Chapter 24 The Founding of San Francisco Anza's successful march of 1774 was the signal for action on Buccarelli's part to utilize the newly discovered route to the flow. Before he had an opportunity to do so, however, he set on foot numerous other measures to strengthen all the California within itself, and also against the possibility of foreign attack. These plans culminated in his projected occupation of the Port of San Francisco and the two rivers now called Sacramento and San Joaquin, which for many years the Spaniards termed by the single name of the River of San Francisco. Not only did Buccarelli wish to keep these important strategic points from falling into enemy hands, but he thought of using them also as a base for further northwest conquests. The local situation in Alta California between Anza's departure from that province in the spring of 1774 and its return at the close of 1775 presented the same features as those already described for the period immediately preceding. Conversions of the Indians and increasing domestic animals and crops proceeded at the normal rate, but were by no means great enough to relieve the needs of the province. A start toward white settlement was indeed made, but it was on too small a scale to change the stable affairs materially. In other words, the province lacked precisely those things which it was designed to furnish by use of the Anza route. The beginnings in real colonization just alluded to were provided in connection with the dispatch of Rivera to Monterey to succeed Fagas as governor. Rivera got together 51 persons in Sinaloa, of all ages and both sexes, possibly half a dozen or more families besides a few unmarried men. Crossing to Baja California, he found difficulty in supplying his small expedition, and therefore went on ahead himself to Alta California in order to send back provisions. An interesting proof of the inadequacy of the peninsula as a source of supply for the northern province. Rivera had been ordered to cooperate with Anza, but when he got to Monterey in May 1774, the Sonora captain was already nearing his precedeo on the return journey. On September 26, 1774, the families that Rivera had left behind in Baja California reached San Diego. Thus did the first real settlers come to Alta California, since for the first time white women set foot in the province. Though their whiteness of skin was undoubtedly tinged with Indian red, they were suitable wise for a limited number of soldiery, and by their children were able to contribute yet more to the permanence of the colony. As already mentioned, Buccarelli repeatedly gave orders for the exploration and occupation of San Francisco. But it was not until November 1774, when some of the newly arrived colonists got to Monterey, that Rivera felt strong enough in forces to obey the viceroy's commands. Between November 23 and December 13, he made a somewhat perfunctory expedition to the Golden Gate, running with a perfectly good excuse that the season was too far advanced to do anything toward an eventual settlement owing to the winter rains. In the summer of 1775, Ayala made his thorough exploration of San Francisco Bay. Heseta had also been instructed to enter the port on his voyage down from the north, but missed it in the fog. In September 1775 he led a small party overland from Monterey. Having complied with a letter of disinstruction, he at once returned. Nothing had been done, therefore, to pick out a site for settlement, erect buildings, or found the two proposed missions. But, thanks to Ayala, there was no longer any doubt about the value of the port itself. Meanwhile, preparations were being made under the guidance of a man who could get things done, the intrepid commander of Tubaque. Several months after returning to Tubaque from his first expedition, Anza made his way to Mexico City to report to the viceroy in person. During November and December 1774, he consulted with Bucarelli and plans were drawn up and adopted for a second expedition on a large scale, designed to meet the needs of Alta California, especially to put the province on a sound and permanent basis and safeguard it from the danger of foreign attack. Anza was to take with him thirty married soldiers and their families, besides ten more soldiers as his personal escort to Alta California and back. Domestic animals of the kind most needed in the province, notably those for breeding purposes and beasts of burden, were to be driven along. The crowning event of the expedition was to be the founding of two missions at San Francisco, for which the married soldiers were to serve as a guard. It was almost a year before Anza's preparations were complete. Meanwhile, Bucarelli was busy with a number of related projects, such as the voyages of 1775 to the northwest coast and the internal problems of the frontier provinces and the two California's. There is no question, however, but that he regarded Anza's expedition as the most important measure of all, as indeed it was. Anza recruited most of his colonists from families submerged in poverty in Sinaloa. Gathering his company at Orcasitas, he proceeded to Tubac, where on October 23, 1775, the whole force got underway. The roster of the expedition, as it left Tubac, is worth quoting. Lieutenant Colonel Anza, one. Father Sfont, Garces, and Exarch, three. The purveyor Mariano Vidal, one. Lieutenant Jose Joaquin Moraga, one. Sergeant Juan Pablo Grihalva, one. Soldiers from the Presidios of Sinaloa, eight. Recruits, twenty. Veterans from Tubac, Anza's escort, ten. Wives of the soldiers, twenty-nine. Persons of both sexes belonging to the families of the said thirty soldiers and four other families of colonists, one hundred thirty-six. Militaires, twenty. Herders of beef cattle, three. Servants of the Fathers, four. Indian interpreters, three. Total, two hundred forty. Of the thirty soldiers who intended to remain in Alta California, Lieutenant Moraga was the only one unaccompanied by his wife. Anza's care of this mixed assemblage made his expedition one of the most remarkable in the annals of exploration. Starting with a party of two hundred forty, he faced the hardships and dangers of the march with such wisdom and courage that he arrived in Alta California with two hundred and forty-four. Footnote. Nine persons remained at the Colorado Heela Junction after crossing to the Alta California side. In footnote. No fewer than eight children were born in the course of the expedition, three of them, prior to the arrival at Tubaq. The day of the departure from Tubaq, one mother died in childbirth, the only loss of the whole journey, for even the babes and arms survived both the desert and the mountain snows. When one thinks of the scores that lost their lives in the days of forty-nine over these same trails, Anza's skill as a frontiersman stands revealed. Furthermore, over a thousand animals were included in the expedition. The loss among these was considerable, but enough of them lived to supply Alta California's long-pressing want. A very heavy equipment was taken along, all of it, even the ribbons in the women's hair being provided in government expense. Anza had warned the viceroy that it would be necessary not only to do this, but also to pay the men in clothing and outfit instead of cash since they were habitual gamblers. Of such seemingly unpromising materials were the men who, certainly without their knowledge, were about to play apart in one of the most important acts on the stage of American history. The prices of their outfits are enough to make one sigh for the good old days. Petticoats, relatively, were expensive. They cost about a dollar fifty or twelve realas each. Footnote. The real of which there were eight to a peso is ordinarily reckoned at six and a quarter cents. Since, however, it has seemed best in this volume to calculate the peso as equivalent to a dollar, the real should be counted as twelve and a half cents. In footnote. Women's shoes were seventy-five cents, six realas, and so too women's hats. Each woman got six yards of ribbon at twelve cents a yard. Boy's hats were only fifty cents for realas apiece, but the girl's hats were the cheapest of all. The girls were supposed to require nothing more than the hair of their heads. And so it went. For men, women, and children, clothing of every sort and kind, arms, riding horses, and rations were provided, and all at what now seems to have been an astonishingly low cost. An undemocratic notice to be observed. The fare of the thirty families was the plainest, and its estimated cost for the entire expedition amounted to only one thousand nine hundred and fifty-seven dollars. On the other hand, Anza and Father Font were to have such edibles as beans, sausage, biscuit, fine chocolate, a barrel of wine, cheese, pepper, saffron, cloves, cinnamon, oil, and vinegar at a cost of two thousand two hundred and thirty-two dollars and fifty cents, more than the expense for the thirty families. Anza protested against this allotment when it was proposed, but it may be imagined that his objections were somewhat perfunctory, for the arrangement was entirely in accord with the ideas of the day. Footnote. A translation of the document listing the equipment of the expedition is given in Chapman, the Founding of Spanish California, 461 to 466. In footnote. Descending the Santa Cruz River to the Gila, Anza went down that stream to its junction with the Colorado. This route was much better than the one he had taken through Papagaria in 1774, but though there was plenty of water, Father was scarce. After a march of thirty-seven days he reached the junction, having been delayed en route by sickness of the expeditionaries, especially on occasions when children were born, for as he put it, it was not possible for the mother to ride on horseback for four or five days thereafter. A serious problem presented itself on his arrival at the junction toward the end of November 1775. Anza found that the Colorado had deepened at the place where he crossed in 1774, so that now it was impossible to get over, even though it was the season when the river was low. It was also impracticable to use rafts, for the Umas would have to swim with them in order to guide them, and the water was then too cold. At any rate, not more than one raft a day could be handled, and there was danger that it might be upset. The Umas knew of no other ford. Their promise to be a long delay, but Anza himself made a morning search and found a place where the river divided into three shallow branches. It was necessary to clear a way through the thickets, however, for it was impossible to get by them on horseback. This done, Anza got his entire expedition across after a wait of but a single day. The stay among the Umas, who were as demonstratively friendly as they had been the year before, was signalized by a famous gift to Chief Palma, which Bukareli had sent to him in the name of the King. This Indian's devotion to the Spaniards was suitably rewarded, at least in the eyes of his tribesmen, when he received a sleeveless cloak of blue cloth, lined with gold, a jacket and trousers of chamois skin, two shirts, and a cap with a coat of arms like that of the Spanish Dragoons. Palma was greatly pleased and reiterated the request that he had made in 1774 for the sending of Spanish missionaries. Garces and Exarch remained among the Umas, but their object was an extended exploration of that vicinity rather than the immediate conversion of the Indians. The three interpreters and four servants of the original roster stayed with them. After a stop of a few days, Anza again went forward, leaving a nearby camp at Santa Olaya on December 9th. Profiting by his former experience, he crossed the Colorado Desert with comparative ease. He split his forces into three divisions, with orders to march on different days, so that the waterholes might have time to refill. The third division, under Maraga, alone met with hardships out of the ordinary. They encountered intense cold. Maraga himself suffered severe pains in the head and ears from which he later became totally deaf. Ahead of them lay the mountains, full of snow to such a degree, said Anza, that we would not have believed so much could be gathered together. To the people of the warm Southland it was indeed a terrifying prospect. On December 19th the dread ascent began. For the next eight days, until they had passed the summit and started down the other side, the march was most difficult and depressing. It rained or snowed almost continually and the weather was extremely cold. One of the women chose this period to be delivered of a child, but after only one day of rest the expedition pushed on, though slowly. On the 26th they felt an earthquake shock which lasted four minutes. It was on the next day, however, that they went over the summit of the pass and hope revived as the climate and country grew more and more delightful. Without special incident they now hurried on to San Gabriel, which they reached on January 4th, 1776. Without knowing it, Anza and his party had very nearly encountered a danger at least as great as any they had actually experienced. A danger which also threatened the very existence of the Spanish settlements in Alta California. The Indians of the San Diego district had always shown a disposition to be unfriendly to the Spaniards, though they had early learned to have a wholesome respect for Spanish weapons. When at length the missionaries began to be successful in their efforts, the unconverted Indians in the neighborhood, for there were eleven villages which had steadily resisted Christianity, took alarm. They felt that their native customs were doomed unless they could either annihilate or expel the dread invader. Their runners communicated these views to their many kinsmen across the southern end of the province, urging a concerted uprising. Messengers came even to the Yumas for the San Diego Indians and the many tribes eastward of the Colorado were all members of the same great human family. While some promised support and others were sympathetic, the Yumas would not rise against the Spaniards due to the good treatment they had received at the hands of Anza. The reputation Anza had acquired among the Yumas was probably all that saved him from being attacked on his march to San Gabriel. To the childlike savage the Spaniards of Anza's following were very different from those who had settled permanently in Alta California. As he neared San Gabriel, however, Anza had noticed some evidences of native unfriendliness. Meanwhile the unconverted Indians of San Diego, in collusion with mission converts, had gone ahead with their plans and at last arranged for a simultaneous attack on the mission in Presidio, which were several miles apart, for the night of November 4th, 1775. What with missionaries and soldiery there were 22 Spaniards in all, eleven at each place, but four of those at the Presidio were sick and two others were in the stocks. All were blissfully unaware of the danger and it seems that no guards were placed. Shortly after midnight the Spaniards at the mission were aroused by the yells of hundreds of Indians who had already set the building on fire. As the little party tried to escape they were greeted by clouds of arrows. Father Luis Jaime was seized and dragged away then beaten to death. Later his body was found horribly mutilated and pierced by eighteen arrows. The other man took refuge in an adobe storehouse, defending themselves desperately. Not one of them escaped wounds, but they did such execution with their weapons, especially one among their number with a suspiciously Irish-sounding name, Corporal Roca, that at daybreak the Indians withdrew. Father Jaime and one other had been killed and a third man died of his wounds several days later. Fortunately the plan to attack the Presidio had miscarried and the men there must have slept peacefully through the night, for they were unaware of the conflict which had raged so bitterly only a few miles away. The first day new of it was when the wounded heroes of the mission fight came the next morning to the Presidio. The Indians hesitated to attack again and thereby lost their chance of success. Soon Ortega came in with a few soldiers whom he had taken with him to found the new mission at San Juan Capistrano. The founding of that mission was postponed and Ortega's men remained at San Diego. The situation would still have been serious but for the arrival of Anza from Sonora. Rivera had only seventy men of his own in the province and these were scattered among five missions and two Presidios over a range of more than four hundred miles. The governor hurried south from Monterey and had good reason to be glad upon his arrival at San Gabriel when he learned that Anza's expedition was approaching that mission. Anza's orders called for him to proceed to San Francisco without delay and found the settlements but he recognized that the San Diego revolt was a superior emergency. Not only did he lend Rivera twenty of his veterans but even went the length of waving his superior rank and consenting to accompany Rivera to San Diego and assist him all he could. On January 7th, 1776 therefore, the two commanders left San Gabriel with a little force of thirty-five men not knowing what they might have to encounter. It seemed to them not unlikely that San Diego had been wiped out and the garrison massacred and that they themselves would have to confront thousands of hostile natives. Fortunately, Ortega had been able to tide over the crisis and their arrival on January 11th definitely saved the situation. At about the same time two Spanish ships came in from Samblas and not long afterward Bucarelli sent twenty-five more soldiers to Alta California. By this time the Indians believed that the Spaniards were coming almost from the skies to punish them and they became afraid. There was no longer any thought of revolt. Indeed, the position the Spaniards was strengthened by the failure of the San Diego outbreak for the Indians felt from this time forth that it was impossible to throw out their conquerors. The authorities were generally agreed that Anza's arrival had turned to scale. Providential Bucarelli called it, just as if he had come from heaven. Men of that day knew too how grave had been the danger. Latter-day historians have been altogether too prone to regard the hostility to the Spaniards on the part of the California Indians as a matter of small consequence, since no disaster, in fact, ever happened. Its real import appears, however, in the light of such events as the Yuma massacre of 1781 to be taken up in a later chapter. As compared with the Yuma uprising, that of the San Diego Indians had much fewer difficulties to encounter. The Yumas were a small tribe of about two thousand, and were close to the Spanish frontier where it was possible to assemble hundreds of soldiers at short notice. On the other hand, the San Diego plot involved untold thousands of Indians being virtually a national uprising, and owing to the distance from New Spain and the extreme difficulty of maintaining communications, a victory for the Indians would have ended Spanish settlement in Alta California, and the eventual loser would have been the United States. It soon became apparent that there was no further immediate danger at San Diego, wherefor Anza was eager to carry out the viceroy's orders which had been given both to him and to Rivera for the founding of settlements at San Francisco. The dilatory governor could not be moved, so after a wait of a month, Anza resolved to proceed without him. Leaving twelve of his troopers with Rivera, he departed for San Gabriel. There he was obliged to dispatch Moraga with ten soldiers in pursuit of five deserting militeers who had run away with some of the best horses of the expedition. Anza then set out with a number of the families up the coast, and after a march of nearly three weeks through driving rains reached Monterey on March 10th. Moraga, who had successfully apprehended the deserters, came up later with the remainder of the families and their equipment. While he was at Monterey, Anza became very sick, and nothing the doctor could do seemed able to relieve his pain. At length, Anza determined to apply some remedy of his own, and this proved to be helpful, but he was far from well when he announced that he would wait no longer and would go at once to explore the site of San Francisco. Taking only a few men with him, and leaving the families at Monterey, he set out for San Francisco on March 23rd. Upon arrival he made a thorough going survey, finding water, firewood, and timber, and marking out the places for the later establishments. For a precedio he picked a site with the Spaniards called the Contil Blanco, or White Cliff, near where Fort Scott now stands. He selected a place for the mission along a little rivulet which he named Dolores, Throws of Childbirth of the Virgin Mary, so-called because that was the name of the day he visited it in the religious calendar, March 29th. This was the origin of the name which eventually superseded the one the Spaniards first applied to designate the mission. Though rarely given to enthusiastic comment, Anza had now seen enough of San Francisco to speak of it in the famous port in terms of warmest praise. Father Faunt was even more expressive of delight. The port of San Francisco is a marvel of nature, he said, and may be called the Port of Ports. Anza had also been instructed to explore the river of San Francisco beyond the point reached by Foggis in 1772. Accordingly he marched around the lower end of the bay, and proceeded up the eastern shore to the junction of the Sacramento and San Joaquin rivers, and southward up the latter to a considerable distance beyond the place Foggis had visited. From a hill he clearly discerned that the two rivers had widely separate courses, but was unable to determine the secrets of the great valley which they traversed. Indeed, Haunt later recorded his belief that for the most part the valley was a great lake studded with islands. Instead of following the route by which he had come, Anza plunged boldly into the hills and emerged near the present Gilroy Hot Springs, once he made an easy march to Monterey, arriving there on April 8. The time had now come for Anza's departure. He had fulfilled the orders of the viceroy insofar as he could without the cooperation of Rivera, though for the lack of it he had not been able to establish the settlements at San Francisco. Indeed, prior to Anza's exploration of that port, Rivera had sent orders for the colonists to erect houses for themselves at Monterey and to abandon the projected foundations at San Francisco for that reason. Anza was disappointed, but felt that he could not undertake the work by himself since Rivera, after all, was governor of the province, so he decided to take his leave. On April 14 he departed from Monterey to the accompaniment of the tears and lamentations of the settlers who had learned to revere and love him in the course of their long march from Sonora. The next day Anza received a letter from Rivera, whose party was then approaching Anza's on the way up from San Diego. In this missive, Rivera answered a much earlier letter from Anza and announced abruptly that he would not join him in making the establishments at San Francisco. The messenger told Anza that Rivera was in an evil temper and would not even look at a letter which Anza had just sent to him. A little later the two parties met. Both leaders saluted, and then, without a word, Rivera put spurs to his horse and rode on. Not long afterward, Rivera sent word to Anza that he was returning and asked him to wait for him at San Luis Obispo so that they might have a conference over the various matters which had been entrusted to them. Anza consented and waited. Two days later, he received word from Rivera postponing the interview until they should reach San Gabriel. Even the patience of a saint might well have been exhausted by this time. Yet Anza agreed to communicate with Rivera, but insisted that it should be in writing. Accordingly, during two days at San Gabriel they wrote letters back and forth. Afterward, Anza and his escort started back over the trail to Sonora. Crossing the Colorado, the great explorer looked upon Alta California for the last time. Though he did not even suspect it himself, his work under the guidance of the great Viceroy was to have an enduring importance beyond anything that had ever happened in the history of the Californias. Something yet remained to be accomplished, however, and it fell to the lot of Anza's capable Lieutenant Jose Joaquin Moraga to do it. With a departure of Anza, Rivera suddenly changed his mind about setting up the establishments at San Francisco. Spurred on, no doubt, by the further peremptory orders of the Viceroy received it about that time. He therefore sent word from San Diego whether he had gone for Moraga to proceed to San Francisco and erect a fort. Moraga got together his families of soldier settlers and accompanied by Fathers Palau and Cambon marched to San Francisco, arriving on June 27th. Only a few days later, there occurred on the opposite coast of North America, the first Fourth of July in United States history, when national independence was proclaimed. At the same time, Moraga and his men, quietly preparing their habitations, were taking an all-important step in the eventual acquisition of the Pacific Coast by the descendants of the embattled farmers of the Thirteen Atlantic Colonies. On September 17th, the Presidio was formally dedicated. On October 9th, there was another solemn function signalizing the founding of the mission of San Francisco de Asis. In January 1777, the second mission was established, this time at Santa Clara, near the present city of San Jose. Thus had the Great Port been occupied, and the vitally needed settlers, with their equally needed herds of domestic animals, were now in Alta California to stay. For the first time, it was possible to say that the province had been placed on a permanent basis. There was no longer any likelihood that it would be abandoned and left open to another power. Two men had contributed more than any others to bring this about. One of them was the gallant ex-captain of Dubak. As the successful leader of the first party of the settlers to the coast, says a recent historian, Anza's position is unique. Only a man of splendid ability and courage and sublime self-confidence could have sustained the fainting hearts of the timid women and children, encouraged them to endure the privations of the desert, or to face the terrors they thought they saw in the snow-covered summits of the San Jacinto Mountains, and the still greater terrors their fancies pictured in the far northern country to which they were going. We may find here and there a figure among the half-forgotten heroes who led their straggling immigrants across the plains and through the mountains after 1842 that deserves to rank with him, but we shall look in vain for any in the Spanish history of the coast, unless we turn back to that of Juan Rodriguez Cabrillo with his broken arm, holding his scurvy stricken sailors to the work of examining the wintry coast southward from Cape Mendocino to his grave in Santa Barbara Islands, and with his latest breath admonishing his successor not to give up the work. Yet Macavanza was that other great figure, Antonio Bucarelli. The Anza expeditions had formed only the most important links in the chain of the viceroy's plans. He contemplated yet other action which would have developed all to California still further and might have saved it for Hispanic America, though not for Spain, as surely as his achievements down to 1776 had prevented its eventual conquest by England. Fortunately for the United States, his hand was removed from the control of frontier affairs late in 1776, just when he was ready to go ahead. Thus the year 1776 marked a culminating point in the Spanish conquest of Alta California. It remains to explain just why the opportunity created by Bucarelli was lost. End of Chapter 24 Chapter 25 A History of California, the Spanish Period. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Chapter 25 The Common Dancy General of the Frontier Provinces By 1776 the northwest coasts had been explored, Alta California placed on a permanent, though not very strong, basis by the success of Anza's second expedition and the founding of San Francisco. The Colorado-Healy region had become well known, Sinaloa had achieved a well-settled state, and Sonora seemed likely soon to do so. In that year too, expeditions of Father Garcés and of Fathers Dominguez and Vélez de Escalante had contributed negatively, at least, to the solution of Spain's problems in the northwest conquest. Garcés had accompanied Anza to the junction of the Colorado and Gila, where he was to prepare the Yumas and other Indians in neighboring districts for the coming of missionaries and subjection to the Spanish ground. The first project of this indefatigable explorer was to visit the Indian tribes of the lower Colorado. This he did, descending the river to its mouth. Returning to the junction, he soon started north, up the Colorado, accompanied as usual by the Indian Terrabal. It then occurred to him that he might possibly find a better route to Monterey than the one across the Colorado desert. But, being unable to procure guides, he struck off instead toward San Gabriel. Going along the Mojave River and through the Cajon Pass, he was the first white man to traverse the route now followed by the Santa Fe Railroad. He remained at San Gabriel from March 24th to April 9th, 1776, when he made a fresh attempt to reach Monterey by an interior route. Proceeding through to Home Pass to the vicinity of Bakersfield, he went on nearly to Tulare Lake. Here he turned back, and made for the Colorado at the point where he had left it, going probably through to Hachope Pass. Once again he was blazing the trail for the Santa Fe, but he did not stop at the Colorado. Instead he resolved to attempt another of his favorite projects, to reach Moqui from the West. By July 2nd this tireless explorer had accomplished his object. As others had reached Moqui from the New Mexico side, this proved the existence of a route from Santa Fe to Monterey. Clearly, however, the route was too long and difficult to compete in usefulness with the one Anza had discovered. Retracing his steps, Garcès reached his mission of Bak on September 17th. At about the same time, Francisco Dominguez and Silvestre Vélez de Escalante, two Franciscans of New Mexico, headed a party which went northwest from Santa Fe in the hope of finding the much desired better route to Monterey. Leaving on July 29th, 1776, they at length reached northern Utah, once they turned northwest. Finding no indication of a route or no tradition of one among the natives, they returned to Santa Fe, arriving on January 2nd, 1777. Unquestionably, therefore, the Spanish line of effort lay along the Anza route and centered strategically at the junction of the two great rivers, though some hopes were still entertained that a good route might be found from Santa Fe. The route from Sonora to the Alta California coast had its share of geographical difficulties, including the Colorado desert, but Anza had amply proved that they were not insurmountable. By far the most serious obstacle was the Colorado River, the passage of which was inextricably interwoven with what was, after all, the principal consideration in Spanish journeyings between Sonora and Alta California, the relations of the Spaniards with the Yumas. Anza's search for a fort in 1775 has already been related. The problem of the Colorado was even better illustrated by the incidents occurring at the time of this return in 1776. This time he got to the river in June when the Colorado was high and swift, though he now had but ten soldiers with him with few effects. It took him two full days and parts of two others to get across, despite the fact that he had raft set his disposal and the assistance of several hundred expert Yuma swimmers. Commenting upon this, Anza wrote in his official diary, quote, On another occasion I have said that if the peoples who dwell along this great river are attached to us, we shall affect its passage without excessive labor, and that if they are not it will be almost impossible to do so, end quote. Thus Anza, if indeed he continued to overestimate the constancy of Yuma friendship, made it perfectly clear that a good disposition of the Yumas toward the Spaniards was a prerequisite to any effective use of the route. Bukareli grasped this fact and probably understood the Indian situation better than Anza himself. There was a need for haste before the ardor of the Yuma should cool. In season and out, Father Garces had been recommending the establishment of procedios and missions not only at the junction of the Colorado and Gila, but also at various other sites along the Gila. In March 1775, in conjunction with Father Diaz, he prepared a long memorial in favor of this plan, pointing out that it could be put into effect at slight cost through a judicious shifting of procedural forces. Among the advantages, in addition to the temporal and spiritual conquest of the Gila country, were the prospects afforded of providing an effective defense on the Sonora frontier against the Apaches, protecting the Anza route to Monterey, and developing a base for the discovery of new routes to both Alta California and New Mexico. Hugo O'Connor, Comedant Inspector and Virtual Ruler under Bukareli of the entire frontier, favored the project and recommended the adoption of Garcesa's suggestion to suppress the procedios of Horcasitas and Buena Vista in Southern Sonora, where at the time there was little to do, and transfer them to the Gila and Colorado. Other leading officials gave similar opinions and Bukareli himself was impressed by the plan. He therefore procured authority from Spain to go ahead with it at the proper season, but meanwhile awaited the outcome of the second Anza expedition. Upon his return from Alta California in 1776, Anza proceeded to Mexico City, taking with him Salvador Palma and several other Yuma chieftains. During their stay at the capital, many attentions and honors were heaped upon these savages from the north, and they in turn begged earnestly for the establishment of missions among them. This was the time, if any, to strike. The imperative necessity was well expressed by Father Garcesa. I am of the opinion, he said, that if the matter of missions on the Gila and Colorado is allowed to cool, there is a danger that all will be lost and that the Yuma's may be the first to enter a league. Bukareli was prepared to act at once, for he held the same views and expressed himself to that effect on various occasions. Just at the vital moment his hand was with stayed, for late in 1776 the new government of the frontier provinces was created apart from the vice royalty and independent of his control. In January 1776 Julián de Ariaga died and his place as minister general of the Indies was shortly afterward granted to José de Galvez, now become the Marques de Sonora. Galvez set about at once to erect the common-dancy general of the frontier provinces which he himself had planned in 1768. The entire frontier, including the salience of the Californias, New Mexico, and Texas, was comprised in the new government, which was to be independent of the viceroy. As might have been expected of Galvez, the whole document establishing this change displayed marked interest in the Californias, of the strategic importance of which the minister general was fully aware. Indeed, a continuance of the northwestward advance was almost the basic idea of the document. The capital was to be at Arizpe Sonora because that post lay midway between Nueva Vizcaya and the Californias, though far to the west of the geographical center of the new common-dancy. The preservation, development, and advancement of Alta California were specifically alluded to as important in the service of God and the King, wherefore the commandant general was ordered to visit that province as soon as possible and to secure its line of communications with Sonora. Orders were also given to send more settlers and cattle there, and anything else that might be needed to aid in its development and protection. It is worthy of comment that the Pacific province alone received extended notice in the royal decree. Whole paragraphs dealt with Alta California, while not a line referred exclusively to Nueva Vizcaya and the provinces of the east. Furthermore, in later decrees, Galvez repeatedly ordered the commandant general to give his attention to the Californias. Of such a tenor was his letter on March 6, 1779, in which he said, quote, His Majesty orders me to reiterate to your Excellency the charge that you view those establishments, the Californias, but more particularly Alta California, with a preference and attention which their importance merits, unquote. Since Samblas lay well within the viceroyalty, Galvez called upon Buccarelli to continue his handling of the supply ships for the minister general realized that their services to the Californias could not yet be dispensed with. The decree just described was dated August 22nd, 1776, but it was not until the following January that it was possible to put it into effect. The plan itself was commendable and in line with the needs of the situation, but it necessarily meant the postponement of action which Buccarelli was about to take since he no longer had jurisdiction. All would have been well if Galvez had made a wise selection for the post of Commandant General. He chose to appoint one of his own satellites, who neither at the time nor thereafter grasped the importance of the movement which Galvez himself had started and Buccarelli carried on. The full effect of their efforts was to be lost through the mistakes of Galvez's appointee. Teodoro de Croy, the first Commandant General, was a nephew of the Marquess de Croy, the former viceroy. He had been employed by Galvez during the latter's residence in New Spain and seems to have displayed some ability in his capacity as a subordinate carrying out specific orders. His competence was to show forth in somewhat similar fashion in his management of the frontier. The affairs of Texas, which province he visited in person at the outset of his administration, he took care of with considerable skill. In later life, too, he seems to have been a moderately successful viceroy of Peru at a time when there were few grave problems to solve. Nevertheless, there seems to be little, if any, reason to modify the following characterization made of him in a recent work. Serious-minded and industrious he certainly was, as is attested by the many voluminous, well-ordered reports that he made on the state of the frontier provinces and also by the very tone of his letters. As a first assistant to somebody else, or even as ruler in a realm where there were no serious difficulties to encounter, he would have been a marked success. But as a leader in the frontier provinces of New Spain, he lacked the broad vision to compass the whole range of his duties. While working hard to settle one problem, he was apt to let the others take care of themselves, or try to have somebody else handle them certainly as regards matters affecting northwestward advance.  Far from observing Galvez's commands to visit Sonora and Alta California as soon as he could, Croy devoted himself to other things. Reaching Mexico City in January 1777, he remained there until August, getting information about his new government and forming his plans. As might have been expected from a man of his caliber, he felt it incumbent upon him to devise something which would differentiate his policies from those of Hugo O'Connor and the viceroy. The former prepared a long report for Croy in 245 paragraphs, giving an account of his own work as commandant inspector since his appointment in 1771, and making a number of general recommendations. In particular, he urged that the procedios of Horcasitas and Buenavista be transferred to the Colorado and Gila rivers, as Buccarelli had ordered, and that the route to Alta California be kept open. He also made suggestions about fighting the Apaches which showed his own understanding of the unity of the frontier. Croy paid small heed to this advice. With the removal of a strong guiding hand from frontier affairs, Indian uprisings began to occur in Sonora during Croy's long residence in Mexico City, though they were by no means more serious character than O'Connor and Buccarelli had been want to cope with successfully. Croy at once cast into discard the plan looking forward toward securing the Northwest conquest. The removal of the two procedios to the Gila and Colorado rivers was abandoned, entailing also a postponement in establishing the missions for which the Umas were clamoring. Anza, who had been appointed Governor of New Mexico with a view to the explorations of new routes to Monterey, was detained by Croy and sent to Sonora to suppress the Ceres. Furthermore, Croy made impossible demands on Buccarelli for two thousand troops, and failing that for the means with which to raise a thousand. His own tendency to dodge responsibility appears in one of his letters to Galvis, in which he said that he certainly was not going to Sonora until he could have soldiers enough to overcome the evils from which that province was suffering. Yet, he said, he regarded the affairs of Sonora as his most important consideration, but precisely on that account he was going to Coahuila and Texas first. His explanation that this would permit his remaining in Sonora once he arrived there sounds rather lame in the light of his harrowing description of the existing situation. Not only did Buccarelli have no authority to grant Croy such reinforcements as he asked for, but it was incomprehensible that the Commandant General should have expected them. The total number of troops in the frontier provinces was only about two thousand, and the addition of even a few hundreds would have been a matter for debate by the authorities in Spain owing to the increase in expanse it would involve. Buccarelli did give Croy two companies of cavalry, but declined to grant him any more. Croy therefore complained to Galvis, but the Minister General inevitably sustained the viceroy. When Croy should obtain personal knowledge of the state of the frontier provinces, Galvis wrote to him, the King would determine how many soldiers were necessary. The implied rebuke struck home and the question of reinforcements was dropped. In August 1777 Croy at length left Mexico City. Going by way of Queretaro and Durango he proceeded to Coahuila and Texas. By March 1778 he had recrossed the Rio Grande and reached Chihuahua and Nueva Vizcaya. There or in that vicinity he remained for more than a year and a half. Not until November 1779 did he reach Sonora and he never visited the California's or even the region of the Gila and the Colorado. Not only had he failed to carry out Galvis's orders, but he had also become absorbed in the affairs of the northeastern frontier, which alone he knew, giving attention to the west so far as it bore upon the problem of Apache wars, but not much otherwise. Meanwhile, what of Sonora, the California's, and the security of the Anza route? Sonora itself had suffered little, if at all, from Croy's neglect. Anza reached Orcasita in May 1777 and handled the situation with his customary energy and ability. He found the series in Rebellion and several other tribes on the verge of revolt. He put down the series, and then the others decided to keep the peace. Apache incursions still took place, but he had not been expected to overcome that perennial evil. It is worthy of note, in the light of Croy's later bad treatment of Anza, that the Commandant General referred to Anza's work in terms of the highest praise. In March 1778 the internal difficulties of Sonora were sufficiently well in hand so that Anza was able to join Croy at Chihuahua whence he proceeded to his government in New Mexico. Arrived in New Mexico, he inflicted a decisive defeat on the Comanches, the most troublesome Indians of that province. In this battle, which occurred in 1779, the Comanche chieftain was killed. He was given no opportunity, however, to carry on the discoveries toward Alta California, which Bukareli had intended he should make. The Californias suffered irreparable harm through Croy's failure to make use of the Anza route, but in other respects the local situation was well handled in spite of Croy's neglect. As already mentioned, Bukareli had given orders late in 1776, providing for the needs of Alta California. Fortunately, too, there was a man on the ground who was able to carry out the vice-roy's plans and to act on his own initiative when occasion called. This was Felipe de Neve, greatest of the Spanish governors of Alta California. As he came to the province from Baja California, he was able to inspect most of the territory and his command on his way to Monterey, which he reached in February 1777. He soon made a trip to San Francisco, and thus at the outset acquired personal information of the whole range of his government. Having satisfied himself as to the needs of the province, he lost no time in communicating his views to Bukareli, for he had not yet heard of the establishment of the Coma Dancy General. Prior to Neve's arrival, the mission of San Juan Capistrano had been founded, November 1776, and that of Santa Clara in January 1777. Neve proposed the addition of three more missions along the Santa Barbara Channel, together with the Presidio. He also wished to form civilian settlements, Pueblos, on the Santa Ana, San Gabriel, and Guadalupe Rivers, and to increase the forces at San Diego, Monterey, and San Francisco. For these purposes, he wanted 57 fully equipped soldiers who should be recruited in Sinaloa and should bring their families with them, and 60 families of laborers, including artisans of various kinds. He also went into detail as to the equipment these recruits should have and the number and kinds of domestic animals to be procured in Sonora that it would be desirable to send with them. Upon receipt of Neve's suggestion, together with letters from Rivera and Sarah, Bukareli sent the correspondents to Croy. Croy was at that time preparing to leave Mexico City for the north, and so returned the file to Bukareli with a request that he attend to the matter. This called forth a noteworthy reply from the viceroy, dated August 27, 1777. It was not in the power of either Croy or himself, he reminded the former, to change royal orders at will. Hence, since the Californians were in Croy's jurisdiction, he was sending back the papers. He went on, however, to give Croy information about the Californians and tell him what he himself would do if still in charge. Neve's suggestion should be adopted, even though they involved additional troops and war expense, for these matters in Bukareli's opinion should take precedence of others in Croy's jurisdiction. There should be additional missions, too, in both Californians and along the Colorado and Gila rivers, so that there might be no gaps in the chain of communication with Sonora. Thus did Bukareli reiterate the opinions he had long held about the importance of the Californians and the Ansarut. Had a matter laying within his jurisdiction, he would almost certainly already have taken the action which he now recommended to Croy. But under the circumstances he was powerless to do anything. His zeal for the royal service and his magnanimity were also most credibly displayed in the advice that he gave and in the courteous manner that he offered it. Unwilling to take immediate action on Bukareli's suggestions, Croy referred the matter to three Sonora officers and then hide himself off to Texas. Not until September 1778 did he get around to consider Neve's proposals again. In a letter to Galvez about the matter he was petulant and lacking in sympathy with the subject. He complained of Bukareli's refusal to handle the Californians for him, but did not account for his own failure to adopt the suggestions of the viceroy. Anyway, he said, the more he read about the Californias, the greater was his own confusion of mind with respect to their affairs. Nevertheless he had decided to approve Neve's projects, but he would wait until he got to Sonora before attending to them. So here was another matter that Croy had put off. But Felipe de Neve was not a man to do nothing while awaiting official authorization. So far as his resources would permit, he proceeded to put into effect the measures he deemed important. Croy's one merit in the management at the Californias lay in the fact that he approved of anything that the governor actually got done. In November 1777, Neve founded a settlement on the Guadalupe. Acting on his own initiative, without any mandate from Croy, he took 15 families from Monterey and San Francisco and made a beginning of the Pueblo which has since developed into the city of San Jose. He also started in to prepare a new reglamento for the Californias, basing his action on an order issued to Bukareli several years before by Julián de Arayaga. In a long report to Croy, Neve pointed out that all the California soldiers were in fact receiving only 40% of the salary theoretically allotted them. Furthermore, they were being paid wholly in clothing, effects, and provisions at an advance to allow for costs of care age of 150% beyond the prices charged in Mexico City. Thus, they were getting some 16% of what their full salary would have purchased in the capital of the vice-royalty. The situation was rendered yet worse because the execution of the existing reglamento was even more defective than the law itself. Naturally, service in the province was not popular. Indeed, it was asking a great deal of these men merely to live in this far distant locality, away from the activities to which they had become accustomed in the regions from which they had come. Neve urged that his troops be given the same pay as the soldiers of other frontier provinces and that some of it be in cash. Under those circumstances, he believed, the men would be contented and others would be induced to come. Neve's memorial, making these and indeed many other suggestions, crossed a letter from Croy asking him to draw up a reglamento. The governor therefore prepared the famous document, which is usually called by his name, completing it on June 1, 1779. In this, he embodied the provisions of his earlier memorial to Croy and in his remitting letter announced, characteristically, that he was putting his reglamento immediately into effect, subject to such later changes as Croy might make. The Neve instrument was eventually approved and was henceforth employed, together with the earlier documents already mentioned, as the administrative basis for the government of the province during the remainder of the Spanish era. Meanwhile, Buccarelli's influence had not been entirely removed from the California's ensamblas. In 1776, prior to the establishment of the Commandancy General and before Buccarelli seems to have known that it was contemplated, news came from Spain of English preparations to send out Captain James Cook on the 3rd of his now well-known voyages to the Pacific. According to Spanish information, he was planning to visit the California's with a view to opening up trade relations, and was intent also on the discovery of a sea route between the Atlantic and the Pacific by what the English called the Northwest Passage, making an attempt for the first time, so far as the English were concerned, to accomplish the same by sailing from west to east. The viceroy was ordered to take such precautions as might cause Cook to fail. Buccarelli's reply, dated June 26, 1776, is one of the most important documents in the history of Spain's efforts along the Northwest coast. It is also almost identical in spirit with his already mentioned letter of July 1773, notably in its lack of alarm if also in its readiness, nevertheless, to take appropriate action. The remarkable activities of the viceroy against possible foreign dangers since 1773 have already been indicated. In all probability he would have displayed a like energy and resourcefulness to forestall this new peril. Almost surely he would have strengthened the California's by developing the land route there too, but under the circumstances he had no authority to do so. By special enactment of the decree providing for the commandancy general, the management of the supply ships had been left within the jurisdiction of the viceroy. This difficult problem Buccarelli continued to handle with success during the remainder of his term. He was also ordered to take charge of a fresh series of voyages to the Northwest coast. Overcoming such handicaps as those already mentioned in dealing with the affairs of Samblas, he equipped two ships which set sail from Samblas in February 1779. Ignacio Artiega and Juan de la Bodega, in command of these vessels, made a careful exploration of the Alaska coast and found neither Russians nor Englishmen, though there was in fact a Russian settlement on Kadyak Island which they barely missed. Upon their return a royal order was issued in 1780, calling for a discontinuance of such voyages. Meanwhile the great viceroy Antonio Buccarelli had answered the last call. On October 9, 1779, after fourteen years of service to the colonies, he died, still in harness and far away from his beloved Spain, to which for many years he had wished in vain to return. To the end his career had been one of solid achievement with respect to those matters that had been left in his charge. For the California's he had been unable to do much after 1776, but he had already accomplished enough to entitle himself to lasting remembrance on the part of the Californians. He had saved Alta California from abandonment, and in so doing, quite unknown to himself to be sure, he had preserved that province and the Pacific coast for the ultimate occupation of the United States. The inevitable further result of his policies, if he had been empowered to carry them out to the full, would have been to keep Alta California at least for the peoples of Hispanic race. Thus it is that if he helped the United States at, very likely, the expense of England, he was in no eyes at fault before his own people for the failure to add yet another great area to the future domination of the Republican Hispanic America. Mexicans remember Bucarelli, not indeed for his exploits in connection with Alta California, but for his high character and his achievements affecting regions now within the area of the Southern Republic. An important thoroughfare in the Mexican capital bears his name. A far greater consequence is the fact that he was buried in the sacred church of Guadalupe, where he has a tablet commemorating his work. This place is to Mexicans, all that Mecca is to Mohammedans, or Jerusalem to Christians in general. As many as 100,000 pilgrims have been known to visit it on a single day. In this great shrine, which associates itself with Mexican nationalism, with the Indians who resisted Cortez and the Patriots who had linked one independence, the grave of Bucarelli is the sole reminder of Spanish domination. Truly the memory of Bucarelli will never be erased from the heart of Mexicans. Thus has one of the greatest and best of the viceroys found a worthy resting place. And to Californians, the church of Guadalupe should have a new significance. End of Chapter 25 Chapter 26 A History of California, The Spanish Period This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Chapter 26 The Yuma Massacre Teodoro decoys neglect to go ahead with the project for establishing settlements on the Gila and Colorado, which Bucarelli had planned, is not to be ascribed to indolence. Most of all, it was due to an imperfect understanding of the situation, wherefor he was more impressed by another plan of his own devising. He felt that it would be quite a feather in his cap if he could bring an end to the Indian wars and in particular reduce the Apaches. Therefore he proposed to inaugurate a general campaign, making use of friendly Indians as well as all available Spanish soldiers in the achievement of his ins. In the light of this grandiose scheme, the smaller undertakings which Bucarelli had favored were either lost sight of by the Commandant General, or else reduced to insignificant proportions. Christ's policy was to be yet another instance of the old, old story of the man who is dazzled by the brilliancy of his own conceptions, but who misses essential details and leaves behind him a record of failure. As early as July 1777, Croy dropped the plan for settlements along two rivers and decided instead merely to send Garces and another religious to the Umas. That, he believed, would be enough for the time being since Chief Palma and the Yuma fighting men would have to join in Croy's general campaign against the Apaches. Furthermore, he felt that it would be a waste of money to found missions along the Gila since the warriors would be absent and the old men, women and children, who alone would remain during the course of the war, would be little inclined to conversion. No precise date was set when Garces should found the proposed mission among the Umas. Indeed, it was several years before Croy got around to give the matter a modicum of his attention. When at length he did interest himself, he seemed to be more concerned with making a record for economy than with the security of the settlements themselves. Meanwhile, Croy failed to grasp the significance of a principle which he himself had subscribed to when it was expressed to him by Father Juan Morphy, one of his principal advisors. In making an argument against such undertakings as the Dominguez Velez de Escalante expedition, Morphy had pointed out that missionaries were accustomed to tell the Indians of the wealth of the king and to make offers of Spanish friendship. The Indians could not comprehend the descriptions of Spanish cities since they had never seen any and when nothing came of the promised gifts and friendship, they were apt to rethink themselves of these ragged half-starved missionaries who had told them of these tales and serious consequences were likely to occur. Neither Croy nor Morphy seems to have applied this generalization to the case of the Umas, though it exactly fitted the facts. The Umas could not understand the long delay in sending them missionaries. To their simple, childlike minds, the introduction of Christianity meant gifts of trinkets and tobacco such as they had received from Anza and they were at first disappointed and later resentful when the expected boon did not come. Chief Palma, the Spaniard's friend, began to lose influence among them and repeatedly requested the authorities in Sonora to hasten the plans for the missions. In 1778 he himself went twice to the Presidio of Altar to urge the matter. It was as a result of Palma's solicitations that Croy, who had not yet reached Sonora, decided at length in 1779 to act. In February he issued orders for Garseis and another missionary to go to the junction and establish a mission among the Umas. Garseis requested a military escort of at least 12 soldiers who should be married men and should take along their wives, thus reducing the likelihood of trouble with the Umas through the rough attentions which otherwise the soldiers would pay to the Indian women. Garseis also emphasized the importance of providing a liberal quantity of gifts for the Umas, of non-interference with their lands and crops, and of sending a number of well supplied and well equipped permanent settlers. The governor of Sonora acceded in principle to most of Garseis' requests, but would not permit the soldiers' wives to go lest the Indian men covet them, and he left it to Croy to decide about the settlers. Moreover, he in any event had scant funds at his disposal even for the small party which was to accompany Garseis at the outset. Croy presently changed his mind and sent orders to hold back the expedition. Before they were received in Sonora, however, Garseis had already departed. In May the sum of 2,000 pesos had been advanced to Father Juan Diaz who had been selected to accompany Garseis. With the purchase of presents for the Indians, mules, and certain necessary equipment, this fund was soon exhausted. In August the two friars and their little army of 12 men started, intending to go by way of Papagaria to the junction. The rainfall that year had been so slight that the route proved unusually difficult. Garseis decided therefore to take two soldiers and push on, leaving the rest of his force at Senoeta. In due time he reached the junction, but arrived with his provisions very nearly exhausted and without the supply of gifts for the chiefs, which was almost a prerequisite for the establishment of friendly relations. As it was the season for planting, the umas were much scattered so that in any event he could not proceed with the establishment of the mission. In letters of September 2 to Governor Corbalon and to Croy he pointed out his wretched plight and asked for a grant of 300 pesos to be devoted principally to gifts for the Indians such as beads, shoes, and cloth. This was essential to success. Funds were also absolutely required for the building of houses and payment of interpreters. A month later, on October 2, Beas came up with the rest of the soldiers. By this time Garseis had gained a clear understanding of the difficulties of his situation. The umas did indeed want to be converted, but it was only because they believed it meant all manner of presence for them from the Spaniards. Other tribes in the vicinity were equally clamorous for that type of material Christianity and were not a little jealous of the preference shown to the umas. To bring the umas in truth under the dominion of the church was going to be a much harder task than it had seemed in the days of the Ansa expedition. Garseis now realized, too, that Chief Palma had no real authority over the umas. He was only one of the many chiefs and neither he nor any of the others had any power except insofar as the Indians wished to obey them. To add to Garseis' difficulties, he found that the umas were eager to go to war with their neighbors. It required all the arts of persuasion in the gift of Chief Palma to keep them from doing so. The conflict was avoided, but the desire for it remained. Garseis now felt that it would be impossible to maintain the Spanish settlement as it was then. Writing to Croy in November, he urged that a second mission be founded and more settlers sent. He also pointed out the need for establishments among other tribes so that the Spaniards at the junction might have recourse to them in case of danger. In particular, he favored the founding of missions along the Gila, supported by a strong military escort to ward off the Apaches, since the Gila route was much better than the one through Papagaria. With the addition of more troops, carefully selected from the standpoint of good character, and the grant of some further financial aid, all would turn out well as the land itself was suitable for grazing and agriculture. Garseis's situation at the junction grew steadily worse. Corbalon refused him the 300 pesos he had asked for, without which Garseis was unable to make a decent pretense of effective missionary work. Garseis and Diaz agreed, therefore, that the latter should go to Sonora and explain in person to the Commandant General the critical condition of the settlement. Yet the spirit of Garseis was as strong as ever. In a letter of December 27th to Croy, he rejoiced that the decision to suspend the Colorado Gila establishment had not reached Sonora in time. The greater part of the next year was to pass before the aid which Garseis had requested was to reach the junction. How the intrepid friar in his small body of soldiery held on is a mystery, but hold on they did. Garseis was certainly not going to risk the failure of a project to which he had devoted the best years of his life. Father Diaz reached a respay in February 1780 and presented his petitions to Croy, who had by this time established his resonance there. In the course of a month they reached an agreement as to what should be done. Indeed, Croy accepted the plan which Diaz proposed in substantially the form that the latter presented it. O'Connor and Buccarelli had wished to transfer the procedios of Horcasitas and Buena Vista to the Gila and Colorado, but Croy felt that they could not be dispensed with at their existing locations. Instead of building two newt procedios, he adopted Diaz's suggestion for a much cheaper type of establishment, and boasted to Galvez of the greater economy of his plan as compared with that of Buccarelli. Two settlements were to be founded at the junction, each of which was to combine the features of mission, procedio, and civilian town in one. One settlement was to have eleven soldiers and the other ten, while four religious and thirty-two civilians, including artisans and interpreters, were to be evenly divided between the two. Married soldiers were to be selected and it was agreed that their wives should accompany them. Croy had intended that the temporalities or material wealth of the missions should be administered by the commandant, but Diaz objected, holding that they provided a fund which was essential to the success of missionary work. Diaz urged, however, that a special grant of two hundred pesos a year should be made to the friars, asserting that that would be even better than their retention of the temporalities. Croy readily consented and the provision for the two hundred peso grant formed part of the decree of March 7th, 1780, which ordered the Diaz plan, just described, to be put into effect. Furthermore, Croy wrote to Galvez that he intended also to secure the Gila route by founding a procedia at the junction of the Gila and San Pedro. The resounding failure, which was to be the fate of the settlements of the junction, has been ascribed to Croy because of the so-called mongrel type of establishment that he founded, something that was not mission, procedo, or pueblo, but a conglomerate of all, and because he took away from the friars the management of the temporalities. It is fitting to observe that there is an element of unfairness in these charges. It would seem that Croy's action, as of the time that he took it, was altogether appropriate. He did little more than approve the recommendations of Father Diaz, who had long been an adherent of Garces's views, and was thoroughly competent to represent him. Indeed, it could not have been foreseen at the time that the settlements would fail. Contrary to what has so often been written, it was not the first time that similar establishments had been made in the Spanish colonies and the expedient had been reasonably successful. If the wrong basis for imputing the humid disaster to Croy has been taken, he nevertheless deserves overwhelmingly to be held to account. The real criticisms that should be applied to him are that his delay in facing the problem had resulted in the loss of the moment when the humas were most kindly disposed, and that by his failure to understand the situation when once he had undertaken the establishments, as witnesses often express pride in the economies of his plan, he not only did not ward off impending evil, but rather promoted it. Nowhere is Croy's failure to grasp the idea of the northwestward advance more clearly shown forth than in the three monumental memorials which he prepared, dated as of the years 1780, 1781, and 1782, though the last was, in fact, ready before news came to the commandant general of the Yuma Massacre in 1781. Footnote. These memorials, as seen by the writer, contained respectively 248, 856, and 1,000 pages in footnote. In all, the keynote was the war against the Apaches. Sonora received considerable space, but more especially with reference to the Apaches in the northeast, and to a lesser extent on account of the Ceres. Each of these documents was intensely local in its point of view. There was not a word in them about the larger projects which had engaged the attention of Galvez and Bukareli. Not a word about foreign aggressions along the Pacific Coast at a time too when they had become a fact. The Californias were not even discussed in two of them, and received a meager and purely local attention in the other. On the very eve of the Yuma Massacre, Kroy was still priding himself on the savings he was affecting by not placing a procedural at the junction of the rivers. In fine, if these documents, which are extraordinarily valuable to the historian for the affairs of the frontier provinces, if they are a tribute to Kroy's painstaking thoroughness on the one hand, they are indisputable proofs of his exceeding narrowness of vision on the other. Meanwhile, the two colonies on the Colorado had been founded in the fall of 1780 on the Alta California side of the river. One of them, Purísima Concepción, was set up near the junction, while the other, San Pedro y San Pablo de Baicunier, was a little farther down. Trouble with the Yumas began almost at once. The enthusiasm which the natives had felt for the transient, gift-bearing Spaniards of Anzestay had long since left them. In addition, the Spaniards who now came among them to live were not slow in proving that they were not entitled to any halo. For example, they paid small heed to the rights of the Yumas in allotting lands, and their cattle ruined the native crops. When the provisions of the settlers became exhausted, the Yumas demanded exorbitant prices to supply them with more, which in turn enraged the Spaniards. The Yuma chiefs now began to plot in secret against the colonists. Even chief Palma, who had for so long been a staunch friend of the Spaniards and owed much of his exalted prestige to their support, at last cast in his lot against them. In June 1781 the long sought recruits for Alta California arrived from Sonora. There were forty families of them, in charge of Captain Rivera with an escort of some eleven or twelve soldiers. Here was to be enacted the last act in the life of the ex-governor of Alta California. True to type, he appears to have been more or less incompetent to the end. He had not been at all liberal with gifts, though it is not clear whether the fault was Rivera's and not presenting them if he had them or in Croy's and not supplying them in the first place. And his cattle destroyed the Mesquite plants of the Yumas, thus fanning the flame of their discontent. The Yumas contained themselves until the forty families had departed, bound for the Alta California coast, then the chiefs decided to act. Rivera and his escort had, meanwhile, recross the Colorado and encamp there, in order to strengthen their animals before proceeding on their way. They were still there when at last the long pent-up wrath of the Yumas broke in full force against the Spaniards. On July 17th, at about the same hour, the two settlements on the West Bank were attacked in overwhelming force and destroyed. The two friars at Baicunyer, one of whom was Father Diaz, and most of the men were put to death. The same thing occurred at Purísima Concepción, though Father's Garcés and Berenice were temporarily spared, only to meet the same fate as the others on the second day thereafter. The women and children at both places were held as captives. Rivera and his men, meanwhile, were just across the river, unaware it would seem, of the dramatic happenings which were taking place almost before their very eyes. On the day after the destruction of the settlements on the West Bank, the Yumas fell upon the forces of Rivera and killed them to the last man. One cannot help wondering whether Rivera had taken proper precautions. At one stroke, more than thirty Spanish soldiers and four friars had been massacred, a disaster of almost unprecedented proportions in the history of Spainís conquest of the Northern Frontier. In the light of the tremendous consequences of the Yuma massacre, that event itself and the immediate aftermath pale into insignificance. Punitive campaigns were planned and several expeditions were made during 1781 and 1782. The survivors were ransomed, but not much else was accomplished. The saddest part of the whole affair was the blight which was put upon the career of the great explorer Juan Bautista de Anza, whom Croix made the scapegoat, though he himself was alone to blame. Ever since Croixís arrival in New Spain, he had not tired of singing the praises of Anza. Anza in Sonora, Anza in Croixís councils at Chihuahua, Anza as governor of New Mexico. Always and under all circumstances he had received, as indeed he had merited, the commandant generalís praise. His great victory over Cuerno Verde, the Comanche Chief, has already been mentioned. He had not, however, made the projected exploration toward Monterey. Indeed Croix was not greatly in sympathy with the idea. He had, nevertheless, kept his hand in as an explorer by an attempt in 1780 to find a direct route between New Mexico and Sonora, though he had emerged opposite Janos and Nueva Vizcaya instead of at the place he had intended. Now Croix suddenly discovered that Anza was not the man he had claimed him to be. Indeed, he insisted that Garcés and Anza had grossly exaggerated the facts in praising the humas in their lands. Since Garcés had met his death in the massacre, Croix presently ceased to attack him and confined his maledictions to Anza. The injustice of Croixís charges is apparent. Anza had stated that the route discovered by him would be impracticable if the humas were hostile or even unfriendly, owing to the difficulty of crossing the Colorado in times of flood. Garcés had repeatedly urged the founding of a procedural at the junction of the rivers and so had Anza. One of Croixís long memorials quotes Anza to that effect. Buccarelli, O'Connor and Galvez himself had advised Croix to take immediate action toward securing the Alta California route. Croix alone was blameworthy because he had delayed too long, but he was not man enough to admit it. In January 1783, Croix called the junta of the leading officers then in Sonora to decide what action should be taken concerning the settlements at the junction. At this meeting appeared Felipe de Neve, who had just come from Alta California by way of the Anza route. Like Anza, he too was in fact nearing the end of his career, but though he was to die at the height of his reputation, he tarnished his fame before the bar of history by joining in the campaign against Anza. He condemned the Colorado country, saying it was a region of salt marshes and sand with slight rainfall and scant pasture, and this of a territory which now includes the Imperial Valley, one of the richest agricultural sections in the world. Neve, though fairly correct from a superficial standpoint, certainly erred in vision. The prevailing opinion of the junta was that the settlements at the junction served no useful purpose, since it would always be possible to use the route to Alta California if some 30 soldiers were sent along. As it would cause a heavy expenditure to restore the settlements, it was held best to abandon the idea. With this decision, made by Croy and his advisors on January 3, 1783, the Yuma disaster, which might otherwise have been a local event of small consequence, took its place in history as a factor of far-reaching importance, for the land route to Alta California had been, and was to remain, closed. Before discussing it further, it is well to turn again to Anza, whose career henceforth was an unbroken record of undeserved misfortunes. Hugo O'Connor, who had quarreled with Croy from the moment of the latter's arrival as Commandant General, had prophesied the Yuma disaster at about the time when, in fact, it had already happened. When he heard of this, Croy made haste once more to exculpate himself. If Anza had not misrepresented the country, he said, he himself would never have given orders for its occupation, and the massacre would therefore not have occurred. Even if true, which it wasn't, this statement is in itself a condemnation of Croy and his failure to understand the problems of the Anza route. Croy was not long to remain on the scene, however. Late in 1783 he was promoted to be Viceroy of Peru. Felipe de Neve now became the Commandant General, and from the first displayed a venomous temper against Anza that is hard to account for, unless as the peevishness of an old campaigner broken in health. It was the custom for Spanish officers to draw up an annual service sheet which at the same time gave an indication of their entire career. Neve ordered Anza to omit styling himself the discoverer of the route to Alta California. On the ground, that honor belonged to the Indian Tarabal. He also commanded him not to lay claim to the victory over Cornel Verde, asserting that the credit really belonged to Azuela. Anza subordinate to that fight. Furthermore, he quarreled with Anza over his handling of New Mexican affairs, and asked Galvez for his removal, stating that he was incompetent. Very likely, Croy was largely responsible for Neve's attitude. It is not probable that Neve ever read Anza's reports and diaries, which in fact represented the Colorado country with substantial correctness. Rather, he listened to the embittered Croy, eager to clear himself from blame and crying to the four winds of heaven that Anza had misrepresented the situation to him. If Anza and Neve had been personally equated, the latter might better have judged his man. But the evidence of their annual service reports would tend to show that they had never met. Through all this misfortune, Anza's conduct was exemplary. As a subordinate, he was not in a position to resent Neve's insults. He met them, though, with a becoming dignity and a clearness of explanation that would have convinced anyone who was not predisposed to an opposite view. Felipe de Neve, who deserves to be remembered as Alta California's greatest Spanish governor and not as a craved Commandant General, soon passed away. At length, one of Anza's old companions, Chacobo de Ugarte, became Commandant General and dared to come to Anza's defense. He wrote to Galvez in 1786 that Neve's opinion of Anza's government of New Mexico had been founded on the incorrect reports of the latter's opponents and that Anza had, in fact, merited praise rather than removal. This was a courageous letter under the circumstances. Christ's failure had been a defeat for the former besetador whose vindictive spleen has already been set forth. Indeed, he had long since appointed a new governor of New Mexico, without in any way providing for Anza, who still remained in New Mexico awaiting the arrival of his successor. Anza, meanwhile, petitioned for the governorship of a province in the vice-royalty, where he might pass the remainder of his days in freedom from hardships. Ugarte warmly espoused this petition, and José Antonio Rangel, who had once been temporary Commandant General and then occupied one of the highest positions in the northern provinces, wrote across the document itself that he too endorsed it. Yet again, in 1787, Ugarte wrote to Galvez on behalf of Anza, this time urging that he be made governor of Texas. The evidence is not yet complete as to the result of Ugarte's efforts, but it is probable that nothing came of them. Certainly Anza did not become governor of Texas, and no record has come to light showing him in possession of any other post. He seems to have remained in New Mexico until 1788, when at length his successor arrived. Thereupon Anza disappears from view. Thus did one of Alpa California's most intrepid heroes pass into undeserved obscurity. The Yuma Massacre did not undo the work of Buccarelli, though it prevented it from coming to its fullest fruition. The great vice-roy had saved the Spanish establishments in the north from failure, thus keeping that territory temporarily in the hands of Spain and checking the designs of the English and Russians, more particularly the former, forgetting a foothold on the Pacific coast. Croy's negligence in handling the situation, which was primarily responsible for the Colorado disaster, brought the great forward movement in the growth of Alta California to a standstill, thus making it inevitable that neither Spain nor Spanish America should retain the province in the north and that it should one day pass into the keeping of the United States. The American people, if most surely they will admire the character and deeds of the great man who would have prevented their ultimate expansion to the Pacific coast, may well feel glad that the favoritism of Galvez brought forward Teodoro de Croy. Judged by results alone, Croy should be regarded as an American hero of the First Water. Chapter 27 A History of California, The Spanish Period Chapter 27 The Aftermath It turned out that the events of July 17 and 18, 1781 settled the question of the development of Alta California under Spain, leaving the province to its own feeble efforts. The story may first be told how Spain came to accept this verdict. Thereafter, it will be possible to go back to the narrative of local events. The principal impulse for the Spanish advance had sprung from a fear of foreign encroachments. Indeed, the prospect of danger in the far northwest had been greater than the fact, but that had been enough to stir Galvez and Bucarelli to action. Henceforth the actual peril was to be greater than ever before. Yet Spain's efforts were in the inverse ratio, growing correspondingly less. It has already been pointed out that a fresh voyage to the north was made by Arteaga and Bodega in 1779, after which orders were received to discontinue these voyages in the future. Events soon caused the Spaniards once more to take cognizance of the northwest coast. When Captain James Cook picked up a cargo of furs there in 1778, a new force came to the fore to affect the situation. Henceforth, there was an economic reason for foreign visits. An English captain named Hanna was the first to follow up this phase of Cook's discoveries. Coming from China, he reached North America in 1785 and recrossed the Pacific with a shipload of furs. In the next three years, a host of Englishmen followed Hanna's lead. Mirrors, tipping, lorry, guys, strange, portlock, Dixon, Barclay, Duncan, Colnett, and Douglas—these were the leaders in these voyages. Some of them came more than once. It was in 1788 too that John Kendrick and Robert Gray, two American commanders, came to the Pacific Northwest after a voyage of nearly a year from Boston by way of Cape Horn. There's was the first of a long series of voyages which were to make the Boston ships, as the American vessels were called, famous in the annals of Alta California and the Pacific Coast. In 1786, a famous French voyage of exploration under the command of the Comte La Perru passed down the coast to Alta California. La Perru informed the Spanish authorities that the Russians had several establishments in the far northwest. It was this report that stirred the Spaniards to renewed activity, with advantages superior to those of any other power, especially because for nearby base of supplies, Spain almost alone of the European and American peoples with interests in the Pacific did not participate in the fur trade. The intendant of the Philippines, Sarriaco González Carvajal, having heard of Hanna's voyage, recommended that the Spaniards should engage in the traffic, but the powerful Philippine company threw cold water on González's scheme and killed it. The reports of La Perru were too definite to be disregarded however, so in 1788 the Princesa and San Carlos, under Esteban José Martínez and Consola López de Aro, were sent to the north. This time the Russians were found. Martínez and López de Aro reported that they seemed bent on pushing as far south as Newt Cassand off the west coast of what is now called Vancouver Island. Information was also received that the English had pretensions to that port. Consequently Martínez was sent out again in 1789. He found some English vessels at Nutca and seized them and their officers and crews. When the news reached England, public opinion was so inflamed that the British government threatened war. Spain at first stood her ground and appealed to France under the terms of the family compact. The great revolution was already in full swing in France and the government was in the hands of the National Assembly. This body acknowledged its obligations under the family compact but imposed conditions to joining with Spain against England that the Spanish authorities felt themselves unable to accept. As Spain could not hope to defeat England without French help, there was nothing to do but yield as she had done twenty years before to the English demands. A treaty was signed in 1790 by which Spain agreed to the right of the English to trade and even make settlements north of the Spanish establishments in Alta California. English ships were also given permission to enter Spanish ports along the coast, though not to engage in commerce. This treaty was supplemented by later conventions of the next few years. The virtual effect of which was to leave the region north of San Francisco Bay open to whichever country should settle at first. The year 1790, when Spain suffered defeat in the Newt-Cassan controversy, may be taken as one of the great dates in the history of Spanish colonization. It marks the beginning of what may be termed the Defensive Defensive, a defensive of a self-conscious waiting kind, the inevitable outcome of which was defeat in disintegration. The new state of mind was well represented in a famous memorial of the Condé de Revilla Gallero, viceroy of New Spain from 1789 to 1794, and son of the former viceroy of the same name. Revilla Gallero prepared a voluminous report on the history of the Department of San Blas and the Californians, including the far northwest, since 1769. The keynote of the document was the vast expense involved in the northern conquests. He praised Buccarelli for what he had accomplished, noting especially that he had been able to achieve a great deal despite lack of sufficient funds. Nevertheless, Revilla Gallero believed that henceforth all costly enterprises of conquest should be looked on at least with skepticism and probably with disapproval. From now on there ought to be an end of such projects as compel us to incur heavy expenses, even if they may be recommended with the most positive assurances of advantageous results, for it is always understood that these results are to be in the future, whereas the expenditures have to come out in cash from a treasury that is full of urgent matters requiring attention and that is constantly covering itself with considerable debts. Once its funds and those of the money lenders are exhausted, the project cannot be sustained. Their advantages will disappear, the return of the sums expended will be difficult, and perhaps it may be necessary to add still greater outlays with the almost self-evident risk of there being yet more fruitless. In the course of twenty-five years, many millions of dollars have been consumed in founding and maintaining the new establishments of Alta California in repeated explorations of its northern coasts, in works at the Department of San Blas, and in the occupation of the Port of Nutka. But if we engage in yet other, more distant and venturesome enterprises, there will be no funds left which to sustain those that we have already taken upon ourselves." Thus did the viceroy announce himself as in favor of retaining what Spain already had, but as opposed to following the policy in the future which had in former years brought about the occupation of Alta California. With a complacency that would have been strange indeed twenty years before, he remarked that the Russians had settlements reaching southward almost to Nutka, but Spain had too few troops and ships of war and too scant funds to dislodge them. He did show some anxiety over the English, being especially afraid lest they try to gain a foothold near the Spanish colonies with the object of engaging in an illicit trade. It might be well, he thought, to occupy Bodega Bay, a little north of San Francisco, and possibly the mouth of the Columbia. He was opposed, however, to extending the Spanish dominion to the northern coasts and favored seating Nutka to the English. The Spanish occupation of such distant localities could only lead to foreign complications and would most certainly cause heavy expense. Clearly the Spanish Empire was on the defensive. Indeed, it did not even go so far as Ravea Gigado had recommended. A weak attempt was made to occupy Bodega Bay. It failed and the project was permanently postponed. Nothing else of any consequence as against the English and Russian peril seemed even to have been tried. The spirit of the Spanish Empire had changed, but there were a number of contributing factors affecting the development of Alta California besides that of the dominant importance given to the need for economy, though they were of about the same order when not even less powerful as in the days of the Spanish advance. The Indians of Sonora continued to be troublesome, especially the Saris. The Apaches, however, soon ceased to be the perennial thorn in the flesh they had always been. Between 1786 and 1797 peace was made with different groups of Apaches. The Spanish government promised to give them various articles that they could not make themselves, even powder and guns, though of inferior quality. Secretly, also, the authorities planned to ply them with liquor so as to demoralize them and to encourage them to make war on one another, hoping that in this way they might become exterminated. At an annual cost of from 18,000 to 30,000 pesos, the peace was maintained nearly to the end of the Spanish rule. Another factor tending to check the use of the land route from Sonora, on which any appreciable growth of Alta California necessarily depended, was that of the rapid changes in jurisdiction of the various governments of the frontier. The Comandancy General did not remain as a single unit for the entire frontier. At times there were two Comandancies, and once there were three. Occasionally, too, the viceroy's power was restored. After 1793 the Californias remained under the viceroy in Sonora under some one or the other of the Comandancies until the downfall of the Spanish government in America. This may help to account for the opposition of later Comandant Generals to the reopening of the Anza route. It meant the making of an effort for the sake of regions beyond their frontiers and a divided authority over any route that might be opened. It must also have tended to make local concerns seem of more account to them than the possibility of foreign danger. Thus was Alta California compelled to depend upon the inadequate services of the Department of Samblas supplemented by illicit trade with foreigners. In one respect the Anza route had already done its work. The province had reached a substantial footing as regards the number and kinds of domestic animals it had. Agriculture, too, though of little variety, developed sufficiently to supply the scant needs of the settlers. The principal lacks were in manufactured articles which had to be procured elsewhere and, most of all, in population. A few straggling colonists crossed over to Baja California from Sinaloa in later years and came north to Alta California, but the great majority of the inhabitants were descendants of those who had come between 1769 and 1781. Prolific as they were in raising families the Spanish Californians could not, by this means, build up a population large enough to expand into the interior where the gold awaited them. Indeed, with the exception of Brancaforte, Santa Cruz, not a single civil or military establishment was founded after Felipe de Neve left the province. The total number of whites, mestizos, and mulattoes in 1790 was about 970 and in 1800 about 1200. Since most of the men were soldiers, the population was economically unproductive. The government quota for the army called for 205 men. Indian labor, mostly at the missions, furnished the larger part of what the province supplied. In 1793 the Christian population of the two Californias was estimated at 12,666. If the development of Alta California had been greatly desired, Sonora was more and more capable of supplying the sinews of advancement. Despite its frequently recurring internal difficulties and the expense of the procedural posts, the province was able to yield a profit to the government even at a time when the salary of the Commandant General was charged against Sonora alone instead of being apportioned over the entire frontier. Furthermore, it grew steadily in number of inhabitants. In 1781, Sinaloa and Sonora combined had a Christian population of 87,644, in 1793 of 93,396, and in 1803 of 121,400. The greater number was to be found in Sonora. For example, in 1781 Sonora had 52,228 or about 60%. Several proposals were made to reopen the Anzirut. For a time they were frowned upon, and in 1786 the viceroy went so far as to prohibit such a measure. Possibly because of the improvement in relations with the Apaches, there was a revival of interest soon afterward. In 1787, Pedro Fagas, who had again become Governor of Alta California in 1782 after Neve's departure, suggested a comprehensive plan for the betterment of conditions in Alta California. His proposals were three in number. That four new missions should be erected, that carpenters, smiths, masons, and other artisans be sent to Alta California to instruct the Indians, and that a Presidio be established at Santa Olaya on the west bank of the Colorado below the Gila Junction, with connecting posts at Sanoita in northwest Sonora, and in the valley of the San Felipe in Baja California but along the Anzirut. The first two proposals were viewed favorably and in the course of a few years were acted upon. The third met with varying response, but the consensus of opinion was against it. A view in which Rev. Giguedo concurred when at length the matter came before him for decision. The question of the land route was raised again in 1792, and in 1796 Diego Borica and José Joaquín de Arriaga, respectively the governors of Alta and Baja California, made suggestions independently of one another with that object in view. It is not necessary to follow the correspondence in detail, but it may be well to cite the memorial of the year 1801 in which Pedro de Nava, then Commandant General, set forth his opinions. The advantages of reopening the Colorado route, according to him, were two, the possibility of giving aid to the Californians in case of a foreign invasion, and the benefits of reciprocal trade between the Californians and New Mexico. As for the first, the route was known to exist and could at any time be utilized if a considerable force were sent along. But there was no need to keep it open unless a foreign attack should actually occur. As for the second, neither of the two provinces was far enough advanced to require any new outlets for trade. The opinions of Nava prevailed. When the question came up in 1804 the matter of the route was decided in the negative. It is to be noted that the plans for developing Alta California by means of the route had received scant attention, virtually none from Nava. Then why use the route any longer? As Nava had said, it was there in case of need. Other proposals were made during the remainder of Spanish rule and indeed in the Mexican period. But nothing came of them. Fear of foreign aggressions in the Californians certainly continued with ever-increasing justification but the day of action had passed. The closing decades of Spanish rule in Alta California and the quarter-century of Mexican rule formed one of those periods which is the delight of the poet and romancer. Life was less stirring than in other days but on the whole was more agreeable. For 12 years of teeming activity from 1769 to 1781 the province had played a great part in history. For the next 65 years the Alta Californians were to witness but one positive factor of supreme historical importance, the coming of the people who were to supplant them, the influx of the Americans, who were to find the gold and make California what it is today. Much went on in preliminary fashion with a bearing on the ultimate American conquest before the province was finally taken over but that story belongs rather to the history of American California than to an account of the dying days of Spain and the troubled era of Mexican control. All else that remains of Alta California history in this period is the local narrative. Much of it picturesque indeed but a great deal of it only petty and yet, though they could not have dreamed it, the Alta Californians were fulfilling the role which Buccarelli had cast for them, a role of deep significance and fraught with moment. Few as they were, imperfect as were their standards of civilized life, they were on the ground and that in itself was enough to keep Alta Californians safe from foreign occupation with its mineral wealth undiscovered. They compelled the Englishmen and the Russian to make the center of their settlements farther north within the immediate range of the profitable fur trade instead of locating an Alta California as each of them wished to do. In this way the Alta Californians virtually saved the intervening coast of Oregon and Washington. They were the scenic while known of the American occupation. Americans may rejoice that they were there and that people of other nationalities may feel glad or sorry, according as their sympathies direct them, but in the light of events as they occurred who can say that the Alta Californians did not play an important part in the history of North America. And justice, not anybody. End of Chapter 27