All right, welcome back to the exec event here at Randy Seidel's house in Massachusetts, sales acceleration, cube after dark. I'm here with Ed Walsh as the CEO of Chaos Search. Ed, good friend of the cube, good to see you. My friend, thanks for coming on us. So we just wrote this piece, George Gilbert and I, this weekend, we dropped it. It's called Getting Ready for the Sixth Data Platform. So we basically said, okay, there's five really prominent data platforms in difference to Oracle. We didn't kind of sort of included Oracle, IBM. You know, there are others, but the big five with the big three clouds, Snowflake and Databricks. And we're saying, look, they're really not set up with this new Uber for all real time environment, digital twin of your business. And we had Ryan Blu on who's the creative iceberg. Basically say, look, these, these platforms could morph. They're becoming, you know, more accepting of open table formats, which by the way could disrupt them. So I want to ask you, because you're in the field, you see all this stuff, what's missing when you talk to customers in today's data platforms? Good question. So, and we might not know all the answers, but I just, what customers are telling us is, or at least, and I can give you a couple examples, is they're looking for, there's platforms for long term retention. What they're looking for is how to get closer to real time. How did they get that telemetry, event logs, but the machine generated data is coming at them so fast and furious that typically all those platforms you just mentioned all have pipelines associated with them. You know, it's the old data prep issue, right? IDC is usually 80% of the problem. Now it's 90% because the tools are easier, but the data prep, the data pipelines, the exact same thing since, you know, the tools are getting better, don't get me wrong. But the net net is they're looking for, okay, that's fine for what I'm trying to do, but how do I marry, and they're looking to marry. So we're like a complement to these platforms. What we do, well, is the streaming data, the telemetry data coming in and making it instantly available to you. So the concept of, you know, we made S3 or GCS hot database, literally stream into any of your access points for GCS or Amazon, worldwide, it's literally interfabric, it's in your dashboard in a minute, queries in seconds. That's something you can't get from these of the platforms, mostly on the streaming data aspect. So that's where we're seeing most of the poll, the demand is looking at how do you bring these and then I guess the other thing is, and you saw this with a Splunk acquisition, the idea of bringing the observability of security data lakes together, both streaming data, both coming at you, you know, the four V's of data, and that's typically they're not able to do that in the other platform. Yeah, so I want to ask you, so you're saying for the streaming data in particular, you can leave the data in place on S3 and that's going to be less expensive to do all that activity, maybe not the full data pipeline, but like you're hearing from customers that, well, it's getting expensive to do all this inside of Snowflake. We want to maybe do some of the batch work outside of Snowflake and you're seeing the streaming work now as well for certain workloads. Sure. And then the other thing is that the, we'll talk Gen AI because you have to toss us into it. People are looking to leverage that. What they used to do like the data bricks on the ML ops, the AI ops, we do see, and I was curious what you're seeing, the LLM technology, people are saying, why do I have 18 different data lakes? Why do I have all this different ML AI and I can look at what you can do with these LLMs? Now they're going to bring private LLMs, they're going to go public to private, but that's causing people to look at architecture differently because, okay, all those platforms, now are you going to go across six different platforms and have six different Gen AI platforms? It becomes hard. I mean, we're definitely seeing a trend toward sort of unifying all the different storage types and data types, but you're right, the power of these LLMs is amazing, but it's really confusing to people, right? There's like all these choices. I know in our particular case, we built theCUBE AI recently and we built it kind of, and we got to an MVP in a month for tens of thousands of dollars or less, I mean, it's quite amazing. And I was at UiPath last week and it's a two-edge sword for those guys, right? On the one hand, a lot of the low-end work, like making clips and pushing them out to social media, a lot of stuff, we did that with our own, we didn't need RPA to do that. We don't need end-to-end automation, but at the same time, if you really do need end-to-end automation, you're going to need a horizontal platform. So it's both, but I think it's hard to predict right now. It's very disruptive and there's so many choices out there. So we're just following clients. So the first, we did the first move, which is using public LLM, so open AI type of things. Now we do telemetry, so security observability. You can't share that with a model. No matter what you do. No, you can't let the LLM vendor have access to that data in no way. So even before, we'll show you how to use a public model and then we see people using, and they're using different terminologies. It's private LLMs or SLMs, subject matter LLMs. I don't know if that's the right terms, but that's what people are using with us. Yeah, we've called it domain specific. Okay, but they're looking for their own, but they're going to take these models, which kind of think of what happened with Meta, right? It somehow leaked out there. Now you have this model that they spent gazillion dollars building. Now you can leverage and optimize for your own environment. So we see, actually, you're going to optimize the application and then the model, but there has to be an innovation at the data layer model. So what we're able to do is bring in all that data, our superpowers, getting all that data, streaming in easily without big teams, doing pipelines, whatnot, have it streaming and now have your model go after it. And we can do public models. And by the way, it's amazing. Without the public model seeing anything but schema, it's amazing what you can do for these different use cases. What LLMs are strong at is helping the humans. So natural language, and it knows a lot of these security type of exposures, they're not all things that happened in the last 18 months. Think of all that history, you're able to do it really quickly. And then we quickly see clients using their own LLMs. But our ability to actually take what you do and application the model, and instead of just using, what everyone's doing is they're integrating the data model, they're not innovating. What we're doing is we have this order of magnitude better data model for cost effectiveness. Now we're orchestrating what you can do in LLMs, public or private with your application. And that like unleashes things. Where does the innovation need to be in your view in that data layer? So it's a couple fold, right? So if you think of data, once you do the LLMs also, you have AI, you want more data, right? So right now with the data models because of complexity of bringing data in the cost, no one keeps even their simplest things like logs. Look at the hack at Microsoft with the whole State Department. If you didn't have the logs, you couldn't go after it. So very basically you should have all your logs but people don't. And then they do a pipeline of logs and they throw out data and that's a wrong way to do it. Because it's too expensive? It's too expensive to put in. So what we have is an order of magnitude benefit. I can give you a couple examples of what people did. But every one of our customers goes from, I'm at four terabytes a day, I'm keeping now 38, Black Friday, 400, 300 and I'm still saving 58%. So what we didn't do is we didn't integrate the backend. We innovated the backend. It is a purpose-built six patents database. We make S3 or GCS a database and because of that we pick up the attributes. So there needs to be fundamental. It's not just putting a format on S3 or GCS. Yes, it's cheaper, right? Everyone knows that but over some, you just can't keep it all but with us you can. So one is you need to be able to cost-effectively keep it all. Second thing is a pipeline, the key ingest. If your database is S3 or GCS, land it and we understand that schema, you set it and forget it. That's not the case for any of these other platforms. That's a lot of time and complexity for all these partners, so. So it wasn't a big surprise. You mentioned earlier the Splunk acquisition by Cisco, $28 billion acquisition. That's good. Like I said, it wasn't a big, well-kept secret. We knew it was coming. We knew a year earlier Cisco tried to buy Splunk for, I think, $20 billion. They ended up paying $28 billion. Maybe Gary still got a little cleanup worth $8 billion, nice job. But what do you make of that? Consolidation in the observability space. I love it. Why? Why do you love it? Why are you happy? I mean, Jeremy Burton was saying the same thing. Okay, so if you look at where Cisco, you just picked up high-quality SaaS revenue. So very few acquisitions you can pick up that type of size of, again, high-quality, high-marge in revenue. So to me it made all sense for the financials. Cisco's trying to do that as a business, get more on the software side, repeatable. And they really want to do this full stack observability, which there's a lot between the lip and the cup to do that, right? So, and the one thing is you look at Splunk, it does a lot of that. So they're bringing enterprise clients. So to me, for technology, revenue quality, the customer base makes all the sense of the world. Now, I think underneath it, same thing about, do you innovate on the data layer? Well, less, right? So there's no, you know, I'm not giving anything proprietary about Splunk, but yeah, they need to do some innovation on the data layer. Imagine if you could have, you know, again, if you look at the architects we're doing, we're saving 58% in the back ends. Imagine what that would do for Splunk's margins. Now, Splunk's margins are unbelievable if you looked at them, right? Well, yeah, that's why it's going to be a creative to Cisco. So I love it. And also, it brings awareness. It's like, hey, listen, you need all this streaming data in. They do that well. Notice, you didn't say the number six platforms were one of them. Now they do this streaming well, just like we do. We just do an order of magnitude more cost-effective. Yeah, this is the, I mentioned Jeremy Bird, he sort of did this post, it was like old guard, new guard, you know, Jeremy's very clever in that regard. But, all right, Ed, thanks so much for taking some time with us on theCUBE. I'll let you go back to the party and appreciate your time. As always, thank you. You're very welcome. All right, keep it right there for more action from the sales accelerator exec event in Massachusetts, we'll be right back.


What are some of your favorite Asian dishes to eat that you cannot find at the restaurant? Let's talk about it because a lot of restaurants don't serve some of your favorite dishes. Why? This went viral on Reddit guys people were talking about this dish that dish. I love this It's a homestyle dish my grandma made my mother made but I cannot find it out and a lot of people were perplexed Why so make sure you like subscribing turning your notifications Andrew because this is a fun one This is just about some deep-cut Asian food knowledge Yeah, but one chili oil that you can't find at the restaurant yet either But maybe you will soon it's smaller sauce. Hopefully we're gonna be hitting some physical markets around the New York area soon But you can still order it Shipments are going out early November very very soon in the next you for being patient guys. Yes. I know it's taking a while I get it. Thank you for waiting. It's our first time hanging there with us It's really good smaller sauce.com from Sichuan to Sicily Andrew The original post was about this Vietnamese stewed pork and egg dish called tick call and this person was just like man I know there's a lot of Vietnamese restaurants in America But I can just not find this anywhere in the few times that I found tick call. It wasn't good. Yeah Yeah, I think Guys, there's a number of dishes that obviously you know from your childhood things that your grandmother made or things that you've Had at some restaurant. Maybe one restaurant or maybe back in Asia Yeah, maybe you had it overseas and you were like dude, I love this dish How come they don't serve it and there's so many reasons why they don't serve it sometimes It's just because no one's ever requested for it. So the restaurant. They don't care if you never asked for it So anyways guys, we're gonna get into the myriad of answers and comments So again, please hit that like button check out other episodes of the hop-hop boys David, what's one of your dishes that you love that is so hard to find at a restaurant? Man They try to enter the US market and like I want to say 60% of them failed We're talking about yellow braised chicken rice from Jinan Shandong aka Huangmen Jifang And this is a dish for northern Chinese construction workers. Yeah Yeah, but how gummers if it if you like it so much Why don't you think more restaurants do it? Is it just that because you have to base a whole restaurant around it and nobody wants to base the restaurant around it or it's not Really a beautiful pretty dish that you can mark up. You know what I mean? Yeah, I mean I don't know because I'm not fully that deep in the restaurant industry to understand all the semantics of it I do think it takes a lot of time I think the stone pots like take up a lot of grill space So you're always looking at your real estate distribution But also for some reason all the versions that I had in the US even the versions in Canada were better We're like half as good. All right as the ones overseas. I'm talking about yings chicken rice Yeah, it seems like you could read you should be able to recreate it somebody bring it Bring on one of my favorites is steamed salmon with it with ginger scallion So there's a lot of steamed fish with ginger scallion at like a lot of Cantonese restaurants like white fish Yeah, it's wife It's usually a cod or a bass or like even a tilapia, but with salmon and Salmon being one of the most popular sushi fish Why isn't it steamed more? Well, well salmon it is more of a Western fish It's a Western fish, but how come it's not steam more in America. I don't get that and then also the Shodrabing which is like a scallion pancake roll often very popular all over China, especially in Taiwan at the market Oh, are you talking about the one that they can kind of make it like an Eggman muffin You can make it like a burrito make it a breakfast version Yes, some little small pop-ups do it here and there but really you can't find it And I'm like listen if you're gonna sell scallion pancakes at your restaurant What about selling a scallion pancake breakfast roll? Yeah Some people were saying that it's because these dishes are theoretically too easy to make at home So the parents or just immigrants in general would want to say Oh, let's order something on the menu that uses a lot of techniques or equipment that we wouldn't have at home Do you think that that's part of it? I think that's more of the parents calculus than the calculus of second or third gen I think a lot of restaurants if you ask them like hey if you go to a full restaurant You're like hey, how come you don't carry tit-call? How come you don't take carry tit-call and then they're just like yeah, man like nobody like asked for it So he's like I'm just trying to sell what sells so like a bowl call rice plates bun means that's what's gonna sell I noticed a lot of stews don't do that. Well in a for a bulk distribution market in America Yeah, I think you can't serve too many different stews because it takes up too much space in the kitchen Because you got to keep the stew going you got to make it in big Big portion of course you got to cook it for like 48 hours. Yeah And if it's not like burned down, right? Yeah, but full and other noodle like one or two noodle soups is the only one that's worth keeping a big pot for you know Yeah, I think there are some street foods Andrew that are like not popular Maybe they could become popular with some upgrade gimmicks, you know Some people would call them gimmicks some people would just call them upgrades tomato egg That's the Chinese stir-fried dish. Maybe you put some meat in it the the fancy a child on maybe the street snacks could use You know guidance I eat which is the Hong Kong egg waffles. It just needs more flavors embedded in the in the carb I think a lot of these dishes that people feel nostalgic for are also cultural ceremonial dishes They may not they may have a certain time of the year or a certain ritual that they're associated with Um regional dishes such as Ilocano food in the Philippines They're not gonna have any representation in America more than likely right because people are just gonna question it Um, also, I think some of these interesting versions of foods Andrew They may split the market tick call has a Chinese Malaysian version called Tai Chi Palo Or Tao Yaak Bak in not because it all came from Hokkien immigrants to Southeast Asia Everybody's got their different versions. Anyway, let's just get into some of the things that people said in the comments section These are dishes that most people whenever they eat it. They love it But they're still somewhat rare to find at these restaurants. Yes, take call and bantet. Okay Have you ever had my definitely is hard to find unless you go to like a viet market that almost looks like a viet So I don't think I ever had that before can try Yeah, I used to get can't drive I've seen it at a couple spots, but only if they have a huge menu and it's probably not that good new new port sifu tan Yeah, who teal who teal is good and I'm seeing more spots serve it But you know what it is some full spots serve these dishes, but they're they they're like throwaway dishes like they don't put Their heart into it. Also Cambodians eat a version of it called catio and it looks very similar shout out to who teal I used to get that at goal in Delhi all the time in San Gabriel Andrew Camco qua the stuffed squashes in a hot pot and stuffed peppers. That looks actually really good I've never had that before bun koon bun koon is a Vietnamese version of churng fun. Yeah I liked bun koon a lot, but I'm not I feel like quite a few viet spots serve it But only a few spots do it good a lot of them don't care But me check Ali used to do it good the best for the cheapest Yeah, yeah, um a lot of people were listing South Indian dishes because Andrew South Indian food has less Representation than the butter chickens and the garlic nons of North Indian I probably the only main like South Indian dish people know is like the Dosa, right? Right, and it's because a lot of South Indian cuisine is vegetarian the avial They use a lot of coconut milk and different. I want to say okra's in there.  It looks really really good. I've never had it before Bendakaya it's just another stewed vegetable Yeah, I don't love okra, but for Chinese people were saying fan cha cha dan tomato egg was their number one Do you think it's valid to get this out or if your mom's like no no no we can make fun Home, you know, you know what I would say to mom if she says no, no, don't get it I'll make it a home.   Are you are you sure about that? Are you sure about that you just got to go get it when you want it if it's really good But I'll tell you this sometimes it can disappoint you at the restaurant if it's a throwaway dish They won't they'll just whip it up real quick They don't get a lot of people are talking about the pricing as well because when it comes to jambing or specifically jambing Gwoze which is under the fat crepes. They were saying in China. It's one to two dollars US in America It's up to 14 due to the labor cost How much do you think it matters when there's a 7x jump from the hometown dude? Why did manufacturing move to China same reason why the jambing is cheaper there, okay? Because labor. Yeah, I know jambing's are kind of expensive in America, but I don't know. Yeah I at least we have them. Well cuz somebody has that kind of artistically poor. It's a crepe. It's a crepe I've literally seen I've got I've bought a 16 dollar crepe like French Crip before and then I've also paid for a High-end jambing and they're made the exact same way right same pan Different ingredients. I like the Peking duck jambing though That's a little bit of the American fusion in there scallion oil noodles, whether it's your poor man or thumbs. I mean or are these different ones? Steam pork belly and shrimp. Whoa, this one's a deep cut Cantonese one. I'm assuming yo I don't even know I've ever had this Some yeah snow cotton egg white fried red bean paste I've never had this before yo It looks good. It looks like something a better version of what I've had to have the Hongdao dipped in the egg whites Somebody says soy bean sprouts with ground pork. This looks like a simple homemade dish You probably can get it out somewhere and flushing or in 626, but yeah, probably not popular goot-ho-tang This is a pork soup with turnips and large dates in it um Once you get the Japanese food Andrew people were talking about man I always miss just tomatoes with soy sauce. This is a very common. I guess Japanese side dish dude I want to make that I never had that before Tonjiru pork stew again the stews Andrew always overlooked right right right right Nick niku jaga Niku jaga is another beef stew beef potato stew from yeah, I can say I don't even know what Japanese restaurant I would go if I wanted to get any of those yeah There's only one place in little Tokyo, LA Suhiro used to have a lot of this stuff Suhiro, okay, I they used to have it and it was open like super late. Um Filipinos also have their own version of tomato egg They got from Hokken traders, but they put onions in it looks good that looks good But they also have a more Spanish version because like we said Filipino food has so many different influences as well of its Own Andrew that is diced up eggs with tomato and raw onions almost like a diced up boiled salad egg salad Right that does not look as good, but I mean to be honest. It doesn't yeah Somebody said chicken in a saw. Um, this is actually possibly starting to come over Andrew I'm starting to see I'm starting to see more chicken in a saw on Philip of the new Filipino restaurants I think the old ones. I don't know if they're gonna sell. I don't know if they're gonna sell I don't know if it's a it's a grill reason. I'm not sure But if it's a grilled chicken leg who's gonna hate on it. Yo, I had to look it up There's about 10 to 20 videos on YouTube explaining you how to make chicken in a saw in an air fryer So, hey guys, I'm we might make it next Jollibee's group bring it over though Somebody sent from Malaysia Malaysian Kolo me and these are a lot of dishes that come from Brunei Borneo Kalamantan Which is a border region between Indonesia and Malaysia, right Borneo Kalamantan from Alhambra That restaurant is crazy dude I mean Malaysian food has a lot of depth to it man So I feel like we've only scratched the surface of Malaysian food in America Some of the me's the me gm's All this stuff on tiktok like KL foodie, and I'm just like dude What am I gonna eat that man? Shout out to pinang Epo um a samlaksa You know That I could see for people who really like that tamarin flavor soup. I can see being into it I'm not as into it. Someone said you can't find good bakote in America You can't find it as a lot of people are not going to put their effort into making a good bakote A good herbal pork stew. Yo, that is so herbal and pinang Malaysia. You cannot believe it For Koreans people said uh, miyoguk, which is a uh A beef and kelp seaweed soup. Oh, I've never seen that. Yeah, it looks good. I think it's ceremonial Somebody said a lot of uh, the chicken dishes dak jjim, dak tori, tang You know these are all like I would say out of all these ones I'm going with dak jjim or jjim dak Man, if you guys ever watched this one documentary on netflix called nation of kimchi or nation of panchan There are so many different types of panchan that i've never had that look delicious from that show. So I So you're saying the american representation of panchan is limited relative to the panchan There's a couple premium specialty korean barbecues. You can go to that specialize in giving you all these Oh, no, they give you like 30 or 40, right? Oh, we specialize in the 20 panchans like, you know But other than that you're going to get like four or five. That's it, right? Patjuk, patjuk is their version. Uh, like we said juk or juk is the is the same word And uh, yeah, they do a red bean paste, but they throw some nuts and some pumpkins on it too I thought that was pretty cool. So shout out to patjuk. I'd like to try that Moving on to thailand andrew a lot of people talk about the mountainous more village dishes I believe this comes from the isan loud border Canom jin nam kao I can see why they don't sell this at the restaurant, bro You said because the chicken feet just throwing in there Especially that type of chicken feet where it's not like falling off the bone. It's a little bit more like chewy and like You know tight around the knuckle. It looks good, but there's not coming over minus the chicken feet. Yeah People say gwejap. This is a five spice rolled noodle that you can get on the streets of thailand Um, basically the noodles they come in these like little squares and once they cook them they roll up So shout out to gwejap. Um, anyway, let's just get into the comments section, adrew Should people just get what they want regardless of what their parents think their parents are out We can make it at home. Don't get this far out. Oh, you want to get the To those or something like that, you know, just some some potato with some pork or whatever we can make it at home I mean unless you're gonna make it at home Just get it when you're out, right? Yeah, I mean I think that sometimes It's fun to get home-style dishes at the restaurant Even if they don't do it even as good as you make it at home Because you kind of want to see how someone else is Going to make it like and and sometimes you just want to eat what you want to eat So I don't think it's wrong I mean try it once and then see if that restaurant can do it well And if they don't do it well, then maybe you don't have to get it again Yeah, yeah, yeah, but then we we could get something we can make at home Or we could get the imperial style things that the emperor like one ton noodles I will never make that at home Because you can get it at so many restaurants, right and it's good and it's cheap But there are certain things that I would probably more think about making at home Yeah, somebody said, uh, man, I just love yokbang Which is this like toy saun meat patty with like, uh, hamyu in there with sardines or anchovies And they were saying but man, I always just see the staff eating it for a manager's meal Yeah, that is the ultimate workers meal is the yokbang is this meat patty If you go to certain Cantonese restaurants and you see the workers They'll they just got this big patty on top of rice and they just break up pieces of it And they just eat it and that's like it kind of smells if you're not ready for it because it'll have like a slight fishy Anchovies in it, right? Yeah, anchovies fishy smell, but it tastes kind of good, but like yeah, it's totally a blue I mean, that's like a blue collar worker meal. You know what I mean and a lot of restaurants. They don't want to serve What they would serve to the workers Man, they don't know if it would sell. Yeah, that's true. Some of these dishes are not pretty Some of these are not marketable dishes. Yeah, of course in asia You can find more places that will serve these things to you because uh in asia, obviously are in respective countries There's just gonna be like a wide ranger Why much wider range of depth but at the end of the day the american restaurants They are sort of beholden to what has margin was easy to cook and what will allow them to survive, right? Yeah, just the capitalism aspects and the economics. Um, ultimately, do you think these home style stew dishes are making in america or not? At some specialty restaurants, maybe the hipster ones that are trying to be like, oh, you know I'm serving my childhood dishes with french techniques mixed in with my mom's cooking You know some of those spots are going to serve it but other than that No, these a lot of these dishes It's going to be hard to market them I'm not saying forever because I think that A lot of dishes were unmarketable for a while, but then became popular The the vietnamese dill catfish that has since become more popular Yeah, did dim sum spots always serve chicken feet? When did that like Become like when did people become confident that people would buy that, you know, I don't know maybe but like I don't know it's tough for the stews because also I think the stews andrew they don't necessarily encourage alcohol Or beverage consumption. That's also another higher margin item that people need and they're very like Protein intensive with the meat. That's a good point and I would say listen for chinese restaurant If they can stir fry it, they might serve it Because it's much quicker. Yeah, if you make them stew it. I don't know. Yeah I mean, I always like goulash and I always thought man How can I can't get any goulash in america unless it's like I'm paying like 20 bucks for it from eastern europe Anyway, guys, let us know what are some dishes you wish you could find that are either home style or just Really authentic or obscure from the country you're from or the country that you know and you can't find it in america I always thought korean hot talks There needed to be a korean hot talk spot because I love the honey nut mixture that's in a hot talk But it's just hard to find and a lot of places they just treated like a throwaway item Like we said, leave it in the comment section below. It's a good thread It makes you think deeper about other asians not your own and even are you consuming? I'll tell you this andre after this thread Next time I can see take call at a viet spot. I'm getting it Until next time we to hop our boys. We out peace


Hello and welcome to the series of video lectures on the subject microprocessor for secondary IT students. I am Dr. Srisail Sarakajbar and in this video lecture we are going to study registers and memory organization of 80286 microprocessor. At the end of this session you will be able to describe register organization of 80286 microprocessor. You will also be able to describe memory organization of 80286 microprocessor. 80286 contains almost the same set of registers as in the 80286 microprocessor case. There are 8 16 bit general purpose registers. There are 4 16 bit segment registers. There is one flag register which is also called as status and control register. And there is one 16 bit instruction pointer register. The figure shows the register organization of 80286 microprocessor. As you can see here in this diagram the available registers are divided into 3 groups. General purpose registers, segment registers and status and control registers. As shown in the figure there are 8 general purpose registers namely AX, BX, CX and EX. There is base pointer register, source index register, destination index register and stack pointer register. All these registers are 16 bit. Out of these 8 registers the upper 4 registers are special in the sense that they are byte addressable. The meaning is that you can use AL and AH as a separate 8 bit registers. So AL is nothing but the lower byte, AH is nothing but the higher byte of this 16 bit AX register. So similar is the case with DX, CX and BX register. So this 8 register serves the general purpose in case of 80286 case along with that they also serve some special functions. For example, AX and DX register are used for multiplication, divide and IO related instructions. The CX register is used to store the count for loop, shift and repeat instructions. BX and base pointer are used as base register to store the base address whereas source index and destination index registers are used to store the offset value. Stack pointer register is used for stack related operations. So along with that there are also 4 segment registers namely code segment register, data segment register, stack segment register and extra segment register. So the purpose of these segment registers is to store the base addresses of their corresponding memory segments. The instruction pointer is a register which is used to store the address of the next instruction which is to be executed. The flag register in case of 80286 is slightly a modified version of 80286 case. Only the lower word of the flag register is shown here. So let us see the flag register in detail. The flag register of 80286 is a modified version of 80286 flag to accommodate various status and control operations that are involved in 80286 case due to multitasking and multi-user environment. The flag register consists of two words, upper word and lower word. The lower word is similar to 80286 case with some additional flags. The upper word of the flag register is called as the machine status word. Now let us see the lower word of the 80286 flag register. So one can see here that the lower word of flag register of 80286 is similar to the flag register which is available in 80286 case. There are some additional flags, there are six status flags, there are three control flags and there are three special field flags which are not available in 8086 flag register. The upper word of the flag register of 80286 is called as the machine status word. There are only four flags which are active. The four flags are protection enable, monitor processor extension, emulate processor extension and task switch. Now let us see in brief about status flags and control flags. The contents of the flags carry flag, parity flag, auxiliary carry flag, zero flag, sign flag or overflow flag are affected or modified after execution of the logical and arithmetic instructions. There are three control flags namely trap flag, interpenable flag and direction flag and these flags are used to control certain operations of the processor and one can see that all the above flags are also available in 8086 microprocessor and they serve the same purpose in case of 80286 also. Along with the status and control flags there are three special field flags. The bits 12 and 13 indicate the IO privilege level and the bit 14 indicates the nested task. The special field flags are only relevant in protected mode. Real address mode program should treat these bits as don't care making no assumption about their status. The IO privilege level is a two bit value. It specifies one of the four different privilege levels necessary to perform IO operations. These two bits generally contain 00 when operating in real mode. The nested task flag controls the operation of an interrupt return instruction and is normally zero for real mode. Now pause the video for two minutes and write down the answer of the following question. I hope you have written the answer. The correct answer is 12 flags. There are six status flags, there are three control flags and there are three special field flags. Now let us see the upper world of 80286 microprocessors flag register which is called as the machine status world. The D16 bit of machine status world is the PE bit which is called as the protection enable bit. If this bit is zero it means the processor will work in real mode otherwise it will be in the protected mode. When the processor is powered this bit is always zero that is when the processor is powered it always start in the real mode. The D17 bit of the machine status world is the MPB which is the abbreviation for monitor processor extension. If this bit is one this flag allows weight instruction to generate a processor extension not present exception that is exception number seven. The next flag is the EM flag which is the abbreviation for emulate processor extension. If this bit is one or set it causes processor extension absent exception and permits emulation of processor extension by the microprocessor unit. The D19 bit of the machine status world is TS bit which is which stands for task reach. If this bit is one or set it indicates the next instruction using extension will generate an exception seven. Using CPU to test whether current processor extension is for current task. The remaining bits D20 to D31 are called as hatched bits and are reserved by the Intel. Now let us see the memory organization and segmentation of the physical memory of 80286 microprocessor. The physical memory of 80286 is set up as an odd bank and an even bank. Just as it is for the 8086 case. The even bank is enabled when A0 is low and odd bank is enabled when BHE bar is low. The 8086 offered only one memory operating mode known as the real memory mode but the 80286 incorporated two operating modes namely the real mode and the protected mode. The real mode is backward compatible with 8086 whereas the protected mode is a advanced mode and in the protected mode it can address one gigabyte of virtual memory space. As you can see here this is the address latches. This is the address latch enable, bus high enable, A0, 2823 are the address lines. This is the upper bank or odd address bytes. This is the lower bank or even address bytes. See a stand for the cheap select which is an active low signal. D8 to D15 are the higher 8 bits and D0 to D7 are the lower 8 bits of the data. This is the reference. Thank you very much.


We have developed a novel electrochemical apti-sensor for the detection of aflatoxin B1, AFB1. This sensor utilizes a combination of aptimers, which are molecules that bind specifically to their target, and a modified version of a voltage-modulated strip flow, VMSF, device. The aptimers are designed to recognize AFB1, while the VMSF device allows for the selective transport of positively charged molecules such as ruthenium hexamin citrate, RU, and H3, 63+, which is used as a redox probe. When AFB1 is added to the system, it causes the aptimers to bind to it, creating a steric hindrance that prevents RU and H3, 63+, from entering the nano-channel. As a result, the electrochemical signal decreases, indicating the presence of AFB1. The sensor has been tested using both synthetic AFB1 and real samples, demonstrating its accuracy and reliability. This article was authored by TongTong Zhang, Shuisu, Xinyu Lin, and others. We are article.tv, links in the description below.


And all of a sudden, hey, Snoop wants to come. And Will Ferrell's on the sideline.  And then Peaches said, screw it, man. Like, why wouldn't I use this to my advantage? So look, it just happens that way.   I mean, there's everybody around here. So USC, they have to be good. Fans will show up. That's kind of sometimes the type of fans that we had at USC. But who cares, man? And I'm telling you what, Lincoln will sell out the Coliseum next year. That place will be full next year. Yeah, and I think that's awesome to hear, by the way. And congrats, Lincoln. I think you already signed like some seven-star one quarterback out of L.A. or whatever. Oh, he's flipping. He's flipping everybody already.


presents the annual Tournament of Roses, traditional Southern California New Year festival. Admiral William Halsey, Pacific War hero, leads the four-mile-long parade of 50 floats in the first great flower pageant since the beginning of the war. The tournament's queen rides past a record crowd of a million-and-a-half spectators. Victory and peace are the keynotes of this year's pageant. San Francisco's float recalls its part in the framing of the United Nations Charter. Of the United Nations Organizations General Assembly, the United States delegation boards the Queen Elizabeth. Edward Statenius, Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Senators Connolly and Vandenberg will represent the United States in opening the great and hopeful meeting for world peace. Bringing the new United States Ambassador to China, General George C. Marshall, War Minister Hou Yingqin, the Mayor of Shanghai, and United States General Wittemeyer extend official welcome. Thousands of enthusiastic Chinese crowd the sidewalks for a glimpse of the general's car as the party leaves the airport. From Shanghai, General Marshall flew to confer immediately with Chiang Kai-shek and communist leaders. The world looks forward to China's future peace and internal security. Transport lies ready to take a group of Japanese war prisoners away from the United States. Most of them will go to Hawaii for reassignment to construction work in the devastated areas of the Pacific before ultimate return to Japan. They make the trip in vessels which will bring American soldiers back home. Hats over eyes, huddled in corners, these soldiers were taken prisoner in the island campaigns which led to Japan's final defeat. All prisoners of war held in America will have been returned by April. This is the challenge of a new year President Truman speaks to the American people. 1946 is our year of decision. This year we lay the foundation of our economic structure which will have to serve for generations. This year we must decide whether or not we shall devote our strength to reaching the goal of full production and full employment. This year we will have to make the decisions which will determine whether or not we gain that great future at home and abroad which we fought so valiantly to achieve. We cannot shirk leadership in the post-war world. The problems of our economy will not be solved by timid men mistrustful of each other. We cannot face 1946 in a spirit of drift and a resolution. The men and women who made this country great and kept it free were plain people with courage and faith. Let us justify this heritage. Nations mourn the death of General George S. Patton, fiery commander of the famous United States 3rd Army which swept all before it on the battlefields of Europe. Returning to the ancient Duchy of Luxembourg, liberated a year ago by Patton's army en route to Germany, come the remains of the famous general who survived two wars only to die of injuries received in an automobile accident. His widow accompanies the casket as it is born in an army vehicle through the silent streets of a grave and grateful city. The courtage, continuing to the nearby American cemetery, includes the general's horse, its saddle tied with crepe, and the general's boots, reversed in the stirrups, and listed men of his various divisions as court Patton's casket to the graveside where he will be committed to the company of his comrades with whom he fought so well. The famous fighting units. The Queen Mary reaches New York with the fighting 82nd Airborne Division, home after two years of battle. He bet his comrades he'd be the first man ashore and he had to get wet to win. It's three boys were fellow passengers of the division.  Their mother, Mrs. Robert Glass, who arrived to join her husband, is grateful to the 8,000 soldiers who contributed a substantial fund for the youngsters' education. Amashita was recently sentenced to hang. Another leading Japanese general goes on trial for war crimes. In civilian clothes, General Masaharu Homa, commander of the Imperial Japanese Army in the Philippines during the war's first nine months, faces a five-man military commission headed by Major General Leo Donovan. Appears his arraignment. He is held responsible for the bombing of Manila after it had been declared an open city. For the shelling of Corregidor, after United States General Wainwright had expressed his intention to surrender. Asked how he pleads, Homa answers in English, The guilt or innocence of Masaharu Homa will be decided by the commission after due trial. The sports resorts are crowded as wartime travel restrictions are eased. In New Hampshire, the skiers take advantage of comfortable new ski tolls. It's easy going up and thrilling sports speeding down the slopes. America's leading pre-war ski jumper, a memorial meeting is held in New York State. Tokul, who was killed with the United States Army in Italy, won many competitions on this bare mountain jump. The winning jump today is made by Art Devlin, who leaps 148 feet displaying perfect form. So lucky or skillful, spill follows spill as the lesser lights try hard to follow in the master skier's ski tracks. These speedy sportsmen shove off on the bobsled run for the first races held here since the war.


Good afternoon. My name is Mona Yacubian. I'm the Vice President for the Middle East and North Africa here at the U.S. Institute of Peace. USIP was founded by Congress in 1984. We are a national, nonpartisan public institution dedicated to helping prevent, mitigate, and resolve violent conflict globally. I am both honored and thrilled to be moderating this afternoon's discussion on a compelling report that was recently published by the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University. Entitled the Ripple Effect, a U.S. diplomatic strategy for a changing world order, the paper calls for a new American approach to multilateralism in the context of an emerging and highly competitive strategic environment. China's steady rise as a global power, combined with more recent events, including Russia's invasion of Ukraine, highlight a number of profound shifts that are underway in our world. These include a system of global governance that's under extreme duress, an increasing diffusion of power that in turn has amplified the growing importance of middle powers, countries such as India, Turkey, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, Japan. These countries can play more of a role in addressing geopolitical problems that threaten global peace and security. The report delves into the need for a commensurate shift in American diplomacy to more effectively engage with these powers while allowing for the fact that their individual and collective interests may not always align with ours. We've established a distinguished panel this afternoon to dive more deeply into the report and its fascinating insights. Ambassador Barbara Bodine is distinguished professor in the practice of diplomacy and director of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown. Prior to this, she spent 30 years in the U.S. Foreign Service focused primarily on the Arabian Peninsula and greater Persian Gulf. Chester Crocker, to my immediate left, is the James R. Schlesinger Distinguished Fellow in Strategic Studies at ISD. He's previously served as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, as well as the chairman formally of USIP's board. We're also delighted to have Dhruva Jayashankar, Executive Director of the Observer Research Foundation. In addition to authoring numerous books and policy reports focused on India's foreign relations and broadly on defense and security policy, Mr. Jayashankar writes a regular column for the Hindustan Times. A warm welcome to all of you and also let me also note we have a virtual audience attending as well, so welcome to those tuning in online. Barbara, I'd like to start with you if I could. Maybe say a few words about the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy as well as the report itself. What was the impetus for this report? How did you go about assembling the working group that contributed to it? Thank you very much. And thank you very special thanks to USIP for hosting this event and for you for chairing this panel. We very much appreciate this. ISD is a part of Georgetown. We were established in 1978 and part of our core mission is to try to bring scholarly theory and the realities of the practitioner world together for the benefit of each. Part of how we go about that is we have for several decades been hosting working groups such as the one that produced the ripple effect where we bring in scholars, think tankers, practitioners, NGOs, a very broad range of people to work through emerging diplomatic and strategic challenges. We kind of stay away from the issue du jour on the front page of the newspaper and we're trying to look at what's coming at the horizon. And clearly the Russian invasion of Ukraine has set off seismic changes and we wanted to really look at what are some of those long term ramifications and implications. And the fruits of all of that labor and Chet was a major drafter and Dr. McFarland from my staff was key to this. Is this report on the ripple effect? So actually Chet, let's turn to you as one of the lead authors of the report and I think there are lots of ways we should look at this. I want to try and for the audience and for this discussion set the context a little bit more. The report zeroed in on Russia's invasion of Ukraine and sort of noted it as Barbara has as well that it was a seminal moment and that it upended policymakers thinking. What's the significance of Russia's invasion? What are the trends that the report sort of zeroed in on that perhaps the invasion itself didn't beget but that were amplified by that particular event? Thank you very much Mona. I think you put it very well. The invasion of Ukraine was a catalyst and an accelerant for existing trends that were already in some cases visible but Ukraine was a pivot in many ways. And of course we learned a lot immediately when we began going around the world looking to get majorities and various institutions to isolate Russia if you will and to pursue our interests. And we found out that actually that wasn't quite the obvious slam dunk that you might have thought it would be. Why? Why was it not obvious to everybody, to every member of the UN that this should be condemned? Well there are some reasons and some of the reasons that we discussed in the working group were things like had we been paying attention to issues of really serious importance to other countries. In addition to ourselves and our NATO allies. Issues like for example climate funding, climate mitigation funding which has been much discussed at COP28. Issues like COVID availability of vaccines where we actually sharing, where we are organizing others to share. Issues like global governance which is a big one. Global economic and political governance. And I think I guess the way I would put it is that while we have been often doing a kind of pre-feaks diplomacy, many other countries in the world were doing a kind of a la carte diplomacy where they would choose their partners and their alliances and their relationships. Actually not alliances, just relationships. A la carte. And we were kind of in this pre-feaks mode. And that's just not the way the world is today. So that was another reason why the Ukraine invasion was kind of a good pivot. A third factor briefly. The world economic situation is changing dramatically. Now think about it, there are almost three and a half billion people living between Istanbul and Japan. And many of them are spending a fortune on infrastructure and they're also trading with each other and talking about all sorts of deals. I think we often assume that whenever our interest rates go up, all the countries that borrow in dollars are going to suffer deeply and go into debt. That didn't happen this time. We had problems but if you look at emerging markets around the world, they didn't suffer the way they used to. So something's going on in the world economy that we took our eye off the ball and we need to put it back on the ball. Chet, if I could, I'd like to draw you out further on one other driver that you all raised in the report, which is the global diffusion of power. And you've sort of talked about it, you've sort of characterized it. But maybe could you, for the audience, just give us a deeper sense of what that means. What does the global diffusion of power look like as a central feature of this changing world order we find ourselves in? It means that many countries have agency. There are many important countries out there that we often don't necessarily attribute importance to. Now, Dhruva will speak from the standpoint of India and other things he may want to talk about. And India is at the top of the list. But think of South Korea, think of Australia, think of Vietnam, think of Turkey, think of Israel, think of the Saudis. Lots of other countries out there that have real serious agency and can catalyze things to happen, can host things to happen, whether we like it or not. And wait a minute, that's not the way the world's supposed to work, right? We used to think that it was kind of automatic that our role is to decide what's going to happen. And the role of other people is to follow what we suggest is going to happen. Leaders and followers kind of world. Well, that's not that kind of world anymore. So, I mean, think Indonesia. So many examples of countries that are big time players in the international scene. To say nothing I've been to you, which is a bigger time. Well, exactly. So that's the cue to bring you in, Dhruva. And how does this shifting order look like from the vantage point of India? How did India view Russia's invasion of Ukraine? And maybe give us a sense of the... We've talked in our call before about a shifting kaleidoscope. How do we understand this emerging world order from the perspective of a middle power like India? Well, thank you. First of all, thank you to USIP and ISD for inviting me. Both are great institutions that I hold in very high regard. I'm also very honored to be here with two very distinguished ambassadors who've had long careers in public service. I come at this from somebody who is not a diplomat, who has spent some time in India and in the United States. And I'm not sure my perspective necessarily reflects that of 1.4 billion Indians, let alone the entire global south. But I will try to offer a few observations that I think might be relevant to this discussion. And I would also say I would encourage everyone to read the report, which I did. It was very insightful and I think a real attempt at trying to grapple with some very complex issues that are shaping the international order. I think one of the striking things about the international order that we live in today is that we don't really have a consensus for what it's called. Very soon after World War II, George Orwell coined the term Cold War, which seemed to have caught on. But there was a whole vocabulary that very quickly in the late 1940s became a sort of consensus in terms of how observers viewed this new post-war world. Containment was, you know, George Kennan famously wrote about it. Winston Churchill spoke about an iron curtain having descended upon Europe, the language of deterrence and mad and nuclear deterrence very quickly became part of people's popular understanding of the changing international order. And the fact is, you know, it's almost three, more than three decades after the end of the Cold War, we don't really have a sort of consensus. We call it the post-Cold War, but that's really defining what it's not, rather than what it is. That being said, it's interesting. I think there is a great general understanding that something has changed. Secretary Blinken spoke recently somewhere where he said the post-Cold War order has come to an end. So clearly there's a realization. But what exactly defines that order still remains to be seen. I think a few characteristics are worth keeping in mind. One is the manner in which the Cold War ended is really quite remarkable in human history. In the past, at least the recent modern history, new orders came up following the collapse of the old order in usually a very cataclysmic war. So, you know, the Napoleonic Wars resulted in what was known as the Concert of Europe. We had the Conference of Vienna and then the Concert of Europe. This is something that the late Henry Kissinger wrote about quite a bit. We saw after World War I the League of Nations, an attempt being formed under Woodrow Wilson to create a sort of new order that was not very successful. And then a sort of system in the post-Cold War, a post-World War II world, led by the United Nations, the Bretton Woods Institutions, and so forth. But the fact that the Cold War ended peacefully actually led to this sort of gap. And it appears to me a well-meaning attempt on the part of U.S. leaders in the 1990s, and many of you would have been observers of those developments, to bring in Russia, China, and many others into existing structures. So Russia was brought into the G7, became the G8. China was brought into the WTO. But what we seem to have underestimated is the degree of revisionism that countries like Russia and China had about this world order. That despite having benefited sometimes to a great degree from this U.S.-led international order, there has been a reason, and we can get into why that is, domestic politics, ideology, other reasons to overturn that international order. At the same time, as Ambassador Crocker mentioned, there has been this distribution of power. To just put a figure on it and to illustrate it, 30 years ago, the U.S. and its allies accounted for over 80% of the global economy. Today it is just a shade over 50%. And that represents the big shift. What's remarkable, I think, and I tell this to my American friends a lot, is that the United States share of the global economy has held relatively steady. It's been about 20 to 25% in this period. And so it's U.S. power, a lot of people describe, including in India, frankly, people describe the U.S. as a declining power. And I always have hastened to tell them the U.S. is not a declining power. In fact, I think the last 30 years have showed the resilience of the United States. Europe and Japan, on the other hand, particularly, have been, in relative terms, declining. And that gap has been really replaced by China, most first and foremost. India, to some degree. And other developing economies, including Indonesia, Russia, Brazil, many others. My final point on this, just bringing it back to the specific question, what does this look like from an Indian perspective? I think we're seeing an emerging order in which countries have agency, including India. India's own resources have grown significantly over the past few years. It's often overshadowed by China's rise, which has been spectacular over the past three decades. But India has grown significantly over the past few years. Today, India has global interests. I just came back from Mexico a little while ago, and you have Indian companies investing, and Mexican companies investing in India. You have India buying resources from Latin America, providing foreign assistance to Africa, playing a role in the security architecture in the Indo-Pacific. So that, I think, illustrates in some ways the kind of changing order that we are experiencing. At the same time, I think clearly we're in a world where the United States and China, in particular, have predominant power, are competing globally. And often, on an issue-by-issue basis, we are going to see countries having to make choices, having to work with one or the other. India, obviously, on most issues, I would say, is working much more closely with the United States today than certainly with China. But many other countries would try and leverage those relationships in a manner that was not too dissimilar to the early Cold Warriors. So let me start with that, but I think we're in for some very interesting times. So, Barbara, I'm going to come back to you, because I think one of the themes that seems to be emerging is we're in a new order, but we're not yet sure what it is or what to call it. Now, I'm not going to put you on the spot, Barbara, and have you coin for us now the term that's going to define the next order that we're in. But I have the word right here. I have it. I have it. Go. No, I don't. Go ahead, please. I think that what is clear is I think we often rely on old terminology, old ways of thinking about and trying to define this new order, and that's where and how we may get this wrong. Now, one of the ways we talk about it is that it's a multipolar world. So how should we define this? Is it multipolar? What do we mean by middle powers? The other term that's thrown around a lot, of course, is global south. And sometimes, I don't know if it's a... Yes, exactly. It could either be a rorsach test, or I'm not sure what, but some people love the term and embrace it. Others immediately have a reaction to it, all of which I think speaks to the fact that we really are in uncharted waters. But how should we think about this? Because terminology matters. Well, words matter, and I think the fact that at the end of World War II, when this new order, the new international order was being formed, the vocabulary seemed to have come pretty quickly and been agreed to and then became the basis of policy and actions. And I think the point that the post-Cold War era was always defined by what it was and we never came up with what it was. This is even more so, and we've got a lot of sticky words, old vocabulary that might have been accurate, but is less so. There's been a lot of talk about how the global south is one of the worst. I think it was Joe Nye pointed out that most of the countries in, quote, the global south are not in the south. So starting with that, it's a really bad term. We haven't quite figured that out. Even the west is not all in the west, so go figure. Multi-polar, I don't think is a particularly useful word either. We had bipolar, which has many implications. We had the romanticized idea of a unipolar world, which I think was more a figment of American imagination than reality.  I think it is a, I'm going to get away from poles and polar, because the pole idea is one of camps, that you're with this pole or that pole. And what we're seeing is not multipolar, but what one person, not me, describes as multi-aligned, where countries shift their alignment, their partnership, their collaboration, based on an interest or an interest. For example, we don't have shared values with China, but we have a shared interest on climate change. Other countries where we may have shared values, but we may not have a great deal of shared interest on a particular topic. And so what you have is this kaleidoscope, and I like that word, this kaleidoscope of constantly shifting patterns and constantly shifting relationships. And I think one of the words, one of the new words of the year was situationship. And so I think we're kind of in a global situationship. You can Google the term and find out what I'm really talking about. The big change is this rise of middle powers, because back in the old days of poles, there was this concept of hedging. And we use it a great deal in our report, and I think it kind of speaks to the stickiness of words. But hedging has a duck and weave feel to it. And in my mind, I always come up with the vision of a hedgehog. What we have with middle powers, and middle powers are states that have sufficient economic stability, varying degrees of prosperity, but economic stability, they've moved out of poverty. They have political agency, they're able to define their own interests, and they know how they want to implement those interests. And they will work with whom ever is appropriate, necessary, useful toward that interest. And you see it a great deal in the Gulf, where the Gulf states work with Russia on oil policy, they work with China on investment, they work with us on security. They're not ducking and weaving. We've used the word a great deal, it's agency. I will define my interests, I will define my values, and then I will go and find the partners to work with. And so, unfortunately, I not only do not have a new word for global south, I don't like polarity, but I will go with multi-aligned. And I think we need to come up with something that captures this new middle power agency, and how that is what is defining this new world order, is the middle power. Not the three great powers, but the middle powers are the drivers. So, that brings me to want to sort of turn the discussion now a bit more. We're sort of setting the context a bit now, try to understand better. Let's start with from a U.S. perspective the opportunities and the challenges inherent in this new order that's emerging for the U.S. And Chad, I'd like to start with you on this question. I mean, how should sitting here in Washington, D.C., across the street from the State Department, what are both the challenges and the opportunities? And I think there are probably equal amounts of both. But what's your sense on that? There certainly are plenty of challenges. I don't necessarily envy my successors who are sitting over in that glorious piece of architecture, not this building, but the one over there. I don't envy them. A number of reasons for that. One reason is that a lot of the countries that we're talking about in the so-called global south, which is not all in the south, are autocratic countries. Not all of them, but a lot of them are.  That's the way they get domestic buy-in. Poking your finger in the eye of the West is really good domestic politics in many, many countries. And I think we should recognize how often we've seen that recently. Just think about MBS in Saudi Arabia and the pleasure he takes in welcoming Vladimir Putin. It's just extraordinary when you think about sticking their finger in our eye. And he's not doing that because he doesn't want our defense equipment. He's doing it because it's good domestic politics in Saudi Arabia.  You tell me if I'm wrong. I have a sense that that's the reason. And I see it in lots of other parts of the world where it's good politics to... So that means we're running against a kind of reflex action where countries are saying, don't tell us how to vote in the UN. We have our own agency. And by the way, we're not dependent on you anymore. If you look at our aid program in country after country after country and compare it to what it used to be, relatively speaking. We don't have that kind of independent or dependence relationship with many countries. So you combine that with the fact that there's a kind of geopolitical trend where invading a neighbor, whether it's Hamas invading Israel or Russia invading Ukraine or Venezuela threatening to take over two-thirds of Guyana, you name it. That reflex is out there. And we might not like it. We don't like it. But the fact is, what are we going to do about it? We've got to stop it in its tracks. And how many places do we have to stop it? And can we stop it by ourselves? So it's a real challenge. Having said that, there are opportunities. I think really serious opportunities because many countries want what we have to offer still. And we have things to offer that nobody else has to offer. It's in the defense sector, in the security sector, of course. Also in the corporate sector and in the economic assistance sector. So there's many types of countries which look to the U.S. still as a kind of balancing factor or as a key partner. And I would suggest that that might be true even in India. I'm going to stop there and turn the floor. So you keep teeing up Dhruva, which is, you're making my job a lot easier. I do think it's, again, this idea of not just the increased agency of middle powers, but the obvious desire to pursue the self-interest of each country. And in the case of India, Dhruva, I think we also should talk about, you sort of touched on it, the globalization that this is all taking place in. You are leading the U.S. branch of the largest Indian think tank, correct? And you talked about all kinds of engagements bilaterally between India and other countries. Help us understand then in a more cohesive way how India is projecting its influence in this globalized, multi-aligned world that we find ourselves in. And again, from the perspective of India, where are the opportunities and what are the challenges? So I would, I'll try to weave in a few different things. I mean, I think just taking a step back, the most important thing that will define the international order in the foreseeable future, the near future, I can't tell the long term, will be global competition between the United States and China. If you think what keeps the most people up in Washington late at night, and yes, there are immediate crises in Gaza and Ukraine and places, but what is the long-term challenge keeping most people up? It is global competition between the United States and China. And it's no longer relegated to the East Asia, the Indo-Pacific. It is playing out now on a global scale. And in almost every domain, not even traditional military domains, it's playing out in terms of competition over electric vehicle supply chains, over semiconductors, over international financing and lending terms, over international institutions. And that, by the way, the same thing is animating folks in Beijing as well. So this, I think, is the single thing that is... Now, in India, we had a bit of a learning curve around this. After the global financial crisis in 2008-2009, India saw an opportunity to work with China to establish better... and other developing economies to establish better bargaining terms in this changing international order. This was saw the first... This period saw the first BRIC summit. It saw India and China working together in climate negotiations, for example, while India at the same time was improving relations with Washington with the United States. What happened, though, and I think India learned this in some ways the hard way, was that China, for its own reasons, wasn't really willing to give much space to India or other developing countries as well. China was looking at things from its own perspective. And, I mean, you can run down a very long list of issues, vaccine diplomacy, you know, when COVID broke out, international order, the United Nations, security issues. Initially, China sent naval flotillas to the Indian Ocean under the guise of anti-piracy operations. But now it's established a base in Djibouti. This is really part of a larger term plan to show a sort of a military presence, its ability to project power globally. So I think India has learned that, you know, whether it was on regional security, on international institutions, on international economics and trade, China actually wasn't really interested in sharing space with anybody. And so this has actually now led to a situation where India's doubled down on its relationship with the United States. It established arguably a closer relationship to the U.S. than it's ever had. So I wonder whether, you know, part of me, other countries have experienced similar things. Australia had a very similar debate in discussion. Japan had a similar debate in discussion a little earlier. And I think we're starting to see some of that play out now in Europe, for example. Yeah, Italy stepped out of the Belt and Road Initiative. But, you know, I mean, I used to go to Brussels quite often about 10 years ago, and people were very open to, you know, China is not a threat. Yes, we don't like everything that they do. But, you know, it's good for business. It's good for our, you know, automated. Today there's serious concerns. What does it mean to have a closer relationship with China? So I think this is where it's going to go. And just bringing it back to the theme of the global south. You know, I would, in defense of the term, I do think there is something there. These are countries that, despite a lot of other differences, and the differences are often pointed out. And by the way, I found that the term global south has more acceptance in the global south than it does in the global north. But, broadly speaking, I'd say there's three things in common that countries of the global south have. One is a post-colonial history or memory. In some cases very distant, 200 years ago, in the cases of some Latin American countries, 20 years ago in some other cases. Secondly, late development. This was really post, you know, after the 1960s and 1970s. And as a combination of those two factors, it means not being, a feeling of not being adequately represented at international institutions. And these are, you know, whether you're talking about Columbia or India or Malawi or Vietnam, that's one thing that all, these are common traits that all these countries have. And that has led to some collective feelings. The international institutions need to be reformed so they can be better represented at these institutions. That they need to be equity when it comes to energy security, food security, health security. That their concerns need to be kept in mind. And this played out in the immediate wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. That debt financing needs to be more sustainable.  So if you look at what collectively these countries have been asking for, it largely flows from those conditions. So that's, Barbara, I would like to bring you in on exactly this point. And Druva has enumerated a number of sort of global governance challenges. But how, from your vantage point, maybe from this 100,000-foot level, how would you characterize global governance challenges in this emerging order, this multi-aligned order with middle powers asserting their agency, et cetera, and perhaps, and we'll get toward this in a little bit, but perhaps a lot of the international institutions no longer really fit for purpose with respect to power dynamics and the challenges that countries face. Yeah, I do want to do one little point on something that Chet made, is that there are countries who, as you put it, like to poke us in the eye. But to kind of go to the broader point, they're not trying to push us away. And I think that that is a very important balance that they will assert agency, which they have every right and proper to do. But they're trying to create space with other powers, not necessarily push it. It's not the old 1960s anti-Americanism. It's, we just want a little bit of breathing space. We want to be dealt with as a partner, and so we're not going to, if we disagree with you, we're not doing it just to be peevish and petty. We're doing it because we've defined our interests differently and so please accept that. International institutions do need to change, and I think this description of the global south and a shared world view and a shared perspective is something that we need to take into account. The conventional large multilateral institutions, the UN, everything that came out of World War II, are too large, too unwieldy. They can't be eliminated. Mr. Bolton notwithstanding. You need that convening space, that ability to debate, even if it's something as salutary as, guess what, not everyone's going to sign up for our Russia resolution. But what you're seeing is greater regionalism. It's either issue specific institutions or it's regionally specific institutions where there is a shared view and a shared identity, but not necessarily within each of these groups a unanimity or a monolithic set of policies. I think one of the things that we have to be careful of when we're looking at how we deal with this regionalism or this issue specific organizations is that we don't fall into the trap of deferring to the largest or most powerful within. The GCC is greater than Saudi Arabia. ASEAN is greater than Indonesia and on and on. And we have an interesting challenge or opportunity to go back to your question of how do we both operate in a multi-aligned world and how they will have relations with Russia and China, which we may not always like, but they still want to have relations with us. It's not an either or. It's not a with us against us. And also have the nuance of dealing with each of the member states in their uniqueness. So just to kind of default to my part of the world, dealing with Doha, not as a subsidiary of Riyadh. Oman is not a subsidiary of Abu Dhabi. And this extends to all the others and also within issue specific. So for a diplomat, you have to be both multilateral and extraordinarily good bilaterally simultaneously. And that's going to be, I think, great fun but a great challenge. So you're actually bringing us to, you know, the third kind of round of questions I wanted to raise before we turn it to the audience, which is recommendations. And how do we, so we've kind of laid out a context, we've talked a bit about both challenges and opportunities. And Barbara, I want to stay with you because the paper talks about something called the variable geometry. Am I getting that right on how? Another term that needs a new name. But I think you were sort of circling around that just now. Now, maybe can you talk a little bit more about, as we think about recommendations, as we think about, okay, what's the way forward? Now from an American perspective, you're a retired American diplomat, how should the United States think about the ways in which it pursues its diplomacy to be as effective as possible in advancing U.S. national security interests in a world such as the one that we've all just been wrestling with? Yes. I feel like we should have Miriam Webster here to help us with, you know, coming up with a whole new vocabulary. The variable geometry was a very awkward term, but at least the way I understand it or the way I will choose to define it is this developing the comfort and the confidence to work with different states as they have these shifting interests. We have core interests. We have core values. We have some core friends. And we need to recognize and hold on to that. We also have regions that are important to us and issues. And it can be kleptocracy. It can be climate change. It can be migration. It can be any number of things. Where we will need to work with states where the value system may be slightly different, where we will disagree on another issue. But this issue, this time, this place, and this time, this place may be, you know, five, ten years, we need to work together. We worked with the Soviet Union on non-proliferation. Despite our differences, we still work with the Russians on space. We have had this variable geometry for a long time, but we need to recognize it. As I said, we had a romantic idea about the unipolar world, and what we did with it was invade Iraq, which might not have been the best use of that particular power moment. But we need to sort of come back to dealing laterally with states as partners.  What does a new diplomatic toolkit look like? And what skill sets need to be better cultivated in our young diplomats to operate more effectively in this very complex environment? Well, I'm glad to be asked for recommendations. I only have seven, and there'll be about 20, 30 seconds for each one. Yeah, I think one of the things I would focus on is the question of timing and the opportunity. Right now, we are in a very, very complicated and dangerous international situation. This is not the moment to begin building the bricks of a new international institution or international order. We have to wait till these wars are over, both for regional and for global reasons, before we can begin to stitch together something like a proper terminology for what Barbara has described as multi-alignment variable geometry. I'm not going to further go into that word thicket. I think Barbara has done it very well. But I don't think this is the moment to do it. So my first recommendation is not now. Don't try and give some kind of major speech whether you are this president or the next one, whoever that turns out to be, about how we're now going to define a new world order. This is not the right time for it. We've got to get some things under control in the Middle East and globally. You know, the meeting in San Francisco with Xi Jinping and Biden was interesting, but that's not the beginning of a new world order. It's sustaining a tolerable level of coexistence. So that's recommendation one. Recommendation two is we need to expand our portfolio of useful relationships with other countries. Expand our portfolio of relationships. We should be looking at what some smaller countries do very effectively. Countries like Qatar, countries like Switzerland, just to think of a couple, and they're not the only ones. Singapore is another one that makes a very special practice of building multi-stakeholder alliances and relationships with lots of other players. But why do they do it? They do it to create space so that people can communicate and solve problems. So that's a second or a third recommendation. We need to do a lot more training of our diplomats in multilateral affairs. Training, and not just training them, but actually giving them good jobs. Assigning them or recruiting them and assigning them to multilateral diplomacy. And related to that, and this is something I feel strongly about as a former assistant secretary of state for a regional bureau, we need to connect regional bureaus in our state department with functional bureaus in our state department so that they can actually foresee what's going to happen and be able to link together the issues and the interests, whether it's value-driven or interest-driven. We've got to enable the African Bureau to take that example and understand why COVID access was so darn important. And so that kind of thing needs to be brought together. So I'm up to recommendation number six, I think. UN reform, okay, yeah. Let's get India a permanent member of the Security Council and let's do it after the Ukraine war is over. Yeah. Let's draw you out a little bit further on this. I mean, here's one very specific recommendation that the report makes, which is that India should become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Will that help solve this challenge? What more needs to be done to make these multilateral and international institutions fit for purpose and frankly more reflective of the times that we find ourselves in? Well, I was actually going to, you know, hearing all of this and reading the report, I was thinking a little bit about sort of how do you rethink the very concept of diplomacy for this changing world, the one we don't yet know how to define. And I was thinking a few things. You know, obviously, you know, I think India sees itself as having a strong case for a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Not just India, it's working with a few other countries. It's called the G4, Germany, Brazil, Japan, and India have been working together. But, you know, I think beyond that, a few things are happening. So let me say, sort of group into two points. One is, I think, already we're seeing a host of new institutions taking shape, somewhat organically, that are setting standards that will have a very long knock-on, set of knock-on effects. And these are things that sometimes don't get that much attention. I'm not talking about BRICS and things like that that do get the attention. But organizations like GPAI, which is a global partnership on artificial intelligence, the Artemis Accords, which is setting new standards for space exploration and cooperation, the Mineral Security Partnership, which is about how countries can work together on critical mineral supply chains. I mean, these are all U.S.-led initiatives, by the way, which have incredible buy-in from allies, but also a lot of partners. India's a member of all three of the organizations that have been mentioned. But these are actually doing the work, the hard work of setting the standards in many critical areas of the near future. So we're going to start seeing some organic institution-building where the traditional multilateral institutions have not been as successful. There's now been a very concerted effort this year. And India has pushed this through the G20 to widen the mandate of the World Bank, to better allow it to meet some of the needs, particularly climate financing needs to be there to work with the private sector in blended finance and other mechanisms. So the thing is that the project of institutional reformation is under way, sometimes in ways that don't get the necessary attention that they deserve. But I also want to address, since we're here, a few thoughts briefly on how to think through diplomacy. And I realize I'm saying this on sharing the stage with some very experienced diplomats. But it's occurred to me, just as an observer and as a well-wisher, just a few thoughts, pretty for the United States. Diplomats are the eyes and ears of their government in post. And in the old days, you would be sent out on a posting. You were there for three years. You had very limited contact with your home country. You would travel back maybe once or twice in the middle of your posting. But you were the eyes and ears of your government. When I was living in Delhi, I would see diplomats from various countries coming in for one year or two years. It's been half the time in training, a lot of time on home leave, on personal leave. And by the time they'd started to figure the place out, they were shunted off to their next posting. And so it was very basic. And this is not just with the U.S. Foreign Service. I see the same thing would apply to the Indian Foreign Service. I think we need to be in a place where four or five year postings are more common. The topics that diplomats need to be focused on, it used to be a lot of emphasis on arms control during the Cold War, on missile technologies. That was something that a lot of diplomats became well-versed in, sanctions later. But today it's subjects like health security, it's vaccines, it's semiconductors, it's battery technology. And these are things that diplomats need to become well-versed in. In fact, our partner organization, ORF, in India, has started something, they started last year or two years ago, called the Forum for Future Diplomacy, working with the foreign ministries of, let me see if I can remember this, India, UK, Australia, UAE, and Japan. Precisely to train diplomats, it's like a two-week course in India on how to sort of think through some of these issues. A third thing, and I know this is a congressional-funded institution, but I do think the delay ambassadors confirmed is a net loss for the United States. It's something that, in India, there was no ambassador for two or three years, and it's not a big deal in some ways, Ambassador Garcetti's doing a great job, but it's something that is easily exploited by the US as competitors to say, look, the US doesn't care about you. And while obviously the Senate needs to do its job in due diligence and all that, I think a system whereby you have faster confirmation processes would do a lot to at least not weaken, unnecessarily weaken the US footprint abroad. Two other quick thoughts. One is a lot of the institutions, not I wouldn't say at the State Department or in what we think of as diplomacy, but are parallel to that, were designed for a particular purpose, often during the Cold War, but today no longer seem to serve that purpose. And I'm thinking USAID, Voice of America, the Peace Corps, Radio Free Europe, the IVLP program, and these became sort of a do-good public diplomacy kind of function in the immediate post-Cold War period. But I do think some of their purposes need to be rethought a little bit in a much more competitive environment. How can they be the best use of taxpayer money to advance American objectives? And finally, just bringing you back to this institution a little bit, there was a book that was written by an academic, Richard Stanford named Alexander George and he came to Washington in I believe the early 90s, somebody may recall here, and he wrote a book called Bridging the Gap. And it was basically how can the academic community actually help policy makers? And he listed out a few things that could be done. I think he was at a USIP if I recall, yeah. And I think it's worthwhile thinking how can the academic community and ISD and USIP are perfectly situated for this. How can they use some of the big ideas in academia, the kind of large data sets that are gathered? How can that be put towards how can that be made useful for policy makers? So those are my thoughts. Can I make one very small point? Yes, and then I want to open it up to our audience. Yes. That this report in these working group series are part of a Carnegie Bridging the Gap. There we go. ISD has been working on Bridging the Gap with these reports bringing academics and practitioners together. So that's what we do. So thank you for endorsing us. There we are. So I'd like to bring members of the audience and if you have a question, just raise your hand. We have mics around. We can get to you. Those online, please use the chat box on the event page. Questions? From the audience. Yes, please. In the front row. Hi. I don't think it's on. You're good. Hi, I'm Chris Inman. I'm the Senior Program Officer on the Program for Violent Extremism here at USIP. And I primarily work in Africa except now with Sarhang in Iraq. And I'd like to know more about I really agree with the need to bridge my work on a functional team with regional colleagues. But it's not that common. And I'm curious if you have thoughts on how we can reform this within our embassies not only within the same embassy but in a place like the Sahel where the crisis the multiple crises are very regional. Are there additional reforms that we can do to be able to more effectively address regional problems? Who would like to take that? Do you want to start chat? Yeah, I think you put your finger on a real serious challenge which is connecting the dots in our diplomacy. And some of our embassies in Africa are tiny and some of them don't have ambassadors in them. So we recently read about there was a coup d'etat in Niger there was no ambassador there an ambassador arrived a few weeks after the coup d'etat, brilliant brilliant. And quite often the people who actually have any staffing capacity in these small posts or DOD or the intelligence community or USAID not mainstream state people political, economic, cultural officers. So that's a problem and it's a problem also if the folks back home in the regional bureau in that funny building over there are not doing the connecting of the dots either. So I think you put your finger on a serious issue. So from one of our virtual audience members there's a question that actually was going to be a question I was going to ask if we didn't have others. So let me ask it which is and maybe we'll start with you Dhruva on this how will the BRICS plus expansion affect its influence when each power is individually increasing in global prominence? So is it diluting its effect? Are they actually going to be working at cross purposes over time? How do we understand that? I fall into that view and I've been getting that question a lot, surprisingly amount a lot of times. I was a view that sort of BRICS well let's take a step back. BRICS was created at a particular point of time. It started off really as a Goldman Sachs report in 2004 BRICS members they started meeting the leaders from the four countries at a ministerial level. In 2009 they finally bumped it up to a summit and this was really in the wake of the global financial crisis and again with a very specific purpose which is to reform multilateral financial institutions so that those countries which were slightly better off after the global financial crisis in relative terms could have a greater interest in those institutions. The net result was what was called the BRICS New Development Bank, NDB which has done something, it has a headquarters in China it's lent about $9 billion since its creation but I think it's reached its limits and partly because of the ownership structure and China's wish to take a leading role in it. An expanded BRICS actually dilutes it further it has countries like Saudi Arabia and Iran on it which if you can get them to agree on things that would be great I'm a bit skeptical Ethiopia, Argentina which may have pulled out under the new president the UAE so I think for China and Russia it serves a particular purpose it's to show that they're not isolated that they have friends they like the nice photo op for the other countries I think it's a useful talk shop for India they find it's useful to engage with all of those countries but if you look at what the common agenda is it's a pretty diluted common agenda there's some talk today about finding non-dollar means of trading that is one area of some common concern it's sometimes mistranslated in the press as the BRICS seeking a shared currency which again I'm not sure how that's going to happen but I won't say BRICS is useless but certainly I don't think it's what the sum of its parts are anywhere close to it Chet did you want to come in on this particular question? Very briefly the problem with the BRICS is that there's no mortar and you need mortar to build something to go with your BRICS and as you said Drew I think exactly right you dilute when you expand you dilute the coherence if there is any but I think we should relate to the way the US should relate to the BRICS as an entity but also individual members and just see where they're going if they can make progress on some practical issues like Groova mentioned that's great let them do it I don't see it as a threat So we are coming toward the end of our time I think we could go on for for quite some time more I think we've only just begun to scratch the surface on this very very rich paper that you've written for those of you who are here with us there are copies of our very distinguished panel for leading this discussion and what I hope we can do is dig deeper into some of the issues that we started to surface and perhaps have additional discussions and learn more together on this All of you here in our audience in the room please join me in thanking this excellent panel for a terrific discussion Also announced there will be a reception on the second floor Thank you to join us and enjoy a beverage and a little light bite So thank you