Yeah, this one works optional, so as far as it even came. But this is a good one. We started our initial look at these subjects, what now, 14 weeks ago or something. We looked first at axial loading and our, I don't even remember if we specifically stated it, but the objects being loaded, we're relatively short in that their length dimension was not terribly bigger than their width dimension. I don't remember that we actually said it. But that, if we did look at it more specifically, for ductile materials under this kind of loading, they would tend to deform something like this. And we did look at that a bit when we looked at the different strains and the different directions with Poisson's ratio. So a ductile material would tend to deform like that. A brittle material like a ceramic like brick or concrete would tend to, if pushed far enough, would tend to not really deform before it would finally just fracture and have a catastrophic failure. At least catastrophic if nothing more in terms of the part itself is no longer abuse. What we're going to look at now is axial loadings where the length is much greater than the width and that the mode of failure is not necessarily just one of some kind of catastrophic destruction, but more, quite possibly, something where the piece buckles rather than just deforms it. In terms of whatever's on the end of it loading in that way, it could be the same type of failure. If this was a column support for a building or a deck, it could be that this slope there is enough to cause what would be termed a failure of the structure. Maybe it doesn't come apart and maybe once the load's reduced, everything returns to normal as it happens to happen with elastic solvents. But it could be just this angle imposed on the structure is enough to cause what would be considered failure of the structure. If it's your Aunt Martha sitting on the edge of that deck at your wedding reception and she tumbles off the deck, you could consider that a failure because, well, first thing her lawyers are going to do is write you out of the will. So even if it's just deformation there, we want to prevent it. So we're going to look now at loading and possible failures of columns. Our target of concern is going to be what will term this critical load where that's the smallest possible load, sorry, the greatest possible load we can put on and not go into failure, however that might be defined. We'll define it based upon the normal stresses in the material because that's one way we can quantify this as we look at just single members of a structure, not looking at the tire structure. But it's certainly possible that even if the member itself doesn't fail, we can consider the structure itself as in failure. So we're going to model this column to start with as a simply pinned two-member linkage. So it's two pieces of equal length pinned together. We need to allow the top to move up and down so we can imagine that something like that will suffice. That way the top is free to move up and down as part of the deformation, but not free to move side to side because certainly you could imagine if you're loading a long skinny member and the top can go anywhere it wants, then the thing's just going to fall over. We don't even have any real loading on the piece. We just pushed it aside. So we've got to keep it so that it's stable side to side, but free to move up and down. And then we'll apply some load to that and try to see what we can estimate for it's possible failure. So as it's loaded, then it'll deform something like this, of course, as being an equilateral triangle because the two pieces are of equal length. Within the limits of our ability to sketch these things, it'll deform something like that. Just like the last couple weeks of concern to us is this amount of deflection from the neutral position. And just like we did with the beams earlier, we'll call that a little v. Now because these are elastic solids, there's a tendency of the solid to try to return itself to the neutral position, which we don't have modeled here yet. So what we'll do is imagine that there's a spring that becomes depressed as our model for a column deforms. And it's that spring trying to restore things that allows us to make a model of this business. So if that was length L, and this is L over 2, we'll use this part of the deflection there as theta. Remember, as usual, these pictures are grossly exaggerated just so we were able to see them. They're actually much, much smaller than this. The deflections and the length are much, much smaller. So let's see. Let's label this point A. If we look at a free body diagram of point A, we see something like, well, let me load it back in there, although I don't have anything going on here. So there's some load P there. This is a two-force member, but we don't, well, we will use that. So that puts that as the load there. And that's what P, well, let's see, we'll start it. Let's try it now in a second. We've also got this spring restoring force there. And then, of course, there's load from the bottom leg as well. So we have a free body diagram there on the pieces. This, that component is equivalent to P. That angle is theta. That's right, you know? Yeah. OK, yeah, we're OK. And so the horizontal balance here, this is then P tan theta. And we know then that the balance of the restoring force, the elasticity of the column itself that we're modeling with this spring must be 2 P tan theta. Now, we could also have modeled it as not this linear spring there. We could also have modeled it as having some kind of torsional spring there that would try to return it to its normal. It's just a matter of how an author of a book wants to look at it, which way he thinks his students will see it the best. Ours happens to use the linear spring and not the torsional spring as the model. But the results in the end are going to be the same. So now we've got this little bit of business there. We're going to have to use some of our very fair approximations such that we're talking about very small angles here. So if measured in radians, then the angle is equal to the tangent of the angle itself. So we're going to be able to be done with that. And the deflection, remember that's this piece there. The actual distance that the point was deflected will be approximately L over 2 theta, theta again in radians. That's just it's such a small angle that the arc length is essentially equal to the total displacement as it is. So we can put those together in the general displacement. Remember our spring formula, the spring forces, a spring constant times whatever the amount of deflection is. So we can put those two together. We get then a formula that allows us to put all the pieces together to that point. Now we want that to be less than or equal to the actual force that we calculated would be the restoring force as it is, which is 2 p theta. That's using both approximations there for small angles. Make sure everything's OK. No. Let's see, we want this spring to be greater than that. If it's not greater than that, then we're going to lose our piece. So this is the restoring force of the spring. This is the force due to the load. We want the restoring force of the spring to be greater than the load, otherwise it will fail. So this is restoring side. This is load side. So that makes sense now that we got it as greater than. If the load is greater than the restoring force, then it's going to fail. So we've then got a critical, a lower, actually an upper limit on our load that we call p critical equal to something like k L. Let's see, 2 comes over. Theta is canceled. We get k L over 4 as our design limit. Yeah, that's where we everything. That looks OK. That's just the turning point. Anything on either side of that, if our restoring force is greater than our load, then we have stability. And if our restoring force is less than the load being applied, we have unstability. In other words, the column cannot withstand those loads. And it's going to continue to buckle farther. As it goes farther, it deflects more. And sooner or later, it either fails or the restoring force becomes great enough. So we're going to use that p critical to be our limit. And we want to find just what it can do if it goes to any more than that, then we're going to lose, by whatever means, the integrity of the column. OK, so we've gotten down to pretty simple. You can imagine it depends upon the length of the solid. You've done this before, too long skinny things are much more wobbly than our short skinny things. We can even see that with my audio visual aid. A short piece is much more stable than is a long piece. It takes much less to make this deflect. The veins aren't even sticking out in my neck when I do this one. But when I do this one, it's ready to get deflect as much. They're supposed to be looking at the veins in my neck now. You can see it's much more stable. Even though they're same material, same cross-section, it's much easier to make the long one deflect. So the greater the L, the lower the more we have to worry about it, as we'll see in a little bit. OK, so let's continue our model. We've now got a way we can model the entire piece, not have to use that two bar linkage model again, where as we load this, now failure will come something like that. We want to model that now by putting these two things together. So we'll make an imaginary cut somewhere right in the middle. And we know we've got loads like that. But those are offset and make a couple. Going that way, so we need moment, internal moment, going the other way to counterbalance that moment that we have now with, again, this being the deflection at center column of V. Now we can put those two together just like we did in the last couple weeks. This is really no more than a beam in simple bending. We know then that that moment is related to that amount of bending by one of our bending formulas. And that's just what the spring needs to oppose. So that's got to equal minus p, pV. That's the size of this couple. And it has to oppose that to the minus sign. All right, we can rearrange things a little bit. And you'll like where this is going, because it means that not all of the classes you take are useless to us.  We can get down to that. Which looks like what? Looks like a differential equation. Specifically a linear, meaning the coefficient terms are constant, second-order differential equation.  So everybody's got it solved, I assume. I know that as an undergraduate, I would solve things that quickly. Just by pretty much glancing at it. Yeah, just in fact, maybe I just don't even put up the solution. So quickly done. Anyway, I don't know. I have to look up this stuff and follow it along. So we've got that then as our linear first-order, sorry, second-order differential equation with solutions, something like C1 sine lambda x plus C2 cosine lambda x as a solution. Look fairly familiar. How do we find out what C1 and C2 are? Yeah, boundary conditions, some kind of known situation, such as when v equals 0, then we know that, I guess the other way around, at x equals 0, v equals 0. Because then I wrote down the same thing. At x equals 0, we know v equals 0. That's the business of us having that upper end in a track. We also know that x equals l, v equals 0 again, because we've got the bottom pinned. Unfortunately, that leads to C1 equals C2 equals 0, which is a trivial solution. It just says that there's no equation left. So that's not a sufficient solution for us. So what we'll do is just keep C2 equal to 0, because that is certainly a solution. And then just solve on the remainder part, which is simply another solution to these. It's not as if we're ignoring parts of the solution. So this will give us then the solution, the square root of p over e i x, no, l, yeah, l, actually using the lower limit. That equals 0 is now our solution. In terms of l, that's the only way that we'll get a solution in here where the sine of that equals 0, which will also satisfy our second boundary condition. Doesn't matter then what C1 is. If the second term is 0, it will be a sufficient solution. So that then translates to in the type of formalism we use for differential equations. Now that n is significant in that. It gives us possible modes of failure. Our beam could fail simply like that. That's n equals 1. It could also fail like this, which would be n equals 2, and so on. This second mode of failure, we could guarantee if we fix the beam at a midpoint, drawing's a little off a midpoint. But if we fix the beam at a midpoint so that it can't deflect side to side, then this is the more likely, in fact, the first mode of failure isn't even possible if we fix it at the end. What also happens, though, because of that is that the critical load for that failure is much greater in the second case, in fact, four times greater in the second case than it is in the first. Because solving for the critical load back here at this point then gives us that. And we see that if n is greater, if n is greater then our load goes up. Actually, it's n squared, doesn't it? Which will give us the fourth. We need. Yeah, because we put the L over. Then square, which will square the n. So if we have the second failure mode, then n equals 2, which gets squared. We go to a four times greater possible critical load. And you can see this in certain structures where, as there are silver columns, they might actually pin them together with a stringer of some kind to help prevent the middle from deflecting, which then allows the end to go up, allows then a greater critical load as a possibility there. So we'll use n equals 1 for most of what we're looking at here so that we find the minimum load that could cause failure that way. Anything worse than that is of protection. All right, so let's relate this down to the stresses. We're going to see in a deformed column like that. So the normal stresses, I think our book actually will call them the critical stress because then based upon the critical loads that we're determining here, remember that's the maximum load we can withstand and avoid failure. So now we'll relate it to the stresses. Was there a question? Yeah, would you use this for something like a foundation wall or something? Well, not necessarily for a wall. You might want to do it if these are the, you know, the, or the heart-free foundation. No, not really. I'm thinking more of just a timber, a wall made out of wood that you, the typical height of a wall is 8 feet. That's a long run without any support. So there are typically stringers put in there. But if you pour concrete around these, then they're not really columns anymore. Is a column a self made out of concrete? Yeah, yeah, you could except concrete won't fail by buckling like this. Concrete will fail. Remember that the stress strain diagram for concrete was something like that and then it just fails. It doesn't go through very much bendy. All right, so we're going to set n equals to 1 since that's the load of failure that supports the least critical load. Then we want to find the maximum critical load within that constriction. So we're going to use the limit here on the stresses as something like this. And then there might also be a factor of safety that we'll put in here, too, which we actually will do. OK. What's the pain in the arm? Oh, I've got the A. Good, because I need that right now. Since I over A, it's purely a matter of the geometry of the cross section. And we've seen it before, not in this class, but we've seen this before in dynamics and physics one. Our book gives it the symbol R, but we know it as the radius of gyration. Dynamics, we were using the symbol small k. Purely geometry, which means if you're buying beams like those I beams in the back of the book, that will all be specified and probably be right in the table. And so we've got then that I over A is, no, no, not the A, the L squared. Because what we'll do now is take that little piece there and define what's known as the slenderness ratio. We don't have any symbol for it, just define it, define as L over R, which as you get older goes down. Because not only do you shrink as a person, you tend to fill out as a person. So on human beings, L over R is constantly increasing. Not in my case, though, of course. So we've got then I squared over E times E times the inverse square of that slenderness ratio, which has no particular symbol to it. Pi squared E, all right. So I think we're OK. This almost seems to be missing because I have A, right? Pi squared R, L times E. Oh, we're missing. I think that's OK. I don't see exactly where my answer pert came in. Maybe we'll find it in a second with the notes. Is A's an area? Pardon me? Is that A just an area? Yeah, the cross-sectional area. In dynamics, we can find it as the restitution is I over a moment. This is area, first moment of area that we're using, not necessarily the first moment of mass like we're using. So the unit's different. Dynamics. For I, they're still in units. Well, yeah, they would be because there's mass moment of inertia, this is area moment of inertia. In dynamics, we use mass moment of inertia and actually a mass radius of gyration because of that. So they're similar, not exactly the same. If you remember, we first used it like that. But if the density is constant and the thickness is constant, then you get to what we had in statics, which is a first moment of area. But that's what's constant density and constant thickness. So they're related but not interchangeable directly. And so our stress as a function of this slenderness ratio is known as Euler's buckling equation. And it's going to look like something like that since it's 1 over the inverse square. So let's look at a little problem. All right. For maybe building a deck or something, it's very common that the columns are square, usually 4 by 4 because that's what's available. But let's determine you can't custom cut columns. They don't have to be 4 by 4. This is just a lot cheaper when you go to Lowes and get them. So we're going to look at the possibility of using square columns for a couple different Lowes. So for a wood, Young's modulus is about 13 gigapascals. And we want to find A, the dimension A, which is just the length of one side of a wood column, such that we stay under a critical stress, which we get from over here, of 12 megapascals, a factor of safety of 2.5, a column length of 2 meters, about 60, and for two different types of two different Lowes, 100 kilonewtons or 200 kilonewtons. So we have everything we're given, except we'll have to back out of the area. And since we're assuming it's square, then it's going to get a bit simpler as we step through it. OK, we'll apply the factor of safety. We have to apply it somewhere. It's usually specified. We'll apply it to the load. So we're going to design this for a critical Low. And we'll start with the first 100 kilonewtons times the 2.5. So we're going to design it for a critical load of 250 kilonewtons. That will over design it. We'll put in a lot more material in the column to withstand the 250, expecting only 100 will be on it. So we could solve for a critical moment of area from our equation. And all the pieces that are in there, pi squared e, that will give us a critical area and allows us to solve them for a. And then once we've got that, then we check that against the allowable stress that was given and determine if it was below that limit. So once the work's done, all we have to do is watch our units as usual, because we've got all those pieces now. So you check that with a proper unit. That should be in units of length to the fourth. So let's use meters, OK? So we've got all those pieces. Don't forget for a square shape like this, the moment of area is 1 to the power of a to the fourth. And down here in the area, of course, be a squared. So we can solve for a critical moment of area. From that, get the length, proposed length of a side. Double check it and make sure it's below the limit of the allowed normal stress. Anybody want to have this with the right units and meters? Travis, you look like you have it. What is that? 1.95 times 10 to the power of 6. And that's not what I have. Yeah, I have 7.8 times 10 to the power of 3 for I in here. Yeah, I've got 7.014 times 10 to the power of 2. What? That's what I have to do. Calculator's different than mine. Hey, you're out. Fellas, this is on tape, which will probably make the 5 to 10 times better. Give you that window. You got this now, Travis? OK. What did you forget to square? I used 100,000 instead of 200,000. Yeah, we're applying factor safety to the load. OK, from that, you should get a limit, then, a squared that you get in the controls. Actually, since we're we want to know the real normal stresses and check those, not the limit here. So this should actually be 100. Because if we put the 250 in there, we'd be putting the factor safety in twice. 2.1, you know what I got. What did you get for the dimension A? I got. Where did it go? 09834. 098. Using this, then backing A out of it, you got 098. Is that meters? So you might specify 100 millimeters instead of 98 millimeters. No, that's not millimeters. That's meters. We'd be using spaghetti if that was millimeters. It's terrible when it rains. I'll see you for no reason. OK, so maybe 100 millimeters makes this calculation real easy. Comes out something like about 10 megapascals, which is below the 12. So you use the factor of safety. Yeah, it's already been applied. If we apply it again here, then we've applied it twice. All right. You guys, well, I don't guess we need to, will you? I guess you could. Double check it for the 200 kilonewton load just to see what happens when it doesn't quite work great. Just redo it for the 200 kilonewton load. Do it there as well, remembering the factor of safety. We only want to apply it once, and then we'll see what we get there. So force goes up a little bit. We're going to need greater moment of aerated withstand that. So A goes up, and then see what happens to the stresses, whether they go up too much or not enough. The load's increased. We're also increasing the area, so it might still be OK. All right, this one's easy. That just doubles. 6 times 10 to the minus 3 meters to the fourth. That should give dimension on the side of, anybody have to have it? Yeah, 117. Yeah, 117 millimeter, something like that. Of course, you can't buy custom made wood with SI dimensions in America. You're going to have to buy this wood from Europe. Like a 770 millimeter. Yeah. We'll have to get out of here. Earl can handle it. It's slapped for a pretty hard word. Earl and Ace hardware can handle anything we send them. So you should get 14.6. I think that's what you said, John, anyway. And that's greater than the 12, so this, if we really do need the 200 kilonewton limit, we're going to have to design it based on the critical stresses rather than the critical buckling. It's close enough, though. You'll be gone by the time. No, because you build these in the summer. That's when your mother-in-law's in town. Sorry, Nana. Just kidding. She's watching this. OK, for a picture of what we have going on here, we have that Euler's buckling equation. That's just the equation we came up for the stresses a little bit earlier. But now we're designing for a particular limit and we can't go above that. So that's essentially what we're doing now. We don't want to stay below that critical limit. Stay somewhere down on the buckling curve, somewhere down there. OK, with that one, David, you're happy with that? That's for square timbers. And part of the reason square timbers are used for posts most commonly is because there is a bias in the orientation of the solid itself. If you use a column like this, this kind of column is much more likely to buckle with respect to this axis. Let me double check just what our book calls that, the y-axis. Yeah. Then it is with respect to the x dimension. And you know that, too, from the very same demonstration piece, as I push down on this, it's much more likely to bend perpendicular to the smallest dimension than it is. Can't even make it bend. Can't a little bit. Not easy. This way, it buckles very easily. And that's because of the aspect ratio of the cross section is much different. So square columns are probably most commonly used because they can be put in in any one of the two orientations possible without concern of which way they might buckle. I noticed they were doing that on the new wing of Lens Falls National on South Street. Doing what? They had the timbers. No, they had support there on the steel, but the support columns were square. The columns were square? Yeah, they were using the support building burn up. Yeah, well, whatever one gives a sufficient moment of area, two is economical enough to use. And three, are those going to be exposed? No, but they already tear your beams. Yeah, OK. Sometimes, because a square beam might look better than does a niving exposed, it depends. If you're doing a group hug, you want all that stuff out because it just looks cooler. So we'll investigate the possibility now with a beam like this. Oh, there's the dimensions I'm looking for. This will be two inches down here, four inches up there. We'll use Douglas Furr as a Young's modulus of about 1.9 times 10 to the sixth psi. Good thing it's in psi. We'd hate to have to use wood that has values. And the wood we grow in America doesn't come in SI units. Laub will stress of 3.78 times 10 to the third psi. 5 foot long, I guess 5 foot high is the better term for a column like this. OK.  So once we've figured out the load put in a factor of safety, that way you can have 1 and 1 half mothers-in-law on the deck. All right. So find slenderness ratio, this L over R, and then find the allowable load once we've determined that. Now, the concern is that it's more likely to buckle in one direction than the other. Well, experience tells us which it is, but it doesn't mean it's not something that we can double check. Ixx, that's the one we've been using mostly, which the 112th BH cubed, where B is the 2 inches, the 4 inches. Now, remember, we're not necessarily using that number. We have the radius of gyration as the piece down here. So we've got to determine what the radius of gyration is. Then we need to do the same thing in the y direction. Just to double check this in both directions. We know from experience which one to worry about in particular, but double check it anyway. Make sure it gives us what we expect it to give us. Get our numbers. We have the radius of gyration apart. A is the same for both of them. So whichever one's the smaller, it's going to be the one that's the greater concern. And it reduces to H over the square root of 12, B over the square root of 12. So it tells you right there which one's the lesser. And then once we've got that, we can do zone A for the critical load. It's obviously, hopefully it's obvious that we're going to need to use yy there as the critical radius of gyration. So that will give us a pre-critical load. And the allowable load is that times our factor of c. So we would expect this to fail at one place. We'll put even greater limits on that. We need it right. I want to reduce that. What, Chris? Why are we using a smaller radius of gyration? Because it's more likely to fail in that direction. That lowers our critical load. If we design it with the greater one, we'll have a higher critical load. If we use that, then it could be over what the lower critical load is. It does get a bit confusing when we have two things going on at once. Sometimes we want the greater in one place. Sometimes we want the lesser. Remember, this is our critical load. It's the upper limit that we would expect to be finding. So we may have a critical load yet. Check with somebody. That's me. Come on, let's talk to somebody. David's got it. For r, y, y, I have 5, 7, 7 inches. So the slenderness ratio is 5 feet over that, symbol for that. And this ratio, of course, is unitless. So that's about 104. Is that OK so far? That's easy for it. Oops, oops, oops. One of those days, this is May. Units wouldn't have worked out on the area, which is what, 8 square inches? So far, we have units up there. Oh, yeah, and this is unitless. So that'll give us units of pound. These are the slenderness ratios, 104 unitless and that's squared, a lot of good. For that, I don't use the pi. What's somebody else got for that? I have 13.9 kips and then we apply the factor of safety to that, reduce that by 1.5 just to make sure, just to make sure we'll only allow a lesser little bit than that one. That comes out to be 9.2. You have 11.1 for which one? For this one, you have to square pi. You have to square the slenderness ratio. Sure, if you're doing something else wrong. This cap. Everybody's talking about 13.9. Phil, you got 13.9? I don't, safety don't. All right. Notice that based on the ultimate limit, which is the business we looked at in the very first couple weeks, if you're looking at the stress, we use the ultimate limit stress for this part of it, then we find that the allowable load is much, much greater, meaning this is much more likely to fail by buckling than fail due to just simple normal stress. The type of thing we looked at in the first week was much greater danger than failing by buckling. Do you get it finally? You need it. You want a slide roll? Yeah, I'll do better off. Yeah. The batteries don't go down on those. Where did that question come from? The P to the critical. This one? Yeah. Where'd that come from? Right there on my nose. I don't think I had actually that equation. Remember, we had this critical stress equation, and that's where we brought in the slenderness ratio. This equation was pi squared d pi squared e over l r squared. If you solve this for the critical stress, then you get the equation we have over there. I just didn't take that extra step. You got it fixed finally? That was square root of 8. Square root of 8. All right. Slightly different, but related problem when we get started. Imagine using an I-beam for a column. We'll use our regular model. We'll modify this a little bit for more possibilities. On Monday. But imagine this. What we've got is the beam is stabilized at midpoint, which forces it into the second mode of failure. However, since it's an I-beam, it depends upon which way the I-beam is turned. So we're going to look at it as if we're looking down straight down at there. We can see the I-beam looks something like that. We'll be looking straight down at it, and we would see these supports if we look down there. But they're all the way down at the midpoint. So it's oriented in that way as opposed to it being an H-beam with two midsupports. So it's supported that way. Which means in the plane pictured, possible mode of failure is the second mode. In the plane, the opposite plane, where those supports are in that direction, it's now more likely to fail in the first mode. And there's a different moment of area for the two directions. So we have to make sure we've got that. So for this picture, we'll put y in that direction. Is that right? No, that's x. Because then this will be the xx direction that agrees with this one. And for it turned on its side, a 90 degree review, that'll be yy. So we could actually put the hidden line of the flange. Sorry, the web as we see it there, if that helps a little bit. So we're looking right down the y-axis, right at the beam like that. So we're seeing the two new lines of the flanges there. So we have to investigate both of those modes of failure. This is all other things being much less likely, because it'll fail in this way first. But it's not a symmetric beam in the two directions. So we have to look at both of the possible modes of failure. So here's some of the other information you need for this. Steel beam. So we'll use 29 times 10 to the third KSI as Young's modulus. An allowable stress of 42 KSI. Factor of safety, 2.5 on the buckling equation. Not too big a deal. We apply that then to the, where's the other piece of, oh, the type of beam it is. So once we find out the normal stress, then we'll apply it to there to apply it to where it was buckling equation. The other piece you need to know is this beam is a W8 by 24. Yeah, W8 by 24. Oh, also that it's 25 feet taller. I think that's all the pieces then you need. So determine a critical load based on the two possible failure modes, using that particular beam. Because it's more likely to bend in one direction than the other. These are two very different moments of inertia. And they're right in the table. You don't have to actually calculate those. But they're significantly different. And they're right there in the tables in the book. And they differ by a factor of about 4, which is surprising. But remember, these deformations are very small. So we're not used to seeing them in our practical experience, even imagining them. You'll find in the book that one has a moment of inertia about that axis of 82.8 and about the other axis of 18.3. That's the concern for this mode. This mode accepts the bends in this direction, then we're looking at moments in that direction. Also, the effective length is half on that one. But that's either putting in the N equals 2 or the half either way. All right, so that takes us to the end. We'll look at that one before Monday.


Good morning everybody. Please be seated. My name is Choi and I will serve as moderator of this second session. As a moderator, I'd like to briefly explain in three, four minutes the context of our discussion. This session will pick up where the previous one left out, left off East Asia. From East Asia, we will be zeroing in on North East and the Korean Peninsula. We are gathered here to discuss and reflect on the future of East Asia, North East Asia, and the Korean Peninsula. Why? Why are they important to us? The rise of East Asia would be recorded in history as the most significant phenomenon of the second half of the 20th century along with the Cold War. East Asia accounted for only 10% of the global economic output after the Second World War. Now, it accounts more than 25%. This historic rise enabled East Asia to serve perhaps as the engine of the growth of the world economy in the 21st century. Looking into the future, it is important to bear in mind that East Asia has about 1.6 billion people with a culture, to the emphasis on education, hard work, thrift, and deferred gratification. By virtue of this, many experts predict that East Asia will serve as the main engine of world economic growth in this century. As such, East Asia appears to promise a broad future for itself as it rise to the entire world. The Korean Peninsula is a case in point. It is situated at the heart of the Northeast Asia, and it served traditionally as an Indonesian route for the hegemonic power that was in the past. But now, it has become a route for communication and commerce and the conduit of prosperity. For example, before South Korea and China normalized their relations in 1992, the trade volume was negligible and there was not a single direct flight between the two countries. As of last year, however, the trade volume between the two countries surpassed $250 billion, and the number of direct flights between the two countries exceeded 840 per week. What is remarkable is that all these positive developments took place along with Korea's strengthening its alliance with the United States, maintaining, albeit some frictions, its mutually beneficial relations with Japan in trade, tourism, and cultural exchanges, and developing its good relations with Russia. However, this very positive evolution in the Northeast Asia can be maintained only when we manage successfully a number of issues in the region, including territorial and historical issues. At the same time, most of us can agree that the North Korean problem along with its nuclear issue constitutes the single most serious problem facing Northeast Asia. While South Korea has been evolving rapidly, North Korea remained frozen in history. Its relationship with China is, again, case in point. Twenty years ago, its trade with China was about $3 billion, as of last year, $7 billion. The direct flight between two countries, between North Korea and its most important country in the world, China, was five times per week. Last year, still five times per week. So these present a very complex and serious problem for all of us. How to deal with them, what the nature of this problem, what kind of keys do we have to open the door for the future? Fortunately, we have five eminent speakers who will elucidate the essential aspects of these subject problems. We have Thomas Bagger from Germany, and Charles Guijou from Korea, T.A.D. Mariani of France, Marcos Roland from the United States, and Anatoly Trokonev from Russia. We'll start with Thomas Bagger from Germany. He's currently head of the German Foreign Minister's, no, head of policy planning of German Federal Foreign Office. Previously served as head of the German Foreign Minister's Office, and he served also as political councillor in Ankara, Turkey, and in D.C., the United States. Mr. Bagger, you have the floor. Well, thank you very much. I think we heard a remarkable speech by the President this morning, but I'd like to draw your attention on a speech that she gave in the German city of Dresden in former East Germany in March this year when she was on her presidential visit to Germany. And it was a lecture titled An Initiative for Peaceful Unification of the Korean Peninsula, and she laid out in greater detail some of the issues that she also touched upon this morning. And I think the German-Korean relationship is far broader than the rather superficial similarity of having a history of division. But it's quite interesting that we come back to this issue of division and unification on the Korean Peninsula. First, because the President has made it a strong hallmark of her policy initiatives, but secondly also because there's a new dynamic in this intractable issue, namely in the attitudes of Beijing and of China. And I think that is something that we should discuss and that there's a lot of dynamic in the relationship between Korea and China these days. We have, though, set up an advisory group, Korean, German, to discuss and sort of reflect on the German and European experience, some of which has already been touched on in the first panel this morning. Not because we think that there are lots of similarities, actually the differences between the Korean and the German experience are rather striking. And just to mention a handful of them, the experience that there was a war between the North and the South on the Korean Peninsula and there was never a war between East Germany and West Germany. The dimension of the experience of division, we're talking 70 years now on the Korean Peninsula, we only had 40 years before reunification happened in Germany. When you compare the size of the population, you're talking two to one here, you were talking four to one in Germany. When you talk about the difference in GDP per capita, it was maybe, I don't know, three to five to one in the case of Germany and you may talk about something that is closer to 15 or 20 to one in the case of Korea. And then finally, maybe the most important issue of all that has already been mentioned is the nuclear dimension, of course, which was not there in the case of Germany. And as a final reminder on the differences or on the sort of the unpredictability of what we're trying to address here as an issue, let us not forget that German unification, sort of the fall of the iron curtain and the wall in Berlin and Europe came as an almost complete surprise at the time 25 years ago. So given all of those differences in the overall situation, you know, why is it useful to even look at the European and the German experience as we've tried to do? Because the key question, the key question, how to build among the nations of the region the proper framework for peaceful political and social change. That is the same challenge that we were facing in Europe and for which we've tried to find our own solutions. And former Foreign Minister Han, who's chairing that group on the Korean side, is sort of better placed than me to talk about the reflections of that German Korean group. But I'll just name three sort of categories that are hugely important. One that the President has stressed and is sort of obvious in the way she frames Korea's policies is the need to build trust. And I think it's entirely appropriate to stress this point. Also given sort of the Russian dimension of what we're facing as security challenges. We can talk for a long time about Ukraine and Eastern Ukraine and Crimea, but the larger dimension of the conflict is the loss of trust that has been built over decades in Europe. And that is the real loss and that is the challenge of rebuilding it in our part of the world. But it's also the challenge here. Second, pragmatic cooperation. Try to focus on pragmatic steps and practical solutions in order to narrow the gap that divides south and north. And if you think about it, if you reflect about the history of Ostpolitik in Germany and Europe, it took place over decades. It was very controversial at the beginning, also domestically controversial. But in the end, it became part of the continuity of German foreign policy. And I think this policy continuity and look at it as a long-term strategy is absolutely critical. Thank you. Thank you, Thomas, for your presentation. I think it's very important for you to underline the differences rather than similarities between the cases of Germany and Korea. Because when, from Korea's perspective, when you deal with North Korea, the most serious obstacle comes from North Korea itself. As Pyongyang is very much afraid of the contact with South Korea, the rapprochement, the interaction, there is the most important distinction, difference between Korea and German case. In the case of Germany, East Germany was eager to embrace and follow suit of the West Germany's overture for the rapprochement between the two Germanies. But in case of Korea, North Korea is still very reluctant, afraid of any gestures from South Korea, because they see all of them as Trojan horrors. But we have an expert on this issue, Chul Gi-ju, who served as ambassador to France, Morocco and Mauritania. And currently, he serves as the senior advisor for foreign policy and security of the President of the Republic of Korea. And he will explain us, I hope, the current government's approach to the reunification policy and North Asian question. Thank you very much. Good morning. It is my pleasure to join such a distinguished group of speakers today. A larger context were already explained by Madam President this morning.  Next year marks the 70th anniversary of the division of the Korean Peninsula. And during those seven decades, South Korea evolved into a vibrant democracy with one of the most dynamic economists. North Korea has been undergoing deeper international isolation and economic dysfunction, at least because of its pursuit of nuclear weapons. It is the people of North Korea that suffer most as a result. North Korea's new problem poses a direct threat to the security of all countries in the region and beyond. Left unchecked, it could potentially jeopardize the entire non-proliferation regime. Over the last 20 years, collective efforts have been made to achieve North Korea's denuclearization, yet very little progress has been made to date. Whereas the P5-plus-1 continues to engage in intense diplomacy on the Iranian nuclear issue, the six-party talks is in its sixth year of hearth and counting. If we are to prevent the next 20 years or the next 70 years from being a repeat of the last 2020 when North Korea was able to build up its nuclear stockpiles, or the last 70 when South and North Korea faced each other off, we must be serious about taking a fresh and creative look at moving forward. The Korean government is pursuing a multi-pronged process and wishes to restart the six-party talks while simultaneously pushing for direct inter-Korean dialogue with Pyongyang to cooperate in ways that would help lay the groundwork for our eventual reunification. These include tackling humanitarian challenges, ways to help improve the lively food of ordinary North Koreans, and ways to restore a sense of common identity as one people. We will, of course, observe UN sanctions in this process, and we also believe that North Korea's dire human rights situation must be improved and redressed. In this regard, we welcome the increased international momentum that this year has seen. At the same time, North Korea's provocations will be firmly met, and for us it is very important to maintain a strong Korea-U.S. alliance. Success in denuclearizing North Korea will offer a test bet for spurring progress in achieving broader non-proliferation goals around the world. Ultimately, as Madam President has been saying, unification can be the silver bullet to resolving many of the key challenges that plague the Korean Peninsula, such as the nuclear issue, human rights questions, abuses, and North Korea's social and economic challenges. Our Unification Preparation Committee has already been launched, with the view to paving the way to unification, and we are working on that. And we deeply appreciate the support of our partners in the international community for ultimate unification of the Peninsula. Our approach to the North Korea nuclear issue could also be aided by a regional multilateral security dialogue, for such a framework can help address insecurity that North Korea might have about giving up its nuclear weapons. But the significance of regional architecture in North East Asia would go beyond its potential contributions to resolving the North Korean question. This region lies at the intersection of the three largest economies in the world, and has benefited tremendously from globalization, open market. Yet historical and territorial tensions stand in the way of North East Asia's ability to unleash its full potential. Our regional mechanism has the potential to mitigate geopolitical tensions and rivalries in the region. The need for regional architecture in North East Asia is widely recognized, not least by our partners in Europe, who are at the avant-garde of regional cooperation. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon also stressed a similar point at last month's East Asia Summit in Myanmar. He points out that North East Asia remains the crucial missing link in UN engagement with regional or sub-regional organizations under Chapter 8 of the UN Charter. He called on the region to explore creating a new security architecture and applaud the Korean government's initiative to fill this gap.  Habits of cooperation need to be cultivated, and it is easier to build up such habits of cooperation from soft issues rather than from hard security issues. As countries in the region get used to mutual collaboration in areas like nuclear safety, we have 100 centrals in the region already. They can develop a level of trust necessary for tackling more challenging political and security issues. Such multilateral cooperation in North East Asia can also reinforce the momentum for progress on the nuclear front and inter-Korean dialogue. A strengthened security dialogue structure in North East Asia can also interact with other regional groupings like ASEAN, ARF, ASEM as a way of inter-regional cooperation to address world peace and stability. I hope that the WPC can serve as platforms that generate support for filling the missing links of global connectivity. As North Korea continues to grow in geopolitical and economic importance, it is increasingly being looked upon to play one way or the other a greater role in tackling global challenges, be it the fight against climate change, contagious diseases or terrorism. Until now, it has been the West that has widely been expected to bear the brunt of a lion's share of contributions for the global commons. Today, it is difficult to imagine plausible solutions to global challenges that do not include North East Asia. And there is a cause for optimism. In the campaign against Ebola virus, for instance, we see China making huge contributions in manpower and treasure following the leadership demonstrated by United States and key European countries. Japan is also providing sizable financial assistance and courage following by stepping up to send health workers to fight the Ebola virus in West Africa. And during the course of time, we are very much helped by European partners. Likewise, North East Asian countries have recently announced significant steps to tackle global warming issues. Maybe the Asian countries can be mobilized to support the success of the party conference next December in terms of addressing climate change issues. Hence, the role that North East Asia is expected to play and will be playing to meet the host of challenges facing humanity will likely grow. Indeed, North East Asia's cooperation is becoming increasingly indispensable to dealing with global issues, and I hope to see it increase. As I mentioned earlier, next year will mark 70 years since the Korean Peninsula was divided, but it is also an immensely symbolic year for virtually all the countries that are represented in this conference. And as the 70th anniversary of the end of our war that has shaken every corner of our world approaches, we see how every region continues to be beset with each one set of challenges. This is not called for despondence, but for renewed determination to learn from the past and do more to improve our world. Only then will we be able to tell our children that the world is more peaceful, safer, better and cleaner. Then it was some 70 years ago, this is what we seek to achieve here on the Korean Peninsula, and we count on your continued support along this journey. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chu, for sharing with us Korea's government policy as a perspective regarding North East Asia and North Korea. Next speaker is Diedi Mariani de France, who is now currently a French member of parliament for French citizens abroad and co-president of the French-Russian dialogue. He previously served as the Secretary of State and then Minister of Transport as a special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan of President Sarkozy. Mr. Mariani, you have the floor. And to make a French translation. South Korea has been a major economic power for the past 20 years. A significant commercial partner of the European Union. Last Friday, there was the dinner of the Franco-Korean Chamber of Commerce in Seoul, and the President reminded me that for France, if we report the trade with Korea to the population, this trade is clearly superior compared to the one we have with Japan. This performance is the result of a certain number of economic choices and social realities, a very strong Paris on education, the choice of an open economy, and a high level of poverty and investment. Thus, in the eyes of its economic dynamism, of its insertion into international trade, and of the high level of life of its population, South Korea is no longer ignored by European companies. At the same time, South Korea also has to know the risks that include integration into a globalized system, i.e. a slowdown of growth due to the economic crisis of 2009. This is China, South Korea or Japan. These first-rate export countries have not been spared by the crisis. They must be recognized as an interdependent zone, in which one of the challenges for the coming years will be to ensure the stability of the zone and, despite strong tensions that persist, these tensions, of course, we know them. Korea's geopolitical situation is indeed at the heart of the issues of North-East Asia. For 60 years, South Korea has been in the midst of tensions that focus the attention of its neighboring countries, but also, as we have recently seen, the entire international scene. The absence, for example, of Kim Jong-in last September and the speculation that this will lead to the stability of the North Korean regime, including the part of European democracies, and the proof that the future of South Korea's peninsula represents challenges beyond North-East Asia. These last few years have succeeded, on the other hand, of North-East Asia countries, politicians more or less inclined to a reunification of the two Koreas, without, of course, concreting this. We can indeed recall the policy of the commitment led by President Kim Dae-joon from 1998 to 2003. This policy, which was to avoid the economic collapse of North Korea and to reintegrate into international politics, could have helped to relax the regional geopolitical context and therefore strengthen the security of the region. This loss of cooperation could even let us hear a reunification at the end of the 90s, but, as everyone has seen, the situation has, of course, not evolved as expected. Lee Min-kyung-bak, elected in 2008, put an end to this policy. However, the return to a policy of confrontation did not also lead to a de-nuclearization of North Korea. Today, we see that the relations between the two Koreas are variable. Among what could have been analysed as the sign of a de-jel, we can take the visit to Incheon last October, of a delegation from Pyongyang, to the occasion of the closure of the Asian Games. Indeed, this visit let us hear the wish to resume bilateral dialogue. We can also mention the first meeting since 2007 of the North and South Korean military, on October 15th. But, at the same time, some facts remind us of the persistence of tensions. The de-jel has therefore not taken place and the North Korean question does not seem to always be resolved. The international scene, despite some summations, is more apt to ease tensions. On the North Korean side, we can see a resistance capacity. Of course, no one knows exactly what the real support of the people in the North Korean regime is, but the trauma of a fratricidal war and the memories of decades of division of the nation on the basis of cold war, which ultimately, little by little, this division has settled in some minds. These differences in Asia-North East, including the territorial and historical litigies, must of course be managed and resolved peacefully. Dialogue and negotiation attempts exist. Indeed, following the October 2002 crisis, during which a nuclear weapons development programme was discovered, it was launched in 2003 and to talk about SIS, reuniting the two Koreas, the United States, Japan, China and Russia. These discussions aimed at finding a peaceful issue to the security issues raised by the North Korean nuclear programme, without real success, since North Korea has continued its nuclear development. Today, different hypotheses can be formulated for a dismantling of the North Korean nuclear programme. Mr. Chae Sung-chung, Professor of the Department of International Relations at the National University of Seoul, has divided these hypotheses into three groups. The first is to refer to a review of the talks in order to remove the means to dismantle the North Korean nuclear installations and demand from Pyongyang the declaration of all these nuclear programmes. The second four figures will be based on the idea that North Korea will not renounce its nuclear ambitions. Finally, the third scenario is to minimize reciprocated actions with North Korea and wait for a positive response to finally remove fructose negotiations. I would like to quickly develop the four figures in which we will insist on the re-talking. Indeed, despite the difficulties of the first attempts, the six talks, as well as the multilateral negotiations, remain incontournable. Even if these negotiations have not reached the planned goal, these negotiations have been suspended since April 2009, following the withdrawal of North Korea. They have allowed a pragmatic approach. In the hypothesis of a re-talking, the states present at the table of negotiations will not only set up a process of denuclearization, but above all, are interested in diversifying the negotiation subjects. The four to talk about assistance can be the opportunity, as the previous moderator just said, to open new negotiations around other regional issues, such as maritime issues, environmental protection, or economic integration. In other words, even if these talks are not dissuasive today to put an end to North Korea's nuclear efforts, they must be a lever to create a dialogue and to strengthen cooperation in diplomatic, economic and military matters. It is also one of the strategies mentioned by the Secretary General of the United Nations on the occasion of the summit of East Asia last November 13. He has in effect called on the needs of the Asian countries to widen their coordination and to study the creation of a new security architecture for a more narrow regional cooperation, and, of course, in particular, in Asia of the North-East. A re-talking is also plausible. Last November 25, the special envoy of North Korea and the Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to accelerate the efforts aimed at re-talking to assist on Pyongyang's nuclear program. The representative of Seoul in his negotiations was also made in Russia last week to discuss the security situation in the region with its Russian geologist. He also made a major document for the Chinese authorities. In conclusion, the transformation of North Korea and its integration to the international community must be progressive. On the University of Yangtzei, the gradual transformation of North Korea and its integration to the international community should be encouraged. We can see that between China and Japan, despite the differences that everyone knows, economic pragmatism is the key. Political tensions have not, in effect, committed to the intensification of exchanges. Certainly, economic links will not impose any political convergence. However, they can be a means to approach the Asian countries of the North-East, and, in particular, North Korea, which today does not take part in the global system that we know. What is less or less exact, what is, by the way, less or less exact, since China maintains with North Korea economic relations that have been strengthened since the beginning of the 2000s. Economic exchanges between the two Koreas have also developed, $1.8 billion in 2008, making South Korea the second commercial partner behind China. In conclusion, I said that Korean peninsula is still a real challenge for the future of Asia and the North-East. The perspective of Korean reunification, certainly perhaps far from it, is still envisaged by more or less brusque scenarios. I must say, to discuss with the Korean parliamentarians that I had the opportunity to meet, that at the moment, the will does not seem necessarily an obvious enthusiasm. A peace between the two countries and the Pacific relations are, of course, unanimously desired, but reunification also seems to be worried, I think on both sides, since if German reunification is done, I was going to say, with a certain time, but with a certain economic gap that was not the one we know between the two countries. By the way, the return to a cold war would not be the best vector to approach North and South. We must not underestimate, I think, the capacity of survival of the North Korean regime, because waiting for the collapse of the North Korean regime and renouncing dialogue with the North Korean would inevitably lead to confrontation, even if the perspective of dialogue remains always possible. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Mariani, for your exposure. We have two points of your presentation. First of all, North and East Asia is a key region in the world. Second, the division of Korea, which does not show the signs of the approach, tangible and significant. With Pyongyang, we always maintain the program of nuclear weapons, Crest, Langjie, the large, the last, and from there. Thank you. Now we have Marcos Noland from the United States. Marcos served. He is now currently Executive Vice President and Director of Studies of the Patterson Institute. Previously, he was a senior economist at the Council of Economic Advisers in the Office of the President of the United States. He wrote numerous articles on North East Asia and the Korean Peninsula and gave lectures at the 8th University in Johns Hopkins and other forums. Marcos Noland, you have the floor. Thank you very much. It's a great honor to be invited to participate in this gathering. South Korea is the development success story of the last 50 years. 50 years ago, this country was poorer than Mozambique or Bolivia. Today, it is richer than Spain or New Zealand. And last night at dinner, one of my French colleagues predicted that it will catch France within 10 years. Please, please keep in mind that was the prediction of a French colleague, not my prediction. As spectacular as South Korea's economic development has been, its political development has been as impressive, if not more so. In a period of roughly 10 years between 1987 and 1997, it went from leadership passing from a military authoritarian strongman to his elected but hand-picked military successor to an elected centrist civilian politician to a former dissident getting elected president. And these accomplishments on both the economic and political fronts have been recognized internationally. As was alluded by a previous speaker, South Korea National is now the Secretary General of the United Nations. South Korea was the first Asian and first non-G7 country to host the G20 summit. South Korea hosted the second nuclear summit. A truly impressive history of accomplishment. If you want to see a contrast, look north. North Korea is mired in the third generation of a Stalinist dynasty. As President Park remarked in her speech this morning, it was the subject of an absolutely devastating, comprehensive 400-page report by UN Commission of Inquiry into its human rights abuses, which led the General Assembly to amend referral of the regime to the International Criminal Court. Its economy is characterized by growing inequality and corruption. It experienced one of the worst famines of the 20th century and even now a significant part of its population remains chronically food insecure. Looking forward, the best-case option for the United States is the peaceful unification of Korean Peninsula on Seoul's terms. The questions are how we get there under what conditions should we settle for second-best alternatives. A permanent division of the Peninsula is clearly a possibility. But when people think about unification, it basically boils down to three scenarios. First one is one side conquers the other one militarily. The second one is that the Peninsula experiences a peaceful, gradual, consensual unification which is measured in decades and that's the official position of the two governments. The third possibility is the one that's usually talked about the most which is an abrupt German-style collapse of the North and its absorption by the South. Normally, the Korean equivalent of the peaceful disappearance of East Germany is assumed but there are no guarantees and I'll come back to this point in a moment. Now the first possibility is horrific and given the maintenance of deterrence on the Peninsula and conflicts for 50 years, for 60 years, hopefully it will not eventuate. That leaves the second and third possibilities. Which of these two scenarios and a prolonged consensual unification or abrupt collapse and absorption scenario prevails revolves around whether North Korea can successfully address its economic, political and diplomatic challenges and survives permanently as an independent political entity or whether multiple stresses that the regime confronts creates an unmanageable situation and it experiences an abrupt change culminating by absorption by South Korea. Now earlier this year the Ilman Institute of International Relations surveyed 135 experts a term I use advisedly in this context with respect to the future of North Korea. Obviously there was a range of views among this multinational cast of experts but the consensus from this survey was the life expectancy of the Kim Jong-un regime was something on the order of 10 to 20 years. A majority expected it to fall from an internal power struggle and that unification with South Korea would be the final endpoint. This implies that the consensus among the experts at least is towards that abrupt unification scenario. Now with respect to that scenario establishment of civil order is essential as the US learned or was reminded in Afghanistan and Iraq. If there is prolonged violent political opposition to South Korean rule then a quarantine or something akin to the situation with respect to Israel and the West Bank Gaza territories could obtain and the predictions on the economic side of subsequent development of the peninsula would obviously be dampened or attenuated. The good news is that recent planning by the South Korean government shows a new sense of seriousness and unification would accelerate peninsula growth and lead to a dramatic reduction in poverty. The bad news is that the price tag could easily exceed a trillion dollars or less as the South Korean government planning assumes if the DMZ is maintained as a mechanism of population influx control permitting very disparate levels of per capita income in the two parts of the peninsula for an extended period of time but that scenario itself raises political issues that I will skip over in the interest of time. Ultimately the key determinant of which of these scenarios eventuates is the capacity of the North Korean leadership and the rest of the world that means all of us can influence incentives at the margin but we should not exaggerate how much influence we have on these internal developments. In this respect the key issue for us and especially for South Korea is how we frame engagement and South Korean political history provides alternative conceptions. As was alluded to by my predecessor President Kim Dae-jung had a policy called sunshine policy derived from the esophable of the sun and the wind. They bet on who can make the traveler disrobe the wind blows and blows but that only makes the traveler stop more tightly, the sun warms the traveler, he takes off his robe. The key point here is that the sunshine policy was conceived as an instrumental policy. Kim Dae-jung didn't want to pursue sunshine with North Korea because he was very nice or he liked North Korea. He wanted to pursue it to transform North Korea in a way that would make national reconciliation more feasible and ultimately set the stage for unification. His successor government, the government of President Noh Mui-yoon drifted into a different conception of engagement, a conception of engagement where the point of engagement was engagement for engagement's sake. And the idea was that if you engage with North Korea it would feel less humiliated, it would feel greater status, it would have less likelihood of lashing out as a result and so engagement is a kind of assurance that turns the heat down and permits peaceful coexistence. For this line of argumentation to be persuasive in the case of Han, one has to have in mind some sort of turning point in North Korean behavior so that these handouts are justifiable appeasement and not simply a self-destructive enablement of a hostile state. And North Korean threats of a nuclear first strike against the United States make this line of reasoning hard to sustain diplomatically, nor for that matter is the South Korean public willing to go along with a one way street of handouts anymore. So we're back to a world of reciprocity and the issue is how we should structure engagement and President Park this morning outlined her policy of trust politic which recognizes this domestic political imperative explicitly. The goal of engagement should be to encourage the evolution of the North Korean state in desirable directions encouraging less threatening and bellicose behavior externally less repressive practices internally while encouraging the rehabilitation of the North Korean economy as a hedge against possible collapse. The answer of which to the question of which of these concepts of engagement will prevail whether it is a means to an end or an end of itself will impact not only the nature of North South relations but the relations of each respective states relationship with the United States relationships in Northeast Asia more broadly and ultimately the future of North and South Korea themselves. Thank you. Thank you Marcos for presenting those two scenarios very clear of the possible evolution of North Korea. The first one is prolonged but peaceful process of integration. The second one reunification by default in other words by the collapse of North Korea. And particularly I advise you to take note that his explanation that we should not exaggerate the level of influence we can possibly have on North Korean evolution. So we unfortunately do not have any representative from Japan or China but we do have from Russia Mr. not only Torkunov who is diplomat and scholar he serves currently as rector of the Moscow Institute of International Relations and president of the Russian International Studies Association and also the chairman of the Russian co chairman of the Russian Japanese History Commission Mr. not only you have the floor. Thank you very much professor you know all this talks about the resumption of dialogue between two careers about the new measures taken by both sides involved in this process brought my memory back to the 1972 that time I walked in our embassy in Pyongyang and it was my first diplomatic position on the graduation of the University and I remember that time because we were so happy to know that the joint statement of North and South in summer of 1972. And there were a lot of hopes. And we think about very bright perspectives for the Korean Peninsula and for both Koreas. By the way, at that time we didn't have the diplomatic relations with South Korea. And many of us dreamed to go to South Korea and to walk there and to know this country because we read a lot about the reforms of South Korea taken by President Park Jong-hee that time in the 60s and early 70s. So much water has flown under the Han River bridges since that time. But unfortunately we again and again come back to the same topics. And we speak about the resumption of dialogue. And I should say that the current reality is much more complicated when in the Cold War era. Then the security in Korean Peninsula was more or less guaranteed by the antagonistic nuclear superpowers. Now we can witness a complicated interplay of controversial national interests both of big and smaller powers, each playing its own part in this geopolitical play. Korean Peninsula remains the hub of bilateral, regional and global problems. The major plays are the two Koreas and the four powers. The two Koreas remain the major actors with totally incompatible priorities. The inter-Korean relations follow a repeated turn. A crisis gives a way to detain, which in turn is replaced by another surge of hostilities. We used to assume that the Korean War of 1953, which formerly has not ended, started initially as a civil war between the competing elites. But later the two sides were supported by outside forces and conflict remains international till today. The essence of inter-Korean relations remains unchanged. The goals of Korean War remained unfulfilled for both parties. And each believes that the only complete victory over the enemy and its capitulation can put it to end. In Park Kyung-hae, Kim Jong-un era, no major breakthrough isn't decided. Although the policy of Seoul became more balanced, while North Korea, after an outbreak of tension in 2013, also calmed down. However, even now the intentions of both sides still remains incompatible. Pyongyang wants South Korea's large-scale assistance, which could strengthen the regime without any conditions. Especially a condition concerning Pyongyang's right to security, so to say, emanated in nuclear deterrent. Seoul, through its trust policy, pursues the goal of controlling the situation and opening up North Korea, while softly inducing changes in the Northern society in preparation for the eventual fall of Kim's family regime and unification of South Korean terms. The pretext of prior genocularization and meaningful steps puts, in my view, a cap on any practical steps to cardially improve relations. At the same time, Pyongyang remains deeply suspicious about South Korean motives and, of course, cannot be expected to yield in principle issues of preservation of its governance system. In fact, the fact that both Koreas share ideas of nationalism and want to solve their problems without outside interference gives some hope for the future. However, the international dimension of Korean civil war in early 1950s resulted in a situation in which the two Koreas cannot settle their scores independently, without great powers' intervention. Although the extent of great powers' interest is different, and let me elaborate a little about the position of two countries, USA and Russia. USA remains the principal collector in the Korean Peninsula region, and Washington currently preferred a policy of containment of North Korea, so-called strategic patience, while keeping strong political and military grip on South Korea. A new testament of USA's desire to keep ROK under control and limit its foreign policy maneuverability is the inclusion of ROK in the deployment of terminal, high-attitude air defense systems aimed against China and Russia. For the United States, the geopolitical motivation is of primary importance. The growing efforts to contain China is the most obvious reason for giving attention to the Korean issue. International recognition of the Paris regime and the normalization of the situation on the Korean Peninsula would put in question the U.S. military presence in the region and the creation of missile defense system in Northeast Asia. The Obama administration has not developed an articulate strategy with regard to North Korea. Yesterday in the plane I read comments on the recent visit of a new appointed special envoy in Korea, Mr. San Kim, and from these comments I understood that nothing new was brought to Korea, new ideas, new proposals, new initiatives. This in turn fits the fears of North Korean elite that Washington is hoping for a cataclysm in North Korea and its absorption in the South Korea, or a leadership change that would make Pyongyang more mullable. As for Russia, for Russia's stability and prevention of a conflict its eastern frontier, which could lead to tectonic changes in geopolitical situation, is the utmost priority in its Korean policy. Therefore, all other considerations and priorities should be considered secondary to this agenda. Unfortunately, it's questionable where the goal of denuclearization of North Korea is attainable for the moment. So any diplomatic process is only a tool to hedge the risk, stop North Korea's improvement, its arsenal, and prevent nuclear proliferation. Of course, North Korean nuclear weapon program and YMDE proliferation issues are vital and should be solved, but not at the cost of stability. However, there is no need for North Korea to use these missiles. Once relations with these countries are normalized and Pyongyang's possession of these dangerous weapons is not a worst-case scenario if responsibly handled. At the same time, the nonproliferation issue cannot be suitably solved without addressing broader security issues. Russian experts believe that the North Korean quest to get nuclear weapons resulted from the situation that during the Cold War Korean security was guaranteed by the superpowers. The collapse of the Soviet Union led to a dangerous loss of equilibrium on the Korean peninsula to the extent of the possibility of the use of force. Potential reforms in the neighboring country constitute a chance for Moscow to improve its position in Northeast Asia, strengthening the role of Russian business and regional projects important from the economic and geopolitical points of view, such as the gas pipeline to South Korea, the territory of North Korea, and the trans-Korean railway connected to Trans-Siberia. The reforms would contribute to implementation of these projects and they in turn to the stabilization of the economic situation in North Korea. As you may know, Russian-North Korean relations are playing very important role in strengthening its position in the Northeast Asia. Deterioration of relations with Pyongyang has several times resulted in decline of Russia's influence in solving the problems directly related to its national interest. Russia has always stood firm that North Korea legal interests should be absorbed and this country should not be the object of isolation. I believe the agenda of diplomatic process should be comprehensive and not be concentrated solely on North Korean nuclear problem, but address comprehensive security issues including that of the North Korean and normalization of relations between all the parties. The solution to the Korean issue could also be found through political and diplomatic means, preferably within multi-party diplomatic process which should not be regarded as a zero-sum game. A new security system in and around Korean Peninsula should take into account the legitimate interests of all the parties. For example, a new concept of maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula based on a system of cross agreement among all six parties process participants can be suggested as a final result of the six-party talks. Such a system would legally secure each participant's rights and obligations to other members in regard to the situation on the Korean Peninsula and would make it possible to monitor the fulfillment of these obligations. In this case, the implementation of bilateral obligations arising, for example, from the agreement between North Korea and the United States, would be a subject to monitoring by such countries as China and Russia. In turn, the relations between the ROK and the United States could be under absorbance by North Korea. Such a system could incorporate obligations stemming from the existing agreements with regard to the Korean Peninsula. The issue of denuclearization of North Korea could be resolved with this framework. Thank you. Thank you, Anatoli, for sharing with us your thoughts. One can particularly appreciate your presenting the crux of the matter of inter-integrated relationship. You explained that North Korea wants a large-skill assistant from South Korea to strengthen its regime. On the other hand, South Korea wants an opportunity with North Korea even providing larger assistance with a view to changing its strategy and its society. So there is a sort of bad luck. We also take note of explanation about the nuclear issue. This question is not a $10 issue. It is linked to the larger regional security as well as North Korean question itself. I'd like to thank the five panelists for having presented their views in a very succinct and clear manner. And the option is we have 15 minutes for exchange with the floor. So unless you, among you, would like to react to some comments, I'd like to open the floor to the audience. So you have the floor. Raise your hand and the microphone will be brought to you. Please identify yourself. Excellent question. He explained the response to your question anticipating because he addressed the differences between Germany and Korea. He said that in case of, and I edit my points of view, the difference between Germany and Korea is for German unification, Soviet Union holds the key, held the key. On the other hand, in case of Korea, it is not China, it is North Korea which holds the key. So would you like to react to his question? Herr Bagger, you and Mr. Choe? Well I would second that point. I think there is quite an interesting development in the Chinese appreciation or non-appreciation of what is going on in North Korea and therefore a dynamic also in the South Korean-Chinese relationship. But I would also agree that of course there is a difference, sort of China plays a hugely important role for what happens in North Korea and what happens on the peninsula, but it does not hold the key to the same degree as the Soviet Union did in 1989 to what happened in Germany and in Europe. So both of these things are important, but I'm not in a position to talk about sort of the Korean-Chinese relationship, there are others here who should do that. Mr. Choe? Thank you very much. The ties between North Korea and China remain very strong and China hopes to see prolonged stability and security in the region. And China does not want recurrence of conflict, armed conflict in the region, in the vicinity. On the other hand, South Korea has strengthened its ties with China very deep. And we are very strong economic partners, we have Korea, China, FDA recently announced and many other things, many summit-level meetings and quite close contacts and conversations. What has changed in China is that China doesn't want North Korea to possess or develop nuclear weapons. And China, as others, as a P5 member of the Security Council, cannot pardon another state to develop nuclear weapons because one must uphold the principle of non-proliferation and NPT regime. So that makes the relations between North Korea and China a little bit chilly at the moment. But I think in solving this problem and resolving this conflict, we need to consult each other and we are in close contact. And as some already mentioned, our negotiators are strolling around and my colleague went to recently to Russia, China also and our experts in Japan. So among the stakeholders, constant contact and absolutely finding a solution or finding a permanent solution, which is unification, we need to rely on Chinese support. And I think China has no difference in that approach. Thank you. Thank you. We have two more questions from the left side. But if someone has a question from the right side, you have the priority for the sake of balance. Please. Thank you very much. That's almost from Japan. I have a question to Ambassador Jo. There is a rumor in everywhere that in today's world of uncertainty, the nuclear umbrella of the United States over some part of Asia may not last forever. Some Asian countries have a wish to have their own weaponry system based on nuclear. And some cited South Korea may wish to have North United without giving up nuclear capability because that could be a last result for safety even without the nuclear coverage of the United States. Is this rumor just rumor or any subtle feeling to do with this in South Korea? Thank you. Thank you. I think it's a complete rumor and a groundless rumor that may be, I don't know, promoted by some. But frankly, while North Korea is developing nuclear weapons origin region, we are developing our Polish for non-proliferation. We are now negotiating with United States of prolonged new type of nuclear agreement and we want to be one of the model champion of non-proliferation. So even though in Korea, we have few people who may emphasize that we must have enrichment right in terms of having new nuclear agreement with United States, but that is not the general notion of the Korean public and the Korean government. We want to uphold the principle of non-proliferation and stick to that point and we want to be a model country in promoting peaceful uses, respecting the rules of NPT and IAEA. So there's no doubt and if there is unification sometime, we hope very much it will be done peacefully and if still there is something remaining in North Korea about nuclear devices and it has to be carried away by responsible members of the Security Council and I don't think there is any doubt on that and we really hope we should not develop our logic into that wrong direction and let us unite our forces in preserving the current NPT system. Thank you. Thank you. Left side, middle of the left side please. And then in front. Thank you very much. I would like to ask you a question that is very naive and I think it can be addressed to all of the members of the panel who wishes to reunification of Korea. Mr. Choe, you must respond to that question. First of all, I think in Korea, larger public wants to realize reunification because we have been one country for the past 2,000 and some more years and so 70 years is very long and by emphasizing the so-called unification monancia or whatever, in Korean we call it Daebak, the big monancia, we may do that and suddenly it allows public attention that unification is something which you should not be afraid of, which may create for the dynamism for Korea to continue to grow and make the region prosper together. So I think a larger public in Korea supports that notion. But I don't know whether our friends share the same viewpoint but for Korean sake we are there, we have this new preparatory committee preparing constant work and they got very much support from the public. Thank you. In front, left side. And then we have Ben Hampson from Canada. I wonder if the two Korean members of the panel could comment on the stability of public attitudes towards what have clearly been oscillations in policy from the sunshine policy to cooling, now a policy based as we heard more on reciprocity, is the public behind it and when there's disappointment as there may well be, how do you manage that? I think again Ambassador Joo is the obvious person to respond to the question. Before him, can somebody from the panel would like to address the issue? Marcus? I would be happy to address two of the other questions that have been asked but I'm not an expert on the South Korean public opinion. Okay Ambassador Joo. Very briefly, before we had the five year, five year progressive government which supports the sunshine policy and the Canada policy. Then we have another very conservative government. Now we have a second conservative government. Now we launch the so-called unification preparatory committee where the participants in the committee are largely from conservative elements but there are a few people or several people representing other in a way of opinion. So astonishingly we found that there is a good consensus emerging out of this preparatory committee and I think I'm very much hopeful that this committee may play a central role in collecting public opinion or national opinion to the right direction so that we can have more easier access to difficult issue which is unification issue and strategic issue of talking with North Korean partners. So overall I think we are more positive in that direction that we might consolidate public opinion into right direction which is working for peaceful unification, gradual unification and prepare the groundwork for supporting both government and parliamentary viewpoint unification policy. Thank you. Perhaps we can entertain one last question before you are done for lunch. Yes. Thank you sir. Today as we know economy dominates the politics. Keeping this in mind are we fearing from China or can we ignore China if we are thinking about reunification or unification process. My suggestion is or my feeling is if we involve the Japan, China, Russia, US and if we initiate the unification process is it possible one, please comment on that. Second, keeping nuclear issue apart, keeping the other issues whether the development issue or the economic development or the other issues, is it possible the unification will go ahead in that way? Thank you very much. Thank you. Any reaction from the panelist? Yes, Marcos. I'd like to very much to listen from Ambassador Minifu to answer that question as well because he's directed to China. Well, Marcos first. The absence of a Chinese representative from the sample with all due respect to our hosts I think is really a lacuna. China has enormous influence on North Korea and Chinese attitudes and policies are absolutely critical. In my remarks I referred to a survey by the Ilman Institute of International Relations. What's very interesting about that survey is that the Chinese experts surveyed have very distinct views relative to the non-Chinese experts. The non-Chinese experts saw China as the key to resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. They saw Chinese pressure on North Korea as absolutely essential. And with respect to the question of who wants unification, they saw China as being the single biggest beneficiary from Korean unification. The Chinese experts in turn view China as having much less influence on North Korea than the non-Chinese do. They think bilateral engagement by the United States is the key to resolving the nuclear issue. And what's really interesting there is complete uniformity among these 135 experts that North Korea will not surrender its nuclear program for removal of sanctions or economic inducements. The old idea that somehow this was a bargaining chip that North Korea was simply going to negotiate a way for a package of goodies. At this point in time there is no belief in that theory or hypothesis anymore. Thank you, Marcus. Last intervention of this session, Ambassador Wu. Thank you, Chair, for giving me the floor. I think we should not exaggerate China's influence over North Korea. Good example. We don't want North Korea to go nuclear. They just ignore our advice. We told them what can assure your security is not nuclear arsenal but development. When people are hungry with empty stomach, you can't have the security. They just ignore our advice. Other thing you see this year, my president choose to come to Seoul first. Our North Korean friends are very much angry. Not long ago we hosted the Shanshan forum in Beijing to talk about Asia security issue. On that issue China, we believe I think Richard Haas is right. In the Northeast Asia, I mean Asia region, what is missing is security architecture. I think we are open-minded. We like to talk about it. We invited North Korea to participate in this forum. They declined invitation. Many other countries joined this forum. So I think this issue is quite complicated. We should not exaggerate the influence of China. I think what we can do together, I think international community, US, Korea, China, Japan, Russia, we have to join hands to exert influence over North Korea to lead them to give up nuclear arsenal. I don't see this prospect at this stage. Thank you. Thank you. I'd like to thank the five panelists for their brief and succinct presentations and audience for their attention. We will end the meeting for lunch with former Prime Minister Lee Hong-gu. Thank you.