Hello, and welcome to this session in which we'll discuss the loss contingency. What is the main idea behind loss contingency? Well, it's a loss. Obviously, it's a loss. It could be also a gain, but we're concerned more with the loss that is based upon an event happening. So the loss is contingent. It means there is a condition that could happen or it may not happen. And when that happen or may not happen for a period of time, it will resolve this uncertainty. The best example of a loss contingency or a gain contingency is a lawsuit slash litigation.  You have to wait until the outcome. See what happened to that outcome. Well, the outcome could be against you. You could have a loss or if you sue someone, you could have a gain or you can be sued and not lose anything. So what's happening is you are waiting for that contingency to resolve itself. Well, while you're waiting, what do we have to do for accounting purposes? In other words, do you record the loss, not record the loss? What do you have to do with this? So as I said, lawsuit is a good example.  Environmental liabilities. You have a cleanup to do. You are responsible because you had, for example, like bridge petroleum. You had a spill. Your oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. You have a cleanup. Environmental liabilities. Warranty and guarantee costs. And we'll discuss this in a separate recording because it's very important to understand how we account for warranties and guarantees. Because when you guarantee a product, the customers might come back and you have to make them good on that product. You have to fix the product, replace the product. That could be a loss contingency. Coupons. For example, many retailers or many supermarket stores, what they do is they offer coupons to customers. So when, or manufacturers for that matter, what happens is as a customer, you collect those coupons and some customers will go back and would redeem the coupon. So the coupon themselves are a loss contingency. When the customer comes back to redeem them, the company will have to come up with either cash or free product. So that's a loss contingency. Not everyone will come back, but some people will come back. So the company will estimate that contingency rebate. Sometimes you might buy a computer. You might buy a desktop and with it comes a rebate, basically a form. You fill it out.  And I did this long, long time ago. I bought a desktop when, you know, desktops were popular. And I don't remember the price for it, but they gave me $100 rebate. And I never understood why, why would they give me $100? They send me a check for $100. If I fill out this form and send it back to them, well, they want to collect information about you, my address. Well, I bought a computer. It means I like computers. They can sell this information to marketing companies. Also, that guarantees could be a contingent liability. Basically, a loss contingency is when you guarantee the debt of other companies. So one company will guarantee the debt of another company. Why? Because they want them to survive. They want them to be able to borrow money. So therefore they will guarantee the debt. What happen if you guarantee the debt of another company? You are responsible for that debt. If something happens, you are responsible for that debt. So let's assume we do have those situation. What do we have to do? Well, here's what we have to do. First, we have to estimate our probability to determine what accounting treatment we should have. Estimating the probability means what? It means estimating what's the event happening against us or for us. For example, if we are being sued, I will use the lawsuit as an example. And the chance of being us losing is 3% chance. We spoke to the lawyer and the lawyer said, there's nothing to this case. Just you can't forget about it. Well, if that's the case, that could happen. The loss is ignored. We don't do anything if there's a remote chance. The probability is remote. In other words, there is no chance we are going to lose. How do we determine this? Well, we ask expert, lawyers, consultant, people that knows something about the issue. And they told us, look, don't worry about it. It's remote. Now, if the probability is reasonably possible, what is reasonably possible? Well, there's no reasonably possible quantitative number. But let me tell you, I'm just going to put a number for it to understand it. Well, there's a 50% chance we could lose. There's a 50% chance we may not lose. So we really don't know. It's reasonably possible. What do we have to do under those circumstances? Under those circumstances, we have to disclose this information in the footnote. What does that mean? That means in the annual report, in the notes of the financial statements, we have to say, for example, if we are being sued, we would say something to the effect that we are being sued by such and such party in such and such court. And the outcome will come in two years. And just so we will not let you know about this. That's it, reasonably possible you disclose. What happened if the probability is high? Notice I put it in red. What is high? It means there is a 90% chance and there is no numbers in the literature. I'm just making those numbers to illustrate what is high probability. There is a good chance you are going to lose. More likely than not, you are going to lose this case or you are going to come up with the money. Well, if that's the case, what do you have to do? Well, if you don't know the number, if you don't know how much you are going to be responsible for, you just disclose it.  Maybe the judge or the jury will decide and there is no precedent. You just, you cannot really know. Now, if it's probable and notice the plus and you can estimate the dollar amount. Now, you can estimate. You might have more than one estimate. We'll look at an example to see what happened to the estimate. If we have more than one estimate, you might have a low estimate, a low estimate, high estimate. How do you deal with this? Well, if that's the case, if it's probable and you know the dollar amount, under those circumstances, you accrue. What does accrue mean? It means you're going to have to debit some sort of a loss and credit liability. So now you accrue the loss. So when do you accrue the loss? Well, two conditions will have to be there. It's probable you are going to lose and you can estimate the dollar amount. If those two conditions exist, even if you have a range, we're going to look at an example to see how it works. If you have a range of estimate, then you have to accrue. Now, the best way to illustrate this is to look at an example. Before we look at an example, let me just remind you whether you are an accounting student or a CPA candidate to take a look at my website and my resources, farhatlectures.com. I don't replace your CPA review course, nor I replace your accounting course. I'm a useful addition to your CPA review course. I'm a supplement to your accounting courses. I explain the material differently. I provide you with resources, multiple choice, through false additional lectures and exercises that's going to help you understand the material better. Your risk is one month of subscription. Your potential gain is improving your performance, whether it's your accounting class or your CPA review course. If not for anything, take a look at my website to find out how well or not well your university reviewing on the CPA exam. This is a list of all my accounting courses that I have resources for. Advanced accounting, managerial accounting, intermediate, A to Z, all accounting courses. My CPA supplemental resources are aligned with your Becker, Roger, Gleam and Wiley. So it's very easy to go back and forth between my material and your CPA review course. I give you access to 1500 plus previously AI CPA released questions with detailed solution. If you have not connected with me on LinkedIn, please do so. Take a look at my LinkedIn recommendation, like this recording, share it with other, connect with me on Instagram, Facebook, Twitter and Reddit. So let's take a look at this example to illustrate the concept. Let's assume British petroleum BP is involved in environmental liability at December 31st, 20x5. So we do have an environmental liability. So prepare the December 31st entry assuming that it's probable and will be liable for 1.5 million. Well, if it's probable and we know the dollar amount, pretty straightforward. We're going to debit the loss, credit the liability for 1.5 million, pretty straightforward. Both of these conditions exist. We book the liability and the loss. Let's assume it's not probable that we will be liable. That means it's reasonably possible or there is a remote chance. What entry do we make? No entry. If it's reasonably possible, we disclose. If it's remote, we don't do anything. And to be safe, always disclose. How about that? Prepare the December 31st entry if any, assuming it's probable that BP will be liable and the amount could be 1,250,000, 1.4 million, I'm missing two zeros here, 1,750,000 or 2 million. And we are told by the lawyer or by the expert, the most likely amount is 1.4 million. Well, good. If we know the most likely amount is 1.4 million, guess what? We're going to go with that estimate. Debit, environmental cleanup loss, 1.4 million, credit liability, 1.4 million. Why? We are giving a range and we are told the most likely amount will go with the most likely amount. Well, let's prepare the December 31st entry if any, assuming that it's probable that BP will be liable and the amount could be 1,250,000, 1.4 million, 1,750,000 or 2 million. Well, now we have four figures and we are not told which one is the most likely amount. What do we do under those circumstances? Under gap, you are going to be conservative the other way around. What does that mean? It means you are going to book the lowest number, the lowest loss. Hold on a second. If I'm conservative, I should book the highest cost, highest loss. Well, no, and you're going to see why in a moment. Therefore, we're going to debit environmental cleanup loss, 1,250,000. We're going to debit lawsuit liability, 1,250,000. This is what we're going to do under those circumstances. Now, why we're going to do so? Let me illustrate why we do so. What happens if the estimate is wrong and the actual loss was 1,750,000? So now what we're saying is, okay, you booked 1,250,000, but the actual loss was 1,750,000. What do we have to do under those circumstances? Not a problem at all. We're going to debit lawsuit liability, 1,250,000 to remove this liability. So this liability is gone. We're going to debit. We're going to credit cash because we are responsible for 1,750,000 and we're going to debit a loss for half a million. So simply put what we did is, look, we did not run away from the loss. We booked the loss, a total loss of 1,750,000. Well, why didn't you went with the higher estimate? Why didn't you go, for example, with 2 million? Well, if you went with 2 million, then you will have to reduce it. You have to reduce your liability and book again of 250. So the idea behind it is if you booked the higher amount and the actual was lower, then you have to book again. And what GAAP don't like is booking those gains that don't make any sense. So you'll show a gain because you made a bad estimate. Well, then you can basically kind of monkey with the numbers, book a high estimate, then when it settles, it settles for less, you book again. So they don't want you to eventually book again. They prefer to book a loss for now and later on add to that loss. It's a little bit against what we know about conservatism, but that's how they want you to do it. So if there is no most likely estimate, go with the lowest amount. It's against, initially you would think it's against conservatism, but the point is to avoid booking again later on. So it's conservative on that end. Now, the best way to learn about this more, you have to go to my website, farhatlectures.com, multiple choice and look at additional resources.  Don't shortchange yourself. Your accounting career will pay you dividend for years. You just have to focus for the next two to three years, focus on your career, throw everything on this. You will get there. Good luck, study hard, and of course, stay safe. The CPA exam is worth


Welcome back to Kids Fun Science. My name is Ken. Today's experiment is Miracle Fruities. It simply turns sour into sweet. What you need for this experiment is the Miracle Fruities and you see my description. I'll show you where I got mine. So I'm changing things up. I'm going to talk about the science behind the Miracle Berries before I do the experiment. So the Miracle Berries contain a protein called Miraculant. The proteins that coat the taste buds before it changes the receptivity so that the sour foods taste sweet. So the more sour or acidic the food is, the stronger or sweeter flavor it becomes. All right, welcome back to Kids Fun Science. So today we're going to do a fun experiment. Well, kind of fun if it works, right? So we're going to be taking the Miracle Fruities, right? So it's an African fruit that when after you take it, it's supposed to change your taste buds. So anything acidic or sour, right, is going to make it taste sweet, supposedly. And so to test it, we're going to first do these things in front of us before we take the Miracle Berry to see our expression. And then we're going to take the Miracle Berry. It takes about three to five minutes. We'll show you how we do it. And then we're going to try it afterwards to see if it does make a difference. So what we have today to test is vinegar, some sour patches, mustard, and onion, lime, and lemons, right? So we'll go through that in just a second. Okay, so I'll explain what we're doing. We're taking the Miracle Berries. We're going to do a test run before we take the berries. And we're going to see our expression. So we're each going to start off with a lemon, right?  Very sour. A little sour. A little water. Then we're going to do a lime. It wasn't sour at first. It kicks in later, yeah. It kicks in a little bit. Let's do a little mustard here. I'm not looking forward to this. I don't even like mustard in the first place. Berries make that difference. Three more to go. A little onion we have here. Not going to eat the whole thing, just a little bite, right? Onion is not that bad. I like onion. It's not really sour, but I wouldn't eat the whole thing. A little water. Now we have two things left. We have the sour patch and we have the vinegar. So we're going to do the vinegar and then hopefully a sour patch, even though it's sour, it's going to help us get rid of the vinegar on there. I'm just going to, okay, I'm just going to assume this is really taste bad, but I guess we do have to try it. I'll do it. I'll do it. That was not very good. The last one, sour patch. Take that. We're not going to be bad. We have a little sour cake. Nothing sweet, just sour. So those weren't really bad. So we'll clear this off. We're going to take the miracle berries. So there's 10 of them that come in this package. Look in the description. I'll show you where I got mine at. Put it up here. Never had these before. So you can see they're in a tablet form. We're going to take one of these each and we're going to roll it around our tongue. Do not chew it. Do not swallow it until it's dissolved. It's supposed to be three to five minutes. We're not going to let you watch the whole thing. So we'll start it and then we'll come back when we're ready to test after this is dissolved. So we each took our miracle fruity, right? We took about three to five minutes. We didn't really time it. Kept it through our tongue, rotating it. Now, because it's coated on taste buds, it's supposed to trick or deceive the way we taste things. So if it's sour, it's supposed to taste sweet. If it's extra sour or acidic, it's supposed to taste extra sweet. So let's start with the lemons. It should taste like a lemonade. Really sweet. It's like he made a lemonade and added a whole extra sugar. Wow. That's amazing. All right. It's a lime. I don't know what this tastes like. I knew that probably it's going to taste like a lemonade. All right. So sweet. A little sweet. Yeah, it's like sugar. It's not a lemonade. I wouldn't have a sweet lime all the time, but it was good. So, I don't know where's my mouth? A little mustard? Sure. Before I didn't like the syrup, I don't like mustard. I don't know if it really. So it tastes like mustard. Yeah. It didn't change too much. Or is any sweet it too at all? All right.  Going back to the onion, right? Definitely sweet. Yeah, I'm sweeter for sure. It's not like super sweet, but it's not really super acidic. It's clear. It tastes like vinegar. This is the one. Definitely not vinegar. Yeah, still strong. Yeah. I don't think it had like this like, wow, sweet taste.  And then the last one sweet and sour right here. I'm assuming this is going to taste sweet anyway. Oh, it's absolutely no sour. Yeah, no sour. So before when we tasted it, yeah, a little bit of sweet, and then you had all that sour, all wiped out, all sweet, all the way. So, miracle fruities, 10 in a pack, alters your taste buds where it deceives it and it like coats each one and makes it actually something to sour acidic turn into sweet. So give it a try. Let me know in the comments below what you think. And thanks for watching. Came out good. One take, right? All the way through. The lemon definitely did change-


This whole thing, it almost feel like a situation where it's like, it's this girl that you're talking to. Y'all been talking for a long time and you interested in her, you think she's interested in you too because y'all been having a lot of dialogue back and forth for months. Late night phone conversation, FaceTime, all that good stuff. But then when it's time to make something official, she's like, ah, you know what? I'ma go in another direction. I don't know, sorry to start off like that but that's where it feels like it's headed to me. I don't know because the Ravens, they have been linked with O'Dell Beckham Jr. since like before the end of this past season. It's always been like, oh, Ravens, they're conversating with O'Dell Beckham Jr. Ravens keeping tabs on O'Dell Beckham Jr. Ravens interested in O'Dell Beckham Jr. Raven's gonna talk to O'Dell Beckham Jr. It's always been something when he had his workout a couple of weeks ago, Ravens were one of the teams that were there. Now there was a bunch of other teams there too but Ravens were there. So when it comes to O'Dell like, hey, I would be forward, I'd be cool with it but I just, I'm not counting on it happening. It would be cool and it'd be nice to get a healthy O'Dell. Nice cleaned up O'Dell cause again when he had his surgery and Cleveland apparently it wasn't all the way clean. They didn't do a good job but then he had the second one recently and they apparently had to fix the first one and then work on whatever else was going on up in there but now he should be good to go. So we'll see. But like one bright spot about this whole thing is that nobody signed him yet. So the Ravens have an opportunity. They still in the runnings I guess. But anyway, let's get to the report. We don't know all this talking, we didn't even get to the report yet. It came from Josina Anderson who has been on everything O'Dell Beckham, Jr. and everything Baltimore Ravens too. And Josina Anderson she handles herself with so much class. She's never messy with anything. She asks the right questions. She asked the straightforward questions but she keeps it respectful all at the same time. Not everybody can do that. Not all reporters can do that. Not everybody can keep it classy. Not everybody can keep it respectful. So shout out to Josina Anderson. But anyway, she said I'm told free agent wide receiver O'Dell Beckham, Jr. has arrived at the Biltmore with plans to talk to at least the Ravens per him. So she talked directly to him. Now, when she first put the Biltmore, I was like, hold it, did you spell Baltimore wrong? I know that both words are close but there was no accident. That's the hotel that all of them are staying in. So O'Dell Beckham, Jr. like, hey look, all the teams and I'm sure he gonna talk to other people too. I don't think this is just gonna be an exclusive Ravens conversation. It ain't like he gonna go there. All right, let me, let me go and he's been training in Arizona. So he's close but it ain't like he gonna be like, all right, let me go talk to Ravens. Okay, bye, I'm leaving now. No, man. O'Dell trying to, he trying to accept that market. He trying to see what his market is, man. So he gonna be talking to some other people too. I'm sure. But hey, Ravens involve cool, cool. Let's see what happens. Let's see if they can make something happen. If they can get something done. You know what? While we were talking about this, I had completely forgot that they signed Nelson Aguilot. I completely forgot about that. I'd like, I just remember that just now while we were recording this video. So I don't know, man. I don't even really know what to think about this whole thing.  Because I just, we've seen this a lot, man. Not for this long, not for these long periods of time where they've been talking to somebody for this long but we've seen this a lot. Raven's interested, Raven's talking and it ended up not going through. So, and again, with the quarterback situation, that is one thing that is so big. Like, that's huge. O'Dell Beckham Jr. don't know who gonna be throwing on the ball if he were to go to the Ravens. Again, Nelson Aguilot, I told ya. Nelson Aguilot was like, hey, cut the check. O'Dell Beckham Jr., like, hold up there, buddy. Wait a minute. So, Raven's gotta see. But the longer this whole thing goes on with Lamar Jackson, the longer that bigger name, Free Agents, both offense and possibly defense too. But certainly on offense, they may be hesitant and they may be like, oh, you know what? Get back to me, Ravens. We could talk later. You know what? Let me go look at my other options and we could talk later. And then I think with the uncertainty right now, it's such a tricky situation because with the uncertainty with Lamar Jackson right now, I feel like it would make Ravens, like for them to really get somebody, I feel like they would have to actually pay a little bit more. But we know they're not gonna do that. Unless Nelson Aguilot has some other offense that would a little lower than the Ravens and Ravens just had to lock them up. But I feel like it would make them have to pay a little bit more. Just because it's like, hey, we don't know what's happening with our quarterback, but we still want you. We'll cut a couple more million dollars than we normally would. Just my thoughts. So, anyway, we'll see what happens with O'Dell Beckham Jr. If anything, and we'll go from there. I love y'all team keeping clean. Make sure you subscribe so you don't miss not one video cause there's always something going on. I love y'all, I appreciate y'all. We out.


So one year ago, as Barry indicated, we were all preparing many of us for a historic election in the United States. The first female president. Oh, well we got a historic election, but it's not what many of us expected. And since then, of course, we have seen in one, nine months, not even fully a year since he actually took office, we have seen the United States pull out of the Paris Climate Accord. We've seen a lecture to NATO. We've seen America first being touted before 150 delegates at the United Nations. And we are now seeing, as of just yesterday, Senator Jeff Flakes from Arizona saying this new normal cannot be tolerated. So can it? What are not just the personality and psychological implications of Donald Trump presidency, but more importantly, what are the political and policy implications of the Donald Trump presidency? And so I'm looking forward to a great discussion this morning from each of our panelists. I've been told they have officially only five minutes to give their scene center from where they see policy and politics. And we will be starting with Anne Anderson. She is the former ambassador, the Irish ambassador to the United States, to Ireland in the United States, just coming back here to Ireland this summer. Then we'll be followed by Larry Donnelly, who is often my partner in crime talking about politics. And he's also the NUI Galway Law Lecturer and a regular political columnist with the journal.ie. And then of course we'll be having also John Isle, who is a long time journalist, former journalist for a variety of publications and now the head of communications with Goodbody and of course the very own IIEA. Chief Economist Dan O'Brien will be also speaking, and fellow columnist, the Sunday Independent as well. So I look forward to hearing each of their positions and insights on one year of Donald Trump. Take it away, Anne. Thanks Gina. And it's good to have the opportunity to tune out some of the daily noise and think a little bit about what's happening. We only have five minutes, as you said. So I just wanted to touch on three themes. One, populism, two issues around America First, as you mentioned, and sovereignty, and three issues for the media since I gather this is a session that's much focused on the media. And I'll keep it short, but I want to frame it around two speeches and an opinion poll, because that's a kind of handy frame of reference for me. The two speeches that I would identify as being very significant were the ones that Trump made on the day of his inauguration on the 20th of January, and then the big speech at the United Nations on the 19th of September. I'll come to the opinion poll later. These were very important speeches because of course they were very carefully crafted and calibrated. Nothing improvised about them. And I guess they had quite a resonance for me too, because I was there, all the ambassadors were on the podium for the inauguration we were all invited. And given my long, long experience at the UN, of course I was particularly attuned to the UN speech, so both of the speeches were ones, of course, that I listened to very carefully. Now, populism, obviously he was a populist candidate. This is not an accusation, this is a badge of honour that Donald Trump the candidate wore, President Trump wears. He channeled the populism that is there. He also helped to focus it. He was an enthusiastic advocate of it. And we saw it right through the campaign. But it was still, I must say, quite striking on the day of the inauguration. And you always expect a degree of transition between the candidate and the president. And of course the inauguration speech is traditionally the big, unifying, binding up the rules speech. It was not that kind of speech. Many of you will remember the American carnage speech. And what was so interesting there, surrounded by all the great institutions of state and the representatives, that he took direct aim at Washington, the elite, the end of the swamp in politics. And this was to be the day, the 20th of January, when the people were back taking control. And we have seen the outworking of that populism in so many ways over recent months. And that taking on of Washington, and you mentioned the flake speech yesterday, I'm sure we'll come back to that later. But it has been, and the echoes of that are right across the political spectrum. We see populism in Europe, of course. It was very interesting to see the Democratic Party, for example. Again, you see the grassroots questioning the establishment of the party, the ascendancy of the Bernie Sanders wing. So how populism continues to play out through the 2018 election, through the 2020 election, would obviously be very interesting. Second point then, America First sovereignty, particularly the UN speech. Again, of course, who should be surprised about America First? It was a theme right through the candidacy. We heard it in the inauguration speech. But somehow it was particularly startling there in the UN context. After all, this is an organization that is built on common purposes, common values, universal declaration of human rights, and so on. The whole theme of President Trump's address was the primacy of sovereignty. And I couldn't count how many times the word sovereignty was mentioned throughout the speech. And as I say, in this particular context, it is rather startling. Because throughout all my years at the UN, and many of you will know, normally when you hear people reaching for sovereignty at the UN, it's countries like China, Russia, or others who are accused of human rights violations. And this is their shield against those accusations. So it was an inversion of everything that we are normally used to at the United Nations when you hear the US come and talk in this way about sovereignty. Normally they're with us, the Western countries, in acknowledging sovereignty, but placing all the emphasis on universality of values and so on. So this is clearly going to continue to play out in terms of American leadership and the international order. Third and final point then before Gina points me to the clock. The question of the issues that are there for the media, and as I mentioned, an opinion poll, it's not obviously on par with the big set piece speeches, but I was quite struck by a political opinion poll last month where one of the questions was trust in the media and how do you believe the media are treating Donald Trump. Put aside what the Republicans and the Democrats think, because that's fairly predictable. But among independents, 44% of them thought the media were fabricating stories about Donald Trump. 31% among independents thought that they weren't. Now, this is quite extraordinary and tells us something about how the whole fake news accusation is truly taking hold. In the media there's no doubt they helped to put Donald Trump in the White House. The disproportionate amount of publicity that he got was certainly a factor. Maybe there's a degree of atonement now. It's hard to know what's going on. We know how siloed the US media is. On Fox News obviously President Trump could do no wrong. In much of the mainstream media, including your former CNN people, it's a constant drumbeat of criticism and so on. Now, one may absolutely say it's well deserved. He gets the coverage that he deserves. But of course this is grist at the middle of his supporters, feeds this narrative about the president as victim and you know the lone hero that's kind of going to slay the liberal media. So I think it's really something for the media to reflect about because this level of distrust in the media is certainly corrosive of any democracy. So it's a big issue to think about. I leave it to that, Gina. Very nicely, very good setup in terms of the populism, that idea of things that you would say not in a setting of the United Nations and yet it's being said and yet who are you playing to and what's the role of the media. Thank you very much for that and I appreciate that. Let's now turn to Larry Donnelly. As I said, political commentator extraordinaire as well as the columnist for the Journal.ie and the law lecturer at MUI. Larry. Thanks, Gina. I think anybody who would have read my columns before the election last year might dispute your characterization of me as extraordinaire given how boldly I predicted Hillary Clinton was going to win. And I suppose what I'm going to talk to you about is what think tanks are going to have to get through in order to get through if you get what I'm saying. And there's three points that I'd like to make. The first is Trump the candidate versus Trump the president. And I think there are big differences between the two on a number of different levels. I think the only two certainties when it comes in particular to the international order with respect to President Trump has been unpredictability and has been his doing politics poorly. And I think politically he's done things poorly here. His administration has done things poorly both substantively and from a communications point of view, which is a huge element of politics in 2017. Economically, as opposed to Trump the candidate, arguably Trump has done the bidding or been more susceptible to the needs of the markets, etc. and largely ignored the people who were less well off, the so-called people who inhabit that broad amorphous entity known as Middle America. And internationally, despite the America First rhetoric, despite the fact that he was going to pull back and not going to engage in any more unnecessary wars, he's arguably been something of a bully on the international stage and if not get an interventionist, certainly a would-be interventionist. And I think when it comes to Trump the candidate versus Trump the president, the key question becomes what do the soft Trump voters make of this? That is not the base, not the people who are at the rallies, but the people who voted for Trump. Not because they loved him, I thought he was a wonderful person, but because they didn't like Hillary. They wanted to give the system a kick. They didn't like where they were at in life. They wanted to change things and shake things up. What do they make of all this? That's the key political question. The second point I want to make is with respect to the separation of powers, the famous separation of powers in an American context. And I suppose the relative weakness of the executive branch coupled with the robust legislative and judicial branches in the United States, all a part of what I still think is the founders of America's genius design have curtailed the president in some respects, as some of us thought they would. However, probably in different ways than we thought they might. I think in terms of his legislative agenda, I think again it's worth coming back to the fundamental difference between the legislature, the Congress in the United States, versus parliamentary systems in Western democracy. And that's because the big difference, as I would see it, is that the legislators there are not constrained in any real way by the party whip. So as such, they are really activists. They're anything but supine as the point has been made, particularly about Dahl and Shannadair and under the last government. So as such, the few moderates left in the Congress have helped to thwart Trump's plans on Obamacare and, until very recently, on tax policy. On the flip side, and this would have been fascinating from a political science point of view, Trump has chosen not to pursue policies where Democrats might agree with him more. Trump has chosen policies on things like rebuilding American infrastructure and amending and scrapping trade deals aggressively where conservative Republicans would recoil. So it's a funny dynamic going on in terms of the legislature. As for the judiciary, we all know that a lot of federal judges have struck down the so-called Muslim ban. And here's where I have to draw a lesson between what I tell my students to do. That is, your personal opinion shouldn't be your legal opinion. Personally, and absolutely abhor the ban, I think it's contrary to what America stands for. I think the law is pretty squarely on the president's side in this. And I think that the judges are adopting what I would regard as a pretty selective approach to precedent and it made some legally incorrect decisions. I expect that the Supreme Court will side with the president ultimately on this. And if anything, I think the judges rather define decisions, show that they're drawing something of a line in the sand when it comes to the president and that they are people too. I don't think they would have been very impressed with President Trump's way over the top attack on the first judge to strike down the ban. Third point, and here's where I'm afraid it gets grim in my humble opinion for the broader world order. I don't believe that Trump came from nowhere. I think he's a symptom of a broader malaise when it comes to America and its people's attitude to the rest of the world. Poll after poll show that the overwhelming majority of Americans self-define as isolationists and believe their country's best days are behind it. Trump is a reflection of the turnback-to-clock conservatism that I believe is now the ascendant school of thought in the U.S. and it isn't confined to middle America. The two parties in the D.C. establishment have had their heads in the sand about this for a long time because it's against their own self-interest and they would argue bad for the world. At any rate, if Trump doesn't give this very large sway to the electorate what they want and there's no doubt in my mind that they brought him to the White House I don't think any other Republican would have defeated Hillary Clinton then they'll look for another messenger who will, I think, do what they want. As such, I think America, vis-a-vis the international order will change significantly in the future, Trump or no Trump. Perhaps the only hope for the status quo and for the foreign policy establishment and the D.C. establishment more broadly is that Trump implodes and fails so badly with extreme consequences that enough Americans change their mind on this fundamental issue. And that, in my view, is one of the major reasons why they're up to get him so badly. Again, that's my humble opinion. Thank you. Thank you, Larry Johnnelly, for your humble opinion and that bleak picture of isolation and some over-goblism. Thank you very much. But it does strike a chord with what Anne was just talking about in terms of populism and someone rising to the front and being that personification of these sentiments. It's very interesting. Thank you very much, Larry. Let's now turn to John. I, ladies and gentlemen, John. I'd like to start by thanking Larry for that helpful formulation of separating a legal opinion from a personal opinion. Because what I'm going to do is pick up where both Anne and Larry left off in talking a little bit about radical politics that we've seen emerging in the United States and how these politics almost don't matter at all to the U.S. economy and to how markets are performing that. So, notwithstanding my personal opinion about what's happening in Washington, the state of the U.S. economy actually looks quite healthy. In fact, the global economy as a whole is strong. It's growing and it looks as if the crisis years or the years in which we've had to apply crisis thinking are behind us. Not only is the U.S. GDP growing at, I think the last number was 2.2 percent on an annualized basis, but you see Chinese economic indicators are coming in ahead of expectations. Eurozone is growing again. Obviously some problems in the U.K., but emerging markets also are performing strongly. So this sort of economic backdrop helps the United States and provides, I think, a significant contrast to what's happening politically. What exercises people in the media and exercises them, I think, on an emotional level about what's happening in the White House and in Washington more broadly. So just I wanted to sort of take everybody through a little bit what is happening in the U.S. economy in terms of the economic indicator, the market cycle, maybe a little bit how this is reflected in the policy of the Federal Reserve. And then I'll get to the almost part about where politics actually might matter. So first thing to say, again, GDP, as I said in the U.S., is growing quite strongly at 2.2 percent, which on a relative basis compared to where we were coming from eight years ago is to be welcomed. Employment trends are very good. There was a small drop-off due to the hurricane impact in Texas and Florida last month, but the overall trend in employment at job creation is very, very strong. Unemployment in the United States is down below 5 percent. This will start showing up presumably in wage growth and overall increase in living standards. Business sentiment is likewise robust. The manufacturing and services PMIs are both on growth trends and at very high levels, and showing no sign of the United States moving into a recessionary territory or even a general slowdown. And then finally, the consumer is coming back into focus in the United States. The consumer is, of course, the driver of the economy there. Consumer debt is low, and consumer behavior indicates that the economy still has some way to go on this growth trajectory. So the markets, as we see, the stock markets in the United States are at all-time highs. In fact, reaching all-time highs on a regular basis, I believe this year alone, we've had 50 or 60 days where we've ended at an all-time high level. Some people believe that there is a correction lurking behind these all-time highs. Our good body, which is one plagiarizing from our Chief Investment Officer, Herman Swords, is that we may have as much as two years left in this market cycle. He bases this view on the strength of the U.S. economic indicators, the strength of the global economy generally, accommodative central bank policy, and then finally the strength of earnings of the corporations, which is really what drives the market. So we have strong earnings going through from the corporate sector as well as earnings upgrades, which is something we haven't seen regularly through the recovery. So supporting all of this underneath it is a federal reserve that is being very cautious in terms of its rate-out policy, trying not to make the mistake of killing the recovery before it's properly got going. And even though the Fed has started its hiking cycle again, and I believe we're expecting another rate hike this year and maybe two or three next year, the ECB is very far away from increasing interest rates. The Bank of Japan still remains very accommodative, and even though quantitative easing is going to be withdrawn, it's just going to be a smaller level. So we'll have central bank support for this global growth for some time to come. And then finally the last bit is the tax cuts. This is very much in the news now, the so-called tax reform agenda in Washington. Looks less like tax reform than maybe tax cut at any cost. That may be jeopardized now. The news overnight, I think, was of Bob Forker and Jeff Flake in the Senate have turned on the president now which maybe complicates things in terms of passing new tax legislation. But we, in good body, don't really see the tax cuts as essential to the continued growth of the economy or the performance of the markets. We see it as a possible upside surprise. So the economy and the markets are likely to just continue moving in a positive direction. And to get to my caveat, which is about whether politics matter or not, on a day-to-day basis they don't seem to, apart from microvolatility. But where I think personally, this is more my personal opinion, the risks of the type of politics coming out of the White House in particular, but in the Republican Party more generally, and I'm showing my colors here, I think long-term have the potential risk of degrading the United States' credibility of a world stage more generally. So the direction and consistency of American policies, those things matter. They matter to trade relations and with the protectionist rhetoric, especially coming from the Republican side, which may align perfectly well with populism and the expressed opinions of what they're called and turn back the clock conservatives, where I think we'll have a deleterious effect in the long-term on whether local institutions and American trading partners can trust the word of the White House. And I think once that credibility is squandered, it's very hard to turn back. So that would be the almost part of the politics don't matter to the economy. Thank you very much, John. And that was actually a touch on what my first question would have been on that one is, what is that long-term impact? Because they talk about economies that are built with the trajectory of the former administration, and then what happens when you change things over time, what it means to be so reported to more of that. And so as we go from economy to the chief economist for the IEA, let's forward to having you, Dan O'Brien, bring it on home for us. Thanks, thanks, Gina. So look, I want to do three things in terms of less focusing on the individual and more focusing on the outcomes. One, looking at the U.S. economy, which John has already done. Another, looking at the relationship between Europe and the U.S., the economy, and how the policy arrangements work, and then looking at America and the world more globally. Looking at the U.S. economy, it's still a cancerous quarter of the world, a global economy, so it's extremely important for everyone. As John said, it's doing well. My key point on it is if you look at the real economy data, whether it's GDP, labor market spending, consumer spending, you don't see any inflection points from last year or the inauguration this year. So the change in regime doesn't appear to have had any effect on the functioning of the world's biggest economy one way or the other. And that really shouldn't surprise. The U.S. President and Mary has alluded to it. The executive power in the U.S. is much more constrained, and most prime ministers in Europe have a lot more power over the economy than U.S. presidents. Interest rates are set by the Fed. Congress is much more controlled over budgets than European parliaments tend to, and of course it's a federalized country in each state has its own budget and does a lot of economic policy stuff. So no real surprise that the president, the change in regime has not really affected, it's not affected the U.S. economy in any way, one way or the other. In terms of Europe and the U.S., the integration of the two continents, they are by far the most integrated economic big continents in the world. People tend to think of China as being a big player, but the integration in terms of trade and investment across the Atlantic is many multiples of, say, Europe or China, U.S. and Asia. So it's an extremely important part of the world economy and still accounts for just under about half of the world economy, and that's reflected in very deep institutional relationships between Washington and Brussels. Again, I would contend that there's actually been very little change. If we look at something like TTIP, it was going nowhere, it's still going nowhere. If we look at the tax disputes, there were big tax disputes between Washington and Europe before the current administration. They haven't escalated. They're still there. It's not as though things have got much worse. The border tax, that idea was on the table, not the President's but his party, that would have triggered a trade war with Europe. That was taken off the table. So the relationship with Europe, and this was for a President who was pro-Brexit, hostile to the EU and questioning a NATO, all of those things have pretty much gone, and the relationship across the Atlantic is remarkably similar, and there's been much more continuity than many people would have expected. And just one, again, looking at data, huge volume of stuff shipped back and forth across the Atlantic. You run those numbers over the past two years. Again, no inflection point around the election or the inauguration. Trade across the Atlantic, billions every week hasn't really changed. It's continued. There's no up or down or real change. Finally, more change on the global picture. Although one of the promises in the election was that China would be labelled a currency manipulator on day one, that didn't happen, and that would have triggered a trade war with China. But there have been more changes, certainly around pulling out of TPP, the long and difficult arrangement around Asia to create a free trade area. The US has pulled out of that, and also the renegotiation of NAFTA, the trade agreement between Mexico and Canada. A lot of similarities with Brexit there in terms of trying to unscramble that egg, and that's ongoing and certainly a sign of retrenchment and less involvement in the world. Reflected also, it's been mentioned the Paris Accords and the Iran deal, pulling back from things, and these are manifestations of that. The big point to my mind is the WTO. It's the multilateral organisation par excellence in the world. When countries get into disputes over the way the trade system works, people go to its court. It's very much like it's to the world trade, what the European Court of Justice is to the European Union. Not a lot of people follow it. It's a pretty arcane body, and a lot of stuff goes on there. It's complex and technical, but it is a vital institution in terms of keeping the multilateral trading system open. Here again, the U.S. has not been appointing people to its main, most important court, and that's viewed as, if that continues, then the capacity of that court to act and to fulfil its function will be degraded. I wonder, does that reflect more a... rather than a proactively wrecking multilateral institutions, is it a form of neglect that the institutional capacity in the White House simply isn't there to do all of these things one way or the other? So to conclude, the much less has changed, in my view, under the current administration than one might have expected, although clearly that leadership role is gone and in a vacuum there are real questions to ask whether or not the international system can continue to function over the longer term without a leadership player. Fascinating. All right, so Dan, Larry, Anne, and John, thank you very much for your initial thoughts. I think we've got a great scene set. In the short term, in spite of the tweets, in spite of the carnage, in spite of the Rocket Man, in spite of all the things that we get upset about on a daily basis, in the short term anyway, a lot of sound and fury signifying nothing. Anne. No, I think that's too reassuring perspective. I mean, I know that... The markets are still going on. You were talking very much, yeah, but... The institutions are going around, Tim. We maybe need to make a distinction between the economics and the politics because, I mean, both John and Dan were talking very much from an economic perspective. But to say that the European-U.S. relationship is fundamentally unchanged under Donald Trump seems to me to be overly reassuring. So from where you sit as a former diplomat? You know, I mean, there were concerns during the Obama period. There was the pivot to Asia, and people felt there was... Maybe it was a benign neglect. We kept being told by the Obama administration, it's not a pivot away from Europe. It's a pivot to Asia. But it felt like less attention, less love, like any long-term relationship. We felt, you know, we're like the old married seer we're being taken for granted, and they're being seduced by the newer partners in Asia and elsewhere. But that was different from the... I do think that there is, politically speaking, at least there is a brittleness that has entered the relationship between Europe and the United States. I mean, I watched the video recently again in preparation of this, of when he presented his lecture to NATO. And you can see the cutaways of the other leaders who were there. There was not comfort. Those micro expressions that tell all. There's a feeling of apprehension. There's the unpredictability. And there is that... Beneath everything, there was that sense of a kind of joint leadership in terms of values between the US and Europe. And, as I say, I spoke about the kind of shock of that speech of the United Nations.  Of course, it wasn't unexpected that he walked away from the climate change agreement. But in so many areas, there is the feeling that we, together, we were the kind of authors of so much of the international order. We were the guarantors. I mean, when you hear something like, for example, the Commission of Human Rights in the United Nations, I mean, I remember when we were up for membership of the Commission and we were competing against the United States, and Susan Rice, the American ambassador, got up to make this ringing speech to the rest of the UN membership about how the US is necessary in these major international institutions. It's a sign of the seriousness of purpose. Without the US voice, these institutions would be so much diminished. And people nodded, and they voted for the United States. And now we have, well, will we or will we not stay in the UN Human Rights Commission? The idea that they would just easily turn their back and walk away from these institutions that have been built up over decades, that, yes, they have problems, they have challenges, but we can only face those issues together with the United Nations. So for Europe to lose that partner in setting a tone and trying to establish a leadership in the international order, to me, it's something very serious and it is creating concerns. That's the concern. And if I can push you just a little bit since you're no longer officially the ambassador, although I know you have diplomatic elements that you need to keep in check potentially, that's the concern. What would you suggest is the response? Well, I mean, for so long, Europe has been having this debate about whether Europe didn't need to step up more to the place. I mean, of course, part of the response is to work, not just with the president, but with members of the administration. Although, you know, a somewhat disempowered secretary of state is not necessarily the ideal partner to be working with. So part of the answer, obviously, is to continue to work with not just the president, but the White House team, the Congress, and so on. To go around President Trump. Well, I mean, there's no... This is a person that, the idea that somehow he is somebody, you know, that other people are putting the strings of this puppet, that totally underestimates President Trump. He is undoubtedly putting a very, very clear personal imprint on this administration. So the idea that you can just circumvent him is not real. It makes no sense for anybody to operate on that hypothesis. But nevertheless, a president is surrounded and you work with the president and with the executive and Congress and so on. But also, you maybe, you know, this, if Europe can get its act together, maybe this is the moment that should be empowering for Europe. I remember years ago when I was ambassador to the EU, and Chris Patton was the commissioner for external relations. I remember him, just a phrase stuck in my mind when he was around the table with the council members one stage. He said, he's so fed up. He said, America gets to do the cooking and Europe gets to do the washing up. In other words, the sense that, you know, we were always out there with the humanitarian aid and so on, but when it came to the real stuff on the Middle East and so on, it was, America was really shaping the outcomes. So, I mean, for so long Europe has been feeling, listen, we need to get into the kitchen and, you know, be the, at least the co-chef. So now, I mean, maybe part of the answer is, part of it is, you know, our indispensable partner, the United States, seeing how best we can work and influence, but maybe part of the answer, also, is thinking how if there is something of a vacuum being created, well, who would we rather fill that vacuum? Do we want Russia? Do we want China? Or do we want the European imprint to be more clearly there? Okay, thank you, Anne. I'm going to continue with politics and we'll turn over to Larry now, talking about the idea that you're an American, obviously, but you've also been living here in Europe. What is that suggestion that you would say in terms of policy that Europe can do? I know there's a lot of focus in the next discussions on Brexit, but how can Europe come together in the light of this? Or is this an opportunity or is it not? Well, I think one way or the other, I think Europe is going to have to come forward more dramatically. I mean, for the reasons that I outlined at the beginning, I mean, in the sense that Trump, I believe, is merely a reflection in some ways. Scary as this might sound, but he's a reflection of a viewpoint that's very much taken hold of the United States. And if you want to look at what Trump's animating impulse always has been, is that the U.S. is getting a raw deal on the global stage. And an awful lot of Americans agree with that point of view. So that's why I think the recalibration of America vis-a-vis the world is going to happen one way or another. So, yes, I think that there is a way for Europe. Europe is going to have to stand up and there is going to have to be a cohesive approach to all this. What the exact nature of that approach is, I'm not so sure, but what I would urge and people immediately assume that America taking more of a back step in terms of its place in the world immediately assume that that's necessarily a bad thing. I don't say that it necessarily is a bad thing. And I think we only have to look at decades of ill-begotten wars and conflict in the Middle East to see why that's a reality. So I think that there is a place for the European Union. I think there is an emphasis on the shared European values that are so strong and still permeate the Union despite disagreements across it. I think that there is an opportunity to promote those and push those, if not as an antidote to the United States but just as a different approach and alternative to some of what the United States has pursued in terms of its foreign policy in recent years. All right, Larry. So Dan, then the U.S. is getting a bad deal. We're getting a bad shake out of all these multilateral agreements economically. Is that valid? And if so, what should the U.S. be doing and what should Europe be doing in response of that? Take Donald out of it and just, is he echoing what's true? Well, I think just moving away from the economics and looking at the NATO piece, for example, you know, most of the members of NATO for many years have committed to spending 2% of their GDP on defense and very few of them have. And it's been a long-time gripe of both this president before he was president. Yeah, they singled out 23 out of 25 aren't they in their fair share? Absolutely. And, you know, other presidents have constantly, I've been following European affairs for 20 years and this has been an issue for all of that time.  And that is a perfectly valid criticism the Americans make of how Europe has done things. So adding pressure to Europeans to come up and pay for their own defense seems to me to be a perfectly reasonable position to put forward. And maybe this president now that Europeans are, as Anna said, this is a more unpredictable president. They maybe see that they will have to stump up. They can't depend on the U.S. as much as they did in the past anymore. And if that happens it may be no bad thing. Interesting. So keeping along the lines really quickly on politics as it relates to the policy then and it looks like his rhetoric is strong. His rhetoric is divisive. His rhetoric is startling to the diplomatic words that we're all supposed to use. But it doesn't seem to make a blip on the economy. It's not really, it's pissing us all off and we're talking about it on radio and we're writing about it and all of that. But maybe is it going to have an effect? I think it's a short term and long term question isn't it? Let's take them. So in the short term it actually, like rhetoric doesn't really affect things. Okay, so maybe you have a situation where a central bank governor like Mario Draghi said something and it has a direct impact because he carefully calibrates his speech to indicate something to the market so he's taken seriously. But I think Donald Trump has just been tuned out. So you had an initial, I think right after the election, there was an initial stock market rally in anticipation, maybe some of the things that would be coming through like infrastructure spending, you know, that fiscal stimulus, tax cuts, the end of the bounding care, whatever it was. He's policy failure so far as a president, right? But what the markets are telling you is actually either the anticipation of failure was priced in or it was never that significant to the upward motion of the market. In the first place. Now, the markets are right until they're wrong, right? And this is how it works. Let me go back and we recalibrate. Yeah, exactly. And likewise, events are insignificant until they're significant. So the question isn't necessarily whether when Donald Trump shoots his mouth off, does that make a difference? What matters is what events can make a difference. So how much trouble can he actually get us into or how much trouble will he actually get us into? If we're going to look at the negatives, right? So do I think it's a problem for markets if European countries start spending more on NATO? No, of course not. That may or may not be an outcome of Trump's isolationism. But say, looking at the Korean Peninsula, nobody wants that to get volatile, right? But again, there's been a lot of firing of words. Of course, yeah. But there hasn't been a real firing. I mean little things, but nothing to date. No, no. But again, as I said, it's not a problem until it's a problem. And then, of course, everybody scatters for the exit. So we speak in a really theoretical or speculative way about this stuff because we don't know what the big event will be that might put it into all of our optimism in the markets or on the economy. But those events are out there. Whether they happen or not depends on Trump's efficacy as a leader and how robust... How would you say he's doing so far? Do you want the elite... Efficacy? No, I want the personal opinion. Come on. The personal opinion, I think it's an unprecedented fiasco. It's a chaotic regime that's barely staffed any of its departments. Just on a formal basis. Let's just forget about whether I agree with the policies or not. He hasn't populated the government departments with sufficient people to actually get worked up. Oh yeah, you get a state department that's still under vacancies. Very basic measure. Things aren't happening. So the capabilities of the government to actually get things done or influence the world for good or bad are being degraded all the time. So just the maintenance level of managing an effective government is not there. And anyone who's worked in a large-scale organization knows you just have to fill certain positions. You have to have a head of HR. You have to have a chief operating officer. All of these things. And that isn't happening. But the other thing is, you know, he seized on this kind of populist feeling in America and he stoked it. I grew up in the United States. I've lived over here half of my life. What always fascinates me about going back is the caricatured image many Americans have of what the rest of the world is actually like. Especially Americans who've gone nowhere else except in the United States. And so there's a whole politics that's been developed behind a veil of ignorance. To appeal to that. Exactly. And so what you'd hope from a president is a bit of leadership and saying, hang on, I've been out in the world. I've spoken to other people in the world with the representatives of the people of the rest of the world. And here's what's actually happening out there. Instead, Trump takes us as lodestar the uninformed opinions of the people who elected him and says, right, okay, I'm going to reinforce that. I'm going to encourage you in thinking. And then I'm going to develop policies that somehow reflect it. When those policies get out into the real world, they won't work the way everybody expects. My over simplistic message that I'm using to sell to my base isn't going to sell in reality. And let's take that nugget. Thank you very much, John. To Anne, when you talk about, it's not just populism that's happening in the United States or isolationism that's happening in the United States, like at Austria, look at the other countries that are starting to pull in, being Angela Merkel didn't get what she expected and the rise of other parties that are looking inward. We talk about what to do with populism and what's the message that resonates that can appeal but can also have real applications. Is there a balance there? It's a number of factors, obviously, and anybody who's read JD Vance and the Hillbilly Elegy and so on have a good sense of what's happening in America. But the larger picture is the disappointment with globalization and the fact that the liberal model and the globalization, it is working to the benefit of some, but not to the benefit, this is the perception, certainly, the benefit of everybody and the growing inequality in so many of the economies is certainly feeding this feeling of total disillusionment and if you look at, I mean, instead of turning the accusation on the rest of the world and accusing the rest of the world of freeloading on America, which is the consistent theme, I mean, it's much more relevant, I think, to look inwards as to what's happening in the United States and yes, there is the growth, there is unemployment less than 5%, but the fruits of the prosperity are being so unevenly shared and the inequality is growing more and more by the day and most commentators believe that if this mooted tax legislation gets through that it will add to that inequality, it'll improve things for the corporations. They still want to get rid of a state tax. I mean, as Gary Cohen said, there is supposedly said only morons pay it state tax in the United States because you don't get to pay it over more than, you know, you can leave five and a half million as an individual to your successors before you get to pay a state tax. If you take that away, of course it's going to feed the inequality. But in the United States, it's the feeling of the swades of the country, the de-industrialization, they haven't been left behind, but it's a failure, of course.  That is the 21st century. But the fact that America has not invested in its education to equip people to do something else, the fact it hasn't equipped in its infrastructure, certainly in some of these forgotten states, the fact that the inequality gap is getting wider by the day, all of that is feeding into globalization. So this easy scapegoating, it's the rest of the world, freeloading on us that has resulted in this situation, that is sheer irresponsibility. Sheer irresponsibility, Larry Donnelly. Globalization, business-wise, I think the economists would argue, were intrinsically connected. So why are we still resisting that? Or why are many in the United States still resisting that from how they feel, I guess, in their pocketbooks? But what is their message or is it education? What's the solution around that? Or do you even see there's a need for one? I think you answered the question that people, the purported benefits of globalization, the much touted benefits of globalization, broad swathes of America are not feeling that, they're just not feeling it in their pocketbooks. They're not feeling the benefits of it. It's because the good jobs that used to be there are no longer there. I'll probably get killed by economists on my right and left here. One of the things about the United States is that it didn't have to, it could have still been an active free trader, it didn't have to enter agreements, for instance, the North American Free Trade Agreement, that while jobs were moving, there's no question about that, it didn't have to effectively accelerate the rate of that job, the rate of these, the factors of jobs moving south, et cetera. And whether that's, and economists can debate the speed of that detraction, et cetera, but the perception is that it did, and that's the political perception that Trump has fed on. And the other thing that I think is alive in the United States, and this is a coastal issue as well as a Middle America so-called issue. If you look at the rising costs of living in the United States, particularly in the Northeast and on the West Coast, which is driven by a tiny percentage of the population, it is now the case that people on an income that in this country would be very, very significant are no longer well-off or no longer comfortable. They're hurting, they're struggling as well. So when I was talking earlier about the people who have been left behind, there is this portrait of the steel worker in Pennsylvania or the coal miner in Ohio, whatever it might be. It's actually broader than that. And I think that Trump's success is indicative of the fact that it's broader than that. So the trouble, I think, the difficulty is not just confined to people who work with their hands for a living, live paycheck to paycheck. It's even bigger than that. Gina, could I just come in? Please, I was going to go to you next. Jump right on in, Jim. One of those things, America is a remarkably closed economy. People talk about globalization destroying jobs in the Midwest. America is the most closed economy of the big, rich economies. Why is that? Well, because it's just so big, it tends to be the bigger the economy you are. Because they're just selling with themselves. Exactly. So the bigger it's a smaller economy, the more open you tend to be because you can't make cars and all that sort of stuff. Right, you've got to live on that. But the United States is a very closed economy. The reason things have not gone well in some parts of the United States. But doesn't it also work that we have problems with in the United States with our manufacturing focus, whereas the education point from Ann Anderson, if we could get people excited about IT skills or training or thinking about skilling the future and turning that clock back. That's exactly the point I would make, that it's domestic policy failures to adapt to the inevitable change that goes on in all economies. If you look, this is the idea that jobs are disappearing everywhere. If you look at every developed country in the world, more people are working now than ever before. Not even that. And there's a big jobs gap in need for IT skills. Well, there is, absolutely. But the U.S. is one of the only countries in the rich world where the share of the adult population working is falling. Greece is the other one. Everywhere else, actually more adults are working than ever before. So what's going on? It can't be about this globalization piece because Europe is much more globalized. If globalization was destroying jobs and making things much worse, then Europe would be in a much worse position than the U.S. But in many ways it's the U.S. So my point would be it's domestic policy failures at state and federal level in the U.S. that have not addressed how to deal with economic change for people rather than globalization causing all of this. Okay. And so, John, how does that dialogue need to be changed? I mean, I think that conversation has to happen on a deep cultural level, but I'm not sure the United States political discourse is appealing to have it. Because it doesn't serve the purpose of the two political party system to get elected or what's the reason? So when I was listening to Dan talk there, I just started thinking like the United States is having a crisis of masculinity, I think. He's talking about... But he's the personification of masculinity. What do you mean? The people who work with them, well, that's exactly it. It's a reaction to that crisis. So the people who work with their hands, so the self-image of the American man is not somebody who's a healthcare worker. That's where the jobs go at this. I think about my... MedTech, let's blend them both together, yeah. Yeah, exactly. So I was thinking I was thinking about my own father there who's retiring at age now, but his career trajectory is like a little microcosm of the American economy over the last 40 years. He started in banking. He became a bomb trader. He was flushed out of Wall Street in 1990 during that recession and then retrained and became a fiber optic technician for 20 years, stopped that and became a geriatric nurse for the end of his career. Wow. Retraining. But the rest of America is not doing that. So that's one guy. But the American man hasn't done that. So to do the J.D. Vance caricature, the American man has done from... He lost his job in 1990, maybe retrained once, and now he's on OxyContin. Hmm, yeah. So addressing that is how do you reconfigure an entire national self-image?  We made airplanes. The United States still does this, but it's not. Well, in the way we make trucks, is that the way we make trucks? Exactly. It's not the manufacturing thing. You can see that Trump touches it like he has a sixth sense for understanding this stuff. So getting rid of environmental regulations is the way of saying that we're going to be men again driving our cars. I do think it's gender. I'm sorry to get ahead in this direction, but I think the conversation is a cultural one, and when people try to have it, and it was personified in the presidential race, wasn't it? You look at the gender divide in terms of we voted for whom and how Hillary Clinton was portrayed by the Republicans as well. It became a high-regender election. And not that Hillary Clinton is exactly a really far-left wing feminist, I think, just completely in the middle of the road Democrat, actually, and quite hawkish and in all the ways that you'd expect a man to be. Sorry, I've gone down a bit of a rabbit hole here, but I guess my ultimate point is... But the tangent of how this personified and what's at the crux of the populist and the turn-back-to-claw conservatives that's impacting or not impacting the economy that is also impacting the way our allies are Europeans, especially since we're here and your allies are feeling that credibility deterioration, that lack of trust, that who do we turn to when we want a negotiation? It does seem all very tied together. It doesn't, did you? I have a bit of optimism about this, which is that demographics will ultimately overtake this impulse. The question is, what will be left by the time that happens? So I think, you know, you look at the crisis of the white men, white men in the United States, and then you look at the minority demographics and you see that, okay, electorally speaking, the numbers, I know the Democratic Party has been saying this for decades, but eventually the numbers work out. Maybe Larry has something to say. He does, he's tucked my sleeves. I know I've been the prophet of doom and gloom all day. Let's go, let's move that optimism. Let me continue on in that vein. That had been the equation, John's equation had been the equation that fueled optimism, relentless optimism in the Democratic Party for some time. However, it has to be taken on board what happened in 2016 when arguably the most anti-immigrant, anti-Latino presidential candidate, at least in living memory, ran for the presidency of the United States. He received almost 30% of the Latino vote. And before people start saying that was all Cubans, Cubans are a tiny, tiny percentage of that overall Latino vote. And the reality is, I was saying to Dan before, there's been some great political science coming out of the United States in this election, it's one good consequence of it. And there's been a lot of theorizing and one of the theories that has gained some currency is that what if it is the case that the Hispanic American community is actually much more like the Irish American community than the African American community? If that's the case, then the Democratic Party's whole calculus and their whole formula for success needs to be majorly and seriously rethunk. On that optimistic note, Dan, or Larry, I want to ask you though, does that mean because they voted we're in, but we don't want others in? We want the prosperity that we have. There's lots of reasons. There's also the theories behind it. There's a theory that they're more socially conservative. There's all sorts of reasons for it. Okay, all right, fair enough. I want to give you guys a chance though, because there's a lot of great topics going on here, a lot of great themes about the globalism, about what the allies can or can't do, what the economy that is happening or isn't being affected in the short term, you have been potentially in the long term. What's the situation for the internal domestic policies that need to be changed? And I'd love to hear if any of you have a question raising from where you're sitting right now that you'd like to ask any of our panelists. And I think we have roving mics. Yes, we do. Look, there's a roving mic right behind us. Anyone? Yes, sir. Francis Jay, this is my name. Thanks very much for a really interesting discussion. Just a couple of questions. There's always been, I think, in American history, there's always been a populist and nativist strand. I mean, there was no nothing party, great name in the 19th century. There was huge isolationism in the 1920s. So how different is this? Is it just Trump's personality? Larry was saying that it's Trump didn't come out of nothing. Is this trend deeper in his view than it has been in the past? And my second question is obviously parallel to Trump. Over the last 30 years, there seems to have been more and more polarization within the United States. The Democratic States, I mean, I remember I lived in the States when I was a kid and California was more a Republican state. Now it's a one-party state. The Eastern West Coast, maybe Chicago and Illinois, Democrat, but it just seems more and more polarized. And I'd like to know what you're thinking is on where that's going to lead and why some of the people who seem to have been the biggest victims of globalization seem to be trending more and more Republican. I mean, I'm thinking of West Virginia again, classic Democratic state. Now it's one of the strongest Republican states in the nation. Okay, thank you, Francis. Three parts, if I can remember, we've got, is it a blip every 20 years? Is it also something that's happening that's dividing stronger than ever? And is it something that you're going to see continue to trend flipping over to Republicans? We've got the Latinos that are Republicans. Now we've got the out-of-work coal miners in West Virginia that are Republicans. Are there any different cuts left, Larry Dongley? I'll try to take those both quickly. I'm not a historian. All I can do is hope that on the first point that you're correct that this is a blip rather than a long-term trend. At the moment, I'm a little bit pessimistic, as you can probably tell. But we can only hope that it is a blip and that a whole series of factors will take over, including government policy as Dan has alluded to, will ameliorate some of those issues. As for the second point in the polarization on the issues, I think there's no doubt that there has been two polls emerging. I would suggest to you that that's in large part a role of the money, the role that money plays in American politics. The money's special interests are on the polls. They're on the hard right and the hard left on both issues, and they help to drive things to a great extent. The second thing I would suggest to you, and this is inward-looking as a Democrat, the Democratic Party used to be a... You have a crazy system in the United States. We have 320 million people, and you have two political parties. Objectively speaking, if someone was to land in from the moon and look at that, they would say this is crazy. So if you're going to only have two political parties, then you need to have bigger tents. And what I'd suggest to you in recent decades is that the Democratic Party's tent has shrunk. You mentioned West Virginia. Mike Dukakis won West Virginia in 1988. Donald Trump won it by 40 points in 2016. In a large part, I would suggest to you that's because the Democratic Party's tent has shrunk and it's become dominated by people who think that Manhattan cocktail parties or San Francisco cocktail parties, and not about the people who work with their hands for living, who might also go to church every week and own a gun. So that's my take on it. Thank you, Fred. Does anybody else have a question or comment? Can I just make a brief comment on that? Just a very brief comment on that. The first part of it, that populism, there's always been that vein, there's always been a strain, there's no authority, and so on. What I think is somewhat concerning now is the legitimation of some populist sentiments and making them more mainstream, more acceptable. And I think that's a real change from what we've seen before, and that's something I think that to be. And a flaming of that, an encouragement in many ways from the top. Yes. From the top. Yes. Well... Can I put words in your mouth, please? I'm sorry. Excuse me. The kind of... Some of those populism is fueled by many factors, and it has many manifestations, but certainly there are strains of racism and sexism and misogyny and so on that are clearly in the form of populism that we're encountering today. And those sentiments are always knocking around in any community, fueled by what? But the fact that they are now more respectabilized, given more voice, more center stage, is something that I think is concerning. Yes, ma'am. Sorry. What's your name? Sorry. Hi, my name's Ruth Kennedy. I'm a broadcaster with a number of outlets here in Dublin. Just on the... Yes, I knew that. Just as a question for Larry Donnelly or anyone else on the panel. With regard to... You started to touch on race or perceptions of race in the US with regard to elections and Democrats' calculations and so on. It would appear to me that the Republicans are just an awful lot more successful at using data science in two ways to further their aims. One is in partisan gerrymandering and the other is in targeting of advertising. And working in the media, I'm interested in what happens in other countries. And PBS Frontline did an interview with Donald Trump's social media guru who started out as one guy with a laptop with a small business and he ended up with a staff of, I think, 300. And he targeted ads using data science, using Facebook, down to the individual voter. And the blend between media and advertising as we all know, church and state has become completely blurred or in fact it's vanished, so the mainstream media still exists. But in actual fact, what people perceive to be the media is actually a targeted Facebook ad that comes to them and their neighbor gets something different. But to the partisan gerrymandering, the Republicans are using data science in an incredibly successful way. I think there's a case at the moment in Wisconsin where it relates to the division between the numbers of people who vote and the actual whole of seats. It's so huge. And gerrymandering, growing up in the 70s and 80s in Ireland, gerrymandering is at best considered to be a fraud and the worst considered to be an enormous injustice against a particular group of people. In the States, I believe it's not illegal. And there is a case, am I right? Just wondering if you have anything to say to that with regard to race and partisan gerrymandering. So let's talk about cocktail parties is one thing. In actual fact, underneath the surface there is this incredibly laser focused, targeted use of data science to do something that's legal. But in actual fact, I think in 2020 they're reviewing the issue that the party that's in power is allowed to actually crack and pack districts in order that they can maximize their vote to an astonishing degree. Okay, fascinating question. I'll just take a quick and let everyone else come in on it. In terms of gerrymandering, I think first of all, you're right. If there's one thing I could change about American politics, I suppose two things, money first and then. But gerrymandering would definitely be one of them. The way that the congressional districts are constructed effectively with the duplicity of both parties, Republicans more so as you say, but are such that it pays people to move away to the right and way to the left based on the composition of their districts. So Barack Obama and others are starting to do work on this. And indeed, there is litigation and there is definitely a racial component of it. From a strategic point of view, however, what I would say is I would continue to point to the ills of bringing people to the right and the left because I don't believe that you will get the majority of Americans and you have to move hearts and minds on this. I don't believe the race appeal will move the hearts and minds of the majority of Americans. I think it has to be a bigger, broader argument about the ills that have been done to the American system because when it comes to those voting rights issues, a lot of white Americans, as I'm speaking frankly, turn off when they hear things that it's wrong for somebody to be asked to produce identification when they're voting. Most white Americans anyway think that that's absolutely logical and natural and not an imposition whatsoever. So politically speaking, to make that move, I think it has to be a broader, bigger argument than simply a race-based one, even though on the merits I agree with you. There's a lot that could be discussed about that particular, the data and the gerrymandering, and the way that elections are run in the United States and I would love to give more time to that. Unfortunately, we don't have... I can take one more question. I want to give everyone an opportunity to give a final thought. Yes, ma'am. Hi, Ann. I just referred to the legitimization of misogyny and racism that is sort of happening under the Trump regime and John there referred to the crisis in masculinity in America. And, of course, there's a crisis in masculinity everywhere, I think, but the fact is both these... I see the men's and herds not as you said. These two things I think show the huge discrepancy between how Trump is viewed as far as I can see in America and how we view him here in Europe. We here tend to think, oh, my God, isn't Trump awful? Whereas there is no indication and especially not from that poll that you mentioned at the outset, Ann. And I just wondered, I wanted to ask you, in fact, who exactly was polled? The 44% who thought he is the victim of fake news all the time. Am I right? I believe those were the impediments. Yes, yes. Ann, go ahead. If you want, if you wouldn't mind. I'm going to jump in. Can you just let me finish the point? Because you're wearing work clothes. And also the whole idea of the masculinity in crisis. It's interesting that probably here in Europe we think of masculinity. That Trump is, in fact, morphing into Harvey Weinstein and that he is massively represents the masculine in crisis. Whereas probably in America he has seen as somebody who is addressing masculinity in crisis, as you say, by his environmental policies and bringing back all the carment, the manufacturing and all those things. So there is, what I'm trying to say is, I think here we don't have a clue what Trump stands for in America actually and that we think that the next election is a foregone conclusion. If he lasts that long, he certainly won't be re-elected. But I think on the basis of that poll you quote, and the building up and how corrosive of democracy such ideas are, that in fact this is by no means given and that that's how we should be thinking now. Ann, if you would, I'm going to frame that as our last point and I'm going to start with Ann then as you were directing it to her. But let's talk about that and have the panelists get their reaction. Is this a blip, as you see it, or is this a reflection of something more and the new normalcy? If you would sort us off with that. Well, I mean, the chances must be quite high that President Trump will be re-elected. I mean, there is always an advantage to an incumbent. I think in the last 50 years only Carter and the Elder Bush lost the race to be elected a second time. So there's a huge inbuilt advantage for the incumbent. On the other hand, there's no question that Trump base is very loyal and he scores low in opinion polls but he largely holds on to that 40% or so that brought him to the White House. And there is absolutely no sign irrespective of anything the President says or does. There's no sign of the faith of that 40% being impacted in a very significant way. So the outcome of the next presidential election, obviously, is going to... But also, I should say, there's no sign of the President really making any serious attempt to enlarge his base. I mean, so much of what he says and does is obviously connecting to that base, resonating with the base, but not pushing his appeal outside the base. So the outcome of the next election very much depends on that base remaining solid, getting out to vote, and, of course, who the Democrats can put up and if the people at the margins and the independence can be attracted to who the next Democratic candidate is going to be. But, I mean, the questions of race and sex, they're pervasive, really. And, I mean, if we look at other issues like that, dominating the headlines in the states over the last few weeks when so much else important was going on, I mean, the question of the athletes taking a kneel and so on.  He would say it wasn't racist. It's just people who were refusing to respect the flag. But many people would see it as a coded kind of racism. There are many other issues that, you know, they're coded sexism, they're coded racism. But these issues resonate with people and they're very real and very significant. But, as I say, the outcome and the direction there is a big advantage to the incumbent. But, and so far, President Trump shows every sign of keeping his base rock solid. Pretty rock solid. And if that continues, it will be a very big challenge for the Democrats in 2020. Larry Donnelly, final thoughts from you on the solid base. Thank you, Anne. The soft support that you mentioned. I don't think it's a blip. I think it's something that's bigger than Trump, but I think that that's the case. I think that the reelection, Trump's reelection chances will depend in large part, obviously, on what happens next few years and also who the Democrats put against him to run. And the other thing is, I think we could have a long discussion about who Trump's base actually is because I think we get a variety of perspectives about who they are. My one thought would be they are not conservative Republicans. They are different. They are much harder to classify. And I agree with their larger number. Can you continue from optimism to optimism? No, I think pessimistic. I think the way we think in the Western world, I think this is just an American thing. I think the trend in the Western world is towards greater anger, alienation, polarization, intolerance of the other side's position. And you see that in elections in Europe, in Austria as far as Beeld as Australia, which incidentally is at 26 years of economic growth. So I don't think it's about economics necessarily. That there is, you know, a collective consciousness change going on just as nationalism rose in the late 19th century or the Western world became more socially liberal in the 1960s. It seems to me there is a darker, moved change in the way we collectively think. And that is going and continues to go in a direction that I personally slightly fear of a lot. Okay, so we have optimism, optimism, optimism, and now, John. I'll just bring it back to the economics. What we haven't really talked about is how the financial crisis and the Great Recession have affected politics generally. So an event that happened 10 years ago is resonating still today. And I think what is animating politics is not so much the people's living standards aren't where they were before the crisis, because they are objectively. You know, the GDP has come back as we know in Ireland and so forth, but nobody feels like they are where they should be. I think that's a big problem in America. I think it's a problem here as well, and clearly in other places in Europe, Germany is one of them. Why am I not feeling like my life is better than it was 15 years ago? I know from my own circumstances that I don't really feel like that. Things felt a lot better in 2005. And we all know it was in the lead, but it doesn't matter. We experienced it, we felt it. And so that activates people because part of the problem of liberal democracy and market capitalism is that we're on this upward trajectory. It's a very teleological way of looking at the world, like the best-selling communism. We're all sort of going toward this imagined future, where our lives get materially better all the time. And if you've lived most of your adult life in a situation of relative uncertainty, whether that's from the trauma of having gone through a significant economic shock, like the financial crisis, or the fact that your wages are stagnated, I think you start looking around for other causes that aren't in the economic data. And you say, well, what is it? Is it because my position as a man has declined relative to women? Is it because we let more refugees into the country in the last decade? Is it because of these bad trade deals that we've struck with other countries that have allowed China to prosper and become an economy nearly as large as the United States, when I always thought we'd be number one? What happened to that? So the weird number one idea in America is a very powerful one. And we're sort of flirting with number two now. And I think that has consequences. And one of the expressions that I'm trying to imagine, even having this conversation where it couldn't have been elected. And I don't think we would. I think it would remain subterranean feeling. But because Trump has been elected, we've all had to confront this. So what has actually happened now that we've got this surprise, this sort of black swan political event that we really couldn't have predicted to three years ago? Where did it come from? And it came from something real. It's not some strange affiliation. So I'd agree with Larry, this is a trend. I'll wrap this up with, and he put it in a numeric way, that we are now flirting with number two. I think if we take it as a different sort of connotation, what are the causes that brought us to number two? And how do we respond to those? And how do we change the education, the discussion, and get people motivated around a hope and something that will give them an economic reality that is different than what they have today?