Welcome to Free Thoughts. I'm Trevor Burrs. And I'm Aaron Powell. Joining us today is Christopher J. Fett Weiss, Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University. His new book is Psychology of a Superpower, Security and Dominance in U.S. Foreign Policy. Welcome to Free Thoughts, Chris. Well, thank you for having me. Yeah, a lot of your book is about the concept of unipolarity and in a foreign policy world. What does that mean? And are we in a unipolar world? Unipolarity just means that there's one dominant power in the system. For political scientists, polarity refers to the distribution of power. So during the Cold War, we had a bipolar system where we had two roughly equal powers. And before World War I, there was a multipolar system. By most people's estimates today, we have a unipolar system. One country is strong enough to make and enforce the rules on everybody. Now, what happened to American foreign policy thinking on that period after the Soviet Union when you thought we would just sort of sit back and say, wow, we've been spending on our military for 50 years in order to fight the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is gone. What happened when we became a unipolar world? Yeah, you'd think that after the Soviet Union collapsed, we could have rethought a lot of things about a lot of aspects of our foreign policy. And our spending and our national security because we got a lot safer. But we don't seem to have believed that we've gotten safer. We don't seem to perceive safety, which is a bit strange because the threats we face now, any diplomats of any prior era would love to have our problems. The threats we face now are relatively minor, especially compared to the Soviet Union. But we are the most fearful country and we're most afraid country in the world in a lot of ways. And that doesn't make any sense. So what I've been trying to figure out for a few years is why that is. Why are we so scared of the Iranians and the North Koreans and al-Qaeda and ISIS? And there's a lot of different reasons, but they all come back to our power. So the Soviet Union is gone, but doesn't China counterbalance our power a bit? A bit. And regionally, they don't have the capability of projecting power across the Pacific. They could make life more difficult for us in the South China Sea and the various areas right around China, which we might ask, why do we care much what happens there anyway? But that's a different story. The Chinese, though, don't have the capability of projecting power around the world and don't seem to have the interest, frankly, to do it like we do. They don't have the blue water navy to any real extent that we do. And they don't even though they're increasing their spending on their military, it's not at nearly the pace that they could if they felt more threatened by us than as we perceive them to. If the world then is less dangerous now than it was when we were locked in the Cold War, why do we seem so convinced? And by we, I mean, maybe both the foreign policy establishment, but also just ordinary Americans that the world is a dangerous place and an increasingly dangerous place. That's a great question. I've been trying to figure that out for a while. And I think some of the answers are in this sort of basic human psychology that the strongest members of any group tend to be the ones that are worried, they worry more, especially the strongest countries worry more because they assume that there are bad actors out there scheming against them. We seem to be hardwired to not be able to relax or not be able to recognize safety. And there may be some aspects of US culture to US society. We're a much more religious society than most, for instance. And religious people tend to see or comfortable with notions of good and evil that make other kind of other people a little bit queasy. So there's a lot of factors that go into it. But we seem to be culturally incapable of recognizing that we're pretty safe and secure.  We get into a lot of unnecessary conflicts and unnecessary problems because we think we're in such danger. But the world, so the world in this unipolar setup that it's in now is you've said it's whether we believe it or not, it's safer. And so maybe it's a good thing that we might think it's not or that we might think there's lots of threats because that would encourage us to keep being powerful, which might maintain the unipolar world. So can we, I guess the question is, can we trace the relative peacefulness of the world now to the United States being the single dominant factor? And if the United States stopped thinking that there were threats, would it then jeopardize that a bit if we kind of backed off some? Well, that's a great question. And that's one of the big outstanding issues in U.S. foreign policy. What would happen if we were to cut back on our presence and our spending and our activism abroad? And there are some people, especially sort of the neo conservatives, who will tell you that the only thing standing in between chaos around the world and abject genocide and total destruction of the liberal order is U.S. power, which strikes me as a bit of an odd statement. We don't have that gigantic of a Navy, for instance. We have a couple of hundred ships, but they're not. They wouldn't be able to keep peace at sea unless sea is the sea was already pretty peaceful and that we don't have enough power that we would be able to stop, say, the Europeans from fighting if they really wanted to. It could well be that we have this large, expensive police force out there that is patrolling a relatively stable beat. You know, the world itself is much less violent than it has been in any earlier era, which is a statistics that I'm sure you guys are familiar with, but other people may not be, that there's much less warfare going on in the world now than ever before. Whether or not that's because we are patrolling the world or there's other factors going on at the same time is not clear to me at all. And it would be more rational to test that, to cut back a little bit and see if violence starts to spread and see if the old rules start to come back in. Because I'm not convinced at all that it's our power and our presence that keeps everybody else from fighting. We're not that strong. So that sounds, though, like a potentially pretty costly experiment. I mean, if what we're talking about is whether or not the U.S. being strong and involved is keeping the peace. If you're wrong, that it's in fact not the U.S., but the U.S. maintains its strength and presence and the peace continues great. Because it certainly doesn't seem to be making, at least as you've articulated so far, things more violent. But if the U.S. were to step back to test the hypothesis, that the cost of you being wrong might be high in human lives. It could be disruptive if done wrong. If done fairly stupidly, like, I don't know, if we ever say I have a president who has no diplomatic tact at all, and alienates allies around the world and dislocates or injects chaos into alliance relationships, maybe, if it were however done relatively slowly, if it were done cautiously. And step in a piecemeal fashion that could be easily reversed. I would suggest that, for instance, if the United States were to pull back a bit from Northeast Asia, that it's unlikely the North Koreans would go on a rampage and try to reunify that peninsula by force of arms. But we could get there, we could get back there pretty quickly though if they do try. It's not the case that pulling back towards, say, the United, even just pulling back our forces closer to the United States would mean that we can't get back there quickly if we needed to. We could fly around the world pretty quickly these days. This isn't the Roman Empire where it took three months to walk up to Gaul. We can get anywhere pretty quickly. And it doesn't necessarily mean that we would be abandoning the world. Nobody thinks we should wall ourselves off and stop trading. Well, a few people think that, I guess some do these, to stop trading and stop interacting with the world. But it's just like, I think we're getting to an age, I'm getting to an age where I have back problems. And there's no back problem that surgery can't make worse. There's really no international problem. The U.S. intervention can't make worse. And I think that if we stop thinking of ourselves as the first and second line of defensive democracy abroad, the other problems make short themselves out. And it might not only be cheaper, but be better in the long run. You write about how there's a strange nostalgia for the Cold War amongst, especially the foreign policy establishment. And I think that the foreign policy establishment, I mean the D.C. foreign policy world are kind of the people you're writing about here because you mentioned many times that there's a big disconnect between scholars, academics, like you who write about foreign policy and the people who work in foreign policy in Washington, D.C. And the people here in Washington, D.C. tend to be kind of chicken littles for lack of a better term. And one of the things that they do is they reminisce fondly to the Cold War. And how wonderful it was that we had 30,000, I think, Russian missiles pointed at our head. And I think one of the metaphors you bring up is it used to be locked in a room with a cobra and now we're locked in a room with a bunch of bees and it's even worse. Why do you think it is that people think that the Cold War, I lived through a little bit of it, I don't remember it that well, but why do people think that the Cold War was such a great time? This is, that's such a great question. Nothing drives me crazier than nostalgia for the Cold War, especially among people who lived through it, who knew what it was like, who knew, number one, how much daily violence there was around the world, how many proxy wars were going on. And number two, how the danger that we all felt that any time, now we know, it came close a couple of times when there were either mistakes or rogue morons that could have pushed the wrong button or could have just got us into more issues and brought it all tumbling down. No one who lived through 1983, now we know about the Abel Archer Stair should have any nostalgia for the Cold War, but they do, you hear it over and over again. And I talk about in the book about there are psychological explanations for this. First of all, we know how it came out. We know we won, and so we can look back and things always look better in retrospect. Ah, we remember the good times, remember the good things, the good emotions, but the scary things tend to fade. The emotions that came with fear, the kid going to bed at night, we're worrying about nuclear war like I did, and I imagine the whole generations did before me, they, that fades, but we know we won. We had this sort of clear morality to it. There was the bad guys and the good guys, and now we don't know necessarily who the bad guys are. We know that we have small regional bad guys. We seem like the world is coming apart at the seams and people have nostalgia, including some really senior people. Martin Dempsey, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs, he used to say this is the most dangerous the world has ever been in his lifetime, which, what is he talking about? There were so many more dangerous moments during the Cold War and not just dangerous for local people around the world, which they certainly were, but for say the species, then there are now. We don't have a capability, it seems, to appreciate how much better things are getting, and both people on the right and the left will reject the positive news that comes in. Steven Pinker's written a couple of great books talking about how in most aspects, life around the world, the system is getting better, but people have this visceral reaction to it. They attack the notion that things can get better. They say, well, that we can't let down our guard, fine.  This puts me in mind also of Carl Schmidt, and there's this notion that you see, like David Brooks, I think epitomizes this, of without a grand enemy, we can't have a sense of common purpose, that it's not just that we overestimate how much better, or we underestimate how bad things were back then, and underestimate how much things better are now, but that there's kind of, is there like a psychological angle to it too of the Cold War gave us purpose? Absolutely, absolutely. There's a bunch of, there are a lot of psychologists who think that people need to have an enemy to function, because we all need to know we're the good guys, we're the good people, and there's no point in being good if there's no corresponding bad. There has to be evil out there, and there's a very clear pattern of how that evil manifests itself into an enemy, and we see right now, people are quite happy to have Iran as the enemy, the focus of all of our anxiety and all of the evil in the world is the Iranians, which despite the fact that they're manifestly weak, they can't do much of anything, they can't project power outside of the Gulf region, but we think of them, or some people in this country, think of them as the replacement for the Soviet Union. There's a great article, it just came out a couple of days ago. Now, I forget exactly where they was talking about how the Israelis are, people in Israel have a higher level of happiness, of sort of general societal happiness than most other countries, and the authors were saying yes, because they have an enemy, they know they're united in a struggle, they have a, it brings them together, and people have a purpose for their lives, it's a lot of times that enemies give us that. So we feel better sometimes, deep down perhaps, but we feel better when we have an enemy, upon which to focus all of our hatreds and maybe self-loathing and all sorts of things, but at least there's somebody we know we hate, and that seems to be ubiquitous in the world, and it's just in humanity, and certainly in the United States. Yeah, we also have a bad, we're very bad at understanding our enemies because of where we sit in the world, is you write a bunch of years, a quote you have from Ronald Reagan's autobiography, which I just wanna read a little bit of it because it struck me as amazing. It quote, perhaps this shouldn't have surprised me, but it did. I'd always felt that from our deeds, it must be clear to anyone that Americans or moral people who were starting at the birth of our nation had always used our power only as a force for good in the world. During my first years in Washington, I think many of us took it for granted that the Russians, like ourselves, considered it unthinkable that the United States would launch a first strike against them, that we assumed that the Russians knew that there's no way we would attack them, and this is the kind of way that we think about our enemies that is extremely damaging. Yeah, and that's a very common psychological phenomenon that sometimes is referred to as overestimation of benevolence. We think, wait, we know we're good down deep, we're good people. Therefore, we generally sense that other people, other countries, see us as good too, that they know that our intentions are good. Sometimes we'll screw up, but we're at the root, good people, and we're trying to do the right thing. That is not how countries perceive one another. In fact, it's sort of quite the opposite, that if you need a general rule in international politics, the other is always a realist. The other country, whoever it is, they only are interested in power, and you can't trust their word, but they're certainly only interested in maximizing their strength. We think of Putin and China and Iran, they are just trying to maximize their power, and in the regions and around the world, they're cool-headed realists. They're not any more complicated than that. That's certainly how countries see us. Good luck convincing anybody in the Arab world that we invaded Iraq for anything other than oil, because they see us as a realist. That's ubiquitous in human society. The other countries are realists, but we don't see it that way. We assume that they know we're good. Reagan assumed the Soviets knew we were at heart good people, which seems a bit, and it was certainly surprised the Soviets, but it wouldn't surprise psychologists who study this overestimation of benevolence. And related to that is the fundamental attribution error, which is that your opponents are acting in concordance with their character. Right. Anything they do reflects their character, but when we do bad things, because we've been forced into it by events, we had really no choice, and everyone should understand that this isn't what we wanted to do, but it was forced upon us by our situation. And the psychologist for this, it's so widespread as the fundamental attribution error that when they do something, it's a reflection of their character. But when we do something, it's a reflection of what was going on at the time of the situation we found ourselves in. How has unipolarity affected the second nuclear age, as you describe it, in a world where there are fewer nukes than there were in the Cold War, but we seem to be more scared of that. Yeah, for about 15 years, people in my business have been writing about the second nuclear age with the general feeling that it's gonna be worse than the first nuclear age, which was the Cold War. The Cold War was the first nuclear age, and now this one, it's gonna have new rules. We're gonna have a lot more actors. They're gonna give, they won't be trustworthy actors with nuclear weapons. They're gonna give these weapons over to terrorists, maybe, and there's a good chance they might use them. It's a new nuclear world out there. However, so far, all the evidence says, yeah, it's a new nuclear world, and it's much better. We have 90, we've gotten rid of about 90% of the nuclear weapons we had during the Gulf War. We've had, I'm sorry, during the Cold War. We have not had a great deal of proliferation. In fact, during the Cold War, we had nine nuclear states, and now we have nine, because South Africa gave them up, and North Korea is the only country that has joined the nuclear club. There hasn't been runaway proliferation. There hasn't been anybody sharing them with terrorists. There hasn't been use. So yeah, it's a new nuclear age, but it's better. And I don't understand, one of the many things I've been trying to understand is why are we so pessimistic about the future of nuclear weapons when all the trends are, well, we'd say, positive? So early in our conversation, Trevor mentioned something that you've argued that there's this huge disconnect between what the foreign policy establishment, the people who are doing foreign policy within Washington, think about the world, think about these issues, and what you and other academics and people who study foreign policy, but aren't part of that establishment, the consensus among you. And it seems to be related to, one of the things that we notice is your presidential candidates will frequently run as, if not doves, at least, we shouldn't have as many wars. I'm not gonna bomb all these countries the way my predecessor did. Barack Obama seemed to be a good example of this. And then they get into office and shortly thereafter, they're bombing everybody and seem to be just as belligerent as the guy who came before. And so we might on the one hand say that's because of all these psychological issues that you've listed out. But is it possible that it's simply because since they are in Washington, and they are like the ones actually doing this stuff, and so they are out there engaging the world and know about what's going on in the world, that the world is simply a scarier place than you know because you're not privy to the same information they are. I mean, it's possible. Sure, and that's certainly what people in the Intel business who I'm sure you've run into many people in Washington who love to tell you that if you knew what I knew, you wouldn't be so happy.  And sure, there's gonna be details. John Mueller from Kato, he often talks about how if all you do is if you're exposed to classified information about terrorism all day, it's sort of like sitting in the basement with a police band radio, you would never leave your house. But if you look at the aggregate trends, the overall data of what's actually happening and get outside of the Beltway, get outside the bubble, things are pretty good. I tell my students all the time, look at Europe. Europe is the most peaceful part of the world right now. That's weird. That's historically weird. Jefferson called them a arena of gladiators and now it's the most peaceful area in the world. I'm German by ethnicity and my people aren't peaceful, but now they are. Something's going on in the world. Maybe it's the United States making for instance the entire Western Hemisphere to be at peace. There's no civil war, ethnic conflicts or any wars of any kind going on the Western Hemisphere for the first time since at least the 17th century. Nobody seems to care. So I'm not sure what people could be learning when they get there. I think much more likely is they just kind of get socialized into ways of thinking rather than exposed to different kinds of intelligence because the people around the White House, they don't have access to any kind of scary intel, but they do have a very clear notions that Ben Rhodes of the former Obama administration officially used to call the blob, very clear notions about how in absolutely inevitable it is for the United States and important it is for us to be active everywhere. But so it could just be being socialized into the thoughts rather than scared by the intel. You argue in the book that it could be the case or it is the case, I don't think it's necessarily so, but I think there's a tendency, you argue, for the powerless, the relatively powerless nations to be better at forming, and of course I'm putting the nations don't have beliefs but the people in these nations, but those nations are better at forming accurate beliefs than people in the unipolar power such as the United States. Why would that be a case? Yeah, there's some reason to believe out there that power is indirectly related to wisdom, that either strong individuals or strong countries when they might perceive reality much differently than people who are weaker. And just to give you one example, the strong don't have to worry about the weak as much. The strong don't have to worry and put themselves in the position of lesser actors. So they're not as good at empathizing, of understanding others because they're not encouraged to spend much time trying to figure others out. So whether it's a CEO, and there's a lot of sort of business literature about this stuff that people high up in companies are not as good at understanding other people than people lower down in the corporate ladder. So it's the same thing happens in the international system. The United States is never gonna be as good at understanding other countries as they are at understanding us because they have an incentive to try to figure out what we're doing. And good luck, by the way, figuring out what we're doing now. But we have very little incentive to try to figure out what the Albanians are up to. At least maybe there's a few people in the State Department who do. But empathy suffers. And there's a lot of other things that help out little David's when they're fighting against or just having to deal with Goliath. It's Goliath's perception. He's not taking David too seriously. And sometimes things can go wrong. Now, my favorite part of the book is your discussion of what you call the enemy image and how it just sort of read like an item list check off of listening to people talk about foreign policies. I like to get in some of those. But first of all, what is the enemy image? And how does it come from this sort of unipolar world? Right, well, the enemy image is essentially just a persistent negative perception of another person or another country. And a lot of this came from research from the Soviet Union and the United States. How did they perceive each other? It's essentially a set of misperceptions or at least a set of a way of thinking about another actor which, by which everything they're gonna do, everything they do is perceived negatively. And other actors can't change their image because everything they do is gonna be interpreted through the lens of the enemy image. And so it blocks empathy. It blocks any kind of international reconciliation. And when the enemy image is present in an international relationship, there's a good chance you're on the road to war. You're at least on the road to international rivalry. But when like right now the United States and Iran are just seeing each other through that image. And there's no way to break that necessarily unless you kind of recognize it's there. And we could be on the road, especially with the particular people running the government. Now we might be on the road to some trouble with the Iranians in the future. This enemy image, is it uniform across the people versus their government? So we might think that their government, the government of Iran is belligerent and bad in all these ways and no matter what it does, we're always going to read it through that. But do we in general also apply that same thinking to the people of Iran who are of course the ones who are going to die when we start a war? Right, no, generally speaking, we make a distinction and people make a distinction on both sides. That we like the Iranian people. We understand that we tend to think that they're like us but we don't like their government. Same thing during the Cold War, you're hurt all the time. We have nothing against the Soviet people. We know that they're being oppressed by their government. It's their government we don't like. And you hear the same thing that go in the other direction. If you've ever traveled through the Arab world, people say all the time, we love the American people. It's the government we don't like. So it's the government that's holding back the people. And right now it's the people in the throes of the enemy image want to help the Iranian people. And the assumption is that the evil lies in the state house. And that's one of the ways that it misleads our thinking. One of the ones that I think is very fascinating that you point out is focusing on intent rather than capability.  Yeah, it was strange. During the Cold War, we'd say to us a lot of intelligence analysis would come out and say, we really can't know the Soviet intent. Are they going to strike us first with nuclear weapons, for instance? But so we can't know their intent. So let's just focus on their capability because we understand that the threat is some kind of function of capability and intent. So what we couldn't tell their intent necessarily, that was controversial. Let's just look at their capabilities. Now it's totally reversed. Now we only look at the Iranian intent and don't look at their capabilities because we assume that, because the Soviets had a huge capability, the threat was high. Well, now the Iranians have a mid-skill capability. They can't really hurt us in any kind of significant substantial way, but they want to. Netanyahu talks of all the time, the Iranians want to conquer the world. Well, fine, they're not going to do that though. The threat for them to do that is zero. Their capability is marginal, but we focus instead on the intent. So when you have a very powerful country, you, in the unipolar system, we don't look at the capability of our potential enemies. Like ISIS's capability was never particularly high, but we, if you listen to the news, you listen to our leaders and it sounded like we were fighting a good Superman. The threat that they posed was enormous. So it's, if we keep in mind that threat is a function of some way of capability and intent. And if either one of those is zero, then the threat is zero. We don't worry about the English threatening us. They have huge capability, but they have zero intent. So it's the same with the Iranians, very low capability. So even if they wanted to hurt us, even if they wanted to conquer the region, and by the way, I don't see much signs, so many signs that they do. But if they wanted to, they couldn't do it. The threat's very little. Does terrorism change that equation though? I mean, so that we don't have to worry about say ISIS invading America and taking over the Eastern seaboard, but they can still strike us at any time in very acute ways. So the fact that we have terrorists, that we have international terrorists, so that they have access to weapons that can at least hurt us on the micro level and do it in ways that we can't seem to protect against would seem that it doesn't really matter that they don't have a large arsenal. Well, it does if we kind of, I think this is a very important point to try to, if we could help keep the terrorist violence in perspective, if we realize that the threat that they can pose to us, and they can kill people, they can make life miserable for a brief period of time in a very small area, but they can't do any long-term lasting damage to the United States. All they can do is really commit an enormous graphic crime and they would like us to be scared of them. I don't understand why this country is so eager to succumb to terror that the terrorists are trying to promote. And the metaphor I always use that if I were in charge of the Department of Homeland Security, I'd be like a stewardess or a flight attendant. If the wing is on fire, the flight attendant's gonna say, oh yeah, the wing's on fire, that's okay. Would you let's sit down, sir? Would you like some peanuts? Instead, our Homeland Security Department says, there's a very small chance the wing will explode into flames in the flight, but just sit down and try not to worry about it. So it's the opposite.  I tell that to people all the time and they say, how do you know? You don't understand what they think. I say, yeah, but I understand math and no one else seems to around here. And if you do get killed by terrorists, you can come back and haunt me from beyond the grave. Because the message should be, they cannot do any real harm to us, rather than we need to be eager, we need to be so vigilant and track them down, that's counterproductive. And that's exactly what they want us to do. So I don't understand why we're so happy and so willing to do exactly what they want us to do. What about the specter? We kind of touched on this before, but everyone I think is thinking, well, what about suitcase nuclear weapons? That this 0.1% chance of a nuclear weapon is too high. And if they want a nuclear, if they got a nuclear weapon, they would want to use it in America. Is I mean, I think that, do you agree with that? I mean, maybe not, but in that, that therefore means we have to be... Well, no one thinks it's a good idea to give nuclear weapons to terrorist groups and to ask them, you guys behave yourselves. But even if they got suitcase nukes, and all of our concern about these suitcase nukes goes back to something a Russian general said during a press conference about 15 years ago. And he said, we were missing some suitcase nukes, Conrad, and we said, what? But it's number one, they couldn't set them off. It's very difficult for, even if terrorists got nuclear weapons, it's not like there's a button on it that they could push. But let's just go over, go beyond what I think are the pretty much insurmountable technological issues a terrorist group would have in either building or stealing and setting off a nuclear weapon. I don't think it's possible, but if it did happen, and if a suitcase nukes went off, it would be obviously horrible. But it wouldn't be something that we couldn't recover from, however grimly we had to do it. I don't think the odds, and if you look into this, I teach weapons of mass destruction in classes. And I don't think the odds of this happening are anything to really any realistic kind of concern. But it's certainly not something that we should be considering going to war to try to prevent. You know, I think in the background, a lot of people's minds would the Iranians give nuclear weapons to Hezbollah. It strikes me as very unlikely and not something that we should necessarily be putting at the forefront of our foreign policy. I'd like to go over some of these indicators you list of that you might be suffering from the enemy image problem. It's almost like a self-help book for people. Say, if you checked seven of these boxes, you might be suffering from the enemy image problem.  The first one is, our differences are fundamental and existential. Right, yeah, we are much different from them. The enemy is fundamentally different from us. At the heart of it is, of course, we're good, they're bad. But during the Cold War, it was the Soviet evil, and we were good. Now it's the sort of radical fundamentalists in Tehran, fundamentally evil. There's no point in trying to change them because it's their nature, not something that we can find common ground between us because they're just different than evil. They do not value human life like we do. That's consistent throughout my whole life. I've heard people say, oh, you know, the enemy, wherever it is, was of Japanese, Vietnamese, Soviet, certainly. Now Arabs, they don't value human life like we do. That's always wrong. Everybody values human life the same. But, you know, maybe some leaders could be more callous about it. It's ridiculous to think that we have found, and either the United States is terrible at choosing enemies, or we always choose enemies that have, you know, that no regard for human life. Or that's a misperception, that we, and that's a sign that you're not perceiving them properly. You're in the throes of the enemy image, buddy. I mean, We examine what you're thinking.  I mean, we don't tend to value it much if it's not within our shores.   Their word cannot be trusted. Negotiations are a waste of time. This one sounds familiar, especially now. Right, yeah. North Korea, the skeptics of negotiations, and those who are in the throes of the enemy image will say, look, there's no point in talking to them. There was no point in talking to Soviets in the 1970s. When we started, say, we sat down and had the Saul talks and then the ABM talks. They're going to cheat. There's no point in having these discussions because the enemy can't be trusted. That, more than anything else, more than any other reason is why the Iran deal, the JCPOA, was opposed in so many circles because it's not so much they didn't like the deal. They made up reasons. There was, from an arms control perspective, an unbelievable deal, but people didn't trust the Iranians and they could never get past that. And so any deal with the Iranians was, by definition, going to be a bad deal. And an old basketball coach said, any pass to a bad player is a bad pass. And that's the same kind of thing, same kind of thinking that occurs with the Iranians. That's why they opposed the Iran deal. It had nothing to do with the substance, which, because the substance was irrelevant if it was with a deal with Iran. The enemy regime is simultaneously dangerous and fragile. Yeah, there's a paradox here because if the Iranians at the one hand are so strong, then why do we think that more sanctions will make them collapse? The paradigm, the paragon of this is there's a guy named Michael Ladine at the Foundation for Defense and Democracies who's been arguing for years that we only need, if you just had a small marine landing in Iran, people would rise up and overthrow their dictator media. And it was bloodless implosion. That was Bay of Pigs, too, wasn't it? Right, and yeah, the Bay of Pigs, and it was the groundwork, essentially, for Iraq, that we thought, oh, we show up, it will be greeted as liberators, everything will be great. But they're so dangerous, too. It's this belief that the people are on our side, that there's no such thing as nationalism, that they might not appreciate getting invaded. But as long as we show up, they will be on our side and we can overthrow their dictator. So their dictators, therefore, are fundamentally insecure and they're fragile, so they're likely to lash out more because they know they have to... People objected when President Obama seemingly didn't do much to support the Green Revolution in Iran a few years ago. Well, what the heck could we have done? And there's this notion that if we had just made some statements the right way, and maybe parachuted in some supplies, they could have overthrown the regime. This is crazy talk, and it's very common among people who think, in terms of enemies, that they're, at the same time, dangerous, but fundamentally fragile, which is weird, but it's ubiquitous. Following up on that, though, when we, as Americans, look out at the world and don't go and visit on a regular basis these regimes or have a lot of contact with everyday Iranians or everyday North Koreans, the underlying assumption of the all we need to do is send in Marines is that the reason that the people are supporting their government right now is out of fear, is that they fear the repercussions of rising up, and so us sending Marines or us just going in there would show the people that their government is not the threat that they thought it was, and then they would rise up. So is that part of the underlying mistaken assumption, is that if we look at a place like North Korea or we look at other governments where we think that they're brutalized in their own Saudi Arabia, for example, is it not fear of the regime that keeps the, fear will keep the systems in line? Is nationalism a stronger force than we give it credit for? Yeah, it's certainly an issue that people believe that, and it's fueled by a variety of different expats. People come out of their countries, it's like Ahmed Chalabi came out of Iraq and convinced the Bush administration that every Iraqi will join side the Marines and they'll fight Saddam Hussein together. But what all that underestimates is nationalism as much as the people who are most anti-Trump in the country. If you had some Russian show up or somebody show up and say, hey, I'll help you get rid of them, they might say, hey, whoa, whoa, what are you doing? Get out. They might not like their leader, but it's their leader. And it's their problem that they'll deal with. It's very rare that people like to be helped by very heavily armed foreigners, unless they're throwing out other heavily armed foreigners. Sure, the French like, people said, oh, it'll be like going into Paris in 1944. What are you talking about? They were overthrowing the Nazis. If we had said, okay, we're gonna put a new regime here, it's not gonna be French. They had a different vote, one thing. In 1975 or something, yeah. Yeah, number five on the list of ways you might know that you're suffering from the enemy image problem. They are realists, we kind of mentioned this before, they are realists and only understand the language of force. Yeah, how many times, it's always phrased that way too. How many times have you heard somebody say, you know, the only thing Putin understands is the language, is force, the language of force. But that's the way everybody is, from the beginning of my life, I've heard it from maybe it was Gaddafi and then only the Ayatollah only understands force. In Eastern Europe, people only understand force. The Chinese right now, we know, the only thing they really understand is force. This is crazy. People understand lots of things, but it's all part of this notion that the others are realists and because these are realists, the only thing they really respond to is force. That's the only thing Putin will respond to, that's dangerous because that encourages people to act with force when a lot of times. People understand a language that uses words too and they can figure out a language of money, for instance, we have a lot of that. We can get our way a lot of times with money. Turns out, the Iranians could understand the language of diplomacy. Until we screwed up that deal, everything was working out pretty well. Our various enemies work together. Yeah, there's this notion that especially, my favorite example of it was our former national security advisor who lasted almost three weeks. He had written a book that essentially- Michael Flynn, you're referring to Michael Flynn. Michael Flynn, he unified all of the US enemies into one big anti-US conspiracy, essentially. There's a belief system out there. Psychologists refer to this as a closed belief system. The notion that all of our enemies are working together, which helps explain, for instance, why we were swallowed the notion that Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden were gonna work together, because this is, believe all of the enemy, the enemy is my friend. Well, okay, but it's not the case necessarily that all of our enemies like one another at the same time. They can, turns out they can despise us both pretty equally. But because we know we're good, we assume evil is united. So we think probably the Iranians and Russians are working in cahoots, and ISIS is probably working with the Iranians, even though they're totally opposite in a lot of the major religious matters. So, but once we think that everybody's working together, then it's us against the world. It's certainly the case with a lot, especially the neocons, that we say Robert Kagan talks about how there's a authoritarian axis forming out there. No, no, no, I don't really think so. I think that's once again the enemy image at work. This is one that Trump, I think, recently said or used when he described Iran as having a hundred year plan, that which is their superior strategist who take the long view. Yeah, it's always the case that our enemies, they're patient. We need to have some initial, like especially the Chinese, they think in terms of millennia, no they don't. It's not the case that they're much better strategist than we are. In fact, it's well-known misperception that the enemy is very strategic and very calculating. Well, we know, we don't know what the hell's going on a lot of times. We're arguing amongst ourselves. We're taking it one day at a time, reacting to things. But we know Putin, he's a chess player. God, the metaphor that drives me crazy. They play chess. We're playing checkers. Morons during the Obama administration, I would occasionally hear, you know what, it's not even checkers, Obama's playing marbles. Okay, fine. But it's not the case necessarily. Maybe it is the case that Putin is thinking five steps ahead and he's a master strategist. Maybe he had no idea that his active measures that went on during the 2016 election were gonna result in the way they did and now he doesn't know what to do. It might not be the case that every authoritarian out there is a super genius that we are facing a bunch of wily coyotes. But that's what the enemy image encourages us to think. They understand us better than we understand them and they know we are reluctant to use force. This is related to the Reagan quote I read previously. Yeah, that benevolence, they know we're good and that gives them an advantage because they know, for instance, you hear people now say, the Iranians know that we're not gonna start a war. So they can do whatever they want. They have such an advantage. We don't know that they won't start a war. Certainly the case, they hear it all the time during the Cold War, the Soviets had an advantage. They know we'll never strike first. What? They had no, and we don't know. They were more scared of us striking first than we were because we generally had a military advantage. But our enemies know us and they know we're good. Which is just demonstrably wrong. No one thinks the other side is good. In fact, they generally think that we're realists too. It takes a foreign policy expert, quote unquote, to understand their true nature. I like this one a lot. Yeah, after 9-11, experts on Islam popped up all over the place. Just like during the Cold War, there were experts on the Soviet Union. A lot of them, the neo-conservative movement in the 1970s, a lot of them were former Trotskites, people who were hip-deep once upon a time in communist theory. So they'd say, oh, you have to really understand how they think to really understand them. And so people were digging after 9-11 into the sort of intellectual precursors of Osama bin Laden and trying to really understand how they're thinking and the threat they pose. And it's never the case that people who in the defense business who get into the mind of the other figure out, you know, he's not too bad. It's always that they're super evil and that they, in order to really understand the extent of their evil, you can't really just read the news and figure it out on your own. You need the experts. Because the experts in the defense circles generally are more hawkish than everybody else. And Leslie Gale before 9-11 famously said, look, I ended up supporting the war in Iraq. I'm sorry, not before 9-11, before the war in Iraq. I ended up supporting the war because of professional pressure. Everybody was supporting the war. I didn't wanna be on the outside.  But does this mean then that we should only look to the average person's opinion? I mean, so like, yeah, so like if it's, I'm, you know, there's a foreign policy issue going on in Ghana and you were to ask me, like, I don't know anything about Ghana, whether I know foreign policy there or not. And so you wouldn't wanna ask me. So you're saying we should, should we look to different sorts of experts? Yeah, yeah, I think, and the, if you imagine a Venn diagram, the most dangerous area in the middle there is when you have sort of conservative or right wing or at least hawkish political ideology and expertise overlapping. When you have experts surrounding the president, for instance, who are both of a neoconservative background and cause it's almost, hawkishness is pretty much one of the central parts of that identity or certain definitions of a neoconservative and an expertise in the, in another country. Then those are the ones who are gonna be exceptionally hawkish and exceptionally likely to recommend a military solution to problems rather than say to a cooperative one because they, and they're most likely in particular to just see life through the enemy image. And I feel like I'm doing David Letterman here. And number 10 on the list of ways you might know that you're suffering from the enemy image problem is they are Nazis. Yeah, if there's one marker, as soon as people are referring to the other side as Nazis, they're probably not using some good way to perceive the other. And it's, everybody's been a Nazi since I have been in, old enough to understand these debates from Saddam Hussein and Slamo Nazis or Slamo fascists we used to hear all the time, not so common now perhaps, but these are just the next version of Nazis. Fortunately, there's only one version of Nazis. And no, and they combined intent and capability. And so they were a threat, but luckily those ones, even if we don't like them, most of our potential enemies out there don't have one or the other. So speaking of people often accused of being a Nazi, let's talk about our current president. So looking, so given the kind of framework that you have articulated in the book and that we've discussed today, and then given what you see in the current administration, how do you see the next several years playing out? Do you think that things, I mean, are gonna get, is there any chance they're gonna get better? Are they gonna get worse? Well, there's no chance of things getting better. Because all the stuff we've been talking about so far, very, very little of it applies to Donald Trump because it would assume that he's thinking about anybody else or thinking about other countries.  And so there's no chance this guy's gonna change it all and get better, but it doesn't necessarily mean everything's gonna fall apart. And I've been writing recently, he's talking about how what we're doing right now, we're having a massive test of the international system. We're gonna find out what norms and rules are actually gonna be persistent. We're gonna have a test of, say, the overall downward trends and violence that we talked about before. If everything, if these, whatever survives the next few years of Trump are gonna be the things that will probably be more persistent and more, we're lasting than others. Because if they can survive the Trump years, if there's still less violence around the world, if it's democratic order still holding together, after the Trump years, then maybe we can have, say, with some confidence that that might be around for a while. But for now, it's a little bit like, you know, if your team is in the NCAA tournament, you just, in the early rounds, you just kinda wanna survive in advance. And that's what I feel about the Trump years. We're just gonna try to survive in advance. Maybe if some point, maybe it'll be over. Thanks for listening. Free Thoughts is produced by Test Terrible. If you enjoyed today's show, please rate and review us on iTunes. And if you'd like to learn more about libertarianism, find us on the web at www.libertarianism.org.


So first off, a little circuit here, three exercises, they don't have to be the actual exercises that I'll be performing in my chest workout, it's just a simple circuit that enables me to warm up the chest muscles through a range of different angles and movements. So incline dumbbell presses, flat bench dumbbell flyers, and then a cross bench dumbbell pullover, three great movements to open out my chest, extend through and to stretch it, a few stretches after each circuit, so two circuits in total. Listen, the weight really isn't an issue here, maybe 50-60% of the weight I'm normally lifting, I'm really not aiming to get a pump in my chest, I'm just aiming to go through a range of motion. So now we can start the first major work set on incline bench press, and I'll say with this, my focus is primarily on the upper portion of my chest, so you're going to see a lot of exercises focusing on this region, as opposed to your typical standard bench press and dumbbell flyers. Inclined presses, my first exercise. Listen, the reason I start with this and not your typical flat bench press, is I'm not trying to get my chest bigger, I'm not trying to get stronger. My workouts now are all about symmetry and balance and proportions. So for me, my chest, I need a little bit more balance up top. So whilst I'm fresh after my warm-up, I want to build up to the maximum amount of weight that I can manage on an incline, because that's where much more of the upper clavicular pectoral, this region of the chest, as opposed to the more mid-bulky part, tends to get worked. It gets a lot more stress placed on it. So a couple of tips here. Progressively building up the weights, you see me work across four sets, with that last set being a drop set. And really what I'm doing here is like getting into a calm building up to top speed. I want to go through all the gears, just like I'm going through a decent amount of weight, good increments so that I can really warm up and engage the chest, rather than just putting a lot of weights on and trying to bench out the maximum. So no real rep range, somewhere 10, 12 others came as low as eight. But as long as I reach my target, which is practically failure, I haven't got my training partner here, so I have to be careful. But I'm reaching up to my maximum threshold with the most weight I can lift. It's about seven or eight reps. Then I'm taking about half that weight off, widening my grip, getting a nice sort of wide incline press. And you'll see I'm pretty much pulsing just on the upper clavicular area, which is working here. So a lot of focus on my upper chest. I'm going to move on, continue with some presses, we'll find a machine press, then I can start working more with the flyers, dumbbells and cable. Machine press. The reason I like machine press after the free weights is because free weights, especially that barbell bench press, use a lot more muscle involvement activation to actively press that bar and control it back down. So even though I'm doing the same type of basic press by using machine, it fixes me in that very set range of motion. Therefore I can put a lot of that tension firmly on the muscle without trying to balance or stabilize it. So free weights, barbells, dumbbells, machines, cables, even body weight. I try and mix it all into my chest workout and every other muscle group, just so that I'm always stressing the body from different angles, using different techniques. Speaking of techniques, a drop set, I involved into this one, similar to on the first exercise. So within each exercise, certainly early on in the workout, I want to build up to the maximum weight I can lift for no less than six or seven reps. Once I hit that point, I'm going to push through, get one or two more reps after that and then involve a drop set where I take about 30% of the weight back off and instantly go back into that set and just get as many more reps as I can. Really stressing that muscle much more than if I was just trying to always lift heavy weights. So if you are training on your own, you don't have a sparto or a training partner to assist you and help spot on some of those heavy weights, make yourself a rest pause, or like what I'm doing, immediately lower the weight down that resistance and jump back on that exercise and try and get five, six, even eight or ten more reps. Chest is feeling pumped. I'm going to move on and start to incorporate some flies into this chest workout. What about chest flies is that it actually works the chest through its natural function and that is it closes the arm in like this, just like the breast on a bird or a chicken. It does that with its wings. So doing that on a flat bench with dumbbells is probably the greatest exercise to cause the most effect with that particular motion. So I've already hit a couple of presses both on the incline and with the machine and like I mentioned earlier that I wanted to focus on my upper chest a lot. That doesn't mean every exercise always needs to be on an incline. I'm going to vary the angle of the bench, the angle on the line of the pull or the push, either with cables or a barbell. There's always something different. I'm never going to do the same exercise in the same manner over and over. So with the chest flies, pretty basic here, flat bench, fairly heavy, and you'll see that with my arm I'm trying to keep quite a fixed angle at my elbow. I'm not bending my elbow or flexing it as I bring that weight up. I want to keep my arm complex here fixed. So all of that movement is being generated from the pectoral, squeezing in up, up at the top. Also get nice, deep, as low as the weight down, as low as you can. Really stretch out that chest. That's why I've got a slight bend in my elbow otherwise I've got a lot of strain on my bicep. So just enough stretch to open out around the origin here and as I bring that back up, getting a nice, deep stretch and deep contraction in the chest. My final point here is you'll notice on the last set I was only focusing on about two-thirds of the motion and that is the weight all the way down and I'm pulsing it up and I'm not pulsing the dumbbells all the way up. The reason for that is simply because I want to stress out around this area of my chest and this gets worked the most, the outer region, when my arms are sort of out there furthest apart. So a lot of stress on there, not too heavy but enough to get eight or nine good reps. Then I'm going to drop that weight down, lower the weight and finish off by closing the arms all the way from top to bottom. Chest is feeling really pumped. I'll tell you what, working with Eric a few hours ago, having him work on opening out my muscle fibers and kind of working around all the muscles on my shoulders, I genuinely do feel like I'm able to push more weight. So let's put that to the test, move on and I'm going to superset now some parallel bar dips for the lower chest and also some varying angles on the cable fly. It's a great little combo here for chest. Those parallel bar dips, which a lot of people think actually targets their tricep and it does but just by tilting forwards at the waist, it's a great exercise to recruit and target more the lower region of the pectoral. That combined with our cable flies, both from a high angle. So this kind of movement down to more of a neutral or shoulder level and then a decline, upwards lift like that, supersetting those back and forth, rep range. To be honest, I'm not really counting. With the dips, it's until failure and with the cable flies after the dips, I'm at about 60% of my normal weight, maybe 12, 13, 14 reps, but it's those final few repetitions where I can really feel every muscle fiber just fight to get the arm to that end position. And that's really what much of this workout is about. It's not about being so focused on the numbers, the weights, the reps, it's about having a general idea of what you want to achieve and then just setting out and smashing through it. So you'll see throughout that sometimes on that ninth or 10th rep, other times I'm pushing 12, 13, 14 upwards and then doing a drop set. And that's simply because if it's feeling good and I want to run with it, I'm going to keep pushing. And that doesn't mean lifting heavier and heavier. It means working beyond and upwards of my threshold and then including some other training or shocking principles such as you've seen me do them, the drop sets, the rest pause and the superset. It's been about a 30 minute chest workout. My chest is really feeling pumped. I've got a lot of blood in there, worked it through a lot of angles, it's feeling nice and just mobile. So I did say this was going to be a chest and a shoulder workout. So I'm going to do a simple circuit now seeing as though I've got a lot of blood pulled into my upper region. My shoulders are nicely mobilized and warmed up. So I think I'm going to superset a press movement with a series of lateral raises. 15 minutes left and then we're done and all of that in under one hour. That's the workout done. You saw that after putting detailed chest workout, I moved on to shoulders. Really just as a circuit, two sets, 12, 15 reps each. I'm not focused on the overall weight. It's more just the pump that I'm getting in the shoulders, having already worked them within much of that chest workout. So nothing special here, just a seat to dumbbell press and then I moved straight on and did a circuit with some standing lateral dumbbell raises and then bent over rear reverse fly or dumbbell fly. If you like, purpose of this is, like I said, just to work the shoulders as an ancillary muscle, especially after they've already been involved in a lot of the chest workout. But chest was the primary focus of today's workout and I can certainly feel it. Listen, a few pointers and tips I'd like to leave you with at the end of this workout. And that's really the focus should be more on the muscle activation, the involvement of the muscle. Don't worry too much about how much weight you're pushing. That will come, especially if you're just starting out. It'll be much more productive for you to work with a lighter weight and really ask yourself every time you're performing that rep, the full extension, the full range of motion, am I feeling the muscle? Can I contract it? Am I feeling it squeeze? If not, you need to maybe drop that weight back and really find out what the causes so that you can engage and squeeze that muscle. Otherwise, if you're not fully engaged in the muscle, then you're not really fully optimizing that particular work set. If you're only thinking about the weight or the reps, if that makes sense. One other thing is the contraction is probably just as important as the amount of weight you're lifting. And if you're unable to maximize that contraction and really squeeze the muscle on each and every repetition, even if you're not holding the actual rep there, just kind of moving the weights in and out, but you're still able to pump and flex that muscle. That, I would say, is as not, if not more important than the overall weight that you're lifting. So definitely take that into account on every workout you do. Speaking of which, this is one of five of my weekly workouts. The actual muscle groups don't change too often, but as you'll see, many of the training methods and the principles, drop sets, shock and principles that I incorporate into those workouts do. And you can fund all of them on my profile at supplementsworld.com under the training tab.  It's been a long day for me. I'm going to wash this out, protein-shaking here, another two scoops of protein, and then I'll eat a meal about an hour now once I'm home and changed. So until next time, listen, guys, keep making progress. Even if it's only a tiny amount of progress in each workout, it's still progress. Train hard and train smart. I'll see you guys back here soon. Take care.