Well, thank you folks for coming. It's a little bit like church here. Everybody sits in the back and you kind of have to draw them up front, right? So I guess instead I'll just move forward a little bit. So thank you very much for coming. And I want to point out that this lecture that I'll do today is the third in a series. Dr. Chao, Brian Chao gave the second lecture earlier this year and Dr. Mulrandy Stone, did the first lecture this year. So typically we do them all together at the same time. We just couldn't coordinate schedules to be able to do it. So now the third and last of these sort of organizing lectures to help sort of provide a framework for how to think about China. Dr. Mulrandy Stone's lecture focused on sort of China's culture. And Dr. Chao focused I think mostly internally China's economy and the politics of China's economy and I'll be looking outward. You'll see some overlap in our presentations but I'll be looking at sort of how the Chinese think about security and economics outside of China and how that affects China's foreign policies in many different dimensions. So the idea is that Xi Jinping has to balance various factors, right? So security, external security, wealth, the generation of national economy and hopefully increasing the GDP for capital over time. And then the third is stability, right? So internal political stability. So those are the things we'll focus on but I should tell you who I am, I suppose. My name is Peter Dutton. I am now a professor in the Stockton Center of International Law. My background, I have both a law degree and a PhD. So I focus on the intersection between international law, China and maritime strategy. So a lot of the work I've done has been on things like the South China Sea, the legal issues there and the relationship between the strategic and legal issues in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. I started more recently a project on Taiwan. And so I'm looking at the legal and strategic and political aspects of that dynamic. Prior to my current position, I was for a year and a half the interim dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies. Before that, I was director of the Tana Maritime Studies Institute here at the college. That's the short bio. I've actually been at the college for 22 years and held a bunch of different positions in that time. But that really gives you a sense of who I am and what I do. I like very much to teach. I'm not teaching this year, but next year, I'll be sure to get back into the classroom. And I'll join my Stockton colleagues whenever I can in teaching their courses. All right, so security, wealth and stability. I think of the three big things that Xi Jinping and the leaders of China have to focus on. And so one of the things about security is we think about external security sort of in the context of modern times, in the context of where China is today. And we forget that China actually thinks about security very differently. So it's not just that China has a sort of a longer history than places like the United States, but it has brought China's history of the last 200 years into the political conversation. So there's very much an ideological component of the way China thinks about security, external security. And you have to think about the fact that from about the late 1700s until just about the turn of this century, right about 1989 really, I suppose. So for about 200 years, China was in some kind of internal upheaval or external conflict, almost continually for 200 years. So it began under, China had reached the apex of its power in the late 1700s. It was unquestionably the most powerful country on the planet at that point in time. It was a very continental state at that time as well and an expanding continental state in the late 1700s. But with that expansion came in some internal weakness. Keeping up with stability, internal stability as it was expanding in a continental direction became a very difficult thing to do in terms of resources. So internal instability began to creep in or cracks of internal instability and internal rebellions that began for various reasons in the late 1700s. And that sort of accelerated for various reasons into the 1800s when China began to fight a series of wars primarily with maritime powers. It was also quite, let's be clear, it was also fighting a number of conflicts on its periphery with continental powers but it was utterly unprepared to address maritime conflict. And so China lost all of the wars that were maritime focused from 1840 until the end of World War II. And so I suppose you could say that China was on the winning side in World War II but that was because it was in a coalition against Japan. So China has, and then what you have after World War II is revolution, right? So you have internal instability, just utter upheaval. And that really didn't end until after the Tiananmenin in 1989, right? So you have essentially 200 years of internal and external instability and the two are very related in the way China thinks about security instability. So in order to become more secure and internally stable the Chinese turned to wealth generation, right? So you think about a communist party that is very on communist in its approach to wealth generation. And so by the 1980s, actually Mao Dada in 1976 and as Deng Xiaoping ascended to power he began to look at ways to generate wealth for China in order to generate both external security and internal stability. And that's the purpose of wealth generation, fundamentally the purpose of wealth generation. It's less about, I mean, it has the effect of making everybody's lives better but it's less about that. That's not the fundamental purpose for it. So it's about becoming more secure and more stable as a country. So the turning point as I mentioned already was that period of 1989 to 1992 after Tiananmen Square, the whole essential concepts of communism and the ideological viewpoint of communism and revolution had run their course. There was no longer a lot of appetite for revolution and communism after the series of things like the Great Leap Forward where millions of Chinese died in order to pursue frankly some pretty bad policies in the late 50s, early 60s. And then there was the Peltual Revolution in the 60s and early 70s when again, millions of people died and there was a suppression of any sort of individual rights or freedom or individuality even. And then in 1989, you had another sort of incident, the Tiananmen Square incident where the Chinese Communist Party and the PLA actually ended up killing many of the dissidents and the students in Tiananmen Square. And we're all familiar with that. So you got to the point where the people in the party were really disconnected by that point in time. And so the party did an incredible job of internal reassessment and developed a policy where Chinese Communist Party's legitimacy was based on three factors. It was based on generating wealth. So it was not, now here, there is an element of the bargain between the people in the party where generation of wealth was about, your life will get better. So the overarching purpose of generating wealth was to become more secure and stable, but also that stability component, internal political stability component had to do with creating a relationship again between the party and the people that was beneficial to the people, right? And that the benefits were going to be economic and everybody's life would improve because their economic situation would improve. The second element of that relationship was based on something called patriotic education campaign. Essentially it was the party built economic wealth for the people or would build it. And then at the same time it built nationalism, sort of consciously created nationalism. And here's where that concept of the century of humiliation comes in to play, right? Where consciously reminding the people from preschool up through PhD programs, everybody participates in this patriotic education campaign. And now as you may have even read, even in companies, even Western companies in China have these education programs that they have to learn. And so you have a situation in which the Communist Party has consciously created a nationalist ideology for the people of China that is based in part on humiliation, right? The past humiliations of that period of time in the 1800s and 1900s when China was weak and unstable and insecure. And demonstrating that the Chinese Communist Party can make China a whole again and strong again, right? So it's that relationship between the people and the party that was consciously generating part through wealth and in part through this development of nationalism. And the third aspect of it was called something called the three represents. And this is where the party expanded instead of an internal, what's called othering, right? You have the ins and the outs, right? The good people and the bad people that had been the revolutionary approach to how to solidify the control of the party. There's good people, they're the peasants, they're the workers, they're the Communist Party. And there's the bad people, the intellectuals, the artists, the capitalists, the landowners, right? That the exploiting class, right? So the good people and the bad people. Well, the party in that period of time between 1899 when you realized that they were going to need all of these people in order to generate the wealth necessary to become more secure and more stable. And so they brought the three representatives, they brought everybody into the party. The problem then became what? If there's something that's negative, if everybody is good in terms of the party's perspective, then there's no one to blame for the bad things, right? In the past, the blame would fall on the bad elements of society, right? Oh, it's the capitalists that are causing this problem and we need to rectify it by punishing the capitalists. Now China had to look for another way to place blame and it looked externally, right? So here you have a party that is all encompassing the Chinese people and that's good, right? It brings everybody into the party and it stabilizes the internal political situation. But in order to have someone to blame, let's put it that way, in order to have someone to blame, you have to have an external bad guy, right? And so what you saw at that point in time was a beginning of the degradation of the relationship with Japan, right? Because Japan's the bad guy, Japan's the one that invaded us twice, right? And we gotta watch out for the Japanese and they're trying to take our islands, the St. Papua Jago Islands, et cetera. And so that became one and the other became the United States, actually. It's just sort of varies depending on what the message is at the time. So China-Foreign relations became different after that point in time because of the internal situation. So what you see is a relationship between internal politics and externalization of the political approach to security and stability. So let's see. Xi Jinping, he's of course the top leader and in order to bring together these elements, right? He has developed the basic concepts that he's laying out, right? So we remain true to our original aspiration of socialism with Chinese characteristics, right? So socialism with Chinese characteristics is a new approach to economic relationships that combines socialism and elements of capitalism to create a moderately prosperous society in all respects, right? So everybody's going to be included in this larger effort and then to achieve the Chinese dream of national rejuvenation, right? So we're looking back before the center of humiliation attempting to recreate a powerful China with global impact and the capacity to manage affairs in East Asia without outside interference, right? That's the essence of where Xi Jinping is trying to head. But he's got a dilemma, right? Because there's only so many resources and only so much that he can put into these objectives. And so let me explain this a little bit. So this is called the S-Curve and it is a model for how states become high GDP per capita states, essentially. And in the bottom left, you have a low GDP per capita states you see down there at the bottom, Malawi, Malawi, Burundi states with a very low GDP per capita. In the upper right-hand corner, you have the United States, Switzerland, UAE, Qatar, so states with a very high GDP per capita. And what you have is something in the middle. So you have this initial increase when a state's economy begins to grow. A lot of that initial growth is based on external investment. That was part of what the Communist Party did to bring in external investment after 1990 and begin to grow the economy with external investment. And you get easy, that sort of easy growth, right? Just based on a literate population, the capacity, the resources, the capacity to become more productive individually. So you're building productivity, increasing productivity in society based on external capitalization. And so you can get that easy growth and that tends to be with manufacturing, right? So low-end manufacturing. Sometimes there's other approaches to it like resource inscription, but generally speaking, it's low-end manufacturing. And you begin to rise in the S and then you get to the point in the middle where you level off. And that's because essentially the easy growth, the manufacturing growth has been exhausted. And so it depends on the size of your economy and the size of your population, how long that growth period will last and because China's huge and has a lot of resources, including a strong population, it can, it'll last a long time. We saw it begin to level out around 2010, that period of time. We saw it leveling off of the growth model into that what's called the middle income trap. That middle box there in the S curve is the middle income trap. And states often get caught there because they're caught between the rising growth and then the headwinds that are caused by that rising growth. So some of that, some of those headwinds are demographic. How many workers per non-worker do you have? So the elderly and the young, the non-workers, when you end up with a much older population, you have more costs to bear with fewer workers. So China has that problem. You also have rising expectations of a middle class for a better life, better education system, better health system, cleaner environment, all these become headwinds to rising up to the top level. But the biggest headwind has to do with the capacity to grow beyond manufacturing through things like innovation or finance and investment. These are the ways that you end up in the upper right hand corner. The sort of shorthand, the bumper sticker of it is the society has to get rich before it gets old. So the idea basically is you have to, you have to have fewer headwinds, right? Then the things that propel you into well. So this is what Xi Jinping is trying to do, and he references the middle income trap. Some economists think this is nonsense. I actually think it's a good model, but more important than that, Xi Jinping thinks it's a good model. He references the middle income trap all the time. And so he's thinking about how does China get out, get up into that upper quadrant, where you have a very large, more than a billion population? How do you raise the GDP per capita of that population? And it's through innovation, it's through finance, it's making money from money, right? So investment, looking, and that in part explains why China is looking outward in its investment approach. We'll come back to talk about that in a minute. But this is why China is in the middle income trap now, and it's why you've seen the GDP per capita and the growth level out over the last 10 years. A lot of what you've seen in growth over the last 10 or 15 years has been either debt driven or external investment driven, right? So a lot of that growth, you can grow an economy if you keep borrowing, right? From the economy. But in the end, that's not a sustainable approach. So China is at that point now, where they're in that middle income trap, they're out of options for growing rapidly, and they've got to figure out a way to get to the upper right-handed corner. Or expansion, right? So internal growth and ways to work externally, to build relationships where you can invest effectively abroad has to be balanced against the expansion. Now why? This should sound familiar to two of the legs of the post-1989 bargain with the people, right? The first is economic, raising everyone's economic level as raised the national wealth that you can do more with. But at the same time, nationalism, right? The other one is nationalism, and that is the Chinese Communist Party's drive to demonstrate efficacy, effectiveness in creating a stronger China capable of achieving the China dream. And so there's a pulling tug between investment in these two areas, economics and security, external security as the Chinese define it. So you see Taiwan, you see the investment, it's an example of the investment in the military, in the PLA, but you've got to figure out ways to invest in providing nationalist benefits at the same time that you're providing economic benefits. So what kind of security does China want? How does China think about its external security given these two competing interests? The first thing to say is that China looks at the external world as a land power. This is very important to understand. And there's two fundamental approaches to global security. One is an interior security strategy. The globe here shows, I think a good example of that. Essentially it's where you think of a bullseye and there's decreasing rings of control around the bullseye, right? Decreasing rings of control and military capabilities that extend further out to expand the perimeter around that which you're trying to defend. That's an interior security strategy. Well, China has taken that approach to its overall security where land dominates the sea, right? So yes, China is building a stronger and more capable navy, but it is fundamentally up to this point using that navy as a land power uses navies, which is to say to help expand the perimeter of control around the territory rather than to play the away game essentially. I'll come back to that in just a minute. So they're developing an expanding interior strategy, right? So I use the missile rings here as a way of demonstrating the concept, but China's incrementally expanding its capability outward. Initially it was to protect the coast, then it was to protect the near seas, then it was to move beyond the first island chain and to begin to affect the influence events in beyond the first island chain. And the best way to think about it is in terms of control, influence and reach. The Chinese don't use those terms exactly, those are my terms, they use similar terms though that control is how the Chinese think about their maritime periphery. And it's not a set area. You might hear control within the first island chain and that's a rough approach to it, but it's control as far out as the technology allows you to exercise sea supremacy, right? So control and influence, the next is to influence the outcome of events. So you might think about that as achieving the culminating point of enemy advance, right? In that second area, right? That might be the Philippine Sea or even a little bit farther from China's shores. And then the third is reach. Now this is the idea that China uses its fleet to go around the world, but at the sufferance of other stronger powers, right? China does not have bases, it doesn't have the capacity to project power and sustain power in conflict. If for instance, China wanted to send aircraft carriers into the Eastern Mediterranean, it would only be able to do so if it was allowed by other stronger powers to do so. It could be prevented from doing that. That's what I mean by reach. China has the capacity to reach around the world with its navy, but not to control events around the world with its navy. So control is local, it's near seas. Influence is that next sort of second tier where they're trying to prevent an attack from reaching the zone of control. And then finally reach to achieve other events around the world or to achieve other interests around the world, but not the capacity to control other areas of the maritime convey. Why? Because they use the land to control the sea. They have a land power, missile power, air power approach to act with sea power. So sea power operates under the umbrella of land power in order to achieve the interior objectives. Now the other approach to security strategy is an exterior security strategy. It's essentially the way you wake it. It would be to surround the bullseye, so to speak, right? So the United States pursues an exterior security strategy through our relationships in Europe with NATO, our alliances in East Asia. We're able to be resident in the areas of potential threat and to control the commons in between our territory and that area. That's called an exterior security strategy. You're essentially trying to surround the potential area of hostility. So you can see in that a fundamental clash of basic security strategies between an expanding interior where China is attempting to achieve more and more control over space in East Asia and the United States, which has historically been resident in East Asia to prevent another country from achieving control over that space. The design of the United States was never to be the hegemon, the sole power in East Asia, although there were times when we were. That's not the design. The design is to prevent someone else from becoming the sole dominant power in that region. So you can see where some of the clash between the American interests and the Chinese interests overlap. We have vital national interests in the same geographic space is how I like to put it, because China is an expanding interior power and the United States is a resident exterior power. So when China looks out at the world, this is basically what China sees. So China sees the American position in Japan. China sees the American position in the Philippines. China sees the American support for Taiwan. So China looks out at the world and sees the American position there, but by now what we see is China weakening the American position and the American lines as the red lines there are the ways in which China is demonstrating the capacity to undermine the security of the United States position in the region as the exterior power allied with regional maritime interests. If you think about it, I don't think I have the map. I should have done that. If you think about the map of China, you can think about in the upper right-hand corner, northeast corner is Manchuria, then there's Mongolia. Mongolia as a state today was actually part of historically part of China during the Qing dynasty, but they're even part of Mongolia, outer Mongolia, it's called, inner Mongolia, sorry, is part of China today. Then Xinjiang, the Turkmenistan, Turkestan, I can't remember East Turkestan, that's what it was called. The Turkic area was brought into the Chinese dynasty during the Qing dynasty, and the same thing with Tibet. So you have this arc of control that was completed around China during the Qing dynasty, right? That period of time in the late 1700s when China was at its most powerful is when China brought into the imperial system these external territories. It's part of the internal weakness that they have to deal with today. China remains an imperial system. There's historical conquering of these lands, but they were brought into the imperial system in order to provide a buffer zone, right? To provide stability on historical China's borders, the Han Chinese border. But the Qing failed to provide that same stability in the maritime periphery, and you can see what the Chinese are trying to do today. It's to complete that arc of security around central China by including the maritime domain in that larger security system. So are they looking to expand further in order to generate more security for their economic system as it's developed? Yes, they are. They're probing for opportunities for overseas bases to date the only place Cambodia and Djibouti. Those are the only two places. Djibouti, for sure, had one already. I'll talk a little bit more about that in just a minute. And there seem to be developing one in Cambodia. It's pretty clear that that's what's going on there. The one in neither one, frankly, provides a great benefit to the Chinese. Cambodia, the base in Cambodia, I think it's just an opportunity. It does push a bit to the Southwest China's ability to station maritime forces, but recall that they've got the three large bases and five small bases among the Spratly Islands. So this probably doesn't tremendously shift the strategic posture for the Chinese. And remember too that this is within the South China Sea. So again, it doesn't tremendously shift the posture. What does it do? It fundamentally surrounds Vietnam. It changes the dynamic of the South China Sea. It creates, China is on Vietnam's northern border. China and Vietnam contest the islands in the South China Sea. And now China has a position in Cambodia. And so it changes the security dynamic for Vietnam in ways that may, I think, China hopes favor its interests. It also provides the opportunity for more naval power to be in the vicinity of the Indonesian straits, Strait of Malacca and the other straits through the Indonesian archipelago. So, but I don't think it changes things dramatically. I also think the same thing about Djibouti. It has not turned into the kind of forward operating base that I think the Chinese hoped it might do. But at the same time, in times of conflict, remember, China does not have the capacity to defend its interests abroad, right? Times of conflict. What does this base become? It's a disconnected, it's untethered from China's security system and easily severed by other maritime powers in the region, India, Australia, perhaps the United States, et cetera. France actually has interests in the region as well. So you have other powers that might have the capacity to rather easily sever China's connection to Djibouti should they desire to do it. So they're probing for opportunity, but they really haven't turned that corner yet. And I do wonder whether China will in fact turn the corner into something of a more expeditionary naval force with the capacity to control regional events because they have bases in the region that support the naval power and each other in that region. So I'm not convinced based on the evidence to date that China has that capacity despite what you read from some people about China's Navy is going global. Yes, it's true, but China's Navy is only going global at the, at the sufferance of other states. Okay, so in the Indian Ocean, China has interests, right? Supply chain interests that both resources and energy and markets that run across this. And you would expect that China would look for an opportunity to connect those with its South Tennessee bases, including apparently Cambodia, but they would need a node in the middle. So you would be looking at, say, perhaps Sri Lanka, perhaps the Maldives, perhaps Seychelles. Who knows, that if China is going to attempt to make this leap to be able to dominate their East West supply chains and sea lines of communication, you would expect to see some more development in that area. You might also expect to see it in, say, Pakistan, what are there, or in Myanmar. To date, there's been talk for more than 20 years now about the possibility of a string of pearls bases or bases in the Indian Ocean region. And for various reasons, and I think one of them is the cost, both political and economic cost of bases, China has chosen not to pursue it as avidly as they might. So what kind of Navy does China want then? I think there's, first, remember, I think the key to remember is Taiwan first, right? So keeping pressure on Taiwan, a force structure developed to put pressure on Taiwan and to focus on that as a source of, remember that nationalism and that desire to make China, quote, whole, right? By bringing these territories back under Beijing's dominance, that's the first priority. It remains the first priority for Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party. And what would we be looking for to see if there's going to be change? Well, I've developed this five, the ladder of five different types of bases, beginning at the bottom and going up to the top. And what you would expect to see would be China looking for overseas naval bases that work their way up this ladder. At the bottom is really just a friendly port, right? Where ships, if you're from the Navy or naval, you know that ships pull into ports all the time. They are looking for ways to rest, they replenish and conduct naval diplomacy, right? So you're out and about and conducting national and naval diplomacy. These are just friendly ports, right? Just permission to come into a foreign port. And China has plenty of these on a worldwide basis and that's typical of all Navy's. Moving up one, you have bases where there's logistic support. There might be ongoing commercial ties. You use perhaps the same port over and over again and so you develop commercial ties and have contractual logistics relationships. China had one of these. It was in the port of Aden prior to the central collapse of Yemen into civil war. So China used the port of Aden on a regular basis in this way. They had ongoing logistic support contracts and they had developed a sort of a routine relationship with commercial support in that port. Next up you would see on the third one of the ladder, you would see a logistics hub where you have a permanent contractual relationship where rather than sort of ad hoc contractual relationships, you have a permanent contractual relationship. That's not just economic but political as well. The example that I use for this would be someplace like Jebel Ali for instance in Dubai. You have, it's not a base per se but it is a permanent contractual relationship between the UAE and the United States to use Jebel Ali and the peers there for support. And there's a carrier pier where we come and go on a routine basis. And there's existing contractual relationships that have a political component behind them. So that's an example of that third level up. Fourth level up, I just referred to it as a place. We talk a lot about navies having places, not just bases. And the idea is we have a permanent presence with political commitment. That's the key. You might think of this as perhaps Singapore, right? The US has a permanent logistics support system and permanent agreement with the government of Singapore to use Changi and to the peers at Changi and to, and so there's, what you see as you're going up the ladder is a shift from a sort of commercial ad hoc relationship to a more politically permanent relationship, right? And so as you go higher up, there's an international diplomacy aspect to the relationship that increases in intensity. And so at the place level, you have a permanent relationship with the other country. It may not be a defense agreement, it may be just a status of forces agreement where you're allowed to use permanently a facility and even to have like in Singapore, a permanent logistics hub, but it's based on that political level of commitment. And finally, you have a base, a full-on base, something like the American Naval Base in Yokosuka, Japan where it's based on a deep political commitment between the two countries. There's a permanent presence. There's the capacity to work well together on security issues, often as allies. And there's full, all of the support that, I mean, the very extensive support that Navy's need to support each other. And it's that level of base that clearly China does not have anywhere in the world. So we might be seeing something like it beginning to develop with Cambodia, it's unclear exactly how high on the ladder that will go, but even in Djibouti, you have something maybe approaching that level of place, somewhere between a logistics hub and place, but definitely not at that top level of political commitment where Djibouti and China are now allies supporting each other, right? So that's as you would look for a change in China's approach to its security interests, where it intends to move beyond original power into a more expansionary naval power that will intend probably as a next stage, the logical next stage would be to develop naval power in the Indian Ocean. But there's a lot of pushback from others, United States, Australia, India and others to doing that. So there's costs for China to doing it. And they don't seem to be willing to pay those costs, at least not yet. So the key there is the political relationships. China is also reluctant to develop political relationships in the same way that the United States and others have, where China is committed to supporting the security interests of other states, right? China does not feel the confidence, it doesn't feel like it has the resources to do that while it hasn't got its own interests at this time. Okay, along with this, so remember, I talked about the expanding interior power and the forward-based exterior power, that affects how the US and China view international law of the sea, right? So you can see, first of all, in China's view, maritime order is based entirely on national interests, without necessarily reference to global interests and how national interests and global interests are related. In fact, it's quite the opposite. In my engagement with the Chinese, they're very focused only on what China wants in its regional neighborhood. And when you press them and say, well, are you willing to live in a world where others start following your rules and start attempting to take over large areas of water space and make it their own, there's not any response to that, right? So at this point, China's policies are purely national in focus without reference to any aspect of how China's policies will affect the global maritime rules-based system. Remember, as we all, I'm sure, remind the Chinese when we see them, that China's a growing power and others will follow China's lead. Because of China's power, others will follow its lead eventually. And so challenging the Chinese on whether they want to live in a world where their rules now apply more broadly has been an ongoing conversation that I've had with the Chinese. On the left, you see what the South China Sea would look like if the rules of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea were followed. So what you have on the left here are the exclusive economic zones in the blue dashed lines of the coastal states. The red dashed line is China's nine dashed line claim, the broader claim, without reference. It is without reference to existing international law. On the right, what you have is what I call the inside out, outside in. China's approach to making its claim. The inside out approach is saying, hey, we have historic rights based on this nine dashed line. We inherited the nine dashed line from the Republic of China. We have rights based on it. And those are historic rights to the water space and to the land within it. They haven't fully clarified what those historic rights are but what they've also done. So that's the outside in, right? You're claiming the water space based on the outside line, the nine dashed line and everything inside it based on the line and historic rights. Remember that there is no reference in international law to that approach at all. The inside out approach is to say, okay, well, all of the islands in the South China Sea belong to China. We claim them, we possess them and the rest of the countries that occupy them do so because we're in that one, right? So we're not willing to use force to extricate them. So, but they're trying to say, we own them, there are. And we are going to draw baselines around the island groups meaning collectively, collect the island groups, draw lines around them and draw our resource zones from that collected point. Well, again, that's not what international law allows, period.  That's just not what international law allows. But you see an example of that on the right there. Now this is notional, the Chinese haven't told us exactly what their baselines would look like, but this is a foul rent. I've participated in enough discussions with the Chinese to know that this is roughly what the Chinese are talking about. And so what you can see is that they collectivize the islands and then draw the exclusive economics out from that. And that takes you essentially throughout the entire South China Sea. And when you talk to the Chinese about what that now the nine dashed line means in this case, they say, well, that's the medium line between our claim and the coastline of other states. And that's our basic negotiating position about the nine dashed line. So whether you get there from the outside in, in other words, the line is ours, everything in its art based on historic rights or the inside out that's using the language of the law but not the law, right? Baselines and territorial seas and exclusive economic zones uses the language of the law but it's not applying the law in how that's actually achieved to dominate space. So these are the ways in which China's undermining the maritime rules based order. And without reference to how that might affect the global rules based order in the maritime domain. And so it's very interesting that China hasn't made that shift from looking at itself as a global leader based on the power that it has achieved through the wealth it's been able to generate. It hasn't made that shift from narrow national interests to sort of enlightened national interests in the context of global power. It just hasn't made that shift yet. So it still remains a continental state focused on Taiwan and controlling its regional space. So that's the kind of maritime order that China wants. It does want to avoid provoking conflict, right? So it desires expansion in the maritime domain, the maritime direction without escalation, without reaching military conflict. So its policy remains to seek a reunion with Taiwan through peaceful means, even as it's building military power and demonstrating the capacity to use military power. There's a coercive element to it but its policy remains first to achieve it through peaceful means on only use of force and last resort. But in the East China Sea and the South China Sea, China has been much more proactive in using non-military power. So non-militarized coercion, this is how I use for this, non-militarized coercion to achieve control over this expanded maritime periphery that is claiming for itself. It's also doing a little bit of violence to the concept of use of force in international law and in the international system because it's essentially defining anything that is a law enforcement platform is by China to you, by definition not a use of force. So a Coast Guard vessel or a maritime militia vessel might plow right through a Philippine vessel and sink it as it has done as they have done, but that's not a use of force because it was done with a Coast Guard vessel or a militia vessel. So these are considered below the threshold of Article 24 of the UN Charter and not invoking Article 57, so that the right of self-defense. So Article 52, sorry, Article 52, right of self-defense. Yeah, thank you, I'm getting all my 50s next up. Article 51, right of self-defense, thank you. So getting those, sort of blurring the paradigm there and blurring the approach to use of force. They are attempting to expand without provoking escalation. This is part of what the gray zone needs, essentially part of it. All right, so what kind of economic order does China want, right? So we've heard quite a bit about the expansion recently of the Belt and Road Initiative, bringing new members, I think Iran and Saudi Arabia, both recently were brought within a number of different Chinese breaks, but also the Belt and Road Initiative. So China is looking at ways to connect its economic power to the global market for the purpose, for in part, for the purpose of expanding its economic relationships and its economic activities. But for a very important component to expand its political power through the economic relationships. And China's been fairly effective in being able to use economic power to achieve political outcomes to date. So what is the Belt and Road Initiative? In short, it's offshoring manufacturing. Remember, China's got the, it's essentially used up low-end manufacturing capability and now frankly wages in China have begun to make low-end manufacturing in China less competitive. So China itself has begun offshoring some of that to other places. Ethiopia was a key place that China offshored this to and before it developed into civil war. China's been unlucky in that regard. Developing markets for its products, a lot of what China's doing in Africa has to do with developing markets and setting the rules of a structure and the relationships to use these markets for the long-term. Access and resources also in Africa, but elsewhere as well, but a lot of the focus is on Africa. Building infrastructure throughout the world, frankly. Establishing rules in relationship to this. And this isn't just international law. These are things like business standards or manufacturing standards. There's all kinds of things that make Chinese products more globally essential to the supply chain through things like standards and not just the rules of economic relationship, although they are attempting to establish rules of economic relationship that favor Chinese interests as well. And then creating long-term relationships, so that China is looking for ways to expand its global power, not so much through military power as we've seen, but through its use of economic relationships for political power. Longstanding relationships in Africa. China has had a long history of engaging with, from the 1950s through 60s and 70s, China was actively involved in welcoming and assisting states that were emerging. So whether that was out of colonialism or emerging as new states during that period of time, China exercised a lot of leadership and still considers itself the leading state of developing states in the world. I think we've hit enough there. The economic prize for China is the European market. It's even bigger than the American market. It is a challenging market because there's both a combination of state-based national standards and then EU standards. But China is really looking to leverage its economic power in Europe for the same reason because it wants not just to have that market drawn to the Chinese economy, but also to have political leverage there, to weaken American political leverage in Europe that has been developed over the last couple of centuries. We've already mentioned the headwinds that China faces in developing its wealth and what it's doing to try to advance its interests there. So maintaining power is the internal stabilization that the Chinese Communist Party is attempting to do through its policies of internal security, wealth generation and external security. So stability, security and wealth together, maintaining Chinese Communist power but also sustaining China's overall rise within the international system. So what thoughts or questions do you have? Yeah. So relating to the S-curve. Yeah. I noticed that the dates on there were quite old. Yep. Where were it placed at China currently? It's right in the same position. Yeah, it's a GDP per capita thing. China's GDP per capita hasn't changed much. Got it. Yeah. It's just the only one that I could find. It was from the economists actually some time ago. Yep. Yep. So there are a lot of internal conflicts which are at presently going on in the China like the UPS and the other state. How is that affecting his expansionist policy or the sustaining policy for the rise? So China has a pretty good internal control system, I think. Occasionally you see commentators predicting China's collapse in various ways because of these internal challenges that China faces, debt being one of them but also internal dissent being another. But China has very effectively developed since 1989, has developed an internal control system that is largely economic, I'm sorry, largely cyber-based and economic-based. So the capacity to use cyber capabilities to control the population and communication among people and then to even control access to resources through various cyber control mechanisms. There's almost no cash used in China anymore. All trends, nearly all transactions are through apps on the phone that are actually very carefully controlled and monitored by the Chinese government. And then of course they have the external security system. People are monitored incredibly in China. So I think what the Chinese Communist Party has done to maintain internal stability and the security of party has been to recognize that there is, that they would have to give up a certain amount of control, internal control, but that they replaced that control with the monitoring and monitoring system so that they could zero in on potential threats, cut them out before they became too serious. That's my view at least. Did that answer your question or, okay. Yeah. Think about Stalin, how starkly he was to dangers to Soviet communism of external power. And you said China needs that external opponent. But it doesn't seem as if China uses the United States in the same way that Stalin did. Sometimes they presented more like the United States, it's annoying. Yeah. So can you characterize the difference in the need for this external opponent? Yeah, I'm not sure I can do a good comparative contrast with the Soviet and Stalin, but I can say that the Chinese relationship with the United States is complex, right? Because the Chinese need the American economy, every bit as much as they are seeking the same level of interest in the European economy. So you have to be careful not to overdo the political condemnation. But there's a pretty steady drony internal to the Chinese conversation about negative aspects of the relationship with the United States and the American provocation of China in various ways. Things that frankly, they just don't even have to have to highlight at all. For instance, American intelligence gathering from the airspace outside of China is an example that the Chinese use all the time to sort of highlight the American pressure on China. They could just ignore it entirely. People might know or might not know or care, but the Chinese focus on it as a way of generating sort of a sense of anger at the United States for interfering in China's overall regional security. And it's somewhat manufactured, you can see it. But you're right, it is a complex relationship. They can't take it too far, right? Because they need the American investment and relationship with the American markets as well. Soviet Union was pretty different. It was economically isolated. They didn't need us, right? So not in the same way. So I think that might help explain some of the difference, but I don't know if there's a Soviet expert in the room who can clarify some of that, but all right. Nina. I'm wondering how much in your research you're coming into contact with China's working emerging tax. So I know in a lot of this sort of expansion of its military power, a big component of that is developing new capabilities and especially around AI, which of course I focus on, but I'm thinking also in terms of quantum technologies is what I think they're quite advanced. How much is this coming into contact with some of the maritime strategy stuff that you're... So I would say a lot. Actually, it's not an area of focus for my research up to date, especially for structure and technology issues, but anyone who studies China bumps up against these issues all the time. And the degree to which China is really rapidly seeking to advance its capabilities in these emerging technologies, part of this has to do with security, but part of it also has to do with getting in that upper right hand quadrant of the S-curve, it's how you innovate to take advantage of the next revolution, right? So one of the years ago it was Apple and the iPhone, and I don't know what the next innovation might be, but China is seeking to position itself within these technology advances to be at the forefront of it. And they are also bringing some of these technologies into the military field. I think the leading edge of it is pretty classified, just exactly what the Chinese are doing. But every year when the annual China Power Report comes out from DOD you learn new things about what the Chinese are doing at an unclassified level that just is stunning, right? So space technology I think is a real area of expansion and the capacity to communicate with space. I've only gabbled in learning about this quantum computing and what's that? There's a couple of different phrases related to that that are not coming to my mind at the moment, but the capacity to, is it quantum communications? Yeah, the quantum communications as well is something that I've seen that the Chinese are seeking to position themselves at the forefront of. I'll be honest, I don't understand the technology well, but it does to me real pause and concern to see how vast China is developing as kids learning. Do you have anything else to add? I mean, what are you seeing in your work? Yeah, so I think what I'm seeing, because my work is on emerging tech, so I'm really coming at it from that angle, but a lot of what I'm seeing, especially around quantum stuff, is China's had a few impressive breakthroughs with computing, but also with cryptography I believe was one of the ones I saw recently. And the discussions happening in the tech space around this is whether China's kind of trying to redefine what military influence looks like. So maybe it doesn't have to resemble the way the US has spread its military influence around the globe, it's going to be something new, right? And something technology based. So I just didn't know if this was, but the maritime angle is one that I'm not familiar with at all. So I was wondering if that would come up. You know, it brings to mind the last defense white paper that the Chinese developed. I don't recall the year, 2013 maybe? Maybe someone knows, but it's been a while.  And I went through line by line and all of the maritime stuff, I highlighted it and I blew or something, right? But then there was what I noticed, and this was what everyone was focused on, because there was a real sense that China's maritime policy said turn to corner. Again, and especially with the Navy, there was this sort of like, whoa, what does this really mean for us, right? Moment when China's white paper came out because there was so much naval stuff in it. But I took another marker to yellow and went through it and marked up all of the, the references to new technologies and new domains, right? And what you ended up with was a document that was equally blue and yellow, right? And so what I think what we were seeing was an investment in two different approaches to expanding global power. And my sense is that they have limited what they've invested in the Navy power, right? The Navy has an expansionary tool, right? And that they have focused on technology, emerging technologies and emerging domains as the expansionary tool. I also came across a couple of really interesting Chinese papers about the way in which technology could be employed. And one of them, in particular, by a very influential Chinese writer from a very influential think tank at the National Defense University, wrote about leapfrogging over naval power. Like that naval power was so 19th century, right? So the idea that naval power is no longer the primary mechanism or the most effective mechanism of power projection for states, that power projection through, actually the paper was about space technology, power projection through space technology as a mechanism for global maneuver and the capacity to mass power and globally maneuver through space as opposed to in the maritime domain could be achieved more effectively and efficient, right? That's, so those two things really struck me. And I just haven't had the capacity to pull on the threads of the different programs but it did strike me to see that the Chinese probably have seen more breakthroughs in the emerging domains, the cyber, the space. They actually have more domains than we do in military domains. So Lansi air, space and cyber are sort of the American domains. They include the electromagnetic domain and the cognitive domain. They have two different additional domains that they see as sort of warfare domains. And so it's the emerging domains, like the space, the cyber, the electromagnetic and the cognitive domain that they have been focusing on how to project power and achieve strategic effects that way. That's what I observed. I don't know, it's really interesting. Maybe someday we'll be studying China's naval power as a competitive strategy. China's competitive strategy, develop a navy to keep the Americans worried about the navy and then develop these other domains as the primary effort, I don't know. You shall see. Yeah, what else, anything? Julia, is there anybody on Zoom that has a question? All right, I don't know if Julie's sitting there. Thanks for coming. I really appreciate it. And I hope you got something out of it. I enjoyed chatting with you. Thank you.


Okay. Will this reaction have an equilibrium constant? Yeah, how do you know that? Well, that and it's an equilibrium, right? Okay, so it's an equilibrium. So it's going to have an equilibrium constant. What is it? Aq equals ICL squared divided by CL2. Times I2, right? They're all gases, so they're all in the equilibrium expression, okay? So we could do our normal Le Chatelier's principle if we wanted to, like, if I added CL2, what would happen to the reaction? It would go to the right, right? What would, if I added CL2, what would happen to the concentration of I2? Decrease, right? What would happen to the concentration of ICL? Increase, right? What if I removed ICL? What would happen to the concentration of CL2? Decrease, right? Because it would go that way, okay? Everybody's cool with that, right? I know it takes a little bit getting used to, but you're almost there, right? Okay, but now remember we could also say we could increase or decrease the pressure, and that could potentially have an effect on the reaction, right, the reaction dynamics. So, remember what I said, the first thing you need to do is figure out how many moles of gas each side of the reaction tanks, okay? So, moles are given to you by the relative moles, right? Are given by the coefficients, okay? So, how many moles of chlorine gas do we have in this reaction, relatively? One. And how many moles of iodine gas? One. One. And how many moles of ICL2? So, which side has more moles of gas relatively? Neither one, right? Neither one. Why? Why? Because one plus one equals two. Two, for those of you who are feigning confused, you know, feigning confusion. I know you can do one plus one, and I know that for a fact. Okay? So, anyways, hopefully everybody realized this is kind of a trick question, right, already. But what would happen if I decrease the pressure? Or decrease the pressure, specifically? To the tree. Nothing. What would happen if I increased the pressure? Nothing. It wouldn't push it either way. Why? Because there's two moles on both sides, relatively, okay? So, it doesn't favor, it doesn't favor to go from two to two, or from two to two, they're the same, you know? So, increasing the pressure or decreasing the pressure will keep the equilibrium constant the same. So, you cannot, you know, change the concentration of products. You can't get more products by, you know, decreasing or increasing the pressure. Is everybody okay with that one? Okay, so I think that's about the end of our discussion of Le Chatelier's principle.


Good morning, everyone. My name is Vrindan. I represent Diva Pothil University from Navi Mumbai and good morning to everyone. Luckily we are from Mumbai so we didn't have to travel but those who have travelled, it's the best time to be in Bombay. It's nicer, it's not so hot. So welcome everyone. Just to lead on to Martin's presentation, he mentioned about the teaching cultures. So slightly different in India. I'm sure everyone agrees. There's a lot of respect and people choose to be in the education profession as a teacher for 30, 40 years. Which is an upside for us. So when we have used Moodle in our university, we've seen that passion in our teachers but agree there needs a lot of support from all areas for them to be successful. So I'm just going to quickly give an overview of what we are because most of us here wouldn't know. So we are based out of Maharashtra. The three key verticals in our business is education, healthcare and sports. Our founder Dr. Diva Pothil started this in 1983. Today we have more than 150,000 plus students for university's 10 campuses. We have all hospitals in the form of charitable hospitals. So they are not for profit hospitals and yes, more than 150 programs. That's the president for Diva Pothil group who's running the show today. Unfortunately couldn't make it today but a lot of inspiration and motivation comes from him. Moodle was encouraged under his leadership last, past two and a half years back when we started. So we will just play a short video to give you a small overview of what we've done so far. The restriction of a classroom could limit a student's ability to learn. To help a student learn without boundaries, Diva Pothil University introduced a customized learning management system. My Diva. My Diva provides a unique platform for the students, faculties and the administration to interact with each other. As a result, the faculty and administration can manage the teaching process to provide the best learning experience to the student. With my Diva, a student can learn at his own pace by planning his studies, assess his performance with customized feedback from the faculties and seamlessly communicate with the faculty and staff to accomplish his or her academic goals. Students can get information regarding lecture notes in the form of presentations and case studies to reinforce the understanding of a topic. Reference reading material provides links to an online journal or article and reference video showcases information from subject experts and industry professionals. Students can check for semester-wise syllabus and subjects for the entire course and plan their studies by taking advantage from previous years question papers and question bank uploaded by the faculty. The student also stays updated about his daily attendance status as the faculty can mark attendance online. My Diva also assists students who apply for an exam online, pay fees online and save their hall ticket and payment receipts in their emails. The faculty can assess assignments uploaded by the student on my Diva to provide customized individual feedback while keeping a digital record of the same to avoid extra paperwork. The learning analytics in my Diva allows the faculty to track, comment and report on how the student is progressing and monitor the consistency in performance development. As the administration is also on board for my Diva, the online notice board and calendar is updated with official information about holidays, conferences, seminars, events and academics so the students can manage their day-to-day procedures. My Diva also allows the students, faculties and administration to contact each other effortlessly with the help of the query window without the need to share any personal contact information. At Diva Partly University, we believe one can bring innovation in education only when students, faculties and the administration work towards a common goal. So I think the video was a summary of all what we've done so far, but it wasn't easy. I think I just met a few people. So we started this two and a half to three years back, quite a shift in terms of the mindset of how you teach. So we had a lot of challenges on the way. A lot of faculty and head of departments had to be explained the value within it and we had to customize at every stage. So we have a few slides that kind of run through the same information. Key focus was students and faculty to make sure learning process is at the center. Most of the software, most of the tech that we saw otherwise was towards an ERP for the management to keep track of the backend. Well, there's heaps to do that, but we wanted to touch space where teaching and learning is benefited. In terms of administration, key deliverables were in advance learning methods, effective communication. You've seen the video. I don't want to repeat the same thing. In terms of faculty content sharing, having discussions with students. So even here we had a few faculty that were really technologically advanced and they wanted to use this to the advantage. And they came up to us to understand how they can interact more with their students. So apart from classroom teaching, they had their own discussion forums where they initiated conversations for students to ask after class questions. Some of them are shy to ask questions in the class. Whereas there was some faculty who just didn't want to adapt to this sort of learning. They just wanted to stick to their original way of teaching. So to that what we did is we had both of them to meet and talk to each other to understand how easy it is and how it kind of relieves you from having more contact points. So still I would say now that we've achieved it, it's an ongoing process for staff and faculty to understand values. Some colleges have a lot of benefit. So in terms of our students, we are almost 10,000 plus students on model right now. We have a lot of health science courses. So we have School of Medicine, which runs MBBS and BDS, which is doctors and dentists. So to offer content on an online platform is a little challenging over there because most of their learning is on job, like probably on an operation theater or things like that. But there are partners in India, which through IBBS, we've tried to integrate that have content related to health science courses. On the contrary, we have an engineering college, which is more classroom-based learning and they understand tech. A lot of faculty are advanced engineers themselves, which have no problem using the system. So point being, every course has its own challenge which you've faced and we are still evolving in the process. In terms of students, yes, attendance is the key aspect in India. So we have faculties pushing in SMS notifications just saying, hey, you're just falling back in terms of your attendance. It's also in terms of a number of weeks remaining for your exams. So just two weeks to go to the exams, question papers already on model. So we're trying to push as much in terms of notifications through email or SMS to the students. Other aspects like online fee payments, notice boards, all those go hand in hand. These are most used areas by students, lecture notes, assignments, case studies, quizzes, question banks, papers, additional reading materials, videos and discussion forums. Another institute which is our management institute, sorry, doing BBA and MBA, very friendly to the system. Because most of the content is also available in open format. So we just allow YouTube links or any other links that are out there as free to be put up on moodle so that if a faculty struggles to cover a particular aspect in that 90 minutes, the student can still go watch the video which is hosted in some other platform. It's just giving enough information. Four phases in the last two and a half, three years. Sorry for the small fonts but we started at 216 students, a lot of permutation combinations and as of today we have more than 10,000 odd students on board. These are a few learnings. I wouldn't want to read through all but the most important was the students were very proactive in terms of what they want. As Martin mentioned, we all are on Facebook and the students age group 16 to 21 probably are more active on social media and WhatsApps and all other apps. So we also felt the need that we should be on their mobile devices and not urge them to go on a desktop to log in to get their content. So we have also initiated the app. We have content streaming through the app. We have a few pictures of that as well. So the app is live from the last six months. We use the same moodle app that is available for us. It's almost similar to the desktop version but here we have crisp information in terms of what's most relevant for them. Time tables, notifications for the week, assignments coming up, attendance falling back. Also if they want to go and read through the presentation that is about to begin for the week, it's available in terms of a reader which they can just read on their mobile before the lecture or after the lecture. So we've done all these integrations. Still a lot of learning. There's a lot of feedback that comes from students throughout in terms of what they want and what for faculties want to deliver. We also have not included that slide but I'm just going to speak about it quickly. We're trying to pick up some information on gamification. So there are a few faculties from the engineering college collaborating with our MBA faculty. They're trying to devise some sort of a gamification back end where in students that are most active on LMS or who participate and have the most engaging results on LMS have some sort of coins or points which they can redeem in probably canteens or sporting areas or other. Same thing for faculty. We're trying to integrate performance reviews of the HODs of how well the faculty is rated by the student in terms of what is offered apart from classroom learning. So again, ongoing process. I wouldn't say we've reached 100% because it's not just one IT department or one faculty. It's a collaborative effort between students, faculty and us. And we are evolving in the process. So, yeah, that's what we're doing at DIY Portal and thank you, that's about it. Thanks. Any questions? Thanks. To be honest, no. But what we're trying to do is some of the students that are very active, they have come up with these ideas of making sure other students are aware because awareness is one thing. The way of teaching and learning we have here is more exam specific unfortunately in India rather than voluntary learning. Probably 10, 15% of the students are those. So gamification is in the form, let's say there are 12 presentations in a strategic management class and there are 12 quizzes to that. The first 10 takers of the quiz are probably recognized in some form or the other. It's just kind of probably end of the week or the principle of the college could probably recognize saying these are the 10 most active students. It's not a rocket science to take a quiz. The other 90% can also do the same. So just creating more awareness and excitement for the 16 to 21 year olds so that they can come on board and do more. Contribute content to what extent to the faculty? Contribute content to this platform. So what we have done is, I'm just going to go a few slides back. Every college has recommended a nodal officer for MyDY. So we call it MyDY as the name of the app. And that coordinator goes to each and every department. And these are the things that the faculty should be prepared with. And most likely they have lecture notes. They have case studies. Some of the courses, like if you talk about health sciences. So this is a no-brainer for an MBA faculty. Easy. Engineering, very easy.  They couldn't spend time on doing this. And the quality doesn't come out in a PPT for a doctor versus what they do on the table. So we have a model for that as well. We have a BBA hospital management students as interns who work half the day with them just to understand how they feel would be the best to do a presentation. And they actually make presentations for them. They actually collate all the YouTube links from other resources. They do all the hand-holding for them and upload it. So we try and ensure all these aspects are in there for every faculty. It is a fight. I wouldn't say it's easy. To a point that it is perceived as additional work for no reason. And with all due respect, teachers have been teaching this subject for the last 25 years when probably I was in school and if I go tell them, hey, this is the new way to learn. They're going to be like, hold on, boss. I know what I'm doing. So it is literally one-on-one. We have to just tell them this is no additional work. We'll give you resources. We'll work with you. This is just to make you feel even better, give you more tools for the students so that students get more content from you. So again, ongoing process. So it's part uploaded with the help of whatever students and all. And part of it is still lecture you're saying. Or this is a supplement to the lecture. Yes. So everything is classroom teaching. Everything stands as is. Once that week's content is taught in class, they're supposed to use the backend to upload all this for the students to have it as additional learning resources or to look back on what is taught in the last one week or two. Just one more question. And that is that do the students get an opportunity to upload anything here? I mean, other than their own assignments and so on. So far, no. It's a brilliant idea, but so far, no. You know, you should consider that. Sure. Because, I mean, students sometimes come out with a much better explanation than even the teacher can give, you know. I'm sure. So you should think about that. Sure. I also have that. I mean, actually it's very nice to know that you are doing a lot of things. But I just have one question is, have you made it compulsory for all the faculties of, I mean, who are involved in this to upload? Because as rightly said, that if you don't have discussions, you have written assignment case studies and discussion forums. So is it discussion forum continued for that unit? Or it is just the same. Because many times I find faculties retaliate to get into this online. Correct. Because as you said, they do not have that much time. But this is one very interesting way of engaging students, which we have done at university. I just wanted to check, have you made it compulsory for every faculty to contribute? Yeah. So compulsory is a little harsh word, but yes, we try to do that in the best possible way. So again, the president of our university, Dr. Vijay Patil, is quite young. So he attends all these meetings with the head of the institutions, with the LMS coordinators. And it's more motivation in the form, let's do this. This is different. And we try and have at least half of these things compulsory. You cannot force someone to have a discussion forum if the faculty is not active. But things like presentations, case studies, assignments, videos. So we try and, yes, do it subtly compulsory. So in the last two and a half, three years, we as an internal IT department have pushed our management to make it compulsory for all the faculty. Now, I think it's the other way around. Most of the faculty, it's this way. So a particular college would have 80% of their faculty uploaded everything in their first two weeks of the semester.  What's the big deal? Some of the older faculties are doing it. It's a huge thing for the younger faculties feeling, well, if they can do it, why can't we do it? So it's a change in the way you think it's difficult. I agree. We've taken two and a half, three years for them to understand. That's why we also named it MyDY in the interim. Rather than saying it's a software, we just call it MyDY. So all of us can adapt it. They are using it for their own internal inspections, which is UGCs and NAC, as technology is one of the areas where NAC and UGCs also rate colleges. So it's working in their favor now. It's a lesson plan. All the lesson plans are available on the side. Lesson plans of all the lectures. Yes. They are made it by the lectures. Yes. And you are using it for blended form? No. It is in the blended form? Classroom plus sound line? No. It's only classroom learning. All this is available as additional learning resources or weekly quiz, weekly lectures that are taught in the class are on the system. So this system runs parallel to the curriculum in a semester. Let's say 13 weeks. Three weeks are gone. Three weeks of content will be up for the students to read. Exam coming up. There will be a question paper that will be up. So it's not blended at all. It's not an obligation. It's and. It's not, you know, a compulsion that you have to have a part of this year and part of no. Everything is taught in the classroom. Everything stays as is. This is supplementary. Thank you. Thanks. Just one second. I have a very small question. Going forward, your numbers have gone from 200 to 10,000 students using. Going forward, will it help to reduce the fees? I don't know. That depends on how much my developer charges me. If he's going to do it free of charge, the fees will come down. No, no. See, technology is costly. I agree. But the number of users have really gone up. That's why I'm asking. Because if you have to really do this in India, education has to come down. So very specific. I'm not saying the technology should come down. As it is, the number of users are large. So your question is, would it affect the fees to come down? Don't. I'm not asking you to reduce, but will you feel it will reduce? I don't think so, but it will help in reducing the fees as such. Especially being in this part of the town. And I am probably youngest in my management, but there's too many bodies in government of India, department of education that have a lot of say in who does what fees. There's AICT norms and there's so many other norms. I'm not completely aware. But this cost being an open source is not so high. It's not so less. So it doesn't really affect the fee structure model as much. We are not charging students separately for this. It's in the tuition fees. It's within the fees they pay. So it's irrespective.


You are tuned to 6.60 now for more drama in the NBC series, The Pacific Story. Thirty minutes from now you'll hear the Midnight News Summary brought to you each evening at 12 from the NBC Newsroom in New York. W-E-A-F, NBC in New York. The National Broadcasting Company at its affiliated stations presents The Pacific Story. This is the story of the Pacific, the drama of the millions of people who live around this greatest sea where the United States is now committed to a long-term policy of keeping the peace. This is the background story of the events in the Pacific and their meaning to us and to the generations to come. Hanoi Perfume and Gunpowder. Hanoi in northern French Indochina with its force of high fangs and with one of the most fantastic railroads in the world presents a difficult knot in the tangled skein of affairs in the Pacific. The French, the Chinese and the native animites all have an active interest in this side door to the Pacific and that means conflict. The Chinese have no territorial ambition in French Indochina. But in our war with Japan it was sharply demonstrated that we must exercise some control over the Yunnan Fury Road to Hanoi and the port city of Haifeng. For over a century France has governed French Indochina. We point with pride to the culture and institutions we have fostered there. Also we have investments and interest in Indochina which must be maintained. We native animites are grateful to the French and we admire the Chinese but we would like independence to live and govern ourselves in our own way. We British naturally favor the French point of view. The French have done a splendid job of administration in French Indochina. But the French close the Yunnan Fury Road to China at the most critical time. You Chinese must get out of French Indochina. Britain will back up the French. Then we shall keep Chinese troops in Pankin and are known to ensure our interests.  They are our rights. There are many signs to the picture. There is the Chinese side as taught in Chinese schools. It is known that in the third century BC we Chinese spread into Indochina. The new land was called Annam or Pacific South. The Chinese ruled the Annamites from 213 BC until 391 AD. A period of more than 1000 years. The Annamites completely adopted our Chinese civilization and culture. Their religion, their governmental structure, their art and their culture are all of Chinese origin. Much of this Chinese civilization is retained by the Annamites right up to the present day. And in French circles? French missionaries had established themselves in Indochina as early as the 18th century. But it was not until late in the 19th century during the reign of Napoleon III that we sent our admirals on expeditions to conquer Hanoi and the region of the Red River. Jacques, did you say a conquer? Yes, but we used weapons. There was much fighting. Men were killed including our admirals. Jacques, we did not set out to conquer these Annamites and Chinese people. Well, then we set out primarily to open the Red River to commerce. Ah, that is better. So that the Annamites as well as we might mutually profit through the fruits of trade, eh? We. But there were some differences of opinion who would shake the fruit from the tree. In fact, there was quite a lot of bludge-building in the next 12 years over whether or not the Annamites wanted us to help them. You brought us up to 1885. And finally? After a series of costly defeats, the Peking government saw the futility of obstructing the French Empire and gave up the fight. Gave up the fight? Jacques. They merely signed a mutually beneficial series of treaties recognizing the French protectorate over Annam and the occupation of Tonkann. By so doing, the Chinese gained a large reduction in imports across the Tonkann border. And Jacques, when was the remainder of French Indochina consolidated under the French flag? In 1893, when we took Laos and Siam's Cambodia. Took? Jacques. Well, then we pacified those backwards regions. That is better. And in Annamite circles, you might hear something like this. The early 20th century saw a marked growth of native resistance to the French. Under a rather heavy yoke of taxes imposed upon us to support some of the fabulous French enterprises in our country, our peasants, artisans, and intellectuals became ripe for the wave of nationalism, which swept over Asia with the Japanese victory over Russia in 1905. At this time, also the great influence of Sunyap Sen left nationalistic impressions upon our people. And what about the communistic influence upon us? This made itself felt about 1926, when the first group of Annamite communists was organized in Canton. Since then, the communist movement has shown a steady growth. And today is an important influence in our thinking. Today there exists a three-corner dispute among the Annamites, the Chinese, and the French over northern French Indochina. We Chinese have played an important part in the development of French Indochina. We Annamites do not need you. We never did need your help. And we French did not need your 150,000 Chinese food station in Dongqing and Annam. But Chinese have been the bulwark of the economy of French Indochina. You Chinese have monopolized it. Our rights, our fists. But we French have founded schools, colleges, hospitals, beautiful public edifices. And all of us strangled as Annamites to maintain them. That's fantastic railroad you built. We did not need that. China needs the Yunnan Furilos and the terminal city of Hanoi and its fourth city, Haikong. Hanoi, the city of perfume, is in many respects one of the most extraordinary communities of the world. As the capital of the province of Tongqing and the seat of the government of French Indochina. And as the second most important cultural and commercial center, Hanoi exerts a keen influence in the political functions and intrigues of southeastern Asia. Hanoi is a focal point in the present tri-sided dispute over northern Indochina. Located 80 miles inland, Hanoi has access to the oceans of the world by the Navigable Red River. With a population of some 140,000 Annamites, Chinese, Japanese, Indians and French, Hanoi is a cosmopolitan city. Hanoi is a city of high-biscuit hedges, planting temples, pagodas and rickshaws. Of exotic oriental shops and bazaars snuggled along teeming and such quaintly designated streets as the street of grass, the street of silk, the street of perfumes, of copper-skinned street vendors, orking food in portable kitchens, out-of-door barber shops and chanting flower vendors, of oppressive warmth radiated from the blue tropical skies. And yet, with all its far-eastern atmosphere, Hanoi is unmistakably French. And, like French cities, Hanoi has its spacious tree-shaded avenues, beautifully-sendered parkways, ornate public buildings, European-type homes and villas, and sidewalk cafes replete with men and women almost as volatile and chic as their Parisian brothers and sisters. Hanoi is a city of military parade and pageantry, of perfume and gunpowder. What another parade? Well, this is the third I've seen today. Is this some kind of a holiday or something? No, you will find that these parades take place nearly every day. Yes, but why march the soldiers so much in this hot sun? It is mostly for the benefit of our snakes. You mean to entertain you? Do you like to watch these parades? No. No, we do not. We enemies generally do not care for military pomp and ceremony. Our women do not like the soldiers. We are not a military keeper. Well then, why do you stand up? The French believe such military pageantry is good for us. We can see, they say, where the money of us taxpayers is spent, and our children are impressed with the might of France. Of the Parisian pageantry and lavishness which everywhere is exhibited in Hanoi, even the French residents of the city express differing opinions. Foolish. It is wasteful and prodigal. But my friend, it is beautiful and for a mindful of home. But we are not home. We are in Hanoi. And why not try to make Hanoi as comfortable as possible and as much like home as possible? This is no place for such things. That Hanoi Opera House, for example, there was a miracle of wastefulness. Do you realize that, as if it was planned, it would have seated the entire European population of the city? Is there reason of wisdom in such an enterprise? And the Opera House is just one example. But the Opera House was never finished. Fortunately for the taxpayers. As it was, it costed pretty penny. Yes, I think Breux, the academician, was right when he said, our lavishness here in Hanoi sums up all the French faults. Love of pleasure, artificiality, unreflecting enthusiasm and wanton lack of foresight. But not all of the taxpayers' money has been recklessly squandered without producing useful results. The French have also accomplished much good for us. There is a university of Hanoi founded in 1907. Up to that time we animates found it far too expensive to send our children to school in France. And so we were obliged to send them to Japan or to the University of Hong Kong. We are very proud of the University School of Medicine for many of its graduates have won considerable recognition. And from the University of Hanoi branched other public benefits. A silence for the insane and for lepers. Our difficult health and sanitation problem have been dealt with adequately. And the French have given us higher cultural values and living standards. Another noteworthy phase of French administration, especially to all democracy-loving people, is found in the fact that the French have governed the natives of French Indochina probably with less high-handedness than any other imperial-minded people has ruled in such a way. I say I'm not as a curious thing about your French attitude in public places towards natives. Yes. I mean, you don't seem to draw any color line, do you? Color line. The way every shade of racial color is covered right here in this cafe. Mongols and Tonkines, Analyze, half-castes, quarter-castes. I must say you treat the natives as if they were your equals. We treat them all democratically. And do you find that a good idea? A very good idea, Monsieur. We are, after all, visitors to these people's country if we accept one's hospitality, why not accept him as an equal? But nowhere else in all the East is such a thing practiced. Oui, Monsieur. I know. Yes, our French clubs and French drawing rooms are open to all shades and mixtures of human beings. By Joe, just look at that. What, Monsieur? A pure-blooded French woman, accompanied by a dark-skinned native. But what is wrong? Is it any more scandalous than a fair-skinned Norwegian woman being accompanied by a swalded Spaniard through the theater in Madrid? No one seems to know why Indochina should be the only place in Asia where such color equality should exist. Or whether it has developed there as a result of government policy or because the French people have no racial prejudices. Of great importance in the picture is the Ananfu Railroad. For more than one reason, this railway is one of the most fantastic projects ever conceived and built by man. It is also a powerful motivating influence in the present Chinese occupation of northern Indochina. Its building was a great undertaking. The vitality, the wealth of any nation or region, whether it be in Europe, in North America or in Asia, depends upon one thing, gentlemen, transportation. We must be a railroad in French Indochina. I beg to differ with you, Mr. de Maire. It is quite preposterous to think that railways, merely by their passage to a country, will create wealth. Railways are useful only as instruments of wealth. They are the means, not the creators of wealth. Never in my life before have I heard such foolishness. Wait, everybody knows that to be wealthy a country must have adequate transportation facilities. But there already is adequate transportation facilities in French Indochina, the waterways and roads. It is true there are waterways and roads in existence in French Indochina. But modern railways are also needed. What for? What? There is practically nothing in French Indochina to be transported. There is no economic need for a railway system. The natives raise and produce barely enough for themselves locally to consume. They have nothing to exchange, nothing to transport. Ah, but the railways will encourage trade. Besides gentlemen, there are other urgent reasons for building railways in French Indochina. We must be the British with a railway into southern China. In order to link French Indochina with China and to beat the British where they're proposed railway into China preparations for this unantiful railroad were rushed through. It is really very simple. I just have to draw a line on this map with my pencil. Thus, and we shall have our realign. It is ridiculous to think that you can build a railroad so easily with a pencil line across a map. How else? The curves and direction must be plotted. But not with a pencil. Do you know anything of the terrain where you have drawn that line? Have you ever been there? No, but I have built many railroads. France, yes. But French Indochina is different. Here you shall find mountains to toss down boulders, touring gorges to slide, torrential rains to wash away roadbeds, rampaging rivers to wash out bridges, malaria to kill and triple your labor. Ah, those rivers and mountains to speak of let us not cross them until we come to them. One section of the fantastic unantiful railroad was planned simply by tracing with a pencil a line across a map. This only one example of faulty planning was the cause of unheard of difficulties encountered in an empty valley which became celebrated as the mistake of 500 meters. The constant fight against nature wasn't the only problem that descended upon the ambitious but brash engineers. Men, men, we must have men to labor if this railroad is ever to be finished. Sixty more stricken with malaria this morning, eh? And the lack of facilities we have to care for them is appalling. It's inhuman. They knew the risks they were taking when they came to work for us. But that is not the point. Soon we'll have no men to work at all. There are so few people even living in this sparsely settled region. Then we just have to import more coulis from China. But the cost is prohibitive. And wait till it's learned by our headquarters that we cannot carry on with the already fabulous budget voted for us this year. For financial reasons too, the unantiful railroad several times by a hair's breadth escaped doom. A legend grew up that the railway had cost the lives of 100,000 animites and Chinese coulis. Though facts proved that this figure was considerably exaggerated. Since the total number of coulis ever hired was about 80,000. Probably a third of these died. A terrific mortality, even without the exaggeration. Finally, on April 1, 1910, the first locomotive reached Yunnan from Hanoi. Well, Jean, we have succeeded. Our railroad is now a living, breathing thing stretching all the way from Hanoi and the Pacific into Yunnan in southern China. But for what good purpose? There never will be enough rates to justify what we put into it. The rails practically duplicate already existing waterways and roads. And the opposite will be frightfully high. Ah, but it is an engineering seat we can well be proud of. The Yunnan-Fu Railroad is one of the world's boldest engineering achievements. Along its 600 miles of tracks were constructed 3,000 bridges and tunnels. Its most spectacular segment is at the bayhole gorge in Yunnan, over which a 200-foot steel span swings between sheer cliffs. Where this bridge meets almost perpendicular walls, 300 feet above the river, two tunnels have been built out of solid rock. The Yunnan-Fu Railroad was to become the bone of contention between the French and the Chinese. In November 1939, newscasters had something to say about this. The second stage of Japan's offensive in China, the attack on unoccupied China's links with the outside world, now seems to have been virtually completed. Today, the Imperial Japanese armies capture the ports of Yamchao and Nanning. And this generalissimo well, of course, nobody understands better than you what this means to China. Yes, it means that the enemy now have all of China's importancy ports. We have only two lifelines left to the outside world. The Bono Road and the Yunnan-Fu Railroad. We must use every means possible to keep supplies coming in over both. But surely, now the Japanese will make an attempt to somehow shut off these lifelines too. The Yunnan-Fu Railroad after all is French. France is neutral. But on December 30, that same year of 1939... The modern of Japanese bombers today made the first direct attack on the vital Yunnan-Fu Railroad at Main Street, the first custom station within the Chinese border. The government of France held by logistic protest with the Imperial Japanese government over the recent bombing of the Yunnan-Fu Railroad. The government's protest against the bombing of the Yunnan-Fu Railroad by the Japanese bombers we demand an explanation from the Japanese government. General Governor Kattru, the Japanese Imperial government very much regrets the bombing of the Yunnan-Fu Railroad. Did I remind you that this railroad is the proper say of the French government? Unfortunately, the Yunnan-Fu Railway is the only way ultimately the Yunnan-Fu Railway is also an important military target. That makes no difference. France still objects. Furthermore, Your Excellency, I am instructed to inform you that unless the French government itself cooperates with the Japanese government and seizes to transport over the Yunnan-Fu Railroad a certain commodity, we shall be constrained to bomb the railroad out of existing. And what are these certain commodities? Oh, such commodities as gasoline or trucks, Your Excellency? Without much of an explanation to the Chinese or to anyone else, the French government shortly afterwards did exceed to these Jap demands. Soon the list of contraband commodities was extended to include many more items objectionable to the Japanese until on June 25th, 1940 It was reported today that Governor General Kattru informed Japanese officials that the transportation of all goods to China over the Yunnan-Fu Railroad has been stopped pending Japan's agreement on the itemized schedule. This means that only such commodities and items which Japanese inspectors shall find not objectionable shall be transported over the railroad into China. And of course, Generalissimo, that means that by their action in exceeding to the Japanese demand they have in fact closed the Yunnan-Fu Railroad to China and that is only part of it. At present there await shipments over the railroad some 150,000 tons of Chinese supplies and 2,200 motor trucks. All of this may be considered captured by the enemy. Thus, by bitter object lesson the vital importance to China that the Yunnan-Fu Railroad was sharply demonstrated during the war. But even in peacetime the importance of this railroad is not to be minimized. Our south-western provinces of Yunnan and Guangxi have easier access to the sea by way of the Yunnan-Fu Railroad than they have through Chinese territory. It would be definitely to our advantage to have an assurance that the Yunnan-Fu Railroad and the port of Haifeng are the best At the end of hostilities in the war and with the British occupation of Saigon and southern Indochina Chinese nationality troops 150,000 strong under the command of General Lu Han recently appointed governor of Yunnan lost no time in occupying northern Indochina Chang'in and Anam. As commander of Chinese national forces in French Indochina let me say most aesthetically that the Chinese have no territorial ambition in this country. We are here for only one purpose to aid the Indochinese and the French in disarming the enemy. Meanwhile General Alessandro, commander of French forces in northern Indochina en route to participate in the Japanese surrender ceremonies was detained for several days by the Chinese at Hanoi.  We very much regret this indignity. It was an unfortunate mistake. Is it also an unfortunate mistake that the Chinese have omitted to honor the flag of France by not posting it at the surrender ceremonies? In the name of France I refuse to participate in the ceremonies. We, Anamites, too do not rest easy over this Chinese occupation of Chang'in and Anam. In the past we have had good reason to be suspicious and fearful of Chinese intentions. However our feelings toward the French are not much more cordial than they are toward the Chinese. We do not need nor want French domination in any form over our country. To prove that these are no mere Anamite words last October 2nd a red flag with blue and white horizontal stripes in one corner was hoisted over a French mansion in Hanoi's suburbs. A political party representing a union of revolutionary parties of the Vietnam independence movement for Indochina. Vietnam political party however is only one of several Anamite parties resolved to give Indochina political independence. Another with definite communistic tendencies is the Viet Minh headed by Ho Chi Minh but even these native political parties though united in their one biggest common desire so far have not agreed on any united course of action. They hurled charges and counter charges at each other. And so while formal hostilities with the common Japanese enemy have ceased all issues of the peace are not settled. French Indochina remains pretty much the unhappy subject of a three corner dispute between the French, the Chinese and the Anamites that indicate a strong desire to be left alone without foreign interference. Further complicating the picture are the British forces in southern Indochina. Since the Japanese surrender the atmosphere in Indochina has been charged with attention which on frequent occasions has broken out in fighting with all three or four factions including the British participating. Not until last February 28th was the first encouraging note sounded toward at least a partially peaceful and satisfactory adjustment of the situation. Today it was reported that China has agreed to evacuate by March 31st from the provinces of Tangkin and Anam in northern French Indochina its army of occupation of 150,000 men under the command of General Wuhan. In return the French have agreed to give up their free working sessions in Shanghai. And so the Chinese firecracker in northern Indochina the fuse of which has been sputtering for six months may not explode. But the French and the Anamites still have their differences to iron out and the end of the conflict in Indochina is not yet. You have been listening to the Pacific Story presented by the National Broadcasting Company and its affiliated independent stations to clarify events in the Pacific and to make understandable the cross currents of life in the Pacific Basin. For a reprint of this Pacific Story program send ten cents and stamps or coin to University of California Press Berkeley