Hi everybody. Is the mic on? Is it working? Okay. My name is Brian Fishman. I am a counter-terrorism research fellow here with the New America Foundation. And with us today is Stephen Tankel. Stephen is a professor up at American University, teaches a variety of courses, looking at terrorism, American policy. He got his PhD at King's College in London and is one of the world's best experts on last grade TAIBA, if not the best. And we're really excited to have him here today, especially at this moment that I think is particularly prescient because we stand here today at a time when the United States relationship with Pakistan is more strained perhaps than it ever has been. And there are a lot of questions by both counter-terrorism specialists but also the foreign policy community at large about how bad that relationship can get and what it means if that relationship does get extraordinarily bad. And hidden in that is obviously Pakistan's nuclear weapons but also its relationship with a variety of militant organizations. Whether it is various Taliban organizations in the FATA, whether it is Al-Qaeda in Osama bin Laden's presence not far from the Pakistani military academy or the Pakistani ISI's longest and perhaps deepest relationship with the militant network, meaning Lashkar type or what does that relationship mean going forward? What does it mean for U.S. relations with Pakistan? So as we go forward I'm going to try to stay out of the way as much as possible and turn it over to Stephen. He will talk for half an hour, maybe a little bit more, give us sort of a take on where L.E.T. is today and how we should be thinking about it. And then we'll ask questions. When you ask a question please stand up, wait for the microphone and announce your affiliation just so we all have a sense of where you're coming from. And with that, Stephen. Brian, thank you very much and my thanks to the New America Foundation for having me here. The question that we sort of posed for this talk today was is Lashkar type a poise to become the new Al-Qaeda? And I think that's an interesting question to ask and provides a means for exploring the group for several reasons. And I think it's also particularly important because in answering that question it tells us a lot about Lashkar's relationship with the Pakistani state and what we can and cannot expect the Pakistani state to do about that group. Now it's also a question that I touch on briefly in the conclusion of my book, which I think New America for selling out there. And it's one of the most common questions that I've been asked about Lashkar. Since I've given talks in which I discussed the group's evolution over the 20 plus years, which is the main subject that I've written about, I knew that I wanted to devote at least sort of one of these talks to the Lashkar Al-Qaeda question. I also knew that I wanted to do an event along these lines at New America Foundation, which has been kind enough to publish some of the shorter pieces that I've written. And it seemed the perfect place to discuss this particular question because it's home to some of DC's foremost experts on Al-Qaeda. I'm sitting next to one of them. And it launched the AFPAC channel, which has become sort of the go-to for people interested in updates and analysis regarding that part of the world. All of which is a long way of saying once again, I'm very grateful to you guys for having me here today. So is Lashkar Ataiba poised to become the new Al-Qaeda? I would argue in Lashkar's present incarnation, the short answer is no. But that does not mean it poses no threat to Western interests regionally in South Asia or globally. And I'll touch on that as I go through the course of my talk. And the other stream that you'll see running through this, the other important theme will be sort of Lashkar's relationship with the state and how that checks its ability to become sort of the new Al-Qaeda as well. And I want to do five things today, and I'll do them as briefly as I can. The first is, you know, I want to focus just on Lashkar as an organization, as well as the strategic environment in which it operates, because it is a unique organization and I think it's important to understand it as such. Second, I think it's important to acknowledge those areas where one can analogize Lashkar to Al-Qaeda since the question of whether the former is poised to replace the latter doesn't come from nowhere. But in doing so, I'm going to try to unpack those similarities to show that when one takes a nuanced view, there are important distinctions between the two. Third, I'd like to delve into the factors that I believe restrict Lashkar from displacing Al-Qaeda as the leader of the global jihad. And here I should be clear that for definitional purposes, I'm talking about Al-Qaeda central, not its affiliates in the Arabian Peninsula or Iraq or Islamic Maghreb. Not to ruin the suspense, but in terms of those factors that I'm going to talk about, as I suggested earlier, I'm going to argue that Lashkar's relationship with the Pakistani state, in particular, as well as elements of its ideology serve as a check against that happening. To do all of that, I'm going to be pulling from research that I did for my book and some of that might be familiar to folks here. From there, I want to delve into a fourth point, which is the ideological and organizational competition that's going on between Al-Qaeda and Lashkar-Etaiba today in Pakistan. And there I'll be pulling on research that I conducted over the summer. Finally, I'd like to conclude by discussing briefly what this means for Lashkar and the threat it poses, and I think that'll serve as a good jumping off point into discussion. So, point one, understanding Lashkar in its strategic environment. And forgive me if this is an old hat for some of you. I think it's important just to begin by discussing the two ways that we can comprehend the Jihadist milieu in Pakistan. The first is by sectarian orientation. Most militant groups are Dio Bandi, as is the Qatashara, the Afghan Taliban, Tariqa Taliban Pakistan. Lashkar-Etaiba is an Ali Hadith organization. The Ali Hadith are Salafist in orientation. And so there is competition between those two, the Ali Hadith Lashkar and most of the other Dio Bandi groups. And so Lashkar has never been as close to the Taliban as have most other militant groups in Pakistan. Secondly, we can comprehend the Jihadist milieu by loci of operation. Now, historically, pre-911, there were three main areas for operation. The first was fighting in Kashmir, or supporting terrorist attacks against India. The second was Afghanistan. The third was sectarian violence in Pakistan. What's important here is that Lashkar was involved only in operations in Kashmir and in supporting attacks against India, whereas the Dio Bandi groups were active in multiple loci of operation. In some cases, all three of them. Okay. Post 911, those loci still hold some utility, but I think it's important just to note that the Kashmir conflict has declined. Attacks in India with exceptions of major ones such as the 2008 Mumbai attacks are primarily done by homegrown actors with some assistance from Pakistani groups. Meanwhile, Afghanistan is a place where every group is now active, including Lashkar-e-Taiba. Sectarianism has become part of a revolutionary Jihad in Pakistan. That's a new loci of operation. Groups have now added the near enemy and are fighting against the Pakistani state. So that's a fourth loci. And then a fifth would be the addition of global Jihad. And by global Jihad, I mean launching out of area attacks against the US and its allies. It's important to note that the biggest divide is no longer the sectarian one between the Ali Hadith and the Dio Bandis, though that still exists. I would argue the biggest divide today is between those who engage in violence against the state, revolutionary Jihad or sectarian attacks and those who don't. And here it's important to note, as some of you are no doubt aware, that Lashkar remains one of Pakistan's most reliable proxies and has benefited from copious amounts of state support over the years. So it's not surprising that it falls on the side of groups that are not attacking the Pakistani state and are not engaging in sectarian violence. Now, a little bit about Lashkar. Briefly, to me, to understand Lashkar-e-Taiba, one needs to understand the two dualities that define it. First is that it's a missionary and a militant organization, which is to say that its leaders lend equal credence to Dawa and Jihad. And on the missionary front, it pursues a reformist agenda that aims to purify Pakistan via Dawa, i.e. nonviolent activism and the conversion of its population to Ali Hadith Islam in order to create a true Islamic state. So it wants a revolution, but it's pursuing it nonviolently. And it's channeled much of the state support that it received over the years into building up not only its military capabilities, but also a social welfare infrastructure run under, you know, it's above ground organization, Jamaat-e-Dawa. So that's sort of the missionary side. And I think it's just important to note that when I was there this summer, a lot of people spoke about the expansion of JUD in Pakistan. Numerous interlocutors suggested that it was seen to have, quote, very powerful backers who were interested in promoting its growth in Pakistan. I'm going to come back to this later, but the presumption is that one of the reasons why LET's growth in terms of the JUD above ground footprint is being promoted in Pakistan is that it's a means to check some of those other groups expansion who are anti-Pakistani. The second duality concerns its military activities in that Lashkar is both a pan-Islamist outfit and a Pakistani proxy. Ideologically, it places an emphasis on the recovery of lost Muslim lands and the defense of Islam throughout the world. That's a very universal agenda, right? That said, liberating Kashmir and then all of India remains Lashkar's primary focus. Its leaders believe India is an unnatural entity that it will fracture under pressure. So that remains sort of the most important front for them. That said, as the Kashmir Jihad has declined over the years and the Afghan insurgency accelerated, Lashkar became involved in that front as well. Now notably, as many will know, since 2001, Indian influence has increased in Afghanistan too. And here it's important to note that Lashkar's pan-Islamist priorities overlap as should be clear with the army and the Pakistani side of size. And you'll forgive me if throughout the talk, I shorthand them, there's the Pak mill with the Pak mill's interests in checking Indian hegemony. So we get that overlap of pan-Islamism and Pakistani proxy identity. As I've mentioned, Lashkar leaders abjure attacks against the near enemy. It's one of the few groups that has not turned on the state or birth splinter groups that have done so. And as I said, evidence suggests that it serves as a priority for the groups that are at war with the state. So it provides domestic utility, domestic security utility to the Pakistani state as well. Now, if you think that at times Lashkar's had trouble reconciling these dualities, you'd be correct. Indeed, I argue in my book that since 9-11, as it played its own double game, Pakistani proxy and social welfare provider on the one hand and contributor to the Jihad against the US and its allies on the other. Doing so arguably has helped it to remain intact as well as to remain in the good graces of the Pakistani state because the global Jihadist activities are done clandestinely and take a back seat to the Pakistani proxy role. But it's inevitably created tensions within the group, which appear increasingly to focus on the issue of whether or not to engage in attacks against Pakistan. This has implications, as you might imagine, in terms of Lashkar's need to seek other outlets for Jihadist aggression. And I'll discuss these implications in greater detail in my concluding remarks. I think it's helpful just at this point too because we are talking about, you know, is L.E.T. poised to replace Al Qaeda, right? It's this group with universal ambition. It's Salafist. It's engaged, participate in the global Jihad. Is it poised to become the new AQ? So I'll turn to sort of the second part of my talk, which is analogizing the two organizations. First, yes, they are both Salafist in orientation. But it's important to point out that whereas Al Qaeda's leadership traditionally has taken, I think it's fair to say, more of a pragmatic, big-tent approach and sought alliances with the Obandi militants, most notably the Taliban and TTP, Lashkar is much more doctrinaire in its Salafism and doesn't want to mix with them for theological reasons. It doesn't mean that collaboration doesn't take place, but there's what I would term much more, you know, separateness than necessarily togetherness. Second, both are admittedly pan-Islamist, but Al Qaeda prioritizes global Jihad against America and, secondarily, its Western allies, as well as embracing revolutionary Jihads against Muslim governments, including the one in Pakistan. As I mentioned earlier, Lashkar is much more about classical Jihadism, which means it's fighting to liberate occupied Muslim lands. And most importantly, India is the main enemy, not America. This is partly due to ideology, but it's also the result of the fact that the leadership retains an element of nationalism that is distinctly at odds with Al Qaeda. And here again, important to note, Lashkar refrains from attacks against Muslim regimes in general and Pakistan specifically understandable given the significant state support it received over the years. Third, both have a stable of hardened militants known for their operational and tactical acumen. And just as AQ was known partly for the level of instruction it provided in some of its camps during the 1990s, Lashkar today is considered to have among the best-trained militants as well as to boast a cadre of high level trainers, best-trained militants in Pakistan, I should say. And that's no surprise since some of those trainers are former army and ISI. Fourth, both Al Qaeda and LET have what could be defined as affiliates, which give them operational reach. For Al Qaeda Central, this is, you know, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is one. Al Qaeda in Iraq is two. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is three. And it works with associated groups as well. And the Indian Mujahedin, which is an indigenous jihadist network in India, could be said to be an affiliate of Lashkar-Tibas, which also has worked through various local actors in Fatah and northeast Afghanistan. The nature of these affiliate relationships, however, is quite different and I think it's worth exploring them for just a moment, because of what they say about the group's strategic approach. AQC has affiliates in part as a result of an accumulation strategy. It wants to have an over-global presence, such that its name is linked to operations in different theaters. Organizationally, these affiliates have pledged an oath of allegiance to Al Qaeda's Amir and they're expected to abide by certain rules upon joining. As Leah Farrell noted in her Foreign Affairs article, these include rhetorical unity, the inclusion of global jihadist targets in theater, and a promise to seek approval before operating out of theater. In contrast, Lashkar has used the Indian Mujahedin as a vehicle to strike India without its own name being attached to the attacks. Indeed, although the aim is far more lethal as a result of Lashkar support, it's questionable whether its leaders would have considered the network they led as a Lashkar affiliate to begin with. As to those groups in FATA or in Afghanistan, their purpose again was to allow Lashkar members to fight in Afghanistan while providing the group's leadership with plausible deniability about its presence on that front. So whereas Al Qaeda is seeking to have its name attached globally, Lashkar is seeking plausible deniability in terms of its actions. Fourth, and I'm just going to touch on these briefly, you know, but I think it's important to note that both have robust transnational networks. In Lashkar's case, this means South Asia, the Gulf, Australia, Europe, and North America. Now, Lashkar has used those for attempted attacks against Western targets. I'll talk more about that in my concluding remarks, but primarily it's used them for fundraising, propaganda, or to support attacks against India. Indeed, it's hard to imagine Al Qaeda using David Headley, the Pakistani-American responsible for all of the reconnaissance in the 2008 Mumbai attacks for an attack against India. They likely would have used him for attacks against America. Some people might be thinking, yeah, but Lashkar also sent Headley to Denmark, right, to pursue attacks there. This is true, but as those who followed the David Headley case would know, Lashkar also put that operation on permanent hold as a result of ISI pressure, which speaks to the greed of which it can be influenced by the Pakistani state. Now, in other fora, I've discussed what the Danish plot meant in terms of the interconnectivity of the militant milieu, because Headley ultimately migrated over to Al Qaeda, which essentially poached a Lashkar operative, not the first time, probably not the last time that they've done that, and I'm happy to get into that in the Q&A. Here I'm going to use it as a jumping off point to discuss some of the constraints on Lashkar and why that makes it unlikely to replace Al Qaeda in its present incarnation. First, it should be relatively obvious, unlike AQC, and by the way here we're moving into sort of the third part of the talk, factors restricting Lashkar's becoming, you know, the next Al Qaeda central. Unlike Al Qaeda central, whose leaders operate clandestinely, Lashkar controls a robust infrastructure that operates in plain sight as do its own leaders. This infrastructure and the freedom of movement carries with it a number of benefits the core Al Qaeda organization does not enjoy in terms of fundraising, recruitment, ability to promote propaganda quite publicly, etc, but it also serves as a leverage point that can be used to constrain Lashkar's activities and has been in the past. This doesn't mean Lashkar won't contribute clandestinely to terrorist attacks against Western targets or fight in Afghanistan, but as one of its senior members explained to me during my last visit, the leadership understands diplomatic pressures on Pakistan and it understands the red lines that exist for it. And so it's difficult to imagine the group choosing to become the public face of the global jihad in the way Al Qaeda central is. It's also questionable whether Lashkar in its present incarnation would have the legitimacy to do so for two reasons. First, as you might imagine, this ongoing relationship with the Pak mill, the susceptibility to state pressure robs Lashkar's leaders of legitimacy in the eyes of a number of jihadists who respect the sacrifices that AQ leaders have made and the forthright manner in which they challenge the U.S. as well as its many allies. This is something Lashkar can't change without incurring huge costs at home by breaking with the Pakistani state. Second, Lashkar is a Pakistani organization and quite frankly it's difficult to imagine a number of Arab groups following it for that reason alone and that's something that Lashkar can't change full stop. Finally, you know, I want to come back to you know Lashkar's ideology because that would also make it challenging for it to lead the global jihad in its current incarnation. If we think back to the 1990s, Al-Qaeda used America to sort of unify those who wanted to target the near enemy and those who wanted to wage iridentious jihads. To those who wanted to target the near enemy it said, you know, you're never going to be able to defeat these apostate Muslim regimes so long as they have U.S. backing. Okay, so you need to defeat the U.S. first. And to those who wanted to wage iridentious struggles it said, look the U.S. has troops in Saudi Arabia, this is an occupation, they should come first. So that was sort of the pre-911 way of unifying these two and then post-911, what Al-Qaeda has done is elevate the near enemy, you know, sort of to an equal level with the far enemy in order to broaden its inclusiveness. Lashkar still prioritizes India as the main enemy and it considers it haram or forbidden to attack any Muslim country or government. So it's very difficult to imagine it being able to ideologically provide the type of inclusive leadership that Al-Qaeda has sought to provide. And indeed, over the past couple of years, this has actually led to ideological competition between Lashkar-e-Taiba and Al-Qaeda Central in Pakistan, which brings me to the fourth point of my talk, the Lashkar-Al-Qaeda competition. And, you know, just not to put too fine a point on it, but the crux of that debate revolves around whether or not to conduct jihad in Pakistan against a Muslim but potentially idolatrous government or only abroad i.e. in places like India and Afghanistan where the enemy is known to be a non-Muslim aggressor. So, L.E.T. makes a number of claims about Al-Qaeda and I'm just going to cite four of them. First, it points out and here it's not too far away from, you know, sort of mainstream Islamic thinking that accusing another Muslim of apostasy, as Al-Qaeda does with the Pakistani regime, is a dangerous practice and the better course of action is to lead them back on the righteous path, doing otherwise makes you a taqfiri and an apostate yourself. Fine. Second, it says that those who murder Muslims instead of the true enemy, i.e. Christians, Jews, and in L.E.T.'s case, Hindus, are apostates. So, right here we have Al-Qaeda, I'm sorry, Lashkar using some pretty heavy language. It's essentially saying that Al-Qaeda, you know, these guys are apostates because of their activities, which is a pretty, you know, heavy type of accusation. Third, they say cooperating with non-Muslims for worldly profit makes a Muslim misguided but not an apostate. Only if Muslims actively fight against other Muslims are they then apostates. It's important to note, I talked to Lashkar members about this point and they said they were essentially trying to explain the Pakistani state's actions, arguing that, yes, Pakistan takes aid from America but they're doing this for worldly profit and they're not actively fighting against the Mujahedin in Afghanistan. They're only providing indirect assistance to the US so they are very misguided and Lashkar disagrees with their politics vehemently and protests against them but that doesn't make them apostates and therefore they can't be fought. So this is sort of a very interesting way in which Lashkar is trying to explain the Pakistani state's behavior and make it ideologically acceptable not to fight them. Fourth, it suggests that fighting the Pakistani government is a distraction from the real Jihads and Kashmir, the Indian mainland, Afghanistan and other places where Muslim aggressors are found. Now, Al-Qaeda responds to these points with several of its own. The overarching theme of point one for Al-Qaeda's response is you guys are a bunch of hypocrites. Okay? It says, look, you've accused people such as Kashmala Tariq, some of you may know a member of the National Assembly in Pakistan who's an ardent advocate of women's rights, Omar Abdullah, the chief minister of Jammu and Kashmir who's a Muslim, to be apostates. And you know, our tax, Al-Qaeda says, against the Pakistani state are no different than your Lashkar attacks against government forces in Indian held Kashmir where you sanction killings of Kashmiri Muslim politicians. So you're doing the same thing we're doing. Second, they say, you're wrong. Anybody who helps supports or even condones aggression by non-Muslims towards Muslims should suffer the same consequences as non-Muslim aggressors. In short, there's no difference between working for profit and actively fighting. They also argue that they're attacking Pakistan not just in terms of its support for America's fight in Afghanistan, but also the bombardment of American drones, which Pakistan has provided assistance for and also for attacks by the Pakistan army in Fatah. And it then essentially calls out Lashkar in a tome that was published sort of rebutting a lot of Lashkar's points and says it calls them out saying, you're making these arguments as a result of your relationship with the state saying that its leaders, Lashkar's leaders want to protect their sources of government funding. So you guys are in this for worldly profit too. And the implication is that you're drawing these distinctions to avoid criticism for its support of the Pakistani government. Finally, Al-Qaeda argues that fighting against the Pakistani state is not a distraction from the jihad against the unbelievers but is intrinsically connected to it because it results in the disruption of American operations in Pakistan, Afghanistan and possibly elsewhere. And it's arguably the case that the fact that that Pakistan is facing an insurgency at home has led it in part to triage and provide priority for fighting those jihadist groups that are attacking it as opposed to taking on those groups that aren't. You know, and that has helped complicate the US-Pakistan relationship. So, you know, Al-Qaeda isn't necessarily wrong from that strategic vantage point. Unfortunately, though that may be. So to conclude, you know, my sort of the fifth part of my talk and launch us into, you know, the Q&A. What does this mean for Lashkar and the threat it poses? First, you know, again, it should be obvious. It's very unlikely that the Pakistani state is going to turn on LAT in the short term.  There's evidence to suggest that there's collusion between the Pak mill and Lashkari Taiba in terms of framing some of those ideological messages. All right. There's also evidence to suggest that at times Lashkari Taiba members have contributed intelligence that has helped the army or ISI take out some of those militants who are attacking the Pakistani state and there's at least, you know, one or two instances that I know of in which Lashkar members were involved in what might be considered sort of direct action where they themselves attacked one of these groups. Now at the same time, and this is one of the things that I was there researching this summer, there's evidence that factions or freelancers within Lashkar are complicit in attacks against the Pakistani state. All right. And there's no doubt that it's at least cooperating with some of AQ allies in Afghanistan. So what's happening there? How do we sort of square that net circle? You know, and here, you know, sort of what it comes down to is those tensions that I spoke about within LET. And it's unclear whether the leadership is at times looking the other way when some of its members are engaging in operations with Al-Qaeda, whether they're unaware of it, whether people are leaving and then are being welcomed back into the sort of quote, big tent.  But then they're very quick, most of the time, to add. But they were former Lashkar members, right? No current Lashkar members ever been involved in an attack against the Pakistani state. The minute it happens, the guy wasn't in LAT anymore. And it's very difficult to imagine, you know, to figure out whether they really had left or whether that is sort of their own plausible deniability. What's important also to note is the personal connections that exist, the desire to avoid splintering means that some of these guys, even though they do leave, still get help from elements within Lashkar Taiba, which means that that infrastructure that Pakistan is sort of protecting is at times being used against it. So, you know, that is, I think, a very important type of contradiction to try to wrestle with. And it's one that my sense is the Pakistani state is becoming aware of, but hasn't yet really, you know, at least in terms of the officials that I've spoken to, they're aware of it, but there's not, there's no real strategy forward on what to do about it, leaving aside Lashkar's sort of geopolitical utility as well. You know, so what does this mean in terms of the Lashkar threat? Well, first, as I said, infrastructure is being used against the Pakistani state.  Third, what's probably of most interest to people in this room is what does it mean in terms of the threat to the U.S. and its allies? And here's where I promise to sort of conclude this. And I think the first point that it's important to make there is that it's important to remember Lashkar's not ideologically opposed to a tax against America or its allies, right? This is about sort of strategic prioritization that's not precluded ideologically. Second, I think it's important to point out that, you know, at this stage, it still appears that the ISI is constraining, you know, Lashkar Taiba in terms of attacks transnationally. Certainly was in, you know, the sense that I got when I was there in July, although that is a much debated point. But, you know, it's also, I'd be loath not to point out that if relationships between America and Pakistan really, I mean deteriorate and fall apart and the ISI were to loosen that leash, you know, then Lashkar could increase its involvement in the global jihad with a bit more of a clear conscience. And I think that's something that obviously U.S. and Pakistan are at this point, you know, hopefully looking to avoid happening. But it's also important to note that, you know, as one Lashkar leader said to me this summer, you know, if Pakistan ever decides that America is its enemy, LET will be there, you know. So, now at present, as I said, you know, we sense that there might be some pressure on the leadership, you know, to restrain itself, but there's obviously pressure on the leadership internally to push the envelope against America and its allies to make up for its conservatism vis-a-vis fighting against Pakistan. This actually helps to explain the Mumbai attacks. You know, it also helps to explain Lashkar's possibly expanding role in Afghanistan. One of the things that I picked up this summer is there appears to be a pipeline running directly from Mansara into Kunar-Nurstam province that suggests a desire to allow LET militants to access that conflict zone without having to travel through FATA and mix with all those groups that are attacking the Pakistani state, but you're creating a pressure valve so these guys can still be active, right? And it's also important to note that Lashkar has a history of providing ad hoc support for, you know, terrorist attacks against the U.S. and allied targets and at times has shown itself willing to directly attack them as well. And I'll briefly just tick off its capabilities which most people are probably familiar with those transnational networks that I mentioned. You know, very good training capabilities in Pakistan especially in the areas of sort of small armed, you know, small unit tactics and explosives expertise as we saw with the 2008 Mumbai attacks, patient, thoughtful reconnaissance. It's got a lot of money which it can throw at attacks. It can provide logistical support so it doesn't have to be on the front end of an attack and we've seen that potentially with the shoe bomber. There's some evidence to suggest that LAT was involved in providing some low-level logistical support. Also the 2006 liquid attempt to use liquid explosives to blow up some transatlantic airliners. So all of those areas provide ways in which LAT can act. Further, if it fails to act individuals or factions within it might use the groups capabilities to pursue their own operations. And as I mentioned, because the group's former members don't always cut ties with it, its alumni network can pose a threat as well using that infrastructure. So look, the bottom line and I'll conclude here is however the group evolves it's not going to be into al-Qaeda 2.0 for all of the reasons that I outlined. And it's worth reiterating that at present again biggest threat remains to India and hence the stability of South Asia. But when considering the threat to the U.S. and allies we have to consider not only sort of its intent and its strategic prioritization but also those capabilities that I highlighted. Lushkri Taiba can provide in many ways the operational sinews for the global jihad and it can do it in a clandestine manner and that makes it sort of a a threat that's worth considering today and a potentially greater one tomorrow. So again, that's not to say it is going to be the next AQ not what I'm saying it is to say a group we're going to continue to keep our eyes on you know I think for the foreseeable future. So I'll end there and we can get into Q&A. Great, thank you very much that was wonderful. I see a lot of known troublemakers in the audience and I really am excited to have you ask Steven hard questions but I'm going to ask the first and that is about this this notion of Pakistani support a range of militant groups and their reactions. I mean you talked a little bit about these groups that are attacking the state and folks like L.E.T. that have rejected that notion despite some Pakistani support for U.S. operations in Afghanistan and in one respect or another. It strikes me that at least at times there is a third category and al-Qaeda elements have made this argument occasional. He's a Wahari and a Biyahia Libbi have at times said you know at the Pakistani state they've completely gone off the deep end and you know what? They were always off the deep end because they embraced democracy and those sorts of things. So you've got Pakistan's Pakistan has essentially played with fire for a long time and they've started to get burned over the last decade in a very serious way. And I'm wondering what you think the now I don't know if we can say imminent at this point but 2014 withdrawal of most of the coalition from Afghanistan how that will change the dynamic between these various militant networks in Pakistan and how the ISI or the Pak Mil will respond to that dynamic and attempt to manipulate the militant environment after the withdrawal. One I think you know provided that there is still violence in Afghanistan and I think unfortunately we would all agree that there's we're probably not going to see peace break out you know as soon as the US begins its drawdown you know to a degree we'll see a you know a continued sort of continuation of what we're seeing today which is some groups continuing to be supported by the Pakistani state to serve its interests in Afghanistan those groups in turn working with other groups that may become somewhat emboldened to attack to escalate their attacks against the Pakistani state particularly and this is something that Pakistanis are concerned about you know if they're able to you know create better safe haven for themselves on the Afghan side of the border and move back and forth to launch attacks on both sides you know and we'll continue to see sort of that circle where Pakistan is supporting you know the Haqqani network you know which has relations with Tariqi Taliban Pakistan and you know elements that sort of operate into the Punjabi Taliban umbrella some of whom are occasionally being used on the Afghan side of the border or are coming and asking to fight on the Afghan side of the border and are also then coming back and launching attacks on the Pakistani side of border and I think we'll continue to see what we've seen for a while which is you know an attempt at arbitration and I think we've seen that with you know Pakistan's response yes Al Qaeda might have said you guys are beyond the pale and publicly Pakistan might have said you know some of these groups need to be defeated completely but you know I think what we've seen privately is an attempt to sort of play groups off against one another that's been the historic approach you know including with the TTP you know even now you have sort of good TTP and bad TTP I mean to the degree that we can refer to the Tariqi Taliban Pakistan as one entity so I think there will continue to be a lot of arbitration and one of the things that I you know came away with I spent a month in Pakistan looking at the threat to the the main thing that I was looking at was the threat to the Pakistani state from Pakistani militant groups I wasn't interested so much in the threat that these groups posed abroad I was really interested in the threat they posed to Pakistan I wanted to understand what that meant in terms of a constraint on Pakistan's action and if it really was one one of the things I came away somewhat you know I don't want to say convinced but but came away believing more is that I don't get the sense that this is viewed within the security establishment as necessarily an existential threat to Pakistan you know I think to a degree this is seen as it's a threat that needs to be taken seriously but if taken seriously it's a threat that can be managed and it could be managed by by playing group one group off against another through arbitration through intelligence led operations through extradition judicial action you know and that while whereas we may see the violence that's going on in Pakistan as completely unacceptable to Pakistan this is you know they are I don't want to say that this is an acceptable level of violence for them but they are going to manage it rather than you know sort of turning against all of these groups why don't we go to a few questions I've got a million more but I'll interject later and wait for Jennifer in the background as you come up to the front Jennifer we'll start up here and and work our way back so go here and and then you men thank you very much Rob Beagoyle with India Globe and Asia today Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was just in Pakistan and she thought that relations will improve with Pakistan because of her visit but again so many things happened my question is that one can Pakistan control these LIT or Hakani network and so forth what message do you have for India and for the United States now the future of these groups in Pakistan if Pakistan doesn't control them or if they have capability thanks I've said this before and it's you know it sounds somewhat flip but I think it's it's true I think Pakistan has more control over groups like the Hakani network and Lashkirtiaba than it admits publicly and a lot less than it would like to have in reality you know I think that's I think that's probably a fair way of saying it I think you know one of the things that particularly with with Lashkar since I think the Mumbai attacks in 2008 you know there was that that moment where there was a question um you know will they really crack down this time or will they decide to double down and try to just regain control over Lashkirtiaba you know and my sense is that it's been the latter right you know most people suggested that the crackdown was going to be for anybody who's seen the movie Groundhog Day it was going to be somewhat like that it was going to be like crackdowns past it was going to be somewhat cosmetic and it turned out to be an enlarged part cosmetic so you know I think there's continued attempts to regain control you know and and my concern is you know that that managing jihadists is is more art than science right and you know I you you don't get the sense that that control can be interminable that that will last forever and I will add on that you know I think in particular with regard to Lashkirtiaba because it tells us something about the dynamics of how this works you know my sense is that this was less about regaining control of the leadership I don't think the leadership was ever out of control I think this was more about regaining control over some of the people within the ISI who were handling Lashkirtiaba and had allowed Mumbai to to happen the way it did and then helping Lashkar's leaders to try to regain control over their own organization and that tells us something about a the type of approach that the Pakistani state is going to try to take be you know it suggests that great in the short term you can help regain control over elements factions within the organization but that only lasts for so long and it only lasts as long as you can give them an outlet in Afghanistan and it only lasts as long as you can convince them that they shouldn't be lured away by people you know in Al Qaeda or others who are saying listen you know the Pakistani state has always been beyond the pale and I've argued before and I would argue again that that's so long as militancy sort of remains a buyer's market in Pakistan which is to say if you want to if you want to fight against the Shia you can find a group or groups to do that with if you want to fight against the state you can find a group or groups to do that with if you want to fight against India you can find a group or groups to do that with if you want to fight in Afghanistan you know so long as that remains the case and individuals are moving around you can maybe manage things so that there's not a conflagration but you're going to continue to get slippage right either at home or abroad actually when we start here Jennifer Hi Mr. Tankal I'm Jilla Nuri from Voice of America Afghan TV you've been on our show my question is there was an article today in New York Times about this group Lashkar-Jangavi behind this bomb blast in Afghanistan which happened against this Shia shrine in Afghanistan which is in Afghanistan Shia and Sunni doesn't have too much things but when this thing happens basically what do you think about link between Lashkar-Jangavi and Lashkar-Tayiba and how do you see this attacks I don't see real links between LHA and Lashkar-Tayiba I do see links between Lashkar-Jangavi and a lot of the other Dio Bandi militants in Pakistan and I think it's I mean I you know look we're here to talk about LAT but I think we can certainly I'm happy to engage on on LHA for a second one of the things I was looking at this summer was sort of what the new militant nexus looks like right we use all these terms for some of these Dio Bandi militant groups Lashkar-Jangavi Jayshin Muhammad Harakat al-Majaheddin Harakat al-Jahad islami questionable how much utility they really have we're talking about groups as they existed in 2002-2003 there's a whole new network of actors right now that are you know tangentially related to the infrastructure that these that these actors had and Lashkar-Jangavi's place you know that group as it existed I think in 2002-2003 it doesn't exist the same way anymore you know it's very difficult to pin down exactly how it exists you get different answers but one of the things that I heard is if there's a leadership you know they're with they're in North Waziristan right but we're not sure there's a leadership and it might just be that you have a lot of different cells and it's questionable whether they really are trying to be part of a political movement you know one of the things that Lashkar-Jangavi wants is reformism in Pakistan what Lashkar-Jangavi has historically wanted is to kill the Shia right I mean that that has that was their sort of raison d'etre in the 1990s and to a degree because they were one of the first groups that the state really did turn on after 2002 it had already started to turn on them by that point and really did crack down on them more so than others you know it's not surprising that they also quite close with those who are waging revolutionary jihad you know in Pakistan and so you get sort of this nexus between fighting against the near enemy fighting against the Shia several Tariqi Taliban Pakistan leaders came out of Lashkar-Jangavi okay L.E.J. you know has is able to tap into sort of throw like another group at everybody but Sipa-e-Sahaba Pakistan is the sort of the above ground political wing that it had split off of they can still tap into SSP mosques Medotas etc and so they can have a nationwide presence so is it surprising to me you know do I can I confirm or you know say that L.E.J. definitely was responsible in Afghanistan no but is it surprising to me that they you know are sort of infecting these other groups with that sectarianism that sectarian agenda no that that's not surprising and I think that that's a threat that a lot of Pakistanis actually are aware of is the threat from sectarianism you know and certainly if that's now moving to a greater degree than hitherto over the last 10 years to to Afghanistan as well you know well then we can just add another reason why things look you know a bit more bleak there Jennifer, I'll go here Hi, I'm Ira Weiss I'm not affiliated with anyone question you were talking about a dialogue you describe something it sounds like a dialogue between Al Qaeda and Leshka you tell me about concerning the theological justifications for different kinds of attacks where does this dialogue take place what kind of media does this dialogue and do they actually do they actually refer to the other organization in this dialogue so this this dialogue is taking place in in multiple forums one and I can speak more to the to the Lashkaratiba and then then to the Al Qaeda and one Lashkaratiba is holding seminars and symposiums throughout the country for its members to try to re-inculcate in them this we don't fight against our fellow Muslims type of ideology that's from current and former members of the group who've told me about these they're preaching that at times in their Friday sermons and mosques you know they're working through mullahs that they have in different areas throughout the country to do that some of their ideological leaders are going out and doing roadshows as well if you will you know they're also making radio cassettes and they're and they're they're publishing things online in forums and they're also publishing sort of electronic books right now some of the points that I was making are John from an al-Qaeda response which was a book length response you know that was distributed electronically you know that was given to me by a militant in Pakistan you know who I was talking to about this who said listen this will give you a pretty good sense and in that you know al-Qaeda literally says we are responding to you know Sheikh Aks's talk in you know I don't remember where it was off hand and here are the points that you know La Shahrit Aiba has made and here are how we respond to them and those who follow sort of some of these jihadist debates will know that it's not uncommon to get people writing book length this is my responses to that person and then somebody else will publish this is my responses to that person's responses and you know I mean there's a lot so and there's a lot of it that is you know pulling on Islamic history and a lot of you know arcane theological debates but there's also you know as I tried to point out here some some quite kind of cutting much more you know today issue type of stuff in terms of like listen you guys are on the Pakistani government's dime and so of course you're saying that right so yeah so that's that's how those debates are happening Jennifer we can go back there actually Elaine Sereo I'm very interested in sort of a previous presentation here at the New America Foundation regarding a role of fostering economic ties between Pakistan and India and how that can is that do you see this being thwarted or even sabotage via interests within Pakistan who support LAT who may be orchestrating things with LAT to to you know make sure that this sort of process this sort of progress or step or one step forward two steps back or that kind of thing does not happen sure let me let me speak first sort of directly to the the question of most favorite nation status you know Pakistan's you know you know reported decision to grant MFN to India which was you know a particularly a long time coming this you know if it goes through and economic ties between the two improve is a good thing I mean you know in an area where we're often talking about bad things I mean this is a good thing and it's a good thing for a number of reasons one you know I'm not an economist you know but from those who I've spoken to or I've read if you know run the numbers this you know this could be good for both countries economically and certainly you know Pakistan could could use some some you know economic benefits right now in the form of as they always say trade not aid right so so that in and of itself is a good thing look one of the reasons why MFN had you know took so long to go through was you know and again if you talk to to people in Pakistan they'll tell you because there were those in the security establishment who didn't want to see it go through you know either because they thought that Pakistan was going to get a you know a raw deal from it or because they thought that there shouldn't be any type of engagement along these lines until you know Kashmir is settled or you know what have you if you know economic ties improving that moving forward all of that is good now as to sort of lush car's role as a spoiler or the desire of people in Pakistan to use it as a spoiler be it for you know improving economic ties or improving ties of any other sort as you spoke to yeah there's certainly you know I think there's certainly concerned about that you know one of the questions that I asked how right to to not just current members of lush car's have but also you know a former senior official who recently left for for personal reasons which means that you know he doesn't necessarily disagree with the group's you know raison d'etre he had personal issues with people I said what do you think you know lush car would do you know if the Pakistani state wanted to find a political solution to Kashmir you know he said you know his sense was and you have to remember he's speaking to a western researcher who knows has written a book about this which you know I mean we had a very collegial discussion over four or five hours but you know they're still we have to take into account the biases that exist in terms of the interviewer the discussion right but he said you know his sense was if they wanted to find a political solution would the leadership you know sort of is it mature enough to abide by that you know his sense was yes and I've heard that from others but it's very difficult to know and I want to put a very fair fine point on this if that's a message that they're trying to send to western interlocutors or whether that's really the case because certainly one of the concerns has been either that the Lashkar leadership would try to spoil any type of political solution or you know that elements within the group could and I would add on to that you know I think there's also a fair a fair case to be made that in the Indian and Pakistani security establishment on both sides of the border there are though there are you know potential spoilers exist and if you want to you know use a group to spoil the piece or you know a piece process Lashkar is a pretty good one right so that just makes it all the more difficult and also by the way makes it all the more unlikely that Lashkar is going to be dismantled before you get any type of piece because quite frankly you know why would Pakistan give up that kind of leverage at the negotiating table in advance sure Steve nice to see you again my name is Kami but I I'm with the Pakistani spectator and I'm sorry to repeat my question the question that I asked you a few months ago that where I could get some money several forums actually to to write a book about Kashmir you know there were thousands of graveyard discovered in Indian Kashmir and some of people those people were buried alive do you think that least Lashkar Taiba crazy and stupid people are more violent than what's going on in Indian Kashmir what's going on as a matter of fact in Pakistani Balochistan where Paki army is killing hundred of Baloch so I mean where I could get this money and write about these issues and I think I agree with you that these people are violent religion does inspire violent there is no doubt about this but see I'm a Punjabi I'm a Kashmiri I'm a Paki and I refuse to accept that somehow these people are I listen to this listen to this you've you've you've asked me this question before no no listen listen to this actually in several so I can I can respond to it I refuse to accept this you know premises that somehow we are pro-genetically violent at the same premises that 20 years ago in this city people thought about blacks okay you know sir thank you now listen I mean there should be some balance I I I completely I completely take your point I would like to point out is a Muslim life really that cheap that we don't care and this is the very younger that inspired these people yeah yeah no no first of all I never made that statement I know that I think you came in background is actually if I can detail it what God cannot just enough people would call sir sir you sir please sit down since you are writing so no one would call you better the sympathizer so you've had a chance to ask your question that's enough okay I mean I you know I'm happy to try to respond to that as as best as I can and I you've asked me this question and I think every forum that I've I've ever spoken at so you'd think I'd be well practiced at it by this point one you know at no point did I suggest in in any way shape or form that you know there is anything Islamic about terrorism or that you know that there's that there's anything all religions have violence in them okay we can find Christian extremists Jewish extremists Muslim extremists I've actually you know at another thing published a paper looking at the similarities between you know in extremism among the three Abrahamic faiths so you know sort of my record in terms of looking at this cross faith is pretty good secondly I I'm not sure I think you might have come in late so you didn't really hear what the subject of my talk was about that leave that aside third your question about Kashmir there have been a lot of great books written about Kashmir I'm sorry that I haven't written any of them there were no books written about Lashkaratiba so I decided to write that one I think if you think there should be another book written about Kashmir then you should go ahead and write it after I get through publishing my thesis and a couple of other articles and books and you know if I could see space in that market I'm happy to look at it but to your overall question you know Lashkaratiba one of the reasons why it's interesting to me is it is a symptom of a much wider problem okay and it is a problem in which no side is innocent okay it's impossible to get around the fact that the Pakistani state has supported terrorist groups you know at times all right you know has given support to militant organizations chief among them you know L-E-T it's impossible to get around the fact that that Lashkaratiba is an Islamist organization or that Pakistan for primarily nationalist purposes has instrumentalized that Islamist sentiment for its own purposes it is also important to get around the fact that the Kashmir conflict that erupted in 1989 erupted you know for the most part as a result of indigenous grievances all right because of serious mismanagement and neglect by the Indian government and I think as you have pointed out it's relatively well documented that there you know that there were you know significant human rights violations committed by Indian security forces you know in Indian administered Kashmir both sides have blood on their hands so you know I thank you for pointing that out I think that's an important point to be made but you know you've pointed that out on numerous occasions and I I always take that point so I think that's an important thing for all of us to remember here I don't really go much beyond that with you know with answering your your statement okay other yes sir Faragore's Fatemi with Oxford Char group can I just follow up what the gentleman talked about on Kashmir because it seems to me in these kinds of farms we talk about I'm sorry what in these kinds of forums that we have we talk about everything except Kashmir now if Kashmir did not exist would the Pakistanis need the Lashkar's after they lost three wars to India their decision was that the only way to fight India over the Kashmir situation was to create these irregular groups India on the other hand to counteract this is doing all it can in the Northwest frontier in Afghanistan and to gin up all the problems that they can create for the Pakistanis to counteract this so as long as Kashmir exists can we talk about these things without really talking about Kashmir I think the foreign policy establishment has totally forgotten that when you talk to a Pakistani this is very deep in their heart as a Kashmiri as to what has happened in these past 60 or so years as this conflict has gone on I'm going to I think it's a very valid point let me say this about Kashmir first my sense is that that there should be a that India and Pakistan should settle their territorial dispute over Kashmir because it would be good for India because it would be good for Pakistan and because it would be good for the Kashmiris and at this stage they deserve some sort of settlement and they should do that I mean above and beyond whether or not you know the states do things for geopolitical utility but leaving Lashkar aside you know for that reason alone you know it is worth settling I would also say that settling Kashmir is going to be part and parcel to any type of any sort of real peaceful reconciliation between the two countries okay and there's a bit of a chicken and egg in terms of how that's going to work so I think that's something that's all well accepted you know I think there are and continue to be questions about you know what role outside interlocutors could play in terms of promoting that process I myself have said I don't think that the U.S. can play a role in terms of forcing both sides to the table but it can provide something of a safety net once talks start to keep them from devolving okay and I think that's an important role that you know the U.S. and international interlocutors can play now is settling Kashmir going to mean the end of Lashkri Tiber my sense is it's necessary but not sufficient okay I don't think that we should believe that if Kashmir were settled on Tuesday that L.E.T. would be demobilized on Wednesday all right Lashkri Tiber provides other types of utility to the Pakistani state all right one you know at the moment it provides you know it's not a major player in Afghanistan but you know it's another group that's active there two it continues to provide some sort of leverage these of the you know India now that may want to use that leverage to settle Kashmir it's possible three there is this sense I think it's potentially somewhat misguided but that you know Lashkar's many trained members could act as some sort of an auxiliary force in the event that there will war between India and Pakistan right four what I was speaking about during you know sort of much of the talk today is they provide domestic utility as well against some of these other groups right I mean it's not just we don't want to go after a group that isn't attacking out this is a group that promotes an ideology that others shouldn't be attacking us and then five we shouldn't overlook the fact that it provides enormous social welfare utility as well okay that's not to overstate it I think one of the things that I you know I and many others and I I did this in my book and I think others have done this as well is to promote this concept of of you know the above ground Jamaat to Dawa like they've got an office in every single district right and they're the world's biggest relief agency they're not but they have penetrated pockets of the population they help deliver vote banks for politicians okay if you close down all their madatas all their hospitals you got to replace that with something else keep in mind you're then putting out a lot of workers as well there are a lot of other more complicated reasons you know beyond I mean cashmere is plenty complicated that you have to get into when you talk about how you end Los Gretaiba and it probably ends you know at this stage what people are talking about is with some sort of transition to a nonviolent entity rather than you know smashing it into a million pieces right so you know again that's to come back to does that mean that we we shouldn't be encouraging and the Pakistan and India shouldn't be seeking some sort of settlement to cashmere they absolutely should be and we should encourage that is that going to immediately trigger a demobilization of Los Gretaiba and other groups no I don't think it necessarily is again necessary most likely but probably not sufficient yes sir in the back smart chatter due from safe foundation Steven I think it's interesting that the cashmere came up maybe you should write a book on cash the reason is I mean I'm originally from India I was born but I'm an American citizen but the way I see the cashmere problem it should be considered settled as is which means those people in the Indian so-called Indian occupied cashmere or Indian cashmere who are being terrorized by the Indian military because India is at war I mean just as United States is at war in Iraq or Afghanistan India is at war in that part of cashmere they should back up and go across the border the border is very close and live peacefully and in a very humane treatment in the Pakistani side which probably isn't the case but they should because in most most of India there are enough Muslims in various parts of India and they're still living in peace with a few eruption here and there once in a once in a blue moon which always happens because of these ethnic conflict so the cashmere can be settled that way which means one part of cashmere stays in India which means India also has a claim that the whole cashmere was in its possession till Pakistan illegally took part of cashmere would you study that and make that point clear to your Pakistani friends since you lived in Pakistan a couple things one I never lived in Pakistan two I have studied that three I think there would be plenty of people in Pakistan perhaps some in India certainly I would assume some in this room who would probably disagree with you if somebody from Pakistan were to stand up and were to promote what their vision of the conflict is it would be quite different unfortunately and I have been to track two events and other dialogues where we talked about cashmere for several days I know it's surprising after those fora still haven't sorted out the problem I don't think I'm going to be able to do it in a minute or two I could try to address your statement so do we have any other questions non cashmere specific questions I think we've covered that one sir right there yeah on the aisle yeah Kyle Graham a grad student at George Mason University some of my research in in looking into terrorist organizations particularly in East Asia leads me to believe there are some kind of communications between a left and let and that let he's moving towards more of an intellectually based terror network particularly in their dealings with educational institutions in Lahore have you found that in your research with I'm sorry with which group with a left the formerly the Seren gas Tokyo people right I haven't seen that I here's what I can say about sort of L.E.T.'s you know sort of communications in its international connections one you know the group not only has those transnational networks that I mentioned which which suggests nodes in those various areas I mean some of their operatives have traveled you know almost globally and so how you know may have created you know ad hoc connections with who knows which individuals where certainly in Southeast Asia there was you know there were connections with Gemma Islamia we knew that some guys from J.I. were were you know captured you know at I think at a Lashkar Madrasa in like 2002-2003 one of them was related I think was the brother of Humbali who was person behind the 2000 to Bali blast and you know in addition the group has a sort of an external affairs department which is responsible for connecting with both sort of above ground Islamist organizations as well as it's got an operational wing that has been connecting with militant groups you know around the world for the most part these have been groups that that would be considered quote jihadist but in certain instances Lashkar you know has been suspected of reaching out to you know to other groups you know for strategic purposes the one that the most comes to mind is I've never heard anything with with the folks in you know with the left what I've heard is the Maoists you know in in India you know and this I've heard from somebody in LET you know even he says yes there might have been some attempt to quote shake hands with them you know over the fact that both want to hurt India though it's not clear anything ever came of it I think this is something that Lashkar is open to certainly one of the things that we can say about it historically in terms of its evolution is it's shown a propensity to be able to forge allegiances with a host of different actors when it's needed to these haven't necessarily been strong binding allegiances but for a group that is so doctrinaire religiously it can show its own pragmatism at times I'm sorry that I don't know specifically about that about that group but I do know that yes in general there have been attempts to sort of build that network and something that is certainly of concern and I alluded to this as I was concluding my remarks is the ability because of the networks because its operatives have traveled you know globally because they they do quite well in terms of IT and communications you know they could provide some sort of means for information sharing or coordination at some level of course the thing that's going to potentially get in the way with that is you have to be worried if you're you know al-Qaeda about coordinating too much with IT because if the leadership wants to turn you over you can but at the same time you know there's a lot of separateness and togetherness and so it's got that potential to play that role yes sir in the back do you have any other questions because we should run through one or two here Mike Sponder you mentioned that the Pakistani military feels that they have control but they like more control but Mubarak felt he had control Qaddafi felt he had control Assad obviously still feels he has control how fragile is the Pakistani world because of who can control and what happens if the spokes start spinning again nuclear capabilities right um hold on one second yeah sure and is there any other one last question yes sir ma'am you've been waiting for a while and as you ask it and then hit them both okay yes yeah my question is about wait for the mic thank you my question is about the future of your US and Pakistan relations and do you still see Pakistan as a serious partner to US for not being in born about decisions in Afghanistan and what is the primary source of funding for Lashkar Taiba thank you okay um I'll take the control question first I think what I said is Pakistan has less control than it would claim publicly and more than it would like and not as much as it would have like to have you know in reality so I I didn't say that they feel as though they've got complete control um quite frankly that's it's very difficult to get a sense of what the army or the IS you know what elements in the army in the IS I feel about their you know about their level of control um I certainly can't quantify how much control they have I don't know if those who are charged with trying to exercise it could really quantify how much control they have but I could almost guarantee that if they could they wouldn't tell me um that said you know the is there a concern that that that that control attenuates over time or that they don't have as much as they think they do or would like to have yes absolutely and that's what I I think I said that before when I was saying that you know that this is a bit more art than science that um that you can sort of manage things but you have to deal with slippage um because you don't control every entity you know every entity all the time and actions can have immediate impact in terms of attacks in your own country and then you know attacks abroad can have second and third order impacts on Pakistan as well and I think they worry about all of that and I think they have I think it's fair to say they have more control over you know like Lashkar-e-Taiba than they do over J.C. Mohamed or splinters of J.C. Mohamed actually they've probably got pretty good control over the core of J.E.M. because you can't swing a cat in Bahá'u'lláh poor without like you know hitting you know an ISI agent probably but you know but control is is it can attenuate it can be you know it's it's very difficult to pin down so your point is quite valid and I think you hit on one of the key concerns which is the question about counter-proliferation right and that's something that I think everybody worries about I'm sorry that I don't have an answer for you in terms of you know being able to quantify it here's what I can say absent nuclear or you know or or chemical materials getting to the hands of of a of a Pakistani group do I think that any of these groups poses an existential threat to the Pakistani state I mean that's really questionable and absence they're getting hold of nuclear material right or a nuclear weapon of being able to use it you know I would argue that that if you look at what the major threats are to the Pakistani state right now the things that touch people on a daily basis potential water shortages right it's the fact that you don't have electricity sometimes in some places 12 hours a day it's employment it's that you're looking at a youth bulge you know in a country where you already have employment problems and education issues you know these are the issues that I think you know over time are you know much in some ways much more existential I mean you know people have argued Pakistan has always muddled through and it may still I'm simply saying those are potentially bigger even than the militant issue the militant issue is one again that comes back to to the the nuclear question and I think that's somebody something that people rightly worry about you know all the time it's certainly and this is a nice segue into the other question is something I think the US worries about quite a bit and you know so to the the US-Pakistan relationship I don't think I need to go over all the reasons why right now it's bad we all know right now it's bad right I mean it's traditionally been you know for the last 10 years or so and one could argue even before that it's been it's been a relationship built about security issues and that's been primarily it and for the last 10 years those security issues have been I think first and foremost you know and certainly in the last several years Afghanistan and the groups fighting there counter-terrorism measures you know and then thirdly counter-proliferation the nuclear thing none of those are going away though Afghanistan you know becomes less pressing after 2014 you know I have argued and would continue to argue that the US needs to have continue to have some sort of relationship with Pakistan because counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation will remain important for the foreseeable future and I would argue of the two counter-proliferations probably the one that you know is less than the news on a day-to-day basis but is more important over the long term you know I have also argued that that you know I would like to see the US and Pakistan building some sort of relationship beyond you know sort of the security equation that looks unlikely right now right I think there's a lot of good thinking being done on on how we relook at aid and trade and all these other things but right now that's going to be very difficult and it's going to be very difficult you know because of you know the the NATO raid on top of the bin Laden raid on top of Raymond Davis and you know all the other things that we could pile into that you asked about Bon you know I don't think that is I don't think on the first person to say that's not promising right I think it's from the Pakistani side you know I think it's fair to say that there is a sense and sir you did allude to it that Pakistani lives are worth less you know then then American lives I think that is something that the that the population feels you know I don't I don't agree with that but I understand why there is that feeling on the US side you know there's the sense that many of the the problems Pakistan is having and possibly this this latest rate itself is the result of you know problems that Pakistan has created for itself right and and there there in lies lies the rub as far as Bon is concerned some of that was probably about respect or you know the the security establishment trying to reclaim you know its space one could also argue that some of it might have been about you know I would question what did Pakistan have to bring to the table in Bon you know was this did they you know not miss an opportunity did they not miss an opportunity to take advantage of a crisis kind of thing I don't know you know but that I think speaks to the degree to which these actors are just not on the same page right now things will continue to muddle along I think you know at at the lowest levels for all the reasons that I cited I would be talking for like another several hours and we could all get into it if we try to talk about how we go about rebuilding this I don't I don't have time for that right now unfortunately neither do you although I think it's a question that we all need to continue to have so I'll conclude by answering a much easier question which was sort of I think part C where does let you get its funding mostly domestic you know conception that it gets the majority of its funding from you know Salafi you know actors in in the Gulf it gets money from the Gulf and it gets money I think from Europe but I think most of its money you know or the biggest share comes from domestic fundraising right and not just from domestic fundraising but from investments in businesses you know this is not I mean these these guys are people who they've invested in legitimate enterprises you know they've got their fingers in a lot of different pies that is from our perspective in terms of you know how we try to deal with the organization a good thing and a bad thing it's bad thing because it means that we can't choke off funding Lord knows I think people have made valiant attempts of doing so it's it's also a bad thing because it means that sort of in that regard our leverage is limited but it means that the Pakistani government and I alluded to this earlier does have some leverage because you can close down those businesses you can close down that infrastructure if you really wanted to now that that's a double-edged sort as well but but but but but Lashkaritiba is in many ways sort of insinuated itself into the fibers of of Pakistani society or at least parts of it and so that suggests that when you try to deal with it you have to deal with it knowing that that's the case okay unfortunately we are out of time I would be perfectly happy to sit here and harangue Stephen all afternoon but that's not in the cards Stephen thank you very much for for coming this was really wonderful thank you very much for having me and everybody make sure you pick up a copy of this book Storming the World Stage which is for sale outside and that way you'll be able to nail him even better next time he's out public all right yeah


This is Washington Brady for Whale Law Media and I'm talking to Catherine who attended the Reclaim St Kilda Rally in Melbourne on Saturday. How are you? I'm very well thank you. Excellent well thanks for talking to us. Now first off we live in a time when journalists feel entitled to decide what other people's views really are but I'd rather get you to say for yourself.  Uh no my family sir.  What drew you to Saturday's rally? Describe to us like what you witnessed at the rally. I mean we've all seen what's on the papers and on the telly but what did you actually see? There was a significant number of Asian Australians and they were definitely with the reclaim that unedited YouTube videos of the speeches by Blair Cottrell and I think the other one was Neil Erickson. Now what they were saying a lot of it was definitely anti-immigration and you can agree with that or disagree with that. I didn't in their speeches I didn't notice and did you see or hear anything overtly racist on the day? Did you see anyone making Nazi salutes or carrying swastikas or seeing I think actually the police did an unusually good job. I mean that's that's why things like Charlottesville got so violent was because the police let the groups mingle they didn't intervene and break things up um whereas yeah I must say Victoria police seemed to do a very good job. Organisers said they want to hold more rallies. If there are are you likely to go? So there you have it what's reported in the mainstream media seems very much at odds with the experience of people on the ground and I'd like to thank Catherine for talking to us for Whale Oil Media this is Washington Breedy.


I'm really honored to be part of this panel and to come after this really fascinating presentation. And I'm really glad to have this opportunity to present an early version of this work examining the connection between types of wartime local governance and the stability of post-war governments. So of course quite a lot of work has already been done on the determinant of civil war recurrence and the obstacles that may prevent post-war government from achieving stability. And so this existing argument emphasized the importance of the way in which a conflict or at least its first phase has ended. They suggest that durable peace is more likely after one side in the war achieves a clear victory because having a military dominant victor details further challenge. And in contrast settlement leads to a more fragile peace because even if the parties agree to the terms that have been negotiated they have no guarantee that these terms will be enforced. And so these are really important mechanisms and we do have evidence that civil war recurrence is less likely after conflict that ended with a victory of one side. But at the same time there are important patterns of variation that this mechanism live and explain. So not all victory leads to a stable peace and not all settlement fail. And there is value in understanding this unexplained pattern. More specifically it's important to better identify the threats that post-war government face even when they were formed by victors. And it's also important to better identify some of the resources that have allowed some of the governments that emerged out of settlement to achieve stability. So maybe one way to make progress in this area is to look more closely at the specific processes through which the post-war order can unravel. And so I focus on three mechanisms of processes. So the first is a process of fragmentation. So it can be the fragmentation of the ruling coalition or some of its constitutive entities. But it can also be the fragmentation of the insurgent movement with whom the government is negotiating. The second mechanism that can threaten post-war stability is incomplete or failed demobilization. So demobilization program or efforts whether they are structured and supporting by international agencies or not are notoriously hard to implement and flawed implementation often means that demobilization is not thorough enough to allow the government to provide security. And a third mechanism that can undermine stabilization is post-war government's reliance and dependence on local power broker. So the task that post-war government face is that they must rebuild and stabilize the country but often without the benefit of strong institution. And so in this situation they often form alliances with different type of local power broker who have local capacity for social control. But these alliances are fragile and costly and therefore they limit the possibilities for genuine recovery and for durable peace. So I'll talk more about the mechanism when I get to the case study. But I want to get to my core argument which is that the vulnerability of post-conflict government to these three mechanisms. So mechanism fragmentation, failed demobilization and dependence on local power broker depends at least in part on how dominant arm group in the conflict have approached local power structure during the war. So what I mean by local power structure are the various form of community level organization that shape people's everyday behavior and interaction as well as local political processes. And so we can make a broad distinction between some arm group that have established themselves by co-opting local power structure. So examples of this would be the Tuareg rebellion in Niger and Mali which mobilized in part around existing confederation. And another example would be the Shan State Army in Myanmar which capitalized on traditional local ruling dynasty. The SPLM in South Sudan which had plans to establish a whole different new administrative structure but in practice ended up often co-opting existing traditional chiefs. And in the other category you have other arm group that have mostly displaced and transformed local power structure. Including various group from the Viet Minh that set up people's revolutionary community in villages throughout northern and central Vietnam or in Afghanistan, the Taliban who started to set up shadow governments in the early 2000s. So of course this is an oversimplification and there's a lot of really important work that has been done that shows variation in how rebel group approach local power structure. Both across the territory is a control and also over time throughout the course of the conflict. So yeah, so this doesn't capture this really important within case variation but still we can say that there are differences in rebel groups, dominant and aspirational strategy. And so my main point is that it is harder for post-war government to achieve stability after conflict in which dominant actors adopted strategies of cooperation rather than transformation. Why? Because there are more severe and more misaligned incentive within organization that have adopted strategies of co-optation. So when rebel group have built themselves and grown by co-opting local power structure, they remain quite dependent on the local elite who control this structure. And so the top leadership of the group cannot easily, in case of internal conflict, the top of leadership cannot easily replace this local elite. If, let's say like I'm going to talk about the case of Somalia, like a clan leader wants to leave the armed group, he will take his community and his faction with him. So this local elites maintain this kind of exit option, which means that there are greater risk of fragmentation both during and after the war. Second, to preserve the status, these local elites are likely to resist genuine demobilization. So for an armed group to disarm, it's not enough for its top leadership to agree to demobilization. An important condition of successful demobilization is the presence of an institutionalized integrated chain of command that is committed to the effort and that is recognized as legitimated by the fighters. And so in organization that grew through a co-optation, this condition is less likely or unlikely to be present. Finally, when armed group adopt strategies of co-optation, it's then difficult for post-war government to consolidate power and rule autonomously. This is because the elites that have been co-opted become strong men that can be effective rival to the post-war government. And when on the contrary, armed group have used strategies of transformation, they've already replaced strong men by strong organizations that can be then key levels that allow them to rule autonomously. So that's the theory of the mechanism that the degree to which post-war government are vulnerable to fragmentation, stole demobilization or lack autonomy depends in part on the extent to which armed group, during the war, have co-opted rather than transformed local power structure. So how can we look at this empirically? So one way to do this, and this is still a work in progress. Sorry, I didn't manage the... Oh, sorry, I was wrong. I have this data set that has a range of viable, capturing ways in which armed group have approached local power structure. And so I've documented both practice in which they have transformed this structure by creating new institutions, by redistributing land and assets, by empowering disempowered group, and practices through which they have co-opted. And so the plan is to look at whether we see some kind of connection between these wartime practices and the likelihood of civil war recurrence. But for today, I want to present evidence from a comparison between two cases that ended similarly with a victory of the insurgents and yet the post-war government had extremely different trajectory. So in both Ethiopia and Somalia, insurgent groups overthrew the incumbent regime in 1991. And so in Ethiopia, a coalition of rebel groups led by the Tigray People Liberation Front overthrew the regime of the DERG. In Somalia, different rebel groups, including the United Somali Congress and the Somali national movements, but there were more groups overthrew the regime of the DERG. So in Ethiopia, the rebel coalition that came to power stayed in power from 1991 until 2018. And it's been a period of severely constrained political right for the country, but also a period in which the government was able to enact successful reform, leading to lower poverty and better access to basic services. And throughout this period, there were localized conflict and mass protests, but none of this conflict became an existential threat to the government. In Somalia, the level of violence did not really decline after the fall of the previous regime, even after the UN sent a mission to enforce a ceasefire, and the transition government was not formed until 2000. So it was too divided to agree on the path forward. It was replaced by a new transition federal government, which was not really more successful at restoring stability. And if we zoom in at this period that immediately follows the war, we see the role of the three processes I mentioned earlier, so fragmentation, incomplete demobilization, and dependence on local power brokers. So in Ethiopia, the group that the TPLF, the group that dominated the ruling coalition, continued to experience severe internal crisis after the war, just how did that during the war? But this severe internal crisis did not lead to a splintering, in part because of its rules and procedures, but most importantly because no member of the top leadership had a personal following, he was able to withstand the crisis without splittering. And we see something completely different in Somalia. The two main groups, so the USC and SNM, both disintegrated. Somalia went through a long period of fractional war. So we can take the example of the United Somali Congress. There were two factions that fought until 1998, and even when they started to negotiate that triggered a new splintering. I'm probably not going to have time to go through all the mechanisms, but I wanted to say something about demobilization. So the TPLF was able to demobilize a lot of the insurgent troops, and those troops that were not demobilized were integrated into the National Army, and they even arrived at a situation where the insurgent troops agreed to fight under the leadership of National Army officers, meaning of the officers of the army they had just been fighting a few years earlier. In Somalia, the insurgents were unable to demobilize their fighter. There are many examples, but even in Somalia, which is now viewed as part of Somalia that achieved order or stability, there was so little control of the insurgent faction that they ended up abusing their own clan or the clan they were coming from. So two very different paths, and the question is, do we have evidence of a connection or continuity to wartime mode of local governance? And largely, we do. So I want to start by saying a few words about the TPLF strategy of local engagement. So the TPLF established its support base by dismantling the existing village-level political structure, replacing them with new popular councils, and then it used this council to enact a very radical land reform programme, like redistributing land, which is one of the most consequential and radical reforms you can enact in an agrarian society. And so this reform helped the TPLF build a robust support base. It helped the organisation recruit during the war, but it also helped with demobilisation because then there was plots or lands that the fighters could go back to after the war. And in Somalia, the mobilisation process was very different. Initially, there were efforts to establish each of these organisations as multi-clan organisations that would be based on a shared political platform rather than on clan identity, but these attempts mostly failed and they failed for a range of reasons. Some of them was because the government strategy was to arm a clan faction against each other, but also it failed because once they transitioned from mobilisation to actually taking arm against the government, it was more efficient to build combat units around the clan lines and to try and recombine the units they had. So those were the main points I wanted to touch on and to conclude, I want to say briefly a few words about some of the theoretical and practical implications of the distinction I was making. So one theoretical question that it might be relevant for is always this question of whether new wars are different from previous wars in that they contribute to the erosion of state institutions rather than state building. Maybe the distinction can help us look differently at the question of under what conditions do wars make the state and one of these conditions maybe that the dominant actors have initiated a political process that undermines the rival of the state. And finally, there is also this argument that has been made sometimes that foreign intervention prevents a return to stability by preventing the emergence of a clear vector, but as we've seen, insurgent can defeat the adversary without having the capabilities of achieving a secure peace. And so, yeah, I'll stop here. Thank you very much.