All right, thank you everyone for joining us. My name is Brian Schmidt, the Vice Chancellor and President of the Australian National University. I'd like to start today's webinar by acknowledging and celebrating the first peoples across the world on whose traditional lands and airwaves we all reside. I'm joining you from Canberra today and I would like to acknowledge the Nonewell-Nambri people of this region pay my respects to their elders past and present. It is indeed a privilege today to be joining with our very interesting panelists, the Honorable Arthur Sinodinos and our Chancellor, the Honorable Julie Bishop for a conversation about the recent U.S. election and what it means for the future of the Australia-U.S. relationship. As a dual American-Australian citizen, you might imagine I followed the outcome of the election very closely and indeed voted in the last state I was present in, Massachusetts. So it has been a remarkable election in that it's just been very different than anything that I have had in my 53 years of life. Certainly the U.S. is polarized in a way that it never has been in my lifetime and I see that within my own family. It is quite interesting to see that my family noting I grew up in Montana and Alaska but my family is throughout the Midwest and my family has sort of split 50-50 between Biden and Trump. But in a way where I'll have to be honest, I could not have told you in advance who was gonna go which way. And I think that's what's so peculiar about this election is how the U.S. has polarized on certain lines hard to think about. For example, 25 years ago when I moved to Australia. So today's panel brings together our current and former distinguished leaders from the Australian government. And in particular, I would like to thank Ambassador Sinodino's for hosting our ANU North American office within the embassy in Washington, D.C. Your support and the Australian government support allows us to strengthen our education, our research and our policy cooperation between the U.S. and Australia. Additionally, it is one of my key priorities to connect more deeply with our alumni community who are located of course literally in every country around the world. And just as all of you living in the United States have a connection back to campus and to Canberra, I do feel that strong connection to the U.S. still where I of course attended my university days. The links between Australia and America are strong and are emerging as a key part of thought here in Australia and I hope also in America. And I think they're increasingly going to be important for the future of our region as we undergo what are probably going to be substantial changes over the coming months, years and decades. Also a special thank you for our New York ANU Alumni Committee who have been great volunteers in helping us stay connected with our U.S. alumni base. And I believe members are on call today. So thank you all. And I do hope to be able to come and visit you in person when we're all able to travel again. And I hope that is coming up next year. I also want to thank again, Julie and Arthur and for being part of this today. And I really look forward to listening to the discussion myself. And I'm now going to hand over to our moderator, Paul Harris, the director of the ANU North American Liaison Office. Over to you, Paul. Thank you Vice Chancellor and welcome everyone to this online event wherever you are across America, Australia or indeed around the world. I would like to start today by acknowledging that here in Washington DC, we are coming to you from the land of the Piscataway people. And one of my favorite things about the time I've spent working and living here in the U.S. has been the opportunity to really learn more about Native American cultures. It's also been a real privilege to work as part of the embassy team here in Washington. And I would like to add my thanks to the ambassador for hosting the ANU North America office here within the embassy and for supporting our work to strengthen education and research partnerships. My job today is to introduce our two distinguished speakers. But before I do, a few quick housekeeping points for our audience. As attendees, you'll have your video and microphone automatically turned off. This just helps us to keep the sound of video quality as clear as possible. Please note that the webinar today is being recorded. And if you do have any technical issues, you can email alumni at anu.edu.au and our team will try to assist as quickly as possible. We have a large audience today. In fact, I think we achieved a new record for registrations for our online alumni events. So thank you to all of you. There will be time for questions for our speakers later in the session. But please note that with so many people participating, I'm sure I won't be able to get to everybody's questions. You can submit questions during the webinar using the Q&A function at the bottom of the screen. And if we have time, I'll get to those. We've also had some written questions submitted in advance and I have grouped these by theme for our speakers. If you're submitting questions during the webinar, you are welcome to submit questions anonymously if you prefer. So now let me briefly introduce our two distinguished speakers. And if I could ask our speakers to turn on their cameras and microphones as I introduce them, that would be great. So first, Ambassador Arthur Sinadinas, who took up his position here in Washington in February this year. The Ambassador was previously Minister for Industry, Innovation and Science in the Australian government and a Senator for New South Wales in the Australian Parliament from 2011 to 2019. During this time, he also served as Cabinet Secretary and Assistant Treasurer. Over a public career spanning four decades, Ambassador Sinadinas has also served as Chief of Staff to Prime Minister John Howard and in the Senior Executive Service in the Treasury. Welcome, Ambassador. The Honourable Julie Bishop commenced at the beginning of this year. Thank you. The Honourable Julie Bishop commenced at the beginning of this year as the 13th Chancellor of the ANU, the first woman to hold the role. From 2013 to 2018, she served as Australia's Foreign Minister, responsible for advancing Australia's interests in the world and our more than 100 overseas missions. She also served as Deputy Leader of the Federal Liberal Party from 2007 to 2018. In a senior political career over 20 years, she was also Minister for Education, Science and Training, Minister for Women's Issues and Minister for Aging. Julie is now also the Fisher Family Fellow in the Future of Diplomacy Project at the Kennedy School at Harvard, which is one of our closest US partner universities. It gives me great pleasure to welcome our distinguished speakers today to discuss the future of the Australia-US relationship. And I'll now hand over to the Chancellor to kick off the conversation with the Ambassador. Thank you, Chancellor, over to you. Thank you, Paul, and delighted to be with you all. I'm here in Western Australia on the lands of the Wajak people of the Noongar Nation. And I pay my respects to Elders Past and Present. Arthur, good to see you. I haven't seen you for a very long time, but you're looking fit and well. And let's kick off by just talking about the elephant in the room, COVID. Now, you arrived in Washington, DC just before COVID-19 started to impact on major American cities last March. What's been the impact on the morale of the American people? And how has it affected the diplomatic community? But also, just as a backdrop to the presidential election, tell us about how COVID-19 is impacting the United States. Well, thanks, Julie. Great to be with you. And congratulations on this new role of yours. And thank you to the ANU for having Paul Harris here, who's doing a great job on your behalf. And a shout out to all the ANU alumni here in the US. And I'm keen to catch up with you in person as well. Look, it's been all-pervading, Julie. It's just been like a big black cloud over everything. It's dominated, obviously, the health system. It's dominated the economy. It's dominated the political system. Not a day goes by where it is not the number one or two story in some form or another. We're going through another wave at the moment, which is pretty big. There are a lot of places in the US where ICUs are now under real pressure. So my family, the embassy have been going through the same experience as a lot of people here in the US, which is we've had to be very careful. For six weeks, I was here. I was able to get around, meet people. We had a couple of ministerial visits. And then we had to go into lockdown. And we put the embassy in the lockdown. And I've done a lot of my work from home. I'm speaking to you tonight from a home office, which is not bad, but must admit, was not quite what I expected when I got here. And it's restricted our movements clearly to a degree. But that said, everybody's in the same boat. So we've accepted that we've all just had to take measures. And we're going to be taking measures until probably the spring here, wait for the vaccine to have effect, plus get over the peak, which is associated with the winter months. And we go from there. I must say that I think within America, COVID has played into the politics hugely. There's no doubt that people have been divided over responses to COVID. There's a very strong federal state structure here. I mean, we have a federal structure in Australia. And West Australians have always been, I think, very much at the forefront of standing up for states' rights. But over here, even during COVID, it was interesting to see the extent to which power was devolved to the states as well, that while the federal government could do certain things, at the end of the day, states, if they decided to go a different way, they could. And in different parts of the country, that's what you get. It's a very diverse country in that sense. But the politics now going forward is that with a new administration, it'll be interesting to see to what extent they do things differently at the federal level. And we can discuss that later if you like. Absolutely. Arthur, as you know, here in Australia, our state premiers have taken quite a dominant role in dealing with COVID. And we seem to have morphed from a flattening the curve policy whereby we would ensure that our ICUs and our medical and health professionals were ready to deal with an increasing infection rate. We've moved morphed, in fact, from flattening the curve to total elimination, eradication of it. And now all of the borders across Australia are open. And we're dealing with one or two outbreaks, maybe, per state, and most of them are from overseas. So very little, if any, community transmission in Australia. So the situation could not be more different from that in the United States, it seems to us. No, no, that's absolutely right. But what we're trying to do with the US is persuade them that, and we've given this administration information on this, we've also given information to the new administration about our COVID response, our testing and tracing review, and all the other stuff that was done. And we've also sought to promote the idea that it's in their interest to make sure vaccines that are developed here are also more broadly available, particularly in the Pacific, to supplement the efforts that we're making. It's very important, I think, for the US, particularly in soft power terms, to be on the front foot in that regard. Yeah. Now, Arthur, before we turn to the current state of the election and the outcome, just turn a little to the Australia-US relationship. Next year marks the 70th anniversary of the ANZAS Treaty between Australia and the US. Is this recognized in Washington? What do you see as the perception of the US about Australia and the ANZAS Alliance? I think it'd be true to say that they don't talk about the ANZAS Alliance every day, but they are conscious of the strong links between us, including the military side of that. And wherever you go, whether it's Republicans or Democrats in the Congress or whatever, the perception of us as a strong ally and partner is there. And if anything, it's been reinforced by recent events, by our capacity to stand up on issues of principle that may involve our great Northern neighbour, for example. But there's been a recognition that we're not just... I gather you mean China, not your Northern neighbour, Canada. No, no. Canada's been very well behaved recently, I have to say. But it is the great challenge of our time, and they recognise the way that we have also stood up on all of that. So they don't take us for granted. They see the strong relationship, but it's in our interest always, as you know, from all the great work you did as Foreign Minister, to help shape the engagement with the US, so that their focus on our region, the Indo-Pacific, is as strong as possible. And that's something that, you know, when we think about a new administration, is very much at the forefront of our minds. Well Arthur, we'll come back to some of those topics, but let's just get an overview. As we stand here today, tell us about the election and the transition process. How do we interpret the election results across the nation, and where to from here, up until midday on the 21st of January? Well, as of today, the 50 states and Washington DC have certified their results, which would mean that the president-elect, Joe Biden, is formally the winner. That'll be ratified at the Electoral College next week, and then by the Congress in early January. There is a potential court case involving Texas suing certain swing states, but at this stage, most experts don't give that a great chance of getting up. So we've had a result. Every election is divisive, because by definition, particularly in a country like this, where you have to get the vote out, you have to galvanize voters on issues. And this is a country which is going through a lot of change, demographic change, urbanization. The city-country divide is sharper than it's been before. And so there are the racial issues, which we'll come to later, but there's a lot going on here. And what the election did, I think, was to flush out a lot of these issues and make it very clear that there are very strong views across America about the future of the country and whatever. So where we stand today, this is a country which has some major challenges ahead of it. But the lesson of history is that whenever the US is being challenged in this way, they've responded, they have a resilience. And their institutions have certainly been tested. No doubt about that. And believe me, do they take their institution seriously, whether it's the Supreme Court, the role of the Congress, the checks and balances, the separation of powers? That's all being tested, but it's been tested and it's survived quite well. I think the country has a lot of resilience. And so this narrative about decline of the US, I think, is very much overdone. I think there's a great resilience and a capacity to reinvent itself. Absolutely, and we've seen that time and time again. Let's come then to an assumption of a Biden administration. Let's assume that Joe Biden is sworn in as president on the 21st of January. Now, he's well known to us in Australia as vice president in the Obama administration. And from what we've seen already of his cabinet choices, there are some of the senior Obama administration people familiar to Australia and other nations in his lineup. What do you think a Biden administration will mean for the future of the Obama pivot to the Indo-Pacific? Now, we will recall that President Obama made that quite a feature of his foreign policy, although they then got somewhat distracted by wars and conflicts elsewhere. But nevertheless, if Biden is seen as a continuation or a transition on from Obama, what can we expect to see in the Indo-Pacific? And I specifically want you to mention the TPP, the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Now, that was a key element of Obama's administration and Hillary Clinton and Secretary of State was most certainly a supporter. She wasn't when she became a candidate because we were going into more of a protectionist mode at that point in the 2016 election. So do you think there's any hope of a Biden administration getting back involved in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, maybe a revamped agreement? Thanks. I don't think it's Obama 2.0. The reason being that the world has moved on. It's not the world it was in 2016, 17. And the sort of people who are now around Joe Biden, while very familiar to him, very much part of his inner circle or people who he worked with in the Obama administration, they've spent the last three or four years reflecting. And not only on that period and what's happened since. And the big story in that regard, Julie, is China. So when you speak to them privately or in the public presentations that they do, they are very conscious that that is the big issue, the geo-strategic competition and how they should handle that. And while many of them have what you and I would describe as Atlanticist backgrounds and a natural bias towards thinking about Europe and NATO and Russia, they have not just the more familiar ones like the Kurt Campbells of the world, but they have as a group, I think now pivoted and understand where the real challenge lies. And what we found in the Congress in the time I've been here on both sides of the aisle, there is a very strong focus now on the geo-strategic competition with China and what does that mean in practice? You're singing from my hymn sheet on the TPP, the point that we made to, or we were gonna make to Trump 2.0 and we have made to Biden related people is that this has to be reconsidered. You're right, it was a major part of the pivot, the economic and trade part of the pivot and the result would have been that they would have been setting the standards in the region and that's what we want. We want standards in the region, high quality standards around trade and investment and ultimately the Chinese can be part of that if they want but only if they observe the rules and that was the point to have a strategic pillar on the economic side. So I think of TPP at the moment as a bit like Hamlet without the Prince. The US has to be part of that process. Now, they have made it clear, the Biden people, their focus initially is domestic investment to improve the competitiveness of American workers and the American economy. And we think we can start with bite-size achievables for example, potentially a digital trade agreement which can be regionalised given some of the other digital trade agreements in the region but we also want to work towards getting them engaged on the TPP and we think by the end of next year with summit season coming up in Asia that would be a good opportunity to start to get them on the sticky paper on that because that would send a powerful signal of US engagement to the region. But Arthur, recently Australia, China and others in the ASEAN signed the RCEP, the Regional Cooperation Economic Partnership, whatever the actual... Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, yeah. Now China is a member of that. It is a different free trade agreement from the TPP. I always thought that the TPP was the gold standard. RCEP is a different agreement altogether but nevertheless it was an indication that China was prepared to be part of a regional economic agreement for the benefit of the region. Does that play into the US thinking at all? Well, it plays into our presentation to the Americans which is look at RCEP. China is now part of that. ASEAN plus agreement was driven by ASEAN as you know and that's why we want you in the region in a major trade agreement because you and others can then set the standards and you're right, TPP is a high quality agreement. It covers issues around state-owned enterprises, industrial subsidies and the like. So it's a very important agreement for us to get up and that would be our argument to the Americans and has been. Well, Arthur, more broadly on economic and trade policy given what we have observed and experienced under the Trump administration. What are going to be your key messages on behalf of the Australian government? What are you going to be saying to the new administration on economic and trade policy? We've seen America first, some of almost, that it was America only for the last four years but given the scale of the US domestic challenges and we'll come to some of those in a minute. How much focus do you really think there will be on an international policy platform like trade and what will our message be? Well, our message on that initially will be, in a sense, do no harm. We're coming out of the pandemic. We need a strong recovery. As part of that, global trade and investment has to be promoted rather than deterred. So we want to work with them. We recognize their focus on domestic investment, as I mentioned before, on infrastructure, skills training, health education and the like. And we understand that they want to engage stakeholders in the trade space, including labor and environmental groups early on, so that these groups have ownership of the trade outcomes. We understand all that. But our argument will be whether it's by American or any of these other things to work in a way which is consistent with promoting open trade rather than greater protectionism. And we all want resilient supply chains because of what's happened during the pandemic, but that doesn't have to be at the expense of international trade. Trusted supply chains among allies and partners, I think, are going to be important in that regard. That'll be part of our pitch. But as I mentioned before, we want to put up bite-sized achievables like a digital trade agreement and work from there going forward. And we also want to work with them in areas like critical technology, critical minerals and the like. Hey, Arthur, just putting my Chancellor's hat on, of course, the digital trade agreement. How can Australian universities best engage with that agenda? If that's the way the US-Australia trade relationship is heading, how can our universities get involved? Well, I think universities have a lot to offer because of the technical understanding we've got in this space. And so my advice to universities, particularly universities like the ANU, which also have strong interdisciplinary capacities, is to engage with DFAT in particular on how these agreements are being put together and identify the opportunities to shape the engagement that goes on as part of those agreements. Okay, we'll take you up on that. When travel starts again, I'm sure there'll be a delegation from ANU knocking on your door. We've been alluding to some of the domestic challenges in the United States, and we saw on our TVs the widespread protests, some pretty violent, relating to issues of race and law enforcement. What do you think the long-term impact of those issues will have on American politics and domestic economic policy in particular? I think, firstly, on domestic politics, the President-elect's response has been to make it clear that, for example, his cabinet will be a diverse and inclusive cabinet. He's made a big effort to do that, and I think that is being demonstrated by the appointments he's made to date. And he... Kamala Harris as vice president. Yes. It's a diversity ticket. Yes, exactly. And so he's using the power of his example to send a message that diversity inclusion is a win-win for the economy as a whole. You know, you can't just do things according to the old boys' clubs for one of a better description. And I think he's helping to break through some of those barriers by those appointments. He's also keen to look at the sources of disadvantage within the US and what are the best sweeter policies to deal with that. He's been getting briefed by a group actually associated with Harvard, a young Harvard economist. I forget his name now, but he's put together these massive data sets which have tracked socioeconomic pathways for people of different groupings, different characteristics through COVID to show how they've been... Some have been advantaged or relatively disadvantaged by what's happened. And that is providing a bit of a mental map for the President-Elect and the Vice President-Elect to think about what is the best way to bring policy to bear to deal with entrenched disadvantage. Arthur, I'm just going to ask one more question basically to set the scene, perhaps for some of the questions that I see coming in on chat. Now, this predates the Trump administration and often critics of Trump, and there are many, will say that he began it, but this trending back to isolationist roots began way before President Trump. Do you think it really is a trend line? I mean, driven by community sentiment about the cost of intervening around the world? I mean, essentially I got the perception at times that the American public were tiring of fighting other people's wars, that the burden of international leadership wasn't weighing as easily on their shoulders as it had in the past. Or do you think that's overstated? Do you think the US will continue its role as the primary sponsor and champion of the international rules-based order? That network of conventions and treaties and procedures underpinned by international law institutions that has essentially managed relations between nations since the end of World War II? You're right that there has been, among the American public, an element of fatigue about what they call the forever wars. I'm referring here specifically to Iraq and Afghanistan. And there's no doubt that there is, within the American polity, a strain of isolationism. But what I detect in both parties is while there's differences of emphasis, there's a recognition to the point you made before that the US actually gets massive benefits itself from a global rules-based order. It's not just some active charity on their behalf for the rest of the world. And during President Trump's time, I think there was, I think, a view pushed by the administration that allies had to do more. But in Australia's case, as you know, over the last few years, we have been doing more in terms of our defense spending, the outreach to the region, the stuff you did with ASEAN and others, et cetera.  So I think the Americans are getting the message that their allies are prepared to do more. And now remarkably, we have the Germans, the Dutch, the French talking more openly about Indo-Pacific strategies and about what they do in the region. Next year, the UK is going to be sending the Queen Elizabeth carrier and carrier group to the Indo-Pacific. So people have got the message that, yes, we've got to do more together, but the US as well has the message. And certainly President Biden himself, President-Elect, is strong on the message about working with allies. They recognize the benefits. And we, I think, should probably do a better job of explaining sometimes to the American public the benefits everybody gets from this global rules-based order. Well, without doubt, one of the strengths of US power is not only its military strength and its global naval fleet, but its global footprint comes about because of its network of alliances around the world, whether it be NATO or ANZES or the Philippines, Japan and the like. It's that collection of countries that back similar values as the United States or a similar world view that gives it its global reach. And that would be very hard to replace. And just before we go, I just wanted to ask one more question before we turn to general questions. The freedom of navigation exercises that the US have been taking in South China Sea, do you believe that those freedom of navigation exercises and the US assertiveness in conducting those exercises, not only in that area, but around the world, will continue under a Biden administration? Yes, I believe they will. And I think the Biden administration, like ourselves, will stand up on principle when it comes to the South China Sea. And that any disputes should be resolved according to international law. I think they'll be quite strong on that. That'll be also part of their broader, I think, focus on the rule of law internationally, human rights, et cetera, et cetera. They are going to be very strong on all of this. And by us standing up on these issues, as well as the US, we've encouraged countries in the region to also be more assertive in this regard. And I think that's important because they're important principles at stake, as you say, in terms of freedom of navigation, freedom of the seas, and how that plays into the global rules-based order. And so we can expect to see a return to some of the multilateral organisations support for the WTO, a return to Paris Agreement, Human Rights Council, some of these, they are not perfect organisations, they're not perfect entities by any means. But if they didn't exist, you'd have to invent them. So you'll see a return to US leadership because that was certainly missing in action, even in my last few months as foreign minister. I would be turning up at events where you would expect in times gone by where the US would turn up, state its position, and countries would basically line up between the US and others. But then the US was missing from many of these forums and others didn't step into the breach, quite frankly. So we're going to see a return of the US to... I think the convening power of the US is important if you're going to get the sort of reform that everybody wants, whether it's in the World Trade Organisation around the appellate body and other changes to the way it operates, the way the World Health Organisation operates. In regard to the Paris Agreement, there is a commitment from the President-Elect to go back in on day one and they've made climate change a whole of government priority. So it's both a domestic priority and a foreign policy priority. So yes, I think they will be more active in multilateral bodies, but it'll be the usual story. Julie, it'll be a mixture of what they do in multilateral bodies, what they do bilaterally, what they do in plurilateral situations and many laterals and all the rest of the laterals. And they do that because they can. Exactly. On that positive note, I'm going to hand back to Paul, who I think is moderating questions from our audience. Thank you so much. We've got a lot of questions coming through and I will also draw on the questions that were submitted in advance by some of our audience members. But I mean, perhaps just to start with a quick one for you both, given that we've talked, you've talked so much already about areas where we can really work together with the United States. One of our audience members asked, can you see any potential hiccups on the horizon for the relationship and what might they be? So perhaps Ambassador, we could throw to you first and then to you Chancellor, just for your perspective on any issues that might cause some difficulty in the relationship. Look, being Frank, some people in Australia are saying, well, Australia has a certain approach to climate issues. The Biden administration or Biden administration in prospect has this multifaceted approach that I alluded to before. So what's going to happen in this space? Well, the first thing is that we've been looking at what the Biden administration is offering, particularly in respect of investment in clean energy and the like. And there's a lot of overlap with what we're trying to do with investing in our low emissions technology roadmap that the government released recently. And we've also indicated in recent times what we appear to be doing about the Kyoto carryover credits. And also obviously on the issue of targets, our approach is that targets are an issue that will be addressed in due course. But what we're doing with things like the low emissions technology roadmap is lay out a path for getting there. So we're looking forward, actually in a personal sense, I'm really looking forward to engaging with them on things like that because I think there's a lot we can actually do together. And again, these are the sort of areas where ANU can play a role given the strengths you've got in some of the relevant areas. So I think there's a lot we can do together. We can help clear up some misconceptions. But in general terms, the vibes we get are very positive from them. And our main job is to shape their engagement in the region. Paul, I also think it's worth noting that Australia has a very independent foreign policy and there are always hiccups in relationships with other countries. It's how you manage them that I think counts. I mean, I remember during my time as foreign minister, I privately and publicly disagreed with the Obama administration. And then later with the Trump administration on multiple foreign policy issues, whether it be in relation to Syria, where the US at one point was convinced that presidents of Assad must go, whether it was Iran, where the Trump administration withdrew from the nuclear agreement, whether it was Libya, an arms embargo was put in place while they were pouring arms into Syria, Ukraine, the Obama administration refused to provide lethal arms to Ukraine and the like. So there are times when Australia will disagree with the United States. So I expect that will continue. We don't always agree with the UK, with Europe, with China. It's how we manage it. But I think that we have a sense of familiarity with Joe Biden and his view of the world, because after all being in public life for almost 50 years in the United States, so I'm expecting a very positive relationship between the United States and Australia. And of course, as new matters emerge, as new opportunities emerge, we are in a very good position to take advantage of them. And I certainly agree that our universities in ANU will be at the forefront of pursuing those opportunities with the technology trade agreement with the US, particularly as there seems to be a decoupling in the technology area between the US and China. And if there's incompatibility there, or then obviously Australia will need to be very nimble and flexible in its response. Indeed. I might just pick up on that actually and ask you Ambassador, when our prime minister visited Washington late last year, we had a strong emphasis on boosting science and technology collaboration. There was the announcement of the funding for collaboration with NASA and ongoing discussions in a range of areas like quantum science and artificial intelligence, which are still going on and which many of our researchers in Australia are involved with. So could I just ask you perhaps as a follow-on from the chancellor's last point, why do you think that's so important when we already have a lot of fantastic high quality research collaboration? Why this emphasis on further strengthening science and technology collaboration with the US? Because Paul, the US is still very much at the forefront of so much of science and technology. And we in Australia, I think, have a comparative advantage in this area. We punch above our weight in part because of the quality of universities like the ANU. But so I'm very keen for us to have as deep an engagement as possible and suck the marrow out of this if I can put it like that. And really get results that help to further the cause of Australia being an innovation nation. I never get sick and tired of talking about that. It's about having an innovation mindset across the whole economy. And it's by deepening our engagement with the US in these sorts of areas that we can do that. Quantum's a great example. We've got great things happening in quantum in Australia and we want those things to really develop and be the basis of industry development in Australia with an Australian workforce. And partnering with the US in those sorts of advanced areas is going to be very much to benefit. Frontier technologies, AI, critical technologies, hypersonics, quantum, you go through the list, the space domain, there's a lot going on and a lot we can work with them on. And Julie is right. There is a tech decoupling going on in those areas where technology, national security and trade sort of overlap. And this is where the concept of trusted supply chains comes into play. In the context of that sort of, at least a decoupling in key fields of technology that you're both describing, one of our audience members asked a question about current challenges in the Australia-China relationship and how that is perceived in Washington and in America. Ambassador, maybe I could throw that to you first. Well, over here, as I alluded to a few questions back, Americans or in the American political establishment have really noted the way Australia has stood up on these issues and they've noted how we've been treated in those stashes and both Jake Sullivan, who is the incoming national security advisor and people in the Trump administration have been public in their support of Australia and encouraged other countries. Indeed, other countries have come forward to support us. So there is a recognition that we're standing up on these issues. So from our point of view here in Washington, we're getting pretty strong support. The point I make to people when they ask me about these issues is we don't wait for a phone call from Washington or London or somewhere else. We've made these decisions and Julie, much closer to some of these decisions than I was, we've made these decisions based on principle, right? And this is the point we're trying to get across, perhaps to some of our neighbors in the region. We're not doing this because we're anti-Chinese in this case, for example. We're doing it because there are principles at stake. And in a consistent rules-based order, you have to stand up for principle because if you become ad hominem or inconsistent, people will see you have no credibility. You have to be consistent. Yeah, I think it's interesting. I'm looking at some of the questions coming through on chat and there's this suggestion that Australia doesn't make its own decisions and it doesn't have an independent foreign policy. Well, that is in fact not the case. Australia makes its own decisions based on its national interests. And some of them don't please China. Some of our decisions don't please China and China responds by using economic coercion, very assertive, sometimes aggressive China. Other nations respond differently, but at the end of the day, Australia makes its own decisions in its national interests. For example, I recall that we didn't join the Belt and Road Initiative, not because of some anti-China reason, but because of the governance concerns we had and the financial structure. It was not a model that attracted Australian interest, had nothing to do with the fact that it was a Chinese model. And I'm not sure whether the Morrison government is continuing that, but we take our own decisions that don't always please our partners and friends and allies and particularly in trading relationships. But I think that Australia does gain the respect of others by being true to our principles, by being true to our national interests and not apologizing for making decisions that actually are for the benefit of the Australian people. Now, every country does that in its own way. China, the US, the countries of Europe and Australia and others in our region, you make decisions that are in your national interest. I might take that and ask a couple of questions that we had pre-submitted from audience members about the Australia-US alliance, but also different groupings of different countries. And we had a couple of questions that were on a common theme of whether, if we think long-term into the future, we should be relying on the United States for our security. And people ask different questions about different groupings of countries. One alternative that was put by one of our audience members was recreating a kind of new British empire where we would join together with the UK and Canada and New Zealand and perhaps even India. So could I get both of your thoughts, perhaps starting with the Chancellor, on different kinds of groupings in the context of how we think about the bilateral alliance? Well, we don't rely solely on the United States for our security. I mean, we have a military alliance that commits each to come to the other's support if under attack. And that only happens in extreme circumstances. I think the ANZAS alliance has only been in vote once since 1951 when it was entered into. And that was September 11 when Australia invoked the ANZAS alliance because the United States was under attack. But the best way that we can ensure our national security, I believe, is to have strong and constructive relationships with the nations of our region. And that's what we seek to do and beyond. I mean, personally, I think that we need to invest more in our diplomatic network through the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. And interestingly, that's an issue that Jim Mattis, the former US Defense Secretary, raised the other day, a webinar I was on with him and they were talking about building up US military. And Jim Mattis, the former Defense Secretary, said, what I would rather see is the State Department in the US build a bigger diplomatic network and you'd need less reason for a defense and security network. I liked his thinking. And so that's something that I would certainly continue to advocate. But also I think that we do have some very strong relationships in our region. Australia's relationship with Japan, we recently signed a sort of a status of forces agreement with Japan. We have a very strong relationship with South Korea. The Quad, and I'd be interested in Arthur's comments on the Japan, US, India, Australia relationship seems to have come to another level. So Australia is busily engaging with other nations in our region and beyond. And that's what gives us our security umbrella, not just the United States. Of course, that's a very primary source of support, but our alliance is beyond. I agree with all of that. And let me just build on it a little bit. You can't force feed these things. Relationships develop for a whole variety of reasons because you have values or interests in common. And as long as the US has an interest in a global rules-based order, we will have a common interest. And the values that we have in common will continue, I think through time, decent humane universal values, the sort of values that underpin liberal democracies. But that doesn't mean we also don't have relationships with countries which may not have quite the same values, but interests which are in common. Vietnam is a classic recent example. And to Julie's point, and this was one of the great things she did in her time as foreign minister, is we have been reaching out creatively into our region through Southeast Asia, the Pacific, whatever, Northeast Asia, as Julie mentioned, in a way which has been quite active and quite forward-looking. And so when the US look at us, they see an alliance partner that is prepared to engage independently in the region, doesn't always talk about the region the same way the US does. I mean, we have common interests, but when we talk to the region, we say to the region, this is not about you choosing between the US and China. What we say in the region is what we want for the region and the reason we want US engagement in the region is that to give countries the capacity to exercise their independence and their sovereignty. Because countries in the region say to us, they don't want to be in a situation where they have to make some sort of binary choice. They want to be able to live with China, to deal with China, trade with China, but they want the security of having someone like the US engaged in the region. The Quad is developing organically. India, in particularly in recent times, has become much more engaged because clearly they've got issues, not just with China, but also as they grow themselves, they realize their engagement in the region is very much to their security interest. They're becoming very active members of the Quad. And that's why I say you can't force-feed these things. Interests and values will bring countries together. And we do act independently of the US, but in ways which are consistent with objectives we have in common for this global rules-based order. Thank you very much. I might just take us back to the election result, if I can, before we finish our time for Q&A. One of our first questions submitted in writing was from an audience member who asked about the election result. And the question goes as follows. Biden's election victory can be understood as a rejection of Trump, the individual, but not necessarily Trumpism or the Republican Party. So how wary will other countries be that Trumpism could return? And what are the risks to Australia of assuming that things will, quote unquote, go back to normal? Well, perhaps I'll start and then we can finish with... Look, I think this goes to the heart of the Trump presidency and there's much focus on Trump, the individual, his idiosyncrasies and his unorthodox style, sure, and his personal foibles and his obsession with Twitter. But I don't think there's been enough attention given to the reasons why more than 70 million Americans voted for President Trump. Now, I think that there are large sections of the US who feel that they have become steadily worse off under the policies of successive administrations. And in particular, they perceive that the forces of globalism have cost them their jobs or lowered their standard of living. And quite frankly, there is some evidence to justify these concerns. So they voted for an outsider who would disrupt the system that they believed had failed them. Now, President Trump has used populist policies, you know, protectionism, American first, and that appeals to these people who feel disenfranchised or disempowered. And I think that until they feel a material improvement, they'll continue to vote for a disruptor, whether it's President Trump or someone else. So I think we're likely to see a bigger contrast between future administrations. You know, it depends on whether it's a more orthodox candidate or another populist. But I think arguably the biggest risk to Australia of this political environment is that the US becomes more focused on its domestic agenda and the domestic divisions within the country and less focused on its longstanding role as sponsor and champion and guarantor of the international rules-based order. Because that order has benefited Australia enormously. I mean, it's supported Australia's economic growth and many others since World War II because the United States has taken that role. So, Arthur, what's your thoughts? No, I think that's a great analysis of what's been going on here. And the perception that wealth in recent times has been concentrated on the East and West Coast and the flyover states, so-called, have felt like they've missed out. And you're right that there will be quite a focus on the domestic agenda because I think President Biden realises investing back in the US is part of his way of reaching out to some of these people who feel they've been left behind. And there's no doubt that President Trump tried to put together a vision of how to deal with all of these sorts of issues. What we're saying to Biden administration by all means deal with those issues, but let's deal with the external side as well because when they get into power on the 20th of January, can you imagine the national security advisers in trade is gonna be pretty heavy. So they're gonna have to focus on external as well as domestic issues, but on domestic institutions like the ANU, which have great policy analysis skills across so many areas, we have to think about ways, well, okay, how do we apply policy lessons from Australia and elsewhere in this environment to address the very issues that Julie talked about. Thank you, Ambassador. And maybe if with one minute that we have left, if I could ask you one final question, which is to see if you could offer us a bit of a prediction about what you think will happen with the Georgia Senate runoff elections coming up and what do you think that will mean for the balance of power in the new year? Look, still too early to tell, most of the money at the moment is that it is very close and that likely that there'll have to be a recount. We haven't even had the proper count because we haven't had the election yet, but already because people think it's gonna be very close, the challenge has been the Republicans have got to get the vote back out and because of the confrontation around the election itself, which may have undermined some people's confidence in electoral processes, the Republicans are now working to try and get the vote out. In Georgia, Stacey Abrams, who ran for governor, has a huge vote generating machine she's put together and they're gonna have to crank back up. So I think it's actually gonna be quite a close race if the Republicans can retain the Senate as a result of that winning the two seats there, that will mean that they will be able to have a majority in the Senate and therefore push the president-elect more towards the center than perhaps he might otherwise have been inclined.  Thank you so much and I'd like to thank both our speakers on behalf of our alumni team and our North America office here. It's been a fantastic opportunity to hear your insights. I will now hand back to the vice chancellor for the final word and to close today's event, but please take care everyone and thanks again. Thank you, Paul, and let me thank Ambassador Senadino's chancellor, Julie Bishop. That was a dynamite conversation. I think one of the great things about COVID-19 and there's not much great about it has been our ability now to have events like this where we literally have the likes of two of you with all of your knowledge and wisdom in our living rooms. And I was really impressed by your willingness to speak to the issues and I think people will have gotten insights today that you just simply don't get via any other means and it's not gonna be printed in the same way in media. So really, really appreciate that and I hope our alumni group has appreciated that as well. I thank you to our audience today who have joined us from around the U.S., around the world and I hope you have enjoyed this as much as I have. As we end the year of 2020, I do wish everyone a happy and safe end to what has been a pretty crappy year. Can't put it any other way. 2021 will continue to bring challenges but I know we'll be on the road to recovery but there will be opportunities. For us at ANU, it's a significant milestone. It's our 75th anniversary. It is an opportunity for alumni in the wider university community to come together, to reflect, celebrate our shared history while looking to the future. Universities have an incredibly strong role about shaping the future and we can make the future be better and more prosperous or we can mess it up. And I think we need to be in the middle of that conversation to help make sure we take the right path. So thank you one and all. If you are interested in being involved with our 75th anniversary activities, please get in touch with our alumni relations team. Thanks again and hope to see you all in person in 2021.


Hello everyone. Today I'm going to tell you about location patterns of manufacturing industries in Tunisia. The literature on agglomeration economies shows that firms enjoy positive externalities from concentration of economic activities in a particular region. In most countries, concentration is too great to be random. Concentration is indeed determined by the complex interaction of manufacturers. We broadly distinguish between three main categories of factors. The first category is what we call first nature causes. These concern concentration attributed to natural cost advantages, including the proximity to the sea, the characteristics linked to the physical landscape, the abundance of natural resources, favorable climate conditions, and so on. The second category is what we call second nature causes or the whole market effect. These concern concentration attributed to the interaction between economic agents. They are divided into agglomeration forces operating via factors of production, including physical and knowledge spillovers and labor market pooling and agglomeration forces operating via goods related to demand and cost linkages. The third category is the in-between category is what might be called economic infrastructure. They include local public goods, such as transport networks, and factor endowments, such as industry specific skills. Let's introduce briefly agglomeration economies. A common classification of agglomeration economies distinguishes between localization and urbanization effects. Localization effects cause a high concentration of firms of the same industry. This is assimilated to externalities of specialization. And urbanization effects lead to clustering of firms of many different industries. This is assimilated to externalities of diversity. Both localization and urbanization effects can be divided into static and dynamic externalities. Dynamic externalities arise from technological and knowledge spillovers, and static externalities include natural cost advantages, local public goods, factor endowments, and pecuniary externalities related to demand and cost linkages. Both static and dynamic externalities explain the existing location of firms, but only dynamic externalities account for economic growth. In this presentation, I will try to shed some lights on broad spatial location patterns of the main manufacturing industries in Tunisia. My investigation will be based on three empirical studies and on general information about the characteristics of the various cities and main manufacturing industries involved. I will tackle mainly three issues. I will first answer the most crucial question of whether manufacturing industries are indeed agglomerated in Tunisia. Second, I will try to identify the main factors accounting for specialization patterns. And finally, I will try to suggest few facts about urbanization patterns based mostly on stylized facts, given that most studies have been conducted on the developed world, mainly on U.S. cities, so we still know very little about the developing world. The three empirical studies have mainly focused on testing whether dynamic externalities account for economic growth. They use data on Tunisian coastal governories and delegations, and the main manufacturing industries involved are divided into mature industries, including textile industries, leather and shoes industries, and agro food industries. And knowledge-intensive industries including chemical industries, electric and electronic industries, and mechanical and metallurgical industries. Let's start with the first issue. Manufacturing industries are indeed agglomerated in Tunisia. Mature industries are agglomerated along the whole coastal line. Leather and shoes industries are concentrated in the northeast region, notably in the governorates of Bizerte and Nebel. Tick-style industries are concentrated in the center east in the governorate of Monastir, and agro food industries are concentrated both in the northeast in the governorate of Nebel, and the center east in the governorate of Svex, the second central business district in the country. While knowledge-intensive industries are mainly concentrated in the northeast region, precisely in the governorate of Ben-Aruz, one of the four governorates of the Great Tunis. Now let's move to the second issue where I investigate specialization patterns. I will try in particular to broadly assess the importance of knowledge spillovers for each sector whenever it's possible. I start with mature industries. First, textile industries. This sector is less dependent upon local resources. It is one of the most exporting sectors in the country, and moreover, specialization is reinforced by foreign direct investment. The governorate of Monastir is characterized by its skilled labor pools specialized in textile due to the local transfer of knowledge from one generation to the next. It is also characterized by its good transport networks, including an international airport, and by its research infrastructure, including a competitiveness center specialized in textile. For this sector, it may be possible to broadly assess the importance of knowledge spillovers, which prevail based on empirical studies, mainly those using labor productivity-based regressions. Moreover, based on IEDI and Matusi, who found that 11% of new firms are created in Monastir, like the third after the two central business districts, Tunis and Svex, and moreover, most of new firms created at the national level are in the textile sector. This may suggest the likely importance of knowledge spillovers for these industries. One may then conclude that concentration of textile industries in Monastir is mainly attributable to skilled labor pool, to strong forward linkages mainly related to large foreign demand, and to the likely important knowledge spillovers. Now, let's move to the second sector, leather and shoes industries. This sector is largely dependent on tenant leader, so tannery is a crucial segment in the industry. Specialization is largely impassed by foreign direct investment in the proportion of 70% according to Kara Andris, and moreover, the Tunisian production is largely linked to the international market. Indeed, more than 95% of firms export 100% of their output. As for the two governments, Nebel and Bezert, they are characterized by their proximity to tanneries at least two, and to the most important ports in the country, the port of Redes for Nebel and the port of Bezert for Bezert, reducing thereby shipping goods to foreign consumers. Given that specialization in this sector is largely impassed by foreign direct investment, the question which arises why foreign direct investment does not favor the location of the governorate of Sfax, though it has similar characteristics as the first two governorates with its two tanneries and its important port, the second in the country. The answer is likely due mainly to two reasons. First, the attractiveness of the first two governorates, the beauty of their landscape, their mind weather, also for their touristic infrastructure, especially for the case of Nebel. And the second reason is the weak attractiveness of Sfax to foreign direct investment for many reasons, including its poor international accessibility. Sfax also exhibits these economies quite common to large towns and to central business districts, and it is also a quite capitalistic governorate. One may then conclude that concentration of leather and shoes industries is mainly attributable to input sharing, to strong forward linkages mainly related to large foreign demand, to the physical geography, the attractiveness of the city, to environment quality of life, and also to the prevalence of knowledge spillovers based on empirical studies, though it's not clear whether they are important or not here. Now let's move to the last mature sector, agro-food industries. This is a resource intensive sector, so the question which arises, shall we expect agro-food firms to concentrate more in governorates having natural cost advantages or in those contributing the most to the agricultural production at the national level? This sector is known to serve mainly the local market. Now let's describe the two governorates starting with Nebel, which is characterized by its natural cost advantages including climate conditions and land favorable for growing high value farm goods including citrus fruits, grapes and strawberries. Nebel is also characterized by its factor endowments including its skilled labor pool due to the transfer of know-how from the Andalusians since the 16th century and also to the availability of water resources due to the transfer of water from the northwest region region well endowed with water resources through the Mid-Jerda Cabin Canal. Nebel is also characterized by its proximity to technology parks specialized in plant biotechnology, water and environment and by its large market size and large local demand including strong seasonal tourist demand. One may then conclude that concentration of agro food industries in the governorate of Nebel is mainly attributable to natural cost advantages, climate conditions plus land to factor endowments, skilled labor pool plus availability of water resources to important pecuniary externalities related to demand and cost linkages and also to the prevalence of knowledge spillovers though we cannot assess their importance here. As for the governorate of specs, concentration of agro food firms there is attributable more to factor endowments and to strong agglomeration forces operating via goods than to natural cost advantages. As for agglomeration forces operating via goods similarly to the case of Nebel specs is characterized by its large market size and large local demand indeed more than 80% of its agro food firms serve the local market. As for its factor endowments in addition to its skilled labor pool as in the case of Nebel specs is characterized by an important by its important financial capacities allowing its investors to exploit economic policies which provide subsidies to encourage the cattle farming sector despite its poor grazing land. Now let's move to knowledge intensive industries which are mainly located in the governorate of Ben-Aruz. All what we can say or the most important we can say about these sectors is that one of these sectors notably electric and electronic industries is the first exporting sector in the country. As for the governorate of Ben-Aruz it is characterized by its skilled labor pool with higher human capital partly generated by its quite important research infrastructure including two technology parks specialized in biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries among other things and also an aerospace center. Ben-Aruz is also characterized by its well-designed industrial zones where a non-negligible portion of knowledge intensive industries firms are located. Ben-Aruz is one of the four governorates of the Great Jonas so it is characterized by its proximity to the first central business district Jonas meaning quite large land and housing prices so the location of knowledge intensive industries there is probably for the important knowledge spillovers which are likely to be more than enough to make up the high costs. One may then conclude that concentration of knowledge intensive industries in Ben-Aruz is mainly attributable to industry specific spillovers mostly knowledge spillovers to factor endowments including skilled labor pool with high human capital and well-designed industrial zones and to a lesser extent to forward linkages related to foreign demand for the aforementioned sector. Now I will suggest few facts about urbanization patterns. First it is well known in the literature that new firms generally locate in diverse environments. In Tunisia the largest portions of new firms are located are created in the two central business districts Jonas and Spaks. One may then conclude that Jonas and Spaks are two diversified governorates. As for Jonas there is an empirical evidence about this fact as for Spaks so far this fact is only based on observed patterns. Second though larger cities tend to be more diversified there is however a weak correspondence between city size and diversity. Ben-Aruz and Jonas are the most diversified governorates in the country however Ben-Aruz is more diversified but smaller than Jonas. After this investigation one may come up with the following conclusions. First the main manufacturing industries are all concentrated in Tunisia. Second labor market pooling is the most important agglomeration mechanism at work for both mature and knowledge intensive industries suggesting that industries partly locate in specialized environments to share a common pool of specialized workers. Second according to several studies localization effects are low and urbanization effects are high in knowledge intensive industries. This is not the case of Tunisia where both effects are high in knowledge intensive industries. Indeed Ben-Aruz the most diversified governorate is also the most specialized in knowledge intensive industries suggesting that the most important agglomeration mechanisms at work are labor market pooling and knowledge spillovers. The fourth conclusion there are no clear patterns for the correspondence between city size and specialization in Tunisia. Indeed several patterns coexist. First medium-sized cities the case of Bizarre and large cities the case of Monastir are specialized more in mature sectors and less in knowledge intensive industries. The second pattern large cities the case of Ben-Aruz are specialized more in knowledge intensive industries and less in mature industries. Third medium-sized cities the case of Sphax and large cities the case of Nebel are specialized in both knowledge in both mature and knowledge intensive industries. And I finish with the last conclusion. It is well known in the literature that urbanization effects are high in central business districts. This is the case of Tunisia where the two central business districts Tunis and Sphax are diversified however they exhibit different patterns. While Sphax is both diversified and specialized Tunis is diversified but has no single manufacturing industry. We should be here very cautious in drawing conclusions in general because this might not be the case if we consider service industries. Thank you very much for your attention.