Okay, I think I'm going to start because I have got already so many questions via email so I want to make the best out of our time so good afternoon everyone. A very warm welcome to the from the ANU Center for Arab and Islamic Studies. I'm Karima Lashir I'm the director of the center and also the moderator of this event. I'd like to start by paying my respect to the nonoval and numbery people of the camera region, and to all the first nation Australians on whose traditional lands we meet and work. So, when we can see this event the situation was very alarming between Ukraine and Russia but things have moved quite in a very dangerous turn as there is a full scale Russian invasion of the country. I just heard that the Russian military is very close to cave. This war of course is very multi dimensional and has serious repercussions for the region and globally with this with us to discuss this crisis are two of the best a new expert on Russian and the Eurasian Carol Norzhanov and Matthew Essex. Carol is based at the Center for Arab and Islamic Studies the Middle East and Central Asia at the School of Arts and Social Sciences, and Matthew Essex is based at the strategic and defense studies centered at the edge of Asia and the Pacific. Without further ado, since we need every minute of our time this afternoon, I will invite Matthew and Carol to offer us insight and reflection for about 15 minutes each. And then we will open the floor for Q&A. Please mute yourselves and turn off your videos to ensure that everyone can join in the event because we've got a large audience of over 300 people for this event, and please make sure to send me your questions either via the chat function or wait till the Q&A slot and then you can unmute yourself raise your hands unmute yourself and ask the questions. Thank you all for your cooperation and I'll start with you, Matthew. Thank you very much. Well, thank you so very much Karima and good to see such an enormous turnout for for an event like this would that everything that had anything to do with Russia generated such such a huge turnout but obviously something of great interest to people. I won't take up too much time. I'll thought I thought I would just briefly talk about three things. One, the origins of this conflict. Second, the aims that Vladimir Putin might have. And third, how he's going with that. And what some of the implications might be. And then obviously happy to to take questions after Kirill's had a go and he'll obviously be far more erudite than I am. In terms of causes of conflict, it's fairly customary in political science and international relations to talk about three different types of causes. Or structural causes, so called intermediate causes for wars and then triggering causes. So in other words, the the actual attack, what causes natural attack. And I think it's important to look at two kinds of stories here about how this invasion of Ukraine has come about. The first version of the story comes from the Russian Federation comes from Vladimir Putin. And it is effectively that Russia has been backed into a corner for years and years and years by a West that was, if not actively trying to marginalize weekend and overthrow the Russian government. And the very least, trying to ignore its problems. This narrative has been around for a very long time. In fact, it's a narrative that, although it was not quite as nationalistic and vitriolic. It's a narrative that you can find starting in about 1992 1993. It certainly is not something that was the invention of Vladimir Putin, although of course he has amplified it considerably. In the early 1990s, you had people like Andre Kosilev, the former foreign minister of the Russian Federation under Boris Yeltsin, going off to the CSCE as it was then the conference for security and cooperation in Europe, and giving a speech, which sounded straight out of the pages of Russian ultra nationalism. And he said, Russia regards all of the former Soviet republics as post imperial space. We reserve our rights to exercise sphere of influence over those countries. If anyone else wants to threaten us then we will use the full might of our disposal with our military and up to an including nuclear weapons. He finished the speech and left the room. Everybody was stunned. And he then came back and he said, Well, what I just did was, you know, a sham. It was obviously a ruse, a joke if you like. But he said this is where it's going to go if Russia's concerns aren't taken seriously. A few years later, Yevgeny Primakov, the former foreign minister and former prime minister of Russia had another go at explaining Russian concerns about NATO expansion, and he used to counterfactual. And he said, Okay, well let's consider that the Cold Wars over. And in fact it's the Warsaw Pact that wins, not NATO. The United States says, Well, what are you going to do. And the Warsaw Warsaw Pact says well what we're going to do is we're going to unify Germany under a Warsaw Pact flag, but we don't have any intention to expand. And the United States says can we join. And the Warsaw Pact says no, not yet we're a defensive alliance though you have nothing to fear from us. And then France petitions for membership in the Warsaw Pact is accepted and the United Kingdom petitions for membership in the Warsaw Pact is accepted. And the United States says, Well, what's going on. And the criminal says, I don't worry, we're expanding truly for defensive purposes. Can we join. No, you can't join. The United States petitions for member members of the Warsaw Pact. And then so does Canada. And Primikov's argument was, Well, you know, under those circumstances, wouldn't you feel left out. Wouldn't you feel as though perhaps this was a threat to your security. And has turned this from a series of objections into perhaps even outright fascination with an obsession perhaps with NATO expansion. So the, the, the other side of the story then about the origins of this crisis is that Russia has not been backed into a corner at all. It's been Vladimir Putin. It's been the effectively radicalization of the Siloviki around him, who push him, well not push him actually who go along with him towards, you know, conflict and war and basically a neo imperial posture expand Russia's territorial footprint. So those are the two stories. Who is right. I'm not completely sure that either side is completely right. I spent the majority of my career and I've been watching Russia for about 30 years now. I spent the majority of my career in the least in the early stages, thinking that the Russian line was right that NATO expansion was a very bad thing that it made Russia more insecure. At the last 10 years, however, I've had a bit of a change of heart on that so much so that probably have become one of Australia's more hawkish people. When it comes to the Russian Federation's supposed security concerns when it comes to NATO. And there are a variety of reasons I'd give for that one reason is that it's quite clear that Ukraine itself, or, you know, Estonia or even the NATO Alliance does not threaten Russian security. It doesn't threaten the security of the Russian state because Russia has 6000 nuclear weapons. It has more nuclear warheads than anyone else.  So I think that the threat if there is one from NATO is much less of a threat from an alliance of the military security type I think it's more of a normative threat. I think it's more a threat to the regime of Putin. And the reason I think that in particular I think is demonstrated by Putin's very odd essay, which he published supposedly wrote there is disagreement about whether he did write it, but published halfway through last year, in which he basically said that Ukrainians and Russians were one people, there is no such thing as a Ukrainian. We are being kept apart by the evil NATO the evil West and so forth. If that was odd, then certainly his meeting with his Security Council, and his subsequent angry speech, justifying why Luhansk and the Nets can need to be incorporated sorry need to be recognized as little statelets was I think something that provided further evidence and in it effectively he said Ukraine sovereignty and identity. And he placed the blame squarely at the feet of the rogue regime, basically saying that since the practice in the euro my done Ukraine has not been a sovereign actor and doesn't deserve it anyway, made all sorts of odd suggestions from history such as well and in created Ukraine nonsense, praised Stalin, said Ukraine was getting nuclear weapons seemed you know straight out of the Russian ultra nationalist playbook. And then of course, there was the speech he gave, which was declaring war effectively declaring he was invading Ukraine, in which he went over very similar ground. Unfortunately enough, of course he was wearing the same suit the same tie, and his shirt had the same wrinkles in it, and if you looked at the metadata. It was filmed on exactly the same day as he held his Security Council meeting, so this was entirely pre cooked. Therefore, I think that's, you know the cause of the conflict is Putin's desire to expand a territorial footprint he is in fact pushing closer to NATO, rather than getting rather than trying to move further away from it. So, you know, in his strategic footprint in Belarus takes away the notion that Belarus has strategic autonomy by the fact that he has now 30,000 troops there, who are going to stay indefinitely, and he virtually controls the Pashanka, following the sham elections of last year and the U.S. system. And I think he probably does want to carve out some space in Ukraine for, if not Russia proper, then little stateless. Russia tends to be now surrounded by ceasefires and stateless that he can control, and, you know, effectively increase his, his geopolitical size. As to what he wants. I'll be very brief with this. There are three possible things he wants. One is what he said he wanted, and that is the territory of Donetsk and Luhansk, or is protecting that territory. Interestingly enough, of course, he has chosen to support what the Kremlin back separatists their claim, rather than what they control. Despite the onset of hostilities 70% of that territory was controlled by the Ukrainian army. So that is a much bigger geographical area. Now he says that's all he wants. However, he also says that he is going to demilitarize Ukraine and denazify Ukraine. Again, a very common Russian nationalistic trope that says Ukraine is ruled by Nazis and, and is, you know, horrible far right wing state.  And more than that, it basically says I'm going to do regime change. And when a member of the State Duma, Nikonov was interviewed yesterday he said we are going to put in place a regime friendly to the Kremlin to Russia. So I think it's fairly obvious that Putin wants more than simply independence for Luhansk and Donetsk. The US intelligence on this has been correct once. And interesting that it's been shared with the world before Putin invaded as to how it's going well probably not as well as he thought it was going to go. At least initially now there's a long time, obviously a long time for this to play out, but at least the first 24 hours would suggest that Russia has not achieved all of its military objectives that it would have had for day one. Including in particular, a very audacious bid to capture the airfield, the main military airfield near Kiev, using VDV special forces, paratroopers, and that would have allowed Russia to reinforce its position very close to the Ukrainian capital. I rather suspect that what the plan was was to get into Kiev quickly to capture Zelensky to capture those who are on kill lists and execute them or imprison them, and then install a friendly regime. They probably will Russia probably will end up doing that depends what happens with with Zelensky whether he gets out or not. And they probably will end up doing that, but it'll take them some time and they're going to have to use tanks. And that raises a question I guess also for the Ukrainian military and that is, do we engage in urban warfare in Kiev in Kharkov in, you know, various other places, because the Russians aren't mucking around. They've brought thermobaric weapons basically fuel their explosives that will decimate entire city blocks and if they start using those, then the civilian casualties will be absolutely horrendous. But that's my assessment of the sort of origins Putin's intentions and and how it's going. And with that, let me hand over to Kira. Thank you Matthew. Wonderful, please Carol. Thank you, Matthew. Thank you, Karima. Matthew, as always, you are majestically in your analysis and in preparation for this event, of course, which started about 10 days ago. The idea was that Matthew will be the voice of reason and I'll be a quasi Putin's to trying to rationalize Moscow's behavior. Unfortunately, the past 24 hours rendered this task completely impossible for me because really what Putin is doing right now what has been doing what he has been doing in the past 24 hours seemed genuinely unthinkable to me. I honestly believe that he would not cross the line he would not opt for an invasion. I did believe that he'll end up recognizing the independence of Donbass and Luhansk and Donetsk, but he wouldn't cross the red line. Unfortunately, it happened and all this bloodshed and violence is solely the doing of putting that's his agency. It's his choice. I'm trying to come to terms with this kind of behavior was without really resorting to psychoanalysis or drawing a long reaching parallels with imperial hubris of Putin and as Peter Dutton did a couple of weeks ago in a moment of realistic eloquence he said Putin is about to become a septogenarian. He wants to go down history books as an achiever of things and so hence his behavior is becoming increasingly irrational. As a sleepless night I thought maybe there is indeed something deranged something fantastic work about Putin's disposition, but upon reflection I am still prepared to cut Putin some slack in a very negative very critical way. I do believe that whatever is happening in Ukraine now at the hands of the Russian military is still fairly rational and it is still motivated by considerations of some national security interest, not by the reconstruction of the USSR or the Russian Empire Mark two or Putin's megalomania. And the reason I'm convinced or not convinced I'm tilting to think this way is actually the signals are the signals coming from Moscow from the Kremlin right about now. And after this aggression commenced in the past 20, not 20 for 12 hours probably, Foreign Minister Lavrov and Dmitry Peskov speaking on behalf of Putin said, well we're actually we're prepared to talk. What is at stake is really the neutrality of Ukraine and the diffusion of this NATO's preep eastwards and all that. And, well, it's, there's no jingoism and no this super patriotic internationalist talk that accompanied the adventure in Crimea in 2014, for example. So, but taking a step back unlike Matthew I cannot claim that I have been watching Russian politics for 30 years my kettle of fish is really Central Asia, the former Soviet republics and Afghanistan, and my reading of what possessed Putin and what compelled Moscow to go for such extraordinary violent and ultimately counterproductive length has I think a historical parallel in the Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan in 1979, because now we know that it was not precious megalomania, neither it was the desire for imperial expansion towards the Indian Ocean, it was all security driven, but the Soviet Union badly miscalculated in parrying this largely imaginary threat or overblown threat of the combination of radicals, a turban headed ruffians hooligans who were probing at the Soviet Union's underbelly and the American protrusion from Pakistan and the direction of Central Asia again. So that's the second element of that faithful decision in 1979 to resort to food violence was the perception in Moscow that, well, we have nothing to lose really. The relations with the West are so bad and I get them worse because Carter is winding down the date and the perishing missiles are about to be deployed in Europe and sanctions are coming out our way. So, well, what do we have to lose so hence the troops went in like a ton of bricks, and we all know the story how it unfolded to of course the Soviet Union achieved its security objectives in a weird extremely violent way but then it had to pay a colossal price, and the the adventure in Afghanistan is widely regarded as one of the factors contributing to the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union. So I think this parallel is valid and the Russian leadership in its finite wisdom decided that the threat from Ukraine is very real it's actually gaining momentum. I think you made a very interesting point about the distinction between systemic reasons for the conflict and the trigger points trigger events, and putting the already himself said that one of the trigger points for the major escalation has been Zelensky is quite unwise common that Ukraine is going to get nuclear weapons again. So that that was noticed in the Kremlin and earlier trigger point was the new military doctrine published by Zelensky in March 2021 which basically said not only Ukraine will join NATO Ukraine will help NATO in waging a hybrid warfare against Russian. That's certainly said the alarm bells ringing in Moscow and that's perhaps what triggered the initial deployment, a mass amount of Russian troops on Ukraine's border. So thus, I think Matthew is absolutely correct that Russia could have achieved neutrality of Ukraine or let's say non membership of Ukraine in NATO through other means through this. The alarm bell diplomacy bringmanship. We kind of anticipated this why Putin went with the troops in still remains to be seen. And here. Like Matthew, I can venture three scenarios, perhaps in the reverse light of the implementation compared to Matthew's analysis. So the worst case scenario Putin wants to deny Ukraine sovereignty wants to append Ukraine as kind of a new province to the Russian Federation, so total occupation and subjugation. The second scenario is that indeed it's all about regime change. It will be out of office some kind of puppet government will be installed in Kiev. The third one actually and I don't have a crystal ball I don't have confidence in this scenario at all but I hope against hope that's what Putin thinks really. So putting will capture additional territory in Ukraine, perhaps will take some regional centers, not key if it will be extremely difficult for the Russian military. And then he will bargain for a new settlement with the West with the government of Ukraine as well only this time it will not just be about non membership in NATO and neutrality. This has been increased by Putin now he added on a couple more items and this is recognition of Russian sovereignty over Crimea and of course ironclad guarantees to the now independent republics of Luhansk and Donetsk. So thus, there is still a chance for diplomacy, Putin seems to have a very strong set of cars in his hands right now, tactically, but strategically and in the in the longish perspective midterm to long term perspective. It may backfire spectacularly for Russia and will create enormous problems for putting internationally and even domestically. And I think that this that what when we discuss anything that Putin does and basically the contrast the trajectory of the Russian foreign policy. We should pay close attention to what the locals say and think and it's not just the Russian elite it's also the Russian people. The fact on the ground that it's measured by public opinion polls in Russia is that the war this belligerent attitude of Putin is unpopular in Russia. In one of the recent polls the questions was asked for ordinary Russians well, how do you assess Putin's foreign policy. Put in thumbs up say on the count of standing up to NATO yes he's a good man, ensuring our physical security against the repetition of the Serbia scenario. The same poor reveal that when it came to Ukraine it put in both voted down that he's a criminal relationship with Ukraine he's inability to reach some kind of sensible compromise persuade. And if to assume a neutral stance is regarded by the Russians as as a failure. So hence this attempt to force neutrality with pompons on will not go down is not going down over the Russian public. And we see already demonstrations and dozens of Russian cities that is small, but they will grow in size. And the Russians are protesting not because of their fear of nuclear economic sanctions crime coming from the West, but of course it's the moral outrage. The Russians do not have hatred stores the Ukrainians. And as Matthew mentioned, Putin's forays into some idiosyncratic reading of history which is really weird and bizarre. But on the other hand, if you think about this, the Russians and the Ukrainians are like this, they know a lot about each other and it's difficult really to separate what happens in one country from what happens in another country, but they all want peace and Putin is the violator of peace and that will rebound badly on him. The final comment I would like to make and it's again in no way exonerates Putin's aggressiveness is in my opinion there was so many opportunities to prevent what has eventuated and the my perception is that for an awfully long period of time the West was not taking Russia seriously it was kind of derisory sneering oh well the Russians what do you expect from them Putin in a fit of anger escalated situation they will just threaten him with sanctions he'll blow away it will blow over of course this was a complete and utter misreading of the seriousness of Russia's intentions. It was not Putin it was actually Medvedev the liberal one who advanced the idea that Russia is entitled to a sphere of privileged interests in the former Soviet Union. Did the West react to this in some kind of robust military way drawing a line saying no no no it's not goes on no and conversely the same president of the Russian Federation Mitri Medvedev made an offer to the collective West in 2010 most recently. Let's sit down let's negotiate let's rejuvenate the Helsinki process and make the OEC the organization for security and cooperation in Europe as a collective mechanism that will ensure the absence of war and conflict in Eurasia. He was turned down like a bad spread. The West simply did not listen so thus the West neither deployed some kind of forceful argument in terms of deterring Russia's ambition in the former Soviet Union nor it tried to reach an accommodation. With Russia, perhaps reasonable quick walk or who knows how it may have panned out and just to conclude on a clever authoritative note. That's exactly what George Canon incidentally advised when he talked about firm and vigilant containment of the Soviet Union and by inference. Do not mis underestimate them study them listen to the signals coming from them. Sometimes you have to be able to do them sometimes you need to not compromise unfortunately again this nearing the region and the absence of attention and reactive nature of Western policies who suddenly walk up to the realization that 200,000 troops are enveloping Ukraine. This is a tragic lesson that will be rectified in the future one way or the other. So thank you. Thank you. Fantastic. Thank you. That's really a lot of food for thought, Matthew and Carol. I've already got many questions on the chat books and also I've got few questions coming via email by colleagues who couldn't join us live so you've answered few of the questions. One recurrent question about was about the Russian public opinion is it behind Putin or not I think you've addressed that very clearly. Carol, one question that has been asked by many is about the role of China it is. Many experts, including yourselves would say that's the only person putting with listen to is the Chinese president and because they have this kind of special relationship. What role do you see China playing in this war and related to that another colleague is asking with China use this opportunity to invade Taiwan like to use the same, you know, the same parameter of territorial expansion and ambition. So, and then the second question I'll just give you a few so that you can address it is about the implications for Russia itself within Russia itself you know what kind of implications you see for the country. And one repeated questions time again is about the political economy of this conflict is putting, I have this on email and in the chat box is putting using this to make use of or to manipulate the market economy.  How do you see the political economy of this conflict playing out in the short and long term particularly with that gas pipe from that was initiated and now stopped by Germany how do you see the implication that for. Not only the Russian and the region economy but the blog the global economy at large so if you can please kindly start with this I have loads to put to you through thank you so much to both. Okay, that that's a lot to deal with I might cherry pick some of them, because I wasn't taking notes so I'll let me start with China, shall I. Will China take the opportunity to invade Taiwan know China will if it does decide to invade Taiwan it'll do it based on its own perceptions of what its interests are and based on timing that you know it considers to be right. I think we need to be very careful in simply assuming that because countries are authoritarian they are not only in league with one another in terms of their ideas but also micro manage their strategic policy. This has popped up recently it's absolute complete fiction. It may well be that and China certainly does have designs on Taiwan but that it would be affected by Russia or some kind of master plan I think is best left in the realms of fantasy. That said, I think China and there's another argument I think it's more serious one that says you know China is the only country that stands to benefit out of all this. Because it will see that the heat is being taken off it. The United States under the Biden administration and even the Trump administration as well turned its attention very much to to China, whether a trade war with China or strenuous competition with China.  Yeah, there are aspects of that that's true, but the US hasn't exactly been covering itself with, you know, glory in terms of coming up with an operational Indo Pacific strategy modernizing its Indo Pacific fleet. And most importantly coming up with an economic counter to the Belt and Road Initiative.  China will privately be very irritated with what the Russians are doing here. They certainly weren't happy with what happened in Crimea and made no secret that they were cross about that. They also had interests in Ukraine in terms of Belt and Road connectivity and Ukraine's number one trading partner is China. So, the Chinese will will not be pleased with that they certainly also won't be pleased with Moscow because Moscow tends to go around doing now a lot of intervening. And China claims that it is, you know, one of the torch bearers of non intervention article two of the UN Charter, and of course that's central to Chinese messaging as well associated with its rise, which is okay we will rise peacefully, you know we won't pose a threat to you you won't pose a threat to us no one will we will all respect each other's sovereignty. So, that's the aspect of the sort of, you know, China dimension as far as I'd, I'd go what was some of the other ones. The political economy of the conflict. Look, cure probably knows more about this than I do but of course Russia has had experience with sanctions. So divested away from US dollars and it bought gold instead. And it has a fairly big sovereign wealth fund that it, I think, thinks that it can ride out sanctions. I'm not quite sure it's going to be able to do that for a huge amount of time. It depends how long the international community wants to remain united, because it will dwindle those reserves very very quickly indeed. If it is faced, not just with you know the inability of any of its banks to raise capital in US dollars or in Europe, but also things like export controls in the tech sector export controls and mining. The ideas which the Russian government relies on very much are going to, to be hit and hurt so that there will be pain for Russians as a result of this decision. And when you combine that with the fact that less than 2025% of the population actually agree that war with Ukraine is a good thing. We will have pressure generate some pressure, even though of course, Putin is not beholden to electors at the ballot box the way he might be here, or elsewhere. Thank you, Matthew, Carol, would you like. I would agree with Matthews analysis of where China stands on all this, just to validate this a bit further. The joint statement of Putin and Z dating back to the 4th of February made it very clear China stands with Russia on the issue of NATO China completely buys the Russian narrative NATO expansion is what says bad. They stand shoulder to shoulder to this Western aggressive conduct China is absolutely irritated by the recognition of the separatist republics and China will not of course recognize the appending of new territories should it happen, just like it refused to recognize the annexation of Armenia. I'm not sure what's going to happen to Taiwan of course I find Matthews comment credible there. Now in terms of political economy first starting with the Nord Stream pipeline project. Unless something happened over the past 12 hours, the German position is. Posing the pipeline. I think the German word is yet so for the time being, while indefinitely one till such time that the crisis is resolved. But effectively yes it's going to be put on hold it's not going to generate income to the Russian Federation anytime soon, having said that the cost of the pipeline was between 11 and $15 billion. And more than recoup the that cost of construction already through higher gas prices over the past year. And Dmitry Medvedev who is pretty much in the outer circle of Putin now the he made a very interesting statement. He's saying that we don't really care. Nord Stream working or not working with this crisis propelling natural gas prices in the region of 2000 euros per 1000 cubic meters we're not worried we're going to make a big buck if not in Europe then South East Asia. The writing words maybe depending on the market volatility. Russia will be hit for six in this energy sector but at the moment it's only cocky speech and supreme confidence. We mentioned the sovereign wealth fund, the cushion that Moscow has amassed and it's 635 billion dollars, which will last the Russian economy and social welfare payments for well over a year. By comparison so the most nuclear of the economic sanctions mild at the moment in the West is a Russia's disconnection from swift. Once put the cumulative damage from this act at $50 billion. So can Russia right over this unpleasantness probably it can. Of course there are extra considerations like Russia can no longer borrow money in the West but again, it's a survival. It's in the, there is no immediate prospect of Russia changing his behavior because of economic hardship. The midterm perspective so three to five years and sort of down the track, if the iron curtain descends again and if Russia cannot tap into global finances and especially global technology. This will, this will hurt Russia big time and, but who knows does put in thinking the categories of a week from now a month from our posterity we just don't know. So thanks. Thank you, I suppose the question that is also with the way with her to the world economy you know with the rise of prices of oil and the struggle of many countries to keep oil subsidies in place that would have serious repercussions for many countries around the world particularly with the, as we're coming out of COVID but we can go back to that as well I see one raised hand. Taylor, would you like to unmute yourself and ask the question and then I'll carry on with the chat box thank you Taylor. Alright, thanks very much and thank you to you guys for hosting such an awesome event for people like me to gain insight into such a current world issue it's brilliant. Yeah, moving on to my question. I know we've kind of touched on this but I was just wondering, you know we don't have a crystal ball but what conclusion do you guys see coming if Russia would be successful with their military objectives in the Ukraine which it seems like they probably will be. Yeah, thank you. Thank you. Thanks Taylor. Matthew and Carol do you want another question to go with that. Yeah, yeah, let's have another one. Yeah, so I think you've addressed this question about anti the anti war movement in Russia how significant it is particularly if there are more Russian casualties as we go along with the but one other question that I think is recurrent and I received quite few by email is what role can they to play. I mean they've been very good at threatening. Are they going to pursue that line of and do something with those threat or is just like empty threats, as we've seen also from the European Union. What role can or the United States what role can the United States contribute to the current situation. They're trying to pursue the road of diplomacy but also there was some strong threatening words from the president so could you please address those and then briefly because I've got quite a lot of questions coming. Thank you so much. They're trying to do militarily nothing. They've already said they're going to do nothing repeatedly in fact, and it's one of the things that I think is been a bit problematic in terms of managing Putin is that it gives him a green light. Putin's calculation now look I was one of the few people who said yeah I think Putin will go in to Ukraine I think you will fight and I'd have to take absolutely no comfort whatsoever in being correct about that but it's my assessment would be that the approach to Russia, at least initially after the end of the Cold War was probably far too harsh far too dismissive, but its response after Crimea has been far too weak. And the product frankly of successive administrations kicking the can down the road, and thinking the Russia problem will just go away. It's just made that decisive. It's an inflection point I think for the West and really needs to decide how it's going to step up or not with relation to Russia. Now Biden has said he will defend and protect every centimeter or inch of course it being America of NATO territory. I get bigger. It's interesting that Finland and Sweden are joining the emergency discussions with the NATO Council I think today or tomorrow. And there is a strong push from the fins, finish MPs to to join NATO. It may be in fact, you know when we talk about some of the strategic effects or longer term effects for put in so that one of the counterproductive things he makes NATO bigger, and he makes NATO more united. The addition of countries like Sweden and Finland, those that have had, you know, the closer to Russia you are the more wary you are I think of Russian intentions and I think the less likely you are to buy arguments that you can trade your way to peace which has been the sort of German approach and certainly, I think to some extent the French and Italian approach to. So, does that kind of answer some of those questions. Again, I cannot fail to agree with Matthews analysis. So, technically for the short run putting may have parent the NATO threat, long term implications are absolutely gruesome and green for Russia. So, but the first question was about Russia's military objectives and why I'm sort of not convinced that the objective is physical control and occupation of the whole of Ukraine or even regime change. It's again it's historical precedent 2008 the five day war with Georgia, Russian troops were poised on the really scourge approaches to the national capital Billy see they could have taken that the law hanging for Georgia is much smaller than Ukraine, they didn't. They achieve the objectives destroyed the military infrastructure NATO trained forces of Georgia were absolutely pulverized than they withdrew, but of course, loitering with intent enough hasn't also set a ensuring good behavior of Georgia in the future. So, I think that's actually more likely scenario for Ukraine in the future so the conflict may become frozen indefinitely but please in this crude, very horrible way putting will ensure Ukraine's neutrality. The US role and in the deterring putting in the changing his religion behavior. Matthews said in Patrick know I would add actually it was cringe worthy for me to hear the message from London from Boris Johnson, Boris Johnson or Ukrainians fight for your freedom. But we'll give you more on courage with maybe throw in some arms but you fight, we stay away from all this. So, in Russian Ukraine, there's actually quite a cynical program in circulation that the West is prepared to fight Russia in Ukraine until the last Ukrainian soldier. And this is, again, this is exactly the signal that encouraged Putin, perhaps to step over the red line because he understood there'll be, there'll be no military consequences for Kim doing this.  And just this harsh silence and the capitals of the former Soviet republics including in Central Asia is such a great testimony to this. They do not dare to even raise concerns about Russia's behavior. It's a deathly silence that cowering thinking well, well, Putin says that the Ukraine is an exception Russia expects everyone else is sovereignty in the former Soviet Union but is it really the case. Right, I, there's another question about comparing this invasion to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. I mean, they are for people like us who work on the Middle East, it's actually brings quite a powerful question because they were both based on the idea of, you know, peacekeeping and spreading democracy. And the, the person who is asking the question is saying why that is such a different international reaction to both invasions, which is very pertinent question. I'm not sure there was a different international reaction to, to both of them I was certainly around for Iraq. And I remember when 150 of Tony Blair's own members of parliament voted against him. On the state level rather than the people they were must protest in the UK against the war, as well as in major European capitals but I suppose the question is on the state level because there's a lot of condemnation of the invasion of Russia on state level rather than people level. I'm not necessarily sure what the analogy is frankly given look I'm not a Middle East expert but you know, I mean if you're asking the question you know wasn't the US just as much to blame in going into Iraq as Russia into Ukraine. Yeah, sure.   I think what makes this different is that the problem with the Middle East is that the invasion of Iraq upset the Middle Eastern security order in that the US took away the one person that everybody agreed that they hated more than Israel. And in the form of Saddam Hussein. Ukraine. I'm not really sure has has been doing an enormous amount to to threaten Russia I mean you're all says yeah you know it has a military doctrine where it says will contribute to hybrid and a lot kind of thing well, you know Russia is the hybrid power excellence. You only have to go to, you know, Stockholm or Helsinki or to Tallinn to to or to Warsaw to, you know, experience the reach of Russian messaging disinfo propaganda and so forth. And so in the Iraqi context or the Iraq war context I don't think the United States was upsetting the international order too much. I do think that in going into Ukraine, what Putin has done has gone into that sort of middle ground or quasi neutral type region that now does for better or worse thrust the world back to about 1989 or possibly 1987 in terms of security at the moment so possibly 1997 depending on where you draw the lines. And that that poses a huge credibility question for NATO and for the United States, which is well what happens when Putin decides that the polls don't deserve to exist as a sovereign country, and they have no identity. Well the Estonians have no identity, although Lithuanians or Latvians what happens then. So I think that this is, you know, something that's going to be profoundly shocking, and requires probably a response that's slightly more robust than the one we've seen so far. Well, I'll be quick I think that actually there's actually married to this question and compels us to think about the changing nature of global international relations. In these cases I think we have a situation where a big power reacts to an adversary under some kind of cloud of hypertrophied security concern, except the United States in 2003 was a superpower in many ways in 2003. It was synonymous with international law. I mean of course they were murmurs from old Europe and the criticism came from other quarters but America was a trans setter America decided what is right and what is wrong on the international law. There was subsequent atonement and Mac Calphe but at the time it was pretty obvious. Now fast forward to 2022 and Russia, Russia by no stretch of imagination, despite its 6000 plus now warheads is a trend setter up holder or interpreter of international law. Obviously, the criticism of Russian action would be much more severe, although I noticed that I can't explain this food for thought the so called global international coalition against Putin is struggling a bit. And of course NATO and the collective West Australia show solidarity but it's not just China look at India Pakistan, Gulf monarchies Brazil, Argentina, well, what, where are they why aren't they falling in line and this castigation and a problem to put in. Perhaps the international order is not what it used to be in 2003 Russia could not have possibly attack Ukraine in 2003. Well, in 2022 just miscalculated perhaps, but there'll be no immediate fallout threatening. Thank you. Thank you to both going back to the question of the role of other international organization there are few questions on the role of EU, as well as the UN, what can the UN do. Given there was an emotional message from the UN Secretary General begging Russia to stop. Is there something else that they could do in practice like kick rush out of the Security Council, probably most impossible. And Matthew you spoke about putting pushing for so called the notification of Ukraine given as you said the President is Jewish himself. What implication has that that for the region itself with that upset Germany. One colleague is asking but also has it got implication for Israel itself Israel maintains very good relations with Ukraine. It has declared it respect for international law, which is very fascinating for a country like Israel in breach of many international laws, but at the same time, the Israel relationship with Russia. Be careful not to upset Russia so what do you see the ramifications of these issues. Thank you. Well it's it's put Israel in a kind of awkward position because on the one hand Israel vetoed the refuse to request for iron dome missile systems missile defense systems to go to to Ukraine. On the other hand, it's probably been lent on quite heavily by the United States, as well as of course having its own you know domestic, you know political constituency public opinion, requiring a response so that's why they've come out and condemned Russian behavior. You know other countries India Pakistan yeah you know India has a good trading relationship with Russia it's reliant on Russia for 60% of its military kit. We're going to get it. Well perhaps the US but it costs more. And that's going to take time. Pakistan, yeah, you know, Pakistan previously massive mega recipient of USA, during the war on terror now increasingly close to China in run Khan was, you know, in, in, in Moscow meeting Putin. He's been fusing what you know special times he was exciting times I think he said that he was visiting in. In terms of the, you know what is it, what's the effect on Germany of that kind of kind of language no I don't think it has a huge effect. It has a rhetorical effect that it will be assumed okay this is just the way that Putin does his messaging, and it's reflective of, you know, various Eurasian as do unite kind of tropes that you find in in Russian politics and society so I don't think necessarily it's going to bite that deeply even though people would find it deeply off putting. Karima I'll deal with the first question then and it's international agency in finding a solution to the conflict, we have to distinguish between the immediate action and long term action and of course while we're sitting here in rainy conditions where people are dying on the ground in Ukraine, and the US United Nations, unfortunately can do very little about it right now, so in terms of immediate cessation of violence. What can and should and really ought to happen is some kind of international broker who has enough hoods and enough credibility both with all sides to come in and do something about this. If you recall in 2008, as the Russians were closing on Belize there was an angel of peace descending upon the battlefield and it was a sarcosis the president of France. He was certainly not qualified to fulfill this role he failed already, when he tried to engage in shuttle diplomacy, so it will have to be someone else and who cannot be a Nelson Mandela kind of a peacemaker I just don't know. What I noticed though is that the international Red Cross is already part of the action and in the best spirit of impartiality and humanitarian attitude it renders the systems to humanitarian assistance to people trapped both in and don't suffering from action from the Ukrainian forces and of course in the territories that are now being pummeled by the Russians to what extent the ICRC can reach an understanding a ceasefire humanitarian corridor. Again, I just don't know. In the long term, of course, the agency of the EU and NATO will be supreme. They will have to deal with regeging the security architecture in Europe. I agree with Matthew that Finland and Sweden are more than likely to join the Euro force may again be resuscitated as an appendage or rapid deployment force the disposal of NATO but it's a matter of years it's not like material to the immediate cessation of while. Thank you. Thanks. A few questions about who is next in Russia's war of aggression. Would it be Moldova would it be one of the other countries in Central Asia who who is next next on the chart of the imperial expansion and few colleagues are asking this question time again. If Ukraine approach NATO and asked for help military help directly. Do you think that NATO would say no. Wouldn't they said some sense of help. I've got so many questions here. Matthew, could you please answer them briefly and then I can take you through so that I can be fair to everyone and whoever is online please feel free to raise your hand if you want to ask a question directly. Thank you. Okay, will NATO help in terms of boots on the ground. No, Zelensky asked in fact and his press conference that he just held today said I asked all 27, you know, 27 countries what are you going to do, and I received silence back. He will probably have, you know, he'll get sold javelins and stingers and, you know, non lethal equipment as aid by various NATO members, including the United States Australia has said we will provide non lethal aid to Kiev. But that's going to probably be more important for you know resistance, rather than in the aftermath of the conflict. The main hostilities that is then in the current phase as to who's next that's a favorite game of Russian strategic policy and you know politics watches, where does Putin go next. I always thought it was going to be North Kazakhstan after Nazarbayev died. I was wrong about that. But, you know, right more recently in the sort of CSTO context where you know you had peacekeepers going in very very briefly, you know to clean up the streets of the terribly, the terribly volatile streets of Kazakhstan which is really just a sort of power play purge. The next he may go to Transnistria and Moldova, Biden has been hinting that's my might be what he wants. I suppose my perspective on, and it depends whether or not there is a diplomatic solution and here I probably disagree a bit with curio in terms of, you know, a diplomatic angel. I just don't see how diplomatic out what a diplomatic angel has to broker, because the question put in has posed is, or demand he's made is wind back the security system that was put in place beginning in 1993 1994. And it's completely unacceptable to the West and they're not going to say yes to that, and they're not going to blink to it and they're not going to bring in new institutions for new realities I've been reading that since 1991. And that is whatever you know the outcome of the conflict will be and whatever attitude the United States and NATO takes to Russia in. Thanks to Russia in future I imagine that you know the dies cast now and no one will believe put in ever again in the West, and he will turn himself into you know complete pariah from that region of the world for probably the rest of his time in office. All right, well, I can just second methods and emphatic no NATO will not help in any form or shape militarily as to who's next my hunch is nobody provided that they own good behavior as far as Moscow is concerned they told the line they acknowledged that Moscow has the risk security, national security interest to pursue on the sovereign territories, I abstain from getting too close to with the West and go for a bit during NATO. So Georgia has been on good behavior since 2008 well really since 2010 since I actually went so nobody talks about Georgia succumbing to the clutches of the bear. The new government in Moldova, Sandu said, look, we're taking a pause in terms of our deliberations on NATO membership. Fine, the Russian said okay we can deal with this. And of course, just a couple of days ago, well, just as Putin was making an announcement about the recognition of Donbass. The other president came on a visit to Moscow, and they, they hit it famously with Putin, and I leave said well Russia and Azerbaijan are like this strategic partners, and all that, because I leave apparently made the comment that our rapprochement with Turkey will not progress beyond limits that are acceptable to Russia. So something like this. Thank you. Thank you so much. I've got. I'm trying to syncretize the question so that I don't repeat the same them to you. Who would put in listen to who you think would be apart from the rich Russian cronies and possibly China. Anybody else who could do the diplomatic bid. And do you think that this war will turn up into a gorilla war that will tear apart, not only Ukraine but also the Eurasian region itself. And if putting fail in this mission. Do you think Ukraine could join or the would be encouraged to join NATO given what we've been covering so far. Matthew. Okay. He just put in listen to put in this is to put in. He in the past has sometimes listened to such in he sometimes in the past has listened to, you know, other members of his inner circle. But I think he sees himself as the best arbiter of what is right and what is wrong for Russia. I think he views himself very much as you know the the only one who's got the the answers. Increasingly, I think, you know, looking at perhaps his legacy or you know his view that whoever replaces him won't be able to do as good a job. Does he listen to she well I would have thought that China would probably tell him have told him not to invade Ukraine, and he certainly went ahead and did that. I don't know. I don't think there is anyone else who will sway put in. And if you look at his Security Council meeting, where he put everybody on notice where he, you know, basically slapped down love of where Medvedev had to turn himself into a hardliner. You know, he completely humiliated Nadezhkin, the head of the SVR. He was certainly sending the message that I am in complete control, whether that continues, if you know the inner circle decides well you know the old man's getting a bit crazy. I don't know. I think they're all very terrified of him and I don't think that they would move against him. He's thrown into a guerrilla war, definitely in Ukraine, broader Eurasia probably not the spillover. The spillover possibilities really aren't there unless you get spillover to say Romania, or perhaps Moldova. But yeah, I think definitely there will be some kind of attempt by Ukrainians, whether they live in Donetsk or Hansk, or if it is regime change, you know, in places in the north and in Kiev to to bleed Russia as much as possible. All right, so to whom does Putin listen. I don't want to sound banal or controversial but Putin does listen to the Russian people, at least from time to time he is not as omnipotent and all knowing as the western media portrays him. I cannot provide you an example of Putin changing his foreign policy as a result of demotic pressure but mostly domestically it happens all the time and right about now, for example, there is a third round of the pension reform in Russia. So social spending is about to be cut. Putin is absolutely terrified about this. It's not just demonstrations in Russian history that came very nearly to upsetting the balance of power occurred not in support of Alexei Navalny or some noble moral cause. It was always about pensions, it was all about cutting wealth benefits to the Russian population. So thus, if that grounds for public opinion will come to bear upon Putin where people really feel the pinch. Well, that would be a cause for him to act. Gorilla war in Ukraine. Oh, absolutely hypothetical and again I'm not sure this is going to happen. Putin occupies Ukraine that will be the real movement freedom fighters all over, but it's it's it's the worst case scenario because there are plenty of Putin loyalists in Ukraine, the quiz links or fifth columnists. Just think about this Ukrainian skill in Ukrainian some Putin resides over it it said it's not an optimal solution and must be avoided at all costs really. Thank you, Sam. Could you please unmute yourself and ask your question. Yes, thank you. I'm just interested with this been some. We've heard a denial of you know we can't psychoanalyze Putin and he does listen to some people. There's some sort of democratic thing. I'm interested in whether we know we've learned anything about the kind of processes of decision making in the Kremlin, or maybe it's just confirmed or we already knew. Yeah, so just a question is about the kind of decision making processes and whether we've learned anything about that. Matthew. Yeah, that that's a really good question. I mean, I, I've been looking at Russia for a while and even as it trended anti democratic in the last yachts in years and then certainly under the Putin years. There is a form of institutional bargaining that takes place in terms of decision making in the Russian Federation. Particularly when it comes to things like investment because investment funds have been scarce, opening up the Far East, for instance, and the energy sector, the power of Siberia to plants now typically it is of course, both the oligarchs and those who are developing gas, you know, gas pipelines and gas fields that get the funding rather than those, you know, who are asking for funding for schools for infrastructure for follow on services and so forth. So, in terms of the way this plays out with the mechanics of the way that, you know, bureaucratic politics plays out in Russia, that there is a form of consent. Well, if not consensus then bargaining and winners and losers and they go through a process security affairs, you know supposedly do the same thing within the context of the Security Council, but then again, it does depend very much on the perspective of the matter, how much Putin is invested, and where different Kremlin tribes are at a particular time so for instance, the FSB used to be absolutely supreme, in terms of, you know, its influence over decision making on Russia. Then there was an internal ruckus and show you in particular had to hold back the tide and you know the word was that hang on the armed forces are not getting the credit that they do. So, show you, you know was was kind of elevated this is putting strategy however he keeps some up some down and keeps them all on their toes. I think the one thing we do have to be very careful about is this notion that Putin decides everything in Russia it's absolutely not the case. He decides the overall strategic direction. And also when there are problems. He works out what the solution is. So, the decision making process for something like shall we recognize Luhansk and Donetsk. Obviously that is something that does come from Putin. In fact, if you looked at some of the, you know, not just metadata but some of the eagle eyed photos of watches, both put in watches and the watches of those in the Security Council at that meeting. It does look as though he signed the decree to least yes the sign the decree to recognize Luhansk and Donetsk before that meeting had even taken place. It's kind of undercuts the idea that there is you know institutional bargaining over such an important thing but over other aspects of policy they're most certainly years. Thank you, Carol. So, so I will approach your question from a slightly different perspective, Matthew covered the institutional aspects of decision making brilliantly, but I would like to use two adjectives it's dynamic and interactive. So, to say that Putin has some amazing grand plan would be an absolute misreading of the situation. It's flexible and I dare say that even two weeks ago a plausible outcome in Ukraine without this violence without this work would have been possible. Well, the Russian foreign policy establishment spearheaded of all things the communist party of the Russian Federation sent out a filler to the West and to Ukraine, because it's the communists who initiated the bill in the Russian Duma to recognize Donetsk and Luhansk zero reaction. Well, let's take it on board let's escalate it a bit further. So that's what Putin thinks or does to today may not be reflective of how he used to think, or what he did maybe a year or two before. So Lavrov is on record on someone occasion saying Minsk process Russia recognizes total sovereignty of Ukraine and we swear by it will change the quite dramatically so the final bit he is. The process is busy and time it's not transparent at all, but recall it's Churchill who use that metaphor it's an enigma wrapped in a mystery and so on and so forth. But then Churchill finish that quote with his, his own approach that it's all about the national interest. The national interest is well articulated that has been constant for maybe 15 years now it's just the ways this national interest is achieved very quite considerably and situational. Thank you. Thanks Carol Matthew so two more questions that I see recurrent in the chat box what about Australia. I mean, I think Morrison condemning in the strongest term the invasion of Ukraine. Do you think Australia will send troops, what do you think the position of Australia would be given that it's offering a to Ukraine. So that's one question the other one going back to my favorite region the Middle East. I mean, Russia has missed up Syria a big time I mean they've destroyed the country they broke that brutal regime of Assad and nobody took notice of that they're only taking Ukraine. How do you think that venture in the Middle East affected Russia flexing its muscle and gaining more confidence in Eurasian and in its own surrounding region. And second, how do you see the role of Turkey and Iran they're both in a very tricky positions Turkey is a member of NATO but it's also a good friend in a kind of way with with Russia because they buy arms from Russia they are trying they are really not happy with the West they turn to Russia so it's very hard for them to condemn they're keeping a very neutral almost neutral but quite a subtle way of making comments about the situation. Iran is even worse because the Iranians have a very tricky situation with the Americas they want to go back to the nuclear program discussion but they don't want to upset Russia So how do you see this this is playing out in this particular region as well. Thank you both. Hey, Carol, do you want to do the Middle East Turkey and I'll do Australia. Sure, absolutely. So first Syria and how it affected the situation in Ukraine in a couple of ways for me the Russia's involvement in Syria since 2015 is a clear cut case of again it's a security driven process. It's not about standing up to America and restoring the Soviet Union's global outreach. Russia has clearly identified security interests and one of the second tier security interests that has been accomplished in Syria is quite an extraordinary rate of rotation of the Russian military personnel through Syria. Pretty much from the battalion level up every Russian officer has been to Syria and done this and that. And the reasonable precision of Russian strikes in Ukraine has been attributed to I saw some discussion with the Russian open sources to the well trained officer for who had experienced the delights of mass destruction in Syria and of course Basha already said, look, no problem with recognition of Luhansk and Donetsk, all you need to do is to ask so at least a chink in the global outrage against Putin's aggression in terms of Turkey and Iran I kind of joked with a colleague just this very morning that Erdogan may be that angel, you know, who will come, who belongs to NATO but also has good relations with reasonable relations with Putin, it's too frivolous I don't want to probe any further. Of course, Turkey now stands shoulder to shoulder with the rest of NATO in terms of castigating Russia but Erdogan is quite capable of surprise he's been around long enough and is a master politician. And Iran, Iran, just like China, of course, solidarized with Russia in terms of labeling NATO and aggressive power, you know, it has been reticent in terms of the most recent development. But this is to add to an earlier question about Russia and China and Taiwan, lest we forget it's all in the Pacific is also quite important. And in recent times, the trilateral naval exercises have been held. So China, Russia, and Iran and if the trend continues, they'll only get bigger and better and more threatening to Australia. Now what does Australia do. Well, look, obviously Australia is a bit player in all of this. Ukraine is a long, long way away and I think there's no surprise that there has been linkage in terms of political elected official elected people. And it's now drawing, you know, comparisons between what Russia is doing and what China might do reflecting Australia's own sort of security pathologies I think so. But that said, I do think it's important in a number of ways that we don't often focus on in relation to how Canberra sees its role in the world. And the first one is that we have put on an awful lot of store on the notion of values and principles and rules based order and so forth and standing up to authoritarian states standing up to bullies standing up for, you know, those who are democratically elected. So I think it's our response is actually quite important in that it's not just simply virtue signaling to the United States or to the European Union but if you actually go to have this as the bedrock or part of the bedrock of your foreign and security policy. Then what happens in Ukraine is just as important as what happens in Taiwan or what happens in Myanmar or what happens even closer to home. So I think the, the issue of the conflict in Ukraine is is quite symbolically important for Australia in terms of walking the walk as well as talking the talk in its in its sort of security affairs. Beyond that, yeah, well provide some non lethal assistance to Ukraine apparently we're going to be providing some cyber assistance to obviously we won't know what that is. We will probably never know what that is. But one would assume that there will be sharing of intelligence sharing of signals sharing of intercepts, possibly some offensive cyber by the black hats. But again, we just don't know. Thank you. Thank you, Matthew. So, possibly the last question unless anybody wants to come in from the participant here raised that hand and ask question. So it appears that Russia launched three types of war against Ukraine one was a propaganda one about fact that Ukraine is an artificial country, it doesn't have a national identity is so divided ethnically and there is no real nation and apparently they pursue that quite passionately within Ukraine itself and also with the public in in Russia the second war was the same cyber attacks there were a series of cyber attacks that apparently has caused a lot of havoc in Ukraine and of course the third one is the military one. How do you see the use of history this divide and rule being pertinent to Ukraine. I mean given that question of the Russian speaking minorities, who apparently in my understanding are defined themselves as Ukraine, but they are Russian speaking without the diversity of the nation which is very common in that part of the world. How do you see these three types of war interconnected and how really is this use of history to abuse and pursue this imperial ambition. Thank you very much. I might just come in on the sort of information war side. It's interesting that you know that the typical target of information war like this is effectively diaspora communities right. And of course there's plenty of them whether you whether you're in Ukraine you find plenty of those who would be Russian speakers who increasingly less identify with themselves as Russian. And I actually make the same argument in frankly of Kazian south city to with people who you know provided Russian passports and like well what am I going to do with this. I'm a Georgian am I, but I speak Russian. Same thing with the stoner and so forth. That's one aspect to Russia's information strategy I think directed directly against Ukraine. But the other part of the information strategy is directed against disaffected people in the West in particular. And that's been the most interesting development over the last, you know, five, eight years or so is that desire to reach out to people who feel that their government lies to them then the media lies to them. They've been behind by globalization. They have various other access to grind and push this sort of narrative about ethnicity and culture and citizenship and frankly blood. And it's very much a, I think a racial argument that's being made that really does I think animate and bring together a lot of those we associate, particularly with the alt right in the United States, but also the pro brexit forage movement and the minority and so on other groups of course within Germany and France and so forth so it is a message that is appealing because sort of talks back to what Huntington said about civilizations and I certainly don't endorse the civilization or thesis but he had an interesting thing to say about what makes people fight. And he said that faith and family and blood and belief, what people ultimately fight for and will die for. And I think that's been recognized very much by propagandists in the internet research agency in St. Petersburg but also more broadly in the FSB in the SVR, and it's been weaponized quite successfully more outside the immediate zone of conflict right now than necessarily within it. Well, essentially all history writing is political. We all know this, but some countries weaponize history more efficiently than others and of course Matthew already went through the main points and Putin's idiosyncratic historical speech. My reading of it is slightly different, I think he was actually targeting domestic audiences the Russians themselves, trying to explain why his own Ukraine policy has been such a disaster so far. In that very speech, this caused the fact that since independence, Russia had longed $250 billion into Ukraine through subsidized gas prices mostly. So thus the Russians may ask a given question and we are at war what what gives and how come and Putin shifts the blame of course on Lenin it's even in my infinite wisdom I could not overcome that horrible legacy, the mistakes Lenin had created. So, of course, the Russian propaganda uses a lot of historical anecdotes tropes and narratives but the reverse is actually quite true as well. Not everything that comes from Ukraine by way of this uplifting national discourses, factually correct or benign, suffice it to say, look, again, I have to be very careful about what I'm saying I'm not exonerating Putin at all I think he made a huge mistake and this war is absolutely disgusting. But the Ukrainian government has its own share of mistakes, including abuse of history. Well, the post my done government, not the landscape but his predecessors, habitually referred to Russophonic people in the east of Ukraine as who mentioned and deformed creatures, not worthy of living in Ukraine. So the last guy of course has rectified those mistakes, but people remember and there's residual sympathy in, you know, in the, to the east of the neeper towards the Putin narrative that oh my God, you know, all those neo-nazis coming from the west of Ukraine are squeezing you, squeezing you out of your comfortable cultural space. So dangerous games, everyone plays a history worse but perhaps Putin has weaponized it more successfully than others. Thank you. Thank you so much. I think I'm going to give you a break. Matthew and Carol, we grilled you for an hour and a half. That was incredibly sophisticated. Thank you so much for answering all our questions and thank you to all attendants. This will be posted on our website as well as on YouTube in due time. I wish to end by expressing our solidarity with the Ukraine people and hoping that things will be resolved in the best possible way. And Carol, I really buy into your theory that Erdogan can be the angel of peace in this case. So let's hope for the best. Thank you all very much. Thank you everyone. Thank you.


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Students, in this module, I will discuss about the software architecture which has evolved over the last 60 or 70 years with reference to making the databases work on the internet. Things were not what we are seeing today, they started off very very differently because that was not the purpose for which the network or the internet is being used today. And of course, there were issues about the technology, about the processing power which I will discuss. So, a term terminal over here means that a teletype machine with little or no processing power and the client server environment which we are using today. So, I will give a very brief as a matter of fact an oversimplified historical overview of the last 70 years starting from the 1950s or may be 40s also. And this is overview is oversimplified just to give you an idea how things have evolved over the period of time. And of course, this has a benefit of hindsight also because what was happening during the last 60 or 70 years, it seemed apparently that there was no direction. But when we look back, we can see of course there was a direction also. So, let me first go over our time or temporal overview and then I will look at the pros and cons what has happened and in the positive sense what has increased, what has decreased of course in the positive sense and then I will do a comparison of the different architectures. So, if we look at how things have evolved, the computer age up to 50s mainframes and dumb terminals. Dumb terminals are the terminals, text terminals, teletype machines without any processing power and they are connected to the mainframe and they are running applications on the mainframe and there are many many issues with it. And then there was the rise of the operating system. Operating system instead of the programmers writing routines to do certain things, all of those things were made part of a larger program which kind of encapsulated the hardware and that program was the operating system. And that led to the structured programming also because there were many complaints about programming the projects not getting completed, so which I will discuss in the subsequent slide. And in the 1970s there was a revolution which was of the personal computers, PCs and the processing power moved out of the rooms onto the desktop. And in the 90s we have the world wide web, the growth of the internet and now we have the processing power in our palms, in our smartphones, in our touch phones and the future is open. So this is just a brief overview, historical overview. Now let's look at what has increased, what has decreased over this period of time. So the story so far there is a rapid increase in the processing power and the good news is that with this rapid increase in the processing power the cost has been decreasing. Now it costs less to have more processing power as compared to yesterday, as compared to last year. Then is the rapid increase in the bandwidth, in early days there was only the copper, now we have fiber optic, we have satellite communication, we have Wi-Fi and so on. The list goes on, we have ADSL also. And then of course is the decrease in the communication cost. It has become more affordable to transmit data over the internet. Sometime back it used to cost a lot to make a telephone call overseas, now we know it costs a fraction, a fraction of that amount. Then of course with all this there has been an increase in the computers and software applications and no wonder the person who was behind the operating system, who was behind these applications for a long time was the richest person in the world. But then is a growing backlog of software projects due to difficulties in programming. So we had the structured programming, further details is not part of this course. And persistent curious about the lack of productivity with many computerized programs and operations. But there is one thing more, customized software development costs a lot, even with structured programming, even with different routines and tools and utilities, it still costs a lot. And the complaints about difficulty in using computers have resulted in computer use become more intuitive, more user friendly, more widespread and it has been become popular with the children also. So this is just an overview, the positives and the negatives. Now let us compare, now what has happened over this period of time? There has been a tremendous change in the software architecture of the machines which are behind our web based database applications. So here is the comparison, now you can see certain major differences, now this is the which was used historically and this is what we have now. So you see that the operating system was only with the server, now we have the operating system with the server and we have something over the client over here also. So the client is, this is a dumb client, this is a smart client with CPU and processing power. Then of course we have the data displays here also, data displays here also, but we have this browser over here, the browser was no longer over here. Now we see that instead of all things jumbled together, they have been separated and we have HTML file, this is all public domain. So what is the benefit of all, the benefit of this architecture is that it now supports what we want it to do and it has resulted in proliferation of internet all over the world. So this is all I have for this module, thank you.


From Austin, Texas, it's theCUBE covering DockerCon 2017, brought to you by Docker and support from its ecosystem partners. Hi, I'm Stu Miniman, joined with my co-host, Jim Kobielus, and we're here with theCUBE at DockerCon 2017. When I talked to John Furrier, he said, Stu, you know, at DockerCon, we're going to give Solomon Heikson founder, we're going to get Ben Gallup, the CEO, and we're also, of course, going to get Marianna Tessel, who is the EVP of strategic development. Marianna, thank you for having us back again and we've been having a great event. How are everything with you? Thank you, first of all. Yeah. It's great, great. I mean, this is the second day of DockerCon and I think we had a great set of announcement yesterday and amazing set of announcement today as well, so it's really going great. And, you know, I've been roaming the exhibit all and actually a couple of people said this was one of the best shows they've been part of and that this very engaged audience is great, is great to hear. Yeah, from the keynote yesterday, the word that stuck out to me is really scaling. You know, as we talk about scaling deployment, it's just scaling the ecosystem and the show itself. So, you know, I was at that first DockerCon when we were like wedged in that hotel room as Ben joked.  The cubes usually a little bit smaller footprint than we have at some other shows, but Austin, first of all, you picked great locations. I mean, San Francisco, you know, Seattle here, looking forward to, we announced yet where next year's is. I don't think we announced that yet. Usually it happens in the afternoon. Okay, but you know, here in Austin, so talk to us a little bit about some of those announcements, the stuff that you're excited about with growing the ecosystem. You know, I'm going to continue to theme you started with scale and obviously, like you said, a lot of things are changing and scaling. One of the things we've noticed that more and more companies and enterprises have really started to use that, to use us more in scale and more in production, more apps, more of that going on. And one of the trends we've noticed that actually Ben covered on stage today is that there's not just kind of the bleeding edge development and all new apps, web apps, but actually we're starting to see more of a traditional apps coming on board as well and more traditional apps saying, wait a second, I want those benefits as well. I don't know if I want to go all the way to the extreme of rewriting my code and going to microservices, but I can reap a lot of the benefits from dockerizing and putting our tools on top. So we've actually seen more and more of that in more and more companies. So, yeah. The discussion actually with Solomon, we talked this morning, is he was like, oh, I don't know what Lego set we are. And I said, you know that green flat piece that you can build everything on top of? So you can have your space set and your castle and all the pieces there. You want to be a platform that can build. It goes into one of the announcements you guys had today. It's the modernized traditional applications. Maybe walk us through a little bit what that means, that mix of the microservices versus traditional apps and how that, do you guys see yourselves participating in customer's journey? Right. So, yeah, when we call this program, by the way, there has a nickname, MTA. But, you know, it's like you said, what we've seen is customers and users that want to have benefit of the, you know, across the board with the right new code as they have more traditional apps with traditional stacks. And what we came up with is a way for you to move from more traditional to the new and dockerizing really quickly, using our tools that really quickly. And in there, one of the things we also announced today is a go to market and a program, basically a good program that helping customers to do that. And we have great partners that we announced today and I'm sure we're going to have even more with Microsoft, Avanon, HPE and Cisco. Avanon, what we're going to basically provide is a way for you very quickly to start seeing the benefit, taking a traditional app and within days, in fact, like five days, you should be able to already get it in a modern state and start seeing the benefits from that. And, you know, it's something that we're going to encourage customers to do and again, very quickly see the benefits. In fact, we had a customer today, Noren Trust, who's already been doing that, talking about the benefits they've been seeing, they've been seeing from this program. So, yeah. Mariana, in terms of developer enablement, that's everything to getting dockerizing, to make dockerizing a universal phenomenon for wrapping legacy systems, for refactoring existing code, for building greenfield applications. What will docker do to continue to improve the experience of Project Mobi as an enabler for your ISV ecosystem? Going forward, how do you see the experience of front end in front of Mobi evolving to enable greater simplicity and speed of development? Yeah, first of all, I have to say that one of the magic, you know, the secret sauces of docker is our user experience and the way we made technologies sometimes that were already available, super accessible and super useful for developers and ops and users. So I would say that's definitely something that we have the DNA to do. And, you know, in a project in Mobi, we see ISVs and companies and not, it doesn't have to be a company, it could be like users or it could be a company that can come in and collaborate and really create a new component or a new project from what we're going to put there and hopefully others as well is a whole set of his Lego building blocks that they can assemble. Are there any plans of dockers to provide task-oriented skins or experiences on Mobi for different roles, I mean, different developer roles associated with particular projects? You know, task, wrapping in a legacy system is a different task, obviously, from developing a green field containerized application. So to what extent will you evolve the tool to enable more task-oriented roles specific interface? Yeah, I would say that, you know, as part of Mobi and across the company, we do have this realization that it could be that developers started to use docker first, but actually ops and even like we talked about traditional IT is pretty prevalent. So our idea, our thought is really to cater to all of these audiences and kind of understand, have a conversation with them and understand what exactly they need, what make them productive. An example of what I mentioned with the MTA program, the modernized traditional apps, that when he started more towards, you know, maybe an ops audience, you know, so like different things we do, we try to understand our audience and engage with them and see what's going to make them most productive, both in terms of tool set and in terms of how we, you know, bring it to them. Right, right. Mariana, we had the opportunity to have some of the, you know, partner keynote speakers on theCUBE, John Gosman on from Microsoft yesterday, we had Mark Kavage on from Oracle here. There's a lot going on, maybe give our audience just a little flavors to some of the other partner activity going on here that we might have missed, you know, if we weren't watching closely. Right, I mean that was first start and I think we had the same conversation last year and just like explaining how important it is for us that we work well with our ecosystem. It's a big part of our plan and strategy and again, confirm realization that customers want to use choice, different things. They were not alone in the world and we really want to engage with a vast ecosystem. So you saw, you know, from cloud providers to like more on-prem infrastructure, to ISVs, to networking providers, storage providers, so like a whole understanding of like, wait, in order to be a full platform, we really need to understand how to integrate and how to engage with the ecosystem and how to help customers have benefits of the entire thing combined. So we've been really looking at where the different leaders, sometimes customers take us there, they're like, hey, please partner with this company or that company, understanding mapping of what is needed and you know, and kind of again, like I said, starting from cloud infrastructure, network storage, management monitoring, security, all the way to ISVs. But you know, I would, since you brought up the fact that Mark was here, Mark from Oracle, I do want to talk a little bit about that because I think that is maybe even a bit new and unique that we, another thing that we announced today is the fact that we have Oracle dockerizing their apps and putting them in docker store and that is big. And again, for us, it's obviously big, but again, big for users. It's a very easy way to get, you know, software you really need and not only that, we announced several weeks ago a certification program. So the nice thing about that, if something is certified in store, you can really use that with a lot of trust. It's, you know, it's been tested, it's secure that we made sure that it followed best practices. We made sure that there was support engagement with the publisher. So that's again, geared towards enterprises that really want to have the confidence of downloading something from a store and just using it. So again, Oracle is kind of groundbreaking and putting their software there and you know, we're very excited about that and we think there's going to be more to come and we really looking forward to this, like an amazing service for our users who want to really start from component that exists and the components that they can trust and be productive very quickly. You know, I'm curious, how do you think of the docker store in relation to things like the Amazon marketplace or you know, many of your other partners have their own piece. There really is no, you kind of like enterprise app store today, so what do you guys want to own? How do you integrate with partners as you look at that, you know, develop over time? Right, and for us, docker store started as an enabler as we saw more and more need from users to basically, I don't like, hey, I want, you know, I'll take this as I talk about Oracle. I want to use a database. I don't want to go and dockerize it again. If somebody already done it and they already prepared it and they already went through it, why wouldn't I just reuse it? So the fact that you can put things in this building block and then move them around, it also actually enables the idea that you can reuse the same component between different users, right? So basically, you have here something that you can do once and many people can benefit. So that's the benefit we see, it started with official images long ago and we saw just unbelievable traction for it. Users really loved it. It makes them productive very quickly and we wanted to expand it to a wider set of ISVs, a wider set of components, a wider set of apps and made them available, you know, so we right now see it as more as an enabler and what kind of, again, it's one of the things that listening to our users, listening to our customers, we saw that that's kind of one of the things that will make them productive really quickly. One of the things we saw in abundance here at DockerCon this year is customers of, you know, Visa and MetLife and so forth, up on stage talking about how they're using Docker in their business for actual live applications. In terms of partners, are you focusing on particular vertical industries in terms of partnership with ISVs and VARs, particularly geographies? Give us a sense for where you're going in terms of diversification of geographies and industries in terms of your focus on partnerships. Yeah, and, you know, and again, different parts of the stack require different kinds of partnership, like on the south end of the stack, right, from on the infrastructure. We're looking for partners that either provide on-prem or cloud infrastructure or they can provide set of plugins that integrate with us and set of tools that can be used with Docker to complete and enhance the overall experience of users using Docker, right? So that's kind of one set of partnerships that, again, started from hardware vendors to cloud, to different plugins. On the north side of it, as we look at it, it's like we just talked about the fact that we have- Top of the application. The application services end of the stack is the north, right? Exactly, and all the way to the content, what you actually put inside and what you run. We also- Data and so forth and so forth, yeah. Exactly, we form, you know, a set of partnerships there and making sure that we, we're making sure that those components available in store, those components of Dockerize that companies can really use that. And, you know, obviously Microsoft and is a huge partner for us in the OS and in other Azure, other areas as well, and again- And storage vendors with Veritas and so forth, there's a fair amount of the data inside the ecosystem that really- Absolutely. You're going to continue to develop- Data, Clodera, you know, you've seen a lot of that. And we continue our partner and seeing what's needed there, understanding also we're trying to predict where customers are today, where they're going to be, maybe, what they will need a year or two from now and be ready for that. All right, so Mariana, that leads me to my final question. So we know where you're going to be in Europe. You won't tell us yet the location of the North American show for next year, but, you know, as you look at the ecosystem, how do you see that developing, you know, and when we sit down with you a year from now, what do you hope to have as the progress? Yeah, so if we look at the exhibit hall, I am hoping that it's, we're going to see even bigger exhibit hall with every single DockerCon. And just not just for fun, but really it's kind of indicates the collaboration we have with the ecosystem. And I would like us to be known as a trusted and productive partner for our ecosystem and a trusted and productive partner for our customer that kind of knows to work together with all of these constituencies to have amazing results.  So you see the kind of productivity and we would like to continue, enhance it even more and get there fast. So, yeah, so. Yeah, absolutely. So Mariana, always a pleasure to catch up with you and we've got a few more interviews left, two days of live coverage for Jim Kobieles and I'm Stu Miniman. Thanks for watching theCUBE.


In this final video, we want to do a brief recap and then also show you how you can get some of these indicators loaded up on your platform. Once again, my name is Harish Swaminathan and you can see my Udemy profile here. I have over 122,000 students with almost 20,000 reviews here and I have various courses on financial markets, trading and a lot of material on options. You can take a look at all of these to get to know a little bit more about me and this is my website optiontiger.com. Here you can also browse through all our products, whether it's options, whether it is algos and indicators, you'll find information over here. If you want to directly go to the products, you can just click on the products menu and once again it will take you to all the products where you can take a more detailed look at all of these indicators that we've discussed. You can also contact us on our email address which is info at optiontiger.com. Our YouTube channel is option tiger and you can search for option tiger on YouTube. You'll see all our videos. There are over a thousand videos on YouTube. Let's do a brief recap of the four steps. There are just four key steps and they are all visual and this is the best way to create a successful trading plan for the long run. The step one is to identify the right candidates, whether it's swing trading, long term or day trading and we saw that on the platform. You can create how many of stocks you want on your list here and once you load these algos for the day trades and the swing trades column, it will automatically tell you which stocks are very bullish and which stocks are bearish. Depending on the market direction, you would want to take a trade accordingly. You can create as extensive a watch list as you want. You can put all of the stocks that you're interested in and it will automatically act as a scan or a filter and present you with the best possible trading candidates. Once you've done step one, the next step is to get a high probability trade entry and this is where the multi-time frame trend indicator comes into play. You want to get your trade entry with a visual cue so that you don't have any emotion or any guess work whether you're taking the trade at the right time or not and the MTFT gives you the accurate trend prediction on five levels and with a master indicator, it makes it a no-brainer. For example, if you would look at the S&P futures here, you can see in the last two days, the multi-time frame trend indicator has two dots and both are green. A trend could be developing. Here, this is a good time to take a bullish trade because you have all five time frames as well as the master indicator that's lit up and this is telling you a trend could be developing to the bullish side. So this would be a good time to take a trade. Now, you don't have to wait for all five even if four are developed, that's fine. That would be getting in a little bit early but if you wait for all five, then that gives you the maximum conviction for the trade. So you might enter a little late but that's okay. If you can catch 80% of the move, then that is good enough for the trade. So this is how you would get a very high probability trade entry. Then the steps three and four become relatively easy. Once you get your trade entry right, that is half of the job done with the combination of the MTFT as well as the customer RSI. This will help you stay in a winning position to the maximum possible time and once again, these indicators are visual so it will tell you when the trend is over, when it's time to get out of the trade and when you should exit. So for example, if you were in a bullish trade from this point onwards and you rode up this wave and just because you see one dot on the lowest level, that doesn't mean you have to get out of the trade but once you see two or more, then you want to get out of the trade. So here you would get out right at this point because you're seeing two dots on the multi-time frame and you're also seeing the customer RSI going into the bearish zone. So this is where you would want to exit this bullish trade and for a bearish trade, it works exactly the same. So if you're in a bearish trade here, until you see the customer RSI come out of the bearish zone and into the bullish zone, you would want to be in this trade or if the MTFT shows two or more indicators, two or more rows that have changed the trend, then you would want to exit your trade. So between the two, the MTFT and the customer RSI, these will help you to stay in a winning trade as long as possible and it will also tell you when to exit. If you've watched this video series so far, we're going to show you how you can get your hands on these indicators at a very, very cost effective price. So normally if you go to the multi-time frame trend indicator page, you can see it's listed for $24.97 and similarly the SPX-Tix goes for $9.97 and the customer RSI goes for $4.97. Overall, if you look at all five of these indicators, the list price goes to over $4,000. However, we are going to give you a special which is a 65 to 70% off and that's what we'll look at next. In this special, you can get all five algos for $16.97 and that is about 65% off and as you may know, Option Tiger deals with a lot of detailed options education. 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We've not offered it this low ever before and also if you don't want all five algos, maybe you're not a day trader so you're not interested in the day trading watch list, please email us at info.optiontiger.com and we can make some adjustments on the price. Whatever your questions are, whether you want to mix and match some algos with some options education, that's fine. Just send us an email at info.option tiger.com and we can respond and customize a package for you. If you just want the whole package, then you can just go to paypal.com and get the entire five algo package for $16.97. If you want the entire options education bundle, you can get it for $9.97. If you have any questions, please email us at info.optiontiger.com and we want to thank you for going through this video series. It's a cutting-edge set of products and these products will help you remain successful consistently in the markets. Once again, thank you very much and if you have any questions, please email us at info.optiontiger.com. Thank you.