Section 1 of An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding by David Hume. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer visit LibriVox.org. This reading by Karl Manchester 2007. An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding by David Hume. Section 1 of The Different Species of Philosophy 1. Moral philosophy or the science of human nature may be treated after two different manners, each of which has its peculiar merit and may contribute to the entertainment, instruction and reformation of mankind. The one considers man chiefly as born for action and is influenced in his measures by taste and sentiment, pursuing one object and avoiding another according to the value which these objects seem to possess and according to the light in which they present themselves. As virtue of all objects is allowed to be the most valuable, this species of philosophers paint her in the most amiable colours, borrowing all helps from poetry and eloquence and treating their subject in an easy and obvious manner and such as is best fitted to please the imagination and engage the affections. They select the most striking observations and instances from common life place opposite characters in a proper contrast and alluring us into the paths of virtue by the views of glory and happiness, direct our steps in these paths by the soundest precepts and most illustrious examples. They make us feel the difference between vice and virtue. They excite and regulate our sentiments and so they can but bend our hearts to the love of probity and true honour they think that they have fully attained the end of all their labours. 2. The other species of philosophers consider man in the light of a reasonable rather than an active being and endeavor to form his understanding more than cultivate his manners. They regard human nature as a subject of speculation and with a narrow scrutiny and examine it in order to find those principles which regulate our understanding excite our sentiments and make us approve or blame any particular object action or behaviour. They think it a reproach to all literature that philosophy should not yet have fixed beyond controversy the foundation of morals reasoning and criticism and should forever talk of truth and falsehood vice and virtue beauty and deformity without being able to determine the source of these distinctions. While they attempt this arduous task they are deterred by no difficulties but proceeding from particular instances to general principles they still push on their inquiries to principles more general and rest not satisfied till they arrive at those original principles by which in every science all human curiosity must be bounded. Though their speculation seem abstract and even unintelligible to common readers they aim at the approbation of the learned and the wise and think themselves sufficiently compensated for the labour of their whole lives if they can discover some hidden truths which may contribute to the instruction of posterity. 3. It is certain that the easy and obvious philosophy will always with the generality of mankind have the preference above the accurate and abstruse and by many will be recommended not only as more agreeable but more useful than the other. It enters more into common life moulds the heart and affections and by touching those principles which actuate men reforms their conduct and brings them nearer to that model of perfection which it describes. On the contrary the abstruse philosophy being founded on a turn of mind which cannot enter into business and action vanishes when the philosopher leaves the shade and comes into open day. Nor can its principles easily retain any influence over our conduct and behaviour. The feelings of our heart, the agitation of our passions, the vehemence of our affections dissipate all its conclusions and reduce the profound philosopher to a mere plebeian. 4. This also must be confessed that the most durable as well as justice fame has been acquired by the easy philosophy and that abstract reasoners seem hitherto to have enjoyed only a momentary reputation from the caprice or ignorance of their own age but have not been able to support their renown with more equitable posterity. It is easy for a profound philosopher to commit a mistake in his subtle reasonings and one mistake is the necessary parent of another while he pushes on his consequences and is not deterred from embracing any conclusion by its unusual appearance or its contradiction to popular opinion. But a philosopher who purposes only to present the common sense of mankind in more beautiful and more engaging colours, if by accident he falls into error goes no farther but renewing his appeal to common sense and the natural sentiments of the mind returns into the right path and secures himself from any dangerous illusions. The fame of Cicero flourishes at present but that of Aristotle is utterly decayed. La Bruyère passes the seas and still maintains his reputation but the glory of Malabranche is confined to his own nation and to his own age and Addison perhaps will be read with pleasure when Locke shall be entirely forgotten. The mere philosopher is a character which is commonly but little acceptable in the world as being supposed to contribute nothing either to the advantage or pleasure of society while he lives remote from communication with mankind and is wrapped up in principles and notions equally remote from their comprehension. On the other hand, the mere ignorant is still more despised nor is anything deemed a sure sign of an illiberal genius in an age and nation where the sciences flourish than to be entirely destitute of all relish for those noble entertainments. The most perfect character is supposed to lie between those extremes retaining an equalability and taste for books, company and business preserving in conversation that discernment and delicacy which arises from polite letters and in business that probity and accuracy which are the natural result of a just philosophy. In order to diffuse and cultivate so accomplished a character nothing can be more useful than compositions of the easy style and manner which draw not too much from life, require no deep application or retreat to be comprehended and send back the student among mankind full of noble sentiments and wise precepts applicable to every exigence of human life. By means of such compositions virtue becomes amiable, science agreeable, company instructive and retirement entertaining. Man is a reasonable being and as such receives from science his proper food and nourishment. But so narrow are the bounds of human understanding that little satisfaction can be hoped for in this particular either from the extent of security or his acquisitions. Man is a sociable no less than a reasonable being but neither can he always enjoy company agreeable and amusing or preserve the proper relish for them. Man is also an active being and from that disposition as well as from the various necessities of human life must submit to business and occupation. But the mind requires some relaxation and cannot always support its bent to care and industry. It seems then that nature has pointed out a mixed kind of life as most suitable to the human race and secretly admonished them to allow none of these biases to draw too much so as to incapacitate them for other occupations in entertainment. Indulge your passion for science says she but let your science be human and such as may have a direct reference to action and society. A truce thought and profound researches I prohibit and will severely punish by the pensive melancholy which they introduce by the endless uncertainty in which they involve you and by the cold reception which your pretended discoveries shall meet with when communicated. Be a philosopher but amidst all your philosophy be still a man. 5. Were the generality of mankind contented to prefer the easy philosophy to the abstract and profound without throwing any blame or contempt on the latter it might not be improper perhaps to comply with this general opinion and allow every man to enjoy without opposition his own taste and sentiment but as the matter is often carried farther even to the absolute rejecting of all profound reasonings or what is commonly called metaphysics which will now proceed to consider what can reasonably be pleaded in their behalf. We may begin with observing that one considerable advantage which results from the accurate and abstract philosophy is its subservience to the easy and humane which without the former can never attain a sufficient degree of exactness in its sentiments, presets or reasonings. All polite letters are nothing but pictures of human life in various attitudes and situations and inspire us with different sentiments of praise or blame admiration or ridicule according to the qualities of the object which they set before us. An artist must be better qualified to succeed in this undertaking who besides a delicate taste and a quick apprehension possesses an accurate knowledge of the internal fabric the operations of the understanding the workings of the passions and the various species of sentiment which discriminate vice and virtue. How painful so ever this inward search or inquiry may appear it becomes in some measure requisite to those who would describe with success the obvious and outward appearances of life and manners. The anatomist presents to the eye the most hideous and disagreeable objects but his science is useful to the painter in delineating even a Venus or an Helen. While the latter employs all the richest colors of his art and gives his figures the most graceful and engaging airs he must still carry his attention to the inward structure of the human body, the position of the muscles, the fabric of the bones and the use and figure of every part or organ. Accuracy is in every case advantageous to beauty and just reasoning to delicate sentiment. In vain would we exalt the one by depreciating the other. Besides we may observe in every art or profession even those which most concern life or action that a spirit of accuracy however acquired carries all of them nearer their perfection and renders them more subservient to the interests of society. And though a philosopher may live remote from business the genius of philosophy if carefully cultivated by several must gradually diffuse itself throughout the whole society and bestow a similar correctness on every art and calling. The politician will acquire greater foresight and subtlety in the subdividing and balancing of power. The lawyer more method and finer principles in his reasonings and the general more regularity in his discipline and more caution in his plans and operations. The stability of modern governments above the ancient and the accuracy of modern philosophy have improved and probably will still improve by similar gradations. 6. Were there no advantage to be reaped from these studies beyond the gratification of an innocent curiosity yet ought not even this to be despised as being one accession to those few safe and harmless pleasures which are bestowed on human race. The sweetest and most inoffensive path of life leads through the avenues of science and learning and whoever can either remove any obstructions in this way or open up any new prospect ought so far to be esteemed a benefactor to mankind. And though these researches may appear painful and fatiguing it is with some minds as with some bodies which being endowed with vigorous and florid health require severe exercise and reap a pleasure from what to the generality of mankind may seem burdensome and laborious. Obscurity indeed is painful to the mind as well as to the eye but to bring light from obscurity by whatever labour must needs be delightful and rejoicing. But this obscurity in the profound and abstract philosophy is objected to not only as painful and fatiguing but as the inevitable source of uncertainty and error. Here indeed lies the justice and most plausible objection against a considerable part of metaphysics that they are not properly a science but arise either from the fruitless efforts of human vanity which would penetrate into subjects utterly inaccessible to the understanding or from the craft of popular superstitions which being unable to defend themselves on fair ground raise these entangling brambles to cover and protect their weaknesses. Chased from the open country these robbers fly into the forest and lie in wait to break upon every unguarded avenue of the mind and overwhelm it with religious fears and prejudices. The stoutest antagonist if he remit his watcher moment is oppressed and many through cowardice and folly open the gates to the enemies and willingly receive them with reverence and submission as their legal sovereigns. 7. But is this a sufficient reason why philosophers should desist from such researchers and leave superstition still in possession of her retreat? Is it not proper to draw an opposite conclusion and perceive the necessity of carrying the war into the most secret recesses of the enemy? In vain do we hope that men from frequent disappointment would at last abandon such airy sciences and discover the proper province of human reason. For besides, that many persons find too sensible an interest in perpetually recalling such topics, besides this, I say, the motive of blind despair can never reasonably have place in the sciences since, however unsuccessful former attempts may have proved, there is still room to hope that the industry, good fortune or improved suggestivity of succeeding generations may reach discoveries unknown to former ages. Each adventurous genius will still leap at the arduous prize and find himself stimulated rather than discouraged by the failures of his predecessors while he hopes that the glory of achieving so hard an adventure is reserved for him alone. The only method of freeing learning at once from these obtuse questions is to inquire seriously into the nature of human understanding and show, from an exact analysis of its powers and capacity, that it is by no means fitted for such remote and obtuse subjects. We must submit to this fatigue in order to live at ease ever after, and must cultivate true metaphysics with some care in order to destroy the false and agilirate. Indolence, which to some persons affords a safeguard against this deceitful philosophy is, with others, overbalanced by curiosity, and despair, which at some moments prevails, may give place afterwards to sanguine hopes and expectations. Accurate and just reasoning is the only Catholic remedy fitted for all persons and all dispositions, and is alone able to subvert that obtuse philosophy and metaphysical jargon, which, being mixed up with popular superstition, renders it in a manner unpenetrable to careless reasoners, and gives it the air of science and wisdom. 8. Besides this advantage of rejecting, after deliberate inquiry, the most uncertain and disagreeable part of learning, there are many positive advantages which result from an accurate scrutiny into the powers and faculties of human nature. It is remarkable concerning the operations of the mind that though most intimately present to us, yet whenever they become the object of reflection, they seem involved in obscurity, nor can the eye readily find those lines and boundaries which discriminate and distinguish them. The objects are too fine to remain long in the same aspect or situation and must be apprehended in an instance by a superior penetration derived from nature and improved by habit and reflection. It becomes, therefore, no inconsiderable part of science, barely to know the different operations of the mind to separate them from each other, to class them under their proper heads and to correct all that seeming disorder in which they lie involved when made the object of reflection and inquiry. This talk of ordering and distinguishing, which has no merit when performed with regard to external bodies, the objects of our senses, rises in its value when directed towards the operations of the mind in proportion to the difficulty and labour which we meet with in performing it, and if we can go no farther than this mental geography or delineation of the distinct parts and powers of the mind, it is at least a satisfaction to go so far and the more obvious this science may appear, and it is by no means obvious, the more contemptible still must the ignorance of it be esteemed in all pretenders to learning and philosophy. Nor can there remain any suspicion that this science is uncertain and shimerical, unless we should entertain such a skepticism as is entirely subversive of all speculation and even action. It cannot be doubted that the mind is endowed with several powers and faculties, and these powers are distinct from each other, that what is really distinct to the immediate perception may be distinguished by reflection and consequently that there is a truth and falsehood in all propositions on this subject, and a truth and falsehood which lie not beyond the compass of human understanding. There are many obvious distinctions of this kind, such as those between the will and understanding, the imagination and passions which fall within the comprehension of every human creature, and the finer and more philosophical distinctions are no less real and certain though more difficult to be comprehended. Some instances, especially late ones, of success in these inquiries may give us a just a notion of the certainty and solidity of this branch of learning, and shall we esteem it worthy the labour of a philosopher to give us a true system of the planets and adjust the position and order of those remote bodies, while we effect to overlook those who, with so much success, delineate the parts of the mind in which we are so intimately concerned. 9. But may we not hope that philosophy, if cultivated with care and encouraged by the attention of the public, may carry its researches still farther, and discover, at least in some degree, the secret springs and principles by which the human mind is actuated in its operations. Astronomers had long contented themselves with proving, from the phenomena, the true motions, order and magnitude of the heavenly bodies, till a philosopher at last arose who seems from the happiest reasoning to have also determined the laws and forces by which the revolutions of the planets are governed and directed. The like has been performed with regard to other parts of nature, and there is no reason to despair of equal success in our inquiries concerning the mental powers and economy if prosecuted with equal capacity and caution. It is probable that one operation and principle of the mind depends on another, which again may be resolved into one more general and universal, and how far these researches may possibly be carried it will be difficult for us before or even after a careful trial exactly to determine. This is certain that attempts of this kind are every day made by those who philosophise the most negligently, and nothing can be more requisite than to enter upon the enterprise with thorough care and attention. That if it lie within the compass of human understanding, it may at last be happily achieved, if not, it may however be rejected with some confidence and security. This last conclusion surely is not desirable, nor ought it to be embraced too rashly, for how much must we diminish from the beauty and value of this species of philosophy upon such a supposition. Moralists have hitherto been accustomed when they considered the vast multitude and diversity of those actions that excite our approbation or dislike, to search for some common principle on which this variety of sentiments might depend, and though they have sometimes carried the matter too far by their passion for one general principle, it must however be confessed that they are excusable in expecting to find some general principles into which all devices and virtues were justly to be resolved. The like has been the endeavour of critics, logicians and even politicians, nor have their attempts been wholly unsuccessful, though perhaps longer time, greater accuracy and more ardent application may bring these sciences still nearer their perfection. To throw up at once all pretensions of this kind may justly be deemed more rash, precipitate and dogmatical than even the boldest and most affirmative philosophy that has ever attempted to impose its crude dictates and principles on mankind. What though these reasonings concerning human nature seem abstract and of difficult comprehension, this affords no presumption of their faulthood. On the contrary, it seems impossible that what has hitherto escaped so many wise and profound philosophers can be very obvious and easy. And whatever pains these researches may cost us, we may think ourselves sufficiently rewarded, not only in point of profit, but of pleasure, if, by that means, we can make any addition to our stock of knowledge in subjects of such unspeakable importance. But as after all, the abstractness of these speculations is no recommendation, but rather a disadvantage to them, and as this difficulty may perhaps be surmounted by care and art, and the avoiding of all unnecessary detail, we have in the following inquiry attempted to throw some light upon subjects from which uncertainty has hitherto deterred the wise and obscurity the ignorant. Happy if we can unite the boundaries of the different species of philosophy by reconciling profound inquiry with clearness and truth with novelty. And still more happy if, reasoning in this easy manner, we can undermine the foundations of an obtuse philosophy which seems to have hitherto served only as a shelter to superstition and a cover to absurdity and error. CHAPTER II. OF THE ORIGIN OF IDEAS. Everyone will readily allow that there is a considerable difference between the perceptions of the mind when a man feels the pain of excessive heat or the pleasure of moderate warmth, and when he afterwards recalls to his memory this sensation or anticipates it by his imagination, these faculties may mimic or copy the perceptions of the senses, but they never can entirely reach the force and vivacity of the original sentiment. The utmost we say of them, even when they operate with greatest vigor, is that they represent their object in so lively a manner that we could almost say we feel or see it. But, except the mind be disordered by disease or madness, they never can arrive at such a pitch of vivacity as to render these perceptions altogether undistinguishable. All the colors of poetry, however splendid, can never paint natural objects in such a manner as to make the description be taken for a real landscape. The most lively thought is still inferior to the dullest sensation. We may observe a like distinction to run through all the other perceptions of the mind. A man in a fit of anger is actuated in a very different manner from one who only thinks of that emotion. If you tell me that any person is in love, I easily understand your meaning, and form a just conception of his situation, but never can mistake that conception for the real disorders and agitations of the passion. When we reflect on our past sentiments and affections, our thought is a faithful mirror, and copies its objects truly, for the colors which it employs are faint and dull, in comparison of those in which our original perceptions were clothed. It requires no nice discernment or metaphysical head to mark the distinction between them. Here, therefore, we may divide all the perceptions of the mind into two classes, or species, which are distinguished by their different degrees of force and vivacity. The less forcible and lively are commonly denominated thoughts, or ideas. The other species want a name in our language, and in most others, I suppose, because it was not requisite for any but philosophical purposes, to rank them under a general term or appellation. Let us, therefore, use a little freedom, and call them impressions. Employing that word, in a sense, somewhat different from the usual. By the term impression, then, I mean all our more lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will. And impressions are distinguished from ideas, which are the less lively perceptions, of which we are conscious, when we reflect on any of those sensations or movements above mentioned. Nothing, at first view, may seem more unbounded than the thought of man, which not only escapes all human power and authority, but is not even restrained within the limits of nature and reality. To form monsters, and join incongruous shapes and appearances, costs the imagination no more trouble than to conceive the most natural and familiar objects. And while the body is confined to one planet, along which it creeps with pain and difficulty, the thought can, in an instant, transport us into the most distant regions of the universe, or even beyond the universe, into the unbounded chaos, where nature is supposed to lie in total confusion. What never was seen, or heard of, may yet be conceived, nor is anything beyond the power of thought, except what implies an absolute contradiction. But though our thought seems to possess this unbounded liberty, we shall find upon a nearer examination, that it is really confined within very narrow limits, and that all this creative power of the mind amounts to no more than the faculty of compounding, transposing, augmenting, or diminishing the materials afforded us by the senses and experience. When we think of a golden mountain, we only join two consistent ideas, gold and mountain, with which we were formerly acquainted. A virtuous horse we can conceive, because, from our own feeling, we can conceive virtue, and this we may unite to the figure and shape of a horse, which is an animal familiar to us. In short, all the materials of thinking are derived either from our outward or inward sentiment. The mixture and composition of these belongs alone to the mind and will. Or, to express myself in philosophical language, all our ideas, or more feeble perceptions, are copies of our impressions, or more lively ones. To prove this, the two following arguments will, I hope, be sufficient. First, when we analyze our thoughts or ideas, however compounded or sublime, we always find that they resolve themselves into such simple ideas as were copied from a precedent feeling or sentiment. Even those ideas which, at first view, seem the most wide of this origin are found upon a nearer scrutiny to be derived from it. The idea of God, as meaning an infinitely intelligent, wise, and good being, arises from reflecting on the operations of our own mind, and augmenting, without limit, those qualities of goodness and wisdom. We may prosecute this inquiry toward length we please, where we shall always find that every idea which we examine is copied from a similar impression. Those who would assert that this position is not universally true, nor without exception, have only one, and that an easy method of refuting it, by producing that idea which, in their opinion, is not derived from this source. It will then be incumbent on us, if we would maintain our doctrine, to produce the impression, or lively perception, which corresponds to it. Secondly, if it happened, from a defect of the organ, that a man is not susceptible of any species of sensation, we always find that he is as little susceptible of the correspondent ideas. A blind man can form no notion of colors, a deaf man of sounds. Restore either of them that sense in which he is deficient. By opening this new inlet for his sensations, you also open an inlet for the ideas, and he finds no difficulty in conceiving these objects. The case is the same, if the object, proper for exciting any sensation, has never been applied to the organ. A laplander, or negro, has no notion of the relish of wine. And though there are few or no instances of a like deficiency in the mind, where a person has never felt or is wholly incapable of a sentiment or passion that belongs to his species, yet we find the same observation to take place in a less degree. A man of mild manners can form no idea of inveterate revenge or cruelty, nor can a selfish heart easily conceive the heights of friendship and generosity. It is readily allowed that other beings may possess many senses of which we can have no conception, because the ideas of them have never been introduced to us, in the only manner by which an idea can have access to the mind, to wit, by the actual feeling and sensation. There is, however, one contradictory phenomenon which may prove that it is not absolutely impossible for ideas to arise independent of their correspondent impressions. I believe it will readily be allowed that the several distinct ideas of color, which enter by the eye, or those of sound, which are conveyed by the ear, are really different from each other, though at the same time resembling. Now, if this be true of different colors, it must be no less so of the different shades of the same color, and each shade produces a distinct idea independent of the rest. For if this should be denied, it is possible, by the continual gradation of shades, to run a color insensibly into what is most remote from it, and if you will not allow any of the means to be different, you cannot without absurdity deny the extremes to be the same. Suppose, therefore, a person to have enjoyed his sight for thirty years, and to have become perfectly acquainted with colors of all kinds, except one particular shade of blue, for instance, which it never has been his fortune to meet with. Let all the different shades of that color, except that single one, be placed before him, descending gradually from the deepest to the lightest. It is plain that he will perceive a blank, where that shade is wanting, and will be sensible that there is a greater distance in that place between the contiguous colors than in any other. Now I ask, whether it be possible for him, from his own imagination, to supply this deficiency, and raise up to himself the idea of that particular shade, though it had never been conveyed to him by his senses. I believe there are few but will be of opinion that he can, and this may serve as a proof that the simple ideas are not always, in every instance, derived from the correspondent impressions, though this instance is so singular that it is scarcely worth our observing, and does not merit that for it alone we should alter our general maxim. Here, therefore, is a proposition which not only seems in itself simple and intelligible, but, if a proper use were made of it, might render every dispute equally intelligible, and banish all that jargon, which has so long taken possession of metaphysical reasonings, and drawn disgrace upon them. All ideas, especially abstract ones, are naturally faint and obscure. The mind has but a slender hold of them, they are apt to be confounded with other resembling ideas, and when we have often employed any term, though without a distinct meaning, we are apt to imagine it as a determinant idea annexed to it. On the contrary, all impressions, that is, all sensations, either outward or inward, are strong and vivid. The limits between them are more exactly determined, nor is it easy to fall into any error or mistake with regard to them. When we entertain, therefore, any suspicion that a philosophical term is employed without any meaning or idea, as is but too frequent, we need but inquire, from what impression is that supposed idea derived? And if it be impossible to assign any, this will serve to confirm our suspicion. By bringing ideas into so clear a light we may reasonably hope to remove all dispute, which may arise, concerning their nature and reality. Footnote 1. It is probable that no more was meant by those who denied innate ideas than that all ideas were copies of our impressions, though it must be confessed that the terms which they employed were not chosen with such caution, nor so exactly defined as to prevent all mistakes about their doctrine. For what is meant by innate? If innate be equivalent to natural, then all the perceptions and ideas of the mind must be allowed to be innate or natural in whatever sense we take the latter word, whether in opposition to what is uncommon, artificial or miraculous. If by innate be meant contemporary to our birth, the dispute seems to be frivolous, nor is it worthwhile to inquire at what time thinking begins, whether before, at, or after our birth. Again, the word idea seems to be commonly taken in a very loose sense, by lock and others, as standing for any of our perceptions, our sensations and passions, as well as thoughts. Now in this sense I should desire to know what can be meant by asserting that self-love or resentment of injuries, or the passion between the sexes, is not innate. But admitting these terms, impressions, and ideas, in the sense above explained, and understanding by innate what is original or copied from no precedent perception, then may we assert that all our impressions are innate, and our ideas not innate. To be ingenuous I must own it to be my opinion that lock was betrayed into this question by the schoolmen, who, making use of undefined terms, draw out their disputes to a tedious length, without ever touching the point in question. A like ambiguity and circumlocution seem to run through that philosopher's reasonings on this, as well as most other subjects. End of footnote. End of chapter two. Section three of an inquiry concerning human understanding. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org. Recorded by Gesino. An inquiry concerning human understanding by David Hume. Section three of the Association of Ideas. It is evident that there is a principle of connection between the different thoughts or ideas of the mind, and that in their appearance to the memory or imagination they introduce each other with a certain degree of method and regularity. In our more serious thinking or discourse this is so observable that any particular thought which breaks in upon the regular tract or chain of ideas is immediately remarked and rejected. And even in our wildest and most wandering reveries, nay in our very dreams, we shall find, if we reflect, that the imagination ran not altogether at adventures, but that there was still a connection upheld among the different ideas which succeeded each other. Were the loosest and freest conversation to be transcribed, they would immediately be observed something which connected it in all its transitions. Or, where this is wanting, the person who broke the thread of discourse might still inform you that they had secretly revolved in his mind a succession of thought which had gradually led him from the subject of conversation. Among different languages, even where we cannot suspect the least connection or communication, it is found that the words, expressive of ideas, the most compounded to yet nearly correspond to each other, a certain proof that the simple ideas comprehended in the compound ones were bound together by some universal principle which had an equal influence on all mankind. So it would be too obvious, to escape observation, that different ideas are connected together. I do not find that any philosopher has attempted to enumerate or class all the principles of association. A subject, however, that seems worthy of curiosity. To me, there appear to be only three principles of connection among ideas, namely resemblance, contiguity, in time or place, and cause or effect. That these principles, served connect ideas, will not, I believe, be much doubted. A picture naturally leads our thoughts to the original. Footnote, resemblance, end of footnote. The mention of one apartment in a building naturally introduces an inquiry or discourse concerning the others. Footnote, contiguity, end of footnote. And if we think of a wound, we can scarcely forbear reflecting on the pain which follows it. Footnote, cause and effect, end of footnote. But that this enumeration is complete, and that there are no other principles of association except these may be difficult to prove to the satisfaction of the reader or even to a man's own satisfaction. All we can do in such cases is to run over several instances and examine carefully the principle which binds the different thoughts to each other, never stopping till we render the principle as general as possible. Footnote, for instance contrast or contrariety, is also a connection among ideas, but it may perhaps be considered as a mixture of causation and resemblance. Where two objects are contrary, the one destroys the other, that is, the cause of its annihilation and the idea of the annihilation of an object implies the idea of its former existence. End of footnote. The more instances we examine and the more care we employ, the more assurance shall we acquire that the enumeration which we form from the whole is complete and entire. End of section 3. Read by Gesine in March 2007. An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding by David Hume. Section 4, Part 1. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer visit LibriVox.org, this reading by Carmanchester 2007. An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding by David Hume. Section 4. Skeptical doubts concerning the operations of the understanding. Part 1. 20. All the objects of human reason or inquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds to wit relations of ideas and matters of fact. Of the first kind are the sciences of geometry, algebra and arithmetic, and in short every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain. That the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the square of the two sides is a proposition which expresses a relation between these figures. That 3 times 5 is equal to the half of 30 expresses a relation between these numbers. Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought without dependence on what is anywhere existence in the universe. Though there were never a circle or triangle in nature, the truths demonstrated by Euclid would forever retain their certainty and evidence. 21. Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the same manner, nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible because it can never imply a contradiction and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness as if ever so comfortable to reality. That the sun will not rise tomorrow is no less intelligible a proposition and implies no more contradiction than the affirmation that it will rise. We should in vain therefore attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. Were it demonstratively false it would imply a contradiction and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind. It may therefore be a subject worthy of curiosity to inquire what is the nature of that evidence which assures us of any real existence and matter of fact beyond the present testimony of our senses or the records of our memory. This part of philosophy, it is observable, has been little cultivated either by the ancients or moderns and therefore our doubts and errors in the prosecution of so important an inquiry may be the more excusable while we march through such difficult paths without any guide or direction. They may even prove useful by exciting curiosity and destroying that implicit faith and security which is the bane of all reasoning and free inquiry. The discovery of defects in the common philosophy if any such there be will not I presume be a discouragement but rather an incitement as is usual to attempt something more full and satisfactory than has yet been proposed to the public. 22. All reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the relation of cause and effect. By means of that relation alone we can go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses. If you were to ask a man why he believes any matter of fact which is absent, for instance that his friend is in the country or in France, he would give you a reason and this reason would be some other fact as a letter received from him or the knowledge of his former resolutions and promises. A man finding a watch or any other machine in a desert island would conclude that there had once been men in that island. All our reasonings concerning fact are of the same nature and here it is constantly supposed that there is a connection between the present fact and that which is inferred from it. Whether nothing to bind them together the inference would be entirely precarious, the hearing of an articulate voice and rational discourse in the dark assures us of the presence of some person. Why? Because these are the effects of the human make and fabric and closely connected with it. If we anatomise all the other reasonings of this nature we shall find that they are founded on the relation of cause and effect and that this relation is either near or remote, direct or collateral. Heat and light are collateral effects of fire and the one effect may just be inferred from the other. 23. If we would satisfy ourselves therefore concerning the nature of that evidence which assures us of matters of fact we must inquire how we arrive at the knowledge of cause and effect. I shall venture to affirm as a general proposition which admits of no exception that the knowledge of this relation is not in any instance attained by reasonings a priori but arises entirely from experience when we find that any particular objects are constantly conjoined with each other. Let an object be presented to a man of ever so strong natural reason and abilities. If that object be entirely new to him he will not be able by the most accurate examination of its sensible qualities to discover any of its causes or effects. Adam, though his rational faculties be supposed, at the very first, entirely perfect, could not have inferred from the fluidity and transparency of water that it would suffocate him or from the light and warmth of fire that it would consume him. No object ever discovers by the qualities which appear to the senses either the causes which produced it or the effects which will arise from it nor can our reason unassisted by experience ever draw any inference concerning real existence and matter of fact. 24. The proposition that causes and effects are discoverable not by reason but by experience will readily be admitted with regard to such objects as we remember to have once been altogether unknown to us, since we must be conscious of the utter inability which we then lay under of foretelling what would arise from them. Present two smooth pieces of marble to a man who has no tincture of natural philosophy he will never discover that they will adhere together in such a manner as to require great force to separate them in a direct line when they make so smaller resistance to a lateral pressure. Such events as bear little analogy to the common course of nature are also readily confessed to be known only by experience nor does any man imagine that the explosion of gunpowder or the attraction of a lodestone could ever be discovered by arguments a priori. In like manner when an effect is supposed to depend upon an intricate machinery or secret structure of parts we make no difficulty in attributing all our knowledge of it to experience. Who will assert that he can give the ultimate reason why milk or bread is proper nourishment for a man not for a lion or a tiger but the same truth may not appear at first sight to have the same evidence with regards to events which have become familiar to us from our first appearance in the world which bear a close analogy to the whole course of nature and which are supposed to depend on the simple qualities of objects without any secret structure of parts. We are apt to imagine that we could discover these effects by the mere operation of our reason without experience. We fancy that where we brought on a sudden into this world we could at first have inferred that one billiard ball would communicate motion to another upon impulse and that we needed not to have waited for the event in order to pronounce with certainty concerning it. Such is the influence of custom that where it is strongest it not only covers our natural ignorance but even conceals itself and seems not to take place merely because it is found in the highest degree. 25. But to convince us that all the laws of nature and all the operations of bodies without exception and own only by experience the following reflections may perhaps suffice. Where any object presented to us and where we required to pronounce concerning the effect which will result from it without consulting past observations after what manner I beseech you must the mind proceed in this operation. It must invent or imagine some event which it ascribes to the object as its effect and it is claimed that this invention must be entirely arbitrary. The mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause but by the most accurate scrutiny and examination for the effect is totally different from the cause and consequently can never be discovered in it. Motion in the second billiard ball is a quite distinct event from motion in the first nor is there anything in the one to suggest the smallest hint of the other. A stone or piece of metal raised into the air and left without any support immediately falls but to consider the matter a priori is there anything we discover in this situation which can be get the idea of a downward rather than an upward or any other motion in the stone or metal. And as the first imagination or invention of a particular effect in all natural operations is arbitrary where we consult not experience so must we also esteem the supposed tie or connection between the cause and effect which binds them together and renders it impossible that any other effect could result from the operation of that cause. When I see for instance a billiard ball moving in a straight line towards another even suppose motion in the second ball should by accident be suggested to me as the result of their contact or impulse may I not conceive that a hundred different events might as well follow from that cause. May not both these balls remain at absolute rest may not the first ball return in a straight line or leap off from the second in any line or direction. All these suppositions are consistent and conceivable why then should we give the preference to one which is no more consistent or conceivable than the rest. All our reasonings a priori will never be able to show us any foundation for this preference. In a word then every effect is a distinct event from its cause it could not therefore be discovered in the cause and the first invention or conception of it a priori must be entirely arbitrary and even after it is suggested the conjunction of it with the cause must appear equally arbitrary since there are always many other effects which to reason must seem fully as consistent and natural. In vain therefore should we pretend to determine any single event or infer any cause or effect without the assistance of observation and experience. 26. Hence we may discover the reason why no philosopher who is rational and modest has ever pretended to assign the ultimate cause of any natural operation or to show distinctly the action of that power which produces any single effect in the universe. It is confessed that the utmost effort of human reason is to reduce the principles productive of natural phenomena to a greater simplicity and to resolve the many particular effects into a few general causes by means of reasonings from analogy experience and observation. But as to the causes of these general causes we should in vain attempt their discovery nor shall we ever be able to satisfy ourselves by any particular explanation of them.  Elasticity, gravity, perhesion of parts, communication of motion by impulse these are probably the ultimate causes and principles which we shall ever discover in nature and we may esteem ourselves sufficiently happy if by accurate inquiry and reasoning we can trace up the particular phenomena to or near to these general principles. The most perfect philosophy of the natural kind only staves off our ignorance a little longer as perhaps the most perfect philosophy of the moral or metaphysical kind serves only to discover larger portions of it. Thus the observation of human blindness and weakness is the result of all philosophy and meets us at every turn in spite of our endeavours to elude or avoid it. 27. Nor is geometry when taken into the assistance of natural philosophy ever able to remedy this defect or lead us into the knowledge of ultimate causes by all that accuracy of reasoning for which it is so justly celebrated. Every part of mixed mathematics proceeds upon the supposition that certain laws are established by nature in her operations and abstract reasonings are employed either to assist experience in the discovery of these laws or to determine their influence in particular instances where it depends upon any precise degree of distance and quantity. Thus it is a law of motion discovered by experience that the movement or force of anybody in motion is in the compound ratio or proportion of its solid contents and its velocity and consequently that a small force may remove the greatest obstacle or raise the greatest weight by any contrivance or machinery we can increase the velocity of that force so as to make it an overmatch for its antagonist. Geometry assists us in the application of this law by giving us the just dimensions of all the parts and figures which can enter into any species of machine but still the discovery of the law itself is owing merely to experience and all the abstract reasonings in the world could never lead us one step towards the knowledge of it. When we reason a priori and consider merely any object or cause as it appears to the mind independent of all observation it never could suggest to us the notion of any distinct object such as its effect much less shows the inseparable and inviolable connection between them. A man must be very seditious who could discover by reasoning that crystal is the effect of heat and ice of cold without being previously acquainted with the operation of these qualities. End of section 4 part 1 Section 4 part 2 of An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer visit LibriVox.org this reading by Karl Manchester 2007 An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding by David Hume Section 4 Skeptical Doubts Concerning the Operations of the Understanding Part 2 28 But we have not yet attained any tolerable satisfaction with regard to the question first proposed each solution still gives rise to a new question as difficult as the foregoing and leads us on to further inquiries. When it is asked what is the nature of all our reasonings concerning matter of fact the proper answer seems to be that they are founded on the relation of cause and effect. When again it is asked what is the foundation of all our reasonings and conclusions concerning that relation it may be replied in one word experience. But if we still carry on our sifting humour and ask what is the foundation of all conclusions from experience this implies a new question which may be of more difficult solution and explication. Philosophers that give themselves heirs of superior wisdom and sufficiency have a hard task when they encounter persons of inquisitive dispositions who push them from every corner to which they retreat and who assure at last to bring them to some dangerous dilemma. The best expedient to prevent this confusion is to be modest in our pretensions and even to discover the difficulty ourselves before it is objected to us. By this means we may make a kind of merit of our very ignorance. I shall content myself in this section with an easy task and shall pretend only to give a negative answer to the question here proposed. I say then that even after we have experience of the operations of cause and effect our conclusions from that experience are not founded on reasoning or any process of the understanding. This answer we must endeavour both to explain and to defend. 29. It must certainly be allowed that nature has kept us at a great distance from all her secrets and has afforded us only the knowledge of a few superficial qualities of objects while she conceals from us those powers and principles on which the influence of those objects entirely depends. Our senses inform us of the colour, weight and consistency of bread but neither sense nor reason can ever inform us of those qualities which fit it for the nourishment and support of a human body. Sight or feeling conveys an idea of the actual motion of bodies but as to that wonderful force or power which would carry on a moving body forever in a continual change of place and which bodies never lose but by communicating it to others of this we cannot form the most distant conception. But notwithstanding this ignorance of natural powers and principles we always presume when we see like sensible qualities that they have like secret powers and expect that effects similar to those we have experienced will follow from them. Footnote The word power is here used in a loose and popular sense. The more accurate explication of it would give additional evidence to this argument. C section 7 End footnote If a body of light colour and consistency with that bread which we have formally eat can be presented to us we make no scruple of repeating the experiment and foresee with certainty like nourishment and support. Now this is a process of the mind or thought of which I would willingly know the foundation. It is allowed on all hands that there is no known connection between the sensible qualities and the secret powers and consequently that the mind is not led to form such a conclusion concerning their constant and regular conjunction by anything which it knows of their nature. As to past experience it can be allowed to give direct and certain information of those precise objects only and that precise period of time which fell under its cognisance. But why this experience should be extended to future times and to other objects which for all we know may be only in appearance similar this is the main question on which I would insist. The bread which I formally eat nourished me that is a body of such sensible qualities was at that time endued with such secret powers but does it follow that other bread must also nourish me at another time and that like sensible qualities must always be attended with like secret powers. The consequence seems no wise necessary. At least it must be acknowledged that there is here a consequence drawn by the mind that there is a certain step taken a process of thought and an inference which wants to be explained. These two propositions are far from being the same. I have found that such an object has always been attended with such an effect and I foresee that other objects which are in appearance similar will be attended with similar effects. I shall allow if you please that one proposition may justly be inferred from the other. I know in fact that it always is inferred but if you insist that the inference is made by a chain of reasoning I desire you to produce that reasoning. The connection between these propositions is not intuitive. There is required a medium which may enable the mind to draw such an inference if indeed it be drawn by reasoning and argument. What that medium is I must confess passes my comprehension and it is incumbent on those to produce it who assert that it really exists and is the origin of all our conclusions concerning matter of fact. 30. This negative argument must certainly in process of time become altogether convincing if many penetrating and able philosophers shall turn their inquiries this way and no one be ever able to discover any connecting proposition or intermediate step which supports the understanding of this conclusion. But as the question is yet new every reader may not trust so far to his own penetration as to conclude because an argument escapes his inquiry that therefore it does not really exist. For this reason it may be requisite to venture upon a more difficult task and enumerating all the branches of human knowledge endeavour to show that none of them can afford such an argument. All reasonings may be divided into two kinds namely demonstrative reasoning or that concerning relations of ideas and moral reasoning or that concerning matter of fact and existence. That there are no demonstrative arguments in the case seems evident since it implies no contradiction that the course of nature may change and that an object seemingly like those which we have experienced may be attended with different or contrary effects. May I not clearly and distinctly conceive that a body falling from the clouds and which in all other respects resemble snow has yet the taste of salt or feeling of fire. Is there any more intelligible proposition than to affirm that all the trees will flourish in December and January and decay in May and June. Now whatever is intelligible and can be distinctly conceived implies no contradiction and can never be proved false by any demonstrative argument or abstract reasoning at priority. If we be therefore engaged by arguments to put trust in past experience and make it the standard of our future judgment these arguments must be probable only or such as regard matter of fact and real existence according to the division above mentioned. But that there is no argument of this kind must appear if our explication of that species of reasoning be admitted as solid and satisfactory. We have said that all arguments concerning existence are founded on the relation of cause and effect that our knowledge of that relation is derived entirely from experience and that all our experimental conclusions proceed upon the supposition that a future will be conformable to the past. To endeavour therefore the proof of this last supposition by probable arguments or arguments regarding existence must be evidently going in a circle and taking that for granted which is the very point in question. 31. In reality all arguments from experience are founded on the similarity which we discover among natural objects and by which we are induced to expect effects similar to those which we have found to follow from such objects. And though none but a fool or madman will ever pretend to dispute the authority of experience or to reject that great guide of human life it may surely be allowed a philosopher to have so much curiosity at least to examine the principle of human nature which gives this mighty authority to experience and makes us draw advantage from that similarity which nature has placed among different objects. From causes which appear similar we expect similar effects. This is the sum of all our experimental conclusions. Now it seems evident that if this conclusion were formed by reason it would be as perfect at first and upon one instance as after ever so long a course of experience but the case is far otherwise. Nothing so like as eggs yet no one on account of this appearing similarity expects the same taste and relish in all of them. It is only after a long course of uniform experiments in any kind that we attain a firm reliance and security with regard to a particular event. Now where is that process of reasoning which from one instance draws a conclusion so different from that which it infers from a hundred instances that are no wise different from that single one? This question I propose as much for the sake of information as with an intention of raising difficulties. I cannot find, I cannot imagine any such reasoning but I keep my mind still open to instruction if anyone will vouch safe to bestow it on me. 32 Should it be said that from a number of uniform experiments we infer a connection between the sensible qualities and the secret powers this I must confess seems the same difficulty couched in different terms. The question still recurs on what process of argument this inference is founded. Where is the medium the interposing ideas which join propositions so very wide of each other? It is confessed that the colour, consistency and other sensible qualities of bread appear not of themselves to have any connection with the secret powers of nourishment and support. For otherwise we could infer these secret powers from the first appearance of those sensible qualities without the aid of experience contrary to the sentiment of all philosophers and contrary to plain matter of fact. Here then is our natural state of ignorance with regard to the powers and influence of all objects. How is this remedied by experience? It only shows us a number of uniform effects resulting from certain objects and teaches us that those particular objects at that particular time were endowed with such powers and forces when a new object endowed with similar sensible qualities is produced we expect similar powers and forces and look for a like effect. From a body of like colour and consistency with bread we expect like nourishment and support but this surely is a step or progress in the mind which wants to be explained. When a man says I have found in all past instances such sensible qualities conjoined with such secret powers and when he says similar sensible qualities will always be conjoined with similar secret powers he is not guilty of a tautology nor are these propositions in any respect the same. You say that one proposition is an inference from another but you must confess that the inference is not intuitive neither is it demonstrative of what nature is it then to say it is experimental is begging the question for all inferences from experience suppose as their foundation that the future will resemble the past and that similar powers will be conjoined with similar sensible qualities. If there be any suspicion that the course of nature may change and that the past may be no rule for the future all experience becomes useless and can give rise to no inference or conclusion it is impossible therefore that any arguments from experience can prove this resemblance of the past to the future since all these arguments are founded on the supposition of that resemblance. Let the course of things be allowed hitherto ever so regular that alone without some new argument or inference proves not that for the future it will continue so in vain do you pretend to have learned the nature of bodies from your past experience their secret nature and consequently all their effects in influence may change without any change in their sensible qualities this happens sometimes and with regard to some objects why may it not happen always and with regard to all objects what logic what process of argument secures you against this supposition my practice you say refutes my doubts but you mistake the purport of my question as an agent I am quite satisfied in the point but as a philosopher who has some share of curiosity I will not say skepticism I want to learn the foundation of this inference no reading no inquiry has yet been able to remove my difficulty or give me satisfaction in a matter of such importance can I do better than propose the difficulty to the public even though perhaps I have small hopes of obtaining a solution we shall at least by this means be sensible of our ignorance if we do not augment our knowledge 33 I must confess that a man is guilty of unpardonable arrogance who concludes because an argument has escaped his own investigation that therefore it does not really exist I must also confess that though all the learned for several ages should have employed themselves in fruitless search upon any subject it may still perhaps be rash to conclude positively that the subject must therefore pass all human comprehension even though we examine all the sources of our knowledge and conclude them unfit for such a subject there may still remain a suspicion that the enumeration is not complete or the examination not accurate but with regard to the present subject there are some considerations which seem to remove all this accusation of arrogance or suspicion of mistake it is certain that the most ignorant and stupid peasants nay infants nay even brute beasts improve by experience and learn the qualities of natural objects by observing the effects which result from them when a child has felt the sensation of pain from touching the flame of a candle he will be careful not to put his hand near any candle but will expect a similar effect from a cause which is similar in its sensible qualities and appearance if you assert therefore that the understanding of the child is led into this conclusion by any process of argument or rash ossination I may justly require you to produce that argument nor have you any pretence to refuse so equitable a demand you cannot say that the argument is abstruse and may possibly escape your inquiry since you confess that it is obvious to the capacity of a mere infant if you hesitate therefore a moment or if after reflection you produce any intricate or profound argument you in a manner give up the question and confess that it is not reasoning which engages us to suppose the past resembling the future and to expect similar effects from causes which are to appearance similar this is the proposition which I intend to enforce in the present section if I be right I pretend not to have made any mighty discovery and if I be wrong I must acknowledge myself to be indeed a very backward scholar since I cannot now discover an argument which it seems was perfectly familiar to me long before I was out of my cradle end of section four section five of an inquiry concerning human understanding this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org an inquiry concerning human understanding by David Hume section five skeptical solution of these doubts part one the passion for philosophy like that for religion seems liable to this inconvenience that though it aims at the correction of our manners and extirpation of our vices it may only serve by imprudent management to foster a predominant inclination and push the mind with more determined resolution towards that side which already draws too much by the bias and propensity of the natural temper it is certain that while we aspire to the magnanimous firmness of the philosophic sage and endeavour to confine our pleasures altogether within our own minds we may at last render our philosophy like that of Epictetus and other Stoics only a more refined system of selfishness and reason ourselves out of all virtue as well as social enjoyment while we study with attention the vanity of human life and turn all our thoughts towards the empty and transitory nature of riches and honors we are perhaps all the while flattering our natural indolence which hating the bustle of the world and drudgery of business seeks a pretense of reason to give itself a full and uncontrolled indulgence there is however one species of philosophy which seems little liable to this inconvenience and that because it strikes in with no disorderly passion of the human mind nor can mingle itself with any natural affection or propensity and that is the academic or skeptical philosophy the academics always talk of doubt and suspense of judgment of danger and hasty determinations of confining to very narrow bounds the inquiries of the understanding and of renouncing all speculations which lie not within the limits of common life and practice nothing therefore can be more contrary than such a philosophy to the supine indolence of the mind its rash arrogance its lofty pretensions and its superstitious credulity every passion is mortified by it except the love of truth and that passion never is nor can be carried to too high a degree it is surprising therefore that this philosophy which in almost every instance must be harmless and innocent should be the subject of so much groundless reproach and obliquy but perhaps the very circumstance which renders it so innocent is what chiefly exposes it to the public hatred and resentment by flattering no irregular passion it gains few partisans by posing so many vices and follies it raises to itself abundance of enemies who stigmatize it as libertine profane and irreligious nor need we fear that this philosophy while it endeavors to limit our inquiries to common life should ever undermine the reasonings of common life and carry its doubts so far as to destroy all action as well as speculation nature will always maintain her rights and prevail in the end over any abstract reasoning whatsoever though we should conclude for instance as in the foregoing section that in all reasonings from experience there is a step taken by the mind which is not supported by any argument or process of the understanding there is no danger that these reasonings on which almost all knowledge depends will ever be affected by such a discovery if the mind be not engaged by argument to make this step it must be induced by some other principle of equal weight and authority and that principle will preserve its influence as long as human nature remains the same what that principle is may well be worth the pains of inquiry suppose a person though endowed with the strongest faculties of reason and reflection to be brought on a sudden into this world he would indeed immediately observe a continual succession of objects and one event following another but he would not be able to discover anything further he would not at first by any reasoning be able to reach the idea of cause and effect since the particular powers by which all natural operations are performed never appear to the senses nor is it reasonable to conclude merely because one event in one instance precedes another that therefore the one is the cause the other the effect their conjunction may be arbitrary and casual there may be no reason to infer the existence of one from the appearance of the other and in a word such a person without more experience could never employ his conjecture or reasoning concerning any matter of fact or be assured of anything beyond what was immediately present to his memory and senses suppose again that he has acquired more experience and has lived so long in the world as to observe familiar objects or events to be constantly conjoined together what is the consequence of this experience he immediately infers the existence of one object from the appearance of the other yet he has not by all his experience acquired any idea or knowledge of the secret power by which the one object produces the other nor is it by any process of reasoning he is engaged to draw this inference but still he finds himself determined to draw it and though he should be convinced that this understanding has no part in the operation he would nevertheless continue in the same course of thinking there is some other principle which determines him to form such a conclusion this principle is custom or habit for wherever the repetition of any particular act or operation produces a propensity to renew the same act or operation without being impelled by any reasoning or process of the understanding we always say that this propensity is the effect of custom by employing that word we pretend not to have given the ultimate reason of such a propensity we only point out a principle of human nature which is universally acknowledged and which is well known by its effects perhaps we can push our inquiries no farther or pretend to give the cause of this cause but must rest contented with it as the ultimate principle which we can assign of all our conclusions from experience it is sufficient satisfaction that we can go so far without repining at the narrowness of our faculties because they will carry us no farther and it is certain we here advance a very intelligible proposition at least if not a true one when we assert that after the constant conjunction of two objects heat and flame for instance weight and solidity we are determined by custom alone to expect the one from the appearance of the other this hypothesis seems even the only one which explains the difficulty why we draw from a thousand instances an inference which we are not able to draw from one instance that is in no respect different from them reason is incapable of any such variation the conclusions which it draws from considering one circle are the same which it would form upon surveying all the circles in the universe but no man having seen only one body move after being impelled by another could infer that every other body will move after a like impulse all reasonings from experience therefore are effects of custom not of reasoning custom then is the great guide of human life it is that principle alone which renders our experience useful to us and makes us expect for the future a similar train of events with those which have appeared in the past without the influence of custom we should be entirely ignorant of every matter of fact beyond what is immediately present to the memory and senses we should never know how to adjust means to ends or to employ our natural powers in the production of any effect there would be an end at once of all action as well as of the chief part of speculation but here it may be proper to remark that though our conclusions from experience carry us beyond our memory and senses and assure us of matters of fact which happened in the most distant places and most remote ages yet some fact must always be present to the senses or memory from which we may first proceed in drawing these conclusions a man who should find in a desert country the remains of pompous buildings would conclude that the country had in ancient times been cultivated by civilized inhabitants but did nothing of this nature occur to him he should never form such an inference we learn the effects of former ages from history but then we must peruse the volumes in which this instruction is contained and then carry up our inferences from one testimony to another till we arrive at the eyewitnesses and spectators of these distant events in a word if we proceed not upon some fact present to the memory or senses our reasonings would be merely hypothetical and however the particular links might be connected with each other the whole chain of inferences would have nothing to support it nor could we ever by its means arrive at the knowledge of any real existence if I ask why you believe any particular matter of fact which you relate you must tell me some reason and this reason will be some other fact connected with it but as you cannot proceed after this manner in infinitum you must at last terminate in some fact which is present to your memory or senses or must allow that your belief is entirely without foundation what then is the conclusion of the whole matter a simple one though it must be confessed pretty remote from the common theories of philosophy all belief of matter of fact or real existence is derived merely from some object present to the memory or senses and a customary conjunction between that and some other object or in other words having found in many instances that any two kinds of objects flame and heat snow and cold have always been conjoined together if flame or snow be presented anew to the senses the mind is carried by custom to expect heat or cold and to believe that such a quality does exist and will discover itself upon a nearer approach this belief is the necessary result of placing the mind in such circumstances it is an operation of the soul when we are so situated as unavoidable as to feel the passion of love when we receive benefits or hatred when we meet with injuries all these operations are a species of natural instincts which no reasoning or process of the thought and understanding is able either to produce or to prevent at this point at this point it would be very allowable for us to stop our philosophical researches in most questions we can never make a single step farther and in all questions we must terminate here at last after our most restless and curious inquiries but still our curiosity will be pardonable perhaps commendable if it carry us on to still farther researches and make us examine more accurately the nature of this belief and of the customary conjunction once it is derived by this means we may meet with some explications and analogies that will give satisfaction at least to such as love the abstract sciences and can be entertained with speculations which however accurate may still retain a degree of doubt and uncertainty as to readers of a different taste the remaining part of this section is not calculated for them and the following inquiries may well be understood though it be neglected and section five this recording is in the public domain section five part two of an inquiry concerning human understanding this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org an inquiry concerning human understanding by David Hume section five skeptical solution of these doubts part two nothing is more free than the imagination of man and though it cannot exceed that original stock of ideas furnished by the internal and external senses it has unlimited power of mixing compounding separating and dividing these ideas in all the varieties of fiction and vision it can feign a train of events with all the appearance of reality ascribed to them a particular time and place conceive them as existent and paint them out to itself with every circumstance that belongs to any historical fact which it believes with the greatest certainty wherein therefore consists the difference between such a fiction and belief it lies not merely in any peculiar idea which is annexed to such a conception as commands are assent and which is wanting to every known fiction for as the mind has authority over all its ideas it could voluntarily annex this particular idea to any fiction and consequently be able to believe whatever it pleases contrary to what we find by daily experience we can in our conception join the head of a man to the body of a horse but it is not in our power to believe that such an animal has ever really existed it follows therefore that the difference between fiction and belief lies in some sentiment or feeling which is annexed to the latter not to the former and which depends not on the will nor can be commanded at pleasure it must be excited by nature like all other sentiments and must arise from the particular situation in which the mind is placed at any particular juncture whatever an object is presented to the memory or senses it immediately by the force of custom carries the imagination to conceive that object which is usually conjoined to it and this conception is attended with a feeling or sentiment different from the loose reveries of the fancy in this consists the whole nature of belief for as there is no matter of fact which we believe so firmly that we cannot conceive the contrary there would be no difference between the conception assented to and that which is rejected or it not for some sentiment which distinguishes the one from the other if I see a billiard ball moving towards another on a smooth table I can easily conceive it to stop upon contact this conception implies no contradiction but still it feels very differently from that conception by which I represent to myself the impulse and the communication of motion from one ball to another were we to attempt a definition of this sentiment we should perhaps find it very difficult if not an impossible task in the same manner as if we should endeavor to define the feeling of cold or passion of anger to a creature who never had any experience of these sentiments belief is the true and proper name of this feeling and no one is ever at a loss to know the meaning of that term because every man is every moment conscious of the sentiment represented by it it may not however be improper to attempt a description of this sentiment in hopes we may by that means arrive at some analogies which may afford a more perfect explication of it I say then that belief is nothing but a more vivid lively forcible firm steady conception of an object than what the imagination alone is ever able to attain this variety of terms which may seem so unphilosophical is intended only to express that act of mind which renders realities or what is taken for such more present to us than fictions causes them to weigh more in the thought and gives them a superior influence on the passions and imagination provided we agree about the thing it is needless to dispute about the terms the imagination has the command over all its ideas and can join and mix and vary them in all the ways possible it may conceive fictitious objects with all the circumstances of place and time it may set them in a manner before our eyes in their true colors just as they might have existed but as it is impossible that this faculty of imagination can ever of itself reach belief it is evident that belief consists not in the peculiar nature or order of ideas but in the manner of their conception and their feeling to the mind I confess that it is impossible perfectly to explain this feeling or manner of conception we may make use of words which express something near it but its true and proper name as we observed before is belief which is a term that everyone sufficiently understands in common life and in philosophy we can go no farther than assert that belief is something felt by the mind which distinguishes the ideas of the judgment from the fictions of the imagination it gives them more weight and influence makes them appear of greater importance enforces them in the mind and renders them the governing principle of our actions I hear at present for instance a person's voice with whom I am acquainted and the sound comes as from the next room this impression of my senses immediately conveys my thought to the person together with all the surrounding objects I paint them out to myself as existing at present with the same qualities and relations of which I formerly knew them possessed these ideas take faster hold of my mind than ideas of an enchanted castle they are very different to the feeling and have a much greater influence of every kind either to give pleasure or pain joy or sorrow let us then take in the whole compass of this doctrine and allow that the sentiment of belief is nothing but a conception more intense and steady than what attends the mere fictions of the imagination and that this manner of conception arises from a customary conjunction of the object with something present to the memory or senses I believe that it will not be difficult upon these suppositions to find other operations of the mind analogous to it and to trace up these phenomena to principles still more general we have already observed that nature has established connections among particular ideas and that no sooner one idea occurs to our thoughts than it introduces its correlative and carries our attention towards it by a gentle and insensible movement these principles of connection or association we have reduced to three namely resemblance contiguity and causation which are the only bonds that unite our thoughts together and beget that regular train of reflection or discourse which in a greater or less degree takes place among all mankind now here arises a question on which the solution of the present difficulty will depend does it happen in all these relations that when one of the objects is presented to the senses or memory the mind is not only carried to the conception of the correlative but reaches a steadier and stronger conception of it than what otherwise it would have been able to attain this seems to be the case with that belief which arises from the relation of cause and effect and if the case be the same with the other relations or principles of association this may be established as a general law which takes place in all the operations of the mind we may therefore observe as the first experiment to our present purpose that upon the appearance of the picture of an absent friend our idea of him is evidently enlivened by the resemblance and that every passion which that idea occasions whether of joy or sorrow acquires new force and vigor in producing this effect there concur both a relation and a present impression where the picture bears him no resemblance at least was not intended for him it never so much conveys our thought to him and where it is absent as well as the person though the mind may pass from the thought of the one to that of the other it feels its idea to be rather weakened than enlivened by that transition we take a pleasure in viewing the picture of a friend when it is set before us but when it is removed rather choose to consider him directly than by reflection in an image which is equally distant and obscure the ceremonies of the roman catholic religion may be considered as instances of the same nature the devotees of that superstition usually plead an excuse for the memories with which they are upgraded that they feel the good effect of those external motions and postures and actions in enlivening their devotion and quickening their fervor which otherwise would decay if directed entirely to distant and immaterial objects we shadow out the objects of our faith say they insensible types and images and render them more present to us by the immediate presence of these types than it is possible for us to do merely by an intellectual view and contemplation sensible objects have always a greater influence on the fancy than any other and this influence they readily convey to those ideas to which they are related and which they resemble i shall only infer from these practices and this reasoning that the effect of resemblance in enlivening the ideas is very common and as in every case a resemblance and a present impression must concur we are abundantly supplied with experiments to prove the reality of the foregoing principle we may add force to these experiments by others of a different kind in considering the effects of contiguity as well as of resemblance it is certain that distance diminishes the force of every idea and that upon our approach to any object though it does not discover itself to our senses it operates upon the mind with an influence which imitates an immediate impression the thinking on any object readily transports the mind to what is contiguous but it is only the actual presence of an object that transports it with a superior vivacity when i am a few miles from home whatever relates to me touches me more nearly than when i am 200 leagues distant though even at that distance the reflecting on anything in the neighborhood of my friends or family naturally produces an idea of them but as in this latter case both the objects of the mind are ideas notwithstanding there is an easy transition between them that transition alone is not able to give a superior vivacity to any of the ideas for want of some immediate impression no one can doubt but causation has the same influence as the other two relations of resemblance and contiguity superstitious people are fond of the relics of saints and holy men for the same reason that they seek after types or images in order to enliven their devotion and give them a more intimate and strong conception of those exemplary lives which they desire to imitate now it is evident that one of the best relics which a devotee could procure would be the handy work of a saint and if his clothes and furniture are ever to be considered in this light it is because they were once at his disposal and were moved and affected by him in which respect they are to be considered as imperfect effects and as connected with him by a shorter chain of consequences than any of those by which we learn the reality of his existence suppose that the son of a friend who had been long dead or absent were presented to us it is evident that this object would instantly revive its correlative idea and recall to our thoughts all past intimacies and familiarities in more lively colors than they would otherwise have appeared to us this is another phenomenon which seems to prove the principle above mentioned we may observe that in these phenomena the belief of the correlative object is always presupposed without which the relation could have no effect the influence of the picture supposes that we believe our friend to have once existed contiguity to home can never excite our ideas of home unless we believe that it really exists now i assert that this belief where it reaches beyond the memory or senses is of a similar nature and arises from similar causes with the transition of thought and vivacity of conception here explained when i throw a piece of dry wood into a fire my mind is immediately carried to conceive that it augments not extinguishes the flame this transition of thought from the cause to the effect proceeds not from reason it derives its origin all together from custom and experience and as it first begins from an object present to the senses it renders the idea or conception of flame more strong and lively than any loose floating reverie of the imagination that idea arises immediately the thought moves instantly towards it and conveys to it all that force of conception which is derived from the impression present to the senses when a sword is leveled at my breast does not the idea of wound and pain strike me more strongly than when a glass of wine is presented to me even though by accident this idea should occur after the appearance of the latter object but what is there in this whole matter to cause such a strong conception except only a present object and a customary transition to the idea of another object which we have been accustomed to conjoin with a former this is the whole operation of the mind in all our conclusions concerning matter of fact and existence and it is a satisfaction to find some analogies by which it may be explained the transition from a present object does in all cases give strength and solidity to the related idea here then is a kind of pre-established harmony between the course of nature and the succession of our ideas and though the powers and forces by which the former is governed be wholly unknown to us yet our thoughts and conceptions have still we find gone on in the same train with the other works of nature custom is that principle by which this correspondence has been affected so necessary to the subsistence of our species and the regulation of our conduct in every circumstance and occurrence of human life had not the presence of an object instantly excited the idea of those objects commonly conjoined with it all our knowledge must have been limited to the narrow sphere of our memory and senses and we should never have been able to adjust means to ends or employ our natural powers either to the producing of good or avoiding of evil those who delight in the discovery and contemplation of final causes have here ample subject to employ their wonder and admiration I shall add for a further confirmation of the foregoing theory that as this operation of mind by which we infer like effects from like causes and vice versa is so essential to the subsistence of all human creatures it is not probable that it could be trusted to the fallacious deductions of our reason which is slow in its operations appears not in any degree during the first years of infancy and at best is in every age and period of human life extremely liable to error and mistake it is more conformable to the ordinary wisdom of nature to secure so necessary an act of the mind by some instinct or mechanical tendency which may be infallible in its operations may discover itself at the first appearance of life and thought and may be independent of all the labored deductions of the understanding as nature has taught us the use of our limbs without giving us the knowledge of the muscles and nerves by which they are actuated so has she implanted in us an instinct which carries forward the thought in a correspondent course to that which she has established among external objects though we are ignorant of those powers and forces on which this regular course and succession of objects totally depends and section five part two this recording is in the public domain chapter six of an inquiry concerning human understanding this is a libra vox recording all libra vox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to find out how to volunteer please contact libra vox.org an inquiry concerning human understanding by david hume section six of probability though there be no such thing as chance in the world our ignorance of the real cause of any event has the same influence on the understanding and begets a like species of belief or opinion there is certainly a probability which arises from a superiority of chances on any side and according as this superiority increases and surpasses the opposite chances the probability receives a proportionable increase and begets still a higher degree of belief or ascent to that side in which we discover the superiority if a die were marked with one figure or number of spots on four sides and with another figure or number of spots on the two remaining sides it would be more probable that the former would turn up than the latter though if it had a thousand sides marked in the same manner and only one side different the probability would be much higher and our belief or expectation of the event more steady and secure this process of the thought or reasoning may seem trivial and obvious but those who consider it more narrowly it may perhaps afford matter for curious speculation it seems evident that when the mind looks forward to discover the event which may result from the throw of such a die it considers the turning up of each particular side as a like probable and this is the very nature of chance to render all the particular events comprehended in it entirely equal but finding a great number of sides concur in the one event then in the other the mind is carried more frequently to that event and meets it oftener in revolving the various possibilities or chances on which the ultimate result depends this concurrence of several views in one particular event begets immediately by an inexplicable contrivance of nature the sentiment or belief and gives that event the advantage over its antagonist which is supported by a smaller number of views and recurs less frequently to the mind if we allow that belief is nothing but a firmer and stronger conception of an object than what attends the mere fictions of the imagination this operation may perhaps in some measure be accounted for the concurrence of these several views or glimpses and prints the idea more strongly on the imagination gives it superior force and vigor renders its influence on the passions and affections more sensible and in a word begets that reliance or security which constitutes the nature of belief and opinion the case is the same with the probability of causes as with that of chance there are some causes which are entirely uniform and constant in producing a particular effect and no instance has ever yet been found of any failure or irregularity in their operation fire has always burned and water suffocated every human creature the production of motion by impulse and gravity is a universal law which has hitherto admitted of no exception but there are other causes which have been found more irregular and uncertain nor has rhubarb always proved a purge or opium a soporific to everyone who has taken these medicines it is true when any cause fails of producing its usual effect philosophers ascribe not this to any irregularity in nature but suppose that some secret causes and the particular structure of parts have prevented the operation our reasonings however and conclusions concerning the event are the same as if this principle had no place being determined by custom to transfer the past to the future in all our inferences where the past has been entirely regular in uniform we expect the event with the greatest assurance and leave no room for any contrary supposition but where different effects have been found to follow from causes which are two appearance exactly similar all these various effects must occur to the mind in transferring the past to the future and enter into our consideration when we determine the probability of the event though we give the preference to that which has been found most usual and believe that this effect will exist we must not overlook the other effects but must assign to each of them a particular weight and authority in proportion as we have found it to be more or less frequent it is more probable in almost every country of europe that there will be frost sometime in january then that the weather will continue open throughout the whole month though this probability varies according to the different climates and approaches to a certainty in the more northern kingdoms here then it seems evident that when we transfer the past to the future in order to determine the effect which will result from any cause we transfer all the different events in the same proportion as they have appeared in the past and conceive one to have existed a hundred times for instance another 10 times and another once as a great number of views do here concur in one event they fortify and confirm it to the imagination beget that sentiment which we call belief and give its object the preference above the contrary event which is not supported by an equal number of experiments and recurs not so frequently to the thought in transferring the past to the future let any one try to account for this operation of the mind upon any of the received systems of philosophy and he will be sensible of the difficulty for my part i shall think it's efficient if the present hints excite the curiosity of philosophers and make them sensible how effective all common theories are in treating of such curious and sublime subjects end of section six of probability this recording is in the public domain chapter nine of an inquiry concerning human understanding this is a liberbox recording all liberbox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit liberbox.org recording by ml co in cleveland ohio july 2007 an inquiry concerning human understanding by david hume chapter nine of the idea of necessary connection part one 48 the great advantage of the mathematical sciences above the moral consists in this that the ideas of the former being sensible are always clear and determinant the smallest distinction between them is immediately perceptible and the same terms are still expressive of the same ideas without ambiguity or variation an oval is never mistaken for a circle nor an hyperbole of foreign ellipses the isosceles and skillenium are distinguished by boundaries more exact than vice and virtue right and wrong if any term be defined in geometry the mind readily of itself substitutes on all occasions the definition for the term defined or even when no definition is employed the object itself may be presented to the senses and by that means be steadily and clearly apprehended but the finer sentiments of the mind the operations of the understanding the various agitation of the passions that really in themselves distinct easily escape us when surveyed by reflection nor is it in our power to recall the original object as often as we have occasion to contemplate it ambiguity by this means is gradually introduced into our reasonings similar objects are readily taken to be the same and the conclusion becomes at last very wide of the premises one may safely however affirm that if we consider these sciences in a proper light their advantages and disadvantages nearly compensate each other and reduce both of them to a state of equality if the mind with greater facility retains the ideas of geometry clear and determinant it must carry on a much longer and much more intricate chain of reasoning and compare ideas much wider of each other in order to reach the abstruser truths of that science and if moral ideas are apt without extreme care to fall into obscurity and confusion the inferences are always much shorter in these disquisitions and the intermediate steps which lead to the conclusion much fewer than in the sciences which treat of quantity and number in reality there are scarcely a proposition in euclid so simple as not to consist of more parts than are to be found in any moral reasoning which runs not into chimera and conceit where we trace the principles of the human mind through a few steps we may be very well satisfied with our progress considering how soon nature throws a bar to all our inquiries concerning causes and reduces us to an acknowledgement of our ignorance the chief obstacle therefore to our improvement in the moral or metaphysical sciences is the obscurity of the ideas and ambiguity of the terms the principal difficulty in the mathematics is the length of inferences and compass of thought requisite to the forming of any conclusion and perhaps our progress in natural philosophy is chiefly retarded by the want of proper experiments and phenomena which are often discovered by chance and cannot always be found when requisite even by the most diligent and prudent inquiry as moral philosophy seems hitherto to have received less improvement than either geometry or physics we may conclude that if there be any difference in this respect among the sciences the difficulties which obstruct the progress of the former require superior care and capacity to be surmounted there are no ideas which occur in metaphysics more obscure and uncertain than those of power force energy or necessary connection of which it is every moment necessary for us to treat all our disquisitions we shall therefore endeavor in this section to fix if possible the precise meaning of these terms and thereby remove some part of that obscurity which is so much complained of in the species of philosophy it seems a proposition which will not admit a much dispute that all our ideas are nothing but copies of our impressions or in other words that it is impossible for us to think of anything which we have not antecedently felt either by our external or internal senses i have endeavored to explain improve this proposition and have expressed my hopes that by a proper application of it men may reach a greater clearness and precision in philosophical reasonings than what they have hitherto been able to attain complex ideas may perhaps be well known by definition which is nothing but an enumeration of those parts of simple ideas that compose them but when we have pushed up definitions to the most simple ideas and find still some ambiguity in obscurity what resource are we then possessed of by what invention can we throw light upon these ideas and render them all together precise and determined to our intellectual view produce the impressions or original sentiments from which the ideas are copied these impressions are all strong and sensible they admit not of ambiguity they are not only placed in a full like themselves but may throw light on their correspondent ideas which lie in obscurity and by this means we may perhaps attain a new microscope or species of optics by which in the moral sciences the most minute and the most simple ideas may be so enlarged as to fall readily under our apprehension and be equally known with the grossest and most sensible ideas that can be the object of our inquiry to be fully acquainted therefore with the idea of power or necessary connection let us examine its impression and in order to find the impression with greater certainty let us search for it and all the sources from which it may possibly be derived when we look about us towards external objects and consider the operation of causes we are never able in a single instance to discover any power or necessary connection any quality which binds the effect to the cause and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other we only find that the one does actually in fact follow the other the impulse of one billiard ball is attended with motion in the second this is the hole that appears to the outward senses the mind feels no sentiment or inward impression from this section of objects consequently there is not in any single particular instance of cause and effect anything which can suggest the idea of power or necessary connection from the first appearance of an object we never can conjecture what effect will result from it but where the power or energy of any cause discoverable by the mind we could foresee an effect even without experience and might at first pronounce with certainty concerning it by mere dint of thought and reasoning in reality there is no part of matter that does ever by its sensible qualities discover any power or energy or give us ground to imagine that it could produce anything or be followed by any other object which we could denominate its effect solidity extension motion these qualities are all complete in themselves and never point out any other event which may result from them the scenes of the universe are continually shifting and one object follows another in an uninterrupted session but the power of force which actuates the whole machine is entirely concealed from us and never discovers itself in any of the sensible qualities of body we know that in fact heat is a constant attendant of flame but what is the connection between them we have no room so much as to conjecture or imagine it is impossible therefore that the idea of power can be derived from the contemplation of bodies in single instances of their operation because nobody's ever discover any power which can be the origin of this idea 51 since therefore external objects as they appear to the senses give us no idea of power or necessary connection by their operation particular instances let us see whether this idea be derived from reflection on the operations of our own minds and be copied from any internal impression it may be said that we are every moment conscious of internal power while we feel that by the simple command of our will we can move the organs of our body or direct the faculties of our mind an act of volition produces motion in our limbs or raises a new idea in our imagination this influence of the will we know by consciousness hence we acquire the idea of power energy and are certain that we ourselves and all other intelligent beings are possessed of power this idea then is the idea of reflection since it arrives from reflecting on the operations of our own mind and on the command which is exercised by will both over the organs of the body and the faculties of the soul 52 we shall proceed to examine this pretension and first with regard to the influence of volition over the organs of the body this influence we may observe is a fact which like all other natural events can be known only by experience and can never be foreseen from any apparent energy or power in the cause which connects it with the effect and renders the one and infallible consequence of the other the motion of our body follows upon the command of our will of this we are every moment conscious but the means by which this is affected the energy by which the will performs so extraordinary in operation of this we are so far from being immediately conscious that it must forever escape our most diligent inquiry or first is there any principle in all nature more mysterious than that of the union of soul with body by which a supposed spiritual substance acquires such an influence over a material one that the most refined thought is able to actuate the grossest matter where are we empowered by a secret wish to remove mountains or control the planets in their orbit this extensive authority would not be more extraordinary nor more beyond our comprehension but if by consciousness we perceived any power or energy in the will we must know this power we must know its connection with the effect we must know the secret union of soul and body and the nature of both these substances by which the one is able to operate in so many instances upon the other secondly we are not able to move all the organs of the body with a like authority though we cannot assign any reason besides experience for so remarkable a difference between one and the other why has the will and influence over the tongue and fingers not over the heart or liver this question would never embarrass us where we conscious of a power in the former case not the latter we should then perceive independent of experience why the authority of will over the organs of the body is circumscribed within such particular limits being in that case fully acquainted with the power or force by which it operates we should also know why its influence reaches precisely to such boundaries and no farther a man suddenly struck with a palsy in the leg or arm or has newly lost those members frequently endeavors at first to move them and employ them in their usual offices here he has as much conscious of power to command such limbs as a man in perfect health is conscious of the power to actuate any member which remains in its natural state and condition but consciousness never deceives consequently neither in the one case nor in the other are we ever conscious of any power we learn the influence of our well from experience alone and experience only teaches us how one event constantly follows another without instructing us in the secret connection which binds them together and renders them inseparable thirdly we learn from anatomy that the immediate object of power and voluntary motion is not the member itself which is moved but certain muscles and nerves and animal spirits and perhaps something still more minute and more unknown through which the motion is successively propagated ere it reached the member itself whose motion is the immediate object of volition can there be a more certain proof that the power by which this whole operation is performed so far from being directly and fully known by an inward sentiment or consciousness is to the last degree mysterious and unintelligible here the mind wills a certain event immediately another event unknown to ourselves and totally different from the one intended is produced this event produces another equally unknown till it lasts through a long succession the desired event is produced but if the original power were felt it must be known or it known its effect must also be known since all powers relative to its effect and vice versa if the fact be not known the power cannot be known nor felt how indeed can we be conscious of the power to move our limbs when we have no such power but only then to move certain animal spirits which though they produce it last the motion of our limbs yet operate in such a manner as it's wholly beyond our comprehension we may therefore conclude from the whole I hope without any temerity though with assurance that our idea of power is not copied from any sentiment or consciousness of power within ourselves when we give rise to animal motion or apply our limbs to their proper use in office that their motion follows the command of the will as a matter of common experience like other natural events but the power or energy by which this is affected like that and other natural events is unknown and inconceivable 53 shall we then assert that we are conscious of a power or energy in our own minds when by an actor command of our will we raise up a new idea fix the mind to the contemplation of it turn it on all sides and it lasts dismiss it for some other idea when we think that we have surveyed it with sufficient accuracy I believe the same arguments will prove that even this command of the will gives us no real idea of force or energy first it must be allowed that when we know a power we know that very circumstance in the cause by which it is unable to produce the effect for these are supposed to be synonymous we must therefore know both the cause and effect and the relation between them but do we pretend to be acquainted with the nature of the human soul and the nature of an idea or the aptitude of the one to produce the other this is a real creation a production of something out of nothing which implies a power so great that it may seem at first sight beyond the reach of any being less than infinite at least it must be owned that such a power is not felt nor known nor even conceivable by the mind we only feel the event namely the existence of an idea consequent to a command of the will but the manner in which this operation is performed the power by which it is produced is entirely beyond our comprehension secondly the command of the mind over itself is limited as well as its command over the body and these limits are not known by reason or any acquaintance with the nature of cause and effect but only by experience and observation as in all other natural events and in the operation of external objects our authority over our sentiments and passions is much weaker than that over ideas even the latter authority is circumscribed within very narrow boundaries while anyone pretend to assign the ultimate reason of these boundaries or so why the power is deficient in one case not in another thirdly this self command is very different at different times a man in health possesses more of it than one languishing with sickness we are more master of our thoughts in the morning than in the evening fasting than after a full meal can we give any reason for these variations except experience where then is the power of which we pretend to be conscious is there not here either in a spiritual or material substance or both some secret mechanism or structure of parts upon which the effects depends and which being entirely unknown to us renders the power or energy of the well equally unknown and incomprehensible volition is surely an act of the mind with which we are sufficiently acquainted reflect upon it consider it on all sides do you find anything in it like this creative power by which it raises from nothing a new idea and with a new kind of fiat imitates the omnipotence of its maker if I may be allowed so to speak who called forth into existence all various scenes of nature so far from being conscious of this energy in the will it requires a certain experience is that of which we are possessed to convince us that such extraordinary effects to ever result from a simple act of volition 54 the generality of mankind never finds any difficulty in accounting for the more common and familiar operations of nature such as the descent of heavy bodies the growth of plants the generation of animals or the nourishment of bodies by food but suppose that in all these cases they perceive the very force or energy of the cause by which it is connected with its effect and it's forever infallible in its operation they acquire by long habit such a turn of mind that upon the appearance of the cause they immediately expect with assurance its usual attendant and hardly conceive it possible that any other vent could result from it it is only on the discovery of an extraordinary phenomena such as earthquakes pestilence and prodigies of any kind that they find themselves at a loss to assign a proper cause and to explain the manner in which the effect is produced by it it is usual for men in such difficulties to have recourse to some invisible intelligent principle as the immediate cause of that event which surprises them and which they think cannot be accounted for from the common powers of nature but philosophers who carry their scrutiny a little farther immediately perceive that even in the most familiar events the energy of the cause is as unintelligible as in the most unusual and that we only learn by experience of the frequent conjunction of objects without ever being able to comprehend anything like connection between them 55 here then many philosophers think themselves obliged by reason to have recourse on all occasions to the same principle which the vulgar never appealed to but in cases that appear miraculous and supernatural they acknowledge mind and intelligence to be not only the ultimate and original cause of all things but the immediate and sole cause of every event which appears in nature they pretend that those objects which are commonly denominated causes are in reality nothing but occasions and that a true and direct principle of every effect is not any power or force of nature but a volition of the supreme being who wills that such particular objects should be forever conjoined with each other instead of saying that one billiard ball moves another by a force which it is derived from the author of its nature it is the deity himself they say who by a particular volition moves the second ball being determined to this operation by the impulse of the first ball in consequence of those general laws which he has laid down to himself and the government of the universe but philosophers advancing still in their inquiries discover that as we are totally ignorant of the power on which depends the mutual operation of bodies we are no less ignorant of that power on which depends the operation of mind on body or a body on mind nor are we able either from our senses or consciousness to assign the ultimate principle in one case more than in the other the same ignorance therefore reduces them to the same conclusion they assert that the deity is the immediate cause of the union between soul and body and that they are not the organs of sense which being agitated by external objects produce sensations in the mind but it is a particular volition of our omnipotent maker which excites such a sensation in consequence of such a motion in the organ in like manner it is not any energy in the will that produces local motion in our members it is God himself who is pleased to second our will in itself impotent and to command the motion which we erroneously attribute to our power and efficacy nor do philosophers stop at this conclusion they sometimes extend the same inference to the mind itself in its internal operations our mental vision or conception of ideas is nothing but a revelation made to us by our maker when we voluntarily turn our thoughts to any object and raise up its image in the fancy it is not the will which creates this idea it is the universal creator who discovers it to the mind and reddens it present to us 56 thus according to these philosophers everything is full of God not content with the principle that nothing exists but by his will that nothing possesses any power but by his concession they rob nature and all created beings of every power in order to render their dependence on the deity still more sensible and immediate they consider not that by this theory they diminish instead of magnifying the grandeur of those attributes which they affect so much to celebrate it argues surely more power in the deity to delegate a certain degree of power to inferior creatures than to produce everything by his own immediate volition it argues more wisdom to contrive at first the fabric of the world with such perfect foresight that of itself and by its proper operation it may serve all the purposes of providence then if the creator were obliged every moment to adjust its parts and animate by his breath all the wheels that's depend this machine but if we would have a more philosophical computation of this theory perhaps the two following reflections may suffice 57 first it seems to me that this theory of the universal energy and operation of the supreme being is too bold ever to carry conviction with it to a man sufficiently apprised to the weakness of human reason and the narrow limits to which it is confined in all its operations though the chain of arguments which conduct to it were ever so logical there must arise a strong suspicion if not an absolute assurance that it has carried us quite beyond the reach of our faculties when it leaves the conclusion so extraordinary and so remote for common life and experience we are got into fairyland long ere we have reached the last steps of our theory and there we have no reason to trust our common methods of argument or to think that our usual analogies and probabilities have any authority our line is too short to fathom such immense abysses and however we may flatter ourselves that we are guided in every step which we take by a kind of verisimilitude and experience we may be assured that this fancied experience has no authority when we thus apply it to subjects that lie entirely out of the sphere of experience but on this we shall have occasion to touch afterwards secondly i cannot perceive any force in the arguments on which this theory is founded we are ignorant it is true of the manner in which our bodies operate on each other their force or energy is entirely incomprehensible but are we not equally ignorant of the manner or force by which a mind even the supreme mind operates either on itself or on body when side to seat you do we acquire any idea of it we have no sentiment or consciousness of this power in ourselves we have no idea of the supreme being but what we learn from reflection on our own faculties where our ignorance therefore a good reason for rejecting anything we should be led into that principle of denying all energy in the supreme being as much as in the grossest matter we surely comprehend as little the operations of one as of the other is it more difficult to conceive that motion may arise from the impulse than it may arise from volition all we know is our profound ignorance in both cases end of chapter 9 chapter 10 of an inquiry concerning human understanding this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by ML Co in Cleveland Ohio July 2007 an inquiry concerning human understanding by David Hume chapter 10 of the idea of necessary connection part two 58 but to hasten to a conclusion of this argument which is already drawn out to two greater lengths we have sought in vain for an idea of power or necessary connection in all the sources from which we could suppose it to be derived it appears that in single instances of the operation of bodies we never can by our utmost scrutiny discover anything but one event following another without being able to comprehend any force or power by which to cause operates or any connection between it and its supposed effect the same difficulty occurs in contemplating the operations of mine on body where we observe the motion of the ladder to follow upon the volition of the former but are not able to observe or conceive the tie which binds together the motion and volition or the energy by which the mind produces this effect the authority of the will over its own faculties and ideas is not a bit more comprehensible so then upon the whole there appears not throughout all nature any one instance of connection which is conceivable by us all events seem entirely loose and separate one event follows another but we can never observe any tie between them they seem conjoined but never connected and as we can have no idea of anything which never appeared to our outward sense or inward sentiment the necessary conclusion seems to be that we have no idea of connection or power at all and that these words are absolutely without any meaning when employed either in philosophical reasoning or common life 59 but there still remains one method of avoiding this conclusion and one source which we have not yet examined when any natural object or event is presented it is impossible for us by any sagacity or penetration to discover or even conjecture without experience what event will result from it or to carry our foresight beyond that object which is immediately present to the memory and senses even after one instance of our experiment where we have observed a particular event to follow upon another we are not entitled to form a general rule or foretell what will happen in light cases it being justly esteemed an unpardonable temerity to judge of the whole course on nature from one single experiment however accurate or certain but when one particular species of event has always in all instances been conjoined with another we make no longer any scruple of foretelling one upon the appearance of the other and of employing that reasoning which can alone assure us as any matter of fact or existence we then call the one object cause the other effect we suppose that there is some connection between them some power in the one by which it infallibly produces the other and operates with the greatest certainty and strongest necessity it appears then that this idea of a necessary connection among events arises from a number of similar instances which occur are the constant conjunction of these events nor can that idea ever been suggested by any one of these instances surveyed in all possible lights and positions but there is nothing in a number of instances different from every single instance which is supposed to be exactly similar except only that after a repetition of similar instances the mind is carried by habit upon the appearance of one event to expect its usual attendant and to believe that it will exist this connection therefore which we feel in the mind this customary transition of the imagination from one object to its usual attendant is the sentiment or impression from which we form the idea of power or necessary connection nothing farther is in the case contemplate the subject on all sides you will never find any other origin of that idea this is the sole difference between one instance from which we can never receive the idea of connection and a number of similar instances by which it is suggested the first time a man saw the communication of motion by impulse as by the shock of two billiard balls he could not pronounce that the one event was connected but only that it was conjoined with the other after he has observed several instances of this nature he then pronounces them to be connected what alteration has happened to give rise to this new idea of connection nothing but that he now feels these events to be connected in his imagination and can readily foretell the existence of one from the appearance of the other when we say therefore that one object is connected with another we mean only that they have acquired a connection in our thought and give rise to this inference by which they become proofs of each other's existence a conclusion which is somewhat extraordinary but which seems founded on sufficient evidence nor will its evidence be weakened by any general difference of