I start the meeting. I welcome the Justice Committee's 10th meeting of 2015. I ask the Government to switch off mobile phones and other foreign devices. They interfere with broadcasting even when they are silent. The apologies have been received. The decision on taking business in private, I am asking you to agree to consider item 3 on our approach to stage 1 consideration of the FAI sudden deaths Scotland bill and item 4 in our work programme in private. Are you agreed? We are moving on to human trafficking bills. Our main evidence session is our fourth one. We have three panels of witnesses. Before I start, John, you wanted to clear an interest. Thank you very much. I welcome our first panel of witnesses, Siobhan Reardon, programme director at Amnesty International Scotland, UNPAGE, parliamentary affairs manager at the Equality and Human Rights Commission and Kirsty Thomson from the Legal Services Agency. I thank you all for your written submissions and will go straight to questions.  Your light will come on automatically. It is very efficient in here. Questions. John, Jane and Elaine. Thank you. This is mentioned in Amnesty's submission, but I would also like the other panel members' view on it, please, and that is about Lord Advocate's guidelines and non-prosecution. Can you comment on that, please? Can we go? Yes, we will get into the swing of it. Yes, we very much welcome the intention of the proposed legislation to ensure that all offences which constitute human trafficking are contained with one act, as well as to fully support victims of human trafficking. One of the issues in our submission, however, is that guidance, placing a duty on the Lord Advocate to publish guidance about the prosecution of credible trafficking victims who have committed offences, we do not think that guidance is strong enough. And we are calling for a statutory defence on the face of the bill, so a non-prosecution principle and statutory defence should be included on the face of the bill. Yes, Mr Page. I would agree with Amnesty's comments. I welcome the provisions in section 7 on Lord Advocate's guidelines, but the guidelines are not the same. They do not offer the same security as a statutory defence. We know that there are still problems with victims of human trafficking being prosecuted for offences that formed part of the exploitation that they were experiencing. I do not think that they are necessarily mutually exclusive. My team has worked with victims of human trafficking who have unfortunately been caught up in the criminal justice process, and undoubtedly the most effective way to protect them is to get in early and to ensure that the non-prosecution principle applies. The current Lord Advocate has been clear that there is a strong presumption against the prosecution of credible victims of human trafficking. That does not always necessarily filter down to the front line. There is current guidance at the moment. I would say about the bill as it currently stands. It refers to guidelines, and it refers to guidelines on prosecution. I would like to see it clearer within the bill what it states in the EU directive about the principle of non-prosecution and the non-application of penalties. I have also raised in another public forum with the Lord Advocate about the status of the guidelines. What does it mean in practice if they are not followed? I understand that he has taken some of those points on board. There is not a statutory defence in the legislation that is inconsistent with other jurisdictions in the UK. My understanding of the statutory defence as it is worded within those other jurisdictions is that it would be quite hard to implement in practice. There are quite a lot of exceptions to it, and it puts the burden on the victim of human trafficking to establish X, Y and Z. It would be another level of protection to include it in the bill, but in practice the most effective means of protection in our experience is getting in early and not prosecuting. You do not get in early, you need something. Absolutely. Are you back at this? Yes, I was going to move on to a different topic. If it is a supplementary, I have forgotten about my A and B lists. Is this a supplementary to that? I wonder how the panel responds to paragraph 56 of the policy memorandum to the bill, which notes that the introduction of a statutory defence in this area was rejected because it would place a burden on victims to prove the connection between their offending behaviour and their trafficked status, which the Government believes would run contrary to a victim-centred approach. Would you like to respond to that? Who wants to take that up? Ms Thompson? I think that it would be difficult in practice to put a burden on the victim. However, that said, it is an additional means of protection for a vulnerable group of individuals. I do not see why we cannot have both. I guess that it is about how we word it within Scotland. I would like to add that international law makes it clear that our legal system must take adequate steps to ensure that the criminalisation of victims of trafficking does not occur. Individuals have been victims of heinous human rights abuses. They are at lives of ruin, and then to put them into a situation in which they are criminalised or deemed until they can prove otherwise guilty of criminal behaviour adds horrific insult to horrific injury. The intention of the legislation to which we are speaking is about a victim-centred approach and ensuring effective and adequate support. A presumption of statuary defence and presumption of innocence needs to form a very much part of that framework. One final follow-up, would you anticipate the need for a time limit on the statutory defence? As Kirsty said, I think that there is a lot of work to be done. Certainly looking at the modern slavery bill and looking at what is happening in Northern Ireland, we can look at what amendments and suggestions have been made. We do not agree entirely with what is happening and proposed amendments, particularly with the modern slavery bill, but it needs to start from a human rights approach from the victim's point of view. From there, we can look at how it is worded, how it is contextualised, what guidance emanates from that and what policy platforms emanate from that. However, it has to start from the victim and from the human rights approach from the victim's point of view. I just wanted to add that from front-line practice in this area, I am not a criminal defence lawyer, but in trying to implement the non-prosecution principle in practice using the current guidance, there has been a lack of awareness among criminal defence solicitors. That is the first point. The second is a lack of clarity about what is the legal status of that guidance. How do we raise the non-prosecution principle? How do we do it? What does it matter? When liaising with criminal defence solicitors is something that is a statutory defence or has the equivalence of a statutory defence, it would seem just by virtue of that to raise awareness to ensure better application in practice. Margaret, you are on the same point. I think that Police Scotland raised this point. The future proofing of criminality and would it be better to have it on the face of the bill to have a kind of catch-all rather than trying to establish under guidelines what is current now but may not be covering what happens in the future? It is interesting that you mentioned the police. One of the legacy forces that we included in our submission, giving evidence to the commission's 2011 inquiry, stated that a clearer definition of what activities or actions might fit within the definition of exploitation would help within legislation, would help agencies. I think that this is the real nub, as my colleagues have mentioned. We are dealing with a complex hidden problem where there is a systemic problem of lack of awareness on the part of even well-meaning professionals to identify and deal appropriately with people who have experienced a profound human rights abuse. It does not need to be either or it can be both and if there is a way of wording, a statutory definition that assists in the overall process, as other people have said, of trying to disentangle human trafficking victims from the criminal justice system in the first place. Nevertheless, if there are additional safeguards there, it can only be a good thing for raising awareness among professionals. I am sorry, I am sorry, I am sorry, I am sorry, I am sorry, I am sorry, Christians pooling a face of me as well, which I think means you won't come in with a supplement on the same point, but before I take you, who wants to come in next? Sorry, somebody else wants to come in. I agree with what Margaret Mitchell has said. I don't know if, as word did, section 7 is future. I just wanted to clarify, I think that Alison had a very good question on the police memorandum 56. Are you quite happy that the burden will be on the victim to prove the connection between the offending behaviour and traffic status or do you not believe that there will be a burden on the victims? I think that if we just rely on a statutory defence, then again, I am not a criminal defence lawyer and colleagues will be giving evidence later, but then the burden is on the victim to show that they fall within that defence. The principle of non-prosecution takes away that burden and ensures that all competent authorities working with that victim have an obligation to ensure that they are identified as such and not prosecuted or not subject to penalties. Just to clarify, statutory defence is not absolute, it is a presumption. It is a presumption that you have been trafficked, am I correct? It is not an absolute defence, it is a presumption that you have been trafficked, which the Crown has to rebut surely. Again, I would ask my colleagues later on that they are not giving evidence. I know that you have justised me. I will get that checked out. John Swinney, do you want to come back in? Again, it is back to the amdus nebdins that we have received, Ms Reiron, and it is under the heading of sexual exploitation and prostitution, the criminalisation of the purchase of sexual services as a human trafficking reduction measure. As a committee, we have received a great number of statements. You might say that they are in a pro-forma style, and a number of them are making strong representations one way in relation to that matter. You conclude by saying that there is an insufficient evidence basis for how this, namely the criminalisation of the purchasing of sex, reduced the demand for human trafficking for sexual exploitation in Scotland. Can you expand a bit further on that, please? Absolutely. Human trafficking and prostitution are two very separate and complex issues. Our concern—and obviously, we are commenting on something that is not within the bill—we are commenting on something that is due to many other organisations mooting this for inclusion. Our concern is that, yes, human trafficking via sexual exploitation happens within the gamut or the crime of prostitution. We do not deny that. However, prostitution does not always equal human trafficking. Our concern is that, by conflating the two within this piece of legislation, we are not addressing either of these very complex issues adequately. The piece of legislation that we have before us is about human trafficking. We would very much urge the committee if there was a need, if there was a desire to look into reduction of sexual exploitation, reduction of prostitution, that that would be done on a separate platform with a separate legislative and policy framework that addresses the separate issue of prostitution rather than conflating it within a piece of legislation on human trafficking. The Convention on Action Against Trafficking of Human Beings and the EU Traffing Directive expressly provides measures to be taken for discouraging and reducing the demand for trafficking victims. The criminalisation of the purchase of sexual services is not one of the measures that they recommend. Furthermore, we were very specific with our wording when we talked about the lack of an evidence base. Much discussion has been made around the Sweden model or Nordic model. That is a very specific legislative response to reducing prostitution within those countries. We need to ensure that we have a clear, evidential base that links prostitution and the criminalisation of the purchase of sex within a Scottish within a regional context. Fundamental to that is listening to the stakeholders, listening to the rights holders within prostitution and those organisations that fully represent those voices. What has happened is that we have seen the model being used in other countries in Europe. It is quite attractive to take a model that, seemingly, some have said has worked and implemented in a different context, in a different situation with the hope that it will also achieve the same ends. We are saying that there are two very different issues that need to be addressed through an adequate and effective legislative and policy framework. We do not think that we would be doing service to either victims of human trafficking or victims of sexual exploitation prostitution by conflating them within the one piece of legislation. I have got supplementaries. I just want to check with Jeane. You are something different, so supplementary to this. I do understand that I have got Gil and I have got Eileen. Both wanted to come in this particular line of questioning. In regards to Amnesty International, I see that you have concerns with regards to the prospect of, if we did succumb to criminalisation for the purchase of sexual services, then there is a prospect that those people who are engaged in it might not be protected and driven underground. I wonder if you would want to make any comment on that. I will reflect on the comments made by the Council of Europe of Experts on Action Against Trafficking of Human Beings Greta in the third general report. If the criminalisation of the purchase of sexual services is to be seen as a measure for reducing the demand for sexual exploitation and human trafficking, it needs to ensure that measures taken do not, as you rightly say, drive the victims of trafficking underground, making them much more vulnerable to further exploitation. Looking at criminalisation of the purchase of sexual services on its own without looking at the country context, the regional context, without listening from the rights holders and without looking at a wider, huge wealth of welfare responses as well, I think would be incredibly detrimental, would not be appropriate for this piece of legislation. I would strongly, and Amnesty, as we advocated in relation to the Northern Island Bill, would strongly advocate that if this is something that is to be viewed and taken forward, the Justice Committee itself would take on research to find out very much a Scotland-specific context for this issue. Further to that, I know that in Scotland, although I do not have any evidence to this effect, I have just been told in other areas in the work that I do, that some parts of the Scottish community, some ethnic groups are very, very difficult to engage in, and the knowledge that was passed to me is that there is prostitution taking place in a very, very close society. I wonder if any of the panel or Amnesty International had any evidence of that, in particular, or if there was any evidence to suggest that the fear that people have with regards to driving underground—is there any evidence that can be brought to the table in that regard? I do not have any evidence at this point in time that I can share with the committee. However, I think that the assumptions that you have communicated have been anecdotally communicated in relation to the adoption of such a model, of such a legislative response from both NGOs, campaigning organisations and rights holders within Europe, certainly by the Council of Europe group of experts on actually against trafficking in human beings. They have raised questions about that as well, so whilst I do not have evidence that I can provide at this moment in time, anecdotally, I think that we have also been hearing the same thing. Can I take Alayne now, Alayne on the same thing? Yes, it is just according to an article in Hollywood Online this morning, the Scottish Government says that it is speaking with a range of different interested parties and will carefully consider any amendments brought forward related to the criminalisation of the purchase of sex. It sounds as if the Scottish Government is giving some consideration to the representation that is being made to it. Have you been in conversation with the Scottish Government about that, and what is your view of those like Tara who believe that if it does not happen and it has happened elsewhere in other parts of the UK that Scotland will become a soft touch for criminals exploiting women in this way? We have not been in contact specifically on the issue with the Scottish Government. We felt that it was something that we wanted to raise within this forum first. We would like to think so. I think that, as I said earlier, that a model, including a criminal justice approach with the criminalisation of the purchase of sex, has been used in other countries and has been discussed. I think that we are talking about Sweden, Norway, Finland and a number of countries that have already implemented something along those lines. I think that to talk about a Swedish model or anodic model is a misnomer because it has been a different variation on that approach. Canada and the UK are also talking about that. What we are saying is that to look at the criminalisation of the purchase of sexual service on its own as a stand-alone measure to reduce human trafficking and bisexual exploitation, we do not feel that that is adequate and appropriate. Would you prefer to say that it is stand-alone legislation if it is considered at all? As I said before, we would like to think that there are two very serious issues that really deserve stand-alone legislative scrutiny and policy platform. Yes, I think that that is absolutely clear. Jeane, a different line, yes? I would like to ask the panel whether it is about child trafficking victims, whether they think that the provisions of the Children and Young People's Scotland Act 2014 are sufficient to protect and support child trafficking victims, or should the bill be more explicit? In what ways should it be explicit? Who wants to take that up? Ms Thompson? I think that the bill should be explicit regarding the protection of child victims of human trafficking. The key European standard, the EU directive, makes it very clear that children are particularly vulnerable. They have particular characteristics that need particular measures of protection. The EU directive saw fit to make that clear. I think that the bill should also see fit to make it clear in terms of ensuring, again, just taking the overarching principles from the EU directive regarding the protection and assistance to child victims of human trafficking. Yes, the detail and clarity of that would be that in a strategy, but it is a stark omission from the bill, as far as I am concerned. Again, we represent child victims of human trafficking across Scotland in our service and there are difficulties in implementation. A clear statutory principles taken from the EU directive would greatly assist. Is there anybody else? Yes, Ms Rowden. I think that... That's enough if you agree with this. If you don't need to elaborate, if you agree with everything that's just been said, don't let me stop you because you've complimented the committee. If you want to be specific, you should be kind of elaborate, but I completely agree. Jane, do you want to ask? I'd like to... Mr Page hasn't indicated he wants to say anything. No, I would agree with everything. There you are. I've been given general points. We all agree. I wanted to just inqui in about the role of child guardians. I visited that project in Glasgow and it seemed to me that they were playing out a very important role and the bill is not very specific about that either, so I'd like some comments about that if you've got them. We work on an almost daily basis with the Scottish guardianship service. Undoubtedly, they play an important role in the identification of child victims of human trafficking and indeed ensuring access to support and assistance. I do think that their role would be strengthened by having it contained within statute. At the moment, they are part of the proceedings by virtue of personalities, effectively, rather than by virtue of them having a right to be notified of certain proceedings, having a right to attend. There is no automatic referral to them, for instance. I think that the EU directive is very clear on the requirement for a guardian. The Scottish guardianship service at the moment only works with separated children. It does not work with all children. In order for us to say that we've transposed the EU directive, I think that we need to be clear on the clarity as to who is a guardian and who is the guardian for all children. I'm not sure that the Named Person and the Children and Young Persons Act does that. Okay, that's very helpful. Right. Anybody else? Did you all agree? Just that's lovely, isn't it? That makes us… I'll take Margaret next. Margaret, because you've not been in. I wonder if the panel, particularly Ms Thompson and Mr Page, would comment on their concerns about the definition of trafficking and exploitation that is currently drafted in the bill? At the risk of repeating what has been made, there is a virtue in looking again at the requirements of the EU directive and seeing how effectively the proposed transposition of the directive into law through this bill actually is. Specifically on the travel point? The travel point, which I know has been well made in previous evidence sessions, and we cover it off in our submission. But just being absolutely clear, and again just reiterating my earlier point about given the complexity, complex hidden nature of the crime and given the very real problems of low awareness amongst the public in general and professionals that may be coming in contact with traffic people, getting the legislation, the primary legislation, as clear as possible about what constitutes trafficking and exploitation can only be a good thing. That does not mean that I know that there have been worries voiced about if you try to have a comprehensive definition in law, you have the unintended consequence of it being too rigid and not being able to apply to every situation, but you can have a non-exhaustive but nevertheless wide-ranging definition in the face of the bill that better reflects the directive wording. Would it be your contention that it doesn't comply with the EU directive that is currently drafted? There is a great deal of a wide margin of applicability in how states transpose directives into domestic law. I think that it would be more about less looking at it as a compliance issue and more as a matter of best practice in getting the best possible legislative framework in Scotland. Just to say that absolutely it is an issue of best practice rather than compliance. However, the directive itself stipulates that when states are bringing legislation in a domestic context, they should apply the widest possible definition of what human trafficking is to address yet in terms of best practice. Yes, I echo the comments of my colleagues this morning. I don't like the use of the word travel as it is inserted. I think that it makes the definition too narrow. In thinking of cases that I have seen of British and non-British cases of human trafficking, I would be worried that that definition would not apply to all those cases. It takes us to look at the movement first rather than looking at the exploitation and working back from that. In your submission, you go a little bit farther and say that it does not comply. I would argue that it is too narrow and I would be worried about the consequences of that. It is beautiful to read your submission's quote. The factor is that variation between the panel members. I think that it must be of concern to the committee. Thank you for that. Thanks, Margaret. I'm going to take Rodrick, who hasn't been in yet. I just wanted to move the discussion on to section 8 of the bill, the duty to secure support and assistance. I can invite you to let me have your thoughts as to whether you think that this section is adequate or whether it could be improved. Who wants to pitch in? Ms Thomson, you look as if you're not the starting block. I think that it is excellent that the criminal justice bill has taken on board the recognition from the EU directive and others that, even though it is a criminal justice bill, we require to protect the rights of the victims and provide support and assistance. The second point is to make sure that it does that in the best way possible. The current regime in Scotland works on a funding arrangement for adults. Obviously, it doesn't refer to children, which is a gap. Unlike England and Wales, there has been quite a flexible operation of that funding arrangement. It is not tied too closely to the operation of the national referral mechanism. I am very much of the viewpoint that, if someone fits within the definition of a victim of human trafficking as designated in the EU directive, there is a requirement to provide them with support and assistance, regardless of whether they have been referred into or agree to be referred into a formal process of identification, such as the national referral mechanism. I would be concerned that, in putting that on a statutory footing, we have made the current flexible practice a little bit more rigid and a bit more aligned to an ANRM, and, of course, it doesn't refer to children. I think that the provisions under section 8 have to be read against the policy, rather than the legislative work that will be done with the development of a national human trafficking strategy. There will be a lot of work there to ensure that we don't end up, as has been said, with an overly rigid NRM-focused understanding of the needs of human trafficking victims. However, we have a clear sense of how trafficking networks are going to be disrupted through a national strategy, but also how the care support and assistance that is referred to in the provisions for the national strategy are best aligned to existing devolved national and local structures and systems so that there is, and again, this gets back to the point of making sure that social workers and professionals from criminal justice agencies and right across the public sector in Scotland have the confidence and training to identify human trafficking victims, regardless of whether that person has been through the NRM process. I just wondered whether anyone had a view as to whether or not there should be in the bill some kind of recognition of a minimum standard of support and assistance in some form by regulation or otherwise. Are we quite happy to leave it? There has been discussion around the trafficking care standard. I think that it would be useful to explore what kinds of things that would cover, but again, working in human rights and equality law and policy, there is an enormous challenge around transforming the debate beyond bare compliance to best practice and ensuring that human rights principles are enacted in practical, meaningful ways is about more than compliance to minimal standards, so it would be a challenge in wording that correctly. In terms of the provisions section 31 on the strategy itself, does anybody have any comment on the requirement to prepare a trafficking instrumentation strategy on those provisions? It is welcome that the requirement is there. The proof will be in the pudding. We will have to see what comes out of the strategy, but it is a proper alignment of a Scottish strategy with existing structures around adult and child protection, different provisions of criminal law, national outcomes and indicators. The policy and legislative environment in Scotland is very distinctive, so a national strategy cannot be a standalone free-floating entity for it to have purchase with agencies, particularly at the local level. It will have to be made explicit how that is aligned with the other policy and legislative drivers that local authorities, the police, health boards and others are working to. I have still John Gil and Christian. Give me an idea of the questions so I can put you together if they are similar. John, what shoes are you on? It was simply a comment in Amnesty's evidence, if you will be able to please, about an independent and specialist human trafficking commissioner. That is fine. You are the same and Christian. Let us go back to the national referral mechanism first, then the commissioner, because that is partly what Roddy's question is about, so have you asked yours first? My question on both is quite similar. On the national referral mechanism, we had some evidence that we took and people were thinking about having a Scottish model. I note that in the recent evidence given by Amnesty International, we talked about it. Do you think this idea of a Scottish model, if we need a Scottish model, should it be in the bill, should it be in the strategy, where it should be set and how we should go about it? As set out in our submission, we believe that the current national referral mechanism, there are many failings to it. We are not the first to say that. I think that that is commonality and probably what the committee has heard. We believe that in order to truly address the intention of the bill about a properly victim-centred approach to trafficking, we believe that examination of the potential of a Scottish model is something that we have actually called on the Scottish Government to commit to. For many reasons, Ewan has outlined that there is a very distinct context in Scotland. We have many different drivers, we have different policy platforms and we have different stakeholders. It is a different environment. We believe that that needs to be taken into account. On a question of geography, both in terms of closeness of geography and in support services, we believe that having a multi-agency, multidisciplinary model for identification and supporting victims of trafficking, both adults and children, would and could be delivered very well here in Scotland. We are very supportive of the examination. Where it sits, I think that that needs to be looked at in terms of strategy, but also in looking at what we want to deliver, how far it wants to go, whether we need to put it on statutory footing or whether it needs to be something within guidance, we need to be something to progress to and it needs to be as part of the strategy and action plan. I think that there is further discussion to be had, but I think that the principle and provision of a Scottish model to identify and support victims of trafficking is something that we are very supportive of. Mr Page, are you waving your pen? Is that an indication of intention to speak? I am, and it is. I suppose that the commission would approach this less from the question of should there be a separate Scottish NRM, then what would a model of excellence on how an NRM should operate be and are we currently anywhere near that? I think that the answer would be a resounding no to its credit. The Home Office Review from November last year recognised the many failings of the current arrangements and many of them were picked up in the commission's 2011 inquiry, particularly the obvious glaring conflict of interest where you have an organisation investigating somebody's status as a traffic human being at the same time as considering their immigration status. At the very least, given that the dust has settled on the UK election in May and the gears start to turn again, we are going to be looking at pilots to test some of the Home Office Review's recommendations. My understanding is that at present none of those pilots will be Scotland-based. An obvious modest first step I would have thought would be to look again at whether that is adequate for our purpose. The NRM, the Home Office Review, explicitly excluded Scotland from its recommendations on traffic children in the recommendations made because it recognised that the system in Scotland is too distinctive to make broad recommendations that are going to work here. Mr Allart made the point last week about a person with mental health problems or learning disabilities who may be a victim of human trafficking and what would happen there. If you were looking in general in Scotland at a person who had mental health problems or learning disability and was in a situation of enhanced vulnerability, it is highly likely that that person would be treated as an adult at risk of harm and would immediately be brought into the multi-agency framework that was introduced, but the Adult Support Protection Act in Scotland is not the same policy framework as has been proposed even under the new requirements for traffic adults in the Home Office Review. The Home Office was right to recognise that law and policy around children is too distinctive to make broad recommendations. I would argue that it would make sense through pilots or through further consideration to look in the round at the distinctive policy and legal environment that we work to in Scotland. From that, that would help to give a more definitive answer to whether we need a separate Scottish NRM or whether we just need an NRM that is better able to place the victim at the centre of its deliberations but is also alive to the complex differences in law and policy across the different UK jurisdictions. I think that what I would like to see is a more general duty in section 8 regarding early identification and appropriate access to support, again, taking the principles from the EU directive in the Council of Europe Convention. I would be even to strip out some of the detail that is already there and contain more of the detail about how we ensure that early identification and access to support on the ground within a strategy or other documentation. From the ground, there is still a lack of understanding about what the NRM is and how it operates, but there is still a lack of understanding about how each public authority in Scotland still remains with the responsibility to identify and protect and how our obligations in terms of victims of human trafficking fit within existing child protection framework, adult protection framework and where 16 and 17-year-olds fit in. There is still a requirement for clarity as to how not only do we early identify but how we provide support within our existing frameworks. John, you have a question, which was the same as Gil's. We have the answer there, but it will be a law enforcement commissioner, not a victim-centred commissioner. Are we thinking the same thing? Should it fit? Should it be in the bill? Should it be in the guidance? Should it be in the strategy? Are we thinking of having a Scottish distinct anti-slivery commissioner? I think the points that Bill made at the anti-slivery commissioners focus will be on criminal justice elements and the disruption of trafficking networks. That is all to the good. It is one of the fundamental recommendations that we made in our inquiry. You are right that it is not going to cover everything that we want to see with the Scottish legislation. Being clear about roles, speaking as an employee of a cross-border commission, it is making sure again that, even with the tighter focus on criminal justice, that the commissioner is properly cognisant of the different legal and policy drivers, the different provisions in criminal law and so forth will be essential. To that end, like a number of other submissions, we believe that the bill should explicitly state the legal duties and obligations of the commissioner's role as it pertains to Scotland. One of the problems comes from misunderstanding or ignorance of different institutions and different aspects of devolved institutions. If we can state it clearly, then at least everybody is on the same page as to what the different roles and responsibilities are. One of the concerns was the absence of any reference to the UK anti-slavery commissioner within the bill. How does the interface work? How does any integration work? At least if it is stated explicitly on the face of the bill, as the legal duties and obligations, there will be some common understanding. I am not looking around at anybody. I am going to say thank you very much for giving your evidence. I am suspending for five minutes before we move on to the next panel. We are all back, so let us get on to the next session. I am pleased with another panel after this and other work to do this morning. I welcome our second panel of witnesses, James Hoek, who is the Dean of the Faculty of Advocates. James will grow member of the criminal law committee in the Law Society of Scotland, an assistant chief council in Malcolm Bray and Police Scotland, and more on the McKinnon chair child, the Scottish child protection committee chair's forum. Before I proceed, Roddy, you want to make a declaration. Thank you very much. I thank you all for your written submissions and I will go straight to questions. Margaret John. Could you ask the panel if they have any concerns about the definition and if so, what are those concerns? Or perhaps so you know that if you just indicate to be called and your light will come on, microphone will come on, traumatic, who wants to take that up? No concerns. Well, some concern has been expressed about whether or not the definition complies with the EU directive definition. The panel has heard evidence from the previous session about it, perhaps it is not a question of compliance but more a question of best practice. Over the course of previous panel sessions, the panel have heard that there are concerns about the use of the word travel in section 1, that perhaps the exploitation of victims could be expanded to include other activities. Reference has been made to perhaps a catch-all provision as well, and also the society take on board the fact that this is an opportunity to implement the EU directive in the widest sense and also to perhaps future proof this particular matter for as far in the future as we can possibly achieve. In your written submission, you did not raise any concerns about this and you have said its interpretation quite widely, but I think that there was a specific concern about the use of the word travel and that it did not cover travel within a country in a rural area from city to city. The information that we have obtained from Ms Thomson, who gave evidence at the earlier session, is that the solicitors who deal with victims of human trafficking often encounter situations where it is not inter-country trafficking but it is within a single country and perhaps even from one part of a city to another part. It would be better if that particular situation would be covered in the offence. The faculty picked up one or two specific issues in relation to the definition. I have read the previous evidence before the committee and I note the points that have been made about the primary definition. It is perhaps worth keeping in mind that one of the purposes of legislation is to implement the obligation to bring the directive into effect in our domestic law. It will, I think, be useful to go to the directive as the legislation that is to be implemented in our law. Previous witnesses have noted the difference between the basic definition in article 2.1 of the directive and the basic definition in the legislation. I have noticed in the policy document the reasons given by the Scottish Government for the approach that they have taken. I have to confess that I do not at this point have a view on whether the differences between the directive and the act are material and significant and what those might be, but it is worth noticing that there are differences and that that always presents our risk, at least that we are not fully implementing our obligations. There are two respects in which the act could be better aligned with the directive. The first is in relation to the question of consent. Article 2.4 of the directive tells us that consent of a victim to the exploitation shall be irrelevant. In the act, consent is dealt with only by reference to the arrangement of facilitation of travel, so there seems to be a failure to reflect accurately the directive there. Article 2.5 of the directive tells us specifically that, when the conduct referred to paragraph 1 involves a child, it shall be a punishable offence of trafficking in human beings, even if none of the means set out in paragraph 1 has been used. Those are the threat, use of force and other forms of coercion. It is fair to say that, in section 3 of the bill, the apparent attempt or the attempt to reflect that in section 3 subsection 8 is, if I put it this way, perhaps not the most obvious way to give effect specifically to the requirements of article 2.5. I think that it was probably just to reiterate the point that has been made in terms of the importance of the word travel in terms of trying to ensure that we have a clear definition of what we are meaning in terms of trafficking and working with children from a child's perspective. We have children who are being moved around cities from one area to the other. The bill has to strongly emphasise that we have children who are being moved around cities on a regular basis and that we have to ensure that the bill takes account of that. I agree with that, although I think that it is well defined in the bill. The definition of travel is quite adequately described and it is deliberately broad. Mr Wolfe referred to the policy description intent behind it, which is to make the definition of trafficking broad and we would support that without feeling qualified to offer any comment on whether it is consistent with the EU directive and EU legislation. I think that that goes slightly beyond the primary definition. I would agree with the point that, in our written submission, we would be keen to see the issues around forced labour and servitude that are dealt with in section 4, that it is clear that they are around about consent. We think that it is important that consent should not necessarily be an issue. IE people might consent to being in those situations but we do not think that that should be taken and it should be explicit in there that that is not necessarily an issue and it is not at the moment and we have raised that. Again, we raised in our written submission that we felt that it would be helpful to specifically define the circumstances around forced criminality, which is an issue that has attracted consideration and debate in relation to, for instance, the statutory defence, which might come on to later. We think that it would be very helpful if forced criminality or exploitation to commit criminal acts was specifically highlighted as being a form of exploitation and that would assist us with dealing with that as a live issue. Where would that be put in, which is section 4? I think that you put in section 3, I think. Section 3, okay. John, you are next, followed by Elaine. Thank you, convener. Good morning, panel. If I could just follow on on that, ACC Graham, it actually was the area of questioning that I was going to ask you. There must be a challenge for Police Scotland, the come-up on a scene, if we would understand typically a house where drug cultivation has taken place. You are treating that as a crime scene quite appropriately initially. What at the moment takes place that would cause you to identify the individual as a victim of human trafficking? Who are you engaging with? Is there anything in the legislation that will make that easier in the future? I note your comment about the specific insertion of that in the ball. To cut to the chase at the moment, there is not anything in the legislation that is going to make that specifically easier in a situation where we feel that the people who are involved at a fairly low level in an organised crime group who have been coerced or exploited to find themselves in the position of committing that crime, i.e. normally acting as somebody who is looking after a cannabis cultivation, and there are a myriad of other circumstances that I should add where people are forced or coerced into criminality who have been trafficked. In the specific example that you ask about, it relies upon the police at the point that the offence is identified. Normally there will be a report or we will proactively identify that there is a cannabis cultivation. When we find that, we will then find a number of indicators, signals that would suggest to us that the individuals who have been involved have potentially been subject of trafficking. In the vast majority of circumstances when we arrive at a set of premises, individuals are not present, because quite often people do not live or spend long periods of times in the premises. We might do something proactive to try to identify those people, and in the vast majority of cases the individuals who we do identify them will not identify themselves as having been exploited or forced into the work that they are doing, even though we may be able to gather evidence that that has been the case. The point that I am making earlier is that it would be helpful to us if, when we identify those circumstances that we could demonstrate that we believe somebody has been forced to commit that crime as a specific forms of exploitation, it would be helpful for that to be specified in the act. Can I ask the two other issues regarding that? One of them is about the identification of age and the challenge of that and what difference that would make in how you would treat an individual on that point. Also, the influence of immigration law, because we hear that that takes precedence, and we have heard in the previous panel the decision maker having a decision about the wellbeing of an individual, also having responsibility for it, and the competing tensions that can be there. At what stage would you, for instance, become aware of the immigration authorities expressing an interest? Are you obliged to tell them? If there was a question over somebody's immigration status, then we would be obliged to tell immigration authorities so that they could fulfil their role in relation to that. We would do everything that we could to try and work with an individual who had been the victim of a crime to ensure that they were adequately supported within the current regime and within the services that are available, and that is very different in different parts of the country. As I think that you are probably inferring through your question about what difference does it make when you identify the age of the victim, that will vary from place to place as well, and has been highlighted in our written response. Even within Scotland, once the— Yes, yes. Is that in relation to the support mechanism? Yes. There are different services available in different places, and there are sometimes different views taken and different arrangements available in different local authority areas. I think that that is a particular issue where there is a question about children under the terms of the bill, who would be ages 16 and 17, and the circumstances that we have found. Some of the people who have identified at that age being put into supported accommodation that is not always entirely suitable, so anything that could strengthen those arrangements round about support would be extremely helpful. I do think that it might be helpful to strengthen some of the arrangements round about presumption of age as well, where I think that at the moment there is a proposal that the presumption should be the age that is asserted by the victim. My own view is that if the victim is believed to be a child, then the presumption should be that they are a child as opposed to the age that they assert, which in our experience might be the assert that they are older than they actually are. Therefore, we would not want to go with a presumption that they were not a child just because they said that they were not. That could be included specifically in the legislation as well. I was going to come to that later. Ms McKinnon, do you want to say anything about the presumption of children? In relation to children, we have a very well-recognised child protection process for children under 16. ACC's point is important in terms of the age group of children between 16 and 18, where at times our processes can come into conflict in terms of children's services and adult services and where those young people actually sit within the realm of service provision and support. Certainly for children under 16, we have, as we say, fully robust child protection processes that are mirrored across Scotland. They do not differ. Our processes are similar across Scotland in terms of managing young people who we believe to be at risk of, or have been at risk of. To know their age, if you are saying all, it is all hunky dory if you are 16 and under, but there has to be a presumption. There has to be a presumption in terms of some of the young people we do work with at the moment will say to us that their age is older than we probably believe it to be for a number of reasons, some of which are about their own protection and fear of speaking out in terms of their age. There is a real need to ensure that we are working with young people to try and secure and understand the age appropriateness of what it is they are saying. At the moment, we take the view that, where we believe a child to be under 16, we will take the appropriate measures in terms of securing them in an appropriate accommodation if that is necessary. We have a difficulty in terms of accommodation and supporting young people between 16 and 18, and sometimes the support and accommodation will vary significantly across Scotland and will not always be appropriate to the needs of the young person. Do we need to do something about that in this bill? I think that the bill needs to be very clear in terms of how we are defining a child in terms of a child up to 18 and under and ensuring that that group of young people who can be very, very vulnerable are properly identified, supported and that the appropriate services provision is put in place for them. Again, I go back to the directive article 13.2. Members of state shall ensure that, where the age of a person is subject to trafficking in human beings is uncertain, and there are reasons to believe that a person is a child. That person is presumed to be a child in order to receive immediate access to assistance, support and protection in accordance with articles 14 and 15. As a jurisdiction, we have an obligation to ensure that that presumption is applied. I notice that, if one looks at the bill that is before the United Kingdom Parliament at section 51, there is a presumption about age in that bill. Or the avoidance of doubt that a child is 18 and under. Under the directive, that is correct. Right. Does anybody else wish to come in on us, John? Thank you. I now have Elaine Foll but Alison Eileen. Just to follow up on that line of questioning, we have also heard evidence that there should be cross-referencing to the legislation that specifically applies to children in Scotland. Do you think that that would assist the bill? The bill itself does not contain any specific information on children and young people. That clearly is an issue that we have legislative processes in place for children and the protection of children. The bill would be enhanced if we had something that locates existing legislation in that process, so that we can clearly define the processes that are in place that we work with currently in terms of the protection of children, vulnerable children. Mr Wolff. Is there one thing that I could just add to that? If one goes to the directive, there are a series of provisions in relation to children. Those include provisions about the appointment of a guardian and a series of provisions in relation to the way that children will be treated in the course of investigation and prosecution of trafficking offences. It may be that within our existing legislative regime and administrative practices, all of these obligations on the directive are met, but the committee might wish to invite the Scottish Government, by way of good order, to identify for the committee precisely where the various obligations are met in the existing regime. One of the potential problems, if one is implementing a directive, one is entitled to rely on the general legislative regime in the country, but if one is relying on administrative practice, that may or may not be sufficient. Without identifying any particular issue, it is a fairly obvious gap when one looks at the bill against the directive. The directive contains a whole series of very detailed provisions about child victims, which do not appear anywhere in the bill. The committee perhaps needs to be confident that the Scottish Government has ticked the boxes in terms of making sure that all of those are, in fact, going to be enforced in our system. The presumption of age is a good example of one where one has already identified a potential gap in the enforcement. It is a follow-on point from that. It is true, and it has been recognised in previous evidence and written responses, that the measures that are currently in place across Scotland probably extend beyond what is required under current statute in some places. However, I think that having the opportunity, as is the intent of this bill, to place it into statute and therefore require that to take place as a safeguard that we should be seeking to secure. I do not think that it is irrational to say that it is currently happening and therefore we do not need to legislate for it, because the whole premise of the bill is to focus attention on the issue of trafficking in a way that Hither 2 has not taken place, with some of the disparate legislation and practices that are in place. We did make a comment in relation to the securing of support and assistance that we felt could be strengthened, even in relation to adults. I would support the comments about specifying children, but in relation to adults, where at section 8, subsection 3, the wording is that Scottish ministers may also secure provision of support and assistance. That is during the periods when competent authorities are looking to assess if reasonable grounds are met and we would recommend that the term must, it should replace, may also, because it does not give a particularly strong safeguard in the way that it is currently worded that that support and assistance will be provided. I do not want to indulge the committee convener about the benefits of that, because I suspect that they have been well portrayed already. From a law enforcement perspective, support and assistance is absolutely critical to get people's maintained presence and assistance in the criminal justice process. Probably more than nothing else, this is the thing that, if we do not have in place, is a substantial barrier towards us getting more people through the court process. It must feel protected. Exactly. Can I also ask you about whether part 2 of the bill and whether or not there should be either a statutory defence with regard to victims of trafficking or a presumption of non-prosecution put on the face of the bill? We have also had some evidence that suggests that that could mean that the victim would have to prove the link between the offence and the fact that they were trafficked. I wonder what your views on that might be. The starting point for the issue is article 8, which requires member states to ensure that national authorities are entitled not to prosecute. The background to that provision is that, in some member states of the European Union, prosecutors in effect are obliged to prosecute if they find a crime. That is the reason for the particular form of the article. I accept immediately that the English courts have at least held that that article does not impose an obligation on us to introduce a statutory defence. That said, the principle of non-prosecution is well recognised. The concern is that, without a statutory defence prosecution or the protection for victims in this jurisdiction, it might be less than in the other parts of the UK. The English Bill and the Northern Irish Act contain statutory defences. I myself do not see those defences as being a substitute for sound prosecutorial discretion. The starting point must be the exercise of good judgment by the Lord Advocate and prosecutors. I have great faith in the integrity of the Lord Advocate and his staff in the way that they go about their tasks. However, if no one is infallible and if one has a case where the Lord Advocate or prosecutors have decided to prosecute, and, nevertheless, the victim of trafficking is able to satisfy criteria that would have to be defined if one defined a statutory defence, then that defence would be there as a feel safe for the accused. It is fair to say that the starting point of one's look at a statutory defence is a recognition that a crime has been committed by the victim of trafficking, and one has to apply one's mind to the nature of the relationship with the trafficking conduct, which would justify a defence. However, that has been found possible to do in the act in Northern Ireland and the bill in England. One of the advantages of the defence is that it, as I read it, would allow an accused person to invoke the statutory defence in circumstances where one would not be able to rely on a common law defence of necessity or coercion. They would potentially go beyond that, and therefore would provide additional protection to the victim. The other respect in which, at present, the victim in Scotland is less well protected than in other parts of the UK is that, in England and Wales, the court has the power to exercise its own judgment as to whether the prosecutorial decision was properly made. There have been cases in the English courts where the English courts have ultimately quashed the conviction because the English court has taken the view that, in circumstances involving trafficking, the prosecution should not have been brought. In Scotland, we have traditionally placed enormous faith in the judgment of the prosecutor, and the courts have historically, in Scotland, been very slow to step in unless there is a very clear case of oppression. We are already in a position where, in terms of the formal structures in place, the victim in Scotland may be less well protected against the possibility that the prosecutor may make a misjudgment. That is not in legislation south of the border or the intervention of the courts, perhaps? No, that is a difference in the general structure of the law in England and Wales. Yes, but it is not in any trafficking bill. It is not in any trafficking bill. That is just what I am getting at. Clos 45, with the modern slavery bill, contains a specific defence. I should say that, both in the English Bill and the Norn the Irish Act, care has been taken not to apply the defence to every crime. It is recognised that applying the defence across the board would be going too far. In the Norn the Irish Act, it is applied only to crimes that are punishable for less than five years, with some exceptions. The English Act approaches that in a slightly different way. In both acts, a way has been found to define appropriately our defence. I will go to Mr Mulgrew, then I will take ACC Groom simply to pick up on the point that Mr Woolf made about the abusive process plea that can be taken in England and Wales. The equivalent in Scotland would be what is called a plea in bar of trial, which can be taken where an accused person is able to assert that the prosecution against him would be oppressive, but it may be an opportunity within the bill to encapsulate, as well as enshrining the prosecutorial discretion and the guidance that the Lord Advocate will publish, enshrining a statutory defence, also enshrining a plea in bar of trial on the basis that the person accused is a trafficking victim who has been compelled to commit this crime on the basis that he or she is a trafficking victim, so it is maybe another point that the committee would wish to consider. They are all mutually exclusive. The Lord Advocate's discretion of statutory defence and the plea in bar would afford the victim extra rights. It might also concentrate minds if you could add a plea in bar of trial additionally. Yes, because I do not question Mr Woolf's integrity of the Lord Advocate and his team, but there are occasions when additional information arises. As the committee referred, sometimes the national referral mechanism can make mistakes. First responders go back to them, the TARA project go back and say that a mistake has been made in not identifying this person as a victim. So there might need to be those extra pleas available or defences available to a victim to ensure that their rights are protected. It might also come out during the course of a trial, something in the evidence that was not there if we had a statutory defence. It might come out during the course and it would be useful to have that. I would echo the principle that we would want to put everything in place so that we could ensure that we would avoid the circumstances in which somebody was prosecuted for a crime that they had been forced to commit through being trafficked. We all agree about that. I do think that there are some problems that have been highlighted with statutory defence. Mr Woolf said that there are some exceptions in the modern slavery bill. I think that there are 130 offences that have been exempt from the defence and that in itself is problematic as to what they are and how that would potentially play out in investigations and prosecutions. From a police perspective and the investigation process, I will go back to the question from Mr Finnie about what happens when you identify those people. We do everything we can to gather as much information at the earliest opportunity and report that to the Crown so that a decision can be taken. It might be that in the early stages before we have gathered all that information we do identify that a crime has been committed, but we are very careful about how we deal with that person, whether they are an accused person or whether they are a victim. My expectation, based on our discussions with the Crown, is that there will be very clear instructions issued by the Lord Advocate about this particular issue more so than is the current position. The practical experience of the past two years, particularly since Police Scotland has been in existence, caused us, because we were concerned about this issue, to do a fairly comprehensive exercise in looking at whether there are any cases where, with what we know now, in terms of our victim-centred approach to those issues and the learning that has emerged around about victims of trafficking being forced into criminality, are there any cases where we have criminalised somebody and they have been convicted and we could not find any through that exercise and we did it jointly with the Crown? There was not any evidence to support that, in the future, that measure would be required. I do think that, additionally, the focus of this legislation is to try to take away the onus of responsibility from victims to identify and to self-declare, because we understand that that is a vulnerability in current structures and systems of the legal basis for any kind of prosecution or indeed for any action that is based upon the foundation of a victim self-asserting that their circumstances are exploitative or that they have been trafficked and yet the statutory defence would rely on that almost exclusively. For a number of reasons, I think that there should be measures put in place to ensure that individuals are not criminalised where they have been coerced, but I am not sure that the statutory defence is the best means of doing that and I think that robust instructions from the Lord Advocate to the Police would very adequately deal with the circumstances. I think that, with a couple of points that ACC Graham raised there, the first is that he identified clause 45 of the modern slavery bill and schedule 4, which identifies a number of exceptions to the statutory defence. Section 22 of the Northern Ireland Act does it slightly differently and puts it more shortly, so there is an example where it can be achieved perhaps in shorter terms. The other point that was raised is about the fact that there have been no examples identified in Scotland where persons who are trafficking victims have been convicted where there would have been a defence available to them, but the difficulty that we experience as practitioners is that even trafficked victims do not identify to their solicitor that they are a trafficking victim for a variety of reasons. If the measures of support, as is referred to in section 8 of the bill, if they are fully implemented and the EU directive fully implemented, then it might have a beneficial effect in that victims are prepared to come forward and assist the police in other prosecutions. I think that we are also aware that, even at the last gasp, people that we would identify as having been trafficked do not say that they have been trafficked because the criteria by which they have measured the lives previously were so different from what we expect in our own society. I have got that Christian is on the same line or something different. No, I think that ACC Graham answered my... Thank you very much. You are deleted. I think that we covered that in our written response, so we thought that that would be helpful. We thought that it might be helpful to outline some of the ways in which people could be exploited, but we understand that that is not exhaustive. Indeed, there will be means by which people will be exploited that perhaps we have not yet thought of. That should be on the face of the bill. I think that it would be very helpful if the bill was sufficiently broad that it would enable future means of exploitation to be included in the various offences. I think that we have dealt with statutory defence quite comprehensively. I note from the Law Society's written submission that you query the need to increase the maximum penalty from 14 years to life imprisonment, and you draw on evidence that four people convicted in Scotland in 2013. The custodial sentences for those convicted were just under two years. Do you want to elaborate on your concerns about that? A sentence of life imprisonment would give a court the widest sentencing powers available, but in light of the few prosecutions that there have been thus far and the penalty currently available of 14 years, the society's view was that the Scottish criminal justice system could not be seen to be a soft touch to traffickers. A sentence of 14 years imprisonment is quite a significant penalty and is not often imposed by the courts in Scotland for even the gravest of offences that we deal with currently. If I may, I would like to change the discussion to section 8 on the provisions for support and assistance. Mr Wolff, you have referred in the faculty submission or the faculty submission refers to that particular provision and suggests that it does not go quite as far as various provisions in the consultation. Would you like to just expand on that view? I suppose that there is a prior point that has struck me looking at section 8. That is that it imposes our duty on the Scottish ministers to secure for an adult who falls within the section the provision of such support and assistance as they consider, necessarily given the adult's needs. I suppose that what that provision invites is a question about how in practice this is going to be implemented. On the face of it, it is imposing our duty on Scottish ministers to apply their mind to the support and assistance that the particular adult needs and then to secure the provision of that support and assistance. I wonder whether that is really what is intended to happen on the ground. Is it intended that there will be an agency or a group of officials within the Scottish Government itself who will be engaging in the exercise of assessment of need and determination of the appropriate level of support and assistance and ensuring that that is provided? That is what the provision says. If that is not what is intended, one would need to have a different provision that would be placing the appropriate responsibilities on other agencies, local authorities and others. If one is going to do that, one might wish to see a mechanism within the bill that would secure that those other agencies were applying a consistent approach in the nature of the support and assistance that they would be providing across the piece. Of course you can, yes, Excellen? Very good moot today. Just perhaps I can raise something that I do not think has been raised so far in the evidence session, which is again referred to in the faculty's written submission, which is the question of confiscation of property. I take it from reading that submission, that the potential provisions do not go far enough to protect a potential innocent party whose property might be forfeited. Will you again care to expand on that? The provisions in relation to detention and forfeiture are sections 9 and 10 of the bill. I think that there are two points of concern. One is in the context of detention. There is a power for the sheriff to release a vehicle, ship or aircraft on certain conditions, but only if satisfactory security is tendered. The provision of security itself may be financially burdensome. The concern is that there may be circumstances in which looking to the provisions of section 10 forfeiture at the end of the day would never arise. The concern is that an owner is being put at that stage to either having the vehicle, ship or aircraft detained, or if it is to be released, it is to be released only on the provision of security. It would be better if the sheriff were given a rather broader power to release these items at that interim stage. At the stage of forfeiture, there is also a concern that there is the potential for the innocent owner of, let's say, a ship that is being chartered to a trafficker or a small aircraft that is being chartered to a trafficker. It may find their ship or their aircraft confiscated or forfeited. There is a concern that that is going further than would be appropriate. Are you concerned that it might have convention implications or is that taking too far? One could readily see how an innocent owner could bring a convention rights challenge to a situation where their property has been taken away from them. That would be a good reason. I know that there are implications to the police in this. Do you want to comment on your point of view? Perhaps not surprisingly, we are broadly supportive of the intent behind this section. It is comprehensively outlined in the legislation that the circumstances when something is going to be confiscated and retained need to be justified. I do not see where the risk would be that it would be wrongly taken from somebody or retained in circumstances that were innocent. I think that the legislation is designed to prevent that from happening. I will go back to the question about sentencing from earlier. I do not make any specific comment about individual sentences, but the intent of the legislation is to provide a focus and demonstrate the intent of Scotland as a nation to make our country a difficult place for traffickers to operate in. Indeed, there has been some suggestion in the past that some of the legislation and practice that we currently have that Scotland could be a soft touch. Therefore, in line with the sentencing question, I think that we should explicitly state that there could be a life sentence as a maximum penalty and a very clear message about how seriously we take this as a nation. Likewise, in terms of confiscation of property, I think that it is absolutely essential that we have a range of options by which we are able to tackle, prevent and disrupt traffickers from operating. That is one well-recognised tool in the armory of disruption and prevention, as being able to prevent people from continuing by taking away that, which will, in some respects, cause them the most concern. I think that it is essential that those elements are retained and they are retained in a way that can be worked. We already have some significant challenges with some of the existing means by which we can take assets and confiscate property from. People have to work very, very hard and rightly so to demonstrate that anything is the proceeds of crime. I think that this is entirely consistent with that legislation, so I would support it. I raise a question with regard to the UK Anti-Slavery Commissioner. We have a lot of evidence that people are asking why there is no reference to this post within the bill. My question is quite direct to lawyers in fact. I am not entirely sure whether it is lawful for this Parliament or the Government to enact anything on the face of a bill since it is a reserve matter. I have to confess that I have no particular view on the issue to do with the anti-slavery commissioner. It is not something that I have applied my mind to. If something is a reserve matter, then this Parliament does not have power to pass legislation that relates to the reserve matter. That does not prevent the Parliament from passing legislation that is incidental to non-reserve matters but which affects reserve matters. The line can sometimes be not an easy one to draw with precision. I am afraid that I have not looked at the specific question of the anti-slavery commissioner. Are you suggesting that maybe not in the face of the bill but maybe in guidance, would that be competent? The prior question is whether the anti-slavery commissioner is a reserve matter and that is not something that I have applied my mind to. I thank you for your evidence. I am going to suspend for just a couple of minutes to allow witnesses to change over. It is a long call. Thank you very much. Welcome, our third panel of witnesses, Lord Advocate Wright, Ornwell, Frank Mulhawn and QC, Kathleen Harper, National Sexual Crimes Unit at the Crown Office on Procure to Fiscal Service and Katrina Dill-Rimple, head of policy division at COPFAS. I think that you have all been here before. I think that you have been here before Ms Harper as well. I have not now. You have not. It is exciting for me. We are very gentle.  I will go straight to questions, please. Let's see who did not get in first and last at Malayne, then I will take Christian. Thank you, convener. I just wanted to go back to the issue about part 2 and whether or not there should be a statutory defence or presumption of non-prosecution actually on the face of the bill, or whether Lord Advocate should be left to guidance from yourself. We had contradictory evidence in the previous session between the Faculty of Advocates and the Law Society and Police Scotland, which I do not know whether you have managed to catch. Basically, the Faculty of Advocates and the Law Society were in favour of it being on the bill, the police were less keen on that idea, so I invite your views on that. I think that if you put a statutory defence in the face of the bill, it will lead to more injustices than if I am Lord Advocate issuing instructions. First, we would take our lead from Parliament as to what the extent of a defence is if it is to be placed on the face of the bill. You know that the dynamics of human trafficking, I am sure that you have received a lot of evidence and read a lot of information on that. Often, it is the case that victims of human trafficking do not know that they are victims of human trafficking. It may be that they have a fear of authority from their own country, which can include solicitors. A statutory defence places the onus on the accused to raise the defence. In order for that defence to be considered by a jury, there has to be an evidential basis for it. There is no burden of proof on an accused person, but they have an onus on them to raise it, and for certain evidence—or the defence to be rooted in evidence—before it can be considered by the jury. If you look at the Northern Irish and English and Welsh legislation, and indeed the director, he would talk about compulsion. We have the common law offence of coercion, which is very narrow. I do not think that that really fits the territory that we are in. When I talked about having an evidential basis in order for it to be considered by the jury, I came back to the point that I made that often victims of human trafficking do not know that they are victims of human trafficking. They have a social bond, an economic bond with the trafficker. It seems to me that instructions issued by me to prosecutors and the police will capture a lot more than a statutory defence in the face of the bill. Let me explain that. Just now, on the basis of the approach that we currently take in relation to victims of human trafficking, we can deal with intelligence or information from organisations that support victims in the field, such as TARA. We have had cases—I know of certainly one case involving cannabis farms—where information came to us in the middle of the trial, and it was based primarily on intelligence that was received and given to us. Our procedures to ensure a consistency of approach is that it will be investigated because it is very important that there has to be credibility for victims of human trafficking, because it is an easy thing to say that I am a victim of human trafficking when you are charged with a serious offence, so it has to be properly investigated. However, if there is credible evidence or credible intelligence, it will go to Cath Harper, who is the head of the national sexual crimes on my left, to then take a decision on what to do. We have abandoned prosecutions on the basis of intelligence, and we will continue to do that in the future. There are also problems in relation to statutory defences. statutory defence, on the basis of the principle of fair notice, has to receive notice of what the defence is. Normally, in criminal procedure, that has to be done a certain amount of days in advance of the commencement of a trial, ranging from 10 to 2 days, depending on what the defence is. There are exceptional circumstances where the court can admit it during the currency of the trial itself. However, a statutory defence, the point that I am making, is that it would apply to the criminal proceedings. In general terms, it has to be made known, lodged in advance of the commencement of the trial. Now, human trafficking does not necessarily follow this kind of rigid procedural structure, and we have had cases. In fact, without getting into details, we are currently considering a case of shoplifting for three individual, three persons who have been convicted of shoplifting, and the information, in fact, intelligence, only came after conviction and sentence. Again, that is something that a statutory defence would not cover. If we have the necessary means to be able to apply to the court, if the information is credible for the court, to then set aside the conviction. I think that it is a much more flexible approach where the Lord Advocate issues instructions, not guidance instructions, to our prosecutors and to police, and allows the agencies, NGOs and the field working with victims to have this channel of communication with the Crown. It is far more productive and will lead to fewer injustices than perhaps a rigid statutory defence on the face of the bill. In my view, I think that it is much better to do that by Lord Advocate's instructions, which prosecutors and chief constable are obliged to follow. Can you just say that section 7 says, guidelines rather than instructions, should that be amended too? That is a very good point. Three of us gave evidence to the cross-party group on human trafficking, and one of the points that was made there was the distinction between guidelines and instructions. I reflected on that. I think that it was Kirsty Thompson of the LSLA who raised the point. My view is that these would be much better as instructions, as opposed to guidelines. I think that the point was made while guidelines are guidelines. They are not instructions that you have to do something, and it seemed to me that in this field it would be much better for it to be instructions. My practice is Lord Advocate, where, on the face of a bill, I am required to issue guidelines or instructions. My practice has been to publish draft guidelines during the passage of the bill. I signed them off yesterday, so I can chair and send them to you. I will also have them published in SPICE, and we have sent them to many of the groups who work with victims and deal with human trafficking in the field, including the commissioner for the UK, including the head of Europe, including TARA and various organisations. I make the point that, if you have any concerns or any suggestions to make the instructions more focused, please let me know before I finally sign them off and issue them to prosecutors and chief constable. I have one issue that came up in the previous session that was suggested in the UK courts, and in Northern Ireland there was a process by which the court could quash prosecution, if certain things came tonight. By the implication from what James O Falls was that that did not exist within the Scottish system? I do not think that that is right. In the Scotland Act, the Lord Advocate is required to comply with EU law. I am required to comply with the Scotland Act and the Human Rights Act, so I cannot act ultra-virus of that. If, for example, it was said that I was prosecuting a victim of human trafficking, it is open to the defence to raise what is called a compatibility issue, to say that I am acting incompatible with EU law. There is also the common law playing bar of trial in the grounds of oppression, so there are plenty of avenues of challenge within criminal procedure in Scotland for that to be raised. Of course, there is also the issue of judicial review on the decision making. I make a public statement as I have made at the cross-party group and at the human trafficking summit in October of last year that I will not prosecute a victim of human trafficking. That is not what we are about, but you have to ensure that you are all aware and understand the dynamics of human trafficking between the trafficker and the person trafficked. It is not a black-and-white issue in many cases. Lord Advocate, we have accepted that the status of someone from not thinking of being trafficked may be something that they never recognise themselves practically at some point. We understand the complexities and I think that it is very useful for you to have gone through the wide range of discretion that is used by you as public prosecutor in Scotland. It has been very helpful to let us contrast putting in a statute. I think that we have come to any unit, but it has certainly been very helpful. One of the issues, of course, is that you may make a statement that you would never do it, but the legislation has to be strong enough that, if a future Lord Advocate took a different view or whatever, the legislation has to be strong enough. I thought about that point and I was reflecting on previous Lord Advocates and my time as Lord Advocate. There is a continuity and I cannot think of any occasion where I have rescinded previous Lord Advocates guidance or instructions. We may strengthen them and finesse them, but I would think that future Lord Advocates, to issue instructions that victims of human trafficking should be prosecuted. One, it would be ultra-virus of the European Union directive in any event, but secondly, I do not think that they would act in such an ethical way. I was just thinking of even, for example, the circumstance that none of us here would particularly want, where we came out of the European Convention of Human Rights and had a British human rights law instead, would that affect? I would be different, because that is a human rights item. We are going into political arena this year, Elaine. I have got supplementaries on this line from Margaret Roddick and John. Alison, are you on the same thing? Are you on the statutory defence? Alison was first, so I did not know that your first, Alison, was on the same question. Then I have got supplementaries on this whole issue, Margaret Roddick and John after Alison. Thank you.  I mean, and I absolutely appreciate your commitment that you have made this morning in relation to instructions. But the LSA and previous evidence session made it quite clear that they did not think that the non-prosecution procedure and the statutory defence were mutually exclusive and that there was an extra safeguard there for people who slipped through the net sort of thing. How do you react to that? Back to the initial point, I take my lead from Parliament. If you say that the way in which the European Union directive has to be implemented was a defence, it seems to me that that is your choice and I implement it in that way. Should I go wider than that? If I went wider than that in the guidelines, would I be taking a different view from Parliament because you have considered the matter and you have said that the statutory defence is a way in which the discharge of EU obligations, so it seems to me that there would be a sort of tension between both. So you are saying that there are exclusive, you do not have a requirement for non-prosecution but also statutory defence?  Well, I think that in essence yes they are because what I would be saying is that I take my lead from Parliament because you have considered that you as the Parliament and this is a way in which you have discharged the European Union directive obligation, so to discharge it. The defence of statutory defence is in the English and Northern Ireland bills. Are there no guidelines then around about non-prosecution in either of these jurisdictions? I am not aware of guidance yet. There may be guidance that will be issued by prosecutors in England and Wales and Northern Ireland. I should add that there is a huge carve-out in relation to statutory defence in Northern Ireland and England and Wales. It does not apply to many, many offences. I think that 130 was a previous contributor to the Justice Committee, whereas my guidelines would apply across the board. Of course, that talks about statutory defence often without going into details of human trafficking, but often you will only find out that there are victims of human trafficking at the end or beyond the criminal justice process. That does not fit very well with a statutory defence. That does not fit at all with a statutory defence. I will take Roderick, then I will take Margaret, and then I have John, because she came in. Representative in the law society in the previous panel, he talked about playing bar of trial with common law defence. I was not sure whether he was suggesting that that would be put in a statutory framework, but would you like to comment on that? Existing common law, you would need to put it in a statutory framework, because it exists in any event. A clean bar of trial on the grounds of oppression is that there are very high tests that you have to meet to be able to establish it. Of course, you have to evidence it. It has got to be rooted in evidence before you can make that plea to the court. My point is that, when you are dealing with Lord Advocate's instructions, you can take account of information, take account of intelligence, because in this world there is a lot of intelligence that you would not be able to evidence. It might not be in the interests of the victim of human trafficking to be able to give law enforcement that evidence. I think that it is much better for me to issue instructions and to have in place a framework where we can take account of intelligence information from a wide range of bodies to be able to do justice. My principal point is that we are not about prosecuting the victim of human trafficking. The point was to take on board totally what you said about the flexibility, and that sounds very good. The point was made that, in a very small set of circumstances, that might be another useful tool in the box. My fairly argument, I do not think that it is, because I think that it would be far too narrow. I think that a much more flexible, holistic, inclusive approach working across all the agencies and people involved in combating human trafficking is much more important and much more productive of delivering justice, which is what we are about. That is where I come on that. I do not know from Kathleen Harper, the senior counsel ahead of NSCU, who has been taking those decisions. I do not know, Kathleen, if you want to comment on the work that goes into those decisions. From my perspective, the Lord Advocate's instructions provide something that is very effective and flexible, as the Lord Advocate has said. Cases come to me as the lead prosecutor for human trafficking as head of the national sexual crimes unit. Cases coming to me as a single point of contact perhaps gives confidence both externally and internally within the organisation that a consistent approach will be taken to those cases. That is married up to the raising of awareness within the department of what to look for, the factors to look for, the signs to look for. Those in COPFS who are dealing with potential cases are aware of reading the signs necessary. The cases all come to me as a one point of contact, which I think allows for a very effective approach. It is also very flexible because, as the Lord Advocate has said, we will be looking at all manner of information, intelligence and all sorts of advice from the UK Human Trafficking Centre from Migrant Help from other organisations. We will look at all intelligence and all information so that there is a wide-ranging approach that allows a very flexible approach. That approach lasts throughout the life of the case and beyond. Even if there is a conviction, we can look at that and apply to the courts retrospectively to have the conviction set aside. It is a very flexible and effective tool in the form of the Lord Advocate's instructions. I suppose that there will be a lot about awareness raising there. If someone realises that they are not considered to be a victim of trafficking and, therefore, they do not have any defence, then to have a statutory defence option open to them is easily understood by them, whereas they are going back to the same people who have said, we do not consider you a victim of trafficking. Is there not some problematic or problems with that attitude, albeit we accept what you are saying that it is not your interest to prosecute and that you want to be open, but you will still be seen as the body that thought that they were not victims of trafficking? Is that not problematic? The fact that a person does not realise themselves that they are a victim of trafficking is going to be a problem for anybody dealing with that sort of issue. It would be the same for defence counsel, for instance. It is the fact that you do not recognise them as a victim of trafficking. They have nowhere to go, then, in saying that it was not criminal behaviour because you were complicit. Again, we are going to be taking in to account all the information that is available. There is a very strong presumption against prosecuting Henry if they are seen as a credible or possible credible victim of human trafficking. A very wide-ranging approach will be taken. The point is, what if you get it wrong or what if you do not read the signs properly? That is where we are coming from. First, there are instructions. Secondly, I cannot act in contravention of EU law. That is a directive from the European Union, so it leaves me wide open to a compatibility issue that can be raised before the court. Thirdly, I am subject to judicial review for my decisions, and I say my decisions, but prosecutors act on my behalf and on my instructions. What you have is locks avenues by which, if I am willfully blind on the issue, I can be challenged through the courts and the courts have superintendents of my decision making. I do not think that it is willful blindness that is the point. The intelligence may not have reached you and perhaps— I take the point. If intelligence has not reached me, intelligence may not reach the defence at all. It may be that there is no statutory defence, yet someone is a victim of human trafficking. One of the issues with statutory defence is that it places a focus on the victim, to raise it with a lawyer and to lodge the defence with the court. I understand the underlying ethos for the European Union directive is that it would take a holistic approach to that, and it is not just the victim who requires to be able to raise the issue with law enforcement. It may not want to do it, but there are other avenues in my instructions whereby the issue can be raised outwith the victim or the alleged victim themselves. I think that the examples where proceedings have been discontinued, the information about the victim being human trafficked was not from the victim themselves. I think that in one situation it was actually from the LSA and other agencies that provided that information to the crime who undertook further investigations, and that was reported to the head of NSU. We are currently, without revealing too much detail in public, considering persons who have been convicted of shoplifting. As part of victims of human trafficking, they were required to shoplift on behalf of the traffickers. The information that we are checking out came only post-conviction and sentence. In fact, the persons who were convicted and sentence for shoplifting, some of them have returned to their country of origin, so notwithstanding that, we feel that we have a duty to look objectively at that. If, at the end of the process, there is credible evidence or credible information, because I do not think that it should be restricted to evidence, that there are victims of human trafficking, so notwithstanding that some of the persons do not live in the country will apply to the court to set aside the convictions. I suppose that the benefit of that is that there are no time limits for the law advocates' instructions throughout the whole life of the case that those instructions will apply. I have a couple of members who want to come in, if they could maybe join your questions, because I think that this is a very important but very important debate about John and Alison both wanting to ask on the same thing that I take it on the issue of the statutory defence. I have been trying to frame a question for the law of advocacy. It has made a very compelling case for your instructions. My question is about when do you stop being a victim of human trafficking, if someone were to remain, for instance, in the UK? There must come a tipping point where, if you want to go, okay, there were a victim, they are now a resident of the UK. It is not a get-out-of-jail-for-life free card, so I would have thought that perhaps you would have wanted to put the owners back on to the individual to prove their position. When do you stop being a victim, perhaps, is the question? In relation to the European Union Directive, what we would look at is whether you were a victim of human trafficking at the time of the commission of the offence, which is the point. It may be that the world is moved on and that they have been integrated into society and no longer a victim of human trafficking. Of course, if at that stage he or she committed an offence, of course they would not have the victim of human trafficking defence open to them because they would not be a victim of human trafficking at the time they committed the crime. I know that you were restricted on what you could say about the shoplifting, but excuse me, it is a very pernicious crime of human trafficking and the influences can be long lasting. Are you able to give an assurance that there will always be a consideration given to see if there has been an element of coercion when someone has been involved in that crime, if they have previously been a victim of human trafficking?  For example, if we get credible information 10 years on that the person convicted was a victim of human trafficking, we will still look at it, so it will persist in the future. A couple of points. If a case is set aside following further information, would the assistance and support that a victim of trafficking would have expected had they been identified earlier be applied later in the process? It is probably best directing that to the agencies involved, but I would be astonished if it would not. Would you have a referral mechanism to make sure that that is done? Is it appropriate for you to tell us how many cases in the last year have not been prosecuted? I am sure that we have six individuals where we have taken a decision not to prosecute or discontinue or set aside a conviction, and we have had one individual that was referred to CAF, but once all the investigation was done with all the different agencies, it became apparent that that individual was not what we deemed to be an incredible victim of human trafficking and that prosecution continued. It shows that the test is applied. There is very good information out there from the international labour office from the EU commissioner, anti-trafficking commissioner, as to the signs and what you would consider when you are reaching your judgment, and prosecutors are being trained in this area. For example, Brona spoke at the Crown Council annual weekend conference on human trafficking, which was very well received. It is very important that there is an on-going commitment to train our prosecutors on any developments, any changes in the dynamic of human trafficking, so that they have the most up-to-date information available. Thank you, Christian. I want to keep away from prosecuting victims and going to prosecuting people who are trafficking, who are offenders. I would like to know from you what exactly we are at. In the past, did you have difficulties to prosecute? Will the provisions invisible will help increase the number of prosecutions? I think that it will. It will certainly help because it consolidates the field that is very disparate currently in relation to the legislation that applies. It also makes strengthens our hand in relation to proceeds of crime, making it a lifestyle offence. There are prevention orders there. There is the aggravation of human trafficking. I think that it makes the obvious point that you may not be able to prosecute on the evidence available for a human trafficking offence, but what you can do is that there are sort of ancillary offences such as fraud, such as immigration offences, such as keeping or running a brothel, all these types of offences that we have used in the past. In order to put it in proper context, the bill includes the recommendation that is made by Barones Kennedy, the human rights commission, that there should be an aggravation that can be applied to the non-human trafficking offences but are part of the landscape. Going back to your point, I think that that will strengthen the hands of law enforcement in relation to the prosecution of human trafficking. There are challenges, there is no point in hiding that. There are challenges in relation to prosecuting human trafficking. Availability of witnesses is a huge issue in relation to the prosecution of those cases. Often you find that the key witnesses disappear and go elsewhere. We are well aware of that. We have had successes in relation to convictions for human trafficking. We have had convictions for economic exploitation of human trafficking. We have had sexual exploitation. We have had proceeds of confiscation orders applied. A member was convicted of trafficking and prostitution. All three of them received pretty significant sentences of imprisonment. We have strengthened the links with Europol. We have had very good links with the European Union anti-trafficking commissioner who visited the Parliament and I met her. His heads of prosecution across the common law meeting two years ago were to discuss human trafficking. Of course, very importantly, there was a human trafficking summit. I see that as not just the Scottish problem. I think that we all agree on that. There is no point in driving human trafficking south. We have all got an interest in dealing with it across the UK and beyond. That is why, at the summit, we had Jim Wallace, the advocate general for the UK, the DPP England Wales, the DPP Northern Ireland and the DPP for the Republic of Ireland, together with a European Union input. We are working from the commitments that were made in the summit. Within a year's time, we will drill down into what we are committed to do working together. I hope that that will make the United Kingdom and Ireland a bad place to do that type of business. I might add in two ways, but we receive a lot of evidence of the inability of the national referral mechanism to address a lot of these issues. Do you think that the bill is very much limited to identifying that trafficking with offences took place? The national referral mechanism is not helping, but the strategy that is in the provision of the bills should maybe advance a lot more of its problems and, therefore, increase the number of prosecutions that we would all like to see. The national referral mechanism is a valuable tool. We need to be able to identify victims of human trafficking. Compact to the point that I made, it is often not black and white. In our recent prosecution in Colova, Scotland, we had victims who were coming here for a better life economically. They had been promised a job, they contacted the traffickers through the internet and they arrived at Glasgow airport, believing that they were going to a job. What then happens is that there is a grooming dependency that is built up with the traffickers and they are introduced to men that they might want to meet and get to know better. They are in a very difficult situation because the trafficker has taken all their documents for safekeeping, as it was said to them. My point is that what you need is a huge matrix of many organisations in the field. I think that we have—I am not saying that it is perfect—we can always improve things. However, going back to my instructions, what we need to do is to be able to take information from all the players in the field and be able to act on it. That is what I think would be the best way in which to combat human trafficking in Scotland and the United Kingdom. What was the prize on the field that came in front of the committee and said that they wanted to have some children provision in the face of the bill? What do you think about that? I can see the arguments in favour of that. I think that the approach that has been taken by the Scottish Government—I am here as Lord Advocate, I was not involved in the drafting of the bill—was to have a fence that applies across the board, regardless of age. The one aspect of it that I gave some consideration to is the presumption of age. That, on balance, might be helpful to have in the bill. We know that there are occasions where there is some jubiety about the age of the victims. It is a general requirement that, if you suspect that a victim of human trafficking is a child, until you have definitive confirmation of what the position is, it should be treated as a child. That is common sense. We would all want to do that. If it is not in the face of the bill, what I can do—we have already discussed it—is to include it in the instructions. That is another means of dealing with it. I do not know if that answers your question. However, if it was in the face of the bill, I would not be upset about it. If it is not in the face of the bill, I would certainly include it in the instructions. Will you add new instructions on the same principle before we have learned difficulties before we have disabilities? I need to look at it, obviously, but there comes a point where there are far too many classes of victims, which perhaps is a bad thing. It would just depend on what the issue is. Is there an issue in relation to persons with learning difficulties? I know that there is one thing that is not in answer to your question, but the consent is not a defence in clause 1 of the bill. I notice that it is not in clause 4, but I would like it in clause 4. The principles of statutory construction interpretation, the way in which the courts would look at it, is that, while the Parliament has taken the view that it should be mentioned, it should be provided for in clause 1. Therefore, the Parliament has taken the view that it should not be provided for in clause 4. Therefore, it requires consent in relation to clause 4. I think that it is a danger in relation to statutory construction. I hope that that is helpful. It is on the definition. Why spread concern about the use of the word travel? Do you think that it could benefit from further clarification to ensure that it was spelled out that this includes within, as opposed to between countries? That is the international issue that has been raised. I do not think that it is a problem with the definition in the bill. I checked last night the Oxford short dictionary as to what the definition in the Oxford short of travel is, and it is to move from one place to another, so there is no sort of international injection of internationalism within that definition. You have to be moved surely because we had evidence that somebody could be held in a flat and trafficked within the flat. There is no travel involved. I think that that is clear from the way in which clause 1 is drafted. A person commits an offence if a person arranges or facilitates another person's travel. What does that mean? The way that the courts will construct or interpret that is to look at the rest of the section because, in particular, you have to recruit the person with a view to transporting or transferring the person. That could include someone in a flat, transporting or transferring the person. Transfaring or exchanging control of the person goes back to the chair's point that that could be included by that subhead and also harboring or receiving the person, which, again, the definition of travel is, to my mind, does not require an international country to country element. Is perhaps just where it appears in the clause in that the first word that hits you is arranges of another person's travel, the emphasis perhaps, rather than the substantive when we look at all the other subsections. Is the word included in particular by and then gives four examples? That is the way that the court will interpret this. It will say, what does travel mean? What did Parliament intend? Look at 1, 2, 3 and 4, and you can see the clear intention of Parliament. It is not restricted to movement from one country to another or one place to another. It is much more expansive than that. The point was given that there has been such concern raised by so many witnesses. Would it not be better just to belt and brace and clarify the word travel to make sure that it is spelled out? It means within. It means for better legislation. My view is that on strict canons of statutory construction it is unnecessary. Given the examples in subsection 1A and the four sub clauses following that, and arranges of facilitates that travel, so it is not just those things happen and arranges of facilitates that travel? What you could do, I suppose— I think that it is a bit—it is not as clear. Well, that is a matter for Parliament. You could take the view that Anne is unnecessary there, but what I think you would need to do is hear from the parliamentary draftsman or the sponsoring Government Minister as to what is meant by that. You can see why it seems to facilitate—it seems to be linked and always to idea of travel. As a prosecuting body, that must be of concern to you, I would have thought. Well, I am looking at it with very limited time to reach a view. If I am arguing, if I am defending this in a court, I would not think that this was in any way flawed, I think that the tension of Parliament would be clear. I am going to finish there. Thank you very much. I think that you have given us food for thought about the statutory defence. If I am ever in trouble and you are not the Lord Advocate anywhere, will you defend me please? It is a good argument to put there. Thank you very much. We are now moving into private session.