there are still many countries of middle or small size in the world. All the countries enjoy sovereign equality. Their interests and pursuits should be truly taken into account. And the principle of multilateralism and equal footing consultations should be observed in order to advance democratization of the international relations and build up a multipolar world. No country possesses monopoly on the international affairs. Major powers should not seek hegemony. Number eight, the last but not the least, I'd like to say that the friendship between ordinary people is the source of the relationship between countries. The future of the world is in the hands of the young generation. This event with the participation of the students from many countries is quite meaningful. Hopefully, the young people of all countries will enhance mutual understanding and foster true objective and fair knowledge about each other. It will lay the foundation for the sustainable peace and development of the world. Thank you. Thank you for your very engaging open one opening remarks Minister counselor Pial. Next up is Dr. Alexander gab with a senior fellow in the chair of Russian the Asia Pacific program at the Carnegie Moscow Center of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Dr. gab web you have the floor. Thank you Danielle and pleasure to be here I'll try to be very brief and pointed in order to leave more room for the discussion. First, I would disagree with the notion of a trilateral international order because I don't think that Russia really belongs in the category of superpowers anymore. I think that Russia used to be size of one doing economy a couple of years back. Now it's probably size of Shandun economy. It's smaller than Texas and yes the great power metrics is not about the only about GDP size, but the comprehensive national power of Russia is a far cry from either the US or China what Russia really is is a strong great power that is fully strategically autonomous so far and there are very few countries in that league and Russia actually takes pride of maintaining full strategic autonomy. If you count, you can find perhaps India being in the same league. And then we have troubles because many of the great power economic power houses technologically power houses or military advanced countries are allies of the United States. Sovereignty is limited by their alliance obligations and many countries that are fully sovereign like North Korea or Iran are definitely important regional players but don't necessarily have the local reach so Russia is unique but it's not a poll in the international system. Russia's key task for the upcoming decades is really to balance its relationship with the United States and China and not to be dragged into the confrontation between the two superpowers that's the way the Russian leadership defines the national strategic goals so Russia actually doesn't want to pick sides in this confrontation or very enhanced and pretty bitter competition. Russia's problem is that the relationship with both sides are now increasingly different and changing with the US. It's going to get worse before it gets worse. I think that many people paid attention to yesterday's spat between President Putin and President Biden following Biden's interview to ABC channel. It's a scandal but it's just a symptom of a far bigger problem that the US Russian relationship is now, which is in free fall. There are very few low hanging fruits of positive cooperation and most of them have been already picked in the first days of administration. If you're thinking about the renewal of the Star Treaty, there might be limited cooperation on issues of climate change and environment. There might be cooperation on the Iran nuclear dossier and North Korea, but beyond that, everything else is more about competition or managing this and that it doesn't turn into a pot standoff. So prevention of unintended incidents on air, sea and land is probably the most important task. With China, the relationship is deepening and I would agree with Minister of Council that even if we take away the US from the picture, we see a very important improvement in this relationship over the course of the last couple of years. I think that it's not only because of lighting air Putin and Xi Jinping have an amicable relationship, but the drivers are really structural. One of them is the border Russia and China decided to sort out their territorial issues that in late 80s when pragmatism prevailed in both capitals with the Chinese LPN at the helm of the Communist Party in China and Mikhail Gorbachev at the helm of the Soviet Union. So the course to gradually resolve the territorial dispute was inherited by Mr. Putin from his two predecessors. Now this water is a factor of stability because Russia and China understand the downsides, the risks and the cost of having adversarial relationship along this monumental border. So not always with each other, but never against each other is the formula that drives this relationship. Then there is the huge economic implementarity between the two that it's largely untapped and that both countries are continue to tap with a deal signed in 2014 on the gas pipeline, the two sides are discussing a new pipeline deal. The flow of LNG come into Russia bulk of agricultural products fertilizers. So there are a perfect match when China has a huge capital surplus has a giant market and has really cutting edge technology and Russia needs modern technology requires foreign direct investment and also has abundance of natural resources. And the third pillar is similarities between the political regime, because Russia claims to be democracy. China is also a democracy with Chinese characteristics, but neither is a democracy in Western sense. So I think that sovereignty and non interference into affairs of other powers, which means that the US and the West shouldn't interfere into affairs of Russia and China is really unifying the moment in domestic political setup. China couldn't care less about Russia's minority rights or prosecution of gay people in Chechnya or whatever. Russia couldn't care less about situation in Xinjiang or Hong Kong, because it's really a bilateral issue from the kind of national standpoint The three pillars are really driving them closer together. Russia's problem is that in the current standoff between the two poles, it has to put more acts in the basket China. And as the confrontation develops Russia reduces its dependency on the on the best, including in terms of trade finance to an extent and particularly modern technology and throws its slot with China so it's increasingly dependent on China in body technology and it doesn't adapt that technology fully. But it definitely imports more so when we are talking about strategic civilian technologies like 5G and other China is increasingly a prominent player. So down the road, the key challenge for Russia will be how to address this growing asymmetry between China and Russia because the Chinese economy continues to grow. Russia is a prolonged recession due to lack of structural reform. So far China treats Russia with a lot of respect, a lot of caution. But there is no guarantee that this will continue that way forever. And since China will have the stronger cars and stronger leverage one or two decades down the road, it might be tempted to use it in order to forge a far better conditions or far better far better ends of the deal that it has now and for Russia, balancing that is a key challenge, given the reality that relationship with the US is deeply broken and doesn't have a quick fixes in short term. Thank you for those remarks, Dr. Gabyev. Next is Dr. Richard Weiss, a senior fellow fellow and director of the Center for Political Military Analysis at the Hudson Institute. Thank you very much for having me. I agree that the China-Russia relationship is probably stronger than any previous point in history. You see an unprecedented range of joint security, economic and diplomatic initiatives. As the previous speaker mentioned, they've resolved their territorial disputes and we see a lot of cooperation in both bilaterally and multiliterally in the U.N. And their leaders seem to get along very well. They meet very frequently, much more frequently than Russian and Chinese leaders in the past. And what's interesting is you've also seen the diplomats from both countries discuss not only what they oppose in terms of the US policies, principles and institutions, but also offer their own joint visions of various issues. So in the opposition category, you see them denounce US military alliances, missile defenses, arms control policies and so on. And then in their cooperation is visible, for example, in Central Asia and between Peninsula and integrating their Eurasian economic integration projects. And at the global level, you see them pushing joint norms for cyber and outer space, for international economics and other areas of the world's governance. But as I think it's important to note that this final Russian cooperation varies substantially by time by region and by functional area. So time it's clearly on the upswing now but before both in Soviet and Russian history, we've seen substantially worse relationships in terms of region. You see them sometimes very working very closely but other times not at all you don't see much coordination at all so you see most cooperation in Central Asia and increasingly East Asia and now even the Arctic. But you don't see much alignment in Europe in South Asia or the Middle East and probably hardly any in Latin America or Africa. In functional areas, there's strong cooperation, security, in terms of arms sales, in terms of joint exercises, joint statements. But in the economic domain, as Alex mentioned, it's really lagging behind a lot of expectations. Even in energy, we almost see a natural partnership given Russia's resources and China's needs. It's been taking them, it took them years to begin the flow of large, large flow of energy resources from Russia to China. And I think that this, even in the defense it's clear it's not a mutual defense alliance it's not as close as the US ties for example with NATO or South Korea or Japan. And you see, the phrase that's often been offered is that of alignment without alliance and in which they can, as Alex mentioned, they can do what they want with regard to third parties as long as they don't really conflict each other. So it's not as if they demand that you're with us or against us, it's more, you know, Russia can do what it wants in Ukraine and Georgia and China can do what it wants in the East China Sea and against Taiwan and the others won't, won't necessarily need to overly support that. And I think that actually makes the alignment stronger because it's because it doesn't have many constraints, it doesn't require exclusivity or binding agreements. There's not a lot of burden with this. But looking ahead, you know, I think you could see this pattern continue. And in which, but you could see think think things that could drive them apart. It's closer together so in the form in the latter category, if the US were to present a more serious more direct US military threat, you could see them deep in their cooperation in terms of exercises perhaps develop joint missile defenses and so on. In terms of economics, I think the fear in Washington has always been you'll see a marrying up of Russian skills and basic science and technology with China's enormous monetary labor and manufacturing resources, but you could also see consider many factors why they might split apart. As I said, in terms of their history, we're sort of an atypical moment when they're their relationships are good, but you see a lot of past instances when it's much bad. I, the Russians used to tell me when I went there a decade ago some express some concerns about China's military buildup their views to talk about that issue now with with most Westerners but I'm sure it's still on their mind. So far, China's been deferential for Russia's security interests in Central Asia, but let's just say things in Afghanistan go much worse and the Chinese don't have confidence that the Russians will defend their interests there then you could see them adopting a conservative policy in the region which could alarm Russia. You certainly see, there's still lingering concerns about the demographic disparity and in in the Russian Far East and neighboring Chinese provinces and what that means for long term Moscow's long term control area. You see status disruption, I mean, it's probably great some Russians that they're no longer considered by many as the equal superpower of the United States that it's now China that's considered that that taking that category. And the final factor I would like to emphasize is this relationship is really much a top down driven project so it's really been driven by the leaders, particularly President Putin on the Russian side. But at societal level, you still see a lot of Chinese and Russians more interesting learning European languages or studying the US and they do in each other and so that leads me to think that if there's a change in leadership in China and especially Russia, you could eventually see a different policy less aligned towards each other. But thank you and I'm happy to discuss these issues further in the session and question and answer session. Thank you very much, Dr. Weitz. Our fourth speaker is Dr. Ron Emitter. Thank you for joining us. Professor of the history and politics of modern China at St. Cross College at Oxford University, whose recent book China's Good War contest that China's reassessment of the world war two years is central to its newfound confidence abroad into mounting nationalism at home. Welcome Dr. Mitter you have the floor.  I've only just managed to come in because I've been on the back of another talk elsewhere so I haven't heard the other distinguished panelists comments. And what I'll do is just spend five minutes or so touching on two points which I hope haven't been made elsewhere if they are I apologize for repeating but we'll move to panel discussion very soon anyway. The first one is a more historical point and the second point is one that is to do with something that is out of this week's headlines sorry between the two. We cover a variety of basis on this question of the China, Russia, US triangular relationship that that way. So in historical terms, I mean, as Daniel was kind enough to say, I spent a lot of my academic life in the last few years, looking at the way in which one particular historical event the Second World War, and then which of course in a broad sense is known to you know I'm sure everyone on this call has actually remained a very potent source of political capital, both in terms of domestic politics and in terms of international relations for the countries that we are talking about here and here I'm concentrating mostly on actually China and Russia, although the United States of course is relevant to that but since I think I may be. Yes, I think I'm one of the speakers who's not actually in the US at the moment I'll bow to those who are on the on the American front. I think it's no great secret to those you know Russia well that it has over the years, made a great deal of domestic political capital in terms of the great patriotic war, and the memory of World War two but I think it's often less appreciated and in recent years very become very noticeable that actually memorialization of the Russian World War two experience and I use the word Russian there advised me because the Soviet experience while of course embedded within that also has particular points of difference in parts of the Soviet Union such as Central Asia, the Baltics and so forth, but the Russian war experience as expressed by the Putin government is now given almost a sort of sacred status in terms of the way in which Russia presents itself both at home and to the outside and the element I want to add to that and which I've talked about at more length in the book that Daniel kindly mentioned China's good war is that idea that actually China also, not just for the last few years but really for the last 40 years the reform era has also been embedding aspects of that World War two experience into the way that it deals with the wider world in terms of both domestic and international experience. So, just to again in a short time given a couple of quick, you know, examples of what I mean by by that. It's worth remembering that, you know, as with the Soviet Union, the Chinese price paid during World War two was immensely high with over 10 million deaths, many tens of millions of refugees and the destruction of much of China's infrastructure during that time. For a long time, China's World War two experience between 1937 and 45 was politically very problematic in China because, as most historians will know, including historians in China, the anti-communist Kuomintang, the nationalist party of China under Chiang Kai-shek was of course very central, along with the Chinese Communist Party of course, in fighting against the Japanese and in China's history establishment has been much more open about talking about the fact that a non-communist rule so immensely closely involved. But that acknowledgement of a wider contribution of defeating Japanese has opened up certain geopolitical possibilities. So, as I say, one example of that I'll just stick to one in limited time. 2013, just seven or eight years ago, huge commemoration in China itself, lots of discussion in media about the 70th anniversary of the Cairo Conference of 1943, slightly obscure seeming at the World War two conference, who the heck cares about that? Well, actually, one of the arguments made at that time in China, and still very much made today, is that the communique signed by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and China, meaning, of course, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, not Mao Tse-dong, at the end of the Cairo Conference actually gives authorization to certain contemporary maritime claims in the East China Sea, in particular, the Jiayu Senkaku Islands dispute comes up in that context very, very, very frequently. And so that kind of present day territorial claim can be backed up by a selective but actually quite informed use of China's World War two experience. And that's also used to bolster the relationship with Russia today. And this is the fact that in the early days of the war, the Soviet Union was actually very supportive of the Chinese war effort, sending the government 150 Soviet fighter pilots unofficially to help the Nationalist Army, and also of course, providing a lot of military and financial assistance. All of this of course was assisting the nationalist government of China, the Chiang Kai-shek government, not primarily the communists, but nonetheless is regarded as part of this wider sense of Russia and China having that shared relationship. Further note, aside from this historical one, but as I said, I do want to put on the table, the idea that history, modern history in general, and World War Two history in particular is a really important point of connection and contrast and connection between Russia and China today. Another element I want to bring up from today's this week's headlines is an event that you may not have noticed because it happened here in the UK, where I am now rather than in the US, which was the big British document 114 pages long about the strategic integrated review of the foreign policy and defense policy. You can find it for free on the British government's website if you want to see it, and obviously in short term, I can't talk, nor will I talk about all of its many complex aspects. But I do want to talk about the different ways in which the British government today has positioned Russia and China in the year 2021 because it says something very interesting about geopolitics in the near future. China has positioned Russia as a hostile power. You may say that's wrong. You may say that's right. I'm not making a judgment here. I'm just saying that word hostile has been used in black and white in document. China is being phrased in a way that he's much more nuanced to use a word it's being talked about as a competitor as a collaborator in areas like climate change, and also potentially an opponent. So that echoes the words of Tony Blinken of course in the rather robust meeting that we've been talking about and anchorage in the last few days about, you know, cooperating where we can opposing where we must. In other words, the UK orienting itself towards, perhaps in both cases, a view of China and Russia that will find favor with the Biden administration in a way that actually I think probably wouldn't have worked in quite the same way with the former Trump administration. So my final thought there is look at the UK as a mid sized but significant geopolitical actor with obviously a P5 UN Security Council seat significant if small armed forces and a global trading role and look at the way in which China and Russia are positioned differently to understand how the big relationship between the US and these two powers is also refracted through middle powers as well because of course there's three big actors are huge, but they're not the only ones in that triangular relationship. Okay Daniel I'll stop my comments there and hand back to you for the panel discussion. Thank you. Thank you so much for your remarks Dr Mitter and thank you again to all of our panelists for those stimulating opening remarks panelists. If you have any questions I invite you to ask and discuss them amongst yourselves. Well I respond to some points that were made by other panelists. You have the floor. Okay, thank you. I very carefully listen to the comments and remarks of other panelists. I want to respond to some points. The first of all, I think, Mr double if you should not underestimate the power and the strength of the Russian Federation. We always think that this country is a country with very huge potential for development. It has a very rich natural resources, very huge scientific and technology potential potential of human resources. So personally, I am very optimistic towards the future of Russia. I'm a Russian speaker. I worked in Russia for quite a few years, six years. I studied over there. So, I think, we should have some confidence in the future of that country that leaves next next. That is a neighboring country of China. The second point is that I'd like to add information. Just this year, we'll mark the 20th anniversary of signing the China Russia treaty on good neighborliness and friendship, friendly cooperation, and the two sides already agreed to add some new dimensions into the treaty and renew it. As far as I remember, there is an article in this treaty that China and Russia will will never be enemy towards each other, and they will establish everlasting friendship and China and Russia have no territory demands towards each other. So, I think there are very, quite many very positive articles in this treaty. So, of course, the two countries as two major powers is their consistent constant task to deepen and enhance strategic and political trust. But I think the future of the two countries relationship is a bright one. And as for the points of Mr. Ray's, you said that China and Russia are not allies. It's some weak point for the relations. I don't think so. It's true that China and Russia are not allies. They are only partners, but the partnership is more flexible than allies. It allows the two countries to maintain their own positions, one corporate in the spheres where their relationships are aligning with each other, are converging. So, I think it's not a weak point. It's a strength for the relations between China and Russia. As for the points that were made by the third interlocutor, I forgot your name, I'm sorry. You mentioned history. It's true that history for our countries is a source for absorbing strength and pride. Just last year, all the world celebrated the victory of the world against militarism and fascism, especially China celebrated the victory against Japanese militarists. I think the current international order was established as a result of the victory of the anti-fascist forces of the world. We should uphold this order, this international system with the UN at its core and which was based on the international law. One of the main connecting points between China and Russia is that both China and Russia called for maintaining safeguarding this international order, but not that so-called rules-based order that was championed only by a few countries. So, in this sense, we are not so-called revisionist. We call for safeguarding the current international order, although it needs some improvements according to the current changes in the international situation and the international landscape. Thank you. Do any of our panelists have a response or perhaps another question? Yeah, I just wanted to say, I want to make clear that I agree that the fact that Russia and China are not formal allies in the sense that, well, I just want to be right. The durability of their strategic partnership is enhanced by this lack of constraints, exclusivity, or binding agreement. So it actually is, makes it harder to break this alignment because the Russians don't demand that China fully and openly support what they do in Ukraine in Georgia. And the Chinese have not fully demanded that Russia, for example, back their territorial stances in the East China Sea or against Japan. But I think, as Alex mentioned, this may not always be the case at some point that Chinese may decide that since they have certain, you know, the Russians have become dependent on them for economic and other reasons, they may actually demand that, for example, Russia stop selling such a dense weapons to India or more openly support their stance against Japan. Two fingers on this. First Minister Council, thank you so much for expressing confidence in the future of my country. As you've spent time in Russia, you know that this is a sport of Russian intelligence here to be frustrated about lack of progress that we want our country to succeed and kind of be angry at the Russians and the society, including ourselves, not delivering enough. And that's an old tradition going back centuries. I think that I agree with Richard that there might be some friction points. And it's normal that China has a lot of leverage. But at some point probably wants to use that. Again, this is a hypothesis that's never been tested in linkage of the issues. We've seen that use of leverage in commercial deals. For example, the Russia China oil pipeline deal in 2011, where China had a lot of leverage by providing the loan and having the market, and it has pressed Rosnev to change the contract a little bit to China's territory. It has also forced Rosnev to abandon its drilling project in Vietnam's territorial waters that China claims are Chinese territorial waters. So since partnership with China is far more important for Rosnev than partnership with Vietnam, Rosnev was forced to pick size and basically picked China. So these are commercial issues. The big question mark is whether 10 years down the road Russia's dependency on China will be so huge that China could link the commercial issues and political issues, the way we see China doing with Australia. Of course, it's not China's invention. US is doing that time and time and time again. And Russia does the same, of course. Russia is angry about the quality of Georgian wine once it has political problems with Georgia, same with Moldovan wine, same with many other countries. But that's the big question mark going forward. And I think that this is a concern in Moscow. We diversify our ties enough, or how do we build enough other options and maintain, of course, this very productive and respectful relationship with China. Two fingers on Richard's remark on the far East. I don't think that this is a genuine concern anymore in the Russian leadership because of demographic trends in China. The working age population is aging. The working age population is aging. So I don't think that anybody seriously believes that this demographic overhang that used to be a big concern in the 90s and a decade ago is a huge challenge in the next decades. And I think a good testament to that is the buildup of the cross-border infrastructure on land. Because 10 years ago China always said why don't we build a bridge across a Moor River. And Russia always said, it's a great idea. I never did anything. Because there were concerns by the Russian military that, okay, today it's Russian commercial cargo, but tomorrow it might be Chinese tanks rolling over to kind of conquer the far East. I think that this concern is gone. And for right way, I don't think that this scenario of kind of any demographic challenge to the Russian far East is a reality. The challenge is that China will become the towering economic player in the far East. But so far, the far East is not too attractive for too many investors and also the Chinese presence there is limited. And we can probably talk about Central Asia later. I believe Dr. Mitter has a response. And then I would like to open the floor to questions from the audience. So please submit your questions and the Q&A function at the bottom of your screen. Dr. Mitter, you have the floor. Sure. Yeah, just a brief response. And again, thank you to all panelists for their comments and thank you to Minister Councillor Piau. I absolutely agree with you. I think last year's 75th anniversary of the Allied victory was, you know, an immensely important event. It was rather spoiled by the pandemics like so many things. So I think the possibility of international co-celebration was pretty limited, but there was still quite a lot that went on. In Beijing also, Moscow and Britain. But of course the US. But I think what I found most interesting is the way that recently a lot of Chinese leaders have been talking about what happened at the end of that event in terms of geopolitics as a starting point for China's role in the world. I think, for instance, last year at the Munich Security Conference, China's Foreign Minister, Mr Wang Yi, talked about how 1945 was when China was the first signatory to the United Nations Charter. And actually Xi Jinping, amongst others, has talked about this. Now this marks a really significant shift because, of course, there's still a huge amount of concentration. Of course, in some ways it was seen two years back in 1919 on the anniversaries to do with Tian Guo, you know, the foundation of the People's Republic of China. And that 1949 date of course remains an absolutely foundational one in terms of the country's narrative about itself. But it's only quite recently within the last five years, 10 years, something like that, that a really big deal has been made of 1945, and that point of origin of the international system with China as a co-owner. And I'd like to say that Dean Acheson, the US Secretary of State at the time, called his memoirs present at the creation. In other words, the creation of the 1945 world. And these days China is also saying, well, we were creating it too, we are also there at the beginning of that process of doing it. What I find interesting in the Russian context is that, and I'm not a Russia specialist, so be happy to hear from others on this, is that that sense of ownership of the 1945 world is much less clearly expressed. And it does seem to me that most of the Chinese sort of the Russian discourse around that order, even though of course the Soviet Union, the predecessor state was absolutely a founder of 1945 order is much less keen to take ownership of it as a product of the second World War While China, having previously not really talked about it that much in recent years has very firmly claimed ownership of the 1945 order, in a way that's seen in the statements of President Xi Jinping, Foreign Minister Wang Yi, and all sorts of other less famous people who actually make quite similar sorts of points in Beijing. So I see a divergence there between the relationship of Russia and China, and the historical legacy of the 1945 order in the present day. I'd like to open the floor to our audience. Our first question is from Daniel Mandel, and it is as follows. Does Russia consider itself to be an Atlantic European nation, or an Asian Pacific nation, and how might this impact Russia's actions with respect to increasing US China tension in the Indo Pacific region. Is Russia likely to join China to limit us influence in the Pacific, or use the shift in Washington's attention from Europe to the Pacific to become more aggressive in Europe. This start probably I don't think that Russia perceives itself as Asian, for sure. And the national polling done by Levada shows that they can hardly find anybody who has an Asian identity beyond probably ethnic minorities who preach Buddhism are more connected to the culture of Asia than of mainstream secular orthodox culture of Russia. But it's interesting that the number of people who identify themselves as Europeans so say that Russia culturally belongs to Europe has dropped down very significantly in the course of last decade and that's probably a result of the government's propaganda which preaches that Europe has abandoned its core traditional values, and Russia is now the beacon of the real traditional core values of the West and is a civilization in itself So the Russians are increasingly turning to themselves and seeing themselves as a unique civilization with huge cultural impact of Europe, but very distinct and very different from Europe. On the second part of your question I don't believe that this will be driven by identity issues, but this will be more driven by the strategic pragmatism. There are not too many military assets in the Pacific, I think that Richard can talk about this in more detail, but we see that Russia starts to develop a very limited interoperability with the Chinese armed forces. So Russia has invited PLA to the military drills called Vastok, the East in 2018 and that partnership will be enhanced. It's interesting because China was one of the primary targets of these drills before, and now PLA is taking part of it so that also shows a significant improvement in bilateral relationship. And there were two incidents of joint patrols of strategic bombers in 2019 and 2020. These are very limited and demonstrative operations, but I think they point to a broader reality that Russia and China seek some limited interoperability in the in the Pacific as well. I'll stop here. If any other panelists have a response to the same question, feel free to add on. Otherwise we'll move to the next question. Yeah, I would say also that you see a lot of diplomatic coordination. So Russia and China have developed and pushed this joint peace plan for South Korea, you've seen them become very critical of the US alliances with Japan and South Korea. They're particularly critical of US missile defenses based in these countries. So you see, yeah, joint military exercises, a lot of diplomatic coordination, and what you're not really seeing though is economic, joint economic efforts so that's the lagging indicator. I heard in the question that China wants to limit the influence of the United States in the Asia Pacific region. I think it's not so, it's incorrect point of view. You know, President Xi Jinping said that the Pacific Ocean is the huge enough to accommodate both China, the US and other regional countries. We always respect the existence, the historical existence and practical interests of the United States here in the region in the Asia Pacific, and we have no intention to displace or replace the United States here in the region. And we are willing to strengthen our communications and engagement with the United States on the principles of mutual trust and equal-footed treatment towards each other so as to manage the differences and contradictions and conduct constructive interactions. Second point that I want to make is that we are against establishing so-called small circles against some specific countries in this region in the Asia Pacific. We think all the regional mechanisms should be transparent, should be inclusive, should be open, and such regional mechanisms should aim at strengthening mutual trust and cooperation between countries of the region, should benefit regional peace, stability and prosperity, but not against any other third party. As for the cooperation between China and Russia in the region, I think the cooperation, the collaboration between the two countries is aimed at maintaining stability and peace and development and prosperity of the region because both China and Russia are located in the region. So how the region develops going forward has a direct impact on both countries, although Mr. Gabor said that according to the civilizations, maybe Russia doesn't belong to Asia, it belongs to Europe, but geopolitically it is located in this region. So it has a direct interest in the region. So our cooperation, the military drills and so on so forth, they are aimed at enhancing cooperation and peace stability in the region, but not aimed against some other specific countries. Thank you. So our panelists are finished with this question, I would like to move on to the next one. Our next question is from John Zhang Liu, and as is as follows, would it be possible in the foreseeable future that Russia would reorient to the US European block. For instance, Yeltsin was much closer to the West than Putin and would such an attitude be likely to resurface. The divisions between Russia and the West really run very, very deep. It's now the influence of the government propaganda and real displeasure of the large swath of population, including parts of the elite about the West and definitely the least of grievances is very long and continues to grow on both sides. And it takes a fundamental rethinking of Russians foreign policy foundations. I don't think every turn to a kind of pro-western or liberal political orientation of the early 90s, because Yeltsin has also two very different parts of his presidency and two very different attitudes towards the West. I think that the illusions about Russia's opinion being considered has soured, and it's debatable whether the West should have cared about what Russia thinks about NATO expansion and other issues at all back then. Definitely a late Yeltsin is very different from an early Yeltsin. I don't think that anybody in Russia has the illusion that Russia could be integrated into Euro-Atlantic Russians or that this really serves Russia's national interest. At the same time, I think that the interest in having a normal pragmatic neighborhood and not fighting over sovereign political choices of Ukraine and Belarus has a constituency in Russia, but that definitely will require a profound change in Russia at home. I think that on the other side, the change needs to be even more significant. Yeah, I think that as long as President Putin remains in power, that's impossible. I think he's so soured on the West and his perceptions and views of the US and its allies are so negative. And in addition, his policy in the course of China is really described as the main success of his foreign policy. So I just can't see him or anyone close to him repudiating that. But after he leaves office, other possibilities may arise. Our last question is from Alexander Schnorr. His question is for the minister counselor. As Yang Fan mentioned that China supports the current global order, but that it needs some improvements. And he asked that you elaborate on this. What source of improvements does China seek and how does it seek to reshape the international order? Please repeat the question. Sorry. Absolutely. I mentioned that China supports the current global order but that it needs some improvements. And can you elaborate on this? What sorts of improvements does China seek? And how does it seek to reshape the international order? Thank you. You know, in recent years, there is a phenomenon in the international relations and the international landscape that is the rise of the emerging markets. I think not only China, India are rising, are becoming stronger, but also quite a few developing countries. But the reality is that the representativeness of the developing countries of the emerging markets in the international institutions is not so high. So we think that we need to reform the international institutions according to the changes of the international landscape. It is not only reflected in the UN, but also its specialized institutions, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and so on so forth. The first point, the second point is that the society is progressing ahead. There are many new technologies, new phenomena in the world, but many international institutions, they were established in the 20th century, when just the Second World War was concluded in 40 years, 50 years, and 60 and 70 years. So we should reform, improve such international institutions according to the changes that are occurring in the 21st century. For instance, the reform of WTO, the World Trade Organization. There are so many topics that are not included in the rules of WTO. Of course, from one hand, we should uphold the multilateral trading system with WTO at its core, and from the other hand, we should reform it according to the new realities, according to the development of the new technologies. Thank you. We actually have a bit of time, so if any panelists have a response to that same question, or we also have another question. Okay, our next question is from Sophie Lasko. How does the Chinese government view Russian-Ukrainian conflicts in Crimea and the Donbas region? How does this impact Russian-Chinese partnership? The US has openly condemned Russian aggression in the Donbas, so how does China's approach to Russian endeavors in Ukraine play into China-U.S. relations? It's a question to me for all of our panelists. Let me start. I don't think that it's really that much important. I think that China tries to be diplomatic and always says that it supports the territorial integrity of Ukraine. But at the same time, it supports the peaceful resolution of the conflict along deadlines. It doesn't really go into details because Ukraine is an important partner, Russia is an even more important partner, and then also China doesn't want to add more frictions to its already strained relationship with the West by choosing sides in this conflict. I think that China is well aware of the facts of Russia's aggression, support, and guidance for the rebels. But it really doesn't want to pick any sides here because China doesn't have that much stake in that conflict. Along the same lines, Russia doesn't want to pick sides in the conflict between China and its neighbors in the South China Sea. So it goes like we supported national law, we support peaceful resolution of the territorial disputes, and we are against interference of the extra regional players, meaning the US. That's it. But Russia definitely doesn't provide any more tangible support for China's position. And I think that both countries are fine with that. China really doesn't need Russia's vocal support to exert its maritime claims in China and in the South China Sea. And Russia doesn't need China's recognition of Crimea as part of Russian territory or support for its war in Donbas in order to continue with the with the with the policies of its choosing. Yeah, I would add that Russia's also been fairly tolerant about Chinese investment in Ukraine and you know China used to get a lot of its when Russia was limiting its arms sales China would bypass that by buying the systems from Ukraine. And then and and and now you see the Chinese trying to buy, for example, an important motor production facility to help help them develop advanced air aviation and air, you know, particularly fighter plane engine. And so I think that, yeah, Russia has been fairly tolerant about Beijing's policies towards Ukraine, since it doesn't want to risk this most important relationship the Alex said that China's relations with others so strained it that he wants to tie this Russia I think it's even more so with Russia with its relations so strained with the West that it really can't it doesn't it just can't risk a two front confrontation with China at this point. China supports sovereignty independence and the territory integrity of other countries. It's the principle that is written in the UN charter and both Russia and Ukraine are friendly countries of China. And we hope that Russia and Ukraine could resolve their differences through dialogue and the consultations and with peaceful means. You know, I have deeply believe that Russia and Ukraine, they are historically and culturally very closely connected. I think they have the wisdom to resolve their contradictions through engagements. Our next question is from Jason Feng for all panelists. How do you see the shift of the potential development of the Sino US quasi alliance, given that the influence of the United States and East Asia is potentially decreasing. There are certain limits to this alignment. I don't think that both countries want to form an alliance with the type of guarantee provided by article five, because both countries have enough strategic autonomy and enough potential to pursue their independent foreign policy and defend themselves so they don't need each other for that sake. An alliance brings limitations to that freedom, and alliance also brings a question of hierarchy because we know that everybody need to is equal, but some countries are more powerful and can kind of kindly ask other countries to support its foreign policy goals while newer members and smaller members probably cannot. They get defense, but they don't necessarily leverage all of the assets available to the alliance to pursue their foreign policy goals. So I think that there are clear limitations, but as long as the US is considered to be a challenge for both, and I think that the US shouldn't be ridden off anywhere, particularly in the East Asia because as Jake Sullivan said in on courage and that's true. It's not only about the US and China, but it's really about the US and its allies. So the US is not going anywhere, the alliance relationship are not going anywhere and that means that both Russia and China have a lot of reasons to strengthen and deepen their cooperation, including in security realms. I believe we have time for maybe one more question. This one is from Elliott land. Since institution building, like in the WTO is a necessity in the short and medium term. How does an international set of actors come together to mutually make new rules in the realms of tech climate change or ongoing trade policy. How would this happen with the current global power dispensation. And does this make the need for new institutions because older ones have a lot more historical baggage and potential bias. There's a lot of dialogue and that you see in the UN they just adopted some cyber rules and so on but this is difficult because the briefly in the arms control realm you've got a arms control structure that this origin in Soviet US limits. And now you have all these new technologies, cyber weapons, space weapons, artificial intelligence, which clearly wouldn't. And you can't just do that between Russia and the US and I think this is behind the Trump administration push which I expect the administration push to continue to include China and other countries and some of these locations and transparency arrangements. Mr is a you mentioned the so called track mechanism for arms control between the United States Russia and China. You know, China, according to his arsenal and nuclear arsenal is not on the same level. As the Russian Federation and the United States. I think Russia and the US their shoulder, the most significant responsibility for disarmament and for maintaining the strategic stability in the world. Of course, China is contributing to the arms control regime as well in the framework of five permanent members consultations in the framework of Geneva conference arms control and through bilateral contacts. But China will not be a part of for the so called traditional mechanism for disarmament because China is not as the same level as same level has the same weight as Russia and the United States. I think though the question was on the new technologies and I think even that is something where China arguably is leading in some sector such as artificial intelligence, cyber capabilities. And it's developing a rapid rapidly developing a space program. And so if you're going to deal with these issues, I can't see how between the between Russia and United States, even in the nuclear round. I think that if you look at the present missiles, China have more interweaving means missiles and Russia and US put together and I think that's what contributed to the collapse of the intermediate nuclear forces agreement so I, you know, I'd love to be able to just do the Russia us for some of these as a simpler but it just doesn't make any sense with the operation of these capabilities to other countries. We are just about out of time. I want to thank all of our panelists. Dr. Mater had to leave us unfortunately a bit early, Dr. Gabweb, Dr. Whites and Minister counselor Piao. Thank you for joining us. Thank you for your insights and your vigorous discussion this morning. We truly appreciate you sharing your time and experience with us. Our next panel is on turbulent tides the South China Sea and we'll begin at 1030 am EDT would love for you to join us for that. Thank you again all of our panelists.