This is what we're going to start though, because zero points, 0 for 10, 0 for 6 for 3. First game without a made field goal. This is not when you want to do it. Since his rookie season and afterwards Steve Kerr said that they need him back, this is obviously now the beginning of what happens to Clay Thompson. So what are we hearing? Clay Thompson is very open to seeing his marketplace in free agency. We've discussed it. We've talked about it. The Warriors offered him an extension. Before the season, two years, 48 million. He declined it. He believes at that point, and I think still as the year has gone on, that he is worth more, deserves more. I'm told his free agency is going to be about respect, is going to be about principle as far as where he stands in that Warriors organization for championships. He's come back from an ACL injury. He's come back from an Achilles injury. And because of what he's done, feeling like he's deserving, and he has a lot of thinking to do this summer, he's going to have interest in the marketplace. There's going to be teams that are going to want to play Thompson. If you look at his second half of the season, though, 19 points a game, 45% from the field, almost 42% from three-point range, it's going to be the hardest call in his life to make. If he does end up finding another spot to leave, as far as calling Steph Curry, calling Dre Montgomery, calling them and saying, I'm gone, but he is going to be open to testing the market. This is going to be weird, man. Free agency usually comes down to one thing and one thing only, Shoms. It's not respect. It's not, it's money. And he, maybe he thinks he deserves more money than the franchise thinks he does, and he did show flashes this year that he still can play. He still can explode and have big games. He's healthy. And to go through the injuries and the recovery that he has gone through to get back to this level is super impressive. So I do think there's a smaller market team out there that is going to throw him a lot more money than Mike Dunleavy and the Warriors are prepared to do. So I do. Is he regretting turning down that 248? I don't think so, because I think he will end up getting more than that or a longer deal this summer. I really do. And I think he deserves that. He's a huge name. He's going to bring in a lot of different, to a team like Orlando, for example. I know we keep talking about that. That is exactly what that franchise needs. They're a team on the rise. He's a great locker room guy. He's a great vet. He provides them shooting that they just have never had. So I do love it.  This is one game of his entire legendary hall of fame career. He had a big time, second half of the season. He did. So he's put himself in position to go. And again, this is respect with him and his team, his franchise. It would be very weird to see him on another team because it he's one of those guys that makes sense that he finished his career. But at the end of the day, players have a short window to make the most money possible, let's be honest. And he has that opportunity now to go and get another bag.  It just it it was hard to watch last night. And we're going to we'll talk about this game, obviously a lot. But it was just the clay part of it, the body language, the moment you realize they knew that this was done. Like, I don't know if you're if you're Clay Thompson, do you really want to leave Golden State or do you need the fresh start? Maybe it's a need thing at this point, Lou. Yeah, I think he's going to take a look this off season and really, really have a like this looks like the end. Like how he looks like he's soaking everything in. Like I think he understands that this may be an end of an era and he's going to have to weigh his options.  It's going to be a deal that that probably wasn't there for him at the beginning of the season at a lower number, or he's going to go get the money somewhere else. I hate to see this team, this dynasty come to an end in such a fashion for Clay with the things that he's been able to accomplish with this group. But, you know, I think he has his future somewhere else. And it's interesting because he's could be a free agent and he can go and get it back somewhere else, but they also could move some other. They also can try and get off dream on. They also Chris Paul is probably coming to an end soon. So there's also there's other ways they could do to keep him while making it kind of mutually beneficial for both him and the franchise.


Today I want to talk about the most common reasons why people miss the net so if you want to hit the net more often you want to score more goals than this video is for you. The biggest thing is that you become conscious of these mistakes or these bad habits and actually see yourself doing them and then you can correct them and you'll become a lot better shooter you'll hit the net more often you'll score more goals. First one is simply trying to hit the ball way too hard okay you do not have to put a hole in the back of the net for it to counter as a goal and that's exactly what happens you might hit a rocket of a shot but if it's you're trying to kill it every single time you're not going to be consistent with your shooting okay. If you don't know about me I used to be a huge under-achiever but through obsessive self-improvement I found my success earned a college scholarship played for my national futsal team a youtube channel with over 100 million views I've helped players worldwide and I'd love to help you improve faster and achieve more. Some of the best shots that I've ever hit in my life are not the ones I've tried to kill the hardest they're the ones I focused on just making good contact and having good technique especially if you're in close range it's much better for you to pick your spot put it down in the corner just like that think about the messy typical goal okay that is much more reliable you'll score way more often if you get in the habit of doing that now I'm not saying you can't hit the ball hard I'm just saying you don't have to kill it okay because when you try to kick the ball way too hard you lose your focus you lose your control okay so maybe just hit it about 80% and you're gonna be much more likely to get the ball on target you are going to hit it hard make sure you get your body over it okay if I can get here and I can get my body positioning over the ball really make sure that there's no way that ball is going over the net and I can make sure that my body is going towards the net my fall through is going towards the net then you can hit it as hard as you want if that ball is running away from you and you're trying to nail it as hard as you can you're way back here what do you think is going to happen okay that's what's going to happen because there's no control number one you're leaning back you're not getting over the ball enough or at least central and number two is the direction that your body faces when you hit the ball so I talked about this in another video if I come through the ball and what's a right footer's tendency is to pull it to the left I hit it and I end up like this with my body okay the ball is always going over there for a left footer a tendency is to pull it to the right so I hit it and my body ends up facing this way okay and that's over exaggerated but if you're always pulling it to one side or the other think about where your body ends up okay so second mistake is your body positioning if you want to improve faster and achieve more this season use the soccer success planner it's 100 free players all around the world have already used it to improve you can download it right now there's a link in the description below the third mistake is just lack of focus if you want to hit a good shot you need to be focusing on everything that you can control most people when they're in this situation they're not even thinking they're just panicking and it ends up being a shot that they don't really want to have you know you're like gone on a run you cut through three guys play to one two you sprinted up the whole field and now it's time to shoot and you have just no energy and you just kind of swing at it okay it's all about focus so especially when you're really tired you need to somehow find that energy for that half a second to really focus on what you're doing and what I mean by focus is focus on your technique okay decompose especially if you're in close areas and you have the time to pick a spot decomposed think about okay where I want it to go how I'm going to get it there and just produce that technique focus on that technique all the things we talked about body over the ball nice fall through make sure my body's going where I want it to go okay and just that mental focus make sure you get that ball on target the last problem the biggest mistake people aren't hitting the net consistently enough is because they're not practicing enough and that's the simple truth all these tips all these videos they're great but if you're not getting out to the field and practicing you're gonna miss the net especially when you're in a high pressure situations so you need to be practicing shooting in all these different situations with both feet and you need to do it consistently the truth is most people want to score goals they want to hit the net but the only time they practice shooting is in their game on Sundays they don't take advantage of every single day of the week or you go to your practice and maybe your team does a shooting drill but how many shots do you actually get you only get a few shots so if you want to be a goal scorer you need to be getting hundreds of shots every single day both feet different situations and if some of the bad habits that I illustrated or demonstrated in this video today are things that you do become conscious of them and make sure you don't make the same mistakes again and again learn from your mistakes and you're going to become a better player a better shooter and a better goal scorer removing up divisions to making national teams players who use the online soccer academy get results access elite level coaching and training become a complete player make a difference on the field and get noticed when you play limited spots available apply today start improving tomorrow link in the description below


Well, thank you all so much for being here. I just wanted to introduce briefly our three panelists. Unfortunately, Congresswoman Moore had a vote today and couldn't be here. The bill, she was sponsoring. But anyway, to my left, we have Jason de Parle, who is a staff writer at The New York Times and a Bernard L. Schwartz fellow here at New America. In the middle, Katie Royce. Katie's the author of several books, including In Praise of Messy Lives, which discusses, among other things, her experience as a single mother. And she's also a professor at the Carter Institute of Journalism at NYU. And on the end, we have DeVira Cohn. DeVira was a journalist herself for many years at The Washington Post. And she's now a senior writer at the Pew Research Center who has frequently studied marriage patterns and other aspects of changing family life in America. So thank you all so much. So we're all familiar with some of the recent numbers that have come out relating to single motherhood. The CDC report in March that showed that the number of American children born to single mothers in America is at an all time high. The Pew report that came out a couple of weeks ago at the end of May that showed that record numbers of female breadwinners, especially in households that are female-headed. And I guess I was hoping we could start by discussing some of the factors that might be driving this trend. Maybe this is the question for Dee. Well, I guess one thing to say upfront is that there are many different kinds of single moms. The average numbers that you see hide a lot of variety. And so that also helps explain some of the factors that are driving the increase. So on the one hand, you do see an increase in children being born to women who've never married. Well, to some extent, that reflects the fact that marriage is becoming less prevalent in US society. People are marrying later. There's some evidence that a smaller number may ever marry, although many people say that they would like to be married. So that's one factor driving that population. There's also been a growth in cohabitation or unmarried partners, people living together. That is also driving the numbers in so-called single moms. In fact, a lot of the increase we're seeing in children living with mothers who allegedly are single involve kids who actually are living with two parents, but the parents are living together and not married. And then, of course, there's also issues like divorce, separation, and so forth. And even though divorce has leveled off or decreased in recent years, it still affects a large number of children in their living circumstances. Jason, you've done a lot of work on how these changes in family formation are driving inequality, rising inequality in America. I wondered if you could maybe talk about the origins of that. Well, let's go back to your earlier question about why I think there's a debate that will never be settled about to what extent is it being driven by economic changes on the fall of wages, particularly for low-skilled men that make them seem less marriageable and to what extent it's being driven by cultural changes relating to, among other things, birth control and broader acceptance of unmarried parenthood. And the two things, I think, interact. In terms of the way it interacts with the inequality debate or the inequality trends, the move towards single motherhood varies a lot by education level. So college-educated Americans still marry and have children within marriage at very high rates. Americans with high school education are less, do not by and large have children outside of marriage. Those two trends have been that way for three or four decades. I think what's changed really in the last decade or decade and a half is what's happened in the middle. And the middle used to more closely resemble the top. If you go back, I want to say maybe two decades ago, you look at the top third and the middle third, and the family structure looked pretty much the same. And now there's been an erosion in the trend towards marriage, patting births within marriage. There's been erosion among both thirds, but it's been much steeper in the middle third. So the middle third is shifting more towards the bottom third in terms of the family structure. How that affects the inequality debate is that the people who least need to be married for economic reasons are the most likely to. So the people with the highest incomes are most likely to have two incomes in the household, and the people with the lowest incomes are most likely to have one income in the household. So it exacerbates the trend towards inequality. I mean, what you mentioned at the beginning of your comment, the increasing acceptance of single motherhood. And one of the things that I was discussing with Dee yesterday was that, in fact, given the increase we're seeing in these new patterns of family formation, there's actually less acceptance, less public acceptance of single motherhood than you would think. You can speak to this better than I can, but we're describing some public opinion surveys that had been done. I was hoping you could. Sure. Well, we've been polling about a number of changes in family forms for some time. And what we found is that public disapproval of single mothers or single women having children is still quite high. The latest survey was about 64%. Now, that was down from 71% a few years ago. And disapproval is lower. So single mothers or non-marital births? Well, it has some extent to do with how the question is phrased. If you say single women having children, is that a big problem? That was the way our question was worded. But if you ask about unmarried parents living with children, disapproval is a lot lower. And it is also a lot lower for same sex couples raising children than it is for, if you frame it as a single woman by herself without a man involved. So there is a little wiggle room in the disapproval. And there is some, as we've said, softening of disapproval. And of course, disapproval is much lower among younger people, who lives have reflect a much greater prevalence of this kind of single parenthood. So what they're seeing may be reflected in their attitudes. Did you look at what single parents say about what the disapproval rate would be among people who are themselves single parents? The 42% are having children outside of marriage. It's much less, but it's not zero. I don't have the numbers right at hand. But there's still some disapproval, but it's not nearly as good. It's not quite a majority, as I recall. I think when we talk about the disapproval, it's important to look at the crudeness of the terms, as you were saying. So to me, the term single mother itself is the fiction of a fundamentally conservative society. And in England, JK Rowling's organization Gingerbread has this movement called Lose the Labels. And the reason being, and her point, which I think is quite valid, that women move in and out of singleness in the course of a lifetime. People get divorced and suddenly find themselves a single mother for a year.  These are very different circumstances. People have babies on their own living together with their father. And so these terms are pretty unuseful, actually. And the term single mother, to ask people if they disapprove of it, is already entering into a very charged language to talk about these things. So I think one of the problems is that the term itself is it conjures all these stereotypes and ideas for people that may not really reflect the kind of variety of human experience. But it seemed to be the case when you were describing the public opinion surveys, when we spoke yesterday, that other social trends, such as gay marriage and such as cohabitation, public opinion has more kept pace with that. People have become much more accepting of gay marriage very quickly as it's become more common. And they know people in the institution. People have become much more accepting of cohabitation. For some reason, it seems that public acceptance of single motherhood has not really kept pace with the increases. Well, that's not my impression. That's not your impression. No. I don't think I ever meet anybody who expresses any surprise or disapproval about single parenthood in these days. It seems it's almost a norm. You and I were talking. I've been spending a lot of time at a public school in Texas. And in the second grade class, I've been monitoring.  It's not a pejorative thing. It's just I think there are maybe one out of five kids in the class if that has a two-parent family. Well, certainly the numbers, as we've said, there's no disputing that the numbers of children of single parents is high. However, we do live in a country where one of the presidential candidates recently blamed the increase in violence, essentially, on single mothers. So we are living in a world in which it's OK to say that for a politician to say a quite prominent politician of one of the major parties to say that. So I think I mean, I live in New York City, and I could just wish that I lived in that Texas school because I don't see that kind of totally warmhearted acceptance around me. And obviously, the numbers bear out, even though it's gone down slightly, that huge numbers of Americans do say they disapprove of children being raised by single mothers. But again, they don't disapprove of children being raised by two unmarried parents. And one of those unmarried parents is also a single mom. So it really depends on, I think, the definition of single mom. We also have research, and I think this bears on the single mom definition, where Americans have a strong belief that children benefit by having both a mother and father present in the household. And I think that that's part of what's going on in the high disapproval for moms raising children on their own. And the lesser disapproval, I mean, really only a minority disapprove of unmarried couples raising kids. Is that do you think due to the practical difficulties or the sense that there are fewer resources, or is it just about the fact of having a father in the home? I don't know, it'd be interesting to test that. We actually did ask a question recently that we'll be publishing some data about what the role of a dad is. Because I was curious about that as well. I don't know whether it's the fact that it helps to have two people if you're trying to run after a toddler, or whether having two incomes is more helpful than having one, or whether there's a moral component. And we certainly know that among people who describe themselves as religious, or who have conservative political views, there is more disapproval of the single mom on her own than there is. But by any measure over the last two decades, there's got to be a trend towards greater public acceptance of single parents. A pretty surprisingly low, I mean, if you look at the acceptance of gay parents is surprisingly higher among even conservative people than the acceptance of a single mother. And I think that's what the interesting thing is, why do we still have this particular pocket of kind of traditional conservatism, and why does it endure? And I think there is, frankly, a moral component. Obviously, it's impossible to measure, but I think if you look at the language that people use to talk about single mothers, you see that in a certain way this country has not evolved as far as we think from the days of Nathaniel Hawthorne and Hester Prynne, our kind of original puritanical town with its single mother with the Scarlet A. And some of that feeling of suspicion, and I do think it's a sort of irrational moral issue, not just the kind of practical concerns, I think. Well, there's certainly been an evolution of academic evidence over the past several decades that suggest all else equal. Kids do better in two-parent families, on average. So kids are gonna be more likely to do well in school, more likely to stay out of trouble in a two-parent family. So I think the consensus among liberal academics has shifted over the past two decades, but I wouldn't say it translates into a moral disapproval. I would say that there's been a shift among liberal academics. I'm thinking of somebody like Sarah McClanahan, Christopher Jenks, Elle Sawhill, towards a view that the two-parent family, the kids do better in two-parent families. It's interesting you say that, though. I mean, it's interesting because I think that there's a lot of class issues at work in some of these conversations, and that, especially in the work of Professor McClanahan, who I've talked to extensively, her evidence shows that the biggest difficulty or obstacle for children of single mothers is financial insecurity. And I actually asked her question, partly, obviously, due to my own special curiosity. As the single mother of two kids, two different dads. Whether absent financial insecurity, does a child have a better chance of doing well? So financially equal situations. Neither family has financial insecurity. In a married home where there's stress and conflict, is that gonna be more or less destructive than a child with a single mother, no stress and conflict in the home? She very categorically said, it is much more destructive for the child to be in the home with two parents, and stress and conflict, than the one parent without stress and conflict. And her evidence and her research points up. The one that doesn't have stress and conflict. I'm talking about stress and conflict in the home. So that's parents fighting, and parents, you know, adults fighting around you. So that's the specific stress and conflict she was referring to. And so I have to say, I think that some of the, I know people love to kind of quote these studies, and even people who know nothing and not you, of course, but many people who know nothing about these studies love to kind of wave them around to say, like single motherhood is gonna cause your child to be a shooter like Mitt Romney. But actually, I think people's understanding of what these studies actually say, which are really complicated and go into many definitions of what is these different varieties of single mothers. So I think the research is a bit more complicated. And we also don't know, sorry, I'll stop talking in one second. We also don't understand the world, which is our new world. So the world in which 53% of babies born to women under 30 are born to single mothers, we don't know what's gonna happen when those children get older. Because part of the problem that children of single mothers have is that they are sort of outcasted or different or other in a world in which they are no longer that. I think our idea of what family is may be refreshed and renewed and may evolve with the times as we can see with gay marriage and other issues. Well, thank you. Katie, you spoke in one of your recent pieces about single motherhood about sort of support, the question of support for single mothers. And you gave the example of European countries, which approached the issue much differently. Mentioned preferential daycare admissions. And are there ways that you believe that we should be thinking creatively about how to provide support for families so that at least the economic inequality aspect is... Well, I'm not, yeah, I mean, I don't feel qualified to make policy proclamations, but I do see and what I said in that piece is that obviously we can sort of all agree that being a single mother can be more challenging than having two parents in the home. And I was just pointing out in a place like France, the response to that added difficulty is preferential access to excellent daycare. In England, the response is to use, with various kind of amendments to the tax system to penalize single mothers and make it much more expensive than it would be otherwise. And in America, our response is kind of moralism. Like our response is not to help single mothers in various ways, but to judge them. And I think that there are more constructive attitudes and obviously we are faced with this incredibly, rapidly changing demographic. And rather than think about how can we help this situation, we immediately carry all these kind of charged assumptions about who these women are and what they're doing and the children in danger and all of these fantasies in our heads. I guess I'm wondering a little bit whether it's a chicken and egg problem, like in a society where there are greater social supports across the board and you were mentioning people who have a deep economic need to be together. In a society where there's universal access to healthcare or state provided daycare, you have obviously less of an economic, people's decisions about partnering are less driven by economics. I'm phrasing this question very poorly, but I guess I wonder whether in it- What Katie was saying is right, I think in that it's very hard to disentangle in the studies, if you have studies that show that all else being equal, kids in two parent families do better than kids in single parent families, the all else being equal is a big problem because all else is never equal. Maybe marriage works for those who are married that doesn't mean it would work for those who aren't married. So that gets back to the question is are there enough marriageable men? Is there enough, is the real root of the trend towards single parenthood economic? If you had better paying jobs for low and medium skilled men, would the men therefore be more appealing marriage partners with those marriages work better? To say that kids who are in two parent families are doing better than kids who are not doesn't mean that you can somehow marry up the other people and those kids are gonna do as well. And I would argue, nor does it mean you should. I mean, I just feel like the assumption here that the only acceptable way to raise children kind of are bringing some Eisenhower era assumptions to the table here, which is two married parents, two children in their nuclear family in their separate house. And I just, that's not what America is anymore. And I don't even know if that's what America should be. And I think to possibly change the parameters of the debate and say, maybe there are, maybe some of these people should live together and not be married. Maybe some of these people should, maybe some of these things like our assumption that there's one thing we want people to do and that's get married and anything else is bad. I just, it's outdated and I also don't think it's necessarily true. I think that there are families that work and families that don't. There are married parents as we all know, and we can read like any book, poem or play or watch a movie and we know that not every child in a household with married parents is happy or flourishing. And even if you wanna protect your children and do the best you can and not harm them, you can't. You might be able to, you might not be able to. So this idea that we can create a perfect childhood and a perfect childhood looks one way, which we in America very, we like that idea, I just, I think it's a flawed assumption. I just don't know where all this, who you're talking about with all these moralizing people. I mean, it seems to me there's been a revolutionary acceptance of a redefinition of America. Well, we've just been talking about the coup polls, which are like documenting higher numbers of disapproval. So, you know, you too can discuss this, but it's a pretty, you know, I think where these people are is everywhere. Where these people are are, you know, it's not really, for me to say there are people who disapprove of single mothers, that doesn't seem to me like a controversial or obscure claim. I think it'd be very odd for somebody to beam into a New America panel in 2013 and find it taking as a given assumption that there's a moralism in America towards single parenthood. I think what there is is a huge change in single parenthood and you can debate what its effects are and what its causes are, but. Well, do you mention that there is in fact public disapproval, I mean, fairly, I forget the figure. There's public disapproval in the sense of people feel that it's bad for society and it's not necessarily the best way to raise kids, having one parent, one mother, as opposed to a mother and a father. So, again, public does not disapprove or majority does not disapprove of unmarried couples living together, which would include a single mom and a single dad. There is some sense that it's not the best for society to have a single woman having a child on her own without a man in the picture. That's, again, a societal attitude and I think some people may be reconciling that in their day-to-day reality with people they know and they may well like and think they're doing a great job and, again, as I said, disapproval is ebbing and most young adults do not disapprove, so I suspect we'll see that attitude permeate society. It's interesting, I mean, I just think about it from my strange warped universe as a single mother and in my writing on single motherhoods and I've written a lot of pieces, obviously, about single motherhood and I get a lot of letters from single mothers who are really all over the country in different demographics than me, different education levels and different economic levels and all of these letters, some of them are very long and very detailed and nearly all of them express that they do feel that there is a prejudice against single mothers, that they experience it every day in their daily lives and I think, you know, living within the world of single mothers, I mean, I could name like 16 things that happened to me in the last six months and it would bore everyone in the room to tears, but no, but I mean, I'm willing to do it, but rather than list that, I can tell you that I and all of these single mothers who write to me feel those things and it may be that when you're kind of like stepped outside of this experience, you don't see it or you don't understand it or you don't experience it, but I think it's pretty clear, as I say, not just where I live in New York City and not just here in New America and one of the things that I think is a challenge in thinking about this debate is that we're not just talking about right wing conservatives who have these prejudices, we're talking about the nice New York Times liberal reader who has these prejudices and so one of the things that to me is so important and why I think like J.K. Rowling's like lose the labels campaign and all of that is important is because the way we think about this debate is extremely moralistic, extremely puritanical, extremely irrational even in educated liberal circles. I wanted to open things up to questions. I think that there was, yeah, you had a mic. Is there anybody who'd like to ask one of our panelists? You would not bore me giving me some examples of when you feel the prejudice and or what other single mothers have told you would be very interesting to me. Okay. Okay, I mean, I feel like there's so many stories I could mention, one single mother friend of mine for instance went to a party with lots of kids around and there's sort of kids running around, grownups having a party, Brooklyn liberal educated circles and the host says to my friend, let's call her child Finn. I just want you to know, Finn is always welcome in our house which I just submit to you, you would not say about a one year old child with two parents. You wouldn't feel like you needed to make that special extra welcome articulated. When I was pregnant, somebody said to me with my son and I guess I was sort of, he was trying to give me some advice and he was said, you know, why don't you just wait till you have a regular baby? Why don't you wait and have a regular baby?  You could be like, she's crazy and oversensitive or you could see that some of this is a little bit, it's articulating something like why is this child irregular?  Okay, so this is our language that we're using today and I think a lot of it you see in language. When I was pregnant, same period, pregnant at my daughter's kindergarten, one of the little kids comes out, hand on her hips, five years old and she looks at me and she goes, when are you gonna get married? And now, I mean, not to say this prejudice is coming from a five-year-old but say it coming from something happening in that five-year-old's home, I'm just guessing. So what I'm telling you is I'm living in the most liberal, most kind of bookish, cultured, tiny corner of the world and I feel it and so I don't feel really comfortable sharing like stranger stories and what they say to me but I can tell you that people feel all of this and I can tell you close friends and relatives of mine will step in and say, that boy needs a man in the home and people will feel that they can ask you and single mothers, all single mothers will tell you this. People feel like they can ask you to account for your circumstances, like you have to kind of apologize or explain, like why did you end up this way? What are you doing? In a way that you would not ask a normal person with two parents married in a traditional circumstance, you wouldn't feel like they needed to explain themselves so elaborately. So I think there's, again, I could sit here for like 40 years and tell you more stories but there are a lot of stories like that and they're little things but they're not little things because the cultural climate exists in these offhand remarks. It's like that thing that five-year-old said to you in the school drop-off, that's what is our cultural climate. That's where the attitudes are. I think right here on the end. Yeah, it seems like one of the interesting things about public opinion on gay marriage is that people's opinions on whether they say they approve or disapprove doesn't necessarily correlate, for example, with how they'll vote on it or just on a personal level how they feel about it. So I was wondering if you're planning on doing any more polling about what brings people to say approval or disapproval or if you move to, if you plan to move beyond this kind of binary into seeing what opinions led to them saying these things? Well, this actually offers me an excellent opportunity to promo a report that we'll be releasing tomorrow that actually is of the LGBT population. So not of the general public, although it compares some attitudes in the LGBT population with attitudes in the public. Pew Research has been doing a whole series of reports in recent weeks about same-sex marriage and related issues. And I invite you to look at those. Some of them may answer your question and also to look at the report we're putting out tomorrow. You hear the gentleman on the end here? I think there's a microphone behind him, yeah. My name is Bob Patterson. I write for the Philadelphia Inquirer. GK Chesterton once said that in assessing any social problem, we have to first identify the social ideal. And I would suggest, I would ask, what is the social ideal in terms of raising children? And a related question would be, we've done a lot of talk about what adults think. What do you think most American children would prefer if they had their magic wish in terms of being raised? Would they prefer one parent? Would they prefer both their parents? Would they prefer both their parents married? Would they prefer adoption? What would most kids consider ideal for themselves? Katie, would you like to take that? Yeah, I mean, I think you can't. The problem is you can't ask that question of vacuum because unfortunately our children can get born on a little desert island where they can come to their fantasies innocently. The problem is they're born into a culture that is very aggressively pushing certain ideas about family on them from when they're six months old. So what their fantasies are, and I think this is what I think we don't know because because our world is changing so rapidly, the fantasies may be changing. But I can tell you, I think children don't want their parents fighting. Children don't want unhappy parents. Children don't want to be sitting there at a dinner table with simmering rage and resentment between their parents. I think we know that. And so children want to be loved. So I would argue to you, I don't think this is the ideal. We need well-loved children. And what I just proposed, and I think I could say could be echoed by children if they weren't reading so many little bear stories about little bear families that looked in a certain little bear way, that the ideal is that they're well-loved and that well-loved children can come from a lot of different kinds of families. That a family, it could be gay parents, it could be single parents, it could be a single dad, it could be whatever it is. The ideal should be well-loved children. And it's frankly the idea that it's anyone's business, how other people are raising their children or all these moral judgments. What I think children want is to live in a secure environment in which they're loved. I've reported on a lot of single-parent families and my experience has been that most children of those, in those families, wanted father.  So, I don't know, I've never pressed, the kid doesn't have to be your biological father, but you know, I've seen a lot of, I've heard a lot of stories about kids who got their hopes up when mom's boyfriend moved in and then it fell apart. The lady here in the pink. Hi, my name's Samantha Lachman from The Nation. In recent elections, there's always sort of these different terms floating around about moms from you hear about soccer moms to security moms in 2004 to in this most recent election, there was a new term, waitress moms. But in the last election, there was a little bit more of a discussion in the media about unmarried women and what their political preference was were and how they were gonna vote in the election. And I was just wondering, has there been relatively less of a discussion of unmarried women or single mothers because it's assumed that they're gonna vote for Democrats and therefore their votes aren't seem to be up for grabs and is that why the media attention sort of doesn't fixate on them as much as these sort of like mom categories that recur every cycle? It's a very interesting question. Does one of you like to take that on? Well, I think there is the assumption that they're gonna vote Democrat, but as I remember when they were talking about the unmarried woman vote, there was some flexibility. And obviously because we're talking about people from different worlds and different kind of corners of the universe, I think it is to a certain extent up for grabs. And I would think, certainly the Republican parties made a little bit of an effort to speak in slightly more friendly terms about single mothers. But I think it will make a difference obviously moving forward and I bet you will single mothers may be a factor in the next election in that same way where we're talking about waitress moms, soccer moms. I think we have time for just one more question. Let me get this lady here on the end of the row. Yeah. Hi, Liz Peters, Urban Institute. The research, we've been talking a lot about different kinds of family types, but nobody's talked about instability. And the research actually shows that it's instability that is the big factor in affecting children's wellbeing. And I think that the reason that we see, or one of the reasons that we see marriage being in general in the research better for kids is because that's a more stable arrangement on average. If you have a kid being born to cohabiting families, to cohabiting parents, which is happening more and more, that's a very unstable family type. They break up at much, much higher rates than a kid born to marriage. So I think rather than talking about family type per se, I think we need to really think about the stability of the arrangements in which kids are living. Well, there's certainly, what you say certainly is true and for people interested in this topic I'd recommend looking at the work of Andrew Chirlen, especially marriage, go around in which he talks about the fact that many children today are growing up with sequential parent figures in the household. On the other side, I guess it's interesting to note as well that a certain percentage of women who give birth when they're not married do in fact get married later. In fact, some research indicates 60 to 80% do at some point. So that's another kind of transition you see. Get married to the... Some to one else. Some to the father, some to another guy. I think we're about to break for lunch for a little while and there are sandwiches out there which you can all help yourself to. After lunch we're going to be coming back for a panel on divorce led by Casey Greenfield. So look forward to seeing you all after this short break.


Cannabis stocks and CEO interviews brought to you by rich TV live. Hey, how's everybody doing today? This is your boy rich, and I'm here with a very special guest. It's seven trill. How you doing today, brother?   Absolutely. So seven I want you to tell us a little bit about your story. First. I want to thank Andrew Ellington for making this happen Andrew man, you are a champion my friend. Without Andrew this interview would have never happened I've never gotten a chance to meet seven trill and you know what? I'm a big fan of your music, bro I listened to a lot of your music yesterday. I was checking it out, and I know you're a big fan of cannabis I'm the cannabis man When it comes to cannabis stocks, I don't know if there's anybody else That's talked about cannabis stocks more than me I've been doing it for about two years, and I got a chance to see some of your music and I was just depressed So congratulations on all of your success.  It was my escape So I came in the game from like a broken home background, you know what I mean? Pops wasn't there mom was doing her thing and she was wild and so, you know, I was the oldest of three brothers In a nutshell, I started doing music in like sixth grade seventh grade like that summer between Transition to seventh grade my boy started making beats on them on this little fruity loop thing You know, I mean we started recording with a shitty as USB microphone You know that you use a talk to shorties and in chat rooms and all like that So we started like that and basically, you know, I just I kept running. I kept going I had my little girl when I was 18 And that that was the motivation. I quit I quit all the legal stuff I was doing, you know, I mean quit everything I was doing just fully focused on music and made it my profession I've been at it for a good like over over almost like going on 13 years now So it's like it's been been a long time coming man.  So that's just what we do You know, and I mean, I'm I'm I'm more of a I like the the vape cartridges I don't know. I smoke trees in the past and you know, whenever and when it was a social gathering But I'm more of like a I like the oils, you know, what I mean, and it's a different type of high for me You know, I mean and don't you have a sponsor? Aren't you? Yeah, tell me a little bit about it. Yeah, timeless vape Inside of them we they're they're established here. They used to be I believe a they used to be a clothing line But the homie Rocky, you know, he he ended up switching it and making it all at a time this vape company So, um One of my boys, which is an engineer that I go to here out of town in 10p, Arizona He's my engineer. He's my studio base where I go record all my music. It's called deep roots So one of my boys or homies at the at the moment Introduced me to him and he proposed to me because I mean, I got a big name out here, you know I mean in Arizona. So he's like, yo, um, we're we're starting to you know time This base is is a starting to sponsor, you know, local talent And we we don't see why you wouldn't be the best candidate for that because I mean they looked at my numbers And you know, I mean my my Facebook has 167,000, you know, I mean I got you know Views on YouTube like almost to the mills and you know, I mean they I've just been making noise for very very long time out here And it was a win-win situation, you know They're blessing me with product and they were helping me grow as an individual as well as me giving them exposure So it was just you know, it was a win-win. So shout out the time.  You got video almost a million views.  So What's up man? So I just dropped the I dropped the album in June called drowning in my sorrows. That was more of like a More of a real-life type of scenario. Um, there was there was like, you know I talk about smoking all the time regardless because it's something that we do and something that I indulge in but I mean as right now I'm I'm planning a tour of you know, I mean that the West Coast of the United States Right now for the middle of this while basically the mid mid mid year next year 2019 and I'm also dropping a project Called hundred pains on February 15th 2019 so that's basically where I'm at right now. I mean, I'm in the you know I'm in the intermission between dropping albums. So I'm just been writing. I've been doing collaborations for different artists That's been reaching out to me. I've been trying to boost my social media numbers up make connections in any way possible So that I could you know, I could help others when and we could win together, you know What I mean, it could just be a win-win for everybody. So that's basically what I've been doing As well as just a lot of a lot of repetition and writing, you know I mean because repetition is the father of learning, you know, I mean, so you keep doing it doing it So that's all I've been doing writing Me music money money money music music money kids kids kids family and that's it for me You know, I mean you sound like me bro.  It's it's cannabis It's kids. It's box, you know, and then you know now we're getting into music So I'm excited to to collaborate with you bro Like this is honestly something that I can see you one day just getting to those higher levels And if you're a cannabis company and you're looking for someone that's in the hip-hop industry 7 Trill is definitely interested and potentially working with you guys. So holler at your boy We can make it happen. We can collaborate seven. Let me ask you a question Can you put together a song for us like a like a hip-hop stock market cannabis song That's nothing that is nothing for me to do something like that. I can do that definitely, you know I mean, it's nothing for me to do something like that. Yeah, because we're in the cannabis game, right?    I wanted to think about rich and seven trillion definitely definitely that that's that's that's the big picture right there man You just try all we gotta do is put the pieces of the puzzle back together great You know what I mean and once you build that foundation ain't nothing can break it down You know what I mean, so let's do this let's do this again seven men I really appreciate your time today man. I wish you all the best of luck and all of your success and Collaborate again soon and anytime you have any big news any music you want to drop any songs Please send over we'll drop it in our community man And you know I wish you all the all the best of luck and this has been a great time And it's really nice meeting you and talking to you man definitely man Definitely let's do this again sometime as soon as possible and I'll work on those songs that you want me to do And I got you trust me. All right, brother. Thank you so much man. Everybody. Have a great day This is your boy rich with seven trill. We're out You


So thanks for coming. We're here to talk about full disk encryption while you're not really as secure as you might think you are. Oh, what just happened? I'm missing a slide. Okay. I'll just say what it was then. So how many of you encrypt the hard drives in your computer just like a show of hands? Oh, wow. Yeah, welcome to DEF CON. So I guess it's like what, 90% of you at least. So how many of you use open source full disk encryption software, something that you could potentially audit and okay, not as many of you.  Okay, more of you I'd say about 20%. How many of you have ever left your computer unattended for more than a few hours? A lot of hands should be up. Either.  I mean, I'd be surprised if you're not because I'd have to ask or you're like zombies that don't sleep or something. Okay, and then the other answer of course is anyone who leaves their computer unattended for more than a few minutes. Also pretty much everyone. So why do we encrypt our computers? And it's surprisingly hard to find anyone actually talking about this, which is really weird. And I think it's really important to articulate our motivations, why we are doing something, a particular security practice. And if we don't do that, we don't have a sensible goal post to see how we're doing. There's plenty of details in the documentation of full disk encryption software of what they do, what algorithms they use, what, you know, how their passion passwords and so forth, but almost nobody's talking about why. And I argue that we encrypt our computer because we want some control of our data, some assurances about the confidentiality and integrity of our data that nobody's stealing our data or modifying our data without us knowing about it. And it's basically, we want determination over our data. We want to be able to control what happens to it. And there's also situations where you have liabilities for not maintaining the secrecy of your data. Lawyers have to have attorney-client privilege. Doctors have patient confidentiality. People who are in finance and accounting have all sorts of regulatory rules that they need to comply with. And so if you're leaking data, you know, there's companies which have to notify their customers that, oh, we've someone left a laptop unencrypted in a van and it got broken into and stolen. So your data might be out there on the Internet. But it also speaks to, and it's really all about physical access to our computers that we want to protect them because really, full-disk encryption doesn't do anything if someone just owns your machine. But it also gets to a greater point of if we want to build secure networks, if you want to have a secure Internet, we can't do that unless we have endpoints that are secure. You can't build a secure network without the foundations of the secure endpoints. But by and large, we've figured out the disk encryption theory aspects of the stuff. We know how to generate random numbers reasonably securely on a computer. We know all the block cipher modes of operation that we should use for full-disk encryption to get these sorts of nice security properties. We know how to derive keys from passwords securely. So mission accomplished, right? We can all stand on an aircraft carrier and, you know, the answer is no, it's not the whole story. There's still a hell of a lot of cleanup that you need to do. Even if you have absolutely perfect cryptography, even if you know it can't be broken in any way, you still have to implement it on a real computer where you don't have these nice black box academic properties of your system. And so you don't attack the crypto when you're trying to break someone's full-disk encryption. You either attack the computer and trick the user somehow, or you attack the user and convince them to either give you the password or get it from them in some other means by like a key logger or whatever. And de facto use doesn't really match up with the security models of the full-disk encryption software. If you're looking at full-disk encryption software, they're very much focused on the disk theoretic aspects of full-disk encryption. And here's a quote from the true crypt web page. They're actual documentation that they do not secure data on your computer if someone has ever manipulated it or is manipulating it while it's running. Like, I wish I was making this up. Basically, their entire security model is like, oh, if it encrypts the disk correctly, if it decrypts the disk correctly, we've done our job. Woot. And I apologize for the text that you probably would not be able to read very well, so I'll read it here, a little bit of it here. So this is an exchange between the true crypt developers and another security researcher by the name of Joanna Rucosa, where she brought up this attack and tried to talk to them and see what their reaction was of feasibility. And so this is what they said. We never consider the feasibility of hardware attacks. We have to assume the worst. And she asks, do you carry your laptop with you all the time? They say, how the user ensures physical security is not our problem. And she asks very correctly, why in the world do I need encryption then? So we live in the, ignoring feasibility of an attack is just, it's specious. You can't do that. We live in the real world where we have these systems that we have to deal with, we have to implement them, we have to use them. And there's no way that you can compare a 10-minute attack that you can conduct with just software, like a flash drive to something where you need to pull apart the hardware and manipulate the system that way. And regardless of what they say, physical security and resistance to physical attack is in the scope of full disconcription. It doesn't matter what you, what you disclaim in your security model. At the very least, if they don't want it to claim responsibility of that, they need to be very clear and unequivocal about how easily the stuff can be broken. So this is a diagram of sort of an abstract system diagram of what is mostly in a modern CPU, or a modern computer, and sort of what the boot process is just so everyone's on the same page, what actually happens here. So as we know, the boot loader gets loaded from the secondary storage on the computer by the BIOS, and it gets copied into main memory through, you know, data transfer. The boot loader then asks the user for some sort of authentication credential, like a password or a key smart card or something like that. That password is then transformed by some process into a key which is then stored in memory for the duration of the computer being active. And then the boot loader of course transfers control over to the operating system and then both the operating system and the key remain in memory for the transparent encryption and decryption of the computer. This is a very idealized view. This assumes that nobody is trying to screw with this process in any way. And I think we can all think of a few different ways where this can be broken. So let's enumerate a few of the things that might go wrong if someone is trying to attack you. So I break attacks into three fundamental tiers. Non-invasive, which is something that you might be able to execute with just a flash drive. You don't even need to take a system apart. Or some other hardware component that you could attach to it, like a PCI card, Express card, or Thunderbolt, the new adapter that gives you basically naked access to the PCI bus. Secondly, we'll consider attacks where a screwdriver might be required where you might need to remove some system component temporarily to deal with it in your own little environment. And also soldering iron attacks, which is the most complicated where you're physically either adding or modifying system components like chips on the system in order to try to break these things. And so one of the first types of attacks, a compromised boot loader, or this is also sometimes known as an evil made attack, where the boot loader itself, since you need to start executing some unencrypted code as part of the system boot process, something which you can boot strap yourself with and prompt the user for credentials and then get into access to the rest of the data that's encrypted on the hard drive. There's a few different ways that you could do this. You could physically alter the boot loader on the storage system. You could compromise the BIOS, you could load a malicious BIOS that hooks the keyboard adapter or hooks the disk reading routines and modify it that way in a way that's resistant to removing the hard drive. But I mean, in any case, you can modify your system so when the user enters their password, it gets written to disk unencrypted or something like that. That in some way the attacker can get it. You can do something similar at the operating system level. This is especially true if you're not using full disk encryption, if you're using container encryption, there's the whole operating system that someone could manipulate. This could also happen from a attack on the system, like an exploit. So someone gets root on your box and now they can read the key out of main memory. That's a perfectly legitimate attack. And then that key could be either trans stored on the hard drive in plain text for later acquisition by the attack or sent over the network to their command and control systems. Another possibility, of course, is capturing the user input via key logger, be it software or hardware, something exotic like a pin hole camera or maybe a microphone that records them typing in sounds and trying to figure out what keys they pressed. This is kind of a hard attack to stop because it potentially includes components that are outside of the system. I also want to talk about data remnants attacks, more colloquially known as a cold boot attack. So if you asked five years ago, even people who are very security savvy, what are the data properties, what are the security properties of main memory? They would tell you, when it powers down, you lose the data very, very quickly. And then an excellent paper from Princeton 2008 discovered that actually, at room temperature, you're looking at several seconds of perfectly good very, very little data degradation in RAM. And if you cool it down to cryogenic temperatures by, say, using an inverted can duster, you can get several minutes where you're getting very, very little bit degradation in main memory. And so if your key is in main memory and someone pulls your modules out and pulls out your attack, pulls out the modules from your computer, they can attack your key by finding where it is in main memory in the clear.  But it's not going to help you if someone takes the module out and puts it either in another computer or a dedicated piece of hardware for extracting memory module contents. And finally, there's direct memory access. Any PCI device on your computer has the ability to in ordinary operation to read and write the contents of any sector in main memory. They can basically do anything. And I mean, this was designed back when computers were much slower where we didn't want to have the CPU babysitting every transfer from devices to and from main memory. So devices gain this direct memory access capability to just, they could be issued a command by the CPU and then they could just finish it and the data would be in memory whenever you needed it. And this is a problem because PCI devices can be reprogrammed. A lot of these things have writable firmware that you can just reflash to something hostile. And this could compromise the operating system or execute any one of any other form of attack of either modifying the OS or pulling out the key directly. There's forensic capture hardware that is designed to do this in criminal investigations. They, like, plug something into your computer and pull out the contents of memory. You can do this with Firewire. You can do this with ExpressCard. You can do this over Thunderbolt now, the new Apple adapter. So these are basically external buses to your, these are external ports to your internal system bus, which is very, very powerful. So wouldn't it be nice if we could keep our keys somewhere else in RAM? Because we've sort of demonstrated that RAM is not terribly trustworthy from the security perspective. Is there any dedicated key storage or cryptographic hardware? And I mean there is. You can find things like cryptographic accelerators. You use them in web servers so you can handle more SSL transactions per second. And they're, you know, they're tamper resistant or certificate authorities have these things that hold their top secret keys. But they're not really designed for high throughput operations like using disk encryption. And so are there any other options? Can we use the CPU as sort of a pseudo hardware crypto module? So can we compute something like AES in the CPU using only something like CPU registers? Until in AMD out of these rather excellent new CPU instructions which actually take all the hard work of doing AES out of your hands. You can just do the blocks like for primitive operations with just a single, you know, assembly instruction. The question is then, can we store, can we, can we store our key in memory and can we actually perform this process without relying on main memory? We have a fairly large register set on x86 processors. I don't know if any of you have actually tried adding up all the all the bits that you have in registers, but it's something like four kilobytes almost on modern CPUs. So some of what we can actually dedicate to key storage and scratch space for our encryption operations. One possibility is using the hardware breakpoint debugging registers. There's four of these in your typical Intel CPU and in 64 bit mode these are each going to hold 64 bit pointer. So it's 256 bits of potential storage space that most people will never actually use. The advantage of course to using debug registers is one, they're privileged registers so only the operating system can access them, ring zero. And you get other nice benefits like when the CPU is powered down either by shutting off the system or putting it in sleep mode you actually lose all register contents. So you can't cold boot these. And a guy in Germany, Tilo Mueller actually implemented this thing as Tresor for Linux in 2011. And he did performance testing on it and it's actually not any slower than doing your regular AES computation and software. How about instead of storing a single key though we can store 228 bit keys. This gets us into more of the crypto module space. We can store a single master key which never leaves the CPU on boot up. And then load and unload wrapped versions of keys as we need them for additional task operations. The problem is we can have our code and our keys stored outside of main memory but the CPU is ultimately still going to be executing the contents of memory. So a DMA transfer or some other manipulation could still alter the operating system and get it to dump out the registers whether they be in main memory or if they're some more more exotic like debug registers. Can we do anything about the DMA attack angle? And as it turns out yes we can. In recently as part of new technologies for enhancing server virtualization for performance reasons people liked being able to attach say a network adapter to a virtual server. So it would need to go through a hypervisor. And so IOMMU technology was developed so you can actually sandbox a PCI device into its own little section of memory where it can't arbitrarily read and write in the system. So this is perfect. We can set up IOMMU permissions to protect our operating system or whatever we're using to handle keys and protect it from arbitrary access. And again our friend from Germany, Tilo Mueller, has implemented a version of Tressor on a micro bitvisor called Bitvisor which basically does this. It lets you run a single operating system and it transparently does this disk access encryption. The guest doesn't even have to care or know anything about it. Which is great. Disk access is totally transparent to the OS. Debug registers cannot be accessed by the OS. And IOMMU is set up so that the hypervisor itself is secure from manipulation. But as it turns out there's kind of other things in memory that we might care about other than disk encryption keys. There's sort of the problem that I hinted at earlier where we used to do container encryption and now we all do full disk encryption for the most part. We do full disk encryption because it's very, very difficult to make sure you don't get accidental rights of your sensitive data to temporary files or caching in a container encryption system. Now that we're reevaluating main memory as a not secure, not trustworthy place of storing data we need to treat it in much the same way. We have to encrypt everything we want to leak. We do not want to leak. So things that are really important like SSH keys or private keys or PGP keys of a password manager or you know any top-secret documents that you're working on. So I had a very, very silly notion. Can we encrypt main memory or at least most of the main memory where we're likely to keep secrets so we can at least minimize how much we're going to leak? And once again surprisingly or perhaps not so surprisingly the answer is yes. A proof of concept in 2010 by a guy named Peter Peterson actually tried in implementing a RAM encryption solution. So it wouldn't encrypt all RAM. It would basically split main memory into two components. A small fixed-size clear which would be unencrypted and then a larger sort of pseudo swap device where all the data was encrypted prior to being kept in main memory. Ended up being obviously quite a bit slower in synthetic benchmarks with read performance, more effective than write performance. But you know what? In the real world when you ran like a web browser benchmark it actually did pretty well. 10% slower. I think we can live with that. The problem with this proof of concept implementation it was it stored the key to the crypt in main memory because where else would we put it? The author considered using things like the TPM for bulk encryption operations but those things are even slower than dedicated hardware cryptosystems so it would be totally unusable. But you know what? If we have the capability to use the CPU as a pseudo hardware cryptomodule it's right in the center of things so it should be fast enough to do these things. So maybe we can actually use something like this. So let's say we have this sort of system set up. We've gotten our keys are not in main memory. Our code responsible for manipulating the keys is protected from arbitrary read and access by malicious hardware components. Main memory is encrypted so most of our secrets are not going to leak even if someone tries to execute a cold boot attack. But how do we actually get a system booted up to this state? Because we need to start from a turned off system, authenticate ourselves to it, and get the system up and running. How do we do this in a trustworthy way because after all someone could still modify the system software to trick us into this great new system but in reality we're just not doing anything. So one of the very important topics is being able to verify the integrity of our computers. The user needs to be able to verify that their computer has not been tampered with before they authenticate themselves to it. And there's a tool that we can use for this, the trusted platform module. It's kind of got a bad rap but we'll talk about that later. But it has the capability to measure your booting sequence in a couple of different ways to let you control what data will be revealed to the system from the TPM in two particular system configuration states. So you can basically seal data to a particular software configuration that you're running on your system. And there's a couple of different implementation approaches to do this and there's fancy therapy to make it really hard to get around it. So maybe we can do this. And so what is the TPM anyway? I mean it was originally sort of like hailed as the grand solution to digital rights management by media companies. Media companies would be able to remotely verify that your system is running in some approved configuration before they would let you run the software and unlock the key files. It ended up being really impractical in practice and so nobody's actually even trying to use it for this purpose anymore. I think a better way to think about it is really just a smart card that's fixed on your motherboard. It can perform some cryptographic operations RSA, SHA, has a random number generator and it has physical attack counter measures to prevent someone from easily getting access to the data that's stored in it. The only real thing that has this ability to measure the system boot state into platform configuration registers. And it's usually a separate chip on the motherboard. So there's some security implications of that. There's some kind of fun bits like monotonic counters, numbers that you can only request the TPM increases and then you can check what the value is. There's a small non-violetel memory range that you could use for really whatever you want. It's not very big, like a computer, but it could be useful. There's a tick counter which lets you determine how long the system has been running since last startup. And there's commands that you could issue to the TPM to let it do things on your behalf which include even things like clearing itself if you feel the need to. So we want to then develop a protocol that a user can run against the computer that they can verify that the computer has not been tampered with before they authenticate themselves with the computer and then begin using it. So what sort of things could we try sealing to platform configuration registers that would be useful for the sort of protocol. And so a couple of suggestions that I have are seeds to one time password tokens, either the time or the event variety.  Something that's difficult to something unique that's not something that someone can easily find elsewhere. And then say disable the video out on your computer when you're part of this challenge response authentication mode. You also want to seal a part of the disk key and there's a couple of reasons you want to do that. It assures that the system within certain security assumptions it assures that the system is only going to be booting into some approved application that you control as the owner of the computer. And so ultimately that means that anyone who wants to attack your system needs to do it either through breaking the TPM or they need to do it within the sandbox that you've created for them. And this of course is not very cryptographically strong or anything like that. You're not going to have a protocol which allows a user to securely authenticate the computer to the same level that you have say encryption in your head. It's never going to be perfect. So I mentioned that there's a self erase TPM command that you can issue as in the software. And since you're also running since you're also require the system to the TPM requires the system to be in a particular configuration before it will release secrets you can actually do something interesting like self destruct. If you develop the software and your protocol to limit say the number of times the computer has been started up unsuccessfully, have it time out once the password has been waiting on the password screen for some period of time, or limit the number of password attempts so you can enter. Or the amount of time since the last computer has been started up say if it's been in cold storage for a week or two. You could also restrict access to the computer for periods of time say in the country and you want to lock down your computer for the duration of the trip so when you get to your hotel or whatever on the other end then you can unlock it but not before. You can also do fun things like leave little canaries on the disc which appear to contain the critical values for your policy but are really just trip wires and you're really just using the internal TPM values. You could also create a self destruct password or duress code to effectively issue this reset command. And since the two options that an attacker would have would be break the TPM or run your software you can kind of make them play by these rules and you can actually do an effective self destruct. The TPM is intentionally designed to be very, very hard to copy. Basically you can't clone it very easily so you could use things like monotonic counters to create blockers, any disc restore, replay attacks and once the TPM clear command is issued it's game over for an attacker who might want to get access to your data. There's some similarities to a system that Jacob Applebaum discussed at the chaos communication congress many years ago 2005. He proposed using a network, remote network server for many of these options that are pretty brittle and kind of potentially difficult to use. Since the TPM is an integrated system component you can get a lot of these advantages by using the TPM instead of remote server. And a hybrid approach is potentially possible. You could have a system set up say as an IT department where you temporarily lock down a system and it can only become available again once you plug it into the network call your IT administrator system again. I'm kind of hesitant to expose a network stack this early in the boot process because it increases your attack surface but it's still a possibility. So I've sort of qualified all my statements so an attacker can only do this that's of course under the assumption that they cannot break the TPM very easily. So this is actually a optical microscope scan of a TPM or smart card done by Chris Tarnofsky who spoke in here at DEF CON last year and then Black had a few years ago on the security of these TPMs. So he's actually done some really great work in figuring out how much how hard these things are to break. He's enumerated the counter measures and sort of figured out what would it take to actually break these things and actually has gone and done it and tested it. So there's things like light detectors, there's active meshes, there's all sorts of things to try to throw you off the track of what it's actually doing.  You can actually get around most of these. So you can de-encapsulate a chip, put it in an electron microscope workstation and go wild. Find where the unencrypted data bus is and just glitch it to spill out all of its secret data. But nonetheless, this sort of an attack, even if you've done all the R and D, something is going to take hours with an expensive microscope and you're still going to spend months of R and D to figure out what the counter measures are on the chip so you can actually break it without frying the one chip of your attack target. There's also recent attacks. I mentioned earlier again that the TPM is a separate chip on the motherboard in almost all cases. It's not up in the CPU like it is saying for DRM enforcement in video game consoles. If you manage to reset it, you're really not going to adversely affect the system that badly. It's usually a chip that's off the LPC bus on the computer, which itself is sort of a legacy bus that's off the south bridge or the platform hub. And on modern systems, really the only sorts of things you're going to find on here and things like the BIOS legacy keyboards. We used to have floppy controllers, but I guess not really anymore. And if you find a way to reset, say the low pin count bus, you'll reset the TPM into a fresh system boot state.  And you'll be able to play back the boot sequence of a trusted boot sequence that the TPM has data sealed to without actually executing that boot sequence, and then you could use this to extract data. There's a couple of attacks that have tried to exploit this. If you're using an older mode in the TPM called static root for trust measurement, you can do this pretty easily. I have not seen any research on a successful attack against the newer Intel trusted execution technology version of the TPM activation. This is an area that probably needs more research to intercept the LPC bus and what it's communicating to the CPUs. That might be another way that you can attack the TPM. Let's look at a blueprint what I think we should have for getting the system up from a cold boot state up into what we have our running trustworthy configuration. There's a lot of really vulnerable legacy system components in our PC architecture. You can do all sorts of things in the BIOS like hooking the interrupt vector table and modifying disk read and writes or capturing keyboard input or screwing with the system in all sorts of fun different ways. Masking out CPU feature registers. There's plenty of options if you want to mess with people. In my opinion, you really want to get out of BIOS controlled mode out of real mode into protected mode and really just do your measurement stuff. Once you get into this pre-boot mode or just your operating system like a Linux initial RAM disk then you start executing your protocol and start doing these things. Once you're using operating system resources, what someone does at the BIOS level as far as interrupt tables doesn't really affect you anymore, you really don't care. You can do sanity checks on your registers like if you know you're running on a core server or if you know it's going to be supporting things like no execute bit and debug registers and other stuff that people might try to mask out in capability registers. Here's the runtime blueprint. What we actually want the system to look like once we're in the running configuration. There was the previous project Trevisor which implemented many of the security aspects of doing disk registers and having IOMMU protections on your main memory. The problem is that Bitvisors are very specialty, not very commonly used program. Zen is sort of like the canonical open source hypervisor where there's a lot of security research going on. People are making sure it's not broken. In my opinion we should use something like Zen as your bare level hardware interface and then use a Linux DOM0 administrative domain on it to actually do your hardware initialization. In Zen all of your pair of virtualized domains are actually running in non-privileged mode in ring three so they don't actually have direct access to things like the debug registers. That's one thing that's already done. Zen exposes things like hypercalls that give you access to those sort of stuff but it's something that you can use in software. And so the approach I'm taking is we'll sort of do that master key approach in the debug registers. We'll dedicate two debug registers the first two to store 128 bit AES key which is our master key. This thing never leaves a CPU register as soon as it's entered in by the process that takes the user credentials. And then we use the second two registers as virtual machine specific or whatever's. It could be either as ordinary debug registers or in this case we could use it to encrypt main memory. In this particular case we still need to have a few devices that are directly connected to the administrative domain. That includes the graphics processing unit which is a PCI device. The keyboard, the TPM all this stuff needs to be directly accessible. So you can't really apply IMMU protections on this. But things like the network controller arbitrary devices in the PCI bus you can set up IMMU protections on it. So they have absolutely zero access to your administrative domain or your hypervisor memory spaces. You can do similar things by creating, you can get access to things like the network by actually putting things like your network controller into dedicated virtual machines. So these things are, these things get the devices mapped but have IMMU protection set up so that device can only access virtual machine. You can do the same thing with your storage controller and then you actually run all of your applications in virtual machines that have absolutely zero direct hardware access. So even if someone owns your web browser or sends you a malicious PDF file, they don't actually get anything that would let them seriously compromise your disc encryption. So I can't take the credit for that architecture design. It was actually the design basis for a really excellent project called the CUBE's OS project. They basically describe themselves as a pragmatic formulation of Zen and Linux and a few custom tools to basically do a lot of the stuff I just talked about. Implements these non-privileged guests and do a nice unified system environment. So it feels like you're really running with one system but it's actually a bunch of different virtual machines under the hood. So I use this implementation of my code base. All the encryption, all the crypto stuff is stuff that I've added on top of it. And so the tool I'm releasing this is still really proof of concept experimental code. I call it failings. It is a patch to Zen to do the implementation of the disc encryption stuff as I've described. Master key in the first two debug registers second two debug registers totally unrestricted. For security reasons the XMM registers which are used as scratch space are encrypted as well as the key when you're doing some VM context switches. And I've also implemented a very, very simple implementation of the crypt keeper paper, the encrypted memory using ZRAM. Because hey, it's been mainlined. It does pretty much everything except crypto. So adding encryption on top of it is just a really tiny little bit of code which is great. The most secure code is the code you don't have to write.  Hardware wise you do have a few system requirements so you need a system that supports the AES new instructions. A reasonably common but not every system has it. Chances are if you have an Intel i5 or i7 almost all of them support it but there are some oddballs so check out Intel Arc to make sure it supports all the features that you need. Ditto, hardware virtualization extensions these are very, very common as of like 2006. IOMMU is a little bit more complicated to find if you're looking for a computer. It's not listed as a sticker specification you kind of need to dig for it and there's a lot of people who should know better but don't about what the difference is between VTX and VTD and so forth. So you might need to hunt for a system that supports the stuff and you want a system of course of the TPM because otherwise you can't implement this measured boot thing at all. So usually you'll want to be looking at business class machines where you can verify this sort of stuff exists. If you look for like Intel TXT it'll have almost everything you need. The cubes team actually keeps a really great hardware compatibility list on their wiki which actually has details for a lot of systems that do this sort of stuff. So security assumptions in order for the system to be secure we have a few assumptions about a few system components. The TPM of course very, very critical component for assuring the integrity of the boot. We need to make sure that there's no back door capable of dumping NVRAM or manipulating monotonic counters or putting the system into a state where it's not actually trusted we just think it is by resetting the PCR attacks and based on remarks by Tarnofsky who has reverse engineered these chips I'm sort of setting a bound of roughly 12 hours of exclusive access to the computers required if you want to do a TPM attack on it to pull out secrets. There's a few assumptions about the CPU, the memory controller and IOMU mainly that they're not back door and they're correctly implemented. Some of these might not necessarily be very strong assumptions because Intel could very easily backdoor some of these things and we have no way of finding out. And some security assumptions about Zen as a piece of software it actually has a very good security record but nothing's perfect and occasionally there are security vulnerabilities. In the case of Zen given its privileged position in the system that's actually kind of a big deal you really want to make sure it's secure. And so under those security assumptions we have what sort of put a framework up for a threat model we want to do a realistic threat assessment where we realize that not every system is reliable. Especially when there's so many legacy components that were designed without any consideration of security. But at the same time also there are not all theoretical attacks or practical and you can't lump very, very simple attacks with a difficult complex hardware attacks. And I think a good analogy is thinking about safe security. We all know that every safe can eventually be broken. It's a question of how much time you could eventually can be broken. And so I think we need to think about our systems in the context of having physical security defenses in terms of hours rather than minutes that we have right now. And as always if I've screwed up, if I've made an assumption that you don't think holds, prove it, verify it, verify mine, make sure I'm right or wrong. And so expected security this is what you'll actually get. Cold boot attack is not going to be restricted by whatever you have in clear. Hardware based RAM acquisition is not going to be effective because they're going to be IOMMU sandboxed to nothing so they're not actually going to get your application state or your system state. And even if you manage to extract the secrets out of a TPM, all it's going to do is get you back to where we are right now where although it is easily broken, you're still all the way down to zero. But if you have a good security habit policy which is reasonable say 12 hours of no contact with your computer, you should be okay. As long as you're reasonably vigilant and not excessively vigilant, you should be okay. A couple of attack methods which are really like these are the main ones that I would attack if I were trying to break into a system that used something like this. Keyloggers and friends are still going to do some mitigation of this by using one-time tokens but still again, you're going to be imperfect. TPM attacks as mentioned before either NV RAM extraction or LPC bus reset intercept hardware. Find some way of tricking the TPM into getting into a configuration that it thinks is trustworthy but is actually not. In RAM manipulation, if you have something which looks like RAM, acts like RAM, but isn't actually RAM, it pretends to be RAM for most time, then there's really nothing you can do because you'd be able to manipulate the contents of the system no problem. You could also try things like a transient pulse injection which is how George Hots broke the hypervisor security on the PS3. A little quick bit about legal notes. I'm not a lawyer obviously, not your lawyer, not legal advice. As far as I know, if you have self-destruct, as far as I know it is not illegal yet. But there has been no legal test case that might be interesting to find out. But I'm not sure I'd want to be that test case either. But you also need to be aware that TPM and strong encryption is not it's illegal in certain jurisdictions. You can't use a TPM in, say, China. You can't use a TPM in Russia. And some companies like the United Kingdom have mandatory key disclosure. You will go to prison if you do not hand over a key like the RIPA act. Future work and improvements, production version, stable version, right now it is not stable. If you put your computer to sleep it will eat your data among a couple of other problems. I'm working on it. And some other things that might be fun to do in the future like open SSL keys are really important. So if there's an API that you could do to basically let you swap out your contents of memory very, very quickly so your exposure time is very easy to install while you guys could all install and maybe upstream the patches to Linux and the goons are getting ready to kick me off the stage. Conclusions, I'm almost done. I'm almost done. So best security in the world goes unused if it's unusable. The model needs to account for realistic use patterns. And it's not just disk encryption. You really need to think about it holistically from the perspective of the whole system. And it's challenging to do this, but it's not a problem. Thank you.


Galleria melanella has been used as a model organism for over 85 years, and it has become increasingly popular due to its ability to survive at high temperatures, its ease of handling, and its similarity to mammals in terms of immunity. It is often used in preclinical studies to test the efficacy of drugs and other treatments, and it is also used to study the effects of infectious agents such as viruses and bacteria. Additionally, this model organism is being used to explore the effects of co-infection and toxicity. Galleria melanella is a valuable tool for studying the immunology of mammals, and it is becoming more widely accepted as a reliable model for testing the safety of new drugs and treatments. This article was authored by ISA Serrano, Claudia Verdial, Lise Tavares, and others.