Hi everyone, I'm Hendrik Waldner and this talk is about policy-compliant signatures, which is joint work with Christian Vardetscher and Christian Mutt. Starting with some motivation, we consider the standard blockchain setting, where we have two parties, Alice and Bob, that are both in possession of a signature key pair. If Alice now wants to create a transaction for Bob, she uses her signing key to generate a signature over the transaction details M and the verification key of Bob. The generated transaction can then be checked for validity using the verification key of Alice. Furthermore, we require unfortability in this setting, which means that no one other than Alice should be able to create a valid signature in her name. In this talk, we consider the more restricted setting, where we require a valid transaction to also fulfill the global policy F evaluated over the attributes of the sender and the receiver. A blockchain that allows for these types of attribute checks can be very useful within corporate environments to only allow for transactions between employees of different departments. In this setting, the key pairs of Alice and Bob are additionally associated with an attribute set XA and XB. To generate a signature, Alice proceeds similarly to the previous case and uses her signing key together with the transaction details M and the public key of Bob. The generated signature is now deemed valid if the policy F applied on the attribute set XA of Alice and XB of Bob verifies. In this setting, we also require unfortability, which means, as in the previous case, that no one other than Alice should be able to create a valid signature in her name. And additionally, that Alice and Bob should not be able to create a valid signature if they do not fulfill the global policy. Furthermore, we require attribute hiding, which means that nothing about the attributes of the different parties is leaked by the public keys. And the generated signatures only reveal that the attributes of the participating parties fulfill the policy and nothing beyond that. Next we are going to see which existing cryptographic primitives we could use to achieve this goal. The first primitive that could be useful in this setting are digital signatures. In a digital signature scheme, there exists a party Carol that executes the setup procedure that outputs a verification key VK and a secret key SK. Carol then sends the verification key to Bob and the secret key to Alice. Alice can use the secret key to sign a message M and generate the corresponding signature Sigma. The verification key can then be used to check if the signature Sigma is valid with respect to the message M. Unfortunately, this primitive does not incorporate any attributes of the sender or the receiver and is therefore not useful in our setting. An extension of digital signatures that incorporates attributes is the notion of attribute-based signatures. In an attribute-based signature scheme, Carol executes the setup procedure to generate a master public key and a master secret key. The master secret key is then used by Carol together with an attribute set XA to generate the signing key SKA of Alice. Alice then uses her signing key SKA to generate a signature Sigma for a message M and a policy F. This signature can then be verified using the master public key and the policy F. The signature in this case is only valid if the attributes XA of Alice fulfill the policy F. The notion of attribute-based signatures incorporates attributes into the signature generation, but unfortunately only the attributes of the sender are incorporated, which is still insufficient for our setting. Another type of signature that handles attributes is the notion of policy-based signatures. Policy-based signatures work similarly to attribute-based signatures with the difference that signing keys are generated with respect to a policy F instead of an attribute set. Furthermore, during the signature generation, Alice needs to provide a witness W for a relation that involves the policy F associated with a signing key and the message that is being signed. A signature now is only deemed valid if the witness W that has been used in the signature generation is a valid witness for the relation involving the policy F of the signing key and the message M. One way to allow for the incorporation of Bob's attributes in this notion would be by including some public information of Bob in the message M that is being signed. The problem here is that for the signature generation, Alice needs to know Bob's attributes to prove that both of their attributes together fulfill the policy. Therefore, we cannot guarantee privacy for Bob in this setting, which makes this notion unsuitable for our motivational example. Since none of the previous primitives fit our motivational example, we now introduce the new notion of policy-compliant signatures. In a policy-compliant signature scheme, Carol executes the setup procedure which takes as an input a policy F and outputs a master public key and a master secret key. She then uses the master secret key together with an attribute set to generate a public key secret key pair. In more detail, she uses the attribute set XA to generate the keys for Alice and the attribute set XB to generate the keys for Bob. To generate a signature, Alice uses her secret key together with the public key of Bob and the message M in the signing procedure. The resulting message signature pair can then be verified using the master public key and the public keys of Alice and Bob. A signature only verifies if the global policy F is fulfilled when evaluated using the attributes XA of Alice and XB of Bob. We can directly see that the notion of policy-compliant signatures provides a good solution for our motivational example. To achieve unforgeability and attribute hiding in our motivational example, our policy-compliant signature scheme also needs to achieve these notions. Before we can talk about how to achieve these notions, we first need to formally define them. We begin with the notion of unforgeability. In the case of unforgeability, we have three different types of forgeries that we need to prevent. The first type of forgery is what we call a key generation forgery. In a key generation forgery, a malicious Alice is able to generate a valid signature for a public key that has not been generated by Carol. Since Carol did not assign any attributes to this maliciously generated public key, it cannot result in a valid policy evaluation. In a signature forgery, an adversary is able to create a signature corresponding to Alice's public key without knowing her secret key. This type of attack is similar to the standard notion of unforgeability for a digital signature scheme. In the third and last type of forgery, an attribute forgery, a malicious Alice and a malicious Bob are able to jointly create a valid signature even though their attributes do not fulfill the policy. After informally talking about the different types of attacks we need to prevent, we are now going to formally define unforgeability using a security game. In this security game, an adversary has access to different oracles that are run by a challenger and can be queried multiple times. The first oracle that the adversary can access is the key generation oracle. It queries it using an attribute set x and receives as a reply the corresponding public key pk. Additionally, the adversary can also query a corruption oracle using one of the public keys that have been previously output by the key generation oracle to obtain the corresponding secret key. The last oracle that the adversary has access to is the signing oracle. Inputting a sender public key pks, a receiver public key pkr and a message m, the adversary obtains a signature sigma for the message m. After the adversary has interacted with the different oracles, its goal is to output two public keys pk and pk star, a message m star and a signature sigma star such that the signature sigma star is a valid signature with respect to the public keys pk and pk star and the message m star. For the adversary to provide a valid signature forgery, it needs to provide one of the different types of attacks that we have previously described. This is the case if it either holds that the sender public key pk has not been query to the corruption oracle or if both of the public keys pk and pk star have been output by the key generation oracle and their corresponding attribute sets x and x star do not fulfill the policy f. We call a policy compliant signature scheme unfortable if it is impossible for any efficient adversary to produce a valid signature forgery. After talking about unforgeability, we now focus on attributiding where we distinguish between an indistinguishability based and a simulation based notion. We start by considering the indistinguishability based notion. As in the case of unforgeability, we define indistinguishability based attribute hiding using a security game. In this game, the adversary has access to the same oracles as before but with a different input output behavior. Also in this game, the adversary can query all of the oracles multiple times. The key generation oracle in this game can be queried using two attribute sets x0 and x1. The adversary then receives as a reply to this query a public key pk that has been generated with respect to the attribute set xb where b is a bit that is sampled in the beginning of the game. The goal of the adversary in this game after it has finished querying the different oracles is to correctly determine the bit b by outputting a bit b prime. A policy compliant signature scheme achieves indistinguishability based attribute hiding if the probability that the output bit b prime is equal to b is close to one half for all efficient adversaries. Besides the key generation oracle, the adversary also has access to a corruption oracle which it can query using a public key pk to obtain the corresponding secret key sk. To not make it trivial for the adversary to determine the bit b and therefore win the security game, it can only query the corruption oracle using public keys that have been the reply to a key generation query where the attribute sets x0 and x1 are equal. If we do not enforce this restriction, the adversary might be able to directly learn the bit b. The signing oracle in this game behaves exactly as in the unforgeability game but we also need to enforce an additional restriction on the queries of the adversary here. Namely, we require that the policy evaluated on the left challenge attributes of the sender key pkx and the receiver key pky used in the signing query are equal to the policy evaluated on the right challenge attributes of the sender and the receiver key. Otherwise, the adversary might again be able to directly learn the bit b. After defining unforgeability and indistinguishability-based attribute hiding, we can now consider some construction approaches for policy-compliant signatures. The first approach to realize policy-compliant signatures is by relying on Carol. In more detail, if Alice wants to generate a signature for Bob, she submits her message to Carol together with Bob's identifier and receives as a reply the signature sigma. Afterwards, Bob can send the signature together with a message and Alice identifier to Carol who outputs either 0 or 1. Unfortunately, this solution requires the involvement of Carol for every signature generation and verification but we would like to have a solution where Carol is only needed for the generation of the public parameters and the keys of the different parties such that Alice can generate the signatures on her own and everyone can verify them on their own. The second approach to realizing policy-compliant signatures is to let Carol issue signature keys together with a certificate that corresponds to the attributes of the corresponding party. For the generation of a signature, Alice would then use her signing key to generate a signature for her message and additionally prove using both of the verification keys and the certificates that her attributes together with the attributes of Bob fulfill the global policy. When Bob obtains the proof and the signature, he can verify the signature generated for the message as well as the proof that the attributes of Alice and Bob together fulfill the policy. This solution looks like a good solution at first sight but it has the drawback that it does not give us any guarantees in terms of privacy. This is due to the fact that for Alice to prove that her attributes together with Bob's attributes fulfill the global policy, she needs to know Bob's attributes which directly compromises privacy. After considering these first approaches for the realization of policy-compliant signatures, we now introduce the necessary tools for our final construction. The first tool that is needed for our construction is a digital signature scheme which we have already introduced. Additionally our construction also requires a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system which is similar to the proof system that we have mentioned in the previous construction approach. The last primitive that we need for our construction is a predicate encryption scheme which allows for the oblivious evaluation of policies without revealing the underlying attributes. We now describe the different primitives in more detail where we begin with non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs. In the first step of a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof, a setup procedure is executed by Carol that outputs a common reference string which is then sent to Alice and to Bob. If Alice now wants to prove the validity of a statement x for which she knows a witness w, then she can generate a proof pi using the CRS, the statement x and the witness w. This proof is then sent to Bob who can verify it using the statement x and the common reference string. We require a zero-knowledge proof system to achieve soundness and zero-knowledge. Soundness ensures that it is not possible for malicious Alice to generate a valid proof for statements x for which no witness w exists and zero-knowledge in turn guarantees that when Bob obtains the proof pi, he does not learn anything about a witness w for the statement x. After introducing non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs we can now focus on predicate encryption. In a predicate encryption scheme, the setup procedure executed by Carol outputs a master public key and a master secret key. The master public key can then be used by Alice to generate a ciphertext ct encrypting an attribute set x. The master secret key in turn is used by Carol to generate a functional key skf that is associated with a policy f. When Bob uses this functional key to decrypt the ciphertext ct, he obtains as an output the policy associated with the functional key applied on the attribute set encrypted in the ciphertext which in this case is f of x. We require a predicate encryption scheme to be attribute hiding, which means that Bob, when decrypting a ciphertext, does not learn anything more about the encrypted attribute set than what is leaked by the evaluation of the policy f. In our construction of policy compliant signatures we only require the predicate encryption scheme to be secret key, which means that the setup procedure only outputs a master secret key that is used for encryption and key generation. After introducing the necessary tools for our construction we are now ready to give a high-level overview of how our construction works. The idea of our construction is to use a predicate encryption scheme to encrypt the attributes of the different parties in the public keys and use the corresponding functional key as part of the secret keys of the different parties for the policy evaluation. To generate a signature the sender decrypts the ciphertext contained in the public key of the receiver and proves in zero knowledge that the decryption output together with its functional key shows that the policy is fulfilled. It can then be verified that the global policy is fulfilled by checking the validity of the generated proof. In more detail the master public key of our scheme consists of a common reference string for non-interactive zero knowledge proof and two verification keys for a digital signature scheme vkp and vks. The corresponding master secret key consists of the master secret key for a predicate encryption scheme and the signing keys skp and sks that correspond to the verification keys vkp and vks. To generate a public key for a participating party a new digital signature key per is sampled where the verification key vk is included in the public key. Furthermore the attributes of the party are encrypted using the predicate encryption scheme and the resulting ciphertext is included in the public key. Finally a signature sigma p is generated using the signing key skp for the verification key vk and the ciphertext ct and is also included in the public key. The corresponding secret key for the public key consists of the signing key sk which has been generated together with the verification key vk and a functional key skf that is generated for the policy f evaluated on the first component using the attribute set x of the party. This half evaluated policy enables us to obliviously check if the sender and the receiver together fulfilled the policy without revealing anything about their attributes. In the last step another signature sigma s is generated using the signing key sks for the verification key vk of the public key and the functional key skf to bind the public key and the secret key together. To generate a signature the sender uses its functional key to decrypt the ciphertext contained in the public key of the receiver and produces the proof pi using the zero-knowledge proof system by proving that the output of the decryption is one and that the functional key that has been used to generate the decryption is part of the secret key that corresponds to the public key of the sender. The generated proof ensures that the policy is fulfilled by both of the parties and that the correct key of the sender has been used. In the final step the sender uses its signing key sk to generate a signature sigma prime over the message m and to prove pi. The resulting signature sigma prime can then be publicly verified by verifying the zero-knowledge proof pi and the signature sigma of the digital signature scheme. We highlighted all the primitives used in our construction can be based on standard assumptions which in turn results in the realization of policy compliant signatures from standard assumptions. After describing how our construction works we now discuss its security where we first focus on unforgeability. We can argue that our scheme is unforgeable by analyzing the different events in which an adversary construct a signature forgery and show that the occurrence probability of these events are bounded by the security of our underlying primitives. The first way for an adversary to produce a forgery is to generate a public key on its own for which it is able to produce a valid signature. The generation of a public key without carol's involvement would result in a signature forgery with respect to the verification key vkp and can therefore be bounded by the unforgeability of the digital signature scheme. Another possibility for an adversary to generate a forgery is by forging a signature for a public key in the system for which it does not know the secret key. In this case the adversary could use a proof pi from a previous signature generated for this key and try to forge a signature with respect to the verification key vk for a new message m prime. If the adversary is successful in this case it has created a signature forgery with respect to the verification key vk. Therefore the occurrence of this event can also be bounded by the unforgeability of the digital signature scheme. A third way for an adversary to produce a signature forgery is by generating a valid signature for public keys that do not fulfill the policy. It can achieve this by either forging a zero-knowledge proof or by creating a valid witness on its own. In the case that an adversary forges a zero-knowledge proof without knowing a witness it breaks the extractability property of the underlying non-interactive zero-knowledge protocol. Extractability requires that an adversary is not able to generate a valid proof for a statement if it is not in possession of a corresponding witness. This is a stronger property than soundness where it is only required that an adversary is not able to generate a valid proof for a false statement. One possibility for the adversary to generate a valid witness is by taking the secret key of a public key that fulfills the policy and forge a signature sigma prime with respect to the verification key of the public key that does not fulfill the policy. This forged key can then be used to generate a valid proof pi with respect to the public key that does not fulfill the policy. This attack results in a signature forgery with respect to the verification key vks and can therefore be again bounded by the unforgeability of the digital signature scheme. This concludes the analysis of the unforgeability of our construction and we can now take a more detailed look into the attribute hiding of our scheme. To achieve attribute hiding we need to ensure that nothing about the attributes of the participating parties is leaked from the public keys and that the generated signatures between different parties only reveal that the attributes fulfill the policy and nothing beyond that. Since the only part in the public key that contains information about the attributes of the party is the ciphertext ct it follows from the attribute hiding of the predicate encryption scheme that nothing about the attributes of the parties is leaked by the public keys. To ensure that no information beyond the policy evaluation is leaked by signature sigma prime we can rely on the zero-knowledge property of our proof system. The zero-knowledge property states that no information beyond the validity of the statement that is being proven is leaked which in our case is the fulfillment of the policy. This concludes our analysis of the indistinguishability-based attribute hiding. Besides standalone security we also analyze the security of policy-compliant signatures in the universal composability framework.  In the UC framework we consider two different worlds the real world and the ideal world. In the real world we have a protocol that is executed by Alice and Bob and can further be influenced by an adversary. In the ideal world we have Alice and Bob that interact with an ideal functionality F which is also accessed by an ideal adversary called the simulator. The inputs of Alice Bob and the adversary are decided by an environment Z in both of these worlds. We say that a scheme is UC secure if there exists a simulator such that it is hard for any efficient environment Z to determine if it interacts with the real world or the ideal world. The job of the simulator here is to properly simulate the interaction in the ideal world such that the environment cannot see a difference with respect to the real world. The intuition behind this definition of security is that all the attacks that can be executed in the protocol execution in the real world can also be executed in the ideal world through the simulator. The same holds in terms of leakage. In more detail it follows that the information that is leaked in the protocol execution is the same as the information that is leaked by the ideal functionality. This security definition further allows that whenever the ideal functionality is used as a subroutine in the bigger protocol execution it can be replaced by the specific protocol for which your serialization has been proven. This is known as the composition theorem. Before presenting the ideal functionality that can be realized using policy-compliant signatures we focus on the ideal functionality that is realized by a digital signature scheme. The signature functionality has interfaces to interact with Alice and Bob. Alice can use her interface to send a key generation request to the ideal functionality which then forwards this request to the simulator. The simulator replies to this request with a key identifier V that is then sent back to Alice. Afterwards for the signature generation Alice sends M as a sign request to the ideal functionality as in the case of a key generation request the ideal functionality forwards the request to the simulator which replies with the signature sigma that is then sent to Alice by the ideal functionality. If Bob is in possession of a signature sigma for a message M of Alice he can send a verify request consisting of Alice identifier, the message and the signature to the ideal functionality. The ideal functionality then forwards the verification request to the simulator which replies to the ideal functionality if the signature is valid or not. This answer is then forwarded to Bob by the ideal functionality. The signature functionality also guarantees unforgability which means that no signature for a message that has never been used in a sign request by Alice will be deemed valid with respect to her identifier V. The described signature functionality can be realized using a protocol where Alice uses the setup procedure of a digital signature scheme to generate her key pair and uses the verification key as her identifier. To sign a message Alice executes the sign procedure using her signing key. Bob can then use the verification procedure together with Alice verification key to check a signature for its validity. The simulator in the ideal world for the signature functionality generates a key pair when a key generation query is forwarded to it by the signature functionality and replies with the verification key as the corresponding identifier. Whenever the simulator receives a sign query it uses the sign procedure of the signature scheme to generate a signature with the signing key that corresponds to the verification key contained in the sign query and whenever a verification query is asked the simulator locally executes the verify procedure using the corresponding verification key and sends the output as a reply to the ideal functionality. The unforgability of the signature scheme in this setting ensures that no one other than Alice is able to generate a valid signature for a new message with respect to her identifier which matches the unforgability guarantee of the ideal functionality. After focusing on the ideal functionality for a digital signature scheme we now consider the extended policy compliant signatures functionality. The policy compliant signature functionality consists of an additional interface to Carol. Carol can use this interface to submit a policy generation query for policy f to the ideal functionality which forwards it to the simulator. The simulator then replies to the ideal functionality with a master identifier vm. This master identifier is then forwarded to Carol. When Alice issues her key generation query she additionally submits her attribute zxa to the ideal functionality which then notifies the simulator that a key generation query has been asked for Alice without revealing the attribute zxa. The simulator then replies to the ideal functionality with an identifier va which is then forwarded to Alice. When Bob issues his key generation query using the attribute zxb the ideal functionality and the simulator interact in the same way as before to obtain the identifier vb. When Alice issues a sign query she submits Bob's identifier vb and the message m to the ideal functionality which forwards this query to the simulator together with the policy evaluation over the attributes of Alice and Bob. The simulator then replies with a signature sigma that is forwarded by the ideal functionality to Alice. For verification query Bob submits the signature together with the message and the identifier of the sender and the receiver to the ideal functionality which forwards this query to the simulator. The simulator then notifies the ideal functionality if the signature is valid or not which is forwarded to Bob. We highlight that it is also possible to submit a corrupt query for the different parties to the ideal functionality. If a corrupt query is submitted the simulator learns the attribute set for the party that is being corrupted as well as the evaluation with all the remaining public keys where the corrupted party acts as the sender. In the case that another key generation query is asked after a corruption query the simulator also learns the policy evaluation for this new key with all the corrupted parties acting as senders. The policy compliance signature functionality guarantees unforgeability and privacy. Unforgeability here means that first no one other than Alice is able to generate a valid signature for her identifier. Second that it is not possible to generate a valid signature for two identifiers where the corresponding parties do not fulfill the policy. And third that no valid signature can be generated with respect to identifiers that have not been output by the ideal functionality. Privacy in this setting means that nothing more about the attributes of the different parties can be learned than what is leaked by generated signatures and corrupted parties. The policy compliance signature functionality can be realized using a protocol where the setup and key generation procedure are executed by Carol to generate the master public key and the master secret key as well as the keys for Alice and Bob. For Alice to generate a signature she can execute the sign procedure using Bob's public key and her secret key to sign a message M and Bob can verify the signature using the verify procedure of the policy compliance signature scheme. In the ideal world the simulator needs to sample all the keys using the information it obtains from the ideal functionality as described on the previous slide. We observe that for the simulator to be able to accomplish this and to guarantee privacy it needs to be able to simulate public keys without knowing the underlying attribute sets and to be able to simulate signatures by only knowing the corresponding policy evaluation of the involved parties. Furthermore it needs to be able to generate a secret key for a previously generated public key in the case of a corruption query by learning the corresponding attribute set after the public key has been generated. The existence of such a simulator is not guaranteed by our current indistinguishability based attribute hiding definition. Contrary, unforgeability in the ideal world directly follows from the unforgeability of the policy compliance signature scheme which is due to the fact that the unforgeability requirements on the policy compliance signature scheme match the unforgeability requirements of the ideal functionality. To guarantee privacy in the ideal world we need to consider a stronger simulation based attribute hiding notion that guarantees the existence of a simulator that is able to simulate the different keys and signatures. In the simulation based security game the adversary has access to the same oracles as in the indistinguishability based one but instead of distinguishing between the left or right attribute set used for the generation of public keys the task of the adversary is to distinguish if the keys and signatures it receives are simulated or honestly generated. For the simulator to generate these keys it obtains some additional information. In the case of a key generation query the simulator learns all the policy evaluations of the requested key with all the corrupted keys where the corrupted keys act as sender keys. In the case of a corruption query the simulator learns the attributes of the key as well as all the policy evaluations of this key acting as the sender key with all the remaining keys. In the case of a sign query the simulator learns the policy evaluation of the attributes associated with the keys that are used in the query. This notion is sufficient for our UC realization and guarantees the existence of the simulator that is able to generate the different keys and signatures in a proper way. Additionally, we highlight that if the simulation-based secure predicate encryption scheme is used as an instantiation in our construction, then we also obtain a simulation-based secure policy-compliant signature scheme. Unfortunately, we are not aware of any predicate encryption that achieves the required notion of simulation-based security. Therefore, we leave it as an interesting open question to construct simulation-based secure policy-compliant signatures. To summarize, in this talk we have introduced the notion of policy-compliant signatures together with the corresponding notion of unforgibility and indistinguishability-based attribute hiding. Furthermore, we presented a policy-compliant signature scheme based on digital signatures, non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs, and predicate encryption that achieves unforgibility and indistinguishability-based attribute hiding. In the last step, we also gave a UC formulation of our notion and presented the corresponding simulation-based notion of attribute hiding that is needed to realize our UC formulation. Thank you very much for listening.


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But how have you guys been? I've missed you guys so much but welcome to the show We're gonna have fun as usual. This is karaoke live on a white to pay for channel My name is feeling and that is that feeling Jean on all socials Of course, I'm usually with half you in the car, but he's not here today You can talk to him at half you in the car on his social media pages The hashtag is a karaoke white if I thought of cross art white to pay for channel is where you find us now We're gonna go straight ahead to our song of the week and this week. I guess we Guess who we are featuring rather. We're gonna feature our very two fight for artists I'm talking about hide the bond and the song is well should I turn up the volume and enjoy All right, that was our song of the week. I hope you loved it as much as we did Absolutely love it.  Take your phone. Yes, you know right now I'm going to clubs so you're gonna be part of the show. You don't have an excuse take your phone Record yourself take a video of yourself singing your favorite song. Just You know, whatever genre of music you choose just sing send it to us at Whitefair4channel and we're gonna be more than happy to feature it on the show, right? Let's have a look at those who already send in their videos I Hey So Baby Amu I Think I take a walk in the park Someone as you say And then he's Kate Kate's got real key If my love some other time you cut out party Yeah, no, oh Bella. Yeah, oh Bella. Yeah, oh Bella. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah, oh Oh To me Oe ga wa ko o rea werazi mangena O tareda kore ho kabarari am suin kage toga modo rahi n'yaraira kari ane, ane, ane, ane Neku jetena eri Joain ne ne gwehete goro kain ne ne gwehete I just want you to try to divide something story. You can see the world you want. I want you to try to divide something story. Take a difference if she says, Buy me a rose call me from work. Open a door for me what will it hurt?   N'achotaka kue nanaue mombasani. Unna vio kataueue, unna nipa mikiueue. Manakilam tujicho, anaku taza maueue. Unna vio kataueue, unna nipa mikiueue. Manakilam tujicho, anaku taza maueue. Unna vio kataueue, unna nipa mikiueue. Unna vio kataueue, unna nipa mikiueue. N'achotaka nipa mikiueue, unna nipa mikiueue. N'achotaka nipa mikiueue, unna nipa mikiueue. Manakilam tujicho, anaku taza maueue. N'achotaka nipa mikiueueue, unna nipa mikiueueue. Unna vio kataueueue, ah. Nipa mikiueueue, haga nipa mikiueue. Manakilam tujicho, anaku taza maueue. All right that was karaoke absolutely love it it's my favorite part of the show that was fine thank you so much for watching it's always a good time hanging out with you guys don't forget the hashtag karaoke white if i for talk to us at half you imboko on his socials at felinejin on my social media pages and of course at white if i for channel talk to us and we're going to be more than happy to chat with you but that's where i'm leaving you i'm going to leave


Oftentimes, when you're applying or getting a new job, the salary negotiation is really the first time they're getting a sense of who you are as a person.  This is your chance to actually demonstrate that you are a person who's out there trying to make the pie bigger. And you want them to wanna hire you more as a result of this negotiation, rather than less. So I'm not a giant fan of word games, but here's one or two examples. Imagine there's salary, there's bonus, and there's equity. Okay, of course I'd like more of all three, but I could ask the other side, help me understand where you are least flexible. Now, if I say where you most flexible, they're probably not gonna wanna answer that question, right? It's sort of, it's a scary question for them to answer. But if I say where you least flexible, everybody wants to tell you that. Yeah, look, I have no room to deal with salary. That's fixed, it's come from high up, whatever. Okay, so now you know what I do? I don't ask them about salary. Nope. Right? And I say, well, okay, let's talk about bonus. Let's talk about equity. And then they can't say that's reasonable. I know you're least flexible on this thing. So. Right. But you got some room to move. So you got some room. Supposed to, well, where are you least flexible? Everywhere. Not the answer you wanna hear. Yeah, it's probably not the answer you will hear. So I wanna allow them to tell me information in a way that's not threatening to them. And also I wanna respect it. Yeah. Because in fact, just like I wanna give the other side what they want, I don't wanna take from the other side what they don't wanna give me. Right. Because that makes them not wanna do the deal. Or even waste time on stuff that they can't move on. Absolutely, it's a useless negotiation. Another version of this is to say, help me understand why those wonderfully talented people you've hired in the past haven't worked out. Because I assume whenever you hire somebody you're expecting it's gonna be great. And I'm expecting it's gonna be great. So can we just talk for a moment about what led to the failures? And the reason why that's so valuable is they'll then tell you things which you can either say, they'll say what we really care is about team players that you may be a superstar on your own but if you're not part of the team that doesn't work here. And I'm like, oh my God, I am kind of the lone wolf person. Maybe I shouldn't take this job. Or you say, hey, guess what? Let me show you why I am Mr. Team.  So if you can understand what goes wrong and you can convince them that you're not the type where they're gonna make a mistake, they're gonna want to have you even more. Right, it's a sure bet for them. Yeah, you're trying to make it a sure bet for them. And one way of understanding that is to explain why you're not gonna be the unusual case where things go wrong. So it's funny to talk about failure a little bit. Yeah, I think many would feel uncomfortable about it but it's such valuable information. And again, it's showing them that you care about their interests, right? Going back to this empathy, their side of the table. I want to make a big pie. That's my goal here. So I want our interests to be aligned and I'm trying to demonstrate how it is that we're gonna succeed on that. I'm a big fan of making the other side's argument. So a lot of people in negotiation when they hear the other side making some story, they spend all their effort showing what's wrong with it. And then what happens, the other side doesn't think they're being understood. You see, in life we can't always get what we want but we can always be understood. And therefore I need to help the other side. I need to demonstrate to them that I understand their perspective. So this is actually a place where Chris Voss and I disagree a little bit. Voss will, when you can't give the person a bonus, he says things to the effect of, I know you must be thinking that I don't really value your work because I'm not giving you this bonus. And he wants the other person to be like, oh no, no, I realize you do like me and this, that. Actually, if that's what my boss says to me and leaves it there, it's like, yeah, you're fn right. Yeah. So you can't just say, I know you're thinking this. You have to explain, here's why I really do value what you do. Here are the ways in which I value it. Here's how I've demonstrated I value it. Here's how I'm going to value it going forward. I may not be able to do this but here are the other things that I do. And so you have to make the other side's argument but you're not doing it to put them on the defensive. You're doing it to demonstrate you understand and there's something else that's going on that's even more relevant. Well, again, and even in sales, summarizing their points allows them to feel good that you're on the same page which opens the door then for more communication. Without that, those conversations don't go nearly to the place that we want, well, that I want them to speaking personally. And let's actually work on that some more. Let's do the yes and to that story which is let me put out on the table all of the objections that you might have. Right, absolutely. Because the fact is if you don't ask them, I don't get a chance to answer them. And so you might just be walking away in the end. We're not going to have a deal because there are these problems that I haven't addressed. So I don't want to hide them. I want to talk about them because if I can't resolve them, then we're not going to reach an agreement. And you may be embarrassed to ask them, but I know you're thinking them. So, for example, I'm thinking the listener to this podcast saying, well, okay, Barry, that's great if you were the small party, but why should the big party ever agree to this? Why should they give up more than half the pie? Because they were used to getting it.  And so you might end up with no deal. And getting half of a great deal is better than a lot of no deal, right? I think the lines I'd rather have 10% of a watermelon than all of a grape. Now, it's a little bit trickier in the event that the small side is prepared to accept less than half the pie. Now do I tell them? And do I wanna have a reputation for somebody who does fair deals out there? So that more people wanna do deals with me. I might choose not to in that case. That's the harder one.


Herzlich Willkommen zu unserer kleinen Woche. Mein Name ist Karina Nuckour und ich arbeite als Kampainerin bei CAMPEC. Ich bin Marita Strasser, auch Kampainerin. Ich bin der erste Ereignis von 2 CAMPEC.   Die schöne neue Welt der Handelsabkommen der USA. Da sind vier Abkommen benannt. Die Bullets sind wieder nicht richtig. Es werden noch mehr. Wir sagen übrigens nie frei Handelsabkommen dazu. Das Wort frei Handelsabkommen, Sie sind nicht frei Handelsabkommen, Sie sind nicht frei Handelsabkommen. Wir sprechen übrigens nie frei Handelsabkommen dazu. Das Wort frei Handelsabkommen, Sie sind nicht frei Handelsabkommen.  Es geht darum, ne��ibriere Politik um zu verportieren. Wie seine letzten Jahrzehnte entendeu, ich habe versucht zu analyticen ihre demokratische Die meisten dieser Abkommen werden vollkommen geheim verhandelt, jahrelang. Und dann überfallartig verabschiedet, gratifiziert.  Eingeschlossen. Das meiste oder viele von denen, was wir wissen, beruht, der daher aufliegt.  Ja, wenn wir über Handelsabkommen reden, dann sollen wir direkt zum Kern das Problem vorstellen.  Investor-Startklagen werden auch kurz mit dem niedlichen Kürzel ISDS. Abgekürzt ISDS steht für Investor's Date Dispute Settlement. Und das bedeutet, dass den einzelnen Konzern, die in den verschiedenen Kreisen sind, wirtschaftlich tätig sind, erlaubt wird, vor Gericht zu ziehen gegen einen der Vertragspartner, also einen der beiden Vertragspartner der beiden Staaten. Nehmen wir mal beispielsweise TTIP. Das ist ein Abkommen des Zwischen der EU und den USA.  Ja, und warum regen wir uns über diese Räder? Das ist eine zukommene Privatisierung des Erwährendenkreises. Das ist eine Privatisierung des Erwährendenkreises. Jederzeit vor diesem zusätzlichen Gremium geklagt werden kann, das heißt, ein Unternehmen, das sich irgendwann beißt, jederzeit verlügt, muss nicht in der Praxis, gibt, man kann auch in keiner von ihnen davon kommen, um die Verklagen zu verklagen, kann man spielen.   Also, wer in einem Verfahren die Kläger-Seite vertreten kann, kann in einem Verfahren der Richter sein. Und wir brauchen die Lawyers, die die deal with this kind of things, can switch between the prosecutor and the judge and these private work structures. Im Großteil aller Klagen weltweit machen unterschiedlichen wechselnden Rollen sind immer dieselben. Daraus entstehen natürlich auch Fressenkonflikte. Es gibt auch einen sogenannten Ehrengruppe-Podex, das gibt auch einen natürlichen Konflikt von Interesse. Und da ist ein Pseudo-Podex noch nicht mal festgelegt, was ein Fressen-Konflikt ist.   Sie werden, das gibt dann sechsstellige Summen, das Sie da verliehen, wenn Sie sich rauskommen. Also Sie haben ein ökonomisches Interesse, möglichst viele Fragen zu haben.  Du klack doch mal, und da kennst du. Und hier findest du, wir machen eine Luki für Beratung, haben ein Beratungs-Suppe für Beratungs-Suppe. Und da ist es so, wenn es jetzt hier macht, ist es normal. Eigentlich nicht so hohen Chancen als Konzernen aus. Ich fühle mich auch aus irgendeinem Grund ungerichtet an. Und da kommt der Anwaltskanzler auf mich zu und sagt, hast du schon mal von ISDS gehört, das ist eine ganz tolle neue Möglichkeit. Und da kannst du klagen.  Sowohl der Kläger als auch der Beklage liebt sich ein Schiedsrichter hoch. Und dann zusammen einigen sie sich auf einen Dritten. Und gemeinsam, also mit so einem Urteil, muss immer mit einer Mehrheit gesprochen werden. Meistens werden sie sich aber auch so in wie ein Konsens einig. Das heißt, so recht als Verhandlungslösung. Um einen Vergleich zu nehmen, wenn ich jemand wegen einer Urheberrechtssache in Deutschland rankriegen will, und ich habe irgendwelche Urheberrechtssachen, und ich arbeite in Deutschland, oder sonst was, dann gehe ich normalerweise nach Hamburg. Weil ich weiß, in Hamburg ist die Rechtsprechung relativ, auf Seite der Urheber, auf der Seite der Urheber, und weniger auf der Seite der Nutzer. Ich kann mir aber den Richter natürlich nicht aussuchen. Das wäre ein Witz, wenn ich sagen könnte, der Richter passt mir nicht. Und zusätzlich kann auch noch der Beklagte in Berufung gehen.  Und interessanterweise fehlt diese Möglichkeit bei den Schiedsrichtern. Ich habe hier ein paar Probleme mit Technologie. Ich bin sehr sorry über das. Du hast wahrscheinlich den Beginn unserer Translation vermisst. Wir werden jetzt versuchen, in das Gespräch zu kommen.  Ich möchte eine kleine Geschichte von Rumänien, von den 90ern, die 1990er-Jahren.    Die Füllungen von Profit-Aggremien waren nicht leidbar. Sie waren nicht bezahlt.  Jetzt sind wir da. Wir werden sie auch verwenden.   Die beiden Brüder wussten nicht, was man so tun würde.  Was sie gemacht haben, war, dass sie ein fremdes Top-Lawyer aus der ISDS-Kommunität war. Und auf der Basis des ISDS-Kommunitäts zwischen Sweden und Rumänien ging sie zu den Arbitration-Paneln in Washington, wo das war, und sie argumentiert, dass wir auf diese Begründung begreifen, um immer zu bleiben und was wir erwähnt haben.  Du hast 250.000.000, 250.000.000 Dollar von der Regierung.   Nein, nicht das. Und das same EU-Kommission ist jetzt verabschieden, mit genauer Klausen.    Aber das ist ein Problem, das sie sich nicht verabschieden. Aber das ist ein Problem, das sich nicht verabschieden. Das ist ein Problem, das sie nicht verabschieden. Das ist ein Problem, das sie sich nicht verabschieden.   Und ein einziger dieser Prozesse könnte ca. 1 Billion in Volumen sein.   Sie wissen nicht, wie sie ihre Billen payen sollten.  Und dann, eine Wartekompagne kommt, und sagt, wir wollen ein Fein. Wir wollen, dass wir Dammages zu sagen, Dammages für was, das du fragst. Und Risiken und Seileffekte, es ist nicht nur uns, die payen, es ist auch unsere Zeichen, unsere Verlustung. Es kann bis zu 20 Jahre dauern für ein Investor, um eine Prozesse so zu starten, nach dem Event.   Und das Code, was wir auf dieser Hardware lernen, ist das. Das ist ein Extrakt von einer solchen Investor-Staats-Protektions-Aggreement, von CETA, der Europäische-Konäden-Aggreement, Artikel X9. Das Recht, das jedes Investor garantiert, ist, diese Reise aus A- und F-Komissionen, dass sie ein Teil dieser Reise sind.   Wenn diese Liste tight und fix ist, dann gibt es dieses Paragraph von legitimativen Überraschungen, das led Marcus Krajewski, einer der wenigen Independent-Experts, viele der Experten, Arbitration-Panelisten, Arbitration-Judges selbst, dieser Person hat gesagt, dass er nicht ablehnt, zu erklären zu seinem Student, was das bedeutet. Es ist ein missbarer Code, aber es wird noch mehr missbarer. Hier haben wir die EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, niemand weiß das, es ist fertig, es ist verabschiedet, es ist ein Wettbewerb zu verabschieden. Es könnte momentan ratifizieren, aber es könnte auch im Ratification-Prozess, aber es könnte auch für die EU-Singapore einen Court of Justice geben, um für sie zu entscheiden, ob es ein Missbarer-Augument ist, d.h., ob sich jeder Mitgliederstaat auch ein Missbarer-Augument ist. Das wäre ein Bisschen in einem Verabschied. Diese Frage ist pendent. Wird die EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement direkt oder wird es in den EU-Singapore ein Court of Justice geben? Wir wissen nicht. Aber was ich finde, besonders interessant und wunderschön in dieser Verabschiedung, ist, dass die Definition, was ein Investor ist, der Knapp-Europe-Augument ist, sehr unterschiedlich, dass man von der Bundesrepublik ein Knapp-Europe-Augument, dass es auch eine Verabschiedung gibt, aber dann ist es einермarm. Was ich finde, ist, dass der Knapp-Europe-Augument Investors can be anyone and Singapore neatly is a tax haven as well. There are hundreds of thousands of post boxes there to add another one there. And that's why exclusively I have the great business tip for you. But please give me five percent if I tell you please. Okay, agreed. The business tip is this. In the state of Baden-Württemberg in southwest Germany just opened some internet company, started internet company, any kind of shack. And then you go to PricewaterhouseCoopers or any other consultancy firm and let them create a holding for you or get a share in a holding that saves your taxes and you can then use this agreement as well. And you then refer to item C and sue the state of Baden-Württemberg for damages your expectations have not been filled because the broadband bandwidth isn't enough or whatever, select anything at all. And as proof for the disappointed expectations you use that famous advertisement from the Baden-Württemberg state which said we can do everything apart from standard German and that will give you damages. With this code that is perfectly possible. And another hint. We did say that these arbitration judges would take about a thousand euros per hour or something which is a bit much admittedly but there is a solution for that. There are business models for business for people like you perhaps. And this is that investors can say we will actually loan you the money if your case looks promising but we'll get 20 or 40 percent from the gains as it were. So that's the less good news I have to say about costs of a procedure like this. There is a cost calculator. Ask Google or MetaGear, the other search engine or whatever. You'll find it quite easily and you can then calculate here you see one million damage sum, a three-person arbitration panel, medium complexity, European tariffs, which are not the most expensive ones. So one million is the value of the procedure and what's this? Oh, 1.2 million costs. That can't be true. Well, it is true. And our Economy Minister, Siegmar Gabel, says that these agreements would benefit small and medium enterprises. Yes, of course. Immediately obvious, of course.  With these arbitration panels, of course, it's different. How else could it be? There are many, many decisions in which states had to defend themselves against completely absurd demands. And they still had to pay millions of costs from tax money, of course, from tax payers money. Okay, let's change the subject, shall we? We also looked at these agreements from an Internet-Politik's point of view. In the negotiations on this agreement, there were people from Google and Microsoft. And I can't stress enough how important these meetings are for lobbyists. Maybe one or another of you knows about these meetings. Yes, they're terrible. The ideal case is that you don't have to go to them at some point because your view of how the reality should look has become law. These agreements, TTIP, for instance, or TISA, or CETA, are unique opportunities for all these tired lobbyists to definitely get revenge for all these lost cases because arbitration courts can just circumvent all these cases. And the reason why privacy is in the crosshairs of lobbyists is that they'll cause lots and lots of new debates in courts. And these would come into effect immediately, the new laws that are being passed in the EU. And one of them would mean that if people use sensitive data, they have to use them inside Europe and save them inside Europe. They mustn't leave the continent. They must get privacy experts to agree on them. The interesting thing is that officially the European Union doesn't have a mandate to talk about privacy. But instead what they do is they talk about free data flows and interoperability. And that doesn't sound too bad. Nobody would argue against that. But the reality is that these are working against the hard facts that are supposed to be of privacy law. And especially for TTIP, we can have a look at the leaked details of some portions. It wants to impose strict limits on what states are allowed to do with personal data. And a similar clause already exists in an existing agreement in the one between South Korea and the European Union. And at that time the European Union, interestingly enough, went to South Korea and told them that we don't like that banks have to notify customers when they save data outside the country. We don't like that. And we're going to remind you of that clause. And funnily enough, the law was retracted afterwards. So people went to show how, you know, if it would stand in front of a court. That means that if it gets passed in the way it stands, it's on the paper here, then it would definitely have impact on privacy. And of course, the European Commission always says, you know, have searched the text, there's privacy written all over it. And yes, it says things like, each party shall adopt appropriate safeguards for the protection of privacy and fundamental rights. It doesn't say they have to. It just says they should. It doesn't say what appropriate safeguards are. Ask a US, ask a US judge. He'd say, yeah, well, then the Fourth Amendment isn't valid for EU citizens. But not only in privacy it gets a bit ugly. Also in copyright matters. Comparison has been drawn often between ACTA and TTIP. And interestingly, the EU really doesn't want these comparisons to be drawn. Because in all these cases it's a sad fact that the current regulations on privacy will be cemented, will be solidified. I would say a lot about TTIP on copyright. But as for CTA, you can say it's pretty bad, because the status quo of copyright will remain the same for lots and lots of years. Even 20 years later you can still sue based on these laws. So if one day we have the lucky occasion to have a parliamentary majority in favor of copyright revolution, then we could pass that. But it's going to get really expensive. And this will, of course, lessen the incentives. Now we are showing a small movie, showing what the other side has to say about that. Ah, der Sound kommt nicht rüber. No sound, apparently. So apparently nobody is rich and sound, so we can't show the movie. Also, we'll tell you what it's about. Karol Krich was interviewed by TV, he's a EU Commissioner, and was asked how many employment TTIP would give. Wie viele Arbeitsplätze gibt es in welches Wachstum wird durch TTIP? How much progress? Thank you very much for having us. Wie viele Wachstum gibt denn jetzt TTIP? How much economic growth will there be with TTIP? Commissioner, we are talking about TTIP. It's a great project. What effects do you hope to get from TTIP? You start? Yes. Okay. If you would look at me. So, there you have it. What effects do you expect from TTIP? TTIP is by far the biggest trade negotiation, bilateral trade negotiation that the European Union ever has been doing. And if we get to a result, this could have a dramatic effect, I believe, for the European economy, directly because it will create a lot of new economic activity, hundreds of thousands of jobs, additional income for our citizens. But I believe that indirectly it will also strengthen our economy on a global scale if you join up the two biggest economies in the world, which are the United States and ourselves. And by the way, we are the biggest European Union. That represents about 50% of the world economy. Now, you can expect that the next big battle on trade is about norms, standards, subsidies. Ah, yes. Who tells you that TTIP will create hundreds of thousands of jobs? Where do you know that from? Well, we are not simply inventing that. We have asked an independent study, and that's the result they are arriving at. The study also says that it would mean 545 euros for a household. Now, I don't think you can figure this out. Five or ten euros close, you know, but it's obvious that we could have a beneficial effect on the income of citizens and also on the coming road. And it will, yes. I'm pretty sure that it will create hundreds of thousands of jobs. You should not forget that already now, owned by Americans. And vice versa, it's about the same. Because it will not be E, but also in the United States. Sorry to interrupt you. Let's maybe stick to the effect. You were referring to the study of the commission. I take the CPR study. It's a study that has been ordered by the commission. We have not been doing it ourselves. Okay. What does the study say? The study says it will be, after the TTIP is done, it will be 0.5% growth in GDP, in European GDP, in 10 years, which means it's 0.05 points every year. That's not a big effect, as you called it. So, yes, more translation. TTIP will be 0.05% more growth, but over 10 years take together, accumulate it. So, it's not actually a very much. So, it's 0.5% over 10 years, 0.05% per year, or something like that.  So, the study that he presented, didn't say anything about employment opportunities. This study by CPR is based on an economic model, that's an economic balancing model, based on offer and demand. And so, every single balance each other out, and there is no unemployment in this model. And so, there is obviously also no gain of employment opportunities. Now, we have a new European Commission. Goch didn't sell himself very well. So, we have a new phase of the Commission. Cecilia Momsrum, also known as Cecilia, for a censorship in her old job. So, now she is head of market, DG market. So, now they are very much into transparency. The new Twitter account, and we now use your website. The facts on one hand, the fact of the EU Commission. And on the other hand, we have the fears, that's always the fears that we presented to you in the last half hour.  And so, in Syria should deal with that in a good way as a commission, but that's actually not what they want to do, because that's a lot of work. And they don't actually still, don't actually answer the important questions. Like, why do we even need those agreements? So, it's not for economic growth, apparently. That's only homeopathic. So, we can add to that, that if the news dies by Jean-Marie Carpal, though the Tufts University is not true, that a lot of jobs in Europe will be lost, then we can be glad, even. Right, and on with ... So, we have this campaign against TTIP, that we started last year in December last year. In spring, we had more than 400,000 signatures against TTIP. And in May, there was a negotiation pending in Washington. I wanted to go there. And because I am a German citizen, I applied for the waiver regulation. I was surprised that they asked me to apply for a visa. And truthfully, I said that the resistance against TTIP was the intention, the purpose of the journey, and I was invited to go to Daalim in Berlin, asked to switch off all my electronic devices. Can you imagine being without electronic devices for three hours? I had an interview with an official from the Department of Homeland Security who asked me why I wanted to go there. And I said, well, this is a meeting of civil rights organization. The purpose is to move against TTIP. And he asked me, did you ever have problems with the police? Out of a clear conscience, I said no. And then he asked, and what was in 1981 at the border to Switzerland? It's no joke. What was that, he asked. And I admit, yes, I have been living. I was living in 1981. I was alive. I was 16, 33 years ago. I was with three people in a car, driver, co-driver, and I was a passenger. And next to me was a piece of dope. And as you wouldn't have to expect, we were stopped and hours of interviews with driver and co-driver and never heard anything about that since then until that day in Daalim. And how they had digitized that, I have no idea. You're probably no better than I do. And as a souvenir of that memorable interview, I was given a blue piece of paper that you see scanned up here. The visa was not granted. And there was a cost of 120 euros to my employer and eight hours of lost work time. And then Maretta was really, really furious. And I can tell you, you do not want Maretta to be furious at you. Yeah. And then we said, all right, it's the European election campaign. The elections are coming up in May. And that is kind of boring. There's not really an issue. So let's invent an issue. TTIP would be a great one. And we made TTIP an issue in the European election campaign. With this tool that you see here, a nice piece of software that we developed. It's that you could choose streets and check whether someone would distribute leaflets there. And if not, enter yourself and ask for these door hangers. And hang those on door handles. They would list all parties with an assessment of their position in the European elections. There was thumbs, well, a medium thumb for the Social Democrats. Thumbs down for the CDU. This is the Christian Democrats. Thumbs up for the Greens, Pirates and the FDP, the Liberals. So you remember those? They went out of Parliament in 2013. They had a, what did they have? Thumbs up, thumbs down, I can't see. So that made TTIP an issue in the election campaign. And we were quite surprised when the first time we met Martin Schulz, in the European Parliament, he had a position paper ready about TTIP. He was quick with that. And you tell me, tell us how it went on. You have to remember, just imagine being in Martin's shoes for a while. I don't know if you want to do that or can do that, but he is known as a proponent of data of attention. And I had a bit of a confrontation with him about Martin Schulz. I thought, well, he is smiling so neatly from the posters. And one of those said, Europe of people, not of money. So that should mean we should be able to talk to him, right? So I went to Martin Schulz. As a sideline, he is a president of the European Parliament, but of course he cleanly separates that from his role as leader of the Social Democrat group. So you traveled to Aachen in Western Germany in an invitation from the local Social Democrats. You have written paper, press, are there, sausages are ready, as you would expect from a Social Democrat meeting.  And you do know that word will come a bit more often and there are those kind of people there, you know? This is of course not Katarina's speech, but the one held by Martin Schulz were from the Tee Protesters. For us it was perfect, because we did not have to invite the press, the SPD had done that. These press people just had to turn around. And we were not just in Aachen with that. Martin Schulz had appearances, he said to himself, well, when badly it's just to go to Hanover and that didn't go that well either. And Berlin and in Dortmund we were as well. And how did we do that? We do not just collect signatures for our online petitions. We inform people as well if there are events on the ground. And that's what makes politicians really angry. Particularly from the Christian Socialists, the Bavarian Christian Democrats. If people appear that are not just, are there not those lefty people from Berlin, but actually local people from Bavaria holding up banners, that really annoys them. There was just one time when we were thrown out and that was in Brandenburg when there was a straw bale festival. They probably do not know demonstration law yet. Because this is a free expression of opinion at an event in the open. So there is no law enabling them to claim this their space from which they can evict you. Just a tip for you. Christian Democrats, who are less ready to hold open air events these days. So less easy to troll. We did not just pursue party heads. We thought actually the idea about parties is that the base has power. But it's probably a bit of a dream, but I still have that dream. And it's worthwhile remembering people in parties to stop their own figureheads and leave that, not leave that reminding to us, but the people in the party. So we went to party events and had targeted information. We had pretzels in Bavaria, red trousers with the social democrats. These people have some kind of expectations and there are lobby booths over and over there. And also for free there was a brochure handed out, an independent study about TTIP with a lot of information about its effects locally in local communities. And this is really effective before the grand speech held by the party heads and even the social democrats as well as the Christian Democrats said, the party base said they did not want these ISDS Tribunals. But the problem is that this hasn't really permeated through to the top. And there is still work to be done. And that's because that's why there's a multitude of further actions. We have our best of tools here, of props. What you see up there is the Canadian parliament that went with our Sita Hammer. You can very nicely install this on top of a parliament building and visualize governments under the hammer. And it's very interesting with Canada in particular because there's this procedure there going on. A company that is involved in fracking has been buying concessions or permits. So they had expectations and the citizens came along and they were as bold to say we're not sure about fracking. There's not so much good that you hear, so we'll have a moratorium on that. And a Canadian company invoked NAFTA, the North American Free Trade Agreement and they had a subsidiary in the US. So that enabled them to pursue their own government, exactly. It's been a month now since a very memorable speech you may have heard it from Zygmar Gabriel, German politician, and he said we can't reject Sita now. It's only Germany where there's protest against these agreements. The rest of Europe is embracing them. And the Minister of Commerce of Economy says that we can disprove it. In order to do that, we started a citizens initiative, a European citizens initiative. We initially wanted to create an official one and you have to write 200 characters and you have to use a special software from the European Union, so it's worthless. And then we wrote our own and we had to get it certified. And finally, you need a million signatures and you have to get a certain quota in more than seven countries. And finally, if you've done all that, you get some warm words from the European Commission. But they didn't even allow us that. So we rejected it and thought that was the end of it. But we told ourselves no, we can do it without the European Union. We sued them and we started our own citizens initiative. And we have, after two months, we got more than one million, we reached the quota in seven countries. Now we're at 1.2 million in nine countries and we need some more signatures and then we'll have the tenth country, Ireland, as well. That's just the beginning, though. We're carrying on, at least until the next million and after Junker, after we spoiled Junker's 60th birthday in Brussels and this will have been the only topic in all the European media, we're going to continue doing that. We've got loads more on our plate. What you can see here is a grassroots movement. That's really being carried out in many European countries and it's starting to bubble up to the top. And these are two maps. You can see them on our website. And it shows how it looks on a regional basis, as well. Interestingly, many CDU and SPD-Mairs have started to realize that these agreements aren't really in citizens' best interests. And more and more resolutions are coming up in Germany that object to these. And it's the same in France. And interestingly, TTIP and CTAB are mixed agreements. So not only the European Commission can sign it for us, but it's also necessary that the individual countries vote on these laws. A mixed agreement therefore means that all European member countries have to agree on it. And that's where the first problem crops up. So Sigma Gabriel saying that we can't make an exception for Germany. That's simply not true. And it's happened before. Also, TTIP und SPD-Mairs sind alle in Deutschland. Und Sie können das auch tun. Ja. So, was ist das Result? So, Christmas-Holidays. Wir schauen wieder weiter. Es ist viel Spaß. Es ist viel Spaß. 150.000 Leute haben eine Konsultation geplant. Wir hatten einen großen Demo. Wenn ihr in Berlin auf den 17. Januar seid, das wäre eine große Demo Dürfen ihr dabei seid. Und bitte zuzusehen, wir werden über TTIP und CTAB Ich hoffe, dass es noch mehr gibt und dass es viele Waffen gibt. Und in Mai wird ein EU-Parlament sein, über die Betrachtungs-Klausen in den Freien und Trade-Aggremien. Wir schauen forward to what the European Parliament will decide. Wir haben eine Mendei, um unsere Arbeit zu fortsetzen. Und wir lieben das. Aber mit den anderen Aktivitäten würde ich euch ein paar Lassen zeigen. Online-Tools sind wirklich toll, aber Off-Line-Aktivitäten und Tools sind auch sehr wichtig.   So ein little rage und das Kommitment ist wirklich hilfreich. Und wir versuchen, dass es ein paar breit und weite Allianzen gibt, zwischen verschiedenen NGOs. Das hilft viel, und das hilft viel.  Und viele Synergie zwischen den anderen Associationen. Das ist wirklich ein gutes Mix.  In diesem Sinne, ich denke, wir erinnern uns ein bisschen an diese Verhandlungen. Und ich hoffe, dass nächstes Jahr wir die Abholung der Verhandlungen oder der Plan für sie und hoffentlich mit den Menschen's Lebensbedingungen zu machen. Vielen Dank. Vielen Dank. Vielen Dank. Vielen Dank. Vielen Dank. Vielen Dank. Vielen Dank. Vielen Dank. Vielen Dank. Vielen Dank. Vielen Dank. Die Internet hat viele Feedback. Tausend Fragen. Wir obweite nicht. Können wir jetzt T-Tiff verhindern? Können wir jetzt noch T-Tiff? Können wir jetzt noch T-Tiff verhindern? Und was können wir jetzt realisieren? Kann der EU-Parlament still prevent them? And what can we still do realistically? Well, the EU-Parliament can prevent it. The National Parliaments can do so as well. What we realistically can do is to keep the pressure up, particularly on our German members of parliament and our German parliamentarians in the EU. They're all online. They all have websites. You just go to the surgery, the date, the official meeting with your local MP and tell him or her if you are going to reject this agreement, I might vote for you. That is what really gives them and has an impression on them. And what's the timeline for this? From now until the end of the year in principle at any time for the European members of parliament, members of the European Parliament, it's particularly important at the end of April, beginning of May before this resolution will be voted on. And I'd like to add that even agreements that have been signed already, there have been hundreds of such agreements, investor state protection agreements. It's often the case that the Global North is trying to sue the Global South into the ground if they noticed that, if these countries noticed that the neoliberal recipe weren't working. And these could be cancelled, these agreements could be cancelled, but you then would have to deal with investors still trying to sue after the contracts have been cancelled, but the earlier the better. Question from Mike from one. Hi, thanks for your work. Quick question. What's your position for the rest of the content of these agreements? If arbitration clause will be taken out, are you still against them? We are still against those agreements even without ISDS, investor state dispute settlement, because there are problems in the area of services. There's a threat of a large wave of privatisation. And with all these agreements, there's the high risk that other areas, such as environmental protection, food safety, Agriculture, the wheel will be turned back and necessary progress might be prevented, because the status quo is not always that nice and what might get solidified, cemented. We are simply cutting what we can do as a democracy. We are curtailing our democratic means. Our ability to say after the fact maybe liberalisation has gone too far and if you then have clauses in these agreements that prevent decisions that have once been taken to be taken back, that in my view is wrong and it's wrong to leave this to our ancestors, sorry to our descendants, a state of things that has proved to be not helpful. Just let Oliver ask his question. Miko, three. Thank you. Thank you to you too for your great work. Great work by Kampakt. I think nobody's going to doubt that. I'm also a member of the EU Council of the European Committee of the State Parliament of Northern Westphalia. The speaker of the Christian Democrats have promised to join us on the streets. Isn't it time for the next level against TTIP? Und against work of agreements? If you look at the structure of the commission like you don't have to be surprised about the results with all the lobby organisations and who's working for PricewaterhouseCoopers and so on. So they are already kind of working for them. Wouldn't it be also interesting for people interested in Internet-Politik, Internet-Governance und monetary-Networks und was Kampakt-Plans in this? Okay, thanks a lot. I'll have to get myself cloned. Well, seriously, we cannot do everything we would like to. We will evaluate ideas towards EU, Europe, but we cannot promise anything. Fundamentally, we are willing to look at economic conditions at a larger scale. We have a few things we'd like to do, such as resolutions, petitions, Direct-Democracy. And some of our people are also co-founders of attack Germany. So there is a link with the movements that is critical of capitalism and globalization. Stiftungsmäßig.  Und auch keine Co-Referrate. Noch eine abschließende Frage. One last question, please. And then the time is up. I'm not going to thank you again, because I worked there themselves. Yes, Oliver, that's right. I'm the S-Problematic. Thanks for granting that again. Isn't it the right time right now to kill the existing ISDS agreements, where we already have a lot of them, that the German Republic signed? Well, I have this kind of domino theory. I believe that if ISDS will be taken out of the agreements that are pending now, then this whole system, probably as a whole, will begin to slide. What I keep saying to those that say, we have to have ISDS, because the whole system is so badly regarded and it's been so much abused in recent years. So those that say, the whole system will fall apart and we cannot longer have investor status with developing countries. So I say, as soon as we kill this, the time is ripe to really kill ISDS as a whole, but we'll have to use another time for that. And also I believe that currently there is an interesting counter-movement. If you look at the success of procedures and the amounts of damages, these agreements have been in place for a long time. Usually it was the case that the North insisted on these agreements with the Global South, saying that our investors will not be willing to invest if they are under protections, although there has been no proof for that. So in these years, more and more procedures have surfaced where investors have turned things around and said we can sue another way and sue the rich countries too because there might be more to gain there too and there have been procedures like Wattenfahl, the Swedish electricity supplier against the German energy change policy and the more procedures like that we have and the more they are debated and noticed by parliamentarians, so as to question that whole system. Thank you, that's all the time we have. And thank you very much for listening. Again, apologies for the late start. Our speakers have been Sebastian and...