Okay, I think we'll go ahead and get going. My name is Andrew Wilder. I'm the vice president of the Center for South and Central Asia here at USIP Wanted to welcome you on behalf of USIP This is an earlier start than we're used to generally at USIP We'd hope to have Minister Masoum Sanegzai joining us from Kabul But unfortunately we just learned that that's not going to happen. So I'm afraid there's a little bit of false advertising Getting it right in Afghanistan includes It's challenging including for events like this We'd also hope to get Ambassador Kai Aida Then the Norwegian government called him to go off to Kinshasa Where he's gotten delayed. So he also couldn't make it today But we still we have an excellent panel today nonetheless On a very challenging topic a very important topic and I think a very timely topic I Think for the last decade Arguably decades maybe the centuries getting it right in Afghanistan has proven difficult Both for foreigners and I think for Afghans. So I'm hoping today's panel will unlock the secret not to put any pressure on But Important decisions are currently being made some of those just a few blocks away from us Summing Kabul, which I think are going to have a big bearing on The next decade in Afghanistan at least in terms of getting it right. And so I'm really hoping That today's discussion can help inform some of that thinking as well Initially we conceived of this as a launch for this new book getting it right in Afghanistan, which is an edited volume by Moid Yusuf Scott Smith and Colin Cookman Which is a compilation of quite a bit of USIP's work over the last few years Primarily on the peace process and how do we get it right in terms of peace in Afghanistan? And but today's topic will broaden it out We thought in particular given the again the fact that very important decisions are being made now about the future Some of these I think we might hear more about in the state of the union address And so I think again we broaden the topic just from the peace process to a range of different topics relating to What needs to be done now in terms of getting it right in Afghanistan? We do have a fortunate to have a very excellent panel today with us to talk about it Starting off with Steve Call who's the Dean of Columbia University's Graduate School of Journalism And until very recently before that was the CEO of the New America Foundation I first met Steve when he was a bureau chief for the Washington Post in South Asia from 1989 to 1995 which is where he collected a lot of the information for his Pulitzer Prize winning book Ghost Wars the secret history of the CIA Afghanistan and bin Laden from the Soviet invasion to September 10th 2001 and We're all waiting with baited breaths to get the sequel Which I don't know if we'll be titled getting it wrong in Afghanistan or what but we are indeed looking forward So I think his last book is definitely the seminal piece really describing what happened in the 1990s in Afghanistan We're also very fortunate to have ambassador Omar Somad today He's a senior Central Asia fellow at the New America Foundation and the founder and president at Silk Road Consulting From 2002 to 2004 Omar was the spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Kabul He then served from 2004 to 2011 as ambassador first to Canada and then to France And then he moved on to his most important assignment, which is as a senior Afghan expert here at USIP and we welcome you back to USIP Then we'd use if is my colleague and a USIP's director for South Asia here He's been at USIP since 2010. We're very fortunate to have me weed I would view him as one of the foremost experts on Pakistan here in the United States Prior to joining USIP we'd spent time at the Pardee Center as a fellow at in Boston University And he worked for Brookings and he worked in many different other organizations including the Sustainable Development Policy Institute in Islamabad Weed is one of those colleagues is sort of a mixed blessing to have as a colleague because just in just in 2013 in 2014 he's the author or editor of four books two forthcoming one here another one Published with Adil Nadja at Boston University So he makes the rest of us look very bad and very so but we are fortunate to have him on the panel today nonetheless And last but not least Scott Smith another colleague and he's USIP's director of Afghanistan and Central Asia Scott also started working in Afghanistan in the mid 1990s with humanitarian relief organization there Then went and spent 13 years at the UN most of it working on Afghanistan either based in New York with DPKO or in Kabul where he served as the senior special assistant to Kaida the SRS UN SRSG there in 2009 and 2010 Scott's the author of Afghanistan's troubled transition Politics peacekeeping in the 2004 presidential election just so we're aware that this troubled transition has been has had quite a long history in Afghanistan With no further ado, I'm going to actually turn it over to Scott who will moderate today's discussion Thanks again once again for coming. All right. Good morning. Let me well I'll speak from here to introduce the book and then I'll moderate from over there Since this is as Andrew said still Has some aspect of a book launch. I wanted to go I wanted to discuss it a little bit and I first wanted to thank my colleague Moid Yusuf for Introducing me to the secrets of the edited volume where you take the work of 15 or so other experts their hard work you stick it all together and you put a cover on with your name on it as Andrew said Moid has been very prolific but there's a certain technique to that prolificness which I now I now appreciate We conceived of this book some time last year at a time when we thought it was reasonable to believe That in negotiation process where the Taliban could get off the ground And we thought that if a negotiation process got off the ground It could benefit from a lot of the thinking and a lot of the writing that had been done on Reconciliation up to that point and we realized that a US IP we actually had a substantive body of that knowledge and we thought well let's put it together and Present it and revive it and see if it could have a new life when it was when it was particularly needed now There are two assumptions behind this the first that there would be a peace process in the second one that knowledge Could advance that peace process or help advance that peace process and the first assumption obviously was proven wrong by events And now I'm beginning to wonder if even the second assumption that increased information can improve a policy is also Being proven wrong and it's on that second assumption that I want to focus my comments This morning in in the introduction to this book, which is the only real work. We did We point out that at the moment that Afghanistan became a major foreign policy preoccupation for the US Which is roughly by the time the Sun set on September 11th, 2001 The foreign policy community here was totally ill equipped to handle it I've racked my brain since then trying to think of another case where a country that had been so low in The ranking of foreign policy priorities became so high so quickly and I can't think of Any certainly there were not many Americans who had experienced who had experienced in Afghanistan In the 1990s Andrew mentioned he was one. I was another Steve was another we might all have bumped into each other the American club sometime in the 90s without knowing it And then that was a period when a lot of the problems that we're still trying to resolve Took took a route So I think it's understandable that decisions that were taken in haste back then have been questioned Later on and and maybe Steve's updated version of ghost wars will go in to what some of those were I suppose like a lot of other People in this town I've also been reading Robert Gaetz memoirs and one of the things he says early on is that one of the operating assumptions From the beginning was that both the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq Would be short and an assumption which she basically argues even you know eight years later Were never really revised I think that actually also helps us understand the quip that a lot of Afghans mentioned Which is that the US has not fought a ten-year war in Afghanistan the US has fought ten one-year wars in Afghanistan And for a personal recollection I remember I remember being stunned in 2003 when I accompanied ambassador lucked every he me to Washington when he was the envoy for Afghanistan and We had we were scheduled to meet with the Secretary of State Powell and had a few minutes beforehand with Richard house who is ahead of policy planning and he said You know tell me ambassador Rahimi What are we doing wrong in Afghanistan and for me it was absolutely stunning that you know a high-level US foreign policy Maker would give such deference to a UN person which is probably not really any other issues on the planet where Where that that deference happened as it did in the case of Afghanistan in those days And I have to say also people like Omar played a Critical role Afghan Americans who had grown up in the US who had gone back to work for their government who helped Afghans understand Americans and Americans understand the intricacies of What Afghanistan was going through so all of that was part of this effort to fill an immense knowledge gap Which had a huge consequences But since those days, you know hundreds of thousands of Americans have have worked or fought in Afghanistan now four secretaries of state Two different presidents have grappled with the problem countless books have been written not to mention policy briefs and events like this one films plays and yet as we begin This crucial year of 2014, which is crucial for reasons. I don't need to explain here, although I'm sure also our panel members will go into You know, it's easy to wonder if we have any superior grasp on the situation Then we did in our state of ignorance 10 years ago or 12 years ago, and we face serious decisions That again need to be made and they need to be quickly and they have immense repercussions I think for us and for the future of Afghanistan and yet it's not clear how we should move There's a quote by the playwright Arthur Miller that I always liked he says Politics's choices and not infrequently. They really aren't any to make the chessboard allows no space for a move I don't think that we're there yet and I have to point out An op-ed by our board member Steve howdy in the Washington Post yesterday, which suggests one possible way of moving forward But I think it's still very difficult and when we speak to the people in administration We speak to academics when we speak to analysts is it clear that There there are not any obvious moves ahead of us so The book that we're launching today which proposes how to get it right in Afghanistan Now seems as Andrew sort of hinted a little bit pompously titled because it offers no guidance For the questions in the situation that we face today I think in an ideal world We would all believe or we would all have hoped that we would be facing a well organized Electoral campaign where the candidates had no fear of Influence from the presidential palace or the state Where the BSA was signed and the future of the Afghan international relationship was Established the commitments made at Tokyo and in Chicago would be met And perhaps the beginning of a peace process where a book like this one might be useful and Maybe in six or 12 months it will have a chance to make that contribution But right now I think we're in a situation that few people anticipated and especially the lack of signing of the BSA has made Uncertain the entire relationship between Afghanistan and the international community and certainly between Afghanistan and the US so I'm still resigning to the belief that that you know knowledge Just have the potential to improve policymaking And I think our panelists are very well equipped to provide us with this knowledge Given the situation that we face today as Andrew said we sort of asked them to think about if you were advising President Obama on what to say in his state of the union address a few days from now What would you what should he say and obviously behind? Two or three sentences in a state of the union address go you know hundreds and hundreds of pages of Thinking What the president says may or may not generate reactions in Afghanistan that clarify the way forward that we'll see in a little while But I will leave now to our distinguished experts the burden of proving at least the second hypothesis of this book that good information Analysis can lead to good policy So now I'll take over from my Take my moderating position I'm happy either way, what would you prefer? I'll stand up. I think it's easier. So Steve Cole will speak first, buddy I'll just Talk for five or seven minutes. I thought what I'd do is start with a very wide lens and then come narrowly Into the question that it's got supposed And start with the question of what how we ought to think about the goal of this transition quite a lot of argument and foreground angst about the particular problem of the BSA and The challenges substantial challenges of the forthcoming election But if you look out past the transition that's scheduled in 2014, where are we trying to to go? And I think one way very simply to put it is that we're searching for a transition that would Place Afghanistan in a sustainable and legitimate position in the international system Where it could settle in with aid support and status proportionate to its place in the international system and responsive to its needs and That really one of the facets of these ten one-year wars has been that there hasn't been a trajectory to place Afghanistan into a sustainable Spot in the lid and legitimate place in the international system where it could obtain the Five or six billion dollars a year that its place in the human development index would suggest it would require and It's place at the crossroads of such an important neighborhood would also suggest it's in the interest of the international community to provide so I Just want to step back and say that you know the purpose of this transition is to create a glide path the possibility of that Sustainable legitimate place over a period of three to five years. I don't think anyone can look Beyond that in setting goals Now this is obviously even so simply stated seems like a modest proposition Obviously a very challenging goal not very easy to obtain one Basis for that judgment would be just to look in the past over the last 30 or 40 years in Afghan history political history There have been very few instances of peaceful transitions of the presidency or of the palace since 1970 Depending on what you want to count inside the Soviet occupation if you want to count the Carmalt and the jeep transition is peaceful. I suppose you could you could do that, but otherwise there have been series of convulsive Transitions and one thing to note about them as they've been associated with they've been shaped these convulsions have been shaped by outside Involvement outside interference outside manipulation and There's really no Alternative in this case, but to accept that the international community is going to be involved in this transition It's going to be shaping this transition But in looking at this pattern of convulsive failure Coups and crack-ups of the security services in particular We might want to look at What some of the patterns of failure have been in the past to try to avoid them given that we are invested in this transition and we do have a variety of interests and its success and Of course, I'll come back to this but one of the patterns is the building up of Factionalism inside the police and the army which is associated with failures of elite consensus about politics and cobble and power sharing and cobble whether it was the Factionalism within the PDPA the Soviet sponsored Afghan Communist Party The two principal factions of Hokies and the Parchamites who spent quite a lot of time struggling over issues that we would now regard as obscure but which were nonetheless bloody and destructive or ethnic or regional power broker Factionalism that is expressed in patronage appointments of generals and other leading figures in ministries security ministries and the fact that those appointments end up being a proxy for Negotiations among elite leaders for peaceful power sharing and transition where those have failed Then the security services have also tended to crack up that would have been maybe more the pattern of the Mujahideen government in the 90s So there's an interest obviously in taking note of that as we go through this transition because while we Fortunately, don't have the Hokies and the Parchamites to kick around anymore We do have that pattern of patronage appointments and and unresolved negotiations among Ethnic and regional leaders for power sharing under what will now be enormous pressure of an election possibly Probably a two-round election almost certainly an election where there will be allegations and evidence of fraud or Problems at the polls that's inevitable So this will be tested again Now Finally in looking to the past. I think you could say there are some models Certainly the United States and NATO have been looking at one where Wasn't a pretty and it certainly isn't fully analogous, but the Soviet withdrawal and reduction of presence in Afghanistan between 1989 and 1992 has been used as a model for American planning because under enormous pressure and Despite many predictions that it would fail It succeeded until the Soviet Union failed anyway It succeeded in a minimalist way the Najib government held an archipelago of cities and Kabul and It was a lot of violence in the country and they didn't have control of the countryside And they didn't have control of major roads at night, but they did manage to hold together What there was of the Afghan state after 10 years of war and to exit their formal? Military forces and to leave behind an advisory force and a plan for economic aid more or less on the scale that is now being Contemplated by the United States and NATO under the BSA actually if you I ran into someone who had done the numbers recently and Suggested that if you put Soviet aid in 2011 based on the best estimate from their archives of what they were providing It was roughly what's planned for international assistance Tokyo and Chicago Maybe we're doing a little bit more, but it's not out of proportion and The scale of advisors that the Soviets left behind you know probably three or four thousand they weren't declared a complicated Geneva Accords Setting but anyone who traveled in Afghanistan then would encounter them Again a little bit less than what we're planning to leave behind So and then under even greater pressure and nonetheless it held together. So that's a model That's not exactly You know a textbook of the National Democratic Institute, but it's something that's been used for American planning So if that's the context and as we come narrowly into this question about what should be done now What the president should say? So one more concentric circle closer, which is what's been happening in the last year or two What can we take? What can we observe about how we're doing as we turn into this really sharp hairpin of the next few months? So I think by and large if we and I Andrew whose work I Admire and always happy to support I think I've been here once or twice over the last couple of years to assess these things that in front of audiences like you along with many others and And I think a year or two ago. You would have heard a lot of anxiety about both the military transition and the political transition about whether the Stalemate that had developed between international forces in the Taliban would remain stable or would deteriorate rapidly whether there'd be a loss of Substantial territory in the countryside whether there would be a loss of cities in the south or east and What you can observe is that essentially the war has remained a stalemate for these two years and some people might regard that as a Failure and some people might regard it as a military success, but it hasn't changed the political Equation I think we can say there's really no pressure on major cities In if anything, there's less pressure on some cities today than two years ago There's likely to be you know loss of Rural territory over the next few years during this transition But the ANSF have come to the forefront they have taken appalling numbers of casualties this year And yet they've managed to hold Quite a lot of the ground that they were handed so far and so what that says to me anyway is that the military aspect of the transition Has been more successful or not, but it's entirely dependent on the political aspect of the transition Which is as of yet untested and is now about to be tested Okay, so on that side, how have we done over the last two years? It's quite a lot of anxiety and Andrew's done a lot of good work and writing about this about what I think First the phrase I first heard from Andrew, which was the Afghan primary Which was essentially the idea that elite groups in Kabul and around the country in anticipation of the election would have to Negotiate a compact that would allow them to hang together Under pressure of fraud allegations or a second round or a split vote or a 2009 repeat And there was a lot of anxiety at this Search for elite consensus and a negotiated compact would fail would fail miserably and set up a sort of a Kenya like or Disaster on the first press conference So that hasn't happened either. It's very hard to measure how well this Negotiation has gone because it hasn't actually been tested yet and it's not transparent But you can see that there has been quite a lot of this negotiating going on There is certainly elements of progress available in the candidates list and at least in the Possibility of a compact between the first and second round between the first place winner in the second place winner avoiding a formal second round vote But how how far along this consensus building has come is something that will now be tested. So then finally What is it that the international community so implicated in this transition and so much a partner in it You know can can do a particularly in reference to the BSA not to further Destabilize what is already a fragile situation? So I certainly share the view that one thing that the United States should not do is to suggest that it is Impatient about the BSA or that a zero option as part of you know is something that the president would embrace anytime soon to to essentially Pull out of the BSA negotiation now would be in my judgment quite destabilizing it would have a cascade of powerful and really unpredictable Consequences inside this very fragile negotiation that's going on among the security services and the political elites. I Appreciate and leave to others the need to keep the zero option out There is a source of leverage in a negotiating sense But it's very easy. It seems to me to overplay that leverage from a distance and to have destabilizing effects that were perhaps not intended and So then just for quick Observations about this negotiation First in my judgment. I think that president Hami Karzai is very unlikely to sign the BSA before the election I've Taken I've been listening to what he's been saying. I've been observing the Pressure he's been under and the the Diversity of world leaders from Beijing to Russia to India who have called him and urged him to sign the BSA I've taken note of the advice. He's gotten from his parliament. I've taken note of the advice He's gotten from his lawyer jerga, and he seems none the less Quite secure in his conviction that the time is not right for him to do this We could spend a lot of time Speculating about why but I think sometimes it's good just to take things that face value So I take it face value his assertion that he's not ready to sign this BSA and I would Premise us policy on the assumption that that is not The most achievable goal. I also don't think it's necessary. I agree with Steve Hadley's argument It's not necessary for the United States to force this issue before April We're for a lot of reasons that we can discuss The second thing I'd observe about it is that the candidates for his to be his successor You know are relatively uncommitted on this question, and that's interesting. Why why given that the lawyer jerga and the parliament Have endorsed this Would it be possible to put the candidates on the rest record to ask them if you become president? Would you sign the BSA? They've been reluctant to volunteer an answer to that question I think probably in part because they're intimidated by Hamid Karzai's position and they seek his endorsement as the tactical advantage in the election and so In any event it's notable that you don't have a situation yet where the candidates are saying Pay no attention to to our incumbent a president who we thank for his service. We're going in a different direction That's a possible development over the next few months, but it's not for the international community to shape it Finally there's a question of timelines Will the second round of the election will the election be completed in May or will it require more time? I think US policy if it's going to be successful is going to have to Try urgently to complete deal seek with international partners to completion the election in May, but at least Hold on to the the realistic Possibility that it might that it might not finish that quickly and And so I do think that there is there's a lot of language for the president to use Around these themes I to me I would go back to the beginning the United States is committed to a sustainable legitimate place for the state of Afghanistan in the international system and it recognizes that the Afghan lawyer jerker the Afghan parliament and At least up until the last mile of the negotiation the Afghan president have sought International security partnership to achieve that goal. We stand ready to you know to seek To to be that partner and to provide that commitment and you know, I don't have to write though the speech But it's really about signaling This sense of commitment at a broader perspective rather than trying to negotiate With the palace in public at a time of great instability in in Kabul. Thank you Thank you for the invitation glad to be here again at US IP And Congratulations to the editors You've done a great job of collecting these pieces and putting them together Now I just returned from Kabul 48 hours ago I went there for a quick visit to see what maybe on the minds of Relevant people and the public in general to the extent possible And I came back thinking that I Haven't seen at least political Kabul so tense and as confused As I'd ever seen it it People seem to be scratching their heads literally Wondering What is happening why it's happening and what might be? Down the road happening down the road. So this is the general sense that I had But at the same time, you know that Afghans are very resilient You know that Afghans have gone through the worst and that this to them is not the worst that Afghans Look on the bright side of things to the extent that they can but they are very realistic as well and in that context of realism They have not lost all the hope that is needed to move forward What they really are concerned about is a backslide is backsliding and regression to what either used to be or what some of or a new Scenario or a new situation that Might sort of Damage the stability that they have experienced the relative stability that they've experienced over the last 12 years or so And the progress they have made I mean obviously signs of progress are everywhere for those Who go to the country not only in the cities but in rural Afghanistan as well? so to the Afghans The the glass is sort of still half full But there are some deep concerns about the political What they really view as? Gamesmanship That are being played And they're trying to make sense of it And it is I think that it's not of course to just the Afghans were trying to make sense of it But you have many others from Washington to Other capitals who are also trying to make sense of what is happening So I'm going to try to in the next few minutes Give you an Afghan perspective an independent Afghan perspective on my own and and And tell you that You know Afghanistan today is Changed country it's a changed society It is definitely more inclusive It is definitely more tolerant And it has prospered to some extent even though we know that all the prosperity that exists is Has not been distributed as just unique equally as it should be and there's there hasn't been as much equity as one would like to see but nonetheless There's a new generation we talk a lot about this new generation But I also would like to act to say that My generation sort of the middle generation also has somewhat shifted and is Not as pessimistic and cynical as they used to be They do not also want to lose the gains that they have made now When Scott told me I asked Scott. What should I be addressing? the first question that he had was is Karzai bluffing and What is going to happen if we have a zero option and Moving to Karzai, I my view is that he is not irrational irrational or delusional I think that he is playing a very complex complex game but a very Very risky game And there is an element of bluff At a certain stage That is probably embedded there But we also have to acknowledge that this current situation is a product of Years of mismanaged bilateral Relationships on both sides. There are things that have happened that should not have happened, but That's past now Part of Karzai's posturing has to do of course with the role he wants to play today and the place that he wants to have in the future in history and The legacy that he wants to leave behind But also his posturing has to do with the way the cars have been dealt And the way the cars are sitting on the table And those cars of course have are multi-dimensional. So you have the internal Dimension you have the regional dimension and you have the overall international context So there are many dynamics at play And he definitely is a character that does not make it easy to focus on these dimensions and to address them And to try to address them in a non-public manner as was mentioned before and this obviously this public sort of diplomacy of Political gamesmanship has made it quite difficult for everyone to deal with the core issues The upcoming elections are very much on everybody's mind, of course, but Karzai's continued insistence as well on the on the BSA as well as events that take place on a daily basis you know again civilian losses here and here or there or Mr. Gates book or other issues that come up Side track the elections to some extent, but in my view The candidates have their views They're obviously waiting for the official campaign period to start to express them more forcefully And I think some of them already have taken position on the BSA Openly in publicly and some have not and so to have Kansas very interesting to see who hasn't Why they haven't and why they may be hedging For one reason or another Now Karzai does not possess many leverages, but He does have a patronate network at his disposal that he has built over the years But what is not certain is whether this patronage network will tell the end play game with him or not There is a chance that it might fracture. There's a chance that you know that again It might continue to do his bidding But there's no certainty on that But one thing is sure President Karzai Does not want to become prematurely in his mind a lame duck And he does want to be the main kingmaker in the next elections so every every move From setting the stage for elections the legal parameters The institutional parameters all of these have been set and the stage has been set in such a way that in the minds of most Afghans and especially the political class It it is to favor his favorite candidate Now this He has tried on many occasions to dispel this notion To give assurances that the elections will be as free and fair as possible that he will not Interfer as of last week he had lunch with all the candidates and their VPs and he again made the case For non-intervention and not interference in elections, but I don't think many people are buying it There are those of course who want to rely on his backing and There are those who feel that they will not have enough weight so they need to Not become a Thone on the side of Mr. Karzai and play along in order to hopefully in their minds receive his blessing Whether that will happen or not and who will receive his blessing is is to be determined over the next few weeks but The public and I think some of the polling that has been done whether you believe in them or not the public is part of the public at least half of the afghan electorate electorate has somewhat decided on on who to support and What is going to be very interesting is to see What might happen between now an election time with the undecided? So if you have the undecided playing a major role in US politics You're going to have an even larger group of undecideds in Afghanistan over the next few weeks Who are also going to determine probably the outcome of the afghan elections on the? Zero option issue I think that the feeling in Kabul was that Karzai doesn't really think that is going to happen he he is convinced that The Americans need him more or need Afghanistan More than Afghanistan needs the US and this has been said by some of his close associates But I came across a quote by Diplomat in Kabul this morning in the Wall Street Journal Which I agree with where he says that we meaning the West are Giving them the impression that we want to stay here at all cost But the public in the West is sick of it and our parliamentarians would happily shut the door on Afghanistan So this is what mr. Karzai doesn't really understand very well, or maybe he does and he's again Risking everything and and and playing this major gamble So there's a new there are new theories that are coming up as to why he may be gambling and Is this is he playing his his hand is it this? you know and overplay and underplay is he is he Does he have ulterior motives is he in touch with other groups and? Some of you may have seen Marvin Weinbaum's great piece this morning where he brings in the has been slummy into the equation we thinks that Karzai and Hikmati are are moving towards Towards an alignment and a coalition and that Hikmati are will eventually soon sooner or later Join the Afghan government the Afghan structure And that this is why and that Karzai is actually probably Feeling that he can rely on other countries and can break with the US This is where I disagree because I think that there is no other country or any group of countries who can fail the gap or replace the eight or nine billion dollars a year that Afghanistan is supposed to receive as Decided in Chicago in Tokyo And even if you put together four or five countries being on that You know on that track it still would not be sufficient and The question comes up as to what do you do with the Taliban then what happens with the Taliban? And then the question comes up as to whether Pakistan and the role that Pakistan may be playing and Maybe starting to ditch in Taliban. I mean, we are seeing a lot of assassinations taking place in Kuwaita We are seeing some Taliban showing Signs of wanting to play politics instead of playing war and We are seeing a hardcore of the Taliban still continuing with their jihad So in the midst of all of this there's a lot happening in the region and I think that Mr. Karzai's game is more focused on the region than it is on the US or Afghanistan and He probably sees a future for himself and for his network and Through the elections in some ways By changing the by realigning the players and so how these players will be realigned is a question that I don't have an answer to and Time will tell but there's very little time left and Is this a grand game as I mentioned earlier? Is this a grand? Strategy on his part To break with what used to be To create a new strategic network in the region and Internally to break with some elements in the Afghan political Society and to Maybe align himself with some new ones Again, these are issues that are very much on people's mind they are sort of breaking news and Just 20 minutes ago and on Twitter. I saw His spokesperson came out And I'm not sure exactly why in what context he again Reiterated that Afghanistan will not allow the US to interfere in elections So this issue keeps coming back from Karzai Who feels stung by the 2009 elections? Whereas the Afghans in the national community believe that he's also to be to be blamed and and and for for Being responsible for part of the problem in 2009 And so Part of the anxiety that exists in Afghanistan today has to do with how the elections will be held and whether it will Eventually be a credible and legitimate election to the extent that is required and we're not talking about perfection here and and Any other Western type models so so that anxiety is very real and We are in the midst of a very dynamic situation both Domestically in the region and of course the international community trying to find its It's a way and it's bearing I Now you did mention them just two more one more minute in terms of what the US should be doing and in terms of You know the the state of the Union coming up. I just jogged down quickly four ideas one that We need to realize that Afghanistan and the region And I just don't want to focus just on Afghanistan But Afghanistan in the region taking into a consideration what is happening in the greater region today including al-Qaeda resurgence does matter and That much is still at stake number two that it is very clear that The Afghan people Have spoken very clearly on many occasions and continue to Either through Parliament or to Roger guy or any other or through media and any other means That they want to continue that this journey that started in 2001 They really do not feel very comfortable about a revolutionary change of Of the path that has been continued But of course this path has had full in us full of potholes this path that has had all of all kinds of problems I'm not saying that they want to continue with you know the same type of Bad governance and corruption and so on and so forth or or lack of justice for example But they want reform, but they do not want to a regime change for example So that is very important Also, it is important to take into account that there are realistically when when conditions in scenarios that exist That it's not Black and white that it's not a zero-sum game that we do have if we if we if we Have the patience. I think that it's very important that To realize that this does not have to fail That failure does not have to be the option available to all of us and finally There is a need for what some people have called strategic patients and I Would say long-term strategic patients and also long-term coordination and and at this juncture Quick Decision-making knee-jerk reactions Or lack of deep understanding of the issues and what is at stake and what Steve earlier referred to as the 1989 to 1992 scenario and beyond Should be avoided an ugly cost. I know we're gonna have time for more discussion. So I'll stop here. Thank you Moe for the the vision from across the border Thanks. Thanks Scott. I Obviously haven't taught you well enough because the cardinal principle of doing these edited volumes as you never let that secret out and I also wouldn't worry about the hypothesis going wrong because I think we can just put an Exclamation mark after the title and we'll be fine in the next edition but but on a serious note I think For those of you who've sort of gone through the exercise of putting edited volumes together The real hard work is to conceptualize the volume and then get the authors to do the hard work And in this case we've been fortunate that that hard work was done And it does say something about USIP's work on Afghanistan and Pakistan and the whole idea was to put this together For people to see the last six or seven years key experts who'd sort of spoken about this issue on where things were going and how To fix them and I think if there's one conclusion to draw it's a fairly Disturbing one which is that if we put this volume together That means that something written six years ago is still as relevant and we haven't managed to break through So Let me turn to what what Scott had asked me to do Which was to talk about Pakistan a little bit and where it stands now Given the next year of trans or this year of transitions in Afghanistan and beyond So Pakistan I think for some years now is no hidden secret every time you talk about Pakistan the number one reason We discuss it in the Afghan context is its spoiling power And it's the effectiveness with which it's used it Over the years and I think this this spoiling power was born out of a very fundamental rational Strategic divergence between Pakistan and the US or the international presence Pakistan had basically two Criteria to decide its strategy One it didn't want domestic backlash coming from the Afghan Taliban the Hakani network, etc The insurgents that are based on its territory on top of what it was getting from the Pakistani Insurgents and second it continued to worry about India and India's role and Indian presence and we can call it paranoia We could call it in security or whatever it is, but it was reality as far as Pakistan was concerned And so both of these told it that it couldn't go after the sanctuaries Through a major military effort as the West and the US were asking it to do for for some time For the for the US presence, of course the idea of the troops sergeant going forward was to degrade the Taliban Talk to the amenable ones bring them into the political mainstream political system And so there was a clear divergence here because the the US policy was Predicated on support from Pakistan in terms of dealing with the sanctuaries and I'm talking here 2009 to 2011 But that support was never going to come because of what I've just told you was Pakistan's calculus So there was a clear divergence of interest here and the end result was that they weren't on the same page The interesting factor is that It was some time back that the idea of strategic depth from Pakistan, which was the real problem in the 90s was buried and So interestingly both Pakistan and the US wanted to get to a peaceful of Afghanistan But the way they thought that would come about while protecting their self-perceived national security interests were very different And thus you saw the angst and the tension and the mud slinging that that went on For as far as we can remember now Well, there's been one major change here as we come to 2014 And that is that the US Pakistan and everybody else Has woken up to the reality that time is running out as Omar said And so even if some of the maximalist goals have not been achieved the fact of the matter is that the number one problem for Pakistan US and everybody else right now is the Prospect or the unwanted prospect of Afghanistan sliding back into chaos or regression Neither Pakistan nor the US want another Afghan civil war on their hands. So so ironically There is more convergence than there's ever been in the last 12 years Partly because both sides have failed to achieve what they wanted to achieve and The other change that has taken place. I think is that tactically And I want to stress tactically because strategically I think it'll be the opposite result, but tactically Pakistan seems to have held out the international community long enough To get what it wanted in terms of a Seat on the big table in when it came to reconciliation There's no more talk of military victory, which Pakistan was never really backing and There've been efforts of course to reconcile the political process and the Taliban etc. Which haven't gotten anywhere but but at least That that has been tried and I think Pakistan has got more space over the past two years Then then it did then it did before So I would argue that 2014 Pakistan will not play spoiler Because of what I've just just mentioned First of all both sides seem to be on the same page and have been for a long time on Al Qaeda There I think there's been very little divergence on on how to deal with them or the Uzbek fighters or the other Central Asians They're also on the same page on the Pakistani Taliban one of the things Pakistan kept saying for a long time as well The West doesn't worry about our insurgents. Well, they do now and and so I think both are on the same page both realize that these These elements have to be dealt with strongly Second I think and as far as the idea of total defeat of the Harkani network of the Taliban has been pushed aside For now at least there seems to be another point of convergence between Pakistan and and the US Third, I think both want elections to go forward simply because both realize that if they don't the regression or the Sliding back into chaos is a possibility not not not a given but definitely a possibility Both are equally fed up by with President Karzai They don't know where to go, but but they also are not comfortable with how he's played this this game in the past year on elections interestingly I find Three tendencies when I talked to or three sort of patterns of thought when I talked to to Pakistanis who matter one they're clueless On what's gonna happen? So there's no no no surprise there second They don't want anything to do with it They want to stay out of it and let this go because they don't think they can do anything To make it work better than it would otherwise and third they're holding their cards for post-election They want to see what comes out of the election and then decide what what the future strategy is the good news There is that means that they will stand back let the elections go forward Play minimal role and and see what comes out of it Fourth you must have noticed that the new Pakistani ambassador to the US one of his first formal statements was that In not in these words, but basically saying the zero option is not a good option And the Pakistani position has been contradictory here for a long time because They're very of long-term US presence and bases, etc But at the same time there's a realization that if there's a precipitous withdrawal All of this may fall apart And here I would personally agree with Steve's comment that that I think the military transition has done much better than many expected But you've also got to keep in mind that Pakistan has traditionally had a very static view of developments in Afghanistan I don't think the changes that have taken place in Afghanistan At least in the urban parts of Afghanistan have been Recognized as much and there's always this lingering sense not only in Pakistan But I think across the region that while ultimately things will fall fall back to the old It's going to be a return of history. So so that keeps reminding people or People keep reminding themselves that ultimately things may not change too much so there I think that's where that statement is coming from which is to say don't leave if you leave this will all all go back So again, that's a point of convergence Fifth I think Pakistan is as desperate as as Afghanistan and everybody else to see economic resources continue to flow to Afghanistan and for the international community to remain engaged and The logic of that is very simple Pakistan is talk about Najibullah more than Afghans do probably they remember the fact that as soon as the Soviet money pulled out things fell apart And so they don't want that to happen either And then finally I think I don't know whether this is a convergence or not depending on which side of the aisle you sit on But Pakistan is still very much hoping that the broader peace process continues after the elections Where you know the Taliban and everybody else can figure out what the coexistence is going to look like and I do recognize that that Discussion has sort of taken a backseat now given that the elections are here, etc But again depending on which side of the aisle you sit on I think it's crucial even for Afghanistan's sake because My only criticism with the or sort of worry about the discussion about elections in this town And usually is that we make we tend to make elections Not a means to an end but an end in themselves and almost seems as if the elections go well Afghanistan will Will be fine and and I think that's not true The real hard work has still to come after the elections Of course elections are the first step to make sure that that doesn't cause the collapse that that many worry about So quickly just just to point now to to the few divergences that I would keep in mind As we go forward before I say a couple of words or what needs to be done First of all, I think if the momentum on the broader peace process of bringing the Taliban in is completely lost And not revisited after the elections. That's going to be a first point of divergence between Pakistan and the international community Second I think Pakistan is still not sold out on this long-term US presence idea I think it wants the US to be there. No precipitous withdrawal, but the idea of a long-term presence bases, etc You know, we may talk about it saying well, we've already decided that's not going to happen I don't think people in the region and I include in this India and Iran and others I don't think people in the region are convinced That that the long-term presence is not going to be worrisome for them Third I think In the hearts of hearts many are skeptical and again, I would speak on this as a region are skeptical that the international community will Keep supporting Afghanistan Again, it goes back to history. They think well, they're saying this. I don't see this happening people talk about well You know, look at what's happening in the US. Will the Congress keep putting money into this? I was just in Berlin the last three days Extreme worried there It was very surprising, but it seems to me that they're equally worried that we're not gonna keep keep doing what we're we're promising to do So I think it needs it's a broader trend But here again, I think the specific question for the Pakistanis is will the world again abandon one constituent I eat the Taliban and deal with the North Which means will there be a soft split between the world's approach to the north versus the Taliban and the Pakistani Worry there is that if you ignore the Taliban it becomes Pakistan's problem And then Taliban go back to al-Qaeda to get money and play their game and the whole cycle The wheel is reinvented Fourth I think there's a divergence on how the US and the international or the US is approaching Pakistan the drones Business and what will be the shape of US tactical policy in Fada post 2014? I think there's no convergence there and that spills over Into what Pakistan thinks about Afghanistan I think as we go forward post elections and finally I think the elephant in the room Nobody has mentioned it. Nobody ever mentions it But if Pakistan's role becomes troublesome again, it will be for no other reason than it's worry about India and What the Indians are going to do in Afghanistan? What role they're going to have what post election outlook the next Afghan president would have towards India versus Pakistan I? Think we've skirted this issue for too long and and I for one have been sort of hopping on this to say that for 12 years We haven't realized how important this has been even though India may not be the number one thread for Pakistan They may have moved on or whatever, but the worry about Quotin Quotin Circle month we used to call it some years ago. So let's just use the same word I think still remains to a large extent Overall, I think this is a much better position than we've been because Everything that may go wrong will go wrong after the elections I think Pakistan's role will be decided by Islamabad and Ravel Pindi Based on what happens to the level of violence in Afghanistan post elections What happens to the momentum of the peace process in terms of bringing the Taliban in somehow? And what's the outlook of the Kabul government post election towards Pakistan versus India versus the region? Let me end if you allow me Scott by by throwing out four or five things that we can do between now and December 2014 First of all, I think the Pakistani position on elections is welcome. Maybe there is space though To talk to Pakistan more and see if they have the capacity to influence the Taliban to allow Smoother elections to go forward in the areas. They wield influence and power Interestingly, and this is not something I've thought of for long, but but it comes out of a few discussions I've attended in the last few four days if you look at it The Taliban are ultimately helping the non-Pashtun candidates in the elections by not allowing the Pashtuns to vote in the areas They wield power and So one of the things that everybody wants is a more representative of an election with everybody who's Franchised going out to vote and one of the messages to Pakistan could be that maybe you should explain this to the Taliban That the end outcome that you're pushing to is something that you don't want and maybe you should allow a Smoother process of elections to take place and of course, I think this is in Pakistan's interest as well in as much as it worries about candidates who traditionally have had trouble dealing with Pakistan rising to the top Second at least my personal view is that we must keep the momentum Whatever is left of it on the peace process the larger peace process continuing and revisited after the elections If we don't I think there's going to be a divergence between the Pakistani and and the US view And I also clearly understand that this is not a popular view for many in Afghanistan But then we need to figure out what the costs of that are and how we are going to mitigate them third I Think Pakistan India dialogue is crucial and I can't stress this enough and there are two specific dialogues that I talk about often One is a dialogue on development. How can Pakistan and India co-exist in terms of their development assistance and presence in Afghanistan? And how perhaps they can set up a couple of Notional symbolic joint projects To suggest that they're moving on from from the old and second I think there needs to be a ruthless cold-hearted closed-door discussion between the intelligence communities because that's really where the fight is going to take place if we go back to a Pakistan India proxy war and it's already continuing I mean, it's no hidden secret both of them play these games And I don't think they've ever stopped but a clear-cut discussion on how the costs are higher for both if they continue this I think it's long overdue Fourth, I think we've already done this fairly well this time but US and the international community needs to keep talking about the BSA about the idea of long-term presence about the idea of the peace process with Pakistan and India and Keep taking them into confidence as they move forward because as I said, there's a lot of skepticism around in the region about What's going to come out of this? And finally, I think Something that we've been avoiding also for a long time and US IP we've been trying to push very hard on this Only marginally successfully, which is that it's time to now focus on US Pakistan bilaterally post 2014 Afghanistan the transitions are going to happen. Hopefully happen. Well But for 12 years you've heard well Pakistan is the real long-term interest. I think it's about time to start Sort of walking the stock and figuring out what that broader relationship is going to look like beyond counterterrorism and and sort of worry about the nuclear weapons and I think they're moving in that direction We need to keep keep keep working on that. Thanks Thanks, Moe. Thanks to all of our panelists before I open it up to you I just wanted to make a small comment on a theme that came out in all three Interventions, which was this question of of Elections and I think you know those of us who watched Afghan elections in 2009 and 2010 and now look at an Afghan election being sort of the hinge between a chance at stability or or or not face that prospect with you know a little bit of trepidation because in the past these elections have have had as much Possibility for breakdown as they have had for for reconciliation and set to some extent It was in part because of the intervention of the international community that that breakdown was avoided and some sort of stability was maintained And it's unlikely that we'll see that sort of intervention in the upcoming election. Certainly. There's no institutional standing for that kind of intervention in the way there was in in the past elections, but I thought Omar's point that you know, this is this is not a zero-sum game Was an interesting one because I think to some extent in these past months since the Karzai's non-signature of the BSA it has to some degree become a bit of a zero-sum game he's made it a zero-sum game and What a successful election would do would allow that game to open up a little bit It would bring in new actors It would hopefully bring in new legitimacy would hopefully allow for a chance to begin this talk or renew these talks with the with with with the Taliban and Basically create much more political space than the than the very restricted space which has now been Defined by will or will not Karzai sign will the BSA so so the We find ourselves basically now, you know hoping that these independent Afghan electoral institutions Will will do the job they were created to do but in the past have not always necessarily done so well With that we have microphones. I'm sure we have we already have a hand up over there So we'll start you can direct your question to Any or all of the panelists obviously and please keep the questions fairly short Thank you, and I'm from Iran and I'm working in IFIS Mr. Ambassador my questions from you As you claim that the half of the country, I mean 50% of Afghans people Made the decision. Who are they going to vote for? I just want to know that based on what? You mentioned this is there any specific isn't a poll specifically find undecided voters in Afghans election as I know maybe there's some problem in the in Afghans polling system because of the there's no senses in Afghans and no sample there's no Sample for the people we can find for the for this kind of polling. It's my question. Thank you Thank you for the quick The question I You know, this is not something scientific and this there's nothing that that Obviously, this is my assumption, but it's based on the three polls that have been taken at Afghanistan two by tolo slash a firm And inside the country that's based also in UAE And you know, there's a lot of crisis criticism of that people I think look at it from their personal bias A point of view and then the third one was also by a non-Afghan polling Outfit it seems to those who are analyzing and following it seems that About half about I'm not saying 50% accurately About half of the population seems to have made up his mind as to who they want to support which is actually much smaller than I expected and Maybe another half of those who want to vote or you know, I have not made up It seems like they have not made up their mind. This can change tomorrow It can change this kind, you know an event can change a person's interview can change all of this Some decision taken here or abroad can change all of this The BSA being signed or not can change all of this. So I am not saying that this is you know, it's not very critical It's just my view looking at what's available and what has been done so far And also these these polling figures are Can change also so doesn't matter if one guy is up today if somebody else tomorrow and I am of the view that There's going there's a lot going that is going to happen between now in April and beyond April And so there's a lot of horse trading that is going to take place and there's a lot of coalition building that's going to take place eventually it may end up a Going to a second round and if it does obviously they're going to be people have to decide on One or one of two candidates and to support one or two of the candidates Thank you very much for the presentation In terms of what referring to the question also introduce yourself. I'm sorry. Could you also introduce yourself? Oh, this is Seidra here from Afghanistan. I just arrived us with my family on October And referring to the question what you as should be doing at this time to help peace and security in Afghanistan and Election I believe you as Can do at least two things in Afghanistan to help the Afghan security and have a Fair and free election one is to initiate a kind of a strategic and clear Communication between US embassy or US government and the people of Afghanistan Still the people of Afghanistan are not sure What you as well be doing and what you as role will be will be in terms of election Many people believe that not many majority of the Afghan people believe that US has already pecked someone to be the president the future president of Afghanistan So therefore therefore their vote Doesn't count there. You know does not have a value. That's what the people say so that lack lack of Communication the strategic communication and messaging lift the people of Afghanistan in a back way and in circumstances And the other thing is US should focus on all forces Existing in Afghanistan not focus in one group types of people one individual or Ethnics should work with all people in Afghanistan with all groups with forces really they can change they have a Value in Afghanistan and they can impact the Afghan politics in the past money Afghans believe that US did not do that in the past Thirdly, externally US should work with our neighboring countries and regional countries I wish all the people of Afghanistan Believe what Mr. Yusuf said in regards to Pakistan's strategy towards Afghanistan I wish if US if Pakistan strategy was the way how how he explained So people of Afghanistan believe that the Pakistan will not be impartial will not sit aside to see what is going on on what what will The future of election would be definitely according to Afghan people Pakistan will play a Rule in the Afghan election and will help a candidate that favor Pakistan's Interest in the country. So there is a need that Pakistan US should work with Pakistan Iran and Saudi Arabia and other countries who have impact on the Afghan peace and security and have their their their people there Thank you. Thanks. I think there are two questions on the side and I'll let me net if any of you have any reactions To that. Let me know. Hello. I'm Patrick Hickey with the US government accountability office I want to ask a question that Senator McCain asked a panel of administration witnesses in December about the Bilateral security agreement. He said if so much is at stake for the United States right now It's all held up on the question of Karzai instead of pursuing the zero option Why don't we pursue something along the lines of a public option that is spell out in public? What exactly is at stake with the bilateral security agreement where troops would be what they would be doing and Just sort of put it out there. So it does become a And a campaign issue for all the campaigns So rather than waiting till after the results the election for somebody to make up their mind on their stance of the BSA Get them to comment on it now The candidates you mean or the Yeah, I mean I think The first thing to quality is Since the campaigning period doesn't begin until the 5th or the 3rd of February It's hard for candidates to speak to forthrightly without being accused by the Federal Commission of violating the ban against campaigning before then which is I think what what Omar was saying that at some point You know, maybe this will become a lot more vocal, but it hasn't been that much, but I don't know if anybody else has a Sort of want to react to both and in one reply and say that I I think that Steve Hadley's piece and most of you have read it most probably Touches upon this issue and gives very good recommendation. I think it's very realistic It makes sense And it's something that the Obama administration to should seriously take into consideration. Basically, he's offering a face-saving option And he does say that on the American side President Obama should make the issue more much more public. He should praise, you know, Afghanistan's progress He should Clarify the situation on night raids He should clarify the strategic US stand on On the peace process And on the elections. So again, Kabul is very Anxious about elections and worried but The US president in the US, of course the State Department has made, you know, everybody has made Made it clear that the US is not intending to interfere, but it's for the president also to put this on the table On the other hand, he can also reassure Afghans, which is what Hadley is saying And probably it is the time for the Americans to say how many troops are probably being considered So that NATO can also Make its decisions known And that as far as the timeline is concerned is very important that the the US and NATO can can wait It doesn't have to be really signed today or prior to elections I think that this can be managed. It's really manageable In terms of the operational side of it and the technical side and also, you know There's a sense that the American public has lost all interest in Afghanistan and some of the polls show that But at the same time, the polls show that 55% of Americans think that they're it's good to have a residual force or continue to be present in Afghanistan for Counterterrorism issues and so on and so forth. So you can't take, you know, not take that into into account And I think that the president can make a case and probably this is the time to make a case Moide, you are done. Yeah, I just want to sort of Respond to the the Pakistan part I think everybody wishes that That part of the region becomes less prone to conspiracy theories, but to be honest, I mean Do you actually believe that the US has picked a candidate and the elections is a farce? I don't know if there's any way to actually change that mindset. I mean that runs very deep in in in how people think On Pakistan I don't blame people who think the way you are saying because there's a history here Which isn't made up. I mean there are 12 years and there's there are years prior to that But the whole failure of imagination is in policy is not to be able to take advantage when things change So even if people want to believe that that's fine The point I'm making here is that there's a fundamental problem not because Pakistan has started to sort of love Everything about Afghanistan because they are now boxed in The spoiling power will come if things go wrong in Afghanistan at the back end And that will come not only from Pakistan. It'll come from everybody who'll start hedging at that point Right now There is no candidate that Pakistan will say oh, this is my man And thus there's a much greater chance that they're going to stay back and let this go Let it happen the elections take place. And the other thing is also remember The influence to spoil an election is very different than an influence to to let people be violent And so I'm not sure there is much there I think this is a moment where the us of anis and others can take advantage of this And try and use Pakistan positively to see if they can put pressure on the Taliban to let elections take place in the regions They have influence again for their own good not not for any normative moral Reason and I think there is a space there to do that Let me actually just add one one One thing about the messaging which came up in both comments, which is it You know, it's it's actually an extremely difficult thing to do To message properly and to calibrate for example when the way you phrase it which is to say what is at stake I think when when ambassador dolbin has tried to explain what was at stake You know the the way it was interpreted publicly by by the presidential palace was your blackmailing us You're saying if I don't sign this you're going to leave and and you're going to leave chaos behind So, you know, it almost has a negative Or it can be twisted to have To send a negative message and I thought one of the more interesting messaging attempts was and perhaps more successful I don't know Omar what you heard was that of of the secretary defense hagel when he went and did not see president carzai And and that sent another kind of message that according to some people actually Was more powerful and convincing than than some of the Diplomatic demarj is to take place or the public comments. Sorry There's another question down here. I think and then we'll go to that This is chef he shared a few from alliance in support of the afghan people asap I have a question for Steve co basically One of the things that has been much talked about in the media is, you know, some Say that In terms of its impact on the election is that some warlords threatening go, you know We're gonna we're rearming and you know the impression overall It's that somehow that they will be if if somehow the bsa doesn't fall through or there's god forbid Something goes wrong in the election that they will be back, you know, in terms of, you know, militarily and there will be much fight Considering that you you know of the 1990s and and now how do you see the possibility of such a scenario? considering things going wrong and on the issue of For ambassador samad Since you just arrived the level of debate within the country in terms of election versus bsa Or more afghans more concerned about the election or the bsa And for yusuf about the pakistan for a lot of afghans the impression is so it's been talked about that Whatever comes from islamabad is not really relevant But what what is relevant is what comes from raul pindi from the pakistani army because the afghan policy is By large a lot of afghans believe is is determined by the pakistani army Do you see you describe that there has been this this shift in the pakistani policy? Concern about the possibility of war in afghanistan But do you think there has been a shift in the pakistani's army's opinion of the same situation being concerned about the same scenario? Thank you So i do think that part of the fragility of this year involves the possibility of an intervention in afghan politics by You know armed armed forces a coup of some sort that's certainly Part of afghanistan's history and it has to be taken into account now. I think there are countervailing forces at work in the in the calculations of the Leaders who would be in a position to organize such an intervention on the one hand they and Both those like You know governor atah and bismillah khan who are among the most powerful um leaders in the country Have invested a lot in negotiations and preparations for a peaceful political transition and it would benefit them and their interests Greatly to have a successful peaceful political transition Equally they represent populations groups networks are armed Officers and the security forces that are not going to stand by passively for anything under the sun So I don't think that they're I would be surprised if they Did not put some are not putting some pressure on the palace to sign the bsa Which they would prefer to see signed But I don't think that there is any reason for them to be impatient about this as long as the united states is not Being impatient about it. That's part of the reason why it's so dangerous for the united states to signal a zero option Is that changes the calculations of those in cabel who worry about the collapse of The state's position in the international system um, so If you look at the armed forces in afghanistan and their political leadership It's a pretty good mirror of the political forces in the country And that means that there's not a great deal of representation of southern pashtuns But there's a very complicated mosaic of northern and eastern A patronage networks and they would have to have a unified view of what was at stake in order to be effective If they were to seek or a reasonably unified view in order to be effective and to prevent What's been very politely called a regression, uh, which would you know be a fragmentation not just Of the opposite of the illegal opposition and the government but within the within the um Armed groups associated with the state. I just I say one thing about pakistan, uh, you know, I Agree with a lot of moeed's analysis, but I think there's another way to frame what the pakistani armies attitude is now you could call pakistani policy now Sort of constructively patient, which I think is moeed's View of it, uh, and and I think that's a perfectly reasonable way. You could call it passive. You could call it complacent What it reflects is I think also a kind of hedging against two possibilities In it's a very active hedging in a certain sense, even though it doesn't involve a lot of activity It's a it's a forward-looking hedge against either success Of the of american policy in afghanistan, which would might involve The sustainable establishment of an afghan army of 300 grand thousand or more with 10 000 us special forces trainers and uh aerial counterterrorism capabilities in afghanistan for an indefinite time not for 30 years, but at least for five years So they have they're going to have to consider How to protect pakistan's interests in the event of a successful transition and then they have to Consider how to protect pakistan's interests in the event of an entirely unsuccessful transition in which there's a regression into civil war And it sort of turns out that in both cases Leaving the taliban and the haqqani is in a kind of forward position But not spoiling or actively disrupting or preempting this future Is a good hedge so so you end up they they look like uh, they're sitting on their hands In fact, I think their thinking is much different than in the past But their actual policy turns out to be quite similar to what it's been While they wait for this future to unfold On uh There is definitely correlation between elections and and bsa and as I mentioned in my initial remarks Right now on the ground. Uh, there's a sense that The bsa debate and discussion is somewhat Under mining and sidelining the election debate and discussion, but people are focused on both and and And they feel that They they they can reinforce each other in a way Um in in the case that the bsa is signed Uh Within the next few weeks as the state more department would like this to to happen um I think that It will take it off the election agenda. First of all If not, then it becomes an election issue And that in itself is going to create a new dynamic And is that kaza is Objective, I don't know Uh, the z thing that he can benefit from this Maybe The is he trying to stoke a certain sense of nationalism at this stage To attract some Armed opposition groups Maybe So again, there's a lot that is involved here and um The more time passes the more complex it becomes um First of all, just let me say that I completely agree with how how you formulated this and I recently wrote a paper for sipre Title decoding pakistan's shift in Afghanistan and the toughest part of writing that paper was that I wanted to say The thinking has changed the strategy Not so much, but but the way they're approaching this is very different now So so I think that's absolutely correct. The only thing that That fundamentally changes I think Is that there is now space for the afghan internal process to go on And then for this Hedge to play out whichever way it plays So if if things go wrong in afghanistan Internally, then I think you're absolutely right. They'll come back to do this I don't think pakistan knows what it will do if it's a very successful transition I don't think they've thought through that Um In terms of pindi versus islamabad, um, I think you're right. I mean the musharif years were all rival pindi Of course, it was a military. I think there's some change there where where the the diplomats are Sort of up front of in terms of the policy and may lead some of the negotiations if there are any But but the first policy and whatever change I've explained Is basically I'm talking of the military. I'm not talking of of the civilian enclave. I don't think I Don't see a point anytime soon where the civilians will trump the military on afghanistan and go a different direction Um, my question is about the position of iran, which wasn't discussed today Not that the united states is in closer contact with iran Could be used as a leverage in influencing the situation in afghanistan vis-a-vis mr. Samadz About hekmat your activity and future possibility of You know alliance between karzai and hekmat your because iran at some point was very active in afghanistan Mr. Wilder you might be knowing about that because They were doing construction under construction You know Appearance that they wanted to influence in afghanistan. So how can iran's role be used as a leverage in iran? Could it be effective? If I may start I think that it's a it's a very good question an interesting question We know officially that iran's position on the bsa Is not favorable that has been made clear It's the only country that it has actually spoken out against the bsa But there is a sense in afghanistan that The so-called liberal wing within the regime in iran Doesn't mind As long as It's not really a focus, you know focused on iran the presence the continued presence of the us and so on and so forth um What they are mostly worried about or Is is mostly intelligence gathering that takes place that might take place from afghanistan in the future Other than that I think that Iran is playing a very Strange game it obviously is involved in In afghanistan as or other neighbors more or less and It has it has Defined sort of its interests And it has its connections to certain Power centers in afghanistan. It has invested quite a bit In different fields It has at times played a constructive role like the bond Agreement in 2001 Tracking down some al-qaeda people even though they are still al-qaeda operatives in iran Sending akhmat you're back to pakistan And so on and so forth, but but also it has played a Sort of its spoilers role as well And so so it what it wants at the end of the day in afghanistan, I think It's some type of balance where again, it's not a zero-sum game and again where some of its interests are protected And This is why they have continued to actually have very good relations with mr. Karzai and mr. Karzai has continued to Expand relations with iran not reduce And so It's going to be Interesting to see what happens. I don't think they're going to Play a major role in terms of trying to to You know, they've they've said and done what they could in terms of trying to stop the bsa I don't think there's much else they can do at this point Thank you. My name is ajmal ghani from the afghanistan council. Thank you for our kind a very good presentation um 2001 to 2014 has been a journey for all of us from the us side and the afghan side And I think the afghans have spoken on the bsa through the lujaga through the polymon and everything But the election is more important Despite the fact that bsa will be part of the debate in the coming days or the coming weeks But the comment from mr. Cole Uh comparison 2014 to 1989 It's not the same Despite the fact that the afghan army was more powerful yet the foes were more powerful as well The foes now are not as powerful as they were and there's a country running What baffles us is the comment that you made that the us side is considering a failed Policy or a failed formula of the soviets On implementing the bsa and the number of troops How do we go from there and how do you explain that? Well, I mean you could argue that from a military perspective given what the world looked like to the soviet army in 1989 that the fact that they were able to exit and Support najib's government successfully until their capacity to provide financial and aid ended suddenly when the soviet union itself ended suddenly in december 1991 Was a was a much great much more successful transition than Not only that they predicted but that also that the us intelligence community predicted and that pakistan expected and that many afghans expected So that's the answer the narrow answer to the question. I certainly agree that It's a very different Time and that the analogy is of limited value It's only one of a series of these kind of convulsions in recent afghan political history that have been shaped by outside powers involvement in afghanistan What are the most important differences today? You know, you could have a parlor discussion of that for a long time, but I would just sketch a few I think one you referred to is the most important The international community's alignment around this afghanistan This transition afghanistan is far more favorable to its prospects for success than was the case In any previous transition that I can think of At the time in 1989 the united states, saudi arabia and pakistan were aligned seeking the overthrow of the najib government soviet union india were you know on the other side and you know varying degrees of activism And you know china had supported the mujahedin and was sort of Passive during this transition Here you have a situation where all of the major neighbors Including iran in the divided complicated way that omar very well described Want this transition to be Successful and indeed have been urging Steps on the palace to to make it as stable as possible Even pakistan in its hedging is not engaged in anything like the active financial military or logistical support For the taliban that it was providing more or less openly in 1989 So in that sense You know here you have all of the world's capacity Organized around the prospect of a stable political transition from president karzai to another president And yet we're still having a conference wondering whether it's possible. So That tells you something about international capacity, I suppose And then so then you look at the internal set arrangements in in afghanistan and talk about the differences and there You know you made the comment that the army was stronger, but the opposition was stronger in 90 89 and 92 I think that's right in both respects But when you say the army was stronger than it was mostly that the leadership, uh, you know najib had a lot of blood on his hands and and Was um, you know in many ways a brutal ruler But he was a strong leader who had in the in the period after 1989 He continuously adapted himself To the circumstances and built a lot of militia and tribal allies that secured his position To the surprise of many of his opponents and he also had a sense of the international System that was more sophisticated than people would have credited in 1985 Here you have in the palace A lame duck president who is constitutionally term limited out and who doesn't have the same leadership characteristics That's created quite a lot of the uncertainty that we're wrestling with here Uh Mr. Cole we're saying the same thing But my question was on the u.s. Side policy the comment that you made That we're going back to the same old formula that the soviet used for the troops And what's going to happen next on the military front? That was my question How come with all that that is happening? in The u.s. In the world with all these studies with all these experts with everything that is going on We're still going back to the same formula that has failed Well, but i'm international my answer is that the view of that there's a way of saying it didn't fail until the soviet union failed And that actually it's not just building on the soviet model. It's the it is the doctrine of u.s. Special forces enabling um armies and developing countries through advise and assist Uh operations that has been modeled in lots of other places from columbia to the philippines to you know many other places and so it's it's there's a there's a I think a useful eyesight on what did and didn't happen during the soviet transition But the real model is a modern american doctrine of special forces enabled advise and assist services to to um new armies in poor countries in unstable regions And here the question isn't whether that doctrine has a record of success. It does across uh the The developing world. It has often, you know very uneven political consequences. It's not uh often Completely successful, but it has a strong track record. The question is how Poor afghanistan is how fragile and young its new politics are and how new this an sf really is given how Rapidly it has grown from zero to 300. I mean from 20 to 40,000 to 300,000 in a very short period of time With high degrees of turnover in recruitment challenges of recruitment and big questions about financial sustainability It's you know, in many ways, it's remarkable that it's held together as well as it has given objectively how Fast the trajectory has been but uh, yeah, I think the the basic doctrine and model of special forces enabled Militaries of this type is not backward-looking. Um, it you know, it's it's american Doctrine with a track record elsewhere in the world Thank you, uh, rigidly smith from the British embassy. I um wanted to ask, um About and and explore One of the reasons that kaza is saying he won't sign the bsa principally his demand that Progress is made on peace talks with with the taliban and I noted your comment use of that there needed to be Um momentum at least post the election if if there wasn't to be hedging by pakistan Um, I'd be interested in your views as to how challenging you think it might be for a new president to To deliver peace talks Assuming that at that point you've either got a bsa in place. Um, or you're negotiating a bsa Um, and uh, what that would mean for the taliban calculation as to whether they should come to talks Thanks. I'll take a first, uh, pass of that. I think it's a good question. Um I think that uh Seeking reconciliation and a political settlement including a settlement that that and creates space for the participation of the taliban Is now established united states policy and it's also established NATO policy and so there's nothing inherently contradictory Between the pursuit of a bsa and the pursuit of reconciliation process indeed the united states as You know along with nato allies including britain actively pursued a reconciliation track that led to the almost opening of the political office of the taliban and cutter just, uh, Uh, you know less than a year ago now, you know, the failure of that track It's fits and starts the slow pace of even confidence building measures is a fair indication of how difficult the process is But quite a lot has been achieved in the sort of shape of the table phase of the negotiation so far And we know from history that these negotiations often take many years and there's a very frustrating early periods of just trying to decide Who's uh a participant and what is the shape of the table and how do you build confidence? But a number of things have been overcome Notably as muid said, I mean pakistan is now At the table in a way that in as recently as 2011 it felt excluded and in the dark and frustrated and and uh concerned the the potential place of a taliban political office and The taliban's potential acceptance of direct contact and negotiation with the afghan government around intra afghan power sharing issues Has been established at least in principle Uh, the united states has come around from, you know talk and fight and reintegration first to A full embrace of reconciliation as a path to a political settlement And the international community is no longer divided on the question. So, um You know in that sense the table is set now What kind of what ultimately? Is the view of afghan political formations Around the government and in the government about the value pace and and scope of a political negotiation with the taliban That's something that hasn't been tested as the high peace council hasn't really resolved that question in principle under karzai spur afghan political groupings have come around to the confidence building process, but I don't think afghan Political or military leaders are themselves decided about how far where they see negotiations in their contest with the taliban But that's the reason to have the negotiations. I think Of the leading candidates who seem likely to end up in the palace if there's a successful election and transition um, you know, I think I don't see anyone who Uh Would lean as far forward Intuitively as president karzai has been doing since 2009 really pushing the international community to come in this direction and engaging and very active if ad hoc Outreach himself Whether it's to you know, the quite a sure or to the to His be islami But I also don't see um any potential president who would regard this as You know anathema or would start running in the other Direction, I think this has now been socialized inside the afghan political elites to a certain extent And there would be space To restart the policy in the process that that has Bubbled up to this point Your Let me first say that I Agree with what what steve has said And now let me give you the the pessimistic side of this which we may come about even though. I think what steve said is is correct I think the pace of of movement of the peace process Some may view it if it doesn't If it doesn't seem as if it's going anywhere After the election some may view it as a function of the level of violence the insurgents are able to create So I don't think it's a coincidence that president karzai pushed very hard after a while Because the insurgency was fairly successful as the surge went up on on our side The insurgents also searched and and they did it fairly well and so Number one worry is one of the worries for me is that The message to the insurgents Maybe we've got a ramp up violence again to get the momentum going and people talking about it So to avoid that I think it's necessary for whoever the president is next To to build that momentum again without Having to go to that point second, I think You've seen pakistan in the news for all the wrong reasons for for some time. It seems to have disappeared Completely unnoticed, but it's disappeared and and the bad press that the us used to get in pakistan also has disappeared That's also not a coincidence. I think it's a thought-out process But that may come back fairly quickly if the peace process is not going anywhere And pakistan feels that the transition has actually been a net negative for it for whatever reason Because then the the the constructive patients becomes the active implemented hedge Which looks very much like the old And as we know from sort of basic Realist arguments of international relations when one hedges the other hedges and the third hedges and you very quickly got an unraveling of this this patient phase Looking like 2009 10 again where everybody is hedging and trying to see how they can play their cards to To get benefit out of this. So so to me I while I agree that the table is shaped now people know they have to go there This has to be a priority post elections and if it's not and if it just keeps Delaying itself for one reason or another. I'm worried then the hedging may look fairly dangerous from all regional parties But also internally in Afghanistan Let me just add a couple of points from my perspective I think that This is a very complex issue to begin with and What the thinking is in Kabul right now in terms of Its connection to bsa and as a condition is that The palace thinks that For example people like Malabar other who They think can play a constructive role in the peace process Or still being held against their will and that The us can actually Make a difference in the in this case the thinking in the palace again is that This is why they are requesting that the peace process be sort of rejuvenated And asking the us to do it The popular thinking is that this doesn't make any sense And so there's a missing link missing element here that people don't cannot make sense of now As far as peace talks and the timelines and whether it's going to be before or after elections One thing is certain Karzai is going to do everything possible between now elections and maybe even Beyond elections because remember it might take All the way up to September and October if it goes into a second round before we have Somewhat of conclusive results from the elections. So we have almost the whole 2014 period ahead almost and so Karzai might is going to try everything to Play his peace cards With the has been slow me as well as with the Taliban and factions within the Taliban And all the way down to a single person like my brother The new a new person a new president is going to obviously face a major challenge if The bsa is not signed first of all Because again the bsa is going to become problematic And they would a new president would have to put the peace process on hold And that is going to be again a very tough decision to make after elections But for the afghan people and for the political class overall The peace process is a reality But a reality that they believe Has been pursued in a totally wrong manner With the wrong expectations with the wrong Strategy And even wrong mechanisms at play So any real substantial Pursuit of a peace process will require an overhaul and A new president will have to a new administration in Kabul will have to really You know connect the dots See what comes first and what comes second And get the afghan people behind it The afghan people want peace but the afghan people really do not believe in this current process And they have huge problems with the current process And so a new process would have to have the backing of most afghans I just want to add one one response. I I think it's also important as we go forward to To figure out where this change is going to come from if the peace process is going to move forward You know one has heard ad nauseam about mullah baradar doing this and that that's a dead story Yes, he's being held there, but we I don't know whether I mean whatever how public this is but People from the palace or interlocutors have met him They've been conversations with the pakistanis with the americans and the answer is there isn't much there The guy's been out for too long. He's not going to be able to pull it off So we we well whatever I think we need to focus on what is really going to do this Rather than holding on to these hopes that you know somebody out of a jail can can pull this off and to be honest I think he's been for once held After consensus decision between a few palaces not only one Let me just add now that we're back on the topic of the of the of the book briefly that In last month we published a paper By antonio giustozzi In terms of the possible taliban reaction towards the electoral process and he was arguing that Uh, there were indications he had found that there could be a degree of cooperation with the elections By the taliban We will also be publishing another paper. Hopefully this month arguing the opposite by another author With another set of insights into the taliban just to show that it's a a Obviously a very murky question um But I think that they're that that If the taliban had the knowledge that moe suggests that they need to gain about how elections work They actually could implement a political strategy That that could have a huge effect on the on the outcome of the election. So, um, just a quick word on a few upcoming publications. I think maybe we'll take One more question and then perhaps ask the give the panelists one two minutes to if they have any final comments. So in the back Thank you very much scott. Um, my name is Najib Sharifi with cobble based tank tank called afghanistan analysis and awareness My question is for mr. Yousef It's um In general in the past 10 years The policies of pakistan towards afghanistan Has it been beneficial to pakistan or damaging because it seems that india again is winning um 100 percent damaging 100 percent predictable And I don't know what a better way to do this was I don't want to get into the details of this. I mean i've written enough about it. I think the way pakistan and the US approached afghanistan post 9 11 The divergence was inherently built in pakistan's policy was A self-fulfilling prophecy The u.s. Response was predictable and the pakistan counter response was predictable So I think you could play this whole game all over again come out with the same policies and still I would answer and say 100 percent um negative And and and I would say the same for the international community in service. I think the whole puzzle could have been rearranged differently, but given the way they approached afghanistan what they thought The respective strategic interests were and how they were going to fulfill them. I think this is exactly how the movie would have played out And there are a number of uh edited volumes that will go into that topic in great detail There are also coming and existing. There are also authored books But Good I know that some of our panelists have to go so I think we'll leave it at that I want to thank all of you for coming obviously and thank our panelists for for for being here Keep an eye on the state of the union and see if any of this comes out


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