11 CHAPTER XXXVI Now tells the tale of Gunnar that in the same wise it fared with him. For when they awoke Glamver, his wife, told him many dreams which seemed to her like to betoken Gael coming. But Gunnar a-readed them all in other wise. "'This was one of them,' said she. "'Me thought a bloody sword was born into the hall here, wherewith thou were thrust through, and at either end of that sword, wolves howled.' The king answered. "'Cur dogs shall bite me, be like. Blood-stained weapons oft betoken dogs, snappings.' She said, yet again I dreamed, that women came in heavy and drooping, and chose thee for their mate. May happen, these would be thy fateful women.' He answered, hard to a-read is this, and none may set aside the fated measure of his days, nor is it unlike that my time is short. So in the morning they arose, and were minded for the journey, but some letted them herein. Then cried Gunnar to the man who is called Fjarnir. "'Arise, and give us to drink goodly wine from great tons. Because may happen, this shall be very last of all our feasts. For be like if we die the old wolf shall come by the gold, and that bear shall no wise spear the bite of his war tusks.' Then all the folk of his household brought them on their way, weeping. The son of Hrgni said, "'Fare ye well with Mary Tide!' The more part of their folk were left behind. Solar and Snivar, the sons of Hrgni, feared with them, and a certain great champion named Orkni, who was the brother of Kostbera. So folk followed them down to the ships, and all letted them of their journey, but attained to not therein. Then spake Glamvar, and said, "'O Vingy, most like that great ill-hap will come of thy coming, and mighty and evil things shall betide in thy travelling.' He answered, "'Hark into my answer, that I lie not ought, and may the high gallows and all things of Grame have me, if I lie one word!' Then cried Kostbera, "'Fare ye well with Mary Days!' And Hrgni answered, "'Be glad of heart, howsoever it may fare with us!' And therewith they parted, each to their own fate. Then away they rode so hard and fast that Wellnigh the half of the keels slipped away from the ship, and so hard they laid on to the oars that Thol and Gunnel break. And when they came aland they made their ship fast. And then they rode awhile on their noble steeds through the murk Wildwood. And now they behold the king's army, and huge uproar and the clatter of weapons they hear from thence, and they see there a mighty host of men and the manifold array of them, even as they wrought there. And all the gates of the burg were full of men. So they rode up to the burg, and the gates thereof were shut. Then Hrgni break open the gates, and therewith they ride into the burg. Then spake Vingy, Well, my ye have left this deed undone. Go to now, by thee here, while I go seek your gallows-tree. Softly and sweetly I bade you hither, but an evil thing abode there under. Short while to bide, ere ye are tied up to that same tree. Hrgni answered, None the more shall we waver for that cause. For little me thinks if we shrunk aback when as men fell to fight, and not shall it avail thee to make us afeard, and for an ill-fate hast thou wrought. And therewith they cast him down to earth, and smote him with their ax-hammers till he died. CHAPTER 37 Then they rode unto the king's hall. And King Otley arrayed his host for battle. And the ranks were so set forth that a certain wall there was betwixt them and the brethren. Welcome hither, said he. Deliver unto me that plenteous gold which is mine of right, even the wealth which Sigurd once owned, and which is now Gudrun's of right. Gnar answered, Never get us thou that wealth, and men of might must thou meet here wherever we lay by life, if thou wilt deal with us in battle. Ah! But like thou set us forth this feast like a great man, and what's not hold thine hand from urn and wolf? Long ago I had it in my mind, said Otley, to take the lives of you, and be lord of the gold, and reward you for that deed of shame wherein you beguiled the best of all your affinity. But now shall I revenge him. Grigny answered. Little will it veil to lie long brooding over that reed, leaving the work undone. And therewith they fell to hard fighting, at the first brunt with shot. But therewithal came the tidings to Gudrun, and when she heard thereof she grew exceeding wroth, and cast her mantle from her, and ran out and greeted those newcomers, and kissed her brethren, and showed them all love, and the last of all greetings was that betwixt them. Then said she, I thought I had set forth councils whereby ye should not come hither, but none may deal with his shape and fate. And with all she said, Will it avail ought to seek for peace? But stoutly and grimly they said nay there too. So she sees that the game goeth sorely against her brethren, and she gathers to her great stoutness of heart, and does on her a mailcoat, and takes to her a sword, and fights by her brethren, and goes as far forward as the bravest of manfolk, and all spoke in one wise that never saw any fairer defence than in her. Now the men fell thick, and far before all others was the fighting of those brethren, and the battle endured a long while unto midday. Gennar and Hergney went right through the folk of Otley, and so tells the tale that all the mead ran red with blood. The sons of Hergney withal said on stoutly, then spake Otley the king, A fair host and a great have we, and mighty champions with all, and yet have many of us fallen, and but evil am I a-paid, in that nineteen of my champions are slain, and but six left alive. And therewithal was there a lull in the battle. Then spake Otley the king. For brethren were we, and now am I left alone. Great affinity I get to me, and deed my fortune well sped thereby. A wife I had, fair and wise, high of mind and great of heart, but no joyance may I have of her wisdom, for little peace has betwixt us. But ye, ye have slain many of my kin, and beguiled me of realm and riches, and for the greatest of all woes have slain my sister with all. Quote Hergney, Why babblest thou thus?  Great for mocking and laughter I deem it, that thou must needs make long tale of thy woes. Rather will I give thanks to the gods that thou fallest into ill. CHAPTER XXXVIII Now King Otley eggs on his folk to set on fiercely, and eagerly they fight. But the Gukings fell on so hard that King Otley gave back into the hall, and within doors was the fight, and fierce beyond all fights. That battle was the death of many a man, but such was the ending thereof, that there fell all the folk of those brethren, and they twain alone stood up on their feet, and yet many more must fare to hell first before their weapons. And now they fell on Gunnar the king, and because of the host of men that set on him was hand laid on him, and he was cast into fetters. Afterwards fought Hergney with the stoutest heart and the greatest manlyhood, and he felled to earth twenty of the stoutest of the champions of King Otley, and many he thrust into the fire that burnt amidst the hall, and all were of one accord that such a man might scarce be seen, yet in the end was he borne down by many and taken. Then said King Otley, A marvellous thing! How many men have gone their ways before him! Cut the heart from out of him, and let that be his bane! Hergney said, Do according to thy will, merrily will I abide what so thou wilt do against me, and thou shalt see that my heart is not a dread. For hard matters have I made tri-love ere now, and all things that may try a man was I feigned to bear, whilst yet I was unhurt, but now sorely am I hurt, and thou alone henceforth will bear mastery in our dealings together. Then speak a counsellor of King Otley. Better read, I see there, too. Take we the thrall, heatley, and give respite to Hergney. For this thrall is made to die, since the longer he lives the less worth shall he be. The thrall harkened, and cried out aloft, and fled away any wither where he might hope for shelter, crying out that a hard portion was his because of their strife and wild doings, and an ill day for him were on he must be dragged to death from his sweet life and his swine-keeping. But they caught him, and turned a knife against him, and he yelled and screamed or ever he felt the point thereof. Then in such wise spake Hergney, as a man seldom speaketh who has fallen into hard need, for he prayed for the thrall's life, and said that these streaks he could not away with, and that it were a lesser matter to him to play out the play to the end. And therewithal the thrall got his life, as for that time. But Gunnar and Hergney are both laid in fetters. Then spake King Ottley with Gunnar the king, and bade him tell out concerning the gold and where it was, if he would have his life.  So now they caught hold of the thrall again, and cut the heart from out of him, and bore it unto King Gunnar. And he said, The faint heart of the Ottley may ye here behold, little like the proud heart of Hergney, for as much as it trembleth now, more by the half it trembled when as it lay in the breast of him. So now they fell on Hergney, even as Ottley urged them, and cut the heart from out of him. But such was the might of his manhood that he'd laughed while he abode that torment, and all wondered at his worth, and in perpetual memory is it held sevens. Then they showed it to Gunnar, and he said, The mighty heart of Hergney, little like the faint heart of the Ottley, for little as it trembleth now, less it trembled when as in his breast it lay. But now, O Ottley, even as we die, so shall thou die. And lo, I alone what where the gold is, nor shall Hergney be to tell thereof now. To and fro played the matter in my mind whilst we both lived, but now have I myself determined for myself, and the Rhine river shall rule over the gold, rather than that the Huns shall bear it on the hands of them. Then said King Ottley, have away the bondsmen. And so they did. But Gudrun called to her men, and came to Ottley, and said, May it fare ill with thee, now and from henceforth, even as thou hast ill held to thy word with me. So Gunnar was cast into a worm-close, and many worms abode him there, and his hands were fast bound. But Gudrun sent him a harp, and in such wise did he set forth his craft that wisely he smote the harp, smiting it with his toes. And so excellently well he played that few deemed they had heard such playing, even when the hand had done it. And with such might and power he played that all the worms fell asleep in the end, save one adder only, great and evil of aspect that crept unto him, and thrust its sting into him until it smote his heart. And in such wise, with great hardyhood, he ended his life-days. CHAPTER 39 Now thought Ottley the king that he had gained a mighty victory, and spake to Gudrun even as mocking her greatly, whereas making himself great before her. Gudrun, saith he, thus hast thou lost thy brethren, and thy very self hast brought it about. She answers, In good-liking livest thou, whereas thou thrustest these slayings before me, but may happen thou wilt rue it when thou hast tried what is to come hereafter, and of all I have the longest lift matter shall be the memory of thy cruel heart, nor shall it go well with thee whilst I live. He answered and said, Let there be peace betwixt us. I will atone for thy brethren with gold and dear-bought things, even as thy heart may wish. She answers, Hard for a long while have I been in our dealings together. And now I say that while Hugney was yet alive, thou mightest have brought it to pass, but now mayest thou never atone for my brethren in my heart. Yet oft must we women be overborn by the might of you men, and now are all my kindred dead and gone, and thou alone art left to rule over me. Wherefore now this is my counsel, that we make a great feast wherein I will hold the funeral of my brother and of thy kindred with all. In such wise did she make herself soft and kind in words, though far other things forsooth lay there under. But he hearkened to her gladly and trusted in her words, whereas she made herself sweet of speech. So Gudrun held the funeral feast for her brethren, and King Atley for his men, and exceeding proud and great was this feast. But Gudrun forgot not her woe, but brooded over it. How she might work some mighty shame against the King. And at nightfall she took to her the sons of King Atley and her as they played about the floor. The younglings waxed heavy of cheer, and asked what she would with them. "'Ask me not,' she said, "'ye shall die, the twain of you.' Then they answered, "'Thou mayest do with thy children even as thou wilt, nor shall any hinder thee, but shame there is to thee in the doing of this deed.' Yet for all that she cut the throats of them. Then the King asked where his sons were. And Gudrun answered, "'I will tell thee, and gladden thine heart by the telling. Lo now, thou didst make a great woe spring up from me in the slaying of my brethren. Now hearken and hear my reed and my deed. Thou hast lost thy sons, and their heads are become beakers on the board here. And thou thyself hast drunken the blood of them blended with wine. And their hearts I took and roasted them on a spit, and thou hast eaten thereof.'  Gudrun said, "'My heart is set on the doing to thee of as great shame as may be. Never shall the measure of ill be full to such a King as thou art.' The King said, "'Worcer deeds hast thou done than men have to tell of. And great unwisdom is there in such fearful reeds. Most meet art thou to be burned on bale when thou hast first been smitten to death with stones. For in such wise wits thou have what thou hast gone a weary way to seek.' She answered, "'Thine own death thou foretellest. But another death is fated for me.' And many other words they spake in their wrath. Now Hrgni had a son left alive, Hyte Niflung. And great wrath of heart he bear against King Atley. And he did Gudrun to wit that he would avenge his father. And she took his words well. And they fell to counsel together thereover. And she said it would be great good hap if it might be brought about. So on a night when the King had drunken he got him to bed. And when he was laid asleep, thither to him came Gudrun and the son of Hrgni. Gudrun took a sword and thrust it through the breast of King Atley. And they both of them set their hands to the deed, both she and the son of Hrgni. Then Atley the King awoke with the wound and cried out, "'No need of binding or solving here! Who art thou who has done the deed?' Gudrun says, "'Somewhat have I Gudrun wrought therein, and somewhat with all the son of Hrgni.' Atley said, "'Yeah, let beseem to thee to do this, though somewhat of wrong was between us. For thou wert wedded to me by the reed of thy kin, and dower paid I for thee. Yay! Thirty goodly knights, and seemly maidens, and many men besides. And yet were thou not content, but if thou shouldest rule over the lands King Boothly owned, and thy mother-in-law full off'd, thou letst sit a weeping.' Gudrun said, Many false words hast thou spoken, and if not I account them. Often deed was I fell of mood, but much did's thou add thereto. Full often this thy house did phrase befall, and kin fought kin, and friend fought friend, and made themselves big one against the other. Better days had I, when as I abode with Sigurd, when we slew kings, and took their wealth to us, but gave peace to whom so would, and the great men laid themselves under our hands, and might we gave to him of them who would have it. Then I lost him. And a little thing was it that I should bear a widow's name, but the greatest of griefs that I should come to thee. I who had a foretime the noblest of all kings, while for thee thou never barest out of the battle ought but the worser lot. King Otley answered, Not true are thy words, nor will this our speech better the lot of either of us, for all is fallen now to naught. But now do to me in seemly wise, and array my dead corpse in noble fashion. Ye that will I, she says, and let make for thee a goodly grave, and build for thee a worthy abiding place of stone, and wrap thee in fair linen, and care for all that needful is. So therewithal he died, and she did according to her word, and then they cast fire into the hall. And when the folk and men of estate awoke amid that dread and trouble, not would they abide the fire, but smote each the other down and died in such wise. So there Otley the king, at all his folk, ended their life-days. But Gudrun had no will to live longer after this deed so wrought. But nevertheless her ending day was not yet come upon her. Now the Volzungs and the Kyukings, as folk tell and tale, have been the greatest-hearted and the mightiest of all men, as ye may well behold written in the songs of old time. But now, with the tidings just told, were these troubles stayed. CHAPTER 40 Gudrun had a daughter by Sigurd, height Svanhild. She was the fairest of all women, eager-eyed as her father, so that few durst look under the brows of her. And as far did she excel other womankind as the sun excels the other lights of heaven. But on a day when Gudrun downed to the sea, and caught up stones in her arms and went out into the sea, for she had will to end her life. But mighty bellows drave her forth along the sea, and by means of their upholding was she born along till she came at the last to the berg of King Yonaker, a mighty king, and lord of many folk. And he took Gudrun to wife. And their children were Hamdir, and Sirli, and Erp. And there was Svanhild nourished with all. CHAPTER 41 Jermynrek was the name of a mighty king of those days, and his son was called Rondvair. Now this king called his son to talk with him, and said, Thou shalt fare on an errand of mine, to King Yonaker, with my counselor, Bicky. For with King Yonaker is nourished Svanhild, the daughter of Sigurth Fafnir's bane, and I know for sure that she is the fairest maid dwelling under the sun of this world. Her, above all others, would I have to my wife, and thou shalt go woo her for me. Rondvair answered, Meet, and write, fair lord, that I should go on thine errands. So the king set forth this journey in seemly wise, and they fare till they come to King Yonaker's abode, and behold Svanhild, and have many thoughts concerning the treasure of her goodliness. But on a day Rondvair called the king to talk with him, and said, Jermynrek the king would feign be thy brother-in-law, and he has heard tell of Svanhild, and his desire it is to have her to wife, nor may it be shown that she may be given to any mightier man than he is one. The king says, This is an alliance of great honour, for a man of fame he is. Gudrun says, A wavering trust, the trust in luck, that it change not. And because of the king's furthering, and all the matters that went herewith, is the wooing accomplished, and Svanhild went to the ship with a goodly company, and sat in the stern beside the king's son. Then spake Bikki to Rondvair. How good and right it were, if thou thyself had to wife so lovely a woman, rather than the old man there! Gudrun seemed that word to the heart of the king's son, and he spake to her with sweet words, and she to him and likewise. So they came a land, and go unto the king, and Bikki said unto him, Meet and write it is, Lord, that thou shalt know what is befallen, though hard it be to tell of, for the tale must be concerning thy beguiling, whereas thy son has gotten to him the full love of Svanhild, nor is she other than his harlot. But thou, let not the deed be unevenged! Now many an ill-read had he given the king or this, but of all his ill-reads did this sting home the most.  Wherefore he, who might know wise still the wrath within him, tried out that Randver should be taken and tied up to the gallows tree. And as he was led to the gallows he took his hawk, and plucked the feathers from off it, and Bade show it to his father. And when the king saw it, then he said, Now may folk behold that he deemeth my honour to be gone away from me, even as the feathers of this hawk! Therewith he Bade delivered him from the gallows. But in that while had Bicky wrought his will, and Randver was dead slain. And moreover Bicky spake, Against none hast thou more wrongs to avenge thee of than against Svanhild.  Yay! said the king. We will do after thy counsel. So she was bound in the gate of the burg, and horses were driven at her to tread her down. But when she opened her eyes wide, then the horses durst not trample her. So when Bicky beheld that, he Bade draw a bag over the head of her. And they did so. And therewith she lost her life. CHAPTER 42 Now Guthrun heard of the slaying of Svanhild, and spake to her sons. Why sit ye here in peace amid merry words? Whereas Jörmán Rekkath slain your sister, and trodden her under foot of horses, in shameful whys? No heart ye have in you, like to Gunnar or Hrgni, verily they would have avenged their kin's woman. Hamther answered. Little didst thou praise Gunnar and Hrgni, whereas they slew Siggeth, and thou wert reddened in the blood of him. And ill were thy brethren avenged by the slaying of thine own sons. Yet not so ill a deed were it for us to slay King Jörmán Rekk, and so hard thou pushest us on to this that we may not abide thy hard words. Guthrun went about laughing now, and gave them to drink from mighty beakers, and thereafter she got for them great burnies and good, and all other weed of war. Then spake Hamther. Lo now, this is our last parting, for thou shalt hear tidings of us, and drink one grave ale over us and over Svánhild. So therewith they went their ways. But Guthrun went under her bower, with hearts swollen with sorrow, and spake. The three men was I wedded, and first to Siggeth Fafnir's bane, and he was berayed and slain, and of all griefs was that the greatest grief. Then was I given to King Otley, and so fell was my heart toward him that I slew in the fury of my grief his children and mine. Then gave I myself to the sea, but the billows thereof cast me out of land, and to this king then was I given. Then gave I Svánhild away out of the land with mighty wealth and low. My next greatest sorrow after Siggeth, for under horse's feet was she trodden and slain, but the grimest and ugliest of woes was the casting of Gunnar into the worm-clothes, and the hardest was the cutting of Herkney's heart from him. Ah, better would it be if Siggeth came to meet me, and I went my ways with him. For here Bideth now behind with me neither son nor daughter to comfort me. O mindest thou not, Siggeth, the words we spoke when we went into one bed together, that thou wouldst come and look on me, yay, even from thine abiding place among the dead? And thus had the words of her sorrow an end. CHAPTER 43 Now telleth the tale concerning the sons of Gudrun that she had arrayed their war-raiment in such wise that no steel would bite thereon, and she bade them play not with stones or other heavy matters, for that it would be to their skave if they did so. And now, as they went on their way, they met Erp, their brother, and asked him in what wise he would help them. He answered, Even his hand helps hand, or foot helps foot. But that they deemed not at all, and slew him there and then. Then they went their ways. Nor was it long or ever Hamdir stumbled, and thrust down his hand to steady himself, and spake therewith. Not but a true thing, spake Erp, for now should I have fallen had not hand been to steady me. A little after, surly stumbled, but turned about on his feet and so stood, and spake, Yay! Now had I fallen, but that I steadied myself with both feet! And they said they had done evilly with Erp, their brother. But on they fear till they come to the abode of King Yarmulrach, and they went up to him, and set on him forthwith. And Hamdir cut both hands from him, and surly both feet. Then spake Hamdir, Off with the head if Erp were alive, our brother whom we slew on the way, and found out our deed too late. Even as the song says, Off with the head if Erp were alive yet, our brother the bold whom we slew by the way, the well famed in warfare. Now in this must they turn away from the words of their mother, whereas they had to deal with stones. For now men fell on them, and they defended themselves in good and manly wise, and were the scathe of many a man, nor would iron bite on them. But there came there too a certain man, old of aspect, and one-eyed, and he spake. No wise men are ye, whereas ye cannot bring these men to their end. Then the king said, Give us a reed there too, if thou canst. He said, Ther skuluth ber yath thou grotty e hail. Smite them to the death with stones. In such wise was it done. For the stones flew thick and fast from every side, and that was the end of their life-days, and now has come to an end the whole root and stem of the kukings. Now may all earls be bettered in mind. May the grief of all maidens ever be diminished. For this tale of trouble so told to its ending. Ullum urlum, othal batni, snotrum urlum, sorg at minni, at theta tregrof of talet vairi. End of section 12 End of Volsunga saga by Anonymous Translated by Erikan Magnusson and William Morris


Welcome back to Kids Fun Science. My name is Ken. Today's experiment is a bird in the cage, or is it? As always, adult supervision is required. What you need for this experiment is paper, scissors, string, glue, and a pen. So it started off, I have in the description a link to this printout. So you're able to print out the bird cage and the bird, and then you're going to have an adult help you cut out the two circles. So just get a couple circles cut out here, one with the bird and one with the cage. And I'll speed this up because you probably don't need to watch me see how well my cutting skills are. So while we're cutting this out, we want to, it doesn't have to be precise, but right around the outside of the lines, you're going to have this cut out and then we're going to glue the back of each side of those. So once we get these completely cut out here, then we are going to flip them up. Now, it's important which direction they go, so you do have to make sure you get the glue on. You want to make sure that the cage, the bird is right side up. It's the easy way for me and the cage is upside down. So then you put your string right down in the middle, bird's right side up, and then you'll have the cage the other way. So go ahead and check to make sure the cage is upside down on the back. It's very important and the bird is facing straight up and now you grab your string and start spinning it around and you'll notice it's when you go around, the bird looks like it's inside the cage. This bird in the cage is an optical illusion called a thomothrope. It is the beginning of animation as we know it and at the surface it doesn't seem to be the same concept. However, while both basically make use of fast-changing frames and or image to create a visual illusion. A thomothrope is caused by an image or light in a different location while the animation in a different image or light in the same location. This time I'm drawing my own and so what I'm doing is I took a piece of cardstock at four inch by two inch and I folded in half and then I drew one image of a stick figure on the bottom part, which is now on the top. And then I'm drawing a second image of a jail cell on the bottom and my pen is not really working with me here. So I'm going to come back with a sharpie and highlight that a little bit better. But this just shows that you can draw your own or you could do in the go in the description and grab the print out that I had for the bird in the cage. You're going to take the string and you want to put it right in the middle of the bottom two inches. First you take your glue stick and go ahead and cover up both sides of the cardstock. And then you're going to stick that string in the middle of the bottom bottom half of it right there. And then when you fold it over, it should be right there where last time we cut out two circles and put them together. And then we have our image there. So I'm going to come back and highlight it here with a sharpie. And then once I get it completely ready, I'm going to switch over to a thicker sharpie here. And we'll get the cage a little bit thicker here. You can use different colors where I basically are just using black and white here, but you can use all kinds of different colors or come up with different images where I'm just using the bird in the cage and a man in a jail cell. Once you have this done, then you want to make sure that one image is facing the right direction. It doesn't really matter with the bars here. And then you give it a look, I did matter. I had it upside down and then I spin it and you can see when it spins really quick, the unhappy man is in jail. Go ahead and go into the description and print out the bird in the cage or come up with your own design and leave in the comments below what you came up with as I only did the man with the jail cell and the bird with the cage. And also if you used any different colors, I'd love to hear about that on which ones you came up with. Remember, the cage has to be upside down on the back and the bird right side up for that one to work. I hope you enjoyed this video. Remember to click thumbs up and to subscribe as we do a new video every day. Thanks for watching.


Today's first talk is Jan Tobias Mulberg and he will be presenting Sankos 2.0 open source trusses computing for the IoT. So let's welcome him. Thank you very much everyone. Good morning ladies and gentlemen. So we had an introduction to the topic already. There are a couple of things here that involve trusses computing. I'll stay here. Good. We have Sankos, we have trusses computing. I'll go through these things. One by another first introduce the basic concepts of what we understand on the trusses computing and how you can use it. I want to make sure that we understand that this is a talk about an open source trusses computing platform as far as I know one of the only open source trusses computing platforms available at the moment and that this is mostly about embedded security. So we're not looking into DRM for desktop systems or something like that. This is specifically a security mechanism for the embedded world but you know this is kind of the first talk of a security session so I want to talk a little bit about what security is, how security normally works and what you have to do to actually get a system somewhat secure and you see there are a couple of different systems on the right side. I have to make sure that there are a couple of different systems on the right side of that slide that obviously have very different requirement, very different use cases, very different security properties as well. And I think it's very important that when we talk about security, when we design security solutions that we don't just you know talk about features of specific systems but that we know exactly what system we have, how that system is supposed to work in a specific context, what users do with it, how they interact with the system, that we then talk about what security properties we need for this kind of system, that we understand how security can possibly be implemented and what requirements have to be satisfied by this implementation. And it's I think very important that we understand that these security requirements, they are not features of the systems, they are what we desire, they define where we want to be. And based on this we then kind of choose technology to implement specific things but we can only choose these specific technologies once we know what kind of attacker we are supposed to deal with. If we are working for a system that is like you know a smart fridge in a personal premise and we want to understand what attackers would potentially do with the system, how they would interact with the system, what they could potentially achieve by abusing the system in one way or another. And obviously that is completely different from what you have when you look into a banking website or into one of these little smart card readers for authenticating with a banking website or what you have when you talk about smart cars or safety critical infrastructure like medical devices or the smart grid. In all these contexts we have very very different requirements to deal with. So talking about requirements and talking about system models and attacker models also means that we kind of have to deal with how attacks evolve over time. So this is a very interesting XKCD post that shows us or that kind of tries to explain how certain low level attacks on CPU architectures or memory architectures work. So we've all heard about Spectre and we've all heard about Meltown. Rohammer came a few years before and all of these attacks as they come along they change our understanding of systems very much and if someone tells us there is new zero day vulnerability, if someone tells us that oh well actually cloud centers and data centers and whatever are actually also vulnerable to real hammers and not just to Rohammer attacks then we have to rethink about these models. We have to reconsider our design choices, we have to reconsider our attacker models and understand how we can adapt a security mechanism that we adapted for our systems that we are using to actually deal with these new things or maybe change to completely different mechanisms and that's something very important and that's why we kind of have to rely upon open source mechanisms to implement security because I believe that that is one of the only opportunities for us to understand how these mechanisms work, what the exact security guarantees are and how we can kind of use them in a well defined way to achieve something rather than just putting layers and layers of complexity on top of each other without actually fixing the holes that might be in system somewhere. So the fourth point here on my list of what you have to do to get security right is to embrace change, to understand how attacks evolve, how systems evolve and to be able to adapt your system and your security methodology, your security approach to these changes in attacker models, in vulnerabilities, in technology that emerges and that might allow you to implement better stuff and I think that's the point that makes it important to think about security requirements not as features but as requirements because only that allows you to actually then seek for a better technology, choose a better technology to implement security in your system. So I think that's the basic introduction. Trusted computing, yeah well a treacherous computing, I was actually thinking about putting one of these treacherous computing stickers on my laptop before giving a trusted computing talk at FOSTEM just to get some plausible deniability for, yeah, you know what, so a trusted computing, according to the trusted computing group we talk about protecting computations at endpoints, protecting data at endpoints, using hardware extensions to enforce specific behavior and well that's also where it can easily go bad and that's what my next slide is but for now these are kind of the things you normally have in a trusted computing system, there are endorsement keys that you can use to, that are kind of hard-baked into your system and that you can use to bind specific software components or specific hardware components to a user by using certificates and you can then use these public keys and private key cryptography there to authenticate these systems to a third remote party that kind of breaks your ideas of anonymity on the web pretty much so we have this concept of a trusted third party that can act as a mediator to kind of implement anonymity on top of it but of course you have to trust it there's no way around this in these settings, the interesting things that we mostly work with are what is in the middle there so this kind of memory curtailing that gives you guarantee that for example a specific piece of data can only be accessed by a specific piece of software that the software cannot be interfered with and we also have remote attestation that is a process that I'll try to explain on the next couple of slides that allows a remote party to actually attest that a piece of software as it executes is in a state that you can actually trust it and that's kind of the building blocks that we talk about. In practice there is a whole range of different architectures around already, if you think about Intel CPUs that implement the ESGX technology or ARM that implements trust zone or trusted computing, there's a platform modules which is what the next talk on this stage is going to be about, they all have different features, they all implement a different subset and different extensions to these basic primitives here. So it matters a lot which one you choose and that you understand exactly what guarantees you get out of this. If you then look into the Wikipedia article about what you can potentially do with trusted computing you find this kind of stuff and I think most of us here will agree that it's actually not what we are interested in. What we were always wondering is that can you use these kind of primitives to do something that really matters, not protect computer games or to do DRM but protect for example critical infrastructure, can we use this to get some security guarantees about medical devices, about automotive computing which is one example I'll show later or about for example the smart grid and guarantee that it's very hard to use this infrastructure by an attacker to for example take down an entire country in a snap second. So there is the treacherous computing approach by Richard Stallman, I have a couple of sentences from one of his papers copied here. This is particularly interesting if you see the idea of trusted computing in the light of recent vulnerabilities in hardware and software we have seen. So I think it's very important to understand that trust computing technology as we have today does not help you against vulnerabilities in the trusted software you actually deploy it will never help you against that. It just makes it harder to kind of inspect these specific vulnerabilities to understand what you're deploying especially if you're on a platform that deploy that supports encrypted deployment of code and things like that. So it also doesn't protect you against all kinds of side channel vulnerabilities. These are specifically out of scope for many trust computing architectures in the documentation in the specification and again you have to gain some understanding about these properties to understand what kind of attackers you can protect against. Is that an attacker that just downloads some hack from a website or are you trying to protect against a governmental institution that has really strong abilities in research and reverse engineer your architectures your designs and use that to try to harm your critical infrastructure. Very different approaches here. So what kind of useful stuff can we do with trusted computing. That's where it all gets interesting. To do useful stuff you first want to make sure that you use these kind of primitives in a way that is understandable for the developers for the entities that deploy software that is kind of non-invasive from a privacy perspective that actually makes sense and aims to provide measurable security for systems that matter. And I think in the Sunco's work which goes on since 2012 already we've been trying to follow a couple of lines here that aim for enabling users to use this technology to understand this technology rather than restricting them and to build upon well understood open source components like compiler technology from LVM and open source microcontroller design and stick these things together extend them to actually build an open source trusted computing platform that is aimed to be analyzed to be understood to be reused in various contexts. So I've been talking about remote attestation a couple of times already. I'm now trying to follow this approach of making you understand this technology by presenting exactly what remote attestation means in the context of for example Sunco's like architectures for that I think you first have to understand what kind of risks there are in microcontroller systems. So one common thing is that you don't have any form of isolation of different processes in these systems. So if you look at ECUs in cars for example or also control systems in the power grid and in industrial control systems you will see a lot of very little microcontrollers deployed like 16 bit MCUs that often have no security mechanisms building. So that means if you in these contexts deploy some application and then you might deploy another application on your MCU and then you might deploy a third application. They all share the same address space and it's very likely that something goes wrong. So if you have a buffer overflow in one of these different components that might even come from different shareholders, from different stakeholders it's quite likely that you know a bug in one component compromises your entire system compromises the interactions of other software modules that you rely on. So if then our little robot there comes along and wants to get some measurements out of the system, wants to get a sense of reading from your microcontroller, wants to control an actuator which might be a critical thing which might be a brake controller in a car or something like that. You can easily end up with situations where this is not reliable, where you have no assurance of integrity of your software, of the security of the communication whatsoever. We address exactly this situation with the Sanquus approach or with trusted computing architectures in general. So one thing we give you with this approach of memory curtailing is strong isolation between different components. So for example the third component, the red one down there, it just can't be overlapping with other components in the system anymore that are using this kind of technology primitives. That is we introduce a little unit in your microcontroller that is just a few gates big and that allows us to capture certain properties of each software module. For example we would want to know where the text section of that module is, that is the actual code you're executing, we would want to know where the data section of that particular module is and we want to of course know the value of the program counter. And then we can for example very simply say that only if the program counter points somewhere into the text section, we can access the data section. Otherwise the data section is not available. So no other module would ever be able to interfere with the confidential state of that one module we are trying to protect. Now we can also use these things, these properties of a specific software module that we captured to for example generate unique keys that are related to that module. So if we again extend our microcontroller a little bit by sticking a triple unit in and say that we use the module identity, let's say the text section and the addresses of data section and so forth to generate a key that is specific to that module. We can use that key even with a third party even with a deployer of that software to securely communicate with the module. And get some guarantees about that specific module has been deployed in a secure way on a microcontroller. Now of course there are some issues here. So if you think about just generating a key directly from the module code and the loading context that would not be really confidential because anyone could potentially know where your module is deployed. So you need some additional software, you need for example or you need some additional steps. For example you want to use that endorsement key that I've used before that is baked into the hardware and integrated in the key derivation process to actually get a proper secret that then as well binds the software module to a specific microcontroller. But that's essentially all what attestation is about. So in this specific context our little robot knows pretty much for sure that he's communicating with the right piece of software and he can even extend this to multiple pieces of software. So for example if these other modules also use our technology he can even extend these guarantees to say okay our module is running on a specific microcontroller and it expects another module with a certain identity, with a certain key to run on exactly the same microcontroller and therefore get a chain of trust. So you basically can use this to get a trusted path on one microcontroller that extends from a piece of application code to a driver module to actual hardware access. That's what we do in Sankos and then of course if you have this kind of secure communication remotely you can extend this to remote sites and you get some guarantees that say that essentially you get a trusted path between input and output components, input and output device drivers on different nodes over a distributed application. I think that's a pretty cool thing, that's a pretty strong guarantee that we've not seen in industry control systems so far. But you know, if you want that kind of stuff then where do you go? What kind of application, what kind of technology do you have at the moment to implement that? And well, here is like a map of hardware and trusted computing architectures that give you attestation, that give you isolation and if you look at the open source column that's on the right there and if you also look at the lightweight, the embedded column you see that basically Sankos is the only thing that is available at the moment. You don't have to take pictures, the slides are online. So I think that's quite a unique thing for Sankos at the moment that we are really the only architecture that is available that you can basically download, deploy on FPGAs that you can experiment with, that you can build experimental software that you can use for research to actually find out how to program these kind of modules because isolation is often not easy to deal with how to develop application scenarios on this kind of architectures. So what I'm going to present on the next couple of slides is a bit of introduction to what we've done to Sankos and how it works and then I would want to present an application scenario from the automotive domain that shows you how you can securely communicate within a car context and make sure that for example, road microcontrollers cannot interfere that remote attackers cannot interfere with the communication that actually controls the critical behavior of a car. I have a little video if there's still time at the end to show that kind of stuff off. So, Sankos. Sankos is built upon a 16-bit MCU that's the open MSP430, so it's an open hardware design that you can just download in its very lock market description and extend with whatever kind of stuff you want. So specifically we put in a little memory management control unit that gives you that kind of isolation guarantee and we also built in a crypto call that allows you to store keys in hardware so that they never lead to software that they can only be used by specific crypto algorithms through a hardware API and that cannot be used in other ways. Where do we start with this kind of software modules and software isolation stuff? So here it is. In Sankos you would see a software module as I explained before in the attestation example as a text section that identifies that contains the executable code of your module and a data section that is located somewhere else in this continuous address space and contains the runtime data, the runtime state of your module. And we use these two to actually generate an identity of the module. That is, we use maybe a hash of the text section plus the start and end addresses of the data section to say that a module is linked, is deployed on a specific node in that kind of setup and we can combine this with a key that is baked in hardware to generate specific keys. There is another extension that I have been talking about before that is this entry point you see there at the beginning of the text section. So the interesting thing is that Sankos modules cannot be accessed. You cannot access the code at any given point. You can't just jump to some arbitrary location in the text section or call an arbitrary function. Instead, you declare a specific function to be entry point functions for your protected module and then you can only jump into these specific entry point functions. And if you then make sure that the interfaces of these functions are sufficiently restrictive, that there are no let's say function pointers passed or stuff like that that you can easily upuse for a return oriented programming attack or something like that, you actually get very strong guarantees that your modules are pretty hard to upuse that an attacker cannot easily manipulate your module to change the control flow and to make it execute, perform cryptographic operations, for example, that are not intended in the application source code. An interesting side effect of this kind of setup is by extending a very simple microcontroller. I think we get quite a strong understanding of how the architecture works, how instructions are processed, how side channels evolve or don't evolve, which is something you typically don't get on larger architectures like, for example, x86. There's no pipelining here. There's no speculative execution. So this is even spectral resistant, I believe. But of course, there's no proof there that's something we still have to do. This is also a very power efficient architecture. So the MSP430 basically runs for I think 12 years on an AA cell that is more than the shelf life of that cell. We have extended it a little bit, especially with the CryptoCore and of course the power consumption rises by this, but that's only 6% if you're not using the CryptoCore continuously. So basically we still have a very long runtime on battery power or a CPU that is still suitable for energy harvesting or similar technologies. So there's a link for the source code of the architecture for the support software if you want to have a look at it, if you want to use it. I want to talk a bit about how keys are managed, how keys are derived in this architecture. So essentially what you have is you have a computing node, you have a Sanquus MCU, we call it N in this context here, and each of these things has a key baked in. At the moment they are static keys, but you can think of using physically unclonable functions to generate these keys initially, something like that. Now from that key we generate a software provider key. So we can name a software provider, we just give him an ID, and we can use this ID to compute a key that is specific to a software provider. And then using this key the software provider can deploy software and the identity of each of the software modules he deploys or she deploys will be used to compute another key that is a software module key. And only the software provider can actually infer this key offline independent from what happens on the MCU and communicate securely with a specific module. So that's kind of the guarantees that you then use to securely communicate and to establish attestation guarantees in your network of Sanquus modules. Now what do we do with this whole stuff? I've been presenting this slide a lot of times in the last couple of months. You might have heard that cars can be hacked, right? So there have been a couple of papers in the last couple of years that show that you can use the remote connectivity of a car, the car Wi-Fi cellular connectivity to interfere with a car's safety critical function. Researchers have shown that you can actually remotely steer a car off the road while it is driving, control the car to engage the brakes and things like that. This is pretty bad. And we've been employing Sanquus in a demo setup to actually mitigate this issue by not just providing authentication on the internal buses that provide this kind of functionality that exchange messages between different controllers and make sure that these controllers interact and control the car. So you need cryptography to kind of protect these messages, but then again, what happens if you're an attacker and you manage to redeploy software somewhere or you manage to abuse a component, to abuse the software on a component, to make an entry decrypt something, you would basically be able to control a lot of the behavior by this kind of attacks. And then of course your cryptographic keys would probably leak. And well, the baseline is you need guarantees on top of just message authentication on these automotive buses that give you some form of software security that allow you to measure the state of the individual software modules that allow you to protect keys from being abused by malicious code, by return-oriented programming attacks and things like that. So we've actually came up with a neat design for deploying software modules in such reactive systems, in such reactive critical systems. And we've also been building a little demo setup that involves some car dashboards, some actual car components that interact with a couple of ECUs that run our Sanctus hardware and that show that an attacker can interfere with the unprotected components, might harm availability on the critical components, but does not interfere with the security of the protected components. So how does it all work together? So a car is a fairly complex bus system. You have a lot of electronic control units installed there. They all interact via different networks, CAN is just one of them. There have been specifications for doing message authentication on these bus systems. They are in the AutoSAR standard since 2015, I think, as far as I know, there are no industrial viable implementations yet. There have been academic proposals for communication protocols that give you some form of key exchange between these components that give you message authentication there. So it would be pretty hard for an attacker to just inject messages. One approach is layer and we have the first author of the layer approach sitting here in the front row. Another approach is Vatican. I don't think we have anyone from Vatican here today. So this has been proposed, but there are no efficient implementations yet. One issue is that if you do your cryptography and software, well, you also have a timing issue because many of these microcontrollers, they're just not efficient. They're just not fast enough to do this so that you actually maintain full control over your car and break in time. You need some hardware support to do that. The next thing is, of course, what about software security? So I explained it before, if you would be able to run a return-oriented programming attack against one of the software components on a controller, would you leak keys? Would you be able to control the software to actually send fake messages or to inject messages that are encrypted, that are signed, that are, so to say, authenticated for the network and control the car? Probably yes, and that's something we wanted to address here. So what you need on top of just having a protocol that gives you message authentication is a way to encapsulate software security and software component authentication somehow in that system and to do it all fast enough, to do it all with probably hardware support for cryptographic operations so that it's actually viable in a real-time context in a safety-critical system. So essentially that's where Sankos comes into play. We have, in such a car network, you have a lot of software, right? You don't just have your critical application that consists of, let's say, a device driver for your brake pedal and a piece of application code that transmits brake messages to some ABS system and a piece of software on the ABS system that gathers information from the different rotation sensors in the state of the individual brakes to send out new signals. You also have little operating systems. You have a lot of software that controls communication protocols, it implements communication protocols, and all that forms a pretty big software stack. So what we're trying to do with our approach here is to isolate the critical application code in these protected modules so that only they would be able to encrypt, decrypt, use the hardware, crypto and protection primitives of the Sankos architectures while all the rest is untrusted. That doesn't mean that this untrusted software is unnecessary. It's certainly necessary for functionality, but it's not necessary to maintain the security properties of this distributed application you have in a car there. So in a traditional setup, you have various approaches how this kind of security can be harmed. You have road control units, someone might just stick in one of these black box dongles from your insurer to inject messages or that could potentially inject messages. Someone might do a remote attack against the car. This is basically all ruled out by our approach because you first have this kind of software authentication, you then have message authentication over the bus, and transit computing or Sankos is the infrastructure to implement this. Now, talking about performance, there are some measurements we've done. So the interesting perspective here is that if you do it in software, your authentication will typically need like six, seven milliseconds on a AVR controller or on a Sankos-style controller. If you do it in hardware, you are actually fast enough, you're below the three millisecond margin which allows you to use this kind of stuff at least in an automotive context as a safety critical system. That's quite important. Another interesting observation is that the software isolation that we do on top of just doing cryptography isn't very expensive. It just imposes an overhead of about 5% maybe which is typically quite doable within the safety margins of these systems. And of course, importantly, there are many, many applications to this kind of system that go far beyond automotive computing. So if you think about smart grid applications, the smart grid of the Ukraine has been hacked quite recently in the takeover of Premiere. We really want to protect this kind of systems in a European context, in a national security context. We want to protect medical devices. We want to protect industrial control systems that could potentially also be up used to actually have disastrous consequences on our society, on our countries. So there's a whole range of applications that can be used here where our technology can apply. And what we outline in the paper I'm citing there at the bottom is essentially a notion of authentic execution that you can use in these contexts. And authentic execution means that you can essentially explain all outputs of one of these embedded control systems based on the inputs you give to that system and the software code of the system. Modulo, of course, bugs in the hardware, Modulo, of course, bugs in the software, but these are orthogonal lines of research, orthogonal lines of work in testing, in system verification to give you very strong guarantees that you've actually implemented the right thing and that there are no easily abusable channels, mechanisms in these components. That's what you have to rule out. So we're actually here to almost finish this talk. I still have a video to show and I still want to summarize this. So I think the key thing for security is to focus on understanding systems, understanding systems, understanding attackers, understanding security requirements. Without this, you will never be able to design lasting, reliable security solutions for anything. And it is my quite strong belief that to do this, you need to rely on open source components, be it hardware, be it software. I believe that there is no other way to actually come up with a solution that is adaptable, that can be well understood and that can actually give you some lasting notion of security for these systems. The next thing is trusted computing is just one little building block that gives you certain features like attestation, like key management, for example, that you can stick in into specific systems, but you have to be willing to adapt. So if it essentially turns out at some point that certain trusted computing architectures are not reliable anymore, or that you need stronger guarantees than your choice of architectures provides, you either want to adapt the architecture or you want to adapt your system and your attacker model and go for a new design. Now, Sankos is made exactly for this. Sankos is made for understanding. Sankos is a, to a large extent, a research prototype that we built to understand how to develop software, how to develop this kind of software, how to use security primitives as we know them from trusted computing and how to analyze this whole system to understand the implications, to understand the weaknesses, to understand how to adapt these systems and change them so that they can work as reliable security solutions in future scenarios. So Sankos is particularly neat in that sense, it's open source, it builds on an open source hardware, it extends this open source hardware, it's a very small trusted computing base only in hardware that allows you to do these key derivation steps that allows you to do at the station steps, attest software, attest multiple individual components, isolate multiple individual components and make them interact in a secure way, even in a distributed context where you have a huge network of this kind of little microcontrollers that somehow must interact to achieve something, to achieve some safety critical functionality, to achieve some IoT sensing functionality, something like that. Many applications to this kind of stuff. But of course, talking about this as a research prototype, there's a lot of ongoing and open stuff to look into. So we've worked a lot in the few parts that are green up there and I think we understand them quite well. Also one of them is IoT trust assessments. So can you use a individual trusted software module in the context of an untrusted, let's say, quanticky-like operating system kernel and use this one module to do some inspection of the running system? Can you, for example, make sure that you get reliable information that no one can mess with about the software that is currently running, about the maybe even integrity of that software? Has it been modified? Has an attack have been tampering with a list of processes? Things like that. That's what you can do here. Of course, that's kind of invasive already because that goes into the direction of treacherous computing. Another thing we've been looking into is secure IO. So this is what I've been talking about before, this notion of extending a trusted path from input devices over device drivers over application modules that do some data processing, again to device drivers and output modules. I think we have a strong, even formal notion about how this can work, what security guarantees we get out of this. The third thing is programming models for kind of developing these applications and deploying them. So we came up with a little extension of C that is like a reactive style language that you can use to write application modules that can then even be deployed on multiple nodes and interact securely and the whole key negotiation, the whole configuration of that network is pretty much automatic. It's also software that is in the public repositories. But of course, there's a lot of stuff we don't understand very well. One is of course, talking about a research prototype, there are maturity issues. So I think at the moment, we are still not really sure about what really the minimal hardware extensions are that you need to implement these kind of guarantees. Is that really a crypto core? Is that really a memory management unit? Or would you maybe also need more like a hardware supported scheduling mechanisms? Or maybe would you need less, and to say, doing your cryptography in software is maybe even much better because then you can even change it. You can adapt to faults, to vulnerabilities that are found in these algorithms. There are a lot of issues then. Of course, we also have issues with tool maturity. So this whole thing builds on LLVM which has for our architecture, a couple of weaknesses and the kind of compiler architecture we've been building around this has its own problems and needs to be enhanced. There's a master student working on this at the moment. There's a lot of work to be done to actually make this a product. That's what it is not, what it not is at the moment. Then we also have to understand the text against these architectures better. So even assuming that isolation gives you very little chance for software attacks like return oriented programming or something like that, we still need to understand side channels in this context. What can you learn, for example, by observing taming behavior of the system, by observing memory access patterns, by observing interrupt behavior? There are many options where an attacker could potentially, especially in the context of an embedded device of something that you might have on your premise, that you might have unlimited access to, that you can screw open and disassemble and inspect, that you can interact with by sending signals to, that you can interact with by controlling timing aspects and so on. There are many issues that an attacker could potentially abuse. And another thing is what we are working on right now is in the scenario of these automotive components or power grid components or medical devices, for example, we really need real-time guarantees. And understanding real-time is not easy, especially if you do cryptographic operations on top of that, because those take and not fixed amount of time. So you normally want to do some form of worst case, execution time analysis on your software to know that it's done within, let's say, one millisecond or something like that. But if you do cryptographic operations, if you have a cryptographic core in your component that needs to be locked to execute an operation, you have to wait for that, then it comes back, all these kind of interactions, they are very difficult to manage for this kind of systems. And of course, I've mentioned it before, you want to have very strong formal guarantees that this software, that this hardware cannot be tampered with. So you want some form of formalization or formal verification over these systems that actually make sure that if you deploy a piece of software and it passes through several steps, it has no bugs, it has no memory safety vulnerabilities like the hard read thing that you could easily app use if it's ever deployed in a protected module. And that's an open line of research, that's an autogonal line of research that I'm pretty much, that I'm very interested in, but it's not covered at the moment to an extent where we could say we understand this, we can deploy this kind of software. I think that's the end of the technical part. I still have a video for you, I really want to show you a video. So there's the setup, there's no audio channel, so I'll just talk a little bit over it.  On the left side, on the right side, there are these things there. It also has two dashboards, normally you don't have two dashboards in a car, in this case we have two dashboards because one is showing you, the right side is showing you how a unprotected car would behave when it is under attack and the left side shows you how our protected setup would behave. So you have central components that could, for example, simulate an ABS system, you have these little ECUs on the outside that could, for example, be brake controllers or controllers that measure rotation speed. You have one keyboard, that's the left keyboard, which I'm pressing right now, which is used to simulate driver interactions, so that could be your brake pedal, your steering wheel, you can increase traction on one side, you can increase speed, and that is all displayed on both dashboards and the individual microcontrollers will receive these messages and do authentication, find out that they're legitimate and then react or not react. You can use the red keypad, now there's an attack going on, you can use the red keypad to actually simulate the attack. So an attacker will inject messages, will execute software on the central component and this will be detected by the protected ECUs that show that, okay, there's something going on, there's a bad message being received that cannot be authenticated and this results in this message being rejected and the controller stays with its previous value. The interesting thing is you see there's a needle dropping on the secure display on the left side. So there are implications of this attack. If an attacker controls software on a central computing node, of course, he will probably do something. He will, let's say, inhibit the break system from working properly, he will inhibit messages from being passed from one component to the display or something like that, but he does so on only one ECU. He probably will not be able to change the safety critical behavior of the entire network and that's an important guarantee we get here. So by controlling this unprotected software, you lose availability guarantees of your network but you probably would be able to steer your car in a safe manner off the road without just crashing against the next tree. That's it, I think I'm done. Thank you very much for listening to my rumblings and I'm happy to answer your questions. Can you put your hands up? From your future work slides, I took away that you do not have preemption right now. So on your architecture, would be something like a microkernel be realizable where you have forceful preemption of the untrusted parts? Well, we have some ideas for implementing preemption. So I think I would put it on our future work but some microkernel like architecture is certainly underscore for managing software there, yes. And then the concept of separating the system into trusted and untrusted portions, it's something that's been done in the past for confidentiality and integrity, that's pretty well researched. But you have the availability as the most important thing on the table, right? At least in these kind of systems, yes. Yeah, and isn't that an issue when you have the untrusted software which could, by some malform packet, for example, made stop and then you have no availability guarantees, how do you think you're gonna solve that? For this kind of thing, so you lose availability guarantees if your untrusted software is actually required to implement them, right? So that's what I meant before. You can isolate the application code for security properties but not for availability. You might lose availability there because that depends on untrusted code.   But of course, preemption is something you need for that which is currently not available. Let's thank our speaker again.


Hey everyone, today we're talking about the 4K Gamer Pro by Photofast. It is actually a sequel to the original 4K Gamer. This is a tool intended to make Nintendo Switch and other platforms upscale to 4K in a much cleaner fashion than the individual platform can do, which in the case of Switch it can do it, or better than a TV can do, because TVs do have their own upscaling technology, sometimes works really well with movies and television, sometimes doesn't usually work that well with games, in fact games often look extremely blurry no matter the setting. Of course we're talking about if it's 1080p or less being upscaled to 4K, not obviously anything that already upscales natively on the platform, or is native 4K like we see with Playstation 5 and Xbox Series X or Xbox One X or Playstation 4 Pro, you know what we're talking about here.  The 4K Gamer Pro does not attempt to do any sort of anti-aliasing. That is sort of a negative, however, while the M Classic does do some sort of pseudo anti-aliasing to your game, which can make it look a bit smoother, unfortunately the M Classic does not support full color RGB. So because of that, certain games, not many, but certain games end up looking not so hot because the colors are wrong. Now how does this technology work in terms of the M Classic and the 4K? The 4K Gamer Pro, well it doesn't have the anti-aliasing and has three different settings, so you can really lighten or intensify the effect as much as you like, which is something the M Classic doesn't offer. It's basically you plug in the M Classic you set and forget, whereas the 4K Gamer Pro you can hit a button on it four times, four times will turn it off, three times are the three different settings. It's like 20%, 50%, and 100%, and it just kind of increases the effect. Now what these both of them do, the M Classic and the 4K Gamer Pro, what they attempt to do is instead of doing what most TVs do, where they take the individual pixel, blow up that pixel to 4K, but then try to separate that pixel into like four or five different sections, they try to blur the lines a bit more between those color differences by making guesses at where the colors would go if it was a native 4K image, and in doing so often create a much sharper looking image. And one thing you'll notice with the 4K Gamer Pro as you're noticing in the 4K so far is that it does increase the sharpness of the game. Now you can increase the sharpness with your television, but it won't have the correct color pixelation, so while the sharpness might make the image look a little better, it's not going to actually get rid of the blurriness. And I tested this across a number of games. We're primarily focused on Breath of the Wild. We also played a little bit of Kirby and the Forgotten Land, and then we actually checked out Apex Legends on Switch, and look, you might not like Apex Legends. I really don't care. The game is super blurry on TV. It's not even that great on handheld, but in TV mode, Apex Legends is a hot mess in terms of the blurriness. I don't know how you can even see enemies on a big screen unless you have this, and I think that's the one instance where I saw the 4K Gamer Pro really stand out was, man, it's like a night and day difference between blurry and actually being able to see characters, which in a multiplayer game like this, being able to see the characters is a pretty big deal. So yeah, I actually am quite impressed. It almost felt like I was playing on a new Switch. Like this was an upgraded Switch I'm magically playing on. This is that Switch Pro we've been asking for.  Again, that's why you can obviously change the settings to lessen the sharpness of the image, but I got to say the 4K Gamer Pro by PhotoFast actually did a really good job. I mean, you're seeing it right now, and again, this footage really does better justice on a big screen TV rather than here. I did do direct record 4K 60 through the Aver Media 4K Gamer Pro, which just is a direct capture card for 4K. It records HDR as well. If HDR was supported, we know Switch doesn't support HDR, so that doesn't matter. But basically, I just went from the high setting to off, the high setting to off. I didn't want to mess with the between settings. I did actually mess with them a little bit, but I mean, I didn't want to try to present them because to be honest, I'm actually more curious what this thing does at full blast if you want to tone down the sharpness. That's up to you individually. Now, you can't actually buy these yet. They're not available to like, oh, let me go on Amazon and buy one and have it shipped to me. They do have a Kickstarter right now. They are shipping them later this fall. And one thing I'm really happy to announce is that we are giving away two of these during Prime Gaming Fest. And what's notable about that is that these aren't cheap. So the M Classic runs about $100, but again, doesn't have full RGB support. The 4K Gamer Pro runs about $150 to $170. So it is more expensive, but you also get a lot more settings with it. You get the ability to mess with things. You do lose anti-aliasing, which will annoy some people. What's interesting, though, is you can actually pair this with an M Classic. I'm not saying that you should because now you're spending pretty much the entire cost of a brand new Switch. But you can actually pair it with an M Classic. So you could take advantage of the different sharpness settings here before it hits the M Classic, which can add the anti-aliasing. And you can actually get the best of both worlds. I don't have an M Classic on hand to show you how that works. I've seen some people mess around with this on YouTube a little bit, but again, to varying degrees of success, I don't know which order, if they went 4K Gamer Pro to M Classic or M Classic to 4K Gamer Pro. They are individually powered. So I don't know, I find this really nice. I also like that with this one, you don't have to unplug it if you don't like the setting. Let's say in a particular game, let's say it's Mario Kart 8 or something, you don't like the sharpness being added even at 20%. That's what's cool about this is you just click the button and turn it off. You don't have to disconnect it. The M Classic is one where you basically have to unplug it and plug in your normal stuff. This one you don't. So that is one benefit as well as you could just let it bypass or use the settings on it. Quick change per game. I do enjoy that. It would be cool if there was a controller for it, so I don't have to actually walk up to my dock and click the button. But hey, you know what, at least it's an option. So that's really what you're paying for is the extra options with this one over the M Classic. And it's just nice to have competition out there. And I really, really enjoy this add-on. I didn't think it was going to make a big difference, but we have like a 75 or 80 inch TV or 85. I don't even know. That giant TV you see on our podcast set. And that's the best TV in the house and has all of the mystical 4K HDR goodness. And I was shocked because like, I basically can't play my Switch on that TV.   And it's really, I can't really show it to you guys. It doesn't really, hey, it's hard to convey through, you know, an off-screen look. But damn, this make a big difference. So I don't know. Enjoy whatever footage I have left. And I'll catch you guys in my next video.


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