And it's my pleasure, along with Chris Johnson, to welcome you to our joint symposium today on China-Taiwan United States relations. We're now almost at the five-year point of Ma Yingzhou's presidency. We're about at the two-month point of Xi Jinping's total assumption of his various positions that add up to being the paramount leader. And so this seemed like a good time to assess where cross-strait relations in the American role are. We've assembled three good panels on various aspects of these issues. And I think we're going to have a really good discussion. Before I sort of leave the stage, I want to express my appreciation to the people who really made this happen. And that's the staff of two organizations, Kevin Scott and Aileen Chang on my staff. And at the Freeman chair, Nicole White did Yo-Person's duty to help pull this all together. And Chris and I appreciate their efforts very much. So without further ado, Chris. Thank you, Richard. I'll just be very brief. Thank you all for coming. We really appreciate folks coming out. And I think the turnout in the room is a good indicator that we picked a good topic today and that there's very strong continuing interest in cross-strait relations. When I first talked to Richard about doing this, we both agreed that with all of the other many issues that are kind of circulating and are the focus of attention in the region these days with the various island disputes and now again with North Korea and so on, we both sort of thought that it would be a helpful time to take a little step back and look at US, Taiwan, China, triangular relations and to get a sense of where it's all going now that we've had a complete turnover in all the respective leaderships and are moving forward in all of the key teams moving ahead. So without further ado, what I'd like to do is welcome our first panel to come up. And we'll get started on a very fruitful discussion. Thank you again for coming. And we'll get going here. Thanks. OK, well, let me just do a brief introduction of our speakers today. And we will get things kicked off here. We're going to ask Yun Sun to come up and kick us off with a discussion of China. She's a visiting fellow jointly appointed by the Brookings John L. Thornton Center and the Africa Growth Initiative. And she's focusing on China's relations with Africa and US-China cooperation on the continent. In 2011, she was a visiting fellow with the Brookings Center for Northeast Asia Policy Studies where she focused on analysis of China's national security decision-making system. So that's why we've asked her to come and talk to us today. She was previously a visiting fellow with the East Asia program at the Stimson Center. And prior to that, she was a China analyst for the International Crisis Group's Northeast Asia project based in Beijing. Her expertise is in Chinese domestic and foreign policy and US-China relations. And she served in a bunch of very prestigious past appointments. Secondly, we're going to have Emerson Nio, a professor of political science at Duke University, come and talk to us about Taiwan. He's the co-author of Balance of Power, which was published by Cambridge University Press in 1989 and has a series of other recent publications that you can see from his biography in your packet. And then we're going to ask Tom Mann to come up and bat clean up and try to explain our own mess here in Washington to us. And he is the W. Avril Harriman Chair and Senior Fellow in Government Studies at the Brookings Institution. And between 1987 and 1999, he was Director of Governmental Studies at Brookings. And before that, he was Executive Director of the American Political Science Association. He's taught at Princeton, Johns Hopkins, Georgetown, the University of Virginia, and a few other very prestigious institutions. So we're very honored to have him with us today. And we're looking forward to a good discussion. So without further review, I'm going to ask Yun Sun to come up and kick us off. Thank you. Thank you very much, Chris, for the gracious introduction. And thanks to Brookings Synapse and CSIS for inviting me here to be today. While my talk is going to focus on two aspects of the Chinese new leader. One is domestic politics. What are the new things that Xi Jinping has delivered so far? And then I'm going to focus on the foreign policy front. What are the new developments that we have observed since he's taking over the power as a top Chinese leader? So it has been almost six months since Xi Jinping was elected as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party at the 18th Party's Congress. And more than a month since his inauguration as China's new president. Given his personal background as a princeling, his experience during the Cultural Revolution and his record of gradually rising to the highest office in China through claiming the bureaucratic ladder, people have had great hopes for him to bring changes to the existing system. The expectation was heightened and strengthened by the senior-level scandals before the end of the Hu Jintao administration in 2011 and 2012. So there was an ensuing perception that the Chinese Communist Party regime has come to a point that it has to adapt and change. So the Chinese also have an oath saying that a new official must start his reign with something new. So perhaps we could start with an examination on the new things that Xi Jinping has created in the domestic politics. So most importantly, Xi Jinping has strived to create a new style of the government that is low-profile, frugal, pragmatic, and pro-the-people. Right after the 18th Party's Congress, Xi Jinping took the first official inspection tour to Shenzhen in Guangdong province in December. For the trip, unlike his predecessors, Xi Jinping ordered that there would be no red carpets, no extravagant banquets, no massive security preparations and no traffic control during his visit. For the Chinese people who are used to the long speeches of the top leaders, extensive welcoming ceremonies, including children presenting flowers, messy traffic due to the road blockage, Xi's new style sends a tacit but powerful message of major differences between him and the previous generations of leaders. So Xi has made the, secondly, Xi has made anti-corruption, a top priority for his government. This echoes people's resentment and frustration of the epidemic corruption of the government officials across the country. Xi made a famous vow to strike both the flies and tigers, referring to corrupted officials both on the grass root level and on the senior level. And there have been several dozens of officials removed, investigated, arrested for corruption since Xi took office. A large percentage of these officials, they are the municipal level or the department level in the central government bureaucracy in terms of their ranking. So the highest case was the deputy party secretary of the Sichuan province, Li Chuncheng, who was also an alternate member of the central committee of the Chinese Communist Party. So that is to say the strike, the anti-corruption campaign under Xi has reached some senior level people, but it has not reached the top level. So some people will argue that this corruption is not genuine or not meaningful unless it really targets and deals with the official, the corruption on the top level, but the scale and the results of his anti-corruption campaign still is rather unprecedented in the Chinese domestic politics. As a part of the anti-corruption campaign, Xi made frugality, a primary requirement for the government officials. As the government bends fancy banquets and extravagant high-priced traditional Chinese liquor, high-end restaurants and liquor industry in China are taking a major hit. So the, for example, the high-end restaurant industry in Beijing, in general, has seen the first negative growth in decades. And some of the restaurants even have experienced a loss as high as 50%, 50%. And hotels such as Shangri-Lao, which I'm sure many of you have stayed there, resorted to developing new menus to cater to the new reality, offering $15 per person lunch option to the government agencies. But still, so far it has not attracted a lot of businesses. Since taking office, Xi has inspected several PLA segments inside China. In December last year, he inspected Guangzhou Military Region, which is under the Army. In February, he visited the Air Force base in Western China. And earlier this month, he visited the PLA Naval Force based in Sanya of Hainan Province. So some argue that these trips were aimed at consolidating his control of the Chinese military. However, a key message that Xi Jinping has sent throughout these visits is that the Chinese military must be ready for combat, which is rather interesting. And given the challenging external environment China faces in this periphery, people in China generally see this as an emphasis on the new leaders' emphasis on the military preparedness for the worst case scenario. So these new policies by Xi Jinping has been relatively well received by its general public in China. People seem to accept that Xi has created a new governance style, distinguishing himself from the previous generations of leaders. The expectation is genuine and high for him to address some of the most critical problems facing the Chinese people, such as a high housing price, pollution, and the rampant corruption issue. And so far, people do not seem to be disappointed already. The relatively clean record of Xi's family members, the good image of his wife, all contributed to this positive outlook. As for whether Xi will bring the major changes to the system such as political democratization, there are critics questioning whether Xi is only making cosmetic changes to the system rather than addressing the core issue. That the first controversy he had experienced was Southern Weekly, which is a Chinese publication from Guangzhou. It was Southern Weekly's New Year's edition calling for constitutionalism and how the censorship by the Department of Propaganda destroyed his original story, hindering the freedom of information and free price. The Guangdong government was able to mediate the compromise in the end between the Southern Weekly and the Department of Propaganda. But Xi himself didn't seem to have played a major role in the resolution of this controversy. Then following the controversial issue, there were rampant hopes that Xi might signal bigger changes by releasing Liu Xiaobo, by re-addressing the Tiananmen event of 1989, or even by the abolishment of the notorious re-educations through labor program in China. But so far none of this has happened. And in my personal view, these are unlikely to happen in the near future because today's Chinese politics is still characterized with different political factions, collectiveness you're making, and the wide existence of interest groups and political conservatism. So despite Xi Jinping's new style and his seemingly stronger power base compared to his predecessor, Xi by himself is still subject to the various constraints inside China. Especially as a new leader of the party, he could hardly afford to eliminate either the leftist or the rightist since the very beginning. In addition, in the near future, Xi Jinping also has more pressing task to tackle. On the foreign policy front, there are some more interesting developments. First of all, on the US with, on the relationship with the United States, China seems to be more cooperative and conciliatory than before. I'll listen to the expert advice from Chris. As after the tense and contentious past three to four years, China, according to the people that I know inside China, China has come to the realization that such a confrontational posture is neither sustainable nor conducive to China's national interest. So therefore, since the beginning of the new Xi administration, Beijing has been eager to turn a new page of the US-China relations or in Xi's own words to build a new type of big power relations. Understanding that China would need to deliver something concrete to open that new page, China has chosen to be more cooperative on a key concern of the United States in the North East Asia, which is North Korea. In the most recent roundup nuclear test and rhetorical provocations by Pyongyang, China has moderately adjusted its policy, lending support to the UN Security Council resolution and putting more pressure on Pyongyang than before. It is reported that China cut crude oil supplies to North Korea in February, possibly as a punishment for its nuclear test. Authorities in Beijing also issued warnings to several North Korean banks to operate within their permitted limits inside China. Although we're suspicious that these were more tactical moves aimed at building a better US-China relations rather than representing a strategic shift of China's fundamental position on North Korea, still they would nevertheless turn out to be helpful to manage the tension on the Korean peninsula. On a similar case of the Iran nuclear issue, China's action has also been promising. In 2012, China's crude import from Iran dropped by 21% compared with the previous year. So we probably will never get Chinese officials to acknowledge that China was actually complying to the US sanction on Iran for its nuclear program. Nevertheless, the end result does reinforce Washington's policy targets. The aspiration for a new page of the US-China relations was also conspicuous during Secretary of State John Kerry's visit to Beijing last week. Many in China have blamed the problems of US-China relations in the past three to four years on the positions and styles of the former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. And therefore, there was a hope that a more moderate and pragmatic John Kerry would be good news for China. And indeed, the conclusion in Beijing is that he is. For Chinese foreign policy analysts, the US rebalancing to Asia was mostly, had been mostly about a enhanced military deployment in China's immediate periphery and surprising China's expanding geopolitical influence. So therefore, when Kerry emphasized US economic leadership, competitiveness, and TPP, it was particularly comforting and reassuring for China. So Global Times, the famous government mousepiece, openly claimed that US adjustment of its China policy eases China's anxiety about its external strategic environment in the past few years. For Beijing, a new era of an improved US-China relations seems to have begun. Another interesting development of Xi's foreign policy is the emphasis on the developing countries and its neighbors. So for his first overseas visit, Xi visited Russia, three African countries, and attended the Brick Summit in South Africa. So as usual, she brought packages of infrastructure projects. And I usually, China committed to the establishment of a Bricks Development Bank, modeled after the China Development Bank. The choices of this nation actually revealed the international quiet mirror that China has seen. The past 10 years, so basically the 10 years during the Hu Jintao administration, witnessed unprecedented growth of Chinese economy, but it was also accompanied by unparalleled, unparalleled foreign policy challenges. So as many Chinese analysts observed, China's external environment did not improve as a result of China's rise. Instead, it has worsened. China has become richer, but less respected. It has more transactions with the world than ever, but also less friends. So therefore, Xi's trip to Russia, to Africa and the Brick Summit, jointly reflects China's strategic moves to break away from this predicament. It seeks to reconsolidate the friendship with Russia, also antagonized by the West, with Africa to reinforce China's developing country's identity and the solidarity with the developing world, and with the emerging economies such as Bricks Nation to align for their collective power. China learned its lessons that it is yet to be strong enough to challenge the existing international order alone, alignment with other rising powers, like in the case of Bricks, and reinforcing its friendship base among developing countries would be a new emphasis of China's foreign policy under Xi Jinping in the foreseeable future. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Fantastic. Thank you so much. That's a great way to kick off. And Emerson, please. All right, good morning, everyone. I have prepared some slides to share with you. And the theme today I'm going to talk about is the China factor in Taiwanese politics. I'm going to focus on three aspects of this question. And actually, I will focus mainly on the first one, the views in Taiwan, on how Taiwan should approach and engage China. And the second one is fairly easy. What do Taiwanese want? Taiwanese want security, prosperity, and dignity. So that's easy to answer. The third one, I'm going to ask your help, because either I will run out of time before I get to that, because you are more experienced than I am in that area. So let's move on. To talk about the main views in Taiwan, I use survey data. Why? Because Taiwan is a democracy. We need to know what the people want. So probably you won't hear me talking about what Ma Ying-jeu thinks. I don't know. But I can tell you what Taiwanese voters, they think, they want. And I've been doing surveys on this topic since 2003. And I have six survey data sets, and they are open to the public. So we can talk about how you can obtain this data later. Let's move on. Well, first, some softball questions. We ask Taiwanese, how do you like Americans? How do you like not Americans? Do the United States, Japan, China? So, sure, on average, Taiwanese feel the warmest toward the United States, right? Japan second and China last. But we can extract more information from these questions. We can find out how much, there's no pointer. Like, who ranked USA first? A means America, right? Who ranked USA first, China second, Japan last? Last, all right? Who ranked American first, Japan second, China last? All right? So we can have a preference rankings, given these three scores, all right? And so, well, so you can see that USA is ranked at the top by many respondents. And Japan and China is, well, we can take a look at this more aggregate statistics, all right? But here, you can see that X means, say, United States, used United States as an example, right? 20% of the respondents ranked the United States at the top. All right? And about 25% ranked the United States at the top. But the US shared the first position with any other country, all right? And about 10% ranked the US at the bottom, all right? And you can see that in Taiwan, among these three countries, all right, China is ranked at the bottom by more than 50% of the respondents, all right? So at least in Taiwan, among these three countries, all right, Taiwanese feel the least warmest toward China and the most warmest toward the United States, all right? And also, you know, we all know that Taiwan and China have very strong ties, but just give you some statistics, all right, and I think this is amazing. More than 40% of the eligible voters in Taiwan have visited China, all right? Many of them, about 20% of them have visited China more than three times, all right? And since 2003, the increase is about 10% to 15% of increase of visits, all right? And also, how many people in your family is doing business in China? 16%, that's a huge number, all right? Among the eligible voters, about one sixth of them have family members doing business in China, all right? Let's say a rough estimate is one million businessmen in China. Each person's income affects a whole household's livelihood. On average, that's about three votes, all right? So that's three million votes and Taiwan has about 12 million eligible votes. That's a quarter of the eligible votes are related to personal business employment in China. So that's a huge number, all right? And the statistics I obtained from the Statistics Bureau shows you the trade between China and Taiwan, you know, just amazing. Last year, it hits $169 billion. Give you a reference point. The US and Germany total trade last year was only less than that, $158 billion. The largest economy and the fourth largest economy, the total trade between them is 158, but the trade between Taiwan and China is 169, all right? And two means Taiwan's export to China and 32 means China's export to Taiwan. So you can see that Taiwan's economy really depends on China, right? More than 20% of Taiwan's export goes to China and only about 4% of China's export goes to Taiwan, all right? All right, so of course you ask Taiwanese, do they worry about the strong trade relation with China? So we say, you know, some people believe that if Taiwan's economy overly depends on China, then China might use its economy leverage to cause Taiwan to make political concession. You agree with this view, all right? Two thirds of them agree. They have this worry, all right? This economy leverage can be used for political purpose, all right? But then you ask them, do you want to trade more with China? 55%, 56% say, yeah, we need to trade even more with China, all right? On the one hand, they worry about China using its economy leverage. On the other hand, they feel the necessity to expand trade further with China, all right? That's like a conundrum for a small power. It's like, gee, they don't want to be coerced, but sometimes they just have to do it. And when we talk about Taiwan, Taiwan independence, this issue is unavoidable, but we know that most people in Taiwan want to maintain the status quo, all right? But that's prime then, see, under what conditions they will move away from the status quo, all right? According to other statistics surveys, they show you 90% of Taiwanese want to maintain the status quo. All right, let's ask them, well, when under what condition you will move away from the status quo, all right? Toward independence and toward unification, all right? So some hypothetical questions, all right? So if the coloration of independence by Taiwan will cause China to attack Taiwan, do you, in Chinese, is Zhan Bu Zhan Chen, all right? It's like, do you favor, that might be the closest translation I can come up, favor Taiwan independence, all right? So majority of them don't favor Taiwan independence if it means war, all right? But if you ask them, if a declaration of independence by Taiwan will not cause China to attack Taiwan, do you favor independence? Then 70% say, yeah, let's go for it, all right? So you can see the switch. So those missiles deploy along the Fujian province, they take home points and say, God, those missiles really work, all right? Clearly deter a lot of Taiwanese, all right? So we can use these two questions to divide the respondents into many three categories. Those will answer yes to both questions. Any cost, I will support independence. No yes means I will only support independence if there's no war, all right? So they are conditional, we don't want war. But if there's no war, then I'm willing to support it. And these respondents, they do not want, they do not accept independence at any cost. They don't care whether it means war or no war, all right? So we can divide, classify respondents into those three groups, all right? So you can see that a lot of respondents in this conditional preference have conditional preferences in that category. And since 2003 to 2012, we conducted six surveys. You can see that those in the middle group, those who have conditional preferences, stay fairly constant. But what happened the last two years? All right, because clearly, it's a no decrease, it's a yes increase by at least five, six percent points, right? Remember yes means those strong independent supporters, right? Only if no war is the conditional independent supporters, no means they don't support independence, all right? And we can do the same to the respondents by asking them any other questions on unification, right? That is, well, hypothetically again, if there's a significant difference between Taiwan and mainland China, right? Political, economic, and social conditions, do you favor unification? I mean, big difference, right? No, right? 77% say no, we don't want unification that way. But if you ask them, hey, if the two sides, the political, economic, and social conditions become more similar, do you favor unification? They're more respondents favor unification, right? But still, under no condition, they will want unification is more than a majority now, right? 54% of the respondents say under no condition, we would support unification. And show you, this is a big shift, all right? Because when we started conducting the survey, asking these questions, the percentage was 29%. Over the last 10 years, it increased almost double. They switched from conditional to just no, not even maybe, right? There's no maybe for a majority of the respondents, right? Now it's a majority of them. Is this trend reversible, right? It's easy to deter Taiwan from moving toward independence, but it's very difficult to facilitate unification, to win their heart, all right? To have unification, right? Well, let's move on a little bit. All right, that's what they want, all right? But we also asked them, well, we say, some people believe that China and Taiwan will become united in the future, and some people believe that Taiwan will eventually become independent from China, which position do you agree with more? That is realistically, do you think that Taiwan can become independent, or the two sides will become united, all right? What you want, your preference is one thing, but your estimate, your expectation of what will happen in the future is the other thing, all right? Turn out, still a majority of the respondents say unification is more likely to happen. Although majority of them don't want unification, let's add a small powers conundrum. They don't want it, but they think it's going to happen anyway, all right? 52.7% of the respondents say, hey, unification is more likely to happen. Even those strong independent supporters, the yes, those strong independent supporters, more than one third, then unification will happen. All right, those conditional independent supporters, more than 60, about 60% think that unification will still happen, all right? So their preference tells you something, and their expectation sends you a different message, all right? So that's something that China can work on, all right? Because something are driving the difference between preference and expectation, all right? And we can ignore this, that's a focus on this. It shows you politics sometimes, so beautiful, yeah? Just those independent supporters, no, no, people's position on independence, all right? We say, okay, ask them the likelihood that independence can be achieved, at 11 point scale, zero to 10, 10 is the most likely, zero is the least likely, all right? The green line means those strong independent supporters, still, most of them don't think are not very optimistic. Taiwan independence unification issues are the top, the hardest issue in Taiwan, but you ask them, is it likely to achieve your goal? No, but they still want to fight about it, all right? Even strong independent supporters don't think independence can be achieved, but they still go to the alley, go knock down the door of the justice, the chief, I don't know, but anyway, it's a politics. Politics is beautiful, I mean. Anyway, so preference and expectation diverge, all right? I think that there's a lot of things, a lot of studies can be done in that area. What's driving the difference? Some questions, just to share with you, just let's go over this. So how to deal with China's military threat, you know? So Taiwanese, they say, well, that's not confront China, that's take more moderate policies, all right? That's not having arms race with China, all right? Very conciliatory. If China withdraws its missile along the southeast coast, do you favor a reduction in arms purchase from the US? Yes, you know, all right? That's not provoke China, all right? And do you think our military is capable of defending Taiwan? No, 91% doesn't think that Taiwan's national defense is strong enough, all right? Taiwanese voters are just so honest, so, yeah, so. They don't think Taiwan can withstand. So do you favor like an interim agreement? Yes, 82%, all right? You can see they are very, and okay, this is interesting, say, some people believe that Taiwan's already an independent country, its name is Republic China, and there's no need to seek further independence. Do you agree or disagree with this view?  And is the current relation between China and Taiwan peaceful or hostile, you know? I only included this question. I started in 2011, so only two trends. So 2012, compared to 2011, more people think the two sides are more peaceful now, all right? So overall, overall Taiwanese think that the current relation between China and Taiwan is peaceful, and Taiwanese are very conciliatory and trying not to be confrontational toward China, all right? And these two questions are also on the survey. If Taiwan declares independence, do you have perception? Perception of whether China will attack Taiwan, all right? Still, more than 60% say yes, but it's a slight, you know, over the years, over the last 10 years, there's a decrease, about 10%. So actually fewer Taiwanese find China's threat credible now. And how about the U.S. security commitment to Taiwan? There's a line missing here. So those who answer yes, those who answer don't know. All right, so the third line is those who answer no. So still, most Taiwanese think the U.S. will come to help Taiwan. But when I have time, I will start to play with this. Why there's a decrease in this uncertain the group, right? That is fewer Taiwanese uncertain about the U.S. security commitment now. So I'll give you a summary of the empirical findings from the survey. The first is bilateral relations between China and Taiwan going stronger, right? Although it's going stronger, but somehow Taiwanese feel still low affinity with China, right? And Taiwan is very conciliatory and not confrontational toward China. And most people, most Taiwanese want to strengthen economic relations with China. But meanwhile, they also worry that, you know, China will use its economic leverage. And all right, so majority of Taiwanese, all right, it's done. So, okay, that's done, just the last two points. Prefer not, majority of them don't want to unite with China but they think, you know, the unification is more likely. And a lot of respondents have conditional preferences on independence unification. And what the last point is the U.S. security commitment becomes more credible in the minds of Taiwanese and China's threat becomes less credible, all right? That's my presentation. Like in the Q and A, if you have questions about my presentation, all right, don't ask tough questions. Instead, help formulate some policy ideas, insights, all right? That's the part I don't have time to get to, although I prepare some something, all right, but. My colleagues have been very informative and very optimistic. They've set a high standard for anyone who's supposed to talk about American politics. That is for sure. The question I'm gonna put and all to brief a time with you this morning is, can the Obama administration conduct an effective foreign policy, especially in Asia, during its second term in light of America's utterly dysfunctional politics? And the answer to stay in the spirit of the panel thus far is yes, our dysfunctional politics will continue. It is not morning again in America. The 2012 elections did not transform American politics. We do not have the makings of broad bipartisan consensus. No efforts to charm Republicans by President Obama will make a damn bit of difference in nor will additional columns by Maureen Dowd. The fact is we in our domestic politics have moved from a permanent campaign to a partisan war, a hot war between the political parties which begin the position of intense ideological polarization. But because they're operating at a rough level of parity, meaning either party can win the White House, can take the majority in the House or the Senate, they act inside Congress in a very strategic fashion. That is, they legislate not to solve problems, but they legislate to gain electoral advantage in the upcoming elections. We are, in other words, caught in a very unfortunate mismatch between our political parties, which by the way the framers of the US Constitution never anticipated, but which have become parliamentary-like, ideologically polarized, internally homogeneous and acting in a very sort of oppositional mode just what Madison didn't have in mind. He anticipated the differences, but thought to design a set of institutions and incentives for people to engage in serious negotiations across the branches, the houses of Congress and across the branches of the executive and legislative branches, yet the parties exist now in a fashion in which the one in the minority acts as a vehemently oppositional party as a parliamentary party would do, but sadly they operate in a political system that makes it very difficult for majorities to act. So a seniority system that constrained policymaking in the past and sometimes brought together agreement between the parties now is a veto point with the routine 60 votes required to get anything done as we just saw in the effort to pass stricter background checks for the purchase of weapons. A very sad outcome. So you've got parties that are parliamentary, but a governing system that is a separation of powers where majorities are not able to act, the ingredients for inaction, for gridlock and for strategic politics. That's the number one problem facing America today. The second problem, and this is the one people don't like to mention in polite company, is that the parties are not equally implicated. We have what I call asymmetric polarization. That is to say there were times when it was the Democratic Party who veered off the mainstream, the center of the median voter, if you will, in the 60s and 70s. But today there is no question that it is the Republican Party that has become the radical insurgent force in our politics, ideologically extreme, contemptuous of the inherited policy regime going back all the way to Teddy Roosevelt, scornful of compromise, dismissive of ordinary concerns about facts, evidence of science, and basically not accepting of the legitimacy of its political opposition. We've lived through an extraordinary period of manufactured crises, of threats of a public default, of an almost mindless debate over fiscal policy that we're now seeing play out. I have to run off to catch a train, a plane, national airport in a few minutes, and I don't know if there are gonna be enough air traffic controllers to allow my flight to get it. Now think about it, we're the greatest country in the world, and look what we're doing. That experience has multiplied hundreds of times around the government budget, but a simple agreement to set aside that sequester, which was originally conceded as a fallback that would force agreement on a more rational basis, has failed because Republicans embrace Grover Norquist, no new tax pledge. It's as simple as that. A great country cannot govern by having a no new tax pledge, and a party cannot be a constructive participant in policy making if it embraces that. Now, that is the sorry truth and the sorry state of our politics. We see some green shoots. Look what's happening with immigration now, with the gang of eight and a serious effort to bring the stakeholders in this debate together. We got unions working with the chamber of commerce, sort of many other, it's sort of pragmatic, reasonable problem solving politics at its best. Well, why is it happening with immigration but not happening on economic policy or gun control? It's very simple. Republicans are worried about becoming politically marginalized in presidential elections for the foreseeable future because every non-white group in America and their share of the electorate is growing with each passing year supports the Democratic Party and particularly true with respect to Latinos. It's even more true actually with Asian Americans. And therefore, Republicans believe that if they fight a comprehensive immigration reform, they're writing their ticket to political oblivion. So they're giving on this. It's still gonna be hard to get through because of the House, but it's a sign at least that under certain circumstances, things can be done. Listen, the reason I'm ending on an optimistic note is two-fold. One has to do with the fact that in spite of these dysfunctional politics, we've gotten quite a bit done. We dealt with a financial crisis and a deep economic recession. One way or another, depending on the Fed at times, other times on unified party government, we've managed to take steps after exploring all other alternatives that would actually be constructive. And we're frankly doing a lot better than Europe. We've avoided the most mindless of austerity strategies, but not without a fight here in the efforts to pursue such strategies as witnessed by the sequester continue. But the fact is, sentiment is changing about all of that. The public's interest is in jobs and growth rather than in deficits and debt. Our debt has a good chance of being stabilized. That is the deficit to debt ratio. The deficits have declined dramatically as the economy begins to increase. There are some Republican senators who are tired of playing opposition politics and want to get something done. So I think there are some green shoots, some opportunities for avoiding the worst of self-destructive steps in economic policy. But it does mean that as we shift to foreign policy that the Obama administration has every interest in one fully exploiting the opportunities that exist in international economic policy. And that's why you see the very aggressive efforts to move ahead in the cross-Pacific agreements as well as in a U.S.-Europe free trade agreement. We know defense cuts are coming. It's inevitable, but there's some thinking going on about how to tailor those to changes in strategy which in my view will not lead to any diminution in the U.S. presence in Asia which is seen as of paramount importance. Thirdly, as has been mentioned already, John Kerry who had relatively little experience in Asia relative to the rest of the globe is actually off to a good start and the environment within Asia itself is encouraging. The final point here is, Republicans have as many differences within their party as they do with the Democrats on matters having to do with aspects of foreign policy, especially in dealing with Asia and China and Taiwan. And therefore my view as the administration really has the room to conduct a sensible, intelligent, aggressive activist foreign policy in Asia. And that's why I end on the same note as my colleagues, complications and Taiwan attitudes of what they want. And in the changes in China, we've got a mess in our domestic politics but in spite of that we can sort of carry on and the incentives and the resources though constrained are there to get the job done. I wanna thank you for giving me an opportunity to participate, to be here and beg your forgiveness for having to run off right now to have any chance of making my plane. Let's hope an air traffic controller or two was not furloughed today. Thank you very much. Okay, thank you, Tom. Appreciate it. Good luck. Okay, now we're gonna take some questions for the panel. As usual with our standard practice here, we're gonna have you identify yourself and please do limit your comments to a question. I will enforce that very vigorously. We're gonna start off with Bonnie here up front. Thank you, Bonnie Glazer here at CSIS. Emerson, I have two questions for you. There is no free lunch, so I'm going to try to draw out some of the policy implications. I'm wondering if you could address the issue of what you think would change the attitudes of the people of Taiwan toward reunification and make them more supportive. And the second question is, you of course didn't talk much about President Ma, but as we all know, his poll ratings have been quite low. And I'm wondering if you would speculate on why you think his poll ratings remain as low as they are. Thanks. Can we accumulate more questions? I need to think, and I need to think. Here, please. Hi, Eric Lo with the Fair Up Server. My question is that since you talk about the realization of the Taiwanese, they expect unification to take place even though they might not want that to happen in a very, what they call it, a very realistic way. So what are the expectations, what the scenario they are thinking about would happen, or do they have expectation would try to reform to a certain extent that they would accept more favorable to a unification? Thank you. Wanna take one more, or are you ready to go? Let's take one more right here and then we're gonna put you on the spot. Yeah, Chen Zhenghao, American University, again with Emerson, a very interesting presentation. Just along Bonnie's question, but push a little bit harder, that is, you basically present what, but you didn't answer why. And with the past decades, if from today's conference, we can see there are three factors, Taiwan factor, China factor, United States factor. So how do you analysis those, whether any of those making the situation develop along the line you just presented? And also how do you put, even though you prefer not talk about Ma Yingju, but how do you put President Ma Yingju into those different categories? What is your analysis of his attitude toward independence or toward unification? Thank you. All right, I have to... Time to step up to the plate. You know, on the unification, again, if I use the survey data, actually younger generation think unification is more likely to happen than older generation. More educated people actually think unification is more likely to be the outcome. All right, these two variables stand out. It doesn't matter how I try to manipulate the data. And so the younger generation, I think they see the reality. It's inescapable.  Doesn't matter whether they like it or not, they have to find a job in China.  That's the conundrum that a small potato, a small power that often has to live it. So unification doesn't matter whether they want it or not, they think China is such a powerful player. They don't have a choice. I think it's more, it's not something they, but what can China do or Taiwan do in order to win Taiwanese heart? I think try softball, try soft approaches. Don't use, like, I don't know, like when Chen Ji, the Gao Xiong city mayor, tried to invite Dalai Lama to Gao Xiong city, right? And the Chinese government could order Chinese tourists not to visit Gao Xiong city.  That's, China knows how to use economy power to punish sanction Taiwan, even at such a micro level. All right, and Taiwanese, yeah, they feel the coercion already. They know, they feel the coercion. They don't think they can escape from that. So I don't, I cannot give you a more insightful policy, you know, like, it takes time, but I think the trend is reversible, right? It just, if I continue, I'm going to, really, but China, what has China been doing? You know, political reforms, what are the political reforms? They only talk about anti-corruption, all right? Corruption comes from somewhere. You cannot just fight the corruption. You have to change your system, but they don't want to deal with it. They say, oh, democracy takes time. All right, show us the timetable. Show us the blueprint. They don't even talk about, they don't even want a discussion of the timetable, the blueprint, all right? You have to give Taiwanese voters some hope, all right? You cannot just show you have dollars, you have money, come and make money, all right?  I just don't see that at all. That's the, I think that's the part that I think Taiwanese have really turned off. Thanks. In the back there. Jeffrey Lindstrom sent our Angus King's office. I was wondering, given that you noted that, oh, sorry, despite Chinese military modernization over the past 10 years, that the percentage of Taiwanese who actually believe that China will attack has dropped somehow, and also on a more related note, is rising Taiwanese belief in the US, or at least consistent Taiwanese belief in the US security guarantees sort of count for decreasing Taiwanese defenseless expenditures and the abolition of conscription. Thank you. I don't have a lot of answers. I'm just showing you some empirical fact. There is, I think the US security commitment to Taiwan is extremely critical, all right? So you can see that there's a slight increase in Taiwanese perception of the credibility of the security commitment of the US, and that corresponds to the slight decrease of their perception of the China threat. So these two variables are correlated, all right? But so the US security commitment does matter. I don't have anything else to share with you on that. Michael. Mike Fonte, I'm the Washington liaison for the DPP. Thanks for the presentations. I have a policy implication for you, Dr. Liu. You said in your presentation that Taiwanese, the vast majority of the field are already independent, no on the name Republic of China, and no need to declare independence. That, as you know, is the DPP's position, right? We're already independent sovereign nation. And I think, I guess my policy implication for you is, when you look at the data, it's clear where the Taiwanese people stand, and I think that that data shows that there's no problem in the stability across the street from the Taiwan side. People want reconciliation, conciliation, they know where they stand. The problem is on the Chinese side. So my policy implication for that is, the next time around in the presidential election in Taiwan, I hope the United States will stay neutral because the last time, having walked Dr. Tsai Ing-wen around for visits and listened to various reports from the Financial Times, it's clear the United States said the problem for stability was Tsai Ing-wen, the DPP. I think your data shows that's not true. So the next time around, I hope the United States will stay neutral. Thanks. Is there a question in there? Up front here. Thank you very much. I'm Liu Zun Yi from Shanghai Institute for International Studies. I'm a visiting scholar in CSIS. I have a comment to Sun Yings Beach and I have a question to Professor Niu. As for Sun Yings Beach, I think you just give us some examples, some shortages about Chinese new leaders, domestic politics and foreign policy. But you have no conclusion. I would like to know about implications from your speech to the relations, to the relations of bilateral, across straight relations and the trilateral relations between China, Thailand and Taiwan and the United States. As for Professor Niu's presentation, I think I learned a lot from your presentation, but I have a short comment about Chinese political reform. Actually, in China now, there are many debates. Some scholars put forward that we must increase political reform and some conservatives think that we must keep incremental space, incremental space. But I think we can reach consensus on this issue because reform is a big transition. I have a question to you. How do you think about United States faculty from public opinion of Taiwan in the more and more close relations, more and more close relations between China, mainland and Taiwan? Thank you. Yuen, I want to kick off. Thank you. Thank you for the great question. On the cross-straight relations and the US, China, Taiwan, and trilateral relations, my argument is an interaction process. The reason that I didn't draw any conclusion is because a lot of factors are still influx. Although we could see some signs of China's foreign policy or China's cross-strait policy coming into shape, but still it's subject to a lot of changes and a lot of factors. For example, one issue that the Chinese media had pointed out last week when John Kerry was visiting Beijing is that the status of US-China relations very much depends on what the US intends to do and what the US policy is. Of course, the claim unfairly puts the responsibility of bilateral relations on the shoulder of Washington, but it does reflect some of the reality. What China is going to do depends on what Taiwan is going to do and what Washington is going to do. For example, one key concern that I have learned in Beijing about Taiwan is, yes, so far in the past five years cross-strait relations have been relatively peaceful and stable, but what about the next election? What if in the next election the DPP comes to power again and there might be future problems for China again? I would say that Beijing's policy depends on the variation and the evolution of these factors. I think the US plays a tremendously important role, not just the security commitment, although it's ambiguous, but at least might exist. I think the US security commitment to Taiwan, the US assurance to Taiwan is so critical because on the one hand we want Taiwan to approach China to reach out to China, but Taiwan is afraid. Taiwan has fear. There's fear inside us. On the one hand we want to reach out, but we want to hold on to something really firm when we reach out and that thing is the United States. If the US is unwilling to give that kind of assurance to Taiwanese, Taiwanese will be very reluctant to reach out to China. That's the role the US can play. It's not like stronger security commitment is no longer needed. It's even more important now because we want to push Taiwan, hey, go ahead, you want to try to deal with China, but Taiwanese are afraid. So you need to give them some assurance. I think the US plays a very, very important role there. It can really help China facilitate unification and don't try to say, hey, US is interfering in the domestic politics. No, Taiwan needs that assurance from the US. Thank you. My question is for Professor Niu. In the survey you showed us, we found that Taiwanese people who favor independence increased sharply after 2009 while the people favor unification decreased significantly also after 2009. How would you interpret this phenomenon? Do you think this is an evidence that more administrations' policy of cross trade relations is actually helpful for a kind of hidden independence just as many Chinese people mentioned? Thank you. I don't think Ma Ying-jeou has any hidden agenda on that issue. He might have hidden agenda on the independence thing. I don't think he has any hidden agenda on the independence. It's a curious empirical finding, right? Do I have an explanation? I don't have a good explanation for this. Why in the last two years has this surge for at least those who choose not to support unification even conditionally? The increase in independence is a few percentage increase. The increase in not supporting unification even conditionally, over 50%, that's alarming. For China, that's alarming. You are losing Taiwan. I hope China do something. Otherwise, forget about it. Back there. Hi, my name is Garrett van der Wies, editor of Taiwan communique. I have a question for you and son. You really did an excellent presentation. Really enjoyed that. I want to see how Xi Jinping is actually changing way of doing things in China. You did not touch on the issue of Tibet and East Turkestan. Do you have any indications how Xi Jinping might change policies there? And a corollary to that isn't the way China deals with Tibet and East Turkestan in a sense, a distant mirror of how China could deal with Taiwan if it really had its way in the future. Cool question. First of all, I would say that Tibet and Xinjiang issue have become they have been categorized in the in the category of national security issues for China. And to a great extent, not only the internal instability that these two issues have created inside China, but also I'm sure that you are aware that Beijing has always emphasized the interference of the foreign forces in these two issues. So in my studies of China's national security decision making, those two issues are put in the category of national security and with strong linkage to foreign powers. As for what Xi Jinping might do differently in Tibet and Xinjiang, so far we have not seen great indication of a major policy change because, well, for one, we know that the conversation or the dialogue between Dalai Lama and the central government has not been resumed. And as for the Xinjiang issue, there's no dialogue between Chinese society and the Uyghur groups in the exile at all. And so far what we see in China is on one hand the government is putting a great emphasis on the maintenance of the stability through either security apparatus or through security built up. And on the other hand, Beijing also emphasized, I'm sure as you're very well aware, emphasized the economic development in the Asing Minority regions because Beijing still sees as the economic development as a key resolution to the conflicts between the Asing Minorities and the Han population and the central government. There seems to be a belief that once these Asing Minorities become richer, they have a better life, they will be happier with the government in Beijing. And whether that's going to turn out to be true, we don't know, but we will observe with great interest. Thank you. Let me just add on that last point. I think this is the problem of expectation in some ways that Xi Jinping faces as the new leader, because of his presentation, there was a similar expectation because of his father's relationship with the Dalai Lama and so on, that there might be some sort of a breakthrough there. But I think the issue is with all these things that we've just been talking about that he's facing, is he going to be able or willing to spend political capital to try to advance those issues? Probably not, and the near term is my opinion. Up here. Hi, my name is Jen Bates, I'm a private citizen. I have a question for Yun Sun. I'd like to know what you think the Xi administration's attitude is to direct election of the chief executive in Hong Kong, whether it will happen and if so when. And for Professor Niu, would more evidence of democracy in Hong Kong help allay the fears of the Taiwanese people? I have not done much research into the situation in Hong Kong, so I'm sorry I don't have an answer to your question. Thank you. I'm sorry, more democracy in Hong Kong? Yeah, that is to say if there was direct election of the chief executive which the Hong Kong people have been asking for for a long time. Would that make the Taiwanese people feel a little more comfortable with eventually democracy would come to China? My personal opinion, my personal opinion, I don't think so. It's, I can elaborate on that a little bit. I think the Chinese government, the official line is this multi-party competition comparing, it's a western idea. It's a blind alley that China doesn't want to venture into. But I want to remind you that the Chinese communists were very good at winning elections in the 40s in those guerrilla area.  They have to win support from the peasants. So they introduced secret ballots. So the KMT was defeated by the communists first by ballots in those areas. So the Communist Party warmed people's hearts before they used civil wars. You know, that in those, what we call the guerrilla, it's Bianchi, right? Guerrilla area. They didn't talk about communism, ideology. They talked about anti-Japanese. They talked about democracy. Right? But they knew how to conduct elections. Fear, you know, free and fair and democratic elections. But once they gained power, you know, they just changed that just a few years ago in 2007. In their National Assembly, National People's Congress, only those who chose to abstain or vote against had to vote. Those who in favor, they don't have to vote. So it's like that's power. Sometime I wanted to become a Communist Party member.  You know, that kind of feeling. It's like it's difficult for them to give away that power. I'm complaining too much, so, sorry. Right over here. Mike Massetic, PBS Online NewsHour. In the island's dispute, we've seen both Taiwan and China play the Japan card, although in slightly different ways. Every time that there's a twist of Japanese nationalism or an apparent one, like the Sunday visits to the shrine, doesn't this tend to push China and Taiwan closer together on things like the island dispute, which is a small nightmare for U.S. policymakers? Well, I'm sorry. Sorry. I don't have a direct answer to your question, but on the survey I did ask, what are the risks on that? So the Taiwanese respondents, they wanted the government, Taiwanese government, to take a top position toward Japan. But they also wanted the Chinese government to take a very top position against, toward Japan on the island dispute issue. So at least on this issue, the two sides had a former United Front again. So that's the survey data shows. I would agree with you that the Japan's position on the disputed islands does tend to push Beijing and Taipei together on the same front. I don't have to argue that a few weeks ago when Taiwan reached the Fissure Agreement with the Japanese government, that was perceived as quite a deviation from that position in Beijing. I would just add that I think my administration has been pretty clear that they don't want to be seen as aligned necessarily with the PRC government on the subject. Bradley Womack, University of Virginia. Emerson, thank you for those wonderful statistics. I'm sure we'll have nightmares about them for a while. And what occurred to me in trying to make sense of the differences between expectations and preferences on unifications perhaps unification in that question carries a fair amount of baggage as unification meaning melting in to the rest of China whereas maybe on the expectation question it's seen as convergence versus divergence. And of course this is the type of question that statisticians don't like because it questions the categories and therefore the compatibility of data. But it seems to me that just in my one person opinion that that might explain some of the differences between those two answers. Well in the interest of time and to keep things moving along and give you guys a short break please join me in thanking the panel and we'll take a 15 minute break. Thank you. Please take your seats. I'm Bonnie Glazer and I'm a senior advisor for Asia in the Freeman chair for China Studies here at CSIS and I will be moderating the second panel today which is on cross-strait political and security issues. Of course we have heard that Xi Jinping has emphasized really continuity in the cross-strait relationship but many observers nevertheless are predicting that China might get impatient toward Taiwan and we've recently heard I think comments by President Ma Ying-jeo suggesting I would say increasingly explicit language stating I would say quite clearly that political dialogue is off the table and that military confidence building measures will also not be discussed during his second term. And so I think that raises a lot of questions for the future of cross-strait political security issues and very pleased that we have three excellent speakers on our panel to discuss these issues. I will just introduce them all together and then invite them up separately to give their remarks. We'll be hearing first from Professor Zhao Quan-sheng who is a professor of international relations and director of the Center for Asian Studies at American University and many of you may know that he also served as director of the Division of Comparative and Regional Studies there at AU. And then we will have Dr. Wang Gao-chung who is professor of the Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies at Damkang University and he is a PhD from University of Pennsylvania and served as National Assemblyman from 1996 to 2000 and in 2006. And then wrapping up we will have Dr. Richard Bush who of course is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and director of its Center for Northeast Asia Policy Studies. So I'll ask each of our speakers to please not exceed 15 minutes and that will leave us plenty of time for Q&A. So we'll start with you good morning everybody. I have prepared five points talking points here with Bonnie just said we have 15 minutes so three minutes per point. I here I would like to make my own analysis of the cross-grade political and security issues from Beijing perspective but of course is my own understanding of Beijing's position and policy and of course later we will have more Q&A for more discuss. First current status second economic versus political integration third major obstacles and fourth Beijing's policy and response and finally future directions. So those are my five prepared points. The first one current status over the past decades particularly after my induce I mean over the not really past decade but since my induce regime the major status of cross-grade relations is that relationship stabilized so we don't really hear some wording or some term such as troublemaker and others but nevertheless there are still even though overwhelmingly positive toward my induce administration but there are still ambivalent feeling that is economic pretty smooth integration but political like behind and so wondering what is the first panel one question asked whether there are hidden agendas or not so there are some kind of suspicion as well. The current status also include the new policy teams as we can see over the past year there are my induce second term and also in Beijing Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang so Xi Li administration and each side also constructed security foreign policy and Taiwan policy teams we all understand for example Zhang Zhijun replaced Wang Yi and also same thing happened in Taipei so we do see each side as new teams working like Yang Jiechi replaced Daibing Guo among others all those kind of new personnel but nevertheless of course the cross-strait relations still closely monitored and controlled by the top leaders from Beijing side is Xi Jinping Li Keqiang and from Taipei side is my induce the second topic is economic versus political integration need to say there are much progress in economic integration represented by Aikafa so it's much faster in terms of bilateral cross-strait relations in economic dimension the other dimensions such as culture and education we also have seen a very much progress I'm not going to give you details but the whether there is a linkage between economic integration and political integration is a huge question mark as we can see from this morning's Amazon's presentation it's not necessarily so at least from public opinion survey in Taipei so that's also presented a puzzle that is why this is the case so this is the first issue I would like to do and the third is what are the major obstacles from Beijing's perspective in terms of political and security dimensions there are four obstacles first still domestically I mean inside Taiwan we do see a great pressure from so called green camp so my injue has to be very much considering this opposition camp and also of course public opinion and others so could not move too fast the second issue obstacle is still identity issue that issue not totally solved we all understand that Chen Shui-bian has a de-synolization campaign and even though my injue made some corrections in that direction but still the sentiment aparting from mainland China it's still there and the third day of course I guess Beijing also realized that the Beijing's current development particularly political reform is far from satisfaction moving toward unification so I guess that's also clear and lastly is so called external factors from Beijing's perspective one of course US armed sale to Taiwan and provide security protection and the other is Japan most recent fishery agreement regarded as a way to divide Taiwan from mainland China let me move to the fourth question that I prepared that is Beijing's policy and response the in general my understanding is that comparatively with Chen Shui-bian regime Beijing much less worried about future independence however is still concerned about the direction therefore I would say that Beijing preferred to put pressure continue not you know in terms of for example the so called the the ceasefire of diplomatic war and the pressure even though with that direction but still in terms of international so called international space still very limited and less negotiable the communication across Taiwan's trade from my understanding is pretty much through internal and internal first there are a lot of dialogue for example from Boao and others but in a way also sort of informal because even Xiaowan Chang and others is not really is not really necessarily representing Ma Ying-jiu fully so there are many internal and informal channels and continue for negotiation but at the same time we do see there are potential for institutionalize the channels for example now talking about mutually setting up representative office in Beijing and Taipei and another possibility so now let me move to another policy another policy and response is looking for more opportunities to have cooperation in security and political dimensions such as the disputed in South China Sea and the Diao Yu San Ka Ku island so there are certainly pressure to from Beijing to have a positive reaction along these lines so that there might be either most likely an informal style of cooperation in this security dimension but naturally there are also much discussions among retired generals and retired diplomats from both sides and finally let me just touch upon the future directions I would say that from Beijing perspective very much of course looking forward to a possible breakthrough during the second Ma regime and particularly with the he is a new leader there is a huge question mark that is whether possible for the next 3-4 years there will be a Xi Ma summit so I guess that's the the much hoped breakthrough but of course like I said it's a big question mark because Ma already pledged he's not going to move fast and the other directions is to expand bilateral consultation in both international and the security affairs I already mentioned some specific cases such as the South China Sea dispute and I understand and also Diao Yu San Kaku understand there are every year for the past couple of years there are if we can use the term that is the track 2 or track one half there are scholars and semi-officials meeting together to discuss those issues and needless to say the region is also ready to provide economic continued benefits to Taiwan so called the dividend reform and the economic growth and the hope and for future potential if we can watch the what I already mentioned the institutionalization of cross-strait channels and institutions that is still under negotiation but it's likely to happen so overall my sense of that is in general it's less worried but still concerned that will be continued pressure from Beijing to move toward not only economic integration but further a possible breakthrough in political dimension thank you thank you professor Zhao and thank you for being succinct and clear I welcome that and we'll expect the same from our next speaker Professor Wang Gaocheng you're next okay thank you I'm a little bit of a bunny I feel very honored to be here to present my observer about the future cross-strait relation I first would thank Dr. Christoph Johnson and Dr. Richard Bush invitation to be here I will provide a so called Taiwan's perspective on this issue although I think I cannot represent the whole Taiwanese I can just be an observer to provide my observation on this issue I also provide a slide a document to express my idea so that you can understand what I say more clearly my talk will divide into three sections one is the possibility to have such a talk in the next few years the second would if this talk one are those issues that Taiwan want to dress on in the talk that what's I would think is the best strategy to promote that kind of political and security dialogue across the straight first about the likelihood of talks on the political and security issue in the next few years my personal feeling that is at least from Taiwan side although China is pushing on that issue I think is very few years especially in the last second term I got that conclusion based on the following reason first I think that most Taiwanese prefer to maintain the stage quo which Professor Emerson Liu just provide the data I also have simple data according a poll conducted by Taiwan's the Manor Affairs Council recently in the last month show that 86% of Taiwanese in fact support maintaining the cross-strait quo that means no unification with China and no independence of Taiwan so many people worry about that if there is a cross-strait political negotiation being set that might represent the beginning of evolution into so-called unification negotiation so you don't worry about that kind of talk so keeping that status so that's why Bonnie just mentioned in a recent interview this month President Ma said that he thought that Taiwanese do not currently regard the cross-strait political dialogue as needed second I think there would be a strong opposition from Taiwan's opposition party DPP if there's a talk settled between the KMT government and Beijing I think that DPP ideologically opposed future unification between China and Taiwan so they will consider any that kind of dialogue means that the KMT government want to push toward that end so that they will strongly oppose that kind of talk and the DPP currently had has 40 seats in the latest game which has the totally 113 scenes that means that the DPP has accounted for the 35 point percent in the latest game which constitute a strong opposition force in Taiwan's political stage I think that the President Ma's present popularity is quite low according to a survey by independent survey company in March President Ma's trust rate was only 26 percent this trust rate was about 56 percent and also according to another source of local Taiwan TV station down in general this year Ma's approved rate was about 14 percent so given that kind of low popularity and approved rate I think it is very difficult for President Ma to strongly push an issue which is not liked by the opposition parties and most Taiwanese so that's why President Ma said in that interview that the new future he will still adhere to the principle of economic first and political latest in promoting the cross trade relation first the political stance of the two sides still diverges substantially the bottom line is that Beijing considers Taiwan as part of it and does not recognize the existence of republic of China and Taiwan but on the other hand Taipei insists that the ROC has still existed after 1949 and includes the mainland and Taiwan given that diversified political position I think it needs more effort to get a talk reach the consensus fifth on the political issue I'm sorry many Taiwanese are skeptical on the effectiveness of cross trade security agreement I think there's two reason for that first the gap of military capability between the two sides is quite large so I think the Taiwan legs are kind of a confidence to have a real negotiation on a security arrangement between the two sides the second China is so far still an authoritarian regime many Taiwanese worry that if there's a security agreement reached between the two sides where China can sincerely to honor its commitment to that kind of security so I think many Taiwanese so far still doubt that the effectiveness of security agreement between the two sides it reached so I think based on the previous five reasons I think I get a conclusion that President Ma I think subjectly he himself is reluctant to promote political dialogue across trade and objectively I think he faced a strong constraint from Taiwan's society and opposition party to conduct that kind of talk secondly I will discuss but if there's a talk on the political and security issue what Taiwan expect from that kind of dialogue I think that on the political issues Taiwan at least will desire two things first we would like to have equality of political status across the straight through that of political negotiation according to in fact according to the ROC constitution we can accept the so called one China principles that's no question but we think that ROC government still exist and it covers both Taiwan and mainland China so I think given one China principle we will demand equal footing position versus mainland versus Beijing so I think we would expect we had better that China at least can admit the existence of ROC government and starting from that position to pursue the future political relations across the straight means that we are pursuing two states of policies I think we can consider that a one spatial relationship under the one China principle that is not a state to state arrangement between the two sides under one China principles second I think Taiwan will require that we will have more international space under the one principle given the development of the last few years right now Taiwan is an observer of the WHA we think that's a good development but we expect that this model can be applied to more UN spatial agency and other international organization especially currently Taiwan government is strongly pursue in the UN FCC and IKL and also we will think that if there is a better arrangement that we cannot we not just get observer status if we can granted formal membership in those organization that will be more preferred by Taiwan Taiwanese government of course that can be done under the one China principle regarding the security issues about on the military side we can accept to create the confidence building major across the street but however given the gap between the capability of Taiwan and mainland China we will expect that China may can do some initiative to show its kindness to Taiwan and also give Taiwanese confidence to pursue that goal so we will require that maybe China can at least reduce its military threat currently against Taiwan for example Taiwanese government has demanded that maybe China can remove its missiles currently against Taiwan before that kind of talk be conducted regarding the CBM we can accept the usual kind of CBM that is that we can increase that include that both sides increasing its military transparency setting up communication channel to avoid the external conflict and create some restrained major exercise the military capabilities and activities and of course we will pay attention that there should be effective censorship mechanism to assure that China would adherence to those CBMs reached regarding peace agreement I think it's a political arrangement we think that if there is a talk on that at least there should be already a strong economic social best reached across the street that is I would like to have more engagement and interaction between the two sides so that Taiwanese will be more familiar with mainland China and also more acceptable mainland and if there is a premium level CBM reached that would be better or at the very least we think that China should also take the initiative to reduce the military threat before that kind of talk can be conducted and after that peace agreement reached we also hope that there should be an effective censorship mechanism to ensure China's adherence to that agreement finally given those difficulty and obstacles my opinion is that if both sides want to promote that kind of relationship I think there are several steps that can be considered by both sides first, I think both sides can start from a track to a platform second, I think both sides should promote that talk based on the principle of incrementalism consensus reached by two sides and equality third, I think the PRC should establish communication with the DPP to reduce the domestic obstacles from Taiwan first, I think the PRC should take actual steps to reduce military deployment against Taiwan before those talks can be conducted that's my point, thank you for your attention and welcome your comment, thank you excellent, we'll turn now to our last speaker Dr. Richard Bush thank you very much Bonnie, thank you all for coming my job is to provide the American perspective to all of this of course the United States is a very pluralistic even polarized country and so it's impossible to sort of capture the full range of American views in any one session my good friend Ray Burghard will give us I think a very good reflection of the administration's point of view so what you're going to hear from me is one humble scholar I would like to talk about these issues at really two levels one is more a strategic or macro level and then one is more specifically military level I think in broad strategic terms what has happened in the last five years has been a real boon to the United States if we think back to this situation before 2008 it was one of increasing mutual fear among all three parties in this triangle the strongest fear was between China and Taiwan where each side feared that the other was going to do something that would challenge its fundamental interests and then it had to take steps to hedge against that and then you had kind of a vicious circle the U.S. fear was that through some kind of miscalculation or excessive action the two sides would slip into a conflict that neither wanted and then we would be involved so this was not an easy time there were white knuckles all around and what happened after really starting in 2005 with some initiatives by President Hu Jintao were some steps taken by the CCP leadership and then by President Ma Yingzhou that involved a certain amount of risk, at least domestic political risk but sought to reassure each reassure the other and expand on areas of cooperation and so far this has worked well and as I say it's good for the United States this is one less problem we have to worry about on an hour by hour basis and we have plenty of problems around the world and we even have some new problems in Asia so this has been good and based on the implicit linkage that exists between what Taiwan does in cross-strait relations and US-Taiwan relations our ties with Taiwan have improved over the last four years now some Americans looking at this situation draw some rather stark conclusions and they form kind of the bookends for the American discussion of this issue one view is that essentially Taiwan is abandoning the United States that it is moving towards a strategic choice essentially to bandwagon with China and to no longer feel that it needs the US security commitment and a strong relationship with the United States this is the idea of organization on the other hand you have people who suggest that Taiwan or specifically our security relationship with Taiwan is becoming in fact a strategic liability for the United States and that our commitments to Taiwan get in the way of a productive relationship with China and that is the strategic imperative for the United States so we should find some way to reduce commitments to Taiwan and yield the benefits that accrue I agree with neither of these views I think the mainstream view is that there are still very good reasons for the United States to remain committed to Taiwan and to help Taiwan in appropriate ways and I think that's the dominant view so far now that's what's happened to date what's likely to happen in the future now we all know what China would probably like to happen it's that there be movement to discussion of political and security issues and that would therefore be progress on the road to achieving China's ultimate goal and that's unification I'm not saying unification right away but movement in that direction similarly we all know what President Ma intends and that is not too much he's set a pretty low set of expectations for his second term things that are doable and yield some benefit but he has said pretty explicitly that political talks or talks on political issues are premature he's not quite clear how a formal peace accord would contribute to Taiwan's security I think that President Ma has a good sense of the political constraints that are binding him to sort of limited and cautious action one is the political environment in Taiwan itself and Emerson's data I think have only sort of justified that view then there's what I think is a conceptual gap between Beijing and Taipei it's essentially over the status of the Republic of China and which previous speakers have discussed so I think that what we're likely to see for the remainder of President Ma's term is a slowdown in the momentum of cross-strait relations maybe even some kind of stall I think there will continue to be progress in the economic area and maybe the cultural area but these will probably be more difficult because they affect more domestic interest I think it remains important that the two sides do a good job of implementing well what they've already agreed to to build confidence for the future I think that this situation is fine for the United States we have always taken the view that as long as U.S. national security interests are not affected we're happy for the two sides of the straight to set the pace and scope of cross-strait interaction I think that a slowdown in momentum does not really affect our national security interests there is the lurking question which Bonnie alluded to and that is what if China loses patience I don't think China will lose patience in the near term which I mean the rest of President Ma's presidency three more years as we've heard the starting point of the Xi Jinping Administration is continuity I think a realism about what is possible given the current Taiwan political environment still we hear complaints and grousing from scholars at least about Ma's intentions and a lack of seriousness the situation becomes more interesting if I could use that word if the DPP were to return to power in 2016 or 2020 I hope that Beijing doesn't overreact in that situation it has learned how to cope with the DPP Administration it has a decent playbook and the United States is part of that playbook and I think the United States from long experience of dealing with political transitions in democratic countries would find ways to adjust as well the most pressing question I think is whether Beijing loses patience and then resorts as a result to an approach of pressure and intimidation and Emerson's data is interesting on this that Taiwan people don't want unification at least in the current setting but they expect it's going to happen well one of the ways it would happen is that if Beijing stepped up the pressure on Taiwan I think that this would pose a big challenge for the United States a Taiwan that submitted to pressure would do so without any violence having occurred probably but still it would not be a voluntary choice so that would be complicated for us obviously the ultimate form of pressure and intimidation is military coercion so here I'm sort of shifting from the macro to more of the micro we have seen a PRC military buildup that has continued and that has changed the threat environment in which Taiwan exists now one would expect in this situation for Taiwan to acquire capabilities that are number one appropriate to this changing threat environment and number two also enhance deterrence against hostile action capabilities that would raise the risks of PRC coercion and complicate any temptation to move in that direction the big question is how to do that I think we're aware that for a long time there's been a bit of a disconnect between Taiwan and the United States about what capabilities Taiwan really needs and there's an impression at least from the outside that Taiwan prefers capabilities that make more of a political statement and the United States prefers capabilities that have a military utility this isn't a black and white thing we understand the value of the political value of arms sales and Taiwan sort of understands military utility but it's a question of emphasis in this regard I would like to cite a very interesting statement that a Pentagon official Peter LaVoy made on this issue in October 2011 and Dr. LaVoy said lasting security for Taiwan cannot be achieved simply by purchasing limited numbers of advanced weapons systems Taiwan must also and the word also is important devote attention to asymmetric concepts and technologies that maximize Taiwan's enduring strengths and advantages I think there's some very interesting implications in this statement but I think I've run out of time and I will close only by making an advertisement and that is for another program that Brookings and CSIS are doing together next Monday on the recent are the quadrennial defense review that Taiwan has just released and I think our discussion will speak to these issues the program will take place at 2 o'clock at Brookings this is kind of a home and home series and we welcome all of you to attend and please tell your friends thank you very much and for that event we will have the Vice Defense Minister from Taiwan Yang Nian Zhu Andrew Yang will be in town for that so we welcome all of you to join so three very very rich presentations and raises I think a lot of issues to discuss I am going to restrain myself but I might jump in later so let's open it up to the floor now for questions and comments please wait for the microphone identify yourself and be brief so that we can work in as many questions as possible right over there Ken Mayer what do the Taiwanese perceive is the United States motivation with regard to its involvement with Taiwan we are going to collect a couple of questions and then we will come back to the panel over here Chen Weihua China dating it seems to me that the problem laid out here by Dr. Wang as a sort of a temporary obstacle that can be overcome like communicating with DPP or like missile deployment that can be done tomorrow if I think DPP doesn't go the way in future government doesn't go the way Chen Weihua dated a decade ago my question is really I mean how accurately can we today predict things like decades from now obviously 40 years ago no one can predict that people in Taiwan and mainland can travel freely I mean I think Lin Yifu obviously didn't predict that when he swam across the street and also I think no one imagined that Lian Zan would have made a trip to mainland like in 2004 so all this happened in the matter just 20 30 years so we probably can predict things 3-4 years from now but I mean we are talking no one thinking about unification will be achieved in 3-4 years but we are talking about something 30 years from now so how accurate is you think all this prediction should be okay and then we'll take one more and we'll come back to the panel over there Karangas King's office I was wondering well going I hope this isn't going too deep into the bushes so to speak but pardon intentional pun but what level of cooperation between the US and Taiwan would be that it wouldn't necessarily irritate China because to example we've seen in recent arms deal such as the sale of Apache attack helicopters to Taiwan that China hasn't raised a big fuss as it did say back in 2001 when we sold them kid class guided missile destroyers thank you sorry my microphone wasn't on who would like to start okay Professor Wang Chinese saying stupid bird and fry first so I think the Taiwan's understanding of American's attitude to this that there's a sound in Taiwan that you notice the worry that we are too close to mainland China's especially on the political and security issues so they're worried that that might interfere with the United States to sell advanced weapons to Taiwan I would say that not represent the whole Taiwanese voiced but just do the concern there that's one thing about the future cross trade relation because I'm not predicting the 30 or 40 years later I'm talking about the based on the data I get President Ma's second term but like I said that we in fact welcome the continue the cross trade economic and cultural engagement hope that with the deepening of that kind of relationship that both sides you know can continue to improve the political relation and find a way to solve that difficulty from my understanding I cannot represent China's attitude but I will think that given the recent improvement of cross trade relations probably I think China will concern very much about the U.S. sale of the submarines or more advanced jet flight to Taiwan but still I mean that given the improvement of cross trade relations we don't still don't know how that kind of development will constraint China's reactions to those selling of weapons one question about the future directions and also the question about maybe next 10 years we all remember that when Nixon and the Kissinger visit Beijing meeting with the Dong and the Mao said to him you know we can wait for 100 years so now only 40 41 years passed so there are still in that case that's a long time and also if I recall my own experience that exactly 30 years ago in San Francisco Asian Studies Association the first open dialogue cross-strait relations among scholars that is Professor Hongda Qiu Qiu Hongda of University of Maryland and I myself in San Francisco we had that discuss later the two articles published in Asian Survey in 1983 so if we look at that experience is already 30 years passed we are still here discussing you know relatively along similar line that is what would happen and what is each side of position so it seems like it will continue at least from this morning's discussion for number of years for years nevertheless I guess from Beijing like I mentioned early from Beijing perspective there are also pressing hope that that might be a breakthrough during mass second administration but of course like also everybody mentioned here is unlikely to happen but there are still hope Bonnie let me speak to the issue of PRC tolerance about arms sales I mean ideally Beijing would offer that we sell nothing to Taiwan and that we have no security commitment to Taiwan because in their view that would improve the chances for successfully negotiating unification on Beijing's terms Taiwan has a different view of the connection between the security relationship and negotiations but that's a different issue but in the real world arms sales exist and will continue it's hard to know what governs Beijing's reaction at any point in time there are political circumstances that affect its response on each occasion it's fair to say that Beijing objects most to systems that give Taiwan the ability to strike targets on the mainland such as advanced fighter aircraft and submarines I would just add one point on the issue of Beijing's policy toward Taiwan I really think that the most important variable is whether or not the mainland continues to see time on its side I think it's very interesting if we link together some of these issues that were talked about in the first panel in this panel that the mainland is quite aware of the fact that support for unification in Taiwan as demonstrated in the polls is actually declining and yet I don't think it has lost confidence that time is on its side and if I would venture to say that if a DPP president wants to come back to power that China would not instantly conclude that time is not on its side after all they survived eight years of a DPP president so it would be interesting to try to tease out this issue of what would make Beijing actually change its assessment that time is on its side because I think if they did that that would be a moment where we would see potential instability in the cross-strait relationship so if anybody wants to comment on that we can do that after we collect a few questions over here Eric Loh Hi Eric Loh with the FairUp server my comment is basically the thing about you just talked about what would make China lose patience I think that the only thing that could make China lose patience is basically of course a DPP president would be one of the things but not exactly but I think that how do US react I think that from what the Chinese has been thinking of it's more like Taiwan is part of them already in their estimation whereas anything that can change this kind of thinking would be a threat to their unification I think that is not playing into their hands that US is not directly involved in the talks or whatever is a good sign that you don't see a kind of interference so I don't think that would be a situation that would lead into a confrontation or something Thank you very much I have a question to three professors I would like to know What was the rule of Taiwan in US rebalance to rebalance to Asia and is there some changes in US policy to Taiwan after 2010 Thank you Good question, okay, we'll take one more from the back Norman Fu and with the China Times it's been predicted that if Mayan Jiu or Hu Jintao before and now Xi Jinping can achieve some kind of a chord in the cross street they'll both win the Nobel Peace Prize So I would like to submit this question to the panelists whether in your belief that Ma or Xi Jinping have that kind of burning desire to win the Nobel Peace Prize If that's the case I'd like to ask Dr. Bush whether the United States I know the US policy the policies always we don't want to get involved because of the failure of the Marshall mission in the mid 40s However, the US has been involved for the past century or so in the Taiwan Strait So my question to Dr. Bush and perhaps even to Ambassador Burkhardt whether the US would like to serve as a sort of guarantor for the signing of such a piece of chords just like what Clinton did for the Oslo chords between the PLO and the Israelis That's my question Alright Let's do finger if it's very short and then we'll come back to the panel Great great hope from Radio Free Asia just a follow up on Norman since China has already two very important persons got the Nobel Peace Award one is Dalai Lama who is fed outside China the second one is Liu Xiaobo who is still in jail So my question is were China and Taiwan would eventually be united Can the Chinese leader get the Nobel Peace Award by the condition that there are two very important Nobel laureates one is feeding outside one is still in jail I would hope that the goal here is to maintain peace and stability not win the Nobel Peace Prize but I'm going to turn the floor over to our panelists who would like to start Richard To address Johnny's question and Eric's about PRC impatience and views of time whether time is on its side I would speculate that maybe it would reassess the situation if it decided that KMT intentions had changed that Guamendong leaders no longer held out the idea of unification at least as some sort of ultimate goal that they were as Beijing would define it interested in two Chinas or one China, one Taiwan and that was all On the role of Taiwan in US rebalancing first of all it is a matter of record that Secretary Clinton in talking about US policy towards Asia referred to Taiwan as an economic and security partner I would phrase it a little bit differently I think that first of all Taiwan is if you will an implicit beneficiary in the US rebalancing policy because I think the heart of that is to maintain our presence in East Asia economic, military, diplomatic and so on and I think that contributes to Taiwan's welfare I think also Taiwan is an implicit contributor to US goals because it believes in peaceful resolution of disputes following international law and expanding areas of cooperation on the Nobel Peace Prize questions I have no idea what the Nobel Committee would do if there was some kind of grand bargain on Norman's question having to do with guarantors first of all it's quite a hypothetical question but I guess the threshold issue is would Beijing which regards this as an internal issue want an external party to be a guarantor United States or anybody else I think I doubt that thanks the question whether on when Beijing would lose patients essentially this just different format of another kind of question that is when China would use military force this question has been discussed many years like I mentioned earlier even during the era of Deng I remember at least on one occasion there are sort of four conditions if I can my own understanding summarized into eight Chinese characters that is Tai Du Wai Li Nui Luan that is the first Tai Du is Taiwan independence and second Wai Li is external forces intervene and thirdly Nui Luan internal chaos and then the last one is lost for long long time without the any sign of unification He Wu Qi He Wu Qi and also early there is another one Soviet Union you know the different occasion different you know whether Taiwan would approach Russia I guess that's no longer because He Wu Qi already under control of the United States nuclear weapons which was raised at one time as a potential precipitation of an attack so I guess all of those elements may not I guess except the last one but my understanding is that as long as the sign is not really moving toward separation then China still can wait for that but the question of course is judgment that's one reason for early we talk about Xi Ma summit that is whether that would happen and also mentioned Nobel I guess the obstacle definitely seems like not from mainland part but is from Mayan Jew we all understand political constraints and others making Ma very reluctant if it's not impossible to open his own way to meet with mainland China leader and that's turn to the question of US position I guess just like any external powers status quo would be a preferred situation including the United States and Japan but at the same time I guess both Washington and Tokyo realize that it's not that something they can totally control just like a Korea peninsula if you ask a North Korea South Korea whether would prefer unification all the major powers may not prefer that but at the same time they also understand that that may beyond individual major powers control is ultimately depends on the cross street people whether they would like to achieve unification respond to Bonnie's question I think that China's the law passed in 2005 the anti-accession law at least three conditions that will use military or non-peaceful means to solve the Taiwan issue that can be of reference although it's not a guarantee but I think it's of reference and my personal think that as long as Taiwan's economic reliance on China continue to increase as long as the United States, I'm sorry China can hold strong military capability to deter Taiwan's move to the formal interdependence I think that China may not lose that the patient in some of this dispute regarding the Taiwan's role in U.S. people's strategy I think we can contribute to two things first we have to stabilize the cross relation I think that's also benefit to U.S. interest in this area and secondly through the excessive in the China we have to change China's view on political democracy and its modernization process I think we can contribute partially to change the China's development to move toward a more liberal and democratic direction I think that's the Taiwan's role can play in U.S. strategies yes I recall President George W. Bush once said that Taiwan is a beacon of democracy I think we have a few more minutes if we'd like to take a few more questions up front thank you Barney and thank you all the panelists I just like to go make a short comments on the earlier points please introduce yourself I'm sorry I'm Barney I'm with Taipei representative office in Professor Zhao's remarks you mentioned that across the states may seek more cooperation maybe in security area for example South China Sea or East China Sea and the last question from previous panel also asked about whether Taiwan and China may line up on East China Sea issue I just would like to clarify that from the very beginning Taiwan has taken very different approach from mainland China's approach and we are very firm on sovereignty claim on East China Sea or Diao Yu Tai but also we also believe that we can show off disputes and we also hope that the concerned parties can take peaceful approach on this issue therefore in last August my government proposed East China Sea peace initiative and recently actually earlier this month we just signed official agreements with Japan so that also we have been taking very different approach from mainland China and we are firm on the peaceful approach thank you okay thank you any more questions Nadia Hi Nadia Chau with Liberty Times Richard I have a question for you today you mentioned unsymmetric capability again and in your book you said that US should consider to help Taiwan to develop its missile can you elaborate what do you think you know what would you suggesting here for the unsymmetric capability Taiwan could have and some people in Taiwan believe like Frank Shea and Anne Glew two weeks ago believe Taiwan is going to facing a mounting challenging ahead strategic risk and challenge but some people also believe that Taiwan has a strategic opportunity in the near future I wonder well you know the panelists what's your assessment thank you okay there's lots of hands we'll just take one final one the woman right there I'm Shuren Shin I'm starting my PhD in political science in Sanford this fall where I'll be focusing on China so I think Dr. Bush just mentioned there is like abandonment theory like in the US even though it's not like mainstream like thinking that Taiwan is pursuing further ties with China and like trying to alienate itself and on the Taiwanese world there's also an abandonment theory because like a lot of people think that oh the US is actually pursuing further ties with China and it's not to be trusted so could you like comment on say like the Taiwanese leadership's perception of its well or its confidence in like US-Taiwan alliance and whether it actually provides an incentive for it to like pursue further ties with the mainland thank you okay thank you very much and I have a point that I'd like to throw out if any of my three panels would like to comment on Frank Sia from the DPP has been talking about this or different interpretations of constitutions and if anybody could comment on what implication that might have for the cross-strait relationship and whether this might be acceptable to Beijing as a basis for going forward even though of course other DPP members including the party chairman has not yet stated whether this would be acceptable for him and for the party alright so let's why don't we start at the other end again Richard just briefly because we're running out of time on the question here about abandonment the United States has been improving ties with mainland China you could say since the 1950s slowly but surely and Taiwan is always worried about being abandoned but it never happens and I think what's important is what the mainstream view is and what US interests are I think my perception of the Taiwan leadership's view of this is that it remains convinced that the United States is a very important factor in sort of Taiwan pursuing its own interests and will continue to be so on the military question let me clarify on the issue of missiles the important thing here for the United States is whether Taiwan's development of missiles remains or is within the parameters of the missile technology control regime I mean that's the key variable I think that in general the sorts of capabilities that at least I'm talking about when I use the words asymmetric and that it's capabilities that make it increasingly difficult or very difficult for the PLA to take the island of Taiwan did I get them all what was your question I'll just repeat that I have an allergy towards any attempt to address complex issues with four-character expressions even Joe R. Gongshu I won't I will put you on the spot I just want to quickly respond to Bonnie's questions from my understanding I think that Francis proposed proposal probably cannot repress the so called the 92 consensus in pursuing the cross-strait relation for two reasons first I think that even the DBP has no consensus about term and what does that constitution represent which means 1949 constitution before 1949 made in China or that constitution amended after 1991 in Taiwan which has different meaning about the boundary of sovereignty of ROC secondly using constitutional consensus to repress the 92 consensus from my understanding that Beijing has no interest because it would lack the word one China the 92 consensus at least have one China with different interpretation but they use the constitutional consensus the one China word will be wipe out from those phrase I am afraid that Beijing will consider that you know recession from Taiwan's previous position regarding this issue so I think that my personal opinion that it may not contribute better than the 92 consensus thank you again start with Bonnie's question Frank Shea my understanding is that Frank Shea's statement is not regarded as official DPP position but DPP actually try to dismiss including his so called private visit to mainland China so in that case may not expect that China really taking that seriously is a DPP position having said that anything depart from total independence from China any individual and not to mention Frank Shea's high position under Chen Shui-bian administration would be welcomed so I would think it's a positive sign from and that's also reflect PRC making effort to reach out with DPP and try to reach some understanding and the question from Taikou, I forgot your name yeah I think that's a good point that is even though both Beijing and Taipei regarded the Diao Yu Dao of San Kaku is part of Chinese territory you know of course when you say Chinese you can say so called greater China or only Taiwan but that itself is different from Japan's position because Japan regarded San Kaku Diao Yu is Japanese sovereignty and position so I think even though you emphasize the difference between Beijing and Taipei but to me fundamentally in terms of sovereignty position there are overlaps there are similarities don't forget Ma Ying-ju's dissertation at Harvard Law School right and he made that very clear it's not part of but of course the East China Sea peace agreement peace proposal is a welcome move in terms of I insist that's a not Japanese sovereignty but having said that I do think the recently reached fishery agreement Beijing has certain suspicion that not necessarily toward Taipei but rather toward Tokyo that is that's an effort from Japan said to really separate Beijing and Taipei so that the two sides could not have so-called united front facing Japan well thank you this has been an excellent panel and before we thank all of our speakers again I'll just mention lunch is in the back we're going to have Ambassador Raymond Burkhard as our speaker after everybody gets their food and sits down probably maybe about 15-20 minutes so again please join me in thanking our speakers