هل تريد أن تبدأ؟   إذا كنت تعتقد أننا لا نعتقد أنه مجدداً إذا كنت أفضل كذلك. أول أسئلة في المرأة هي أنها تفتح قرارة أو تفتح قرارة. هناك يجب أن تشهد ما might be decided in a peace process عن قرارة. وماذا أكثر أشياء التي تفتح قرارة على مرأة قرارة أو تفتح قرارة. وماذا يمكن أن تأكد أنهم يجب أن ينجح أن تكونوا بخطوات فرصة لتشهد سيئة في المرأة. نحن نتخلق على أشياء رؤية للنظر. الحصول على قرارة في تجد أصدقائي المكتب المتحدة ومن ثم بعض الأشياء المتحدة. لكن قبل أن أتحدث عن هذا I want to briefly emphasise the issue of path dependency. You will see we picked that up in the paper. And there seems to be a lot of path dependency in constitution making processes. In everything perhaps, but in constitution making processes. You will see to begin with a significant path dependency in peace agreements on how constitution making is dealt with. May not be a bad thing, path dependency. But two paths, I think, two paths dominate. The first is constitution making, the design of a constitution making process often follows a country's own past experiences. Or successful processes in the neighbourhood. So it's local examples. I actually have to add here that Kenya's process, Kenya's first process has become very influential. In fact, I think you can see signs of it in what was proposed in the South Sudan's transitional constitution and so on. And perhaps even in the 2019, your 2019 charter. And I think one should be warned a little bit about that first Kenyan process. The process that started in 2000 and ended as you probably all know with a referendum that rejected the proposed constitution. And which sowed the seeds for the conflict in Kenya in 2008. It's not a process that I know has worked anywhere in the world. So beware before you follow some some neighbours process. Learn both from their strengths and their weaknesses. So that's one element of path dependency. What you've done in the past and has worked or what you've learned from what hasn't worked. What is done in the neighbourhood or more broadly. Another path dependency issue is. Particularly in peace agreements, I think, which are often done in a hurry. And by people who don't have a great deal of expertise in specific issues. There's a lot of cut and paste. And I think, again, if you thought through these issues well in advance. You may be able to avoid some of that rather hasty pasting together of processes and build a better process. So path dependency is not a bad thing. And people are often more comfortable using processes that they're familiar with comfortable with. But it's not ideally one that learns from past. Errors mistakes. And I'm assuming some elements of. Of constitution making would be in a constitution. Now the specific issues I refer to. I mentioned very the paper mentions very briefly that we kind of anticipate. And I think that's why Andrew's paper is here. That there's very likely that a peace agreement will result in some form of power sharing. As Andrew says, clearly power sharing is often. Uninclusive. The power that is shared is the power of the dominant conflict parties usually. So. In thinking about constitution making if constitution making it. A constitution making process is to take place. Under a power sharing government. Maybe it's worth thinking about. Arrangements for the interim period for a transitional period. That. Are more inclusive. Outside those in the executive itself or in the executive and legislative itself. Are there other ways. Of building more inclusion. And. Not saying very anymore about that. Next point though. We touch on constitutional principles and I think. Peace agreements as you all know routinely. Include some principles often they're kind of very general things. Often it seems they included mostly. To remind parties that they actually do agree on some things. Even if they seem to agree on. Disagree on most things. And constitution making processes themselves. Are usually also bound by principles. Again often they're very, very general. If the process is intended to produce a democratic. Constitution little talk about. Independent courts. Democracy voting and so on. Those principles seldom seem to have any real impact on the actual. Business of constitution making. But constitution making principles can be. Binding and my country is. Most of you probably know is an example of that. What. Happened in South Africa is our principle negotiators. Agree on a set of principles. That would bind future constitution makers. That agreement on those principles. Was essential to actually reaching a peace agreement. Called that without that agreement. On what was to go into a future constitution. We would have not got past. A part of it really. Or we would probably been flung into. Into a bad war. So. That use of constitutional principles. Is not only to set out sort of broadly accepted. Things about a democratic constitution. But also to reassure parties. To the conflict there. That. Their interests would be secured in the future. So it's a mechanism worth thinking about. Not uncomplicated as we could discuss. But we're thinking about. Then thirdly this issue of. What we've called. Related matters in the constitution. I mean one reason for being concerned about. So called related matters. Is I've been worried looking I think. In fact at the. 2019 declaration. Also in fact at the. South Sudan constitution making process. Is discussion about how. Multi level government. Decentralization. Whatever you want to call it. Is dealt with seems to be. Separated. From how the constitution has been dealt with. They're not clear links. Between. The ways. Those things are going to be. Handled. No. There are places in which you can. Sort out. Decentralization well after the event. If you're familiar with the. Tunisia and constitution of 2014. You will see that it's got some. Very. In my view. Lightweight provisions about. Decentralization. And they accepted that they take about. 20 years to implement. You know. That's for Tunisia. If. Some element of. Decentralization. Perhaps even federalism. Is part of a political settlement. And if. Decentralization is a means for. Keeping peace. For balancing power. For. Reassuring. Reassuring regional. You're not going to be able to. Leave it to sort out in 20 years. Or over 20 years. It's. Likely that it's. They're going to be elements of. That deal. In a peace agreement even. And we see a bit of it in the. In a peace agreement. And. Certainly. Into the. Constitution. So. Where does one sort out all the issues. Relating to. Decentralization. And. And how does that. Dovetail. Connect. With the. Constitution making process. I think. People. Cannot. To think about how those. Things. Come together. And I think it could be. Really useful. And. Who's going to be involved in that. Decision making. Decentralization. Decision making. I don't know. Whether. Some of the things you've already. Got in the. In the. Peace agreement. And of course. Your past. Practice is going to how much. That's going to weigh in. Who are the parties. That should be included. Going back to. South Africa. Very briefly. South Africa is a very. Bad example. There. Because. We had such. Dominant. And strongly supported. Main negotiating. Parties. And. Not really. Much strength. In our regions. That we didn't. Really. Need. With one exception. To include. Regional. Groupings. In sorting out. Our. Provincial. Sister. I think that was. Actually the case of. Kenya. Two. But that's not always. The case. And I. Suspect. But you may correct me. That that's not the case. In relation. To. Sudan. We. List a couple of other. What I've called. Connected issues. In the paper. Transitional justice. A land. The ones that. That. Typically. Arise. And you will know more. For your case. But I see. I've got about. Half a minute. Minus. Half a minute. Left or something. So. Let me just. Sort of. Put. The last issue. In my part of the paper. Or my part of the paper. My part of the paper. The last issue. In my part of the paper. Or my part of this. Presentation. On the agenda. And that's a question of. Inclusion. Now. I'm. Pleased to say that. And he's going to pick up on. Inclusion a bit too. I believe. But. I. I'll first point would. Simply be that. Just as you need. The relevant elites. Included in a peace agreement. For it to be effective. You need the. Relevant elites. To be included in a. Constitution making. Process. To. For it to be effective. I think there may be no. Example. Of a successful. Constitution making. Process. By which I'm in a. Constitution getting. Adopted in a sort of. Democratic way. When. That proposal has not been. Supported. By the relevant. Main. Political elites. So. People driven we saw. In Kenya. Was a. Fantastic enriching. Experience. But it failed. You. Have to lock elites. In Kenya. Was a fantastic enriching. Experience. But it failed. You. Have to lock elites. In. To. So you don't. Let go of the people. But you get the elites. So that's kind of the first. The. The second point I think. Is to think about. The. Sort of different levels of. Inclusion. How do you get. Include people in. Decision making bodies. Do you want a public. Participation. Program. As one would normally. Have nowadays. And then a third. Type of inclusion. Would relate to. Referendums. And my last point. Is going to be on that. And I'll go over it. With. It. In the paper. Referendums. Generally I don't. Think. Particularly. Inclusive. That's one point. But also can be. Very dangerous. So one needs to. Think hard. About using. Referendums. As. A tool. Of. Inclusion. That's very much. Over to you Catherine. Thank you very much. Tamara you want me. To present immediately. After. Yep. Perfect. حسناً, لقد أعتقدت أن الأجهزة التي يأتي بها مع الترانس لتحديد أجهزة من الأجهزة التي يجب أن تفعل الترانس لكي يمكنك أن تشهد أجهزة من الأجهزة لكي تستطيع أن ترى الأجهزة. فقط one second. أعتقد أنك تكون مستعدة لكي تستطيع أن تكون مستعدة. أنا فقط أرى أنه يعمل. هل يمكنك أن ترى سقل? سبب. حسناً، حسناً، أولاً، أرجوك أن تقلق إستعمال آخر لأشعار سبب my sincere gratitude لسجنة الأجهزة الأمريكية. وكثيراً، لقد تعلمت أيضاً لأديسة الإنتهاء، لقد تعلمت أيضاً للإنتهاء في أجهزة أجهزة لأسفل هذه المساعدة الأولادية المفترضة وثوراً. و سيكون كذلك فعل أصدقائي، و العصب الظاهر الذي في قمت السودانات يقوم بقصة بعض الأسفل في هذه المحارجة. And I'm really humbled to be given a voice in this forum to add some observations from an outside comparative perspective and hopefully promote further work in critical debate عن مقاومة تقديم في سدان تقديم. بعد أن كريستينة تشارفت بعض الأسئلة وصفت بعض الأسئلة على مقاومة تقديمات المقاومة ومقاومة عن المقاومة. المقاومة عن المقاومةاهدادات المقاومة most likely for providing answer, يتدفع السعرakenة لows anymore معaj about why people should travel within these political decisions and as such and the political decisions that need to be taken in the second part of the paper�� an app welcome to the right we address a bit the options for يمكنهم أن تقديم حديثة مقاومة من المقاومة. هذه are some of the issues that I would like to address and briefly outline in this presentation. Again, I do realize that we are very pressed for time, so I will keep my remarks short and I'm very much hoping that we'll actually have the chance to discuss in more detail afterwards and refer to any questions that you may may have. Let me just maybe start very briefly after Christina has raised her points that in terms of the methodology that we applied, an important element in fact was the question of path dependency. Path dependency in a sense that we looked at the comparative examples, particularly in the region, but also looked at Sudanese history of constitution making as we did realize that specifically when it came to the process of constitution making in Sudan, there is a considerable degree of repeated patterns that can be observed and that might be an indication for a future process taking place in South Sudan. Once again, also talking about the constitution making process we had certain assumptions and this is also addressed in Andrew's paper. We assumed the negotiated peace in Sudan will take place and on the basis of which and after which a constitution for the longer term will be drafted and a political settlement will certainly regulate an understanding of how power should indeed be constrained and exercised. And the first question that is to be raised in this context is when it comes to the constitution making process and as Christina outlined, we chose to focus on the process and not so much on the substance of constitution making but looking at the process, it is generally helpful to think of post-conflict constitution making in stages and these stages can be even a one-stage process which would mean that a permanent constitution is, for example, drafted in the framework of a peace process while, for example, a country is governed by international forces as it was the case in Namibia in East Timor where you had UN supervised process of constitution making that went hand in hand and eventually led to Namibia's independence and in countries that have suffered from prolonged internal conflict and have a lack of a sound and functioning institutional framework, the constitutional process as part of the transition is frequently structured into two stages and two stage processes stretch the transition with an interim transition providing for provisional constitutional framework that precedes a more permanent constitutional framework and when you have such a two-stage process which was in fact in the history of Sudan so far saved two exceptions always the case so in the seven constitutional experiences drafting experiences that Sudan has undergone five of them were in fact interim constitutional arrangements that foresaw a permanent constitutional framework to be drafted afterwards which due to circumstances due to upheaval political changes in the end did not happen but in itself foresaw two-stage processes which is very interesting in the sense that Sudan has always made that choice of a two-stage process obviously that brings up the question is this what Sudan will be looking at when we look at the future constitution making process or is it time or momentum to change the staging arrangement of the constitutional making process the classic example of the two-stage process is certainly South Africa and there what we had was in fact an interim constitution that was drafted by unelected negotiators then adopted by the white South African parliament and that interim constitution set up a process for making the final constitution after elections which was the second stage and the critical element of this two-stage process here is that in between you did have elections and this way it allowed the final constitution to be drafted and adopted by a democratically elected body the democratically elected constitutional assembly in South Africa so two-stage processes with an interim constitution as a first step before engaging in a permanent constitution making process was also for example used in cases of Egypt, the Central African Republic, Ethiopia you run the Burundi for example and as I mentioned before it has been a very prominent feature of constitution making processes in Sudan's history post independence since 1956 in the constitutions of 1964 1985-2005 and also in 2019 in the constitutional charter in fact a two-stage constitution making process was foreseen or is foreseen whereas only the two adopted constitutions of 1973 and 1998 under President Numeri and Omar Abashir respectively constituted permanent constitutions as they were drafted this first question is the question of the staging of the process the next question that obviously is tied to the staging of the constitution making process is the big question of elections when to hold elections in a two-stage process do you hold elections in between having passed an interim constitutional framework like in the case of South Africa hold elections and then ensure that a democratically elected body is the one guiding the permanent constitution making process or as was the case for example foreseen after the CPA the comprehensive peace agreement in Sudan which also foresaw an interim constitutional arrangement but then within this interim constitutional arrangement the INC of 2005 foresaw the drafting of a permanent constitutional framework without scheduled elections being a condition upon which the permanent constitutional process should have been initiated so there is a large difference between these two processes and the timing of elections when do you hold elections and these questions of when you hold elections is certainly dependent on a number of factors that are considerations that should be taken into account first of all how will the constitution be adopted and legitimized secondly will the demands of the people of Sudan for people driven legitimate and inclusive constitutional process be better met before or after elections and thirdly will parties to a peace agreement in Sudan trust that a future constitution making process will protect their interests so these are also the three questions that we highlighted in the paper and that I hope will get a chance to debate further in the Q&A session A final point that we addressed in the paper also very superficially but which is interesting to look at particularly from a Sudanese perspective and a historical perspective in Sudan is the composition of the drafting bodies of the in the constitution making process so far in Sudan post independent in the constitution making process the drafting of the constitutional text has predominantly been done by executive appointed expert commissions this was the case for example of the 2005 INC International Constitution but also in previous constitution making processes in Sudan it was mainly an appointed expert body that was drafting the constitutional text in the constitutional charter of 2019 as amended by the Chuba peace agreement interestingly enough what the constitutional charter for C's is a constitutional conference and it just gives certain indications of what constitution making process could look like it doesn't outline any details also the Chuba peace agreement keeps it in very general terms without offering many details but it's interesting to see that this idea of a constitutional conference is raised in the constitutional charter of 2019 the big question will certainly be in the forthcoming constitution making process whether the arrangement for scene in the constitutional charter which to this day remains the supreme law of the land will actually hold if this process that is for scene it is process that has been outlined and specified to a certain extent in the Chuba peace agreement by which the constitutional charter was amended if this arrangement will also persist in a post-conflict situation in Sudan as yet to come this just very briefly a few of the points that we addressed in the paper and hopefully we'll be able to discuss some of these in more detail now that we get questions from the participants Thank you Okay, thank you so much Professor Murray Dr. Scher ممكن هلا نفتح المجر أي أسئلة أي توضيحات يعني ولا نقاش بشكلهم تمطار حدد من الأسئلة وبعتقد أنه ممكن على أسئلة أنه يبدأ نخش فإذا حدد بيحب يتفضل ممكن يستخدم اليد أو ممكن أنه إذا الكاميرا ديرا بردو يسأل سؤال تفضل يسأل مهم شكرا I think thank you to Catherine and thank you to Christina for the very extensive paper it was extremely informative I think and it really does add to the question of the real challenges that I think Sudan is facing in terms of its constitution making process and I think the real challenge that took place during the transition in terms of the implementation of the peace agreement itself the GPA implementation in Sudan was a very challenging time I think for the transitional government because as you mentioned Catherine just in your comment that the GPA itself did not really give guidelines on how the processes should be not only in regards to constitution making but I think in terms of you know addressing other issues what they do with security reform or whether it do with you know transitional justice processes I think the GPA was very kind of open ended in terms of how those presses should take place I think what I wanted to kind of get your two penses on here is you know going forward I think we've seen the challenges in the GPA but I think I'm really interested to hear from both of you in terms of you know inclusivity I think the process in the peace agreement previously the GPA was very much you know directed towards addressing basically the needs of opposition groups and really addressing the needs of you know power sharing I'm really addressing the needs or the wants of political parties and it very much and it did very little sorry to address the needs of the people so I think it will be really interesting to kind of see or to hear from you in terms of you know ensuring inclusivity going forward in terms of how to address that issue and you know to get to the needs people to be at the centre of one the peace agreement any upcoming peace agreement and I think this is the challenge that we're still seeing until today and how to really ensure going forward you know these processes constitutional making processes are very inclusive of the Sudanese the lay Sudanese person and I would like to see that more addressed may be in the paper of how to go about you know including the Sudanese person in that process and how to ensure you know gender representation youth representation etc etc you know as you may know Sudan is very diverse you know we have a lot of various cultures and traditions and how do you address that challenge how do you make it an inclusive process regardless of our differences as to the needs people and again thank you Christine and Catherine for this very formative paper thank you so much over I know who wishes to respond I don't know Christine do you want to start I just wanted to maybe just briefly outline in the beginning indeed that's a very good point you raised in terms of participation of the Sudanese in fact looking again at Sudanese constitution making processes in the history of Sudan since 1956 so far there has been a complete absence of a people driven constitution making process in all the processes that you had in Sudan so far this has never been a consideration or a real aim of a constitution making process to include the people of Sudan and interestingly enough it's the first time in the Chuba Peace Agreement that you have actually a clear outspoken idea or aim to make the constitution making process an inclusive one and one that is people driven and includes the citizens of Sudan and this is very interesting it's very interesting to see it on paper but there's no further mention of how this shall in fact be implemented or how this shall become reality and maybe Christine you mainly worked on the inclusion aspect of our paper if you want to speak also the element of vertical inclusion that was certainly one of the aspects that we brought up in the paper right so I find this an incredibly difficult question and I think it's the right question but it's a really difficult question that I struggle with and so I agree with what you said in asking the question and Catherine's points and I really sort of found myself struggling to know where to start so we do the easy bit in the paper we talk about inclusion in decision making we make the categories that you're probably familiar with inclusion in decision making bodies let's get diverse groups and mention that the other element of inclusion of course is the production of inclusive institutions so you want your outcomes to be inclusive as well so that's quite easy to say and then you can also I think roughly look at say inclusion with people involved in decision making what Catherine's just referred to as vertical inclusion sort of ensuring that people broadly can influence the process in some way or be involved in the constitution making process so that would be horizontal the people in the decision making bodies and vertical and then how do you make all of this work and I don't think anyone has actually succeeded I was thinking this morning as I was pondering this what one might say in this meeting actually back to the Yemen National Dialogue I don't know how many of you are familiar with the way the National Dialogue was put together I think it was about 4 580 people or so if I remember it correctly and it was made up of a number of blocks of sectors I suppose so the parties had various blocks I think it was 2 or 3 quite a lot of them were drawn from the parties they were drawn I don't know how they worked out the proportions and the strength that was part of the political deal but each party delegation was required to be a bit diverse in the sense of having women in it having young people in it and so on and then there was a block for women and there was a block for young people and there was a block just generally for society I can't remember quite what else you may recall others and perhaps the south because that was one of the big contentious issues had a block as well each of the blocks required the sort of diversity that I've just mentioned young people, women and in fact I think representatives of the south and so on the big problem there of course was how do you choose these people how do you decide who gets into the sort of open civil society group who are the women who go in and I know that to begin with they were quite ambitious to begin with they had a sort of open call for those slots and people I met one delegate to the National Dialogue who said she'd applied online and I said to her do you know how you were chosen she said she had no idea a whole lot of her friends had also applied but she'd been picked out then I kind of discovered that the way they'd got stuck because of course when all the names came in the political parties were interested and we know that everybody in these processes almost everybody almost everybody is affiliated in one way or another and members of civil society are not themselves apolitical and neutral generally so what I understood actually happened is the parties couldn't agree with the main sort of conflict parties or whatever you know the old government and the south and so on and so rely as well at the time I suspect and they finally deferred to the special envoy to Marbenema and he sort of formally was given the role of trying to figure out the composition and he must have paid attention to what people were saying about the affiliation of all those people but I tell that rather long story just to say it's always difficult to sort of move from the commitment to inclusion in a decision making bodies or in committees that might feed into decision making bodies or even on the staff of a constitution making body so to move from the principle and the commitment to be more inclusive to actually selecting people is hard and the best way around it of course is to have very organized civil society civil society that's become used to talking to you elements in it and even if it's quite itself quite diverse and not agreed on everything if you've managed to build civil society that can come to agreements that's a big lobby for proposing people to help groups become decision making bodies become more diverse but you know it doesn't I haven't come across a magic answer there's much more to say about vertical inclusion different mechanisms for listening to people hearing people listening to people not just having public submissions stored in some big room and then thrown away but actually used and having constitution makers respond to people who make submissions to constitution making bodies which I personally think is one of the most important parts of this kind of process but we could have a very long conversation about different and I'm sure many of you have experienced some of them different forms of more and less effective ways of drawing the public in and giving them a real opportunity to contribute to the process even if it is rather crowdsourcing I don't know if that helps Any other questions from the participants? I think Andrew Please I've waved my hand because if nobody else says anything I'll just make a couple of quick comments and when I do my paper I'll greet everyone more but just to say on this question what's interesting about looking at the both at Yemen and at Sudan is that the street drove the conditions and in many other places in the Arab Spring the street drove the conditions that produced the need for change and then the question was how to include them and indeed from the military points of view how to exclude them how to get past the tensions and the hold that they had on freezing public life and how to move past them and what's the commentary that I've seen about Sudan says that the capacity to protest in the street was then not matched by the capacity to participate and the invitation to participate in the processes that followed which meant that that huge energy was lost and indeed was moved aside so what's interesting for me in thinking forward about inclusion is how to develop that capacity and how to ensure that the energy that was there in the street is in some ways able to be channeled and represented and continue to participate because it otherwise disappears and with it goes goes all the energy that was there in the constitution making process in terms of the Jubah peace agreements invitation or suggestion that they would be wider participation it's not coincidence in my view that there was no implementation mechanism for that in fact everything about those processes suggests that that they never intended to give any kind of implementation of those hopes neither to the constitutional principles that are in the transitional constitutional arrangements and in terms of Sudan's past history that's a very clear path dependency in the sense of when you read about all the principles that are in the various agreements they have always been put aside in all the agreements going back to 2005 so the principles are there and indeed the idea of participation might be raised but the implementation mechanisms have always been missing so that's just a brief contribution on this point thank you very much Andrew I will allow myself not ask a personal question but rather to convey as faithfully as possible some of the questions that came up with regards to inclusion in the round table and I think both Sherbill Sami are my witnesses that this came up time and again and perhaps to you Christina on the question of inclusion at least in the round table what came up was how to balance how to reconcile the need for inclusion with the fact that at least some of the parties involved in the conflict have committed crimes against humanity in other terms what do you do in that transitional period to guarantee inclusion but perhaps not at the expense of some kind of transitional justice to convey what came up time and again during the round table and to complete that with a question on one of your last comments regarding referendum and how they can potentially be dangerous so perhaps to put the question differently and again because some participants did express interest in their being a referendum at some point what in positive terms would be some conditions that a referendum should meet for it precisely to be an inclusive mechanism rather than a double-edged sword or this polarizing mechanism I may not be the best person to talk about this transitional justice thing my first instinct I suppose is to wonder whether if one has agreed transitional justice that people have confidence in I know there's a sequencing issue here but if one has that agreed whether it would be easier for people to have suspects potential alleged perpetrators at the negotiating table so that's and I'm saying that because I kind of worry that if you exclude that there's certain people who you probably can't exclude because they wield enough power to be necessary for an agreement and I said to begin with and it's something that I've sort of learned come to believe more and more strongly is you just have to have the people who wield power in agreements and in constitution making actually also so I'm sort of playing with that but I think perhaps particularly Andy perhaps I'm not sure and others at the table may have had more experience in this and we could perhaps come back to referendums which is a bit of a separate issue I think that I'm going to say one more thing one thing that does worry me a bit about what I saw in draft constitutions for Sudan that were floating around around about I suppose it was 2020 early 2020 or 2022 was that there were very grand statements about transitional justice in them very very ambitious statements about transitional justice and again my feeling was that I mean this is not but I find it terribly hard to sort of suggest what needs to be restrained about how much transitional justice you get but again it is a transition so the justice arrangements really need to fit the transitional nature of the situation and sometimes just demanding a sort of perhaps putting too much in that peace agreement demands too much but also may close some doors so to sort of suggest and that caution is needed or constraints perhaps yes I will talk about this a bit more later but just following on Christine's points incidentally there's about five people in my life who know me from a period where I was called Andy Christine is one of them and so nice to see you again I think the difficulty that I want to point out is that all these arrangements require consent and if you don't get the consent of the key parties including those that have been the fighting parties then your agreement right from the beginning is vulnerable at the same time as we'll see in my presentation your real risk is that if you put the people who've done the most damage in positions of power in the transition they are likely to continue to do that damage and so the dilemma that Christine is pointing at is one of the central ones in transitions is that there has to be some mechanism for moving away from the violence of the past but that requires the people with the guns to agree to put them down and how you do that without them saying if you create an existential threat for me I won't put my gun down because I'll have to fight to stay alive how you do that without allowing them also to be in a position to destroy the transition is going to be one of Sudan's central questions I'll get onto this in more detail it's one of the key questions of power sharing but it is also one of the key questions of transitional justice because if you don't learn from the past you're going to repeat it and that's been evident everywhere but the timing is a critical question I mean Argentina's transitional justice came decades after the transition and it is going to be an important question is if you don't consolidate the transition and your parties with the power to wreck it may go after it and that's exactly what happened in Yemen the key parties with the power to destroy the transition in fact were never fully in it but that's a discussion that Christina was part of so you may want to say something more about Yemen's difficulties of getting key players with the capacity to wreck it to stay in the process Christina do you want to go ahead or shall we one participant Dr. Adib is asking to speak so perhaps we can take his question intervention and then I'm back to you Christina while I think about this difficult question Andrew has said Dr. Adib, Fadal yeah let me stop by expressing my profound gratitude for the organizers for organizing such important event and indeed for the presenters for this important information and the great presentations looking at this in a comparative from the comparative standpoint the situation in Sudan in comparison to the cases to the cases that was talked about I'm wondering in this kind of situation whereby we are in the middle of violence in the middle of war in the middle of suffering of conflict affected population and some of them are in Sudan as IDPs others of them are in the neighboring countries others of them in the diaspora so my question how can a constitution making process or a constitution the compensation of the constitution at the beginning can be held and in the process of it so if there's any ideas of how can these programmations of everything in the middle of violence can make a constitution ideas of constitutions Thank you Christina I might leave that to somebody else but if I can go back to there's still a referendum thing lurking around but as I said after Andrew spoke I mean I find this Yemen question really difficult but yes everyone was not kept in the deal it was probably never very inclusive to begin with but at least sort of there was a major change of regime and as I've just briefly thought about it so many little things seem to chip away at keeping people on board I mean one thing that always comes to my mind is with the stroke of a pen the fuel subsidy was removed it turns out that the fuel subsidy was primarily used by the military or one particular division in the military again people who studied Yemen more may know better than I do on this but I think one or two particular divisions benefit of the military benefited especially from the fuel levy because they bought the fuel in Yemen at the fuel subsidy I mean bought the fuel in Yemen subsidized and then sold it out of the country at market rates and with that money that they got that sort of bonus they paid off their huge patronage arrangements and so they kept power that way I mean that money suddenly taken away there's a huge disruption in the process and that was one of the triggers of things starting to fall apart so these very small things happening another thing that I often wonder about is whether going back to Andrew's very point the change was really started by the street but the south and a particular part of or a particular political part of the south of Yemen kind of took over and came to dominate the process so you know every decision had to have a 50% support of the south and so on so there again the sort of the issues got almost hijacked but and of course it all got focused in Sana'a so then the questions must be about whether how I'm actually this is what I was going to say sorry I'm just collecting my thoughts while I'm here but one thing I often also wonder about is when the committee that was set up to design the national dialogue started work before starting to fulfill its mandate which is about how many people should come to the dialogue and what the different commissions should be about they came up with a set of what they called the 20 points and the 20 points were conditions that they said should be met or things that should be done before the national dialogue was to start and those points included things like apologizing for various atrocities actually in the past in the quite distant past in fact 20 years before remedying some of the gross marginalization in the Sana'a area the area in which the Sana'a is really born and the Houthis dominate remedying some of the problems dispossession of property and so on in the south it was a very ambitious list it was totally ignored and the process went ahead nonetheless and I've sort of also often wondered if some of those things had been done and there'd been some steps taken down the path of a changed Yemen rather than just launching into a big hotel and talking about abstract ideas would that have helped keep more people on board it would have involved in much more engagement with the military rather than security issues being dealt with on the side really and obviously unsuccessfully and so on so those are some random thoughts haven't thought about this for a while maybe they can provoke some discussion elsewhere in this group maybe just to add to a few thoughts that Christina just said and I hope I did understand Dr. Adip's question correctly that he was wondering how is it possible to talk about constitution making processes while the war is ongoing and you know the countries in the middle of a protracted conflict did I understand that correctly Dr. Adip who said that was your question yeah yes that is the question I need like some wisdom and ideas about how we can do that before the conflict we were working on this constitution making processes as a grassroots women so what I'm requesting some ideas wisdom on how to resume in the middle of violence well I mean certainly with war still raging in Sudan today it's immensely difficult to predict what a future constitutional process in post-conflict Sudan could potentially look like you know the features of the precise process will depend on the context the composition and the outcome of the negotiations that lead to a peace agreement transitional arrangement and it was for example very interesting in the case of South Sudan that actually in 2018 signed a peace agreement and where questions of a constitution making process were deliberated it was interesting to see that even while violence was still ongoing and the country still had not reached a final agreed peace settlement that different versions of what a future constitution could or should look like in South Sudan or were already circulated by different political parties civil society representatives etc so it was interesting to see that despite the fact that there was no full blown peace agreement to support such a process yet in place still various fractions of society had started the dialogue and the debate of not so much what the process would look like but what in fact the substance of such a constitution must consider and this was mainly questions of a federal arrangement questions of transitional justice etc so that debate I dare say since the first attempt of a constitution making process in 2012 in South Sudan never really stopped however it's undeniable that for the first time questions of a process design for such a permanent constitution making process really were only possible once a peace agreement was in place and once a power sharing arrangement was agreed on and only then could this conversation start about you know how to design the constitution making process so I am in the case of Sudan I don't think I would have the answer for you to say you know how shall this process already take place while war is still raging in the country but I do think a forum like this only shows how many ideas and thoughts they already are from the side of representatives in Sudan and how active this debate and deliberation is already at present while the war is still happening just a quick contribution to build on Catherine's and Dr. Adeeb's points by the way Catherine thank you so much for your map behind you there are a few maps that's got New Zealand in it and I like very much that I can see little New Zealand tucked away in the bottom corner of the map behind you and most there's a sort of movement in New Zealand to say please don't leave us off the map because many world maps cut off that last little bit I'm happy I'll make space for New Zealand especially That's right I'm enjoying being able to see it there I am on this difficult question and it's a really really important question in the middle of conflict what you can see from South Sudan and indeed from Sudan is that the principal military parties look at how they can use the transition in the future to consolidate their position not to hand over power to an elected group what they're looking for is processes by which their access to resources and Christina gave an example of one in Sudan there's going to be a really difficult question with what to do with the rapid support forces access to gold from Darfur in South Sudan the major military parties were also parties that leveraged their access to power and to constitution making to gather resources and to consolidate an ethnic control by their military group of resources that they could then distribute in a sort of patrimonial kind of way to their followers so the real difficulty of working in the midst of a conflict is that the mindsets of the parties are not about a future constitutional system where everybody has access to power to resources where there's a taxation system but they're looking for how to consolidate not only their own survival in terms of the existential risks that come from stopping fighting or putting down their arms as they see it but how they can use the process to gain access to the resources that previously they've got at the power of the gun and so the really hard issues of trying to discuss a transitional process that envisages a completely different access to resources a completely different access to power elections is that those things by definition threaten the military it's one of the reasons why the military I believe overthrew the transition they were not prepared to hand over power to the civilians as the time got closer or the military to hand over power so the Sudan transition got more and more vulnerable because the military weren't prepared to hand over so in my humble view doctor a question goes to the absolute heart of the difficulties it is going to be very hard to get these parties to discuss the real constitutional change when they feel so vulnerable in the process they know that a transition will lose the power and the access and the special resources that they've had the Sudan military just like Egypt's military and the rapid support forces have got access to massive amounts of gold primarily laundered through the United Arab Emirates which enables them to buy and to keep supplying them weapons now is a transitional process going to affect that is what they're interested in so from my point of view the commentary on this question is that is not just of course to acknowledge that it's really hard but there are examples from lots of places where these issues have become were central questions people may remember in the past the problem of conflict diamonds which particular armed groups had access to and the key question was how are you going to move from the access to their resources to a constitutional government now those are hard questions for Sudan there are hard questions everywhere and I think in some ways Doctor Adib's questions points at that and perhaps Doctor Adib you'd like to follow up Doctor Adib you are muted are you losing the mic no in fact I don't have that from the previous time I don't have a follow-up on that thank you so much I think it's very clear and it deepened my thinking about how difficult it is having in mind that the situation in Sudan it might be a little bit different than the situation in South Sudan the recent interest in the proxy war but thank you so much that is very useful to hear from you Christina have you wished to and then I think Selma wants to well I think we should stick to this conversation because it's really interesting and to follow Andrew's point I saw a document talking about how the Khartoum effort after 2019 was to record all the companies and corporations I mean again you must know about this companies and corporations that kind of were being used by the military and intelligence services and even that process you know went somewhere which impressed me that it actually managed to move at all but of course became harder and harder to complete especially as far as the intelligence service was concerned but don't let me Selma yeah yeah I think mine was just an addition maybe that I think maybe something we should think about and keep in mind is that you know the current war has kind of added to the fire of you know the Sudanese people's loss in hope for kind of a transition or a way forward so I think you know how to also build up the momentum amongst the Sudanese people to you know look into kind of the way forward and how to be accepting of a transition again you know a Sudanese I think they feel now that they've really been let down by the people who are involved in the transition specifically the civilian side and I think even more the civil society side of things so I think also maybe just to add to Adeeb's question is how to keep that momentum amongst the Sudanese people in terms of supporting a future transition or constitution making process or a peace agreement process going forward over thank you who would like to see my hand is up should I come in I say comparing things as everyone has really suggested is so difficult but of course one thing that amazes me always is the way the African National Congress in South Africa you know managed to keep up momentum you know not quite as terrible circumstances as you've experienced in Sudan at the moment but nonetheless were a very very long period many people just sustained resistance and one of the great advantages I've come to think for them was they slowly not easily but did build up massive international support and I really think a large part of South Africa's the reason for South African managing the transition was international pressure now I don't you know you need how you do that in different circumstances I don't know that the proxy war issue is particularly horrible and makes it very very hard but that is just one thought that comes to mind maybe and just to add to what Christina just said what appears to also create or keep a certain amount of momentum is actually to see civil society trying to keep organized to not what you see for example in South Sudan is an immense difficulty of that there is no organized civil society and the fact that civil society in itself is so conflicted and fighting against each other that in fact the momentum is lost by them simply embarking in disputes over how to frame the process where to go and to keep communication momentum up and so I do think that momentum might also be lost with a fragmented civil society and a level of an organized element that could keep up and preserve the momentum as much as international support could in the case of South Africa create more momentum and if I could just add to that the analysis that I've read of this process is that the extraordinary amount of organization in the street and in the various committees were primarily directed to sustain the momentum of protest and demand for change the ANC had decades of being a disciplined movement primarily directed towards change and it had spent decades preparing and planning its political platforms and its mechanisms and its decision making and who was going to be allowed to speak in which place these issues paralyzed Sudan and when a few groups were brought in but others weren't and all the momentum went out of the protest because it was no longer necessary because there was some mechanism for change so one of the commentaries that I've read is about preparing for this process in a much more careful way to sustain the decision making and the participation and the connections between the various groups and the transitional process in contrast or put the other way the whole purpose of the military was in fact to dissipate to reduce this momentum they wanted people off the streets one of the consistent demand from the street was for accountability for the massacres that happened by the Sudan Armed Forces and the Sudan Armed Forces wanted this all to go away and they succeeded it worked and the heart of the protest went out and all of a sudden people went into other transitional arrangements and the difficulties then of making decisions became very clear that peace agreement that you referred to Catherine involving the Juba peace agreement was primarily shaped by the Sudan Armed Forces not by the transitional government and this took a substantial amount of of kind of power really out of the transitional process and it appears to have delivered the clear picture that actually the real government with the capacity to lead Sudan forward was the military the military then as you know demanded the rapid support forces to join them and to basically to submit and that's where the division started because the rapid support forces said they wouldn't but that was an inter-military issue not a civilian issue the civilians by that stage were largely pushed aside and so the real interesting question for Sudan looking forward is whether or not the civilian side can sustain its organization and its preparation for a transition and for a constitutional process because the military's goal has been to sideline it and weaken it and it succeeded Thank you I think Isra'a wanted to say something نعم أنا أتكلم بالعربي أم بان بان بلعربي ما سمحتو لتصف السودان أتكلم هل يعمل؟  وما فقط قلت؟ هل قلت المسؤول بشكل أكثر؟ هل يمكنك أن تتكلم؟ أعتقد أن الأشياء التي قلتها بشكل أكثر بشكل كبير بشكل كبير بشكل كبير بشكل كبير بشكل أكثر أعتقد أنها أفضل إلى أناس دون المال والذي يُتسأل أنهي ورنب الفيديو أتكلمت لماذا، إلى أن الأسئل المغرض من الأجاء one of these constitutional principles في المنطقة المعادة في فتاة أجهزة وأنه في السابق من أسئل كبير وأنه على المعادة من فتاة أجهزة أن ف kind of think that they would be upheld in that process toward a government constitution, it would be worth commenting on. Sorry I missed a bit of that because for some reason I couldn't get the Original Transmuted was struggling to hear a bit, but so let me come in and I apologize if I don't follow up fully just directly on the South African constitutional principles. لأنهم كانوا بشكل جيد. السؤال was a tiny bit of what Andrew was talking about, but nothing like it. We had a professional army that once things were going to change, it by and large went with the change. That is very different from the kind of conflict he was referring to, and as I understand, the conflict in Sudan. So we were a different situation. Let me just emphasise that. But nonetheless, there were people who stood to lose a considerable amount if a majority government came in and made a new constitution. And they were the people who control the army and the police forces. So they were not going to go with the deal unless they were given some real security in the future. And what, in my view, was a sort of brilliant solution was the solution of having binding constitutional principles before an election and then an elected constitutional assembly that was to produce a constitution but was bound by the principles. And then, as you've all said, actually those principles were the obvious things and a whole lot of matters. For us, what was important was that we would have basically a federal system of government. And that was very contested, but it was agreed in the principles. So the constitutional assembly had no choice about that matter. But the question then always is how on earth do you trust that deal to be honoured after the election? And in fact, it remains amazing to me that it was trusted that it would be honoured. And I think the answer may be well, the device was that our new top court would have the responsibility of certifying whether or not the constitution adopted by the constitutional assembly indeed complied with those principles. Did it honour those principles or did it not? So that sort of all sounds quite simple.  But of course, in most countries, who would trust the judiciary to that extent? I mean, I can think of almost nowhere else I've worked. You wouldn't even do it in the United States now. Long-standing democracy. So it's slightly amazing to me that white South Africans trusted a future yet to be appointed court. And there are reasons you can give. So the question I suppose in other situations is are there other ways of, if you do have a deal like this, don't it be fragile? Are there other ways of getting principles? Do you have a question about that? Yes. One second. I'm sorry. Could someone mute themselves, please? Sorry for that. No, that's okay. So I mean, I don't, again, it could be interesting to hear whether other people have any ideas. I mean, I often think of, you know, can you have international guarantors? History of international guarantors. The little I know of it hasn't been very good. They quite reluctantly come in to actually do these things. But you could imagine a, I suppose, perhaps a regional court of some sort. I mean, are there ways of managing this?  But if you've had some of these ideas now, it can be helpful if you can sort of put up ideas at the time. And I see Andy has views on this too. I was just going to say something that you know so well but that others might not, which is the reason why both sides trusted a constitutional court was that it wasn't the old court. They set up a new court and the process was going to be broadly regarded as putting people on it who were trusted by both sides. And it worked. In other words, they established a new body and trusted by all sides to reach the decision as to whether or not the constitutional principles had been complied with by the constitutional assembly. And I think for somewhere like Sudan, that's a crucial point that if you wish to have some checking process, it must be one that you believe in. And in South Africa, they made up a new one and it worked. It was trusted and it worked not least because it had these extraordinary personalities on it. If I add to that Andy, just to care a bit of the South African debate between us when I first knew Andy, he was in South Africa. But South Africa also had a sort of odd respect for law. I mean, despite having some of the most horrible laws in the world, it did follow law and it had judges who kind of felt they needed to make decisions that complied with laws and so on. So we got an exceptional court that was more or less trusted. But we also had a population that kind of believed in courts. So it's more than just having the right judges because I don't think you would have got the rank and file of say ANC supporters, particularly happy when the court in fact threw out the first draft of the constitution. If it had not been that actually courts were considered able to make this kind of decision. So it's a whole package of things which goes right to Andy's point. What body might be trusted to be the determining body? Where would you find one? How would you put it together? Would it be just to go back for a moment to something that's quite often talked about in this context is a Kenyan constitution making process. Now I had the remarkable honor of being a member of the committee that drafted the Kenyan constitution. Why might you ask is a South African sitting on that committee? And I think the answer is there were three foreigners out of nine people. The answer simply is the Kenyans didn't trust each other enough as you know their tribal divides are very deep and foreigners they thought was a way of ensuring a more trustworthy process. So that's another example. There must be more. I think that it's certainly gotten very interesting but perhaps this is also the perfect moment to transition into Andrew's presentation and get into power sharing and also guarantees that could accompany any power sharing the arrangements during the transition. Andrew, have you allowed me briefly? Let me just introduce you to our participants in Arabic briefly and then you can get started. إذن دكتور لاتلي له أيضا خبرة طويلة كخبير دولي ودستوري خاصة في مجال المراحل الانتقالية وطنغيمة الانتخابات واشارك أيضا من خلال الأمام متحدة في الوصولة المتعالقة بالترتبات الدستورية وعملة ولهو خبرة طويلة في كنبوديها وشنوب فريخية وقنبيا وطمور الشرقية وإذن في بل أو في إضافة عمليات سلام و الوصولة في شرق أوسط فريخية وشنوب فرق الأسف إذن أنتو بيسكو هر هل سوف تقوم بشاركة؟ شكرا وكذلك وكذلك سأقوم بشاركة هل سأقوم بشاركة سأقوم بشاركة وكذلك يجب أن أعمل لك فإن كذلك ربما يمكنني أن إInter tiring إخثارات لará بسيارة التي يحدث إیںت إطاب room should we أنتو و أنتو ودل الخ trumpet عنصة أمام Shell و أنتو وكذلك سوف تتباك حiston هسيور أرجوك لكي أخبرك كاثران على أن تكون هناك وكريستيني. شكراً لك لك for the invitation. أنا أبحث عن هذا الموضوع، أنه يمكن أن يقوم بشكل جيد. أنتظر، لا أرى أمامك. حسناً. نعم كلاسيك إجزانبل of this is in Libya where you can't really think of it as being a domestic process because it is so dramatically shaped by the offstage externals. The Libyan parties that are being influenced by Turkey and others can't make decisions on their own. That was exactly the same in the Syria process. The Libya parties that are being influenced by Egypt and others can't make decisions on their own. And so your model as to who's going to be at the table needs at least to contemplate getting your fighters. As Christina said, getting your builders and that must include your key political leaders as well as the wider issues that we were talking about. If you want a society which isn't going to be governed by the past, you need some of the forces that shape the decisions for change to be involved. And who's going to form the plans. All right, that's just an overview. And if you were to take nothing else away from these papers. The takeaway is most simple is that if your future power sharing focuses only on rival fighters who are going to share power. The result is likely to be fighting. In other words, and Sudan's past has primarily entrenched the fighters in its next processes. The people with the closest access to military force have been those that have been entrenched and institutionalized in the process. And by the way, the Juba Peace Agreement, despite its agreement, its promises basically does that. Well, the contents of these papers that I present long and short. These are the seven points and I'll extremely quickly go through them. The purpose of the paper, of course, is to assist this kind of discussion. It's offered with, I hope, the same humility that an outsider should bring. These are issues that I study. I read about. I look at comparatively, but the agony and the pain and the extraordinary problems and pain of Sudan's civil war makes any contribution like this. I hope should be suitably humble. These are really hard issues, but I hope it's possible to contribute to the discussion. The power sharing field is broadly aimed at trying to ensure that there's representation of politically relevant groups in the process. It's broadly trying to say that if you mobilize as a group, the basic idea of power sharing is that there should be some way that you're involved in the processes. And in particular, in access to decision making and in access to power. So in broad terms, this field is divided between systems that try and ensure representation. And in broad terms, leave it then to the participants to claim their stake. And systems that broadly say we want to try and get as much cooperation as possible between different groups in the society. So we're going to structure our tools so that all sides are at the table. And we're going to try and ensure that they cooperate because if they don't cooperate, you can't have a government. That sort of division, but in the power sharing field between those that want representation and those that want cooperation is one of the big divisions in the power sharing field. Most of the focus is on, in my view, in conflict situations, is on the group representation. Is trying to ensure that your fighters and your builders are at the table and that you get a wide enough representation of the different groups at the table such that they will own the result. The democratic theory behind this is actually very common sense. Which is that if you're involved in the process, you're likely to believe in it and to participate in it and to stick with it, even if a particular decision goes against you. Now anyway, that's the power sharing field and there's a lot of material in the paper. I think it's important to look at the sequence leading to the current crisis and why the transition failed. Because I think it helps us understand this path dependency and that that both our previous speakers focused on, which is that your past tends to dominate what you do in the present. The sequence that led to the current crisis depends upon how far back you go. But I think each one of the various settlements that you look back in the past has had an enduring effect on Sudan's present. The one that I particularly start with is the conditions which produced the coup that brought Bashir to power. And then at the various settlements and so on that followed after that, including which led to the comprehensive peace agreement of 2005, the separation of South Sudan and then the various things that started in 2019 and have led to the current crisis. The key thing for me about those is that each of them gives us lessons. Why did they fail and what forces produced violence continuing as opposed to why did they fail in the sense of their ambition to produce peaceful governance. Why did they fail in that? Each of them succeeded in temporarily stopping a particular phase of the war. But in fact, Sudan's current dreadful war is the result of that sequence. That sequence has not produced its ambition of peaceful governance. It's produced just the worst war in Sudan's history. Well, how might the war end is an extremely important point in judging which parties might claim to be able to share power. And for that, the extremely simple scenarios are of course that one party wins, that there's a protected war or that there's a political settlement. And those are going into the details of those is important because of who the external parties are. Because of the extraordinary dominance of one of the conflict parties in one of the major states or areas of regions of Sudan. And because of its access, that's the rapid support forces to a pool of funds which don't depend upon state taxation and state revenue. That's the gold in Darfur, completely controlled by the rapid support forces. That's the, that gold has been translated into significant arms flows, including from the UAE and from Russia's paramilitary Wagner Group. And indeed into support from neighboring countries. So how might the war end is an extremely important part of thinking how your power might be shared, which parties are going to claim. And of course what might affect your constitutional process. All of these things join up. And thinking about those scenarios is important. The Economist magazine, not a radical publication in its latest edition, points out that the Sudan Armed Forces are currently being backed by Iran and by Iranian drones. And that has helped them to achieve significant battlefield gains. The rapid support forces are being backed by those externals I mentioned. And that has seen their support. This war looks as if it can go on very substantially. It's important to apply, to move on to .5, to apply a power sharing lens to look at the past and to contemplate how might it be. The power that you've moved towards civilian and peaceful governance. In the past, the power sharing lens has included war actors, primarily, and has led to more war. And has institutionalized violent actors in power, which has institutionalized violence. That's the simple takeaway that I draw out in .5 of this paper. I then go to specific issues, which I'll look at in the next slide. And then I have concluding thoughts in the paper, which has nine key risks, which focuses on the capacity and the systems, particularly if there's to be civilians, to try to manage any future transition to civilian rule, the capacity of those issues. Now I was only going to discuss these specific issues if I had time. I think I've got a time to quickly mention the specific issues part of this paper, which I'll give this slide to, and it's my last. These are the four specific issues that I was asked particularly to make sure that my paper commented on. So I give them a separate heading. The first was managing the military civilian arrangements post-conflict. As I say here, the term post-conflict assumes that there's going to be a separate process for ending the war. In other words, the war will end.  Now our question there is ready to look at why the 2019 arrangements failed. This is exactly what they tried to do. The 2019 arrangements tried to manage these arrangements and to say we're going to end many of the conflicts. The same thing, by the way, with the Jupiter peace agreement. Its whole purpose was to end one aspect of a war. One of the few conflict parties that I met, by the way, and when I was doing mediation work was this guy named Minawi. I met him in Uganda. But who's, of course, the Jupiter peace agreements, one of the key elements is to end that aspect of the war. Well, managing the military-civilian arrangement post-conflict what we can look at is to say why did those arrangements failed? Why did they fail? They failed the immediate proximate cause was because the Sudan armed forces tried to get the rapid support forces to agree to unify into one armed force in a process of two years. And the rapid support forces said no. And they, at that point, it was quite clear that they had substantial backing, substantial forces. And as the Sudan armed forces closed in on them, they took action and that started the war slowly and so on. The bigger reason why this failed is because it became quite clear that actually the Sudan armed forces and the rapid support forces that had staged the coup and earlier had, in fact, not really agreed to hand over to civilian rule. These transitional arrangements were transitional but their purpose was really to reduce the pressures from the street and to gradually enable a process of regaining control. And so when you look at this managing these arrangements post-conflict, that's going to be a critical question. Do the armed forces actually say, look, we cannot govern on our own? We need to hand over to civilian power? Or do they believe, as the military does in Egypt, that actually they should stay in power? And so there's a critical question there as to whether or not the armed forces singly or together actually agree to handle the power. So addressing the power sharing questions, and of course here I just raised these questions, which elements of power, executive power, judicial, legislative power, when you've got power sharing, all of your tools look at different elements of the institutions of power. Is this to be some kind of proportional representation of regions? Is this to be a legislative representation? Are you essentially trying to say that I'm going to give executive power between the two principal conflict parties, which is what was done in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement? Two conflict parties, both one vice president, one president, that's what they meant. So between who to what and using what mechanisms and so on. I focus here on the need for dispute resolution. Because it is one of the critical questions that emerged in it is one of the critical questions that emerges in all power sharing that this issue, as I said, is dynamic. It's not a neutral process where you choose the mechanism. It dramatically affects what happens between the parties. What do you do when there's a dispute? The war in South Sudan really developed, in my view, partly because of this question, that as the situations changed and as it became clear that one or other of the parties may no longer have the same access to power and resources, there was no mechanism for resolving that and the parties went back to war. One of the critical questions in power sharing is the practicality of how it works. Most people agree to share power, but then in fact have almost no rules and mechanisms as to how it's going to work. In Afghanistan, there was a power sharing agreed between the elected president and the person who claimed that he should have been elected. But there was absolutely no mechanism to describe how that was going to work. How do you share power between two executives other than simply having each of them create their own little empire and try to govern their own bits that they can? The whole questions of cabinet government, of rules for power sharing, rules for decision making, of allocation of resources, those practicalities are absent in almost all power sharing. It's as if you agree a headline agreement that there's going to be a legislature and then you do nothing else. How's the legislature going to work? The legislatures need standing orders and rules and systems. There's the capacity to make decisions and there's the preparation of that capacity that I've alluded to. These are guarantees to be included in an interim post-sharing between the war and parties. I come back to these questions. How would the transition have been protected from military overthrow and could Sudan have avoided this current war? If you can answer that, I think you can answer some of these questions as to what guarantees you can get and that's a big discussion. And then lastly, discussions from the region. I'm just going to point very quickly at lessons in half a sentence on each in Cyprus. Your lesson is that when you build power sharing into your constitution, if you make it too rigid, the constitution will fail. If the bamboo cannot bend in the wind, it will break. That's what broke the Cyprus constitution power sharing from 1960. One of the lessons from Lebanon is that if you use power sharing to end the conflict, it may become a permanent feature of your political life and you can never get away from it. And what it enabled is the militarization of one of the parties into being by far the most powerful force in Lebanon and one of the most powerful armed forces in the region and one of the most significant proxies for the expansion of armed force power from Iran in the whole of the Middle East. So the Lebanon power sharing deal in fact enabled a very substantial change to Lebanon's political organization. Didn't just share power between them. It created an entire new set of events. I like the example from Yemen at the end of the Cold War in 1991 of power sharing when the North and South united. They united peacefully in about three days and they agreed to share power 50-50 between them North and South and then there were going to be elections. Those elections completely wiped out the South. The South from being 50-50 in a share of power went to zero and that meant it had no future in a future power sharing arrangement. And so they went back to war and that war they eventually destroyed and that the whole Southern question as to what to do with the South has never been settled. So I like that example and in fact every example that you look at from Yemen in terms of power sharing has got lessons including from the present but that will take me too long and indeed from the past by the way but going right back to the 1962 coup Libya's current power sharing questions and indeed the attempt to move into a joint government that would progress to elections the simple lesson many many lessons from Libya including external parties but in terms of power sharing the lesson I want to highlight is that if you've got no mechanism for continuing the transition your interim parties hang on to power and that's what they've done they have scuttled every single deal to try to move forward and they're still semi power in other words the power sharing that was meant to be an interim process a transition and is so far meant that they cannot get out of it I like the example of Somalia because its power sharing bases all of its power on plan representation in Somalia itself its interim process that has that has that's still the case it's going to be an interesting question as to whether or not they can break out of it and I like mentioning Somali land this little group from the north of Somalia which broke off in 1992 and declared its independence never been recognized I like its example because they took a decision to prohibit plan representation as the basis for its political power sharing instead what they did was to say that there would only ever be three parties that could compete for power they couldn't be plan based and those three parties were going to be the three parties that had won the most votes at the previous local government election and that for ten years those would be the only parties that could then compete and then the process would begin again you'd have local government elections parties could compete and so on that process by the way is in a crisis now because the sequence of of how to choose those three parties has broken down and so they've one group saying let's keep the same parties and test the next elections and another one saying no no we need new political parties but anyway what's interesting for me is that it's a choice as to how to structure power which tries to break the hold of plans on Somalia's political power so there's thousands of examples I just simply pointed these with one sentence lessons and I'm sorry I went on too long that was great Andrew loads of food for thought I'm still taking in it myself I'm wondering if any of RSVD news participants may have immediate comments or questions if nothing immediate comes to mind I will Andrew as I did earlier referred to some questions that came up during the round table we did address the question of power sharing and what quickly emerged in the discussion is that it wasn't necessarily clear whether we were discussing power sharing arrangements as a necessary tool or mechanism so to say out of conflict or whether we were discussing power sharing arrangements as a desirable and desired long term constitutional arrangement so to say and whether if one out of need resorts to power sharing in the short term that kind of inevitably needs to some kind of power sharing arrangement in the long term so I think part of what we struggled with was as to the very purpose with which power sharing to begin with is resorted to and whether as I said there's an inevitable risk in perpetuating power sharing just because at some point it is a necessity so I don't know if you can maybe say something about that before we take other questions or comments okay it's an extremely good question of course and as I as I tried to say in my in this in this simple model of power sharing you need your fighters at the table in order to stop the fighting they have to agree and then the question is who else do you get to the table and how do you structure how there's going to be competition for power the power sharing tools try to ensure group representation and the mechanisms that they use are broadly either elite deals or or representation through electoral systems broadly those are the broad areas that you look at so electoral systems will produce political groups but you might have to structure that to ensure that you get women or that you get this particular or that you don't leave out this particular group that there can be some kind of representation and how you structure those electoral systems is a crucial question as to who ends up in power if your electoral system systematically disadvantages one group a minority group they have no stake in the process and if you leave them out and there's no mechanism for them ever to be in power then what you get very often is that they either abandon the political process or they return to war if they were a former armed group the comprehensive peace agreement in Sudan in talk 2005 the criticism of that agreement is very profound it entrenched only two principal parties the SPLM and the Sudan liberation movement and the Sudan Liberation Army Sudan People's Liberation Army it entrenched them and entrenched the Bashir government it left out all the other regional conflicts at the time this was a deliberate choice was to say let's try and solve the south first and let's not solve all the other ones that choice is to leave out all of those groups and not include them in a transition arguably led to genocide in Darfur because it enabled the then government of Khartoum to deploy all of its forces because it didn't have to fight in the south anymore in Darfur and so genocide in Darfur and the continuation of all of the other conflicts including the ones that were addressed in the Juba peace agreement most recently all of those other conflicts were left out and the whole notion that we need to settle Sudan's conflicts got put aside in favor of a power sharing deal so the issues as to whether or not you need to have some parties to an interim agreement in fact shape the whole of Sudan the 2005 agreement shape the rest of Sudan's history and any possibility of actually solving the whole regional conflicts that was available at the time got pushed aside that were the decision of the mediators and it was the decision of the principal parties so my view on all of this is that the reason these issues are critical and important as was raised in your discussion to Myron your previous discussions is because the history says that if you get this wrong it's likely to have a very very enduring effect on your future processes this is that's ultimately path dependency it's not just that you it's not just that you your choices look like the same in your past it's that you shape the choices of actors the decisions that you make are themselves active forces in shaping the future and so that's why this needs such careful thought but you look as if you're about to say something more Tamara absolutely not I just appreciate very much what you offered in terms of a response and I think we have Selma and Adeeb who wanted to say something and also as Yed who is a colleague from Tunisia who was at the round table so Selma please go ahead yeah thank you Tamara and thank you Andrew for this very extensive paper I think I just have a few comments to make here I think what really needs to also be considered or paid attention to is the complexities or the divisions within the Sudanese army itself at the moment it's well known that you know the Sudanese army is so continuously representative of the Bashir regime that the revolution worked on ousting and you know that is still causing a lot of complexities within the Sudanese people and a lot of mistrust and you know leading up to this process of the war the Sudanese army was very much representative of the Bashir regime even during the GPA or the peace agreement itself that happened people were very reluctant to kind of put their trust within the army or whether the army will ensure you know any kind of transitional process transitional justice process to take place and this is what led to the war that you know even the rapid support forces were mistrusting the army to lead or to ensure the power sharing processes so I think you know with the army still very much being at the center of any peace process or being involved in any peace process it is being seen that the Bashir regime that we worked on ousting was 30 plus years it is still at the very forefront of Sudanese politics and Sudanese democracy so for the Sudanese people to again feel that you know this process of reaching a peace agreement and ending this current war this is really something that you know really needs to be paid attention to and really be considered whether the army itself can sit at a table and be responsible for leading a peace process or a constitutional process this is one point I wanted to make the other point I wanted to make is that you know the rapid support forces is the child basically of the Sudanese army it was formed by the Bashir regime the rapid support forces are now the ones who are fighting the Bashir regime so basically it is them turning against the their mothers basically the process of the war I've seen in your paper kind of what is next or how this process of the war will end I don't see that a peace process inclusive of both parties will happen I don't see that both parties will sit at a table and reach an agreement to end the war this is something that I think is very complex and it's you know something I think beyond what the Sudanese people are seeing I think it's a disagreement amongst them that is continuously going to happen the other thing I wanted to mention is that as I mentioned in my previous comment on Christina and Catherine's paper is some people to one I think can you hear me well? yes so I think you know for us this revolution it took I would say 30 plus years to happen that the Sudanese people were fighting for this revolution for such a long time and there's a huge loss of momentum and huge disappointment that happened among the Sudanese people in how the transition happened so for this process to take place again I think the Sudanese people are now you know fighting famine we're fighting a war we're fighting other priorities so how can we as civil society actors how can we as INGOs how can we as academia et cetera really work with and support the Sudanese people to entrust another transitional process let alone build up towards building our own constitution so I think how can we prioritize or ensure the prioritizing of this process within any upcoming transitional process and I hope my comments made sense there thank you Andrew again would you like me to say something quickly or should we take more questions please go ahead thank you very thoughtful comments in terms of the complexities of the Sudanese army and the reason they don't trust it I simply add into the process that the UAE is not supporting the RSF because it likes them it's supporting them because the Sudan army is still closely aligned with the Islamist political forces that basically were used by to bring Bashir to power and so what the UAE is very nervous about and Saudi Arabia is a revival of an armed Islamist political Islamist movement again in Sudan that's the reason they're supporting the rapid support forces in addition to whatever revenue they get from laundering the gold which primarily goes through the UAE all of this is documented in these footnotes that explain where I and how I make those those calculations the important point that you raise on this is exactly how it is going to be possible to contemplate these two armed forces working together again they have gone at each other's throats in the most violent way and they've gone at Sudan's civilian population and it's extremely hard to see them saying look brother let's just be armed forces together again and let's put this aside it's extremely hard but in the absence of a victory by one a negotiated outcome is is kind of the only thing that one can really see emerging it's extremely hard despite the battlefield gains the drones are bought to the Sudan armed forces it's extremely hard to see one side winning but if one side hands over power to the other that will break the power or risk breaking the power of either of them unless they both agree to leave each other's powers intact in other words they'll get back together and say we leave Darfur to you you can keep doing what you're doing in Darfur and we're not going to leave for your massacres of civilians nor indeed for your previous genocidal role as the judge we're not going to look at that and we leave you the Sudan armed forces by and large in political control and in control of the areas of the economy and let's just agree to that if the two armed forces agree to that that is power sharing between the two armed forces it's not pretty but it might end the war and it almost certainly won't preclude any hand over to civilian rule so that's a deal between the two of them which is very hard to contemplate as an actor wanting civilian and peaceful transition it's the two military agreeing to share power between them but so I I agree completely about the lack of trust and that's going to be central questions for a ceasefire and for the transitional arrangements and for the future how to support the Sudan people is I think one of the big challenges of not just for those that are most closely involved such as you in this but I think it's one of the big questions for the international community because of Gaza Sudan has moved off the center page but the statistics from Sudan continue to be just terrible I mean this is just this is one of the major crises of the 21st century you know it is just huge and and the fact that the sort of war leaves the front pages I think does mean that we should do our best to somehow keep the issues at the forefront of international concern and as for supporting those people involved it's a very humbling question I know a number of people who were strong activists and who I met and those that have survived have all left the country and they are just struggling and hanging on so it's a very humbling question and I hope that there's some way that we can be practical other than just lending support so that was Salma I hope I answered your question or at least I hope I responded to your very good comments I'm sorry there's others yes absolutely thank you so much for that I appreciate it Doctor Adeeb please go ahead yeah thank you Andrew for the great presentation and the information and indeed the ideas I really love your wisdom if you keep doing you'll get what you have done I think your presentation give me a lot of things to think about first I think power sharing and confidence building since there's lack of trust or not trust not only between the conflicting parties but also among others then power sharing might be a little bit difficult and it need to be considered on how to build the confidence between the actors it might take the way or the avenue of a deal a special deal between the armies themselves but the ground realities differ and that is the second point of identity of a division power sharing in divided society might be a little bit difficult taking into account the fragmentation of identity and then power sharing looking at the RSF the RSF is no longer one group different RSF the RSF in their 4 they have their own agendas the RSF in jazeera they do have their other agenda the RSF in they are fighting for their own agenda and so on but it's not only the RSF it's also divided the civil society, ordinary people political parties ex rebel group who just signed the juba peace agreement now they are divided into 2 or 3 group supporting the rabid support forces others they are supporting the military and so I think in this kind of divided society and this fragmentation of identity the power sharing might need to be taken a certain way whereby also confidence building is necessary or essential my last question or comment for both of them is about the woman inclusion in the peace and power sharing theoretically even in the briefest attempt there is power sharing in paper but in reality there is no power sharing and I think it might be better to have a clear regulation on the inclusion of women for all peace process and then the power sharing so the issue of this woman inclusion I think is essential in the peace process and also power sharing but I really like the presentation and the great information that you share and I wish you the best to develop this great paper thank you thank you Dr. just a very quick two very quick comments on the conference building yes exactly it's going to be a really really interesting question parties that are that have committed terrible things or that have huge access to resources know that if they lose power they lose everything that's their fear that they will be held accountable and so the confidence question and accountability question is going to be the two are very close if you ensure if you demand accountability then parties will be very nervous about settling that's a discussion we had before on the inclusion of women it was actually a part of the paper and I I didn't do justice in my presentation I don't want to in any way burden Sudan's women or the responsibility of solving a problem which is primarily if you can be frank being caused by Sudan's men in particular it's armed but there is such a strong evidence of participation of Sudan's women that I asked the question in the paper I wonder whether to do something completely different it might not be possible to say that if we want to avoid a repetition of the past the only way might be if Sudan's women are at the center of a peace process and of the discussions and I didn't want to suggest that too strongly because it might look as if I'm burdening them with taking responsibility for fixing the problem but on the other hand if you don't do something completely different then the likelihood is of a continued repetition and it seemed to me that the suffering is so great and that the arguments for representation are so strong that that might provide a mechanism of breaking through this constant cycle of Sudan which has seen its current war after all the previous ones so thank you for highlighting that and I agree totally but I hope with I hope with appropriate caution because I suggest it but it's up to Sudan's women to take it up I'm sorry next speakers because I think we had Zied and I think Sami would like to also say something Salma did you raise your hand again or this is from before I'm not sure yes I did raise my hand I think maybe it's just something that I can just follow up with Adeeb's comment there and Andrew's reply to that is that I think in the case of Sudan and continuously I think in regards to women representation or the role of women in change I think during our revolution we really saw women at the forefront of the revolution and the revolution was really led by women and youth fully and unfortunately from my experience during the transition working with the transitional government women were really sidelined although they led the revolution and youth led the revolution we really fell back into the trap of politics and specifically traditional politicians being at the forefront of the change in Sudan and I think again that kind of goes back to civil society not being so strong and well built enough to have worked with the revolutionaries to build such a strong foundation for this revolution to grow on so I think and I've continuously said this in a number of platforms is how can we really ensure that going forward we really dig deep and analyze the transition that happened I think whether it's idea or other organizations to really do an in depth study of the transition that happened in Sudan and just not to kind of find solutions and way forward without really looking into the failures of the transition and really looking at how where the problems were and kind of how to support to fix those problems and specifically to build on building the capacity of the various actors that led the revolution so I just really wanted to draw on both of Andrew and Adeeb's comments there in terms of not only supporting the role of women alone but to support the role of youth movements and ghost organizations or ghost movements that really appeared during the revolution Thank you Andrew would you like to say anything before we hand over to Ziad No, I agree Good So yeah, Ziad please go ahead Thank you Tamara I want to thank you again the Arab Association and the idea for this interesting event after the Uganda Round Table like it's sad that the situation has not improved since but so I think Andrew for this comprehensive presentation I agree almost with everything he said just I want to put light on the Juba Peace Agreement and I think I said this in Kampala but I want to repeat it I think we have not I will say we have not questioned too much the Juba Peace Agreement and I think you told that it was a tool for peace but when it was signed it was not war in Sudan and this is also we have to ask the motivation for this Juba Peace Agreement and the impact of the Juba Peace Agreement and the Juba Peace Agreement led to a new power sharing after the revolution who made the FFC or the part was signed with the military in 2019 weaker at least at the sovereignty council with the new actors second thing the Juba Peace Agreement some actors were not represented which were very important actors like Al-Helu and others who were present without having any influence third it created a kind of some privilege for Darfur and the two area regions and which led to for example to the east and the north but especially the east of Sudan led to some to protest and also to block the port and it was an increasing reaction in the east which was one of the reasons to the coup d'etat it's a series of events so I think we have to re-evaluate like the impact of the Juba Peace Agreement on this power sharing to not do the same mistakes after the conflict this is just what I wanted to say thank you very much just a very quick sorry a response from me about this kind of which is in some ways it's a mirror of the the 2005 process the comprehensive peace agreement which is that you deal one area and not with others and you privilege particular actors in one area and not with others I agree completely I think it was for those people who were watching the transition it was a surprise for me humbly watching this to suddenly see this this big peace agreement emerge privileging particular people in one area when there are so many issues that still need to be addressed and as you know John Garang said look we want to create a new Sudan that was the phrase and in fact to go after all Sudan's problems at the center and in all of them and the SBLL SBLM stroke A had all these connections with all of those other areas and they were cut off and one issue was settled and the others continued in war and so I agree I think that looking at this is an extremely interesting and important issue for Sudan going forward is this notion of suddenly doing one deal in one area and I think it had a big influence on the failure of the of the transition I think so I agree with you completely you know more about this than me the analysis and reading is extremely supportive of the need to understand this much much better so it's a very very good point I'll see if I can say something a bit more about it than the final paper but more importantly I think you've put something that's really important of the paper which is which is really important into the discussion which is can these sorts of agreements are needed in each area but if you just do one then what you and you get it wrong you're repeating the patterns of the past you're entrenching your particular actors in power and you're not really building a democratic rule in that area you're entrenching you're power sharing in your power sharing between the center and the one particular military group or a couple but I agree I should let them speak Sami did you want to go ahead thank you thank you Andro I may go to something that maybe Andro or Christine also can come on that that is when it comes to the power sharing principles that according to our experience during the last maybe more than 50 years we can see during that time since Addis Ababa agreement and coming through CBA and after that including the agreement in Cuba or even during the political agreement between the FFC and the military council so the power sharing usually goes with those who are controlling the scene and the final decision the final words usually comes from those even when we were trying to bring the civilian to the table of Juba Bisa agreement usually there is a kind of resistance that usually comes from the rebel groups or from the military side by saying that also you can see that the agreement itself usually comes with so many articles section and provision that addresses constitutional aspects in peace negotiation and later in the peace document so it is quite significant that bringing civilian to the table to address the future not only to ceasefire but to address the future of their country but the situation now when we come and see the current situation and we try to apply the power sharing and as one of the issues that anticipated to be part of the of the issues during the coming peace negotiation so in the current situation I can see that is the maybe civilian participation including women and youth and others and to bring their agenda in the table and try to influence the future of the Sudanese future constitution and the future maybe transition that should be very hard especially when we see that the two parts are actually fighting for the to control the country and besides those two RSF and SAF you also can see hundreds of other maybe rebel groups in Darfur and South Codofan and Blue Nile are also are waiting and watching this situation and whenever there is a table that will address the future of Sudan they will come or they will stand side and come in some point also to disrupt the the future or the transition so this dilemma is there and also it is a question that need to be addressed by Sudanese and also we need to learn from the maybe Andrew can tell us about this how he was when he was addressing the issues in other countries but also I think Christine also can give us like some like experience best practices in Kenya maybe in Yemen in Libya and all those like national dialogues where people were trying to influence the future future constitution to reshape the transition that one of the issues now Sudanese are trying to see how they can become part of that process and to influence the policy makers and to make themselves available and their concern already addressed in that that peace process thank you I'll have a very quick response what's interesting about the agreement on core principles in South Africa was that it really was the centerpiece of the transition and and although you can see lots of high principles in the various agreements in Sudan particularly the high principles that you can see in the comprehensive peace agreement and indeed in the constitution in fact it's never been clear to me that there's been agreement on these amongst key actors including key civilian actors and so one of the interesting things for me to talk about is as an analyst is whether or not there's some kind of process by which Sudan Sudanese might discuss core principles you know the coup which brought Bashir to power as you obviously know more than me was a coup to prevent the scrapping of the law which required the real law to be binding across the whole country and that deal had been arranged with John Garand they said look you can't impose the real law across the whole south Bashir and the government agreed a bill was before parliament and the coup that brought Bashir to power took place the day before the law was to be passed and so in other words this was a desperate attempt to keep the centrality of Sharia law a particular version of it being applied across the whole country what's interesting for me is that that fundamental principle was in fact barely discussed outside of the outside of the narrow peace agreement which had produced that agreement in fact nobody had discussed it in Sudan and the vast bulk of Sudanese religious believers did not believe in a particular according to the research that I've seen did not believe in a very conservative view of Islam and there was a wide range of views of people's relationship with God and that was never discussed so on fundamental principles about rights about the kind of society about the basic values it does seem to me that those discussions have never been adequately agreed adequately held and adequately broadly agreed there's no this is really what we want to do and the core elites that agreed about the South African deal they agreed on that absolutely that was at the centerpiece of what they were going to do so I think it is important that that Sudanese people keep talking about this the question for me is whether or not there's a forum in which this can be held and it might be your forum Tamara and working with idea to focus on can we agree upon what it is really are our basic values yes of course we are religious but in what way must that be part of the power and does it require a coup d'etat back by an Islamist political group to ensure that and impose that and basically then to cause civil war for the whole of Sudan and or is there some peaceful way in which and our agreement on basic values I hope that at least is a commentary Sami on your important points and sort of builds on it Sami I don't know if you want to add anything no thank you thank you Andrew thank you actually also I'm trying to not take the beaver for longer if we can listen from also sorry for Christina on this issue to be created maybe just a quick follow up on Andrew's point in terms of a dialogue on the principles that might carry such a process we had quite an interesting experience over the course of five years it ended in 2010 when we engaged with at the Max Planck Institute Foundation when we engaged with a civil society in Darfur to have a dialogue about a potential peace agreement a kind of list of demands from the side of Darfurian civil society in terms of the values in terms of the principles that they would like to see represented in a future peace agreement slash constitution it was a dialogue that was ongoing over five years and we met at regular instances to discuss these issues and it was so interesting to see to what degree through these years of dialogue principles really crystallized out of this conversation and it wasn't it was obvious when they first met that this was going anywhere it was quite an interesting mix of representatives and it was a process but it was definitely also a process that clarified a lot of those principles for them while they were having this dialogue and this is something that might also be useful in a broader forum in Sudan because sometimes the feeling is there that there hasn't been such a dialogue so far and up until now and so it is not even clear if such principles if such commonalities do exist and as you said I think there is a need for a forum to provide space for such a discussion to happen which again is a great element in building I believe for society to find such principles that they share and want to carry forward absolutely I see one more hand raised perhaps we can take one last comment from Thelma and then I think we can draw this to an end with a few comments since the questions from my side. Thelma please go ahead yeah thank you so much and please excuse me everyone for hijacking the conversation as I did during the round table I think I really want to draw on Catherine's last point I think over the years we really come to know that there is so much division within Sudanese civil society and I think this goes back to the fact that there is so much politics involved within Sudanese civil society and I think maybe Catherine working with Max Planck with the research or the work that you have done I realize that there is so much politics involved within the process that we do not concentrate on what we should be doing as civil society organizations yet we always draw back on our political affiliations and our political knowledge so I think what I would like to see going forward is also how can we as civil society organizations can kind of address that issue and how to learn to be civil society organizations rather than being and kind of work towards supporting that process rather than sticking to our guns with our politics thank you Thank you so much Selma Andrew would you perhaps like to conclude before we move forward with just final comments Well from my point you just responding partly to Selma what struck me I'm not I'm not as immersed in Sudan as many people who I've seen writing on this and of course the Sudanese but what struck me in a personal sense was just how incredibly political people were in other words there's an extremely high level when you when you visit there of what you might call political intelligence political involvement people think about these things a lot at least in the groups that I met and maybe because it's so vital in life and because so much tragedy has emerged what struck me just thinking about Selma's view and the idea of an ongoing dialogue in some way that it really I think there should be some way of getting more discussion about basic principles because they are so crucial to Sudan I think that Sudan has been doing this for 80 years in any way but one of the things that surely people can now agree which is that that the consequence of violence are too big and are too great that it must be a way of governing without violence and so for me at least our sharing issues are they are tools there but they are tools for governing without violence and so far they've been used to ensure violence so the really interesting question will be can you can you find ways of discussing how to make decisions in power without violence and break that cycle because it has been an absolutely repetitive cycle and it's caused such tragedy otherwise just to thank you for the invitation and for giving me an opportunity to share some thoughts with you and please to wish you well humbly because these are big issues Thank you so so much Andrew Catherine would you like to say a final word before I also do so No the same from my side and I'm sure from Christina's side we've spent many many hours discussing these issues we were writing the paper and we are really also humbly looking at the situation and the complexity of it we certainly learned a tremendous amount by just listening to your comments and contributions during the webinar and I do hope some of these ideas will also find mention in our paper as we produce the final versions of it thank you so much for engaging with us and giving us this time to share your ideas on some of these aspects thank you Okay I'll say this in English let me begin just with a few comments in terms of next steps we will be at the association circulating a forum among our Sudanese participants those who unfortunately could not join us today perhaps we did not hear enough of all the participants partly maybe because it was a lot to engage with and in circulating those forums what we hope is also for written comments that perhaps might now arise as a result of this discussion today that we would also convey to you so as a first step we will be doing that with our Sudanese colleagues as we also said initially we do not consider these these papers as final products but rather look forward to maybe now receiving final versions with additional insights that might have emerged out of this conversation but also importantly we do intend to translate these papers into Arabic and for them to be also perhaps easier to use to refer to not just in this group but beyond and I would like to say too that we do not think of these events as one-off initiatives we truly are trying to provide as many spaces as many forums within our very limited means as possible but Andrew back to your suggestion it does seem and this comment of Catherine's Nation Building that the idea of core principles fundamental principles basic principles call it what you may must be somehow at the core of any civil society broad conversation and we and I think we would like to explore ways of maybe engaging in this further so again we do hope to keep building on this dialogue that we had here today on the papers with this group of Sudanese civil society representatives that we had the pleasure to meet in Kampala despite the difficult circumstances that they are all experiencing and lastly and obviously a big big thanks to Catherine, to Andrew, to Christina even though she left because I also bear witness to the fact that they tried their very best to speak to the Sudanese context while being very keenly aware of the challenges and not to just draw on expertise or comparative examples but rather really speak to that context so a big big thank you we really appreciate your input and we really hope for you to participate with us in future such discussions and I see Selma again raised her hand and please of course yes and I think tomorrow you always thank us but we never thank you and I think this was a really thought provoking conversation so I just want to say thank you to the AACL team and to the presenters today Catherine, Andrew and Christina I think for me specifically on behalf of the Sudanese experts group that's attending this workshop and specifically also to Sami and I thank you guys a lot for this really thought provoking conversation I think and for us I think as Sudanese there's a lot to take away from this conversation so I just want to also thank you guys I think because you always thank us but we never thank you so thank you right Sami Sami do you want to say anything okay it's a thank you Tamar actually it's it was a very great pledge actually having this distinguished speaker Christina and Catherine and Andrew and also thank you our Sudanese colleagues who make a time who made a time to attend and to be part of this discussion and maybe 100 thanks to Tamar and her colleagues in the AACL and others behind the scenes who are supporting these events that's actually it was a part of a series of seminars, workshops and roundtables that international idea they committed to to do with this part including AACL and just before that one we made two or three of those seminars and workshops on the arrangement for the most conflict Sudan thank you Andrew, thank you Catherine and also thank you for Christina and hopefully we will keep in touch and continue on the same line over to you Tamar and thank you also to the interpreter for providing simultaneous interpretation we know how challenging it can be thank you everyone شكرا لجميع و إلى اللقاء قريبا سوف نتوصل معكم بشاء المخترحات و نتمنى أن اللقاء يكون قريب شكرا شكرا