So welcome, everyone. Good morning, good afternoon, and good evening, depending on where you're joining us from today. My name is Oge Onobogu and I'm the director of the West Africa program at the US Institute of Peace. Thank you for joining us for this conversation on Guinea, which is part of a USIP series exploring the surge in coups around the world. In September 2021, the military in Guinea Conakry took over following President Alpha Conway's unpopular constitutional change to secure a third term in office. Today, we will explore the role of the economic community of West African states echo us and other regional bodies such as the African Union and the international community. We will also reflect on the several possible pathways that could be followed to return Guinea to constitutional order. To help us explore all these questions today and more, we are joined today by an excellent group of experts. Ibrahim in the end is the regional advocacy manager with the Open Society Institute, West Africa based in Dakar, Senegal. Dr. Joseph Siegel is the director of research at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C. Dr. Chris Fermaniel is the senior associate and regional director for Central and West Africa at the National Democratic Institute also in Washington, D.C. And Alexis Arieth is a specialist in African affairs at the US Congressional Research Services. For our general audience, I encourage you all today to please join the conversation on Twitter using the hashtag, why all the coups. So let's get into the conversation and Ibrahim, I will start with you first. It's been almost three months since the coup in Guinea and the general outlook in the country still seems very uncertain. Can you bring us up to speed on where things are in the country today? What does the current situation look like? Ibrahim? Thanks. Thanks, Olga. It's been now three months since the transition started in Guinea with the military coup. And the transitional government is in place with a civilian prime minister and women and men of integrity holding key ministerial positions in the government. People do not have a very clear timetable with indicators and dates for the review of the voters list, the organization of the elections, and the constitution building process. And despite the ECOWAS sanctions, we are really observing positive developments indicating that the new Guinea authorities are making efforts to rebuild the relationship with the regional organization for the international community. And maybe ECOWAS will consider this during the December 12 summit in reviewing its engagement strategy in Guinea. So the recent developments I am referring to are the transfer of President Conde to his wife's residence. So technically, his situation has improved from being detained at an unknown place to being under house arrest. The establishment of a court to fight financial and economic crimes, in French it's the cours de la cours de répression des infractions économiques financières. An audit of the civil servants registry which led to 6,300 people being sent on retirement and various high ranking military officers being sent on retirement as well. The new Guinea authorities have also authorized former heads of states in exile, Moussa-Dadis Kamara and Sekuba Konate to travel back to Guinea. And this is seen by many as a sign to promote national reconciliation. And the consultation and application process for the establishment of the National Transitional Council, which is supposed to be the legislative body of the transition, is almost complete. And the transitional body will be in place before the end of this month. So we really hope that the National Transition Council will be established by the end of the month and that the timetable for the completion of the transition will be made public by the end of January 2022. The transitional government and institutions will really need technical support to conduct an inclusive and participatory constitutional building process, investigate and litigate on economic crimes while respecting the rights of all parties, build a new clean voter register based on a new population census and establish a coherent and inclusive national reconciliation process. So I will just share these initial remarks for now. And I look forward to the conversation. Thank you very much. Thank you so much Ibrahim. It seems a lot has happened in the last three months, almost three months. So I'm going to turn over now to Joseph Siegel. And Joseph, military coups in Africa basically have a terrible track record for the well-being of citizens. Even though in the case of Guinea, we saw a lot of citizens, mostly young people take to the streets in support of the military after the recent coup. In the past two guineans have experienced military rule before, and they know the consequences can be dangerous. So clearly there is a need to support support an urgent civilian transition. But the question is how best to do this, you know, especially when the military in the current military junta in Guinea seems to enjoy a lot of popular support. I think this idea of popular support is an important one to talk about. Because in the case of Guinea, and often other accrues are seen in Africa, there is often a, you know, some very deep-seated grievances towards the previous administration. And in the case of Guinea, there was a lot of opposition to Alpha Conde's bid to retain power for a third term. There had been massive protests against that. And many felt that he had taken unconstitutional actions to stay in power and was growing increasingly authoritarian. And so when there was the coup in September, there was some relief and, you know, and some sense of hope that this would end, you know, a prolonged tenure for Conde and office. At the same time, I think that to be careful about calling the coup a popular, you know, a popular act. Many of the opposition leaders, you know, while criticizing Conde denounced the means of using the military to try to change the order of country, as you noted, many citizens in Guinea are well familiar with the abuses of the military government. Indeed, you know, Guinea is one of the poorest countries in Africa, one of the most corrupt countries in Africa, because of its many decades of military and authoritarian rule. So I think there's a lot of trepidation about an ongoing military government in Guinea.  And in Guinea, you know, there are serious problems. The question is, how do you change? And the problem of legitimating and tolerating a military intervention is that it effectively creates an extra legal process for political change. And once you start down that road, it's a very slippery slope. You know, what's to say what's legal and what's not legal? What is the process of transition? Who sets the norms for what a new trans traditional order will be in place? And on what basis are they doing it? What legitimacy do they claim? And I think that's really the problem because if we tolerate this, if we recognize the authority of a coup leader, then what's to stop another Lieutenant Colonel from stepping in and saying, well, they're not happy with the way things are going. And therefore they have the right to change the government. Surely there will be a few people come on the streets and support that too. That's not a way that we want to normalize the process of change in Guinea or in any African country. Thank you so much, Joe. Definitely really wonderful insights there. So I'm going to turn over to Dr. Chris Fominio, still following on that thread and the overview that Ibrahim provided as well. So we see that ECOWAS has suspended Guinea, imposed individual sanctions on the military junta, and they've also called for elections within six months. However, there's growing concern about the credibility of African regional buddies such as ECOWAS and the African Union, because it seems that they are tough on coups, but a little relaxed on the issues that caused the coups in the first place. So Chris, this question here is for you. How feasible is it for Guinea to conduct elections in six months? What should ECOWAS and the African Union be doing now during this period of fragile transition to support Guinea and citizens to build the type of inclusive democracy that the country deserves? Over to you, Chris. Thank you very much, Oge for those questions. And let me start with the last point, because I think when we talk about Guinea, there is the track record about the people of Guinea and their aspirations for freedom, for liberties, for democracy that sometimes get overlooked. Let's remember, let's keep in mind that Guinea was the first colony in 1958 to vote against, to go against General de Gaulle of France to say they wanted their independence. And at the time in 1958, the Guinean said, we would rather be a poor country, but be independent and have our freedom than be a colony under France. And that was a very brave decision. And as I look at the politics and the history of Guinea, even in the last five or six decades, I see a constant determination on the part of the Guinean people to have their freedom and their rights respected and to aspire to be governed democratically. That's why the successive military regimes that have occurred or come to power in Guinea have not been able to sustain themselves. Whether it was General Lassana Conte, we had people demonstrating and asking for democracy, or that this camera, or even General Theruba who facilitated the transition and the return to civilian rule in 2010. Now, with regards to the timelines that is being debated now between the junta and echo was, of course, echo is aspects or stated publicly in the declaration made by the heads of states that they wanted elections in six months. The junta has said on its own part that it wants the transitional legislative body that Ibrahim referred to the same day to be the one to determine the duration of the transition. I mean, this is a very sticky point, because nobody wants the military to become so comfortable that they find ways to prolong their stay. I mean, we've seen countries as big as Nigeria that had a one year transition when General Ibrahim, when General Abu Bakr, Abdul Salami, managed the transition from 1998 to 1999 in Nigeria. He stated he wanted a one year transition and it worked. So we've seen other countries that have gone to 18 months, but have fought it along the way. So I think the important thing is going to be to have a timeline that's workable. And that would allow the various pillars, especially with regards to the new constitution and new elections to be conducted in an inclusive manner to kind of lay the foundation for the next phase of guineas democratization process. Obviously, this presents a lot of challenges for ECOWAS, for the African Union, because you're right, they have come under a lot of criticism from the guineans. And I think ECOWAS is being tested in terms of its commitment to its own protocols. Fortunately, we are in the 20th year and ECOWAS this month of December will be celebrating the 20th anniversary of the additional protocols that were adopted in 2001 to strengthen and reinforce democracy and good elections across the sub region. And I think that ECOWAS is mindful of the fact that if it falters on guineas, it's going to open the Pandora's box to what could be a contingent effect, because we've seen the military get back into politics in Mali. We now see it in Guinea. We see it in neighboring Chad. We see it in Sudan. And it's a concern, not just in West Africa, but across the continent, that if our regional organizations are not firm in the way in which they stand up to the military, but also in the way in which they stand up to autocratic regimes, the country could see a lot of its democratic gains reversed. And that would be a very negative trend that we are up to stand up against. Thank you. Thank you very much, Chris. And I will continue on those points that you made and I will call on Alexis now. And Alexis, you know, beyond the statements from the international community condemning the coup in Guinea. How has the U.S. in specific responded to the coup? You know, what's the broader state of play of congressional efforts in response to the coup in Guinea and just the shock and rising coups that we see in general? Are there opportunities for the U.S. to engage during this period of fragile transition in Guinea? Thank you. Okay. So, starting with Guinea, in response to the recent military coup there, the U.S. government has called for a restoration of democracy and respect for the rule of law in the State Department's phrasing, and encouraged a national dialogue to address political conditions that presaged the coup and also expressed support for ECOWAS mediation efforts. On the assistance side, you know, Guinea is a recipient of U.S. foreign assistance, not a top recipient in Africa, but, you know, a sizable recipient, there is a USAID mission and other forms of aid. And pursuant to Section 708 in annual foreign aid appropriations laws, the U.S. government has suspended certain other certain types of aid to the government of Guinea after the coup this year. There are legislative exceptions for democracy promotion, humanitarian assistance, and certain other types of aid, including there's a precedent for considering life-saving health assistance to be a form of humanitarian aid, for example. And as you've probably seen in the news, COVID vaccine deliveries have continued from the United States, for example, the administration has made it very clear that these are not contingent on policy conditions. The U.S. has also provided health system strengthening assistance to Guinea, including in prior years related to Ebola surveillance and response efforts. And there is some precedent for exempting governance support to local versus central government entities, although this has not been publicly detailed. In general, the administration has not publicly released a detailed account of the impact of these aid restrictions. But generally, these primarily concern military aid, including the nascent counterterrorism assistance that we've seen in Guinea in recent years. During the coup, there was a focus on this counterterrorism cooperation because of a video that circulated on social media and eventually got picked up in the international press that showed U.S. military personnel returning to Conakry during the coup from a base nearby where they were conducting training with Indian partner forces. So that military assistance generally is primarily affected and usually suspended or terminated after an application of this provision in foreign aid law. In addition and separately, the president issued a notice recently of his intent to suspend Guinea's eligibility for unilateral trade benefits under the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act for Guinea starting next year. And here the president cited a lack of continual progress toward establishing the protection of the rule of law and of political pluralism. Now this is a reference to a set of democracy and governance benchmarks written into the law that authorizes a go as a program. And so in that same communication, the president also notified his intent to suspend a go of benefits for Molly, for example. Similarly, in apparent connection with the coup in Mali or the coups plural in Mali, and also citing concerns about international humanitarian law presumably a reference to alleged violations of human rights by Malian security forces. There are additional tools at the U.S. disposal, including visa restrictions which were applied in 2009 against members of the junta in power at that time in Guinea. And of course other forms of targeted sanctions, but there have been no public announcements at this time that these tools are being used. Presumably they remain on the table, depending on how the situation evolves in Guinea. In addition, the next year's defense authorization bill as passed in the house would require the executive branch to report on U.S. security assistance to Mali, Guinea and Chad. Reflecting congressional concern with U.S. security cooperation with African countries where military forces have gone on to seize political power. And I would just note in, in addition that the United States government had had expressed significant and high level concern with political developments in Guinea prior to the coup, including at the level of then Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in 2020 and repeated statements of concern from State Department officials about the conduct of last year's elections, both the constitutional referendum and the presidential election that that led to President Pompeo being sworn in for a controversial third term. So the U.S. had publicly and at a very high level stated concerns with that progress with that process and with political trends more generally including political detainees in Guinea. To your broader question about U.S. tools responding to this trend, sort of wave of military seizures of power in the region. Some of these tools are already at play in other countries so Mali is also under this same aid restriction as Guinea under section 7008 pertaining to countries where the military has seized power through a coup. And there are similar discussions I think about additional tools like sanctions and other types of restrictions. It's a broader conversation and I think it's a it's a moving target but I look forward to going more into detail perhaps later in the discussion. Thank you very much Alexis and thank you, you know, Ibrahim and Chris for laying this this this picture this overview of the current situation and also helping to explore some of the possible pathways to move the conversation forward. I think from all of your presentations we've established that the failure of both echo us and the international community to support or proactively support democratic processes when President Alpha Condé was seeking a third term in large part contributed to what led to the current crisis in Guinea. So we're having this conversation on Guinea today against the backdrop of the rise in military coups, not only in the region, and amid the Biden administration summit for democracy as well. I'm going to go around to each of you depending on where you sit and from your vantage point. What type of advice would you give for engagement in Africa, especially in the context of Guinea and in the region. So what what advice would you give as the Biden administration commits to revitalizing global democracy. I'm going to start with Ibrahim. Yeah, thanks. Okay.  The first one is obviously to, you know, help with national dialogue processes, because I guess the situation in Guinea to the one in Mali and I think now we're getting more, you know, will from the people to to have internal dialogues to, you know, be in a position where they can find solutions to their own problems in respect, obviously, you know, of international legal instruments and conventions, etc. So promoting national dialogues and really listening to to these stakeholders in country and trying to understand, you know, where they are coming from, and how they really want to, you know, get out of these situations. The second thing is to really support, you know, long term processes and longer term reforms, because, for instance, the problem in Guinea has a very, you know, deep root cause which is the instability of the Constitution. So really helping, you know, build solid the Constitution's following inclusive participatory processes, but also help build solid institutions and especially institutions at the, at the, at the local level and increase the support to civil society groups and groups, you know, acting as a watchdogs of democracy. I think those groups need youth groups, women's group community based groups need really much more, you know, technical and financial support. And the last, you know, the last piece of advice I can I can give is to support all the efforts around, you know, electoral reforms, reform of the voter. Register and also reform of electoral laws because many, you know, most of the time here, that's where the issue is here in in in Guinea. So, yeah, those are some advice from where I'm, you know, from from where I'm sitting. Thank you. Thank you very much, Ibrahim. I'm going to turn to Joe, if you're there. So, Joe, what advice would you give from where you're sitting from your, from your vantage point? Well, I think there's quite a number of things that can be done to try to reverse the trajectory we've seen a democratic decline. And especially with regards to the the flurry of coups that the Africans experienced the last several years. I would start by saying we need to better incentivize democracy. So, from a positive standpoint, make legitimacy matter. There could be more opportunities, more options for partnership with African democracies and countries that are doing the right thing to try to govern in a way that's participatory and open, transparent. This is both good for Africa in terms of stability and prosperity, but it's good in terms of a basis for partnership with the United States. And so we need to recognize these are long term partnerships we should be building and try to incentivize and encourage great opportunities for development assistance, financial assistance, debt relief, security assistance for countries that are doing the right thing. I think the flip side of that is, you know, there need to be cost for governments and leaders who are trying to undermine democratic processes. And this applies to those who are trying to unconstitutionally extend their terms. And indeed, this is another problem we've seen, you know, 13 leaders in Africa since 2015 extend their terms for their term. So we're seeing a reversion to these, you know, extended presidencies in Africa, which is, which plays into a whole host of other problems in terms of insecurity, corruption, and instability more generally. I would, then, you know, I think specifically when it comes to coups, we need to be clear that when a coup happens, there shouldn't be a question that there shouldn't be any recognition for the the junta that emerges from that. You know, and without international recognition. These co leaders are really isolated. They need international political recognition they need financial support they need to be able to engage with international financial networks. If those aren't accessible to them they really are at a loss in terms of how they can, they can cover. So I think we need to recognize that there's more leverage on the part of the international community than is often appreciated and and and make sure there are costs. I think part of the decline in democratic standards we've seen is that there has been a recognition within some African leaders that the international community is not upholding the same level of standards. So we need to do the minimum amount required to be recognized and in the process retain power and with it, you know, all the disparities in in rather allocation and opportunity and impunity that that come with it. But Joe, so we'll turn to Chris and Chris you, you know, you've been in the business of democracy strengthening for for quite some time so you know that it is long term. So what advice would you give here. Well, you know in all modesty I probably put on the table a few ideas for consideration, maybe three and ask or encourage them to take a keen look at those. But the first point would be that the administration needs to be proactive. In fact, I was, I was delighted when, when my co panelist talked about Secretary Pompeo, when Alexis talk about Secretary Pompeo is being very blunt and very upfront about the fact that Guinea was on the wrong trajectory. I was really delighted when he made that announcement. I believe, either early 2020 or so. And I thought to myself, maybe if you had made the announcement in 2019. When we all had a sense that President Conde was going the wrong direction, it probably would have had a greater impact. And I know that in a number of these countries, the US government is knowledgeable or has a way of knowing in advance where the country is headed. And I think it would be useful to share some of that information with the public so that it puts the autocrats or the military in those countries on notice that they're being watched that the world is watching. So that productivity is something that I would recommend very strongly especially in the domain of public diplomacy. Normally, I would recommend that they put some muscle to their declarations, because people have become to some extent, especially in the global south in general, not just in Africa but in, in, even in Asia and Latin America and other continents. People have become pretty blasé with declarations that are not followed by actions. And we see that the bad actors, whether it's the military, whether it's autocratic regimes, whether it's illiberal forces operating on the African continent, they're very action oriented. And so they do things that undermine democracy, but the pro-democracy elements on the continent, the pro-democracy forces, civil society, political parties, progressive minded legislators very often don't feel that they have the material resources to be able to stand their ground or continue in the actions that are taken to strengthen and deepen democracy. And so it's important to speak out my first point, but it's also more important to back up our declarations with other actions. I recognize that, for example, for the democracy summit, this criteria that has been laid out and not all, you know, 49 countries of South South Africa or not all 54 will be attending.  But I think we need to do more to reward the good guys, but also penalize and punish the bad guys. The third thing I would like to put on the table is the matter of consistency and solidarity in terms of how they engage with various countries. Because now, thanks to technology, we've become, the world has become really flat, that people in Mali know how their counterparts in Guinea are being treated. That people in the military in Guinea and in Mali look at what happened in Chad. And so if you give Chad a pass, because you want to please one ally or you're afraid of ruffling the feathers of another country, that when you get to Guinea and you're taking a tough stance. People are going to look at, you know, the people of Guinea are going to say, but why, why pick on us, you give everyone else a pass. And so there's going to be need for a lot of consistency in terms of how the administration deals with bad actors on the African continent. And how it rewards the good actors to provide incentives so that the people who are laying their lives on the line on a daily basis. The civic activists, the lawyers, the women leaders can have room and space to have their voices heard and for democracy to be strengthened and deepened across the continent. Thank you very much, Chris. And I'm going to turn it now to Alexis. To say upfront that CRS doesn't give policy recommendations, you know, we're just analysts so I would make instead just a few observations. One is that it, it has been a challenge I think for us and other international policy actors to distinguish and emphasize the quality of democracy and not just kind of the procedural trappings of regular elections. And I actually think that the US government seeks to do this and you know through USA ID and State Department democracy promotion assistance there's a range of assistance that aims at some of those quality, you know quality metrics, including efforts to strengthen civil society efforts to strengthen as I mentioned local government actors, not just central government, not just electoral processes but service delivery, but still I think diplomatically it's it's a challenge and that's really what we see playing out in West Africa. Right, it's not just that right now we have a wave of erosions of formal democracy in the form of military coups, or you know rebel challenges to central governments, but we've had a long standing deterioration in the quality of democracy so that even, you know, we even have democracies like Mali obviously we had to learn this, this very hard lesson, multiple times now in the last 10 years, you know, first with the military coup in 2012 that followed a real deterioration in Mali and perceptions of what they were getting out of their democracy under under democracy. And then, again, last year with the with some popular expressions of support for the coup that overthrew President Keita, you know this this reflected it seems to me a sense among many Malians that democracy was not delivering and not just on economic and socioeconomic issues, but also even just on the quality of democracy that nepotism and corruption were undermining the principle of accountability to citizens that lies at the heart of a functioning democracy and undermining true checks and balances. And so we obviously see that in, in Guinea, with President Condé's inheritance of an already very institutionally weak state. And then he, you know, he often decried that institutional weakness as president, while also also taking full advantage of it, right but taking full advantage of the lack of a fully empowered parliament of the lack of true political decentralization of the lack of a fully functioning and independent judiciary. So, so again, those quality issues are at the fore. Another observation I would have is that US influence at the end of the day is limited and peer to peer influence among African heads of state is very important. And so it's not, it's not an accident, I think that President Condé's bid for a third term coincided with President Watara's bid for a third term under very similar conditions and with a very similar roadmap in Côte d'Ivoire. And because of Watara's standing in the international community, I think President Condé benefited a bit from being able to sort of move forward in tandem with his peer in that case. And what we've seen in Mali and Guinea is that ECOWAS heads of state are much more forward leaning and inclined toward punitive actions in the wake of military coups that overthrow elected presidents. Then they are in opposing unconstitutional third terms for other kind of abuses of power or abuses of office by sitting president, by sitting civilian presidents. And so that's obviously a challenge that the United States has to acknowledge and be a bit modest maybe about US influence in the absence of that peer to peer influence. To Dr. Fomunia's point about US messaging, I would note that Secretary Pompeo made his first statement about support for democratic transitions of power in Guinea in September 2019 after meeting President Condé. So it did, you know, start US messaging at the very high level did start in 2019 and then there was another statement by Pompeo in early 2020, as was mentioned. During that same visit to Washington by President Condé, he met with a number of US policymakers and civil society and NGO members. I remember attending a small meeting with him, I believe hosted the Atlantic Council, and he made it, you know, President Condé was fond of saying, I'm the president of Guinea, I'm not the president of Human Rights Watch, right, whenever anybody would challenge him. And he said in the meeting that I was in at least in my recollection, you know, I don't care about what US NGOs, or even, you know, presumably US policymakers say about my presidential ambitions. What I care about is the people of Guinea, and the view of other peer African heads of state, you know, he was coming off of his time as chair of the African Union. And so I think it's, it's crucial that that the that that the United States seek to work with and build support for some of these norms around term limits, for example, and other democratic norms. In full recognition that African views matter, most foremost, that that's the example that people like President Condé look to and understandably so. And then work also, you know, again that that strengthening of civil society can help get at the point that, you know, Guinea and public views matter obviously we all are aware of public opinion polls that showed that and were very much opposed to President Condé's third term bid. So it was a bit spurious of the president to make the point that he did. Thank you very much, Alexis, all very wonderful and insightful thoughts that you've provided here. I want to turn it back to the panel again to see if anyone has any closing thoughts or anything that you'd like to put on the table that we may not have already addressed. I've addressed a lot through this conversation. There are a lot of questions that have come up through the discussion. So wondering if there are any final thoughts that anyone would like to share again. Ibrahim. Yes. Thank you again. So I just want to come back to something that was, you know, talked about earlier. And I think this is a very important instrument, which really needs to be updated, or I would even say revised if you really want to promote democracy, and if you really want echo us to continue playing an important role in the region. And I think, you know, in the revision process, I know some experts have already been hired to work on the revision to propose a draft. But I think it's very important to do advocacy, you know, towards the improvement of the protocol, and especially as you know with regards to the sanction regimes, in order to, you know, ensure that there they will be sanctions for those who will manipulate solutions in order to run for third terms, as well as those who will come to power, you know, through military coups. It's very important to review that instrument and I'm glad that the processes is underway. But, you know, as it always is the case, I think that there needs to be a push that needs to be, you know, strong advocacy for the protocol to be, you know, very progressive now and for the sanction regime to be a concrete one that can be implemented. Thank you. Thank you, Ibrahim. Joe, Chris. Yeah. I'd like to throw a couple other things. One, just again, stepping back, I would want to reiterate, we need to be careful about how we talk about change. I see in a lot of discussion about coups that there's a quick, you know, assessment of how difficult the conditions are, and that there's corruption or there's unhappiness with the government. And therefore somehow that rationalizes the coup. And I think it's important to keep those concepts separate. Yes, there can be criticisms. There can be valid grievances and genuine concerns about corruption. But that doesn't justify taking extra legal means to replace that government. It doesn't justify a coup. If we're trying to build democratic processes, we need to be talking about what are the ways that you address those grievances through legal constitutional means. And how do you empower the domestic reformers? How does the international community get behind those who are advocating for constructive change? You know, any government, any democratic government in the world has its critics that doesn't justify overthrowing them. That's why we have elections. That's why you are having protests. That's why there's a free press. So you can channel those different points of view through constitutional means. So I think that's a really important point to make that we have to be careful about conflating grievances with justifications for the coup. Because coups, again, take you on an extra constitutional path, which then really leaves it up to the coup makers to decide how transitions happen and how you get back to a constitutional and legal foundation. And so it's a big step backward. And if I could, I would throw in another consideration. We haven't really talked about, it applies less in Guinea than in Sudan and Mali and Tunisia, but that's the role of international or external actors in trying to, excuse me, intervene and manipulate these outcomes, these democratic transitions, and in fact, encouraging coups. And, you know, primarily referring to some of the golf actors and Russia. And I think it again as we're doing this review of coups in Africa, we need to recognize when a coup happens and a country's taken off a constitutional path, it makes that country very vulnerable to outside influences who can then co-opt who leaders who are seeking international recognition and support. And in the process, really copper by sovereignty and the interest of trying to gain that, you know, that that external political recognition and financial support. And so, as part of that recognition, I think it's important and incumbent on the international democratic community to call this out, but also to work in a more uniform and collaborative way to uphold democratic norms. And really insist on a high threshold for democratic processes. And in that process, when these things are undermined, when there is a clear violation through a coup to not recognize the junta, to try to work with civilian authorities to re-institute a constitutional path. And in the process, you know, give more voice, give more leverage to citizens in those countries who are electing the leaders rather than to the external actors who can gain more leverage by working through coup leaders. Thank you very much, Chris. Yes, I will echo one of the points met by Joe and maybe expand on it by saying, you know, this conversation about military course and military interventions in political processes has also to be put in a broader context of some of the security challenges, some of the vulnerabilities that West Africa is facing right now. For example, the, you know, the need to counter violent extremism that's really eating at the heart of the Sahel. And that's destabilizing the countries in the Sahel, but now also threatening countries along the Atlantic coastline. We heard the other day about, you know, extremists or Islamist elements killing people in Benin, in northern Benin, we've heard about incursions into northern Côte d'Ivoire. So that's a major security threat that's looking at countries in West Africa. And it will be most unfortunate if the security services in countries in that sub region are spending their time focusing on scheming on how to get involved in politics, rather than really carrying out the missions for which they have been institutionalized or for which they have been created. And that would really put a lot of the economic gains, it would really put civilian lives, the security of the population at jeopardy. And so in some ways this is an appeal to the militaries in those countries to say the purpose of your well being is to guarantee the safety and security of your compatriots. Take to your mission and do it well. And that would be an act of patriotism, rather than spend your nights scheming about how to get involved in the political process, because that's not what you trained for. The second thing I would say is, you know, thanks Alexi for reminding us of the date of Secretary Pompeo's announcement, I was looking for it. I knew that it was early. And many of us were very delighted by that. I would say that, you know, as we discussed Guinea, the US government's messaging on Guinea has been consistent. Because having come out in 2019 to make its position clear, very directly to the president at the time, the US earned the credibility to also condemn the coup and to also work alongside the government to help the country come out of this transition. And what happens, and this is the case for the original bodies is that if you lose the opportunity to speak out, you also lose the credibility in the eyes of the citizens when things really go wrong. Really, I know that USAID and other agencies of the US government have done an incredible job in putting resources into what needs to happen in between elections, because we have to keep our eyes on the fact that the decay of democratic institutions and democracies tends to happen in between elections. Because autocrats know, and even military regimes know that around elections, everybody's around, everybody's putting the spotlight on them. They try as much as possible to play the act or to be their best behavior. But once the lights go off with the elections, then they can go into the very bad practices and everybody's gone, everybody's gone, and waiting for the next election. And so what we do in between elections to strengthen political parties to strengthen legislatures so they can be an equal branch of government and exercise oversight over the performance of the executive branch of government so they can better advocate for citizens and help the government deliver services to citizens. And so what we can do to help civil society and create the space for them to be able to do their work and advocate on behalf of citizens without having their heads chopped out that those things that need to happen in between elections should be prioritized because that's really where the decay begins to happen. And the last thing that I would say for for echo was is that I'm really hoping that going into this 20th anniversary celebration, the heads of states of the sub region are thinking through the path that has been traveled so far where they've stumbled and what needs to be done going forward, I want to remember that in 2015, echo was came very close to adopting a resolution that would have limited every president in the sub region to not more than two presidential terms. In fact, 13 of the 15 presidents of the echo sub region were favorable to that kind of resolution. Unfortunately, that effort in 2015 was torpedoed by just two presidents. Given what is transpired between 2015 and now, I'm hoping that the presidents have learned their lesson. I realize that they have a stake in this and don't want to put up set of themselves to become targets of assassinations or course, and that they will do the right thing, not just for themselves, and their countries, but also for future generations. I think we have to as friends as as partners, work side by side with them with society political parties in the region to make sure that some of these actions that undermine democratic processes can be proactively dealt with and preempted, and that efforts to strengthen and deepen democracy that come with all of the gains of accountability and transparency and space for citizens to participate in how they're governed that those positive attributes could be able to bring that very, you know, commendable and very resource worthy, very rich sub sub region of the continent. Thank you very much Chris for that very compelling message. So Alexis before I bring us to a close, do you have some final closing thoughts that you would like to add here as well. I don't have much to add to the excellent points made by my fellow panelists and by you. I would just as we're having this conversation. My thoughts are turning to friends and loved ones who live in Conakry. The millions have had to live through just unimaginable hardships and challenges over the recent decades, starting but not even ending with regional wars at the country's doorstep, the Ebola outbreak, less than, you know, 10 years continuing of deep economic hardships attributable to the COVID pandemic and other factors. And some of the people I know in in Guinea are cautiously optimistic about what can be achieved now, even though they're fully cognizant and lived through, you know, the dangers and abuses of prior periods of military rule in Guinea. So even though as a as an analyst, I feel very concerned and skeptical about the hunters intentions and what they can achieve and what they even hope to achieve. And yet I have to, you know, I have to hope that my that my that those who I know in Guinea who are cautiously optimistic that they're correct and that I'm wrong. So that's where I would I would close today. Thank you so much Alexis and thank you everyone for a very rich conversation. I think from this discussion we've established that there are some possible pathways to move forward in Guinea, some more obvious than others. But there are possible pathways to explore to help Guinea during this period of fragile transition to move back to constitutional order. So I really want to thank all our panelists today, Ibrahim, Joe, Chris, Alexis, thank you for all your wonderful input in this discussion. And for those who are joining us online I encourage you to continue the discussion using the hashtag on Twitter, while the coups and look forward to continuing this discussion with everyone. Thank you so much. Thank you. Welcome to the fourth and final panel and USIP series on the troubling spate of coons around the world. I'm Billy Ford program officer on USIP's Myanmar team. Now I'll be monitoring our discussion today which will explore the factors that precipitated the latest coup in Myanmar. We'll dig into the implications of the coup and the role of civil society and international actors in restoring a federal democracy. Let me begin by introducing our esteemed panel. I'm excited and honored to be a part of this event since these are some of the most important voices on Myanmar who I followed for many years and whose contributions have become all the more important since the coup. Sara is a doctoral candidate in global studies at the University of Massachusetts. She has held numerous research positions including at Oxford University. Her research focuses on subnational parliaments and federalism, ethnic and identity politics and social media and social change. She is a specialist in human rights and conflict in kitchen state. He's the president of kitchen alliance a DC based human rights organization. He also serves as the spokesperson and secretary of the kitchen political interim coordination team, which is an organization composed of representatives from across kitchen civil society, religious institutions political parties and others that work with the federal human rights and the coordinates with others within the anti coup movement to bring about the restoration of a federal democracy. The president is the joint secretary or joint general secretary of the Sean nationally for democracy, one of the largest political parties in Myanmar. He's also a member of the committee for Sean State Unity and he is a leader of the people's representative committee for federalism, an anti coup alliance of organizations that seeks the establishment of a federal democratic union. In addition to his political work he's a historian of policy analyst and a peace builder who has held numerous senior positions in civil society and research organizations. And finally, Ken Omar is a prominent human rights activists and founder of the human rights organization progressive voice. She was a student activist during the 88 Revolution and since then she served in numerous capacities, including as a founding member of the women's union and a Burma partnership. She's received numerous awards for her activism including the Anna Lynch prize and the vital voices global leadership or for human rights. Thank you all so much for being here today calling it from across numerous time zones at odd hours we really appreciate your presence. I should note that the insights from this conversation will be incorporated into two policy papers. One will be a short commentary piece that focuses exclusively on Myanmar. The other will be a longer report about the spike in coups around the world. These papers will also complement the forthcoming report of the US IP led Myanmar study group, which is an informal group of former diplomats and specialists on Myanmar who have met regularly since May to discuss how the US can respond to the study groups discussions have culminated in the paper that will include a number of recommendations support to support US policy towards Myanmar, and that paper should be released early in the new year. Okay, so before jumping into the conversation with our panel, let me offer one minute of context for those who haven't closely followed developments in Myanmar over the past 10 months, and then I'll turn to our panel for the main event. Right so in November 2020 the onsensual she led National League for Democracy won its second consecutive election in a landslide. On February 1, the day before the newly elected government was set to take its seat seats that the Myanmar military detained leaders of the elected government and took power. Since then a diverse anti coup movement has used violent and non violent means to prevent the military from consolidating its control of the country.  All of this in an attempt to pacify a population that is demonstrably unwilling to return to the military rule that it experienced from 1962 until 2011. The opposition movement has multiple components it includes a nationwide and ongoing non violent movement of civil disobedience and public protests. It also includes an armed opposition movement led by ethnic armed organizations, and new militia groups called People's Defense Forces. And it includes a range of political actors including representatives from the deposed civilian government, as well as representatives from other political constituencies, such as political parties civil society, activist networks and others. These groups share a common hatred for the military but have struggled to fully unify for reasons that I hope we'll get into today. Dialogues between these political groups, which virtually all of our panelists are involved with in one way or another, are ongoing and will be crucial to the movement success. Okay, so I'll leave it there for now and turn to our experts to dig into the causes and the consequences of the coup, and what can be done to restore a federal democracy. Okay, let's dive in. Miarte, first to you, I'd like to start with sort of a general question to help us understand the causes and the enabling factors that led to the coup. Very few people predicted that the military would take such drastic action, especially when they had so much political power under the 2008 Constitution. So what were we missing? What were some of the factors that made Myanmar vulnerable to a coup? Thank you, Billy, and thank you very much for inviting me and I'm really glad to be here. So I think it's important to reflect the rule and authority in the space of the military or Tamil Nadu, you know. So through all the history and at present, you know, Tamil Nadu traditionally see itself in a very significant role like the architect of the country's independence and the guardian of the state, etc. So given that construct, it always try to maintain its power and influence to have the largest share in the political space and the decision making. As we all know that the military all also like prepare very systematically through 2008 Constitution, as you said, for its dominant political position in the transitional politics and has maintained its role and authority, even in the national and sub national legislatures and executive and administrative system as well. So that's why the transition was gaining a momentum. The military fund is shrinking authority in an ongoing power struggle with the National League for Democracy and LD. So it's and also the landslide defeat of the USDP at the like 2020 elections. So the USDP is the military back at party. So is that sort of like things is confirmed such an alarming situation for the military. So another like threat I want to like threat for the military is that the trial at the International Code of Justice ICJ for the alleged genocidal crime against Rohingyas. So in that aspect, the military became independent, like became dependent on NLDs, like, particularly our San Suu Kyi's plan and strategy for the game, and the good will as well. So such condition actually pushed military, especially is top leader like may outline toward a highly insecure position. Like I said, the immediate cause is the 2020 elections where NLD obtained landslide victory whereas the USDP the military back at party faced with the landslide loss. So the military's motive for the coup was getting stronger, and its calculation began. So like who is going to be on its side or not on the side of NLD. At this time, NLDs like national reconciliation approach to what ethnic minorities were in the deadlock. So we can see like some of these good example that the peace dialogue through the 21st century. NLD was in a stalemate and ethnic minorities has been losing trust with NLD and its latest like even the latest attempt of NLD toward like formation of national unity government in the aftermath of the 2020 elections were also filled. Even like a midst of all of these rumors about the possibility of the military coup. So I perceived some of these situations actually influenced the military making miscalculation that minority leaders would not stand with NLD if it staged the coup. Yes, the military's calculation is right to some extent the military leaders that the minority leaders and almost all ethnic resistant armies did not stand for NLD, but they just stand against this and righteousness that military coup and that the brutal lawless crack down against the peaceful demonstration of the people across the country. So this is the background situation that I want to highlight. Thank you. Thank you, Seema. Saichon, over to you. I wonder if you could frame this coup in a broader history because it's not the first in Myanmar. But I wonder how, if at all, was this coup different from previous coups in Myanmar, particularly in terms of its causes. Yeah, hi. Actually, my answer to you to your question is no, and also yes in some point. So looking back to our history, Union Obama was formed in 1948. After the panel agreement in which Obama, Shan, Chen and Chen leaders signed an agreement in February 12, 1947, aiming to form the Federal Union later on. 1947 constitution was drafted and adopted, but the constitution failed to currently and implement some fight or provision in the panel agreement. The 1947 constitution was exercised till 1961, and then ethnic leaders realized that constitution should be amended. In June 1961, ethnic nationality conference was held in Daoji Shan State. The 1947 constitutional amendment proposal, which include the Federal principle was discussed and adopted unanimously in that conference. And again, 1962, General Neh Wing, stage a coup claiming it was necessary to prevent the country from falling apart. He claimed that ethnic nationality conference aimed to amend and improve the 1947 constitution through federal principle was destroying the union. He also spread the false information about federal, federalism, including cessation, which is the promises of Obama to the panel in the panel agreement. It will lead to the disintegration of the union. After that, almost all of the parties in the conference were arrested and many died in prison. From 1962 to 1974, the military regime ruled the country without any constitution. Later on, 1974 constitution, which recognized and allowed only a single party to rule was adopted and exercised. In August 1988, a nationwide people are pricing erupted all over the country, demanding democracy and freedom for all. The people were met with violent crackdown that led to many kill and arrested.   It's meant to shut directly to the bucket. Many student leaders were sentenced to many years in prison, including Aung San Suu Kyi, who was put under house arrest. In September 1988, another coup was staged by another general claiming it was necessary to rescue the country at two inches away from the falling of the cliff. To summarize that the cause and context of the military coup in Myanmar may vary from one another, but I see one thing in common. If the constitutional amendment proposes adopted in ethnic nationality conference in 1961 was implemented. The country will become federal country in which all ethnic nationality in Palmer will govern the country in collective leadership. Where there's no room for authoritarian. If the 1988 democracy movement succeeded and was not cracked down by military coup, the country will transform into democracy country where the military have no room in political leadership role at all. So we can say that the reason the military coup happened was just only to protect the individual and organization and interests of the military. Even though they may claim that it's about saving the country from falling back, destroying the integrity of the country, rescuing the democracy of protecting the constitution, whatever they say. Thank you. That's a fascinating and helpful history to help frame the current moment. Ken Omar, I'd like to bring you in. I wonder what you think are some of the sort of we've looked domestically I wonder what you think of the international kind of external factors that may have made Myanmar more vulnerable to a coup. Did the erosion of democracy in the region, for example, or the weakening of international institutions. Did they somehow increase the likelihood of a coup in Myanmar what were some of the external factors. Thank you. Thanks Billy for having me here. I actually would like to stress the issue of external actors, people I actually discuss on the external factors, if I may. The external actors such as like you know, international think tanks, policy advisors consultants there were so many of them in the past 10 years. They brought in formulas and equations of quick fixes to Myanmar's 60 plus year long conflict, without really digesting or taking time to really try to understand the local context in depth. All the root causes of the human rights violations and atrocity crimes in our country happening for decades, or listening to the people on the ground. And that's a big miss, listening to the people on the ground really deeply was such a big miss and lack for the past decade that I see that a lot of tick boxes also from the international community. There is so much of impact and damage on the ground, especially those external actors that don't uphold the principles of human rights and justice and accountability in their approach to conflict resolution and peace building in the name of peace building. And it became quite problematic in my observation, while they impose the principles of neutrality and impartiality on our civil society actors. In reality, it was rather supporting the one sided peace, so called peace agenda of the military, rather than staying neutral, you know, there were no real equal leverage or equal terms. For the other parties in conflict, and also for the civil society to have a seat at the table. In many cases, the ceasefire agreements signatures were bought out with the incentives of development projects, rather than any meaningful willingness to broker peace. And as we saw during the so called democratic transition of the last decade, the military continue to wage war in ethnic areas committing horrific atrocity crimes with unbridled impunity. Never stop. In fact, these international actors kept domestic actors within a status quo, in turn, that I see is allowing the military to retain the upper hand and further embolden them to continue enjoying impunity, staying above the law, above everyone and everything. And of course that really made Nehma to be vulnerable for another coup like this. The peace process. There were a lot of window dressing. In my opinion, series of and resolve episodes, despite of the ethnic communities or ethnic nationalities efforts all along, leaving, especially leaving the justice and accountability issue, as well as the issue of human rights protection on to one side, for example, the genocide against the Rohingya in 2017. The international community turned a blind eye on conflict related businesses, especially in the ethnic areas that the military was largely benefiting from. All of these gave the military opportunity to wheel their power boldly, or in other words, allow or created the conditions that partly make Nehma vulnerable to and this attempted coup of the past 10 months. And now I want to take the next step on the, this other external factors or the erosion of democracy and erosion of democracy around the world. So I want to talk about the erosion of democracy around the world and I see yes, yes, you're right, it has played some role, as well as you know, as well in this, you know, Nehma situation. For example, the world's largest democracies, when they re-engage with Myanmar in the last 10 years, they give businesses priority over the protection of human rights, and they're not addressing the root causes or the issues of the justice and accountability. And these democratic countries were comfortable to get in bed, to get into bed with the Nehma military and contact businesses with the Nehma military and as they have like, you know, everything is now done right. And that was another, another major mistake that I see, you know, from the international external factors, the multinational corporations from democratic countries like, you know, Canada, US, EU, Japan, Korea, Australia, because they've been, been rolling the Nehma military against the UN guiding principles on human rights and against the recommendations from the UN fact-finding mission on Myanmar. So, these are also the external factors that really, you know, weigh in on what led to this, this military's attempted coup. The other external factor in this attempted coup by the military is the role of Russia and China. These two countries, these two countries' governments being anti-democracy, anti-human rights, protecting the Nehma military for all the decades, past decades. They have always been one of the major stemming blocks for our country's democracy. Even now with the situation on the ground has reached to a breaking point as the, this military hunter really intensified its violent attacks across the country. The Burma currently ranks top wars in September and October in UN Security Council agenda. And yet, you see, we are nowhere near to see any concrete actions from the UN Security Council because of these two countries' governments as the big five, you know, but there are two of the big fives and vetoes. So, yeah, it's these are the, I see as the external factors and factors that actually weigh in or make Myanmar become vulnerable to this attempted coup, really, back to you. Thank you. That's, that's really helpful. Yeah, so it sounds as if you're saying that the democracy support or peace-building efforts during the transition period didn't actually lead to any structural changes, but they actually may have reified the structures that enabled the military to thrive. And that it's not only Russia and China that are causing these issues, but that Democratic nations, and we're even seeing now with India and others who are kind of financing or providing technical or technological support to the junta. It's not only Russia and China, but also Democratic nations that are failing to fulfill their role. Just one more question coming back to you, Ken Omar. How does this democracy movement differ from past movements in Myanmar? And what does kind of the nature of this movement, particularly its strength, its diversity, its sustainability, what does it say about the population's experience with democracy over the past decade? For this question, Billy, I was one of those student activists back in 1988, democracy uprising, and I compare between the two movements, very different. Now we are in a total new landscape and also with a very clear vision of how everybody wants to, you know, build a country or live in a country. It's a, this very strong, popular resistance to the past 10 months of the military's attempted coup really shows the people of Burma's experience with the democracy. Not only over the past decade, that you know, when they were able to enjoy or experience limited freedom, but also even under the previous military regime times, they keep struggling. So this past 10 years in particular that I see is already grounded or rooted in spite of that military's continuing control over the country. And now everybody refused to go back to the status quo of the past 10 years, a facade of democracy, where their aspirations of genuine democracy were held hostage under the military's 2008 Constitution. So actually the people have been in a long struggle for democracy as you already know. And we have to take a note that by passing the generations, people of Burma from different generations, they are not naive of the shortfalls and authenticity of some of the politicians in the past 10 years at the same time also the flaws of the so-called democratic transition. But especially the I would say the rights based civil society who really work hard for the human rights protections and those who work for the, you know, like a flourishing of democracy, you know, like electoral education and those organizations including our colleagues here, you know, like as I mentioned that this is a research organization, for example, they have laid the foundations of the cornerstones of democracy and they kept walking so hard to ensure more opening of the democratic space. But see like one comes to the national level policy matters when National League for Democracy took power in last 10 years, you saw many impose self censorship and draw on censorship leadership, letting her take the lead. While many of them actually knew there are flaws and shortfalls and problematic approaches. For example, when it came to the national reconciliation, draw on censorship and National League for Democracy linked towards the military, while they themselves continue to be insensitive to the needs of the non-Bama ethnic nationalities, or in some instances, practicing even practicing the barmanization policy of the successive military regimes in their approach towards the non-Bama ethnic nationalities. They're not given due recognition to the ethnic nationalities historical heritage and role as founders and equal partners of this union. But see, regardless of those dynamics, people to people, community to community engagement and inter-entra ethnic solidarity have been built and strengthened father in the last 10 years and civil society play a very instrumental role in that. So now that, you know, 10 years of people to people coming together has also become a backbone pillar of the past 10 months of this spring revolution that has become inclusive, vibrant and diverse in tactics in their rejection of the military's coup attempt. And with clear and collective vision for a country they want to build and live in that is free from the military's tyranny or any kind of leadership. So there is a, really, like I said, in the beginning, it's really a total totally different landscape in Burma now that they are not going back to state of school before February attempted coup. That's for sure. Thank you, Kenomar. That's encouraging. Gomsen, I'd like to turn to you now. I mean, pulling on one thread that Kenomar mentioned. Since the coup, the regime has met regularly with its sort of shrinking number of supporters, but the nature of its relationships with these governments, especially it's more important ones like Russia and China. This seems fairly transactional at times rather than a durable partnership. I mean, Russia is making good revenue I think on arms sales to the regime right now and the relationship between min online and China is often contentious. I mean, what what is your, your take on the role of these non democratic governments in supporting the military's effort to consolidate power. Thank you, Kenomar, to be invited. My assessment is that they play a very, very integral role in consulting power. Very important indeed. As you know, the role in these multilateral form or international form except, especially United Nation. As our previous Kenoma said, they were they intervene many times in United Nations, especially in the Security Council in finding proper response mechanism for the country. And the way they reward these as in the past is offering a massive concessions that even would jeopardize the interests of the nation security interests of the nation. In the past we've seen myths on them. Now there's I see Russia and Burma's relations beyond just a transactional issue or transactional. I see it as a people may think that it's just Burma viewed Russia as a weapon shop, but I see it more of a strategic becoming of a strategic partner where Russia has a great interest in the region as well. But it's not one way street. It has, it paves beneficial relationship of both parties. Russia's presence in in Burma, or even dominance in Burma will play a very significant role in regional in regional politics. And also, as you have pointed out, foreign governments, especially our neighbors to neighbors play a very significant role in Burma's domestic politics, since our independence and peace efforts in in the country, especially during the fighting with the kitchens in the past. I mean, renew of tension or civil war in kitchen in the past 10 years, we know China's significant role in in trying to make ways for the army, especially the military. We know in some sense, but on the other sense, it's, it's able to take a lot of its leverage increase its leverage increase its dominance in the Burmese politics inch by inch. It's able to amass its power or mess it's. Yeah, mess it's power over these years. So China's role in Burma has increased in many, many falls within this past two decades. Same as true as well for Russia. And, you know, we can talk about authoritarian regime, facilitating thing to consolidate power of the military. But we also have cannot ignore the fact that democracies were also silent in trying to prevent these consolidation of power by authoritarian regimes. So when K pick was founded, it was largely founded on the principle to end the authoritarianism in the country, not just a military authoritarianism, but also any sort of big power type of dynamic within our country, because it's insurrection began. Not during that, not during the military era. We have to remind ourselves that a lot of ethnic revolutions began during the parliamentarian era as well. So, and foreign governments have played in many roles. I mean the most important thing of all is the psyche of the military it emboldens and empowers the psyche of the military that you can get away. You can get away more by using obscene violence, something that they've seen in in like minded countries that you can put people, thousands and thousands of people in concentration camps and still get away with that. If you are a good friend with them. You know, sort of this wager violence through to power, and that's, that's exactly what they're doing and they're banking on it and they were successful in the past. And they're hoping that they'll be successful this time, because we have lived through as a young age through 1988, and also through 96 and also seen what's happened in saffron. The magnitude and the atrocity, the quality of brutality have have gone to a to large scale. It's not even comparable. Even the incidents. The, the savagery of these incidents have just has just balloon to the level that we've never witnessed. And some of them are violence that we've seen in other authoritarian countries. So I think it's like mindedness of their fellow. These brutal dictatorship brutal authoritarian regimes that this current men online army is trying is greatly inspired by, and we have to ensure it's the most. The responsibility of the, of the, of the powerful, powerful democracy to standards to, to its ideals. So that's my sense, but thanks. Thank you. I kind of like to stay with you actually for one more question. I mean, the kind of that some of the atrocities that the military has been conducting since the coup or not new. I think maybe, maybe what is new is the that those atrocities are now being conducted in the heartland and in urban areas. I mean, I think the UN estimated 41,000 people have been displaced since the guy and 11,000 of way areas that haven't really experienced the types of violence that communities or Sean communities have experienced historically. So I'm curious what you think in terms of what are the consequences of that in terms of inter ethnic relations and he does the fact that there's a now a shared experience of common suffering, somehow helped to create an opportunity for reconciliation and unity between different ethnic nationalities. To certain degree. Yes. So for example, what happened in Rangoon last night. I've seen a lot of ethnic people also shared those across various social media platform. It just to us, it's only proved that this regime or this, these people do not serve the interests of anybody. Well, even the optic of Bermanization. A lot of people, they maybe have some constituent that's ascribed to those ideas of, you know, or, or support for this Bermanization at the end of the day it's not even about Bermanization to be truthful. It's about one click of people that wants to retain its power through any means. You know, but largely through violence, obviously, as any other institution, but for inter ethnic relations. I see the greater enhancement of inter ethnic relations. You know, how NLD handles its handle its power during interim period. They were not full control of the government, but they were very very to be truthful. They were relaxed in their, in their sincerity with relations to ethnic groups, because these rhetoric, this is not the first time that we have witnessed these rhetoric to be honest. We have witnessed this rhetoric that you know, federalism first, I mean we have to make this fight first. Even, you know, prior to 2015 as well. And these rhetoric, we hear these rhetoric again it's it's it's quite funny but on the other hand it's a serious thing but we see this atrocities that's unfolding in the heartland does give a pause to a lot of people and I think our relationship. This, you know, forge in this really, really terrible times. And it, you know, I think a lot of ethnic understands that realize that Burmese people began to understand the pain and the suffering and the our stories are actually told truthfully be even with Rohingya who would have thought that NLD members would talk and speak out against Rohingya of course it's a to certain extent it's a political convenience, you know, but we rather want this to be a virtuous pathway for them as well. And truth to reconciliation that should be started from those who really were not truthful in the past. Thank you. So I try new to kind of in curious your thoughts on this as well I think there have been numerous efforts to unify the opposition movements including the NCC and the PRCF among smaller efforts. I think some of the main barriers to achieving the unity. I mean come send just mentioned some of them in terms of historical grievances and unaddressed misunderstanding and those sorts of or lack of sympathy or empathy. But I wonder what what you perceive to be the main barriers to building unity among those who are fighting against the military now including on these platforms like PRCF and NCC and others and generally. Thank you so much. That was for you. Sorry. So sorry, we really I'm not quite. I lost a little bit and can you repeat my question. Yeah, sure. Yeah, I'm just curious. What are some of the main barriers to achieving unity among the organizations that are fighting against the military right now. We've we've seen the NCC is kind of a more inclusive platform the PRCF is another inclusive platform for dialogue among the opposition actors. I wonder what are the main barriers to building a more unified movement that's fighting against the military. Yes. As you know that there are so many groups alliance initiating any cool movement like NCC. Yeah. And also PRCF people representative for me for federal. And also some other alliances, they are cooperating each other. And also sometime we are operating within the group, trying for a electrification of the military dictatorship. But, you know, we have to somehow distinguish between the different, the differences between unity and uniformity. Unity in diversity is not the same thing as uniformity. Unity in diversity is about common cold. Maybe this different action. We all have common cold defeating this military director. I also like to believe that we all have the common goal of preventing not only cool in the future but also all form of auto returnism. In addition, I also like to believe that we have all. We all have a strong commitment to the establishment of federal democratic union that enshrine human right equality and sub determination for all member states. But I do not believe it's predator nor strategic to pursue this goal with only one action one platform or one front. We must all do what we can, where we can and when we can in our own way to achieve this common goal. That means organization like yes IP also should somehow continue to support all form of our diverse group. Yeah. So, so actually the hindrance. Now is that in any CC point of stand. Most of the new CC member. NLV or somehow pro NLV.  Did you repower the representative from the election.  And then you know, somehow, not quite genuine. I don't know exactly to coordinate or walk with the other group. So actually, even though they are saying that this the combination of did you read power and people have to power, but actually in any CC meeting. So, we see some, some, some lack of, you know, or some lack of giant collective dealerships. And also, actually, you know, in the hindrance is not, you know, it's not the substand, but it's just the one say the political world and also, you know, the concept. Actually, even those person won't know understand won't understand exactly what's in their mind, but they are automatically somehow, you know, doing somehow like publicization or, you know, majoritarian concept. So that's the main thing. So, so if we can collect it up and then, you know, walk as in the value, you know, if as we mentioned in the federal democracy charter collective leadership and other other value if they hold firmly on that. And, you know, they can overcome and also, in some way, we can join together.  So what, like PRCF group like us, we are still trying to stay still on the ground legally. So that's why, as I mentioned that maybe we have same comment go, but I mean, I was action, different action. Yeah. Thank you for that. That's, that's really interesting. And, and a major issue of course for opposition movements around the world is trying to build unity, but not necessarily uniformity as you've mentioned, I don't know whether yet they are kind of mark them send. Do you have any thoughts on that question. Otherwise we can move to another section. Any thoughts on the question of opposition unity or major hindrances to building unity. I have a few. Yeah, I mean if I may share my thoughts on it on this issue. Because of the home bomber came about, and also this long decades of deficit of trust issue. I prefer to use solidarity rather than unity.  We need to actually, you know, like, really like acknowledge the, the, the, the big, the beginning or the, the birth of this nation and some signed the panglong agreement but some some didn't. And some were never even a part of you know any of that, that grouping in back then by political means. So I think you know just like, like really put in the record straight. I think that part of this history is important. And if we are going to do that, if we can do that sincerely. I think unity is something that can come later. But then like talking about the unity when we don't have trust. I don't see a point of even saying that. So to me, I'm allergic to the word unity. I see this, the past 10 months, give the most opportune time for this country to move forward if everybody is still wanting to move forward together. And I think what I see is also, I mean, I hear a science and you're talking about like, you know, the NCC not being legal, whereas the PRCF being the PRCF being the legal. The question to me is what to me is when I when I heard is legal by whom legal status by whom I think we have to question that. Well, of course, you know, like respecting the, the existence and role of the political entities or the political actress in the country, but then legal by whom I think that's the question that I will raise. And if we can overcome some of these ideas true, we are going towards one direction. And yet also, if we cannot synergize the different approach, while respecting and recognizing also each other's role. I think it will still be challenging regardless of we call unity or solidarity for this, you know, one direction that we think that we are, but I'm not so sure in that I'm not so sure that we will be able to do that. I think it's important also to question about this legality because to me, first, this military is not a legal entity. They are not lawful. And then they are attempted coup for the last 10 months. In fact, is failing. They are not successful. So when they are the one, like, when they are the one issue in the directives or amending the existing laws or even making the new laws. I think now the question comes to the other entities in the country is, are we going to accept that coming from this illegal entity, which in fact is nothing more than a criminal gang and terrorist organization. I'll throw it back to the political actors in the country. Thanks Billy. I'm saying, did you want to come in on this. Yeah, so I think for the ethnic it's most came to realize that this conflict have, you know, most people realize that we're playing Russian roulette with our lives for the army to stay in power. It's a matter of time, you know, it's matter of who's time it is to be the victim. And that realization is what's emboldened people to take a much bolder stand that they have done in the past, and understand and forging of solidarity as Ken Oma said, unity is based on trust and trust issue is obviously it's a very troubling or hard because the country after all was founded on an uneven union, right. It was a very uneven society, since its founding. And it has also actually avoided participation of many other people, especially religious minority or foreign born nationals.  But so we see that this conflict of this use of patient of power by in online is as an opportunity to take a chance on on on the promises of founding fathers. And that's one of the principal reason why the chins are very adamant or very supportive of the current current opposition. So we've done it in the past, and it'd be really not unwise to repeat the failure of the past. But, but at the end of the day, we're still in this one family together. So we have to make it work. And under those principle, and just, we can't, we can't let violence win. And that's the sentiment of majority of our people to join this revolution. And that's just one thing that as Kim was said, you know, illegal legal is not now. Actually, I didn't want to emphasize about it. Because we as an army in never, you know, drawing the SAC, for instance, we see election committee or any of their activity. What I want to emphasize is that we stand still in the country in my home. Actually, I'm in my home. So the way we are doing and the way the other group are doing the same. I mean, just the way the different action. Yes, I just want to emphasize upon it. But anyhow, we are trying our best to, you know, searching the way to cooperate each other. You know, the federal democracy charter, part one is protected by SNL, proposed by SNL. So, so I just mean that, yeah, we may have a different way of doing, but we will seek to be unity and also we may seek the way to root to our destination. I just want to highlight on it. Yeah, thank you. Yeah. Yeah, I think a common set of objectives, different methods and trying to find complementarity is critical. Just shifting gears a little bit and I'd like to turn back to you now thinking a little bit about prevention for a minute and then we'll turn to a conversation about response and what should be done. Yeah, what do you think? What can the US and other democracies do to prevent coups like this from taking place in the future at the end Myanmar as well as in other contexts I think the opposition needs to be thinking maybe about, even if there is a restoration of federal democracy, how to build resilience to another military takeover. So I wonder what you think the international community can do to prevent coups like this from taking place. And Kenomar already mentioned some of the failures from democracies and others around the world but I wonder your thoughts and what can be done to prevent this from happening in the future. Thank you, Billy. I actually like for these sort of like a response and then I actually want to highlight actually the rule of the civil society organizations playing because it's really important that to understand you know the role and also their contributions right now, you know, so it's actually like one of the, you know, the, you know, the forces that currently and also the previously have been serving as that, you know, check and balance role and then like maybe some people said that watch talk rose, you know, but currently like the civil society organizations they have been contributing in this sort of like a new like political platforms like and like like and you see see national consultative console and so they have been gaining this sort of like the role and also the contribution like technically and also like politically, you know, that they never, ever have obtained like a previous like like political eras like so.  So, this is actually very good, like, moment. So, like, I mean, sort of like, maybe people like some of these observers and things that they some of some of the international organizations thinks that, oh, new master of society organizations has been like silent or like the, the, the, you know, they have been, you know, like, washed away by this sort of like devastated like the tsunami, you know, like the political tsunami, you know, happened after the in the aftermath of the coup but they don't actually they have this sort of like us with the and actually they have been trying to actually responding in a different, like, meaningful ways, you know, so it's really important to understand different like actors role and then the civil society, the, the role of the civil society is really important, you know, so this is one thing and another thing is that, I mean, not, we can say that not every, you know, like, like, this coup, you know, leads to a long lasting like authoritarianism, but the case of Myanmar is very obvious and no doubt at all that if this time, this resistance against military Haunter Phil, the country is very likely to stay like a military dictatorship for several more decades. It's going to be like 20 years, 30 years, or maybe endless for us to stay under this brutal dictatorship, right. So the US and the democratic international community should take a decisive approach in supporting anti coup and a pro democracy, like, like revolution. Here I just like even want to use the term revolution, because we are not merely in this in the like anti coup movements, but in revolutions. There is this destructive reconstruction, like first to end the deep rooted military authoritarian culture, and then to start a genuine like inclusive democratic society. So, so, so maybe like some of these people like observers or international community thinks that this approach is idealistic. That's not the history has full of like examples that give us enough confidence that such a distract destructive reconstruction would end would render a better society and political system that we all like, especially the, the minorities, like has been longing for the history. So, even like the history of the United States alone and serve is enough case for us to refer right. So I would recommend a decisive support for anti to democratic forces here. Like, and then we should at this point, like, we should not limit with that energy and energy see in considering like a key democratic actors, but we also need to understand the position and strategies of different actors like including PSCF and then, and also the, also the position of the minorities within the minorities right this, like, like, between like ethnic groups for like both the politics of like ethnic minorities is also important to understand So, so this is really important, you know, and I also want to make like, is like another point is that the Nehma military like Nehma authoritarianism or whatever we call militarism or, or state like a driven like conflicts always go hand in hand with like a stream of nationalistic sentiment. And, and then here like the military is also very good at using that the, that like nationalistic nationalism card, you know, so in this, like current context, context, as part of the divide and lose strategy, it has been like the military has been weaponizing the ultra nationalistic group called like the Pusotti or you know like Marlboro at the community level. So this sort of extremist group that we can even call them and civil society, you know that we just the opposite of the civil society are not empower and rising with even with the leather weapons, like provided by the military. Now we have an alarming situation that the level of the mistrust among community members are growing with like a huge potential of leading to endless bloodshed among civilian like a community so this is time now that we need a decisive support from democratic like international community in in ending this military hunter and rebuilding the country. Thank you. Thank you for that. Yeah, the trust deficit at the community level seems to have potentially insidious effects. Again, I wanted to come back to you in terms of thinking about multilateral institutions and prevention. We've seen some symbolic action from ASEAN recently by excluding that online from a few summits and the UN chose not to recognize the military's appointee to the General Assembly. The multilaterals have really done little substance and you spoke at the UN Security Council, an institution that has failed to act. I'm curious what you see as the role of multilateral institutions and mitigating the harms potentially also from a humanitarian standpoint, but also trying to bring about a return to a federal democracy. Yeah. So the challenge that we've witnessed is that no nation is willing to stand up for, I mean, restoring of democracy or restoring justice in the country. I mean, let alone the multinational forgery. So the challenge that we also see is that people nations are prioritizing their national interest. For me, it's people, majority of beginning to think that, oh, these large nationals on large nations of global powers are there to just make bucks or for the self interest. Case in points, even the MOGE itself is a testament that even the, you know, the greatest democracy in the world is not willing to stand up for money. I mean, against, with, it's very easy to take a hard stand against the oil and gas in the country, right, people willing to testize themselves to, I mean, willing to forgo your pay willing to suffer in in jungles across the corners of the country, just to prove that they're, they reject this military, right. I think international community to can take a much hard, much stronger than principles then we're not asking them to just help us. But just standing on principle or the whatever that the charter that they subscribe to. Right. To even stand up to those would be, I think it's, it would be a support to the Burmese people. So it is important that it's also testing times for it's not only in Burma that we've witnessed this, we've witnessed this in many other countries, many other conflict in a global conflict. So it's important that international community commits to its charter, even the UN charter or ASEAN as well. It can't be just a forum where you know networking forum for nations, you can't just serve those interests. Because at the end of the day, that's what they're banking on the military is banking on that these international community will just be self serving, and that the best response that they could that the best response from the U.S. or civilized nations would be to issue statements right and issue solidarity, because at the end of the day it's 10 months already and nothing really substantial have changed. Burmese people have changed dramatically, but I don't think the international community is committed to change yet. So that's what's prolonging this rule. We're talking earlier question about what authoritarian regime regime had done to prop up or to consolidate this. The military has done everything that they could at this time to ensure that he's in power. Right. What does he need he needs a weapon and they're going to help them. I mean, the sophistication level of military army is unfathomable for Burmese community, meaning we would not have thought in our day and age that they will be able to use night vision, you know, night vision attack helicopters in this generation and they're able to do that. They're able to secure any military or weaponry that they need to ensure that they can, they would come out a win and the violence against its own unknown civilians right. And so, I think beyond asking what they could do. The question would be if they could even commit the principle that they ascribe to that they subscribe to in these international forum. So, that's my best response that I could offer. Thank you. Yeah, I'm not asking for anything special just adhering to the stated principles of the organization. And just with last night, or with over the weekend the videos of Tamil Nadu vehicles driving through peaceful protesters it's like, it's all, you know, it's out there for us all to see, you know, it's like, and burning down villages in Chin state or entire cities. And what level is the atrocity adequate to justify kind of more concrete actions that would change the calculations of the time it's kind of baffling but I don't know, Ken Omar if you had any thoughts on that the role of multilateral institutions. At this point, or you can move on if not. I can very quickly see that of both a modular modular organizations, and of course those are comprised of the governments, and particularly the democracy governments. I just want to follow on what said already said. I think, I mean it's really distressed for me to see that how the erosion of democracy. Yeah, because we're seeing the leaders of democracy are not really keeping up with their promises or practice what they teach. I think that is the key. I know we really need to if we really want to prevent the coups or even to stop the current number of militaries on going attempted coup. How do we do that. I think it's really important now, the US government also really step up with the very concrete actions that we're not seeing. Yes, of course they have some actions been taken up such as like you know, like sanctioned military conclomerates and may online and a few of the generals, but that's not enough right so like said we really need to see more actions. I mean also, the reality is like, if we cannot ensure the protection of the human rights, gender equality, inclusiveness pluralism, how can we have democracy, and without rule of law, justice accountability, and then the community will be entrenched that we have seen in Myanmar, Burma already. So, any of the countries with that will always be vulnerable to a coup. Of course, you know, like democracies of the world cannot always be the savior, or like, you know, like go out and save, because the reality is we should be able to build the foundations for democracy and really take that then like a stock in it in the democracy and like really put the foundation on the ground and Myanmar people have proved far more enough, more than they can ever of how much they deserve of their desire for the aspiration of democracy. I think, you know, what else do they do what what does the world wants from the people of Burma. I don't understand anymore. What does the Burma people, you know, like what does the US government need from the Burma people to really prove off what they need and you know they're sacrificing everything that they have really. So my recommendation to the US and other democracy is, they really need to believe in the democracy from Burma people and any other, you know, like people in other countries who are really sacrificing everything that they deserve to, you know, like really have democracy and they actually deserve nothing less, no less than the people in US or Canada really. So these democracy countries themselves, they need to believe in our people as much as they believe in their own democracy. Otherwise, in the name of democracy, dictators will enjoy impunity and destroy democracy. I mean, just my last point, the Myanmar military, again, I will say is the root cause of the immense suffering of our people.  The US government must treat them as one. That's what we need. Yeah. Thank you, Ken Omar. Yeah, that segues into the last question as we're coming to time here. I was just going to ask each of you three kind of top priorities or concrete actions that you would recommend to the US government to help with, you know, with the mitigation of the suffering that's resulted from the coup or efforts to kind of bring about a restoration of civilian-led democracy. Ken Omar, you've mentioned a few points there. I don't know if you had any other specific recommendations that you would like to make at this point. Yes, very quickly. The BROMA Act 2021 is right there in Washington, DC. We need that BROMA Act 2021 pass ASAP. And make sure that because this bill actually has many very, it's quite comprehensive. I've never seen that this comprehensive bill before. And if that is passed, there are many things that we can do because, you know, in our approach, we are actually applying full cuts strategy to stop this military. Cut the finance. So if the bill is passed, then we can really cut the finance going to the military by sanctioning the MOGE. And then we need to also cut the arms and ammunition. Then that bill will allow the US mission in New York to take further steps to maximize their efforts within the UN Security Council. And we also need not only the global arms embargo, but also we need the impunity cut. And we need the US government to actually call the spade a spade, which is the what happened to the range of people in 2017 is a genocide. So just call it, but also in joining us in our efforts to address this longstanding impunity of the military by really like supporting us our call at the Security Council to reform your mind to the ICC or US government can exercise universal jurisdiction and make sure, you know, they're like form their allies and correlation to hold this military leaders to account by international law international criminal law. Thank you. Thank you, Ken Omar. Goom Sen, how about you, three recommendations for the US government at this point. Yes, so the first is definitely destination of genocide for the India. Second is cutting off the funding for the military. And the third is, you know, I was in the Independence Hall in Philadelphia last night. And to me all the importance of significance, the foreign powers have played as well for the US Revolution, NERI war. Had there not been, you know, Lafayette or von Steuben, I don't think United States would have a face or French Navy. United States would not have seen an independence because they lost their independence after 1776. I think that's what Burmese people need. There's some times where people are capable to stand on their own feet. And there are times where they're unable to do that. And United States itself was one of those as well. Thank you. Thank you. Yes, such onion from you. Yes, as I'm in the country. So my my suggestion, maybe a little bit different from others. So my fuss of sorry my priority to US government is that the priority, which will help the emergence of inclusive and multilateral political dialogue and decision making platform. Number one will be empowering and creating moderate political space. As you know that now the tension is quite intense from both every side, let's say. So, in that empowering and creating moderate political spaces that may include arching the SAC and military to stop killing, arresting the anti coup movement protester, and also to release auto detainee. And also humanitarian assistance through CBOs and CSO, supporting the media social media platform, diplomatic engagement to all stakeholders. That is by already one second identify pressure and inducement which may include targeted function. Legitimacy deniers the SAC help and support nonviolent movement and also command ground for civilian protection. That's second priority. That priority will be develop principle for negotiation settlement. If now I'm saying about negotiation, the whole country may say, you know, it's something, say something to me, but actually, we should have negotiation settlement principle of it. For instance, military extraction plan, how the military will move back from the politics. Secondly, federal or confederal or secular state, you have to discuss about it. Also, we have to talk about transition adjusting security sector reform, gender issue development strategy. How the international support for the rebuilding of our country that should be, you know, in that principle of negotiation settlement. Those issues should be in and discussed and also well developed. And then I think it will help our country from inside the country. Thank you. Yeah, last word. Yes, last one. I actually like really support like Mark, Mark, Mark suggesting about the Obama bill, you know, like, so it's actually very comprehensive. So it's a very, like, a practical step. And it's already like a chief in your Senate in the house. And so it's just like some only like we can say that it's very like a feasible and then is some like a few more significant steps, you know, so this is the first like a priority that I want to set. And another thing is that, you know, in terms of, you know, dialogue things, you know, so if the military actually consider in this sort of like a more, you know, a peaceful or like maybe like retaining is like a brutality and you know, taking the puts like taking the pathway of the dialogue. And actually have this sort of like level of brutality and use of force and then like committing that level of like crimes against humanity, you know, so it's already like a pasta line. So, actually, it's leaving the room, and that space, even for the dialogue actually is for us is Nancy. I think we really need the very decisive standpoint for the, from the like international democratic society, including United States with the people of Myanmar to fighting this sort of like the very like last battle for us. We really have we already suffer a lot. Like we have a triple jeopardy. We already been suffered, like the military coup, the covert. And also like all of the economic hardships, but we still like having standing still, we are standing we are fighting.  So, this is my last message that please, you know, just let us, you know, finish our fight against this very and righteous very brutal lawless dictatorship. Thank you. Thank you. I think we'll have to leave it there for now. Thank you so much so much to our panelists, you have taken Omar such onions. Thank you all so much for joining us today across multiple time zones and for sharing your insights. And thanks to those who are tuning in. I hope you found the conversation useful. As I mentioned at the outset us IP will soon publish two papers related to this event series will also publish the Myanmar study group reports, which will include deep analysis of the coup and offer recommendations for the US government. And we're pulling on some that were just mentioned. Stay tuned for those but thank you all again and see you next time.