s most cogent reason for continuance they must desire life so long as it is naturally possible for them to continue living wherefore in no way may a thou doubt but that things naturally aim at continuance of existence and shun destruction I confess, said I that what I lately thought uncertain I now perceive to be undoubtedly clear and that which seeks to subsist and continue desires to be one for if its oneness be gone its very existence cannot continue true, said I all things then desire to be one I agree but we have proved that one is the very same thing as good we have all things then seek the good indeed you may express the fact that everything good is that which all desire nothing could be more truly thought out either there is no single end to which all things are relative or else the end to which all things universally hastened must be the highest good of all then she exceedingly do I rejoice dear pupil thine eye is now fixed on the very central mark of truth moreover, herein is revealed that of which thou didst profess thy self-ignorant what is that, said I the end and the aim of the whole universe surely it is that which is desired of all and since we have concluded the good to be such we ought to acknowledge the end and aim of the whole universe to be the good song 11 Reminiscence who truth pursues who from false ways his heedful steps would keep by inward light must search within in meditation deep all outward bent he must repress his soul's true treasure to possess then all that errors misobscured shall shine more clear than light this fleshly frame's oblivious weight hath quench not reason quite the germs of truth still lie within once we by learning all may win else how could ye the answer do untaught to questions give were it not that deep within the soul to secret sparks do live if Plato's teaching eras not we learn but that we have forgot and book 3 Reminiscence song 11 section 27 all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org The Consolation of Philosophy by Ana Cius Manlius Severinus Boethius translated by H.R. James book 3 True Happiness and False section 12 and song 12 Orpheus and Eurydice then said I with all my heart I agree with Plato indeed this is now the second time that these things have been brought back to my mind first I lost them through the clogging contact of the body then after through the stress of heavy grief then she continued if thou wilt reflect upon thy former admissions it will not be long before thou dost also recollect that of which first while thou didst confess thyself ignorant what is that? said I the principles of the world's government said she yes I remember my confession and although I now anticipate what thou intendest I have a desire to hear the argument plainly set forth a while ago thou deemst it beyond all doubt that God doth govern the world I do not think it doubtful now nor shall I ever and by what reasons I am brought to this assurance I will briefly set forth this world could never have taken shape as a single system out of parts so diverse and opposite were it not that there is one who joins together these so diverse things and when it had once come together the very diversity of natures would have severed it and torn it asunder in universal discord were there not one who keeps together what he has joined nor would the order of nature proceed so regularly nor could its course exhibit motions so fixed in respective position time range efficacy and character unless there were one who himself abiding disposed these various facistitudes of exchange this power whatsoever it be whereby they remain as they were created and are kept in motion I called by the name which all recognize God then said she seeing that such as thy belief it will cost me little trouble I think to enable thee to win happiness and return in safety to thy own country but let us give our attention to the task that we have set for ourselves have we not counted independence in the category of happiness and agreed that God is absolute happiness truly we have then he will need no external assistance for the ruling of the world otherwise if he stands in need of ought he will not possess complete independence that is necessarily so said I then by his own power alone all things it cannot be denied now God was proved to be absolute good yes I remember then he disposes all things by the agency of good if it be true that he rules all things by his own power whom we have agreed to be good and he is as it were the rudder and helm by which the world's mechanism is kept steady in an order heartily do I agree and indeed I anticipated what thou wouldst say though it may be in feeble surmise only I well believe it said she for as I think thou now bring us to the search I is quicker in discerning truth but what I shall say next is no less plain and easy to see what is it said I why said she since God is rightly believed to govern all things with the rudder of goodness and since all things do likewise as I have taught haste towards good by the very aim of nature can it be doubted that his governance is willingly accepted and that all submit themselves to the sway of the disposer as conformed and a tempered to his rule necessarily so said I no rule would seem happy if it were a yoke opposed on reluctant wills and not the safekeeping of obedient subjects there is nothing then which while it follows nature endeavors to resist good no nothing but if anything should will it have the least success against him whom we rightly agreed to be the supreme lord of happiness it would be utterly impotent there is nothing then which has either the will or the power to oppose this supreme good no I think not so then said she it is the supreme good which rules in strength and graciously disposes all things then said I how delighted am I at thy reasonings and the conclusion to which thou brought them but most of all at these very words which thou usest I am now at last ashamed of the folly that so sorely vexed me thou hast heard the story of the giants assailing heaven but a beneficent strength disposed of them also as they deserved but shall we submit our arguments to the shock of mutual collision it may be from the impact some bearer spark of truth may be struck out if it be thy good pleasure said I no one can doubt that God is all-powerful no one at all can question it who thinks consistently now there is nothing which one who is all-powerful cannot do nothing but can God do evil then nay then evil is nothing said she since he to whom nothing is impossible is unable to do evil art thou mocking me said I weaving a labyrinth of tangled arguments now seeming to begin where thou didst end and now to end where thou didst begin or dost thou build up some wondrous circle of divine simplicity for truly a little before thou didst begin with happiness and say it was the supreme good and didst declare it to be seated in the supreme Godhead God himself too thou didst affirm to be supreme good and all-complete happiness and from this thou didst go on to add as by the way the proof that no one would be happy unless he were likewise God again thou didst say that the very form of good was both of God and of happiness and didst teach that the absolute one was the absolute good which was sought by universal nature that dis-maintain also that God rules the universe by the governance of goodness that all things obey him willingly and that evil has no existence in nature and all this thou didst unfold without the help of assumptions from without but by inherent and proper proofs drawing credence one from the other then answered she far is it from me to mock thee nay, by the blessing of God whom we lately addressed in prayer we have achieved the most important of all objects for such is the form of the divine essence that neither can it pass into things external nor take up anything external into itself but as Parmenides says of it in body like to a sphere on all sides perfectly rounded it rolls the restless orb of the universe keeping itself motionless the while and if I have also employed reasonings not drawn from without but lying within the compass of our subject there is no cause for thee to marvel since thou hast learned on Plato's authority that words ought to be akin to the matter of which they treat long twelve Orpheus and Eurydice blessed he whose feet have stood beside the fountain good blessed he whose will could break earth's chains for wisdom's sake the thration bar to set mourned his dear consort dead to hear the plaintive strain the woods moved in his train and the stream ceased to flow held by so soft a woe the deer without dismay beside the lion lay the hound by songs of dude no more the hare pursued but the pang unassuaged in his own bosom raged the music that could calm all else brought him no balm chiding the powers immortal he came unto hell's portal there breathed all tender things upon his sounding strings each rhapsody high wrought his goddess mother taught all he from grief could borrow and love redoubling sorrow till as the echoes waken all tainerous is shaken whilst he to Ruth persuades the monarch of the shades with dulcet prayer spellbound the triple headed hound at sound so strangely sweet falls crouching at his feet the dread avengers too that guilty minds pursue with ever-hunting fears are all dissolved in tears ixian on his wheel a respite brief doth feel for lo the wheel stand still and while those sad notes trill thirst maddened tantalus listens oblivious of the stream's mockery and his long agony the vulture too doth spare some little while to tear at titius's rent sigh sated and pacified at length the shadowy king his sorrows pitying he hath prevalent cried we give him back his bride to him she shall belong as garden of his song one soul condition yet upon the boon is set let him not turn his eyes to view his hard one prize till they securely pass the gates of hell alas what law can lovers move a higher law is love for orpheus woe is me on his euridice day's threshold all but one looked lost and was undone ye who the light pursue the story is for you who seek to find a way unto the clearer day if on the darkness passed one backward look ye cast your weak and wandering eyes have lost the matchless prize end book three true happiness false section twelve and song twelve orpheus and euridice this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information auto volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recorded by Corrie Samuel the consolation of philosophy by Ancius Manlius Severinas Boethius translated by H.R. James book four good and ill fortune section one and song one the soul's flight softly and sweetly philosophy sang these verses to the end without losing ought of the dignity of her expression or the seriousness of her tones then for as much as I was yet unable to forget my deeply seated sorrow just as she was about to say something further I broke in and cried O thou guide into the way of true light all that thy voice hath uttered from the beginning even unto now has manifestly seemed to me at once divine contemplated in itself and by the force of thy arguments placed beyond the possibility of overthrow moreover these truths have not been altogether unfamiliar to me here too for though because of indignation at my wrongs they have for a time been forgotten but lo herein is the very chiefest cause of my grief that while there exists a good ruler of the universe it is possible that evil should be at all still more that it should go unpunished surely thou must see how deservedly this of itself provokes astonishment but a yet greater marvel follows while wickedness reigns and flourishes virtue not only lacks its reward but is even thrust down and trampled under the feet of the wicked and suffers punishment in the place of crime that this should happen under the rule of a god who knows all things and can do all things but wills only the good cannot be sufficiently wonder that sufficiently lamented then said she it would indeed be infinitely astounding and of all monstrous things most horrible if as thou esteemest in the well-ordered home of so greater householder the base vessels should be held in honour the precious left to neglect but it is not so for if we hold unshaken those conclusions which we lately reached thou shall learn that by the will of him of whose realm we are speaking the good are always strong the bad always weak and impotent that vices never go unpunished nor virtues unrewarded that good fortune ever befalls the good and ill fortune the bad and much more of the sort which shall hush thy murmurings and establish thee in the strong assurance of conviction and since by my late instructions thou hast seen the form of happiness hast learnt too the seat where it is to be found all due preliminaries being discharged I will now show thee the road which will lead thee home wings also will I fasten to thy mind wherewith thou mayest saw a loft that so all disturbing doubts removed and safe to thy country under my guidance in the path I will show thee and by the means which I furnish song one the soul's flight wings are mine above the pole far aloft I saw clothed with these my nimble soul scorns earth's hated shore cleaves the skies upon the wind sees the clouds left far behind soon the glowing point she nears where the heavens rotate follows through the starry spheres febuses course or straight takes for comrade mid the stars satin cold or glittering Mars thus each circling orb explores through night's stole that peers then when all are numbered soars far beyond the spheres mounting heavens supremist height to the very fount of light there the sovereign of the world his calm sway maintains as the globe is onward world guides the chariot reigns and in splendour glittering reigns the universal king hither if thy wondering feet find at last away here thy long-lost home thou'lt greet dear lost land thou'lt say though from thee I've wandered wide hence I came here will abide yet if ever thou art feigned visitant to be of earth's gloomy night again surely thou wilt see tyrants whom the nations fear dwell in hapless exile here end of book four good and ill fortune section one and song one the soul's flight this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org the consolation of philosophy by Boethdeus by H.R. James book four good and ill fortune section two and song two the bondage of passion then said I fairly wonderous great are thy promises yet I do not doubt but thou canst make them good only keep me not in suspense after raising such hopes learn then first said she how that power ever waits upon the good while the bad are left holy destitute of strength the one proves the other for since good and evil are concharies if it is made plain that good is power the feebleness of evil is clearly seen and conversely if the frail nature of evil is made manifest the strength of good is thereby known however to win ample credence for my conclusion I will pursue both paths and draw confirmation for my statements first in one way and then in the other the carrying out of any human action depends upon two things to it will and power if either be wanting nothing can be accomplished for if the will be lacking no attempt is made to do what is not willed whereas if there be no power the will is all in vain and so if thusiest any man wishing to attain some end yet utterly failing to attain it thou canst not doubt that he lacked the power of getting what he wished for why certainly not there is no denying it canst thou then doubt that he whom thou seest to have accomplished what he willed had also the power of accomplishing it of course not then in respect of what he can accomplish a man is to be reckoned strong in respect of what he cannot accomplish weak granted said I then does thou remember that by our former reasonings it was concluded that the whole aim of man's will though the means of pursuit vary is set intently upon happiness I do remember that this too was proved does thou also call to mind how happiness is absolutely good and therefore that when happiness is sought it is good which is in all cases the object of desire nay I do not so much call to mind what is fixed in my memory then all men good and bad alike with one indistinguishable purpose strive to reach good yes that follows but it is certain that by the attainment of good men become good it is then do the good attain their object it seems so but if the bad were to attain the good which is their object they could not be bad no then both seek good but while the one sort attains it the other attain it not is there any doubt that the good are indeed with power while they who are bad are weak if any doubt it he is incapable of reflecting on the nature of things or the consequences involved in reasoning again supposing that there are two things in which the same function is prescribed in the course of nature and one of these successfully accomplishes the function by natural action the other is altogether incapable of that natural action instead of which in a way other than is agreeable to its nature it I will not say fulfills its function but feigns to fulfill it which of these two would in my view be the stronger I guess thy meaning but I pray thee let me hear it more at large walking is man's natural emotion is it not certainly thou dost not doubt I suppose that it is natural for the feet to discharge this function no surely I do not now if one man who is able to use his feet walks and another to whom the natural use of his feet is wanting tries to walk on his hands which of the two would still rightly esteem the stronger go on said I no one can question but that he who has the natural capacity has more strength than he who has it not now the supreme good is set up as the end alike for the bad and for the good but the good seek it through the natural action of the virtues whereas the bad try to attain the same good through all manner of concupiscence which is not the natural way of attaining good or does thou think otherwise nay rather one further consequence is clear to me for from my admission it must needs followed that the good have power and the bad are impotent thou anticipatist rightly and that as physicians reckon is a sign that nature is set working and thou thrust off the disease but since I see thee so ready at understanding I will heap proof on proof look how manifest is the extremity of vicious man's weakness they cannot even reach the goal to which the aim of nature leads and almost constrains them what if they were left without this mighty this well-nigh irresistible help of nature's guidance consider also how momentous is the powerlessness which incapacitates the wicked not light or trivial are the prizes which they contend for but which they cannot win or hold nay their failure concerns the very sum and crown of things poor wretches they fail to compass even that for which they toil day and night herein also the strength of the good conspicuously appears for just as thou wouldst judge him to be the strongest walker whose legs could carry him to a point beyond which no further advance was possible so must thou needs account him stronger in power who so attains the end of his desire that nothing further to be desired lies beyond once follows the obvious conclusion that they who are wicked are seen likewise to be holy destitute of strength for why do they forsake virtue and follow vice is it from ignorance of what is good well what is more weak and feeble than the blindness of ignorance do they know what they ought to follow but lust drives them aside out of the way if it be so they are still frail by reason of their incontinence for they cannot fight against vice or do they knowingly and willfully forsake the good and turn aside to vice why at this rate they not only cease to have power but cease to be at all for they who forsake the common end of all things that are they likewise cease to be at all now to some it may appear strange that we should assert that the bad who form the greater part of mankind do not exist but the fact is so I do not indeed deny that they who are bad are bad but that they are in an unqualified and absolute sense I deny just as we can call a corpse a dead man but cannot call him simply a man so I would allow the vicious to be bad but that they are in an absolute sense I cannot allow that only is which maintains its place and keeps its nature for whatever falls away from this forsakes the existence which is essential to its nature but that will say the bad have an ability nor do I wish to deny it only this ability of theirs comes not from strength but from impotence this ability is to do evil which would have had no efficacy at all if they could have continued in the performance of good so this ability of theirs proves them still more plainly to have no power for if, as we concluded just now evil is nothing it is clear that the wicked can affect nothing since they are only able to do evil it is evident and that thou mayest understand what is the precise force of this power we determined, did we not a while back that nothing has more power than supreme good we did, said I but that same highest good cannot do evil certainly not is there anyone then who thinks that men are able to do all things none but a mad man yet they are able to do evil I would they could not since then he who can do only good is omnipotent while they who can do evil are not omnipotent it is manifest that they who can do evil have less power there is this also we have shown that all power is to be reckoned among things desirable and that all desirable things are referred to good as to a kind of consummation of their nature but the ability to commit crime cannot be referred to the good therefore it is not a thing to be desired and yet all power is desirable it is clear then that ability to do evil is not power from all which considerations appear with the power of the good and the indubitable weakness of the bad it is clear that Plato's judgment was true the wise alone are able to do what they would while the wicked follow their own hearts lust but cannot accomplish what they would for they go on in their willfulness fancying they will attain what they wish for and delight but they are very far from its attainment since shameful deeds lead not to happiness song 2 the bondage of passion when high enthroned the monarch sits resplendent in his pride of purple robes while flashing steel guards him on every side when baleful terrors on his brow with frowning menace lower and passion shakes his laboring breast how dreadful seems his power of his state from such a one thou tear thou will see the load of secret bonds this lord of earth doth wear lusts poison rankles over his mind rage sweeps and tempest rude sorrow his spirit vexes sore and empty hopes delude then thou wilt confess one hapless wretch who many lords oppress does never what he would but lives enthralled him's helplessness end of book 4 good fortune and ill section 2 and song 2 the bondage of passion this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Susie G the consolation of philosophy by Anikis Manila Severina Spelivius translated by H.R. James book 4 section 3 and song 3 Kirkys Cup thou seest then in what foulness unrighteous deeds are sunk with what splendor righteousness shines whereby it is manifest that goodness never lacks its reward nor crime its punishment for, verily in all manner of transactions that for the sake of which the particular action is done may justly be accounted the reward of that action even as the wreath for the sake of which the race is won is the reward offered for running now we have shown happiness to be that very good for the sake of which all things are done absolute good then is offered as the common prize as it were of all human actions but, truly this is a reward from which it is impossible to separate the good man for one who is without good cannot properly be called good at all wherefore righteous dealing never misses its target rage the wicked then never so violently the crown shall not fall from the head of the wise nor wither verily other men's unrighteousness cannot pluck from righteous souls their proper glory were the reward in which the soul of the righteous delighteth receive from without then might it be taken away by him who gave it or some other but since it is conferred by his own righteousness then only will he lose his prize when he is ceased to be righteous lastly since every prize is desired because it is believed to be good who can account him who possesses good to be without reward and what a prize the fairest and grandest of all for remember the corollary which I chiefly insisted on a little while back and reason thus since absolute good is happiness it is clear that all the good must be happy for the very reason that they are good but it was agreed those who are happy are gods so then the prize of the good is one which no time may impair no man's power lessen no man's unrighteousness tarnish his very godship and this being so the wise men cannot doubt that punishment is inseparable from the bad for since good and bad and likewise reward and punishment on the contrary it necessarily follows that corresponding to all that we see accrue as reward of the good there is some penalty attached as punishment of evil as then righteousness itself is the reward of the righteous so wickedness itself is the punishment of the unrighteous now no one who is visited with punishment doubts that he is visited with evil accordingly if they were but willing to weigh their own case could they think themselves free from punishment whom wickedness worst of all evils has not only touched but deeply tainted see also from the opposite standpoint the standpoint of the good what a penalty attends upon the wicked thou didst learn a little since that whatever is sin and that unity itself is good accordingly by this way of reckoning whatever falls away from goodness ceases to be once it comes to pass that the bad cease to be what they were while only the outward aspect is still left to show they have been men wherefore by their perversion to badness they have lost their true human nature further since righteousness alone can raise men above the level of humanity it must needs be that unrighteousness degrades below man's level those whom it has cast out of man's estate it results then that thou canst not consider him human whom thou see is transformed by vice the violent dispoiler of other men's goods inflamed with covetness a bold and restless spirit ever wrangling in law courts is like some yelping cur the secret schemer taking pleasure and fraud and stealth is own brother to the fox the passionate man frenzied with rage we might believe to be animated with the soul of a lion the coward and runaway afraid where no fear is taken to the timid deer he who is sunk in ignorance and stupidity lives like a dull ass he who is light and inconstant never holding long to one thing is for all the world like a bird he who wallows in foul and unclean lusts is sunk in the pleasures of a filthy hog so it comes to pass that he who by forsaking righteousness ceases to be a man cannot pass into a god-like condition but actually turns into a brute beast song three curkeys cup the Ithacan discreet and all his storm-tossed fleet far over the ocean wave the winds of heaven drave drave to the mystic isle where dwelleth in her guile that fair and faithless one the daughter of the son there for the stranger crew with cunning spells she knew to mix the enchanted cup for whoso drinks it up must suffer hideous change to monstrous shapes and strange one like a boar appears this his huge form uprears mighty in bulk and limb an afric lion grim with claw and fang confessed a wolf this he was more distressed when he would weep doth howl and strangely tame these prowl the indian tiger's mates and though in such source straits the pity of the god who bears the mystic wad had power the chieftain brave from her fell arts to save his comrades unrestrained the fatal goblet drained all now with low bent head like swine on acorn's bed man's speech and form were left no human feature left but steadfast still the mind unaltered unresigned the monstrous change bewailed how little then availed the potencies of ill these herbs this baneful skill may change each outward part but cannot touch the heart in its true home deep-set man's spirit liveth yet those poisons are more fell more potent to expel man from his highest state with subtlety penetrate and leave the body whole but deep infect the soul and of book four section three and song three kirky's cup this is a libra fox recording all libra fox recordings are in the public domain for more information auto-volunteer please visit librafox.org recording by kori samuel the consolation of philosophy by anesius manlius severinas bowethius translated by h. r. james book four good and ill fortune section four and song four the unreasonableness of hatred then said I this is very true I see that the vicious though they keep the outward form of man are rightly said to be changed into beasts in respect of their spiritual nature but inasmuch as their cruel and polluted minds vent their rage in the destruction of the good I would this license were not permitted to them nor is it said she I shall be shown in the fitting place yet if that license which they believe is to be permitted to them were taken away the punishment of the wicked would be in great part remitted for verily incredible as it may seem to some it needs must be that the bad are more unfortunate when they have accomplished their desires than if they are unable to get them fulfilled if it is wretched to will evil to have been able to accomplish evil is more wretched for without the power the wretched will would fail of effect accordingly those whom thou seest to will to be able to accomplish and to accomplish crime must needs be the victims of a threefold wretchedness since each one of these states has its own measure of wretchedness yes said I yet I earnestly wish they might speedily be quit as misfortune by losing the ability to accomplish crime they will lose it said she sooner than perchance they are wuscious or they themselves think likely since verily within the narrow bounds of our brief life there is nothing so late in coming that any one least of all an immortal spirit should deem it long to wait for their great expectations the lofty fabric of their crimes is often overthrown by a sudden and unlooked for ending and this but sets a limit to their misery for if wickedness makes men wretched he is necessarily more wretched who is wicked for a longer time and were it not that death at all events puts an end to the evil doings of the wicked I should account them wretched to the last degree indeed if we have formed true conclusions about the ill fortune of wickedness that wretchedness is plainly infinite which is doomed to be eternal then said I a wonderful inference and difficult to grant but I see that it agrees entirely with our previous conclusions thou art right said she but if anyone finds it hard to admit the conclusion he ought in fairness to prove some falsity in their premises or to show that the combination of propositions does not adequately enforce the necessity of the conclusion otherwise if the premises be granted nothing whatever can be said against the inference of the conclusion and here is another statement which seems not less wonderful but on the premises assumed is equally necessary what is that the wicked are happier in undergoing punishment than if no penalty of justice chasing them and I am not now meaning what might occur to anyone that bad character is amended by retribution and is brought into the right path by the terror of punishment or that it serves as an example to warn others to avoid transgression but I believe that in another way the wicked are more unfortunate and punished even though no account be taken of amendment and no regard be paid to example why what other way is there beside these said I then said she have we not agreed that the good are happy and the evil wretched yes said I now if to one in affliction there be given along with his misery the good thing is he not happier than one whose misery is misery pure and simple without her mixture of any good it would seem so but if to one thus wretched one destitute of all good some further evil be added besides those which make him wretched is he not to be judged far more unhappy than he whose ill fortune is alleviated by some share of good it could scarcely be otherwise surely then the wicked when they are punished have a good thing added to them to wit the punishment which by the law of justice is good and likewise when they escape punishment a new evil attaches to them in that very freedom from punishment which thou hast rightly acknowledged to be an evil in the case of the unrighteous they cannot deny it then the wicked are far more unhappy when indulged with an unjust freedom from punishment than when punished by a just retribution now it is manifest that it is just for the wicked to be punished and for them to escape unpunished is unjust why who would venture to deny it this too no one can possibly deny all which is just is good and conversely all which is unjust is bad then I answered these inferences do indeed follow from what we lately concluded but tell me said I thus thou take no account of the punishment of the soul after the death of the body nay truly said she greater these penalties some of them inflicted I imagine the purity of retribution others in the mercy of purification but it is not my present purpose to speak of these so far my aim has been to make thee recognize that the power of the bad which shocked thee so exceedingly is no power to make thee see that those of whose freedom from punishment thou didst complain and never without the proper penalties of their unrighteousness to teach thee that the license which thou praised might soon come to an end is not long enduring that it would be more unhappy if it lasted longer most unhappy of all if it lasted forever thereafter that the unrighteous are more wretched if unjustly let go without punishment than if punished by just retribution from which point of view it follows that the wicked are afflicted with more severe penalties just when they are supposed to escape punishment then said I while I follow thy reasonings I am deeply impressed with their truth but if I turn to the common convictions of men I find few who will even listen to such arguments let alone admit them to be credible true said she they cannot lift eyes accustomed to darkness to the light of clear truth and alike those birds whose vision night illumines and day blinds for while they regard not the order of the universe but their own dispositions of mind they think the license to commit crime and the escape from punishment to be fortunate but mark the ordinance of eternal law has thou fashioned thy soul to the likeness of the better thou hast no need of a judge to award the prize by their own act has thou raised thyself in a scale of excellence has thou perverted thy affections to baser things look not for punishment from one without thee thine own act hath degraded thee and thrust thee down even so if alternately thou turn thy gaze upon the vile earth and upon the heavens though all without thee stand still by the mere laws of sight thou seamest now sunk in the mire now soaring among the stars but the common herd regards not these things what then shall we go over to those whom we have shown to be like brute beasts why suppose now one who had quite lost his sight should likewise forget that he had ever possessed the faculty of vision and should imagine that nothing was wanting in him to human perfection should we deem those who saw as well as ever blind why there will not even a sense to this either that they who do wrong are more wretched than those who suffer wrong though the proof of this rests on grounds of reason no less strong let me hear these same reasons said I would thou deny that every wicked man deserves punishment I would not certainly and that those who are wicked are unhappy is clear in manifold ways yes I replied thou dost not doubt then that those who deserve punishment are wretched agreed said I so then if thou werest sitting in judgment on whom would thou decree the inflection of punishment on him who had done the wrong or on him who had suffered it without doubt I would compensate the sufferer at the cost of the doer of the wrong then the injurer would seem more wretched than the injured yes it follows and so for this and other reasons resting on the same ground in as much as baseness of its own nature makes men wretched it is plain that a wrong involves the misery of the doer not of the sufferer and yet so she the practice of the law courts is just the opposite advocates try to arouse the commiseration of the judges for those who have endured some grievous and cruel wrong whereas pity is rather due to the criminal who ought to be brought to the judgment seat by his accusers in a spirit not of anger but of compassion and kindness as a sick man to the physician to have the ulcer of his fault cut away by punishment whereby the business of the advocate would either wholly come to a standstill or did men prefer to make it serviceable to mankind would be restricted to the practice of accusation the wicked themselves also if through some chink or cranny they were permitted to behold the virtue they have forsaken and were to see that by the pains of punishment they would rid themselves of the uncleanness of their vices and win in exchange the recompense of righteousness they would no longer think these sufferings pains they would refuse the help of advocates and would commit themselves wholly into the hands of their accusers and judges whence it comes to pass that for the wise no place is left for hatred only the most foolish would hate the good and to hate the bad is unreasonable for if vicious propensity is, as it were a disease of the soul like bodily sickness even as we account the sick in body by no means deserving of hate but rather of pity so and much more should they be pitied whose minds are assailed by wickedness which is more frightful than any sickness song four the unreasonableness of hatred why all this furious strife? oh why, with rash and willful hand provoke death's destined day if death ye seek, lo death is nigh not of their masters will those courses swift delay the wild beasts vent on man their rage yet against their brother's lives men point the murderous steel unjust and cruel wars they wage and haste with flying darts the death to meet or deal no right, nor reason can they show it is but because their lands and laws are not the same wouldst thou give each his due then know the love the good must have the bad thy pity claim end of book four good and ill fortune section four and song four the unreasonableness of hatred this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org the consolation of philosophy by Anisius Manlius Severinus Birtius translated by H.R. James book four good and ill fortune section five and song five wonder and ignorance section five on this I said I see how there is a happiness and misery founded on the actual desserts of the righteous and the wicked nevertheless I wonder in myself whether there is not some good and evil in fortune as the vulgar understand it certainly no sensible man would rather be exiled poor and disgraced than dwell prosperously in his own country powerful wealthy and high in honor indeed the work of wisdom is more clear and manifest in its operation when the happiness of rulers is somehow passed on to the people around them especially considering that the prison the law and the other pains of legal punishment are properly due only to mischievous citizens on whose accounts they were originally instituted accordingly I do exceedingly marvel why all this is completely reversed why the good are harassed with the penalties due to crime and the bad carry off the rewards of virtue and I long to hear from thee what reason may be found for so unjust a state of disorder for assuredly I should wonder less if I could believe that all things are the confused result of chance but now my belief in God's governance doth add amazement to amazement for seeing that he sometimes assigns fair fortune to the good and harsh fortune to the bad and then again deals harshly with the good and grants to the bad their hearts desire how does this differ from chance unless some reason is discovered for it all nay it is not wonderful said she if all should be thought random and confused when the principle of order is not known and though thou knowest not the causes on which this great system depends yet for as much as a good ruler governs the world doubt not for thy part that all is rightly done song five wonder and ignorance who knoweth not how near the pole boots course doth go must marvel by what heavenly law he moves his way in so slow why lately plunges neath the main and swiftly lights his beams again when the full orbit moon grows pale in the mid course of night and suddenly the stars shine forth that languished in her light the astonished nations stand at gaze and beat the air in wild amaze none marvels why upon the shore the storm lashed breakers beat nor why the frostbound glaciers melt at summer's fervent heat for here the cause seems plain and clear only what's dark and hid we fear weak-minded folly magnifies all that is rare and strange and the dull herds are wellmed with awe at unexpected change but wonder leaves and lightened minds when ignorance no longer blinds End of section five This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org The Consolation of Philosophy by Anisius Manlius Severinus Bertius translated by H.R. James Book four Good and Ill Fortune Section six and Song six The Universal Aim Section six True, said I, but since it is thy office to unfold the hidden cause of things and explain principles veiled in darkness inform me, I pray thee, of thine own conclusions in this matter since the marvel of it is what more than ought else disturbs my mind A smile played one moment upon her lips as she replied, thou callest me to the greatest of all subjects of inquiry a task for which the most exhaustive treatment barely suffices such is its nature that as fast as one doubt is cut away innumerable others spring up like hydra's heads nor could we set any limit to their renewal and we not apply the mind's living fire to suppress them for there come within its scope the questions of the essential simplicity of providence of the order of fate of unforeseen chance of the divine knowledge and predestination and of the freedom of the will how heavy is the weight of all this thou canst judge for thyself but in as much as to know these things also is part of the treatment of thy malady we will try to give them some consideration despite the restrictions of the narrow limits of our time moreover thou must for a time dispense with the pleasures of music and song if so be that thou findest any delight therein whilst I weave together the connected train of reasons in proper order as thou wilt, said I then as if making a new beginning she thus discoursed the coming into being of all things the whole course of development in things that change every sort of thing that moves in any wise receives its due cause, order and form from the steadfastness of the divine mind this mind, calm in the citadel of its own essential simplicity has decreed that the method of its rule shall be manifold viewed in the very purity of the divine intelligence this method is called providence but viewed in regard to those things which it moves and disposes it is what the ancients called fate that these two are different will easily be clear to anyone who passes in review their respective efficacies providence is the divine reason itself seated in the supreme being which disposes all things fate is the disposition inherent in all things which move through which providence joins all things in their proper order providence embraces all things however different however infinite fate sets in motion separately individual things and assigns to them separately their position, form and time so the unfolding of this temporal order unified into the foreview of the divine mind is providence while the same unity broken up and unfolded in time is fate and although these are different yet is there a dependence between them for the order of destiny issues from the essential simplicity of providence for as the artificer forming in his mind beforehand the idea of the thing to be made carries out his design and develops from moment to moment what he had before seen in a single instant as a whole so God in his providence ordains all things as parts of a single unchanging whole but carries out these very ordinances by fate in a time of manifold unity so whether fate is accomplished by divine spirits as the ministers of providence or by a soul or by the service of all nature whether by the celestial motion of the stars by the efficacy of angels or by the many-sided cunning of demons whether by all or by some of these the destined series is woven this at least is manifest that providence is the fixed and simple form of destined events fate their shifting series in order of time as by the disposal of the divine simplicity they are to take place whereby it is that all things which are under fate are subjected also to providence on which fate itself is dependent whereas certain things which are set under providence are above the chain of fate vis those things which by their nearness to the primal divinity are steadfastly fixed and lie outside the order of fate's movements for as the innermost of several circles revolving around the same centre approaches the simplicity of the midmost point and is as it were a pivot around which the exterior circles turn while the outermost world in ample orbit takes in a wider and wider sweep of space in proportion to its departure from the indivisible unity of the centre while further whatever joins and allies itself to the centre is narrowed to a like simplicity and no longer expands vaguely into space even so whatsoever departs widely from primal mind is involved more deeply in the meshes of fate and things are free from fate in proportion as they seek to come nearer to that central pivot while if ought cleaves close to supreme mind in its absolute fixity this too, being free from movement rises above fate's necessity therefore, as is reasoning to pure intelligence as that which is generated to that which is time to eternity, a circle to its centre so is the shifting series of fate to the steadfastness and simplicity of providence it is this causal series which moves heaven and the stars atempers the elements to mutual accord and again in turn transforms them into new combinations this which renews the series of all things that are born and die through like successions of germ and birth it is its operation which binds the destinies of men by an indissoluble nexus of causality and since it issues in the beginning from unalterable providence these destinies also must of necessity be immutable accordingly the world is ruled for the best if this unity abiding in the divine mind puts forth an inflexible order of causes and this order by its intrinsic immutability restricts things mutable which otherwise would ebb and flow at random and so it happens that although to you who are not altogether capable of understanding this order all things seem confused and disordered nevertheless there is everywhere an appointed limit which guides all things to good verily nothing can be done for the sake of evil even by the wicked themselves for as we abundantly proved they seek good but are drawn out of the way by perverse error far less can this order which sets out from the supreme centre of good turn aside any wither from the way in which it began yet what confusion thou wilt say can be more unrighteous than that prosperity and adversity should indifferently befall the good what they like and what they loathe come alternately to the bad yes but have men in real life such soundness of mind that their judgements of righteousness and wickedness must necessarily correspond with facts why on this very point their verdicts conflict and those whom some deem worthy of reward others deem worthy of punishment yet granted there were one who could rightly distinguish the good and bad yet would he be able to look into the soul's inmost constitution as it were if we may borrow an expression used of the body the marvel here is not unlike that which astonishes one who does not know why in health sweet things suit some constitutions and bitter others or why some sick men are best alleviated by mild remedies others by severe but the physician who distinguishes the precise conditions and characteristics of health and sickness does not marvel now the health of the soul is nothing but righteousness and vice is its sickness God the guide and physician of the mind it is who preserves the good and banishes the bad and he looks forth from the lofty watchtower of his providence perceives what is suited to each and assigns what he knows to be suitable this then is what that extraordinary mystery of the order of destiny comes to that something is done by one who knows where at the ignorant are astonished but let us consider a few instances whereby appears what is the competency of human reason to fathom the divine unsearchableness here is one whom thou demist the perfection of justice and scrupulous integrity to all knowing providence it seems far otherwise we all know our Lucan's admission that it was the winning cause that found favor with the gods the beaten cause with Cato so shouldst thou see anything in this world happening differently from thy expectation doubt not but events are rightly ordered it is in thy judgment that there is perverse confusion Grant however there be somewhere found one of so happier character that God and man alike agree in their judgments about him yet is he somewhat infirm in strength of mind it may be if he fall into adversity he will cease to practice that innocence he which has failed to secure his fortune therefore God's wise dispensation spares him whom adversity might make worse will not let him suffer who is ill fitted for endurance another there is perfect in all virtue so holy and nigh to God that providence judges it unlawful that ought untoward should befall him nay, doth not even permit him to be afflicted with bodily disease as one more excellent than Iath said the very body of the holy saint is built of purest ether often it happens that the governance is given to the good that a restraint may be put upon superfluity of wickedness to others providence assigns some mixed lot suited to their spiritual nature some it will plague lest they grow rank through long prosperity others it will suffer to be vexed with sore afflictions to confirm their virtues by the exercise and practice of patience some fear over much what they have strength to bear others despise over much that to which their strength is unequal and these it brings to the test of their true self through misfortune some also have bought a name revered to future ages at the price of a glorious death some by invincible constancy under their sufferings have afforded an example to others that virtue cannot be overcome by calamity all which things without doubt come to pass rightly and in due order and to the benefit of those to whom they are seen to happen as to the other side of the marvel that the bad now meet with affliction now get their hearts desire this too springs from the same causes as to the afflictions of course no one marvels because all hold the wicked to be ill deserving the truth is their punishments both frighten others from crime and amend those on whom they are inflicted while their prosperity is a powerful sermon to the good what judgments they ought to pass on good fortune of this kind which often attends the wicked so assiduously there is another object which may I believe be attained in such cases there is one perhaps whose nature is so reckless and violent that poverty would drive him more desperately into crime his disorder providence relieves by allowing him to amass money such a one in the uneasiness of a conscience stained with guilt while he contrasts his character with his fortune the chance grows alarmed lest he should come to mourn the loss of that whose possession is so pleasant to him he will then reform his ways and through the fear of losing his fortune he forsakes his iniquity some through a prosperity unworthily born have been hurled headlong to ruin to some the power of the sword has been committed to the end that the good may be tried by discipline and the bad punished for while there can be no peace between the righteous and the wicked neither can the wicked agree among themselves how should they when each is at variance with himself because his vices rend his conscience and of times they do things which when they are done they judge ought not to have been done hence it is that this supreme providence brings to pass this notable marvel that the bad make the bad good for some when they see the injustice which they themselves suffer at the hands of evil doers are inflamed with detestation of the offenders and in the endeavour to be unlike those whom they hate return to the ways of virtue it is the divine power alone to which things evil are also good in that by putting them to suitable use it bringeth them in the end to some good issue for order in some way other embraces all things so that even that which has departed from the appointed laws of the order nevertheless falleth within an order though another order that nothing in the realm of providence may be left to haphazard but hard were the task as a god to recount all nothing omitting nor truly is it lawful for man to compass in thought all the mechanism of the divine work or set it forth in speech let us be content to have apprehended this only that God the creator of universal nature likewise disposeseth all things and guides them to good and while he studies to preserve in likeness to himself all that he has created he banishes all evil from the borders of his common wheel through the links of fatal necessity whereby it comes to pass that if thou look to disposing providence thou wilt nowhere find the evils which are believed so to abound on earth but I see thou hast long been burdened with the weight of the subject and fatigued with the prolixity of the argument and now luckest for some refreshment of sweet poesy listen then and may the draft so restore thee that thou wilt bend thy mind more resolutely to what remains song 6 the universal aim wouldst thou with unclouded mind view the laws by God designed lift thy steadfast gaze on high to the starry canopy see in rightful league of love all the constellations move fiery soul in full career near obstructs called Phoebe's sphere when the bear at heaven's height wheels his course as rapid flight though he sees the starry train sinking in the western main he repines not nor desires in the flood to quench his fires in true sequence as decreed daily mourn and eve succeed Vespa brings the shades of night Lucifer the morning light love in alternation due still the cycle doth renew and discordant strife is driven from the starry realm of heaven thus in wondrous amity warring elements agree hot and cold and moist and dry lay their ancient quarrel by high the flickering flame ascends downward earth forever tens so the year in spring's mild hours loads the air with scent of flowers summer paints the golden grain then when autumn comes again bright with fruit the orchards glow winter brings the rain and snow thus the season's fixed progression tempered in a due succession nourishes and brings to birth all that lives and breathes on earth then soon run life's little day all it brought it takes away but one sits and guides the reins he who made and all sustains king and lord and fountain head judge most holy law most dread now impells and now keeps back holds each waiverer in the track else where once the power withheld that the circling spheres compelled in their orbits to revolve this world's order must dissolve and the harmonious whole would all in one hideous ruin fall but through this connected frame runs one universal aim towards the good do all things tend many paths but one the end for naught lasts unless it turns backwards in its course and yearns to that source to flow again when sits being first was tamed End of Section 6 This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org A Consolation of Philosophy, Binicius, Manlius, Severinus, Pothius Translated by H.R. James Book 4, Good Nail Fortune, Song 7, The Hero's Path, and Section 35, 7 Does Thou then see the consequence of all that we have said? Nay, what consequence? That absolutely every fortune is good fortune. And how can that be, said I? A ten said she, since every fortune welcome and unwelcome alike has for its object the reward or trial of the good and the punishing or mending of the bad. Every fortune must be good since it is either just or useful. The reasoning is exceeding true, said I, the conclusion so long as I reflect upon the providence and fate of which Thou hast taught me based on a strong foundation. Yet, with I leave, we will count it among those which just now Thou did set down as paradoxical. Why so, said she, because ordinary speech is apt to assert, and that frequently, the summons fortune is bad. Shall we then for a while approach more nearly to the language of the vulgar that we may not seem to have departed too far from the usages of men? At thy good pleasure, said I, that which advantageeth Thou callst good, does Thou not? Certainly, and that which either tries or amends advantageeth, granted. Is good then? Of course. Well, this is their case who have attained virtue and waged war with adversity, or turned from vice and lay hold on the path of virtue. I cannot deny it. What of the good fortune which is given as reward of the good, do the vulgar a judge at bad? Anything but that, they deem it to be the best, as indeed it is. What then of that which remains, which though it is harsh, puts the restraint of just punishment on the bad, does popular opinion deem it good? Nay, of all that can be imagined, it is counted the most miserable. Observe then, if, in following popular opinion, we have not ended in a conclusion quite paradoxical. How so, said I? While it results from our admissions that of all who have attained or advancing in, or are aiming at virtue, the fortune is in every case good, while for those who remain in their wickedness, fortune is always utterly bad. It is true, said I, yet no one dare acknowledge it. Wherefore, said she, the wise man not to take it ill, if ever he is involved in one of fortune's conflicts, any more than it becomes a brave soldier to be offended when at any time the trumpet sounds for battle. The time of trial is the express opportunity for the one to win glory for the other to perfect his wisdom. Hence indeed, virtue gets its name, because, relying on its own efficacy, it yieldeth not to adversity. And ye who have taken your stand on virtue's steep ascent, it is not for you to be dissolved in delights, or infebled by pleasure, be close in conflict. Yea, and conflict most sharp.  Hold the mean with all your strength, whatever fall short of this, or goes beyond, is fraught with scorn of happiness, and misses the reward of toil. It rests with you to make your fortune what you will. Verily, every harsh seeming fortune unless it either disciplines or amends is punishment. Song 7, The Hero's Path. Ten years at tedious warfare raged, ere illium smoking ruins paid, for wedlock stained in faith betrayed, great atreides wrath assuaged.  When by the cavern's glimmering light his comrades dear Odysseus saw, in the huge cyclops hideous maw, in gulf he wept the piteous sight, but blinded soon and wild with pain, and bitter tears and sore annoy. For that foul feast and holy joy, grim polyphemus paid again. His labors for Alsady's win, a name of glory far and wide, he tamed the centaur's haughty pride, and from the lion reft his skin. The foul birds with sure darts he slew, the golden fruit he stole in vain, the dragons watched with triple chain, from hell's depth's cerebus he drew. With their lord's own flesh, he fed, the wild steed's hydra overcame, with fire, neath his own waves and shame. Maimed a callus hit his head, each cacus for his crimes was slain, on libya's sands, and taeus hurled, the shoulders that upheld the world. The great bors dribbled, spoon did stain, less toil of all his might sustained. The ball of heaven, nor did he bend. Beneath his toil, his labors end. The prize of heaven's high glory gained. Brave hearts press on, low heavenward lead. These bright examples, from the fight, turn out your backs in coward flight, or as conflict won, discharge your mead. End of song, The Hero's Path, in section 35 This is the LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information, or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Recording by Andrew Miller Toronto, June 2006 The Consolation of Philosophy by Anisius Manlius Severinus Boethius translated by H.R. James She ceased, and was about to pass on in her discourse to the exposition of other matters, when I break in and say, Excellent is thine exhortation, and such as well beseemeth thy high authority. But I am even now experiencing one of the many difficulties which, as thou saidst, but now, besed the question of providence. I want to know whether thou demists that there is any such thing as chance at all, and, if so, what it is. Then she made answer, I am anxious to fulfil my promise completely, and open to thee a way of understanding, and to know what it is. I am anxious to fulfil my promise completely, and open to thee a way of return to thy native land. As for these matters, though very useful to know, they are yet a little removed from the path of our design, and I fear less digressions should fatigue thee, and thou shouldst find thyself unequal to completing the direct journey to our goal. Have no fear for that, said I. To learn, where learning brings delight so exquisite, especially when thy argument has been built up on all sides with undoubted conviction, and no places left for uncertainty in what follows. She made answer, I will accede to thy request. And forthwith she thus began, if chance be defined as a result produced by random movement, without any link of causal connection, I roundly affirm that there is no such thing as chance at all, and consider the word to be altogether without meaning except as a symbol of the thing designated. What place can be left for random action when God constraineth all things to order? For ex nihilo nihil is sound doctrine which none of the ancients gained said, although they used it of material substance, not of the efficient principle. This they laid down as a kind of basis for all their reasonings concerning nature. Now, if a thing arise without causes, it will appear to have arisen from nothing. But if this cannot be, neither is it possible for there to be chance in accordance with the definition just given. Well, said I, is there then nothing which can properly be called chance or accident? Or is there something to which these names are appropriate, though its nature is dark to the vulgar? Our good Aristotle, says she, has defined it concisely in his ethics and closely in accordance with the truth. How, pray, said I, thus says she. Whenever something is done for the sake of a particular end and for certain reasons some other result than that designed ensues, this is called chance. For instance, if a man is digging the earth for tillage and finds a mass of buried gold. Now, such a find is regarded as accidental. Yet it is not ex nihilo, for it has its proper causes, the unforeseen and unexpected concurrence of which has brought the chance about. For had not the cultivator been digging, had not the man who hid the money buried it in that precise spot, the gold would not have been found. These, then, are the reasons why the find is a chance one, in that it results from causes which met together and concurred, not from any intention on the part of the discoverer. Since neither he who buried the gold nor he who worked in the field intended that the money should be found, but, as I said, it happened by coincidence that one dug where the other buried the treasure. We may, then, define chance as being an unexpected result flowing from a concurrence of causes where the several factors had some definite end. But the meeting and concurrence of these causes arises from that inevitable chain of order which, flowing from the fountain-head of Providence, disposes all things in their due time and place. Song 1 Chance In the rugged Persian Highlands, where the masters of the bow skill to feign a flight and, fleeing, hurl their darts and pierce the foe, there the Tigris and Euphrates at one source their waters blend, soon to draw apart and plainward each way to wind. When once more their waters mingle in a channel, deep and wide, all the flotsam comes together that is born upon the tide. Ships and trunks of trees uprooted in the torrent's wild career meet as mid the swirling waters chance their random way may steer. Yet the shelving of the channel flowing waters force guides each movement and determines every floating fragment's course. Thus, where ere the drift of hazard seems most unrestrained to flow, chance herself is reigned and bitted and the curb of law doth know. End of Book 5 Free Will and Gods for Knowledge Section 1 and Song 1 Chance This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. The Consolation of Philosophy by Boethius, translated by H. R. James. Book 5. Free Will and Gods for Knowledge. Section 2 and Song 2 The True Son I am following needfully, said I, and I agree that it is as thou sayest. But in this series of linked causes is there any freedom left to our will, or does the chain of fate bind also the very motions of our souls? There is freedom, said she, nor indeed can any creature be rational unless he be endowed with free will. For that which hath the natural use of reason has the faculty of discriminative judgment, and of itself distinguishes what is to be shunned or desired. Now, everyone seeks what he judges desirable, and avoid what he thinks should be shunned. Wherefore, beings endowed with reason possess also the faculty of free choice and refusal. But I suppose this faculty not equal like in all. The higher divine essences possess a clear-sided judgment and uncorrupt well, and an effective power of accomplishing their wishes. Humans souls must needs be comparatively free while they abide in contemplation of the divine mind, less free when they pass into bodily form, and still less, again, when they are unwrapped in earthly members. But when they give over to vices, and fall from possession of their proper reason, then indeed their condition is utter slavery. For when they let their gaze fall from the light of highest truth to the lower world where darkness reigns, soon ignorance blinds their vision. They are disturbed by baneful affections, by yielding and dissenting to which they help to promote the slavery in which they are involved, and are in a manner led captive by reason of their very liberty. Yet he who seeth all things from eternity beholdeth these things with the eyes of his providence, and assigneth to each what is predestined for it by its merits. All things surveyed, all things overheard. Homer with molyphus tongue, Phoebus' glories lay teth sung. Heming high his praise, yet his feeble rays, ocean's hollows may not brighten, nor the earth's central gloom enlighten. But the might of him who skilled this glorious universe to build, is not thus confined, not earth solid rind, nor night's blackest canopy baffle his all-seeing eye. All that is hath been shall be in one guidance's compass he, and save his no eyes all the world's survey know none. Him then truly name the Son. End of Book 5, Free Will and God's Four Knowledge Section 2 and Song 2, The True Son. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information, or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. This reading by Stan Still, West Orange, New Jersey. The Consolation of Philosophy by Inesius Manlius Severinus Boethius, translation by H. R. James. Book 5, Free Will and God's Four Knowledge Section 3 and Song 3, Truth's Paradoxes. Then said I, But now I am once more perplexed by a problem yet more difficult. And what is that? said she. Yet in truth I can guess what it is that troubles you. It seems, said I, too much of a paradox and a contradiction that God should know all things, and yet there should be Free Will. For if God sees everything, and can in no wise be deceived, that which providence foresees to be about to happen, must necessarily come to pass. Therefore, if from eternity He foreknows not only what men will do, but also their designs and purposes, there can be no freedom of the will, seeing that nothing can be done, nor can any sort of purpose be entertained, save such as a divine providence incapable of being deceived has perceived beforehand. For if the issues can be turned aside to some other end than that foreseen by providence, there will not then be any sure for the future, but uncertain conjecture instead, and to think this of God I deem impiety. Moreover, I do not approve the reasoning by which some think to solve this puzzle. For they say that it is not because God has foreseen the coming of an event, that therefore it is sure to come to pass. But conversely, because something is about to come to pass, it cannot be hidden from divine providence, and accordingly the necessity passes to the opposite side, and it is not what is foreseen must necessarily come to pass, but what is about to come to pass must necessarily be foreseen. But this is just as if the matter in debate were, which is cause and which effect, whether foreknowledge of the future cause of the necessity, or the necessity of the future of the foreknowledge. But we need not be at hands at demonstrating that whatsoever be the order of the causal sequence. The occurrence of things foreseen is necessary, even though the foreknowledge of future events does not in itself impose upon them the necessity of their occurrence. For example, if a man be seated, the supposition of his being seated is necessarily true. And conversely, if the supposition of his being seated is true, because he really is seated, then he must necessarily be sitting. So in either case, there is some necessity involved. In this latter case, the necessity of the fact. In the former, the necessity of the truth of the statement. But in both cases, the sitter is not therefore seated because the opinion is true, but rather the opinion is true because antecedently he was sitting as a matter of fact. Thus, though the cause of the truth of the opinion comes from the other side, footnote, that is, the necessity of the truth of the statement from the fact, and footnote. Yet there is a necessity on both sides alike. We can obviously reason similarly in the case of providence and the future. Even if future events are foreseen because they are about to happen, and do not come to pass because they are foreseen, still all the same there is a necessity, both that they should be foreseen by God as about to come to pass, and that when they are foreseen they should happen, and this is sufficient for the destruction of free will. However, it is preposterous to speak of the occurrence of events in time as the cause of eternal foreknowledge. And yet if we believe that God foresees future events because they are about to come to pass, what is it but to think that the occurrence of events is the cause of His supreme providence? Further, just as when I know anything is, that thing necessarily is. So when I know that anything will be, it will necessarily be. It follows then that things foreknown come to pass inevitably. Lastly, to think of a thing as being in any way other than what it is, is not only not knowledge, but it is false opinion widely different from the truth of knowledge. Consequently, if anything is about to be, and yet its occurrence is not certain and necessary, how can anyone foreknow that it will occur? For just as knowledge itself is free from all admixture of falsity, so any conception drawn from knowledge cannot be other than as it is conceived. For this indeed is the cause why knowledge is free from all falsehood, because of necessity each thing must correspond exactly with the knowledge which grasps its nature. In what way then are we to suppose that God foreknows these uncertainties as about to come to pass? For if He thinks of events which possibly may not happen at all as inevitably destined to come to pass, He is deceived, and this is not only impious to believe, but even so much as to express in words. If on the other hand, He sees them in the future as they are in such a sense as to know that they may equally come to pass or not, what sort of foreknowledge is this which comprehends nothing certain or fixed? What better is this than the absurd vaticinations of Tiresias? What air I say shall either come to pass or not? In that case too, in what would divine providence surpass human opinion if it holds for uncertain things the occurrence of which is uncertain, even as men do? But if at that perfectly sure fountainhead of all things, no shadow of uncertainty can possibly be found, then the occurrence of those things which He has surely foreknown as coming is certain. Wherefore there can be no freedom in human actions and designs, but the divine mind which foresees all things without possibility of mistake, ties and binds them down to one only issue. But this admission, once made, what an upset of human affairs manifestly ensues. Vanely are rewards and punishments proposed for the good and bad, since no free voluntary motion of the will has deserved either one or the other. Nay, punishment of the wicked and reward of the righteous, which is now esteemed the perfection of justice, will seem the most flagrant injustice, since men are determined either way, not by their own proper volition, but by the necessity of what must surely be. And therefore neither virtue nor vice is anything, but rather good and ill desert are confound together without distinction. Moreover, seeing the whole course of events is deduced from providence, and nothing is left to free human design. It comes to pass that our vices are also referred to the author of all good, a thought then which none more abominable can possibly be conceived. Again, no ground is left for hope or prayer, since how can we hope for blessings, or pray for mercy, when every object of desire depends upon the links of an unalterable chain of causation? Gone then is the one means of intercourse between God and man, the communion of hope and prayer, if it be true that we ever earn the inestimable recompense of a divine favor at the price of a due humility. For this is the one way whereby men seem able to hold communion with God, and are joined to that unapproachable light by the very act of supplication, even before they obtain their petitions. Then, since these things can scarcely be believed to have any efficacy, if the necessity of future events be admitted, what means will there be whereby we may be brought near and cleave to him who is the supreme head of all? Wherefore it needs must be that the human race, even as thou didst erstwhile declare in song, hearted and deceivered from its source, should fall to ruin. Song 3 Truths Paradoxes Why does a strange discordance break the ordered scheme's fair harmony, hath God decreed, twix truth and truth, there may such lasting warfare be, that truths, each severally plain, we strive to reconcile in vain, or is discord not in truth, since truth is self-consistent ever. But close in fleshly wrappings held, the blindest man, mind of man can never discern so faint her taper shines, the subtle chain that all combines. Ah, then why burns man's restless mind, truths hidden portals to unclose? Knows he already what he seeks? Why toil to seek it, if he knows? Yet happily, if he knoweth not, why blindly seek he knows not what? Who for a good he knows not size, who can an unknown end pursue? How find, how even when happily found, hail that strange form he never knew? Or is that man's inmost soul once knew each part and knew the whole, now though by fleshly vapors dimmed, not all forgot her visions passed? For while several parts are lost, to the one hole she cleaveth fast. Whence he who yearns to truth to find, is neither sound of sight nor blind, for neither does he know in full, nor is he reft of knowledge quite. But holding still to what is left, he groups in the uncertain light, and by the part that still survives, to when back all he bravely strives. End Book 5. Free Will and Gods for Knowledge. Section 3 and Song 3. Truths, Paradoxes. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by M. L. Cohen, Cleveland, Ohio, March 2007. The Consolation of Philosophy. By Ancius Manlius Severanus Otheus. Translated by H. R. James. Book 5. Free Will and Gods for Knowledge. Section 4. A Psychological Fallacy. Then said she, this debate about Providence is an old one, and is vigorously discussed by Cicero in his divination. Thou also hast long and earnestly pondered the problem, yet no one has had diligence and perseverance enough to find a solution. And the reason of the obscurity is that the movement of human reasoning cannot cope with the simplicity of the divine foreknowledge. For if a conception of its nature could in any wise be framed, no shadow of uncertainty would remain. With a view of making this at last clear and plain, I will begin by considering the arguments by which thou art swayed. First, I inquire into the reasons why thou art dissatisfied with the solution proposed, which is to the effect that, seeing the fact of foreknowledge is not thought the cause of necessity of future events, foreknowledge is not to be deemed any hindrance to the freedom of the will. Now surely the sole ground on which thou argueest the necessity of the future is that things which are foreknown cannot fail to come to pass. But if, as thou weren't ready to acknowledge just now, the fact of foreknowledge imposes no necessity on things future, what reason is there for supposing the results of voluntary action constrained to a fixed issue? Suppose for the sake of argument and to see what follows, we assume that there is no foreknowledge. Are willed actions then tied down to any necessity in this case? Certainly not. Let us assume foreknowledge again, but without its involving any actual necessity. The freedom of the will, I imagine, will remain in complete integrity. But, thou wilt say that, even though all the foreknowledge is not the necessity of the future events occurrence. Yet, it is a sign that will necessarily happen. Granted, but in this case it is plain that, even if there had been no foreknowledge, the issues would have been inevitably certain. For a sign only indicates something which is, does not bring to pass that of which it is a sign. We require it to show beforehand that all things without exception happen of necessity in order that a preconception must be a sign of this necessity. Otherwise, if there is no such universal necessity, neither can any preconception be a sign of a necessity which exists not. Manifestly too, a proof exhibited on firm grounds of reason must be drawn not from signs and loose general arguments, but from suitable and necessary causes. But how can it be that things foreseen should ever fail to come to pass? Why, this is supposed us to believe that the events which providence foresees to be coming were not about to happen. Instead of our supposing that, although they should come to pass, yet there was no necessity involved in their own nature compelling their occurrence. Take an illustration that will help convey my meaning. There are many things which we see taking place before our eyes, the movements of charioteers for instance, and guiding and turning their cars and so on. Now is any one of these movements compelled by any necessity? No, certainly not. There would be no efficacy and skill if all motions took place per force. Then, things which in taking place are free from any necessity as to their being in the present must also, before they take place, be about to happen without necessity. Wherefore there are things which will come to pass, the occurrence of which is perfectly free from necessity. At all events I imagine that no one will deny that things now taking place were about to come to pass before actually happening. Such things, however much foreknown, are in their occurrence free. For even as knowledge of things present imports no necessity into things that are taking place, so foreknowledge of the future imports none into things that are about to come. But this, that will say, is the very point in dispute, whether any foreknowing is possible of things whose occurrence is not necessary. For here there seems to be a contradiction, and if they are foreseen their necessity follows, where if there is no necessity they can by no means be foreknown. And thou thinkest that nothing can be grasped as known unless it is certain, but of things whose occurrence is uncertain or foreknown as certain this is the very mist of opinion, not the truth of knowledge. For to think of things otherwise than they are, thou believest to be incompatible with the soundness of knowledge. Now the cause of the mistake is this, that men think that all knowledge is cognized purely by the nature and efficacy of the thing known. Whereas the case is the very reverse, all that is known is grasped not conformably to its own efficacy, but rather conformably to the faculty of the knower. An example will make this clear. The roundness of a body is recognized in one way by sight, and another by touch. Sight looks upon it from a distance as a hole by a simultaneous reflection of rays. Touch grasps around this piecemeal by contact and attachment to the surface, and by actual movement around the periphery itself. Man himself likewise is viewed in one way by sense, in another by imagination, in another way again by thought, in another by pure intelligence. Sense judges figure clothe the material substance. Imagination, figure alone without matter. Thought transcends this again, and by its contemplation of universals considers the type itself which is contained in an individual. The eye of intelligence is yet more exalted. For over passing the sphere of the universal, it will behold absolute form itself by the pure force of the mind's vision. Wherein the main point to be considered is this, the higher faculty of comprehension embraces the lower while the lower cannot rise to the higher. For sense has no efficacy beyond matter, nor can imagination behold universal ideas, nor thought embrace pure form. But intelligence, looking down as it were from its higher standpoint and its intuition of form, discriminates also the several elements which underlie it. But it comprehends them in the same way as it comprehends that form itself, which could be cognized by no other than itself. For it cognizes the universal of thought, the figure of imagination and the matter of sense without employing thought, imagination, or sense, but surveying all things so to speak under the aspect of pure form by a single flash of intuition. Thought also, in considering the universal, embraces images and sense impressions without resorting to imagination or sense. For it is thought, which has thus defined the universal from its conceptual point of view. Man is a too-legged animal endowed with reason. This is indeed a universal notion, yet no one is ignorant that the thing is imaginable and presentable to sense because thought considers it not by imagination or sense, but by means of rational conception. Imagination, too, through its faculty of viewing and forming representations, is founded upon the senses, nevertheless surveys sense impressions without calling in sense, not in the way of sense perception, but of imagination. Seeest thou then how all things in cognizing use rather their own faculty than the faculty of the things which they cognize? Nor is this strange, for since every judgment is the act of the judge, it is necessary that each should accomplish its task by his own, not by another's power. Song 4 A psychological fallacy from the porch's murky depths comes a doctrine sage that doth lichen live in mind to a written page. Since all knowledge comes through sense, graven by experience, as say they, the pen it marks curiously doth trace on the smooth unsullied white of the paper's face, so do outer things impress images unconsciousness. But if verily the mind thus all passive lies, if no living power within its own force supplies, if it but reflect again like a glass things false and vain, whence thy wondrous faculty that perceives and knows that in one fair-ordered scheme doth the world dispose, grasp each hole that sense presents or break into elements. So divides and recombines and in changeful wise now to low descends and now to the height-stuth rise, last an inward swift review strictly sifts the false and true. Of these ample potencies fit or cause I wean where mind self then marks impressed by the outer scene, yet the body through the sense stirs the soul's intelligence. When light flashes on the eye or sound strikes the ear, mind aroused to do response makes the message clear, and the dumb external signs with the hidden foreign combines. End of Book 5, Free Will and Gods for Knowledge, Section 4, A Psychological Fallacy. The Consolation of Philosophy by Boethius, translated by H. R. James. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer visit LibriVox.org The Consolation of Philosophy Book 5 Section 5 and Song 5 The Upward Look Now, although in the case of bodies endowed with sentiency the qualities of external objects affect the sense organs and the activity of mind is preceded by a bodily affection which calls forth the mind's action upon itself and stimulates the forms till that moment lying inactive within yet, I say. If in these bodies endowed with sentiency the mind is not inscribed by mere passive affection but of its own efficacy discriminates the impressions furnished to the body. How much more do intelligences free from all bodily affections employ in their discrimination their own mental activities instead of conforming to external objects. So on these principles various modes of cognition belong to distinct and different substances. For to creatures void of motive power, shellfish and other such creatures which cling to rocks and grow there belongs to sense alone void of all other modes of gaining knowledge. To beasts endowed with movement in whom some capacity of seeking and shunning seems to have arisen imagination also. Thought pertains only to the human race as intelligence to divinity alone. Hence it follows that that form of knowledge exceeds the rest which of its own nature cognizes not only its proper object but the objects of the other forms of knowledge also but what if sense and imagination would again say thought and declare that universal which thought deems itself to behold to be nothing. For the object of sense and imagination cannot be universal so that either the judgment of reason is true and there is no sense object or since they know full well that many objects are presented to sense and imagination the conception of reason which looks on that which is perceived by sense in particular as if it were something universal is empty of content. Suppose further that reason maintains in reply that it does indeed contemplate the object of both sense and imagination under the form of universality while sense and imagination cannot aspire to the knowledge of the universal since their cognizance cannot go beyond bodily figures and that in the cognition of reality we ought rather to trust the stronger and more perfect faculty of judgment in a dispute of this sort should not we in whom is planted the faculty of reasoning as well as self-imagining and perceiving espouse the cause of reason in like manner is it that human reason thinks that divine intelligence cannot see the future except after the fashion in which its own knowledge is obtained for thy contention is if events do not appear to involve certain and necessary issues they cannot be foreseen as certainly about to come to pass there is then no foreknowledge of such events or if we can ever bring ourselves to believe that there is there can be nothing which does not happen of necessity if however we could have some part in the judgment of the divine mind even as we participate in reason we should think it perfectly just that human reason should submit itself to the divine mind no less than we judge that imagination and sense ought to yield to reason wherefore let us soar if we can to the heights of that supreme intelligence for there reason will see what in itself it cannot look upon and that is in what way things whose occurrence is not certain may yet be seen in a sure and definite foreknowledge and that this foreknowledge is not conjecture but rather knowledge in its supreme simplicity free of all limits and restrictions in what diverse shapes and fashions do the creatures great and small over wide earth's teeming surface skim or scud or walk or crawl some with elongated body sweep the ground and as they move trail perforce with writhing belly in the dust a sinuous groove some on light wing upward soaring swiftly to the winds divide and through heaven's ample spaces in free motion smoothly glide these earth's solid surface pressing with firm paces onward row ranging through the burdened meadows crouching in the woodland grove great and wondrous is their variance yet in all the head low bent dulls the soul and blunts the senses though forms be different man alone erect aspiring lifts his forehead to the skies and in upright posture steadfast seems earth's baseness to despise if with earth not all besotted to this parable give ear thou whose gaze is fixed on heaven who thy face on high dust rear lift thy soul to heaven would happily lest it stain heavenly worth and thine eyes alone look upward while thy mind cleaves to the earth end of section 5 and song 5 book 5 free will and gods for knowledge section 6 and epilogue since then as we lately proved everything that is known is cognized not in accordance with its own nature but in accordance with the nature of the faculty that comprehends it let us now contemplate as far as lawful the character of the divine essence that we may be able to understand also the nature of its knowledge God is eternal in this judgment all rational beings agree let us then consider what eternity is for this word carries with it a revelation alike of the divine nature and of the divine knowledge now eternity is the possession of endless life whole and perfect at a single moment what this is becomes more clear and manifest from a comparison with things temporal for whatever lives in time is a present proceeding from the past to the future and there is nothing said in time which can embrace the whole space of its life together tomorrow's state it grasps not yet while it has already lost yesterday's nay even in the life of today ye live no longer than one brief transitory moment whatever therefore is subject to the condition of time although as Aristotle deemed of the world it never have either beginning or end and its life be stretched to the whole extent of time's infinity it yet is not such as rightly to be thought eternal for it does not include and embrace the whole space of infinite life at once but has no present hold on things to come not yet accomplished accordingly that which includes and possesses the whole fullness of unending life at once from which nothing future is absent from which nothing past has escaped this is rightly called eternal this must of necessity be ever present to itself in full self-possession and hold the infinity of movable time in an abiding present wherefore they deem not rightly who imagine that on Plato's principles the created world is made co-eternal with the creator because they are told that he believed the world to have had no beginning in time and to be destined never to come to an end for it is one thing for existence to be endlessly prolonged which was what Plato ascribed to the world another for the whole of an endless life to be embraced in the present which is manifestly a property peculiar to the divine mind nor need God appear earlier in mere duration of time to created things but only prior in the unique simplicity of his nature for the infinite progression of things in time copies this immediate existence in the present of the changeless life and when it cannot succeed in equaling it declines from movelessness into motion and falls away from the simplicity of a perpetual present to the infinite duration of the future and the past and since it cannot possess the whole fullness of its life together for the very reason that in a manner it never ceases to be it seems up to a certain point to rival that which it cannot complete and express itself indifferently to any present moment of time however swift and brief and since this bears some resemblance to that ever-abiding present it bestows on everything to which it is assigned the semblance of existence but since it cannot abide it hurries along the infinite path of time and the result has been that it continues by ceaseless movement the life the completeness which it could not embrace while it stood still so if we are minded to give things their right names we shall follow Plato in saying that God indeed is eternal but the world everlasting since then every mode of judgment comprehends its objects conformably to its own nature and since God abides forever in an eternal present his knowledge also transcending all movement of time dwells in the simplicity of its own changeless present and embracing the whole infinite sweet of the past and of the future contemplates all that falls within its simple cognition as if it were now taking place and therefore if thou wilt carefully consider that immediate presentment whereby it discriminates all things thou wilt more rightly deem it not for knowledge or anything future but knowledge of a moment that never passes for this cause the name chosen to describe it is not provision but providence because since utterly removed in nature from things mean and trivial its outlook embraces all things as from some lofty height why then thus thou insist that divine eye are involved in necessity whereas clearly men impose no necessity on things which they see does the act of vision add any necessity to the things which thou seeest before thy eyes assuredly not and yet if we may without unfitness compare God's present and man's just as ye see certain things in this your temporary present so does he see all things in his eternal present wherefore this divine anticipation changes not the natures and properties of things and it beholds things present before it just as they will hereafter come to pass in time nor does it confound things in its judgment but in the one mental view distinguishes alike what will come necessarily and what without necessity for even as ye when at one and the same time ye see a man walking on the earth and a sun rising in the sky distinguished between the two though one glance embraces both and judge the form of voluntary the latter necessary action so also the divine vision in its universal range of view does in no wise confuse the characters of the things which are present to its regard though future in respect of time whence it follows that when it perceives that something will come into existence and yet is perfectly aware that this is unbound by any necessity its apprehension is not opinion but rather knowledge based on truth and if to this thou sayest that what God sees to be about to come to pass cannot fail to come to pass and that what cannot fail to come to pass happens of necessity and wilt tie me down to this word necessity I will acknowledge that thou affirmest a most solid truth but one which scarcely anyone can approach to who has not made the divine his special study for my answer would be that the same future event is necessary from the standpoint of divine knowledge but when considered in its own nature it seems absolutely free and unfettered so then there are two necessities one simple as that men are necessarily mortal the other conditioned as that if you know that someone is walking you must necessarily be walking for that which is known cannot indeed be otherwise than as it is known to be and yet this fact by no means carries with it that other simple necessity for the former necessity is not imposed by the things own proper nature but by the addition of a condition no necessity compels one who is voluntarily walking to go forward although it is necessary for him to go forward at the moment of walking in the same way then if providence sees anything as present that must necessarily be though it is bound by no necessity of nature now God views as present those coming events which happen of free will these accordingly from the standpoint of the divine vision are made necessary conditionally on divine cognizance viewed however in themselves they desist not from the absolute freedom naturally theirs accordingly without doubt all things will come to pass which God foreknows as about the happen but of these certain proceed of free will and though these happen yet by the fact of their existence they do not lose their proper nature in virtue of which before they happened it was really possible that they might not have come to pass what difference then does the denial of necessity make? since through their being conditioned by divine knowledge they come to pass as if they were in all respects under the compulsion of necessity this difference surely which we saw in the case of the instances I formally took the sun's rising and the man's walking which at the moment of their occurrence could not but be taking place and yet one of them was necessarily obliged to be while the other was not so at all so likewise the things which to God are present without doubt exist but some of them come from the necessity of things others from the power of the agent quite rightly then have we said that these things are necessary if viewed from the standpoint of the divine knowledge that if they are considered in themselves they are free from the bonds of necessity even as everything which is accessible to sense regarded from the standpoint of thought is universal but viewed in its own nature particular but thou wilt say if it is in my power to change my purpose I shall make void providence since I shall by chance change something which comes within its foreknowledge my answer is thou canst indeed turn aside thy purpose but since the truth of providence is ever at hand to see that thou canst and whether thou dost and whether thou turnest thyself thou canst not avoid the divine foreknowledge even as thou canst not escape the sight of a present spectator although of thy free will thou turn thyself to various actions wilt thou then say shall the divine knowledge be changed at my discretion so that when I will this or that providence changes its knowledge correspondingly surely not true for the divine vision anticipates all that is coming and transforms and reduces it to the form of its own present knowledge and varies not as thou demest in its foreknowledge alternating to this or that but in a single flash it forestalls and includes thy mutations without altering and this ever present comprehension and survey of all things God has received not from the issue of future events but from the simplicity of his own nature hereby also is resolved the objection which a little while ago gave the offence that our doings in the future were spoken of as if supplying the cause of God's knowledge for this faculty of knowledge embracing all things in its immediate cognizance has itself fixed the bounds of all things yet itself owes nothing to what comes after and all this being so the freedom of man's will is taken and laws are not unrighteous since their rewards and punishments are held forth to wills unbound by any necessity God who foreknoweth all things still looks down from above and the ever present eternity of his vision concurs with the future character of all our acts and dispenseth to the good rewards to the bad punishments hopes and prayers also are not fixed on God in vain and when they are rightly directed cannot fail of effect therefore withstand vice practice virtue lift up your souls to write hopes offer humble prayers to heaven great is the necessity of righteousness laid upon you if you will not hide it from yourselves seeing that all your actions are done before the eyes of a judge who seeth all things epilogue within a short time of writing the consolation of philosophy Boethius died by a cruel death as to the manner of his death there is some uncertainty according to one account he was cut down by the swords of the soldiers before the very judgment seat of theodoric according to another the sword was first fastened around his forehead and tightened till his eyes started he was then killed with a club end of book 5 free will and gods for knowledge section 6 and epilogue end of the consolation of philosophy by Ancius Manlius Severinas Boethius and translated by H.R. James