I think if I may now come back to the hour, we've got almost the hour, 55 minutes left for comments and discussion from the floor, and suggestions. And I think we've opened them up. The issue is very well. Inger has given us very much a perspective of where thinking and research could should go. I thank you Rob Bess Vos for giving us a very good summary of where some of the UN-based suggestions have gone for strengthening global governance. And Jane, for your presentation of some of the developments in practice by China and where those have been taking the world beyond, perhaps, no, not perhaps beyond conventional thinking from a Western perspective of at least five, 10, 20 years ago. So the floor is open. I'm not going to suggest I will take three initial presentations, but I don't particularly want to have three and then panel three and panel. I want to hear a whole variety of suggestions there. Everyone of the panel will get a chance to come back before we close, but I really want to make sure we've got a chance for our thinking here. Who would like to kick off? Eduardo Galvez, the ambassador of Chile in Helsinki, but he's been heavily involved in financial. Thank you. First, it's going to be more of a diplomatic comment. I'm not an economist, so I'm feeling a little bit scared. I've been working because at the UN, you don't need to be economists to be dealing with that. But anyway, a few comments and then some questions. First, the last thing that Inge said on the role of the state, of the providing the state with policy space for their own policies and what it came to my mind, I'm just going to mention, is an article I read, I think Sunday review of Donnie Roderick put globalization to work for democracies. And when he was saying again, you know, they have, we went and the relation between the market and the state. But how do we went into globalization with so far, you know, ahead, and a state with the idea of respecting some space for a state to have their own, you know, sort of regulations and care for the people in terms of that is came to my mind that now we are, I know there is a populist sort of, you know, a negative reaction against globalization. But it's now it's very clear that the problem is not a state is more, it's more the very, very, very wide opening that create problem. And if I think in Chile, I may say that I remember when we have a controlled to movement of capital and the IMF was against that. I remember because one of my friends was Ricardo was at the Central Bank in Chile and we were sort of, you know, push in some way because at the time the idea that you truly that that you're moving of capital was the same that moving of good and you need to be have a very open. So first things I think for a good change is just respect a little bit allowed for this summit space for the state while we, a small country, we are very much in favor of an open world, of a globalized world. But it is a very, it is for you the expert to see how we can have this kind of, you know, this embedded capitalism that I think Roderick say something like that. But that is my first thing. And because many things should be done at the national level and can be done at the national level. So whenever we reach agreement at the international level, please have that in mind that the second thing I really do agree with two relations between the global and the international, the people tend to confirm that. But I think that we now have a clear idea that many things are global, rather than international. And these go, I think what Rob both say that sometimes we need multi-stakeholders sort of approach to things that not only with the state, you need to have a space for people, for NGOs, for other relevant actors. And that is, I will very much in favor of that. But let me say that also there is confusion in some concept. And I'm just talking with academic people. So just provide please clarity. Sometimes when people say sustainable development, main all the time is people think in environment. And in reality, sustainable development, we have in mind, I'm thinking for us in social inclusiveness and also economic growth. So, but it looked to me that it's almost impossible to change that. Whenever you say sustainable, people think environment, what is very important, but it's not the only thing. And when you say global, think term to think interstate agreement and not. And we, I think we need something better than that. And perhaps the last thing I would like to say is you use the word of responsible sovereignty.  The question is that as I see here, we do have crisis that are global, that are very complex, that need cooperative action from a state and other, you know, actors. And the question is why we are not getting that and that's a little bit going on what Inge Kohl said. Why the state are not doing what it looked like to be a rational thing? And the problem for me here is the kind of incentive. I mean, and in some cases you mentioned, and then I go to the Openest Statement of Minutes of Finance of South Africa, inclusiveness. What would we mean by that? He said, and it was interesting, as a question, you see, because we always talk about inclusiveness. And one of these, and this is related now to going to the concrete thing that we're discussing here, is to have a more broad, you know, participation of developing countries in terms of decision-making and those decisions that are taking globally and participating, I guess, in the IMF and the World Bank. And the G20, while it's good, and this I don't want to be critic with my friend from the BRIC countries, sometimes it gives the impression to us that, well, if China, India and Brazil are taking into account, then we have a more broad, yes, better than G20 than G7. But my experience, and that was something I'm very proud of the UN, we established a group called the 3G, the Global Government Group, together with Singapore and Switzerland. And we have many other countries, 30 or 40. And we say, look, it's not only systemic irrelevant countries, you also need to take into account the New Zealand's, the children's, the Singapore, the Kenya, so it is, when you say inclusiveness, and when you say they're broader, it also need to take into account at least to listen, while, I mean, what the Caribbean countries think and etc. So sorry to be so long, but I just want to say this, we are talking about question of failures and sometimes question of gap at the International Global Economic Governance. And that, what I was talking about failures on gap, and I'm going to stop with that, I guess in tax cooperation matters is an important thing. I was in Addis Ababa, and the last two days of the negotiation on the financial was about that. Was, are we going to create something global to cooperate on tax matters? And I guess, at the end of the day, developed countries were very much against that. And they say, well, if you continue pressing us for creating something like that, you're not going to get anything. And our African hosts were so keen on getting the result of the Addis Ababa, that at the end, we accepted not to create anything at the global level, because I guess people were afraid, developed countries, that we have something in the OECD, and they don't want to have more than 30 or 40 countries discussing that. But still, I think it is a gap. The question of tax cooperation is an important one. And that is something that maybe I can choose to have some priority. I'm sorry for being solo. Thank you very much for that, even if the Addis Ababa experience is not perhaps the most positive. Right, there's quite a few hands up. I'm just going to work my way along as I saw them. So if, and if you just say who you are, because I don't know everyone. Thank you. Yes, I'm Evalisa Mille-Mackey. I'm from the Finnish Foreign Ministry. And it's a pleasure to be here and listen to all these interesting presentations. And thank you, Inge Kaud, for your fascinating words about the need of facilitation of global issues. In Finland, in the Foreign Ministry, we did have a department for global affairs 10 years ago, but then it was dismantled. And I think there were some mandate issues that couldn't be solved. Related to G20, a little bit related to what Eduardo was saying about the global governance aspect. When the G20 was created, I think we posed the question, what is the relationship of G20 to the existing multilateral decision-making bodies, global institutions. So I'm not very clear about that. I mean, how is G20 interacting with the UN or other global institutions? And then Rob Boss was speaking about the coordination and coherence, which is of course a very central issue. And I don't need to remind you that the ECOSOC has the mandate in the UN Charter for Coordination and Coherence. And many people don't, I mean, there are very, a lot of discussion about that. And there was some reorganization of the work of ECOSOC a couple of years ago. So I think there is one issue for research and analysts. I mean, to assess how the ECOSOC has been developing. And I mean, because it has the mandate and we always speak about the strengthening or improving, improving of the work of ECOSOC. But how do you see, how has it developed and has there been any improvement? Or and what, I mean, the problems that remain, what are they? But so I think some outside analysis would be helpful there. Thank you. Thank you very much. And let me just say thank you for Finland for all the support for UNU wider. Many of us have watched its work over the last 30 years have been very impressed by its contributions. Right. We're working our way back. Yes, sir. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. My name is Ibi Ajayi from the University of Ibadan. These are very excellent presentations and I'd like to make comments on two of the papers. The paper by Yungu on China and the paper by Rob Boss. Now, starting with China, of course, there is no doubt now in anybody's mind that China is a rising economic power globally. And everybody is rushing to China to seek one assistance or the other. And that is why you see a lot of African countries going to China to seek assistance. In fact, the development strategy difference notwithstanding. Now, I notice also that China say it through projects rather than budget support. I was wondering, Prof, if you do have any reason for this kind of choice, why is budget support not important? A lot of African countries would like money going to a general pool from which they can draw to finance whatever projects are in priority. I also like to say that the importance of China in the global economy gives rise to the African Economic Research Council deciding to have a plenary this year in Senegal on December 4th on China and Africa. So, of course, it's because of the role of China in Africa's development. A lot of African countries are either dissatisfied with their colonial masters or they see that colonial masters cannot finance their needs anymore. They have to look for alternative sources of funding and that is inevitably justifiable. Now, coming to the paper by Rob Boss, I have a number of questions. The first of which has been addressed by the ambassador there. This policy coherence and coordination which you mentioned, you said very clearly that there is no mechanism for gender-wise coherence. That is disturbing because it will help a lot if we do have a coherence in whatever gender they put in place. And secondly, you also did mention that G20 by and large has fallen back into a rootless talk shop. And I asked myself, what about the UN? The UN decisions too. I did not talk shops. What is the difference? What really are we trying to get at? Lastly, you mentioned the issue of from multilateralism to multistakeholderism. And there you cited two good examples. The first one is the Committee on World Food Security surface. And the second one is the ILO. And you did mention very clearly that ILO actually tries to set international labor standards. And at the same time, the food, the World Food Security also is responsible for agricultural, for responsible for taking care of agricultural and investment. And I asked myself, who decides what is agricultural investment in countries? And what mechanisms are put in place to check medis to make sure that countries are doing the appropriate thing? And the reason for that is if you look at a lot of African countries, who for one reason or the other discover new sources of income. Oil, for example, they neglected the agriculture. And it is very obvious that they have not been investing enough in agriculture over time. So how do you check medis or what mechanisms are put in place to examine what is happening in these countries? Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. I'm going to, as I said, ask the panelists to hold back, keep a note so one can comment later. I would like to encourage us all to try and bring in their thoughts on what are the priorities for trying to strengthen and reform the international system, taking account of political possibilities as well as desirabilities. Okay, I'm working back you, sir. My name is Winston Dukaran from Trinidad and Tobago. And I want to address your question about the priorities for the reform of the global economic system. The three presentations we heard here today were very deep in thinking and their insights in the analysis have a source of convergence in them. On one hand, we heard, for instance, from Mrs. Gu that we were, in fact, at a critical turning point requiring new practices and new thinking. Then we heard from our friend from Germany that yesterday's analytical framework cannot be relied upon to identify tomorrow's or today's reality. And then we heard from Mr. Voss that, in fact, the principles upon which we can talk about will itself be obstacles for the future. Now, this is a set of common threads here. And I'm wondering if what we are discussing is not so much a reform of the global economic system, but indeed the design aspects of the architectural change for governance of the system as the first step in the priority setting. And therefore, what we are involved here is a discussion of a design process. And the question I want to ask myself, really, is to get the new design, would it come from the people or the scholars or the practitioners looking at it purely from the scholarly point of view, as opposed to the political point of view, from the people themselves who are wedded to the old analytical frameworks? Thank you. I want to go to, yes, let's start right there. Please, at the back. My name is Nina Makia. I work for a national NGO umbrella organization, Goldkepa, with over 300 members here in Finland. Thanks for very interesting remarks. I wanted to ask two questions or a couple of questions from first from Dr. Jinku. You pointed, I really like the way you set the scene of not seeing how the international context could accommodate China and other so-called emerging economies, but rather seeing how we could work together and what lessons can be learned from South-South cooperation to North-South cooperation. Having worked in the context of South-South cooperation myself a few years, you pointed out a few differences, but if you look at the work on the ground, there are often much more similarities than differences between the way that South-South cooperation and North-South cooperation works. So my question to you is, what would be the good way of enhancing that dialogue and through which fora, because a lot of the development cooperation talk happens in OECD, which is a forum where China is a little reluctant to engage. So how to go about practically finding that sort of lessons learned that we can learn from each other. My second question is to Mr. Vos. It's good to see that other people are also in search of new development finance. There's a general aid fatigue and it's very clear that little trickle called ODA will never be enough to reach the SDGs. However, you pointed to a few options, but there seems to be very little appetite for actual concrete suggestions for that new development finance of how we go about actually reaching the SDGs. Where do we get the money?  What would be, you know, what can you do now in order to get there? What can you concretely do to get that money flowing? Thank you so much. Barry Gills, Professor of Development Studies at the University of Helsinki. One, Stuart McIntosh, the director of the Group of 30 of Finance Experts, has recently published a book on the redesign of the global financial architecture. And the central thesis in that book is that there has been a shift, a paradigmatic shift, from the dominance of market authority to restoration of state authority over the financial markets. That was done in a moment of crisis when the system instability was so acute and so dire that that concentrated minds and brought about cooperation and change in attitudes and policy by the states in order to restore global financial stability and re-regulate. And so you might say that the other lesson is that in the previous era there was an excess of market authority over political decision-making authority. And that needs to be changed to reversed, that there's political authority, which as a democratic political authority, reasserted over market decision-making globally. Second is that the Committee on World Food Security and the voluntary guidelines also includes an embeddedness of civil society organizations and representing peasants and their organizations and other civil society organizations in the decision-making processes themselves, policy formulation processes themselves. So I'm hoping you could tell us how that example works and how it might be rolled out to other aspects of global governance. The third thing that hasn't been mentioned here at all, but which is a very long-standing issue and is extremely important right now, is demilitarization and disarmament. And the United Nations organization, for example, has it, I assume, within their political will and possibility to re-establish a new round of global disarmament talks by all parties to lead to an agreement by all parties to phased reductions in armaments. Right now we're on the reverse course. So many governments are investing vast new sums into rearmament and new arms races, including out into space. President Obama has recently authorized the program for $1 trillion U.S. expenditure over the next 30 years to modernize the American nuclear arsenal, for example. Now at this time in world history that is exactly what we do not need. And so this is part of development to reverse this extraordinarily expensive, wasteful and damaging trend that has to be part of the future agenda of reforming global governance is global disarmament. Thank you. I think one aspect that we should look into more carefully is the new package of foreign direct investment. When I started my professional life at the U.N. Center on Transnational Corporations with Cindy Dell and Pedro Malan, we discussed the package that at that time traditional foreign investors were bringing to Latin America. Was it the right technology? Was it better to acquire the technology than to bring the investor with all the components? I think that has changed completely. And then we had investors from the region eventually, and we were thinking they were better because they were bringing technology that was more adaptable and so forth. Now Jing was talking about the package, China's model of investment and aid. And I think it creates a lot of problems, particularly in the conflict countries. And one of the problems is that of course they like the fact that there are no conditionalities, but conditionalities sometimes help national governments, weak governments, to carry out some reforms that are essential with regards to the issue of budget rather than project financing. You know, these countries coming out of big crisis, they don't have anything to tax because they don't produce, they don't have anything to tax. So sometimes they need a budgetary support. And the other thing is that what we see in Afghanistan, Liberia and all these countries is that by having donors support projects, they're financing their own agenda rather than the country's agenda, and that creates a lot of problems. Sometimes these crisis countries also need investment in the social sector and security. You just said China invests in infrastructure and productive center. But the most important thing is that you made the link between aid and foreign direct investment. And in fact, you forgot about the security component. In these countries, for instance, what happened in Afghanistan with the INAC mines, which was the largest untapped copper mines in the world, is that they bid and they put together in the same package, they put aid, they put some security, and they put foreign direct investment, they made a bid for the foreign direct, for the mine itself. And then they put all this infrastructure package. And you know, companies from the US and from other donors, they put the components separately. So they put the security, they put the aid separately, and then the companies, they bid on their own, and they can never compete with the Chinese, obviously. And this creates a lot of problems. The fact is that the US military, our military, was not very happy to provide security for the Chinese investors in INAC. And the issue is that it has become very difficult for the Chinese to operate there. And like that, there are many cases in Asia and all that. So in Africa, many cases, and it's not only China, sometimes it's India, sometimes it's Brazil in Mozambique and in other countries. So I think this is something that we have to, is it true that the BRIC countries are bringing technology, which is more adaptable to these countries or not? The other issue is the issue of employment, because many of these countries bring their own people and so forth. So I think this is an area in which we have to think, in the 80s, we thought about this with respect to Latin America. I think we have to think about the foreign direct investment package in relation to crisis countries, particularly in Africa, but also in other places. Thank you. Let me then turn to the panel. And who would like to go first? Jing, are you ready to comment on the questions or the comments related to China? Thank you. Thank you. I will walk backwards on this question on China's approach to the development assistance, why the Chinese prefer the supposed projects rather than the budget support. I think first you need to understand the China's concept or its value of how to do development. In fact, the Chinese have a very practical approach. Well, if I have to use one word or one sentence to summarize it, it's very much to develop your country's economy, it's your job. It's not the Chinese or the European or the American's job to develop its economy. So in other words, China perceives its relationship with many African countries as kind of strategic business partnerships rather than the donor-recipient relationship. That's why it's very reluctant to provide the budget support. That's one thing. Second on this China's intervention in the global or not global domestic governance issues in various African countries and also this Chinese package approach. I think also the security issue. I think one has to be aware. China is very much in a steep learning curve. So it's not, you know, China is very much at learning states. It's still very much, you know, trying to learn the lessons and also the experience of the West in various African countries and also it's learning its own mistakes. So very much the Chinese way of doing things across the river by feeding the stones. That's one thing. And second is, for example, the security issue. China is, you know, not all the Chinese investment in Africa are successful stories. Many failures, you know, many failed companies. So China is, at the moment, is trying to define the call overseas interests and also how to protect overseas investment. So it's still very much a challenge and a new topic for the Chinese government and its companies. And in terms of the bricks, the technology more adaptable to the needs of developing countries. Actually, we at IDS and we have conducted extensive field work on the Chinese agricultural engagement in various African countries and also the Brazilian engagement in African agriculture. We actually, we have the evidence to show that not the bricks country, I cannot just, you know, make that kind of for sweeping statement. But at least China, Brazil, you know, the technologies are more adaptable to the needs of the African countries. So we have the evidence to show that. And also the other questions on the G20, how is the G20 interact with the UN and other multilateral organizations? I think it's a very interesting question. To be honest, I don't think the G20 has an idea of how to, you know, interact and how to define a gender not overlap with the other, you know, multilateral organizations. So it's still very a challenge for the G20. And one of the things with the Chinese presidency of this G20 was very much the China tried to, you know, at least stir the G20 towards the direction, you know, from the short-term crisis response mechanism to the long-term global economic governance institution. That was very much the Chinese dream of the G20. But on the other hand, you know, as we know, the G20 cannot do everything. And so it has to work out a way to try to link up with the other multilateral organizations. That also linked to the lady's question on what would be the way to enhance the dialogue between the South and the North. I think this legitimacy issue is very important. This kind of dialogue has to link with the multilateral, you know, platform like the UN and also, you know, other multilateral organizations. And also that fundamentally, there are indeed two different narratives regarding the issue of how to promote global development and poverty reduction. And, you know, even now with last year's Addis Ababa, you know, development finance conference, and then we had this Foucaq summit in South Africa in Addis in Johannesburg later in the year. So people were arguing there were two, you know, different, well, that's called two different development maps, or we call it two international development map. One is led by the Washington DC and the other is led by the Beijing. And with a different value of what can teach you development nowadays and how to do development. So I think it's very important to try to bridge the gap of the values and the norms, or if we cannot do that, at least try to understand each other's point. It's very important. Thank you. Thank you very much. Let me turn to Rob. Thank you. Very interesting questions and I'm not going to pretend I can answer all of them appropriately. But maybe just for advancing further discussion, let's take just a few of the key points, at least what I picked up as a key point. Let me start with Avelisa's point on the current role, the actual role of Ackershock, right? So you're absolutely right. Ackershock has this mandate to coordinate, right? The promise that Ababa was hinting at in practice, it doesn't mean a whole lot, right? So it's to give a couple of examples, right? So as I said, the World Bank and the IMF are subsidiary or sort of specialized agencies under Ackershock, right? Out of that, there are annual meetings between Ackershock and the Bretton Woods institutions as they're called. Now at those meetings, it's not like Ackershock is coordinating work or sort of looking at, well, how can we better fit this into the broader work? We look at the development agenda, mostly their meetings because they have to be held because it's meant to do so. But I've never seen Dominique Strauss-Kahn or Christine Lagarde coming to those meetings. It's sort of lower level officials that come and they brief the council on what has expired at the annual meetings in Washington or wherever they're being held. So they do include some interest in describing and not doing the job of coordinating the work across different areas of work. Likewise with when the international food price crisis broke out, Ackershock asked the Secretary General to do something. And not that Ackershock said, okay, we're going to step in, ask FVO and other relevant agencies to come up with actions in order to stave off that crisis. A high level task force was put in place, which came up with a framework, but initially FVO wasn't even part of that. So it didn't give the instructions to the agencies to the right platforms to make things happen. So what I was trying to bring to the fore is that we have the framework. We have had various attempts to improve it, but it has not led to really strengthening the powers of Ackershock to actually exercise this role. And that also brings me to the point on what do we want to achieve. One thing is to have platforms, which we discuss the frameworks, the agendas that we have. And we can say, well, there's been quite a bit of success. I think the SDG agenda, Agenda 2030 and Real Plus 20 have been successes of the international community to come together with these goals. What we're talking about here is how can we translate that into actual governing bodies to help steer the process, to coordinate also the implementation and so on. And that's, I think, where we have not worked. The same applies when the global financial crisis broke out. So there was a momentum to say, well, maybe the UN or the UN through the Bretton Woods institution should take a stronger long in coordinating and help mediating the international coordination process. But as I explained, that didn't come about. And part of that is is that, yeah, that actual task has not been taken up and given to Ackershock as some would like it to be. That also brings to the point that we made about sovereignty and the role of small countries. But I think with Ackershock also it's just a selection of countries which rotate in membership. We call it, well, it's 54 members that are part of Ackershock. Now, that wouldn't be a problem if it sufficiently represents and if there would be continuous decision making that would be responsive to all the relevant crisis that and actions need to be taken. So also that we have many proposals being made maybe to change the configuration. Partly to say, well, we have to do everything as like a general assembly. That will be very difficult to get to any great decision making. So there have been various proposals, for instance, to have a group representation within Ackershock to have more effective decision making in a way like the World Bank or the IMF has that with different voting power structures where the members in executive boards or in the National Finance and Monetary Committee take decisions on behalf of a group of countries. So also those proposals have been made by various people in various stages also by the Secretariat, but it never got the same traction because, well, how should it come about and it did not happen. So how to deal with what I think then should happen, we should take to heart the principles which are laid out of subsidiarity, if we can't do it, where we sort of don't overcoordinate at the central level, but the key issues in trying to give broader guidance which then subsequently is being, for the subsidiarity principle, is being further taken forward and negotiated in the specialized platforms or taken out on by the national governments themselves. So also the the Paris Agreement with climate change is about that. So the country has been asked to declare commitments through the international determined contributions, but how to do it that's left to the sovereignty of countries as long as it adds up to the overall picture. Now, well, that's enough, but those are mechanisms that I think we can build on moving forward. Richard wants me to stop. Okay, well, there's yeah, but maybe one question. So the question on how the multi-stakeholderism works and how CFS works and what it means also for the responsible agreements on investment is one example. It's just one of the agreements reached in the CFS. Now, of course, the CFS is a committee, so it's not, doesn't have strong powers, but it is, it's more sort of the platform to build consensus to its agreements that then are carried forward to the relevant stakeholders, mostly national governments. So the principles on responsible investment are being translated to guidelines how governments can implement them at the country level. So and then because the principles are there that you can also raise them without any surprise to private investors say this is how we want you to act and how we want to respond. So what we do as FEO in line with this is to help strengthen the capacity of governments. For instance, if a national government, as they also do that, or private businesses come up and say well we want to buy up 100,000 hectares of land in your country to produce whatever, that they can respond to that saying this we want to happen with these principles in mind and that's in line with with our printer and if that's not the case then we can stop it and call to order to those investments. So they're voluntary but who knows they may they can be made binding at the country level through further regulation. But in terms of decision making it's it's it's like the UN it's through consensus building and sometimes takes a long time but the good thing is once they're there then that's something that all actors are being asked to abide by and with the the hope that that that all actors then will follow through on that. I gave the example early on that we see at FEO those actors coming saying well previously they would go and try and invest and buy up the land where they said well can you help us connect the small hold of farmers so they can produce with the quality and the quantities that we want in order to supply for foods the value chains and that has that's changing the name of the game. So it's done in yet in small quantities but I think they're good examples how we could move forward. Thank you very much. If you could be fairly I still like to try and get one or two other comments. I want to come back to the intervention by our colleague from Trinidad. Reality has already changed I would say we are living in a new type of world with new policy making realities some very clever politicians have noticed it CIA research has noticed it the academic community is lagging behind and because the clever the sink tanks in the north in particular have noticed it therefore you see in the reaction of the industrial countries primarily a stalling. While we are here a club of the converted there is massive research out there on club approaches to international cooperation let's not kid ourselves the mainstream of research goes into the opposite direction from what we are talking about here and you see the club approach in the G20 I know what they are doing and how they are relating to the institutions they give them advice on what to do and the institutions do it it's quite outrageous you know how the G20 feeds into the IMF and therefore I would hate to see the IMF or the World Bank at this point in time to play a more coordinated anything role emphasizing coherence no it will only make things worse but why are the problems so severe and so stubborn because the growing inter we have fostered globalization we have fostered a globalization of public goods created all these global public goods not dealt with them created under provision of them and interdependence in global public goods areas comes together with growing multiplicity if we only had intensified interdependence and still power politics we would be fine you know the sticks would continue to come out and you would do what you are being told to do you would still re-nach in previous areas developing countries also re-natched and tried to hide and not to deliver on what was dictated to them but the terrible thing today is that interdependence in global public goods areas comes together with multi polarity with a what does one call it the blunting of power politics you know if that is the big thing today and therefore we see the move to to this elite lateralism or club approaches in the in the climate change area very obvious what you don't get in international negotiations don't care about international negotiations just agree something the North thinks we will then have our little many tiny little climate finance and finance what pleases us so we must be very very clear about this and where does the money come from the money comes out of so-called order you know and OECD duck even prides itself with the real markers it's a shame to use order that was intended to fight poverty for climate change related purposes that at least up to 50% if not more also benefit the North there should be new and additional resources and if we had good provision pass analysis and at least rough cost benefit analysis Germany Finland we all would know that it pays to be forthcoming in investments or in relaxing intellectual property rights and make sure that you have a better dissemination of clean technology the problem today in my view is really that the conventionally powerful countries find it very hard to accept the new order and therefore I think this triangle if you can keep it in your mind please where there is publicness in consumption and publicness in provision might also have publicness in decision making and this publicness in decision making should start at the national level why do we see all these right-wing movements these days because our politicians shy away from cooperation sometimes for good reasons the in the north the club approach in developing countries reneging because one doesn't have enough voice as a result problems continue and politicians are chasing crisis and they look helpless and incompetent to people and people feel it and I think therefore we see all this death interest and moving away from politics so voice reform is critical effective voice reform at the national level discussing in which country are really global issues being discussed in national parliaments or what do we know about what was ultimately agreed does anybody tell us no no I mean look at them thank god but things are changing I come to the impetus question where does the impetus come from if you were Richard Cooper you would say the world always needs three terrible crisis I will never forget when the planes went into the yeah he maintains three crisis I think it's a shame if we wait for these three crisis and that brings me back to the academic failure in order to rethink you need concepts how would we talk about sovereignty if we wouldn't have the term sovereignty so we need to think a proper definition of global public goods and proper definition of global and and it starts with very simple things so my last word is you can go on fiddling on the fringes you know echozok improvement we have it hasn't brought anything because the same people come never mind what you call echozok you know or you can do a little bit here and a little bit there this is the time for big rethinking and big change and be bold please right this morning I want to just draw a few parallels with the conclusion of practical action which the trade seminar came up with this morning it was said by Kristen we need better analysis and broader analysis of trade in order to bring in the broader issues of equality and social justice faisal said we need to build an epistemic community who want to rebuild and revitalize global trading communities a big overlap with changing thinking and building out from an organization and alan ended by saying we don't mustn't have too high expectations of our political masters but there is a need for real debate well I hope we've got some real debate from this I would like to underline of our own session this afternoon starting with inga and I think the positive example to me of the IPCC which is a very different sort of it's a very scientific body surely it's had a major impact not at once but gradually over what 30 years now of changing thinking and inga and her proposal said we need a stewardship council that also is represents a very small number of different stakeholders but approaching these broad issues and this ties in I think with what Rob was saying with respect to the need to revitalize the the ecosoc it's called that part of unicef of the UN ecosoc could we ever get to a security council which and various people have made that as a security council of ecosoc with again a smaller number of participants and multi stakeholders you've got to have some group representation we've hardly mentioned the TNCs which to my mind are intimately involved with all of these difficulties transnational corporations I don't know how one would bring in the media or how you're trying to keep the media out but we're also enormously influenced by the media's presentation of these issues with their self political interests as well as their others but I think we need to somehow build a smaller group representation in order to in order to formulate policy potentials in a way that can take account of the political as well as the economic priority and as as Jing was saying can we learn from the north north dialogue some of us have seen OECD close up on some of these issues the south south dialogue I know very little about it in order to get conclusions that are relevant for north south improve north south dialogue I'm afraid your dear chairman has failed to give a chance for that band of people there I wanted to end by giving you all just 10 minutes or so for a one one priority proposal that you think might go somewhere so I end by saying sorry but if you felt moved to write a one priority proposal down I will be here for another 15 minutes you could either write it down or tell me we've still got I think till seven before we move to the reception downstairs let me end by saying thank you to one and all thank you for you and your wider for making it possible to have this morning session and the afternoon session and I hope we manage to find a way of carrying forward this debate and this discussion thank you one and all