THE ESSENTIAL DESTINY OF REASON subsection 2 This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Introduction to The Philosophy of History by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel THE ESSENTIAL DESTINY OF REASON subsection 2 What means spirit uses in order to realize its idea? The question of the means by which freedom develops itself to a world conducts us to the phenomenon of history itself. Although freedom is primarily an undeveloped idea, the means it uses are external and phenomenal, presenting themselves in history to our sensuous vision. The first glance at history convinces us that the actions of men proceed from their needs, their passions, their characters and talents, and impresses us with a belief that such needs, passions and interests are the sole springs of action, the efficient agents in this scene of activity. Among these may perhaps be found aims of a liberal or universal kind, benevolence it may be, or noble patriotism, but such virtues and general views are but insignificant as compared with the world and its doings. We may perhaps see the ideal of reason actualized in those who adopt such aims and within the sphere of their influence, but they bear only a trifling proportion to the mass of the human race, and the extent of that influence is limited accordingly. Passions, private aims and the satisfaction of selfish desires are, on the other hand, most effective springs of action. Their power lies in the fact that they respect none of the limitations which justice and morality would impose on them, and that these natural impulses have a more direct influence over man than the artificial and tedious discipline that tends to order and self-restraint, law and morality. When we look at this display of passions and the consequences of their violence, the unreason which is associated not only with them but even, rather we might say especially, with good designs and righteous aims, when we see the evil, the vice, the ruin that has befallen the most flourishing kingdoms which the mind of man ever created, we can scarce avoid being filled with sorrow at this universal taint of corruption, and since this decay is not the work of mere nature but of the human will, a moral embitterment, a revolt of the good spirit, if it have a place within us, may well be the result of our reflections. Without rhetorical exaggeration, a simply truthful combination of the miseries that have overwhelmed the noblest of nations and polities and the finest exemplars of private virtue forms a picture of most fearful aspect and excites emotions of the profoundest and most hopeless sadness, counterbalanced by no consolatory result. We endure in beholding it a mental torture allowing no defence or escape but the consideration that what has happened could not be otherwise, that it is a fatality which no intervention could alter, and at last we draw back from the intolerable disgust with which these sorrowful reflections threaten us into the more agreeable environment of our individual life, the present formed by our private aims and interests. In short, we retreat into the selfishness that stands on the quiet shore, and thence enjoy in safety the distant spectacle of wrecks confusedly hurled. But even regarding history as the slaughter bench at which the happiness of peoples, the wisdom of states and the virtue of individuals have been victimised, the question involuntarily arises, to what principle, to what final aim these enormous sacrifices have been offered? From this point, the investigation usually proceeds to that which we have made the general commencement of our inquiry. Starting from this, we pointed out those phenomena which made up a picture so suggestive of gloomy emotions and thoughtful reflections as the very field which we, for our part, regard as exhibiting only the means for realising what we assert to be the essential destiny, the absolute aim, or, which comes to the same thing, the true result of the world's history. We have all along purposely eschewed moral reflections as a method of rising from the scene of historical specialities to the general principles which they embody. Besides, it is not the interest of such sentimentalities really to rise above these depressing emotions and to solve the enigmas of providence which the considerations that occasioned them present. It is essential to their character to find a gloomy satisfaction in the empty and fruitless sublimities of that negative result. We return then to the point of view which we have adopted. Observing that the successive steps of the analysis to which it will lead us will also evolve the conditions requisite for answering the inquiries suggested by the panorama of sin and suffering that history unfolds. The first remark we have to make, and which, though already presented more than once, cannot be too often repeated when the occasion seems to call for it, is that what we call principle, aim, destiny, or the nature and idea of spirit is something merely general and abstract. Principle, plan of existence, law is a hidden, undeveloped essence which as such, however true in itself, is not completely real. Ames, principles, etc. have a place in our thoughts in our subjective design only, but not yet in the sphere of reality. That which exists for itself only is a possibility, a potentiality, but has not yet emerged into existence. A second element must be introduced in order to produce actuality, namely actuation, realization, and whose motive power is the will. The activity of man in the widest sense. It is only by this activity that that idea as well as abstract characteristics generally are realized, actualized, for of themselves they are powerless. The motive power that puts them in operation and gives them some determinate existence is the need, instinct, inclination, and passion of man. That some conception of mine should be developed into act and existence is my earnest desire. I wish to assert my personality in connection with it. I wish to be satisfied by its execution. If I am to exert myself for any object, it must in some way or other be my object. In the accomplishment of such or such designs, I must at the same time find my satisfaction. Although the purpose for which I exert myself includes a complication of results, many of which have no interest for me. This is the absolute right of personal existence to find itself satisfied in its activity and labor. If men are to interest themselves for anything, they must, so to speak, have part of their existence involved in it. Find their individuality gratified by its attainment. Here a mistake must be avoided. We intend blame and justly impute it as a fault when we say of an individual that he is interested in taking part in such or such transactions. That is, seeks only his private advantage. In reprehending this, we find fault with him furthering his personal aims without any regard to a more comprehensive design of which he takes advantage to promote his own interest or which he even sacrifices with this view. But he who is active in promoting an object is not simply interested, but interested in that object itself. Language faithfully expresses this distinction. Nothing therefore happens. Nothing is accomplished unless the individual's concerns seek their own satisfaction in the issue. They are particular units of society. That is, they have special needs, instincts, and interests generally, peculiar to themselves. Among these needs are not only such as we usually call necessities, the stimuli of individual desire and volition, but also those connected with individual views and convictions or, to use the term expressing less decision, leanings of opinion, supposing the impulses of reflection, understanding, and reason to have been awakened. In these cases people demand, if they are to exert themselves in any direction, that the object should commend itself to them, that in point of opinion, whether as to its goodness, justice, advantage, profit, they should be able to enter into it. This is a consideration of special importance in our age when people are less than formerly influenced by reliance on others and by authority, when, on the contrary, they devote their activities to a cause on the ground of their own understanding, their independent conviction and opinion. We assert, then, that nothing has been accomplished without interest on the part of the actors, and, if interests be called passion, in as much as the whole individuality to the neglect of all other actual or possible interests and claims is devoted to an object with every fiber of volition, concentrating all its desires and powers upon it, we may affirm absolutely that nothing great in the world has been accomplished without passion. Two elements, therefore, enter into the object of our investigation. The first, the idea, the second, the complex of human passions, the one the warp, the other the woof of the vast aris web of universal history. The concrete mean and union of the two is liberty under the conditions of morality and estate. We have spoken of the idea of freedom as the nature of spirit and the absolute goal of history. Passion is regarded as a thing of sinister aspect, as more or less immoral. Man is required to have no passions. Passion, it is true, is not quite the suitable word for what I wish to express. I mean here nothing more than human activity as resulting from private interests, special, or if you will, self-seeking designs, with this qualification, that the whole energy of will and character is devoted to their attainment, that other interests, which would in themselves constitute attractive aims, or rather, all things else, are sacrificed to them. The object in question is so bound up with the man's will that it entirely and alone determines the hue of resolution and is inseparable from it.  For a person is a specific existence, not man in general, a term to which no real existence corresponds, but a particular human being. The term character likewise expresses this idiosyncrasy of will and intelligence. But character comprehends all peculiarities whatever, the way in which a person conducts himself in private relations, etc., and is not limited to his idiosyncrasy in its practical and active phase. I shall therefore use the term passion, understanding thereby the particular bent of character. As far as the peculiarities of volition are not limited to private interest, but supply the impelling and actuating force for accomplishing deeds shared in by the community at large, passion is in the first instance the subjective, and therefore the formal side of energy, will, and activity, leaving the object or aim still undetermined. And there is a similar relation of formality to reality in merely individual conviction, individual views, individual conscience. It is always a question of essential importance, what is the purport of my conviction, what the object of my passion, in deciding whether the one or the other is of a true and substantial nature. Conversely, if it is so, it will inevitably attain actual existence. Be realized. From this comment on the second essential element in the historical embodiment of an aim, we infer, glancing at the institution of the state in passing, that a state is then well constituted and internally powerful when the private interest of its citizens is one with the common interest of the state, when the one finds its gratification and realization in the other, a proposition in itself very important. But in a state many institutions must be adopted, much political machinery invented, accompanied by appropriate political arrangements, necessitating long struggles of the understanding before what is really appropriate can be discovered, involving, moreover, contentions with private interest and passions and a tedious discipline of these latter in order to bring about the desired harmony. The epoch when a state attains this harmonious condition marks the period of its bloom, its virtue, its vigor, and its prosperity. But the history of mankind does not begin with a conscious aim of any kind, as it is the case with the particular circles into which men form themselves of set purpose. The mere social instinct implies a conscious purpose of security for life and property, and when society has been constituted, this purpose becomes more comprehensive. The history of the world begins with its general aim, the realization of the idea of spirit, only in an implicit form, that is, as nature, a hidden, most profoundly hidden, unconscious instinct. And the whole process of history, as already observed, is directed to rendering this unconscious impulse a conscious one. Thus appearing in the form of merely natural existence, natural will, that which has been called the subjective side, physical craving, instinct, passion, private interest, as also opinion and subjective conception, spontaneously present themselves at the very commencement. This vast congeries of volitions, interests, and activities constitute the instruments and means of the world's spirit for attaining its object, bringing it to consciousness, and realizing it. And this aim is none other than finding itself, coming to itself, and contemplating itself in concrete actuality. But that, those manifestations of vitality on the part of individuals and peoples, in which they seek and satisfy their own purposes, are, at the same time, the means and instruments of a higher and broader purpose of which they know nothing, which they realize unconsciously, might be made a matter of question, rather, has been questioned, and in every variety of form negative decried and condemned as mere dreaming and philosophy. But on this point I announced my view at the very outset and asserted our hypothesis, which, however, will appear in the sequel in the form of a legitimate inference, and our belief that reason governs the world and has consequently governed its history. In relation to this independently universal and substantial existence, all else is subordinate, subservient to it, and the means for its development. The union of universal abstract existence generally with the individual, the subjective, that this alone is truth, belongs to the department of speculation and is treated in this general form in logic. But in the process of the world's history itself, as still incomplete, the abstract final aim of history is not yet made the distinct object of desire and interest. While these limited sentiments are still unconscious of the purpose they are fulfilling, the universal principle is implicit in them and is realizing itself through them. The question also assumes the form of the union of freedom and necessity. The latent abstract process of spirit being regarded as necessity, while that which exhibits itself in the conscious will of men as their interest, belongs to the domain of freedom. As the metaphysical connection, that is, the connection in the idea of these forms of thought, belongs to logic, it would be out of place to analyze it here. The chief and cardinal points only shall be mentioned. Philosophy shows that the idea advances to an infinite antithesis, that, namely, between the idea in its free universal form, in which it exists for itself, and the contrasted form of abstract introversion, reflection on itself, which is formal existence for self, personality, formal freedom, such as belongs to spirit only. The universal idea exists thus as the substantial totality of things on the one side, and as the abstract essence of free volition on the other side. This reflection of the mind on itself is individual self-consciousness, the polar opposite of the idea in its general form, or existing in absolute limitation. This polar opposite is consequently limitation, particularization for the universal absolute being. It is the side of its definite existence, the sphere of its formal reality, the sphere of the reverence paid to God. To comprehend the absolute connection of this antithesis is the profound task of metaphysics. This limitation originates all forms of particularity of whatever kind. The formal volition of which we have spoken wills itself, desires to make its own personality valid in all that it purposes and does, even the pious individual wishes to be saved and happy. This pole of the antithesis existing for itself is, in contrast with the absolute universal being, a special separate existence taking cognizance of speciality only and willing that alone. In short, it plays its part in the region of mere phenomena. This is the sphere of particular purposes, in effecting which individuals exert themselves on behalf of their individuality, give it full play and objective realization. This is also the sphere of happiness and its opposite. He is happy who finds his condition suited to his special character, will and fancy, and so enjoys himself in that condition. The history of the world is not the theatre of happiness. Periods of happiness are blank pages in it, for they are periods of harmony, periods when the antithesis is in abeyance. Reflection on self, the freedom above described, is abstractly defined as the formal element of the activity of the absolute idea. The realizing activity of which we have spoken is the middle term of the syllogism, one of whose extremes is the universal essence, the idea which reposes in the penetralia of spirit, and the other, the complex of external things, objective matter. That activity is the medium by which the universal latent principle is translated into the domain of objectivity. I will endeavor to make what has been said more vivid and clear by examples. The building of a house is in the first instance a subject of aim and design. On the other hand we have as means the several substances required for the work. Iron, wood, stones. The elements are made use of in working up this material. Fire to melt the iron, wind to blow the fire, water to set wheels in motion in order to cut the wood, etc. The result is that the wind which has helped to build the house is shut out by the house. So also are the violence of rains and floods and the destructive powers of fire, so far as the house is made fireproof. The stones and beams obey the law of gravity pressed downward and so high walls are carried up. Thus the elements are made use of in accordance with their nature and yet to co-operate for a product by which their operation is limited. Thus the passions of men are gratified. They develop themselves and their aims in accordance with their natural tendencies and build up the edifice of human society thus fortifying a position for right and order against themselves. The connection of events above indicated involves also the fact that in history an additional result is commonly produced by human actions beyond that which they aim at and obtain, that which they immediately recognize and desire. They gratify their own interest, but something farther is thereby accomplished, latent in the actions in question, though not present to their consciousness and not included in their design. An analogous example is offered in the case of a man who, from a feeling of revenge, perhaps not an unjust one, but produced by injury on the other's part, burns that other man's house. A connection is immediately established between the deed itself and the train of circumstances included in it, taken abstractly. In itself it consisted in merely presenting a small flame to a small portion of a beam. Events not involved in that simple act follow of themselves. The part of the beam which was set fire to is connected with its remote portions. The beam itself is united with the woodwork of the house generally, and this with other houses. So that a wide conflagration ensues which destroys the goods and chattels of many other persons besides his against whom the act of revenge was first directed. Perhaps even costs not a few men their lives. This lay neither in the deed abstractly, nor in the design of the man who committed it. But the action has a further general bearing. In the design of the doer it was only revenge executed against an individual in the destruction of his property. But it is moreover a crime and that involves punishment also. This may not have been present to the mind of the perpetrator, still less in his intention. But his deed itself, the general principles it calls into play its substantial content entails it. By this example I wish only to impress on you the consideration that in a simple act something farther may be implicated than lies in the intention and consciousness of the agent. The example before us involves however this additional consideration that the substance of the act consequently, we may say the act itself recoils upon the perpetrator, reacts upon him with destructive tendency. The union of the two extremes, the embodiment of a general idea of direct reality and the elevation of a speciality into connection with universal truth is brought to pass at first sight under the conditions of an utter diversity of nature between the two and an indifference of the one extreme towards the other. The aims which the agent set before them are limited and special. But it must be remarked that the agents themselves are intelligent thinking beings. The purport of their desires is interwoven with general, essential considerations of justice, good, duty, etc. For mere desire, volition in its rough and savage forms falls not within the scene and sphere of universal history. Those general considerations which form at the same time a norm for directing aims and actions have determinate purport. For such an abstraction as good for its own sake has no place in living reality. If men are to act they must not only intend the good but must have decided for themselves whether this or that particular thing is a good. What special course of action however is good or not is determined as regards the ordinary contingencies of private life by the laws and customs of a state and here no great difficulty is presented. Each individual has his position he knows on the whole what a just honorable course of conduct is as to ordinary private relations the assertion that it is difficult to choose the right and good the regarding it as the mark of an exalted morality to find difficulties and raise scruples on that score may be set down to an evil or perverse will which seeks to evade duties not in themselves of a perplexing nature or at any rate to an idly reflective habit of mind where a feeble will affords no sufficient exercise to the faculties leaving them therefore to find occupation within themselves and to expend themselves on moral self-adulation it is quite otherwise with the comprehensive relations that history has to do with. In this sphere are presented those momentous collisions between existing acknowledged duties laws and rights and those contingencies which are adverse to this fixed system which assail and even destroy its foundations and existence whose tenor may nevertheless seem good on the large scale advantageous yes even indispensable and necessary these contingencies realize themselves in history they involve a general principle of a different order from that on which depends the permanence of a people or a state this principle is an essential phase in the development of the creating idea of truth striving and urging towards consciousness of itself historical men world historical individuals are those in whose aims such a general principle lies Caesar in danger of losing a position not perhaps at that time of superiority yet at least of equality with the others who were at the head of the state and of succumbing to those who were just on the point of becoming his enemies belongs essentially to this category these enemies who were at the same time pursuing their personal aims had the form of the constitution and the power conferred by an appearance of justice on their side Caesar was contending for the maintenance of his position honor and safety and since the power of his opponents included the sovereignty over the provinces of the Roman Empire his victory secured for him the conquest of that entire empire and he thus became though leaving the form of the constitution the autocrat of the state that which secured for him the execution of a design which in the first instance was of negative import the autocracy of Rome was however at the same time an independently necessary feature in the history of Rome and of the world it was not then his private gain merely but an unconscious impulse that occasioned the accomplishment of that for which the time was ripe such are all great historical men whose own particular aims involve those large issues which are the will of the world spirit they may be called heroes in as much as they have derived their purposes and their vocation not from the calm a regular course of things sanctioned by the existing order but from a concealed fount one which has not attained to phenomenal present existence from that inner spirit still hidden beneath the surface which impinging on the outer world as on a shell bursts it in pieces because it is another colonel than that which belonged to the shell in question they are men therefore who appear to draw the impulse of their life from themselves and whose deeds have produced a condition that reflects of historical relations which appear to be only their interest and their work such individuals had no consciousness of the general idea they were unfolding while prosecuting those aims of theirs on the contrary they were practical political men but at the same time they were thinking men who had an insight into the requirements of the time what was ripe for development this was the very truth for their age for their world the species next in order so to speak and which was already formed in the womb of time it was theirs to know this nascent principle the necessary directly sequenced step in progress which their world was to take to make this their aim and to expend their energy in promoting it world historical men the heroes of an epoch must therefore be recognized as its clear sighted ones their deeds, their words are the best of that time great men have formed purposes to satisfy themselves not others whatever prudent designs and councils they might have learned from others would be the more limited and inconsistent features in their career for it was they who best understood affairs from whom others learned and approved or at least acquiesced in their policy for that spirit which had taken this fresh step in history is the inmost soul of all individuals but in a state of unconsciousness which the great men in question aroused their fellows therefore follow these soul leaders for they feel the irresistible power of their own inner spirit thus embodied if we go on to cast a look at the fate of these world historical persons whose vocation it was to be the agents of the world spirit we shall find it to have been no happy one they attained no calm enjoyment their whole life was labor and trouble their whole nature was not else their passion when their object is attained they fall off like empty holes from the kernel they die early like Alexander they are murdered like Caesar transported to Saint Helena like Napoleon this fearful consolation that historical men have not enjoyed what is called happiness and of which only private life and this may be passed under very various external circumstances is capable this consolation those may draw from history who stand in need of it and it is craved by envy vexed at what is great and transcendent striving therefore to depreciate it and to find some flaw in it thus in modern times it has been demonstrated ad nauseam that princes are generally unhappy on their thrones in consideration of which the possession of a throne is tolerated and men acquiesce in the fact that not themselves but the personages in question are its occupants the free man we may observe is not envious but gladly recognizes what is great and exalted and rejoices that it exists it is in the light of those common elements which constitute the interest and therefore the passions of individuals that these historical men have to be regarded they are great men because they willed and accomplished something great not a mere fancy a mere intention but that which met the case and fell in with the needs of the age this mode of considering them also excludes the so-called psychological view which serving the purpose of envy most effectually contrives so to refer all actions to the heart to bring them under such a subjective aspect as that their authors appear to have done everything under the impulse of some passion, mean or grand some morbid craving and on account of these passions and cravings to have been not moral men Alexander of Macedon partly subdued Greece and then Asia therefore he was possessed by a morbid craving for conquest he is alleged to have acted from a craving for fame for conquest and the proof that these were the impelling motives is that he did that which resulted in fame what pedagogue has not demonstrated of Alexander the Great of Julius Caesar that they were instigated by such passions and were consequently immoral men whence the conclusion immediately that he the pedagogue is a better man than they because he has not such passions a proof of which lies in the fact that he does not conquer Asia vanquish Darius and Poros but while he enjoys life himself lets others enjoy it too these psychologists are particularly fond of contemplating those peculiarities of great historical figures which appertain to them as private persons man must eat and drink he sustains relations to his friends and acquaintances he has passing impulses and evolutions of temper no man is a hero to his valet de chôme is a well-known proverb I have added and Goethe repeated it ten years later but not because the former is no hero but because the latter is a valet he takes off the hero's boots assists him to bed knows that he prefers champagne etc historical personages weighted upon in historical literature by such psychological valets come poorly off they are brought down by these their attendance to a level with or rather a few degrees below the level of the morality of such exquisite discerners spirits the Thersaites of Homer who abuses the kings is a standing figure for all times blows that is, beating with a solid cudgel he does not get in every age as in the Homeric one but his envy, his egotism is the thorn which he has to carry in his flesh and the undying worm that gnaws him is the tormenting that his excellent views and vitiparations remain absolutely without result in the world but our satisfaction at the fate of Thersaitism also may have its sinister side a world historical individual is not so unwise as to indulge a variety of wishes to divide his regards he is devoted to the one aim, regardless of all else it is even possible that such man may treat other great even sacred interests inconsiderately conduct which is indeed obnoxious to moral reprehension but so mighty a form must trample down many an innocent flower crushed pieces many an object in its path the special interest of passion is thus inseparable from the active development of a general principle for it is from the special and determinant and from its negation that the universal results particularity contends with its like and some loss is involved in the issue it is not the general idea that is implicated in opposition and combat and that is exposed to danger it remains in the background untouched and uninjured this may be called the cunning of reason that it sets the passions to work for itself while that which develops its existence through such impulsion pays the penalty and suffers loss for it is phenomenal being that is so treated and of this part is of no value part is positive and real the particular is for the most part of two trifling value as compared with the general individuals are sacrificed and abandoned the idea pays the penalty of determinant existence and of corruptibility not from itself but from the passions of individuals but though we might tolerate the idea that individuals, their desires and the gratification of them are thus sacrificed their happiness given up to the empire of chance to which it belongs and that as a general rule individuals come under the category of means to an ulterior end there is one aspect of human individuality which we should hesitate to regard in that subordinate light even in relation to the highest since it is absolutely no subordinate element but exists in those individuals as inherently eternal divine I mean morality, ethics religion even when speaking of the realization of the great ideal aim by means of individuals the subject of element in them their interest and that of their cravings and impulses their views and judgments though exhibited as the merely formal side of their existence was spoken of as having an infinite right to be consulted the first idea that presents itself in speaking of means is that of something external to the object and having no share in the object itself but merely natural things even the commonest lifeless objects used as means must be of such a kind as adapts them to their purpose they must possess something in common with it human beings, least of all sustain the bare external relation of mere means to the great ideal aim not only do they in the very act of realizing it make it the occasion of satisfying personal desires whose purport is diverse from that aim but they share in that ideal aim itself and are for that very reason objects of their own existence not formally merely as the world of living beings generally is whose individual life is essentially subordinate to that of man and is properly used up as an instrument men on the contrary are objects of existence to themselves as regards the intrinsic import of the aim in question to this order belongs that in them which we would exclude from the category of mere means morality, ethics, religion that is to say man is an object of existence in himself only in virtue of the divine that is in him that which was designated at the outset as reason which in view of its activity and power of self-determination was called freedom and we affirm without entering at present on the proof of the assertion that religion, morality, etc have their foundation and source in that principle and so are essentially elevated above all alien necessity and chance and here we must remark that individuals to the extent of their freedom are responsible for the deprivation and infeeblement of morals and religion this is the seal of the absolute and sublime destiny of man that he knows what is good and what is evil that his destiny is his variability to will either good or evil in one word that he is the subject of moral imputation imputation not only of evil but of good and not only concerning this of that particular matter and all that happens of extra but also the good and evil attaching to his individual freedom the brute alone is simply innocent it would however demand an extensive explanation as extensive as the analysis of moral freedom itself to preclude or obviate all the misunderstandings which the statement that what is called innocent and what imports the entire unconsciousness of evil is want to occasion in contemplating the fate which virtue, morality even piety, experience in history we must not fall into the litany of lamentations that the good and pious often or for the most part fair ill in the world while the evil disposed and wicked prosper the unity of meanings riches, outward honor and the like but in speaking of something which in and for itself constitutes an aim of existence that so called well or ill faring of these or those isolated individuals cannot be regarded as an essential element in the rational order of the universe with more justice than happiness or a fortunate environment it is demanded of the grand aim of the world's existence that it should foster, nay involve the execution and ratification of good moral righteous purposes what makes men morally discontented a discontent by the by on which they somewhat pride themselves is that they do not find the present adapted to the realization of aims which they hold to be right and just especially in modern times ideals of political constitutions they contrast unfavorably things as they are with their idea of things as they ought to be in this case it is not private interest nor passion that desires gratification but reason, justice, liberty and equipped with this title the demand in question assumes a lofty bearing and readily adopts a position not merely of discontent but of open revolt against the actual condition of the world to estimate such a feeling and such views are right the demands insisted upon and the very dogmatic opinions asserted must be examined at no time so much as in our own have such general principles and notions been advanced or with greater assurance if in days gone by history seems to present itself as a struggle of passions in our time though displays of passion are not wanting it exhibits partly a predominance of the struggle of notions assuming the authority of principles partly that of passions and interests essentially subjective but under the mask of such higher sanctions the pretensions thus contended for as legitimate in the name of that which has been stated the ultimate aim of reason pass accordingly for absolute aims to the same extent as religion, morals, ethics nothing as before remarked is now more common than the complaint that the ideals which imagination sets up are not realized that these glorious dreams are destroyed by cold actuality these ideals the courage of life founder on the rocks of hard reality may be in the first instance only subjective and belong to the idiosyncrasy of the individual imagining himself the highest and wisest such do not properly belong to this category for the fancies which the individual in his isolation indulges cannot be the model for universal reality just as universal law is not designated for the units of the mass these as such may in fact find their interest decidedly thrust into the background but by the term ideal we also understand the ideal of reason of the good of the true poets as for example Schiller have painted such ideals touchingly and with strong emotion and with the deeply melancholy conviction that they could not be realized in affirming on the contrary that the universal reason does realize itself we have indeed nothing to do with the individual as empirically regarded that admits of degrees of better or worse since here chance and speciality have received authority from the idea to exercise their monstrous power and much therefore in particular aspects of the grand phenomenon might be found fault with this subjective fault finding which however only keeps in view the individual and its deficiency without taking notice of reason pervading the whole is easy and in as much as it asserts an excellent intention with regard to the good of the whole and seems to result from a kindly heart it feels authorized to give itself airs and assume great consequence it is easier to discover a deficiency in individuals in states and in providence than to see their real import and value for in this merely negative fault finding a proud position is taken one which overlooks the object without having entered into it without having comprehended its positive aspect age generally makes men more tolerant youth is always discontented the tolerance of age is the result of the ripeness of a judgment which not merely as the result of indifference is satisfied even with what is inferior but more deeply taught by the grave experience of life has been led to perceive the substantial solid worth of the object in question the insight then to which in contradistinction from those ideals philosophy is to lead us is that the real world is as it ought to be that the truly good the universal divine reason is not a mere abstraction but a vital principle capable of realizing itself this good this reason in its most concrete form is God God governs the world the actual working of his government the carrying out of his plan is the history of the world this plan philosophy strives to comprehend for only that which has been developed as the result of it possesses bonafide reality that which does not accord with it is negative worthless existence before the pure light of this divine idea which is no mere ideal the phantom of a world whose events are an incoherent concourse of fortuitous circumstances utterly vanishes philosophy wishes to discover the substantial purport the real side of the divine idea and to justify the so much despised reality of things for reason is the comprehension of the divine work but as to what concerns the perversion corruption and ruin of religious ethical and moral purposes and states of society generally it must be affirmed that in their essence these are infinite and eternal but that the forms they assume may be of a limited order and consequently belong to the domain of near nature and be subject to the sway of chance they are therefore perishable and exposed to decay and corruption religion and morality in the same way as inherently universal essences have the peculiarity of being present in the individual soul in the full extent of their idea and therefore truly and really although they may not manifest themselves in it in extent so and are not applied to fully developed relations the religion the morality of a limited sphere of life that of a shepherd or a peasant for example in its intensive concentration and limitation to a few perfectly simple relations of life has infinite worth as the religion and morality of extensive knowledge and of an existence rich in the compass of its relations and actions this inner focus this simple region of the claims of subjective freedom the home of volition resolution and action the abstract sphere of conscience that which comprises the responsibility and moral value of the individual and is quite shut out from the noisy din of the world's history including not merely external and temporal changes but also those entailed by the absolute necessity inseparable from the realization of the idea of freedom itself but as a general truth this must be regarded as settled that whatever in the world possesses claims as noble and glorious has nevertheless a higher existence above it the claim of the world's spirit rises above all special claims these observations may suffice in reference to the means which the world's spirit uses for realizing its idea stated simply and abstractly this meditation involves the activity of personal existences in whom reason is present an absolute substantial being but a basis in the first instance still obscure and unknown to them but the subject becomes more complicated and difficult when we regard individuals not merely in their aspect of activity but more concretely in conjunction with a particular manifestation of that activity in their religion and morality forms of existence which are intimately connected with reason and share in its absolute claims here the relation of mere means to an end disappears and the chief bearings of this seeming difficulty in reference to the absolute aim of spirit have been briefly considered and the essential destiny of reason subsection 2 what means spirit uses in order to realize its idea this recording is in the public domain the essential destiny of reason subsection 3 this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org introduction 2 the philosophy of history by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel the essential destiny of reason subsection 3 the shape which the perfect embodiment of spirit assumes the third point to be analyzed is therefore what is the object to be realized by these means that is what is the form it assumes in the realm of reality we have spoken of means but in the carrying out of a subjective limited aim we have also to take into consideration of a material either already present or which has to be procured thus the question would arise what is the material in which the ideal of reason is wrought out the primary answer would be personality itself human desires subjectivity generally in human knowledge and volition as its material element reason it obtains positive existence we have considered subjective volition where it has an object which is the truth and essence of a reality namely where it constitutes a great world historical passion as a subjective will occupied with limited passions it is dependent and can gratify its desires only within the limits of this dependence but the subjective will has also a substantial life a reality in which it moves in the region of essential being and has the essential itself as the object of its existence this essential being is the union of the subjective with the rational will it is the moral whole the state which is that form of reality in which the individual has and enjoys but on the condition of his recognizing believing in and willing that which is common to the whole and this must not be understood as if the subjective will of the social unit attained its gratification and enjoyment through that common will as if this were a means provided for its benefit as if the individual in his relations to other individuals thus limited his freedom in order that this universal limitation the mutual constraint of all might secure a small space of liberty for each rather we affirm our law, morality government and they alone the positive reality and completion of freedom freedom of a low and limited order is mere caprice which finds its exercise in the sphere of particular and limited desires subjective volition passion is that which sets men in activity that which effects practical realization the idea is the inner spring of action the state is the actually existing realized moral life for it is the unity of the universal essential will with that of the individual and this is morality the individual living in this unity has a moral life possesses a value that in this substantiality alone Sophocles in his Antigone says the divine commands are not of yesterday nor of today no they have an infinite existence and no one could say whence they came the laws of morality are not accidental but are the essentially rational it is the very object of the state that what is essential in the practical activity of men and in their dispositions should be duly recognized that it should have a manifest existence and maintain its position it is the absolute interest of reason that this moral whole should exist and herein lies the justification and merit of heroes who have founded states however rude these may have been in our history of the world only those peoples can come under our notice which form a state for it must be understood that this latter is the realization of freedom that is of the absolute final aim and that it exists for its own sake it must further be understood that all the worth which the human being possesses all spiritual reality he possesses only through the state for his spiritual reality consists in this that his own essence reason is objectively present to him that it possesses objective immediate existence for him thus only is he fully conscious thus only is he a partaker of morality of a just and moral social and political life for truth is the unity of the universal and subjective will and the universal is to be found in the state in its laws its universal and rational arrangements the state is the divine idea as it exists on earth we have in it therefore the object of history in a more definite shape than before that in which freedom obtains objectivity and lives in the enjoyment of this objectivity for law is the objectivity of spirit volition in its true form only that will which obeys law is free for it obeys itself it is independent and so free when the state or our country constitutes a community of existence when the subjective will of man submits to laws the contradiction between liberty and necessity vanishes the rational has necessary existence as being the reality and substance of things and we are free in recognizing it as law following it as the substance of our own being the objective and the subjective will are then reconciled and present one identical homogeneous whole for the morality of the state is not of that ethical reflective kind in which one's own conviction bears sway this latter is rather the peculiarity of the modern time while the true antique morality is based on the principle of abiding by one's duty to the state at large an Athenian citizen did what was required of him as it were from instinct but if I reflect on the object of my activity I must have the consciousness that my will has been called into exercise but morality is duty substantial right a second nature as it has been justly called for the first nature of van is his primary merely animal existence the development in extent so of the idea of the state belongs to the philosophy of jurisprudence but it must be observed that in the theories of our time various errors are current respecting it which pass for established truths and have become fixed prejudices we will mention only a few of them giving prominence to such as have a reference to the object of our history the error which first meets us is the direct contradictory of our principle that the state presents the realization of freedom the opinion namely that man is free by nature but that in society in the state to which nevertheless he is irresistibly impelled he must limit this natural freedom that man is free by nature is quite correct in one sense namely that he is so according to the idea of humanity but we imply thereby that he is such only in virtue of his destiny that he has an undeveloped power to become such for the nature of an object is exactly synonymous with its idea but the view in question imports more than this when man is spoken of as free by nature the mode of his existence as well as his destiny is implied his merely natural and primary condition is intended in this sense a state of nature is assumed in which mankind at large are in the possession of their natural rights with the unconstrained exercise and enjoyment of their freedom this assumption is not indeed raised to the dignity of the historical fact it would indeed be difficult where the attempt seriously made to point out any such condition is actually existing whereas having ever occurred examples of a savage state of life can be pointed out but they are marked by brutal passions and deeds of violence while however rude and simple their conditions they involve social arrangements which to use the common phrase restrain freedom that assumption is one of those nebulous images which theory produces an idea which it cannot avoid originating but which it fathers upon real existence without sufficient historical justification what we find such a state of nature to be an actual experience answers exactly to the idea of a merely natural condition freedom as the ideal of that which is original and natural does not exist as original and natural rather must it be first sought out and won and that by an incalculable medial discipline of the intellectual and moral powers the state of nature is therefore predominantly that of injustice and violence of untamed natural impulses of inhuman deeds and feelings limitation is certainly produced by society in the state but it is a limitation of the mere brute emotions and rude instincts as also in a more advanced stage of culture of the premeditated self-will of caprice and passion this kind of constraint is part of the instrumentality by which only the consciousness of freedom and the desire for its attainment in its true that is rational and ideal form can be attained to the ideal of freedom law and morality are indispensably requisite and they are in and for themselves universal existences objects and aims which are discovered only by the ability of thought separating itself from the merely sensuous and developing itself in opposition there too and which must on the other hand be introduced into and incorporated with the originally sensuous will and that contrary to its natural inclination the perpetually recurring misapprehension of freedom consists in regarding that term only in its formal subjective sense abstracted from essential objects and aims thus a constraint put upon impulse desire passion pertaining to the particular individual as such a limitation of caprice and self-will is regarded as a fettering of freedom we should on the contrary look upon such limitation as the indispensable proviso of emancipation society and the state are the very conditions in which freedom is realized we must notice a second view contravening the principle of the development of moral relations into a legal form the patriarchal condition is regarded either in reference to the entire race of man or to some branches of it as exclusively that condition of things in which the legal element is combined with a do recognition of the moral and emotional parts of our nature and in which justice as united with these truly and really influences the intercourse of the social units the basis of the patriarchal condition is the family relation which develops the primary form of conscious morality succeeded by that of the state as its second phase the patriarchal condition is one of transition in which the family has already advanced to the position of a race or people where the union therefore has already ceased to be simply a bond of love and confidence and has become one of plighted service we must first examine the ethical principle of the family the family may be reckoned as virtually a single person since its members have either mutually surrendered their individual personality and consequently their legal position towards each other with the rest of their particular interests and desires as in the case of the parents or have not yet attained such an independent personality the children who are primarily in that merely natural condition already mentioned they live therefore in a unity of feeling love confidence and faith in each other and in a relation to mutual love the one individual has the consciousness of himself in the consciousness of the other he lives out of self and in this mutual self renunciation each regains the life that had been virtually transferred to the other gains in fact that others existence and his own as involved with that other the farther interests connected with the necessities and external concerns of life as well as the development that has to take place within their circle that is of the children constitute a common object for the members of the family the spirit of the family the penates form one substantial being as much as the spirit of a people in the state and morality in both cases consists in a feeling of consciousness and a will not limited to individual personality and interest but embracing the common interests of the members generally but this unity is in the case of the family essentially one of feeling not advancing beyond the limits of the merely natural the piety of the family relation should be respected in the highest degree by the state its means the state obtains as its members individuals who are already moral for as mere persons they are not and who in uniting to form a state bring with them that sound basis of a political edifice the capacity of feeling one with a whole but the expansion of the family to a patriarchal unity carries us beyond the ties blood relationship the simply natural elements of that basis and outside of these limits the members of the community must enter upon the position of independent personality a review of the patriarchal condition in extents would lead us to give special attention to the theoretical constitution the head of the patriarchal clan is also its priest if the family in its general relations is not yet separated from civic society in the state the separation of religion from it has also not yet taken place and so much the less since the piety of the hearth is itself a profoundly subjective state of feeling we have considered two aspects of freedom the objective and the subjective if therefore freedom is asserted to consist in the individuals of a state all agreeing in its arrangements it is evident that only the subjective aspect is regarded the natural inference from this principle is that no law can be valid without the approval of all this difficulty is attempted to be obviated by the decision that the minority must yield to the majority the majority therefore bear this way but long ago Jean-Jacques Rousseau remarked that in that case there would be no longer freedom for the will of the minority would cease to be respected at the Polish diet each single member had to give his consent before any political step could be taken and this kind of freedom it was that ruined the state besides it is a dangerous and false prejudice that the people alone have reason and insight and know what justice is for each popular faction may represent itself as the people and the question as to what constitutes the state is one of advanced science and not of popular decision if the principle of regard for the individual will is recognized as the only basis of political liberty namely that nothing should be done by or for the state to which all the members of the body politic have not given their sanction we have, properly speaking no constitution the only arrangement that would be necessary would be first a center having no will of its own but which should take into consideration what appeared to be the necessities of the state and secondly a contrivance for calling the members of the state together for taking the votes and for performing the arithmetical operations of reckoning and comparing the number of votes for the different propositions and thereby deciding upon them the state is an abstraction having even its generic existence in its citizens but it is an actuality and its simply generic existence must embody itself in individual will and activity the want of government and political administration in general is felt this necessitates the selection and separation from the rest of those who have to take the helm in political affairs to decide concerning them and to give orders to other citizens with a view to the execution of their plans if for example even the people in a democracy resolve on a war a general must head the army it is only by a constitution that the abstraction the state attains life and reality but this involves the distinction between those who command and those who obey yet obedience seems inconsistent with liberty and those who command appear to do the very opposite of that which the fundamental idea of the state namely that of freedom requires it is however urged that though the distinction between commanding and obeying is absolutely necessary because affairs could not go on without it and indeed this seems only a compulsory limitation external to and even contravening freedom in the abstract the constitution should be at least so framed that the citizens may obey as little as possible and the smallest modicum of free volition be left to the commands of the superiors that the substance of that for which subordination is necessary even in its most important bearings should be decided and resolved on by the people by the will of many or of all of the citizens though it be supposed to be thereby provided that the state should be possessed of vigor and strength as a reality and individual unity the primary consideration is then the distinction between the governing and the governed and political constitutions in the abstract have been rightly divided into monarchy, aristocracy and democracy which gives occasion however to the remark that monarchy itself must be further divided into despotism and monarchy proper that in all the divisions to which the leading idea gives rise only the generic character is to be made prominent it being not intended thereby that the particular category under review should be exhausted as a form order or kind in its concrete development but especially it must be observed that the above mentioned divisions admit of a multitude of particular modifications not only such as lie within the limits of those classes themselves but also such as our mixtures of several of these essentially distinct classes and which are consequently misshapen unstable and inconsistent forms in such a collision the concerning question is what is the best constitution that is by what arrangement organization or mechanism of the power of the state its object can be most surely attained this object may indeed be variously understood for instance as the calm enjoyment of life on the part of the citizens or as universal happiness such aims have suggested the so called ideals of constitutions and as a particular branch of the subject ideals of the education of princes or of the governing body the aristocracy at large for the chief point they treat of is the condition of those subjects who stand at the head of affairs and in these ideals the concrete details of political organization are not at all considered the inquiry into the best constitutions frequently treated as if not only the theory were an affair of subjective independent conviction but as if the introduction of a constitution recognized as the best or as superior to others could be the result of a resolve adopted in this theoretical manner as if the form of a constitution were a matter of free choice determined by nothing else but reflection of this artless fashion was that deliberation not indeed of the Persian people but of the Persian grandees who had conspired to overthrow the pseudo-smerities and the magi after their undertaking had succeeded and when there was no scion of the royal family living as to what constitution they should introduce into Persia and Herodotus gives an equally naive account of this deliberation in the present day the constitution of a country and people is not presented as so entirely dependent on free and deliberate choice the fundamental but abstractly and therefore imperfectly entertained conception of freedom has resulted in the republic being very generally regarded in theory as the only just and true political constitution many even who occupy elevated official positions under monarchical constitutions so far from being opposed to this idea are actually its supporters only they see that such a constitution though the best cannot be realized under all circumstances and that while men are what they are we must be satisfied with less freedom the monarchical constitution under the given circumstances and the present moral condition of the people being even regarded as the most advantageous in this view also the necessity of a particular constitution is made to depend on the condition of the people in such a way as if the latter were non essential and accidental this representation is founded on the distinction which the reflective understanding makes between an idea and the corresponding reality holding to an abstract and consequently untrue idea not grasping it in its completeness or which is virtually though not in point of form the same not taking a concrete view of a people and a state we shall have to show further on that the constitution adopted by people makes one substance one spirit with its religion its art and philosophy or at least with its conceptions and thoughts its culture generally not to expatiate upon the additional influences of extra of climate of neighbors of its place in the world a state is an individual totality of which you cannot select any particular side although a supremely important one such as its political constitution and deliberate and decide respecting it in that isolated form not only is that constitution most intimately connected with and dependent on those other spiritual forces but the form of the entire moral and intellectual individuality comprising all the forces it embodies is only a step in the development of the grand whole with its place pre-appointed in the process a fact which gives the highest sanction to the constitution in question and establishes its absolute necessity the origin of a state involves imperious lordship on the one hand, instinctive submission on the other but even obedience lordly power and the fear inspired by a ruler in itself implies some degree of voluntary connection even in barbarous states this is the case it is not the isolated will of individuals that prevails individual pretensions are relinquished and the general will is the essential bond of political union this unity of the general and the particular is the idea itself manifesting itself as a state and which subsequently undergoes further development within itself in fact yet necessitated process in the development of truly independent states is as follows they begin with regal power whether of patriarchal or military origin in the next phase particularity and individuality assert themselves in the form of aristocracy and democracy lastly we have the subjection interests to a single power but which can be absolutely none other than one outside of which those spheres have an independent position namely the monarchial two phases of royalty therefore must be distinguished a primary and a secondary one this process is necessitated so that the form of government assigned to a particular stage of development must present itself it is therefore no matter of choice but is that form which is adapted to the spirit of the people in a constitution the main feature of interest is the self-development of the rational that is the political condition of a people the setting free of the successive elements of the idea so that the several powers in the state manifest themselves as separate attain their appropriate and special perfection and yet in this independent condition work together for one object and are held together by it that is form an organic whole the state is thus the embodiment of rational freedom realizing and recognizing itself in an objective form for its objectivity consists in this that its successive stages are not merely ideal but are present in an appropriate reality and that in their separate and several workings they are absolutely merged in that agency by which the totality the soul the individual unity is produced and of which it is the result the state is the idea of spirit in the external manifestation of human will and its freedom it is to the state therefore that change in the aspect of history indissolubly attaches itself and the successive phases of the idea manifest themselves in it as distinct political principles the constitutions under which world historical peoples have reached their culmination are peculiar to them and therefore do not present a generally applicable political basis where at otherwise the differences of similar constitutions is only in a peculiar method of expanding and developing that generic basis whereas they really originate in diversity of principle from the comparison therefore of the political institutions of the ancient world historical peoples it so happens that for the most recent principle of a constitution for the principle of our own times nothing so to speak can be learned in science and art it is quite otherwise for example the ancient philosophy is so decidedly the basis of the modern that it is inevitably contained in the latter and constitutes its basis in this case the relation is that of a continuous development of the same structure whose foundation stone walls and roof have remained what they were in art Greek itself in its original form furnishes us the best models but in regard to political constitution it is quite otherwise here the ancient and the modern have not their essential principle in common abstract definitions and dogmas respecting just government importing that intelligence and virtue ought to bear sway are indeed common to both but nothing is so absurd as to look to Greeks Romans or Orientals for models for the political arrangements of our time from the east may be derived beautiful pictures of a patriarchal condition of paternal government and of devotion to it on the part of peoples from Greeks and Romans descriptions of popular liberty among the latter we find the idea of a free constitution admitting all the citizens to share in deliberations and resolves respecting the affairs and laws of the commonwealth in our times too this is its general acceptation only with this modification that since our states are so large and there are so many of the many the latter direct action being impossible should by the indirect method of elective substitution express their concurrence with resolves affecting the common wheel that is that for legislative purposes generally the people should be represented by deputies the so called representative constitution is that form of government with which we connect the idea of a free constitution and this notion has become a rooted prejudice on this theory people and government are separated but there is a perversity in this antithesis an ill intentioned ruse designed to insinuate that the people are the totality of the state besides the basis of this view is the principle of isolated individuality the absolute validity of the subject of will a dogma which we have already investigated the great point is that freedom in its ideal conception has not subjective will and caprice for its principle but the recognition of the universal will and that the process by which freedom is realized is the free development of its successive stages the subject of will is a merely formal determination a carte blanche not including what it is that is willed only the rational will is that universal principle which independently determines and unfolds its own being and develops its successive elemental phases as organic members of this gothic cathedral architecture the ancients knew nothing at an earlier stage of the discussion we established the two elemental considerations first the idea of freedom the absolute and final aim secondly the means for realizing it that is the subjective side of knowledge and will with its life movement and activity we then recognize the state as the moral whole and the reality of freedom and consequently as the objective unity of these two elements for although we make this distinction in two aspects for our consideration it must be remarked that they are intimately connected and that their connection is involved in the idea of each when examined separately we have on the one hand recognize the idea in the definite form of freedom conscious of and willing itself having itself alone as its object involving at the same time the pure and simple idea of reason and likewise that which we have called subject self-consciousness spirit actually existing in the world if on the other hand we consider subjectivity we find that subjective knowledge and will is thought but by the very active thoughtful cognition and volition I will the universal object the substance of absolute reason we observe therefore an essential union between the objective side the idea and the subjective side the personality that conceives and wills it the objective existence of this union is the state which is therefore the basis and center of the other concrete elements of the life of a people of art of law of morals of religion of science all the activity of spirit has only this object the becoming conscious of this union that is of its own freedom among the forms of this conscious union religion occupies the highest position in it spirit rising above the limitations of temporal and secular existence becomes conscious of the absolute spirit and in this consciousness of the self-existent being renounces its individual interest it lays this aside in devotion a state of mind in which it refuses to occupy itself any longer with a limited and particular by sacrifice man expresses his renunciation of his property his will his individual feelings the religious concentration of the soul appears in the form of feeling it nevertheless passes also into reflection a form of worship is a result of reflection the second form of the union of the objective and subjective in the human spirit is art this advances farther into the realm of the actual and sensuous than religion in its noblest walk it is occupied with representing not indeed the spirit of god but certainly the form of god and in its secondary aims that which is divine and spiritual generally its office is to render visible the divine presenting it to the imaginative and intuitive faculty but the true is the object not only of conception and feeling as in religion and of intuition as in art but also of the thinking faculty and this gives us the third form of the union in question philosophy this is consequently the highest freest and wisest phase of course we are not intending to investigate these three phases here they have only suggested themselves in virtue of their occupying the same general ground as the object here considered the state the general principle which manifests itself and becomes an object of consciousness in the state the form under which all that the state includes is brought is the whole of that cycle of phenomena which constitutes the culture of a nation but the definite substance that receives the form of universality and exists in that concrete reality which is the state is the spirit of the people itself the actual state is animated by the spirit in all its particular affairs its wars, institutions, etc but man must also attain a conscious realization of this, his spirit and essential nature and of his original identity with it for we said that morality is the identity of the subjective or personal with the universal will now the mind must give itself an express consciousness of this and the focus of this knowledge is religion art and science are only various aspects and forms of the same substantial being in considering religion the chief point of inquiry is whether it recognizes the true the idea only in its separate abstract form or in its true unity in separation god being represented in an abstract form as the highest being lord of heaven and earth living in a remote region far from human actualities or in its unity god as the unity of the universal and individual the individual itself assuming the aspect of positive and real existence in the idea of the incarnation religion is the sphere and the definition gives itself the definition of that which it regards as the true a definition contains everything that belongs to the essence of an object reducing its nature to its simple characteristic predicate as a mirror for every predicate the generic soul pervading all its details the conception of god therefore constitutes the general basis of the character in this aspect religion stands in the closest connection with the political principle freedom can exist only where individuality is recognized as having its positive and real existence in the divine being the connection may be further explained thus secular existence as merely temporal occupied with particular interests is consequently only relative unauthorized and receives its validity only in as far as the universal soul that pervades it receives absolute validity which it cannot have unless it is recognized as the definite manifestation the phenomenal existence of the divine essence on this account it is that the state rests on religion we hear this often repeated in our times but for the most part nothing further is meant than that individual subjects as god-fearing men would be more disposed and ready to perform their duty since obedience to king and law so naturally follows in the train of reverence for god this reverence indeed since it exalts the general over the special may even turn upon the latter become fanatical and work with incendiary violence against the state its institutions and arrangements religious feeling therefore it is thought should be sober kept in a certain degree of coolness that it may not storm against and bear down that which should be defended and preserved by it the possibility of such a catastrophe is at least latent in it while however the correct sentiment is adopted that the state is based on religion the position thus assigned religion supposes the state already to exist and that subsequently in order to maintain it religion must be brought into it in buckets and bushels as it were and impressed upon people's hearts it is quite true that men must be trained to religion but not as to something whose existence has yet to begin for in affirming that the state is based on religion that it has its roots in it we virtually assert that the former has proceeded from the latter and that this derivation is going on now and will always continue that is the principles of the state must be regarded as valid in and for themselves which can only be and so far as they are recognized in its determinate manifestations of the divine nature the form of religion therefore decides that of the state and its constitution the latter actually originated in the particular religion adopted by the nation so that in fact the Athenian or the Roman state was possible only in connection with the specific form of heathenism existing among the respective peoples just as a Catholic state has a spirit and constitution different from that of a Protestant one if that outcry that urging and striving for the implantation of religion in the community were an utterance of anguish and a call for help as it often seems to be expressing the danger of religion having vanished or being about to vanish entirely from the state that would be fearful indeed worse in fact for it implies the belief in a resource against the evil namely the implantation and inculcation of religion whereas religion is by no means a thing to be so produced its self-production and there can be no other lies much deeper another and opposite folly which we meet with in our time is that of pretending to invent and carry out political constitutions independently of religion the Catholic confession although sharing the Christian name with the Protestant does not concede to the state an inherent justice and morality a concession which in the Protestant principle is fundamental this tearing away of the political morality from its natural connection is necessary to the genius of that religion as it does not recognize justice and morality as independent and substantial but thus excluded from intrinsic worth torn away from their last refuge the sanctuary of conscience the calm retreat where religion has its abode the principles and institutions of political legislation are destitute of a real center to the same degree as they are compelled to remain abstract and indefinite summing up what has been said of the state we find that we have been led to call its vital principle as actuating the individuals who compose it morality the state its laws its arrangements constitute the rights of its members its natural features mountains, air and waters are their country their fatherland their outward material property the history of this state their deeds what their ancestors have produced belongs to them and lives in their memory all is their possession just as they are possessed by it for it constitutes their existence their being their imagination is occupied with the ideas thus presented while the adoption of these laws and of a fatherland so conditioned is the expression of their will it is this matured totality which thus constitutes one being the spirit of one people to it the individual members belong each unit is the son of his nation and at the same time in as far as the state to which belongs this undergoing development the son of his age none remains behind it still less advances beyond it this spiritual being the spirit of his time is his he is a representative of it it is that in which he originated and in which he lives among the Athenians the word Athens had a double import suggesting primarily a complex of political institutions but no less in the second place that goddess who represented the spirit of the people and its unity this spirit of a people is a determinant and a particular spirit and is as just stated further modified by the degree of its historical development this spirit then constitutes the basis and substance of those other forms of a nation's consciousness which have been noticed for spirit in its self consciousness must become an object of contemplation to itself and objectivity involves in the first instance the rise of differences which make up a total of distinct spheres of object of spirit in the same way as the soul exists only as the complex of its faculties which in their form of concentration in a simple unity produce that soul it is thus one individuality which presented in its essence as God is honored and enjoyed in religion which is exhibited as an object of sensuous contemplation in art and is apprehended as an intellectual conception in philosophy in virtue of the original identity of their essence purport and object these various forms are inseparably united with the spirit of the state only in connection with this particular religion can this particular political constitution exist just as in such or such a state such or such a philosophy of art the remark next in order is that each particular national genius is to be treated as only one individual in the process of universal history for that history is the exhibition of the divine absolute development of spirit in its highest forms that gradation by which it attains its truth and consciousness of itself the forms which these grades of progress assume are the characteristic national spirits of history the peculiar tenor of their moral life of their government their art religion and science to realize these grades is the boundless impulse of the world spirit the goal of its irresistible urging for this division into organic members and the full development of each is its idea universal history is exclusively occupied with showing how spirit comes to a recognition and adoption of the truth the dawn of knowledge appears it begins to discover salient principles and at last it arrives at full consciousness having therefore learned the abstract characteristics of the nature of spirit which it uses to realize its idea and the shape assumed by it in its complete realization in phenomenal existence namely the state nothing further remains for this introductory section to contemplate but the course of the world's history and the essential destiny of reason subsection 3 the shape which the perfect embodiment of spirit assumes this recording is in the public domain