The chair be authorized to declare a recess at any time. Without objection, so ordered. I'd like to begin by welcoming our witnesses who are here today. We have Mr. John Hill, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space and Missile Defense Policy. We have another John Hill, Vice Admiral Hill, the Director of the Missile Defense Agency. We have Lieutenant General Carbler from US Army, Space, and Missile Defense Command. General Carbler, it was great visiting with you last week in Huntsville and seeing all the work you and your team are doing. And finally, we have Major General David Miller, Director of Operations for Space Command. This will likely be the last time that we have Vice Admiral Hill and Lieutenant General Carbler before our subcommittee. Thank you both for your decades of service and for the sacrifices your families have made as well. Our country is stronger and safer because of your tireless dedication and sacrifices that accompany your service. I offer heartfelt thanks for myself and the members of this committee for it. And now on to the topic of the day, Missile Defense. Missile Defense Policy has shifted from a partisan issue years ago to one where there is much more consensus today. One of the driving factors behind this shift is the aggressive actions and advancing military capabilities of China and Russia. It's challenging to argue as some have that U.S. missile defenses are destabilizing when Russia's Moscow Missile Defense System alone has 68 interceptors, more than the total number of U.S. ground-based interceptors, and they are armed with nuclear warheads. And just last week, China claims to have conducted a successful mid-course intercept test. In addition to China and Russia's actions, North Korea and Iran are growing rogue threats. North Korea just last week conducted a flight test of a solid-fueled ICBM, a new capability for its military that is the result of its unprecedented pace of missile tests over the past year. And Iran has multiple space-launched vehicle programs that, in my opinion, are nothing more than flimsy cover for an ICBM program. Missile Defense Policy has evolved in places like Ukraine and Israel as we have seen how it is executed in real-world operations. This is especially true given what Israel has been able to do with Iron Dome to protect its citizens, and recent advancements it has made with the Iron Beam Directed Energy Program. In Ukraine, Vladimir Putin's unprovoked and unsuccessful invasion attempt has been stifled by missile defenses of critical military assets and population centers. Through both conflicts, it's proven that missile defenses save lives and buys time for senior leaders to make decisions regarding how to respond. Missile Defense of the American Homeland provides similar benefits. If for some misguided reason an adversary would attack our territory, we need to be able to take out as many incoming missiles as possible, saving lives and providing senior leaders additional time to calibrate an appropriate response. Furthermore, more knowing that we can defend our country and our people, deters an adversary from even considering an attack on our homeland in the first place. This is inherently stabilizing. There are some other issues I hope our witnesses will address today. I hope we will hear how vital that spectrum is to our homeland missile defenses. If we get the current spectrum debate wrong, there will be unfathomable consequences on our missile defense capabilities. These consequences include an overwhelming financial cost that we would shoulder to replace our current systems and the unimaginable capability gap that would occur in the interim. With this in mind, I hope we get an update on the next generation NGI interceptor program and hear how DOD and Congress can work together to accelerate it. Buying only 20 NGI's doesn't make sense to me. Instead, we need to look at a full replacement of the current fleet for a total of 64. I'm also interested in having a discussion about re-energizing plans to field additional interceptors in upstate New York, which General Milley gave his support to earlier this month. We can't wait for Iran to test an IBCM ICBM before we begin construction on an East Coast site. We know from site construction in Alaska that this will be a multi-year project, so it is best to get started now. On Monday, I was able to attend the space symposium in my home district of Colorado Springs. I guess that was just yesterday, time flies. Based on current trajectories in military technology and the innovation of the private sector, it's clear that the future of missile defense is increasingly becoming space-based. I hope we can address this issue sometime during our classified session later this afternoon. One example of this that we can discuss here and now is a high priority program for me, and that is the HBTSS Constellation. This will provide the sensing, tracking, and fire control needed for hypersonic and other missile defense. Two of these payloads will launch this year while the rest of the constellation will follow in a few years. I also hope to hear from our policy witnesses as to why we are settling for President Biden's limited budget request for the glide phase interceptor, or GPI, that doesn't get us a capability until the mid-2030s. Given the rapid pace with which our adversaries are pursuing and fielding hypersonic systems, I am eager to hear ideas from both DOD on how to pull both HBTSS and GPI to the left. On this issue, many of us in Congress feel a sense of urgency that does not seem to be shared by the executive branch, and that is a problem for our national security. With that, I turn to the ranking member for his opening remarks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Vice Admiral Hill, during your 38 years of service, you've been committed to the development and deployment of ATSEE and land-based missile defense capabilities for not only the United States, but for our allies and partners around the world. Lieutenant General Karbler, you have played a critical role across the Army's artillery and air and missile defense communities to address the growing threat to our forces and have had a unique purview across both the space and missile defense missions. Your collective achievements for our security, for the safety of every one of us in this room, have entailed sacrifices for your families, not to mention the professional burdens and responsibilities that you have so often carried heavily on your shoulders. So gentlemen, thank you. You have my sincerest appreciation as you culminate extraordinary military careers. It's appropriate and important to begin our discussion this afternoon by acknowledging that, unlike your impeccable military careers, missile defense and defeat has a mixed legacy and continues to pose difficult questions about what its purpose is and should be, under what conditions it actually makes us safer and therefore how much and what kind of it we need. As a committee, it is important for us to evaluate these budget requests with a clear understanding of the strategic logic behind them. And so I think it's helpful to frame the conversation with a discussion of the scenarios or levels in which we use or don't use missile defense aided by this chart behind me. The highest possible level of missile defense is the strategic level, which means deterring or defeating a nuclear attack on the United States by a near peer adversary, as President Reagan's fanciful and infamous Star Wars program envisioned. As both the chairman and I discussed during a recent CSIS panel, and as affirmed by both the Trump and Biden administrations in the 2019 and 2022 missile defense reviews, this is not an area where the US is pursuing nor should pursue missile defense. Going down this road would not only be prohibitively expensive, but fundamentally destabilizing. Of course, the crazy logic of atomic peace is achieved through mutual vulnerability where no major nuclear power would launch a nuclear attack because they know, we all know, that the result would be nuclear holocaust. Until we can safely rid the world of nuclear weapons, which I believe is ultimately necessary for the survival of humanity itself, we can neither unilaterally disarm nor unilaterally render useless our adversaries arsenals. If we were to try to render our adversaries missiles incapable, they would simply develop new ones to defeat our defenses as we have seen with our adversaries deploying increasingly sophisticated maneuvering weapons to evade current US missile defense radars. We should always remember that the US decision to leave the anti-ballistic missile treaty in 2002 to develop a homeland missile defense system in response to advancements by the DPRK can almost directly be tied to both the Chinese Communist Party and Russia pursuing more advanced ballistic crews and hypersonic missiles. And the result has been to make the balance of power between nuclear superpowers fundamentally less stable. As multiple general officers have restated before this committee in the past month, we deter our near-peer nuclear adversaries with our own safe, secure, and reliable nuclear forces. Now, the next level down to the fourth level is the area where there is the most debate and that is the limited capability to address rogue nations. This is where our current ground-based missile defense system and the next generation interceptor fit in. And this is where we can argue that our advancements in missile defense over the past two decades since pulling out of the ABM treaty have provided a security blanket against aspiring nuclear powers like North Korea and Iran. However, it should not be lost on this subcommittee that during the latest parade, North Korea showcased 11 KN-22 ICBMs. The publicly stated shot doctrine for the GMD system is four to five interceptors per one incoming ICBM. Given the fact that we currently have 44 in-placed interceptors, so 11 times four for anyone rusty on elementary school arithmetic, if North Korea gets just one more ICBM capable of reaching the United States, we won't have enough interceptors. We therefore are in an arms race today with North Korea. Exactly the arms race the anti-ballistic missile treaty was designed to stop. And at some point, if we continue to expand our current arsenal of interceptors, we must ask not just how North Korea will respond, but how Russia and the CCP will respond as well as they see a pathway for our missile shield to impact their deterrent. I hope that in today's discussion, Mr. Hill can help us understand how the Department of Defense is weighing that important question. At what point will this arms race provoke a response from Russia and the CCP? And therefore, at what point do we move North Korea's nuclear arsenal from category four into category five, which we deter with our own nuclear response? We must all recognize that decisions like that, indeed decisions that we make on this subcommittee this year have implications not just for meeting today's tactical threats, but for ensuring the strategic stability of America and the world for decades to come. Now the third level of missile defense, the nuance that I think is important to distinguish from a rogue nation because the size of a homeland system required to deal with it is very different. And that is the instance of anyone, including a near peer adversary, from having an accidental launch. The chairman referenced this in his testimony as his statement as well. Any student of history understands how close to this possibility we have come in the past, and having some ability to defend against a small, even single accidental launch should be maintained. Level two, which we are seeing play out on the battlefield today is what we call regional missile defense. There's a big difference between level three and level two from taking out a strategic intercontinental nuclear weapon to stopping theater level missiles in current conflicts. Systems such as the Patriot, that and the Aegis BMD system are the cornerstone of regional missile defense and the investments being made in this budget request to improve these systems are needed to meet increasingly complex, short to intermediate weapons that have been proliferated around the world. We've seen these at work in action, the incredible support Ukraine has received from allies and partners in the air, missile defense has enabled them to fight back against near nonstop Russian missile attacks. Missiles are an integral part of modern way of war and so this too is important for missile defense. Ukraine has also reaffirmed the power of the higher level strategic nuclear stability between nations, even in the presence of regional missile defense, because it has not resulted in any strategic nuclear exchange. But we must be cognizant of the danger of crossing this line when developing theater level defenses could it be interpreted to impact strategic stability.  Our ability to see an incoming threat is what gives us decision space to react and respond either offensively or defensively and this is an area where this subcommittee has consistently pushed the department to address. It's a place where more investment and better capabilities unquestionably make us more safe and the world more stable and I'm encouraged that the administration has requested over $6 billion across several programs to develop, improve, and expand the capabilities of both land and space based missile centers to address more complex threats that our adversaries are developing. When we look at this complicated multi-level and multi-layered picture, it is easy to be overwhelmed. This is esoteric stuff but it is vitally important that we get it right, not just for our own national security but for the security of humanity itself. Taking the narrow view, it is an easy vote to buy a few more interceptors but it is up to us in this room to recognize the much longer term strategic implications for the narrow authorization and budgeting decisions we make today. As an American citizen, having a robust layered missile defense system makes me feel more safe and secure this afternoon and buying a few more interceptors would probably make me feel a little bit more comfortable tomorrow but when I think about the world, we will leave to my two and four year old daughters. I am less sure. How will expanding US missile defense today impact strategic stability tomorrow? We are already in an arms race. Will it make our world more safe? That is the discussion that we have too often glossed over or left for another day on this subcommittee and in Congress and it is a discussion and a debate that we must have the political and intellectual courage to resolve. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. Our first witness will be Mr. John Hill, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space and Missile Defense. The floor is yours. Thank you, Chairman Lamborn, Ranking Member Moultrie and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. I'm honored to be alongside my distinguished colleagues here on the panel. Today I'm going to review recent missile threat developments, provide a policy update and explain how the Department's fiscal year 2024 budget request implements our policy. As Secretary Austin and the National Defense Strategy have made clear the People's Republic of China is the Department's pacing challenge while Russia remains an acute threat. Over the past year, the PRC continued to develop, test and field advanced missile systems of all classes and ranges. It also launched ballistic missiles in unsuccessful attempts to intimidate and demonstrate a capability to forcefully unify with Taiwan. Russia conducted thousands of missile strikes in Ukraine to terrorize the Ukrainian people and degrade Ukraine's warfighting capability. Iran launched missile attacks into neighboring states and provided rockets and uncrued aerial systems to non-state actors who in turn used them to target US forces and partners. And North Korea showcased an array of missile systems, including 11 ICBMs and it conducted yet another ICBM test just last week. As outlined in the 2022 National Defense Strategy, integrated deterrence incorporates the Department's efforts to deter and defeat air and missile threats. Our top two NDS priorities are to defend the US homeland, pacing to the PRC and to deter strategic attacks against the United States' allies and partners. This includes staying ahead of the threat from North Korea through improvements to the ground-based mid-course defense system as part of a comprehensive missile defeat approach complemented by the credible threat of direct cost imposition. Our third priority is to deter regional aggression and prepare to prevail if necessary, prioritizing the PRC in the Indo-Pacific and Russia in Europe. The defense of Guam intersects all three of these priorities. To defend our homeland, we requested $3.3 billion to improve our ground-based mid-course defense, including $2.2 billion for the next generation interceptor. Our homeland defense priorities include $1.5 billion for the defense of Guam, an increase of over $600 million compared to the FY23 request, $64 million to improve the defense of Hawaii through investments in air surveillance and other capabilities, $423 million to continue fielding over the horizon radars, and nearly $5 billion for modernizing our space capabilities with new missile warning and missile tracking and next generation overhead persistent infrared architectures. For regional defense, our key priorities include $259 million for hypersonic missile defense sensors and development of the glide phase interceptor, $2.2 billion for the standard missile 3 THAAV and PAC-3 interceptors, $1.5 billion to counter lower-tier missile threats, and $308 million for directed energy development. Missile defense is a notable element of our $35 billion of support to Ukraine since Russia's further invasion last year. Ukraine endures today as a sovereign and free nation in large part because it made air and missile defense top priorities as it leveraged extensive assistance from the United States, our NATO allies, and many others. Our international missile defense cooperation also includes developing testing and training together with allies and partners around the world and supporting them through sales of equipment. So in conclusion, missiles have become foundational to our adversary's way of war, and missile defense has become foundational to integrated deterrence and defense of the nation. To that end, the best thing Congress can do to support the warfighter is pass on time the Defense and Military Construction Appropriations Acts. Thank you for your attention. I'm prepared to take questions. Thank you. We'll next hear from Vice Admiral John Hill, Director of the Missile Defense Agency. Chairman Lamborn, Raking Member Moulton, distinguished subcommittee members. Thank you for the opportunity to talk to you about missile defense today. I'd like to take a quick moment to thank the women and men of the Missile Defense Agency who focus on developing, delivering, and supporting the services to meet the joint requirements of our combat commands with credible capabilities to counter ballistic maneuvering and hypersonic missile threats. To summarize the threat, I would call it large numbers, high speeds, and heavy maneuver. Those are the challenges today and for tomorrow. We're requesting 10.9 billion to continue our mission to meet these threats, and I'm gonna talk to you about three priorities. The first is homeland defense level four, and then I will talk about the priority for Guam, and then the priority for hypersonic missile defense, which are at the level two of missile defense. So the first priority of homeland defense, which includes Alaska and Hawaii, the ground-based mid-course defense as mentioned earlier has protected the homeland from rogue-nation ballistic missile attacks since 2004. Our current focus is on new capabilities to counter the limited but advancing North Korean long-range ballistic missile threat. The GMD system is undergoing a service life extension program to improve reliability and extend the GVIs beyond 2030. These upgrades mitigate the risk until the nation feels the next generation interceptor which is on track for first emplacement no later than the end of 2028. NGI development is executing to deliver advanced interceptors featuring multiple kill vehicle technology, which we'll add to the current fleet of interceptors at Fort Greedley, Alaska, and Vandenberg Space Force Base in California. On to priority two, which is the defense of Guam, the department is developing an integrated air and missile defense system to defend against diverse missile threats. Working with the service and the agencies, we are driving to meet NINDOPACOM's requirement for a persistent 360 degrees layered defense. That capability on Guam against simultaneous raids of crews, ballistic maneuvering, and hypersonic threats. We are driving operational capability and phases to meet clear war fighting needs. As I go to the third priority, which is also level two, the priority of hypersonic missile defense, this is to counter the hypersonic threat. We have integrated tracking capabilities into existing radars, both ground and sea based. That capability is here today. Today's sensor architecture and command and control can track hypersonic threats to support warning and domain awareness, level one. Aegis ships equipped with the sea based terminal capability can engage some hypersonic threats in the terminal phase today. Now due to the global maneuver capabilities of hypersonic missiles, space based tracking and targeting capability is a clear need. Later this year, the MDA developed hypersonic and ballistic tracking space sensor. As mentioned by the chairman, HBTSS will start on orbit operations to demonstrate unique tracking and targeting designed to support hypersonic engagements. HBTSS will participate in flight tests and real world threat collections throughout FY24. The capability will be proliferated and operated by the space force. We continue to work closely with the Navy to upgrade sea based terminal defenses to counter more advanced maneuvering and hypersonic threats. And based on threat evolution, we will deliver the next incremental upgrade in 2025. Sea based terminal is the only active defense available today to counter hypersonic threats. Now in order to expand the battle space against hypersonic threats, we have initiated the glide phase interceptor to counter regional hypersonic threats. GPI leverages proven Aegis weapon system engage on network sensors to provide the depth of fire needed to thin the rate for terminal defenses. Homeland defense BMD against rogue nations, defense of Guam against large raids of high speed maneuvering threat and building out the defense in depth against hypersonic threats. Those are priorities. Thank you, I look forward to answer your questions and it has been an honor to serve. Thank you. Thank you. Well, next year from Lieutenant General Daniel Carbler, US Army space and missile defense command. Chairman Lamborn, ranking member Moulton and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I'm honored to again testify before you and to represent an incredible People First organization of 2,600 soldiers and civilians across 13 time zones and 19 dispersed locations. 20, if you count, Army astronaut Frank Rubio aboard the international space stations and multiple time zones throughout this hearing. Every day, these amazing professionals provide space, high altitude and missile defense forces and capabilities to army and joint war fighters. First, let me express my sincere appreciation for your steadfast support of our people and their families. My role remains unchanged from previous testimonies. I serve as the commanding general for the US Army Space and Missile Defense Command, the commander of the Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense and as the Army's proponent for Air and Missile Defense or AMD. I provide US Northern Command, the soldiers who stand ready to defend our nation from intercontinental ballistic missile attack. I serve as the Army's service component commander to both US Strategic Command and US Space Command and I am the Chief of Staff of the Army's Air and Missile Defense Enterprise Integrator. In Europe, we see a continuation of the largest employment of offensive missiles since World War II and the unprecedented use of attack UAVs in Russia's 14 month war against Ukraine. In the Pacific against the backdrop of multiple missile tests by the DPRK in China, threats of regional and trans-regional complex missile attacks still loom. And in the CENTCOM AOR, our adversaries continue to attack partner nations and US forces using missiles, UAVs, rockets, artillery, and mortars. In short, in my 36 years as an air defender, I have never seen adversary threat activity, whether that be test or operational use as great as I see it today. Adversary actions in the space domain are equally as aggressive as they continue to challenge us across multiple space-enabled mission areas. To address these threats, we must strengthen our capabilities to deny our adversaries the benefit of their aggression. We must continue investment and sustainment of combat-ready, capable, and lethal AMD capabilities. Unfortunately, we do not face these threats alone. We have allies and partners who contribute significantly to the AMD and space missions. Please allow me to briefly outline a few milestones accomplished by our space and missile defense soldiers and civilians. This past year, we have partnered with the US Army Special Operations Command and Army Cyber Command to create a space-cyber-soft triad to provide deterrence and response options to the integrated use of our unique capabilities. We've continued to mature the triad through multiple exercises to include the Army's Project Conversion's 22. In the Air Defense Enterprise, we recently reached a historic milestone with a full-rate production decision for the integrated air and missile defense battle command system, IBCS. This any-sensor, best-shooter, optimal command control construct allows us to integrate the right quantity and mix of AMD capabilities across all echelons building an effective tiered and layered defense. This is the linchpin of the Army's broader AMD modernization effort critical to transforming air and missile defense capabilities well into the future. In closing, and on a personal note, this will be my last opportunity to address the distinguished members of the subcommittee as I'll retire later this year. I am confident in the direction and momentum of the Army's Air and Missile Defense and Space Enterprises. I look forward to addressing your questions. Thank you. And thank you. And lastly, we'll hear from Major General David Miller, Director of Operations, U.S. Space Command. Thank you, Chairman Lamborn, Ranking Member Moulton, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to join Deputy Assistant Secretary Hill by Sabinville Hill and Lieutenant General Carbler, and I'm honored to speak today on behalf of our commander, General Jim Dickinson, as well as the men and women of the United States Space Command. Our strategic competitors are expanding and evolving their inventories of advanced weapons capable of threatening both the U.S. homeland and our interests around the globe, as my panelists have also stated. Our challenge and my focus here today will be mainly in level one, discussion of the domain awareness, warning, targeting, and tracking capabilities needed to quickly identify, characterize, and defeat these threats. To accomplish this task requires joint, combined, and partnered solution involving an array of traditional and non-traditional sensors capable of delivering space domain awareness, missile warning, and missile defense. U.S. Space Command has made tremendous strides in optimizing our legacy space architectures as the global sensor manager and integrating non-traditional sensors capable of contributing to this mission set. While we are excited about the future space-based sensors and architectures being delivered by the Space Force as well as by our missile defense agency teammates, we are focusing now on maintaining our advantage in the space and cyber domain and providing the space-enabled combat edge that joint and combined force enjoys today. The complexity and scale of the threat environment demands that we integrate these sensors and enable timely decision-making and response. Additionally, our missions are not confined to one region. They are inherently global. This only increases the need for close coordination across all combatant commands, supporting agencies, as well as our allies and our commercial partners. This environment demands integrated missile warning, space domain awareness, and missile defense solutions to enable globally persistent space and missile threat tracking, along with many other responsibilities the United Unified Command plan assigned to General Dickinson as the United States Space Command Commander. As a nation's global sensor manager, he is required to plan, manage, and execute the DOD's space domain awareness, missile defense, and missile warning sensors. Recent successes in the integration of these operations, activities, and investments is a direct result of assigning US Space Command as the global sensor manager. We have developed synergies among disparate missions, functions, and systems, significantly enhancing the joint force's effectiveness in protecting the United States and our allies. Since all missile defense travel in, through, and from the space domain, it made sense to assign US Space Command as a global sensor manager. We have the tools, tactics, training, and expertise to accomplish this mission. Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today. I submit my written testimony for the record, and I welcome the subcommittee's questions on this critical topic, as well as the collaboration with these agencies represented here. Okay, thank you, and thank all of you for being here today, and for your opening statements. We will now have a series of questions. I'm gonna ask a specific one of you, General Karbler, and then a couple on hypersonic defense, and a couple on NGIs, and then I'm gonna turn it over to my ranking member. General Karbler, when we are here last year, you told me that our soldiers work in the missile defense mission, particularly Patriot and Thad. We're going through a meat grinder. In other words, the dwell times were nine months at home for every year deployed, less than the time deployed. What is the current dwell time for Army missile defenders, and has Army made any progress reducing dwell times for these soldiers? Chairman, yes, the Army recognized this as a challenge. The high op-tempo for our Army air defense soldiers was such a priority for the Chief of Staff and Army Secretary. They commissioned a health of the force study specific to address the op-tempo challenges for our air defense soldiers. That study encompassed multiple surveys, families, soldiers, officers, NCOs across the entire air defense force. Got back great feedback, and then the Army made recommendations and now has implemented those recommendations really over the past year. Recommendations that stem from everything from paying incentives to professional military education opportunities for our NCOs because they were deployed, didn't have a chance to go to different schooling or officers as well. Mid-tour leave, for example, just all those different opportunities. And we also decreased the demand across our force over specifically in the SENTCOM AOR. So when we went from one to .9 dwell to deploy, we've gone now from one to 1.9, so it's almost one to two. So the current battalions that are over there, one battalion's deployed to dwell is one to 1.9, and the other battalion is one to 2.2. So you can see that in that year, we have really made a significant change and the SECDF's red lines for deployed to dwell is one to two, so we're getting right within the Secretary of Defense's red lines. And quantitatively, we also have proven that this is making a difference. The 32nd Army Air and Missile Defense Command, that's responsible for providing those soldiers to SENTCOM. Last year led the Army for division-sized retention with 109.7% exceeding their retention rate. And this year, they have met 70% of their annual retention goal already, and they also have a 39% stabilization request of the soldiers within that formation. So the soldiers are voting with their feet and they're voting with their feet to stay where they're at right now. Thank you. Okay, thank you for your great progress in that area. So on the first issue, I wanted to ask about hypersonic defense. My top priority this year is accelerating our nation's hypersonic capabilities. There are two capabilities for hypersonic defense that I want to dwell on here for a moment. The HBTSS for sensing, tracking, and fire control, and the glide phase interceptor. The first two HBTSS payloads are set to launch later this year, but the rest of the constellation to get us to full coverage is not expected to launch until the end of this decade. Additionally, the administration's proposed budget does not get us even an initial capability for the glide phase interceptor against hypersonics until around 2035. Only in Washington, D.C. does a missile development program take 13 years. And I don't think it takes that long in Beijing, Moscow, or Pyongyang. So Vice Admiral Hill, given sufficient funding, what's the earliest that MDA believes it could get a glide phase interceptor program to initial operational capability? Yes, sir. Thanks, Chairman Lindhorn. The glide phase interceptor, as I mentioned earlier, is based on Aegis fire control. So we're gonna leverage the existing engage on remote, which today we can do from a Ford base ship. We can leverage existing space-based sensors. We can fuse that through command and control, battle management communications. Today, that drives sea-based terminal. So glide phase interceptor really is providing that area level defense. It really thins the raid before we deal with it down in terminal, which is the worst place to do those sort of intercepts, particularly in the sea base when the debris just comes forward onto the ship. We laid out the plan and we worked within the department. We're very early in the program, Chairman, so just so you kind of level set where we are. We're not at Milestone A yet. We should be kicking into that next phase, which is all about the risk reduction. And that is where we will really build our confidence to be able to accelerate the program. I believe that we can pull it earlier. It is certainly a funding challenge, but we'll continue to work closely within the department to pull it as left as possible, because I agree with you that out in the mid-30s is almost irrelevant. We are not meeting the threat. Thank you, I really appreciate that, and I know it's based on years of great service, so I appreciate that answer. For you and for General Miller, what is the importance to both of you to field the full HBTSS constellation as quickly as possible? I'll go in and just kind of go back to why we should do that. It really is about the maneuvering threat. We no longer have predictable trajectories that go down the threat axis, where your land-based sensors would typically be located to look in that one direction with limited field of view. By being in space, we have the ability to catch these maneuvering threats and then provide the fire control quality data and the latency that's required. The first two that go up later this year, the launch time is roughly a September, depending on the manifest, and then we'll be collecting data throughout 24 to prove out in space what we've already proven on the ground. We're working very closely with the Space Force to integrate into the overall architecture to proliferate HBTSS. So I'll hand it over to Rock Miller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just echo everyone of those points. A couple of key things, I think. The first is the HBTSS capability provides two things in particular, certainly the maneuvering threat and the custody they're in, but it also provides a level of discrimination that's essential if you're gonna provide quality missile defense across the regime of threat areas that we see. So I think within both the COCOM, as well as we have to talk to the service for their specific integration requirements, I think it's absolutely essential to compliment what we already have in the budget in terms of the missile warning, missile tracking architecture. Thank you. And lastly on this subject, Secretary Hill, don't you think that providing the GPI or the HBTSS faster in both cases should be a higher priority? I think we're gonna have a lot of learning this year as Admiral Hill spoke to in terms of the GPI program and as we're moving into this risk reduction and that's gonna give us information that would help make a more confident decision if you wanna move it to the left. We still have the space to move it to the left. So coming forward in that program and that's an option you wanna keep open to do that as you look at the threat. Likewise with the HBTSS, so these launches that are gonna be happening this year, now you get that space-based data to inform your decision as you move to the actual fielding timeframe and I think you still have maintaining that flexibility to do to make the kind of decision you're suggesting, Chairman. Okay, well let's work on making this the highest priority so that we can move it to the left as we've all just talked about. On the next generation interceptor, NGI, the current plan is to buy 20 and these will come online around 2028. I've heard 2027 a little bit, which is even better, but in any case, this will give us a mix of approximately 44 older GBI's and 20 newer NGI's at the end of this decade. Vice Admiral Hill, what's your best military advice? Wouldn't it make sense to eventually start replacing aging GBI's with NGI's if the funding was there? Now Chairman Lambert, great question and when we laid out the acquisition plan, we thought through all of that. We wanted to leave ourselves enough flexibility to give the nation options. So we have two companies that are competing now and that's why you hear different timelines. The government reference architecture for first emplacement is 2028. Both companies are running towards a 27 timeframe, which is great, the power of competition does work and then along the way, we will make decisions on inventory. Right now the acquisition plan was basically what it was four years ago, which was to add 20 and so that was the starting point with the acquisition plan. But what's great about carrying two, the nation has the ability to go beyond the critical design review. You could have two production lines. If you want to really build out capacity, you can neck down to one supplier at that point and have a single production line. You can build the 20, you can add to the 44 or you can replace some numbers of those and then increase more as you go. So it's a very flexible acquisition strategy and I think those decisions do not have to be made today. And Vice Admiral Hill, could the flexibility also encompass not just having two contractors through critical design review, but into production? Yes, sir. So that we have two perhaps varying capability, maybe one for a particular threat, one for another threat that's better suited over here and we can mix and match. Yes, sir. And in fact, whenever we talk about just interceptors, I always like to go back to the total system, the ground base weapon system itself is designed to handle basically the three variants that are in the ground today, plus two new variants. And so again, we built in the flexibility so that we can make decisions at the right time. I would say we've got to come through preliminary design review later this year, have high confidence that we can in fact close the design and then move to critical design review where we can either down select or not. Those decisions are open to the nation. Thank you. Yes, sir. Ranking Member Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to start by just really hammering home one of the points that you were addressing here. If I can attempt to quote Major General Miller, the HBTSS not only detects a maneuvering threat and maintains custody therein, but also provides discrimination so that you can accurately prosecute that threat. That's a very difficult statement for anyone watching C-SPAN right now to understand. It's probably a difficult statement for many of us on the committee to decipher and pull apart. But what we're talking about is fundamentally important and it's something that every American should actually understand, which is that if Russia or China were to launch a hypersonic missile on Washington, D.C., where we're all sitting this afternoon, how much advance warning would we have of that attack? Vice Admiral Hill? Ranking Member Moulton, thanks, great question. And so what I'll do is I'll go back to your levels chart. Right now, when it comes to hypersonic threats from a engagement perspective, we're pursuing a regional capability. But you're exactly right from a sensing capability, we're at that level one piece, which is you want to cover everything. So you want to see a strategic attack on the states for sure. Just to kind of add on to what General Miller mentioned, when I say latency and fire control quality data, if I was explaining that to my daughter, I would say latency means timely, right? We want timely information going to any defensive system or to a warning system. So that's what I mean by latency. When we say fire control, what we mean is position and velocity accuracy at a level that can support a missile on target. So that's what we mean. We say fire control quality against the hypersonic threat. The other piece is the B in HBTSS, right? So, and I didn't mention that in my opening statement, but the B really means the dim targets of ballistic missiles. So what we're seeing in the North Korean shots, and you see it with other countries too, is they shift their propulsion types, and they're much dimmer up in the upper stages. And so when they go there, we lose them with radars. They're very hard to see with other infrared systems. And so you need a sensor that can see that as well. So it's not just the hypersonic maneuvering threat that's gone global, but it's these different propulsion types that are very, very hard to see. And it's what HBTSS was designed to actually detect and provide either warning or weapons control. It's very helpful, but just to get back to my question, how much advanced warning would we have? I'm probably not the right guy to do that. I don't know, Dan, do you want to talk about it? Sir, for the current threats that we're looking at, boosted on the vehicles that you're talking about, you'll get warning within seconds to minutes of that threat activity. And depending on where a threat is located, will dictate how much advanced warning that you have. Obviously a threat immediately off the coast has always been talked about over years as a challenge in a submarine-launched environment. But given the launch timelines that you have talked about from the PRC or your example you provided, we'll certainly have adequate warning for decision-making. Well, I think my understanding is that part of the need to really develop our level one sensing capabilities is that this is not like dealing with the traditional ICBMs and that we could essentially have an attack on a place like Washington, DC without getting much advanced warning at all. I understand you might be able to detect the launch, but you wouldn't necessarily know where that missile is headed. That's why investing in these capabilities is so important. And I also think that you're going to hear from, well, he may have just disappeared, but Mr. Bacon about the need to maintain command and control until we have those capabilities, which is another, I think, really important question for us to address and something that I hope that you will be considering as we go forward. At ASD Hill, back to my opening statement, I want to ask how the department thinks about missile defense requirements for North Korea and specifically how you can weigh the trade-off between continuing to try to keep pace with the North Korean missile threat and the reality that at some point it becomes not only an arms race with North Korea but also might influence Russia and China's behavior in ways that are counterproductive to nuclear stability. So under what conditions would North Korea become a nuclear power that we deter with our own nuclear response instead of with missile defense, essentially moving North Korea from level four to level five? Thank you, Ranking Member Moulton. We described in the missile defense review that the North Korea challenge, what we deal with, we have the missile defense that we've talked about already today, missile defeat, which is about the things we can do to reduce their confidence in how their system's going to work. And then we have always had, and this has been consistent in dealing with the North Korea threat, that the ability of US to cost in positions, that can be nuclear response as well. That's always been part of our posture with respect to North Korea and deterrence there. I think with your question though, of as North Korea continues to just deploy more and more missiles, more advanced missiles, how far do you go in your question, how that relates to Russians?  The warning that you're talking about is improved. We will deal with the missile defense problem there. If North Korea were to take that shot, that will be the time when the nuclear retaliation, the strategic deterrence portion, also has to play its part. It's real. That is the foundation of all deterrence for the United States. And it pights part of the North Korea challenge too. Well, I think it would be helpful for the department to understand where we make this transition because if we're just sort of blindly producing more interceptors to try to keep up, when that's actually not the main deterrence strategy that we have for this particular threat, then we risk other consequences as we've just discussed. The last question is, look, if we were to get into the realm of level five missile defense, deterring a near peer adversary in theory by saying that we're gonna shoot down all your missiles, I mean, how many GMD interceptors would you estimate we would need if we were to trying to deter or defeat an all out Chinese or Russian nuclear attack on the United States? I think in any realm of warfare from the lowest conventional levels to the highest nuclear levels, defense has a role, but the key role of defense is you're denying people the advantage of the attack that would launch in the first place and you're assuring your ability to impose costs that would make them regret having started it in the first place. So whether that's at the conventional level or at the nuclear level, your defense is there to assure your command and control. You mentioned Washington DC. One of the things that we've been investing in sort of the last year's budget, continuing with this is over the horizon radar. That's to improve warning against cruise missile type threats that are a concern as well. The space based sensors we've talked about dealing with some of the hypersonic of the dimmer targets or the dimmer threats we're seeing. So it's that combination of saying, I can sense and see what you're doing. I will have means to intercept, to defend myself to assure critical capabilities like command and control and response and power projection. And I will have my nuclear deterrent if I need to use that as well. At some point, this is just math. A.S.D Hill, what is the answer? How many do we need? I don't think we've, what we've said is right now, we have the 44 that you mentioned. There's 20 more that are a part of the NGI program. That's for 64. That's what we covered in the missile defense review and in the missile defense review to come back to Chairman Lambert's question. We also left open the possibility looking at as the NGI program develops, do we, do we replace the existing? Or do we grow beyond that? If you could just take this question for the record, I'd appreciate it. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Representative Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank each of you for being here today and Admiral Hill, General Carbillet, thank you for your service. You've been instrumental with your colleagues in promoting peace through strength and as a retiree myself for military service. I know you'll be looking back on the successes that you've had and they're so meaningful for our country. Thank you. Secretary Hill facing the threats of the Chinese Communist Party, the murderous threat of war criminal Putin, the unstable North Korean government and the irrational threat of the regime in Iran. As they continue to develop capacity to conduct long range missile threats with greater capability, capacity and intent to challenge America, our allies and our partners by being part of a authoritarian's promoting rule of gun. How concerned are you that there are continued missile development and production? What steps has the Missile Defense Agency taking to adequately detect, deter, deny and protect the homeland and regional partners from these threats? I think the, you've covered Russia and China and the whole range of the threats, I believe, in there. And so the budget that we've put forward this year focusing on significant investments, the Missile Defense Agency alone about $10.9 billion in their programs covering the next generation interceptor, covering the space based sensors we talked about, the HBTSS, discriminating space sensor as well, as well as the regional programs. And we're covering it from both the Homeland Missile Defense perspective as well as all of the regional offense for our forces forward deployed in those conflicts. That is, there's also investments going in through the services. So for example, the Space Force budget deploying the missile warning and missile tracking layers another nearly $5 billion there. Total expenditures about $29.8 billion in the total budget that we're looking at for the ranges of defenses against the threats you described. Thank you very much. And Admiral Hill, the Defense of Guam, it's such a strategic location for the defense of our country, such an appreciated American territory, such patriotic people living there and who we so cherish as to their importance in our national security strategy. The Missile Defense Agency is responsible for efforts of integrating the Army Integrated Air and Missile Defense and Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense in support of the defense of Guam through the command and control battle management and communications. The current plan would demonstrate an initial capability in Guam in 2024, followed by the delivery of an enhanced capability by 2029. Are there any additional requirements or resources that the Missile Defense Agency may need to ensure this function is established on the vitally located and patriotic territory of Guam? Can you highlight the challenges and limitations on this current plan? Yes, sir, thank you. This is really our first year in 23, starting the program. Our total focus right now is on establishing the sites. We know what they are. We've done the early environmental work there. And as you mentioned at the end of 24, our intent is to have the first radar, a engineering version of the command and control suite and a launcher system so that we can test in the environment, just beyond signals and checkouts and those sorts of things. So we'll be on island with capability at the end of 24. And then as you mentioned, there's an enhanced capability as we move forward. If you ask me what I know we need, it is really the infrastructure on the island. So as General Carbone mentioned, the Army's IBCS system is a core part that will integrate with the Aegis capabilities on the island. It is really about quality of life for those soldiers and for the other operators that will be on the island. There are some other capabilities that are meant for a different environment that Emeril Aquilino has challenged us to ensure that we have the ability to integrate those in as well. And so that's what the program really encompasses. Primarily Aegis and IBCS, along with some additional capabilities that we'll say for another session. And very briefly, General Corbill, the people of Ukraine have been so courageous, resisting war criminal Putin and his invasion. Have we learned, what have we learned from missile defense in the war in Ukraine? Sure, sir. I had the opportunity to go to Fort City, Oklahoma and watch the Ukrainian soldiers train in our US Patriot system. And I'd like to talk about that in a closed session. I could have my assessment and observations of their training and their abilities. Thank you. I yield back. Representative Hulan. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you all for your testimony today. My first question is for General Miller. General, you have written in your written testimony that US Space Coms commercial integration strategy and American commercial innovation is an asymmetrical advantage that our competitors don't possess. And I certainly agree with you on that. And I've led efforts in the past NDAA years to ensure that programs like SBIR and STTR operate unimpeded. And I'm again, leading a similar effort to bridge the so-called Valley of Death this year between small businesses and the Department of Defense. So my question to you is, could you talk a little bit more about the commercial integration strategy at Space Com? And do you think that we're doing enough both here on this committee and also at the DOD to leverage our asymmetrical advantage of commercial innovation and what more should we be doing if we aren't doing enough? Yes, ma'am. And thank you for your support on those programs in particular. So I think the start with the relationship, particularly with US Space Command and even the predecessor, STRAC-COM, with commercial industry has gone on for quite some time. It has typically started in the commercial STRAC-COM arena. What you've seen in recent years is expand into other mission sets as well. One area in particular that is expanded into is in the space domain awareness area. We have leveraged commercial sensors at a scale that we had not really anticipated just years ago to fill in potential gaps in locations for coverage, provide new technology developments, and also provide synchronization and integration and more accuracy in some of the capability that we see for space domain awareness. What the commander did in the commercial integration strategy was a focus to try to get a couple of things in particular. One, he wanted a single point of entry and that's our combined joint integrated commercial office within our J8 staff to provide a single face to all our commercial partners on what our requirements are. The second piece was to lay out some key priority mission sets and devolve down into some specific capabilities that we're looking at so that our commercial partners are not guessing what they're looking for. In fact, they have specific asks and requirements that we've defintetized to the extent that we can. There's some examples of goodness, though, that have already shown up. In the last few years, you probably have heard about Joint Task Force, Space Defense's Joint Commercial Office, and they have leveraged the space domain awareness capabilities of a number of sensors and provided us an independent, verifiable, publicly available catalog that we use to provide warning on a range of threats. They also augment and allow us to inform our missile warning capabilities in the future is what we're looking at particularly from a data transport layer, less so from a warning perspective. So I think the future is bright. You'll see that within the unfunded priorities list that the commander has submitted, there are some specific things that he's looking for to try to expand and hasten some of the delivery of those capabilities. I think your continued support there would be most appreciative. I'll definitely take a look at that. And so in terms of what more we can do, that would be something to take a look at.  Is there any sort of inverse of that where you don't know what you don't know but that civilian industry is innovating on and you might be able to take advantage of or benefit from? How are you interacting with civilian industry to understand the innovations that are happening that may be useful to you? Absolutely, our commercial integration cell that's at Vandenberg Air Force Base has been a main place for our commercial industry partners to go to partner with us. So in the realm of what we're learning all the time, in the SDA or Space Domain Awareness Enterprise, a number of the capabilities they provide are varied. There's some really exquisite capabilities somehow but also increased capacity that others have. So we're learning more about what they have to offer and our interface for that is the commercial integration cell. We've also learned that they have specific relationships they wanna have with us on safety of flight and awareness of what the threats are that are on orbit. And how are we sharing that information? Now that's a mission set you'll see transition to the Department of Commerce. Ultimately, is there space traffic management? It's largely a civil function stands up and we begin to repurpose those guardians that are at Vandenberg to do some of the more operationally driven threat warning and assessment mission sets that we see them having. So there's a benefit on both ends here both in what we can get out of the commercial enterprise but also exploring new technologies that they're providing us in order to execute our mission sets even more efficiently. Thank you, I have several other questions but very little time so I think if it's all right I will submit them for the record for you all and thank you very much for your service and for your time. Thank you, Representative Turner. Thank you, gentlemen. I think the last several years have shown us that deterrence by nuclear weapons arsenals alone is dead. Russia has threatened both NATO allies even nuclear weapons nations with nuclear weapon attack. China is tripling its nuclear weapons and is vastly expanding its ICBM capability and of course not in response at all to any missile defense that may in fact thwart in any way their ability to hold us at risk or at target. Our missile defense system is it's currently configured and our Aegis assure that sits in Europe are publicly by policy stated as targeting North Korea and Iran. We by policy state that we are not deploying missile defense systems for the purposes of defending ourselves against the threat of Russia and China. Clearly Russia and China are not being deterred by our nuclear weapons arsenals alone because of their continuing vast expanse and the fact that both of them are pursuing what many people call exotic weapons which are completely new capabilities. They're not modernization of existing capabilities completely new capabilities that can easily be defined and be classified as first strike weapons. Weapons that are intended to initiate a nuclear weapon strike not one that's merely to deter as our posture has been. We're clearly going to have to move to a more blended architecture where we understand that if there is an attack that we have a responsibility to protect the American public because right now most Americans believe that if a nuclear weapon is headed at this very moment to Washington DC whether it be hypersonic or an ICBM that we have systems in place to protect them and we do not. It is time that we do. Let's start with Europe first. In Ukraine Russia has claimed that they may use tactical nuclear weapons and even all of the analysts looking at the situation have been concerned that they might. If they did with the placement of our Aegis Ashore in Poland and in Romania we restricted those systems so that they again are intended to target Iran and not Russia meaning that the United States would basically be a casual observer to watch the nuclear exchange instead of having a role to be able intervene. Admiral Hill could you please describe to us the issue that we're facing with the Aegis Ashore in Poland and Romania. They are not fully functioning Aegis systems, correct? So if you had a ship that was sitting there as opposed to Aegis Ashore which Congress funded and authorized it would have greater capabilities than what sits there today. Is that right Admiral? That's correct sir. We carved out the ballistic missile defense capability for Europe as part of the European phase adaptive approach. There was, we do have the computer base the computer program base that would include cruise missile defense and strike capabilities that those are not included at those sites. Well we have to scrape off the Aegis Ashore that's there or can those be modified so that they could be fully functioning Aegis Ashore like our Aegis at sea. So very early on we want to make sure that we maintain the flexibility on that site should policy change or we require additional capabilities. We could bring it back in through the computer programs which is it's only certified for use for ballistic missile defense only but you know that the it's an inherent capability. There would likely be some additional consoles required depending on what the missions are and potentially additional launching systems. So existing capabilities that we have could be appended to the systems giving them the full functioning capabilities that an Aegis at sea has. Yes sir and I wouldn't refer to it really as appended it would just be enabled. Okay, excellent, excellent. Do you think the situation has arisen that we seriously need to consider our European footprint and we have voluntarily restrained ourselves so these Aegis capabilities are missing. Do you think we've gotten to the point where we need to from a policy perspective begin the debate as why have we done this and shouldn't we look at modifying them? Now we've had questions in the past about whether or not we should enable the cruise missile defense capability just to defend the site itself but it really is a policy question if you're going to add things. And I'm going right there buddy. Yes sir. To our other John Hill. So Mr. Hill. Don't you think it's time that we take a look at this issue that deterrence is dead? What blend do we need and what do we need to do in Europe? I think it is time and I think NATO thinks it's time and I think NATO is looking at whether NATO needs to change its policy structure. NATO has what is called NATO ballistic missile defense policy and they have NATO integrated air and missile defense policy. Won't go into all of the deep dark art of NATO but ballistic missile defense focused on Iran integrated air and missile defense focused on all threats, all directions and so forth. Real question is should we be able to use the just shore sites for both? As Admiral Hill explained, technically you could do it. Now the policy question given what everybody has seen in Ukraine over the past year, people are asking themselves exactly that question of what's the balance of deterrence and defense going forward that we need to have? And that's what our committee I'm certain will be doing at your back Mr. Chairman. Thank you. Representative Carbohal. Thank you Mr. Chair. First I'd like to take a second to congratulate the Space Force on their recent successful launch from the Vandenberg Space Force Base in my district. Congratulations. The rocket carried the initial tranche of Space Development Agency satellites that are key part of the missile warning missile tracking architecture that we're discussing here today. Vice Admiral Hill, GAO published a report in May 2022 that highlighted opportunities to reduce the risk of missile defense agency programs from experiencing cost overruns and scheduled delays. One recommendation is for increased collaboration between program offices and war fighters. What steps has the agency taken to enhance the partnership between MDA and other missile defense organizations? Great, thank you for the question Congressman. We have a series of hybrid programs within the agency. So, and I'll just start from the bottom and work way up. When we have the THAAD program, it's there on Redstone Arsenal. We have an Army Colonel running that program. He's right next door to his partners who are running Patriot and the IBCS system. So that partnership is alive and well from an acquisition perspective and as we feel and deploy those systems. Our Navy program for Aegis is in Dalgren, Virginia right at the Center of Excellence for the Aegis program. Tied closely into all capabilities there the Aegis training right in the center there. Naval officers are in charge of the efforts there at Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense in Dalgren. When you look at the work that we're doing for GMD, there's not a day that we're not talking either directly to Northern Command and the different servicemen that are serving on that staff to ensure that we're providing them all the support they need. Same thing with Fort Greeley, the maintenance is done hand in hand with the soldiers up there in terms of the launch site and all the command and control. So I think we have a very good, strong hybrid system and our partnership with the services as strong as I've ever seen it. Thank you, Lieutenant General Karbler. The need for missile defense assets is at an all-time high due to the operational tempo of NATO and our allies. How are we balancing the global demand for Patriot and THAAD missile defense batteries while maintaining our readiness requirements? Thanks Congressman. As I talked about a little bit earlier, we identified, we had to reduce the demand signal for our air missile defense forces, specifically in the CENTCOM AOR so that we could get that balance so we weren't putting the air defense soldiers through the grinder and affecting readiness through a very high op-temple. So we've done that. The soldiers have elected to re-enlist and stay with their current units which increases readiness so instead of a big turnover now soldiers, particularly this year, 39% of the soldiers have stabilized within their current units as they re-enlist. That helps readiness because those crews now that have been trained together for months and months now stay together for two or three years and then they get promoted through the ranks and then they can share those lessons learned with their subordinate soldiers. And so that helps improve readiness as well. Our air defense readiness we're there 24-7, always stays well within the combat commander's requirements. And again, that's a testament to the soldiers who have stayed on with their organizations. Thank you. Vice Admiral Hill, what are the challenges of defending against hypersonic missiles from a technological standpoint? And as it relates to hypersonic missiles, are your efforts focused on homeland defense or are you looking at regional applications as well or both? Yes, sir. We are focused in on regional capability. If you look at it through the framework of detect, control, engage, detection, tracking of hypersonic missiles incredibly challenging because of their maneuver capability. So they don't launch in a singular azimuth. They don't come directly at you.  So field of view of radars become very limited, which is why we advocate for space in order to track hypersonic missiles. When it comes to the command and control, because of the speeds they fly, that means reaction time is very short. And so that challenges command and control and the ability to get the information to the operator to make decisions. Then finally, when you get to engagement, typically if you engage them in the terminal, that is a very dirty environment. It's electromagnetic down there. There are jammers on the front ends of these things. They maneuver quickly. Our most recent test from two weeks ago demonstrated our capability to take that thread on in terminal. And the glide phase interceptor that we talked about earlier, our regional capability is to be an area defense that's in the glide phase. So if you look at a boosting hypersonic threat, it goes into glide phase before it dives down. We want to engage it there in glide before it comes back into the atmosphere, which is one of the hardest places to engage, but we do have capability there today. Thank you, Mr. Chair. You'll back. Thank you. Thank you. Representative Stefanik. Thank you, Chairman, for your statements regarding the East Coast Missile Defense as you open this hearing. I wanted to address Vice Admiral Hill. As you know, both the NDAA and the Department of Defense have publicly designated Fort Drum as the site selected for a potential East Coast Missile Defense location. And recently in this hearing room, Chairman Milley responded to my question, stating his support for a third Missile Defense site specifically focused on the East Coast at Fort Drum. What is your best military assessment regarding the national security and missile defense need to face 21st century threats and specifically how is Fort Drum well positioned to meet those? Yes, ma'am. When it comes to defense, geography is very meaningful and our ability to expand the battle space for something like a next generation interceptor, that is exactly what the location does and what it does provide. We'll often talk about a shoot, assess shoot. That means getting a shot in early. So if you're geographically dispersed and you have a third site, you have the ability to engage early and then engage again after you've assessed whether or not you've hit the first time. So there was a compelling need there that we continue to watch as the threat increases. Chairman Lamborn talked about space launch vehicles as a ruse. It really is its ICBM technology being demonstrated and being matured. So I think the threat is real and I think where the chairman was going, the more defenses you have, the better. It is a key part of deterrence. So you would support Chairman Milley's assessment? Yes, ma'am. My next question is in terms of the timeline, there are many steps that need to be taken to prepare for that threat of the future. Can you walk us through that timeline and the steps that are needed to be taken in the next few years? Yes, ma'am. The comment you made earlier about the site selection is really step one, you assess some number of sites. Generally, to meet the NEPA rules, you have to assess at least three sites so you have a comparative nature there. And that's usually at a very top level view. What would make sense? All the analysis goes into play in terms of timelines and whether or not you can get that shoot, assess shoot capability and so those locations do matter. And you get a general scrub of what that area would be and what the challenges would be just from a geography perspective. The next steps generally involve going in and doing more invasive work on the areas that we might be considering. So if it is for a drum, we would want to go in to determine how hard would it be to build there. And then you have the other discussions about well, how many silos would you require? What are the timelines? What will we do with the NGI production line? Because to me that would be, you know, the best military advice on what to plan for would be the next generation interceptor since we will have at least one production line, maybe more depending on the decisions that are made. And then lastly, the FY23 NDA required an MDA to report to Congress on an updated assessment for an additional missile defense interceptor site, specifically at Fort Drum, as well as a funding profile for that site. You recently wrote a letter to Chairman Rogers dated March 24th indicating that the report is now late but you are going to meet a deadline of June 30th. Can I get your commitment that you'll meet that deadline of submission before June 30th? Absolutely, ma'am. We have heat and light on that report. We know what you're asking for and those are reasonable requests and we'll get those two on time. Well, thank you, Admiral Hill. I also want to take this opportunity to thank my colleagues. I have led this effort as the representative for Fort Drum for many, many years. And because of the bipartisan work on this committee, as well as our work with MDA and DOD broadly, we are continuing to move this project forward. We know how important it is for our national security, our military, and our missile defense. So thank you very much and I yield back. Thank you, Representative Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A couple of things. In a recent hearing on defending Guam, there was a long list of unfunded priorities. Can any of the programs that new three gentlemen have be delayed so that the defense of Guam can go forward? In other words, shifting money from your programs to the defense of Guam? As the acquisition got to table, I'll tell you that I have limited capability to move money from program to program. There would have to be a work with them. What's money do you have? Now, we're at $10 billion, $10.9 in PB24, yes, sir. I think the number may have been classified, so I won't give it here. It's significantly less than 10 billion. Yes, sir. One of the things that we ought to be paying attention to here on this committee and in the full committee is we make choices. Some people say the defense of Guam's rather important. What is the role of directed energy in the, not in the exo-atmosphere, but in the other defense mechanisms that you intend to employ? Is that a question for me, sir? Seems to me all three of you are in this business, so why don't we start with you and we'll go down the line. Yes, sir. We're investing in directed energy specific in lethality, so what we do is we are actively running tests to determine the right places to place energy in order to get an effect, and there's a range of those effects from just absolute destruction to just disturbing something to take it off track. Against what threat? Multiple different types of the whole range of missile threats. And how far off is your culmination of this effort? I would say that directed energy is promising. It's not something you're gonna see in the near term, at least for missile defense. If you just look at the threat, ballistic hardened nuclear threat, you have to have energy on that target for a long period of time. Hypersonic threats are designed to fly in a very high heat environment, so you have to overcome that baseline heat environment to inflict damage. So it's a big challenge for missile defense to leverage direct energy in the near term. I see. Are you familiar with the Israeli application of directed energy coupled with the Iron Dome and David Sling where they have a software system that will determine whether to use a missile or a directed energy solution? Yes, sir. And we also have investments in weapon selection logic that would determine best use of whatever weapon it is, directed energy or a hard kill weapon. Does their system work? Their system is in trials. It has not been deployed. It's not certified for operational use yet. Thank you. Could you give us an update? I don't know which one of you would handle this one. Maybe it's Mr. Cobbler. What is the Aegis Ashore situation in Poland? I'll take that. Aegis Ashore in Poland has reached his technical capability declaration. It is going through the Board of Inspection and Survey, a Navy process for acceptance. The chief naval operation is on track to accept the site for the Navy at the end of this fiscal year. And then it'll go through UCOM and the NATO acceptance to be fully operational next year. Thank you. How many Aegis Ashore missiles would be necessary to deal with Russia's intermediate range nuclear weapons? So I'd like to take that to the closed session. I see. Well, probably the number, if you go one to one, which we probably ought not assume, we may need two to one because we sometimes miss or there may be some problem. It's been calculated it's over a trillion dollars just to defend Europe. Yes, sir, and I'm not sure what assumptions you're making on which threats. I'd be happy to share them with you. I'd love to see it, but yes, sir, it would be expensive. I yield back. Thank you, Representative Dejarlet. Admiral Hill, I just had a quick question for you. Fiscal year 24 budget requests include 800 million to support the defense of Guam. The current planned outline is for an initial capability to be ready on Guam in 2024, followed by delivery of the enhanced capability by 2029. I met with the Guam Chamber of Commerce earlier today and they echoed Admiral Aquilino's concerns this morning about whether the present workforce is capable of meeting these goals. To what extent are you hindered by labor and workforce issues in meeting these timeline goals and what can we do to support the workforce in Guam to ensure we stay on track? No, sir, it's a great question and it is a real concern. I would say anyone that's doing military construction on the island of Guam will be impacted. We have not realized that yet. We're just doing site selection and the initial environmentals. But once we get to military construction in the 25 timeframe, there will be an impact if we don't come through the visa issue. Okay, apparently they'd mentioned that there was some misconception that workforce was coming in from China. They said that's not true and they were wanting to know about H2B visas. Would that be helpful? That would be very helpful. Not the Chinese piece, but. Exactly, yeah, okay, thank you. I have some questions for the closed session, but I'll yield back. Thank you, Representative Strong. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Carver, thank you for stopping by my office yesterday and it's been a true honor to work with you over the years. I thank you for your service to our country. I'd be remiss if I didn't note how proud Alabama's Fifth Congressional District is to host the Missile Defense Agency and the Army Space and Missile Defense Command at Redstone Arsenal. General Miller, Admiral Hill, Mr. Hill, it's good to see each of you again. Last year's NDAA mandated the department to provide a report to Congress, a comprehensive and layered strategy of how the US military will use asymmetric capabilities to defend hypersonic missile threats. That was due on March the 1st. Do you know how the current status, what's the current status of this report? Yeah, let me take that one for the record if I may. That'll be fine, yeah. Thank you, sir. General Carver, yesterday in my office, you shared that capacity is a top concern of yours. Like you said, the CCP isn't conducting science projects. The threats posed are real. Can you share with us what your top capacity concerns are when it comes to our missile defense system and how potential problems can be avoided? Yes, sir, as we look at the adversaries we've talked about throughout the hearing thus far, every combat commander wants more Patriot. They need more THAAD, and the Army's been very good. We're getting a 16th Patriot Battalion, an 8th THAAD battery through the work with the missile defense agency. We're standing up for maneuver Shored Battalions to get after the counter-UAS drone challenges that our soldiers face. Continued invigoration of the organic industrial base through FMS purchases of Patriot and THAAD are very helpful for us, but the additional capacity requirements we have to meet the adversaries that are out there, I'm just, and I'm never comfortable with the current capacity that we have, and I know it's challenging in a budget environment to have additional air and missile defense units. That's why I'm very happy with where the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army are at in terms of helping increase our air and missile defense capabilities again on the Patriot, THAAD side, and with the maneuver Shored. Thank you, right now the U.S. is facing extremely high operational tempos for our air and missile defense assets. Can you discuss how the global requirements are impacting the readiness of our Patriot and THAAD batteries? Yes, sir, we've gotten after this. We recognize it again, the health of the forest study that the Chief of Staff of the Army commissioned, I identified the stress on the force, laid out recommendations that we are implementing, and again, as we see soldiers re-enlisting at the highest rates within the Army for a division-sized element that's quantitative measure to show that we are making a difference. We've also been able to provide a level of predictability to our soldiers. One of the challenges that was very frustrating was they would go for a six-month rotation, would get extended at nine months, or a nine-month rotation to a year, or a year rotation, and then get extended beyond a year. And what we've been able to do here in the past year and a half is really get that predictability back to the soldiers and their families. Thank you, and again, thank you for your service to our country. General Miller, I know Space Domain Awareness is a top priority for both SpaceCom and the DOD at large. How is Space Command integrating with commercial companies to strengthen Space Domain Awareness and Sensor Management? Thank you for the question, Congressman. I think a few areas I mentioned previously, I'll foot-stop on a couple if I can. The main effort we've focused on up till now is to ensure that we call those non-traditional sensors, in other words, not purpose-built necessarily for a missile warning or missile defense mission. So we have taken sensors and capabilities that the commercial sector has offered to provide, on the one hand, unique places and locations for us to leverage for collection and detection tracking. We have also looked to that commercial sector to provide us advanced algorithms and tools to allow us to provide better analytic data on any potential risk threats or even just safety-of-flight concerns that we see while simultaneously disseminating warning to our partners and using unclassified means in order to be able to do that. So all the way from detection, all the way through reporting that the threat of commercial integration has been put at every step along that way. The commercial integration strategy was designed to enhance that, and we see a lot of productivity coming out of that relationship just so far, and it's only been months since initiated, Congressman. Thank you. I thank each of you for being here today, Mr. Chairman. I'll yield back. Thank you. We will now go into a brief recess. We'll go up to the SCIF in room 2337, and votes will be called at about five o'clock. So with the indulgence of the witnesses, we'll go till approximately five o'clock, and then we'll be done for the day, and we will now be in recess.