Chapter 16, Paragraph 2, Part B, of An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Anna Simon. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation by Jeremy Bentham. Chapter 16, Division of Offences, Paragraph 2, Divisions and Subdivisions, Part B We come now to offences against trust. A trust is, whether is any particular act which one party, in the exercise of some power or some right, which is conferred on him, is bound to perform for the benefit of another. Or, more fully, thus. A party is said to be invested with a trust, when, being invested with a power or with a right, there is a certain behaviour which, in the exercise of that power or of that right, he is bound to maintain for the benefit of some other party. In such case, the party first mentioned is styled a trustee. For the other party, no name has ever yet been found. For want of a name, there seems to be no other resource than to give a new and more extensive sense to the word beneficiary, or to say at length, the party to be benefited. The trustee is also said to have a trust conferred or imposed upon him, to be invested with the trust, to have had a trust given him to execute, to perform, to discharge, or to fulfil. The party to be benefited is said to have a trust established or created in his favour, and so on through a variety of other phrases. Now, it may occur that a trust is often times spoken of as a species of condition, that a trust is also spoken of as a species of property, and that condition itself is also spoken of same light. It may be thought, therefore, that in the first class, the division of offences against condition should have been included under that of the offences against property, and that at any rate, so much of the fifth class now before us as contains offences against trust should have been included under one or other of those two divisions of the first class. But upon examination it will appear that no one of these divisions could with convenience, nor even perhaps with propriety, have been included under either of the other two. It will appear at the same time that there is an intimate connection subsisting amongst them all, in so much that of the lists of the offences to which they are respectively exposed, any one may serve in great measure as a model for any other. There are certain offences to which all trusts as such are exposed. To all these offences, every sort of condition will be found exposed, at the same time that particular species of the offences against trust will upon their application to particular conditions receive different particular denominations. It will appear also that of the two groups of offences into which the list of those against trust will be found naturally to divide itself, there is one and but one to which property taken in its proper and more confined sense stands exposed, and that these in their application to the subject of property will be found susceptible of distinct modifications to which the usage of language and the occasion there is for distinguishing them in point of treatment make it necessary to find names. In the first place, as there are, or at least may be, as we shall see, conditions which are not trusts, so there are trusts of which the idea would not be readily and naturally understood to be included under the word condition, add to which that of those conditions which do include a trust, the greater number include other ingredients along with it, so that the idea of a condition, if on the one hand it stretches beyond the idea of a trust, does on the other hand fall short of it. Of the several sorts of trusts, by far the most important are those in which it is the public that stands in the relation of beneficiary. Now these trusts, it should seem, would hardly present themselves at first view upon the mention of the word condition. At any rate, what is more material, the most important of the offences against these kinds of trusts would not seem to be included under the denomination of offences against condition. The offences which by this letter appellation would be broad to view, would be such only as seem to affect the interests of an individual, of him, for example, who is considered as being invested with that condition. But in offences against public trusts it is the influence they have on the interests of the public that constitutes by much the most material part of their pernicious tendency. The influence they have on the interests of any individual, the only part of their influence which would be readily broad to view by the appellation of offences against condition, is comparatively as nothing. The word trust directs the attention at once to the interests of that party for whom the person in question is trustee. Each party, upon the addition of the epithet public, is immediately understood to be the body composed of the whole assemblage, or an indefinite portion of the whole assemblage of the members of the state. The idea presented by the words public trust is clear and unambiguous. It is but an obscure and ambiguous garb that that idea could be expressed in by the words public condition. It appears therefore that the principal part of the offences included under the denomination of offences against trust could not, commodiously at least, have been included under the head of offences against condition. It is evident enough that for the same reasons neither could they have been included under the head of offences against property. It would have appeared preposterous and would have argued a total inattention to the leading principal of the whole work, the principal of utility, have taken the most mischievous and alarming part of the offences to which the public stands exposed and forced them into the list of offences against the property of an individual, of that individual to wit, who in that case would be considered as having in him the property of that public trust which by the offences in question is affected. Nor would it have been less improper to have included conditions, all of them, under the head of property, and thereby the whole catalogue of offences against condition under the catalogue of offences against property. True it is that there are offences against condition which perhaps with equal propriety and without any change in their nature might be considered in the light of offences against property. So extensive and so vague are the ideas that are want to be annexed to both these objects. But there are other offences which though with unquestionable propriety they might be referred to the head of offences against condition could not, without the utmost violence done to language, be forced under the appellation of offences against property. Property considered with respect to the propriety implies invariably a benefit and nothing else. Whatever obligations or burdens may by accident stand annexed to it, yet in itself it can never be otherwise than beneficial. On the part of the propriety it is created not by any commands that are laid on him, but by his being left free to do with such or such an article as he likes. The obligations it is created by are in every instance laid upon other people. On the other hand, as to conditions, there are several which are of a mixed nature, importing as well as a burden to him who stands invested with them as a benefit, which indeed is the case with those conditions which we hear most of under that name, and which make the greatest figure. There are even conditions which import nothing but burden, without any spark of benefit. Accordingly, when between two parties there is such a relation that one of them stands in the place of an object of property with respect to the other, the word property is applied only on one side, but the word condition is applied alike to both. It is but one of them that is said on that account to be possessed of property, but both of them are alike spoken of as being possessed of or being invested with a condition. It is the master alone that is considered as possessing a property of which the servant, in virtue of the services he is bound to render, is the object, but the servant, not less than the master, is spoken of as possessing or being invested with a condition. The case is that if a man's condition is ever spoken of as constituting an article of his property, it is in the same loose and indefinite sense of the word in which almost every other offence that could be imagined might be reckoned into the list of offences against property. If the language indeed were in every instance in which it made use of the phrase object of property, perspicuous enough to point out under that appellation the material and really existent body, the person or the thing in which those acts terminate by the performance of which the property is said to be enjoyed. If, in short, in the import given to the phrase object of property, it made no other use of it than the putting it to signify what is now called a corporeal object, this difficulty and this confusion would not have occurred. But the import of the phrase object of property, and in consequence the import of the word property, has been made to take a much wider range. In almost every case in which the law does anything for a man's benefit or advantage, men are apt to speak of it on some occasion or other as conferring on him a sort of property. At the same time, for one reason or other, it has in several cases been not practicable or not agreeable to bring to view under the appellation of the object of his property the thing in which the acts by the performance of which the property is said to be enjoyed have their termination or the person in whom they have their commencement. Yet something which could be spoken of under that appellation was absolutely requisite. The expedient then has been to create as it were on every occasion an ideal being and assigned to a man this ideal being for the object of his property. And these are the sort of objects to which men of science, in taking a few of the operations of the law into this behalf, came in process of time to give the name of incorporeal. Now of this incorporeal object of property, the variety is prodigious. Fictitious entities of this kind have been fabricated almost out of everything, not conditions only, that of a trustee included, but even reputation have been of the number. Even liberty has been considered in this same point of view. And though on so many occasions it is contrasted with property, yet on other occasions being reckoned into the catalogue of possessions, it seems to have been considered as a branch of property. Some of these applications of the words property, object of property, the last for instance, are looked upon indeed as more figurative and less proper than the rest. But since the truth is that where the immediate object is incorporeal, they are all of them improper, it is scarce practicable anywhere to draw the line. Notwithstanding all this latitude yet among the relations in virtue of which you are said to be possessed of a condition, there is one at least which can scarcely, by the most forced construction, be said to render any other man or any other thing the object of your property. This is the right of persevering in a certain cause of action, for instance in the exercising of a certain trade. Now, to confer on you this right in a certain degree at least, the law has nothing more to do than barely to abstain from forbidding you to exercise it. Where to go farther, and for the sake of enabling you to exercise your trade to the greater advantage, prohibit others from exercising the like, then indeed persons might be found who in a certain sense and by a construction rather forced than otherwise might be spoken of as being the object of your property. That is, by being made to render you that sort of negative service which consists in the forbearing to do those acts which would lessen the profits of your trade. But the ordinary right of exercising any such trade or profession, as is not the object of a monopoly, imports no such thing. And yet, by possessing this right, a man is said to possess a condition, and by forfeiting it to forfeit his condition. After all, it will be seen that there must be cases in which, according to the usage of language, the same offense may, with more or less appearance of propriety, be referred to the head of offenses against condition, or that of offenses against property, indifferently. In such cases, the following rule may serve for drawing the line. Wherever, in virtue of your possessing a property, or being the object of a property possessed by another, you are characterized, according to the usage of language by a particular name, such as master, servant, husband, wife, steward, agent, attorney, or the like, there the word condition may be employed in exclusion of the word property. And an offense in which, in virtue of your bearing such relation, you are concerned, either in the capacity of an offender, or in that of a party injured, may be referred to the head of offenses against condition, and not to that of offenses against property. To give an example, being bound in the capacity of the land steward to a certain person to oversee the repairing of a certain bridge, you forbear to do so. In this case, as the services you are bound to render are of the number of those which give occasion to the party, from whom there are due, to be spoken of under a certain generical name, that is, that of land steward, the offense of withholding them may be referred to the class of offenses against condition. But suppose that, without being engaged in that general and miscellaneous course of service, which with reference to a particular person would denominate you his land steward, you are bound, whether by usage or by contract, to render him that single sort of service, which consists in the providing, by yourself or by others, for the repairing of that bridge. In this case, as there is not any such current denomination to which, in virtue of your being bound to render this service, you stand aggregated, for that of architect, mason, or the like is not here in question, the offense you commit by withholding such service cannot with propriety be referred to the class of offenses against condition. It can only therefore be referred to the class of offenses against propriety. By way of further distinction, it may be remarked that where a man, in virtue of his being bound to render, or of others being bound to render him, certain services, is spoken of as possessing a condition, the assemblage of services is generally so considerable in point of duration as to constitute a cause of considerable length, so as on a variety of occasions to come to be varied and repeated, and in most cases, when the condition is not of a domestic nature, sometimes for the benefit of one person, sometimes for that of another. Services which come to be rendered to a particular person, on a particular occasion, especially if they be of short duration, have seldom the effect of occasioning either party to be spoken of as being invested with a condition. The particular occasional services which one man may come by contract or otherwise, to be bound to render to another, are innumerably various, but the number of conditions which have names may be counted and are comparatively but few. If, after all, notwithstanding the rule here given for separating conditions from articles of propriety, any object should present itself which should appear to be referable with equal propriety to either head, the inconvenience would not be material, since in such cases, as will be seen a little farther on, whichever appellation were adopted, the list of the offenses to which the object stands exposed would be substantially the same. These difficulties being cleared up, we now proceed to exhibit an analytical view of the several possible offenses against trust. Offenses against trust may be distinguished in the first place into such as concern the existence of the trust in the hands of such or such a person, and such as concern the exercise of the functions that belong to it. First, then, with regard to such as relate to existence, an offense of this description, like one of any other description, if an offense it ought to be, must to some person rather import a prejudice. This prejudice may be distinguished into two branches. One, that which may fall on such persons as are or should be invested with the trust. Two, that which may fall on the persons, for whose sake it is or should be instituted, or on other persons at large. To begin with the former of these branches. Let any trust be conceived. The consequences which it is in the nature of it to be productive of, to the possessor, must, in as far as they are material, be either of an advantageous or of a disenfranchisant nature. In as far as they are advantageous, the trust may be considered as a benefit or privilege. In as far as they are disadvantageous, it may be considered as a burden. To consider it then upon the footing of a benefit. The trust either is of the number of those which ought by law to subsist, that is, which the legislator meant should be established, or is not. If it is, the possession which at any time you may be deprived of with respect to it, must at that time be either present or to come. If to come, in which case it may be regarded either as certain or as contingent, the investigative event, or event from whence your possession of it should have taken its commencement, was either an event in the production of which the will of the offender should have been instrumental, or any other event at large. In the former case, the offence may be turned wrongful non-investment of trust. In the latter case, wrongful interception of trust. If at the time of the offence whereby you are deprived of it, you were already in possession of it, the offence may be styled wrongful divestment of trust. In any of these cases, the effect of the offence is either to put somebody else into the trust or not. If not, it is wrongful divestment, wrongful interception, or wrongful divestment, and nothing more. If it be, the person put in possession is either the wrongdoer himself, in which case it may be styled usurpation of trust, or some other person, in which case it may be styled wrongful investment or attribution of trust. If the trust in question is not of the number of those which ought to subsist, it depends on the manner in which one man deprives another of it, whether such deprivation shall or shall not be an offence, and, accordingly, whether non-investment, interception, or divestment shall or shall not be wrongful. But the putting anybody into it must at any rate be an offence, and this offence may be either usurpation or wrongful investment, as before. In the next place, to consider it upon the footing of a burden. In this point of view, if no other interests than that of the persons liable to be invested with it were considered, it is what ought not upon the principle of utility to subsist. If it ought, it can only be for the sake of the persons in whose favor it is established. If then, it ought not on any account to subsist, neither non-investment, interception, nor divestment can be wrongful with the relation to the persons first mentioned, whatever they may be on any other account, in respect of the manner in which they happen to be performed. For usurpation, though not likely to be committed, there is the same room as before. So likewise is there for wrongful investment, which, in as far as the trust is considered as a burden, may be styled wrongful in position of trust. If the trust, being still of the burdensome kind, is of the number of those which ought to subsist, any offense that can be committed with relation to the existence of it, must consist either in causing a person to be in possession of it who ought not to be, or in causing a person not to be in possession of it who ought to be. In the former case, it must be either usurpation or wrongful divestment as before. In the latter case, the person who is caused to be not in possession is either the wrongdoer himself or some other. If the wrongdoer himself, either at the time of the offense he was in possession of it, or he was not, if he was, it may be termed wrongful abdication of trust. If not, wrongful detractation, or non-assumption. If the person whom the offense causes not to be in the trust is any other person, the offense must be either wrongful divestment, wrongful non-investment, or wrongful interception, as before. In any of which cases to consider the trust in the light of a burden it might also be styled wrongful exemption from trust. Lastly, with regard to the prejudice which the persons for whose benefit the trust is instituted, or any other persons whose interests may come to be affected by its existing or not existing in such or such hands, are liable to sustain. Upon examination it will appear that by every sort of offense whereby the persons who are or should be in possession of it are liable in that respect to sustain a prejudice, the persons now in question are also liable to sustain a prejudice. The prejudice in this case is evidently of a very different nature from what it was of in the other, but the same general names will be applicable in this case as in that. If the beneficiaries of persons whose interests are at stake upon the exercise of the trust, or any of them, are liable to sustain a prejudice resulting from the quality of the person by whom it may be filled, such prejudice must result from the one or the other of two causes. One, from a persons having the possession of it who ought not to have it, or two, from a persons not having it who ought, whether it be a benefit or burden to the possessor, is a circumstance that to this purpose makes no difference. In the first of these cases, the offenses from which the prejudice takes its rise are those of user-patient of trust, wrongful attribution of trust, and wrongful imposition of trust. In the latter, wrongful non-investment of trust, wrongful interception of trust, wrongful divestment of trust, wrongful abdication of trust, and wrongful detritation of trust. So much for the offenses which concern the existence or possession of a trust, those which concern the exercise of the functions that belong to it may be thus conceived. You are in possession of a trust. The time then for your acting in it must, on any given occasion, neglecting for simplicity's sake the then present instant, be either past or yet to come. If past, your conduct on that occasion must have been either conformable to the purposes for which the trust was instituted or unconformable. If conformable, there has been no mischief in the case. If unconformable, the fault has been either in yourself alone or in some other person or in both. In as far as it is lain in yourself it has consisted either in your not doing something which you ought to do, in which case it may be styled negative breach of trust, or in your doing something which you ought not to do. If in the doing something which you ought not to do, the party to whom the prejudice has accrued is either the same for whose benefit the trust was instituted or some other party at large. In the former of these cases the offence may be styled positive breach of trust, in the other abuse of trust. In as far as the fault lies in another person, the offence on his part may be styled disturbance of trust. Supposing the time for your acting in the trust to be yet to come, the effect of any act which tends to render your conduct unconformable to the purposes of the trust may be either to render it actually and eventually unconformable or to produce a chance of its being so. In the former of these cases it can do no otherwise than take one or other of the shapes that have just been mentioned. In the latter case the blame must lie either in yourself alone or in some other person or in both together as before. If in another person the acts whereby he may tend to render your conduct unconformable must be exercised either on yourself or on other objects at large. If exercised on yourself the influence they possess must either be such as operates immediately on your body or such as operates immediately on your mind. In a latter case again the tendency of them must be to deprive you either of the knowledge or of the power or of the inclination which would be necessary to your maintaining such a conduct as shall be conformable to the purposes in question. If they be such of which the tendency is to deprive you of the inclination in question it must be by applying to your will the force of some seducing motive. Lastly this motive must be either of the coercive or of the alluring kind. In other words it must present itself either in the shape of a mischief or of an advantage. Now in none of all the cases that have been mentioned except the last does the offense receive any new denomination. According to the event it is either a disturbance of trust or an abortive attempt to be guilty of that offense. In this last it is termed bribery and it is that particular species of it which may be termed active bribery or bribe giving. In this case to consider the matter on your part either you accept of the bribe or you do not. If not and you do not afterwards commit or go about to commit either a breach or an abuse of trust there is no offense on your part in the case. If you do accept it whether you eventually do or do not commit the breach or the abuse which it is the bribe giver's intention you should commit you at any rate commit an offense which is also termed bribery and which for distinction's sake may be termed passive bribery or bribe taking. As to any further distinctions they will depend upon the nature of the particular sort of trust in question and therefore belong not to the present place unless we have 13 subdivisions of offenses against trust that is one wrongful non-investment of trust two wrongful interception of trust three wrongful divestment of trust four usurpation of trust five wrongful investment or attribution of trust six wrongful abdication of trust seven wrongful detractation of trust eight wrongful imposition of trust nine negative breach of trust ten positive breach of trust eleven abuse of trust twelve disturbance of trust thirteen bribery from what has been said it appears that there cannot be any other offenses on the part of a trustee by which a beneficiary can receive on any particular occasion any assignable specific prejudice one sort of acts however there are by which a trustee may be put in some danger of receiving a prejudice although neither the nature of the prejudice nor the occasion on which he is in danger of receiving it should be assignable these can be no other than such acts whatever they may be as disposed a trustee to be acted upon by a given bribe with greater effect than any with which he could otherwise be acted upon or in other words which place him in such circumstances as have a tendency to increase the quantum of his sensibility to the action of any motive of the sorting question of these acts there seem to be no others that will admit of a description applicable to all places and times alike than acts of prodigality on the part of the trustee but in acts of this nature the prejudice to the beneficiary is contingent only and unliquidated while the prejudice to the trustee himself is certain and liquidated if therefore on any occasion should be found advisable to treat it on the footing of an offence it will find its place more naturally in the class of self regarding ones as to the subdivisions of offenses against trust these are perfectly analogous to those of offenses by falsehood the trust may be private semi-public or public it may concern property person reputation or condition or any two or more of those articles at a time as will be more particularly explained in another place here too the offense in running over the ground occupied by the three prior classes will in some instances change its name while in others it will not lastly if it be asked what sort of relation there subsists between falsehoods on one hand and offenses concerning trust on the other hand the answer is they are altogether disparate falsehood is a circumstance that may enter into the composition of any sort of offense those concerning trust as well as any other in some as an accidental in others as an essential instrument breach or abuse of trust are circumstances which in the character of accidental concomitance may enter into the composition of any other offenses those against falsehood included besides those to which they respectively give name end of chapter sixteen paragraph two chapter sixteen of an introduction to the principles of morals and legislation this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Ruth Golding an introduction to the principles of morals and legislation by Jeremy Bentham chapter sixteen division of offenses paragraph three genera of class one returning now to class the first let us pursue the distribution a step farther and branch out the several divisions of that class as above exhibited into their respective genera that is into such minute divisions as are capable of being characterized by denominations of which a great part are already current among the people in this place the analysis must stop to apply it in the same regular form to any of the other classes seems scarcely practicable to semi-public as also to public offenses on account of the interference of local circumstances to self-regarding ones on account of the necessity it would create of deciding prematurely upon points which may appear liable to controversy to offenses by falsehood and offenses against trust on account of the dependence there is between this class and the three former what remains to be done in this way with reference to these four classes will require discussion and will therefore be introduced with more propriety in the body of the work than in a preliminary part of which the business is only to draw outlines an act by which the happiness of an individual is disturbed is either simple in its effects or complex it may be styled simple in its effects when it affects him in one only of the articles or points in which his interest as we have seen is liable to be affected complex when it affects him in several of those points at once such as are simple in their effects must of course be first considered in a simple way that is in one way at a time a man's happiness is liable to be disturbed either one by actions referring to his own person itself or two by actions referring to such external objects on which his happiness is more or less dependent as to his own person it is composed of two different parts or reputed parts his body and his mind acts which exert a pernicious influence on his person whether it be on the corporeal or on the mental part of it will operate there on either immediately and without affecting his will or immediately through the intervention of that faculty vis by means of the influence which they cause his will to exercise over his body if with the intervention of his will it must be by mental coercion that is by causing him to will to maintain and then actually to maintain a certain conduct which it is disagreeable or in any other way pernicious to him to maintain this conduct may either be positive or negative when positive the coercion is styled compulsion or constraint when negative restraint now the way in which the coercion is disagreeable to him may be by producing either pain of body or only pain of mind if pain of body is produced by it the offense will come as well under this as under other denominations which we shall come to presently moreover the conduct which a man by means of the coercion is forced to maintain will be determined either specifically and originally by the determination of the particular acts themselves which he is forced to perform or to abstain from or generally and incidentally by means of his being forced to be or not to be in such or such a place but if he is prevented from being in one place he is confined thereby to another for the whole surface of the earth like the surface of any greater or lesser body may be conceived to be divided into two as well as into any other number of parts or spots if the spot then which he is confined to be smaller than the spot which he is excluded from his condition may be called confinement if larger banishment whether an act the effect of which is to exert a pernicious influence on the person of him who suffers by it operates with or without the intervention of an act of his will the mischief it produces will either be mortal or not mortal if not mortal it will either be reparable that is temporary or irreparable that is perpetual if reparable the mischievous act may be termed a simple corporal injury if irreparable an irreparable corporal injury lastly a pain that a man experiences in his mind will either be a pain of actual sufferance or a pain of apprehension if a pain of apprehension either the offender himself is represented as intending to bear a part in the production of it or he is not in the former case the offense may be styled menacement in the latter case as also where the pain is a pain of actual sufferance a simple mental injury and thus we have nine genera or kinds of personal injuries which when ranged in the order most commodious for examination will stand as follows viz one simple corporal injuries two irreparable corporal injuries three simple injurious restrainment four simple injurious compulsion five wrongful confinement six wrongful banishment seven wrongful homicide eight wrongful menacement nine simple mental injuries we come now to offenses against reputation merely these require but few distinctions in point of reputation there is but one way of suffering which is by losing a portion of the goodwill of others now in respect of the goodwill which others value you may be a loser in either of two ways one by the manner in which you are thought to behave yourself and two by the manner in which others behave or are thought to behave towards you to cause people to think that you yourself have so behaved as to have been guilty of any of those acts which cause a man to possess less than he did before of the goodwill of the community is what may be styled defamation but such is the constitution of human nature and such the force of prejudice that a man merely by manifesting his own want of goodwill towards you though ever so unjust in itself and ever so unlawfully expressed may in a manner force others to withdraw from you a part of theirs when he does this by words or by such actions as have no other effect than in as far as they stand in the place of words the offence may be styled vilification when it is done by such actions as besides they're having this effect are injuries to the person the offence may be styled a personal insult if it has got the lengths of reaching the body a corporal insult if it stopped short before it reached that length it may be styled insulting menacement and thus we have two genera or kinds of offenses against reputation merely to wit one defamation and two vilification or revilement as to corporal insults and insulting menacement they belong to the compound title of offenses against person and reputation both together if the property of one man suffers by the delinquency of another such property either was in trust with the offender or it was not if it was in trust the offense is a breach of trust and of whatever nature it may be in other respects may be styled dissipation in breach of trust or dissipation of property in trust this is a particular case the opposite one is the more common in such case the several ways in which property may by possibility become the object of an offense may be thus conceived offenses against property of whatever kind it be may be distinguished as has been already intimated into such as concern the legal possession of it or right to it and such as concern only the enjoyment of it or what is the same thing the exercise of that right under the former of these heads come as has been already intimated the several offenses of wrongful non-investment wrongful interception wrongful divestment usurpation and wrongful attribution when in the commission of any of these offenses a falsehood has served as an instrument and that as it is commonly called a willful or as it might more properly be termed an advised one the epithet fraudulent may be prefixed to the name of the offense or substituted in the room of the word wrongful the circumstance of fraudulency then may serve to characterize a particular species comprisable under each of those generic heads in like manner the circumstance of force of which more a little farther on may serve to characterize another with respect to wrongful interception in particular the investigative event by which the title to the thing in question should have accrued to you and for want of which such title is through the delinquency of the offender as it were intercepted is either an act of his own expressing it as his will that you should be considered by the law as the person who is legally in possession of it or it is any other event at large in the former case if the thing of which you should have been put into possession is a sum of money to a certain amount the offense is that which has received the name of insolvency which branch of delinquency in consideration of the importance and extent of it may be treated on the footing of a distinct genus of itself next with regard to such of the offenses against property as concern only the enjoyment of the object in question this object must be either a service or a set of services which should have been rendered by some person or else an article belonging to the class of things in the former case the offense may be styled wrongful withholding of services in the latter case it may admit of further modifications which may be thus conceived when any object which you have had the physical occupation or enjoyment of ceases in any degree in consequence of the act of another man and without any change made in so much of that power as depends upon the intrinsic physical condition of your person to be subject to that power this cessation is either owing to change in the intrinsic condition of the thing itself or in its exterior situation with respect to you that is to its being situated out of your reach in the former case the nature of the change is either such as to put it out of your power to make any use of it at all in which case the thing is said to be destroyed and the offense whereby it is so treated may be termed wrongful destruction or such only as to render the uses it is capable of being put to of less value than before in which case it is said to be damaged or to have sustained damage and the offense may be termed wrongful in damagement moreover in as far as the value which a thing is of to you is considered as being liable to be in some degree impaired by any act on the part of any other person exercised upon that thing although on a given occasion no perceptible damage should ensue the exercise of any such act is commonly treated on the footing of an offense which may be termed wrongful using or occupation if the cause of the things failing in its capacity of being of use to you lies in the exterior situation of it with relation to you the offense may be styled wrongful detainment wrongful detainment or detention during any given period of time may either be accompanied with the intention of detaining the thing forever that is for an indefinite time or not if it be and if it be accompanied at the same time with the intention of not being amenable to law for what is done it seems to answer to the idea commonly annexed to the word embezzlement an offense which is commonly accompanied with breach of trust in the case of wrongful occupation the physical faculty of occupying may have been obtained with or without the assistance or consent of the proprietor or other person appearing to have a right to afford such assistance or consent if without such assistance or consent and the occupation be accompanied with the intention of detaining the thing forever together with the intention of not being amenable to law for what is done the offense seems to answer to the idea commonly annexed to the word theft or stealing if in the same circumstances a force is put upon the body of any person who uses or appears to be disposed to use any endeavours to prevent the act this seems to be one of the cases in which the offense is generally understood to come under the name of robbery if the physical faculty in question was obtained with the assistance or consent of a proprietor or other person above spoken of and still the occupation of the thing is an offense it may have been either because the assistance or consent was not fairly or because it was not freely obtained if not fairly obtained it was obtained by falsehood which if advised is in such a case termed fraud and the offense if accompanied with the intention of not being amenable to law may be termed fraudulent obtainment or defraudment if not freely obtained it was obtained by force to wit either by a force put upon the body which has been already mentioned or by a force put upon the mind if by a force put upon the mind or in other words by the application of coercive motives it must be by producing the apprehension of some evil which evil if the act is an offense must be some evil to which on the occasion in question the one person has no right to expose the other this is one case in which if the offense be accompanied with the intention of detaining the thing forever whether it be or be not accompanied with the intention of not being amenable to law it seems to agree with the idea of what is commonly meant by extortion now the part a man takes in exposing another to the evil in question must be either a positive or a negative part in the former case again the evil must either be present or distant in the case then where the assistance or consent is obtained by a force put upon the body or where if by a force put upon the mind the part taken in the exposing a man to the apprehension of the evil is positive the evil present and the object of it his person and if at any rate the extortion thus applied be accompanied with the intention of not being amenable to law it seems to agree with the remaining case of what goes under the name of robbery as to dissipation in breach of trust this when productive of a pecuniary profit to the trustee seems to be one species of what is commonly meant by speculation another and the only remaining one seems to consist in acts of occupation exercised by the trustee upon the things which are the objects of the fiduciary property for his own benefit and to the damage of the beneficiary as to robbery this offense by the manner in which the assistance or consent is obtained becomes an offense against property and person at the same time dissipation in breach of trust and speculation may perhaps be more commodiously treated of under the head of offenses against trust after these exceptions we have 13 genera or principal kinds of offenses against property which when ranged in the order most commodious for examination may stand as follows viz one wrongful non-investment of property two wrongful interception of property three wrongful divestment of property four usurpation of property five wrongful investment of property six wrongful withholding of services seven wrongful destruction or endamagement eight wrongful occupation nine wrongful detainment ten embezzlement 11 theft 12 defraudement 13 extortion we proceed now to consider offenses which are complex in their effects regularly indeed we should come to offenses against condition but it will be more convenient to speak first of offenses by which a man's interest is affected in two of the preceding points at once first then with regard to offenses which affect person and reputation together when any man by a mode of treatment which affects the person injures the reputation of another his end and purpose must have been either his own immediate pleasure or that sort of reflected pleasure which in certain circumstances may be reaped from the suffering of another now the only immediate pleasure worth regarding which anyone can reap from the person of another and which at the same time is capable of affecting the reputation of the latter is the pleasure of the sexual appetite this pleasure then if reaped at all must have been reaped either against the consent of the party or with consent if with consent the consent must have been obtained either freely and fairly both or freely but not fairly or else not even freely in which case the fairness is out of the question if the consent be altogether wanting the offense is called rape if not fairly obtained seduction simply if not freely it may be called forcible seduction in any case either the offense has gone the length of consummation or has stopped short of that period if it has gone that length it takes one or other of the names just mentioned if not it may be included alike in all cases under the denomination of a simple lascivious injury lastly to take the case where a man injuring you in your reputation by proceedings that regard your person does it for the sake of that sort of pleasure which will sometimes result from the contemplation of another's pain under these circumstances either the offense has actually gone the length of a corporal injury or it has rested in menacement in the first case it may be styled a corporal insult in the other it may come under the name of insulting menacement and thus we have six genera or kind of offenses against person and reputation together which when ranged in the order most commodious for consideration will stand thus one corporal insults two insulting menacement three seduction four rape five forcible seduction six simple lascivious injuries secondly with respect to those which affect person and property together that a force put upon the person of a man may be among the means by which the title to property may be unlawfully taken away or acquired has been already stated a force of this sort then is a circumstance which may accompany the offenses of wrongful interception wrongful divestment user patient and wrongful investment but in these cases the intervention of this circumstance does not happen to have given any new denomination to the offense in all or any of these cases however by prefixing the epithet forcible we may have so many names of offenses which may either be considered as constituting so many species of the genera belonging to the division of offenses against property or as so many genera belonging to the division now before us among the offenses that concern the enjoyment of the thing the case is the same with wrongful destruction and wrongful endamagement as also with wrongful occupation and wrongful detainment as to the offense of wrongful occupation it is only in the case where the thing occupied belongs to the class of immovable that when accompanied by the kind of forcing question has obtained a particular name which is in common use in this case it is called forcible entry forcible detainment as applied also to immovables but only to immovables has obtained among lawyers at least the name of forcible detainer and thus we may distinguish ten genera or kinds of offenses against person and property together which omitting for conciseness sake the epithet wrongful will stand thus one forcible interception of property two forcible divestment of property three forcible user patient four forcible investment five forcible destruction or endamagement six forcible occupation of movables seven forcible entry eight forcible detainment of movables nine forcible detainment of immovables ten robbery we come now to offenses against condition a man's condition or station in life is constituted by the legal relation he bears to the persons who are about him that is as we have already had occasion to show by duties which by being imposed on one side give birth to rights or powers on the other these relations it is evident may be almost infinitely diversified some means however may be found of circumscribing the field within which the varieties of them are displayed in the first place they must either be such as are capable of displaying themselves within the circle of a private family or such as require a larger space the conditions constituted by the former sort of relations may be styled domestic those constituted by the latter civil as to domestic conditions the legal relations by which they are constituted may be distinguished into one such as are super added to relations purely natural and two such as without any such natural basis subsist purely by institution by relations purely natural i mean those which may be said to subsist between certain persons in virtue of the concern which they themselves or certain other persons have had in the process which is necessary to the continuance of the species these relations may be distinguished in the first place into contiguous and uncontiguous the uncontiguous subsist through the intervention of such as are contiguous the contiguous may be distinguished in the first place into connubial and post connubial those which may be termed connubial are two one that which the male bears towards the female two that which the female bears to the male the post connubial are either productive or derivative the productive is that which the male and female above mentioned bear each of them towards the children who are the immediate fruit of their union this is termed the relation of parentality now as the parents must be so the children may be of different sexes accordingly the relation of parentality may be distinguished into four species one that which a father bears to his son this is termed paternity two that which a father bears to his daughter this also is termed paternity three that which a mother bears to her son this is called maternity four that which a mother bears to her daughter this also is termed maternity uncontiguous natural relations may be distinguished into immediate and remote such as our immediate are what one person bears to another in consequence of their bearing each of them one simple relation to some third person thus the paternal grandfather is related to the paternal grandson by means of the two different kinds which together they bear to the father the brother on the father's side to the brother by means of the two relations of the same kind which together they bear to the father in the same manner we might proceed to find places in the system for the infinitely diversified relations which result from the combinations that may be formed by mixing together the several sorts of relationships by assent relationships by dissent collateral relationships and relationships by affinity which later when the union between the two parties through whom the affinity takes place is sanctioned by matrimonial solemnities are termed relationships by marriage but this as it would be a most intricate and tedious task so happily is it for the present purpose an unnecessary one the only natural relations to which it will be necessary to pay any particular attention are those which when sanctioned by law give birth to the conditions of husband and wife the two relations comprised under the head of parentality and the corresponding relations comprised under the head of filiality or filiation what then are the relations of a legal kind which can be super induced upon the above mentioned natural relations they must be such as it is the nature of law to give birth to and establish but the relations which subsist purely by institution exhaust as we shall see the whole stock of relationships which it is in the nature of the law to give birth to and establish the relations then which can be super induced upon those which are purely natural cannot be in themselves any other than what are of the number of those which subsist purely by institution so that all the difference there can be between a legal relation of the one sort and a legal relation of the other sort is that in the former case the circumstance which gave birth to the natural relation serves as a mark to indicate where the legal relation is to fix in the latter case the place where the legal relation is to attach is determined not by that circumstance but by some other from these considerations it will appear manifestly enough that for treating of the several sorts of conditions as well natural as purely conventional in the most commodious order it will be necessary to give the precedence to the latter proceeding throughout upon the same principle we shall all along give the priority not to those which are first by nature but to those which are most simple in point of description there is no other way of avoiding perpetual anticipations and repetitions end of chapter 16 paragraph 3 part a chapter 16 part 3b of an introduction to the principles of morals and legislation this is a vibravox recording all vibravox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit Libravox.org an introduction to the principles of morals and legislation by Jeremy Bentham chapter 16 part 3b general of class one we now come to consider the domestic or family relations which are purely of legal institution it is to these in effect that both kinds of domestic conditions considered as the work of law are indebted for their origin when the law no matter for what purpose takes upon itself to operate in a matter in which it has not operated before it can only be by imposing obligation now when a legal obligation is imposed on any man there are but two ways in which it can in the first instance be enforced the one is by giving the power of enforcing it to the party and whose favor it is imposed the other is by reserving that power to certain third persons who in virtue of their possessing it are styled ministers of justice in the first case the party favored is said to possess not only a right as against the party obliged but also a power over him in the second case a right only uncooperated by power in the first case the party favored may be styled a superior and as they are both members of the same family a domestic superior with reference to the party obliged who in the same case may be styled a domestic inferior with reference to the party favored now in point of possibility it is evident that domestic conditions or a kind of fictitious possession analogous to domestic conditions might have been looked upon as constituted as well by rights alone without powers on either side as by powers but in point of utility it does not seem expedient and in point of fact probably are into the invariable perception which men must have of the inexperience no such conditions seem ever to have been constituted by such feeble bans of the legal relationship then which are capable of being made to subsist within the circle of a family they remain those only in which the obligation is enforced by power now then wherever such power is conferred the end or purpose for which it was conferred unless the legislator can be supposed to act without a motive must have been the producing of a benefit to somebody in other words it must have been conferred for the sake of somebody the person then for whose sake it is conferred must either be one of the two parties just mentioned or a third party if one of those two it must be either the superior or the inferior if the superior such superior is commonly called a master and the inferior is termed as servant and the power may be termed a beneficial one if it be for the sake of the inferior that the power is established the superior is termed a guardian and the inferior his ward and the power being thereby coupled with a trust may be termed a fiduci one if for the sake of a third party the superior may be termed a superintendent and the inferior his subordinate this third party will either be an assignable individual or a set of individuals or a set of unassignable individuals in this later case the trust is either a public or a semi-public one and the condition which it constitutes is not of the domestic but of the civil kind in the former case this third party or principal as he may be termed either has a beneficial power over the superintendent or he has not if he has the superintendent his servant and consequently so also is the subordinate if not the superintendent is the master of the subordinate and all the advantage which the principal has over his superintendent is that of possessing a set of rights uncooperated by power and therefore as we have seen not fit to constitute a condition of the domestic kind but be the condition what it may which is constituted by these rights of what nature can the obligations be to which the superintendent is capable of being subjected by means of them they are neither more nor less than those which a man is capable of being subjected to by powers it follows therefore that the functions of a principal and his superintendent coincide with those of a master and his servants and consequently that the offenses relative to the two former conditions will coincide with the offenses relative to the two latter offenses to which the condition of a master like any other kind of condition is exposed may as had been already intimated be distinguished into such as concern the existence of the condition itself and such as concern the performance of the functions of it while subsisting first then with regard to such as affect its existence it is obvious enough that the services of one man may be of benefit to another the condition of a master may therefore be a beneficial one extends exposed therefore to the offenses of a wrongful non-investment wrongful interception is searching wrongful investment and wrongful divestment but how should it stand exposed to the offenses of wrongful abdication wrongful dedication and wrongful imposition certain it cannot of itself for services when a man has the power of exacting or not as he thinks fit can never be a burden but if to the powers by which the condition of a master is constituted the law thinks fit to annex any obligation on the part of the master for instance that of affording maintenance or giving wages to the servant or paying money to anybody else it is evident that in virtue of such obligation the condition may become a burden in this case however the condition possessed by the master will not properly speaking be the pure and simple condition of a master it will be a kind of complex object resolvable into the beneficial condition of a master and the burdensome obligation which is a next to it still however if the nature of the obligation lies within a narrow compass and does not in the manner of that which constitutes a trust interfere with the exercise of those powers by which the condition of the superior is constituted the latter notwithstanding this foreign mixture will still retain the name of master ship in this case therefore but not otherwise the condition of a master may stand exposed to the offenses of wrongful abdication wrongful dedication and wrongful imposition next as to the behavior of persons with reference to this condition while considered a subsisting in virtue of it being a benefit it is exposed to disturbance this disturbance will either be the offense of a stranger or the offense of the servant himself where it is the offense of a stranger and is committed by taking the person of the servant in circumstances in which the taking of an object belonging to the class of things would it be an act of theft or what is scarcely worth distinguishing from theft an act of embezzlement it may be termed servant stealing where it is an offense of the servant himself at a styled breach of duty now the most flagrant species of breach of duty and that which includes indeed every other is that which consists in the servant for drawing himself in the place in which the duty should be performed this species of breach of duty is termed elopement again in virtue of the power belonging to this condition it is liable on the part of the master to abuse but this power is not coupled with a trust the condition of a master is therefore not exposed to any offense which is analogous to breach of trust lastly on account of it being exposed to abuse it may be conceived to stand in point of possibility exposed to bribery but considering how few and how insignificant the persons are who are liable to be the subject to the power here in question this is an offense which on account of the want of temptation there will seldom be any example of impractice we may therefore reckon 13 sorts of offenses to which the condition of a master is exposed this one wrongful non-investment of mastership two wrongful interception of mastership three wrongful divestment of mastership four usurpation of mastership five wrongful investment of mastership six wrongful abdication of mastership seven wrongful detraction of mastership eight wrongful imposition of mastership nine abuse of mastership ten disturbance of mastership 11 breach of duty in servants 12 elopement of servants 13 service stealing as to the power by which the condition of a master is constituted this may be either limited or unlimited when it is altogether unlimited the condition of the servant is styled pure slavery but as the rules of language are as far as can be conceived from being steady on this head the term slavery is commonly made use of wherever the limitations prescribed to the power of the master are looked upon as inconsiderable whenever any such limitation is prescribed a kind of fictitious entity is thereby created an inequality of an incorporeal object of position is bestowed upon the servant this object is of the class of those which are called rights and in the present case is termed in a more particular manner a liberty and sometimes a privilege an immunity or an exemption now these limitations on one hand and these liberties on the other may it is effinent be as various as the acts positive or negative which the master may or may not have the power of obliging the servants to submit to or to perform correspondent then to the infinitude of these liberties is the infinitude of the modification which the condition of mastership or as it is more common to say in such a case that of servitude admits of these modifications it is evident may in different countries be infinitely diversified in different countries therefore the offense characterized by the above names will if specifically considered admit of very different descriptions if there be a spot upon the earth so wretched as to exhibit the spectacle of pure and absolutely unlimited slavery on that spot there will be no such thing as any abuse of mastership which means neither more nor less than no abuse of mastership will there be treated on the footing of an offense as to the question whether any and what modes of servitude ought to be established or kept on foot this is a question the solution of which belongs to the civil branch of the art of legislation next with regard to the offenses that may concern the condition of a servant it might seem at first sight that a condition of this kind could none have a spark of benefit belonging to it that it could not be attended with any other consequences than such as rendered as a mere birthing but a birthing itself may be a benefit in comparison of a greater birthing conceive a man's situation then to be such that he must at any rate be in a state of pure slavery still may it be material to him and the highly material who the person is whom he has for his master a state of slavery then under one master may be a beneficial state to him in comparison with a state of slavery under another master the condition of a servant then is exposed to the several offenses to which a condition in virtue of it being a beneficial one is exposed more than this where the power of the master is limited and the limitations are next to it and hence the liberties of the servant are considerable the servitude may even be positively eligible for amongst those limitations may be such as sufficient to enable the servant to possess property of his own being capable then of possessing property of his own he may be capable of receiving it from his master in short he may receive wages or other emoluments from his master and the benefit resulting from these wages may be so considerable as to outweigh the birthing of the servitude and by that means render that condition more beneficial upon the whole and more eligible than that of one who has not in any respect under the control of any such person as a master accordingly by these means the condition of the servant may be so eligible that his entrance into it and his continuance in it may have been altogether the result of his own choice that the nature of the two conditions may be the more clearly understood it may be of use to show the sort of correspondency it is between the offenses which affect the existence of the one and those which affect the existence of the other that this correspondency cannot but be very intimate is obvious at first sight it is not however that a given offense in the former catalogue coincides with an offense of the same name in the letter catalogue usurpion of servanship with usurpion of mastership for example but the case is that an offense of one denomination in the one catalogue coincides with an offense of a different denomination in the other catalogue nor is the coincident constant and certain but liability contingencies as we shall see first then wrongful non-investment of the incondition of a servant if it be the offense of one who should have been the master coincides with wrongful detraction of mastership if it be the offense of a third person it involves in it non-investment of mastership which provided the mastership be in the eyes of him who should have been master a beneficial thing but not otherwise is wrongful wrongful interception of the condition of a servant if it be the offense of him who should have been master coincides with the wrongful detraction of mastership if it be the offense of a third person and the mastership be an beneficial thing it involves in it wrongful interception of mastership three wrongful divestment of servanship if it be the offense of the master but not otherwise coincides with wrongful abdication of mastership if it be the offense of a stranger it involves in it divestment of mastership which as in far as the mastership is a beneficial thing is wrongful four the assertion of servanship coincides necessarily with wrongful imposition of mastership it will be involved in it wrongful divestment of mastership but this only in the case where the usurper previously to the usurption was in a state of servitude under some other master five wrongful investment of servanship the servanship being considered as a beneficial thing coincides with imposition of mastership which if in the eyes of the pretended master the mastership should chance to be a burden will be wrongful six wrongful abdication of servanship coincides with wrongful divestment of mastership seven wrongful detraction of servanship with wrongful non-investment of mastership eight wrongful imposition of servanship if it be the offense of the pretended master coincides with usurption of mastership if it be the offense of a stranger it involves in it imposition of mastership which if in the eyes of the pretended master the mastership should be a burden will be wrongful as to abuse of mastership disturbance of mastership breach of duty and servants the elopement of servants and servant stealing these were offenses with without any change of denomination their equal relation to both conditions and thus we may reckon 13 sorts of offenses to which the condition of a servant stands exposed is one wrongful non-investment of servanship two wrongful interception of servanship three wrongful divestment servanship four usurp of servanship five wrongful investment of servanship six wrongful abdication of servanship seven wrongful detraction of servanship eight wrongful imposition of servanship nine abusive mastership 10 disturbance of mastership 11 breach of duty and servants 12 elopement of servants 13 servant stealing we now come to the offenses to which the condition of a guardian is exposed a guardian is one who is invested with power over another living within the compass of the same family and called a ward the power being to be exercised for the benefit of the ward now then what are the cases in which it can be for the benefit of one man that another living within the compass of the same family should exercise power over him consider either of the parties by himself and suppose him in point of understanding to be on the level with the other it seems evident enough that no such cases can ever exist to the production of happiness on the part of any given person in like manner as to the production of any other effect which is the result of human agency three things that is necessary should concur knowledge inclination and physical power now as there is no man who is so sure of being inclined on all occasions to promote your happiness as you yourself are so now there is the any man who upon the whole can have had so good opportunities as you must have had for knowing what is most conducive to that purpose for who should know as well as you what it is that gives you pain or pleasure moreover has to power it has manifest that no superiority in this respect on the part of a stranger could for a constancy make up for so great a deficiency as he must lie under in respect of true such material points as knowledge and inclination if then there be a case when it can be for the advantage of one man to be under the power of another it must be on account of some palpable and very considerable deficiency on the part of the former in point of intellect or what is the same thing in other words in point of knowledge or understanding now there are two cases in which such palpable deficiency is known to take place these are one when a man's intellect is not yet arrived at that state in which it is capable of directing his own inclination in the pursuit of happiness this is the case of infancy two when by some particular known or unknown circumstance is intellect has either never arrived at that state or having arrived that it has fallen from it which is the case of insanity by which means then is it to be ascertained whether a man's intellect is in that state or no for exhibiting the quantity of sensible heat in the human body we have a very tolerable sort of instrument the thermometer but for exhibiting the quantity of intelligence we have no such instrument it is evident therefore that the line which separates the quantity of intelligence which is sufficient for the purpose of self-government from that which is not sufficient must be in a great measure arbitrary where the insufficiency is the result of want of age the sufficient quantity of intelligence be it what it may does not accrue to all at the same period of their lives it becomes therefore necessary for legislators to cut the gaudium knot and fix upon a particular period at which and not before truly or not every person whatever shall be deemed as far as depends upon age to be in possession of this sufficient quantity in this case then the line is drawn which may be the same for every man and in the description of which such as it is whatever persons are concerned may be certain of agreeing the circumstance of time affording a mark by which the line in question may be traced with the utmost degree of honesty on the other hand when the insufficiency is the result of insanity there is not even this resource so that here the legislator has no other expedient than to appoint some particular person or persons to give a particular determination of the question in every instant in which it occurs according to his or their particular and arbitrary discretion arbitrary enough it must be at any rate since the only way in which it can be exercised is by considering whether the share of intelligence possessed by the individual in question does or does not come up to the loose and indeterminate idea which persons so appointed may chance to entertain with respect to the quantity which is deemed sufficient the line then being drawn or supposed to be so it is expedient to a man who cannot with safety to himself be left in his own power that he should be placed in the power of another how long then should he remain so just so long as his inability is supposed to continue that is in the case of infancy till he arrives at that period at which the law deems him to be of full age in the case of insanity till he be of sound mind and understanding now it is evident that this period in the case of infancy may not arrive for a considerable time and in the case of insanity perhaps never the duration of the power belonging to this trust must therefore in the one case be very considerable in the other case indefinite the next point to consider is what may be the extent of it for as to what ought to be that is a matter to be settled not in a general analytical sketch but in a particular and circumstantial dissertation by possibility then this power may possess any extent that can be imagined it may extend to any acts which physically speaking it may be in the power of the ward to perform himself will be the object of if exercised by the guardian conceive the power for a moment to stand upon this footing the condition of the ward stands now exactly upon a footing with pure slavery add the obligation by which the power is turned into a trust the limits of the power are now very considerably narrowed what then is the purport of this obligation of what nature is the course of conduct it prescribes it is such a course of conduct as shall be best calculated for procuring to the ward the greatest quantity of happiness which his faculties and the circumstances he is in will admit of saving always in the first place the regard which the guardian is permitted to show to his own happiness and in the second place that which is obliged as well as permitted to show to that of other men this is in fact no other than the course of conduct which the ward did he but know how ought in point of prudence to maintain of himself so the business of the former is to govern the latter precisely in the manner in which this latter ought to govern himself now to instruct each individual in what manner to govern his own conduct in the details of life is the particular business of private ethics to instruct individuals in what manner to cover the conduct of those whose happiness during non-age is permitted to their charge is the business of the art of private education the details therefore of the rules to be given for that purpose any more than the acts which are capable of being committed in violation of those rules belong not to the art of legislation since as will be seen more particularly hereafter such details could not with any chance of advantage be provided for by the legislator some general outlines might indeed be drawn by his authority and in point of fact some are in every civilised state but such regulations it is evident must be liable to great variation in the first place according to the infinite diversity of civil conditions which a man may stand invested within any given state in the next place according to the diversity of local circumstances that may influence the nature of the conditions which may chance to be established in different states on this account the offenses which would be constituted by such regulations could not be comprised under any concise and settled denominations capable of a permanent and extensive application no place therefore can be allotted to them here end of section 23