Part 2, Section 9 of the Freedom of the Will by Jonathan Edwards. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Of the connection of the acts of the will with the dictates of the understanding. It is manifest that no acts of the will are contingent in such a sense as to be without all necessity, or so is not to be necessary with the necessity of consequence and connection, because every act of the will is some way connected with the understanding and is, as the greatest apparent good is, in the manner which has already been explained, namely that the soul always wills or chooses that which in the present view of the mind, considered in the whole of that view and all that belongs to it, appears most agreeable. Because, as was observed before, nothing is more evident than that, we men act voluntarily and do what they please, then they do what appears most agreeable to them. And to say otherwise would be as much as to affirm that men do not choose what appears to suit them, best or what seems most pleasing to them, or that they do not choose what they prefer, which brings the matter to a contradiction. And as it is very evident in itself that the acts of the will have some connection with the dictates or views of the understanding, so this is allowed by some of the chief of the Armenian writers, particularly by Dr. Whitby and Dr. Samuel Clark. Dr. Turnbull, though a great enemy to the doctrine of necessity, allows the same thing. In his Christian philosophy, page 196, he with much approbation cites another philosopher as of the same mind in these words, No man, says an excellent philosopher, sets himself about anything but upon some view or other, which serves him for a reason for what he does. And whatsoever faculty he employs, the understanding with such light as it has, well or ill-formed, constantly leads. And by that light, true or false, all her operative powers are directed. The will itself, how absolute and uncontrollable, so ever, it may be thought never fails in its obedience to the dictates of the understanding. Temples have their sacred images and we see what influence they have always had over a great part of mankind, but in truth the ideas and images in men's minds are the invisible powers that constantly govern them. And to these they all pay universally a ready submission. But whether this be in a just consistency with themselves and their own notions of liberty, our desire may now be impartially considered. Dr. Whitby plainly supposes that the acts and determinations of the will always follow the understanding's view of the greatest good to be obtained or evil to be avoided. Or, in other words, that the determinations of the will constantly and infallibly follow these two things in the understanding. One, the degree of good to be obtained and evil to be avoided proposed to the understanding and apprehended viewed and taken notice of by it. Two, the degree of the understanding's apprehension of that good or evil, which is increased by attention and consideration, that this is an opinion in which he is exceeding peremptory, as he is in every opinion which he maintains in his controversy with the Calvinists, with disdain of the contrary opinion as observed and self-contradictory will appear by the following words in his discourse on the five points. Now, it is certain that what naturally makes the understanding to perceive is evidence proposed and apprehended, considered or adverted to, for nothing else can be requisite to make us come to the knowledge of the truth. Again, what makes the will choose is something approved by the understanding and consequently appearing to the soul as good. And whatsoever it refuses is something represented by the understanding and so appearing to the will as evil. Once all that God requires of us is and can be only this, to refuse the evil and choose the good. Wherefore, to say that evidence proposed, apprehended and considered, is not sufficient to make the understanding approved or that the greatest good proposed, the greatest evil threatened, when equally believed and reflected on, is not sufficient to engage the will to choose the good and refuse the evil, is in effect to say that which alone doth move the will to choose or to refuse is not sufficient to engage it so to do, which being contradictory to itself must of necessity be false. Be it then so that we naturally have an aversion to the truths proposed to us in the gospel that only can make us indisposed to attend to them but cannot hinder our conviction when we do apprehend them and attend to them. Be it that there is in us also a, is a redundancy to the good we are to choose that only can indispose us to believe it is and to approve it as our chief is good. Be it that we are prone to the evil that we should decline that only can render it the more difficult for us to believe it is the worst of evils. But yet what we do really believe to be our chief is good will still be chosen and what we apprehend to be the worst of evils will, whilst we do continue under that conviction, be refused by us. It therefore can be only requisite in order to these ends that the good spirit should so illuminate our understandings that we attending to and considering what lies before us should apprehend and be convinced of our duty and that the blessings of the gospel should be so propounded to us as that we may discern them to be our chief is good and the miseries it threateneth so as we may be convinced that they are the worst of evils that we may choose the one and refuse the other. Here let it be observed how plainly and peremptorily it is asserted that the greatest good proposed and the greatest evil threatened when equally believed and reflected on is sufficient to engage the will to choose the good and refuse the evil. And is that alone which doth move the will to choose or to refuse and that it is contradictory to itself to suppose otherwise and therefore must of necessity be false and then what we do really believe to be our chief is good will still be chosen and what we apprehend to be the worst of evils will whilst we continue under that conviction be refused by us. Nothing could have been said more to the purpose fully to signify that the determinations of the will must ever more follow the illumination, conviction and notice of the understanding with regard to the greatest good and evil proposed reckoning both the degree of good and evil understood and the degree of understanding, notice and conviction of that proposed good and evil and that it is thus necessarily and can be otherwise in no instance because it is asserted that it implies a contradiction to suppose it ever to be otherwise. I am sensible the doctors aim in these assertions as against the Calvinists to show in opposition to them that there is no need of any physical operation of the spirit of God on the will to change and determine that to a good choice but that God's operation and assistance is only moral suggesting ideas to the understanding which he supposes to be enough if those ideas are attended to infallibly to obtain the end but whatever his design was nothing can more directly and fully proved that every determination of the will in choosing and refusing is necessary directly contrary to his own notion of the liberty of the will for if the determination of the will ever more in this manner follows the light, conviction and view of the understanding concerning the greatest good and evil and this be that alone which moves the will and it be a contradiction to suppose otherwise than it is necessarily so the will necessarily follows this light review of the understanding not only in some of its acts but in every act of choosing and refusing so that the will does not determine itself in any one of its own acts but every act of choice and refusal depends on and is necessarily connected with some and to see the cause which cause is not the will itself nor any act of its own nor anything pertaining to that faculty but something belonging to another faculty whose acts go before the will in all its acts and govern and determine them here if it should be replied that although it be true that according to the doctor the final determination of the will always depends upon and is infallibly connected with the understanding's conviction and notice of the greatest good yet the acts of the will are not necessary because that conviction of the understanding is first dependent on a preceding act of the will in determining to take notice of the evidence exhibited by which means the mind obtains that degree of conviction which is sufficient and effectual to determine the consequence and ultimate choice of the will and the will with regard to that preceding act whereby it determines whether to attend or know is not necessary and that in this the liberty of the will consists that when God holds forth sufficient objective light the will is at liberty whether to command the attention of the mind to it or not nothing can be more weak and inconsiderate than such replies this for that preceding act of the will in determining to attend and consider still is an act of the will if the liberty of the will consists in it as is supposed as if it be an act of the will it is an act of choice or refusal and therefore if what the doctor asserts be true it is determined by some antecedent light in the understanding concerning the greatest apparent good or evil for he asserts it is that light which alone doth move the will to choose or refuse and therefore the will must be moved by that in choosing to attend to the objective light offered in order to another consequent act of choice so that this act is no less necessary than the other and if we suppose another act of the will still preceding both these mentioned to determine both still that also must be an act of the will an act of choice and so must by the same principles be infallibly determined by some certain degree of light in the understanding concerning the greatest good and let us suppose as many acts of the will one preceding another as we please yet are they every one of them necessarily determined by a certain degree of light in the understanding concerning the greatest and most eligible good in that case and so not one of them free according to Dr. Whitby's notion of freedom and if it be said the reason why men do not attend to light held forth is because of ill habits contracted by evil acts committed before whereby their minds are indisposed to consider the truth held forth to them the difficulty is not at all avoided still the question returns what determined the will in those preceding evil acts it must by Dr. Whitby's principle still be the view of the understanding concerning the greatest good and evil if this view of the understanding be that alone which doth move the will to choose or refuse as the doctor asserts that every act of choice or refusal from a man's first existence is moved and determined by this view and this view of the understanding, exciting and governing the act must be before the act and therefore the will is necessarily determined in every one of its acts from a man's first existence by a cause beside the will and a cause that does not proceed from or depend on any act of the will at all which it once utterly abolishes the doctor's whole scheme of liberty of will and he at one stroke has cut the sinews of all his arguments from the goodness, righteousness, faithfulness and sincerity of God in his commands, promises, threatenings, calls, invitations and expostulations which he makes use of under the heads of reprobation, election, universal redemption sufficient and effectual grace and the freedom of the will of man and has made vain all his exclamations against the doctrine of a Calvinist as charging God with manifest unrighteousness, unfaithfulness hypocrisy, fallaciousness and cruelty Dr. Samuel Clark in his demonstration of the being and attributes of God to evade the argument to prove the necessity of elision from its necessary connection with the last dictate of the understanding supposes the latter not to be diverse from the act of the will itself but if it be so it will not alter the case as to the necessity of the act if the dictate of the understanding be the very same with the determination of the will as Dr. Clark supposes then this determination is no fruit or effect of choice and if so no liberty of choice has any hand in it it is necessary, that is, choice cannot prevent it if the last dictate of the understanding be the same with the determination of elision itself then the existence of that determination must be necessary as to elision in as much as elision can have no opportunity to determine whether it shall exist or no it having existence already before elision has opportunity to determine anything it is itself the very rise and existence of elision but a thing after it exists has no opportunity to determine as to its own existence it is too late for that if liberty consists in that which Armenians suppose these and the will determining its own acts having free opportunity and being without all necessity this is the same as to say that liberty consists in the soul having power and opportunity to have what determinations of the will it pleases and if the determinations of the will and the last dictates of the understanding be the same thing then liberty consists in the mind having power and opportunity to choose its own dictates of understanding but this is absurd for it is to make the determination of choice prior to the dictate of understanding and the ground of it which cannot consist with the dictate of the understanding being the determination of choice itself here is no alternative but to recur to the old absurdity of one determination before another and the cause of it and another before determining that and so on in the night if the last dictate of the understanding be the determination of the will itself and the soul be free with regard to that dictate in the Armenian notion of freedom then the soul before that dictate of his understanding exists voluntarily and according to its own choice determines in every case what that dictate of the understanding shall be otherwise that dictate as to the will is necessary and the acts determined by it must also be necessary so that here is a determination of the mind prior to that dictate of the understanding an act of choice going before it choosing and determining what that dictate of the understanding shall be and this preceding act of choice being a free act of will must also be the same with another last dictate of the understanding and if the mind also be free in that dictate of understanding that must be determined still by another and so on forever besides if the dictate of the understanding and determination of the will be the same this confounds the understanding and will and makes them the same whether they be the same or no I will not now dispute but only would observe that if it be so and the Armenian notion of liberty consists in a self-determining power in the understanding free of all necessity being independent, undetermined by anything prior to its own acts and determinations and the more the understanding is thus independent and sovereign over its own determinations the more free then the freedom of the soul as a moral agent must consist in the independence of the understanding on any evidence or appearance of things or anything whatsoever that stands forth to the view of the mind prior to the understanding's determination and what a liberty is this consisting in an ability, freedom and easiness of judging either according to evidence or against it having a sovereign command over itself at all times to judge either agreeably or disagreeably to what is plainly exhibited to its own view certainly it is no liberty that renders persons the proper subjects of persuasive reasoning arguments, despotulations and such like moral means and inducements the use of which with mankind is a main argument of the Armenians to defend their notion of liberty without all necessity for according to this the more free men are the less they are under the government of such means subject to the power of evidence and reason and more independent on their influence in their determinations and whether the understanding and will are the same or no as Dr. Clark seems to suppose yet in order to maintain the Armenian notion of liberty without necessity the free will is not determined by the understanding nor necessarily connected with the understanding and the further from such connection the greater the freedom and when the liberty is full and complete the determinations of the will have no connection at all with the dictates of the understanding and if so in vain are all the applications to the understanding in order to induce to any free virtuous act and so in vain are all instructions, councils, invitations expostulations and all arguments and persuasives whatsoever for these are but applications to the understanding and a clear and lively exhibition of the objects of choice to the mind's view that the will must be self-determined and independent on the understanding to what purpose are things thus represented to the understanding in order to determine the choice End of Part 2, Section 9 Part 2, Section 10 of the Freedom of the Will by Jonathan Edwards this LibriVox recording is in the public domain volition necessarily connected with the influence of motives with particular observations on the great inconsistence of Mr. Chubb's assertions and reasonings about the freedom of the will that every act of the will has some cause and consequently by what has been already proved has a necessary connection with its cause and so is necessary by a necessity of connection and consequence is evident by this that every act of the will whatsoever is excited by some motive which is manifest because if the mind unwilling after the manner it does is excited by no motive or inducement then it has no end which it proposes to itself or pursues in so doing it aims at nothing and seeks nothing and if it seeks nothing then it does not go after anything or exert any inclination or preference towards anything which brings the matter to a contradiction because for the mind to will something and for it to go after something by an act of preference and inclination are the same thing but if every act of the will is excited by a motive then that motive is the cause of the act if the acts of the will are excited by motives then motives are the causes of their being excited or which is the same thing the cause of their existence and if so the existence of the acts of the will is properly the effect of their motives motives do nothing has motives or inducements but by their influence and so much as is done by their influences the effect of them for that is the notion of an effect something that is brought to pass by the influence of something else and if volitions are properly the effects of their motives then they are necessarily connected with their motives every effect in event being as it was proved before necessarily connected with that which is the proper ground and reason of its existence thus it is manifest that volition is necessary and is not from any self-determining power in the will the volition which is caused by previous motive and inducement is not caused by the will exercising a sovereign power over itself to determine cause and excite volitions in itself this is not consistent with the will acting in a state of indifference and equilibrium to determine itself to a preference for the way in which motives operate is by biasing the will and giving it a certain inclination or preponderation one way here it may be proper to observe that Mr. Chubb in his collection of tracks on various subjects has advanced a scheme of liberty which is greatly divided against itself and thoroughly subversive of itself and that many ways one he is abundant in asserting that the will in all its acts is influenced by motive and excitement and that this is the previous ground and reason of all its acts and that it is never otherwise in any instance he says page 262 no action can take place without some motive to excite it and page 263 volition cannot take place without some previous reason or motive to induce it and page 310 action would not take place without some reason or motive to induce it he being absurd to suppose that the active faculty would be exerted without some previous reason to dispose the mind to action so also page 257 and he speaks of these things as what we may be absolutely certain of and which are the foundation the only foundation we have of certainty respecting God's moral perfections page 252 to 255 261 to 264 and yet at the same time by his scheme the influence of motives upon us to excite to action and to be actually a ground of volition is consequent on the volition or choice of the mind for he very greatly insists upon it that in all free actions before the mind is the subject of those volitions which motives excite it chooses to be so it chooses whether it will comply with the motive which presents itself in view or not and when various motives are presented it chooses which it will yield to and which it will reject page 256 every man has power to act or to refrain from acting agreeably with or contrary to any motive that presents page 257 every man is at liberty to act or refrain from acting agreeably with or contrary to what each of these motives considered singly would excite him too he has power and is as much at liberty to reject the motive that does prevail as he has power and is at liberty to reject those motives that do not and so page 310 311 in order to constitute a moral agent it is necessary that he should have power to act or to refrain from acting upon such moral motives as he pleases and to the like purpose in many other places according to these things the will acts first and chooses or refuses to comply with the motive that is presented before it falls under its prevailing influence and it is first determined by the mind's pleasure or choice what motives it will be induced by before it is induced by them now how may these things come together how can the mind first act and by its act of volition and choice determine how be the ground and reason of its volition and choice for this supposes the choice is already made before the motive has its effect and that the volition is already exerted before the motive prevails so as actually to be the ground of the volition and make the prevailing of the motive the consequence of the volition of which yet it is the ground if the mind is clearly chosen to comply with the motive and to yield to its excitement comes in too late and is needless afterwards if the mind is already chosen to yield to a motive which invites to a thing that implies and in fact is a choosing of the thing invited to and the very act of choice is before the influence of the motive which induces and is the ground of the choice the son is beforehand with the father that begets him the choice is supposed to be the ground of that influence of the motive which very influence is supposed to be the ground of the choice and so vice versa the choice is supposed to be the consequence of the influence of the motive which influence of the motive is the consequence of that very choice and besides if the will acts first towards the motive before it falls under its influence and the prevailing of the motive upon it to induce it to act and choose be the fruit and consequence of its act and choice then how is the motive a previous ground and choice so that in that nature of the things volition cannot take place without some previous reason and motive to induce it and that this act is consequent upon and follows the motive which things Mr. Chubb often asserts as of certain and undoubted truth so that the very same motive is both previous and consequent both before and after both the ground and fruit of the very same thing to agreeable to the fore mentioned consistent notion of the will first acting towards the motive choosing whether it will comply with it in order to it becoming a ground of the will's acting before any act of volition can take place Mr. Chubb frequently calls motives and excitements to the action of the will the passive ground or reason of that action which is a remarkable phrase then which I presume there is none more unintelligible and void of distinct and consistent meaning in all the writings of Don Skotis or Thomas Aquinas when he represents the motive volition as passive he must mean passive in that affair or passive with respect to that action which he speaks of otherwise it is nothing to the design of his argument he must mean if that can be called a meaning that the motive to volition is first acted upon or towards by the volition choosing to yield to it making it a ground of action or determining to fetch its influence from dense and so to make it a previous ground of its own excitation and existence which is the same absurdity as if one should say that the soul of man previous to its existence chose by what cause it would come into existence and acted upon its cause to fetch influence dense to bring it into being and so its cause was a passive ground of its existence Mr. Chubb very plainly supposes motive or excitement to be the ground of the being of volition he speaks of it as the ground or reason of the exertion of an act of that will page 391 and 392 and expressly says that volition cannot take place without some previous ground or motive to induce it page 363 and he speaks of the act as from the motive and from the influence of the motive page 352 and from the influence that the motive has on the man for the production of an action page 317 certainly there is no need of multiplying words about this it is easily judged whether motive can be the ground of volition taking place so that the very production of it is from the influence of the motive and yet the motive before it become the ground of the volition is passive or acted upon the volition but this I will say that a man who insists so much on clearness of meaning in others and is so much in blaming their confusion and inconsistence ought if he was able to have explained his meaning in this phrase of passive ground of action so as to show it not to be confused and inconsistent if any should suppose that Mr. Chubb when he speaks of motive as a passive ground of action does not mean passive with regard to that volition which it is the ground of that some other antecedent volition though his purpose and argument and whole discourse will by no means allow such a supposition yet it would not help the matter in the least for one if we suppose an act by which the soul chooses to yield to the invitation of a motive to another volition both these suppose volitions are in effect the very same a volition to yield to the force of a motive inviting to choose something comes to just the same thing as choosing the thing which the motive invites to as I observed before so that here can be no room to help the matter by distinction of two volitions to if the motive be passive not with respect to the same volition to which the motive excites but to one truly distinct and prior yet by Mr. Chubb that prior volition cannot take place without a motive or excitement as a previous ground of its existence for he insists that it is absurd to suppose any volition should take place without some previous motive to induce it so that at last it comes to just the same absurdity for every volition must have a previous motive then the very first in the whole series must be excited by a previous motive and yet the motive to that first volition is passive but cannot be passive with regard to another antecedent volition because by the supposition it is the very first therefore if it be passive with respect to any volition it must be so with regard to that very volition of which it is the ground and that is excited by it. Three the Mr. Chubb asserts as above that every volition has some motive and that in the nature of the thing no volition can take place without some motive to induce it yet he asserts that volition does not always follow the strongest motive or in other words is not governed by any superior strength of the motive that is followed beyond motives to the contrary previous to the volition itself his own words page 258 are as follow though with regard to physical causes that which is strongest always prevails yet it is otherwise with regard to moral causes of these sometimes the stronger sometimes the weaker prevails and the ground of this difference is evident namely that what we call moral causes strictly speaking are no causes at all but barely passive reasons of or excitements to the action or to the refraining from acting which excitements we have power or are at liberty to comply with or reject as I have showed above and so throughout the paragraph he in a variety of phrases and says that the will is not always determined by the strongest motive unless by strongest be preposterously mean actually prevailing in the event which is not in the motive but in the will but that the will is not always determined by the motive which is strongest by any strength previous to the volition itself and he elsewhere abundantly asserts that the will is determined by no superior strength or advantage that motives have from any constitutional state of things or any circumstances whatsoever previous to the actual determination of the will and indeed his whole discourse on human liberty implies that his whole scheme is founded upon it but these things cannot stand together there is a diversity of strength in motives to choice previous to the choice itself Mr. Chubb himself supposes that they do previously invite induce excite and dispose the mind to action this implies that they have something in themselves that is inviting some tendency to induce and dispose to volition previous to volition itself and if they have in themselves this nature and tendency doubtless they have it in certain limited degrees which are capable of diversity and some have it in greater degrees others and less and they that have most of this tendency considered with all their nature and circumstances previous to volition are the strongest motives and those that have least are the weakest motives now if volition sometimes does not follow the motive which is strongest or as most previous tendency or advantage all things considered to induce or excite that follows the weakest or that which as it stands previously in the mind's view has least tendency to induce it here in the will apparently acts wholly without motive without any previous reason to dispose the mind to it contrary to what the same author supposes the act wherein the will must proceed without a previous motive to induce it is the act of preferring the weakest motive for how absurd is it to say the mind sees previous reason in the motive to prefer that motive before the other and at the same time to suppose that there is nothing in the motive in its nature state or any circumstance of it whatsoever as it stands in the previous view of the mind that gives it any preference but on the contrary the other motive that stands in competition with it in all these respects has most belonging to it that is inviting and moving and as most about tendency to choice and preference this is certainly as much as to say there is previous ground and reason in the motive for the act of preference and yet no previous reason for it by the supposition as to all that is in the two rival motives which tends to preference previous to the act of preference it is not in that which is preferred but wholly in the other and yet Mr. Chubb supposes that the act of preferences from previous ground and reason in the motive which is preferred but are these things consistent can there be previous ground in a thing in the event that takes place and yet no previous tendency in it to that event if one thing follows another without any previous tendency to its following then I should think it very plain that it follows it without any manner of previous reason why it should follow yeah in this case Mr. Chubb supposes that the event follows an antecedent as the ground of its existence which has not only no tendency to it but a contrary tendency the event is the preference which the mind gives to that motive which is weaker as it stands in that previous view of the mind the immediate antecedent is the view the mind has of the two rival motives conjunctly in which previous view of the mind all the preferableness or previous tendency to preference is supposed to be on the other side or in the contrary motive and all the unworthiness of preference and so previous tendency to comparative neglect or undervaluing is on that side which is preferred and yet in this view of the mind is supposed to be the previous ground or reason of this active preference exciting it and disposing the mind to it which I leave the reader to judge whether it be absurd or not if it be not then it is not absurd to say that the previous tendency of an antecedent to a consequent is the ground and reason why that consequent does not follow and the want of a previous tendency to an event yet a tendency to the contrary is the true ground and reason why that event does follow an active choice or preference is a comparative act wherein the mind acts with reference to two or more things that are compared and standing competition in the mind's view if the mind in this comparative act prefers that which appears inferior in the comparison then the mind herein acts absolutely without motive or inducement or any temptation whatsoever then if a hungry man has the offer of two sorts of food to both which he finds an appetite but has a stronger appetite to one than the other and there be no circumstances or excitements whatsoever in the case to induce him to take either the one or the other but merely his appetite if in the choice he makes between them he chooses that which he has least appetite to and refuses that to which he has the strongest appetite this is a choice made absolutely without previous motive, excitement, reason, or temptation as much as if he were perfectly without all appetite to either because his volition in this case is a comparative act following a comparative view of the food which he chooses in which view his preference has absolutely no previous ground yet is against all previous ground and motive and if there be any principle in man from whence an active choice may arise after this manner from the same principle volition may arise wholly without motive on either side if the mind in its volition can go beyond motive then it can go without motive for when it is beyond the motive it is out of the reach of the motive out of the limits of its influence and so without motive if so this demonstrates the independence of volition on motive and no reason can be given for what Mr. Chubb so often asserts even in the nature of things volition cannot take place without a motive to induce it if the most high should endow a balance with agency or activity of nature in such a manner that when unequal weights are put into the scales its agency could enable it to cause that scale to descend which has the least weight and so to raise the greater weight this would clearly demonstrate that the motion of the balance does not depend on rates in the scales at least as much as if the balance should move itself when there is no weight in either scale and the activity of the balance which is sufficient to move itself against the greater weight must certainly be more than sufficient to move it when there is no weight at all Mr. Chubb supposes that the wheel cannot stir at all without some motive and also supposes that if there be a motive to one thing and none to the contrary volition will infallibly follow that motive this is virtually to suppose an entire dependence of the wheel on motives if it were not wholly dependent on them it could surely help itself a little without them or help itself a little against a motive without help from the strength and weight of a contrary motive and yet he is supposing that the wheel when it has before it various opposite motives can use them as it pleases and choose its own influence from them and neglect the strongest and follow the weakest supposes it to be fully independent on motives it further appears on Mr. Chubb's hypothesis that volition must be without any previous ground in any motive thus if it be as he supposes that the wheel is not determined by any previous superior strength of the motive but determines and chooses its own motive then when the rival motives are exactly equal in all respects it may follow either and may in such a case sometimes follow one sometimes the other and if so this diversity which appears between the acts of the wheel is plainly without previous ground in either of the motives for all that is previously in the motives is suppose precisely and perfectly the same without any diversity whatsoever now perfect identity as to all that is previous in the antecedent cannot be the ground and reason of diversity in the consequent perfect identity in the ground cannot be a reason why it is not followed with the same consequence and therefore the source of this diversity of consequence must be sought for elsewhere and lastly it may be observed that however much Mr. Chubb insists that no volition can take place without some motive to induce it which previously disposes the mind to it yet as he also insists that the mind without reference to any superior strength of motives picks and chooses for its motive to follow he himself here and plainly supposes that with regard to the mind's reference of one motive before another it is not the motive that disposes the will but the will disposes itself to follow the motive for Mr. Chubb supposes necessity to be utterly inconsistent with agency and that to suppose a being to be an agent in that which is necessary is a plain contradiction page 311 and throughout his discourses on the subject of liberty he supposes that necessity cannot consist with agency or freedom and that to suppose otherwise is to make liberty and necessity action and passion the same thing and so he seems to suppose that there is no action strictly speaking but volition and that as to the effects of volition and body or mind in themselves considered being necessary they are said to be free only as they are the effects of an act that is not necessary yet according to him volition itself is the effect of volition yea every act of free volition and therefore every act of free volition must by what has now been observed from him be necessary that every act of free volition is itself the effect of volition is abundantly supposed by him in page 341 he says if a man is such a creature as I have proved him to be that is if he has in him a power of liberty of doing either good or evil and either of these is the subject of his own free choice so that he might if he had pleased have chosen and done the contrary here he supposes all that is good or evil in man is the effect of his choice and so that his good or evil choice itself is the effect of his pleasure or choice in these words he might if he had pleased have chosen the contrary so in page 356 though it be highly reasonable that a man should always choose the greater good yet he may if he pleased choose otherwise which is the same thing as if he said he may if he chooses choose otherwise and then he goes on that is he may if he pleases choose what is good for himself et cetera and again in the same page the will is not confined by the understanding nor any particular sort of good whether greater or less but it is at liberty to choose what kind of good it pleases if there be any meaning in the last words it must be this that the will is at liberty to choose what kind of good it chooses to choose supposing the active choice itself determined by an antecedent choice the liberty Mr. Chubb speaks of is not only a man's power to move his body agreeable to an antecedent active choice to use or exert the faculties of his soul thus page 379 speaking of the faculties of the mind he says man has power and is at liberty to neglect these faculties to use them a right or to abuse them as he pleases and that he supposes an active choice or exercise of pleasure properly distinct from an antecedent to those acts thus chosen directing commanding and producing the chosen acts and even the acts of choice themselves is very plain in page 283 he can command his actions and herein consists his liberty he can give or deny himself that pleasure as he pleases and page 377 if the actions of men are not the produce of a free choice or election but spring from a necessity of nature he cannot in reason be the object of reward or punishment on their account whereas if action in man whether good or evil is the produce of will or free choice so that a man in either case had it in his power and was at liberty to have chosen the contrary he is the proper object of reward or punishment according as he chooses to behave himself herein these last words he speaks of liberty of choosing according as he chooses so that the behavior he speaks of as subject to his choice is his choosing itself as well as his external conduct consequent upon it and therefore it is evident he means not only external actions but the acts of choice themselves when he speaks of all free actions as the produce of free choice and this is abundantly evident in what he says elsewhere page 372, 373 now these things imply twofold great inconsistence one to suppose as Mr. Chubb plainly does that every free act of choice is commanded by and is the produce of free choice is to suppose the first free act of choice belonging to the KCA the first free act of choice that ever man exerted to be the produce of an antecedent act of choice but I hope I need not labor at all to convince my readers that it is an absurdity to say the very first act is the produce of another act that went before it two if it were both possible and real as Mr. Chubb insists that every free act of choice were the produce or the effect of a free act of choice yet even then according to his principles no one act of choice would be free but every one necessary because every act of choice being the effect of a foregoing act every act would be necessarily connected with that foregoing cause for Mr. Chubb himself says page 389 when the self-moving power is exerted it becomes the necessary cause of its effects so that his notion of a free act that is rewardable or punishable is a heap of contradictions it is a free act and yet by his own notion of freedom and therefore by him it is a contradiction to suppose it to be free according to him every free act is the produce of a free act so that there must be an infinite number of free acts in succession without any beginning in an agent that has a beginning and therefore here is an infinite number of free acts every one of them free and yet not any one of them free but every act in the whole infinite chain a necessary effect all the acts are rewardable or punishable and yet the agent cannot in reason be the object of reward or punishment on account of any one of these actions he is active in them all and passive in none yet active in none but passive in all etc five Mr. Chubb most strenuously denies that motives are causes of the acts of the will or that the moving principle in man is moved or caused to be exerted by motives his words page 388 and 389 are if the moving principle in man is moved or caused to be exerted by something external to man which all motives are then it would not be a self-moving principle seeing it would be moved by a principle external to itself and to say that a self-moving principle is moved or caused to be exerted by a cause external to itself is absurd and a contradiction etc the next page it is particularly and largely insisted that motives are causes in their case that they are merely passive in the production of action and have no causality in their production of it no causality to be the cause of the exertion of the will now I desire it may be considered how this can possibly consist with what he says in other places let it be noted here one Mr. Chubb abundantly speaks of motives as the cause of the will and says that motives do excite volition and induce it and that they are necessary to this end that in the reason and nature of things volition cannot take place without motives to excite it but now if motives excite the will they move it and yet he says it is absurd to say the will is moved by motives and again if language is of any significance see at all if motives excite volition then they are the cause of its being excited the cause volition to be excited is to cause it to be put forth or exerted yay Mr. Chubb says himself page 317 motive is necessary to the exertion of the active faculty to excite is positively to do something and certainly that which does something is the cause of the thing done by it to create is to cause to be created to make is to cause to be made to kill is to cause to be killed to quicken is to cause to be quickened and to excite is to cause to be excited to excite is to be a cause in the most proper sense not merely a negative occasion but a ground of existence by positive influence the notion of exciting is exerting influence to cause the effect to arise or come forth into existence to Mr. Chubb himself page 317 speaks of motives as the ground and reason of action by influence and by prevailing influence now what can be meant by a cause but something that is the ground and reason of a thing by its influence and influence that is prevalent and effectual three this author not only speaks of motives as the ground and reason of action by prevailing influence but expressly of their influence as prevailing for the production of an action page 317 which makes the inconsistency still more palpable and notorious the production of an effect is certainly the causing of an effect productive influence is causal influence if anything is and that which has this influence prevalently so is there about to become the ground of another thing is a cause of that thing if there be any such thing as a cause this influence Mr. Chubb says motives have to produce an action and yet he says it is absurd and a contradiction to say they are causes 4 in the same page he once again speaks of motives as disposing the agent to action by their influence his words of these as motive which takes place in the understanding and is the product of intelligence is necessary to action that is to the exertion of the active faculty because that faculty would not be exerted without some previous reason to dispose the mind to action so from hence it plainly appears that when a man is said to be disposed to one action rather than another this properly signifies the prevailing influence that one motive upon a man for the production of an action or for the beingUh rest before all other motives for the production of the contrary for as motive is the ground and reason of any action so the motive that prevails dispose as the agent to the performance of that action now if motives dispose the mind to action, then they cause the mind to be disposed and to cause the mind to be disposed is to cause it to be willing and to cause it to be willing is to cause it to us to be the cause of an act of the will. And yet the same Mr. Chubb holds it to be absurd to suppose motive to be the cause of the act of the will. And if we compare these things together, we have here again a whole heap of inconsistencies. Motives are the previous ground and reason of the acts of the will, yea, the necessary ground and reason of their exertion, without which they will not be exerted and cannot in the nature of things take place. And they do excite these acts of the will and do this by a prevailing influence. Yea, an influence which reveals for the production of the act of the will, and for the disposing of the mind to it. And yet it is absurd to suppose motive to be a cause of an act of the will, or that our principle of will is moved or caused to be exerted by it, or that it has any causality in the production of it, or any causality to be the cause of the exertion of the will. A due consideration of these things which Mr. Chubb has advanced, the strange and inconsistencies which his notion of liberty, consisting in the will's power of self-determination void of all necessity, united with that dictative common sense that there can be no volition without a motive, drove him into, maybe, sufficient to convince us that it is utterly impossible ever to make that notion of liberty consistent with the influence of motives in volition. And as it is in a manner self-evident that there can be no act of will, or preference of the mind without some motive or inducement, or anything in the mind's view which it aims at and goes after, so it is most manifest that there is no such liberty in the universe as Armenians insist on, nor any such thing possible or conceivable. End of Part 2, Section 10. Part 2, Section 11 of The Freedom of the Will by Jonathan Edwards. This Lieber-Vox recording is in the public domain. The evidence of God's certain foreknowledge of the volitions of moral agents, that the acts of the wills of moral agents are not contingent events in such a sense as to be without all necessity appears by God's certain foreknowledge of such events. In handling this argument, I would in the first place prove that God has a certain foreknowledge of the voluntary acts of moral agents and secondly show the consequence or how it follows from hence that the volitions of moral agents are not contingent so as to be without necessity of connection and consequence. First, I am to prove that God has an absolute and certain foreknowledge of the free actions of moral agents. One would think it wholly needless to enter on such an argument with any that profess themselves Christians, but so it is God's certain foreknowledge of the free acts of moral agents is denied by some that pretend to believe the scriptures to be the word of God and especially of late, I therefore shall consider the evidence of such a prescience in the most high as fully as the designed limits of this essay will admit supposing myself herein to have to do with such as own the truth of the Bible. Argument one, my first argument shall be taken from God's prediction of such events. Here I would in the first place lay down these two things as axioms. One if God does not foreknow, he cannot foretell such events that is he cannot preemptively and certainly foretell them. If God has no more than an uncertain guess concerning events of this kind than he can declare no more than an uncertain guess positively to foretell is to profess to foreknow or declare positive foreknowledge. Do if God does not certainly foreknow the future volitions of moral agents than neither can he certainly foreknow those events which are dependent on these volitions, the existence of the one depending on the existence of the other, the knowledge of the existence of the one depends on the knowledge of the existence of the other and the one cannot be more certain than the other. For how many, how great, and how extensive, so ever, the consequences of the volitions of more agents may be, though they should extend to an alteration of the state of things through the universe and should be continued in a series of successive events to all eternity and should in the progress of things branch forth into an infinite number of series, each of them going on in an endless chain of events. That must be as ignorant of all these consequences as he is of the volition whence they first take their rise and the whole state of things depending on them, how important, extensive, and vast, so ever, must be hid from him. These positions being such as I suppose none will deny, I now proceed to observe the following things, one, men's moral conduct and qualities, their virtues and vices, their wickedness and good practice, things rewardable and punishable, have often been foretold by God, Pharaoh's moral conduct in refusing to obey God's command in letting his people go was foretold, God says to Moses, Exodus 3, 19, I am sure that the king of Egypt will not let you go. True God professes not only to guess at, but to know, Pharaoh's future disobedience, in chapter 7, 4, God says, but Pharaoh shall not hearken unto you, that I may lay mine hand upon Egypt, etc. And chapter 9, 30, Moses says to Pharaoh, As for thee and thy servants, I know that ye will not fear the Lord. See also chapter 11, 9, the moral conduct of Josiah, by name in his zealously exerting himself to oppose idolatry, in particular acts was foretold above three hundred years before he was born, and the prophecy sealed by a miracle and renewed and confirmed by the words of a second prophet, as what surely would not fail. Kings 13, 1, 2, 6, 32. This prophecy was also, in effect, a prediction of the moral conduct of the people in upholding their sismetical and idolatrous worship until that time, and the idolatry of those priests of the high places which it is foretold, Josiah should offer upon that altar a Bethel. Micaiah foretold the foolish and sinful conduct of Ahab, in refusing to hearken to the word of the Lord by him, and choosing rather to hearken to the false prophets, in going to ramoth Gilead to his ruin. First Kings 21, 22, 22. The moral conduct of Haziel was foretold in that cruelty he should be guilty of, one which Haziel says, What is thy servant a dog that he should do this thing? The prophet speaks of the event as what he knew and not what he conjectured. Second Kings 8, 12. I know the evil that thou wilt do unto the children of Israel.  The moral conduct of Cyrus is foretold long before he had a being in his mercy to God's people and regard to the true God in turning the captivity of the Jews and promoting the building of the temple. Isaiah 44, 28, and 65, 13 compare Second Chronicles 36, 22, 23, and Ezra 1, 1 to 4. How many instances of the moral conduct of the Kings of the North and South, particular in instances of the wicked behavior of the Kings of Syria and Egypt are foretold in the 11th chapter of Daniel, their corruption, violence, robbery, treachery, and lives, and particularly how much is foretold of the horrid wickedness of Antiochus' epiphanies, called there a vile person instead of epiphanies or illustrious? In that chapter and also in chapter 8, verse 9, 14, 23 to the end are foretold his flattery, deceit, and lies, his having his heart set to do mischief and set against the Holy Covenant, his destroying and treading underfoot the holy people in a marvelous manner, his having indignation against the Holy Covenant, setting his heart against it and conspiring against it, his polluting the sanctuary of strength treading it underfoot, taking away the daily sacrifice and placing the abomination that maketh desolate, his great pride magnifying himself against God and uttering marvelous blasphemies against him, until God in indignation should destroy him, with all the moral conduct of the Jews on occasion of his persecution is predicted. It is foretold that he should corrupt many by flatteries, chapter 11, 32 to 34, but that others should behave with a glorious constancy and fortitude in opposition to him, verse 32, and that some good men should fall and repent, verse 35, Christ foretold Peter's sin in denying his Lord with its circumstances in a peremptory manner, and so that great sin of Judas in betraying his master and his dreadful and eternal punishment in hell was foretold in that like-positive manner, Matthew 26, 21 to 25, and parallel places in the other evangelists. To many events have been foretold by God, which are dependent on the moral conduct of particular persons, and were accomplished either by their virtuous or vicious actions. Thus the children of Israel's going down into Egypt to dwell there was foretold to Abraham, Genesis 15, which was brought about by the wickedness of Joseph's brethren in selling him and the wickedness of Joseph's mistress and his own signal virtue in resisting her temptation. The accomplishment of the thing prefigured in Joseph's dream depended on that same moral conduct. Japham's parable and prophecy, judges 9, 15 to 20, was accomplished by the wicked conduct of Abimelech and the men of Sechem. The prophecies against the house of Eli, 1 Samuel, chapters 2 and 3 were accomplished by the wickedness of Doag, the Edomite, in accusing the priests and the great impiety and extreme cruelty of Saul in destroying the priests at Nab, 1 Samuel, 22. Nathan's prophecy against David, 2 Samuel, 12, 11, 12, was fulfilled by the horrible wickedness of Absalom, in rebelling against his father seeking his life and lying with his concubines in the sight of the Son. The prophecy against Solomon, 1 Kings 11, 11 to 13, was fulfilled by Jeroboam's rebellion and usurpation, which are spoken of as his wickedness. 2 Chronicles 13, 5, 6, compare verse 18. The prophecy against Jeroboam's family, 1 Kings 14, was fulfilled by the conspiracy treason and cruel murders of Abashah, 2 Kings 15, 27, etc. The predictions of the prophet Yehu against the house of Abashah, 1 Kings 16 at the beginning were fulfilled by the treason and parasite of Zimri, 1 Kings 16, 9 to 13, 20. 3 How often has God foretold the future moral conduct of nations and people of numbers, bodies, and successions of men with God's judicial proceedings and many other events consequent and dependent on their virtues and vices, which could not be foreknown if the volitions of men wherein they acted as moral agents had not been foreseen. The future cruelty of the Egyptians, interpressing Israel and God's judging and punishing them for it, was foretold long before it came to pass, Genesis 15, 13, 14. The continuance of the iniquity of the Amorites and the increase of it until it should be full and the ripe for destruction was foretold above 400 years before. Genesis 15, 16 Acts 7, 6, 7. The prophecies of the destruction of Jerusalem and the land of Judah were absolute. 2 Kings 20, 17 to 19, Chapter 22, 15 to the end. It was foretold in Hezekiah's time and was abundantly insisted on in the book of the prophet Isaiah, who wrote nothing after Hezekiah's days. It was foretold in Josiah's time in the beginning of a great reformation, 2 Kings 22, and it is manifest by innumerable things in the predictions of the prophets relating to this event, its time, its circumstances, its continuance, and end. The return from the captivity, the restoration of the temple, city, and land, etc. I say these show plainly that the prophecies of this great event were absolute and yet this event was connected with and dependent on two things in men's moral conduct. First, the injurious rapine and violence of the king of Babylon and his people as the efficient cause, which God often speaks of as what he highly resented and would severely punish. And secondly, the final obstinacy of the Jews. That great event is often spoken of as suspended on this Jeremiah 4, 1, and 5, 1, 7, 1, 2, 7, 11, 1, to 6, 17, 24, to the end, 25, 1, to 7, 26, 1, to 8, 13, and 38, 17, 18. Therefore, this destruction and captivity could not be foreknown unless such a moral conduct of the Chaldeans and Jews had been foreknown. And then it was foretold that the people should be finally obstinate to the utter desolation of the city and land, Isaiah 6, 9, to 11, Jeremiah 1, 18, 19, 7, 27, to 29, Ezekiel 3, 7, and 24, 13, 14. The final obstinacy of those Jews who were left in the land of Israel in their idolatry and rejection of the true God was foretold by him and the prediction confirmed with an oath, Jeremiah 44, 26, 27, and God tells the people, Isaiah 48, 3, 4 to 8, that he had predicted those things which should be consequent on their treachery and obstinacy because he knew they would be obstinate and that he had declared these things beforehand for their conviction of his being the only true God, etc. The destruction of Babylon with many of the circumstances of it was foretold as the judgment of God for the exceeding pride and haughtiness of the heads of that monarchy, Nebuchadnezzar and his successors and their wickedly destroying other nations and particularly for their exalting themselves against the true God and his people before any of these monarchs had a being. Isaiah chapter 13, 14, 47 compare Habakkuk to 5 to the end in Jeremiah chapter 50 and 51. That Babylon's destruction was to be a recompense according to the works of their own hands appears by Jeremiah 25, 14. The immorality of which the people of Babylon and particularly her princes and great men were guilty that very night that the city was destroyed, their reveling and drunkenness it. Bel Shazar's idolatrous feasts was foretold Jeremiah 51, 39, 57. The return of the Jews from the Babylonian captivity is often very particularly foretold with many circumstances and the promises of it are very peremptory. Jeremiah 31, 35 to 40 and 32, 6 to 15, 41 to 44 and 33, 24 to 26. And the very time of their return was prefixed Jeremiah 25, 11, 12 and 29, 10, 11, 2 Chronicles 36, 21, Ezekiel 4, 6 and Daniel 9, 2. And yet the prophecies represent their return as consequent on their repentance and their repentance itself is very expressly and particularly foretold. Jeremiah 29, 12, 13, 14, 31, 8, 9, 18, 231, 33, 8, 54, 5, Ezekiel 6, 8, 9, 10, 7, 16, 14, 22, 23 and 20, 43, 44. It was foretold under the Old Testament that the Messiah should suffer greatly through the malice and cruelty of men as is largely and fully set forth. Psalms 22, applied to Christ in the New Testament. Matthew 27, 35, 43, Luke 23, 34, John 19, 24, Hebrews 2, 12, and likewise in Psalms 69, which it is also evident by the New Testament is spoken of Christ. John 15, 25, 7, 5, etc. And to 17 Romans 15, 3, Matthew 27, 34, 48, Mark 15, 23, John 19, 29. The same thing is also foretold Isaiah 53, and Micah 5, 1, this cruelty of men was their sin and what they acted as moral agents. It was foretold that there should be an union of heathen and Jewish rulers against Christ. Psalms 2, 1, 2, compared with Acts 4, 25, 228. It was foretold that the Jews should generally reject and despise the Messiah. Isaiah 49, 5, 6, 7, and 53, 1, 2, 3, Psalms 22, 6, 7, and 69, 48, 1920. And it was foretold that the body of that nation should be rejected in the Messiah's days from being God's people for their obstinacy and sin. Isaiah 49, 4, 2, 7, and 8, 14, 15, 16, compared with Romans 10, 19, and Isaiah 65, at the beginning compared with Romans 10, 20, 21. It was foretold that Christ should be rejected by the chief priests and rulers among the Jews. Psalms 118, 22, compared with Matthew 21, 42, Acts 4, 11, 1, 1 Peter 2, 4, 7. Christ himself foretold is being delivered into the hands of the elders, chief priests and scribes, and is being cruelly treated by them, and condemned to death, and that he by them should be delivered to the Gentiles, and that he should be mocked and scourged and crucified. Matthew 16, 21, and 20, 17 to 19, Luke 9, 22, John 8, 28, and that the people should be concerned in and consenting to his death, Luke 20, 13 to 18, especially the inhabitants of Jerusalem, Luke 13, 33 to 35. He foretold that the disciples should all be offended because of him, that night in which he was betrayed and should forsake him. Matthew 26, 31, John 16, 32. He foretold that he should be rejected of that generation, even the body of the people, and that they should continue obstinate to their ruin. Matthew 12, 45, 21, 33 to 42, and 22, 1 to 7, Luke 13, 16, 21, 24, 17, 25, 19, 14, 27, 41 to 44, 20, 13 to 18, and 23, 34 to 39. As it was foretold in both the Old Testament and the new that the Jews should reject the Messiah, so it was foretold that the Gentiles should receive him and so be admitted to the privileges of God's people. In places too many to be now particularly mentioned, it was foretold in the Old Testament that the Jews should envy the Gentiles on this account. Deuteronomy 32, 21, compared with Romans 10, 19, Christ himself often foretold that the Gentiles would embrace the true religion and become his followers and people. Matthew 12, 28, 10, 11, 12, 21, 41 to 43, and 22, 8 to 10, Luke 13, 28, 14, 16 to 24, and 20, 16, John 10, 16. He also foretold the Jews envy of the Gentiles on this occasion, Matthew 20, 12 to 16, Luke 15, 26 to the end. He foretold that they should continue in this opposition and envy and should manifest it in the cruel persecutions of his followers to their utter destruction. Matthew 21, 33 to 42, 22, 6, and 23, 34 to 39, Luke 16, 49 to 51. The obstinacy of the Jews is also foretold. Acts 22, 18. Christ often foretold the great persecutions his followers should meet with both from Jews and Gentiles. Matthew 10, 16 to 18, 21, 22, 34 to 36, and 24, 9, Mark 13, 9, Luke 10, 3, 12, 11, 49 to 53, and 21, 12, 16, 17, John 15, 18 to 21, and 16, 1 to 4, 20 to 22, 23. He foretold the martyrdom of particular persons, Matthew 20, 23, John 13, 36, and 21, 18, 19, 22. He foretold the great success of the gospel in the city of Samaria, as near approaching, which afterwards was fulfilled by the preaching of Philip, John 4, 35 to 38. He foretold the rising of many deceivers after his departure, Matthew 24, 45, 11, and the apostasy of many of his professed followers, Matthew 24, 10, 12. The persecutions which the apostle Paul was to meet with in the world were foretold Acts 9, 16, 20, 23, and 21, 11. The apostle says to the Christian Ephesians, Acts 20, 29, 30, I know that after my departure shall grievous wolves enter in among you, not sparing the flock. Also of your own selves shall men arise, speaking perverse things to draw away disciples after them. The apostle says he knew this, but he did not know it. If God did not know the future actions of moral agents. For unless God foreknows the future acts of moral agents, all the prophecies we have in scripture concerning the great anti-Christian apostasy, the rise rain, wicked qualities and deeds of the man of sin, and his instruments and adherents, the extent and long continuance of his dominion, his influence on the minds of princes and others, to corrupt them and draw them away to idolatry, and other foul vices, his great and cruel persecutions, the behavior of the saints under these great temptations, etc., etc., I say unless the volitions of moral agents are foreseen, all these prophecies are uttered without knowing the things foretold. The predictions relating to this great apostasy are all of a moral nature relating to men's virtues and vices, and their exercises, fruits and consequences, and events depending on them, and are very particular, and most of them often repeated with many precise characteristics, descriptions, and limitations of qualities, conduct, influence, effects, extent, duration, period circumstances, final issue, etc., which it would be tedious to mention particularly, and to suppose that all these are predicted by God without any certain knowledge of the future moral behavior of free agents would be, to the utmost degree, absurd. Five unless God foreknows the future acts of men's wills and their behavior as moral agents, all those great things which are foretold both in the Old Testament and the new concerning the erection, establishment, and universal extent of the kingdom of the Messiah were predicted and promised while God was in ignorance whether any of these things would come to pass or no, and did but guess at them, for that kingdom is not of this world, it does not consist in things external, but is within men, and consists in the dominion of virtue in their hearts and righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost and in these things made manifest in practice to the praise and glory of God, the Messiah came to save men from their sins and deliver them from their spiritual enemies, that they might serve him in righteousness and holiness before him. He gave himself for us that he might redeem us from all iniquity and purify unto himself a peculiar people zealous of good works, and therefore his success consists in gaining men's hearts to virtue in their being made God's willing people in the day of his power. His conquest of his enemies consists in his victory over men's corruptions and vices, and such a victory in such a dominion is often expressly foretold that his kingdom shall fill the earth, that all people, nations, and languages should serve and obey him, and so that all nations should go up to the mountain of the house of the Lord, that he might teach them his ways, and that they might walk in his paths, and that all men should be drawn to Christ and the earth be full of the knowledge of the Lord, true virtue in religion, as the waters cover the seas, that God's laws should be put into men's inward parts and written in their hearts, and that God's people should be all righteous, etc., etc. A very great part of the Old Testament prophecies taken up in such predictions as these, and here I would observe that the prophecies of the universal prevalence of the kingdom of the Messiah and true religion of Jesus Christ are delivered in the most peremptory manner and confirmed by the oath of God, Isaiah 45, 22, to the end, look unto me and be ye saved all the ends of the earth, for I am God and there is none else, I have sworn by myself the word is gone out of my mouth, in righteousness and shall not return that unto me every knee shall bow, and every tongue shall swear surely shall one say in the Lord have I righteousness and strength even to him shall men come, etc. But here this peremptory declaration and great oath of the most high are delivered with such mighty solemnity respecting things which God did not know if he did not certainly foresee the volitions of moral agents, and all the predictions of Christ and his apostles to the like purpose must be without knowledge as those of our Savior comparing the kingdom of God to a grain of mustard seed growing exceeding great from a small beginning and to leaven hidden three measures of meal until the whole was leavened, etc., and the prophecies in the epistles concerning the restoration of the Jewish nation to the true church of God and bringing in the fullness of the Gentiles and the prophecies and all the revelation concerning the glorious change in the moral state of the world of mankind attending the destruction of antichrist the kingdoms of the world becoming the kingdoms of our Lord and of his Christ and has been granted to the church to be a raid in that fine linen white and clean which is the righteousness of saints, etc. Corollary one hence that great promise and oath of God to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob so much celebrated in scripture both in the Old Testament and the new namely that in their seed all the nations and families of the earth should be blessed must be made on uncertainties if God does not certainly foreknow the volitions of moral agents for the fulfillment of this promise consists in that success of Christ in the work of redemption and that setting up of his spiritual kingdom over the nations of the world which has been spoken of, men are blessed in Christ no otherwise than as they are brought to acknowledge him, trust in him, love and serve him as is represented and predicted in Psalms 72 11 all kings shall fall down before him all nations shall serve him with verse 17 men shall be blessed in him all nations shall call him blessed this oath to Jacob and Abraham is fulfilled in subduing men's inequities as is implied in that of the prophet Micah chapter 7 1920 Corollary two hence also it appears that the first gospel promise that ever it was made to mankind that great prediction of the salvation of the Messiah and his victory over Satan made to our first parents Genesis 3 15 if there be no certain prescience of the volitions of moral agents must have no better foundation than conjecture for Christ victory over Satan consists in men's being saved from sin and in the victory of virtue and holiness over that vice and wickedness which Satan by his temptations has introduced and wherein his kingdom consists 6 if it be so that God has not a prescience of the future actions of moral agents it will follow that the prophecies of scripture in general are without foreknowledge for scripture prophecies almost all of them if not universally are either predictions of the actings and behavior of moral agents or of events depending on them or some way connected with them judicial dispensations judgments on men for their wickedness or rewards of virtue and righteousness remarkable manifestations of favor to the righteous or manifestations of sovereign mercy to sinners for giving their inequities and magnifying the riches of divine grace or dispensations of providence in some respect or other relating to the conduct of the subjects of God's moral government wisely adapted there to either providing for what should be in a future state of things through the volitions and voluntary actions of more agents or consequent upon them and regulated and ordered according to them so that all events that are for told are either moral events or others which are connected with and accommodated to them that the predictions of scripture in general must be without knowledge if God does not foresee the volitions of men will further appear if it be considered that almost all events belonging to the future state of the world of mankind the changes and revolutions which come to pass in empires kingdoms and nations and all societies depend in ways innumerable on the acts of men's wills yet on an innumerable multitude of millions of volitions such as the state and course of things in the world of mankind that one single event which appears in itself exceeding inconsiderable may in the progress and series of things occasion a succession of the greatest and most important and extensive events causing the state of mankind to be vastly different from what it would otherwise have been for all succeeding generations for instance the coming into existence of those particular men who have been the great conquers of the world which under God have had the main hand in all the consequent state of the world in all after ages such as Nebuchadnezzar Cyrus Alexander Pompey Julius Caesar etc undoubtedly depended on many millions of acts of the will in their parents and perhaps most of these volitions depended on millions of volitions in their contemporaries of the same generation and most of these are millions of millions of volitions in preceding generations as we go back still the number of volitions which were some way the occasion of the event multiply as the branches of a river until they come at last as it were to an infinite number this will not seem strange to anyone who well considers the matter if we recollect what philosophers tell us of the innumerable multitudes of those things which are the principia or stamina we tie concerned in generation the animalcula inseminate musculo and the aura in the womb of the female the impregnation of or animating of one of these in distinction from all the rest must depend on things infinitely minute relating to the time and circumstances of the act of the parents the state of their bodies etc which must depend on innumerable foregoing circumstances and occurrences which must depend infinite ways on foregoing acts of their wills which are occasioned by innumerable things that happen in the course of their lives in which their own in their neighbor's behavior must have a hand and an infinite number of ways does the volition of others must be so many ways concerned in the conception and birth of such men so no less in their preservation and circumstances of life their particular determinations and actions on which the great revolutions they were the occasions of depended as for instance when the conspirators in persia against the magi were consulting about a succession to the empire came into the mind of one of them to propose that he whose horse made first when they came together the next morning should be king now such a thing coming into his mind might depend on innumerable incidents wherein the volitions of mankind had been concerned but in consequence of this accident Darius the son of Heistaspis was king and if this had not been probably his successor would not have been the same and all the circumstances of the Persian empire might have been far otherwise then perhaps alexander might never have conquered that empire and then probably the circumstances of the world in all succeeding ages might have been vastly otherwise i might further instance in many other occurrences such as those on which depended alexander's preservation in the many critical junctures of his life wherein a small trifle would have turned the scale against him and the preservation and success of the Roman people in the infancy of their kingdom and commonwealth and afterwards upon which all the succeeding changes in their state and the mighty revolutions that afterwards came to pass in the habitable world depended but these hints may be sufficient for every discerning considerate person to convince him that the whole state of the world of mankind in all ages and the very being of every person who has ever lived in it in every age since the times of the ancient prophets has depended on more volitions or acts of the wills of men than there are sands on the seashore and therefore unless God does most exactly and perfectly foresee the future acts of men's wills all the predictions which he ever uttered concerning David Hezekiah, Josiah, Nebuchadnezzar, Cyrus Alexander concerning the four monarchies and the revolutions in them and concerning all the wars, commotions, victories, prosperity and calamities of any kingdoms, nations or communities in the world have all been without knowledge so that according to this notion God not foreseeing the volitions and free actions of men he could foresee nothing appertaining to the state of the world of mankind in future ages not so much as the being of one person that should live in it and could fore know no events but only such as he would bring to pass himself by the extraordinary interposition of his immediate power or things which should come to pass in the natural material world by the laws of motion and course of nature we're in that is independent on the actions or works of mankind that is as he might like a very able mathematician and astronomer with great exactness calculate the revolutions of the heavenly bodies and the greater wheels of the machine of the external creation and if we closely consider the matter there will appear reason to convince us that he could not with any absolute certainty foresee even these as to the first namely things done by the immediate and extraordinary interposition of God's power these cannot be foreseen unless it can be foreseen when there shall be occasion for such extraordinary interposition and that cannot be foreseen unless the state of the moral world can be foreseen for whenever God thus interposes it is with regard to the state of the moral world requiring such divine interposition thus God could not certainly foresee the universal deluge the calling of Abraham the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah the plagues on Egypt and Israel's redemption out of it the expelling of the seven nations of Canaan and the bringing Israel into that land for these all are represented as connected with things belonging to the state of the moral world nor can God foreknow the most proper and convenient time of the day of judgment and general conflagration for that chiefly depends on that course and state of things in the moral world nor secondly can we on this supposition reasonably think that God can certainly foresee what things shall come to pass in the course of things in the natural and material world even those which in an ordinary state of things might be calculated by a good astronomer for the moral world is the end of the natural world and the course of things in the former is undoubtedly subordinate to God's designs with respect to the latter therefore he has seen cause from regard to the state of things in the moral world extraordinarily to interpose to interrupt and lay an arrest on the course of things in the natural world and unless he can foresee the volitions of men and so know something of the future state of the moral world he cannot know but that he may still have as great occasion to interpose in this manner as ever he had nor can he foresee how or when he shall have occasion thus to interpose corollary one it appears from the things observed that unless God foresees the volitions of moral agents that cannot be true which is observed by the apostle James acts 1518 known unto God or all his works from the beginning of the world corollary two it appears that unless God foreknows the volitions of moral agents all the prophecies of scripture have no better foundation than mere conjecture and that in most instances a conjecture which must have the utmost uncertainty depending on an innumerable multitude of volitions which are all even to God uncertain events however these prophecies are delivered as absolute predictions and very many of them in the most positive manner with the separations and some of them with the most solemn oaths corollary three it also follows that if this notion of God's ignorance of future volitions be true in vain did Christ say after uttering many great and important predictions depending on men's moral actions Matthew 24 35 heaven and earth shall pass away but my words shall not pass away corollary four from the same notion of God's ignorance it would follow that in vain has he himself often spoken of the predictions of his word as evidences of foreknowledge of that which is his prerogative as God and his peculiar glory greatly distinguishing him from all other beings as in Isaiah 41 22 to 26 43 9 10 44 8 45 21 46 10 and 48 14 argument two if God does not foreknow the volitions of moral agents then he did not foreknow the fall of man nor angels and so could not foreknow the great things which are consequent on these events such as his sending his son into the world to die for sinners and all things pertaining to the great work of redemption all the things which were done for four thousand years before Christ came to prepare the way for it and the incarnation life death resurrection and ascension of Christ setting him at the head of the universe as king of heaven and earth angels and men and setting up his church and kingdom in this world and appointing him the judge of the world and all that Satan should do in the world in opposition to the kingdom of Christ and the great transactions of the day of judgment etc and if God was thus ignorant the following scriptures and others like them must be without any meaning or contrary to truth Ephesians 1 4 according as he hath chosen us in him before the foundation of the world 1 Peter 1 20 who barely was foreordained before the foundation of the world 2 Timothy 1 9 who has saved us and called us within holy calling not according to our works but according to his own purpose and grace which was given us in Christ Jesus before the world began so Ephesians 3 11 speaking of the wisdom of God in the work of redemption according to the eternal purpose which he proposed in Christ Jesus Titus 1 2 in hope of eternal life which God that cannot lie promise before the world began Romans 8 29 whom he did foreknow them also did predestinate etc 1 Peter 1 2 elect according to the foreknowledge of God the Father if God did not foreknow the fall of man nor the redemption by Jesus Christ nor the volitions of man since the fall then he did not foreknow the saints in any sense neither as particular persons nor as societies or nations either by election or by mere foresight of their virtue or good works or any foresight of anything about them relating to their salvation or any benefit they have by Christ or any manner of concern of theirs with a redeemer argument 3 on the supposition of God's ignorance of the future volitions of free agents it will follow that God must in many cases truly repent what he has done so as properly to wish he had done otherwise by reason that the event of things in those affairs which are most important these the affairs of his moral kingdom being uncertain and contingent often happens quite otherwise then he was before aware of and there would be reason to understand that in the most literal sense Genesis 6 6 it repented the Lord that he had made man on the earth and he grieved him at his heart and first Samuel 15 11 contrary to numbers 23 19 God is not the son of man that he should repent and first Samuel 15 29 also the strength of Israel will not lie no repent for he is not a man that he should repent yea from this notion it would follow that God is liable to repent and be grieved at his heart in a literal sense continually and is always exposed to an infinite number of real disappointments in governing the world and to manifold constant great perplexity and vexation but this is not very consistent with his title of God overall blessed forevermore which represents him as possessed of perfect constant and uninterrupted tranquility and felicity as God over the universe and in his management of the affairs of the world as supreme and universal ruler see Romans 125 9 5 2 Corinthians 11 31 1st Timothy 6 15 argument for it will also follow from this notion that as God is liable to be continually repenting of what he has done so he must be exposed to be constantly changing his mind and intentions as to his future conduct altering his measures relinquishing his old designs and forming new schemes and projects for his purposes even as to the main parts of his scheme such as belong to the state of his moral kingdom must be always liable to be broken through want of foresight and he must be continually putting his system to rights as he gets out of order through the contingents of the actions of moral agents he must be a being who instead of being absolutely immutable must necessarily be the subject of infinitely the most numerous acts of repentance and changes of intention of any being whatsoever for this plain reason that his vastly extensive charge comprehends an infinitely greater number of those things which are to him contingent and uncertain in such a situation he must have little else to do but to men broken links as well as he can and be rectifying his disjointed frame and disordered movements in the best manner the case will allow the supreme lord of all things must needs be under great immiscible disadvantages in governing the world which he has made and of which he has the care through his being utterly unable to find out things of chief importance which thereafter shall befall his system for which if he did but no he might make seasonable provision in many cases there may be very great necessity that he should make provision in the manner of his ordering and disposing things for some great events which are to happen a vast and extensive influence and endless consequence through the universe which he may see afterwards when it is too late and may wish in vain that he had known before that he might have ordered his affairs accordingly and it is in the power of man on these principles by his devices purposes and actions thus to disappoint God break his measures make him continually change his mind subject him to vexation and bring him into confusion but how do these things consist with reason or with the word of God which represents that all God's works all that he has ever to do the whole scheming series of his operations are from the beginning perfectly in his view and declares that whatever devices and designs are in the hearts of men the council of the Lord shall stand in the thoughts of his heart to all generations Proverbs 19 21 Psalms 33 10 11 and that which the Lord of hosts have proposed none shall disinalt Isaiah 14 27 and that he cannot be frustrated in one design or thought Job 42 2 and that which God doth it shall be forever that nothing can be put to it or taken from it Ecclesiastes 3 14 the stability and perpetuity of God's councils are expressly spoken of as connected with his foreknowledge Isaiah 46 10 declaring the end from the beginning and from ancient times the things that are not yet done saying my council shall stand and I will do my pleasure and how are these things consistent with what the scripture says of God's immutability which represents him as without variable-ness or shadow of turning and speaks of him most particularly as unchangeable with regard to his purposes Malachi 3 6 I am the Lord I change not therefore ye sons of Jacob are not consumed Exodus 3 14 I am that I am Job 23 13 14 he is in one mind and who can turn him and what his soul desireth even that he doth for he performeth the thing that is appointed for me argument 5 if this notion of God's ignorance of future volitions of moral agents be thoroughly considered in its consequences it will appear to follow from it that God after he had made the world was liable to be wholly frustrated of his end in the creation of it and so has been in like manner liable to be frustrated of his end in all the great work he had wrought it is manifest the moral world is the end of the natural the rest of the creation is but a house which God hath built with furniture or moral agents and the good or bad state of the moral world depends on the improvement they make of their natural agency and so depends on their volitions and therefore if these cannot be foreseen by God because they are contingent and subject to no kind of necessity then the affairs of the moral world are liable to go wrong do any assignable degree ye liable to be utterly ruined as on this scheme it may well be supposed to be literally said when mankind by the abuse of their moral agency became very corrupt before the flood that the Lord repented that he had made man on the earth and it grieved him at his heart so when he made the universe he did not know but that he might be so disappointed in it that it might grieve him at his heart that he had made it it actually proved that all mankind became sinful and a very great part of the angels apostas ties and how could God know before that all of them would not and how could God know but that all mankind notwithstanding means used to reclaim them being still left to the freedom of their own will would continue in their apostasy and grow worse and worse as they of the old world before the flood did according to the scheme I am endeavoring to confute the fall of neither men nor angels could be foreseen and God must be greatly disappointed in these events and so the grand contrivance for our redemption and destroying the works of the devil by the Messiah and all the great things God has done in the prosecution of these designs must be only the fruits of his own disappointment contrivances to men as well as he could his system which originally was all very good and perfectly beautiful but was broken and confounded by the free will of angels and men and still he must be labelled to be totally disappointed a second time he could not know that he should have his desired success in the incarnation life death resurrection and exaltation of his only begotten son and other great works accomplished to restore the state of things he could not know after all whether there would actually be any tolerable measure of restoration for this depended on the free will of man there has been a general great apostasy of almost all the Christian world to that which was worse than heathenism which continued for many ages and how could God without foreseeing men's volitions know whether ever Christendom would return from this apostasy and which way would he foretell how soon it would begin the apostle says it began to work in his time and how could it be known how far it would proceed in that age yea how could it be known that the gospel which was not effectual for the reformation of the Jews would ever be effectual for the turning of the heathen nations from their heathen apostasy which they have been confirmed in for so many ages it is represented often in scripture that God who made the world for himself and created it for his pleasure would infallibly obtain his end in the creation and in all his works that as all things are of him so they would all be to him and that in the final issue of things it would appear that he is the first and the last revelations 21-6 and he said unto me it is done I am Alpha and Omega the beginning and the end the first and the last but these things are not consistent with God's liability to be disappointed in all his works nor indeed with his failing of his end in anything that he has undertaken in the part two section 11