Good morning and welcome to the fourth meeting of the European and External Relations Committee in 2016. Can you make the usual request that mobile phones are switched off? We are on airplane mode. We have received apologies from Hans-Alla Malick this morning and we don't have a substitute for him here. Agenda item 1 is a decision on taking business in private. It's just to check the committee. It's happy to take item 5, which is discussion on the UK Government and the CETA. Aged item 2 is our substantive item for the morning, which is EU reform and the EU referendum implications for Scotland. For a while, we were talking in what ifs, but now we know what actually is possibly going to happen. We are delighted to have with us this morning a panel of expert witnesses. We have Professor Christina Boswell, who is the director of research at the School of Social and Political Science at the University of Edinburgh, Professor John Curtis, Professor of Politics at the University of Strathclyde, Senior Research Fellows, Scotland's Social Research and Economic and Social Research Council Fellow, the UK in a Changing Europe programme. That is a long title. We have Dr Kirsty Hughes, who is an associate fellow from the Conference of Europe in Brussels, Professor Michael Keating, Professor of Politics at the University of Aberdeen and the Director of the Economic and Social Research Council Centre for Constitutional Change. On video conference with us this morning, we have Dr Fabian Zuleig, who is the chief executive and chief economist with the European Policy Centre. Good morning, everyone, and thank you so much for coming along. Fabian, you know how the video conference works. We have a wee slight delay, so if people can just take their time and hope you realise that it will come through loud and clear. Fabian, I would like to maybe start with you this morning, just because you are on video conference, so we can start that process. If you want to maybe say a few words about the general political conditions and how you see it. Sure, and good morning and thank you for having me again. I think what we had last week was important. We had to have a deal, but from a Brussels perspective, I think this almost concludes the involvement of Brussels in the referendum. I think the campaigning is now switching very much to the UK, and it is actually quite surprising how little discussion there has been on the content of the deal. There is a lot of discussion around what the deal might mean, whether it will legally hold up, but very little discussion of the substance. I think that reflects that the important message was that we had to get a deal, but not necessarily what the details of that deal are. I think what is also worth mentioning is that what we are not talking about here is essentially a reform of the EU. What we are talking about is a reform of the relationship of the UK with the EU. There are very little wider implications in terms of EU reform, not least because we are not talking about fundamental treaty change at this point. What we are talking about is clarifying some aspects of the treaty and adding some provisions, but everything that is in the deal has to be compatible with the existing treaties. Professor Michael Keating, would you want to give us some of your initial thoughts? As I said in the note that you have got there, you could read this agreement in a narrow way or in a broad way. In a narrow sense, nothing very much has changed because the concessions that were made to the UK were fairly minor and are not going to affect things like migration flows, but the whole debate and the framing of the referendum is very significant. It represents effectively a disengagement of the United Kingdom from the continuing European project. We may stay within the EU, but whatever the result of the referendum, it seems to be much more likely than not that the UK will opt out of future moves to further integration. The provision about not being bound to close the union or ever close the union is itself rather symbolic, but it is a recognition by the other member states that a UK opt out in the future could become the norm rather than the exception. It strikes me that even the stay campaign, the remain campaign in the lead-up to the referendum, has been accepting David Cameron's agenda that we need to disentangle ourselves to some degree from the European Union. If you add to that the fact that a referendum will be required for transferring any further competences from the UK to the European Union, it looks extremely difficult for us to be involved in any further moves, which might concern migration, aspects of financial regulation that would involve us, even though we are not in the Euro. We are thinking about further moves about climate change, energy—these are big issues. They will have an impact on the UK, but it is unclear whether the UK will really be involved in them. There is a Scottish dimension here, because if the UK is travelling in one direction towards a looser relationship with the European Union, Scotland might want to travel in a different direction. Here, the critical issues are to do with migration, possibly energy and the social dimension of the European project. Professor Keaton, do you think that it is your view that the deal that is on the table is not what people are being asked to vote for in the referendum? My concern is that there is a deal, and it is either take it or leave the deal within the context of Europe, but the actual referendum question will be in or out, so the question for the referendum has no real bearing on the deal? It is a bit like the Scottish referendum, and there are three options, but we only get to vote on two of them. It is either partly out or completely out. We do not have the option of staying completely in. I think that that is unfortunate, but the work that we have been doing—we have had some meetings around Scotland in the north of England where I am going this afternoon—about the European issue, we are trying to refocus away from these rather minor changes to the bigger question of what is the future of Europe and what should the United Kingdom's place be in within the European Union. We have written evidence that you have sent in, and you have focused quite a lot on the media perceptions that have been developing around this. Do you want to give us some of your view? I think that the package that was agreed last week has nothing to do with the challenges currently facing the European Union—nothing at all to do with them. I also think that it has very little to nothing to do with reasons why the UK should, in my opinion, stay in the European Union. Although some parts of it are fairly insignificant and irrelevant, as Michael said, it is bad for the UK and it is bad for the European Union in various ways. We do not have a vote on that. There is no vote for the status quo. We cannot say that we would rather keep what we have now. I do not think that the way that those renegotiations were done by David Cameron involved the other parties in any significant degree, so there was no cross-party consensus on getting that particular package. The reference to the media I made in the note you are referring to was that so far—and it is very early days—we seem to be seeing a debate, if you look at the BBC or the pages of some of the broadsheets, between two wings of the Conservative Party with rather little attention given to, say, the Labour opposition or the SNP gets some attention when Nicola Sturgeon says something about independence. At the moment, we are seeing a gov versus Cameron or Boris Johnson versus Cameron, and one can only hope that it opens out from that. On the package, even though I think that that is not going to be a major focus of debate, although it is at the moment, for instance, in terms of whether it is legally binding or not—again, I agree with Michael Keating that what I am calling the agreement to never close the Union for the UK is actually a significant change, although Britain already has very major opt-outs. It managed in the past to balance having those opt-outs with playing an influential and occasionally leading and strategic role in the EU. You think about enlarging the EU eastwards after the Berlin wall came down, and I think when you write into a treaty that the UK is not committed to further political integration, you are making an extraordinary statement and you are stepping back. When you look at the details of some of the other things, like the red card, it may not ever get used, but the UK failed to get the red card agreed proper into governmental negotiations for the Lisbon Treaty and the Constitutional Treaty, and now in the pressure to say, I have got to have a deal, so we stay in the EU, the UK has been given a special thing that not all the 28 in normal circumstances would have agreed to. Lastly, one thing that concerns me is that it is not only a question that in future steps, whether it is on energy or migration that the UK will keep opting out, I think that the British public, fair enough, do not fully understand how the EU works, so the EU already has powers agreed, including with the UK, to take steps forward on energy or climate change or the environment, but if a future progressive government in the UK, if we can imagine such a thing, decided to lead on big steps forward on climate in the EU, surely a lot of the public, if they voted to stay in, would say, but surely didn't we vote that we weren't going to do that sort of thing anymore, so I don't think the referendum, given this deal, will resolve the perennial British debate over the European Union. Do you see any of the additional powers as part of the deal that David Cameron has secured? Do you see any of the other EU states using those powers? Do they have any use to any other EU states? Well, I think that the benefits breaks other states may try to use. I think that the way it's been worded is to try and discourage other states from using it. I think that it's deeply disturbing. It's the thin end of a wedge in terms of introducing discrimination into the labour market, which I don't think should happen even if we weren't part of the EU. Otherwise, the red card, well, the red card can only be used if 55% of the votes of all the national parliaments use it, so it would require other countries to use it, but the so-called yellow and orange cards have barely been used since the Lisbon Treaty brought them in, so I think that's not very likely. The child benefit criteria may be used, the rather nasty and unneeded penalising of third-country spouses may be used, but, as I said at the start, it's really nothing to do with either the principal problems in the way that the EU operates, the main challenges it faces or even the main reasons as to why Britain should stay in them. Thank you very much. Professor Curtis, you are one known to have your finger on the pulse of what people are thinking and saying, so please give us your wisdom. I inevitably come out of a slightly different perspective from my colleagues, and I understand their views about their feeling that there isn't much substance to this, but I think that one needs to understand that the renegotiation was primarily about symbolic politics, not about substantive politics. I think that the first thing that we have to bear in mind is that we are talking about a relatively sceptical country so far as Europe is concerned. As we revealed yesterday, British social attitude shows that 65 per cent of people in the UK wish either to get out of the European Union or wish to have its powers reduced. While my colleagues might like to have the option of keeping the status quo on the ballot paper, I'm fairly confident it would lose if it were to be on the ballot paper, so maybe from their perspective it's probably a good thing that it's not going to be on the ballot paper. Scotland is not immune from this. Again, Scottish social attitude is exactly the same question at the same time. 60 per cent of people in Scotland can also be regarded as Eurosceptic, so don't presume that Scotland is necessarily wildly different so far as wishing to reduce the powers that Europe is concerned as opposed to wanting to leave. That said, one also needs to wear the Eurosceptic and potentially goes much further than there is indeed anything in the renegotiation. Over a half of people would like to end the freedom of movement provisions. There is even a wish to actually get rid of the reciprocal health agreement that currently exists inside the European Union, so don't underestimate the extent to which the public would like to reduce the Royal Amendment of the UK. The truth is therefore that what David Cameron was trying to do with his renegotiation is to send signals to two audiences. The first is a general public, which indeed is deeply sceptical about the European Union. He was therefore trying to send signals to say that, in particular, I recognise your concerns. In terms of symbolism, of course, the fact that immigration is linked with welfare benefits is not just simply touching upon the undoubted high level of concern about immigration in the UK but that in-work benefits have become increasingly unpopular with British public opinions. Putting the two things together was a way of meeting those audiences. That is one audience. One can understand that the modal British voter is a Cameroonian, i.e., I suppose we should stay in, but could we please make Brussels less powerful? He was sending a symbol to that audience. The other group, of course, to which he was trying to peel in his sense, was really the primary political objective of this exercise. It was a message to the Conservative Party and particularly to those members of the Conservative parliamentary party who exercised about the issues of sovereignty. In particular, not least the reasons for doing that is that he was anticipating that, by renegotiating and coming up with his deal at meeting those concerns, he would avoid a serious split in his party and that the bulk of Conservative MPs would be behind him and only a minority of cabinet members would be in that position. I think that we now know two things about the success of the exercise in this perspective. The first is that, so far as avoiding the split inside the Conservative party's concern, the renegotiations have failed. We are now greeted with the sight of the Prime Minister and the leader of the Scottish Conservative Party campaigning for Remain in the period leading up to elections at the beginning of May, while the leader of the Welsh Conservative Party and the Conservative London mayoral candidate are going to argue for leave. More seriously, of course, two non-trivial players inside the cabinet, Boris Johnson and Michael Gove, have now come out in favour of leave, and it is also pretty clear that maybe a majority of Conservative MPs will be in favour of Remain, but the party is going to split pretty much down the middle. As a result, Conservative voters in this referendum are not going to get an unambiguous queue that they should be voting in favour of Remain. The polls differ to some degree about the position, but they all agree that Conservative voters are pretty heavily divided on this subject, and there must now be a serious poset that remains so. The second came back to the objective, so far as the public is concerned. The expectation was that by sending out these symbolic messages and that the Prime Minister has done a deal, he has got a piece of paper, he can come back and he sorted things out, that there would be a serious swing in favour of the Remain camp. The truth is that, because Euroscepticism goes much wider than what the Prime Minister is anticipating, although people are now rather less critical of the deal than they were when the original draft deal was published at the beginning of February, it seems to be pretty clear that more people think that it is a bad deal than a good deal. Certainly, if one now looks at the evidence of the opinion polls, there are three polling companies that polled just before the publication of the draft agreement, who published in that period, who then also did a poll between the period of the publication of the draft agreement and the doing of the deal last week and who have subsequently polled again. If you take out the don't know, it is essentially what you discover, is that before the publication of the draft deal, on average, these polls said that it was 53% for Remain. In the interim period between the draft deal and the doing of the deal, it was 50% for Remain, so there was initially seemingly an adverse reaction. Since then, it has come back to 52%. In truth, it looks as though for all the huffing and puffing in Brussels, and I am sorry for all those who are up all night, but it looks as though in terms of persuading the public, the immediate impact is pretty close to zero. Professor Boswell, you may have come from another completely different perspective for you, so please share. I will focus my comments on the impact of provisions on banning or limiting access to welfare on migration flows, so my area is UK and European immigration. I agree with comments that these measures are largely symbolic and, arguably, irrelevant in terms of the attempt to impact on mobility flows, so I think that they won't have a significant effect either on flows from EU countries into the UK or, indeed, on the public purse. I don't think that they will create significant savings. One of the aspects to bear in mind in that is that this so-called alert and safeguard mechanism, the emergency break, not only is it limited to seven years and limited to the first four years of people arriving in the UK, but it is also overlooked in media reporting that there is a stipulation that the limitation should be graduated, so it should be gradually phased in over those first four years, so it is not a blanket ban over four years. It might have an unanticipated inadvertent effect on mobility, so, for example, it might well lead to a short-term increase in mobility to the UK in this sort of year or so, leading up to its entry into force. It might affect the household decisions of those most affected by the reduction or the ban in work tax credits and families most affected are likely to be households with children where one of the partners is working or where there's only a single parent. That might encourage the second parent to take up employment. In the case of single parents, this could have a very adverse effect on welfare, so I think that's an area that we really have to worry about in terms of the welfare impact of this measure. I would actually suggest that we also need to pan out a bit and think about this focus on central-east European mobility as the main issue of concern. The first point that I would make here is that this is now under 50 per cent of EU immigration. The majority of EU immigrants are now coming from the EU 15 countries, which are the original members of the European Union, and that's most obviously associated with recession and austerity in south European countries. This is not mentioned in the debate. This is 52 per cent of EU nationals in terms of recent inflows into the UK. The A8, which is that group of countries that were not subject to transitional arrangements and had immediate access to the labour market in 2004, is very important because that's one of the arguments that's apparently justifying the UK's introduction of these special measures. That group now constitutes just 27 per cent of EU immigration flows into the UK and it's declining. We're actually seeing a quite significant rise in EU 15 immigration, a decline in A8 immigration and A2, sorry for all this jargon, but A2 immigration, which is immigration of Romanian and Bulgarian nationals who acceded to our labour market, were allowed access to the labour market in 2014. They're actually relatively low numbers and remaining steady. The big trend is actually not central-east European immigration. The second contextual point, and this is my last point, is that actually far more significant in terms of labour market dynamics and an ergo labour migration dynamics is going to be changes to the national living wage. The introduction of the national living wage and the gradual increase in the level of the national living wage may have quite significant impacts on mobility and that could go in different directions depending on how stringently it's enforced. If it's not stringently enforced, which is likely given current trends in enforcement of illegal employment, it may well create a pull factor and encourage employers who can't afford or feel they can't afford the higher costs to want to undercut the new wages by employing EU migrants on a regular basis. That's a worrying trend to look out for. The Prime Minister has said that the problems in the eurozone are driving fundamental change in Europe. Secondly, there is a crisis of European competitiveness. Thirdly, if we don't address these challenges, the danger is that Europe will fail and the British people would drift towards an exit. On that, in his letter to Donald Tusk, he referred to seeking reforms that would benefit the European Union as a whole. I'm coming from a position where I would prefer to stay in, but I do think that things need changing for lots of reasons. Following the negotiations at the European Council meeting, an agreement in EU reform, what do you think attitudes of other EU leaders now are to the UK in relation to trying to improve the EU as a whole? Do you think that his attempts on economic governance and competitiveness will actually produce some growth and some extra employment and some good things in the European Union, which is what is lacking at the moment? Fabian, given that you are sitting in Brussels right now, you are right at the heart of the action. Can you tell us whether you have any thoughts on Jamie's question? Yes, sure. First, in a narrow sense, if we look at what is in the deal itself and we look at the competitiveness chapter, you could conclude that the competitiveness chapter in the deal is quite thin. It is quite thin, but I think what that reflects is actually that the agenda of the Juncker Commission, to a very large extent, has moved in the direction in which the Conservative government wanted to move in any case. The Juncker Commission's economic reform agenda is very close to the priorities of the UK government. In that sense, there is an overlap there. Whether these economic reforms will be delivered, we have to see. I think that is, for me, the wider point with EU reform. It is, I think, universally recognised that there are many things which need to be addressed at the European level, that there are a number of areas where there are difficulties. I do agree that economic performance is an area of concern, but we shouldn't forget that there are other crises which we are facing at the moment, which in terms of political magnitude are even bigger. But I think what we have to recognise is the way you change policies at EU level, the way you influence the system, the way you actually have the possibility of creating long-term reform is not this process. This process is a very unilateral process. It is focused on one member state. If we want true EU reform, we are talking about a process which not only has to involve the 28 member states, but which has to involve the institutions, all of the institutions fully. It is a long-term process because we are then talking about deciding on a common vision for where the European Union should go. All of this is not possible in this timeframe and in this process. I would fully agree that we still need to discuss EU reform, but I think that is the irony in this. Having a referendum on EU membership in the UK or in any other country for that matter hinders the discussion of fundamental reform, because the only thing which is on the table now is what is in the deal. There will not be any discussion on fundamental additional issues because the fear will be there that that could trigger an adverse reaction in the referendum debate. I think what we are actually seeing is at least for the coming month very little fundamental change at the European level, whether we then return to that long-term reform agenda afterwards depends on a number of different factors, including on if the UK stays in, whether the UK will engage more constructively again with the European Union processes or whether the UK will continue to stand on the sidelines. Firstly, briefly on the competitiveness side of things, I spent the first third of my career working on competitiveness and my PhD was on British and European competitiveness, but there is always a lot of motherhood and apple pie about the aims, whether it is in last week's statement or in the 2001 Lisbon summit or whatever. You could do a whole report on competitiveness, but I think for me in a nutshell, growth and productivity growth interact and tend to go together. Productivity growth may not be everything we mean by competitiveness, but you need the two together if you are to move forward and be competitive in a global sense. I would say that there are two things concerning competitiveness in the EU at the moment. One is the extraordinary austerity policies that we have seen. We have seen them in the UK, but we have seen them more severely in the Eurozone and the shocking levels of unemployment and youth unemployment across southern Europe. That also comes through at the more micro, let's call it industrial policy level, because you then have the same neoliberal economic approach there, dictating the ways you can and can't intervene to tackle unemployment or to try and develop more competitive industries. You have got the Yonker 300 billion plan to try and tackle some of the impact of austerity, to tackle unemployment and competitiveness. That would be an extraordinary plan if it was a real plan, but there is only 30 billion of EU money and most of that 30 billion is not even new. So I don't think I am very encouraged by what I saw there. Very briefly on your first question, which was about attitudes to the UK as a result of this negotiation, Britain has been a very difficult member of the club for all the 40 plus years of its membership. That has been tolerated in varying degrees of ups and downs in other member states attitudes to us, because sometimes we've also done more positive things, sometimes we've played a strategic role, but I think patients has worn extremely thin. I think it's quite extraordinary at one level that we have actually seen other European nations and individuals willing to come along with Cameron to play the game to say the things that need saying, but I mean there are limits and I think we've reached that limit. Michael Keating. Yeah, I was going to make the same point as Kirsty did about competitiveness and macroeconomic policy, austerity, that's the other side of it, but the economic government's question also is about the safeguarding non-euro countries from decisions taken within the euro zone, and I think what we've got here is highly problematic because there's a very weak provision whereby non-euro countries will have a voice but not a vote in decisions in the euro group. They'll be allowed to voice their concerns, but the other countries will still be allowed to meet themselves as a euro group formation and take decisions that only affect themselves, but they will affect the United Kingdom because almost anything that happens in the euro zone has an impact in the United Kingdom. If the euro is going to survive, it will be by getting a tighter monetary and regulatory and banking union, that will necessarily involve the United Kingdom because many euro zone banks are based in London, so the city of London will be partly regulated by the euro zone or whatever happens, and I think that's going to become immensely problematic in the future. If the euro collapses, then the problem will be resolved, but if the euro survives, I think that provision is really inadequate to resolve the question of what the UK's right-and-ship of the UK regulatory system will be to that of the euro zone. Any other comments on Jimmy's question? Do you want to come back on Jimmy? I've got another question, if that's possible. You're fired away. Turning then, so we now know what we're voting on, and the question is probably for Professor Curtis. What are the polls telling us about the voting intentions in the EU referendum in the UK and in Scotland, and what are the main issues that concern voters in relation to the European Union in this referendum? Mr McGregor, the opinion polls are not being very helpful in this referendum, in the sense that there is a systematic discrepancy between those polls that are conducted via the internet and those that are being done via the telephone. Those who have been done over the telephone are suggesting that the remain side are well ahead, and typically, on average, they've got about a 59 per cent vote for remain, and 41 per cent for leave once you take out the don't knows. The internet polls, in contrast, on average, during the course of this year have literally said that it's a 50-50 split, and don't ask me which is right and which is wrong, because I'll be honest with you, I don't know. Scotland is concerned that the picture is much clearer. It seems perfectly clear that Scotland is going to vote to remain inside the European Union. The telephone polls suggest that maybe that's as many as 75 per cent of people in Scotland will vote in favour. The internet polls put it at about 66. This, of course, is very different from the position that we last had a referendum in 1975, when Scotland was less likely to vote in favour of staying inside the common market. The explanation for that is essentially to do with the changed position of the SNP, which back in 1975 was campaigning to leave the European Union. What you discover once you're doing the analysis is that, essentially, Conservative voters north of the border are split on the issue, much as Conservative voters are south of the border—the same is true for Labour and Liberal Democrats—but that SNP supporters, who, of course, are now the largest group in Scotland, come out about three to one in favour. They're not united, but they're three to one in favour. I mean my converse. Of course, there are very few UKIP supporters north of the border. It's the way in which the SNP has made the European Union part of its wider vision of independence that I think is crucial here. Staying inside the European Union has been part of the idea of independence in Europe and being inside the European Union is seen as a pathway towards Scottish independence. The way in which those two issues have been linked, and given the relative popularity still of independence in Scotland, that's the principal explanation as to why Scotland is quite clearly going to vote to remain. My second question is about what are the main issues that concern the vote. The main issues are pretty clear. It's also clear that they will leave many a voter with a fair dilemma. Issue number one is immigration, together with issues of sovereignty, and also, much more broadly, the feeling that being inside the European Union is somewhere another undermines Britain's distinctive identity. I mean, nearly half of people think that being inside the European Union across the UK as a whole undermines our sense of identity. Those are all issues that are essentially leave issues. In other words, far more people think that immigration will be reduced if we leave the European Union than if we stay. More people are concerned about the identity consequences of being inside the European Union rather than feeling that it's perfectly okay. Those are the leave issues. The remain issues are primarily—it's partly to do with the extent to which people think that being inside the European Union will enhance Britain's influence in the world, and more people think that if we leave, we will have less influence than more. However, in truth, in part, that's an EH1SW1 issue. It's something that exercises politicians but doesn't necessarily exercise the public so much. The crucial issue for the public, and it essentially comes back to your previous question, is the economy. It's perfectly clear and it's been clear for some considerable time that people are inclined to believe that being inside the European Union is better for our economy than being outside it. Therefore, in his sense, this is a referendum where people are going to have to tussle with two fittings. On the one hand, they think that being inside the European Union means that Brussels bosses around about, undermines our Britishness, results in too much immigration, but hang on, which side of our bread is buttered? However, are we better off inside the European Union? Is leaving the European Union potentially too risky a project, and therefore maybe should we hang in that? The referendum will be determined by how those issues get resolved. The only thing that I can add to that is that some work that I presented yesterday is that I think that for so long as voters are convinced that the economy will be better off inside the EU than outside, it is likely that Remain will win. However, there's no guarantee that that will continue to be the position. Thank you very much, Lord Campbell. Before I start on the questions that I wanted to answer, I wanted to ask a brief supplemental to Professor Curtis on the difference between the telephone and internet poles. You weren't speculating as to which might be right. Could you just elaborate from 2015 Westminster experience and, for example, what conclusions on that particular topic could be reached? One thing that is undoubtedly true is that it's long been the case that internet poles have tended to find more UKIP supporters than have telephone poles. That was very clear in the run-up, including the 2015 election, although the differences in the raw samples often got minimised by the various ways in which the poles are weighted and filtered, etc. At the end, I can't remember the exact figures, but the story that I'm going to tell is roughly correct, is that if you look at the actual final opinion poles, which is always the test that you have to apply, the internet poles, on average, were saying something like 15% or 16% UKIP votes. The telephone poles were saying something like a 12% UKIP vote, and it was in between the two. From that lesson, the guidance that one can give you is, well, hang on, maybe it's somewhere in between the two, which, at the moment, would mean that it's about a 54% remain vote. That said, however, of course the proportion of people who say they're going to vote to leave in any opinion poll is substantially greater than the proportion of people who say they will vote for UKIP. Therefore, the extent to which one can read off the evidence of UKIP in 2015 and the relative accuracy of the two approaches to what is the position now is perhaps debatable. The second thing one needs to realise is that, insofar as the principal collective problem with the opinion polls in 2015 was underestimating Conservative support and overestimating Labour support, the difficulty here is, of course, that at the end of the day, supporters of both of those political parties are divided on the European issue. The Conservative party, most obviously, with probably more Conservative voters inclined at the moment to vote to leave than to remain, but the Labour party, the advantage to remain is only around two to one. In other words, this is an issue that cuts across party lines. Therefore, it therefore follows that even if the opinion polls actually have solved all the problems of 2015, and they would not say they have at the moment, that that doesn't mean to say that they get the opinion referendum right because it cuts across the things that caused them jobs in 2015. Conversely, it also follows that even the opinion polls are still getting it wrong if our Conservative Labour is concerned. It may still, at least one set of them, get the opinion referendum right because it is a cross-cutting issue. I am afraid that 2015 is not terribly helpful because, essentially, of the cross-cutting nature of this issue, parties' supporters are divided and because we are looking at a phenomenon for which the level of support is much higher than the level of support for UKIP. The conclusion from that might be that, as far as opinion polls are concerned, that we await the result of the referendum with a considerable degree of interest in reflecting on the opinion bells approach. Indeed. Of course, another thing that you need to realise, however, is that referendums are always more difficult for opinion polls than our elections. The truth is that opinion polls have learned from their past mistakes. Their methodologies develop and adapt over time, but they can learn from one election to the next. Undoubtedly, the independent inquiry into what happened in 2015 will be published relatively shortly, and that will undoubtedly impel further changes inside the industry. Whether referendum in contrast, it is day and over. You are not sure, therefore, whether the things that you do to get a general election right necessarily apply to referendum. Of course, yes, we have had a referendum on this subject 40 years ago, but it is so long ago, and the opinion polling has conducted so differently that, frankly, you cannot really take much lessons from that. Thank you. I think I will leave opinion polls alone now. I think opinion polls should be taken, but they should never be inhaled. It is dangerous. Very enough. Could I move on to just about the question of sovereignty again and just ask the panel what their views were. Obviously, having heard the views expressed earlier on about the decision on ever closer union and what that might mean for the future, whether what the panel's views were and things that were speculated quite about the press the weekend about a further statement, a restatement of sovereignty, which could be dealt with on an internal basis. I think we are still awaiting verification on that. What impact do they think that that might have on the view taken by the electorate on sovereignty issues? Professor Keating. I will try that one. It is a pity that we do not have a lawyer here, but the issue of sovereignty is a very abstract notion until it is translated into something rather practical. If the UK Parliament passes a resolution saying it is sovereign, it must already be sovereign in order to pass a revolution saying it is sovereign. There is a circularity to it. You cannot legislate parliamentary supremacy by definition. The idea that it has been floated is that the Supreme Court should have the ability to strike down European legislation in the name of national sovereignty, but if that is in the name of parliamentary sovereignty, which is all we have, it is meaningless. It just becomes circular. All you are saying is that Parliament is not bound by European law. It is, as long as we are part of the European Union. It was also floated that we could have the German system whereby the German constitutional court has assumed the right to disallow certain European legislation on the grounds that it violates the German constitution, not because it violates German law but only because it violates the German constitution, the basic law. We do not have a written constitution to measure that against. Once you start looking at what would this mean in practice, it dissolves in your hand. It is something that has become symbolically important for the Conservative Party, for certain people within the Conservative Party. I expect that we will have some kind of symbolic declaration, but I do not see what constitutional significance it can have until we have a written constitution in this country, which we are not going to get. Would it, in your view or in the panel's view, affect the views of voters in any way or have no effect whatsoever? I think the truth is that sovereignty is an issue that exercises politicians because politicians sit in institutions and they always want to like the idea that the institution of which they are a member should be relatively powerful. Voters however do not sit in any of these institutions and therefore for them they do not necessarily quite so exercised. As I have already suggested in my comments, there is no doubt that for many a voter there is a question mark about the legitimacy of rule from Brussels as they would craft it. In much the same way, so many people in Scotland, there is a question mark about the legitimacy of rule from London. These are essentially the same issues. This is a question about who do you regard as legitimacy. Given that only around 15-16% of people across the UK actually feel European, for the most part Europe is other than us, they do not feel that rules that come from Brussels are something in which they have an emotional investment that comes from an institution whose legitimacy they respect. At that sense, yes, it is a concern for the public. However, at the end of the day, as I put in part of my earlier remarks, I think so far as the leaf side is concerned is that banging on about sovereignty is not going to get them very far, because that argument is already won. The crucial issue in the referendum in the end is whether or not the leaf side persuade people of the economic arguments. The research I presented yesterday basically shows that if you are concerned about the impact of being in the EU on Britishness and you are for that kind of wise Brussels messing us around view, there is about a 40% chance that you will vote to leave, but 40% is not going to win the referendum. If, on the other hand, you are concerned about Brussels's rule and you are convinced that the economy will be better off outside the EU, there is an 80% chance that you will vote to leave, so you can see how in the end it is going to be the economic issue that is crucial, and sovereignty may exercise Boris Johnson and Michael Gove, but my respectful advice to them is that if they wish to win the referendum, stop banging on about it. Dr Hughes. I think two points. I'll bring the end, Fabi, enough to Dr Hughes. Oh, sorry, Fabi. Firstly, as Michael was saying, the primacy of EU law cannot be overruled by Westminster. You can't run the EU of all the 28 countries can then overrule what they actually agreed in the Council of Ministers in the European Parliament, so at the end of the day, if you really can't work together, then you'd have to vote to leave. I actually disagree with John a bit on the sovereignty issues. I think maybe banging on about sovereignty, per se, may not go down very well with voters, but I think voters do care about democracy and therefore the legitimacy issue, and I think I was checking back to David Cameron's famous Bloomberg speech where he started the ball rolling about what he said he wanted to achieve, and it's very interesting that democracy was one of his three big categories, and if you look at what he got, what did he get that actually relates to that? He got this funny little red card for national parliament, and it's so astru, so I don't think that's going, that's not going to be worth Johnston and Gove or Cameron or, you know, banging on about. So, you know, I think there are huge issues of democracy and legitimacy today across the European Union, and you see it in the various populist movements of left and right, and the new movement set up by Yanis Varifakis, and you see it in the UK as well, so I don't think the way the British debate on Europe happens means that we address those in any interesting or central way, but I do think those issues matter for voters. Thank you. Fabian. I just wanted to make the point that I find this debate on on sovereignty quite misguided, because we should look at what the whole purpose of the European Union is, and the purpose of the European Union is that we transfer certain competences to the European Union in which we then exercise shared sovereignty, and that is the whole point of having an instrument like the European Union. Of course, in those areas where we have shared those competences, the final word has to lie with the European Court of Justice, because you otherwise will have a completely meaningless framework at the European level, because every member say it will then at the point when something does not suit them anymore, try to go back to their national decision making processes, and cancel whatever has been agreed at the European level. So if you exercise this in the sense that some people seem to be suggesting you would destroy the decision making process at the European Union level, and you would make the European Union completely ineffective, I think what it does indicate for me at least is that even if we have a yes vote in the referendum, that some of these issues certainly for parts of the Conservative Party are not going to go away, that we simply are going to continue to have these debates, because there are certain issues about shared sovereignty which seem to not be acceptable to parts of the Conservative Party. So I'm afraid what that indicates to me is that the referendum unfortunately is not a solution for changing the UK-EU relationship to something more positive, but that it actually might just perpetuate these kinds of arguments. The question of the European Court of Justice. In relation to the provisions in relation to social benefits and free movement, is there a possibility, obviously these apply to all member states, the decisions that the European Court of Justice might wish to assess them for compatibility with the treaties? Is that a real problem? Yes, I think there is a very real possibility of that occurring. In relation to the indexation of child benefits less so, that's probably going to be seen as broadly consistent with non-discrimination principles. But on the issue of the ban on in-work benefits, obviously that clearly implies differential incomes for EU nationals and UK and non-UK EU nationals. One of the weaknesses in the declaration and the decision is actually the grounds on which a member state can claim such an emergency break. It's really quite severe circumstances. It's where an exceptional situation exists on a scale that affects the essential aspects of its social security system, including the primary purpose of its in-work benefits system and so on. This is really stringent. The other aspect that's mentioned here in terms of the conditions under which a member state might be legitimate in applying or might have acceptance in applying this stop is based on odd phrase about where, given the UK made that decision to allow immediate labour market access to the A8 who exceeded in 2004. But, as I said before, this isn't actually the primary cause of current EU immigration flows to the UK. So, empirically speaking, it's very doubtful that the ECJ would hold up that the UK was justified even if, in principle, it agreed that such an emergency break was justified in those exceptional circumstances. The empirical grounds on which the UK could claim to meet those conditions, I think, is very, very weak. I still see on the subject that Professor Boswell has just replied and looked at in depth how one of them is already answered. Although the reform package has been put together in response to the UK concern, the measures included in the decision are applicable to all member states, not just the UK. As a result of that, the provisions within the decision could be used by any other member states, if they wished. Do you believe that the provisions in particular, in relation to the social benefits and free movements, are likely to be used by any of the other member states? I think that we already have a justified expectation that Germany would want to use the indexation of child benefits provision. In fact, there's been a very controversial discussion in Germany since around 2013-14 on EU immigration and access to welfare, and the perception that it's called Armutsmigradion, the idea that poor impoverished migrants from central and east Europe are migrating to Germany because of the generous welfare benefits. It's interesting that Angela Merkel rather did well out of the fact that David Cameron was raising those issues and getting the flack for raising those issues, and Merkel often happens in EU negotiations, was effectively keeping quiet and hiding behind Cameron as he made those arguments. In terms of the in-work tax credits, it's probably less appealing to other EU member states, but I think that the indexation of child benefits. Germany actually did that in 1975 in relation to Turkish guest workers who were apparently abusing the system in a similar way, and that resulted in quite large-scale reunification of children with their families in Germany, so people moved their kids to Germany in response. I suppose that the bottom line in Professor Curtis touched on it was, has this deal done enough to persuade Eurosceptics to stay in? I think that Professor Curtis said that the polling before and after the deal hasn't really moved very much at all. In that sense, Mr Cameron, you could argue, is likely to fail. The shift in public opinion will not be driven by us banging on here about the constitution and so on, but it will be driven by the media, the relentless negativity that we are just about to get rid of. It started anyway, hasn't it? In many senses, that could tip the balance in favour of leaving, because I think that there is a relentless negativity already in the UK media, particularly in the English newspaper media against the European Union. What are your views on that? Despite all our best efforts to have reasoned argument and discussion about all the issues that will essentially be driven by what the newspapers want people to hear? A couple of points to come back on. I think that the truth is that one's best judgment that the immediate movement of public opinion in the wake of doing the deal is that, basically, it's not had any impact. That, however, is significant given that the hope, if not necessarily the expectation of people on the main side, is that concluding the deal would help to shift public opinion, whereas probably it's just not made much difference. So far as the media is concerned, one does have to remember here that you are talking about a declining industry and that a half of people across the UK don't regularly read a newspaper at all anymore. I think certainly what is true, this is true much more broadly, it's certainly true that whereas in 1975, pretty much the whole of what you might regard as a British establishment, including much of his newspaper industry, was all lined up in favour of staying inside the common market, the British establishment quote-unquote is now somewhat more divided and the media empire will be divided. Now, one can certainly anticipate that Daily Express is going to come out in favour of leave, the Daily Mail perhaps, but what's going to happen to Rupot Murdoch's newspapers? Well, to be honest, we might be awaiting a long time, much as we did during the independence referendum, as to where eventually Mr Murdoch was going to put his money, if anywhere. So, sure, there's going to be quite a lot of relatively critical coverage in some newspapers, but whether or not newspapers like The Sun and The Tines will come out against, I think, you know, it's still up in the air. Meanwhile, you do have newspapers like The Guardian and The Independent, and so far as anybody reads them anymore, the FT will clearly be coming out in favour. So, it's going to be a mixed media message, but sure, it's going to be precious on both sides. I mean, so far as the broadcast media is concerned, of course, at the end, they're going to have to try to give equal access to both sides of the debate. Dr Hughes, you obviously had picked up this issue about a media influence and how that works. Do you want to give us some insight? I think that Professor Boswell, I think maybe your view from how migration and the whole argument around migration is maybe argued as well, would maybe be somewhere where you could give us some thoughts as well. Professor, did Dr Hughes? Thank you.  Also, as you know, if the alternative sources of news are social media and other online sources, you can see that social media is not exactly full of strongly tested facts and unemotionally expressed opinions. I mean, I think at the moment, you know, if you look at the polls that John Curtis has quoted or if you look at the bookies, it's still telling us that the remain should win, but it's also giving us at least the one in three chance that we will leave, which is enormous. It's quite extraordinary, and we also know that a big chunk of the population is unsure, is very open to being swayed. So, I think the question of where, in which direction the momentum will go, how influential the media will be, the migration issue, you know, we've seen just extraordinary developments in the last few days of Austria convening this meeting with Hungary and all the western Balkans and deliberately excluding Greece and Germany. So, you know, the amazing pressures and crises that EU is facing at the moment are not going away while we're having this bizarre debate on the sidelines. And I think, you know, I think it's also very interesting in terms of the, there's lots of potential ways the votes could break down across the UK, but from what we see so far, you'd expect, as again was said earlier, Scotland and also Northern Ireland to certainly vote unless there's a dramatic change to stay. Wales is not as Eurosceptic as England, but it's pretty Eurosceptic. But you could end up with a situation where Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland vote to stay, England votes to leave, and then either England drags the other three out unwillingly, or the three keep England in unwillingly, and either way, you've got a huge political crisis. And so, of course, in Scotland there's been a lot of focus on, might there be a second independence referendum, but I think the crisis will actually go beyond that if we end up in that situation, and Scotland at that point would certainly be in discussion with other parts of the UK. And it's also just one last point while we're on this, that if, you know, the vote could go in very different directions, maybe we'll suddenly find it's 6040 to stay, and it's, you know, quite extraordinary, you know, restatement of Britain in Europe. But if there were three parts of the UK voting to stay and England voting to leave, you might end up with a fractionally close UK wide vote. I mean, it might be 49.7 to 50.3. What's the debate going to be then? It's all very well-saying. We're not having a second referendum, but I think the way the vote goes could be explosive. Professor Boswell. I mean, is this basically on the question of the prospects for more positive media coverage on migration issues? Very pessimistic really. And I think, I mean, the fact that, you know, David Cameron made the decision to frame the issue around welfare dependence, et cetera, and he made that gamble thinking, well, if I then ex-frame it in these times and offer this symbolic stop, then people's concerns will be allayed, but he obviously hasn't succeeded even in offering that symbolic stop. So I'm afraid that they've kind of lost the battle on framing the issue. So I'd be very pessimistic about coverage. Sorry. I was just thinking that, you know, the positive case has to be articulated by someone, but this committee has been very positive over the years, but you know, you're through across the parties, and my worry is that that simple positive case that the public can relate to is not being made yet. Yeah, and I think it's not likely to be done so by UK wide mainstream parties at the moment. I mean, I've for a long time made the case that we should do what Germany did, which is have a cross-party commission, which makes a clear case for the benefits and some of the challenges associated with immigration have a really open debate, and I think the kind of the environment in Scotland would be much more propitious for that sort of cross-party commission. There is one part of the UK where the media are, I mean, it's perfectly, are cottoned on to the fact that perhaps they have to play the immigration issue a little more carefully, and that is in London. In not least, one of the things that there's now an appreciation is that there will be about a half a million of EU citizens living in London who, although they will not have a vote in the European Union referendum, will have a vote in the London mayoral election. We now have two candidates on the opposite side of the fence, and it's therefore quite possible that the interests of European Union migrants and the way in which they vote could play a decisive role in the London mayoral election. Because of the diversity of London, it's now perfectly clear that no politician and no media outlet can come out with a wholly negative message. I have two questions, please. The first one was, I take your point about the London mayoral elections. Do you think that there will be any effect of the European referendum on the Scottish parliamentary elections?  What would be the reaction of other member states to the UK voting to leave? Are they going to be quite happy to agree a free trade agreement with the UK following on from such a referendum result? What might be the economic impact of a vote to leave? Fabian, can I bring you in on the second part of Adam's question there, just given where you are and how you view things? Absolutely. I think while it is clearly an uncertain situation, it's unprecedented. We've never had this situation before, but I think there are a lot of reasons why this will be economically detrimental for the UK if it happens. I think when I hear some of the Eurosceptic argument that the UK trade deficit gives it some strength in post-Brexit vote negotiations, I find very strange. Usually a trade deficit is not construed as something which gives you economic strength. I think what we have is a debate which would happen around access to the single market, and there I see very few political incentives for the countries remaining in the European Union to give the UK a generous access to the single market, especially if the UK insists on opt-outs on special provisions in areas such as free movement of people. I do not see where the incentive would be to do that. What we would see is that when it comes to trade in goods, there would be, in my view, relatively little impact, because most trading goods is governed by WTO rather than EU provisions. The countries of the European Union could continue to export their manufactured products to the United Kingdom where the effect would be in trade and services, where the European Union actually provides a framework for the UK where the UK is very successful in exporting services, and particularly this would affect the financial sector. I think on the single market side there would be a detrimental effect. On top of that, I think what we would see and that wouldn't happen overnight but would happen over time, is that the attractiveness of the UK as a destination for foreign direct investment would reduce very significantly. A lot of companies globally are investing in the UK at least in part because the UK is a gateway into the European Union. That kind of investment would switch to other places. A lot of the investment in the UK is not to serve domestic UK demand but it is actually to serve European Union demand. So I think the idea that you could have a soft exit and that you could have the same kind of benefits from the European single market when you are outside the European Union, I think it's politically and economically extremely unlikely. Professor Cotters. I deal with the first half of your question. It's probably going to matter less in Scotland than probably in any other part of the UK. Essentially because Ruth Davidson, together with the majority of at least her current MSPs, have come out in favour of remain, they are therefore on the same side of defence as all the other principle political parties in Scotland. Given the relative weakness of UKIP north of the border, this is probably not going to be a central issue. Elsewhere, yes, Northern Ireland, because it matches into the unionist national split in Wales because the Conservative party is much more skeptical and UKIP is much stronger and in the English Council elections. Much more broadly, we are now witnessing the quite extraordinary sight of a party leader choosing to hold a referendum on a major divisive issue just at a time when we are about to hold the biggest set of midterm elections during the course of this Parliament leaving aside the open elections. Therefore, what impact the continual representation of Conservative division will have on Conservative support between now and the beginning of May, we don't know, but certainly having had 12 months of witnessing a certain amount of internal strife inside the Labour party, all of a sudden the focus has switched in the opposite direction with unknown consequences electorally. Okay, very quickly, because we are just about at a table. In the sense, you know the answer better than me, but I just think that one thing that might make a difference to what John said is that if the polls get even closer or the Brexit side goes ahead for some of the time, what is the Scottish Labour party's position going to be on independence in the face of Brexit? What is the national UK's position going to be on that? Nicola Sturgeon and the SNP have already said things about, very carefully worded, but they seem to be getting stronger at the moment. I would have thought that it may depend on the polls how much it comes across into those elections. Well, whatever happens, it's going to be another interesting year in politics. Can I thank you very much? We've got the minister in next, so that's why I'm sort of hurrying you along a wee bit because we want to obviously get a view from the Scottish Government too on this matter before we conclude our report, but can I thank you all very much for your written evidence, for your verbal evidence and up until the reports, you know, we're considering a report, I think, next week. If there's anything, you know, last minute that you think we should ensure is in there, please let us know, but thank you so much. And Fabian, thank you again for joining us for Brussels. Thank you very much. I'm going to suspend for about five minutes to allow witnesses to change over a quick comfort break. Good morning and welcome back to the European External Relations Committee. We now move on to agenda item 2, which is our inquiry on EU reform and the impact on Scotland. Our second panel this morning is the minister for European External and International Development, Hamza Yousaf MSP. Good morning minister and welcome back to committee. And with you today, you have Craig Eggner, the head of European Relations Team and the Scottish Government. Minister, we have a very interesting session just before you came in with some very learned and diverse people in the room, so we're looking forward to hearing you. I believe that you have an open statement to give us some of your views. Yes, thank you, convener, and I can't confess to being as enlightening as those scholars because they have really expert knowledge, and I will be certainly listening and replaying the session to hear what they had to say. But thank you very much, convener, as always for inviting me to give evidence today at your inquiry on EU reform and EU referendum. I know that you've taken evidence, as I say, from a wide range of sources, from academics, but also from many other stakeholders about EU reform and intergovernmental relations. The Scottish Government certainly looks forward to your report. Last week, convener, I visited Ireland. I was there, delivered speeches at conferences organised by the Centre for Crossborder Studies in Dundalk, and also gave a speech at the British Irish Chamber of Commerce in Dublin. The EU referendum and the consequences for the UK, if it was to leave the EU, absolutely dominated discussion on Ireland. Bear in mind that there is an election tomorrow, but the issues of the EU referendum eclipsed or almost eclipsed even their own general election due tomorrow. Last weekend, the Prime Minister announced that the referendum will be held, as we know, on 23 June this year. He also announced that he would campaign for the UK's continued membership as a consequence of the deal and the settlement that he secured at European Council on the 19th of February. I don't think that you'll be surprised to hear me say that I'm disappointed that the Prime Minister and the UK Government have chosen to hold the referendum in June so soon after the Scottish elections and also the elections in Wales and Northern Ireland. The referendum will cut across the election campaigns for devolved parliaments. I do not believe that it gives us sufficient time or indeed space to make the positive case for a membership, but I won't dwell too much on that in my opening remarks. In terms of the renegotiation, I'm very pleased that a deal has been struck, but I think that the argument in this discussion is less about the deal itself. It's more important about the fact that the deal allows us to move on to the more substantive arguments about whether or not we should stay within the European Union. Again, the Scottish Government will be campaigning, of course, for the UK to stay within the European Union. I will come to the outcome of the deal in a second, but it's important to say that citizens across the UK will not be voting on the deal. That won't be on the ballot paper, what will be in the ballot paper, as to whether we should leave or remain in terms of our membership with the European Union. I think that there is a risk that all of that is clouded if we look to view the discussion simply through the prism of what the Prime Minister renegotiated. There is much in the package that we would agree with—some, of course, that we wouldn't agree with as well. We support, for example, a competitiveness agenda with its focus on completing the single market and tackling some of that red tape bureaucracy that exists in Europe. On economic governance, we agree that the rights of those countries outside the Eurozone should be protected in EU governance structures, of course, not to the detriment of Eurozone countries. It's important that non-Eurozone countries do not face the costs of bailing out those on the Eurozone. On sovereignty, we note the explosion of the UK from ever closer union secured by the Prime Minister. To be frank, we in the Scottish Government have never interpreted ever closer union to be just a union of countries but a union of peoples. The treaties allow for different paths of integration. I thought that that was a point that was made in Professor Keating's submission, so I'm not clear how this agreement adds beyond singing out the UK for special agreement. While the Scottish Government has some reservations on the inward migration, it's critical to our success and our population growth and our economic productivity for the future that we are able to attract migration to Scotland. EU citizens have greatly contributed to our country, to our society. We know of the studies from UCL and many other studies that have shown that the economic contribution of EU citizens has been substantial. Therefore, a seven-year emergency break or any other measures that would create a disincentive to come to Scotland would be deeply worrying and deeply concerning. On the benefits of membership, we will be making that very positive case. We have to make that positive case in order to remain within the European Union. The vote itself is on an absolute knife edge across the UK. We have seen recent polls that have put it within the margin of error. In fact, over the period from June 2015, our analysis shows that, on average, remain has a small percentage point advantage over leave across the UK, with only 4 per cent. Whereas in Scotland, that is a 20 per cent advantage for remain over leave. We will continue to make the positive case about the economic, social and cultural case to remain within the European Union. That is not to say that we think that the European Union is perfect, convener. We have our own reform agenda, which is shortly to be refreshed. We do think that there will be no surprise to any committee members that we would prefer to have Scotland in the European Union as an independent country in its own right, but in the current constitutional setup, we think that it would be democratically indefensible for Scotland to be dragged outside of the European Union. If it was, then the First Minister has been clear that that could precipitate demand for a second independence referendum. However, let me make it absolutely clear, convener, without any shadow of a doubt, that I want Scotland and the UK to vote to stay within the European Union. Before we get into substantive questions, you opened with your concerns around the date. Can you give us any insight into whether Scotland or even any other devolved nations that are Ireland and Wales had any consultation with the UK Government on the decision to take the date of 23 June? I would say that there was unity amongst the devolved administrations, that a June date would be unwelcome. That was widely publicised. There was a letter that was signed by the First Minister of Scotland, First Minister of Wales, First Minister of Northern Ireland and the Deputy First Minister of Northern Ireland saying that a June referendum would be unwelcome for a number of reasons. Some people have suggested that seven weeks is enough of a gap, but we have already seen in the past week how the news agenda has been completely utterly dominated by this issue of the European Union. Perhaps even the internal politics within one political party is opposed to the wider issues. That may or may not continue, but if it was to continue, that level of media dominance of my own canvassing sessions, as we all have been doing, knocking those undoubtedly, we have had this issue come up in the doorstep, which is a good thing, because people are talking about it. However, it means that if it continues at that pace with that level of media dominance, first of all that could interfere with our own Scottish election campaign, where we want to be talking and all parties and all politicians will be wanting to talk about the health service or we want to talk about education, about the justice system and so on and so forth. There is also potential interference, of course, because of the fact that there are certain statutory actions that the UK Government has to take. Some of those would interfere directly in the timescale of Scottish elections, for example the 10-week period whereby the UK Government would have to report the outcome and what progress it has made on the UK's renegotiation. That would be at the time to release that information would be around the time when postal ballots are coming out for the Scottish election. There is clear interference within our own elections, as well as the political agenda being completely and utterly dominated by the EU issue, and therefore perhaps focus is being taken away. If we want to make the positive case about Europe, that makes it quite difficult if we cannot have a substantial conversation about the European Union, whereas, as I say, any politician in Scotland will be talking about other issues quite rightly to do with the Scottish election. A great amount of difficulty with that date is no consultation. We certainly gave our view, but there was no substantial and meaningful consultation on why that date would not be suitable. Do you think that the economic governance and competitiveness—two of the points that were raised by the Prime Minister—will bring any benefit to the Scottish economy? I thank the member for the question. It was some opening remarks, and I hope that I made it clear that there are certainly parts of the Prime Minister's and the UK's renegotiation that I would agree with. Again, we are looking through the detail and what the actual practical implications will be of what the Prime Minister has managed to renegotiate. However, certainly on economic governance and the competitiveness agenda, I think that there is a lot of advantage there to be had for the UK and, indeed, for Scotland. Scotland, Edinburgh, in particular, with its financial centre, can be greatly important in terms of competitiveness, as well as being clear that the EU should focus on some very important competitiveness agendas, such as the digital single market and the energy union, which I think is incredibly important. I can see certainly some advantage for Scotland. I am not convinced that we had to go through the process that the Prime Minister took us through in terms of renegotiation. We had to have a referendum on the back of that, but in terms of the deal, at those points, the Scottish Government has a lot of agreement with. I have already mentioned sovereignty. I am not convinced that we had to have the singling out of the UK's special treatment from our cross-union, and I have already mentioned how, on freedom of movement and the fourth basket in terms of in-work benefits, the Scottish Government does have some concern. However, certainly in the economic governance and competitiveness, I am happy to say that I am sure that there should be, if, once we see the practical implication of this policy, there should be some benefit for Scotland. I am coming from the same position as yourself in that I would prefer that Scotland and the UK stay in. If they did come out, do you consider that there is any viable alternative to EU membership for Scotland, i.e. after or another organisation like that? I would agree with many others who have made the statement that the Norwegian foreign minister probably got it right, former foreign minister, when he rightly said that he paid but had no say when he was talking about his own country's model. Of course, there are other models to explore—the Norwegian and the Swiss, the Icelandic model, but none of them at all give you the same representation. However, of course, you still have to pay, contribute and still abide by many of the rules and the legislation. I think that any other model that has been explored and Westminster committees have explored those models. I think that this committee has indeed had some discussion about other models. Many other politicians have explored them, but I think that nothing gives you the same quality of representation. However, you are still having to pay. In the event of leaving, has any thought been given as to how things like CAP subsidies would come through or rather be replaced? It is interesting that the UK Government Department for Energy and Climate Change said that there had not been any discussions on their behalf on what would happen to CAP payments if there was a Brexit. Our line has always been that we are campaigning very positively so that Scotland and the UK stay within the European Union. Of course, we will always be scenario planning and we will always be ensuring that we put Scottish interests first, but we will absolutely be working on the premise and campaigning hard for not just Scotland but the rest of the UK to stay within the European Union. In the previous session, we were talking a little bit about the impact that the media might play in the campaign. In fact, the campaign will probably have nothing to do with the deal that Mr Cameron negotiated, and it will touch on a whole range of wider issues out with that. Largely, we are driven by the media. We have some experience in Scotland on the relentless negativity of the media, so to count on that, what would the Scottish Government's aims be in that regard and how do you plan to articulate the positive case for Scotland and the UK remaining in the union and how would you plan to set that out so that the public can easily access and understand that? The member for the question. I think that the media would probably say that they are driven by relentless negativity of politicians as much as we are driven by their relentless negativity, because the real concern, I would say to Mr Coffey, is that this entire debate is viewed through the prism of migration. That has been what the UK Government has often talked about, it is what the media, as you rightly say, suggests that I talk about, and I know, certainly again from my experience, when the EU is brought up to me on the doorstep, it is largely around the agenda and the issue of migration, and that would be deeply concerned, because although we can make very positive arguments for migration, I think that the narrative that is being set by the media will be very difficult to counter. We will do our very best to do that, so what we will try to do from a Scottish Government perspective is first of all be honest in this debate, so do not descend into the pit of negativity, as we often saw, as you said, through previous referendum and Scottish independence. I think that we will make a positive case, but that involves being honest. In a single look, the UK, if it was to leave the European Union, of course it could still trade with France and Germany and Spain, but our point is a very simple one. The EU has 53 trade agreements, and the UK would have to renegotiate all 53 again. Renegotiating 53 trade agreements as a medium-sized country is very different to the terms that you might get if you renegotiate as a largest trading bloc in the world. Pointing out some of those realities will be really, really important, but I think that also making the positive case about how the European Union shapes people's everyday lives. Not just a macroeconomics, which is important—we have access to 500 million customers and consumers, 20 million businesses—doesn't necessarily mean too much to people in their everyday lives, but things like social protections are really, really important. People's fact that nobody will be forced to work more than 40 hours a week, the fact that maternity pay and paternity pay is guaranteed within European legislation, the fact that anti-discrimination legislation is enshrined within European Union law and the fact that, if we are removed from that, those safeguards are only in the hands of an unfettered UK Government, regardless of which colour that UK Government is. I am making the argument about social protections, but what you might call the microeconomics is what would affect people in their everyday lives and their everyday pockets, the fact that, by mid-2017, it won't cost you a penny to make mobile phone calls between one European country and the next. That means something to people when they go to Olodyd in Tenerife, or whether they go to Paris, or whether they go to Munich or Berlin. Those two airlines only exist because of EU deregulation. I think that it is making the positive case on a very micro-level, a very macro-level, but also challenging some of the misconceptions about migration, but also being very, very honest in this debate and being positive, I think, will be how we will try to counter that. We have the benefits of EU membership booklet, which many members here probably will have seen. Again, we are refreshing that, but it is a pretty simple and easy to understand guide. I think that it is one that we should make sure that it gets out to as many people in Scotland as possible. Some people may think that leaving the European Union suddenly frees the UK from all obligations and costs and so on. In the previous session, we discussed the issue of continued access to the single market. In a prior session to this, the Norwegian officials explained to us that it costs their country €70 per head to maintain that. Now, a quick calculation for the UK would take that to about £4 billion a year. That is what you still have to pay to be not a member of the club, but you have to pay, but you have no say, as you explained earlier, Minister. Do you think that that kind of issue will be clear enough to people who are tempted to leave the European Union thinking that they will gain all those savings when, in fact, they will not? I think that the challenge will be that, for those who believe in European Union membership, such as myself and most of the people around the table, it is difficult to find a very pithy sweet soundbite. Paul Tyson is obviously very good at those, but it is very difficult to find those pithy soundbites for continued European Union membership, because it is a very nuanced argument. It is a very nuanced discussion. It is one that involves and requires quite a fair bit of articulation. For the other side who want to leave, throwing around simple soundbites is quite easy, so that will be one of the challenges. Your Norwegian official and yourself are absolutely correct to say that we would have to still continue to pay, but we would not have so much of a say. The other thing that was mentioned to me by Northern Irish officials, which I thought was a fairly good point, was that even if the UK was to leave and that money was to come back into the UK Treasury, for regions such as Northern Ireland and Scotland who benefit more from European funds, is there a guarantee that the UK Treasury would disembush those funds in a way that the European Union would, in a way that Northern Ireland would get more money, but Scotland would get more money and so on and so forth? I am not convinced that that would be the case. Even if the UK Treasury got the money back, there is no guarantee that it would disembush in a way that it was fair as it was when we were in the European Union. Just on that point, minister, I know that the Rural Committee has been looking at this very, very closely, but to illustrate the point that was made about whether the disembushment of moneys would be fair and equitable in that respect, the UK got a very generous funding formula for the common agricultural policy payment, based on the challenges that Scottish health farmers face. However, when that money came to the UK Government, it then was not disembursed on that basis. It was shared equally, which then put those health farmers who were the justification for that more generous funding in a pretty challenging situation. Given that as an illustration, I do not know whether you are aware of any other areas around European structural funds or European social funding or any of the elements that have an impact on the social union, which for me is the most important part of the year. People forget that we have had 60 years' worth of peace and 60 years' worth of capacity building. The Northern Island peace agreement is a key aspect of that. There is a whole area that I think is unexplored, and I know that the economic argument may be the most forceful argument, but the social argument I think for me is the most precious. I entirely agree, convene, for my generation and your generation too, that we do not necessarily—we went brought up with this notion of out of the ashes of war in this construct and actually it has served us. We take peace for granted in our generation, and that might be different in Northern Ireland certainly, but I think in Scotland and probably England and no doubt Wales, we probably take peace for granted. Forgetting, of course, that before the European Union, before the United Nations, we faced two world wars that annihilated populations. Millions of people, not tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands, millions of people lost their lives in those two world wars. It is a remarkable achievement that in the European continent there has not been that level of conflict thereafter. Yes, there have been conflicts and, of course, we are aware of what is happening between Ukraine and Russia, but generally on the continent, that level and that scale of war and conflict has not been seen. That is an incredible achievement and a lot of people scoffed when the European Union won a Nobel Peace Prize. I can understand why some people were concerned at that, but I think that it was fairly warranted and merited if you consider that achievement over the course of the past 60 years. Your point, convener, about the cat payments, I think, is very well made. 2014-2020, €4.6 billion will be disembursed to farmers. Is there an absolute assurance from the UK Government that that money would come to Scottish farmers in the event of the UK leaving the European Union? We have not seen that agreement. We have not had that confirmation from the UK Government. Would they be able to tie in future UK Governments up until that point? I do not know. I think that that point is well made. The third point that you made is absolutely right. We do not often talk about the social. We will certainly do this in government, but I would love to be able to speak to all the communities that have been affected positively by European structural funds and other European money, because it is a heck of a lot of projects that are a lot of good. Just in the Parliament this week, we had the 40th birthday, and I signed the card for the Princess Trust. They have received European Union funding for a number of years now, and that has helped young people into work, given young people confidence, and helped them in their educational capacity as well. That work that they do would not have been possible without some European funding. Even at a very small level, there are stories to be told in every community in Scotland. The Smith commission made a reference to improving into government structures. I do not know if you could give us an update on how that is working so far, and the extent to which you might be able to highlight that kind of issue in the context of the EU referendum debate. I think that the question is an excellent one. When it comes to sovereignty, which has been much talked about, the red card system and other things that have been mentioned, often they are talked about in relation to national parliaments, bringing sovereignty to national parliaments, but we would unsurprisingly make the case that devolved parliaments should also be considered in those discussions. How can we have a greater say in what is happening in the European Union? How can we seek and redress? How can we articulate those areas where we are particularly uncomfortable with and show our opposition to particular measures, as opposed to just national parliaments? I would be unsurprising to you that we have been pushing that case and other devolved administrations have been pushing that case. In terms of inter-governmental relations, there are many pieces of work going on and ever-evolving pieces of work with the UK Government and other devolved administrations. I think that it would be fair to say that, being on JMC, the joint ministerial committee in Europe, for the last few years, that it is a forum that I think definitely could work better. It is a bit formulaic at times. It is a bit set-piece at times. I think that there is an understanding of that, so there are officials who are doing work in the background at the moment again between the UK Government and devolved administrations to see how we can and devolve Governments to see how we can make that better. There are also some other conversations happening with other inter-governmental forums. I know that two British Irish Council would be another one where there is often talk about how that can be refreshed, how it can work better for all of the stakeholders that are involved. That is an ever-evolving conversation, but devolved parliaments have a job to do within any renegotiation to ensure that there will be a part of that conversation. I know that the white paper that was just produced by the UK Government makes mention of the fact that, when it comes to renegotiation, the UK Government will endeavour to discuss that with the devolved parliaments and Governments, and we will certainly be taking them up on that. In the previous session, we had talked about the impact that the EU referendum might have on the Scottish election without being partisan about it. What are your fears or what are your hopes in that respect? I will never be partisan when I come in front of the committee, but I would say that there is a genuine concern that we have really important issues. We can go one of two ways. The issues that we wish to discuss during the Scottish election are very important issues that affect people's everyday lives. I have mentioned some of them already in crime, education, health and so on and so forth. They are really important agendas. They are completely subsumed, diluted or completely overshadowed by the EU referendum. Every time people in Scotland are turning on their news, their debates, whatever it is, it is all dominated by the EU. Considering the fact that there will probably be debates between the leave campaign and the remain campaign, will they dominate any debates or overshadow any debates that will take place between the Scottish leaders of all the political parties and so on? It could go that way. That is one way it could go. The other way is the complete opposite, of course. The other way it could go is that the EU discussion in Scotland just does not get the attention that it deserves because we are obviously in election mode. Everybody will be speaking about those issues, about the Scottish election quite rightly. Therefore, the EU issue does not get the substantial time and attention that it deserves. Either way is a loss. Either way, it is not good for either our Scottish parliamentary elections or it is not good for the EU referendum. Then you will get the worst of both worlds, to coin a phrase, that nobody will get a substantial discussion on the Scottish election, nobody will get a substantial discussion on the EU referendum and therefore both our electorate is not informed fully about the issues on both elections. I think that that could be the worst of both. That is part of the reason why we have consensus. Then there is the obvious, the other points that I made in terms of the actual EU bill. There are some statutory requirements that the UK Government has to fulfil and they would very much interfere in the timeframe. There would then be the issue of Pardor as well. I mean, we go into our Pardor dissolution period on the 23rd, the end of the 24th technically of March. Once we do that, of course, then once we come back into government and the Government is reappointed to whatever government that is, there would then be another further Pardor period after that. Effectively, you could have 10 plus weeks of Pardor and that is just not helpful. I talk about even more than 10 weeks of Pardor and that obviously is not very helpful and could grind government or slow government down, which is again not what any of us would want. In 2011, the Scottish Government ministers were not appointed to the 25th of May, which means that Pardor would start on the 26th of May. What kind of challenges would that pose an incoming Government? It creates a lot of difficulties. The point is well made in the question, convener, but it does not mean that the Government would not be able to do anything or could not do anything. It would not be absolutely restricted, of course, but it is certainly an important European matter, which, as the committee has already discussed, affects farmers and fishermen. It affects organisations up and down the country in terms of European social funds. It affects academic institutions. It affects a whole wide berth of society. It could be affected by it. It is really not helpful having our own Scottish Parliament elections and having Pardor after that as well. For those reasons and many other reasons, it was right that the First Minister of all the devolved parliaments and devolved nations were opposed to a June referendum, but we have it, so we are just going to have to find a way of getting on with it. It may be 24 hours to sort everything out. It may be a bit of a stretch for any Government. Just on that point, minister, does that mean that there will not be any Scottish ministers making proclamations about the referendum election or the referendum date, because the Pardor, for ministers and not having ministers in place, will be in place leading up to the referendum? There will not be any Scottish ministers, in other words? No. The Pardor rules would not prevent the First Minister from appointing a Government, however, the First Minister may well be, so he or she would be able to appoint a new Government. When they come in, I cannot see any reason why they would not be able to appoint that Government. The Pardor rules would apply in and around questions of Europe. Other Government pronouncements and discussions could be had, but perhaps I am not understanding the questions rule. The only reason I make that point is that, in 2011, the Scottish ministers were not appointed 28-day Pardor period in advance of the referendum would start on the 26th of May. That would surely take us over the deadline to the 23rd of June, wouldn't it? No, what I meant was that they would not stop the Government from appointing ministers. What they could not do and what ministers would be restricted from doing would be making particular pronouncements about the European referendum that were not already in the public domain. The same way that our Pardor works in the Scottish Parliament, the Scottish Government ministers are still Scottish Government ministers, even during the Pardor period. You cease to become an MSP but you do not cease to become a minister of the Government. Therefore, you can reiterate those lines that are already a minister in the public domain. What you can't be doing is creating new policy, new announcements and, as I say, anything that is not in the public domain as a Government minister we wouldn't be able to do in the Pardor period. However, there are other challenges as well with that. During the 23rd date, as I say, we would be going from one Pardor period straight into another. The point is a fair one. It may well cause whichever Government comes in post, may be the fifth, and may well cause an urgency that previously was not there during the 23rd period. Minister, you mentioned that you had been in discussion with your Irish colleagues last week. Outside of Scotland, perhaps the greatest impact on the UK leaving the European Union might be felt in Ireland and the implications for the peace process and, in particular, the common travel area on the border. Can you tell us a wee bit about what the Irish concerns were and how we might help to move forward with that in the debate? I mean, I think I completely underestimated how big an issue this was in Ireland. I knew it was an issue, but until I arrived there and spent a couple of days there and took part in the panel debates and discussions I did, but even having private conversations with business people and with others, this is a huge issue for the Irish Government. I think that that's demonstrated by the fact that during the Scottish independence referendum the Irish Government was absolutely studiously neutral and did not make a pronouncement. Either way, we are very, very careful and measured in their pronouncements and saying that this is a matter for the Scottish people, etc, etc, but they have been very vocal already in this issue of the EU referendum, because it does affect them or the implications could potentially affect them in the event of the UK leaving the European Union. There are a few concerns that they had. One is obviously the cross-border issue. It is an absolute and quite right to see it as incredible progress that you can drive between Northern Ireland and the Republic, and you don't even know you've passed through a border necessarily. There's a speed bump on the road and that's better. There's no checkposts and no guards on the border. Their genuine concern is what would happen, but would there have to be a physical border? I'm not advocating that that would be the case, simply some of the concerns that were brought up from those in Ireland was that would we go back, would we be regressing backwards to a point where you would have to have some sort of border there between Northern Ireland and Ireland? Again, I don't make any assumptions on that, I'm just saying that's one of the concerns that were raised. And also then the peace process, again, that you mentioned and the Good Friday agreement and so on and so forth. However, I would make the point that the Irish concerns shouldn't be viewed again through the prism of just the Northern Irish relationship. They're deeply concerned about a UK exit from the EU because of what it would mean with this relationship with the rest of the UK as well, and trade being the obvious point, but also just a cultural relationship. In terms of the common travel area, I suppose the fair remark on that would be that common travel area existed before, free movement, before Shingon, before anything like that existed, so the common travel area existed around about 23, 19, 23, so there would have to be adjustments, I'm sure, but there could be a discussion about how that may well be continued. But the real concern is about the relationship with the rest of the UK and then the cross-border issue with Northern Ireland, but it's a massive issue there in Ireland. As I say, the relations are on Friday, and the Government may well take a matter of weeks to be appointed, depending on the election result. However, I'm sure that once it's appointed, absolutely, it will be quite vocal on some of its concerns around the European Union. I would say that I've often been asked what I think about European Union member states intervening in the UK's discussion, and I've often said, even publicly, that I don't think it will be particularly helpful having Brussels officials or even other member states necessarily telling people in the UK which way to vote. I think that there would be a backlash to that, but the exception would probably, in my opinion, be the Irish. I've often said that I think that the Irish are viewed, particularly in Scotland, I can't speak for other parts of the UK, but the Irish are being very favourably viewed with a lot of affection, seen as our cousins, and the advice is genuine and sincere advice. I think that you'll hear the Irish speak out quite loudly about this issue once their elections are out of the way and once a Government is formed. Just a final point, minister. I'm looking east from Ireland and maybe if any of your other communications with other European member states, and I understand what you're saying about, wouldn't it be helpful for other people to express to us which way we should vote? However, we heard from Fabian Zuleig earlier, who had said that there is some serious pressures between the UK's relationship with the other member states and that this deal is like a once that's it, no more Britain will have had enough sort of an attitude coming from other member states. I'm just wondering if you've picked up any of that and what the Scottish Government's reaction to that would be? Yes, I think that the UK is seen as a regerging partner of this institution, the European Union, and I think that even the Prime Minister has insinuated as much that they see it as very much a pragmatic and practical relationship as opposed to one that they are necessarily engaged in positively. I think that that's fair enough to have that view. It's stiffened to mine, but it's fair enough to have that view. During the whole renegotiation process, I certainly picked up and I won't name the member states at all, but certainly there was a number of member states that we spoke to, whether they were permanent representatives or embassies. Who did to express concern that the UK had already had a significant number of opt-outs, has a rebate, how much more does it want, how committed is it? There were certainly some countries who said, look, the renegotiation will engage constructively, but we certainly won't do that at any cost. There were some real red lines, and obviously the Prime Minister came across those red lines and therefore things were renegotiated in the spirit of compromise. I couldn't comment whether or not this is the last renegotiation we'll ever see or whether the European Union and the UK's relationship will continue to evolve, but I think that it's time that the UK Government started to realise that some of the real benefits and positive opportunities that could be captured if we play a real positive and engaged role within the European Union. Of course, we are already a power broker. We are one of the significant players within the European Union, but we should be using that in a positive way instead of always whinging and always mourning about what could be better. Reform is important, but what about the opportunity that could be had if we made Europe work for the citizens a little bit better? I think that the other European Union member states that there would be no exaggeration to say that every single one of them wants the UK to stay within the European Union. They believe—I think that they are right to believe—that the European Union is stronger for having the UK in it as well as the UK being stronger for being within the European Union. Just on that whole aspect of the UK and its opt-outs and its renegotiations, do you think that the UK's behaviour in all of this in some other countries who are pushing much further to the right domestic policy and pushing again some of the social policies that I think are the best part of the European Union? Do you think that that might give some countries—because there is a bit of a school of thought that it would give some countries a push to enable them to push forward with some of their more sort of discriminatory policies or ideals? I would be reluctant to speculate on that, convener. Obviously, the current UK Government has allies with other governments, particularly those on the centre-right of European politics, but I think that the general point that I would like to make on that is that that is why I prefer to have the social protections protected by an EU that is made up of governments in the centre-left and governments in the centre-right and by its very nature. Therefore, the compromise often has to be somewhere around the middle, whereas if we were to leave those social protections unfettered in the hands of a UK Government and successive UK Governments, I believe, in my opinion, have been much more on the centre-right whether they were red or whether they were blue on the centre-right of the spectrum. Therefore, leaving those social protections and noting the hands of an unfettered UK Government carries great dangers. However, I think that the UK has, of course, natural allies. There are many countries who take a very different view to the UK. I think that they are well documented that they have big differences with the UK in terms of integration and so on and so forth. However, we have a deal there. I do not agree with everything. The Scottish Government does not agree with everything, but we certainly do not want to harp on about the renegotiation deal. We just want to get on with making the positive case, with making a case that Scotland's interests are best served within the European Union. The European Union is stronger for having a UK in it, but if we get the EU to work better for us, we can have a more prosperous and more socially just and a more economically viable European Union for all its citizens. That is what the European Union should be about. It should not be just about raising the votes, as the Irish call it, for just some of the people on the top. It should be about raising everybody. That is what we will be aiming to deliver between now and June 23 and no doubt beyond. Okay. Thank you very much. Minister, that concludes our evidence with you this morning. Can we thank you for coming along and wish you well in your endeavours? I am going to suspend very briefly. Welcome back. Our gender item 3 this morning is a series of different reports from the Scottish Government. We have a report on horizon 2020, the Scottish Government's 1 plus 2 language learning policy, the Scottish Government's transposition of EU directives and the European structural and investment funds. Any comments or questions? On the very last page of the letter on European structural and investment funds, it touches on an issue that committee members have raised over the period about some kind of summary of money that comes from the European Union to various projects in Scotland. I just found the letter a wee bit tricky to get to grips with. Is it possible to get this summarised in some kind of tabular form so that we can see the different categories in different amounts? I would make it a lot easier to do that. Thank you very much. Any other comments or questions on any of the reports? The only thing that I would draw your attention to is the same letter that Mr Coffey has just been speaking about in the very last sentence on the first page. The commission is reviewing its findings about and controlling what an entity is. An audit visit to the Scottish Government to allow them to conclude on whether to lift a suspension. We will update the committee once we know the position, which was mid-Febru, so I am suggesting that we contact the Scottish Government and ask them for that update. Just one point that I noticed that Wales gets 2.5 per cent and Scotland only gets 1.65 per cent of the 2020 funding. I wonder why that was. Wales has got a smaller population than Scotland. We can interrogate that figure and find out. Okay, happy to note the reports pending the agreements that were made. Okay, thank you very much. Agenda item 4 is moving on to our Brussels bulletin. Comments, questions and clarifications. Just to take us to the equal opportunities page and gender equality. I have highlighted some of the MEPs who have seen that as a downgraded document, which restricts the duration of the proposed action. Can we ensure that we send them to committees, do not we? Yeah, yeah, yeah. So the equal opportunities will have access to this. But we can inform them specifically about that section and about that report. Yeah, thank you very much. Yeah, we can do that specifically. We do that on the number of occasions we committee, so happy to do that. Anything else? Rod Campbell. A couple of things I just wanted to highlight. I was pleased to note that the European Parliament had, presumably at debates, adopted a resolution on the review of the the biodiversity strategy calling in particular for better implementation and financing for birds and habitats directive and also called upon the commission not to revise the nature directives. So I think that's a positive move and I'm pleased that that has been addressed at the European level and I noticed also kind of the debate on sexual harassment and violence against women. So and the reiteration of their call for an EU directive on combating violence against women, which seemed to me certainly worth certainly worth looking at. Yeah, thank you. Jimmy. Just on the agricultural policy priorities, which under the Netherlands presidency it says they're sharing member states experiences on the most recent common agricultural policy reform. Will you yourself mention convergence, which I think is an issue? And the other issue is that, I mean, I think if you asked, I mean just generally that it has been disastrous for so far for Scottish farmers and, you know, for the reasons for that should be explained, but, you know, if we're going to share experiences, that's an experience that should be shared because it shouldn't happen again. Yeah, we'll get the Dutch ambassador in front of us next week so we could have a conversation about all the points that you've raised. Yeah. Yeah. Okay. Okay, anything else, Willie? Thanks, community. I could just refer to page eight there. There's an issue there about data protection. It talks about an agreement between the European Union and the United States on data transfers and data protection and privacy. It's not entirely clear to me what kind of data we're talking about here and just what the protections actually are. It talks about three-step dispute resolutions and it all sounds horribly familiar in terms of TTIP in the kind of debates that arise from that. We heard at a previous committee convener that there was some concerns within Europe about data security issues and how unprepared that they thought they were for this. So, with that in mind, I would appreciate further information about this, exactly what it means and what the implications of it are. Yeah, we can do that for you. Yeah. Okay. I'm happy to draw the Brussels Reliton to the Tension of Oliver committee's the Parliament with a specific reference to the Equal Opportunities Committee. Yeah. Thank you very much. I think that that is possibly us finished or public section of the committee this morning. I now suspend to go into private. Thank you.