Part 3, Chapter 1 of Canada's Hundred Days. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by James O'Connor. Canada's Hundred Days by John Livesey. Part 3, Chapter 1, Confronting the Canal du Nord. There comes a time when the spent athlete, having passed his goal, throws himself panting on the ground and relaxes his strained muscles. His heart labors visibly under his bared chest. Thus the Canadian Corps, after nine days in tense fighting, culminating in the capture of the droquat-caant line, abandon itself to rest. But it is a rest of a comparative kind only. The cessation of hand-to-hand fighting, but not relief from the perils of war. We have fought our way into this watery triangle. Or one should rather say, peninsula formed by the flooded area of the canal du Nord on the east, and the sinsee and its marshes on the north. On the east we have settled down to sniping raids and local chutes, and the enemy is equally active. On the north he holds the entire country south and southwest of Douay, to the borders of Rue, Gavrel, and Opie. For here his great system of defense is still intact, and the British line is hardly advanced from where it lay on August 26. Our troops holding the line have a lively time, and have to improvise both defense and shelter. Daring things are done in the way of reconnaissance, and Canadian engineers in particular spend the day and night crawling on their bellies along the canal side, exploring for practical crossings or flying low over its course, careless of death. But relatively few troops are actually in the line, because the position is one of great natural strength, and the enemy is in no mood to attack in force. Just as they are, lying out for the most part in the open, our troops in the line have a bad time of it. The second Canadian division is in line on the right, from Inche to the Aras Kambray Road, and from there north the line is held by the third Canadian division. Casualties are heavy. Thus, the 6th Brigade has been in the line from September 6 to 16. The 31st and 27th battalions, and the latter had 75 casualties in that period, the loss of the former being even heavier, with a number of men gassed. The character of the fighting is well illustrated by the following extract from the narrative of the 4th Brigade, whose command was here taken over by Brigadier General G. E. McQuague, Brigadier General R. Rini, having been appointed to a command at Bramshot. Quote, the second Canadian division was held up at the Canal du Nord, with the enemy patrols on the near Western side. The troops then settled down to the work of building a main line of resistance. The possession of Inche and Muères was still in dispute, and a counterattack was possible from that direction. On September 12, 13, the 4th Brigade relieved the 6th Brigade in the front line. The occupied line extended from a few hundred yards north of the Arras Cambray Road along the Canal du Nord to the Lark, just north of Inche. It was about two miles in length, and there were practically no trenches. Rifle pits and shelters had been made by the other troops, but these were very meager and unconnected. There could be no movement from one pit to another during the day. The enemy machine and field guns were very busy, and for a while the troops suffered heavily, despite the splendid camouflaging of their positions with bows and other covering. The first task was to build a support line. This was sighted on top of the ridge in front of the Guisey switch. Large working parties from both reserve and support battalions were engaged on this every night under direction of the engineers. When the support line was finished, the front line was begun, a section being built at a time. It was a period of dangerous and difficult work by night and flying low by day. There were several fierce patrol encounters by night around Baral Wood and the big German dump, end quote. Similar conditions exist north of the Arras Cambray Road, a particularly nasty spot being in the neighborhood of a court San Quentin, where the enemy has direct observation from the commanding heights east of the canal. Of units not in the line, some are lucky enough to go back to Arras and beyond, but many are held in close support in the old trench lines, living in enemy dugouts. There is a continual strafing of this area day and night, and our troops, though far removed from the battle line, suffer many casualties. Thus, Lieutenant Colonel G. R. Perks, VC of the 116th Battalion Central Ontario, was severely wounded by a stray shell on the afternoon of September 15th in the Guimap area. Rest is no picnic in no man's land. In the first days after the battle, there is a listlessness among such battalions. The men, thoroughly tired out, lie about among the trenches and dugouts they occupy, sleeping a great deal or gossiping about the battle. Losses have been so heavy that there is not the same elation that accompanies such a victory as Amiens. Indeed, the men are decidedly pessimistic. While I guess the old corps is pretty well done in this time, says a grizzled miner from the porcupine. You just mark my words, we'll go out to rest in a day or two and chant to another tap till next spring. It's just like Passchendaele all over again. There is, in fact, a general sense of depression. We have won our victory, but where have we landed? In the heart of no man's land, stretching to our strange imagination in all its horror through many bitter weeks of winter. For we have no notion in our head but that the war is going on well into 1919. Presently, perhaps where we lie, the Bosch will make a stand and we shall dig in for the winter, the winter, the winter, the abominable winter. Such a feeling in early September is natural, inevitable, but it may be here noted that much the same idea obtained until well on into October, until indeed weeks after the Bosch had made his first proposals for an armistice. To take a still greater leap ahead, few men in the Canadian Corps believed in the armistice as an accomplished fact on the very night before it was promulgated. The reason for this lay no doubt in the fact that it was the fortune of the Canadian Corps to be fighting its way hard right up to what one may term the zero hour of peace. But the view of the man in the field is extraordinarily circumscribed. His platoon is his home or perhaps you may extend it to his company. Other companies in his battalion are next to our neighbors. He has a pretty good guess as to just what they are about and once in a while stops in his own work to take a look over the fence into their yard. But the battalion, we are speaking of the private soldier, is the limit of his range and indeed company offices have but slightly wide a vision and it is only the battalion offices who know about the doings of the brigade. These limitations, but in widening eddies, are to be found as one months progressively through the brigade to the division, to core and to the bright imminence of army. Army knows it all, of course, or it wouldn't be army. The point of all this is just simply that in the varying degree of one's opportunity, whether one be private or captain or colonel, one is so engrossed in the immediate battle picture that one fails to grasp the significance of the war map as a whole. One may be certain that no battalion commander engaged in the Drogot-Kiant Line affair gave a thought for several days to what was going on north or south. So far as he was concerned, the war was being fought and won or lost right then and there. And how much more does not this apply to the private who has not seen a daily paper for a month and has not the privilege of reading the news bulletin telegraphed daily by army, a font of information that irrigates in its passage thirsty minds at core division and brigade but has become a trickling stream before it reaches the battalion and dries up entirely as it gets to company HQ.  Rumors of disaster chase each other round. Let me tell you something on the strict QT. The Balli Brigade has also cut to pieces that its mother's son wouldn't know it. The sergeant, he says, will have to go out to Bologna to refit. Good old Bologna, the sooner the better. But there is a more hopeful note. I hope to God they won't leave us stuck here, says another. Four days rain.  They say there's fine billets in Cambrai. Why don't they let us have a go at that and put in the winter there? That'd be something worth fighting for. Cambrai exercises a curious psychological influence on the core. It is the subject of talk in the mess and the man in the ranks regards it as some vague El Dorado. From the Voidabouche, a considerable height about a mile southeast of Canycourt, we have a plain view of Burlon Wood and Hill. And we know that right behind in the Valley of the Shelte lies the fair city of Cambrai. Cambrai, in fact, dominates our imagination. Ask a soldier its population and he will say offhand, oh, about a quarter of a million or so. And he has some idea of Cambric loons and that it was the capital of the old Frankish kings. This interest is because it is the first considerable city confronting us that has lain hid in the enemy grip since 1914. Amiens and Arras were familiar enough. Familiar is the gay tristing places of Minon leave, less familiar in ruins. But Cambrai has first all the charm of the unknown, a name that stirs the imagination and quickens our interest. We conceive a city of beautiful streets and ancient palaces, crowded with monuments of art and war. No disappointment could have been greater than Cambrai as at last we came to see it. But we have wandered afar from our gossiping soldiers. In such cases this, the veteran NCOs are invaluable. Eternal grumblers themselves, they will not allow it in their men. What are you talking about, cries one. The old brigade done in, why you wooden head? This brigade at only half its strength can lick the tire out of any other brigade in the core and throw in a Bosch division at that. This battle was nothing. You should just have seen Regina Trinch, my boy, and then you could talk. With so many commissioned officers casualties, the value of these tried and tested old sergeants becomes more and more apparent. Just about this time, the core receives for the first time reinforcements who, to make no bones about it, are conscripts, graphs under the compulsory service act pasted Ottawa a year ago, though they ought to prove themselves as good soldiers as any. It would seem that these men, many of whom were only held back by family circumstances from voluntary enlistment, had been snubbed and bullied on their training grounds. They meet here a very different reception, though they enter at once the brotherhood of arms. They are welcomed on precisely the same footing as had been the volunteer reinforcements. It was made very plain to them by these old sergeants that despite their intensive training in England, they were very green, nothing more than rookies, and must learn all over again, far which, with becoming modesty, they were did lucky to have come to the best school in France. The NCOs enjoyed immensely this business of the breaking in of the young idea, young in war, if not in years. But beyond the hazards of battle, their own ranks are depleted, because many of them are over in England taking the officers course to fill vacancies in their respective battalions. In the recent fighting, the percentage of casualties among officers has been out of all proportion, and this loss made itself felt throughout the fighting to follow. Anticipating a little again, this curious fact may be recited. A certain battalion received on September 26, back from England, 16 of its old NCOs, who had successfully taken their course, and all went into battle next morning. Next day, every one of them was a casualty, and within 48 hours, the bulk of them were back again in blighty. But in a day or two, there is a marked change. The men begin to sit up and take interest in their immediate surroundings. The YMCA has opened up a canteen nearby, and long lines of men gather, a patient queue, waiting their turn for cigarettes and biscuits and chocolate. Mail comes in. Wonderful is the efficiency of the core post office throughout these operations. Mail comes in, and there are letters from home to be answered. Letters one may be sure for mothers and sweethearts, never more welcome than now. There are other letters to write, not so easy, taking much thought, but inspired by such a loving kindness for the chum who died upon the field, that when at last they reach a distant, sorrowing heart, they bring a brave message of comfort. He was the best pal I ever had, and he died a hero. All through the battle, I felt safe because he was by me, and then I had to go on alone. Ran one, we were privileged to see long afterwards. But now a battalion band strikes up, a group of men gather. A football makes its appearance, locked or breaks out in the crowd. The battle and anguisher forgotten.  The YMCA, soldier's friend indeed, produces the paraphernalia of baseball, and soon two picked teams are at it hard, battling for the honour of the battalion, the men crowding in behind the plate, yelling support and making side bets on each inning. Battalion officers umpire, and it is not hard to see they have the confidence of their men. It is a merry scene in the waning light. The core has come to life again. When you see this going on, remarks an officer whose battle experiences dates from Eapers in April, 1915. You may be sure the men are ready to go in again. These two battalions would put up a great scrap right tonight, but 24 hours ago they were a pretty sad looking outfit. We have seen how the second and third Canadian divisions had taken over the line of the Canal du Nord on the night of September 3, 4. They pushed right down to the West Bank, but this being exposed to direct fire from the opposing wooded slopes, it was held only by light patrols. The enemy showed a good deal of activity, and particularly in the region of Soshi-Koshi, did not hesitate to push his raiding parties across under cover of night. Our outposts were thus continually engaged.  South of the core boundary from Inchi-Inatois to Muwares, the situation of the 17th core was not so good, but the enemy still clung fast to a strip on the west side of the canal and to the canal bed itself, in this sector unfinished and dry. The enemy was in great force, and it seemed indeed as if we were definitely held up on the west side of the canal. It was in these circumstances that the core commander came to a momentous decision. Sirathakuri was asked to attack on the present core front, and thus turn the canal from the north.  But he submitted instead alternative proposals, which finally were adopted and led to the great battle of Cambrai. End of part three, chapter one, recording by James O'Connor, friend of Massachusetts, May 2010. Part three, chapter two of Canada's Hundred Days. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by James O'Connor, Canada's Hundred Days by John Livese. Part three, chapter two, the first battle of Cambrai. From the Bois de Bouches, five miles distant, southeast by east, hurl on wood looms up to view, dark and threatening, precisely as it looms up from any surrounding prospect, whatever. Between us lies the valley of the canal du Nord, with beyond the ground, sloughing up to Burlon. There save for an occasional little wood, such as that of the quarry. Standing on the 75 meter elevation of the Bois de Bouches and facing Burlon, a little to the right and on the west side of the canal lies the village of Inchi in Atua. And as far to the left, 2,000 yards north-east of Inchi, but on the east side of the canal is the village of San Les Maquillons. 2,000 yards south of Inchi, on the west side of the canal is the village of Muers. Which not only proved impregnable during every stage of the first battle of Cambrai, but only recently had withstood the assaults of troops of the Third Army on our right. Immediately east of Inchi, a canal stretch of 3,000 yards was still uncompleted and therefore dry. These works are not situated in the valley bottom, but form an embankment on its eastern slopes. And the stronghold is reinforced by a series of lifting locks, each in itself a fortress from 40 to 60 feet in depth, edged by steep banks and masonry. Opposite Inchi from the top of the east bank, presenting an elevation of about 60 meters, the hill slopes steadily back and up to where at the crest of Burlon Wood, it attains an extreme elevation of 110 meters, thus commanding a clear view of all movements west of the canal, as far as the Vois de Bouche. All this slope presents for enemy machine gunners a natural glassy, paralleling the canal, running from 2 to 500 yards east of it is the heavily wired trench system known as the Canal du Nord Line. Midway between this and the summit is the strongly fortified Machillon Line. Over the crest of the slope and back of Burlon Wood is the Machua Line. Burlon Wood is a fortress in itself. It's batteries of artillery and machine guns dominating the approach. We are already familiar with the features north of Inchi, the flooded area with all bridges demolished and any attempted crossing entirely dominated by the superior east bank. Impregnable to assault from the west, the chain of villages lying along the east bank, Sands-le-Machillon, Machillon, and Sochi-les-Tres screened by woods and swamps and extending north to the high ground of the town of Vois-si-la-Vergère has to be reckoned with by an attacking force crossing the canal further south and striking mints eastwards. For until this trip has been cleared of its garrison, it presents a highly vulnerable flank. Immediately south of the wares runs the Bopam-Cambre road. The first-class highway will now shell-torn, passing just under the southern slope of Burlon Wood through the village of Anu and then east to Cambre through the village of Fontaine-Nautredam, 1,500 yards east of the wood. Three or four thousand yards further east the road parallels but at some little distance north, the Shelt Canal or to give it its French name the Canal de l'Escole and known also south of Cambre as the Canal San Quentin. A mile and a half north and a little east of Fontaine-Nautredam is the village of Raelincourt situated on the Arras-Cambre road. This road, after crossing the canal of the Shelt du Nord at Marquion, runs in a straight line southeast through Raelincourt and St. Ole into the Faux Vogue Contempre where it joins the Bopam road at an acute angle. The combined road then passing east across the Shelt Canal into the city of Cambre. 2,000 yards east of Fontaine-Nautredam the Shelt Canal which up to now has followed a general northerly course swings off almost sharp to the east and then 2,500 yards further on as it reaches the Faux Vogue Contempre turns off again to the north. At the point where it turns east the strongly fortified Marquion line the last organized trench system west of Cambre passes from the east to the west side of the canal and then takes a northerly course to the west east of Raelincourt and between that village and Sa'ili are joining it to the northeast. Then it passes in a northeast direction to a little west of Sancourt where it joins up with another strong trench system running off at right angles west to link up with the canal's nod line south of Soshile Strait. Forming a strong pivot of defense the village of Hainacourt lies at the junction of the Marquion line and this western trench line 5,000 yards northeast of Burlon village itself situated against the northwest slope of Burlon wood. Between Burlon and Hainacourt passes the Aras Cambre Road and on this line a thousand yards south of the road is the considerable elevation known as Pilgrim's Rest. One more tactical feature may here be noted this being the railway but after crossing the canal the nod at Soshile Strait winds up the hill through many deep cuttings skirting Burlon village on the north and joining the Bopam Cambre Road a little east of Fontaine Notre Dame since it follows the course of the road into Cambre. There are thus three distinct trench systems all running more or less parallel to the canal the nod in the north and south direction first the canal the nod line then midway up the slope the Marquion line and finally behind Burlon wood the very strong Marquion line between these trench systems the enemy had organized many series of fortified shell holes protected by spider web wire and it was in fighting through this maze rather than in the actual storming of the trenches that our heaviest losses were to be incurred in these September days of waiting we are all studying the campaign of the previous November now known as the first battle of Cambre but different indeed are the plans and execution of such operations one gathers from the men who fought them from the stereotyped accounts of the contemporary histories of the war for embalmed in the official reports on which these unnecessarily founded are often misstatements of fact and distortions of perspective the patient historian of the future must dig below this surface if he is to discover truth in all her aspects unclouded by prejudice and untanished by self-interest burl on wood and the whole surrounding battlefield is to enter so sharply so poignantly into the history of the Canadian Corps that a sketch of this first battle is an essential preliminary to what is to follow we shall be concerned not so much with its course from day to day as with its general scheme and the reasons for its relative failure after his brilliant success with the Canadian Corps of Vimy Ridge Sir Julian Bing received well-deserved promotion to the command of the Third Army then vacant by the removal of General Allen B. to Palestine it was not in his nature to sit down to passive defense while hard fighting was going on elsewhere and so he evolved a plan of attack which as we have seen in the account of the Army in show unsuccessful in result when some degree it was was nevertheless destined to revolutionize conditions on the west front sounding the death knell of trench fighting and preparing the way for open warfare oddly enough that brilliant plan was not only the germ of our present success but seems also to have supplied the inspiration for the great German offensive of the spring of 1918 struck by the fact that the battle in the north was going so well as had been hoped Sir Julian Bing in July 1917 came to the conclusion that a diversion on the right flank of the Third Army might not only draw enemy troops from the north but might seriously interfere with any plans the enemy might have for a counter offensive on the large scale he therefore laid his plan before the British commander in chief asking that his divisions in the line were heralded by six fresh divisions all the tanks and the whole of the cavalry the idea being a secret attack unheralded by the alarm bell of a heavy and protracted artillery preparation as then was the fashion a rolling artillery barrage and the tanks being relied upon to break down the way for the infantry while the cavalry would have seized any opportunity of passing through it is to be presumed that Sir Douglas Hague was sympathetic but it was a new idea never popular at GHQ and the dreadful fighting in progress on the north seemed to deny the diversion of the necessary troops shortly after this the 6th, 35th, 40th and 50th divisions were sent north and for the time being the project was out of the question but Sir Julian, enamored of his idea was not to be discouraged and early in the autumn he advanced it again this time he received encouragement and was told he should have the Canadian Corps for the operation but just 36 hours the 3rd Army commander saw his great plan fructifying with to his purpose the Corps he had done so much to make what it was when there came the news that the Canadian Corps too was ordered north Passchendaele destroyed any chance it had of taking part under its old leader in these new battle tactics after this a rot set in for our cause Russia had gone to pieces and Italy was invaded divisions had to be hurried to her support from the west front but whatever the cause perhaps because there was need for desperate measures and the plan while offering minimum risks held out great prospects it came about that in mid October Sir Douglas Hague was finally converted and the 3rd Army authorized to go ahead with its preparations instead of 6 fresh divisions however the battle must be fought with divisions already battle weary though all the tanks and cavalry were promised it is not to our purpose to deal with this very interesting operation at length except insofar as it has a direct bearing on the 2nd battle of Cambrai the battle opened at dawn of November 20th so soon as there was light enough for the tanks to see there was a tremendous concentration of these no less than 460 being on the line and the whole attack had been carefully rehearsed each tank having its track at the jumping off place marked out with its number while the troops to follow were trained beforehand to maneuver with that particular tank these tanks were of an early model and could not cross unaided the Hindenburg line here 14 feet wide and 8 deep so the idea was conceived of a fascine or faggots suspended from their bows to be dropped into the trench and over which they climbed up the other side this plan worked out perfectly in practice the surprise was complete and for a time everything went well the barrage jumping from trench to trench and the defense being overwhelmed but the troops engaged stoutly as they fought did not present a heavy enough mass of infantry to accomplish the full purpose nor as their advance spread out into an ever deepening salient had they sufficient reserves to defend the line they had won the general direction of the attack was northeast in the direction of Cambrai across the Shelt Canal between Manier and Cantang and through Marquois and north along the canal to Nord with the commanding heights of Burlon Wood as an early objective three possibilities were present one was the unlimited that is to say such a surprise might be affected that the barge would be rolled back a considerable distance the second was at the Hindenburg support line i.e. that is the Marquois line might be captured and consolidated and the third more limited in scope was for a raid on a glorified scale capturing trenches and inflicting considerable loss upon the enemy in this result what was actually achieved lay somewhere between the second and third possibilities at first everything as we have seen went according to program on the right good progress was made our troops at one point establishing themselves across the Shelt Canal and in the center we were hung up for vital hours in front of Fleskiez on the left the attack went better being pushed forward as stride the canal to Nord to the Bopam Aras Road but the advance considerable though it was had not gone so far and fast as had been hoped the enemy brought up great masses of reserves and was able to hold the Manier line no opportunity had been furnished the cavalry as has been previously noted one squadron of the Fort Gary Hoss actually crossed the Shelt Canal nevertheless the local success of the first two days was great the attack reaching the line of the Shelt can't hang a new and wherever it is possible enough that left to his own judgment Sir Julian Bing would have been content to consolidate this position offering as it did a favorable line as a future jumping off route but on November 23 Sir Douglas Hague no doubt anxious to exploit as far as possible such a striking success ordered that Burlon would be attacked from the south the tired troops again went forward and stormed the wood there followed five or six days fighting of a ding dong nature with varying fortunes during which the wood changed hand several times we seized but failed to hold the village of Fontan Notre Dame which then established itself a tactical feature of first importance to any force consolidating itself in Burlon Wood every student of the war will remember the thrill of pride and hope of November 20 1917 and the following days how at last a ray of light seemed to have penetrated those dark months how the news was hailed with joy in every allied capital and with corresponding foreboding in enemy countries but how after ten days heroic effort the storm broke upon the weary but devoted troops when five or six fresh enemy divisions burst up the Banto Valley capturing Ghanalu and pushing into Guzakor only the extraordinary gallantry and tenacity of some of the divisions engaged especially the guards the 2nd and the 47th and 56th divisions prevented a disaster these three divisions held the Burlon Wood line against eight enemy divisions altogether five in the frontal attack and three in reserve they held on throughout the day in some places the enemy drove in seven distinct attacks but not one of them reached our main line although forward post changed hands the great slot of the enemy suffered there was at that time regarded the most serious he had had in the war as it turned out the success limited though it was proved the very great strategic value at a critical time the enemy was thrown out of his stride for the rest of the year tactically too the 3rd army had the best of it the Hindenburg line south of Buers was not only captured but held they suffered indeed 42,000 casualties in the fortnight's battle losing 7,800 prisoners but on the other hand they inflicted casualties estimated at 80,000 capturing 11,000 prisoners and 170 guns though against these must be set the 150 guns the enemy captured on November 30 but he used up in the battle 30 divisions against the 11 British divisions engaged and many of these were either brought down from the north or deflected from Italy altogether disappointing as the final result might have been the battle was a real victory had the 3rd army been permitted to embark on it with the support requested including the Canadian floor and at a time of year when the days were long it is pretty certain that the highest expectations of Sir Julian Bing would have been realized as it was laboring under every disadvantage the soundness of his tactical theory not only proved itself but has served as the model for all future operations on the grand scale End of part 3 chapter 2 recording by James O'Connor Randolph Massachusetts May 2010 Part 3 chapter 3 of Canada's 100 Days This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org According by James O'Connor Canada's 100 Days by John Livese Part 3 chapter 3 The Plan of Attack The problem of the Canadian core was entirely different in front of us across the canal lay the high ground from which Sir Julian Bing's men had been beaten back but the weakness of his position had not developed from failure to push home those attacks it came from the increasing exposed flank his drive north created for an active enemy east of the Shelt Canal on the other hand provided we could cross the canal to north overwhelm the enemy defense on the opposing slope and seize the high ground we should have attained a position not only practical for defense but commanding the valley of the Shelt and the city of Cambrai lying within it once established on the high ground north of the city beyond the Marquois line and its fall must come about inevitably with the necessity of storming it which would have involved not only heavy casualties for ourselves but must have resulted in its partial destruction from every point of view to be avoided so far as possible but to carry out this operation successfully it was essential that I drive necessarily of the spearhead type be assured first a degree of protection along its exposed left flank and second that there must be adequate support by troops operating immediately on our right so as to prevent the creation of an equally vulnerable right flank on the left therefore any plan of attack must include the mopping up of the whole peninsula east of the canal to north and south of the Sin Sea thus placing that river between us and the enemy's army based on Douay but on the right all that was necessary was that as our line advanced north of Cambrai the ground should be cleared as far east as the Shelt Canal we have seen how the corps commander declined to commit his troops to a frontal attack on the canal de Nord from the area we were holding throughout September north of Sainz-les-Marquions where the flooded condition of the canal and the high banks opposing us denied success and how he submitted an alternative plan that plan is best explained in his own words as follows on September 15th I received the details of a large operation to be carried out later in the month by the 3rd and 4th armies in which the Canadian corps was to cooperate by crossing the canal and by capturing Burlon Wood and the high ground to the north east of it to protect the left flank of the attack the 22nd corps on the left was to take over the front held by the Canadian corps to a point 1200 yards north of the Arras Cambrai Road and the Canadian corps was to take over part of the front held by the 17th corps, 3rd army as far as Muers, exclusive which was to be the Canadian corps's right boundary for the attack by this side slip to the south the right of the Canadian corps was to be placed opposite a dry portion of the canal to north on a front of about 2500 yards the Germans were then holding in strength a strip of ground on the west side of the canal and every effort made by the 17th corps to clear this ground and reach the canal banks had been repulsed on September 22 the task of the corps was enlarged to include, in addition to the objectives already mentioned the capture of the bridges over the shelt canal north of Cambrai and the high ground overlooking the Sinsea Valley the right boundary was not altered to assist in carrying out the above additional task the 11th British Division and the 7th Tank Battalion were placed under my orders the date of this operation was definitely fixed for September 27, 1918 at dawn it was decided that the 4th and 1st Canadian divisions would carry out the initial attack capture the village of Berlon and Machiaon respectively and immediately thereafter seize Berlon Wood and east of Guadacoque and Dartford Wood at this stage the 3rd Canadian division would pass through the right of the 4th Canadian division and advance from the line east of Berlon Wood in an easterly direction towards Nauville-Syremé in liaison with the 17th corps the 11th division was to come up on the left of the 1st Canadian division and advance in a north easterly direction toward Ipinoi and Waseel-e-Vegère the 4th Canadian division on the right centre was to advance towards Blecourt and the 1st Canadian division on the left centre was to advance in the direction of Abancourt this attack was front with difficulties on the corps battle front of 6,400 yards the Canal du Nord was impassable on the northern 3,800 yards the corps had therefore to cross the Canal du Nord on a front of 2,600 yards and to expand later fan-wise in the north easterly direction to a front leading 15,000 yards this intricate manoeuvre called for most skillful leadership on the part of commanders and the highest state of discipline on the part of the troops the assembly of the attacking troops in an extremely congested area known by the enemy to be the only one available was very dangerous especially in view of the alertness of the enemy a concentrated bombardment of this area prior to zero particularly if gas was employed was a dreaded possibility which could seriously affect the whole of the operation and possibly cause its total failure to meet such an eventuality careful arrangements were made by the counter-battery staff officer to bring to bear especially heavy neutralizing fire on hostile batteries at any moment during the crucial period of preparation these arrangements were to be put into effect in any case at zero hour to neutralize the hostile defensive barrage on the front of attack with the exception of the second Canadian division which was now holding the entire front and would be in core reserve at the time of attack every resource of the Canadian core was to be crowded in that narrow space the provision of an effective artillery barrage presented considerable difficulty owing to the depth of the attack and its general direction on the fourth Canadian division front particularly the depth to the initial objective was such that the batteries were compelled to move forward into captured ground and continue firing the barrage from these new positions provision was made for the advance of a number of batteries with their echelons to the canal line and beyond whilst the attack was in progress a large number of machine gun batteries were detailed to supply the initial barrage and later to advance in support of the infantry provisions were also made for engineer units to move forward immediately following the assaulting troops to effect immediate repair to the roads and crossings of the canal in order to enable the artillery to move up in support of the infantry the greatest precautions had been taken to ensure secrecy and camouflage had been used extensively to prevent detection of the preparations of all kinds that were in progress further to conceal our intentions it was decided that no preliminary fighting to secure a jumping off line would take place and that the Germans would be left in possession of their positions west of the canal at the very hour of the attack it was also hoped that by letting the Germans retain this ground their defensive barrage would remain well west of the canal instead of being placed on the canal itself where the banks offered a serious obstacle and reduced very considerably the rate of advance of the assaulting troops on our right the 17th Corps was to advance to capture Fontaine Notre Dame in conjunction with the capture of Burlon Wood by the 4th Canadian division on the night of September 25, 26 the 22nd Corps on the left took over the front as far south as the Aras Kambray Road and arranged to extend the artillery and machine gun barrage to their front so as to deceive the enemy regarding actual flanks of the attack the 4th and 1st Canadian divisions went into the line on their respective battle fronts the 2nd Canadian division on completion of the relief passed into Corps Reserve during the night of September 26, 27 all final adjustments and moves were made and everything was ready before zero hour this was for everybody a night full of anxiety but apart from the usual harassing fire and night bombing nothing untoward happened before proceeding to the attack itself a review of the general strategic plan of which it forms so vital apart is not out of place the 4th and 3rd British armies were about to launch a frontal attack on the Hindenburg system hitherto unbroken from San Quentin North to Kambray it was to be the honourable function of the Canadian Corps having already passed through the Hindenburg line west of the Canal de Nord to press forward on the extreme left of this general attack and thus turn the Hindenburg system from the north its task was not so much to capture Kambray which in fact was outside our southern boundary as to drive forward along the northern bank of the Shelt and thus compromise enemy communications north and south in our opening chapter sufficient extracts were made from Sir Douglas Hague's victory dispatch to outline the general plan we may now with advantage follow him again the details of the strategic plan upon which future operation should be based with the subject of careful discussion between Marshal Faulk and myself preparations were already far advanced for the successful attack by which on September 12th the 1st American army assisted by certain French divisions drove the enemy from the San Miguel salient and inflicted heavy losses upon him in prisoners and guns ultimately it was decided that as soon as possible after this attack Faulk and Bergen and simultaneous offensive should be launched by the Allies as follows by the Americans west of Meziers by the French west of Argonne in close cooperation with the American attack and with the same general objectives by the British on the San Quentin Kambray front in the general direction of Moberg by the Belgian and Allied forces in Flanders in the direction of Ghent by these attacks it was expected as already indicated that the important German forces opposite the French and Americans would be pressed back upon the difficult country of the Ardennes while the British thrust struck at their principal lines of communication it was intended to take advantage of the weakening of the German forces at the front to clear the Belgian coast by a surprise attack success in any one of these offences might compel the enemy to withdraw to the line of the Meuse the results to be obtained from these different attacks depended in a peculiarly large degree upon the British attack in the center it was here that the enemy's defenses were most highly organized if these were broken the threat directed as his vital systems of lateral communication of necessity react upon his defenses elsewhere on the other hand the long period of sustained offensive action through which the British armies had already passed had made large demands both upon the troops themselves and upon my available reserves throughout our attacks from August 8 onwards our losses in proportion to the results achieved and the prisoners taken had been consistently and remarkably small in the aggregate however they were considerable and in the face of them an attack upon so formidable organized a position as that which now confronted us could not be lightly undertaken moreover the political effects of an unsuccessful attack upon a position so well known as the Hindenburg Line would be large and would go far to revive the declining morale not only of the German army but of the German people these different considerations were present to my mind the probable results of a costly failure or indeed of anything short of a decided success in any attempt upon the main defenses of the Hindenburg Line were obvious but I was convinced that the British attack was the essential part of the general scheme and that the moment was favorable accordingly I decided to hold all trepatory measures including the preliminary operations already recounted were carried out as rapidly and as thoroughly as possible he then proceeds to describe the difficulties of the task confronting the 4th and 3rd armies continuing the battle of Cambrai which on October 5th culminated in the capture of the last remaining sectors of the Hindenburg Line was commenced by the 1st and 3rd armies between the neighborhood of St. Quentin and the Sheldt the 4th, 3rd and 1st armies in the order named occupied on the evening of September 26th a line running from the village of Selenci west of San Quentin to Gricorre and Pontroute and then east of Villere and Limpierre to Villere's Guislaine and Guzacorre both exclusive thereafter the line continued covering Corre and Muers and thence along the west side of the canal to Nord to the floods of the Sinci at a Corre San Quentin on the 1st and 3rd army fronts strong positions covering the approaches to Cambrai between the Nord and Sheldt canals including the section of the Hindenburg Line itself north of Guzacorre were still in the enemies possession his trenches in this sector faced southwest and it was desirable that they should be taken in the early stages of the operation so as to render it easier for the artillery of the 4th army to get into position on the 4th army front where the heaviest blow was to fall the exceptional strength of the enemies position made a prolonged bombardment necessary I therefore decided that a very heavy bombardment opened during the night of September 26, 27 along the whole front of all three armies should be followed on the morning of September 27 by an attack delivered by the 1st and 3rd armies in this way the enemy might be deceived as to the main point of the attack the 1st and 3rd armies would be enabled to get nearer to their final objective and the task of the 4th army artillery would be simplified on the morning of September 26 French and American forces attacked on both sides of the Argonne between the Meuse and Sweep rivers at 5.20 a.m. on September 27 the 3rd and 1st British armies attacked with the 4th, 6th, 17th and Canadian Corps in the direction of Cambrai on the front of about 13 miles from Goussé court to the neighborhood of Sotilastre the success of the northern part of the attack depended on the ability of our troops to debush from the neighborhood of Weyrves and to secure the crossings of the Canal du Nord in that locality the northern portion of the Canal du Nord was too formidable an obstacle to be crossed in the face of the enemy it was therefore necessary for the attacking divisions to force a passage on a comparatively narrow front about Weyrves and thereafter turn the line of the canal farther north by a divergent attack developed fan wise from the point of crossing this difficult maneuver was carried out successfully and on the whole front of our attack our infantry assisted by some 65 tanks broke deeply into the enemy's position this testimony to the work of the Canadian Corps from so high a quarter is very satisfactory though it was inchy and not mewares that furnished the jumping off spot as has been explained this difficult maneuver had originated in the brain of the Canadian Corps commander it was a daring plan that success alone could justify every commanding officer in the Corps to whom the secret had been entrusted was well aware of that thus the narrative of the first Canadian division after an appreciation of the general strategic situation says the battle was divided into three main phases first on the left the storming of the canal denour and the advance on Cambrai followed immediately by the second phase the great blow which shattered the Hindenburg line and outflanked the defenses of San Quentin and third came the general attack on the whole front which resulted in the capture of Cambrai and San Quentin and forced the enemy to retire behind the line of the river cell it was in the first phase of this battle that the Canadian Corps was chiefly interested but to the Corps was given the task of forcing the canal denour capturing Burlon Wood and the high ground to the north of it and then advancing on Cambrai and seizing the crossings of the Shelt Canal and the Sinsea River to the east and north of that city this would afford complete protection for the main attack to the south and this was the real objective of the Canadian Corps the attack presented many unusual features in the first place the canal denour was passable on the course sector on a front of 2500 yards only this meant that four divisions had to be got through this narrow defile and in addition there were engineers, artillery, machine gunners and all the supply trains of various descriptions to add to these difficulties the canal had to be bridged in many places especially to permit the passage of guns and limbers at the very outset therefore the success of the battle devolved upon the engineers while the infantry under cover of the artillery barrage might carry the canal into the burst rush it was essential that guns and ammunition be brought forward across the canal as soon as possible to do this bridges were a necessity the task set the engineers was of vital importance the plan of course was confided to the army commanders Sir Julian Bing as has been seen was in command of the 3rd army on our right and on one of these September days he came over to corps headquarters at Newville Vitas to talk it over with Sir Arthur Curry mutual confidence and esteem existed between the past and present Canadian corps commanders Sir Julian could speak with peculiar authority but no one knew this battlefield so intimately had studied it to such good purpose nor could more fully appreciate its dangers and difficulties he had heard he said of the proposed plan of attack and as an old friend he could not refrain from pointing out its hazards did Sir Arthur Curry think he could really carry out the operation because in his opinion the Canadian corps was attempting the most difficult maneuver yet attempted on a battlefield in this war they discussed the plan in detail and Sir Julian went away if not convinced at least immensely struck by its audacity and brilliance End of part 3 Chapter 3 Recording by James O'Connor Randolph Massachusetts May 2010 Part 3 Chapter 4 of Canada's Hundred Days This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Recording by James O'Connor Canada's Hundred Days by John Livesey Part 3 Chapter 4 Marching up to battle We come to the evening of Thursday, September 26 The Feast of St. Cyprian Our valley east of New Beale, Vitass is now crowded with troops On many occasions during the past four years men have massed here friend or enemy for attack or defense but never have they been so thickly, so openly congregated nor will they be again one may hazard so long as history is in the making But until nightfall there is little sign on the surface No place in the world is so empty as no man's land It is populated only as is a desert plain by an advancing horde of locusts They pass over stripping every green thing as they go and leave it even more waste than it was before One recalls a little scene on the plateau just to the north a month ago It was in the early afternoon very hot and not a sign of life except that shells were bursting around Morshila Proof and a tremendous uproar was in progress over the slope to the northeast where the gray fog of our barrage was fast blotting out the dark outlines of salt wood but not a sign of life Suddenly a shrill whistle and immediately men in kilts covered with khaki aprons began tumbling up literally from the bowels of the earth from unexpected and unseen mouths of dugouts so cunningly contrived by the late occupants the Bosch that they are quite unnoticeable even a few yards away but they lie flush with the ground with no betraying litter of excavation They stumble up awkwardly but they are laden down with their kit The roll is called a brief order and they trudge off towards the smoke and the uproar an extraordinary prosaic business Then it's a little plateau is as empty again as a warren after the drumming alarm has sent the coney scurrying to cover but presently a flare goes up from the wood Then it was a matter of a platoon moving up from support into line Now it is battalions brigades whole divisions for the corps is marching up to the great assault in the canal du Nord The days are grown short and it sets by six o'clock and an hour after it is dark In the gloaming is a scene of bustle and ordered confusion The men laden down for the battle stand by in companies waiting for the word A great concentration of artillery is going forward and engineer trains are pushing up with pontoons and bridging material steel and heavy timber It has been a good fortune to dine if such may be termed the hasty meal in a bomb-proof shelter with the headquarters of a battalion whose adjutant is a particular friend This battalion is to move into support and next day its objective is burl on wood We gladly accept an invitation to march up some way with it It is a long and tedious march of some dozen miles over secondary roads and traversing ridge after ridge The movement is diagonal because we pass southeast out of our own area into that of the core on our right to the jumping-off line astride Inchi and Atua The men whistle and sing in the best of spirits they march by companies in column 4 strung out over the white road tramp, tramp, tramp under a starlit sky They march through the ghostly outlines of Wancourt Over a plank road our engineers have built across the Koyu'u and so up the steep climb of Wancourt ridge Here the colonel who is riding ahead orders a halt and the men have a ten-minute rest They line the roadside lighting cigarettes and chafing one another On the left the Aras Kambray road around Viz and Atua is being straight by distant enemy batteries and occasionally he turns a searching fire on our battery positions but it is nothing more than normal Some bombing is going on north of the scarf but it is too dark for effective work or our marching units would offer a conspicuous target The night is mild with the southwest wind the moon entering its last quarter A late riser is hidden by scutting cloud We watch the battalion march by A fine sight where it has been recruited up to strength Steaming cook kettles bring up the rear with a hot meal ready for the men Then we turn back for we too must be getting to our appointed place It is after midnight when we start out it has begun to rain at first a drizzle and then a pitiless downpour and it is pitch dark but as we climb out of Cherry on the road to Hindakor a stray enemy shell ignites one of our ammunition dumps and makes the going better From Hindakor the road runs over another ridge to Canikor whence it turns sharp south past the Boida Bush then southeast towards Inchi becoming a little better than a track Midway and on the right are Hindley cops and Boida Inchi on an elevation yards from the village and commanding a view of the canal and battleground beyond This road is a quagmire lined with trenches facing south part of the Hindenburg support line taken by us three weeks before We are early and shelter for a time in a dripping dugout Our troops, weary by their long march are crowded close in the trenches, in the woods and behind the hill crests with perhaps a tarpaulin stretched over their heads but at four o'clock the rain stops and a clearing sky promises a fine day We walk on to the little hill crowned by the Boida Inchi where are some trenches and great variety of shell holes Two of our battalions lie in this little wood The troops are packed very close We are attacking divisions being squeezed into a perilously narrow frontage because the line of assault is confined to less than a mile and a half on either side of Inchi in Atua which indeed is the boundary between our fourth and first divisions From where we stand the canal is about 3,000 yards away and the Bosch are holding this side of it their line running due north from the northwest corner of Wehrs by the 17th Corps midway between Inchi and the canal to west of Sandsley Machion The first task of our infantry therefore is to overwhelm and thus make good the west bank of the canal itself but the limited area is also restricted in depth close behind is a great concentration of artillery which is about to lay down what for its limited area is the most intense of the war All the Canadian Corps artillery is here with 700 rounds to each gun as well as a large number of Imperial heavies The attack offers an extra-ordinary difficult problem In the first place the character of the initial barrage is in itself unique for it is not the usual straight away affair Covering first the actual crossing of the canal due north to find then to protect the advance of the infantry on Burlon Wood on the one hand while on the other it is to fan out in a wide sweep to the north until finally it shall return from the east on to the east bank of the canal pinning in by its arc the enemy garrison holding that side of the canal as far north as Waseel Le Vaget but that description hardly succeeds it is more than that The intention is that our first division after crossing the canal shall swing off first northeast then north and gradually close back on to the east side of the canal thus taking from the rear the enemy garrison whose position from frontal attack west of the canal as has been before explained is impregnable to provide a protective flank for this complicated operation a stationary barrage is to be laid down some little distance east of and parallel to the canal as the sweep of the infantry develops a creeping barrage is to advance from south to north between the canal in this stationary barrage the latter being lifted step by step as it has reached it is extraordinarily ingenious and intricate to be understood best of the barrage map itself starting with a barrage 3,000 yards in width it is to fan out to 9,000 yards changing form as it goes and the least error in synchronization by either gunners or infantry must result in disaster to our own men this calls for an unprecedented concentration of artillery in a restricted area a little arc back of Enchi so hazardous in itself that should the enemy discover it and lay down a counter barrage on these massed batteries they must be wiped out and yet it is a risk in all its gravity essential if the daring tactical maneuver as a whole is to have any prospect of success in order to give our troops room to deploy for the attack it is necessary to leave the clear space of 2,000 yards deep west of the enemy line and our battery positions are therefore just that much further from the canal line if adequate support is to be given our men as they advance up the long slope against Burlon Wood our batteries must crowd down as close as possible to the canal so soon as its line is secure from the canal our field batteries can command a range to the extreme limit of Burlon Wood in order to accomplish this a novel device has been determined upon and worked out in detail this has been styled an extension barrage 4 brigades of our field batteries are all limbered up and at 0 hour go off on the heels of the infantry by 6 o'clock 40 minutes after the battle opens these are actually in position on the west side of the canal a few years ago in the enemy's hands they thus extend the effective range from the kickoff line from 6,500 to 8,500 yards and as a back battery goes out of action through exhaustion of its effective range its area of fire is taken over by one of these front batteries and then it too comes up to the canal bank this maneuver is made possible by the very effect of smoke barrage we lay down to screen enemy observation from Burlon Wood but the final objective lies considerably east of Burlon Wood and it therefore becomes the imperative task of our engineers to push practical crossings over the canal so that the guns can follow up the infantry 3 hours was the utmost they could be allowed for this task but without efficient artillery support our attacking lines are apt to be driven back down the slope and in the final analysis the success of the operation devolves upon the engineers but more even was required from the artillery than this intricate and fan-like barrage enemy counter barrage work must be smothered and for this purpose a great concentration of heavies was provided both of our own and imperial batteries for three weeks our artillery observation planes had been spotting the enemy's battery positions and it had been found that he was continually moving his batteries about having in all 105 battery positions in front of our attack in order to smother these by our counter-battery work it might be presumed it would be necessary to concentrate fire on every one of them an impossible task the problem was in fact in practice solved in a brilliant fashion immediately the battle opened our observers flew low over the enemy positions reporting by wireless not where his batteries were but what positions were empty thus enabling our artillery to concentrate their fire on occupied positions only with what success will be seen there are always tense minutes before zero it is a pregnant hour but never more so than this morning but we are packed so close that if the enemy is apprised of the attack and lays down a barrage our slaughter must be fearful for several days he has been nervous but our jumping offline has been camouflaged by deliberately destroying his wire far to the north and south as the rain clears off the men make shift to get a meal our rum warms their chilled limbs mist still hangs low in the valley but beyond the outline of the slope can be made out officers consult their maps and compasses and get them into their jumping off ground engineers are there with infantry floats the men carry scaling ladders all is ready but the minutes are interminable at five o'clock there is a faint sound in the east just then the enemy starts throwing up twin red balls of fire the SOS call he used in the army in show but nothing comes of it at last at twenty minutes past five of the morning of Friday September 27 the barrage opens some batteries are so close that the noise is stunning five minutes later the men push forward to secure the west side of the canal the enemy complete though is his surprise pours in a heavy shell fire this morning his SOS signal is twin green balls and soon his entire front line for miles north and south becomes twinkling green he does not know where the main stroke is to fall within a very short time the canal is crossed our men scaling the locks bombing as they go turning away up the eastward slopes prisoners captured this side of the canal come in at once and testify to the complete surprise they are from the 63rd naval division and the first Prussian Guards reserve division big fellows these but they do not look so terrible we had been warned of them but two days before enemy aircraft had dropped leaflets among our men quote spare this terrible bloodshed one red it is time for peace Canadians you will be only slaughtered if you go against our terrible gods the entire staff of an enemy battery was captured before it had fired a shot one of our own gunners performed a wonderful exploit realizing how essential it was to get the guns up as near the canal as possible Lieutenant H H Finney of the first battery CFA made a personal reconnaissance along the canal overnight and then under cover of darkness took his section of 18 pounders in front even of our outpost line he lost half his horses in ammunition but was able when zero struck to direct his fire on an enemy machine gun position across the canal at point blank range with open sights destroying it entirely Canadian engineers now work feverishly constructing bridges and the work goes forward with a will before nine o'clock the first battery crosses the canal prior to this Lieutenant J.A. Daven of the first Canadian divisional ammunition column immediately after zero and under heavy shell fire made a reconnaissance of the canal to nod in front of In-Chi located a practical crossing and by his persistence disregard of danger and good leadership took over a column of wagons and established his A.R.P. 1000 yards east of the canal where he kept up a much needed supply of ammunition for the forward batteries until the bridges were built since August 8th in every battle this officer had thus pushed forward his ammunition dumps under the fighting Sergeant Charles Glacier of the first Canadian division signal column had the honour of taking the first vehicle over the canal he established a report centre well east of the canal laying wires under heavy fire to the brigade and batteries his wireless aerials were shot down three times in half an hour but on each occasion he re-erected them himself our smoke barrage has now reached the distant scene at half past nine the tanks come back their days work done about noon clear above the smoke the gold and silver shower goes up it is the signal that Burlong Wood is in our hands End of Part 3 Chapter 4 Recording by James O'Connor Randolph, Massachusetts May 2010 Part 3, Chapter 5 of Canada's Hundred Days this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by James O'Connor Canada's Hundred Days by John Livesey Part 3, Chapter 5 Operations September 27 Preparations for this battle have been entered into at length because after all it was the plan and the arrangements for carrying it out that mattered those perfected, as we have seen and granted such an instrument as the Canadian Corps efficiently supported by the veteran troops ably commanded of the 11th British Division and the battle itself up to a certain stage at least according to program the different puzzle pots all carefully worked out beforehand fell into their place in the picture until it presented a perfected example of the out of war it was not until difficulties arose on our right flank that the scene became blurred and for a time threatened to ruin the general effect Sir Arthur Curry thus describes the opening operations at 20 a.m. September 27 the attack was successfully launched and in spite of all obstacles went well from the 1st the barrage was uniformly good and the 3rd and 4th Canadian Division Artilleries commanded respectively by Brigadier General J.S. Stewart and Brigadier General W.B.M. King were successful in advancing into captured ground and continued the barrage as planned early in the afternoon the 1st phase of the attack was substantially over and the readjustments of the fronts preparatory to the 2nd phase were underway on the extreme right however the 17th Corps had failed to keep pace with our advance and our right flank submitted to a severe infallad machine gun fire from the vicinity of Anu had to be refused for a considerable distance to retain touch with the left of the 17th Corps therefore the encircling movement which was to have given us Burlon Wood could not be developed fully alive to the gravity of the situation which would be created on the flank of the 3rd Army by the failure to capture and hold Burlon Wood the 11th Brigade of the 4th Canadian Division attacked from the north side of the wood and captured all the high ground pushing patrols as far as Fontaine Notre Dame it is recalled here that Burlon Wood which is 110 meters high dominates the ground as far south as Flesquiers and Havring Corps and that it's lost after very heavy fighting in November 1917 during the 1st Battle of Cambrai caused eventually the withdrawal of the 3rd Army from a large portion of the ground they had won by their surprise attack a severe counter-attack launched from the direction of Rayon Corps against the left of the 4th Canadian Division was repulsed in the afternoon with heavy losses to the enemy owing to the situation on our right flank already explained the 3rd Canadian Division should not be engaged this day the 1st Canadian Division and the 11th British Division however made substantial gains after the commencement of the 2nd phase the former capturing Haener Corps and crossing the Douay Cambrai Road and the latter pushing on and taking Epinoy and Waseel Le Verger by evening to get a clear picture it is necessary to trace the Corps and divisional boundaries the southern boundary of the Canadian Corps and therefore of our 4th Division was to start from the northwest corner of Muir and then run east 5,000 yards trending a little south all the way to a point midway between Anu and Berlon Wood then it took a wide sweep following the south and southeastern slope of the wood to a point about 500 yards northwest of Fontaine Notre Dame this is the Canadian Corps southern boundary ran in almost a direct line a little north of east to the Forburg Contemporary skirting Cambrai on the far side of the Shelt but crossing over the canal at Nouveau Sarimi north of the city thus not only Anu and Fontaine but the line of the Shelt Canal southwest of Cambrai were left in the area of the Canadian Corps the inter-divisional boundary between the 4th Canadian Division Major General Sir David Watson and the 3rd Canadian Division Major General F.O.W. Loomis started east from Inche and then trended off more to the northeast passing through Pilgrim's Rest and following the general direction of Haenakor the northern boundary of the 1st Canadian Division Major General Sir Archibald C. McDowell will be outlined when we come to a particular description of its operations while the time being we will confine ourselves to the 4th Division draw a line from the point northwest of Fontaine Notre Dame described above a little west of north to 500 yards east of Pilgrim's Rest and we have the 3rd objective of the 4th Canadian Division marking the end of the 1st Phase at this point the 3rd Canadian Division was designed to come up taking over the southern half of the area of advance marked out for the 2nd Phase roughly represented by the line from Nouvelle Sarmimi to Sankor both inclusive the 4th Division was to continue its advance on the left of the 3rd Division and therefore between the latter and the 1st Division owing to failure of the 17th Corps to come up on our right flank this plan never matured the 4th Division could do no better than reach its 3rd objective from Fontaine Notre Dame to Pilgrim's Rest and the opportunity for further exploitation northwest of Cambrai by the 3rd Division was thus denied on the opening day better fortune attended the 1st Canadian Division finally supported by the 11th British Division a deep salient being pushed into the enemy defense through Hainakor and between Sankor and Epinoy on the 4th Division front the 10th Brigade Brigadier General R.J.F. Hater was entrusted with the storming of the canal the attacking units had been highly organized for the work and the men went at it with a zip the 50th Battalion of Calgary on the right and the 46th Battalion of Regina on the left the latter being in contact with the 4th Battalion Central Ontario of the 1st Division jumped off at 5 minutes past zero and carried the enemy line on the west side of the canal in their first rush fixing their scaling ladders the 46th climbed down into the dry bed of lock number 4 where the garrison was bombed and the advance continued unchecked the 44th Battalion New Brunswick and 47th Battalion Western Ontario of the same brigade now came up in support so soon as the canal was crossed our troops under cover of a very efficient smoke barrage rushed the canal to Nord Trinch system and then advanced up the slope to their first objective the Machia online a pause was here made for 50 minutes when the attack was carried on by the 11th Brigade on the right and the 12th Brigade on the left until the 2nd objective was secured this being a line just west of Burlon Wood but also including Burlon Village stormed by the 12th Brigade owing to the difficulties of the ground no tanks got up here though several were employed further north by the 1st Division the infantry depended on the barrage and their own exertions though sooner had the 11th Brigade on our extreme right reached the Machia online than it became subject to a very heavy infallad fire from its right flank owing to failure of neighboring Imperial troops to take their objectives as they were held up in front of the formidable Hindenburg support line particularly galling machine gun fire came from the factory on the Cambray Road just east of this support line which here takes a bend south this inflicted many casualties and the 11th Brigade already was obliged to detach elements to form a flank in this direction as it advanced to its objective of Burlon Wood it offered a more and more exposed flank into which the enemy poured a heavy artillery and machine gun fire and launched a number of counter attacks from the southeast the 102nd Battalion British Columbia was forced to swing south a thousand yards outside the Canadian core area taking the strongly fortified factory on the Beaupin Cambray Road the 11th Brigade lost very heavily chiefly from machine gun fire but pushed steadily on reaching their second objective immediately in front of Burlon Wood the brigade held a line with on the right the 102nd Battalion in the center of the 54th Battalion of the Kootenay and on the left towards Burlon Village the 87th Battalion Grenadier Guards of Montreal the 75th Battalion recruited from the Mississauga horse of Toronto was in reserve but pressure was so great on the right flank that it was brought up in support of the 102nd the battle headquarters of both battalions being established together 1,000 yards west of Burlon Wood inside of half an hour an enemy 5.9 inch shell made a direct hit on the combined headquarters Lieutenant Colonel F. Lister of the 102nd being badly wounded as well as his adjutant while the battalion signal officer was killed the adjutant of the 75th was wounded and its signal was also killed and 4 or 5 other battalion officers became casualties as did 4 offices of the British divisional staff on our right who had come up to see how the battle was going the same shell killed a wounded a number of signalers and runners the command of these 2 battalions now devolved upon Lieutenant Colonel Thompson of the Canadian engineers who had joined the 75th Battalion overnight from London for that purpose just as he was about to sail for Canada on leave the 54th battalion on the immediate left fared equally badly for a single shell wounded Lieutenant Colonel A. B. Cary killed Major McDermott Captain Gal and Foster the adjutant and Captain McQuarrie while 2 other officers were wounded this and the fighting of the succeeding days took very heavy toll of our battalion officers several units losing their 1st and 2nd offices in command and company leaders right down to the subalterns after the disaster referred to above Lieutenant Colonel Thompson moved his headquarters to the top of the hill in the meantime the 54th had made a frontal attack on Burlon Wood and got through to its eastern slope here they were strongly counterattacked and came under a very heavy infallad fire from Fontaine Notre Dame and therefore sent back for further assistance Lieutenant Colonel Thompson detached 2 of the companies of the 75th in support and these came under orders of Colonel Cary whose wound was slight enabling him to carry on his command the remaining companies of the 75th were held in reserve though exposed to very heavy fire while the 102nd worked along the south and east of the wood seeking to join hands with the 54th but were prevented by the commanding position the enemy held at Fontaine Notre Dame from here enemy machine gunners trickled back into the southeast corner of the wood and inflicted heavy loss on our men clinging to its southern outskirts and the 3rd company of the 75th was therefore sent up to form a defensive flank during the course of the afternoon and the evening the 102nd beat back successive counterattacks thrown in from the direction of Cantin 2,000 yards to the southeast about midnight information was received from headquarters of the 11th brigade that some of the enemy had reestablished themselves in Burlon Wood as the 3rd Canadian division was to jump off at dawn from a line east of the wood of September 27 it became vitally important to protect their rear by clearing out these enemy elements so the last remaining company of the 75th battalion was sent in to drive them out and establish a defensive flank against Fontaine Notre Dame roping their way forward in the pitch dark bombing as they went and more than once coming to close grips with cold steel the company accomplished its difficult task well before dawn broke and Burlon Wood was at last finally in our hands while this was going on the 87th battalion had cleared the southwest corner of the wood and held it throughout the day at night the battalion attacked again with the object of driving back the enemy into Fontaine Notre Dame and this was a scene of a very gallant exploit on part of Lieutenant E. M. Preston who, realizing that his platoon was under very heavy machine gun fire from the railway embankment to the east and that unless this was silenced the entire advance must be held up called for two volunteers though under continual heavy fire directed by flares the enemy threw up they crawled on their hands and knees until they got within bombing distance of the enemy post ordering his men to throw their bombs Lieutenant Preston rushed the post killing or capturing the garrison and sending back word that the advance could go on on the left of the 11th brigade the 12th brigade after storming the stoutly held village of Burlon passed on up the high ground their right penetrating Burlon Wood from the north while their left established contact with the first Canadian division at Pilgrim's rest this brigade did not achieve this success without very hard fighting all day and especially during the afternoon wind as its elements were fighting their way up on the high ground through wire and concrete machine gun posts the enemy counterattacked time after time but was always beaten back this brigade suffered too from the exposed right flank but the men clung stubbornly to the ground they held exposed though it was to heavy fire from railing corps in front and from all along the macaw line as far south as the Bhopalm Cambrai road all its battalions were engaged during the day these being the 38th of Ottawa 72nd C4th Highlanders of Vancouver 78th of Winnipeg and 85th of Nova Scotia the position then on the night of September 27 28 so far as our right was concerned was that it held a semi-circular position from southwest of Burlong Wood along its base to the east west of Fontaine Notre Dame and then it's running north to a little east of Pilgrim's rest around this whole area the enemy's fire was concentrated every foot of ground held being raked from one or more directions losses of the troops engaged especially of the 11th Brigade were very heavy none but troops of the 1st class could thus have not only stood their ground but consolidated the position under cover of night to a certain extent the plan had miscarried but this was because of events over which the Canadian corps could exercise no control it went amiss through lack of support on our right but not withstanding this and in Burlong Wood we held the key to the defences of Cambrai before proceeding to an account of what was going on in the northern area of the corps a detailed account of the wonderful work of the Canadian engineers will contribute to a better view of the battle as a whole the engineer preparations for the operation were undertaken at five days notice and were exceedingly difficult owing to the nature of the ground the problem involved the repair of roads demolished by shell fire the building of cross-country tracks for infantry and horse transport to the front line the pushing forward of light tramways to the front line to facilitate the delivery of ammunition stores and supplies the provision of engineer material of all sorts and the construction of new headquarters for battalions, brigades, divisions etc the dugout accommodation and shelter for the troops as quickly as they could be improvised a difficult question was the provision of water supply for the large number of horses approximately 40,000 assembled in a very congested area the great problem was to get the infantry and the guns over the canal in the face of the enemy barrage and to provide sufficient facilities in the way of roads, bridges and tramways as would ensure the ammunition for the artillery being sustained and supply of munitions, stores and rations for the large number of troops engaged as it was clear that the enemy's barrage would fall naturally on the canal and be maintained there the following were provided for 7 infantry footbridges of an unsinkable type 10 crossing for guns and horse transport 5 of which had to be developed at once for heavy traffic even while the continuous stream of guns and ammunition wagons was pouring over them at least 10 times Canadian engineer offices flying at a height of about 500 feet and subjected to heavy fire traverse the length of the canal involved reconnoitering for the best spots for tank crossings, bridge sites and infantry crossings such was the preparation following were the results before 0 hour 18 miles of roads had been repaired up to the front lines and 7 miles of tramways constructed on these tramways over 3000 tons of ammunition per day were being delivered to advanced dumps and battery positions the huge concentration of horses was provided with the necessary water supply after 0 all crossings were put through successfully artillery and machine gun fire the first guns crossing the canal at 8.40 am the engineers went over with the infantry to get their foot bridges across and the engineer wagons with their 6 horse teams were pushed forward so rapidly that in several cases all the horses were killed by machine gun fire and the men got their material down to the bridge sites by manhandling the wagons in one case a party the Bosch machine gunners who had been overlooked by the mopping up parties emerged from a concealed tunnel and attacked the engineer party attempting to bridge the canal the engineer officer in charge took part of his men and beat off the attack and at the same time kept the work of construction going without interruption the bridges constructed were of all types pontoon, trestle heavy pontoon and heavy steel bridges for all traffic a remarkable record was made in the erection of two heavy steel bridges a 110 feet span under heavy fire the materials were got on the sites at 2 o'clock in the afternoon and the approaches prepared and the bridges erected in 12 hours actual work by early afternoon three new pumping installations had been established on captured ground with sufficient horse troughs to water 5,000 horses an hour all materials were got forward to the infantry and the positions gained consolidated about three miles of tramways had been constructed and were in operation and over 1,000 of our wounded were evacuated on returning ammunition trains operated by Canadian Corps tramways the battle of the canal du Nord was an engineers battle the success of the whole operation depended upon the speed with which the crossings of the canal were provided and the way in which they were repaired and improved during the day so as to enable the guns and infantry to be maintained in the positions reached in their advance the reorganization the previous spring of the Canadian engineers was thus fully justified and in the open warfare now about to open the value of their work became ever increasingly apparent End of part 3 Chapter 5 Recording by James O'Connor Randolph, Massachusetts May 2010