Keir Starmer's leadership so far has been a transparent attempt to appeal to older white voters by waiving British flags. It doesn't seem to have worked. It also has caused some problems because Labour has refused to offer anything to anyone else. We've seen in YouGov polling that this myopic strategy has already led many young people to abandon the party and new polling from Servation suggests he has just as serious a problem with Britain's Muslims in a weighted poll of over 500 Muslim voters. Servation found that identification with the Labour Party remains high, but is falling. So to the question, which if any of the following political parties do you most identify with, 72% of Muslims said Labour, so incredibly high. That's down 11 points from 2019, but still not huge cause for concern, although, as I say, direction of travel is worrying. That changing relationship of some Muslims to the Labour Party is clearer in the following question. In the past 12 months, has your view of the Labour Party become more favourable or more unfavourable? 25% of people have said more favourable. 37% of people have said more unfavourable. So that's net 12%. So on the whole, Muslim Britons think Labour is going in the wrong direction. And most worrying for Keir Starmer when it comes to this poll is British Muslims' attitudes towards Keir Starmer himself. Now Boris Johnson, very unpopular among Muslim voters. 20% of people think about him favourably. 53% unfavourably. So that's a net minus 33. He's not popular for obvious reasons. He compared Muslim women to letterboxes or sorts of other unsavoury things in his past writings. Starmer, though, is not doing particularly well either. So 22% think about him favourably. That's only two points more than Boris Johnson. 29% unfavourably. And obviously, that's not as high as 53%. So Keir Starmer is on net minus seven. But that's not looking good for a Labour Party leader. As you can see, Labour polling way, way higher than Keir Starmer among Muslim voters. Now you might say this is just a poll. It's speculative. We won't know what happens until an actual election. In fact, it seems that this is playing out on the ground right now. At least, that's if you believe reports from Batley and Spen. Batley and Spen, obviously, the site of a by-election which will be happening on the 1st of July because the MP has now become the West Yorkshire mayor. It's a very, very high stakes by-election. A little bit like Hartlepool. It's somewhere that voted Brexit and where Labour lost in vote share in 2019, essentially, because they backed a second referendum. However, while Labour was trounced in Hartlepool, there were people suggesting that Batley and Spen would be a different story because Hartlepool is a very white place. Batley and Spen has larger populations of ethnic minorities, in particular Muslims, which is why this polling has come out at a very relevant moment. And the particular worry for Labour in Batley and Spen is that whilst I assume their short-sighted strategists have said, well, we need to focus on the flags because it's the older white people who are going Tory and the young people and the Muslims have nowhere else to go, someone landed in the constituency who's caused some problems for Keir Starmer. It's this guy, George Galloway. He's a former Labour and Respect MP and he is explicitly positioning himself as the candidate to vote for if you're unhappy with Keir Starmer's leadership of the Labour Party. You can see a poster here of Starmer out with him looking like he's ready to do some bareknuckle boxing and he's also running as an advocate for Palestinian rights. He's saying, I'm uncompromising in my support of the Palestinians, contrasting himself with Keir Starmer. This apparently is being brought up repeatedly on the doorstep. Labour sources say their last week on the doorstep has been dreadful. The issue is almost exclusively Palestine. On Friday evening, Galloway had been around 45 minutes before us in one of our stomping grounds. Nobody wanted to speak to us. Worrying for the Labour Party. Keir Starmer has been very, very timid when it comes to basically any foreign policy issue, but obviously Palestine is particularly relevant now because of what's been happening, because of the bombardment of Gaza, because of the evictions, the expulsions essentially in Sheikh Jarrah, because of the storming of the Al Aqsa Mosque. All of these issues mean that people want to hear a loud advocate for Palestinian rights, especially people in the Muslim community, and they're not hearing that from the Labour Party. Now Labour are worried. Now the fact this is causing electoral problems for Labour is a little bit ironic given that we have seen so much bashing recently from centrists of the Labour left, and it all focuses on this idea that of course, no one in their right mind, no voter cares about foreign policy, and we don't know why Jeremy Corbyn, why the left always want Keir Starmer to talk about foreign policy, because no one, absolutely no one cares about it. This was Dan Hodges, one of the Mail On Sunday star columnists. Red Wall voters think Labour cares more about the Palestinians than them, and they're right. So we're saying that the reason Labour are losing the Red Wall is because they talk too much about Palestine. What's happened now? They're going to battle you and spend their money. They're going to lose it because Keir Starmer has not been vocal enough about Palestine. How wrong could Dan Hodges be? Now a week earlier, former Labour MP Anatoly had wrote essentially a similar article. She argued, a party that waves the Palestinian flag from its conference floor, but balks at the flag of its own country will never be able to convince people that it is interested in representing the voters of Hartlepool or fit to govern this country. Now that Anatoly piece was published the day Israel began bombing Gaza. It was shared approvingly by, among others, David Miliband. That Dan Hodges article, of course, was published in the middle of the bombardment of Gaza. That was his point. You say, why are Labour even commenting on this? Obviously, from our perspective, Labour were fairly weak on it. You say that the fact they even commented on it shows that they're not fit to win an election. If they do want to stick to their guns on this, Anatoly and Dan Hodges will now need to have a word with the people in charge of Labour's election literature because the party have responded to disquiet among the Muslim community in competition from George Galloway by making their election leaflets about Palestine, Kashmir and Islamophobia. You can see here a leaflet which is being handed out in batley. It does seem like these centrists for just a month ago, for them to be saying, oh, why the hell would you talk about Palestine?  This was everything that was wrong with Corbyn and now Kirstarmer's Labour with a candidate who's not from the left, by the way, handing out leaflets which are now desperately saying, oh, these are what we think about Palestine. This is what we think about Kashmir. This is what we think about Islamophobia. It's desperate. But here's the thing about Anatoly and Dan Hodges. As well as being, how can I put this kindly, idiots? As well as being idiots, they're also ideologues. So by using the red wall as a disciplinary tool against the left, they're able to say, look, these things that you care about, but I am ideologically opposed to, i.e. Palestinian self-determination, a lively Palestine solidarity movement in this country, which holds Israel to account the BDS movement. These things which I'm ideologically opposed to, it's not me saying this. It's the red wall. And we forget that the red wall is as diverse and as varied as anywhere else. So you don't have this complete homogeneity across different seats and within individual constituencies as well. You've got a vast array of racial groups, ethnic groups, religious groups, voting behaviors, social views. But it becomes usefully homogenised and presented as one thing by the right, precisely so it can use the left's own guilt for what happened in 2019 against the left and make sure that you never get too many ideas about shaping the foreign policy of the Labour Party ever again. And so I think that that's what's going on there and that's why Palestine was being framed in that way. It's not because it stands up to even an iota of scrutiny. You've got very rich traditions of internationalism and Palestine solidarity outside of London, not that you would ever know it by reading one of Dan Hodges' columns. You've also got large Muslim communities who do feel very strongly about issues like Palestine and Kashmir. But it wasn't useful to acknowledge that. It was strategic to pretend that the only kind of voter in a red wall seat, whether that red wall seat is Hartlepool or Batley and Spen or whether it's Chesterfield or Derby, it's all populated by the same kind of person, which is an older white guy who loves pies, pints, and the queen. And that's it. So it's in its own way deeply patronising and very stereotypical. But I think as for this hemorrhaging of support for Kerstama amongst Britain's Muslims, you have to, I think, take a slightly more nuanced view. And so there are specific issues like Palestine, like Kashmir, where the Labour Party have been absolutely atrocious, either absent or doubling back on themselves and making U-turns all over the shop. But I think there's also something which I think is a lot more nebulous, a general vibe, which was that with Jeremy Corbyn, if you were Muslim in this country, you knew that he was going to fight for you. You knew that he didn't look at you like you were all potential jihadis and you didn't really belong in this country. You got the sense that he wasn't embarrassed by you. He'd stand by you in your fight and would feel really at home doing so. With Kerstama, unfortunately, there I think is this aura that he and the team around him are embarrassed by their most loyal voter cohorts, whether that's people who live in cities, whether that's young people, or whether that's this country's ethnic minorities in particular Muslims. And I think it's because Jeremy Corbyn was hauled over coals for a perceived proximity to Muslims, which made people tar him with the brush of terrorist sympathiser. I always say Jeremy Corbyn was a victim of Islamophobia because he really was. We were used as a means to discredit and delegitimize his leadership. And I think instead of standing against that in a powerful and forthright way, Kerstama in many ways has couted out to it. And that's just plainly obvious. You don't get the sense that he's going to fight alongside you, take you seriously, not be embarrassed by you the way Jeremy Corbyn was. And I also think that there's you know, something else going on here, which is gestural politics, right? Now George Galloway is, in my opinion, a snake oil salesman. I don't think that he's somebody to be trusted. You look at what he was saying about that really wonderful anti-deportation action that took place in Glasgow. He was condemning it in the strongest possible terms. This is not somebody who's anti-racism is reliable. But in talking to Muslims the way that he does, I think something which he is exploiting is a sense amongst many ethnic minorities in this country, not just Muslims, that the way in which the labour anti-semitism crisis was portrayed in the media completely closed down the room to talk about your own experiences of racism. It was always treated as secondary issue to the primary one, which was labour anti-semitism.  You've got Britain's Muslims who are, you know, subject to prevent, subject to surveillance, are vilified from pillar to post in pretty much every tabloid newspaper in this country going, eh, what do you mean no other minority? Like we've been here this whole time. And when you've got that deliberate, I think, insults to the Muslim experience coming from the press. And when it's something which I think implicitly has been reinforced through Keir Starmer's orientation as Labour leader, it does leave space for somebody like George Galloway to come along with this very shallow gestural politics of recognition and go, see, you know, I'm here for you. And that's probably not going to win George Galloway the seat, but it might peel off enough voters or, you know, demoralise enough of Labour's Muslim voters that the Tories sneak through in battle and spend. And again, it's a crisis of Keir Starmer's making is through his own poor strategy and lack of foresight that he's left himself open to being outflanked on his left.


Hi, I'm Ariel Hamlin from Northeastern University. Today, I will be talking about two server distributed O-RAM with sublinear computation and constant rounds. This is a joint work with my uncle Veria from Boston University. The distributed O-RAM model, or DO-RAM, was first introduced by Ostrovsky and Schup in 1997 and formally defined by Lewin Ostrovsky in 2013. It was originally introduced as a variant of traditional O-RAM that sought to get around the lower bound results in the single server model. In this setting, multiple non-colluding servers act as the O-RAM server. The client interacts with each of them in turn and is able to recover records in this way while maintaining obliviousness. The servers may have the same data or individual databases depending on the scheme. There are many papers that consider the DO-RAM setting, but in this talk we will specifically discuss the secure computation variant. In the secure computation variant, servers work together to emulate the client while maintaining non-collusion and obliviousness. As first noted by Lewin Ostrovsky, multi-server DO-RAM schemes are especially adaptable to secure computation and highly useful for secure computation programs where one wishes to run a program in the RAM model. In the secure computation setting, latency between the number of rounds of communication can be high, which motivates the need for constant rounds. We also wish to limit the amount of work the servers have to do to be sublinear in the data size, as this scales poorly for large datasets otherwise. There are many schemes in this setting. See the paper for full comparison, but in this limited table we examine previous work that either managed constant rounds or sublinear local computation. Gordon, Katz, and Wang, for example, have constant rounds but linear server computation. Jerecki and Wei achieves the best overall parameters, but does not obtain constant rounds in sublinear work. We are the first work to obtain sublinear local computation and constant rounds simultaneously. We present two different constructions. First, an adaptation of square root ORAM to the secure computation DO-RAM setting. This obtains square root log n local computation and a second construction that extends the first in such a way that reads are no longer indistinguishable from writes to obtain a better end to the epsilon for any epsilon greater than zero local computation. We do so by adapting techniques from doubly efficient private information retrieval. I next will discuss our sublinear DO-RAM construction, first by reviewing the traditional square root ORAM construction, then discuss how we adapt it to our secure computation setting. Next, I will explain how we extend it to the unlimited reads setting. Square root ORAM was first introduced by Goldwright and Astrovsky in 1996 and is in the standard single client single server model. In their construction, the server stores two separate data structures, the first of which is a copy of the database called the store. This is a permuted read-only data structure where the client holds the key to the permutation. The second data structure is an updateable stash. When the client wishes to make a read, the server first scans the stash to see if the record has been previously read or written to. The next step is to read a single location in the store. The exact element will depend on whether the element is present in the stash in the previous step. If it is, the element read is a dummy record. If not present in the stash, the record is read itself from the store. The invariant maintained is that each location in the store is only read once. Finally, the element is written back to the stash in the most recent location. This location is updated after every access, whether it be a read or a write. For a write, the first two steps are similar. Only a dummy element is read from the stash and the element written to the stash in the final step is the input element. When the stash becomes full, at the end of an epoch, the stash is reshuffled back into the store, removing any duplicated elements. Each access for square root ORAM takes square root of the database size and is constant rounds. This is a good starting point for our own scheme, but there are two main problems that prevent a generic adaptation using a standard secure computation compiler. The first is supporting the reshuffling at the end of an epoch in constant rounds. This is often done using oblivious sorting, and the only known secure computation variants of oblivious sort are not constant round. The second is representing the permutation of the store in a compact way when the client is emulated by the two servers. These are the two main issues that we will focus on addressing during our construction. I will now introduce our first construction that obtains sublinear server work and constant rounds. As with traditional square root ORAM, we store the data in a permuted store. Only the data is additively secret shared between the two servers. Each of them store the data under the same permutation and have a secret shared copy of the permutation key. We also store the stash as a secret sharing. In practice, the stash is instantiated with a linear ORAM with constant rounds, specifically flowRAM by Dorner et al. Because the stash is sublinear in the overall database size, the linearity of our stash ORAM scheme does not affect the overall sublinearity of our DorAM construction. When a read is performed, the operation and the index to be read are additively secret shared among the two servers. Operations then proceed as with traditional square root ORAM, first by checking that the element is not in the stash. The next step is then to read an element from the store. This is where we deviate from the original square root ORAM and solve our first problem, how to represent the permutation of the store. We do this by leveraging a cryptographic primitive called oblivious pseudo-random functions. As a primitive, OPRFs mean that each server holds a share of the PRF key and the input. They jointly evaluate the PRF while not learning anything about the other server's input. At the end of the protocol, each server learns the output of the PRF. It is this output that represents the location that each server looks for, the element being searched for, whether it be a dummy or index i in the store. In practice, we sort the PRF outputs for each element lexicographically and then do a binary search over those tags to find elements. Finally, once an element is found in the store, we write it back to the stash. For the write, the process is identical until this third step, and this is where we solve the reshuffling and constant rounds problem. When we go to write the element that is already in the stash, instead of writing to the next location in the stash as in traditional square root O RAM, we instead update the element already in the stash in that specific location. This means that each element is only in the stash once, which is key for our reshuffling face. We consider the following invariant to be key to our reshuffling process. If an element has been read or written to, it is in the stash, and each element only occurs in the stash once. This eliminates the issue that was present in the initial square root O RAM construction that he used oblivious sort to remove duplicates, and thus was not constant rounds. We also rely on the observation that each server knows, without loss of privacy, the set of elements that have not been read in the store during the current epoch. Reshuffling is a simple process that takes the elements in the stash and the unread elements in the store, and simply privately repermutes them under a new OPRF key. The stash is then filled with new dummy blocks to be overwritten during the new epoch. Because the permutations between the two epochs cannot be linked, obliviousness is preserved, and the permutation process can be done in constant rounds, though in linear time. In summary, we are able to achieve the first secure computation DOE-RAM variant with sublinear local computation and constant rounds. Our local computation is square root log n, where n is database size. The square root comes from the linear operations performed on the stash, and the log n comes from the binary search performed to find elements in the store. I now want to discuss how we extend this construction to support unlimited reads without having to update the stash. Overall, this creates far better performance when the number of reads greatly outnumbers the number of writes. Now, we move on to our sublinear DOE-RAM with unlimited reads construction. Our motivating thought for this construction is the question. If we are willing to leak the difference between reads and writes, can we support reads without updating the internal state of the servers and thus put off the costly reshoveling process at the end of an epoch? To do this, we turn to another technique to hide data accesses. Private information retrieval or peer. Peer is a read-only protocol, and the servers are stateless during a read access, meaning they provide obliviousness without having to update the server's state. Using peer, the simplest solution is to add a peer store in addition to the store and the stash already existing from our previous scheme. Due to the overall modularity of our first scheme, writes remain the same as the first protocol, but reads now first scan the stash, where the latest copy of the element would be if there was a previous write, and then read the element from the peer store. They then take the element from the stash if it exists or the one from the peer store. Because peer essentially supports an unlimited number of reads, we can support any number of reads between epochs, and refreshing only depends on the number of writes. However, we must be careful in selecting an individual peer scheme to instantiate this version, as we wish to maintain our sublinear server computation and constant rounds in our new construction. As previously mentioned, the trick to choosing the peer scheme depends on two things. The peer scheme must be sublinear computation for the server, and we must be able to emulate the client in constant rounds. This is an issue as traditionally peer schemes require linear server work, which because this peer store would contain our entire database would not work, unlike our stash, which is square root in size. Thus, we turn to doubly efficient peer or deep peer, where the double efficiency here refers to the fact that both the client and the server have sublinear computation. Deep peer is also known as peer with pre-processing, due to the fact that the database is processed during the setup phase. In addition, the constructions for deep peer rely on coding constructions that are highly amenable to secure computation. Leading to an emulated client that only takes constant rounds. I will note that there are other two server peer constructions, namely Korgan and Gibbs, that do meet the sublinear server computation. But those constructions rely on primitives that are not conducive to secure computation emulation, particularly punctured pseudo random sets, which are not clear how to convert to a constant round protocol when emulating the client. The construction of deep peer, first introduced concurrently by Kennedy et al and Boyle et al, are based on new assumptions on noisy permuted read molar codes. I want to take the rest of the talk to introduce some of the challenges we had when converting the deep peer client to a secure computation, and how we solved them by introducing a secure computation variant of fast Fourier transform protocols, which we believe is a contribution of independent interest. I want to go through, at a very high level, the process of how deep peer works using read molar codes. Read molar codes are a family of locally decodable codes that represent the database as a polynomial. In particular, they use a t-degree multivariate polynomial over a finite field, and the encoding is a low-degree extension of the database. In general, however, consider the setup process that takes in a database, and then viewing each element of that database as a point, interpolates a degree t polynomial we will call psi. This is what the server stores. When a client wishes to read the value at index i, the client first represents that index as a random polynomial v. This random polynomial is also a degree t, and evaluates at zero to the index being read. The client then evaluates this polynomial at several preset points and obtains the output, here represented as a, b, and c. These are the points that the client now asks the server to return the values of the database function at. The server obtains the points y sub a, y sub b, and y sub c, and sends them back to the client. The client is then able to interpolate across these t points in order to recover the database value at index i. When emulating this process using two servers, the only steps that are non-local or non-linear operations are the two interpolations and the random polynomial evaluation, as it depends on the secret shared record i. The naive way to compute these steps is an n-squared operation of a matrix multiplication. This would not work for our reshuffling process has to be less than n-squared. However, these operations are also computable by FAST for a transform or FFT algorithm. We introduce an FFT secure computation protocol that can evaluate or interpolate the polynomials in quasi-linear time, n log-squared n, with only local computation, meaning that computing the FFT during these steps does not incur any additional rounds. We believe this protocol may also be of independent interest to the crypto community. To wrap up, we are able to obtain two constructions, the first of which is the first secure computation DORAM with sub-linear local computation and constant rounds. The second is an unlimited reads DORAM that leverages doubly efficient peer when we leak the difference between reads and writes to obtain better asthmatotic performance. For that construction, we are able to obtain an n to the epsilon for any epsilon greater than zero local computation and bandwidth. We also present an FFT algorithm that in quasi-linear time with only local computation is able to do multivariate interpolation and evaluation, and we believe may be a primitive of independent interest. Thank you for listening to my talk. Please feel free to reach out if you have any questions. Our emails can be found on our paper, and thank you for the additional soundtrack of my cat who you may have heard in the background. Karina, I love you.


What's up everybody Jason here for jazby's case breaks calm 2021 panini mosaic football hobby three box break around teams number two Just sold out guys. This is a 32 spot break. Everybody gets around a team in the NFL And we're no veteran common ship, but everything else will all autos relics any numbered cards inserts rookies all that good stuff And again, you're looking at two autographs five silver parallels 15 mosaic parallels and 20 inserts per box And this is a three box break. So here we go. Here's a nice release of customer names James down to Jeremy last bout mojo then we got Cardinals down to the Washington Commanders roll it Three and a six nine times. Good luck one two three four five six seven eight nine nine times Bow down to Andrew nine times one two three four five six seven eight nine Patrons down to the 49ers nine times nine times. So bow. You have the Patriots Anthony with the Chiefs Michael L with the Jaguars David with the Chargers Mike You have the ramps Chris Butler with the Panthers car with the Lions bow with the Texans Steve birch of the Packers Jeremy with the Jets car with the Browns will with the Steelers James of the Giants And you have the Bears David with the Dolphins Richard with the Bengals James with the Vikings Steve birch of the Falcons Mike You have the Baltimore Ravens Andrew with the Bugganeers Brandon with the Raiders Andrew with the Colts bow with the Bills Terry with the Seahawks Andrew with the Saints Aaron you have the Arizona Cardinals Chris Butler with my Eagles Ryan with the Washington Commanders James of the Cowboys Allen with the Titans Michael with the Broncos and Andrew with the 49ers So I'm gonna pause the video guys, you know, we do have a little trade window opening up So if you want to trade for a specific team, you can see if a customer is willing to trade If not when I come back, we'll see if there's any trades and we'll do the break. All right guys so there was some trade offers but No accepting trade, so let's just stick to what you got guys.  I know it's like this brewer that Downstreet my mom's progress. They have like 64 ounce ones. You can just take home. There you go This is mosaic football 2021 Good luck guys Well, we don't really do that here Michael. I mean we don't really break with you know while we eat hot cheetos and Food our hands are always pretty clean But I always tell people I mean if you do like the gloves time to do it's cool But at the end of the day, you're still gonna I would suggest you still prep and clean because Regardless if it's the breaker not touching these cards. These are ones touched at one point but I Mean I don't mind if a breaker has gloves, but I don't personally wear them Doesn't really matter. I would prep these cards anyways Plus, what did you want my fingerprints on your cards? If you ever wanted to track me down It's a good way to do it, right? All right first box Good luck See a blue already Some blue Josh and Jefferson for the Vikings. You know Vikings.  We got Stefan digs Jamar Chase and Derek hard for the raiders Raiders who has the raiders Brandon Aldous? It's got a couple of new toys over there in Las Vegas Las Vegas scary Tara McLaurin Daniel Jones Joe Burrell Tyler Murray inserts Jake funk Jacob Harris rookie. Oh Oh Case hit Case hit Storm chasers DK Metcalf. There you go.  Terry with the Seahawks. There you go DK Beautiful looking car too Overdrive Zach Wilson rookie. Oh, sorry Mike. I was actually just doing these carts Patty What up? All right, we still have another auto potential. Maybe some colors left. I see a rookie and I was a J Jalen Darden that is numbered 18 out of 49 for the Buccaneers going to Andrew Jamison Crowder Zach Erts in it to win it's Kyle Pitts rookie the Michael P. Ryan JC Ornn rookie silver Kelsey Devonte Smith and try to trade couldn't trade mojo for Aaron Rondeau Moore rookie autograph Jerry Rice Silver Trevor Lawrence introductions inserts Taysa Mill Tillman Cam Ager's insert Kyle Pitts red color match You know Kyle Pitts should go off with Marcus Mario to Mario's like favorite target has always been tight ends So expect Kyle Pitts to have a big year If Mario just throwing the ball in him Mario loves those tight ends. All right. Well, not a bad box with the storm chaser Derek Rondeau Moore Jalen Darden color That was box numero uno. Let's go with the next box Jared Goff in book Zach Wilson and a Travis etn introductions prism silver Michael Parsons Devonte Smith NFL debut silver prism John and Taylor red Got a center stage Maddie ice preland rookie Pain Manning of that 51 out of 99 who has the Broncos Michael I think a little pain manning blue Mike Evans over blue chips and we have Joe Dysman center stage Jamar Jefferson Met a battery marshal folk and for the Rams. There you go. The rookie tight end right there Los Angeles Rams that is going to Mike actually. Yeah, that's right. There you go. You got your Rams randomized to you. How about that? Drew Brees Hopkins Nice Trevor Lawrence right there. How about that? NFL debut prism silver Sanders Tom Brady and wow, that's a blue straight fire Dak Prescott for the Cowboys What a James that is numbered to 99 Wilson and Jake Plummer Carlos Tried to a country module Aaron 22 out of 49 Jalen waddles swagger in the water again Trevor Lawrence rookie ish Smith The blue chips Javante Williams silver One more autograph maybe here Once you're ready to pull both of them. Oh, here we go for the football team John Bates try to trick country module Ryan with the commanders Patrick Mahomesies KC going to Anthony. All right, so it looks like that a Maglev filler and Immaculate baseball is actually moving Maglev baseball now down to seven left and I believe three left in Immaculate basketball filler number one So let's sell it that first filler and then when I go through orders, I can repost up the next filler Yeah, Aaron you're getting some nice hits, right? Not too bad. That's number two There's a round auto there too as well The one thing I will say about mosaic is that some of the autographs are a little rough. I think This year they kind of a little bit harder on the autographs, but they did it I Create like potentially three or four case hits with the storm chasers mass grave walls the glass inserts Of course you get a bunch of color But I feel like the autographs have been a little rough Obviously there is nice autographs in the whole case, but obviously you got to get lucky and that's potentially obviously get that that box that's hot but One thing about the heavier based products with some of these numbered cards colors might sell for more than some autographs So two patents other might have another pain, but it wasn't a color of paint manning. I mean it might have just been like a base insert that obviously Just gets thrown in there like that And you like magnetics. You mean Michael. Yeah, we usually don't magnetic not because we don't want to do it but In the sense that we usually think it's shape safer to ship in a regular top loader if of course you hit a big hit and you want a magnetic we'll gladly throw it in there, but like I said Magnetics there Little rattle unless you meant the top. You mean the top loader. Oh, you mean the penny sleeve got you Yeah, I'm if I penny sleeve it obviously I don't want to be stuck penny-sleeving all these cards on on on On air, but the shipping team will penny-sleeve all these cards I'm just top loading some of the better stuff right now All right last box here Kenneth Gainwell Kubrick up Keenan Allen swagger Gregor was so Center stage Jalen hurts. Oh pepper center stage nods Harris rookie and Travis Calcy numbered JJ Watt Silver overdrive Aaron Jones Fred Belitnikov Gold I love the gold man. I love God One out of ten for the Raiders. Nice break for the Raiders Brandon. There you go Damian Williams Zach Wilson rookie Zeke Joe Montania overdrive JK Dobbins Marcus Stevenson Silver Stairmaster Stefan Dix and rookie autographs of Helen Mond Viking's gonna James. No, you're not really man. Honestly out of this rookie class definitely Devonte Smith Whoa, is that three autographs? Oh, is this the last two here? Wow? Maybe the It's a Vikings box Cameron Bynam and a Trevor Lawrence NFL debut silver very nice Jaguars who has a Jaguars Michael? There you go, man. That's a very nice silver right there Teelo not a shabby two boxes. I mean three boxes. Sorry. We've got a case hit and some nice silver some gold some color like it Now this means we're halfway through the case halfway through the case so The next three boxes would be the second half of the case obviously still a lot of potential big hit hiding I don't know what Joe did in the first first three boxes of the case or what he pulled but There could potentially still be more case hits and then there could be obviously more color and more bigger rookie autographs potentially But quick little recap right here Nice to blend the cup there. You got Kelly Mondo autograph Travis Kelsey killer Cameron by the monographs groaning Manning color Trevor Lawrence silver color straight fire Dak Prescott Jay Culver color dates autograph Storm chasers DK their car autograph round in more Jalen Darden and Trevor Lawrence silver Two three four five six there you go six autographs That and storm chaser. So appreciate you guys like I said next ones in the store Jasky's case breaks calm


the bride here how do you feel about getting married? Oh my god so good. What's your second favorite part about today? My favorite? Yeah your first is getting your husband right? Well yes second favorite is the reception. What's your favorite song? Oh all of them they're so good. Is this your playlist? Yes. And everybody loves your tunes how do you feel about that? So good. That's the best. What's happening later?


Hello friends, I am Mr. Sanjeev B. Naik working in Walchand Institute of Technology, Solapor. In this video, I am going to solve the problem based on design and natural tolerances which are used in engineering practice. So at the end of session, learners will be able to solve the similar problems on design and natural tolerances which are commonly used in engineering practice. So this is an example where the shaft is produced on particular manufacturing setup. The diameters of the shaft that produce on that setup are going to vary in their basic dimensions and that is why they are normally assumed to be distributed with a mean value of 40.02 mm having a standard division of 0.02 mm. So it is assumed that the variation provided by manufacturing setup follows normal distribution curve having its mean value 40.02 mm and having standard division of 0.02 mm. Whereas the designer has specified the limit of the design tolerance for the shaft diameter as 40 plus 0.05 mm as upper dimension limit and 40 minus 0.03 mm as a lower dimension unit where 40 is basic size. So the designer has provided basic size 40 mm on which he has specified the upper and lower dimension variation as a design tolerance. Now as per the requirement of design tolerance if this is been manufactured on particular manufacturing process which has got its own and natural tolerance then what will happen about rejection that is whatever quality is expected by the designer that maintaining the dimension between this limit is possible for all the parts produced or not because the design tolerance is different and natural tolerance is different that we can analyze over here. So first we decide whether the there is any rejection if at all and if it is rejection how many shafts are likely to be rejected in terms of percentage. So percentage shafts likely to be rejected so this is what expected answer. So for that what we do we first calculate absolute tolerances just by establishing what is known as lower limit for natural tolerance. We know that as the natural tolerance is distributed by normal distribution curve which is expressed as lower limit and upper limit with the value mean minus 3 sigma is a lower limit of that curve and that is 39.96 mm whereas the upper limit of natural tolerance will be mean plus 3 sigma. So total range of dispersion is between these two limits lower limit and upper limit. So upper limit is mean plus 3 sigma and that results to be 40.08 mm and 39.96 mm. So for natural tolerance we establish two limits upper and lower limit of dimensions in which all the shafts will vary which are been manufactured. Similarly for design tolerances directly we have specified the limit as x1 how if it is lower limit we get 40 minus 0.03 mm is a minimum dimension which is been allowed by the designer to maintain the quality and that is why it is 39.97 whereas the upper limit is 40 plus 0.05 and that is why 40.050 mm will be the upper limit of design tolerance. So by knowing these two tolerance we can further work out with the requirements. So just understand and just recall what is the significance of upper limit and lower limit of dimensions in manufacturing considerations in product design or in acceptance of the product as a quality. So just we have seen that we have established these two limits natural tolerance and lower limit and upper limit design tolerance lower limit and upper limit. Now these tolerance that is the difference between these two is distributed as a mean curve. So this is a normal distribution curve between which we decide the lower and upper limit. So this is a curve which is referred for natural tolerance because it is a manufacturing process. Actually product is manufactured according to this variation which is distributed between minus 3 sigma to plus 3 sigma and that sigma is converted into normal deviated z value because the standard curve is converted into real application of practical application in which we convert standard deviation standard into required standard deviation that is value of z. So that is what a natural tolerance. So this natural tolerance is between minus 3 to plus 3 that is what a natural tolerance is being shown which exists with its lower limit value 39.96 and upper limit value 40.08 mm so which is shown over here. So this gives the natural tolerance dispersion. So whereas what is design tolerance? Design tolerance is 39.97 lower limit and 40.05 upper limit. So this difference between two values is actually design tolerance. So means what designer is expected variation between these two limits which are accepted for its functional requirement. If he is not lying in this region then it is not accepted so it is rejected. So this gives certain idea about considering lower limit upper limit of design and natural tolerance is that there can be certain rejection over here because manufacturing dimension is more than expected design dimension as a limit and that is why the shaft which will have dimensions more than 40.05 till 40.08 these are not accepted so it is rejected. So this way this analysis will help us. So we have to establish this in terms of z so that area under the curve which is provided by standard tables or standard charts considering standard normal curve by central limit theorem and that is what standard dimension areas are known. So to make it that what we calculate first what is the standard division of this dimension with respect to mean where z is 0 so that we calculate at x1 and that value of z1 is given as x1 minus mu upon sigma standard division like this 39.970 is lower limit and mu is 40.02 standard division is this so minus 2.5 so z value at this means what this level is lying at 2.5 minus value of z here this value this we can establish. Similarly we can calculate z according to this line as 40.0 upper limit that gives z2 plus 1.5 so this is a z value plus 1.5 and that is why the area under the curve between standard divisions minus 2.5 to plus 1.5 which is value of z is within design tolerance which is going to be accepted as a required quality of the shafts and anything beyond this like this it is a rejection. So here any dimension lies after 40 point something towards this it is not accepted so this is a rejected number of shafts as a percentage this is a rejected number of shafts as a percentage so area under the curve directly reflects the percentage of either rejection or acceptance and that is why if I want to know how much percentage of shaft is rejected I want to calculate area shaded area this area plus this area this is my need of problem to solve and as design tolerance is less than natural tolerance the first answer is that there is a rejection so as design tolerance is less than natural tolerance there is always rejection. So rejection is going to occur definitely and that is equal to the area under this shaded curve that we can calculate so percentage of rejection of shafts produced will correspond to the shaded area under the curve as shown. So we calculate from standard the shaded area so the first area we calculate between z is equal to 0 to 2.5 so z is equal to 0 to 2.5 and then from 0 to 1.5 so total area is between minus 2.5 to 1.5 that is been obtained between 0 and this value and between 0 and this value from standard table it is obtained as 0.4938 plus 0.432 that is area between this area that is what between the quality norms so it is accepted and that is why the area of rejection is obtained considering entire area under the curve which is 1 that is 100 minus this value which is accepted so it gives 1 minus 0.927 and that results to be 0.073 area so this area plus this area is aggregate to nearly 7.3% so percentage of rejection of shaft is 7.3% so this is the way we can first identify as the design tolerance is less than natural tolerance there is a rejection inherent rejection and that rejection total is about 7.3% so if thousand shafts are produced on this manufacturing system nearly 73 shafts will be rejected so that way the decision making analysis can be made by using this statistical technique in considering design and natural tolerances this is my reference thank you


Hello. I would like to show you one way that I teach number symbols and counting to the students in my early childhood classroom. To begin with, we've been practicing counting for several days now. And I am ready to introduce the numbers, the actual numerals that represent those amounts. So this is one way I would do it. I have my counters, and today we're using pinto beans. And I would say, boys and girls, let's count four. Count with me. One, two, three, four. How many are in my group today, boys and girls, in my row? Four. And then I would show them the number four. Boys and girls, this is the number four. When we have four beans, this is how we show that on a piece of paper. This is the number four. Then we would continue to count. We would count, maybe I might say, boys and girls, let's count to six. One, two, three, four, five, six. How many beans are there, boys and girls? Six. And when you have six beans, this is the number you use. This is the way we write six. And I would continue on in this mode for several numbers. And then I would take one number specifically each day. The first day, of course, I'm going to start with the number one. Then two, I'm going to go all the way to 20. And we are going to practice counting them. We are going to practice writing them. If you don't like the cards that stand up, many times I have my students lay the card down and they'll put six on top of the number six. They can do this in small groups. They can do it with partners. They can do it independently. Now the fun part, I would create a poster numbered one to 20, one being the bottom. And we would put the number one and we would talk about things we can draw. After I put like one dot or one tally or one flower or one X on my chart, I would give the children a paper with a one. They trace the number one and the number word one.  Then when we do day two, we continue and they trace the number and they trace the number word. Then they draw two of their favorite things. And that continues and by the time we're done at the 20, we have a book of counting. Plus it's a book of our favorite things. As an assessment tool, I might use my dots cards, have the children count the dots cards and match it with a picture. This is one way that I teach the children in my early childhood classroom to connect counting and numbers, the actual symbols.


Thank you very much both Vikram and Ram for arranging for this lecture. So what I want to do is to talk a little bit about some of the concepts underlying identity policy. Talk a little bit about some of the experiences that we faced in the UK to give a bit of context to the particular experiences that the UK faced. And then to talk about some of the broader issues of identity policy as they relate to issues of welfare and social inclusion. Particularly because that's one of the claims that the UID programme has. I'm more than happy to answer any questions that anybody has because I'm sure the things that I decided to include in my presentation will leave a whole series of things that people want further questions about as well. So more than happy to take questions as and when required. Perhaps it will be a little bit helpful to explain my intellectual backgrounds. I'm based at the London School of Economics which is the UK's premier social science institution. I'm in the department of management but I'm in the information systems group which means I have an interest and a background in computing technology. I'm actually programme. Not brilliantly but I can programme. I think about the organisational and managerial consequences of technology. So Ron mentioned the work we've been doing recently about cloud computing and you can look at cloud computing just in terms of virtualised servers. But you can also look at them in terms of the organisational issues, the skill sets that you need to manage moves to the cloud etc. So that's very much where I place myself. The department, the group sees itself as doing the social study of ICTs and in particular the focus that the identity policy relates to is the role of ICTs in the public sphere. As mentioned we wrote this report in 2005 looking into the UK ID card scheme and as we've been following the ongoing path of the UK scheme we were writing papers and we put those together in the book that you can see on the right. Let's start with just a simple question about identity policy. So a very simple one is who am I? You've had some people introducing me but on what basis do you trust them? Other than the two introducers I don't think I've met any of you before so how do you know who I am? How do you know that I'm Edgar Whitley who's an academic base at the LSE? How do you know if you are a government department that I'm Edgar Whitley and I'm entitled to some tax credits? Maybe you're an organisation that sends out leaflets and I've said that I'm Edgar Whitley and I'd like you to send me a leaflet. How do you know? How important is it? Maybe I'm actually Mickey Mouse and I've been invited to give this presentation. There is a bit of a giveaway but how do you know that I'm not actually Mickey Mouse?  But that's very common so lots of people know me as Ed Whitley rather than Edgar Whitley but they still think it's me. Maybe I'm Farg in World of Warcraft or some online game. How do you know? Maybe I'm just someone who wants to post some comments about the beauty of Mumbai and what a lovely city it is. The key issue, that's Mickey Mouse, that's not me. So the questions become how do you know who I am and perhaps more importantly do you or should you care? In many contexts certainly in the UK you don't need to know who I am for me to be able to post comments to an online newspaper. In some countries that becomes a requirement. In the online game knowing who I am has nothing really to do with my real world identity. It simply has to do with my game based identity. Knowing who I am if you want to post a leaflet to me doesn't really require very much checking. You might if your conscious of cost check that the address exists but you don't care whether it's written to Bill Clinton or Edgar Whitley or whatever. You've just got to post the leaflet to the particular address. If you're dealing with tax returns and tax credits then you start to get a little bit more uneasy. You need to have a little bit more confidence that the person that you're interacting with is really the person that they claim to be. So this question of who you are and how do you know becomes very, very significant. So I've said that I'm an academic at LSE, different levels of service. So I could show you my LSE library card. Let me show you it's slightly larger. Anybody recognise the face? Is it me isn't it? I mean bit more hair, bit fatter face. Would anybody trust that as a proof that I'm an academic at LSE? Well there's a little bit of a problem that that library card expired. So even if it had at one point in time been a valid proof of ID issued by the LSE and we assume that you know what LSE ID cards really look like. You shouldn't be accepting that because it's no longer valid. But it's okay. They issued me with a brand new library card, valid until 2018. And although the enrolment process has a camera for all of the new students so that they can take their photo, because they already had a photo on the system they just used the old photo of me. It's a little bit clearer because the card hasn't been worn out by being used in the library turnstiles. Is that me? Would you be prepared? Okay LSE ID maybe that's not what you're prepared to accept. How about a driving licence? Anybody accept a UK issued driving licence? Well again this one expired so you shouldn't be accepting that one either. You should in fact be relying on this one where the photo was taken at the end of October and I looked particularly grim in it. But perhaps the photo looks a little bit closer to what I look like at the moment. The UK driving licence has a number of security features. You can see the embossing over the photograph. You can see that the ID number is marked there. There's some very fine printing. So if you were really concerned about me having a fake ID, possibly if I was younger to get served alcohol or whatever, there are various things that you can do to check whether or not this really is a valid ID once the date is correct. Except even in that case it doesn't always work perfectly. This is a beautiful news story from the Irish Republic where they discovered that there was one driver of Polish origin who seemed to be the world's worst driver with regards to traffic offences in Ireland. Because when they kind of did a spreadsheet tabulation they found that time and time and time again this driver called Prarrow-Jasdy was the driver who had been charged with speeding and parking offences and driving under the influence a whole series of different offences all being committed by Prarrow-Jasdy. Except that's not his name. That's actually the Polish for driving licence. And so the Irish police had looked for something that looks like it's a name. So it's got two parts to the first bit and a second bit. It looks a bit like a name and had decided that that was the name. So it's not the first name in the surname, it's just the words for driving licence. You'll actually look very closely the new style driving licence has it up there but not in a bit where it gets confused with the person's name. You'll notice also that that photo is black and white. There was a father of three in the UK who spent four months in jail because he was wrongly accused of having a fake driving licence. He was picked up by the authorities. The authorities asked for proof of ID. He showed them his government issued driving licence. The only thing was that his government issued driving licence had a colour photograph on it which was actually permitted under the older versions of the photo card driving licence. The police who had stopped him had forgotten about or never been informed about that particular requirement. And because he was a suspicious character who was possibly at risk of being an illegal immigrant and then if not held in prison would go underground and would just disappear from the systems. It was assumed that his driving licence was faked but he foolishly stuck a colour photo on it rather than the black and white photo and therefore he was kept in prison. Eventually somebody pointed out that the driving licence of the age that he had was allowed to have a colour photograph. So there's this real issue that even if you have a state issued ID you need to make sure that everybody who is using it for real purposes not just that it looks a bit like you or you've got something in your hand that looks like it's got a photo on it so it will let you in. Something that is a state issued ID you need to make sure that everybody knows what the valid state issues IDs are because otherwise it becomes completely meaningless and you start throwing people in prison because they've got one that's not like the one that you think they should have. The next level up for state issued credentials state issued document is the passport and here typically you get increasingly sophisticated levels of security increasingly sophisticated levels of protection. A variety of different things are done in the passport you can see the really fine printing you can see the multicolored imagery you can see the embossing over the photograph making it very difficult to replace the photograph. If you ever take a modern passport into a nightclub that has ultraviolet light you will see that there's various bits of ultraviolet ink in there as well. These are all the kinds of things that border guards check when they look at the passport and they flick through a few pages so they're either just looking at the photo card or they're doing a couple of other checks that they know make it increasingly likely that the passport in front of them is a genuine one. Just one of the tricks that you can check when you look at your passports if you have a passport at home is the fonts that are used on the passport numbers. If you look very very closely the font size for letters is slightly different to the font size for numbers. When you've been told this it becomes completely obvious and you tell your imaginary fake passport creator conscious of the video cameras that you don't obviously have passport fakers but if you were to have one one of the things that you can tell them is make sure that the font size for the number is slightly smaller than the font size for sorry, for the letter it's slightly smaller than the font size for the number because that's one of those things that once you know it you can immediately spot whether or not it's a fake passport or a passport that hasn't got that particular safety check in it. There are lots more, some of which I know but many of which they weren't even allowed to tell me. So there's that first question when you're thinking about identifying someone different kinds of identification different levels of security different levels of checking it's very difficult to get a British passport because a British passport has one of those advantages that many countries give you a visa or don't even require a visa if you have a British passport therefore there's an incredible incentive for people to either apply for a passport that they're not entitled to or create a fake passport that looks like a British passport and so the UK identity and passport service spends a lot of time making sure that it issues passports only to those people that are entitled to them and a lot of time building in security measures to make sure that with a bit of knowledge you can check whether or not it is actually a valid passport. But that issue of risk and the different levels of risk and the different amount of work that you're prepared to do is a very important one for thinking about identity policy more generally. So I want to move on to my own particular interest in identity issues. How come I'm here to talk to you about this kind of stuff? So as Ram mentioned the UK in around about 2004 introduced proposals to introduce a biometric identity card based around a centralized government database which would hold details both of all of the identity cards and the biometrics that were issued plus an audit trail that would provide details of every time you had formally checked that the identity card was valid. Now the flash and go type check where you just show somebody an ID card and it looks legitimate or you flick it and it has the right sound wouldn't obviously check it on the audit trail. But any time that you were going to do a formal check perhaps by putting the card in a card reader or presenting your biometric they wouldn't just check whether or not the card was valid they'd also check against the database that the data that was held there was correct. And the system would then provide an audit trail of every time that had happened which has very interesting privacy implications because if that audit trail shows Edgar going to the health clinic on Monday and on Wednesday and on Friday and you know that that health clinic is actually the sexual health clinic then you've automatically inferred interesting features about my lifestyle from the fact that I'm regularly attending this sexual health clinic. But more generally there was a whole series of concerns that both those academics and conversations with industry colleagues and lawyers etc got us really concerned that the government was presenting the argument and the evidence for ID cards as straightforward and unproblematic when all the people we were talking to were saying it's not such a great idea there are problems, there are issues that you need to take into consideration. So for example one of the concerns was if you have a single database with all of the details of every UK citizen on it that's going to be a fantastic target for hackers why bother to break into banks when you can get the identity data of 60 million people in the UK. There were questions about the potential benefits if the ID card was there to stop identity fraud and benefit fraud what was the actual evidence of how much fraud was going on and how much of that fraud could actually be addressed by having an identity card so one of the examples that was being argued for by government was that identity cards would stop fraudulent welfare benefits benefit payments of benefit fraud the only slight and sort of sorry to be an academic and point this out to you the evidence was that the vast majority of benefit fraud taking place in the UK had nothing to do with false identities but everything to do with misrepresentation of circumstances so in practice the vast majority of benefit fraud did not involve Edgar going to five different towns to claim benefit under five different names because that's just too much work and the benefit payments even in the UK are not that great what would be easier would be to come along and say this is Edgar claiming benefit and I've got four children rather than three children and I'll get a little bit of extra payment for that fourth child having an ID card that says this is definitely Edgar isn't going to address that level of fraud so what the purposes were and what was actually happening is an important distinction that we weren't saying that they were wrong we're just saying if you're claiming this well this is what the evidence says this is what the consequences are going to be we also had raised concerns about biometrics about the practical consequences of collecting the biometrics who wouldn't be able to give biometrics etc and also the practical consequences of verifying the biometrics because even if you've got people enrolled using their biometrics if you are doing a high security transaction where you need to check that the fingerprint of the person in front of you is actually the fingerprint of the person with the ID card then you need to have a secure fingerprint reader it needs to have a secure connection to the database you need to have trained staff you need to have security accredited trained staff and all of these little details had to the cost because let's say that you're a bank and you want to make sure that you are actually checking the fingerprints of your customer well you can't just have one trained member of staff who's been suitably accredited because they go on holiday, they get sick you've got to have at least two so that's two people that have got to have those security checks then you've got to have the secure connection etc all of these things start to add up and so that was one of the other things in our report was that we raised concerns about the overall cost of the scheme suggesting that the cost was higher than the government had actually said it was going to be it turned out later on that these higher costs were for two reasons one, because they hadn't included all of these extra little bits that were actually really important and second, because they'd only decided to report the costs to the department that was issuing them and the other government department that wished to use ID cards for their own purposes would have to bear the cost themselves and that wasn't in their headline figure so our estimates said if you do a proper costing of the cost to government, which is what citizens care about not the cost to the home office which is what the home office cares about you get roughly twice as much to four times as much cost so the government was saying about five billion and we said 10, 15 or 20 and we had a range of measures because it could be that there's mass public opposition lots of people failing to enrol lots of technical problems getting the systems up and running so you have a high cost all things could go reasonably well all things could go really as well as you have told us that your IT systems are going to be and of course the UK has such a fantastic record of IT systems implementation we don't write off millions of pounds of projects every year so we had a range of figures the government had one figure and it was absolutely sure that one figure was going to be the cost to itself no possibility of variation or whatever so as I say we had all of these different kinds of concerns and we put them together in our report this was 300 plus pages long it had 80 plus people as named contributors and we had a series of further people who had contributed but didn't want to or couldn't be named because of who they worked for or whatever so for example the chapter on the technical security of the system had been reviewed by one of the Ministry of Defence's technical operators technical specialists about computer security he couldn't put his name to the report at the time but it did reveal that it was him that had written that particular chapter at a later stage because of this concern about costs because the government was not prepared to even entertain the possibility that their cost estimates were wrong Parliament insisted that every six months they issue an updated estimate of how much they had spent and how much they were going to spend over the next ten years which meant that if nothing else had happened with the scheme every six months they had to do something the press had a story I had another opportunity to say well this is completely meaningless they've talked about spending this much but they've not done anything yet but it wasn't just the LSE report that had an impact on the overall public perception of ID cards in the UK and this is an extract from a document from the Department of Constitutional Affairs looking into the idea of increased data sharing between government departments so the logic is in order to provide a better service to citizens different government departments will share the details so if the health department knows that you've had a child we tell the tax department that you get extra credits and maybe we tell the education department that in five years time the child will enter school so the statement says we recognise that the more we share information the more important it is that people are confident that their personal data is kept safe and secure this government has an excellent track record of strengthening individuals rights of privacy few months after this the Majesty's Revenue and Customs the taxation department sent two compact discs containing the details of every family that was claiming child benefit to the National Audit Office the National Audit Office wanted to check that the Revenue and Customs was dealing with tax child benefit payments in the right way they had asked for a sample of data but somebody in HMRC decided the easiest way was to just do copy star dot star extract all of the details of absolutely everybody and put it onto a CD stick it into the internal post to the National Audit Office the CDs never arrived but it's an interesting side story that says well maybe possibly they were never actually sent you could imagine the situation it's Friday evening your boss says could you extract this data and send it to the National Audit Office you get distracted, you meet your friends you forget to do it Monday morning the boss goes have you sent those discs to the National Audit Office you say of course I have phone's National Audit Office have you received the discs no ah we would better send them we've still not received them we've got the second set of discs that you've sent but the first set are still not arrived if we're very lucky they were never sent if we're quite lucky they're at the back of a post room somewhere where they slid behind filing cabinets and if we're really unlucky they're in the hands of a criminal gang who have the details of every family in the UK and every child that they have we're just waiting for the right opportunity to use that data to commit widespread fraud because if you know the names, the national insurance numbers the ages of the children, the date of birth etc etc you're basically made understandably when the minister stands up and says in parliament I'm really sorry but we appear to have mislaid the data on 25 million families in the UK the press have a field date so variety of cartoons this is my favourite one we've lost the disc containing every child's name and address we can't deliver them Christmas presents remember the government is saying we're building this computer system which will hold all of your identity data and we're going to keep it really really secure we had said we're not sure that you were up to doing it they had demonstrated that they were not up to doing it public support starts to wither away at that point in fact it withers away to such an extent that by the time we come to the general election in 2010 turns out that every single political party except for one which was the Labour party, the party in government vowed to scrap ID cards as part of their manifesto commitments the mainstream opposition parties the Green Party the Scottish Nationalists the Welsh Nationalists right through to the racist extreme the English Defence League etc all had as one of their populist policy commitments or well fought through properly argued policy commitments to scrap ID cards the only party that still wanted them and even they were probably preparing to ditch them if necessary was the Labour Party the Labour Party we say didn't win the election and the Conservative Party didn't win the election so there was this talk about can we get a coalition government it was very interesting David Cameron the Conservative leader had as a back bench MP as a junior minister member of parliament being on the committee that had reviewed the original identity cards bill he had actually come as a back bench MP to a meeting at LSE literally the organisers had said who's on the committee oh well we won't get the famous people let's go for somebody lower down on the list someone that no one's heard of and somebody kept a recording of that public lecture of that meeting and there's a nice description of him saying I know that we're supposed to be impartial we're just looking at the legislation per se but personally I have serious reservations when he became leader his opponent for leadership was David Davis who had been the interior minister the shadow home office minister who had been leading the opposition to the ID card scheme in the parliamentary debate so whoever won the election opposed to ID cards the Liberal Democrats also had been strongly opposed to identity cards and Nick Clegg the then Liberal Democrat leader had previously had responsibility for opposing ID cards when he was there home affairs spokesman as well so you can imagine it Labour hasn't won people are a bit hacked off with Labour trying to become into power Nick Clegg, David Cameron the coalition this might actually work what policies should we start to discuss taxation policies let's not do that one first scrapping ID cards, agreed, agreed that's the first item on our political agenda we're agreed, coalition agreement let's now worry about the next levels down so the coalition agree scrap ID cards it's the first piece of legislation that they introduce into the new government took a while to get resolved because the Labour Party still said people have bought an ID card to get refund it got a bit complicated they also said we are so concerned about the privacy implications of the previous screen that we are really not confident that simply erasing the details on the database is going to be sufficient we are really concerned that somebody might be able to as you might find if you buy a second hand computer unarrays all sorts of data that's on the thing so the only way that they could be confident that the previous screen was completely gone was by physical destruction of the database so there's YouTube clips of the Home Office Minister throwing hard disk drives into an industrial grade crusher to make sure that this data could never be used again new government no longer having a national ID card scheme doesn't mean the problem of identifying yourself online particularly and for government services particularly goes away so the question comes how do we make progress we don't want to do it that way what can we do to make things more straight forward how can we get identity policy working in the UK given this political history so they set up what they call the identity assurance program and whereas the previous government refused to show up or disagreed violently with the work that we've been doing the new government has actively involved in helping with the discussions for the idea assurance program it's called identity assurance partly it's a linguistic distinction but it's also a useful marker for the change in attitude that the new set of proposals is intended to have and one of the things that the government did was commissioned a report by Sir James Crosby and he wrote a report where he said if you want to differentiate different ways of looking at identity one of them will call identity management and identity management is a system that has an approach to serve the interests of whoever owns the database of identities typically the government it's about making things easier for government things like data sharing etc etc it's okay identity assurance says actually this should be a consumer or a citizen led thing if we are doing identity policy it should be around the needs of the individual not around the needs of the government Sir James Crosby has a background in banking so that's why he talked about consumers rather than citizens but his emphasis is very clear it's a consumer or citizen led concept a process that meets important consumer needs without necessarily providing any spin off benefits for the owner of any database identity in the identity assurance view is all about the benefits to you as an individual not the benefits to the government or the issuer of the identity credential it's about the benefits to you and that's where the indian example starts to get interesting so this is an adhar UID official document going forward adhar will form the basic universal identity infrastructure over which registrar's government and other service providers across the country will be able to build their identity based applications any mention of customers consumers these features in turn are expected to serve a developmental mandate to potentially achieve multiple transformational benefits of development and equitable growth through so sort of towards the consumers and the citizens proper identification leading to better targeting of development schemes provided by government and private sector so it's about the government getting the target of targeting of benefits not the individual being able to get the benefits that they are entitled to ensuring that all fake and ghost records are weeded out from databases so that leakages resulting from such records are avoided that has nothing to do with you and me that has to do with the government systems not being very good so no benefits there increasing reach and efficiency presumably government efficiency in delivering many goods and services like PDS banking financial services etc and then finally something that might be of benefit to the citizen no repeated know your customer checks for residents so lots of things that are there for the owners of the database very little and at the bottom of the list and potentially not a significant feature of your entire existence the know your customer checks identity assurance this other way of thinking about it is there about the important consumer need without necessarily any benefits to the owner of the database so following the election we have a very different perspective UK identity policy is aligned to first of all the policy commitments of both coalition partners they were emphasizing privacy they were emphasizing the rolling back of the surveillance capabilities of the state for liberal and conservative views so there is an interesting political mishmash but both of them essentially were saying we don't like surveillance liberals because surveillance is wrong and conservatives because that's not what the government should be doing and in particular it's not going to be based around a government held database of identity data it also recognises that unlike the previous government which talked about their ID card scheme being the central source of truth the government will know who you are the government is the source of truth about which I heard a UID spokesperson using exactly the same phrase a few days ago it's about well what level of assurance what level of guarantee do you need do you need to know absolutely that I'm Edgar Whitley born on this day at this place in order for me to take advantage of facilities offered by a local authority I know sports facilities you might need to know all of that detail to issue me with a passport but that doesn't mean that you need to all of that detail to issue me with a permit to use the local sports facilities so different levels of assurance different service providers maybe somebody can provide the guarantees for high levels and somebody else can provide guarantees for low levels it's moving to a market of identity providers there are lots of commercial organisations in the UK that know quite a lot about me my bank knows where I live and has done various checks before it gave me credit etc etc it knows its customer my mobile phone company knows less about me it doesn't know that I'm over 18 so it doesn't let me browse over 18 websites via my phone but they do know that I've been paying the bill and the letters that they've been sending to my home address have been being delivered and not being returned so they know me to a certain level of assurance the bank knows me to a different level of assurance why not use my mobile phone my mobile phone provider to log on to some government services and my bank credential to log on to others it's a very interesting different way of thinking about identity to say given the political background of both parties in the coalition privacy is a very important characteristic one of the key groups in the program is a group called the privacy and consumer group and we have the right we don't quite have the right to red flag and stop a particular part of government doing something stupid that's against privacy or against consumer groups but we can certainly request that they come and speak to us and explain what they're trying to do and hear why we think these things are bad for privacy etc this privacy and consumer group has developed a set of principles just three of them here to show you this idea of putting the citizen at the centre of the UK's new proposals so identity assurance activities only take place if I agree to them so you can't it's not the government saying we've got this data and we're going to use it in these kinds of ways I have to agree for the data to be used in those ways I will agree to that because I have a good understanding of what's happening it's transparent to me it's very clear who has access who doesn't have access if there are exceptional circumstances which there will be I know who is in charge of overseeing those exceptional circumstances etc the only people who can participate in that scheme have been accredited they have been properly audited and guaranteed to provide proper services and if there start to be reports that they're not doing a good job they get kicked out they are no longer able to participate so if it were to be the case that they were issuing ID cards or ID credentials to Coriander they would now be excluded from the scheme this idea of accredited and documented individuals and different levels of documentation becomes again interesting in the Indian case again this is a another recent UID document this is about using ATAR for telecommunications services what's particularly interesting and this is straight from their documentation is who are they targeting for the number they are targeting either the people with no documents or people with poor documents so immediately you've got a very different situation to the UK where the UK now is using existing documents to provide different levels of assurance and that's one of the areas where clearly the UK and India are completely different the idea of having large numbers one third of the population potentially if this I'm sure isn't meant to be representational but it's not an insignificant proportion having no documents that just doesn't happen in the UK you have records about people most people to a greater or lesser extent it's certainly not like that UID is explicitly targeting people who can't identify themselves already so it's really addressing a welfare scenario the objectives of inclusion and security can be mutually exclusive at times greater security demands stronger subscriber verification methods subscribers are verified using know your customer documentation which requires submission of proof of identity and proof of address so the people who have no documents saying who they are or where they live or poor documents saying who they are and where they live are not are going to fall foul of these requirements individuals lacking these documents get excluded exclusion immediately from telecom services or resort providing fake documents to get access to services so it starts to raise a question if you are accepting fake documents or if you have no way of checking if they are fake documents doesn't that completely undermine the security requirement but that's a separate discussion use of improper identity documentation for telecom connections is common and has been widely reported in the press and in fact the government requires that telecoms providers do audits and try to improve the quality of their documentation but this does realise and reveal a very important consumer need namely if you want to have full participation in the economic and social life of a society then proper documentation becomes an increasingly important aspect of that and this is where you could see addressing identification is potentially helping so just as a term the idea of legal identity is recognition by the state that an individual exists and is therefore afforded various rights and responsibilities so if you have a legal identity which is not the same as a unique number a legal identity then you start to get all sorts of opportunities in society what kinds of benefits the easiest ways to think about these benefits is to think about how difficult it is for people who don't have proper legal identity education what proof of legal identity is required in order to be given the opportunity for education varies from country to country are you given access to health care if you cannot prove that you are a citizen of the country what about social security and welfare benefits what about voting and franchisement if the state doesn't recognise you then you are not entitled to vote what about banking and credit if you don't have a legal identity then getting banking and credit can be very difficult and even things like property titles and inheritance you claim that this land is owned by your father but there's no record that you are the child you have no official identity therefore you are not entitled to the inheritance of that property so the lack of identity gets all sorts of exclusions coming along and I suppose we should also add legal access to telecom services because having a mobile phone is one of those human rights that everybody perhaps should have but certainly the way it's set up in India if you don't have legal documentation if you don't have a legal identity you get all of those kinds of problems this is actually a legal requirement when convention on the rights of the child says that every child should be registered immediately after birth and should have the right from birth to a name the right to acquire a nationality and as far as possible the right to know and be careful by his or her parents and here is a signatory of that convention plan international estimates that 51 million children a year are not registered at birth so that's 51 million children a year not being afforded those kinds of legal identity rights for a whole series of reasons not realising that registration is important the cost of the registration process the difficulties if you didn't register them at the birth going along and proving that the child was registered etc all sorts of things and of course as with all forms of exclusion and discrimination if you are female if you are rural if you are in certain echelons of society the levels of under registration are going to be far higher this is an example from plan international for Shahidah a young girl from Dakar early parental pressure to get married was an inevitable reality but a birth certificate which showed she was just 15 years old saved her from getting married too young if you have that legal identity that recognition by the state that you exist a birth certificate then your life is potentially transformed in Jamaica I was in Jamaica a couple of weeks ago the birth registration rate is about 89% of under fives have been registered again rural or etc the vast majority of that one of the very direct consequences of a lack of birth registration is if you don't have a birth certificate you can't graduate to high school and obviously if you can't graduate to high school you're immediately in a very different path through society so getting that birth registration getting the civil registration process sorted becomes absolutely core for development India looking at the figures this afternoon fewer than 55% of all births are registered about 14 million out of 26 million births a year not being registered so yes we want identification but maybe getting birth registration sorted out might be a more effective way of addressing many of the development goals that India faces what are the reasons for low registration this is a plan international report lack of public awareness no demand for civil registration documents and the use of alternate documents such as school leaving certificates voter identity cards etc of proof of date and proof of birth is widespread but if you haven't got a birth certificate these documents become meaningless become fakeable so that girl's parents could have given her a school leaving certificate and said made her a year older than she actually was so there's all sorts of things that can happen in those kinds of circumstances so if you want to address development if you want to address issues of inclusion and exclusion policies are important just as in the UK we're not saying that the ability to identify yourself for example online to access government services we're not saying don't do that the LSE report simply said don't do it that way similar concerns are being raised in India about the UID it's not about don't have a means of identifying people it's about what are the practical consequences of doing it in that way so identity policy needs to be done right to address issues of exclusion I want to suggest that a very useful way of thinking about that is one that focuses on the needs of the citizen rather than the needs of the government and there are lots of different ways in which that can be achieved and if you do an identity policy badly as the previous government did in the UK then that has consequences both politically everybody else has a policy to get rid of you I mean they lost the election for a variety of reasons but that certainly didn't help and it also has economic consequences all the money that was spent fighting LSE starting up with these schemes trying to get these people to enrol scheme was rolling for about a year anyone want to guess how many people got a UK ID card scale system for question first UK 60 million people about 40 million over 18s that would have been eligible anybody want to guess how many 15,000 that included airport workers at two small airports who had been given one because they were trying to use that as part of the way of sorting out who gets security clearance to work at airports we also suspect it includes a large number of staff members and their families working for the government department that was issuing ID cards because they desperately had to get the numbers not to look completely embarrassing and the final one sorry it's blue more than happy to take any questions now more than happy to take any questions by email later on the identity policy dot lse dot ac dot uk has all of our publications about identity policy and more general stuff should have a slash with the at the end of it so I'll


Visible to the naked eye, and studied by Persian astronomers around 900 A.D., the Andromeda Nebula was thought to be a part of the Milky Way. In fact, it was thought that all the stars in the universe were in our Milky Way galaxy. That changed in the early 1900s. In 1923, Edwin Hubble found a Cepheid variable in the Nebula. The star altered the course of modern astronomy. The star goes by the name V1. Here's Edwin Hubble's image of Andromeda, which was made on a 4x5 inch glass plate, and dated October 6, 1923. He originally identified three stars and marked each of them with an N for Nova, a class of exploding star. Later, Hubble realized that the Nova at the top right was actually a Cepheid variable. He crossed out the N and wrote VAR for variable. He added an exclamation point, because he knew that this variable would allow him to calculate the distance. You may recall from our segment on Distant Stars that we covered how Harriet Levitt discovered the relationship between Cepheid variable frequency and their intrinsic luminosity. And once we know the intrinsic luminosity of a star, we can use the apparent luminosity and the inverse square law to determine how far away the star is. And indeed, once the period was measured at 31.4 days, he knew he had another galaxy. For V1, distances to stars were measured in thousands of light years. After V1, the universe became a much bigger place. V1 was over two and a half million light years away. Andromeda is a beautiful, barred spiral galaxy with two spiral arms that glow with a massive number of new stars. This is very much like our Milky Way, but Andromeda's disc is 220,000 light years wide. That's more than twice the width of the Milky Way. But recent studies of star escape velocities indicate that both galaxies have the mass of about 800 billion suns, counting stars, gas, dust, and dark matter. Light from this magnificent galaxy left its stars just over two and a half million years ago. When the light that entered Hubble's telescope left Andromeda, there were no humans on Earth. While the light traveled towards Earth, we came into being. We created and lost great civilizations, and we built the telescope that caught the light when it finally reached our planet. In 2015, the Hubble Space Telescope captured the sharpest and most detailed image ever taken of the galaxy. It shows over 100 million stars and thousands of star clusters embedded in a section of the galaxy's disc, stretching across over 48,000 light years. It traces the galaxy from its central bulge on the left, where stars are densely packed together across lanes of stars and dust to the sparser outskirts of its outer disc on the right. Zooming into the boxed field, we see some foreground Milky Way stars in the line of sight to Andromeda, and a couple of distant spiral galaxies shining through Andromeda's disc. A large number of star clusters can be seen in this analysis of Andromeda, the large group of blue stars in the galaxy indicates star-forming regions in the spiral arms, while the dark silhouettes of obscured regions trace out complex dust structures. Underlying the entire galaxy is a smooth distribution of cooler red stars that trace Andromeda's evolution over billions of years. Careful analysis of Andromeda's proper and radial motion indicates that it is on a collision course with our Milky Way. We'll conclude our coverage of Andromeda with a look at its closing velocity. It's closing at 14.4 million kilometers per day. That's almost 9 million miles per day. But given the 2.5 million light years between us, it won't get here for around 4 to 4.5 billion years. We'll cover this in depth in a subsequent segment on colliding galaxies.