into the broader conversation with the speakers. As a reminder, the event is on the record and will be available on USIP's YouTube afterwards. For more resolved work on Renvi ideologies and trends around the world, as well as on online information ecosystems in which Renvi Actors and Ideas can track, please visit our website. Research from both projects seek to provide information necessary and better understanding in addressing Renvi trends, variations, and communications around the world. I'm honored to introduce our chair for today's event, Dr. Cynthia Miller Idris. Dr. Miller Idris is a professor at American University in Washington, DC, where she directs the polarization and extremism research innovation lab peril in the center for university excellence. She has testified before the US Congress and regularly briefed policy, security, education, intelligence agencies in the US, United Nations, and other countries on trends and domestic and international issues like extremism and strategies prevention and disengagement. She regularly appears in the media as an expert source and political commentator, and her most recent book is Hate in the Homeland, New Global Farmer Act. Before handing over to Cynthia to introduce our free and credible experts today on behalf of USIP and resolve, thank you again. We're looking forward to insightful conversation. Thank you, Alistair, for that wonderful introduction. It's an honor to be here, and I'm for completely selfish reasons, to this conversation where I will listen and learn. I'm delighted to introduce our three speakers. I'll introduce them all at once right at the beginning, and then we'll go in sequence. So we have with us today Dr. Julia Drugan, who's a senior lecturer in the Department of Security Studies and Criminology at Makare University, is also the editor-in-chief of the Journal of Policing, Intelligence, and Counterterrorism. And we also are joined then together with Julia, and we'll hear from Dr. Leece Wildeck, who's a lecturer in the Department of Security Studies and Criminology at the same university, which I realize I also may not be pronouncing right, so you'll have to correct me on that, Makare University. Leece is also a member of the Executive Committee for the Addressing, Violent Extremism, and Radicalization to Terrorism Research Network. And then finally, we'll go to Canada and hear from Dr. Amarnath Amarasingham, who's a system professor in the School of Religion at Queen's University and is also a member of the Resolve Research Advisory Council. So I'm really excited to hear about, to take this outside of the United States context or the context of Western New York, where we're often in conversation about the issue of rising white supremacist extremism, racially, ethnically motivated violent extremism, far-right extremism, to get into conversations about even the issue of terminology across borders about legal issues nationally, and most importantly, I think about trends and contextual factors that we've been seeing in variation or in parallel across different global and national contexts. So I'm gonna turn it over first to Julianne Leece, who will share some slides and tell us a little bit about what's been happening in Australia. Thank you so much, Cynthia, and thank you for the introduction. So thank you all for having us here today or tonight in Australia. We're here, Julianne and I, to discuss our research, which is drawn from a series of funded projects that we've completed alongside our colleague, Dr. Brian Barson-Stanton, a data scientist who can't be with us here today. Over the past six years, we've engaged in a series of funded research projects focused on the digital environment and communities and organizations that fall within the remit of Zanvey. Our primary stakeholders have been the New South Wales government, and we have really explored the way in which individuals, organizations, and communities have operated across different platforms within this ecosystem or digital environment. And so what's the situation down under nearly three years after Australian man, Brenton Tarrant, carried out the Christchurch terrorist attacks in New Zealand? Well, for far-right violent extremists at the moment, the current environment is really one that's basically characterized by both crisis and also opportunity. They're under increased pressure from government, from the media, and also from the general public and public opinion. Many of the leaders of far-right groups in Australia are currently incarcerated or under significant security and scrutiny from our law enforcement and intelligence agencies. However, a broader growth of anti-establishment sentiment and support is likely to remain in Australia even as the current crisis brought about by COVID-19 starts to recede into the Backview Mirror. Currently, the National Socialist Network, the group that you can see up there in black, is the main group, a nationwide group in Australia. They've really federated a series of former groups together under a national umbrella. In that image, they are doing the Hail Hitler salute in front of our Parliament House in Canberra, but also other groups like the Proud Boys and small chapters related to international movements, such as the former Atomwaffen movement, the Order of the Nine Angles, Combat 19 and others do exist in Australia, but seem to be quite ephemeral, short-lived and changing very rapidly. Now, COVID-19 has provided a unique environment for far-right groups and for REMV groups more widely here in Australia. The REMV milieu, both online and offline, has definitely proactively appropriated the opportunities created by the crisis as a pandemic and also the associated public health measures, which you might know have been quite dramatic in parts of Australia, even Draconian. The meme above on the right shows these genocide themes being brought into COVID, public health responses, things like COVID tests and so on in the cities and how the far-right is used in this to spread racial supremacist and xenophobic language and ideas. Moving away from the specifically violent side of violent extremism, in Australia, we also have a growing number of small but significant political entrepreneurs who are capitalising on this confluence of the far-right and societal anxiety about COVID and the associated public health measures. And so, very much like America, Australia is a highly multicultural society. And as a consequence, here in Australia, we have experienced all aspects of REMV extremism and at times associated violence. We see risks emerging from a range of different extremisms, Islamist extremism, Buddhist extremism, Hindu extremism, the far-left extremists, as well as right-wing extremists.  So how do you adapt to this complicated environment? And we see that one of our intelligence agencies here in Australia, ASEO, have recently changed the official language used to describe extremism and they have essentially adopted two umbrella terms, ideological and religious extremism. Now, this change, of course, has not been without its challenges. And so in our own research, we've really tried to bound what we're studying and bound right-wing extremism as an umbrella term. We use it to refer to a broad set of social and political movements that they themselves draw from right-wing political discourse, and they do so to undermine the foundations of Australian liberal democracy. These individuals and movements and organisations are really characterised by a reliance on a very polarised worldview that is entirely intolerant of dissent. It is pro-white, actively suspicious of non-white others. And ultimately, these are individuals and organisations that are revolutionary rather than conservative in their approach. Yeah, and so the projects that we're really talking about today focus on far-right extremism for the most part. And the data that informs our studies comes from a collection of social media platforms, including Facebook, Twitter, Gav Reddit, The Chance. And we're recently having started incorporating big YouTube data as well as smaller samples of telegram data into our broader research projects. So what we do is we conduct cross-platform studies of multiple social media accounts across time. This gives us a broader perspective on the far-right in Australia, as well as the ability to see how language and the social dynamics that underplay and undergird this language are changing over time. You can see some of our data sources on the screen, including Facebook data from a number of far-right groups in Australia. Facebook, of course, is notoriously difficult to work with, however, to get data from. Twitter data with over 5 million tweets in one of our recent projects. Gav data with 1.3 million Gav tweets, as they're called, both pre and post their change to the Macedon servers. Gav is a very active space in Australia for the online far-right and the far-right milieu. And it's a space that's grown enormously during the COVID period. YouTube, we've recently collected 13 million-plus comments from 21 Australian-associated YouTube channels, as well as telegram. And we're seeing, I think, as in other parts of the world, a movement of the far-right and aligned anti-government conspiratorial groups and social movements onto this encrypted space with the potential for a distillation effect occurring as that happens. And so one of the key findings from our research really parallels that of the border terrorist literature. And that is that sociality is a key driving characteristic of online right-wing extremist environments and news. So this is a word cloud that really is just a visual aid. It just looks at the frequency of terms in our Gav data, which is historical, from 2019 up to 2020. And what you can see is real prevalence of words such as people and like and white. And these are words that convey a pervading sense of social connectivity across shared values, interests, and norms within this online community here in Gav. And this is a real space where in-group humor, satire, visual imagery, and in-group language really reinforce these social connections. This environment and this use of language and satire, et cetera, really provides users with a real sense of belonging and identity. And this helps them to feel part of a movement, feel something that is bigger than themselves. And you can see from the meme on the right, which is drawn from our work on HN, now Aikun, the Australian image of Brendan Tarrant, the Christchurch terrorist perpetrator and who was from Australia. And it's really used to glorify the perpetrator in attack and kind of draw on in-group humor around Australian humorous characteristics. And so this socially connected space really, as I said, reflects border terrorist literature and the critical role that we know social networks play in helping to engage individuals and moving individuals towards and into extreme ideologies and at times into acts of violence. Our work in this space also highlighted the critical role that emotions can play among users. And what we saw in some of our research on both GAB and Twitter was an interplay of the emotion of anger and the prevalence of anger. Now, often we characterize anger as a really negative emotion, but actually a lot of broader research really highlights how, particularly within social movements, anger can correlate with behaviors of engagement and mobilization and a real sense of agency. And this is definitely one of the key emotions that we saw within this social space. I think another important high-level finding that's really come out in our research over the last couple of years and I think that will be something that we'll talk about today is the interplay between the global and the local amongst the Australian far-right milieu, particularly the globalization and at times a localization of narratives. You can see another word cloud up here made up of GAB posts from the same period that we mentioned before. And you can see just how strongly American politics, American media influences much of this community and the language that they use, in particular their narratives, their terms, their hashtags as well. We're of course making absolutely no statement that the former President Trump is associated in any way with Australia's far-right. It's not. You can see there's another hashtag up there, Ospole as well, which is Australian politics. What we're seeing here instead is the far-right in Australia doing what they always do and the opportunistic using concepts and memes and language and movements from abroad and that are global and reinterpreting them for their own use here in Australia as touchstones. And we have seen a strong importance of American touchstones in that right through. Now this does remain the case still during the COVID pandemic but that has been complicated recently by new local narratives and some new global narratives starting to emerge over the past 24 months. COVID-19 has really driven a localization of narratives that are focused much more on Australian but also on Australian state government level issues. You can see the image up there of the former Premier of New South Wales being shown to look like Sesame Street's Count, counting down the days of lockdown that was actually posted by a militant movement in Australia. And this really affects or reflects again the situation in Australia of public perceptions where during the big lockdowns in Victoria and also in New South Wales, Melbourne and Sydney, we've seen many, many Australians turn more to their state governments and to their federal governments at any time they have in the past and at the same time these militia movements and far-right movements have also turned to state government as well as some of their touchstones for talking about local issues. We've also seen a growth in anti-Semitic sentiment tied to narratives associated with conspiracies and supposed global conspiracies so-called globalists. This already existed of course pre-COVID anti-Semitism has been pervasive in the Australian far-right but COVID has really exacerbated that with the growth of conspiratorial thinking and conspiratorial plots, narratives that have gone out further than just far-right communities. We currently also see a more limited shift to anti-Asian narratives, in particular anti-Chinese and even anti-CCP narratives amongst the far-right in Australia instead of their usual focus on Islam which for many years was a focus on Islam, immigration and terrorism. So the COVID-19 conspiratorial narratives have also had this objectifying effect where they basically framed the Aussie battler, as we call them here, the Australian white man as at the centre of what they see as a global drama, a battle between the forces of good and evil that's writ large on the global stage and it takes on enormous import in their narratives. So along these more traditional narratives of white fragility and white genocide, anti-Semitism, we also noted in our research a sustained increase in the prevalence of conspiratorial thinking and you can see a lexical dispersion plot really highlighting the prevalence of QAnon and associated references. Now I think there are a couple of reasons why this historical data is quite interesting and really sets the scene for our current research. It speaks both to what Julian's already talked about around that localisation and the importance of other narratives, global narratives within an Australian context but also it demonstrates that the prevalence of conspiratorial thinking that we're seeing in our broader database that incorporates YouTube and a broader sampling of Twitter in Australia is that conspiratorial thinking was already prevalent within parts of the internet and parts of the online environment and what we've been examining more recently is the spread of these and the shifting of these kind of conspiratorial narratives and beliefs into more broader public sentiment and essentially what we can see in the meme to the right is that our initial findings from our current research really in line with the emerging scholarship that's also doing work in the kind of pandemic times and is that this presence and this pre-existing presence of conspiratorial thinking really provides opportunities for users and organisations that sit within RenV to align themselves with novel and new communities for purposes of recruitment and even at times potentially mobilisation to violence. So we'll end there, our short presentation, that's really our high-level overview of recent findings in the Australian RenV landscape and looking forward to having the discussion and responding to some of your questions as well. Terrific, thanks, Lisa and Julian and I will have questions, I promise but I'm going to turn it over back to the same time zone as me but a little bit further north to Amir who's going to talk about India from the perspective of Canada, so I mean where he's situated but I know we're going to hear about India here. So I'll turn it over to you, Amir, thank you very much. Great, thank you, thanks for the invite and thanks to Alistair for organising. I'm just going to talk a bit about some of our research that I've been doing with the co-author of mine, Shweta Desi on kind of Hindu nationalism as it plays out in India but in the question period we can get into some of the ways in which it's trickling basically into the kind of transnational space as well. We have a few reports out already and one coming out with resolve hopefully in a couple months or in a couple weeks. In terms of kind of the broader, I think, theoretical frame for us it really goes back to what Stanley Tambia wrote a while back and with a particular reference to Sri Lanka, this notion of the majority with a minority complex and I think that as playing out quite a bit today in parts of India, in the internationalist movement in Myanmar and Sri Lanka and you could probably argue that the great replacement theory in the far right is very much along those kinds of lines as well. This idea that even though you're from a population perspective, from a structural privilege perspective, you're a majority in the country that you're still living with a kind of embattled mentality that you're eventually going to be taken over that these kinds of demographics are often shared. The Hindu population is decreasing, the Muslim population is increasing over time and eventually the kind of stature of Hindu population in India is going to be overturned and so there's this constant kind of demographic panic in internationalist circles that I think is important to pay attention to. In terms of, I'm not gonna spend too much time on this but in terms of the ideological background, of course, people like Savarkar's writings are quite important. His very small pamphlet that you can still find online, Hindutva, who is a Hindu basically outlines the broader thinking around this movement which I'll get into shortly. In terms of the kind of organizational framework, the RSS is basically dominant, the way in which a lot of these ideas have been operationalized and how they've evolved over time. You see Savarkar on the right there and then Golwakar, who was one of the early leaders of the RSS on the left and I think they're thinking in their ways of reaching out in many ways to kind of fascist groups in Italy and kind of fascist movements in Western Europe at the time is also quite important in how they started to think about the Hindu identity as largely one of race, right? And one of the key kind of takeaways with Hindu nationalism that I think a lot of people still confuse is that the notion of Hinduism as a religion is actually just one of the aspects of Hindunis or Hindutva that these guys talk about, right? It's not necessarily a religious only movement. Hinduism as an ism is only one attribute of broader Hindu identity which they think includes things like geographical unity, racial features, common culture and that this all harkens back to when the true Aryans really settled India at the dawn of history and declared a kind of Hindu nation. There's an ethnic racial component to the nation which is very much tied up with the territory of India whoever lived in India, ancestrally whoever pays loyalty to India as a nation or the Hindu nation is kind of fits within that fold which is important because it's not necessarily the kind of nation that we talk about, right? Which is largely around community or citizenship or social contract for Hindu nationalists. It's really none of those things except a kind of ethnic and racial identity of what it means to be part of this movement. What's interesting though is that the kind of notion of racial purity that you find in far right movements, for example is not really present in Savarkar's writings, right? So for example, I couldn't become a white person whereas for Savarkar you could become a Hindu if you lived in India, if you paid homage to the country as the fatherland, as a sacred land. And so he argued that these other minorities in the country seeks Muslims, Christians, et cetera if they paid allegiance to the Hindu nation if they were patriotic, if they understood kind of the racial and ethnic element to this country they would be considered Hindu, right? They were kind of originally Hindu, he would say and that these later identities are conversions that happened because of outside influence and colonialism and so on. So everyone who kind of lived in the Indian state structure is primarily a Hindu in the way he understood it in a kind of racial ethnic way not necessarily a religious way. So there's a kind of interesting difference there between Hindu nationalism as it was initially thought out with a lot of these other far right movements that we've grown accustomed to. In terms of how these ideas are operationalized as I mentioned the RSS is key. It is the largest volunteer organization on the planet with about 20,000 regular branches and estimates around 2.5 to 6 million followers. And they have quite a large kind of international wing as well. This is kind of what the Sang Parivar or the RSS family looks like. Of course the political wing that we're accustomed to is the BJP currently under the leadership of Narendra Modi. But there's also these other kind of social movements and social movement organizations that are part of it primarily the Vishwa Hindu Parishad which has under it two very important wings. The youth wing the Bajrang Dal which is very active today locally and internationally in terms of how it pushes activism on college campuses and things like that. The Durkavahini which is the women's wing also quite active. And so a lot of the agitation that you saw for example around the coronavirus and anti-Muslim sentiment there was led by some of these kind of youth wings of the movement. I'm not gonna spend too much time on this but two kind of key events are important I think for understanding where we're at today. One of them of course is the destruction of the Babri Mosque. Internationalists claimed very early on that it was the actual birthplace of the God Rama that there was a pre-existing temple on the site of where the Babri Mosque was currently situated and that you really need to rebuild the temple on this site. And so the RSS in particular started a massive campaign to rebuild the temple in 1984. They got eventually tired of waiting. And in 1992, internationalists kind of marched on the site and broke the mosque, destroyed the mosque completely. Riots soon followed, about 2,000 people were killed. It was the worst kind of or the largest number of people who died in a kind of riot since partition, right? Since independence from the UK, from the British. 10 years later, a group of Hindu pilgrims are coming down from the site and the train stops at a kind of a city with a large Muslim population. The scuffle breaks out. Somehow the train is set on fire and a lot of people on the train end up dead. Muslims are blamed for the killing of these religious pilgrims and it results in about two months of mob violence, basically killing and looting and raping of Muslims starts to happen. About 1,000 people are killed, mostly Hindus, sorry, mostly Muslims. About 2,000 Muslim homes are destroyed and 150,000 people are displaced. The individual in charge of the Gujarat at the time is of course Narendra Modi who is the current prime minister and he's had to kind of answer for this lack of action on his part and silence on his part for, and that continues even today. So these kind of key moments of 1992 and 2002, pre-social media, pre what we're used to kind of thinking about today just shows that a lot of this communal sentiment and communal violence, anti-Muslim violence does go back quite a ways, but a lot of it has now been accelerated and made much worse in the kind of broader social media context. And I'll talk about three quick case studies in terms of how this plays out today. One of them, as many of you probably remember was the 2020 Delhi riots. This came about because something called the National Register of Citizens was pushed in the province of Assam to basically register everybody in the province as citizens. And what kind of quickly became obvious was that about 1.9 million people could not prove their citizenship, right? They didn't have documents. They were largely asylum seekers from other countries and they couldn't prove their citizenship. And so the Citizenship Amendment Bill was introduced to kind of fast track citizenship for these individuals who couldn't prove their citizenship or didn't have documents in place. That included basically Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Christians from Bangladesh, Pakistan and Afghanistan. You might notice something is missing here and that is the Muslims, right? Muslims were not mentioned in the Citizenship Amendment Bill, partly under the argument that if you were a Muslim from Bangladesh, Pakistan and Afghanistan, you can just go back there, right? Not understanding that these were largely minority Muslim communities, the Shia or the Ahmadiyya who were fleeing persecution in Muslim-majority countries, but they weren't mentioned in the Citizenship Amendment Bill, which obviously resulted in mass protest. The fear, of course, and this was pushed by Modi at the time as a campaign slogan, was that the National Register of Citizens was going to be applied nationally across 22 provinces. And there was a real fear that if 1.9 million people can't prove their citizenship in one province, what is that going to look like when applied to 22 provinces? And how many people are going to be disenfranchised? What is the place of the Muslim community going to look like nationally if this is pushed nationally? The riots and the protests were immediately reinterpreted and framed by a lot of RSS-linked Twitter accounts, Facebook pages, WhatsApp groups, TikTok videos as largely a betrayal, jihadist-minded activists who are trying to kind of destroy Indian integrity or it's just kind of sovereignty, and that there needs to be a kind of pushback from the Hindu-majority against these kind of protests. And so a lot of this was reinterpreted and pushed through social media to kind of say that this fairly legitimate protest of what is the place of our citizenship in this country was reinterpreted as a kind of betrayal to the state. The second case study is corona jihad, which there's been some written on it so far, and we have a report on it too, which I can send you if you send me a message. In March, 2020, a kind of large gathering of the Tablighi Jamaat happened in their headquarters in Delhi at the Nizmadeen Marquez. It was basically a gathering of preachers from 40 countries who came to India basically at the start of the pandemic. They all went back to their countries of origin and obviously the kind of meeting became reported as a major hotspot for the COVID spread. This was immediately reinterpreted from the very beginning as a kind of sinister plot by Indian Muslims to basically infect the population on purpose, right? And so it was pushed on social media, it was pushed on TikTok videos and Facebook posts as basically something that the Indian Muslims are secretly plotting to kind of bring about this mass spread of coronavirus in the country. Corona jihad started trending on Twitter in India, Tablighi virus started trending in India, and the kind of steady flow of misinformation and hate speech on basically all platforms was a bit insane. One of the kind of, the three of the major themes that we noticed, and I could send you the support again if you send me a message, that Muslims are kind of immune to the virus or they believe themselves to be immune to the virus and so they're a bit more reckless with how they behave. They believe that COVID is a divine punishment against non-Muslims and that they're kind of deliberately spreading COVID around the country. So there were videos on TikTok, for example, Muslims kind of taking wads of money and rubbing it all over their mouths and then trying to spend it in the city and so on and basically arguing that they're spreading this virus on purpose. The third case study I'll leave you with is what was known as love jihad which is a conspiracy theory that was pushed for quite a while now that Muslim men are secretly or are tricking Hindu women into marriage in order to convert them into Islam. This largely started or spread as a kind of online conspiracy theory but then started to have real world consequences. Several BJP run states, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh actually passed anti-conversion legislation with penalties of jail and jail time. If kind of evidence of this was found, RSS linked groups, largely the Bajrang Dal that I talked about earlier, the youth wing of the RSS basically sent out advisories to schools, colleges, spread out pamphlets and so on, warning parents and warning young girls about this kind of sinister plot by the Muslim community in the country. Hotlines were set up that people could call and report suspicious activity, suspicious conversion activity that the Muslims are engaging in and on and on and on. And so this notion of kind of this demographic panic, this majority with a minority complex, I think has been quite prevalent in India over time as we've seen, but also accelerating now, largely through different social media platforms. So I will leave it there. Happy to take your questions and comments. Thank you. Perfect, thanks Amar. So I just want to at this point remind the audience that you can submit questions through the Q and A function. And I'm going to ask some questions of my own for a little while and then we will turn to the audience questions. So as they get filtered in, that will be sent my way. So please do populate that Q and A with your questions so that we can get to them. So thanks, all of you that was really, really fascinating and I have so many questions. It's hard to, it's really hard to know where to begin but I want to start with this by picking up on a concept that Amar used a couple of times around demographic panic and it seems like one of the through lines globally that we keep hearing again and again whether it's through conspiracy theories like the Great Replacement or White Genocide or this Love Jihad kind of battle is this issue of demographic panic or concern about demographic replacement from white or Western or Christian civilization though kind of lenses. And I wonder if you could each just talk a little bit about that. I mean, Amar, you just did, but maybe is that how connected is that globally to themes like the Great Replacement? How organic is it to individual nations? And then finally, I guess related to that is how much of this is about actual racial identity and how much of it is about territory in a sense of entitlement to space, right? Because I see those things as so deeply related this idea that certain populations belong in this space and there's somehow the sense of threat about it but I wonder how that gets refracted in the kinds of work that each of you are doing. So maybe we can turn to the Australian case first. Elise and Julian, anything about this idea of demographic panic or territory compared to race or that intersection would be great to hear. It's a really important issue in Australia and you may know that when Brenton Tarrant, the man from New South Wales perpetrated the Christchurch attack, he distributed his manifesto online prior to that attack and that manifesto was called the Great Replacement. And he drew on Renee Camus' concept of the grand replacement and drew on that fear of being swamped in Australia as he put it mostly by Muslims, people who he believed didn't belong. It's a concept that we see right through the far right and as Elise said before, I think during the presentation it's really their defining concept in Australia, this notion of white supremacy, sometimes white nationalism, deep racism and a sense that other non-white people don't belong in Australia. Being a settler country based on colonialism, with our own indigenous history that goes back 50,000 years or more, it's a rather untenable position for them because white people have really only been in Australia for a little over 200 years. But the narratives they put forth online are that white people built Australia, it was built by their hard work, by their sweat, therefore it should now be taken away. And we see that with their narratives about China and the Communist Party in China and saying that China will eventually invade Australia and all buy up Australia or invest in Australia and take away that ability for white people to have control over space. One thing we do see though is that that particular narrative is not very strategically useful for them. We don't see them being able to recruit large numbers of people from the public through that white supremacy or that sort of demographic loss narrative. Instead they really have to push their narrative out into other areas to get traction amongst the broader public. They have to talk about something like Islamic immigration and fear of terrorism. They have to talk about coronavirus and fear of conspiracies and overstepping and overreaching by government. Then they get traction with the public for a time but then when they come back to this deeply racist sort of white supremacist narrative, they tend to lose that public traction again. So it's a difficult one for them. Yeah, I mean we have, when we looked at it empirically in the space, it was really interesting at the beginning of our data collection we saw a number of posts that really pushed this idea and they had a picture of a young girl, white girl that talked about white genocide effectively. And then we saw links to a website that talked very much that had a film of you kind of flying over Australia really focused on that idea that Julian was talking about around the fact that there's a difference between settlers and of white Aussies who built this country up and everyone else who is a migrant. Obviously with a complete absence of engagement around indigenous issues. But actually when we looked at engagement as opposed to just pure presence and pushing it out through bots, et cetera, these kind of posts weren't actually very well engaged. They were really relying on the fact that GAB doesn't have the kind of algorithm that Twitter has, for example. And when we actually looked at how many people were actually kind of seeking to touch this and do something with it, we didn't see as Julian said, that kind of strong engagement. So I think it's important around a core narrative. And it's something that allows them to have a touchstone of their identity that they can build on. But in terms of a recruitment tool and an engagement tool, that's a completely different space. And I think that's a really important finding around the difference between what a group might hold close internally and what they're actually going to be using in this very social space to engage with new audiences and those on the outer wings, et cetera. Yeah, I mean, it's something I've been wrestling with for a while with my work on Sri Lanka and elsewhere. It's just, the way it applies, the way it plays out in parts of Europe is also interesting because I think there's this kind of effective globalization of very real consequences of globalization, demographic changes that are happening. Toronto now where I live, or Ontario where I live is I think 50% minority. And so, there are kind of questions that are rising of all this very rapid changes are happening over the last few decades. Since the 80s in particular, and that kind of white identity, the consequences for white identity aren't really being unpacked, right? At least when we talk about the kind of Western Europe or North America. The difference I think in India and Myanmar and Sri Lanka, of course, is that this is coming from people in power, right? And in a kind of real governmental way, right? And so, for them, they kind of turn on and off or at least try to this communal sentiment largely around election cycles whenever they needed to work. And they're finding over time, much like Trump found, is that you can't really just turn it on and turn it off any time you feel like it. Once you let the communalism genie out of the bottle, I'm mixing all kinds of metaphors here, but you can't really put it back, right? You can't really put it back. And so, once you let it out, it kind of has consequences on its own and it moves on its own. But there is something to be said of very rapid demographic shifts that are happening and how not just white people on the far right, but like every day people are kind of wrestling with these identities. I remember interviews with a lot of former far right and they often talk about things like white civil rights and they'll talk about very mundane cultural artifacts like why is James Bond black, that sort of thing. And so, they point to these kind of issues as kind of building their overall evidence base that something about white privilege, something about white status and the societies being eroded and we're not allowed to talk about it, right? And so, I think that kind of anxiety is very much prevalent, but I think it plays out very differently in some of these countries. So, I want to drill down on this just for a minute more because I'm hearing several different themes here that kind of cross both of these. Sorry, I'm just going to hang up my phone here so it doesn't continue to ring in the background. You know, one of the themes that I hear echoed is this idea of power and something being taken away, a kind of fear of something being taken away a loss of power, a loss of control, loss of status. But of course, we also see very strong scientific racism narratives that are really about dimension, about racial identity, about intermarriage, right? This idea of conversion, right? Some of those kinds of themes. Do you see those as the same or are they, you know, is one a foil for the other? You know, are we, or what we hear people afraid they're going to lose status? But what they're really afraid of is, you know, are some of these ideas of invasion and infection. And I feel like there's a lot of mixed messages coming across here that sometimes don't get fully disentangled. And maybe it's just too messed up and mixed up to disentangle it. But I would love to hear you reflect on the way that you see those narratives come across. I mean, actually, in our report, we really highlighted those two things. This idea of white empowerment and the creation of a strong us with a dehumanized other. And we actually like disaggregated this dehumanized other into different types of groups, all of which are, you know, when you think back to Mary Douglas and how ideas of purity and pollution, you know, this real, like, a sense that we might be strong, but we're still under threat because you need to create that us and them.  So no matter how strong we are, there's this like people coming at you constantly trying to undermine you. So I really think actually they're really important parallel themes. I'd argue that you can't really have one without the other. Otherwise, you know, effectively, you need them to make this toxic.  And so I do actually believe that it's a really important point. And I think that you actually have to have really strong parallel narratives of strength and horror and destruction. Yeah, and I'll make a point there too. I think Cynthia, that's a really important question around scientific racism in Australia because to give some context to American audiences who might not be filled with Australian history, you know, until the 1950s, we had a policy in Australia called the White Australia policy, which meant that you couldn't immigrate to Australia unless you were basically a Northern European, better yet a Anglo-Saxon European. And there were all sorts of mechanisms were in place to prevent non-white immigration into the country. And that was partly due to that geographical anxiety that Australia's had since it was formed as a penal settlement of basically being a European outpost in the wrong part of the world. You know, we're surrounded by Asian countries and we're in the Far East, but we're a European society and that's deeply, deeply entrenched in the Australian psyche as much today as it was 100 years ago. It just comes out in different ways. But the interesting thing is that, you know, once that white Australia policy was overturned, that form of scientific racism you talk about, we don't see that a lot in our research. It definitely exists, you know, we do have white supremacists groups in Australia, but they don't get a lot of traction. Lisa and I did a project some years ago where we actually looked at a de-radicalization project that was happening on Facebook amongst far-right extremists. And we saw the opposite. We saw people were being drawn into the far-right because of that perception of loss of prestige and loss of status. And that might lead them to having lip service around scientific racism and this sense of superiority in eight in the genes. But it was very thin. Some of the people who were being talked to on Facebook through chats to de-radicalize them from their beliefs were actually saying, oh, well, I guess I start to think a bit differently about my thoughts when I talk to my wife and say, well, why? Well, she's from Thailand or she's Chinese or something like that.  And you scratch a bit further if I don't actually think that at all they just have this sense of lack of prestige and lack of status in society. And so this is almost like a facade they're putting up or something like that to try and give themselves a sense of strength. So it's a really complex area in Australia. Yeah, no, I think I was going to talk about Berger as well. But what's interesting about his idea or the kind of broader social psychological literature on in-groups and out-groups is yet the stronger your identification becomes with your in-group, it immediately follows that there's a whole host of consequences for how you view the out-group, right? You tend to view them as more homogenous, not particularly having any nuance or diversity within the out-group. You tend to view them as kind of emotionally driven as opposed to rationally driven, whereas your in-group is very much diverse in thinking and rational, et cetera. And so the question becomes like why what mechanism, I mean, this goes back to radicalization researchers, what mechanisms kind of push heightened in-group identification, right? And how does that actually come about? Because that tends to impact your worldview, how you kind of view the threat to your in-group and the justifications for behavior towards the out-group kind of naturally follow. That could be racial, that could be ethnic, that could be around nationhood, as we're seeing with Hindutva or in Myanmar. But how that kind of largely comes about, I think, is still something we're struggling with. Great. Well, thanks for tolerating my drill down there onto some of the deep ideological questions that I'm really curious about. I want to turn for just a few minutes before we open it up to Q&A a little bit, away from the ideology, per se, towards some of the more strategic and tactical questions within these movements and how they might vary. And really, I want to ask two questions. So I'm just going to throw them both out there and you can decide which one you want to ask. One is about this balance between offline and online worlds and the use of technologies. So one of the things we're seeing here, of course, in the States, is not only the post-organizational kinds of online radicalization increasing, but still the persistence of old-school tactics like paper flyering and, of course, a lot of offline engagement in rallies and protests and the violence itself. So how do you see that offline and online interaction working in each of these countries and across these movements? And the second is really about the use of violence itself. And if you could talk just a little bit about whether you see violence within these movements or groups as being kind of a means to an end or as a kind of valorized principle more broadly. And I think that has implications for the final thing I'll ask afterward, which is about interventions. So I'll let you pick up on any of those parts of it that you'd like to address, but something about violence and about online and offline worlds. I'm changing my mood, yeah. A quick comment on offline online world, Cynthia. In Australia, we are seeing a uptick of stickering and post-ring amongst the far right and the far left at the moment in urban centers. I think that's partly to do with COVID, but also some of those stickering campaigns from the far right explicitly state, almost this ironic position, which is that they say once upon a time like two years ago, the online space was this great space for propaganda because it was open and accessible and you could say what you liked. But now they've pushed so much off these platforms to these encrypted spaces like Telegram where they don't have the reach that they once had. They're moving to the post-ring and the stickering. So it's ironic really that once upon a time the internet was seen as this free space apart from the offline world where you could say what you like. Now it's very much the opposite in these stickering campaigns where they're going back to the streets and back to putting up posters because they feel like they're being constrained more and more online. I'd say that, yeah. I think it's also that sociality is such a big driver. And you know, this is about identity belonging, connection and if you have opportunities to actually meet people in the real world, as you know, the pandemic sold us, you know, social connections are really important. And I don't like, I think that as much as we understand the online space, I think the online space is also full of anything you want it to be full of. If we go searching for these communities and for these users, they are there and it's more about their reach and their impact and their effect and particularly their impact into the real world because people can at times say what they like more openly even without an anonymity and an online space without ramification. And it takes something else to actually meet in person to stick at, et cetera, et cetera. And so I think that the real world will always be important, but they're so interconnected. And just thing on a quick one on violence is that, you know, the use of violence as a tactic is so effective. You know, it is such an effective tool of communication to raise your profile, to gain attention, to aggrandise yourself and your movement and your narrative. If you are seeking to gain the world media and the world attention, then unfortunately violence remains an incredibly strong and useful tool of communication, which points always to our resilience for societies to respond effectively and to reduce that utility of the tool. Yeah, I mean, what I found interesting and this is true kind of for jihadist groups as well is how they frame violence depending on the circumstance between defensive violence and offensive violence. So a group like ISIS was very much open about its offensive intentions, whereas a lot of Hindutva groups, a lot of the violence in Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and even some of the far right maybe is often framed as necessarily defensive, right? It's your defending the slow erosion of kind of purity in your identity by these immigrant hordes and things that are coming in from abroad. And even though it's offensive violence, often it's often justified or rationalised as defending one's in group, a kind of necessarily defending one's in group or an obligation to defend one's in group. So that's always been kind of interesting to me in terms of how they frame threat and what things become framed as threat, right? We saw, for example, or we routinely find in Canada, a lot of these internationalist individuals will show up at places that you never think they're going to show up at these kind of very localised school board meetings and things like that and kind of cause a scene or municipal council meetings and cause a scene because some mosque in the region got some rights they didn't agree with and then that becomes a whole thing. And then it gets fed into and kind of feeds into your second question, which is the online offline, is that these very localised events, which in a pre-social media landscape might have lived and died in these local communities and now get woven into kind of transnational media communities, right? And so all of a sudden something that happens in a very tiny city in Ontario is on telegram and it's being talked about by communities in India, right? Which is and fed into kind of the grievance narratives. And so that's something that's new, I think. I mean, as we talked about, this has always been going on even before the internet, but I think the kind of how these narratives are fed into transnational grievances, I think is something new and the speed at which that happens is something new. Perfect. Thanks to all of you. I want to turn before we conclude today to the question of what policymakers can do, but I'm going to place that on hold for a minute to turn to some of the questions that are being populated from the audience because I want to make sure that we get time to get to those. So I'm just going to ask those in the order in which they came in, unless I can figure out a way to cluster them while you're talking. But I'll start with the first one that I saw, which is about counter narratives. So the question is, are there effective counter narratives being developed in India and Australia? And is there any evidence that political personalities who offer counter narratives can gain support? So what are you seeing on the ground in terms of effectiveness of counter narratives in either India or Australia? I can start quickly. I mean, I think there's efforts in the diaspora communities and there's efforts trans-nationally to kind of push back. There's a lot of Muslim activism to try to push back against this stuff, but in terms of counter narratives, as we traditionally understand them, I don't think there's much. And even the ones that are present that I can think about, I don't think have had much impact in terms of how they've played out on the ground. The challenge, of course, with places like India and Sri Lanka and Myanmar is a lot of these politics are very local, right? And they just happen to reach our radar kind of almost filtered through far-right internationalist channels and so on. But a lot of this is local. And I don't know that much of this counter narrative CVE stuff is really being played out locally. They're kind of being pushed online. But they're not really trickling down to where it matters, I think. Yeah, I think that counter narratives is a complicated area. And really is what you're talking about, Cynthia, about policymaking and the evaluations of effective counter narratives are a few and far between. And I often feel particularly as the right-wing extreme space here in Australia is seeking to align itself with other movements and communities, particularly through the use of conspiratorial thinking, that as soon as you try to counter that, you're effectively playing into the narrative itself and the expectation that everyone is against us. And so I think that is public communication. And we have seen public communication to reach out and moving away from terms like anti-vax, vaccine hesitancy, giving space to manage conflicting relationships. I mean, I feel that's perhaps a more effective space than seeking to propagate a narrative that is very top down. And as Zordi said, much of this comes from bottom up. Yeah, you might want to have a look at some of the narratives that were created in Australia some time back in the X or Y power program, which were very much broadcasting narratives to children about white supremacy and racism. They don't work particularly well, as Lisa's mentioned, that broadcasting and that attempt to ideologically shift someone has been shown timely again to not be particularly effective and it can also entrench these people in their belief systems and feeling under threat and so on and challenged. In Australia, I think there's acknowledgement in government that the far right, the actual far right is quite a small phenomenon and brought large federal or even state-based broadcasting campaigns against their narratives can aggrandise that movement and almost legitimise that movement to some degree. And as Lisa's indicated, I think at the moment a lot of the messaging that's going on at a state level in Victoria and New South Wales is really focused not so much on the white supremacy angle, but those aligned communities such as the wellness community or the yoga community or some religious denominations that are becoming conspiratorial and anti-vax and aligning with some of the far right anti-government conspiracy theories. That's a space where a significant amount of government counter narratives has been happening and has been highly effective. We're now at something like 95% vaccination rate in New South Wales, which goes to show just how small these groups and these aligned movements actually are compared to national samples. Perfect. Thank you. Just moving on to a question about the impact of ongoing local and global dynamics. So we heard a little bit about COVID and about some of the other common global dynamics that circulate, but there's a question here about whether and how narratives about the Taliban's seizure of Afghanistan have taken root among the Australian and in the Indian far right. So how is that being discussed and has it been a mobilizing tool so far in any way? I could start if you like. There's absolutely some incorporation of what happened in Afghanistan into far right content. I mean, I'm not so sure about how it's being talked about in India, but I know from other work on the far right that this idea that a manly men re-established their presence in Afghanistan kind of declared an emirate is often held up as, why can't white people do this? So there's a bizarre kind of admiration for groups like the Taliban, al-Qaeda, even ISIS within elements of the far right that sees them as truly committed individuals who are willing to fight and die for something they believe in and who have shown that doing that helps you establish an actual governance structure, which white nationalists want to establish in the white ethno state. And this goes back even in the early days, I think, even with people like what's his face, Tom Metzger and others who've often praised some of these accomplishments by jihadist groups and so on as potential things to follow. So that kind of stuff happened in Telegram, in particular after the Taliban seized Afghanistan. And so that rhetoric was quite important. Our recent research on Telegram is very similar, I think, to yours in that we've seen a series of narratives around male strength and warrior ethos amongst the far right groups in Australia, including National Socialist Network and others. And it's this dynamic around societies that divide their scholars and thinkers away from their fighters, you know, are prone to become decadent and to fall apart and eventually sort of sink into liberalism and decay, where a society is at a martial and warrior-based and where men are allowed to be militant, will be strong and will be virile. And the Taliban is held up and his victory is held up amongst Australian far right groups as an example of that. And it is just so ironic in that it was only a year or two ago that Islam and the threat of Islam, particularly the threat of Islamic terrorism, was really used by the far right in Australia as its prime mobilising narrative. You know, in our earlier work looking at Gabbond, looking at Twitter, that was really the dominant narrative and that has dropped away enormously in Australia in the last sort of 24 months to be replaced almost by this celebration of strong martial apparently, you know, Islamic cultures such as the Emirate and Afghanistan. Perfect. Thank you. So we're not going to run out of questions here. So I'm going to ask a couple of regional specific ones. So first I'll turn to a cluster of questions that came in for Amar and then I'll turn to some Australia ones. So Amar, there's a couple of questions here about the role of the diaspora. And they're slightly, they're framed slightly differently. So I'll just read them and read the group of questions that are for you in general. So first one says, can you talk about the role of the diaspora in furthering the RSS objectives and narratives? But also another question says, you know, the RSS to influence the diaspora, especially or including in the U.S., how does that impact lobbying and culture wars? And do you see RSS aligned groups interacting with right wing groups in Asia as well? So some of these kind of questions about the diaspora and how these groups work across borders. And then I'll just throw you the other specific regional one for you, which is, how does the issue of accountability or non-accountability for Modi affect the propensity for right wing violence in India? So really one question about leadership and accountability and messaging from the top down kind of, and how that leads to or affects violence and the other about these questions about the diaspora. So easy questions. No, I think the diaspora is huge, right? I think the diaspora influence in what we're seeing with Hindu nationalism trans-nationally is massive. There are groups like the Hindu Swayamsavaksang in the U.S. in Canada and the international wing of the RSS or linked to the international wing of the RSS, which have been organizing protests, have been pushing back against any kind of perceived slight against Hindu identity in the diaspora, any kind of Muslim activism against Hindu nationalism in India and so on. And we know that the famous kind of howdy-mody event in Houston, which was attended by 50,000 people, including President Trump, was kind of an important event to show the way in which kind of, again, this kind of heightened in-group ethnic racial identity forms bonds between other groups that are also elevating these kinds of in-group identities, right? And so there's a kind of mutual respect there. For you, you know, you may be a different ethnicity, a different racial identity, but we're still fighting for the same thing. In Canada, as I mentioned, a lot of these movements, it isn't huge in Canada. There's like one guy really in one organization, but he's very loud. But he shows up, him and his people show up at things like municipal government meetings. There was one recently where mosques in Peel region were allowed to broadcast a call to prayer, for example, during the month of Ramadan.  And so there is a kind of diaspora presence on the ground, in particular of kind of this international agitation. In the online space, it's equally kind of profound, right? You have the famous BJP IT cell, which is a kind of network of trolls and people who kind of occupy the online space.  If you're a critical of the government at all, you kind of get harassed quite easily. I remember when our ISD report came out, you know, I've studied ISIS, I've studied neo-Nazis, and I've never gotten as much hate speech as I did when this one report came out about Hindutva, right? And so the kind of online presence is pretty serious. In terms of the Modi one, I mean, I think that's fundamentally accurate. I think once an individual like him, who, you know, a former member of the RSS, former RSS activist becomes the prime minister, you're going to have much like you saw with the Trump administration, a kind of emboldening of the movement and this kind of social movement that used to function when they weren't in power now function as if they're basically an arm of the government, right? And so a lot of the violence that's happening on the ground is directed off and by ministers, people in power in the state apparatus that go unpunished. But, you know, a massive amount of reporting has shown that a lot of this is driven by people who are in positions of power. Police don't do anything. They stand by and watch as mosques are being burned, etc. And so I think the proximity, having someone like him in power has huge consequences on the ground locally. All right, thank you. I will turn to one of the Australia-specific ones, which is about gender. The question is, are women playing a major role in Australian domestic extremism? Can you talk a bit about the issue of gender? I think gender is quite specific and you have to address it from different times of extremism. In the far right, extremist kind of online space. So we're definitely women or all users who seem to identify in that way. But in terms of huge influence, I think it's important to note that one of the things that we saw was a huge anti-feminist narrative within this kind of milieu. And a real sense of antagonism and a real tension. And I think it is, I think other researchers have pointed to this critical tension within this kind of milieu around how you balance the desire to protect the white woman and equally not give voice to the white woman. To what extent is that protection empowering? To what extent is a woman taking ownership in this space problematic and creates these issues? It's not that women don't exist and aren't a part of the space. But in terms of having major influence, particularly in the research that we were seeing, it's more the role of women and an anti-feminist kind of assessment and narrative and concerns around what the role of women should be and what it looks like, etc. that is kind of being pushed. And as Julian and Augustine alluded to this, we saw it in our previous work, this real strength around in terms of a pushing narrative of male strength, a male empowerment, a male mental health, etc., etc., as opposed to a focus on kind of femininity in females. Terrific. Sorry. Trying to find the mute button there. There's a cluster here of questions about economic issues and so I'll just read them as they come and then anyone can take it. So there's really two questions here. One is whether some of the anti-immigrant narratives are linked to economic insecurity. So how much of this is about sort of they are coming, they are taking our jobs, it says. And the other is can you speak to the real or perceived socioeconomic disenfranchisement of groups that leads to the sense of loss of prestige or status and resentment against minority groups that appear to be doing well. So, you know, I guess on the one hand it's how much of this is about rhetoric and how much of this is about perceived disenfranchisement. Where do we see these issues of economic insecurity real or perceived playing into the narratives or the anti-immigrant discourse? We do have some data from a previous study to support this. We did a study some time back looking at Google search terms in Australia and where far-right extremist Google search terms were located in the state of New South Wales. And without talking about the regions, we did find a correlation between your classic post-industrial white working class economically marginalized areas and what appeared to be online far-right activity. And that would fit with the economic deprivation thesis that I think we're all familiar with for far-right in places like North America and Western Europe and so on. But the reality is more complex, I think, also in Australia in that we also see movements of groups like the Proud Boys and the National Socialist Network and others that are decidedly middle class and urban, young, well-groomed men for the most part looking to create what they call parallel societies where they get jobs in law or government or where it might be and wait for the opportunity for an accelerationist type action to create a grab for power. They don't seem to be attached at all to this economic marginalization, much more about identity in a much better sense of prestige and so on. I think, again, one of the differences between Australia perhaps and some other parts of the world where we have far-right movements at the moment is that Australia has been fundamentally very wealthy for the last 30 years. We haven't, until COVID came, we hadn't actually had a recession for 30 years, old generation had been born and grown up in prosperity. That's largely because of our trading relationship with China and Asia. And that has meant we haven't had that erosion of the middle class that you get in some places. It certainly has happened, but not maybe to the extent of some other parts of the world. And so if that economic deprivation thinks this is correct in Australia, that could be one of the reasons why the far-right while quite noisy in Australia and active are not necessarily as large as you might expect. Yeah, I think it's definitely important. I think it goes back to a lot of studies in radicalization literature, for example, that looks at the specificity problem, which is a lot of people suffer economically. A lot of people are going through these economic difficulties. It's the question of how is it being interpreted and through what lens is it being interpreted? And so this is applied to a lot of my interviews with jihadists, for example, where they'll say things like, because of societal discrimination, they're not going to let me get ahead. And so it's a kind of anticipation of future economic disenfranchisement and how the lens of discrimination comes into interpret your kind of economic potential. And I think that applies to the far-right as well, that it's not simply that people are economically disenfranchised, but how that fits into the, how that can be woven into a kind of narrative, whether you blame the Jewish community or whether you blame immigrants or whatnot. I think it has to be filtered through the kind of some sort of ideological interpretation for it to have mobilizing potential in that sort of way. So by itself, I don't think it really does anything. There's a Canadian incident during the COVID pandemic where because of lockdown, because of quarantine, his economic livelihood, his small business shutdown, all of these kinds of consequences happened to him as Chuck was going to be repossessed. By those things, but those things by itself mean nothing, but because it was reinterpreted through kind of the great research conspiracy theory and is COVID a hoax and who's really behind it, that made him kind of drive across the country to try to confront the Prime Minister of Canada on why are these things happening to me? So it has to be, I think, filtered in some sort of way, otherwise by itself it doesn't really do anything. Great, thanks so much, Amar. So we have about five minutes left in the Q&A portion of this before I hand this back over to Alastair. So I'm going to come back to what I promised I would, which is the concluding thoughts about policy or about solutions, really, and interventions. So knowing that we have an audience that includes a lot of policy folks or a lot of folks who are on the decision-making side of things, if you had a magic wand of some kind and you could just wave it and create some sort of policy action either at the national level or at the global level, and it could be on intervention, it could be on the security side. One or one or two or three things that each of you really think are needed and would really help. And it doesn't have to be the magic wand kind of thing. It can be an actual, but feel free to think big. I'm curious to know where you would go with this. And you have about 90 seconds to convey your thoughts on that. So sorry to make it tight on time, but I'll just let you go in whichever order you want. Okay, well, 90 seconds it is. My wish list, okay, what is it? One, let's talk about what we mean by success in this space. It's really important. The presence of violence is not an indication of failure. So let's think about how we evaluate what we do from the get-go with clear understandings of how we're measuring success. And I think the second thing that is that we talk about a lot with our policy makers here is the importance of disassociating the threat of violence from specific and often very small groups with broader issues of erosion of liberal democracy and social cohesion. And by disaggregating them and not subsuming them to violent extremism, we can have more nuanced messaging, communication and programs. All right, 90 seconds, maybe less. I would say that I'm not going to talk about social media moderation, nor am I going to talk about economics. I would follow on the least by saying that social cohesion in Australia, I think, should be seen as not so much a quest for harmony, but instead how well a society deals with difference and dissidents and whether you're ever to have those conversations ongoing that are part of the democratic situation and model. So social cohesion programs that actually allow people to voice difference and dissidents and create spaces where those voices are civil and engage in the basics. Fundamentals of liberal democracy are really important. I don't think it's about narratives and messaging. I think it's about action, active counter narratives where people do something. And really for me, it comes down to civic engagement programs that allow people to feel like they are paid up stakeholders in whatever local or state or federal level of government they're interested in. Their voices are heard. They have agency. I don't think it's a silver bullet, but I think all of our democracies had much more civil engagement at generations ago than they do today. And it's one of the driving forces of marginalization and radicalization in Australia right now. Yeah, I mean, I agree with all of that. I think the broader issue for me is turning down the temperature a bit. I think a lot of our politics has become made cosmic in a way. I mean, I've said this before is that what used to be kind of very boring policy disagreements have now become kind of us and them in group, out group, kind of good versus evil battles that over the last little while has I think caused a lot of consequences. And so I think turning down the temperature a bit on identity politics and some of that, this kind of identity battles that we're engaged in now, online and offline, I think is a good way to go. I don't know how you do that. Maybe if I had another 90 seconds. But I think that's an important step forward. Terrific. Well, on behalf of USIP and the Resolve Network and everyone listening, I want to thank each of you so much for such compelling remarks. And I couldn't have, you know, I promise I didn't pay them off in advance to say the things about education that I would have said, but I was really delighted to hear that we're not just having a conversation about security and intelligence and improving the kind of hammer of law enforcement, but also about what's required for issues of social cohesion and for learning to live together across difference. And I hope that we can continue to have those conversations in an integrated way as part of our conversations about extremism and political violence. So I'm going to hand it back over to Alastair Reed and it's been a real pleasure to be with you and thank you again to each of our speakers. Great. Thank you very much. Thank you. I just want to say thank you very much to all of our speakers for such an engaging discussions day. And a big thank you for everyone in the audience for taking the time to join us today. If you've found the topic today of interest, please keep an eye out on our website for continuing in this area. We have upcoming papers from our panelists from Amar and from Junion Lease are hopefully coming out within the next few months. And also please come and join us for the next events in the Resolve Global Forum series. Next event is Security Dilemmas in Sub-Saharan Africa, the role of community-based armed groups which will be on Wednesday, December 1st from 9.30 a.m. Eastern time. So please sign up online. And with that, I would just like to bring the session to a close. A big thank you to everyone again. And I hope you all come and join us again next time. Thank you very much everyone.