Good afternoon, everybody, and welcome. I'm Susan Collins, the Joan and Sanford Wildeam here at the Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, and I'm delighted to see all of you with us here today. Before I begin, I'd like to thank the Education Policy Initiative and its co-directors, my colleagues Brian Jacob and Susan Dynarski, for planning our event today, which I know you like me have been looking forward to. I'd also like to acknowledge the Center for the Study of Higher and Post-Secondary Education, whose director Michael Basteto is here today as well, and Charles H. and Susan Gessner for their generous support of today's program. We're grateful for all of those engagements. Well, today we will address a very important question. Is there a student debt crisis? Many of us are well aware of the ever-expanding student loan market, and the latest estimates are that nearly 40 million Americans are laden with perhaps $1.3 trillion of student debt. And one in four of the borrowers is either in delinquency or in default. Last year's graduating class had an average of $35,000 in student debt. Those are striking numbers. The Obama administration recently announced two substantive policy changes, and presidential candidates have focused on a variety of alternatives of ways to lower the debt burdens. Well, today's speakers are two of the leading voices on student debt reform, Rohit Chopra and Susan Danarski. Rohit Chopra was recently named special advisor to the US Department of Education. He previously served as Assistant Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, where he led that agency's work on behalf of students and young consumers. The Secretary of Treasury named him as the agency's first student loan ombudsman, a new role that was established by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Chopra has frequently testified before Congress on alleviating student debt burdens and private student loan reforms. Susan Danarski is a member of the Ford School faculty and a colleague. She's a professor of education, public policy, and economics here at the University of Michigan, and also co-director of the Ford School's Education Policy Initiative. Susan is one of the country's top advocates for assessable higher education. She has testified before Congress on education and tax policy and has widely consulted on student aid reform, including at the Federal Reserve, the White House, the Departments of Education and Treasury, and with the Council of Economic Advisors. She also writes for the New York Times. And if you're on Twitter, I encourage you to follow at Danarski for a really informative and witty commentary. First, just a word about today's format. First, each of our panelists, beginning with Susan, will kick things off with brief opening remarks. I'll then have the pleasure of moderating a conversation with our two experts. I'll start with a few questions of my own before opening things up to the audience. Please write your questions on the note cards that you should have received as you came into the room. And we will have volunteers circulating to collect them from you during the program. And if you're watching online, please send us your questions via Twitter using the hashtag EPI Student Debt. So let's get started. Susan, the floor is yours. So I'm going to start with data. So I want to start out by talking about if there is indeed a crisis in student debt, where is it? So we're at a university in the School of Public Policy. So we should be addressing this question with data, as opposed to say introspecting and thinking about our own experiences or those of our friends or our colleagues. And also, instead of maybe just reading the latest dramatic piece in the news about a distressed borrower, but rather by analyzing the data. Data have been a problem in this context, which means that, in part, anecdotes have filled the void. So if there are not good data on a problem, well, then theorizing and anecdote are going to fill the void. Department of Education, which is responsible for the loans, federal loans in this country, has not been terribly forthcoming in compiling and releasing to the public information of who borrows, who defaults, their experiences. That's changing a bit. And as of this past fall, we actually have some excellent data on debt, default, loans, for people who've borrowed, basically since the late 90s or so, and right up to the present. So what I'm going to say here is based on the analysis of those data. So what do those data say? Well, first of all, they say that you should erase from your mind, if you're thinking of who the face of the student debt crisis is, you should erase from your mind the image of a Yale graduate or an NYU graduate or a Columbia graduate or even a UM graduate. In fact, anyone who graduates with a BA is relatively unlikely to default. So folks who graduate have quite low default rates. The default rate also drops with school selectivity. So the more selected the school is, the lower the rate of default for schools like UM and Harvard and Columbia, about 5%, is what the default rate is. So that's what it was before the recession. That's what it was during the recession. Folks who graduate from elite schools are pretty well buffered from economic distress. Not everybody, but this is, we're talking about averages and tendencies. So who should you? You also should not think of folks who are going to graduate school. So people who graduate, so yourselves. So people who graduate, I know you don't like debt, but the question is whether it's the face of the crisis in our country. So nobody likes debt. Everybody, here's an economist speaking, everyone would rather have stuff free than pay for it. That's an economic principle. You've got your certificate now in economics. So grad students borrow the most, but they're also the least likely to default because they make good money compared to other folks. So graduates have a very, people who borrow from graduate school are unlikely to default. Graduates of select schools like UM might borrow around $30,000 total, is the typical debt for people graduating, but they tend to make good money. And so they can support a debt of $30,000 and pay it off. OK, so that's who it's not. And one thing to note, that I just listed the profiles of the people who are focused on the media. So when the media focuses on student debt crises, the people they profile are folks at Columbia and NYU and people with graduate degrees. So this week in Slate, a graduate of Connecticut College who also has a graduate degree from Penn talked about their experience with $200,000 in debt. So that's a vanishingly unlikely amount of debt. It's very few people have that much debt. And people who graduate with graduate degrees tend not to default. There was also a lovely article in The New York Times that enraged me into writing several upshot posts from a guy who graduated with not one, not two, but three degrees from Columbia University and subsequently defaulted on all of them and was urging others to follow his example in setting his up as a leader of a student loan revolt. These are not the victims of the student loan crisis. So who is? Who is? OK, so the face of student loan distress is a dropout from a non-selective college. So a person who spent a year or two at a for-profit college, proprietary school, like Corinthian University of Phoenix or a community college or a non-selective four-year college. This is all based on the data. If you look at who is defaulting, that's who it is. They're a first generation college student. They grew up poor. They entered college late in their 20s or 30s to improve their job market skills. Many of them were running away from the job market of the recession. And they went to one of these schools to try to tool up so they could get a better job.  They dropped out after a year or even six months. So they borrowed maybe $5,000 to $10,000 a year. No, sorry, in total they borrowed $5,000 to $10,000. They entered with low earnings, $18,000 a year. They exited with low earnings, $20,000 a year. So they entered poor. They left poor. And this typical loan in default is less than $10,000. More around $5,000 is the typical loan in default right now. 44% of the dollars in default are coming from for-profit institutions, people who borrowed at for-profit colleges. Nearly a third of students who entered college during the recession and who borrowed to attend a community college or a for-profit college defaulted within five years. As I said, for the people attending a selective BA institution, it's 5%. So the problems are at the community colleges and at the for-profit institutions. So this is who I have firmly in mind when I think about victims of a student debt crisis, low income, first generation students attending a community college or a for-profit college, students of Corinthian College who were defrauded into borrowing for what was ultimately a non-existent education, personally off from their job, who tried to pick up some skills at the local community college and borrowed to do so, and is exiting with very low earnings. And in my opinion, if there is a crisis of any sort, it's a crisis in low earnings in our country that we have, we lack a safety net, we have a very large number of people who are earning very low earnings and who cannot handle even $5,000 in debt as a result. Great. So first, thanks, Sue, for having me and thanks to all of you for being here. As the dean mentioned, I've recently joined the Department of Education and I'm just a few days into the job, so we'll caveat that. My comments today represent my own opinions. Now, the way I often get a question, Rohit, why do we have student loans? And actually, I always answer, it's important to remember, we have student loans for a very good reason. And that is to ensure that people who might not be able to afford to go to college can make that investment into themselves which can pay off very, very big when done right. But things have changed so much in the past 10 years that it's helpful to think through that. Now, many people who are concerned about student debt, many of you probably in this room, might come from the education world. I probably come from the other stepchild of this world which is thinking about it from a consumer financial markets perspective. And those of us from our lens were really colored and shaped by the foreclosure crisis that we saw in the past several years. And for those of you who are from Michigan, you probably know very well that problems in the mortgage market absolutely devastated parts of Michigan. And this was not unlike other parts of the country. Now, today we have a mortgage market that is very, very different. But I think less discussed was some events that really changed the student loan market too. And I think it's worth mentioning some of them. So one, again, to the financial crisis, there is no question that the financial crisis had two real big effects. One effect is that it really eroded family wealth, actually trillions of dollars of household wealth evaporated in the form of home equity, in the form of retirement savings. So many families felt more stressed about being able to contribute toward their dependent child's education. And at the same time, the financial crisis hit state budgets very hard. And there was some very substantial cuts to public higher education. I wanna echo something Sue said, when you think about who goes to college, you really wanna remember that the biggest group is actually those who attend public colleges. So the mix of families feeling more financially stressed and higher tuition, which by the way is not just something that's recent. I understand that 40 years ago, undergraduate tuition at the University of Michigan was $800. Now inflation adjusted, that's probably about four or five times higher, but the tuition for undergraduates is well more than four or five times higher than $800. And so, but I think it really pronounced, the crisis really pronounced that effect. And I think we've seen substantial increases in reliance on student loans. The Secretary of Education has noted that student loans became kind of the norm at a certain point. So what else happened, I think is important context. And I think that we forget there was a lot of talk about the rescue of the financial system due to gambling on Wall Street, but there was also a huge change in our federal student loan system, which was a law that essentially led to the government purchasing a huge amount of federal student loans. Most federal student loans before 2010 were originated by financial institutions, stamped with a government guarantee. And now those loans, much of them are owned by the government. And in 2010, the President got a law passed to essentially end this bank subsidy program. And now when you borrow student loans, it's all directly through the Department of Education. So all of this put together of more borrowers, more students relying on Pell Grants on student loans combined with the government taking these unprecedented actions really has in some ways created a lot of opportunities that the policymakers and the research community are thinking about all the different tools that can really be used to make improvements to the system. And I think that we're at a place that we need to keep helping people go to college, but we need to remember that the macro environment as well as some poor performing programs are leading to people, many people being in very high levels of distress. And I can't tell you enough that it's, what I would push you to remember is when somebody is delinquent on their student loan, it is often just one sign of a broader array of shocks that are happening in their life, fighting to keep paying rent, struggling to make payments on their car loan and thinking through that as a whole consumer about the trauma that they're managing is something that we always have to keep top of mind. Now that being said, there's a lot of policies that are being pursued to not only address the borrowers who are struggling, but also to inoculate the broader structural issues of college being hard to afford and just a few of them I'll mention, there is now new repayment plans, pay as you earn. This is a broad expansion of affordable loan modifications and repayment plans that allow borrowers to pay a reasonable amount of income to manage those times of distress. My understanding is that there's about 5,000 people enrolling in that in a day per day on average and we have to figure out how we can keep them there to manage through that. There are also new ways for borrowers to get out of default on their federal loans. New rules that have been put in place allow borrowers to get back on their feet through loan rehabilitation and we need to make sure that borrowers are not hiding and that they know that there are options for them. And then of course there has been a lot of interest and activity on enhancements to student loan servicing. Now student loan servicers are the companies that help collect payments and manage your loans and there's a lot of work to do to make that process work better. There's been a, the president enacted a student aid bill of rights that called for a number of potential improvements to student loan servicing and that might be an important way and there's good work being done to help borrowers to navigate through that process and then going forward we have to think about how to inoculate future generations to be able to afford college and not be deterred by loans and the high sticker prices and just a few of them ending some of those bank subsidies for the old federal loan program created money to invest in the Pell Grant program. There are, a lot of people are taking look at the role of accreditors and state oversight agencies. As Sue mentioned, the collapse of Corinthian colleges has raised a lot of questions about the role of how we do oversight. And many of you might have heard of the administration's gainful employment initiatives which essentially is a regulatory framework to prevent schools from graduating or even not graduating students with unaffordable levels of debt. And there's broader conversations all over society inside and outside Washington about making community college free or more affordable. And I think I would encourage all of you as you think about this issue that there is not one initiative that is gonna be a cure-all. It is a series of tools to fight a discrete set of problems. Focusing on just college affordability won't really fix issues for people struggling today. And the reverse I acknowledge is true as well. So lots of hard problems to tackle but big solutions are needed. Thank you very much for helping to frame this very complex and nuanced set of issues. They are of vital importance. And I say that both from my perspective as a Dean of a Policy School and also from my perspective as a parent of two college students. And so there are many, many issues on the table. I, as I mentioned before, will ask a couple of questions first to start things off but I encourage you to use the note cards for us to open things up to the audience participation. Perhaps the place to start is to ask to get more of a sense of just how worried should we be about this crisis anyway. Rohit, you talked about the mortgage loan crisis at the beginning of your remarks and certainly some have suggested that what's happening with student loans is a bubble that could be as concerning as the mortgage crisis was as we all well know. How worried should we be about what's happening in student loans and with student debt? Well, again, coming from the view of someone who's more of a financial services practitioner, I would, I have a very maybe stringent definition in my mind of what a debt crisis is. A debt crisis like we saw on the mortgage market or as we see in parts of continental Europe or in Puerto Rico is a very different animal. It is one where there is an immediate precipice upon where there will be some systemic change that will cause mass devastation very, very quickly. And the term bubble also connotes an economic term that something will pop and will be very quick and dramatic. I do not think what we are seeing in student loans is one that's gonna create rapid systemic risk because there is really not close interconnectedness with big financial institutions that could reverberate through the economy. Now that being said, those are technical terms, but there are many people in our country that it is a personal crisis for them that they cannot manage this debt. I will say, I totally respect what Sue has shared with the data, but I wonder, are some of the borrowers who don't borrow very much but are in default, are they actually in debt on a lot of other instruments? Did they finance their education in other ways that may not show up in the student loan data? So how I would answer that is maybe it's not a doomsday that we thought with the collapse of some of the large financial institutions with the subprime mortgages, but on a personal level, I think we have to ask ourselves, how can somebody who defaults on a student loan really recover and become someone who can participate in the economy and not be discouraged and frankly not to feel like a failure? Now, we've got to do a lot, I don't want to debate over the word what the status is, but I think we can all agree there's so much we can improve for individual borrowers and we need to know more about what the potential impacts are on the rest of the economy, but there may not be something immediate, but there's more to learn there. I follow, I follow that. So I think I agree with everything Roy just said, a bubble emerges when an asset, for example, can get flipped over and over again and its price gets inflated. So think tulips in Holland, tulip crisis, think of a house that continually gets flipped and its price inflates because people have expectations about you can't flip human capital, you can't sell your human capital, right?  What we do have is a lot of suffering and so I just wanted to make some concrete observations about what it means when we've got seven million people, eight million people in default, what does that actually mean for individual lives? So somebody who's in default has an enormous blot on their credit record, what does that mean? Many landlords now do credit checks before somebody can rent. So they're shut out of parts of the housing market. If they want to buy a car to get to work because they're living in a neighborhood that's not where the jobs are, they need to drive to work, they're shut out of getting a reasonably priced loan for their car and they have to go get an 18, 20, 25% interest rate loan, which further presses on their finances. Many employers now check credit records. So they're gonna miss out on job opportunities and then of course add to that the psychological stress of somebody calling your cell phone or calling your home phone, calling your relatives on a daily basis to harass you about your debt. So there's a lot of suffering and that's bad. So I think of that is what the crisis is. We have people who went to school to improve themselves at our encouragement, especially during the recession. We provided a lot of subsidies, told people the right thing to do, job market's weak, go improve yourself in school and as a result there are suffering and it is a man-made crisis and that's what I think of as the student debt crisis. So I mean in terms of the magnitude, the mortgage crisis at the peak, the lending was the magnitude of the debt was close to two thirds of US GDP. This magnitude is not at that level. Is that correct? Yeah, there's approximately, I apologize if I'm not exactly right, but about 14 in the low teens of trillions of outstanding mortgage debt. And what I'd also share is that in the subprime mortgage lending context, there was a set of risky features as part of those loans that led to some potential cataclysmic events and a lot of in finance kind of counterparty transactions, derivatives and other sorts of instruments tied to that. Now there was in fact a subprime private student loan market that really blossomed in the years just when subprime mortgage lending. Generally speaking now most of the lending that is occurring is in the federal loan market where fortunately people have access to these income driven repayment plans. So I think that understanding how the mortgage market unraveled is important, but there are also important differences. And I think one of the important lessons is looking at servicing. In my old role at the CFPB we really we regulated both mortgage servicers and student loan servicers and I was quite struck particularly with the private student loan servicers at the same types of deficiencies. Servicing is a tough business but when it goes wrong for a borrower it can really be quite devastating and as Sue said it can lead to some suffering. So I really encourage that there's a lot of interest in doing more to improve that piece of the puzzle. That piece of it. So it sounds like both of you actually agree that this is not in the realm of the mortgage crisis in that sense. However perhaps in addition to concerns about the impact on individuals there are broader economic impacts in terms of economic growth. Certainly some of the things that you were suggesting each of you pointed to at least the possibility that there might be more aggregate consequences that we should be concerned about. And I wondered if you would each comment on that before we shift gears to a different dimension. So on that front there's one fact that I didn't explicitly put out there which is that the people who have the largest loans are the least likely to default on their loans. So it's a straight line relationship where the smallest loans are the ones that are most likely to default. So we hear this, the narrative tends to be loan debt is going up, it's 1 trillion, 1.2 trillion, 1.3 trillion, defaults are going up. It must be that one leads to the other. So it must be that people are borrowing more and because they're borrowing more they're more likely to default. And back to this fact that the debts that are most likely to default are about $5,000. So these are not the numbers that we think of when we say, okay people now can't get married or they can't buy homes because of this debt. It's not, the people who have the most debt are the people who are currently the winners in our society. People who graduate with the BA, people who graduate with master's degrees, they're the people, the only people whose earnings have been growing pretty steadily for the past decades, earnings of other folks have been dropping or flat. So there is a set of people, these low-skilled, low-income folks with fairly small debts who are suffering, but as you alluded to, they have other debts as well. So what we have a set, we have a very large group of people who have terrible employment prospects. We don't have a sufficient safety net. They are a problem. Their problems are the important ones. The student debt may have been the needle that broke the camel's back. I think it's a better way to put it. It's not the burden that is causing the main problems. Though I think Professor Dynarski's analysis is right on who's actually hitting the default. But I think there are reasonable people who have asked questions, the extent to which people are graduating with higher levels of debt, even if they're not defaulting. Many of those graduates may actually be located in metro areas where cost of living rents have gone up quite a bit. So I think query as to whether are they paying higher student loan payments, higher in rent, maybe actually not experiencing a huge amount of wage growth. And does that interaction, which we don't know too much about, does that have an impact on their ability to hit some of the other milestones? Some of the survey data of public opinion suggests that having a lot of student debt might change the way people think about saving for a down payment, buying a home. We don't really know the specifics of it. And I think as you have mentioned so many times, having better data about student debtors, I think will help us really understand the problems. But I agree. I think mostly about the people who have defaulted. Kind of like I think about the people not too far from here, where there was very high levels of foreclosures. People need to recognize that yes, crisis from an economic term, maybe it's not there. But what's happening to, what happened to people in their foreclosed when they lost their homes and what happens to people when they default is a personal tragedy. And dealing with that is something we have to tackle. And follow up a little bit on that. Every dollar that somebody's putting into a student loan is a dollar they can't put into something else, right? So they can't use it to save or they can't use it. So in that sense, it all has to add up in some way. The New York Fed among others had been sort of developing, putting on a narrative that really sort of pushed the idea, I thought that loans were reducing homeownership rates, for example. And from this newer data that we've got, it really looks like what's been going on is that more and more poor people are taking out loans. And therefore you see among those people who have loans, the home ownership rate is going down. This is a compositional effect. It's that people who never could afford homes are now appearing in the ranks of student loan borrowers. The people who always used to borrow, who go to the elite schools, their home borrowing rates have not changed. It's a shift in the composition of the borrowers that now includes a lot of poor people as opposed to a causal impact of the student loans on people's home owning. So again, this data nerd and me, but these data have given us a much clearer picture about what's going on. And I'm gonna throw out a question. I wanna, we've got a good snapshot now of what happened from like late 1990 to the present. How are we gonna make sure that we keep seeing this information as time goes on and that this door's not gonna close again? How are we gonna know whether we're in this crisis in five years if we don't have new data on this? And part of the things that many of my colleagues and I are thinking about is how actually can we be more transparent and routinize the release of data and information? And I think- Which we do with mortgages very well. Which we do with mortgages. And frankly, the college scorecard which you referred to, which includes, I actually encourage anybody who's interested in education student loan policy to look at the college scorecard because it actually gives you a much more detailed view not only about debt, but also about earnings. And that's really the two sides of the equation that can really help us think about what's the next level of analysis beyond not only do I go to college, but where do I go and where will that pay off? I think you're right though that there is an increasing need to make data available. So, and that scorecard was a big piece of that and I think we're gonna do more. So I am always happy to contribute to a plug for the importance of data. But in addition, as you were both alluding to the importance of helping people understand what the data are telling them and so that they can influence their own decisions in those ways. So a number of your comments have really highlighted the interactions among dimensions of people's lives and the interactions among the different groups who are participating in the loan markets is part of that complexity. So in addition to student borrowers and to various lenders, of course, we also have the colleges and the universities. Some have said, and I believe there is actually research, including by the Fed, that finds that as availability of student aid, of student loans went up, that colleges simply raised their prices. And so that may be a kind of challenging dimension and I would like to hear from each of you your views about whether that simply is how things would unfold. The support for the student aid went up that the universities and colleges simply raised their prices and so that doesn't really help us address the challenge. So I'm not ultra familiar with the literature on it but my understanding is that there is some disagreement and a mixed view about whether the impact of additional aid and loans on the price of college. I will say though that it's important to remember that the published tuition and fees that is out there is not actually what a substantial portion of lower income people pay. And I think with more aid, the net price for several years now has actually stabilized amongst many sectors of higher education. So I don't know the answer to it but it's obviously one that you'd want to know that effect. But I want to make sure it's clear that what's really the answer? We have to tailor the programs so that they meet the policy goals and the policy goal is for people to be able to go to college and advance ahead. But I think it goes into the question of the importance of research and analysis is just increasing every single day because frankly, sometimes when you release more information, new questions arise. So my read of the evidence on this, the best evidence at this point is that for-profit colleges indeed raise their prices when grant aid and loans go up. So their sticker price, they don't give their own aid to people. Their sticker price is their net price. They're not giving scholarships to people and their prices do go up when aid gets more generous. The 80% of students attend public institutions. At those institutions, what drives price, how much money the states are giving to them. So if you look at how much public institutions are spending per student, it's been pretty flat. But what's changed is less of the money is now coming from the states and more coming from the students. So it looks like costs are going up but really it's that- The share. Who pays for it is now the students rather than the state taxpayers. There is some evidence that schools that provide their own scholarships when the Pell Grant goes up, will scale back on their scholarships and shift them to other people who aren't eligible for those scholarships. But the main action appears to be in the for-profits. Thank you. Let me shift gears just a little bit. I think each of you in your remarks talked about some of the either proposals or policy options that have been implemented to try to address some aspects of the student loan crisis. And in particular, you've mentioned the income-driven repayment plans. And those, of course, allow borrowers to repay in installments and often over longer time periods. There've been proposals and I think, Susan, that you have been one to propose this of a managed repayment plan through payroll withholding. And I'd like to ask each of you how much of the problem do those kinds of policies really fix? Well, I personally think that in a world where borrowers can pay as a percentage of their income, it's not a cure-all to college affordability and student debt. But it's an important weapon that a borrower can use to fight delinquency and default and avoid it by getting an affordable payment. And I actually think that's a pretty good weapon and I want to make sure that, you know, for anybody who you think is struggling about it, they should know about that. And it's important that they're able to easily enroll and re-enroll each and every year. There have been some, the president has directed the agencies to look into multi-year certification of income-driven repayment plans. But I would say for the purpose of tackling delinquency, it is pretty powerful. And, you know, I urge people to figure out are they learning about it and give ideas about how to improve it? Are there servicers telling them about it? And if they're not, like, we need to hear about that. So we can fix that. I would say the very fact that we have 7 million people in default and the ranks continue to grow indicates that the system of income contingent loan repayment programs that we have is not working. Like, basically none of those people should be defaulting. Right there, it's, if they're very low income, you know, $18,000 a year, for example. If they were in pay-as-you-warn, they basically wouldn't be paying at all. So a lot of this comes back to, like, where the rubber hits the road, how do we actually implement these programs? And servicing sounds like such a boring topic, like loan servicing, boring, right? But the fact is, like, how do you actually interact with the borrowers? How do you contact them? How do you work with them to get them into a program that works for them? Very same issue came up with the mortgages, right? So there's a big push from the feds for the mortgage companies to restructure loans, restructure the mortgages so that people would have more reasonable payment plans and where it fell apart was like the implementation of it, getting the servicers to actually do it. And that's happening right now as well. I think, you know, frankly, I think the big problem is that Department of Education owns this enormous portfolio of loans. It's essentially one of the biggest banks in the country. And, but it's a service organization. It's not a financial organization. It's very good at giving money to students and getting people to college. And that's what it should be doing. It should not really be in the business of servicing a trillion dollar portfolio of loans. That who in the government collects money from taxpayers? Treasury does. It knows how to do that. I don't think ED knows how to do that. And I don't know that I would want to see ED turn into an organization whose focus is collecting money from people. So I kind of think that this business should be moving out of the Department of Education and somewhere else in the federal government. What do you think of that? Well, I love not being in government. I will say, though, that the issues of engaging borrowers and getting the incentives right, it's hard. Especially when using private firms, there's going to be their own economic incentives. And also, I would add that borrowers, the process to walk through that, many borrowers need that individualized counseling that I think sometimes is just hard to deliver. Many companies may not be set up to do that, per se. So I don't really know what the right answer is. There have been while I was. Also, they're not paid to do it. And they've got a contract with the Department of Education. And if the Department of Education is not paying them enough for the time that it takes to walk somebody through an enrollment in an income-based program, that's a contracting failure. Well, what we saw in the mortgage market was that many of those servicers were working for other financial institutions or for trusts. And it did not work so well. So figuring out how that's worked but related to your point about payroll deduction, maybe there are ways to streamline the repayment issues. And in some ways, I know you've done some work on automating how that might work. I think those are all concepts that we have to really think about. What I want to make sure, though, is very clear is when a borrower is having a tough time on their student loans, there may actually be bigger issues that they're dealing with financially speaking that might have more immediate consequences. For example, getting their car repossessed or making rent. And I think we always have to remember that once people are in trouble, it is like a treadmill that sometimes gets faster and faster and faster. And so figuring out how to deal with all of these many explosions in your life is really hard. And that's why getting those repayment plans clear and that people know about it and can easily enroll in it is just critical. And even if we had my dream of a universal income-based payroll withholding structured, progressive system, it would not deal with fraud. So if there are institutions out there that are selling a product, charging people tuition, getting them to take out loans, but not actually educating them, that's not going to get fixed by this. So the regulation of the for-profit colleges, in particular, is not going to get fixed by there being an income-based program. All it fixes is the back end. But how do we make sure that people are getting the educations that they're paying for? That is a separate issue that cannot be dealt with by income-based repayments. That's right. Yeah, figuring out how to monitor them so that they're not engaged in wrongful conduct. Just today, the FTC and the Department of Education took an enforcement action related to devry. So of course, there are issues of that you're right, that those repayment plans won't solve it. I guess the other thing that I think is important to remember, there is a sense that everyone with student loans is having a tough time. And I actually think that's just not true. But there is a, and for many people who graduate, make good money, sign up for auto debit on their loans, they don't have any, they have a good experience with repaying, but there are- Makes me very happy to pay my loan every month. It's a good experience. Well, in the sense that they feel like they know, they feel like they know what to do. Whereas I think when people are really struggling, that's really where it gets tough. Okay, we're now ready to go to the audience. The first question is actually from Twitter. And we've actually had a nice segue to it. We've been talking a lot about the repayment approaches and mentioned that that's not gonna fix everything. So this question is, is it possible to produce guidelines such as borrow no more than X dollars if you are getting a degree in a particular field or if you're getting an associate's degree? What are your views about that? I went first last time. We essentially do have some of that in that we have annual limits for undergraduates. So we have some caps on it. We don't have caps on other loans such as the parent plus loans. So pretty much parents can borrow the entire contribution that they're supposed to be, that the formula says they're supposed to be making and that's been causing lots of problems. Ditto with grad plus loans. So there's like, should we do that? And would government do it? I think it'd be great if students had better information about what the payoff is to say a degree in education or a degree in social work or a degree in fine arts that would guide them in how much they would borrow for that degree. On average, it's worth it to borrow to go to medical school and not so much for some other degrees. Is the government gonna do that? I think that's kind of what the college scorecard is intended to do. Is the government ever gonna have sort of hard caps but you're getting a degree in animation not gonna lend to you. I don't see it happening. We just don't have that degree of regulation in our country. So I could see sort of an informal advising system trying to promulgate that kind of information. Do I think practically we could have major by major school by school loan limits? I don't see it happening. So a lot of people answer this through rules of thumb about oh, you should roughly not borrow more than this. I think the challenge about doing that when it comes to degree type, bachelor's versus associates, there are significant variations in earnings within those degree types. So I think when it comes, this is just my own quick thinking, is when it comes to vocational training certificates where there's pretty clear understanding of what the type of job you might earn afterward. I'm sorry, the salary you might earn based on that occupation. It may be simpler to come up with what's that right amount to borrow so that it's comfortable to afford. I think actually when it comes to a number of undergraduates, particularly four year bachelor's degree, we all have to acknowledge that so many people don't really know what kind of profession they're going to pursue several years later and that just makes huge complications in either developing rules of thumb or even frankly regulating on it. Okay, the second question, and this is a question related to data, and that is what does the data tell us? What do we know about differences by race? And what, as well, is the kind of impact related to the HBCUs? So I don't have that off the top of my head, but my understanding is that some of the survey data suggests that minorities, particularly African-Americans, borrow at higher rates and more. So the percentage of people borrowing and the average level of borrowing is higher. Now that being said, my understanding is that there is not a similar framework like there is for mortgages where we have much more granular information on how much people are borrowing and low-level data by race, ethnicity, and some other. Now that's, as I understand, so that's not in the FAFSA. It is not, so there's a long history of racial redlining and so forth, and because of that there are requirements that race is included in mortgage applications. The data that I was describing to you that gave all the insight that we now have come from the administrative data that the Department of Education has on student loans, including the FAFSA, which you all know and love. And if you remember filling that out, there's nowhere on there for race. So those data, for that matter, the IRS data that it's been matched to, again, nothing in there about race. So what you can say is you can try to piece it together.  Those populations also have much lower wealth levels. For a given level of income, if you compare an African-American family and a white family, the African-American family will have lower wealth because wealth is something that builds over multiple generations, right? So you need to have, not only your parent, but your parent's parent, your parent's parent, to have had good incomes for many years for you to end up with wealth, and also not have had it seized and appropriated in the institutionalized ways that it has been in the U.S. for African-Americans in particular. And not just wealth, but income. I mean, we know that there's disparities according to some of the government data on what college graduates who are minorities are earning per hour after college versus their white counterpart. So I think there's a lot of mixture there that raises some very serious questions about how do we look at this in a nuanced way if we believe that education is a vehicle to social mobility. So clearly more work to be done to understand those gaps. With the failure of Corinthian, what is the role of the government shutting down institutions versus letting the market take care of poor performing schools? Yeah, so I think the, when I was at the CFPB, I was heavily involved in a lawsuit against Corinthian, which alleged a number of types of misconduct related to their private loans.  And I think it has raised some questions about how does oversight in higher education work? And this is actually the history of oversight in higher education is referred to as the triad, where the federal government, accreditors and states all play a role in doing so. And I think there have been some legitimate questions asked about Corinthian being accredited to the very end. And what is the appropriate role of each? And part of what I'm working on is thinking about what is the appropriate role of the states in protecting consumers from those closures? Now I think you actually were asking me a different question about the market closing it. There are schools that do fail because of their own whatever it may be, financial mismanagement, not being able to provide good programs. But I do worry that there are some programs that particularly where there might not be the level of transparency we would like and honesty and how they represent their programs to their students that some of them may be able to live longer than maybe the market would typically allow if students really knew the full truth about what that program was gonna deliver. I think it's also a bit inaccurate. If you have an image in your mind of the for-profit college industry as being this competitive private market, you're wrong because they get 90% of their income from student aid programs, through loans from the government and from grants from the government. And then there's something called a 9010 rule which means that institutions can't get more than 90% of their income from the student aid programs. The for-profits tend to be right at that margin. And then they can get more money though from people who are getting veterans benefits. That doesn't count in the 9010 rule. And this 9010 rule is sort of one of the few ways which we sort of like regulate the for-profits. But the idea that somehow that market forces are gonna compete them out of existence, I don't think is accurate. The 9010 rule we sort of use as a way to make sure that no institution is completely living off of student aid, but it's a fairly weak regulatory tool. I don't know what you think of it as future as a tool in regulating this industry. Well, I mean, one of the things that I've been closely following for years is we can't deny the fact that there are a number of people post 9-11 who have returned from service and have a generous and appropriately deserved GI bill. And I think because what you've said about the 9010 rule, the 90 is only related to student aid programs that are part of Title IV of the Higher Education Act, but monies from the GI bill and other, especially military-related programs, they do not count. And the Obama administration has actually supported closing that loophole because it is, I think, leading to targeting of those individuals. And I just think the last thing we wanna do is have someone use their benefits on a program that is not gonna help them get ahead. After World War II, we, the GI bill was actually a key instrument of transitioning those from service into productive civilian life. And I mean, many people believe it was part of the engine of growing the economy, of getting people in jobs at pay. And I think it's, we have to fix that. Okay, it's virtually impossible to discharge student loan debt through bankruptcy. Doesn't that make that situation worse than the mortgage crisis in some ways? What are your thoughts about that set of challenges? Yeah, so the main area I've worked on in the student loan context as it relates to bankruptcy is the 2005 change which treated private student loans like federal student loans. And it's worth noting that federal student loans do have income-driven repayment, which is a, and I'm not a lawyer, but it's kind of like a chapter 13 style repayment plan. But private loans don't have that. And a study published by the Department of Education, the CFPB, a few years ago showed that the change in the bankruptcy code did not lead to lower prices nor did it lead to expanded access to loans. So because of that, it probably did not meet its intended goals, and it's something that needs to really be looked at again as to whether it was an appropriate change. I will say though that I think bankruptcy is very well known that it's not dischargeable, but I'm not sure if in any way, what I talked about before about single issue cure-alls, I don't think it's in any way a panacea for what's going on because many, particularly young people, even if they could file, would not because of some of the other effects it might have on their credit. So when it comes to a lot of the federal student loans, I would like to see that people really are able to get into those programs that help them avoid delinquency and default. And you can't get into an income-driven program for your mortgage, right?  But you can do that with the student loans by getting into one of the income-driven programs. So indeed, they're not just, I mean, the reason, the rationale behind them not being dischargeable in bankruptcy is that, say you've got a bad year in terms of your earnings, it may well be that in another five or 10 years you've got a good year. You still have that education and at some point you could be doing fine. And as a society, we wanna make sure that people who are doing fine are contributing so that they can be helping other people get access to college, right? The idea is we've got a pool of money that comes from people who win and it works out, let them contribute their money in the form of both taxes and their loan payments, and that gets recycled, pay it forward to the next generation to educate them. So I would not wanna see people doing these sort of strategic bankruptcies. How many times has Donald Trump been in bankruptcy, right? Where it's just a mechanism for the next deal. I wanna make sure that people are paying their fair share towards the commonwealth. So this question also from the audience kind of follows up Susan on the comments that you were just making about how you want to encourage people to move forward into higher education in ways that really improves their opportunities for the future. So the question here is, but how do we prevent students from over borrowing without discouraging students from enrolling in college in ways that improve their economic future? I mean, that's a delicate balancing act and what are your thoughts about ways to try to get it right? Well, I would say that for the students, the borrowers that I've expressed the most concern about, the traditional access pointers, first generation students, low income students, has been community colleges and has been public institutions. And keeping those and the way that we've sort of protected students against very high risk in making the bet on college is by making those very cheap. We keep public colleges very cheap so that people don't have to borrow, go into debt and they can therefore experiment. And if it doesn't work out, they're not left with a big hangover in terms of debt that they can't afford later on. With the states pulling back on their funding for public institutions, even public colleges have become a more risky place to go to college because you have to end up having to borrow some. So sort of returning to community colleges as being an essentially free access point for education, I think is an important way to make sure that low income first generation folks can experiment with college. It's not gonna fix everything.  So we still have to be thinking about how do we deal with repayment? How do we make a well-functioning loan system? But I think having a vibrant, cheap, well-functioning community college system is one way that we keep that promise. And to be clear, the consequence of not completing or going to community college and not working out is not as grave as if you borrowed a lot for a different type of school. So in some ways it provides a lower risk gateway for people to not borrow much, but also frankly get that credential and maybe if they don't pursue further study that they're still able to get that wage increase. In the other, so one dynamic we saw during the recession was people are pouring back into a school. They wanna go to the community colleges. They're being underfunded and they're oversubscribed. People can't get in the classes they wanna take. They can't get into the nursing program that they want to. And the for-profits took advantage of that. So we've got strong evidence that when community colleges are underfunded, for-profits grow. So in part that in itself is a man-made problem and it could be undone. But the next time we've got a recession or some other event that pushes more people into school, if we have an expanded capacity at the community colleges, the same thing's gonna happen all over again. So the US university system is often compared to systems in our counterparts in other industrial countries. And frankly, the US is a wealthier country than some of those countries which have not faced the types of repayment, challenges, crises that the US is grappling with. So what are the lessons? Are there lessons that we should be drawing from those experiences in terms of how to finance post-secondary education? I mean, I have not studied the international comparisons, but my perhaps ill-informed view is that I think maybe most of those, the differences in borrowing and financing is simply because college as a percentage of family income is dramatically lower in other countries. From my understanding, there's also many industrialized countries, particularly in continental Europe, have universities that are essentially federally funded in ways that keep tuition very, very affordable. Though I do know in some Anglo countries that shift has changed quite a bit, but I don't know the exact answer, but it's possible the simple answer might be explained much of this. There's another piece as well, which is that we, I mean, the US post-secondary system is just the land of second chances and third chances. So if you didn't do well in high school, you can still go to a community college. In German, and maybe eventually you'll be able to go to a university. In Germany, France, there's restricted access to the university, so basically, based on how you're performing in middle school, you're gonna go to a high school that prepares you or does not prepare you for university. And the share of people who are going on to university is much, much lower. And as a reason, just about everybody, so I was meeting along with other people from the higher ed group over at the ed school, we went to England and we're talking to our counterparts there. Their graduation rates from the universities are astoundingly high because they restrict the share of people who can go to the universities. The best students can go and they go on and they graduate. So it's a less risky proposition for the government to invest in them, but it also means that we're not taking a risk on the same number of people. So that's the other structural difference. So we give people the opportunity to take a risk, but then we place all the risk on them. And if it goes badly, what we're hearing is, it goes very badly. And if we wanna let people experiment, then I think we need to provide more in the way of essentially insurance against things going badly. One way to ensure it is to make it free. Another is to, if you don't end up with a strong salary, you just don't pay. And that's what a well-structured, well-functioning income-based repayment plan would do. So the next question is, how much of the problem here is just that the interest rates that are charged on the student loans are just too high. Elizabeth Warren has proposed making student loans at much lower percentage interest rates. What do you think? So I understand that from before 2012 or something, the rates were fixed at, I believe, generally 6.8% was a very common interest rate. Today, new federal student loans are tied to market conditions. So rates today for loans that you're taking out are much lower. Now look, the interest rates, they're set by Congress. If Congress wants to lower the rates or increase the rates, that's their prerogative. For many people, interest accrual is a substantial part of what they repay. But for those who are struggling badly and in default, in many ways, they're not even close to not just paying the interest portion but ever getting near the principal portion. So I don't know, it's one of the many issues about loan repayment, but as it relates to the default issue, I'm not sure that it's directly related. But I think many people have made the argument and the interest rates during the Obama administration did go down with Congress passing a law that many people did feel that that was a more fair outcome to be tied to the broader interest rate environment. I would say that lowering interest rates cuts costs for borrowers. That is undeniable. Does it deal with defaults in a targeted way? No, because basically you're taking a subsidy and so somebody's in distress right now and you're saying, okay, over the next 10 years I'm gonna reduce your payments by 20 bucks a month. That is not the most targeted way to help somebody who's struggling right now with their repayments, right? It really literally, if somebody's got a debt of say $20,000 and you charge them 6.5% versus 4%, it'll make a difference of maybe 20 or 25 bucks a month in their repayment and what their payment is due each month. So it's not a target and it's gonna benefit everybody, including the people who have $100,000 in debt and their MBAs and are earning very good money. So they're gonna get the benefit of that interest rate cut as well. So it's not targeted in the sense of that it doesn't get money to people right when they're struggling, nor does it get the money to those people who need it the most. A lot of the money ends up going to people who are doing just fine. So that's my main concern about using that as a tool to reduce distress and default is that it's not targeted.  It makes people happier to pay less for things. Again, I will put forth that controversial economic principle. So unfortunately, this will be our last question and it is a different type of option to really address this broader challenge. If we're worried about access to college and see student loans as an obstacle, why not just make college free? Yes, taxes will increase, but wouldn't we be better off as a society? Well, I think that's partially why there is an effort to essentially make community college available and free or near free to be that gateway, given that if we believe as a society that getting that credential is critical for that person's future, then I think that's part of it. Now, I think you always have to think about the distributional effects of how you make it free and who you make it free for. But, you know, there's no question that the increase in college tuitions has been something that feels like a real impediment to so many people to get ahead. And they feel like they're putting a lot on the line and risking it. And there's really no other option for them because going to college is the way to ensure, in some ways against poverty for many people in the labor force. So it's a tough dealing with college costs, I think is also very personal to people because they felt like they were able to go to school at, we know you always hear people saying, oh, when 40 years ago was only $800 here.  Not only does it give you more earnings, but maybe even gives you more ability to in what you choose to pursue. So I think it's so important, which I ding economists sometimes for doing in over commoditizing higher education, that it's not just about a ticket to higher wages, it actually shapes a lot of us how we are as citizens. I just wanna say it's a Wharton MBA thing, this stuff. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Go on. But I do feel that though. I feel that it's more than just purchasing some, it's not like buying a factory that produces a certain amount of widgets. It's about who we are as people and citizens too. So I certainly want Susan to weigh in on this, but I'm gonna push you just a little bit. So if I pull out one of the things that you said at the beginning of your response, I think it was no, that you would answer no. We shouldn't just make college free because of the distributional aspects. Well, I don't know about that. I think that for people who can't really, who are lower income, that the cost should not necessarily be an impediment. I guess I would ask, would making college free? And again, I'm more on the financial services side than the education side, but would making college free come at the expense of limiting the ability for people to go? Would it lead to lower Pell grants? Like, what's the trade-offs? Because in actual policymaking, those are things you have to weigh, is that what are you losing by doing that? And that's why I hate to pivot back to this, but the data-driven approach to figuring out what's the right interventions to meet all sorts of goals, I think the world we live in is not just philosophical. It's also about implementing and what figuring out costs and benefits. Historically in the US, community college was free. So community colleges really grew and expanded during the 60s, the 70s, and tuition was nominal, very small amounts. So we departed from that history during the, we have been departing from that history as the states have disinvested. So free community college would kind of be a return to where we were. Should we also make all the four-year institutions free? That would be tremendously expensive and again, it would be poorly targeted, right? So community colleges are where low-income, non-white first-generation students go as their first entry point. So that would be a way to sort of target resources on the people who most need education as a form of economic mobility. Unfortunately, we are out of time. I am sorry, we didn't get to all of the questions, but I do wanna thank all of you for coming and for participating by offering such a wide varied range of questions to our panelists. I'd like to thank our panelists for a very informative and wide-ranging set of perspectives and please join me in thanking both of them for their comments and remarks.


Welcome, this is Melissa Arma with a stock swishing and reviewing how you can make money trading using gap options You could have made forty seven thousand dollars last week in three trades. This is an advanced trader risk I'm gonna go over the beginner ones, too But it just goes to show you how if you get the stock at the right place and you get them over the right place How much money you can make trading which is why it's fun to do and this was take it one day Get out the next you didn't have to wait a long time So it's a huge huge amount of money for a short short period of time So if you're interested in more information you can email me a Melissa at the stocks wish calm or call me at 929 3200 gap watch me on Fox news and Fox business network where I talk about stocks and the market But you can learn my method you can learn what I do you can learn how I make these picks you can get my calls How do I get these results I get these results from simply using my system using the golden gap system You need a system if you want to trade especially if you want to have the consistency and and more than that To take this kind of risk to make this kind of profit. So I called Facebook on the fifth Then boom right a ways dropped into and through the strike in the six It was a put so as Facebook puts again call this in the morning of the fifth Strike was 165 and it dropped it dropped all the way down right away. So you see it here here was the day I called it boom fell beautiful profit So this is almost a 500% return on investment in your money If you took 50 contracts or whether you took even only 10 the point was you turned your money around almost five times The risk was fifty five hundred cost of the option was 110. I was great for Facebook if you could sell it Anywhere anywhere over five that's amazing was almost six five ninety could have made twenty four thousand dollars again You had to risk fifty five hundred, but this is within a day totally worth it And so many people risk this much money trading in a week or a month and then lose it This is a solid trade with it with a huge turnaround again almost 500% Google was a put to call it the same day Google fell here dropped continue the next day boom rare right into the six fell Google puts where the strike was 1160. Okay all these targets were in here It got so close even to 1150 and dropping to that second day But 1160 was a strike it went through another profitable call and again very quickly You take it the one day get out the next cost was seven a little bit more expensive So if you had ten contracts it cost seven grand, but you could have sold it for twenty two Again a beautiful beautiful beautiful trade over two hundred percent return on investment $15,000 you could have made so 15 plus 24 for the Facebook and Baba Baba actually continue But again still think the right thing to do is give out the second day Took it here got out here close to your gap down called it on the gap called it to short called the put drop But I want to point out here this continued even that day this fell through the strike strike was 160 And this still has time to go a long and short again If you're up a lot of money really quickly and it's getting into the strike or pass the strike I think it's a it's wise to get out when you're up a lot of money This one was cheaper than Google not as cheap as Facebook cost was three sold at seven profit $8,000 for 20 contracts, which is 2,000 shares of Baba again a really nice move a really nice straight show You could have made 30 40 7000 dollars and three trades in one week But it was really just one day because you took them all on the fifth and you got out of them all in the six And obviously you had to watch the trades, but they all continued How does this work? Why does this work? I use my golden gap system But the philosophy behind the system is Institutional money if you want to consistently make a lot of money in the market The only way it's gonna happen is if you're trading on the side of institutional money And that's what you see here. This is the sell-off here in Baba. Look at this. It's a dump boom boom boom It's selling selling selling action that comes in and drops it down Now these were advanced risks. So what did you have to risk if you tally do doll up all three trades at once 18? Five, okay, so to make 47,000. That's still super fantastic Now what if you wanted to risk less? Intermediate risk would have been a little over six You still could have made over 15 grand and a lot of people can risk over six beginner risk was 1850 That's still very doable for so many people and you could have made almost five thousand dollars forty seven hundred are really nice Straight if you want to learn how to do this you must learn the system That's how I make the calls and you've got to do my class in order to join the live trading room So my class is called the golden gap course It's a full today course and how to strategically find pick-and-play stocks that are professional bearish gaps classes online You'll be anywhere in the world and take it so 15th and 16th 9 to 5 Cost of the class is $5400 if you want to sign up the deadline is tomorrow. Okay, you have to email me to sign up I'm running a birthday special it ends tomorrow and there will be no exceptions So you would get the training room free for a year and the option letter free for a year This is a huge deal is the last big special before the new website launch very excited about it So you would have gotten all these option calls and you get all the trading calls for the equity trains in the room For the day trades so this is a fantastic opportunity Plus you learn the system and earnings season begins in October. We'll see what happens These these these monies are possible if you risk more but the problem is people don't know what to do So they don't risk it or they don't have anyone to follow. That's good, and I'm really good So follow me risk what you can whether it's five thousand six thousand Whatever you can risk you could have turned your money around huge in last week's trades And I'm telling you it's about focus focus focus and understanding the institutional moves that are coming into these stocks and how they move So again that classes this weekend if you want to sign up it's 54 99 US dollars Email me if you're interested at Melissa at the stocks which calm have a great day


Alright guys, welcome back to another stream. How'd you guys have been? Good. Let's get started. So we'll start with Wednesday because we didn't do anything Thursday through because of Wednesday's Asia session because I was weak then because the market didn't move a lot in New York session Wednesday, which was kind of a weird thing, if anything. Do you expect something to happen? You anticipate it? You woke up for it? What is this garbage, man? They're feeding you. They went in, they just did nothing. Sure they went down, we were looking for the swipe down, we were looking about what, 2600? We ended up getting 2600, but didn't drag ourselves back, which is the surprising thing. So this part was just a complete cry-off. You still could have gone long, I mean it still was a decent sort of long until closing, but it's nothing to hold over night. So you'd have been up since Asia, waiting for that double bottom here, then after this recovery here, then probably been long.  So that's the main thing that you wanted to do. The fact that we just didn't get it Wednesday was always a bummer. I mean we're pretty close to week open, so I mean they still couldn't close week green if they wanted to. Do you know who market buy Matic and decorate my shorts? Was it me? No? I don't market buy. Not anymore? No. Let's see what happened to you. Who did you dirty? I don't know why you shorted anyway. It wasn't ever short. Like I told you guys from Wednesday it was long. I mean it was a swipe down, it's been a long since then. I mean well and truly not really too long, but it's been long until Thursday night I guess. You can see these flashes that you see these closes here up top that are just coming about. So you're just wondering, yeah I'm sure you are long but at the same time, oh no what happened? Oh no, other things move fast. I mean it will come back down as fast as it went up. So if that's any consolation, but yeah that's funny. Oh no, they always do the coins. I mean an hour up an hour down you can see people started buying past this point. So you know people are long from here. This was pure just no one got to enter a bid. Everyone just like okay, let me buy it. Someone let me buy here or market buy here. Everything else just cascade. No one got a best price, no one got nothing. It's just straight to here. Everything from here onwards is either liquidation or people buying. Now you're just getting that on the observe page. But again as fast as I said before, the faster it goes up it's going to come back down. They usually hold these up. You probably look for every console dates to then find itself up on the weekly. So you do have some the way to go up. Shouldn't be sort of too bad but looking out where Bitcoin is trading now. Trading down which is always what we want.  So what's to say we don't drag our asses some more here. Just like oh yeah we're going to go down then console. But let's look at reasonings maybe to why they decided not to do anything here. Probably due to the fact that I mean they just wanted to grab. I mean they're already heavy short here. I was showing you in the book man. Like the fact that they're really heavy short on the downside so they don't they didn't need to sort of hang around here. So to be honest I felt to see any reasoning why they would want to be here. And as you can see this is all short.  But then we got this expected then we expected recovery but in this recovery just ended up becoming just nothing. Because he got a decent amount of long but still it's nothing that we could have not risen above off of. Then finally starts after this point you should start getting clued on. Okay it's not kind of come back. They then slam sound during Asia hits into here as soon as it starts recovering mainly here. So in a position you're saying okay that there's a death somewhat of a long and again you can make this really tight because you know you're safe here. Then it sort of pushes back up again grabs a few long so you see in the sea of shorts you got you got some long here and there. And that's why I said okay it was long until sort of Thursday night or closing. Because you do have these that will end up driving price down but it should be a bullish take in this whole thing the fact that they had to go down. They've been bullish from the get go. The fact that they decided to hold off and sort of just keep adding short it means they're also just waiting on something else. I mean that that they didn't like nothing move during ever and see like in minutes like just very very surprising. Okay personal income spending it's already came in. So that will see large move down again since it's going down first move usually happy to say that that will be bullish. I mean we're expecting what 2 o'clock. Yes on minutes look at that. Minutes to nothing. It's just a little doji here. You see that just nothing. It still went down. We still did the opposite. You still got a trade out of it. Not the magnitude of this but I mean this trade was just carry on from Tuesday. Just again just carry on. You're at a high anyway. See that as a London trade anyway from there. So you just carry that on. I did nothing on Wednesday to say to go against it. It was just perfect gentlemen. Just went down. You'd want to let off during New York session because you're looking for that spike load to then recover. I really talked about how that can get that recovery so you had to go home early and go home. Pretty sad I guess. And like I would say. Not perfect but I ain't afraid. Even if you're wrong you're right essentially. That's why hedging positions is always a great thing because it lets you scale into the opposite side of the position while the market is moving. You intended to get to trade ranges. You just have to get a start then everything else should just work for itself. Again we're just trying to sort of reassess this volume and we've been sort of saying okay there's your shorts. We've got a few longs here and there. There's a few more shorts here. But we know that there's shorts, there's shorts. A decent amount of longs here but mostly a mixed bag divided evenly across here. So if we're coming down we're adding more shorts to previously acclimated shorts. So we just want this to essentially rise off that. And sort of shrug off the disappointment that we got on Wednesday. It should be nice. It should close off the week. If we look at spy here. If we look at spy, spy came in. It did alright.  The start line I should say. I mean it came in here. The whole day did nothing. But again it's still sort of a very long biased area here. You can see as soon as closing comes they just flash it. And there's three markets and some coming up. So they flash it short. So let everyone come short after sort of tricking them into going along and just surprising how it works. Because your long is here. But people long up here because of the breakout. They come back down and it does well basically. What we wanted out of Bitcoin but we didn't really get. Which was kind of a mismatch. But sometimes you get that mismatch and what can you do other than just take it on the chin. The thing about this week is probably just really high. So we've got a lot of ground cover. Unless we want to close this thread. If we end up going up that high ends up just looking like a double top anyhow. Was this area here. So that's something we want to be careful about. If we end up coming back up today. It might end up being overtly bearish for us. If we can't break it. There's something that you want to look at and just say okay. There's something where you're taking off positions and then just sort of easing up on the gas. But considering last week's surprise. I mean surprise palm came back down nicely. Came back down to even so this was the goal of just being a trap. Came back down. Just back into the skies. They went really deep. I think they're just trying to get as much as they possibly can. This. You can see where they got the volume and where they got the quantity up there. They got the quantity down here. I mean they had it from here. That was always a weird thing. Again the way they ended it here. They were expecting that downside to come out. I mean you can see that. They are going but they're closed. Yes. That's all the argument. You can see there's where you've got all your breakouts. Fires here. It's getting sort of punished. Could be decently bearish. Might end up just being bears for the day. I mean it as well as it ends up doing that. Could end up just running these guys out. Then coming back. That's always a possibility that you want to get out for. Very sort of slim chance. And actually not too slim. Blow of the woods looks generally. I mean here generally sort of bullish. You can see sort of what we're coming in. 26. That looks decently bullish. So we can probably expect it to sort of push upwards. So it wouldn't be too bad. If option days look like that. And Bitcoin is something this big looking, this liquid. What I mean by that. I look at it and it looks very blocky. If you look at it, you just look at the variations of the bodies. They look very stagnant. They look like they're very blocky. And they have sort of relatively few variations between them. And it just looks like the same thing being repeated on and on. That's what I mean by that. That's usually never a good. It just means either no one's trading or everyone's just being coerced. Which is probably true for this spot. I mean, even with futures, same thing. You had that selling already. You had all that selling.  I think that's the main thing. They just ruined it for us. So they went in and just say, OK, cool. You decided to buy here. Sorry about that. Thank you. Come back. And you just had a lot of insane selling that just ended up being eaten up. Which is always a good time to see even though prices are going higher. That spot was increasingly increasing. So that's always a divergent. The bulk of this is just selling. So it's being held up for futures long. So that's very fickle. If it's held by just longs.  Because we know there's no real long term people here. Mostly just sellers. So the only way to bring back buyers is to go up higher. Well, not always higher. But generally it's not more often. We don't really have any interesting levels of Bitcoin. We're at nothing sort of new. I mean, everything's just been here for ages. So you guys should have them know where they are. Because they usually in very obvious places.  That volume here. There's one for sore eyes. Especially if we come back here. Just to be expected to reject into there for the most part. Which is nothing interesting. At least to me, nothing. Hopefully get something out of New York. I think you guys have extended bank holiday. I'm not mistaken. I don't think about something. I don't know. Stop caring about U.S. It's still open in 45. Memorial day. Yeah, so it's close to three days for that extended holiday. So they've got pretty much move the lazy bones. That extended holiday should sort of play into effect Friday. Because that means they have a very, very short fall. In the amount of time. Or they can do anything. So they've got to do something now. Meaning. They have to sell the Wednesday. Earlier than earlier. So that's today. And then they have Tuesday. So they're running on empty here. So they've got to move quick. So to speak. So they'll sort of pay their cards.  Okay, they got to do this. But again, recovering. We just got to see if it comes into here caps off. And then comes back down. Adds more short again. You just want it to do that. Because then you're sort of more sustained on the on the bullish side of things. Because it's coming later than it is sooner. Which is what you want. And still haven't cleared the bats out. So we want to clear the bats out before we move. Any, any higher. Just because the higher we move. The more likely we are to have a short day. So. In total. Three ads. This area here. Once we add this area here. We want to add shorts to this area here. We want to clear up bongs. And we want to sort of push out. Again, typical things. Nothing to outlandish. Nothing to garish things. Plenty far to see. AI stocks are storing but average investors aren't yet rushing in. Oh, wow. Let's look at those things. They look interesting to me. Oh, yes. Let's go. I mean, that should be a surprise to know one. I told you from where here. That Microsoft looks great. Yeah, much. It's, it looks great.  The other place that we talked about. I mean, we talked about it here, but. Come back down. Average just soaring. To understand. Now we've got that news coming in. You want to think of selling Microsoft soon? I'll start selling off right now. Actually. As I come to this high. People think about buying this breakout. We want to say. He's supposed to be back to all time highs. See, I already have a look at stocks are free now again because they're investments rather than day trades. But nice. No, that investments. He's like, you could have done a lot better. Like. From March. What is that? From. March 13th to here. Have you guys done better than 30% of your portfolio? Yes or no? Yes or no? If you didn't use, you should have just stuck it in Microsoft and just say, I can call it. In two months in a court, I did that. Like. I don't know. Then there's no point of trading if you can't beat that. Just fine investments. And just look at that. Like, I mean. Yeah, I was always going to. So, like, look at the video. The video was another one. You can't. They all think like, oh, Bitcoin so volatile. You've got to be quick to make money. You've got to be quick to make money. But stocks just been tearing. Like, you see tech stocks in March. When we came in. Short came in late. But again, if you can do 70% on your portfolio, like, what are you even doing? Hey, that for yourself. Like, oh, it's just fine. Yeah, average is about about halfway between the two. So, 45 if you just take between the two. But again, you've got to have some duds in there. So, I mean. Like, if you're, if you're not up on your entire portfolio, at least, at least that, like, what are you doing, man? What are you doing? I mean, you could have even had this far from even earlier and then just been up the whole. You got to change every quarter anyhow. So, again, this is usually a sell. So, you're selling pretty much. It's waiting for it to come back down. Usually these islands are very lonely. Unless they stay up for, like, the three days and just create things. But usually you don't really want to enter into an island. You always want to sort of sell onto those islands just because they look very lonely. But yeah, with that news, with this, plus everything being this high, it's often a good choice to sell.  It's super early. Let's do it, man. I got this one investor and he told me about this thing called chat GPT. And he said it's going to go to the moon. You just have to get in early. Yeah, it's that sort of vibe you're getting. So that's the sort of vibe you sort of get from those news articles or you should be getting from the news articles. Other than that, everything should just sort of say, okay, we're already at this high. You should sell. And just go in.  It's finally back down to normal prices. Just need to back down a lot lower. Nothing too good. Everything should be easy as you can see. It's slowing up here. We want it to come back down. This will hold off a bit lower. Once it's lower, you can then look for higher. Let's double check everything. See if I'm not missing anything.  Expecting a decent amount of sell off come market open due to tech stocks being a bit higher than they should have been. So it makes sense for price to come down a bit as tech sells off. That's a real question. What's expected is not often the case. I mean, look at ratios and see how far they're off each other. Two to two. Decently high to see a tax cut. I mean, ratio to sort of the rest of the market. They're at all time highs. So a lot of money is going into tech. Rest to share everything else. So it's outweighed. So if it sells off, it will be sort of no surprise that spy will go down. It's just the only thing that's pretty much making the market. They have parity. Utilities down like the opposite. So utilities is dragging its feet. Everything else is dragging its feet. Generally ratioed spies just, I mean spies, tech is the only thing that's a game. So if it sort of pushes and fails, I think money should rush out. So you should take sort of sell off. That's something that you want to sort of come into. Everything else sort of sells and that pushes the market down on open. Now you've got to sort of look at, okay, is the market going to go down? Is it going to nuke itself down? Or is it just going to just subside and just sort of mellow? Yeah, just be sort of mellow and just control it here. So it won't be too much of a sell off. And if it does that, then you're sort of looking at it. It's just, okay, that's the reason. Because everything else, it gives everything else a chance to recover. Then that will sort of make the broader market recover. So spy will end up going up, which is what you want. So we're not really messing up too much with our initial hands, let's just say. I mean, just we're bouncing on these errors here as people come in and short these guys instead of being long for no apparent reason, even though textbooks they say should long these, but they don't longer. They short it, which is a pretty, pretty path for the course for retail traders, as they seem to not be able to catch a break. We came into here. We've got a lot of liquidity here and instantly for your covering, but that's very a sharp pin. Easy sort of trading back into this here. So still sort of be wary. I think that's the best advice you can give, especially right now. There's some new cans already printed that. There you go. The cans are already sort of trading into it and trying to find itself back down already for some apparent reason. You want to see that with Bitcoin as well. Again, just sort of green, but spying into this sort of scenario here. Holding up pretty strong. Still within sort of tolerance of what we expect price. I mean, if it goes up any higher, we're expecting a greater fall essentially. The more longs it gets, the better for us that downside swing. If it ends up staying up up until opening bell and even past that, it's just sense of being a short day rather than finding lower to go higher sort of scenario. They should always be expecting that anytime you go lower, you should be looking for an exit. I mean, an entry for a long and then exit for a short. And anytime you're going higher, it should be the opposite. So that's the way you should be thinking. Every downward swing is a potential opportunity. Any upward swings is a potential sell opportunity. And every time you go down, it's like, oh, okay, maybe can I long here? No, maybe next swing down. It's a whole market. It's about being on a trade. I don't always return. I generally don't want to be with the broader market. Often the broader market. Especially with day trading because it's so short-term and volatile. You can get away with being constrained, especially if we are in a very strong offtrend. That's why I like no trend. You can trade both sides of the market without too much just getting some buys back. Nothing's all too major. Some of the scenarios we're looking for in concluded here. Everything looks set in its way. So just be playing out, playing out what we see rather than doing anything outlandish. Going to a million, look to zero. In terms of what we're looking for today, should be sort of setting up already for next week. Because we've got a very long weekend. So we're cutting next week very short. Here we know we've got longs. So these longs here, as they close off, we expect them to be undercut. Once they sort of get undercut, we can then look for prices to come back down. We already had a nice little fill here. See this? It's decent to say. Let's sort by the reasons. I should find this way down a bit. If we're a little close, it's a bit lower. So then Warren tries to try and come back into here again. If we end up going up higher early and just testing back into this, this was more bearish than it is bullish, because then you'll have ace and some mountable amount of longs just raring to just push out the market. We've been really heavy short. I mean, we know these guys are short. We know these guys are decently short here. It's only just recently we have these short term longs that we want to get rid of very quick. We're in pretty deep on the side of short. We should start to do some correction against them at some point in time. We know all of this on the spot side is panic selling. Even right now, there's no spot buyers. It's mostly close up by future longs and we've seen those future longs being here. It's a very sort of fickle market that we find ourselves in. I mean that they're very easy to dissuade as no one's really coming into buy except for one. Last couple minutes, some buyers here and there. But the majority of these just been selling out of the hearts out. Still driving within the territory. We've stopped breaking up high. Be bullish. You've got to sort of hold here. And if we don't do that, we end up coming into here. This is still sort of bullish scenarios. We know a spot is decently bullish today. We've got a lot of putts that needs to be outrun. So that can be outrun by just going higher. I think we're in a decent position. I mean, to be honest, there's nothing else to add onto today. We know where people are coming in, which is mostly along on the early side of things. But generally the consensus is those should not last. Once we get rid of them, we can then go up higher. But it's only when we get rid of them. It should be a simple sort of, it should set itself up for 10 o'clock. And once it sets itself up, it should just follow suit. It should not come out with any sort of surprising things. And I think bizarre thing will probably end up there. There's not really too much to add other than trade safe. See you guys next week.


There has been a lot of talk about bitcoin mining as a way to get rich. Bitcoin mining is probably the worst way to try to get rich, and will end poorly for most people. Bitcoin mining is an industrial infrastructure component. Let me ask a quick question from the audience, if you don't mind. How many people here know how BGP routing works? There are some actually. This is an internet conference. How many of you use the internet? Never mind. I know how BGP routing works, but usually I'm surrounded by no one else who does. Yet everybody uses it. You don't need to know how bitcoin mining works or why in order to use bitcoin. Mining is the industrial infrastructure that secures the network and allows us to operate without intermediaries. The miners are not intermediaries either. Anyone can join that network and participate at any time, leave. They're completely anonymous. We don't actually know where they are. No, actually. Because I think at least media in Sweden are describing mining as something dark. Yes, it certainly sounds dark. I know miners, they're, you know, right? It sounds like loads of hard work. Mining is special purpose high-performance computing that happens with application-specific integrated circuits, silicon chips. Now, that's the kind of thing that if you print in a newspaper, nobody's going to buy that newspaper again. So that's why media don't describe it like that. It's much better to think about the dark web. You know, that sells newspapers. And so we're seeing this, but you know, I don't know how many of you were around in the early days of the internet. This is exactly what happened then. At the time, it was only for geeks and academics and obscure, weird technology that nobody would ever really use. And of course, a plaything for criminals, especially fraudsters. And a lot of people were terrified to do online commerce, to buy things online. And they said, this will never work because people won't do it. So again, we're seeing a bit of that. People are afraid of change. And we're still very early days. We're about where the internet was in maybe 93, 94. Yeah, so it was gaming, porn, and rock and roll back then. Actually, 93, 94 was the first time we had DNS. It was mostly FTP, Archie, and newsnet, newsgroups in text. So, no, no porn. Couldn't really download that stuff. Oh, you don't know ASCII artists. All right. Thank you very much for a very interesting speech. Thank you.