This is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer Please visit LibriVox.org Reading by ML Cohen Cleveland, Ohio may 2007 Anti-Federalist Papers section 21 Brutus letter 1 18th October 1787 to the citizens of the state of New York When the public is called to investigate and decide upon a question in which not only the present members of the community are deeply interested But upon which the happiness and misery of generations yet unborn is in great measure suspended The benevolent mind cannot help feeling itself peculiarly interested in the result in this situation I trust the feeble effects of an individual to lead the minds of the people to a wise and prudent determination Cannot fail of being acceptable to the candid and dispassionate part of the community Encouraged by this consideration I have been induced to offer my thoughts upon the present important crisis of our public affairs Perhaps this country never saw so critical a period in their political concerns We have felt the feebleness of the ties by which these United States are held together and the want of sufficient energy in our present Confederation to manage in some instances are general concerns Various expedience have been proposed to remedy these evils, but none have succeeded At length the convention of the states has been assembled They have formed a constitution which will now probably be submitted to the people to ratify or reject Who are the fountain of all power to whom alone it of rights belongs to make or unmake Constitutions or forms of government at their pleasure The most important question that was ever proposed to your decision or to the decision of any people under heaven is before you and You are to decide upon it by men of your own election chosen specially for this purpose If the Constitution offered to your acceptance be a wise one Calculated to preserve the invaluable blessings of liberty to secure the inestimable rights of mankind and to promote human happiness Then if you accept it, you will lay a lasting foundation of happiness for millions yet unborn Generations to come will rise up and call you blessed You may rejoice in the prospects of this vast extended continent becoming filled with free men who will assert the dignity of human nature You may solace yourselves with the idea that society in this favored land will fast advance to the highest point of perfection The human mind will expand in knowledge and virtue and the golden age be in some measure realized But if on the other hand this form of government contains principles that will lead to the subversion of liberty If it tends to establish a despotism or what is worse a tyrannic aristocracy Then if you adopt it this only remaining asylum for liberty will be shut up and Posterity will execrate your memory Momentous then is the question you have to determine and you were called upon by every mode of which should influence a noble and virtuous mind To examine it well and to make up a wise judgment It is insisted indeed that this Constitution must be received be it ever so imperfect If it has its defects it is said they can best be amended when they are experienced But remember when the people once part with power they can sell them or never resume it again, but by force Many instances can be produced in which the people have voluntarily increased the powers of their rulers But few if any in which rulers have willingly abridged their authority This is a sufficient reason to induce you to be careful in the first instance How you deposit the powers of government With these few introductory remarks I shall proceed to a consideration of this Constitution The first question that presents itself on the subject is whether a confederated government be the best for the United States or not or In other words whether the 13 United States should be reduced to one great republic governed by one legislature and under the direction of one executive and judicial or Whether they should continue 13 confederated republics under the direction and control of a supreme federal head for certain defined national purposes only This inquiry is important because although the government reported by the convention does not go to a perfect and entire Consolidation yet it approaches so near to it that it must if executed certainly and infallibly terminate in it This government is to possess absolute and uncontrollable power Legislative executive and judicial with respect to every object to which it extends for by the last clause of section 8th Article 1 it is declared quote that the Congress shall have the power to make all laws Which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States or in any department or office thereof closed quote And in the sixth article it is declared quote That this constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof And the treaties made or what shall be made under the authority of the United States Shall be the supreme law of the land And the judges in every state shall be bound thereby Anything in the constitution or law of any state to the contrary notwithstanding closed quote It appears from these articles that there is no need of any intervention of the state government Between the congress and the people to execute any one power vested in the general government And that the constitution laws of every state are nullified and declared void so far as they are Or shall be inconsistent with this constitution or the laws made in pursuance of it or with treaties made under the authority of the United States The government then so far as it extends is a complete one and not a confederation It is as much one complete government as that of new york or massachusetts Has an absolute and perfect powers to make and execute all laws to appoint officers Institute courts declare offenses and annex penalties with respect to every object to which it extends as any other in the world So far therefore as its powers reach all ideas of confederation are given up and lost It is true this government is limited to certain objects or to speak more properly Some small degree of power is still left to the states But a little attention to the powers vested in the general government will convince every candid man That if it is capable of being executed all that is reserved for the individual states must very soon be annihilated Except so far as they are barely necessary to the organization of the general government The powers of the general legislature extend to every case that is of the least importance There is nothing valuable to human nature nothing dear to free men But what is within its power? It has authority to make laws which will affect the lives the liberty and property of every man in the united states Nor can the constitutional laws of any state in any way prevent or impede the full and complete execution of every power given The legislative power is competent to lay taxes duties imposed and excises There is no limitation to this power unless it be said that the clause which directs the use to which these taxes and duties shall be applied May be said to be a limitation But this is no restriction of the power at all For by this clause they are to be applied to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the united states But the legislature have the authority to contract debts at their discretion They are the sole judges of what is necessary to provide for the common defense and they only are to determine what is for the general welfare This power therefore is neither more nor less than a power to lay and collect taxes Imposts and excises at their pleasure Not only is the power to lay taxes unlimited as to the amount they may require But it is perfect and absolute to raise them in any mode they please No state legislature or any power in the state governments have any more to do in carrying this into effect Than the authority of one state has to do with that of another In the business therefore of laying in collecting taxes the idea of a confederation is totally lost And that of one entire republic is embraced It is proper here to remark that the authority to lay and collect taxes is the most important of any power that can be granted It connects with it almost all other powers or at least will in process of time draw all other after it It is the great mean of protection security and defense and a good government And the great engine of oppression and tyranny in a bad one This cannot fail of being the case if we consider the contracted limits which are set by this constitution to the late state governments on this article of raising money No state can emit paper money Lay any duties or imposts on imports or exports but by the consent of congress And then the net produce shall be for the benefit of the united states The only mean therefore left for any state to support its government and discharge its debts is by direct taxation And the united states have the also the power to lay and collect taxes in any way they please Everyone who has thought on the subject must be convinced that but small sums of money can be collected in any country By direct taxes when the federal government begins to exercise the right of taxation in all its parts The legislatures of the several states will find it impossible to raise monies to support their governments Without money, they cannot be supported and they must dwindle away and As before observed their powers absorbed in that of the general government It might here be shown that the power in the federal legislative to raise and support armies of pleasure as well in peace as in war And their control over the militia tend not only to a consolidation of the government, but the destruction of liberty I shall not however dwell upon these as a few observations upon the judicial power of this government In addition to the proceeding will fully advance the truth of the position The judicial power of the united states is to be vested in a supreme court And in such inferior courts as congress may from time to time ordain and establish The powers of these courts are very extensive Their jurisdiction comprehends all civil causes except such as a rise between citizens of the same state And that it extends to all cases in law and equity arising under the constitution One inferior court must be established I presume in each state at least with the necessary executive offers appended there too It is easy to see that in the common course of things these courts will eclipse the dignity And take away from the respectability of the state courts These courts will be in themselves totally independent of the states Deriving their authority from the united states and receiving from them fixed salaries And in the course of human events it is to be expected That they will swallow up all the powers of the courts in the respective states How far the clause in the eighth section of the first article may operate to do away all idea of confederated states And to affect an entire consolidation of the whole into one general government. It is impossible to say The powers given by this article are very general and comprehensive And it may receive a construction to justify the passing almost any law A power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper For carrying into execution all powers vested by the constitution and the government of the united states Or any department or officer thereof is a power very comprehensive and indefinite and may for all I know be exercised in such a manner As entirely to abolish to state legislatures Suppose the legislature of a state should pass a law to raise money to support their government and pay the state debt May the congress repeal this law because it may prevent a collection of attacks Which they may think proper and necessary to lay to provide for the general welfare of the united states For all laws made in pursuance of this constitution are the supreme lay of the land And the judges in every state shall be bound thereby Anything in the constitution or laws of the different states to the contrary notwithstanding By such a law the government of a particular state might be overturned at one stroke And thereby be deprived of every means of its support It is not meant by stating this case to insinuate that the constitution would warrant a law of this kind Or unnecessarily to alarm the fears of the people by suggesting That the federal legislature would be more likely to pass the limits assigned them by the constitution than that of an individual state Further than they are less responsible to the people But what is meant is that the legislature of the united states are vested with the great and uncontrollable powers Of laying and collecting taxes duties in post and excises Of regulating trade raising and supporting armies organizing arming and disciplining the militia instituting courts and other general powers And are by this clause invested with the power of making all laws quote proper and necessary end quote For carrying all these into execution and they may so exercise this power as entirely to annihilate all the state governments And reduce this country to one single government And if they may do it it is pretty certain they will For it will be found that the power retained by individual states small as it is will be a clog upon the wheels of the government of the united states The latter therefore will be naturally inclined to remove it out of the way Besides it is a truth confirmed by the unerring experience of the ages That every man and everybody of men invested with power are ever disposed to increase it And to acquire a superiority over everything that stands in their way This disposition which is implanted in human nature will operate in the federal legislature to lessen and ultimately to divert the state authority And having such advantages will most certainly succeed if the federal government succeeds at all It must be very evident then that with this constitution wants of being a complete consolidation of the several parts of the union into one complete government Possessed of perfect legislative judicial and executive powers to all intents and purposes It will necessarily acquire in its exercise and operation Let us now proceed to inquire as I first proposed Whether it be best the 13 united states should be reduced to one great republic or not It is here taken for granted that all agree in this that whatever government we adopt it ought to be a free one That it should be so framed as to secure the liberty of the citizens of america And such and one to admit of a full fair and equal representation of the people The question then will be whether government thus constituted and found that on such principles is practicable And can be exercised over the whole united states reduced into one state If respect is to be paid to the opinion of the greatest and wisest men who have ever thought or wrote on the science of government We shall be constrained to conclude that a free republic cannot succeed over a country of such immense extent containing such a number of inhabitants and these increasing and such rapid progression as that of the whole united states Among the many illustrious authorities which might be produced to this point. I should intent myself with quoting only two The one is the baron de montesquieu spirit of laws chapter 16 volume one book eight quote It is natural to a republic to have only a small territory Otherwise it cannot long subsist In a large republic there are men of large fortunes and consequently of less moderation There are trusts too great to be placed in any single subject He has the interest of his own He soon begins to think that he may be happy great and glorious by oppressing his fellow citizens And that he may raise himself to grandeur on the ruins of his country In a large republic the public good is sacrificed to a thousand views. It is subordinate to exceptions and depends on accidents In a small one the interest of the public is easier perceived better understood and more within the reach of every citizen Abuses are a less extent and of course are less protected End quote of the same opinion is the marquee bakarari History furnishes no example of a free republic anything like the extent of the united states The greece and republics were of small extent. So also was that of the romans Both of these it is true in the process of time extended their conquest over large territories of country And the consequence was that their governments were changed from that of free governments to those of the most tyrannical that have ever existed in the world Not only the opinion of the greatest men and the experience of mankind are against the idea of an extensive republic But a variety of reasons may be drawn from the reason and nature of things against it In every government the will of the sovereign is the law In despotic governments the supreme authority being lodged in one his will is law And can be as easily expressed to a large extensive territory as to a small one In a pure democracy the people are sovereign and their will is declared by themselves For this purpose they must all come together to deliberate and decide This kind of government cannot be exercised therefore over a country of any considerable extent It must be confined to a single city Or at least limited to such bounds as that the people can conveniently assemble be able to debate Understand the subject submitted to them and declare their opinions concerning it In a free republic although all laws are derived from the consent of the people Yet the people do not declare their consent by themselves in person But by representatives chosen by them who are supposed to know the minds of their constituents And to be possessed of integrity to declare this mind In every free government the people must give their assent to the laws by which they are governed This is the true criterion between a free government and an arbitrary one The former are ruled by the will of the whole expressed in any manner they may agree upon The latter by the will of one or a few If the people are to give their assent to the laws by persons chosen and appointed by them The manner of the choice and the number chosen must be such as to possess Be disposed and consequently qualified to declare the sentiments of the people For if they do not know or are not disposed to speak the sentiments of the people The people do not govern but the sovereignty is in a few Now in a large extended country It is impossible to have a representation possessing the sentiments and of integrity To declare the minds of the people without having it so numerous and unwieldy As to be subject in great measure to the inconvenience of a democratic government The territory of the united states is a vast extent and now contains nearly three millions of souls And is capable of containing much more than 10 times that number Is it practicable for a country so large and so numerous as they will soon become To elect a representation that will speak their sentiments Without they're becoming so numerous as to be incapable of transacting public business It certainly is not In a republic the manners sentiments and interests of the people should be similar If this be not the case there will be a constant clashing of opinions And the representatives of one part will be continually striving against those of another This will retard the operations of government and prevent such conclusions as will promote the public good If we apply this remark to the condition of the united states We shall be convinced that it forbids that we should be one government The united states includes a variety of climates The production of the different parts of the union are very variant And their interests of consequence diverse Their manners and habits differ as much as their climates in production And their sentiments are by no means coincident The laws and customs of the several states are in many respects very diverse And in some opposite each would be in favor of its own interest and customs and of consequence a legislature Formed of representatives from the respective parts would not only be too numerous to act with any care or decision But we'd be composed of such heterogeneous and discordant principles as would constantly be contending with each other The laws cannot be executed in the republic of an equal extent to that of the united states with promptitude The magistrates in every government must be supported in the execution of the laws Either by an armed force maintained at the public expense for that purpose Or by the people turning out to aid the magistrate upon his command in case of resistance In despotic governments as well as in all the monarchies of europe Standing armies are kept up to execute the commands of the prince or the magistrate And are employed for this purpose when occasion requires But they have always proved to destruction of liberty and are abhorrent to the spirit of a free republic In england where they depend upon the parliament for their annual support They have always been complained of as oppressive and unconstitutional and are seldom employed in executing of the laws Never except on extraordinary occasions and then under the direction of a civil magistrate A free republic will never keep a standing army to execute its laws It must depend upon the support of its citizens But when a government is to receive its support from the aid of the citizens It must be so constructed as to have the confidence respect and affection of the people Men who upon the call of the magistrate offer themselves to execute the laws are influenced to do it either by affection to the government or from fear Where a standing army is at hand to punish offenders every man is actuated by the latter principle And therefore when the magistrate calls will obey But where this is not the case The government must rest for its support upon the confidence and respect which the people have for their government and laws The body of the people being attached The government will always be sufficient to support and execute its laws and to operate upon the fears of any faction Which may be opposed to it Not only to prevent an opposition to the execution of the laws themselves But also to compel the most of them to add to magistrate But the people will not be likely to have such confidence in their rulers in republics so extensive than the united states as necessary for these purposes The confidence which the people have in their rulers in a free republic Arises from their knowing them from their being responsible to them for their conduct and from the power they have of displacing them when they misbehave But in a republic of the extent of this continent the people in general would be acquainted with very few of their rulers The people at large would know little of their proceedings and it would be extremely difficult to change them The people in georgia new hampshire would not know one another's mind and therefore could not act in concert to enable them to affect a general change of representatives The different parts of so extensive a country could not possibly be made acquainted with the conduct of their representatives Nor be informed of the reasons upon which measures were founded The consequence will be that they will have no confidence in their legislature Suspect them of ambitious views be jealous of every measure they adopt and will not support the laws they pass Hence the government will be nervous and inefficient and no way will be left to render it otherwise But by establishing an armed force to execute the laws at the point of a bayonet A government of all others the most to be dreaded In republic of such vast extent as the united states the legislature cannot attend to the various concerns and wants of its different parts It cannot be sufficiently numerous to be acquainted with the local condition and wants of the different districts and if it could And if it could it is impossible It should have sufficient time to attend to and provide for all the variety of cases of this nature that would be continually arising In so extensive a republic the great officers of government would soon become above the control of the people And abuse their power to the purpose of aggrandizing themselves and oppressing them The trust committed to the executive offices in a country of the extent of the united states must be various end of magnitude The command of all the troops and navy of the republic the appointment of officers The power of pardoning offenses the collecting of all the public revenues and the power of expending them With a number of other powers must be lodged and exercised in every state in the hands of a few When these are attended with great honor and emolument as they always will be in large states So as greatly to interest men to pursue them and to be proper objects for ambitious and designing men Such men will be ever restless in their pursuit after them They will use the power when they have acquired it to the purpose of gratifying their own interest and ambition And it is scarcely possible in a very large republic to call them to account for their misconduct Or to prevent their abuse of power These are some of the reasons by which it appears that a free republic cannot long subsist over a country of the great extent of these states If then this new constitution is calculated to consolidate the 13 states into one as it evidently is It ought not to be adopted Though I am of opinion that it is sufficient objection to this government to reject it That it creates the whole union into one government under the form of a republic Yet if this objection was obviated there are exceptions to it Which are so material and fundamental that they ought to determine every man Who was a friend to the liberty and happiness of mankind Not to adopt it I beg the candid and dispassionate attention of my countrymen while I state these objections They are such as have obtruded themselves upon my mind a careful attention to the matter And such as I sincerely believe are well founded There are many objections of small moment of which I shall take no notice Perfection is not to be expected in anything that is the production of man And if I did not in my conscience believe that this scheme was defective in the fundamental principles And the foundation upon which a free and equal government must rest I would hold my peace Brutus end of anti-federalist papers section 21 Brutus letter 1 The anti-federalist papers section 22 Brutus letter 2 This is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Read by M. L. Cohen Cleveland, Ohio may 2007 1 November 1787 To the citizens of the state of New York I flatter myself that my last address established this position That to reduce the 13 states into one government would prove the destruction of your liberties But less this truth should be doubted by some I will now proceed to consider its merits Though it should be admitted that the arguments against reducing all the states into one consolidated government Are not sufficient fully to establish this point Yet they will at least justify this conclusion Then informing a constitution for such a country Great care should be taken to limit and define its powers Adjust its parts and guard against an abusive authority How far attention has been paid to these objects will be the subject of future inquiry When the building is to be erected which is intended to stand for ages the foundation should be firmly laid The constitution proposed to your acceptance is designed not for yourselves alone, but for generations yet unborn The principles therefore upon which the so-called compact is founded ought to have been clearly and precisely stated And the most express and full declaration of rights to have been made But on this subject there is almost an entire silence If we may collect the sentiments of the people of America from their own most solemn declarations They hold this truth is self-evident that all men are by nature free No one man therefore or any class of men have a right by the law of nature or of god to assume or exercise authority over their fellows The origin of society then has to be sought not in any natural right Which one man has to exercise authority over another But in the united consent of those who associate The mutual wants of men at first dictated the propriety of forming societies And when they were established protection and defense pointed out the necessity of instituting government In a state of nature every individual pursues his own interest In this pursuit it frequently happened that the possessions or enjoyments of one were sacrificed to the views and designs of another Thus the weak were afraid to the strong the simple and unworry were subject to impositions from those who were more crafty and designing In this state of things every individual was insecure Common interest therefore directed that government should be established in which the force of the whole community should be collected And under such directions as to protect and defend everyone who composed it The common good therefore is the end of civil government and common consent the foundation on which it is established To effect this end it was necessary that a certain portion of natural liberty should be surrendered In order that what remains should be preserved How great a proportion of natural freedom is necessary to be yielded by individuals when they submit the government I shall not now inquire So much however must be given up as will be sufficient to enable those to whom the administration of the government is committed To establish laws for the promoting of the happiness of the community and to carry those laws into effect But it is not necessary for this purpose that individuals should relinquish all their natural rights Some are of such a nature that they cannot be surrendered Of this kind are the rights of conscious the rights of enjoying and defending life etc Others are not necessary to be resigned in order to attend the aim for which government is instituted And these therefore ought not to be given up To surrender them would counteract the very end of government to wit the common good From these observations that appears that informing government on its true principles the foundation should be laid in the manner I before stated By expressly reserving to the people such of their essential natural rights as are not necessary to be parted with The same reasons which have first induced mankind to associate an institute government Will operate to influence them to observe this precaution If they had been disposed to conform themselves to the rule of immutable righteousness government would not have been requisite It was because one part exercised fraud oppression and violence on the other That men came together and agreed that certain rules should be formed to regulate the conduct of all And the power of the whole community lodged in the hands of rulers to enforce an obedience to them But rulers have the same propensity as other men They are as likely to use the power which was they are vested for private purposes And to the inquiry and oppression of those over whom they are placed As individuals in a state of nature are to injure and oppress one another It is therefore as proper that bounds should be set to their authority As that government should have at first been instituted to restrain private injuries This principle which seems so evidently founded in the reason and nature of things is confirmed by universal experience Those who have governed have been found in all ages ever active to enlarge their powers and abridge to public liberty This has induced the people in all countries where any sense of freedom remained to fix barriers against the encroachments of their rulers The country from which we have derived our origin is an eminent example of this Their magna card and bill of rights have long been the boast as well as the security of that nation I need say no more I presume to an american then that this principle is a fundamental one in all the constitutions of our own states There is not one of them But what is either founded on the declaration or bill of rights or has a certain express reservation of rights interwoven into the body of them From this it appears that at a time when the pulse of liberty beat high and when an appeal was made to the people to form Constitutions for the government of themselves It was their universal sense that such declaration should make a part of their frames of government It is therefore the more astonishing that this grand security to the rights of the people is not to be found in this constitution It has been said in answer to the subjection that such declarations of rights However, because that they might be in the constitutions of the states are not necessary in a general constitution because quote In the former case everything which is not reserved is given But in the latter the reverse of the proposition prevails and everything which is not given is reserved end quote It requires but little attention to discover that this mode of reasoning is rather specious than solid The powers rights and authority granted to the general government by this constitution Are as complete with respect to every object to which they extend as that of any state government To set this matter in a clear light permit me to instance some of the articles of the bills of rights of the individual states And apply them to the case in question For the security of life in criminal prosecutions The bill of rights of most of the states have declared that no man shall be held to answer for a crime Until he is made fully acquainted with the charge brought against him He shall not be compelled to accuse or furnish evidence against himself The witnesses against him shall be brought face to face and he shall be fully heard by himself or counsel That it is essential to the security of life and liberty that trial of facts being the vicinity where they happen Are not provisions of this kind as necessary in the general government as in that of a particular state? The powers vested in the new crowns extend in many cases to life They are authorized to provide for the punishment of a variety of capital crimes And no restraint is laid upon them in his exercise save only that quote the trial of all crimes Except in cases of impeachment shall be by jury And such trials should be in the state where the said crime shall have been committed close quote No man is secure of a trial in the county which he is charged to have committed the crime He may be brought from niagara to new york or carried from kentucky to richman for a trial for an offense supposed to be committed What security is there that a man shall be furnished with the full and plain description of the charges against him? That he shall be allowed to produce all proof he can in his favor That he shall see the witnesses against him face to face or that he shall be fully heard in his own defense by himself or counsel For the security of liberty it has been declared quote That excessive bail should not be required nor excessive fines imposed nor cruel or unusual punishments inflicted That all warrants without oath or affirmation to search suspected places or seize any person his papers or property are grievous and oppressive close quote These provisions are as necessary under the general government as under that of the individual state For the power of the former is as complete to the purpose of requiring bail imposing fines inflicting punishments granting search warrants And ceasing persons papers or property in certain cases as the other For the purpose of securing the property of the citizens is declared by all the states that quote That in all controversies at law respecting property the ancient mode of child by jerry is one of the best securities of the rights of the people And ought to remain sacred and inviolable close quote Does not the same necessity exist of reserving this right under this national compact as in that of the states Yet nothing is said respecting it In the bill of rights of the states it is declared that a well regulated militia is the proper and natural defense of a free government That outstanding armies in time of peace are dangerous They are not to be kept up and that the military should be kept under strict subordination to and controlled by the civil power The same security is as necessary in this constitution and much more So for the general government will have the sole power to raise and to pay armies And are under no control in the exercise of it yet nothing of this is to be found in this new system I might proceed to instance a number of other rights Which were as necessary to be reserved such as that elections should be free that the liberty of the press should be held sacred But the instances adduced are sufficient to prove that this argument is without foundation Besides it is evident that the reason here assigned was not the true one why the framers of this constitution admitted a bill of rights If it had been they would not have made certain reservations while they totally admitted others of more importance We find they have in the ninth section of the first article Declared that the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless in cases of rebellion That no bill of attainer or ex post facto law shall be passed that no title of nobility shall be granted by the united states etc If everything which is not given is reserved what propriety is there to these exceptions? Does this constitution anywhere grant the power of suspending the habeas corpus to making ex post facto laws past bills of attainer or grain titles of nobility? It certainly does not in express terms The only answer that can be given is that these are implied in the general powers granted With equal truth it may be said that all the powers which the bill of rights guard against the abuse of Are contained or implied in a general ones granted by this constitution So far it is from being true that the bill of rights is less necessary in the general constitution than those of the states The contrary is evidently the fact This system if it is possible for the people of america to exceed to it Will be an original compact and being the last will and the nature of things vacate every former agreement inconsistent with it For it being a plan of government received and ratified by the whole people All other forms which are in existence at the time of its adoption must yield to it This is expressed in positive and unequivocal terms in the sixth article Quote that this constitution and the laws of the united states which shall be made in pursuance thereof Are all treaties made or which shall be made under the authority of the united states shall be the supreme law of the land And the judges in every state shall be bound thereby Anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding quote The senators and representatives before mentioned and the members of the several state legislatures and all executive and judicial officers Both the united states and of the several states shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support this constitution end quote It is therefore not only necessary implied thereby But positively expressed that the different state constitutions are repealed and entirely done away So far as they are inconsistent with this with the laws which shall be made in pursuance thereof Or with treaties made or which shall be made under the authority of the united states Of what avail will the constitutions of their respective states be to preserve the rights of its citizens? Should they plead the answer would be the constitution in united states and the laws made in pursuance thereof is the supreme law And all legislatures and judicial officers, whether of the general or state governments are bound by oath to support it No privilege reserved by the bill of rights or secured by the state government can limit the power granted by this Or restrain any laws made in pursuance of it It stands therefore on its own bottom and must receive a construction by itself without any reference to any other And hence it was of highest importance that the most precise and expressed declarations and reservations of rights should have been made This will appear the more necessary what is considered that not only the constitution and laws made in pursuance thereof But all treaties made or which shall be made under the authority of the united states are the supreme law of the land and supersede the constitution of all the states The power to make treaties is vested in the president By and with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the senate I do not find any limitation or restriction to the exercise of this power The most important article in any constitution may therefore be repealed even without a legislative act Aught not a government vested with such extensive and indefinite authority have been restricted by a declaration of rights. It's certainly ought So clear a point is this That I cannot help suspecting the persons who attempt to persuade people that such reservations were less necessary under this constitution Than under those of the states are willfully endeavoring to deceive And to lead you into an absolute state of vassalage Brutus and anti-federalist papers section 22 Brutus letter 2 anti-federalist papers section 23 Brutus letter 3 This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information on the volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org Read by ML Cohen Cleveland, Ohio May 2007 15 November 1787 to the citizens of the state of New York In the investigation of this constitution under your consideration Great care should be taken that you do not form your opinions respecting it from unimportant provisions or fallacious appearances On a careful examination you will find that many of its parts of little moment are well formed And these it has a specious resemblance of a free government But this is not sufficient to justify the adoption of it The gilded pill is often found to contain the most deadly poison You are not however to expect a perfect form of government any more than to meet with perfection in man Your views therefore ought to be directed to the main pillars upon which a free government is to rest If these are well placed on a foundation that will support the superstructure You should be satisfied Although the building may want a number of ornaments, which if your particular tastes were gratified You would have added to it on the other hand If the foundation is insecurely laid and the main supports are wanting or not properly fixed However, the fabric may be decorated and adorned. You ought to reject it Under these impressions it has been my object to turn your attention to the principal defects in this system I have attempted to show that a consolidation of this extensive continent under one government for internal as well as external purposes Which is evidently the tendency of this constitution Cannot succeed without a sacrifice of your liberties And therefore that the attempt is not only preposterous, but extremely dangerous And I have shown independent of this that the plan is radically defective in a fundamental principle Which ought to be found in every free government to wit a declaration of rights I shall now proceed to take a nearer view of this system To examine its ports more minutely and show that the powers are not properly deposited for the security of public liberty The first important object that presents itself in the organization of this government is the legislature This has to be composed of two branches The first is to be called the general assembly and is to be chosen by the people of the respective states In proportion to the number of their inhabitants and is to consist of 65 members With powers in the legislature to increase the numbers not to exceed one for every 30 000 inhabitants The second branch is to be called the senate and is to consist of 26 members Two of which are to be chosen by the legislatures of each of the states In the former of these there is an appraisal of justice in the appointment of its members But if the clause which provides for this branch be stripped of its ambiguity It will be found that there is really no equality of representation even in this house The words are quote Representative and direct taxes shall be a portion among the several states which may be included in this union According to their respective numbers which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons Including those bound to service for a term of years and excluding Indians not taxed three fifths of all other persons close quote What a strange and unnecessary accumulation of words are here used to conceal from the public eye What might have been expressed in the following concise manner Representatives are to be proportioned among the states respectively According to the number of free men and slaves inhabiting them counting five slaves for three free men Quote in a free state and quote says the celebrated Montesquieu quote Every man who's supposed to be a free agent ought to be concerned with his own government Therefore the legislature should reside in the whole body of people or in their representatives close quote But it has never been alleged that those who are not free agents can upon any rational principle have anything to do in government either by themselves or others If they have no share in government Why is the number of members in the assembly to be increased on their account? Is it because in some of the states a considerable part of the property of the inhabitants Consists in a number of their fellow men who are held in bondage and defines of every idea of benevolence Justice and religion and contrary to all the principles of liberty which have been publicly avowed in the late glorious revolution If this be a just ground for representation The horses in some of the states and the oxen and others ought to be represented For a great share of property in some of them consistent these animals And they have as much control over their own actions as these poor unhappy creatures Who were intended to be described in the above recited clause by the words quote all other persons end quote By this mode of apportionment the representative of the different plans of the union will be extremely unequal In some of the southern states the slaves are nearly equal in number to the free men And for all these slaves they will be entitled to a proportionate share in the legislature This will give them an unreasonable weight in the government which can drive no additional strength protection nor defense from slaves But the contrary Why then should they be represented? What adds to the evil is that these states are be permitted to continue the inhuman traffic of importing slaves Until the year 1808 and for every cargo of these unhappy people Which unfeeling unprincipled barbarous and avaricious wretches may tear from their country friends and tender connections and bring into these states They are to be rewarded by having an increase of members in the general assembly There appears at the first view a manifest inconsistency in the apportionment of representatives in the senate Upon a plan of a consolidated government On every principle of equity and propriety representation in the government should be an exact proportion to the numbers Or the aides afford by the person's representative How unreasonable and unjust it is that Delaware should have a representation in the senate equal to massachusetts or virginia The latter which contains 10 times her numbers and is to contribute to the aid of the general government in this proportion This article of the constitution will appear the more objectionable If it is considered that the powers vested in this branch of the legislature are very extensive and greatly surpass those lodged in the assembly Not only for general purposes, but in many instances for the internal police of the states The other branch of the legislature in which if in either a faint spark of democracy should be found Should have been properly organized and established But upon examination you will find that this branch does not possess the qualities of a just representation And that there is no kind of security imperfect as it is for its remaining in the hands of the people It has been observed that the happiness of society is the end of government That every free government is found in compact and that because it is impractical for the whole community to assemble Or when assembled to deliberate with wisdom and decide with the spatch the mode of legislating by representation was devised The very term representative implies that the person or body chosen for this purpose should resemble those who appoint them A representation of the people of america If it be a true one must be like the people It ought to be so constituted that a person who is a stranger to the country Might be able to form a just idea of their character by knowing that of their representatives They are the sign the people are the thing signified It is absurd to speak of one thing being the representative of another upon any other principle The ground and reason of representation in the free government implies the same thing Society instituted government to promote the happiness of the whole and this is the great end always in view of the delegation of powers It must then have been intended that those who are placed instead of the people should possess their sentiments and feelings And be governed by their interests or in other words should bear the strongest resemblance of those in whom's rooms. They are substituted It is obvious that for an assembly to be a true likeness of the people of any country. They must be considerably numerous One man or a few man cannot possibly represent the feelings opinions and characters of a great multitude In this respect the new constitution is radically defective The house of assembly which is intended as representation of the people of america will not or cannot in the nature of things Be a proper one 65 men cannot be found in the united states who hold the sentiments possess the feelings or acquainted with the wants and interests of this vast country This extensive continent is made up of a number of different classes of people And to have a proper representation of them each class ought to have an opportunity of choosing their best informed men for the purpose But this cannot possibly be the case in so small a number The state of new york on the present apportionment will send six members to the assembly I will venture to affirm that number cannot be found in a state who will bear just resemblance to the several classes of people who compose it In this assembly the farmer merchant mechanic and other various orders of people ought to be represented according to the respective weight Numbers and the representatives ought to be intimately acquainted with the wants Understand the interests of the several orders in the society and feel a proper sense and becoming zeal to promote their prosperity I cannot conceive that any six men in this state can be found properly qualified in these respects to discharge such important duties But supposing it possible to find them is there the least degree of probability that the choice of the people will fall upon such men Wealth always creates influence and this is generally much increased by large family connections This class and society will forever have a great number of dependents Besides they will always favor each other. It is in their interest to combine They will therefore constantly unite their efforts to preserve men of their own rank to be elected They will concentrate all their force in every part of the state into one point and by acting together We're most generally carry their election It is probable that but few of the merchants and those the most opulent and ambitious will have a representation from their body Few of them are characters sufficiently conspicuous to attract the notice of the electors of the state and so limited a representation The great body of the yeoman of the country cannot expect any of their order in this assembly The station will be too elevated for them to aspire to the distance between the people and their representatives will be so very great That there is no probability that a farmer however respectable will be chosen The mechanics of every branch must expect to be excluded from a seat in this body It will and must be esteemed a station too high and exalted to be filled But any but the first men in the state in point of fortune so that in reality There'll be no part of the people represented but the rich even in this branch of legislature, which is called democratic The well-born and highest orders in life as they turn themselves will be ignorant of the sentiment of the middling classes of citizens Strangers to their ability wants and difficulties and void of sympathy and fellow feeling This branch of the legislature will not only be an imperfect representation But there will be no security in so small a body against bribery and corruption It will consist at first of 65 and can never exceed one for every 30,000 inhabitants A majority of these that is 33 are a quorum and a majority of which or 17 may pass any law So that 25 men will have the power to give away all the property of the citizens of these states What security therefore can there be for the people where their liberties and properties are at the disposal of so few men? It will literally be a government in the hands of the few to oppress and plunder the many You may conclude with a great degree of certainty that it Like all others of a similar nature will be managed by influence and corruption And that the period is not far distance when this will be the case if it should be adopted for Even now there are some among us whose characters stand high in the public estimation And who have a principal agency in framing this constitution who do not scruple to say That this is the only practicable mode of governing a people Who think with that degree of freedom which the americans do This government will have in their gift a vast number of offices of great honor and amalgamant The members of the legislature are not excluded from appointments and 25 of them as the case may be being secured Any measured may be carried The rulers of this country must be composed of very different materials from those of any other Or which history gives us any account if the majority of the legislature are not before many years entirely at the devotion of the executive And these states will soon be under the absolute domination of one or a few with the fallacious appearance of being governed by men of their own election The more I reflect on this subject the more firmly am I persuaded that the representation is merely nominal a mere burlesque And that no security is provided against corruption and undue influence No free people on earth who have elected persons to legislate for them ever repose that confidence in so small a number The british house of commons consists of 558 members the number of inhabitants in great britain is computed at 8 millions This gives one member for a little more than 14 000 Which exceeds double the proportion this country can ever have And yet we require a larger representation in proportion to our numbers in great britain Because this country is much more extensive and differs more in its productions interests manners and habits The democratic branch of the legislatures of the several states in the union consists. I believe at present of near 2000 And this number was not thought too large for the security of liberty by the framers of our state constitutions Some of the states have erred in this respect But the difference between 2000 and 65 is so very great that it will bear no comparison Other objections offer themselves against this part of the constitution I shall reserve them for a future paper when I shall show defective as this representation is No security is provided that even this shadow of the right will remain with the people Brutus End anti-fragilist papers section 23 brutus letter number three This is a libra vox recording All libra vox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer. Please visit libravox.org the anti-fragilist papers section 24 brutus letter four read by ml co in cleveland, ohio may 2007 29 november 1787 To the people of the state of new york There can be no free government where the people are not possessed of the power of making the laws by which they are governed Either in their own persons or by others substituted in their stead Experience has taught mankind let legislation by representatives is the most eligible In the only practicable mode in which the people of any country can exercise this right Either prudently or beneficially But then It is a matter of the highest importance Informing this representation that it be so constituted as to be capable of understanding the true interests of the society for which it acts And so disposed as to pursue the good and happiness of the people As its ultimate end The object of every free government is the public good and all lesser interests yield to it That of every tyrannical government is the happiness and a grandizement of one or a few And to this the public felicity and every other interest must submit The reason of this difference in these governments is obvious The first is so constituted as to collect the views and wishes of the whole people in that of their rulers While the latter is so framed as to separate the interests of the governors from that of the governed The principle of self-love therefore that will influence the one to promote the good of the whole Will prompt the other to follow its own private advantage The great art therefore informing a good constitution appears to be this So to frame it as that those to whom power is committed So be subject to the same feelings and aim at the same objects as the people do Who transfer to them their authority There is no possible way to affect this but by an equal full and fair representation This therefore is the great desideratum in politics However fair an appearance of any government may make Though it may possess a thousand plausible articles and be decorated with ever so many ornaments Yet if it is deficient in this essential principle of a full and just representation of the people Will be only like a painted suppokar For without this it cannot be a free government Let the administration of it be good or ill it still will be a government not according to the will of the people But according to the will of a few To test this new constitution then by this principle Is of the last importance It is to bring it to the touchstone of national liberty And I hope I shall be excused if in this paper I pursue the subject commenced in my last number To it the necessity of an equal and full representation in the legislature In that I showed that it was not equal because the smallest states are send the same number of members to the senate as the largest And because the slaves Who afford neither aid or defense to the government are to increase the proportion of members To prove that it was not a just or adequate representation It was urged that so small a number cannot resemble the people or possess their sentiments and dispositions That the choice of members would commonly fall upon the rich and great while the middling class of the community would be excluded That in so small representation there was no security against bribery and corruption The small number which is to compose this legislature Will not only expose it to the danger of that kind of corruption and undue influence Which will arise from the gift of places of honors and emolument or the more direct one of bribery But it will also subject it to another kind of influence no less fatal to the liberties of the people Though would not be so flagrantly appugnant to the principles of rectitude It is not to be expected that a legislature will be found in any country That will not have some of its members who will pursue their private ends and for which they will sacrifice the public good Men of this character are generally artful and designing and frequently possess brilliant talents and abilities They commonly act in concert and agree to share the spoils of their country among them They will keep their object ever in view and follow it with constancy To affect their purpose They will assume any shape and proteas like mold themselves into any form Where they find members proof against directed bribery or gifts of offices They will endeavor to mislead their minds by specious and false reasoning To impose upon their unsuspecting honesty by an actification of zeal for the public good They will form juntas And hold outdoor meetings They will operate upon the good nature of their opponents by a thousand little attentions and tease them into compliance by the earnestness of solicitation Those who are acquainted with the manner of conducting business and public assemblies Know how prevalent art and address are in carrying a measure Even over men of the best intentions and of good understanding The firmest security against this kind of improper and dangerous influence as well as all other is a strong and numerous representation In such a house of assembly so great a number must be gained over before the private views of individuals could be gratified That there could be scarce a hope of success But in the federal assembly 17 men are all that is necessary to pass a law It is probable it will seldom happen more than 25 will be requisite to form a majority When it is considered what a number of places an honor and a monument will be the gift of the executive The powerful influence of the great and designing men have over the honest and unsuspecting by their art and address Their soothing manners and civilities and their cringing flattery joined with their affected patriotism When these different species of influences are combined It is scarcely to be hoped that a legislature composed of so small a number As the one proposed by the new constitution will long resist their force A farther objection against the feebleness of the representation is that it will not possess the confidence of the people The execution of the laws in a free government must rest on this confidence And this must be founded on the good opinion they entertain to the framers of the laws Every government must be supported either by the people having such an attachment to it as to be ready when called upon to support it Or by a force at the command of the government to compel obedience The latter mode destroys every idea of a free government for the same force that may be employed to compel obedience to good laws Might and probably would be used to rest from the people their constitutional liberties Whether it is practicable to have a representation for the whole union sufficiently numerous to obtain that confidence Which is necessary for the purpose of internal taxation and other powers to which this proposed government extends is an important question I am clearly of opinion it is not And therefore I have stated this in my first number as one of the reasons against going into an entire consolidation of the states One of the most capital errors in this system is that of extending the powers of the federal government to objects to which it is not adequate Which it cannot exercise without endangering public liberty and which it is not necessary that they should possess In order to preserve the union and manage our national concerns Of this however, I shall treat more fully in some future paper But however this may be certain it is that the representation in the legislature is not so formed as to give reasonable ground for public trust In order for the people safely to repose themselves on their rulers. They should not only be of their own choice But it is requisite that they should be acquainted with their abilities to manage the public concerns with wisdom They should be satisfied that those who represent them are men of integrity Who will pursue the good of the community with fidelity and will not be turned aside from their duty by private interest Or corrupted by undue influence And that they will have such a zeal for the good of those who they represent as to excite them to be diligent in their service But it is impossible the people of the united states should have sufficient knowledge of their representatives When the numbers are so few to acquire any rational satisfaction on either of these points The people of this state will have very little acquaintance with those who may be chosen to represent them A great part of them will probably not know the characters of their own members Much less that of a majority of those who will compose the federal assembly They will consist of men whose names they have never heard and whose talents in regard for the public good They are total strangers to And they will have no person so immediately of their choice near them Of their neighbors and of their own rank in life that they can feel themselves secure and trusting their interest in their hands The representatives of the people cannot as they now do if they have passed laws mixed with the people Explain to them the motives which induce the adoption of any measure Point out its utility and remove objections or silence unreasonable clamors against it The number will be so small that but a very few of the most sensible and respectable yeomanry of the country can ever have a knowledge of them Being so far removed from the people their station will be elevated and important and they will be considered as ambitious and designing They will not be viewed by the people as part of themselves, but as a body distinct from them And having separate interests to pursue the consequence will be that a perpetual jealousy will exist in the minds of the people against them Their conduct will be narrowly watched their measures scrutinized and their laws opposed evaded or reluctantly obeyed This is natural and exactly corresponds with the conduct of individuals towards those in whose hands they entrust important concerns If the person confided in be a neighbor with whom his employers intimately acquainted Whose talents he knows are sufficient to manage the business which he has charged His honor and fidelity unsuspected and his friendship and zeal for the service of this principle unquestionable He will commit his affairs into his hands with unreserved confidence and feel himself secure All the transactions of the agent will meet with the most favorable construction And the measures he takes will give satisfaction But if the person employed be a stranger whom he has never seen and whose character for ability or fidelity he cannot fully learn If he is constrained to choose him Because it was not in his power to procure one more agreeable to his wishes He will trust him with caution and be suspicious of all his conduct If then this government should not derive support from the goodwill of the people It must be executed by force or not executed at all Either case would lead to the total destruction of liberty The convention seemed aware of this and have therefore provided for calling out the militia to execute the laws of the union If this system was so framed as to command the respect from the people which every good free government will obtain This provision was unnecessary The people would support the civil magistrate This power is a novel one in free governments These have depended for the execution upon the laws of the posse comatatus And never raised an idea that the people would refuse to aid the civil magistrate in executing those laws they themselves had made I shall now dismiss the subject of the incompetency of the representation And proceed as I promised to show that impotent as it is The people have no security that they will enjoy the exercise of the right of electing this assembly Which at best can be considered but as a shadow of representation By section four article one the congress are authorized at any time by law to make or alter regulation Respecting the time place and manner of holding election for senators and representatives Except as to the places of choosing senators By this clause the right of election itself is in great measure transferred from the people to their rulers One would think that if anything was necessary to be made a fundamental article of the original compact It would be that of fixing the branches of the legislature So as to put it out of its power to alter itself by modifying the election of its own members at will and pleasure When a people once resigned the privilege of a fair election They clearly have none left worth contending for It is clear that under this article the federal legislature may institute such rules respecting elections as the lead to the choice of one description of men The weakness of the representation tends but too certainly to confer on the rich and well-born All honors but the power granted in this article may be so exercised as to secure it almost beyond the possibility of control The proposed congress may make the whole state one district and direct that the capital Perenn's the city of new york for instance close prens Shall be the place for holding the election The consequence would be that none but men of the most elevated rank in society would attend And they would have certainly choose men from their own class as it is true with the apostle paul sayeth that quote No man ever yet hated his own flesh, but nourishes and cherishes it end quote They may declare that those members who have the greatest number of votes shall be considered as duly elected The consequence would be that the people who are dispersed to the interior parts of the states Would give their votes for a variety of candidates while any order or profession residing in populist places By uniting their interests might be cure whom they pleased to be chosen And by this means representative of the states may be elected by one tenth part of the people who actually vote This may be affected constitutionally and by one of those silent operations Which frequently takes place without being noticed but which often produces such changes as entirely to alter a government Subvert a free constitution and rivet the chains on a free people before they perceive they are forged Had the power of regulating elections been left under the discretion of the state legislatures Where the people are not only nominally but substantially represented It would have been secure But if it was taken out of their hands It surely ought to have been fixed on such a basis as to have put it out of the power of the federal legislature To deprive the people of it by law Provisions should have been made from marking out the states into districts And for choosing by a majority of votes a person out of each of them a permanent property in residence in the district Which he was to represent If the people of america will submit to a constitution that will vest in the hands of anybody of men A right to deprive them of law of the privilege of a fair election They will submit to almost anything Reasoning with them will be in vain. They must be left until they are brought to reflection by feeling oppression They will then have to rest from their oppressors by a strong hand that which they now possess In which they may retain if they will exercise but a moderate share of prudence and firmness I know it is said that the dangers apprehended from this clause are merely imaginary That the proposed general legislature will be disposed to regulate elections upon proper principles And to use their power with discretion and to promote the public good On this I would observe that constitutions are not so necessary to regulate the conduct of good rulers As to restrain that of bad ones Wise and good men will exercise power so as to promote the public happiness under any form of government If we are to take it for granted that those who administer the government under this system Will always pay proper attention to the rights and interests of the people Nothing more is necessary than to say who should be invested with the powers of government And leave them out to exercise it at will and pleasure Men are apt to be deceived both respect to their own disposition and those of others Though this truth is proved by almost every page of the history of nations To wit that power lodged in the hands of rulers be used to discretion Is almost always exercised to the oppression of the people And the aggrandizement of themselves Yet most men think if it was lodged in their hands they would not employ it in this manner Thus when the prophet Elisha told Hazael Quote I know the evil that that will do unto the children of Israel Their strong hands will thou set on fire And their young men will thou slay with the sword and will dash their children and rip up their women with child and quote Hazael had no idea that he should ever be guilty of such hard cruelty And said to the prophet quote Is thy servant a dog that he should do this great thing and quote Elisha answered quote the lord hath showed me that thou shall be king of syria end quote The event proved that Hazael only wanted an opportunity to perpetrate these enormities without restraint And he had a disposition to do them Though he himself knew it not Brutus End Anti-Federalist Papers Section 24 Brutus Letter 4 Anti-Federalist Papers Section 25 Brutus Letter 5 This is the LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer Please visit LibriVox.org Read by ML Cohen Cleveland, Ohio May 2007 13 December 1787 to the people of the state of New York It was intended in this number to have prosecuted the inquiry into the organization of this new system Particularly to have considered the dangerous and premature union of the president and senate and the mixture of legislative executive and judicial powers in the senate But there is such an intimate connection between the several branches in whom the different species of authority is lodged And the powers which they are invested that on reflection It seems necessary first to proceed to examine the nature and extent of the powers granted to the legislature This inquiry will assist us the better to determine whether the legislature is so constituted As to provide proper checks and restrictions for the security of our rights and to guard against the abuse of power For the mean should be suited to the end A government should be framed with a view to the objects to which it extends If this be few a number and of such a nature as to give but small occasion or opportunity to work oppression in the exercise of authority There will be less need of a numerous representation And special guards against abuse than if powers of the government are very extensive and include a great variety of cases It will also be found necessary to examine the extent of these powers In order to form a just opinion how far the system can be considered as a confederation or consolidation of the states Many of the advocates for and most of the opponents to the system agree that the form of government most suitable to the united states Is that of a confederation? The idea of a confederated government is that of a number of independent states entering into a compact For the conducting certain general concerns in which they have a common interest Leaving the management of their internal and local affairs to their separate governments But whether the system proposed is of this nature cannot be determined without a strict inquiry into the powers proposed to be granted This constitution considers the people of the several states as one body corporate and is intended as an original compact It will therefore dissolve all contracts, which may be inconsistent with it This is not only results from its nature, but it's expressly declared in the sixth article of it The design of this constitution is expressed in the preamble to be quote In order to form a more perfect union to establish justice Ensured domestic tranquility provide for the common defense promote to general welfare and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and posterity These are the ends this government seeks to accomplish and for which it is invested with certain powers Among these is the power to quote make all laws which are necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers And all other powers vested by this constitution in the government of the united states Or in any department or officer thereof close quote It is a rule in construing a law to consider the objects to legislate your hat and view and passing it And to give it such an explanation as to promote their intention The same rule will apply in explaining a constitution The great objects then are declared in this preamble in general and in definite terms to be put abroad for common defense promote the general welfare and an express power being vested in the legislature To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution all the powers vested in the general government The inference is natural that the legislature will have an authority to make all laws Which they shall judge necessary for the common safety and to promote the general welfare This amounts to a power to make the laws a discretion No terms can be found more indefinite than these and it is obvious that the legislature alone Must judge what laws are proper and necessary for its purpose It may be said that this way of explaining a constitution is torturing and making it speak what it never intended This is far from my intention and I shall not insist upon this implied power But join issue with those who say where to collect the idea of the powers given from the express words of the clauses granting them And it will not be difficult to show that the same authority is expressly given which is supposed to be implied into foregoing paragraphs In the first article eighth section It is declared quote that congress shall have the power to lay and collect tax as duties imposed in x sizes To pay the debts and to provide for the common defense and general welfare of the united states end quote In the preamble the intent of the constitution among other things is declared to be to provide for the common defense and promote the general welfare And this clause the powers express words given to congress quote to provide for the common defense and general welfare end quote And the last paragraph is the same section They're an express authority to make all laws which will be necessary and proper for carrying into execution this power It is therefore evident that the legislature under this constitution may pass any law which they may think proper It is true the ninth section restrains their power with respect to certain objects But these restrictions are very limited some of them improper some unimportant and others not easily understood as I shall hear after show It has been urged that the meaning I give to this part of the constitution is not the true one That the intent of it is to confer on the legislator the power to lay and collect taxes Etc in order to provide for the common defense and general welfare To this I would reply that the meaning and intent of the constitution is to be collected from the words of it And I submit to the public whether the construction I have given it is not the most natural and easy But admitting to the contrary opinion to prevail I shall nevertheless be able to show that the same powers are substantially vested in the general government by several other articles in the constitution It invests the legislator with authority to lay and collect taxes duties imposed and exercises In order to provide for the common defense and promote the general welfare and to pass all laws Will should be unnecessary and proper for carrying this power into effect To comprehend the extent of this authority it will be requisite to examine first What is included in this power to lay and collect taxes duties imposed and exercises Second what is implied in the authority to pass all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying this power into execution And third what limitation if any is set to the exercise of this power by the constitution First The detail that particular is comprehended in the general terms taxes duties imposed and exercises Would require a volume instead of a single piece in a newspaper Indeed it would be a task far beyond my ability and to which no one can be competent unless possessed of a mind capable of comprehending Every possible source of revenue for they extend every possible way of raising money whether by direct or indirect taxation Under this clause may be imposed a poll tax a land tax Attacks on houses and buildings on windows and fireplaces on cattle and on all kinds of personal property It extends to duties and all kinds of goods to any amount to tonnage and poundage on vessels to duties on written instruments newspaper Almanacs and books It comprehends and excise on all kinds of liquor spirits wine cider beer etc And indeed takes in duty or excise on every necessary convenience of life whether a foreign or home growth or Manufactory in short We could have no conception of any way in which the government can raise money from the people But what is included in one or the other of three general terms? We may say then that this clause commits in the hands of government the general legislature every conceivable source of revenue within the united states Not only are these terms very comprehensive and extend to a vast number of objects But the power to lay and collect has great latitude It will lead the passing of various numbers of laws which may affect the personal rights of the citizens of the states Exposed their property to fines and confiscation and put their lives in jeopardy It opens the door to the appointment of a swarm of revenue and excise officers to prey upon the honest and industrious part of the community Eat up their substance and riot on the spoils of the country second We will next inquire into what is implied in the authority to pass all laws which shall be necessary and proper to carry this power in execution It is perhaps utterly impossible fully to define this power The authority granted in the first clause can only be understood in its full extent By descending to all the particular cases in which revenue can be raised The number and variety of these cases are so endless and as it were infinite that no man living has as yet been able to reckon them up The greatest geniuses in the world have been for ages employed in the research And when mankind had supposed that the subject was exhausted They've been astonished with the refined improvements that have been made in modern times and especially in the english nation on the subject If then the objects of this power cannot be comprehended How is it possible to understand the extent of the power which can pass all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying it into execution? It is truly incomprehensible A case cannot be conceived of which is not included in this power It is well known that the subject of revenue is the most difficult and extensive in the science of government It requires the greatest talents of a statesman and the most numerous and exact provisions of the legislature The command of the revenues of a state gives the command of everything in it He that has the purse will have the sword And they that have both have everything So that the legislature having every source from which money can be drawn under their direction With a right to make all laws necessary and proper for drawing forth all the resource of the country Would have in fact all power Where I'd enter into detail it would be easy to show how this power in its operation would totally destroy all the powers of the individual states But this is not necessary for those who will think for themselves And it will be useless to such as take things upon trust Nothing will awaken them to reflection until the iron hand of oppression compel them to it I shall only remark that this power given to the federal legislature directly annihilates all the powers of the state legislatures There cannot be a greater solidism in politics than the talk of a power in a government without the command of any revenue It is absurd as the talk of an animal without blood or the substance of one without food Now the general government having in their control every possible source of revenue and authority to pass any law that they may Deem necessary to draw them forth or to facilitate their collection No source of revenue is therefore left in the hands of any state Should any state attempt to raise money by law the general government may repeal or arrest it in the execution For all their laws will be the supreme law of the land If then anyone can be weak enough to believe that a government can exist without having the authority to raise money To pay a doorkeeper to their assembly. He may believe that the state government can exist Should this new constitution take place It is agreed by most of the advocates of this new system that the government which is proper for the united state Should be a confederated one that the respective states ought to retain a portion of the sovereignty And that they should preserve not only the forms of their legislatures, but also the power to conduct certain internal concerns How far the powers to be obtained by the state shall extend is the question We need not spend much time on this subject as it respects this constitution for a government without the power to raise money Is one only a name It is clear that the legislatures of the respective states must be altogether dependent on the will of the general legislature For the means of supporting their government The legislature of the united states will have a right to exhaust every source of revenue in every state And to annul all laws of the states which may stand in the way of affecting it On thus therefore we can suppose the state governments can exist without money to support the officers who execute them We must conclude that they will exist no longer than the general legislature choose. They should Indeed the idea of any government existing in any respect as an independent one without any means of support in their own hands is an absurdity If therefore this constitution has in view what many of its framers and advocates say it has To secure and guarantee to the separate states the exercise of certain powers of government It's certainly ought to have left in their hands some sources of revenue It should have marked the line in which the general government should have raised money It's that bounds over which they should not pass leaving to the separate states other means to raise supplies for the support of their governments And to discharge their respective debts To this it is objected that the general government ought to have the power competent to the purposes of the union They are to provide for the common defense to pay the debts of the united states support foreign ministers and the civil establishment of the union And to do those they ought to have the authority to raise money adequate to the purpose On this I observe that the state governments have also contracted debts They require money to support their civil officers And how is this to be done if they give to the general government the power to raise money in every way in which it possibly can be raised With such control over the state legislatures as to prohibit them whenever the general legislature may think proper for raising any money It is again objective that is very difficult if not impossible to draw the line of distinction between the powers of the general state governments on this subject The first it is said must have the power of raising the money necessary for the purposes of the union If they are limited to certain objects the revenue may fall short of a sufficiency for the public efficiencies They must therefore have discretionary power The line may be easily and accurately drawn between the powers of the two governments on this head The distinction between external and internal taxes is not a novel one in this country It is a plain one and easily understood The first includes imposed duties and all imported goods This species of taxes that is proper should be laid by the general government Many reasons might be argued to show that no danger is to be apprehended from their exercise of it They may be collected in a few places and from few hands with certainty in expedition But few officers are necessary to employ it in collecting them And there is no danger of oppression in laying them because if they are laid higher Then trade will bear the merchants will cease importing or smuggle their goods We have therefore sufficient security arising from the nature of the thing Against burdensome and intolerable imposition from this kind of tax But the case is far otherwise with regard to direct taxes These include poll taxes land taxes excises duties on written instruments on everything we eat drink or wear They take hold of every species of property and come home to every man's house and packet These are often so oppressive as to grind the face of the poor and render the lives of the common people A burden to them The great and only security that people can have against oppression from this kind of taxes must rest in their representatives If they are sufficiently numerous to be well informed of the circumstances and ability of those who send them And have a proper regard for the people they will be secure The general legislature as i have shown in a former paper will not be this qualified And therefore on this account ought not to exercise the power of direct taxation If the power of laying impost will not be sufficient some other specific mode of raising revenues should have been assigned to general government Many may be suggested in which their power may be accurately defined and limited And it would be much better to give them authority to lay and collect a duty on exports Not to exceed a certain rate percent Then to have surrendered every kind of resource that the country has to the complete abolition of the state governments And which will introduce such an infinite number of laws and ordinances finds and penalties courts and judges collections and excise men That when a man can number them he may enumerate the stars of heaven I so resume this subject in my next and by an induction of particulars show that this power in its exercise will subvert all state authority And will work to the oppression of the people and that there are no restrictions in the constitution that will soften this rigor But rather the contrary Brutus And anti-federalist papers section 25 This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain To learn more or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org The anti-federalist papers Read by ML Cohen, Cleveland, Ohio may 2007 Section 26 Brutus letter 6 27 December 1787 It is an important question whether the general government of the united states Should be so framed as to absorb and swallow up the state governments Or whether on the contrary the former ought not to be confined to certain defined national objects While the latter should retain all the powers which concern the internal police of the states I have in my former papers offered a variety of arguments to prove That a simple free government could not be exercised over this whole continent And that therefore we must either give up our liberties and submit to an arbitrary one Or frame a constitution on the plan of confederation Further reasons might be urged to prove this point, but it seems unnecessary Because the principal advocates of the new constitution admit of the position The question therefore between us thus being admitted is Whether or not this system is so formed as either directly to annihilate the state governments Or that in its operation it will certainly affect it If this is answered in the affirmative then the system ought not to be adopted Without such amendments as will avoid this consequence If on the contrary it can be shown that the state governments are secured in their rights To manage the internal police of the respective states We must confine ourselves in our inquiries to the organization of the government And the guards and provisions it contains to prevent a misuse or abuse of power To determine this question it is requisite that we fully investigate the nature And the extent of the powers intended to be granted by this constitution to the rulers In my last number I called your attention to this subject and proved as I think Uncontrovertibly that the powers given the legislature under the eighth section Of the first article had no other limitation than the discretion of the congress It was shown that even if the most favorable construction was given to this paragraph That the advocates for the new constitution could wish It will convey a power to lay and collect taxes, impose duties, and exisces According to the discretion of the legislature And to make all laws which they sell judged proper and necessary To carry this power into execution This I showed was totally destroy all the power of the state governments To confirm this, it is worthwhile to trace the operation of the government In some particular instances The general government is to be vested with authority to levy and collect taxes, duties, and exisces The separate states have also power to impose taxes, duties, and exisces Except that they cannot lay duties on exports and imports without the consent of congress Here then the two governments have concurrent jurisdiction Both may lay in positions of this kind But then the general government have super added to this power Authority to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper For carrying the foregoing power into execution Suppose then that both governments should lay taxes, duties, and exisces And it should fall so heavy on the people that they would be unable Or be so burdensome that they would refuse to pay them both Would it not be necessary that the general legislature should suspend the collection of the state tax? It certainly would For if the people could not, or would not pay both They must be discharged from the tax to the state or the tax to the general government could not be collected The conclusion therefore is inevitable That the respective state governments will not have the power to raise one shilling in any way But by the permission of congress No one will pretend that the states can exercise legislative authority Or administer justice among their citizens for any length of time Without being able to raise a sufficiency to pay those who administer their governments If this be true and if the states can raise money only by permission of the general government It follows that the state governments will be dependent on the will of the general government for their existence What will render this power in congress effectual and sure in its operation is That the government will have complete judicial and executive authority to carry all their laws into effect Which will be paramount to the judicial and executive authority of the individual states In vain therefore will be all interference of the legislature's courts or magistrates of any of the states on the subject For they will be subordinate to the general government and engaged by oath to support it And will be constitutionally bound to submit to their decisions The general legislature will be empowered to lay any tax they choose To annex any penalties they please to the breach of their revenue laws And to appoint as many officers as they may think proper to collect the taxes They will have authority to farm the revenues and to vest the farmer general With his subalterns with plenary powers to collect them in any way which to them may appear eligible In the courts of law which they will be authorized to institute Will have cognizance of every case arising under the revenue laws The conduct of all the officers employed in collecting them And the officers of these courts will execute their judgments There is no way therefore of avoiding the destruction of the state governments Whenever the congress please to do it unless the people rise up and with a strong hand resist and prevent the execution of constitutional laws The fear of this will it is presumed restrain the general government for some time within proper bounds But it will not be many years before they will have a revenue and force at their command Which will place them above any apprehensions on that score How far the power to lay and collect duties and excises may operate to dissolve the state governments and oppress the people It is impossible to say It would assist us much in forming a just opinion on this head To consider the various objects to which this kind of taxes extend In european nations and the infinity of laws they have passed respecting them Perhaps if leisure will permit this may be essayed in some future paper It was observed in my last number That the power to lay and collect duties and excises would invest the congress with authority to impose the duty and excise On every necessary inconvenience of life As the principal object of the government in laying a duty or excise will be to raise money It is obvious that they will fix on such articles as of are the most general use in consumption Because unless great quantities of the article in which the duty is laid is used the revenue cannot be considerable We may therefore presume that the articles which will be the object of this species of taxes Will be either the real necessities of life or if not these Such as from custom and habit or esteem. So I will single out a few of the productions of our own country which may and probably will be of the number Citer is an article that most probably will be one of those on which an excise will be laid Because it is one which this country produces in great abundance Which is in very general use is consumed in great quantities And which may be said to not be a real necessary of life An excise on this would raise a large sum of money in the united states How would the power to lay and collect an excise on cider and to pass all laws proper and necessary to carry it into execution operate in its exercise It might be necessary in order to collect the excise on cider to grant to one man in each county An exclusive right of building and keeping cider mills and oblige him to give bonds and security for payment of the excise Or if this was not done It might be necessary to license the mills which are to make this liquor and to take from them security to account for the excise Or if otherwise a great number of officers must be employed to take account of the cider made and to collect the duties on it Porter ale and all kind of malt liquors are articles that would probably be subject also to an excise It would be necessary in order to collect such an excise to regulate the of these That the quantity made might be ascertained or otherwise security could not be had for the payment of the excise Every brewery must then be licensed and officers appointed to take account of its product and to secure the payment of the duty or excise before it is sold Many other articles might be named which would be objects of this species of taxation But I refrain from enumerating them It will probably be said by those who advocate this system That the observation already made on this head are calculated only to inflame the minds of the people with the apprehension of dangers merely imaginary That there is not the least reason to apprehend the general legislature will exercise their power in this manner To this I would only say that these kind of taxes exist in great britain and are severely felt The excise on cider and peary was imposed in that nation a few years ago And it is in the memory of everyone who read the history of the transaction what great tummels it occasioned This power exercise without limitation will introduce itself into every corner of the city and country It will wait upon the ladies at their toilet and will not leave them in any of their domestic concerns It will accompany them to the ball the play and the assembly It will go with them when they visit and will on all occasions sit beside them in their carriages nor will it desert them even at church It will enter the house of every gentleman watch over a cellar Wait upon his cook in the kitchen follow the servants into the parlor preside over the table and note down all he eats or drinks It will attend him to his bed chamber and watch him while he sleeps It will take cognizance of the professional man in his office or his study It will watch the merchant in the counting house or in his store It will follow the mechanic to his shop and in his work and will haunt him in his family and in his bed It will be a constant companion of the industrious farmer in all his labor It will be with him in his house and in the field Observe the toil of his hands and the sweat of his brow It will penetrate into the most obscure cottage and finally it will light upon the head of every person in the united states To all these different classes of people And in all these circumstances in which it will attend them the language in which it will address them will be give Give a power that has such latitude which reaches every person in the community in every conceivable circumstance And lays hold of every species of property they possess and which has no bound set to it But the discretion of those who exercise it I say such a power must necessarily from its very nature So follow up all the power of the state governments I shall add but one other observation on this head, which is this It appears to me a solid system for two men or bodies of men to have unlimited power respecting the same object It contradicts the scripture maxim which seeth quote no man can serve two masters end quote The one power or the other must prevail or else they will destroy each other and neither of them affect their purpose It may be compared to two mechanic powers acting upon the same body in opposite directions The consequence would be if the powers were equal The body would remain in the state of rest or if the force of the one was superior to that of the other The stronger would prevail and overcome the resistance of the weaker But it is said by some advocates of this system quote that the idea that congress can levy taxes at pleasure is false And the suggestion wholly unsupported that the preamble to the constitution is declaratory of the purposes of the union And the assumption of any power not necessarily to establish justice etc and to provide the common defense etc Will be unconstitutional Besides in the very clause which gives the power of levying duties and taxes The purposes to which the money shall be appropriated are specified that is to pay the debts And provide for the common defense and general welfare end quote I would ask those who reasoned us to define what ideas are included under the terms to provide for the common defense and general welfare Are these terms definite and will they be understood in the same manner and to apply to the same cases by everyone? No one will pretend they will It will then be a matter of opinion What tends to the general welfare and the congress will be the only judges in the matter To provide for the general welfare An abstract proposition which mankind differ in explanation of as much as they do on any political or moral proposition That can be proposed The most opposite measures may be pursued by different parties and both may profess that they have in view the general welfare And both sides may be honest in their professions or both may have sinister views Those who advocate this new constitution declare they are influenced by a regard to the general welfare Those who oppose it declare they are moved by the same principle And I have no doubt but a number on both sides are honest in their professions And yet nothing is more certain than this that to adopt this constitution And not to adopt it cannot both of them be promotive of the general welfare It is absurd to say that the power of congress is limited by these general expressions Quote to provide for the common safety and general welfare end quote as it would be to say that it would be limited Had the constitution said they should have the power to lay taxes etc at will and pleasure Where this authority given it might be said that under it the legislature could not do injustice or pursue any measures But such as were calculated to promote the public good and happiness For every man rulers as well as others are bound by the immutable laws of god and reason To always to will what is right It is certainly right and fit that the governors of every people should provide for the common defense and general welfare Every government therefore in the world even the greatest despot Is limited in the exercise of his power But however justice reasoning may be it would be found in practice a most pitiful restriction The government would always say their measures were designed and calculated to promote the public good And there being no judge between them and the people the rulers themselves must and would always judge for themselves There are others of the favors of this system Who admit that the power of the congress under it with respect to revenue will exist without limitation And contend that so it ought to be It is said quote the power to raise armies to build and equip fleets and to provide for their support ought to exist Without limitation Because it is impossible to foresee or to define the extent and variety of national Exigencies or the corresponding extent and variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them end quote This is said quote is one of those truths which to correct an unprejudiced mind Carries its own evidence along with it It rests upon axioms as simple as they are universal the means ought to be proportioned to the end The person from whose agency the attainment of any end is expected ought to possess the means by which it is to be attained end quote This same writer insinuates that the opponents to the plan promulgated by the convention Manifests a want of candor and objecting to the extent of the powers proposed to be vested in this government Because he asserts with an air of confidence that the powers ought to be unlimited as to the object to which they extend And that this position if not self-evident is at least clearly demonstrated by the foregoing mode of reasoning But with the submission to this author's better judgment I humbly conceive his reasoning will appear upon examination more specious than solid The means say the gentleman ought to be proportional to the end admit the proposition to be true It is then necessary to inquire. What is the end of the government of the united states in order to draw any just conclusions from it Is this end simply to preserve the general government and to provide for the common defense and general welfare of the union only Certainly not for beside this the state governments are to be supported and provision made for the managing such of their internal concerns as are allotted to them It is admitted quote that the circumstances of our country are such as to demand a compound instead of a simple A confederate instead of a sole government end quote That the objects of each ought to be pointed out and that each ought to possess ample authority to execute the powers committed to them The government then being complex in its nature the end it has in view is so also And it is as necessary that the state governments should possess the means to attain the ends expected from them As for the general government Neither the general government nor the state governments ought to be vested with all the powers proper to be exercised for promoting the ends of government The powers are divided between them Certain ends are to be attained by the one and other certain ends by the other And these taken together include all the ends of good government This being the case the conclusion follows that each should be furnished with the means to attain the ends to which they are designed To apply this reasoning to the case of revenue the general government is charged with the care providing for the payment of the debts of the united states Supporting the general government and providing for the defense of the union To obtain these ends they should be furnished with means But does it thence follow that they should command all the revenues of the united states? Most certainly it does not For if so it will follow that no means will be left to attain other ends as necessary to the happiness of the country As those committed to their care The individual states have debts to discharge their legislatures and executive are to be supported And provision is to be made for the administration of justice in the respective states For these objects the general government has no authority to provide nor is it proper it should It is clear then that the state should have the command of such revenues as to answer the ends they have to obtain To say quote that the circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite end quote And from hence to infer that all the sources of revenue in the state should be yielded to the general government Is not conclusive reasoning For the congress are authorized only to control and general concerns and not regulate local and internal ones And these are as essentially requisite to be provided as for those The peace and happiness of a community is as intimately connected with the prudent direction of their domestic affairs And the due administration of justice among themselves as with a competent provision for their defense against foreign invaders And indeed more so Upon the whole I conceive that there cannot be a clearer position than this That the state governments ought to have an uncontrollable power to raise a revenue Adequate to the exigencies of their governments And I presume no such power is left them by this constitution Brutus end of anti federalist papers section 26 brutus letter six