Okay, so this is Stefan and Walter is here sitting next to me in my billiards room, former billiards room. There's no billiards table anymore. My wife took it out.  And Walter's been here for a while in Houston. How do you like our fair city? Oh, it's a wonderful city. I'm glad to be here and I'm glad to be on your podcast. If we form a new state, I will do what I can to get you welcomed here. Oh, you're very kind. Thank you. So Walter and I have been buddies for a while, been hashing out issues in paper and in person at Mises events, et cetera, for quite a while. Yes. And we've talked this weekend. We've been together three nights now about a lot of things. Retribution. Cabbages and Kings. Bitcoin a little bit. Yeah. We didn't get the fraction reserve banking, but... IP. IP. Well, there's not much to talk about there. We agree on that too much. Yeah. Okay, so on the issue of voluntary slavery. Yes. Which we've talked about before. Yes. A little bit. And spart in print. Yes. So what I thought I would do is try to summarize my take on your take on it and you tell me where I'm wrong or where we disagree. Sounds good. Or my take on our common Rothbardian influence or whatever. And the one problem I have with your analysis is that you rely upon a type of analysis Rothbard makes as well in his ethics of liberty. Like where he talks about debtors, prison, et cetera. And the assumption that I have a problem with is the assumption that if you own something, it means you can make a contract about it. Or you can sell it, put it that way. Right? And so you always get these hypotheticals about the guy who has little money, he needs a million bucks to save his kid. And so he wants to enter into a voluntary slavery contract, which is outlandish, right? Because this is probably unlikely, but let's just assume it. And so you're saying that if we don't allow these contracts, he won't be able to do the deal. Right? But my question is, what is the thing that's stolen? And I see this ambiguity in the Rothbardian issue of debtors' prison as well. So let's take a typical contract of a debt like you're talking about. So someone loans a million bucks to A on a given day, right? And they're supposed to do something in exchange for it. Be a slave, repay it in a year with 10% interest or whatever. Right? Yeah. My question is that if you do not comply with the terms of the agreement, then you're a thief. In effect, yes. So the question is, what has been stolen? Is it the original sum of money? Or is it something in the future when the performance that was promised is not given? Well, I think it's something in the future when the performance that was promised isn't given, because that's what the contract specifies that you should give. But are we not getting off the issue of voluntary slavery by talking about debtors' prison? Or do you see it as the same issue? Well, I think they're related. They're not the same issue, but they're related. Okay. We can talk about both. Let's talk about the debtors' prison thing just for a second. Sure. Because Rothbard says in the Ethics of Liberty that if you do not repay a sum owed, then theoretically you are a thief and could be sent to prison because your punishment is deserved in the case of an act of theft. But then he tries to sort of get out of that result by saying that it would be disproportionate. So he uses his proportionality theory to say it's too extreme of a punishment. But in theory, debtors' prison is justified. I borrow 100 bucks from you. I promise to repay 110 in a year, a 10% interest, and comes the year. And I don't have the money. Yes. I stole 110 from you. Okay. So you're saying it's 110 that's stolen, not the original 100. Right. So you would agree that the original 100 that is loaned is given over to the borrower. Yeah. Basically 100% title. In other words, he has complete ownership of that money at that time. Yeah. I borrowed it. I can do with it as I please. You have to be able to in order to spend it. That's the purpose of the loan is that you can borrow the money. Right. So if there's a theft, it's a theft of the money that's not repaid. Right. Yes. But if the borrower is pennyless at the time of the repayment date, he doesn't have 110 dollars. Right. So what 110 dollars is actually stolen? Where is it? I don't know where it is. But it doesn't exist. It's been dissipated. Well, it doesn't exist. But we... No, the 100 was dissipated. The 100 has been dissipated. And then he did not make a profit. Right. He lost it all. Yes. Let's say he gambled on the horses. So there never was a 110 that he owned or has that the creditor has a claim to. Right. But that's what you have a right to. Well. I owe you 110. And now you can take it out of me in hard labor or a pound of flesh or whatever the deal is. But I owe you 110. The year is up now. And I... Well, but you're conflating owing with property. So, I mean, Rothbard even in his contract theory says that the original theory of contract, which is a promise based, that you have to pay what you promise was off base. And that it's all about transfer of title to property. Right. So, if you view a... The way I view a debt contract based upon Rothbard and Evers and the way Evers elaborated on it is that in a debt contract, the creditor gives $100 to the borrower on day one. And he gives it outright with no conditions whatsoever. But, well, there's one condition. The condition is that there's another exchange, which is a future title transfer, 110 in a year. But we all know, both sides know that the future's uncertain, that transfer might not happen. The creditor, the debtor might not even be alive. And he might not have the money. So, basically, there's an exchange of a title transfer to a future uncertain hope, we might call it, or possible thing. Expectation, maybe? Whatever. Yeah. In exchange for a title transfer to $100 now, present good. Right. Right? Now, if on the future one year anniversary date, there is no $110, I don't see what the debtor is stealing. I don't understand what property of the creditor that the debtor is actually stealing. Well, he made a contract to give him $110. He doesn't have the $110, so he's stealing $110 because the creditor owns a promissory note, say, and it's not being made good. So, if you don't want to call it stealing, you have to. No, I don't. I would say call it quasi stealing, or like stealing, or something like that. Yeah, but the problem is your calling is stealing to justify the debtor's prison, or the consequence, or the calling it of a contract, and yet in your argument right now, it seems circular to me, because you're saying, well, he made a contract, or he promised to do it. So, to me, one's got to be primary, and we have to do one or the other. Well, Murray does come out against promises, like if I promised to sing at your wedding or something, I'm not liable to. But this is more than a promise. This was a contract. Yes. Now, I'm not a contract fetishist. I don't say that all contracts must be upheld. For example, Hans, me, and Guido have this tack on fraction reserve banking, even though it's contractual. We don't go along with contracts there.   Right. That's not a valid contract. Another invalid contract would be, you agree to sell me a square circle, which can't exist, or a pink elephant, or a unicorn, which conceivably could exist, but doesn't exist. All those contracts are invalid, so I'm not a contract fetishist. Yeah, but what does it mean for a contract to be invalid? When you say it's invalid, what does that mean? Null and void. I mean, it's silly. I'll sell you a square circle for $10. It means it can't be enforced. It can't be enforced. The whole thing is sort of nougatory because it's silly. But the whole point of contract is we have a property owner that we recognize as in control of legal ownership of a scarce resource, which means he has the power to dispose of it. Right. He has the power to buy his, a manifestation of his assent, or his consent, right, communicated by some language or something that everyone recognizes to assign title to someone else. Right. Partially or incompletely. Right. If it's completely, then it's a sale. If it's partially, then there's a co-ownership situation or a rental or a lease or something like that, right? Yeah. So let's imagine that I have a box, a cardboard box that's worth virtually nothing. And I tell you that inside this box, there is either a diamond or there's not a diamond. There's a maybe diamond. But there's a X percent chance of there being a diamond in the box. And I say, Walter, if you will give me $10 now, I will give you this box and you will own the box and whatever's inside the box. Now you would recognize that as a valid contract, I would assume. Yes. So you're buying an uncertain thing.   So you open the box, there's diamond. You're rich. There's diamond. You lost out. It's a gamble, basically, right? Yeah. Now I view that as the way the future necessarily always is. That if you ever have a claim to a future good that you're buying in a certain thing, a hope of something existing. But if the thing doesn't occur or doesn't exist, there's not an act of theft actually. So this is my problem with this debtors prison thing. I just don't see how someone who is unable to repay a debt is a criminal or a thief unless you adopt the theory of contract Rothbard repudiated, which is the promise theory. Well, I don't adopt the promise theory. I agree with you and Murray that the promise theory is invalid, but I think this is more than a promise because there's been an exchange of titles. I do want to articulate that. I don't believe that there's any such thing technically speaking as a future good. Right now, there are no future goods. There's the expectation of a good in the future. OK. No, no, I like that. I agree with that. But is our problem the 110? Suppose I forgot about the 110 just for the moment. Well, suppose we forget about the exchange. Let's just make it a one way exchange. I agree with that.  You say, Stefan. In one year, I will give you $110. Just if you're alive. Not forgive. It's not an exchange. It's just a unilateral but conditional gift. Now, let's say in one year you don't have the $110. Well, I agree with Murray and I think you about promises.  I'm a bad guy. I'm a rotten kid. Well, I'm not talking about a promise. I'm talking about a title transfer. I mean, are you saying that Murray's title transfer idea only works if there's an exchange, like two directional transfers? I see what you're saying. Now, look, if I give you this wristwatch right now, it's a gift. Yes. And now I say, I change my mind, give it back to me. You can say no backsies as kids would say. What if you give me the watch now and you say, Stefan, I'm going to give you this watch as a gift right now. Here it is. And then I say, fine, but I'm going to let you use it for a year. I'm going to lease it back to you. Or you say, Stefan, I'll give you this watch for a year, but you can't get it until a year from now. I see no difference in those two different arrangements. I agree. The point is there's a distinction between possession and ownership that is right. I would say if I give you the gift even either now or I give it to you as of a year from now. Yes. And I don't come through in a year. I stole your watch. Yes. Either way. So let's say that you give me the watch now as of a year from now. In other words, you date it. You say that, Stefan, I think I'm not going to need this watch in a few months, but I want it for a few months, but I'm going to give it to you now. So in one year, the ownership will be yours. I'm giving you this watch now, but I say, Stefan, is it okay if I borrow it for a year? Yes. Yes. Whatever. And now a year comes and I don't return your watch. No, no, no. If you don't return it to me, I would agree that's theft. Ah, okay. We agree on that. But if the watch doesn't exist in a year, did you steal it from me? Let's say the day before the due date, the watch evaporates or someone steals it or whatever. I owe you a watch. It's your watch. I gave it to you. But you say you gave it to me. What is the it? Well, I would say that if a year comes and either the watch evaporates or it gets crushed or something, I owe you, let's say, 100 bucks. Which would be the equivalent. Why? Because it's your watch. I borrowed it for a year and I'm not returning it to you. I got to give you something. But Stefan, we did say we were going to talk about voluntary slavery. I'm getting to that. We're only going to talk about this for a few minutes and we've already been talking about this. You're right. You're right. So let's talk about voluntary slavery unless you want to do more on this. No, no, no. It's your show. That's fine. It's my show. My show. Okay. And maybe this was preliminary and pointless, but it was fun. It was fun. Yeah, whatever. Okay. So in voluntary slavery and I see connections to what we've been talking about, but the problem I have with voluntary slavery is that there is an assumption by people that ownership of an object implies the right to alienate the title to it.  And that's very simple. And it, you know, I mean, it's simple in a good way. It's like it's pure. You're saying, listen, the reasoning is the same. Occam's razor is simple. Yeah. It doesn't mean simple-minded. No, I'm not saying simple-minded. The problem I have with it is that the original assumption is that ownership implies the ability to sell. Now the reason I think that you say that and others say that is because they're so used to objects of commerce that we sell being things that we own that they assume that the ability to sell is a natural aspect of ownership. Right? Yes. Now, when I think from fundamentals and I think what's the root of ownership of bodies or ourselves, as some people say, self-ownership or body ownership and the ownership of things that we use that are not part of our bodies, I see them as distinct. And I see the Lockean idea is the root of ownership of external objects, but not our bodies. The Lockean idea is that we own ourselves, which I think is a vague statement. I think self is sort of misleading and subject to equivocation. I prefer to talk about scarce resources like our body. So the question to me is only who owns my body? Myself, we can disagree on what self means.  The only real dispute is who owns your body. Some slave owner or a communitarian group or yourself or the person who inhabits the body or controls it. Whether you're religious or not, you don't need to go into that. The question is, which person has the right to control that body? And the answer that we give, we libertarians give, you and I give, is that the original person is the initial owner, not the only owner. The inhabitor of the body. But only initially. You can lose that right by committing crime, let's say. Absolutely. And you think you can lose it by uttering certain words, certain measurable incantations that transfer the ownership to someone else. Yes. Right? Not to disparage it. No, no, no. I accept that. I would say you can lose the ownership of your body by committing an action of aggression because I'm a libertarian. I believe that every person has the right to control his body, but you don't have the right to commit aggression, which implies that you have the right to use force to stop aggression or somehow in response to aggression. Defense. Right. You can also use someone else's body if they consent to it. Absolutely. So there to my mind is libertarian. There's only two ways that you have the right to use someone else's body. Number one, if they consent to it. Number two, if they've committed an act of aggression that justifies treating them like an object. An object. Right. Like you partially or completely own them either during an act of self-defense or after if you believe in retribution, whatever. But the point is that's the only two ways. And my idea is that if I just promise to you or say to you, I will be your slave or whatever. That action. Number one is not an act of aggression. Okay. So then the only way that the master is entitled to use force against the purported slave later, if he changes his mind and tries to run away, which he would have to have the right to use force against him.  It seems to me our differences that you think he did consent because he said so earlier. And I say he didn't consent because he said no now later. And to me, you would have to say that an earlier statement of a scent overrides a later one. Whereas to my mind, it's always the most recent one that matters because for example, let's say you say, you know, let's get in the ring and box. Do you agree? Yes. We get in the ring. We're kind of staring each other down. You put your gloves on. You're looking kind of tough. Walter is a lot more buff than I thought he was. I start having second thoughts and I go on second thought. I don't want to box Walker. Now, if you punch me in the jaw anyway. In that situation, wouldn't you agree that you have committed aggression? Absolutely. And it's because I didn't consent, right? Well, let me give my side of it. Okay, go ahead. But I first want to preface it for because not everyone listening will be a libertarian. Okay. And I want to say that voluntary slavery has nothing to do with the kind of slavery that existed in the United States before 1865 or 1861. That was coercive slavery. And we're not discussing that. We both disagree with anti-bellum slavery. Yes. Finally, something we can agree on. We agree on that. Well, we agree on many, many things. That's true. But on this issue, we bitterly and utterly oppose that as a pretty much a paradigm case of the violation of libertarian rights. Yeah, and probably almost every form of slavery in history that's ever existed. Yes, certainly. Okay. So with that out of the way. And by the way, as an aside, what about people joining the U.S. military now and they cannot quit, right? They enlist. I would say they're sort of coerced into it because of unemployment or inflation or minimum wage laws. And the U.S. government is an illegitimate slave owner in the first place. What's that called? A performative contract? There's a word I'm missing where I can force you to live up to your contract even though you're- Specific performance. That's it. Specific performance contract. That's what we're discussing. Yeah. Well, in my view, specific performance contracts are justified. And with regard to your boxing analogy, before I get into my own little big stick, in the boxing mores, if you put your knee on the canvas, I'm not allowed to punch you. And I'm not allowed to punch you under the belt. I can only punch you over the belt or above the belt. You mean just during the regular match? In an ordinary boxing match, if I punch you below the belt, I'm committing a foul. Yeah. So in other words, no one's consented to being punched under the belt. No one is consented. If you're in front of the belt, you're doing something that is known to be unconsented to, which is aggression. Yeah. And now if it's- If it's intentional. If it's an accident, you know what happens. But if it's intentional, you can lose the match right then and there. Right.  Right. Even though above the belt. So if you don't want to consent anymore, and let's say I look buffer than you thought I would look, it was get down on one knee, and now it's illegitimate for me to punch you. Gotcha. So I think that the boxing analogy isn't- I mean, it's a good first thought, but it doesn't carry a threat. Okay. So go ahead with your- Now let me give my two minutes on this. The example I use is I have a child who has got a dread disease, and it'll cost a million dollars to cure him. And you, Stefan, have long wanted me to be your slave, and you could order me around. Which is actually true.  But very rich. And you'd be a good slave. Yes, I would obey. And what I- the deal is you give me a million dollars, and I give it to my son's doctors, and they cure him. And we each gain, because I value his life more than my freedom, you value my servitude more than the million dollars, so we each gain.  You're not going to give me the million dollars, and my son will die, and we'll both be out of a mutually beneficial contract. So that's my motivation for supporting voluntary slavery. And the thing about consenting, you see, I think that our preliminary discussion is relevant, as you said. I know. It's not just a promise. You gave me a million dollars. There was a contract. There was a collateral. I forget what Murray calls it. There's some word I'm missing again. Maybe collateral is good, but you gave me some physical thing, a million dollars. And now if I- Like a performance bond. Well, no, not a performance bond, because a bond can be overcome.  I'm stealing your property, namely me. So the question is, if I disobey you, and the contract says that you can whip me if I disobey, and I disobey and you start whipping me, and I yell to the police, hey, Stefan is whipping me. He's committing assault and battery. You've got a very good defense. You can say, wait, I own Walter. I bought him fair and square. There's a contract and there's a signature. And I'm not committing assault and battery on Walter because he's my property. And you see Murray says, well, you can't buy my will. And my answer to that is will schmiel. I don't care about will. You only own my body. You don't own my thoughts.  Yeah. But you own the right to whip me if I disobey you. And let's say the contract specifies that.  And you have to say, no, you're guilty because you're committing assault and battery because I changed my mind. And I think it's too late. There are no backsies. I already sold you myself for a million bucks and I don't have the million bucks. You mean your body, not yourself? Sorry. I stand corrected. My body.  I appreciate that. So there's a, let's say, I see three problems with this. Number one, you're saying that I sold myself to justify... My body. My body. Or your body. Sorry. I misspoke. Now you misspoke. It's catching. Saying you sold your body as an argument to justify the ability to sell your body. So I see that as a little bit of circular argument. In other words, this is what we're disputing. Whether or not you have the ability to utter words that transfer title to your body. And you're just saying, well, I sold my body so therefore it justified to use force against someone's body as if you own them. But that, to me, seems question-begging. There was this very famous case of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Norman Malcolm, two very famous philosophers. Norman Malcolm was the student of Ludwig Wittgenstein and they were walking down the street and Ludwig Wittgenstein said to Norman Malcolm, I will give you these trees that we now pass on two conditions. One, you don't do anything with the trees. And two, you don't try to prevent the previous owners from doing anything with the trees. And what he was trying to tell Norman Malcolm was, look, if you can't sell it, you don't own it. And if you can't prohibit other people from doing stuff with it, you don't own it. Just because I give you these trees or sell them to you doesn't mean you own it. These two things are crucial. And I say now that if I really own myself I have a right to sell it. I know. It's not myself, my body. I keep slipping. If I really own my body, I have a right to sell it. If I don't have a right to sell it, I don't own it. Well, it reminds me of these registries that sell you stars. You've seen this? You can name a star after yourself. There's private registries.  They just pick one. They put Walter Block Jr. on it or whatever. Now it's just in their little private registry you've bought and they write the name of stars. I don't know what they give you. I had another friend who lived in China. He was a medical student like 20 years ago. And he says, yeah, when I was there I bought a house and I still own it. I said, what do you mean you still own it? He never goes there. He goes, well, you know, there's a house that I bought when I lived there. I said, well, is it just empty? He said, no, a family lives in it. I said, who? He said, whoever the government said to live in it. I said, well, so in what sense do you own the house? Did they pay you rent? What? Nothing. I said, he says, well, if I traveled to China some day they would probably let me stay there for free one night or something. I said, well, so you basically don't own it at all. Right. So I understand what you're saying. Right. But and I kind of agree with your point about this will issue. I think Rothbard when he says that the reason he disagrees with voluntary slavery is that the will can never be alienated. I agree with you that you don't need the will to be alienated to own someone. Just the bond. Just like you don't need a dog's will to be alienated to be the owner of a dog by its nature as an animal and, you know, a moving spirit. It has its own will. You need the legal right to compel it to do what you want it to do. Precisely. That's what slavery is. So I don't agree with that. But the more I thought about it, I think Rothbard was getting at something that I actually agree with, which I think is this distinction of the sources of ownership, which is that the basis of ownership of the human body is distinct from and more primary than the ownership of external objects that we homestead. And the basis of ownership in the human body, which is what Hoppe points out, is basically who has the closest connection to or link, the best claim to the resource. And in the case of the human body, it just happens to be the natural connection, which Rothbard points out is natural, which is who has direct control over it. Now Hoppe makes this explicit. And I think that's what Rothbard was getting at when he talked about the slave owner, the slave's will was still part of him. What he meant was, even after you promised to be a slave, you are still the controller of your body. And therefore you still have the best connection to it, and therefore you're still the owner of it. Because the source of ownership of bodies is this direct control thing. Well, when I homestead a bit of land by putting in a corn crop where I domesticate a cow, a wild cow, and I domesticate it, in the first instance, I am the owner, assuming that I mix my labor with it sufficiently of the land or of the cow. But then if I sell it to you, you're the owner, even though I was the first owner. Well, I say the same thing goes with the bodies. Certainly we all agree, me, you, Hans, and Murray agree that we are the initial owners. That's the whole point of being against coercive slavery in the early south or in the early US, north and south. But here we diverge. We agree that we're the initial owners, and I say yes, we're the initial owners of the body that we all inhabit, each one of our different body. But then I say you have a right to sell it, and if you don't have a right to sell it, then you don't really control and own the body fully. But you do, because ownership means the right to control. It doesn't mean the right to get rid of the right to control. Well, I guess I think we're at a standstill here. Well, let me ask you this. I don't know what else to say. Let me ask you this. Do you believe that, well, the source of the right to own things, okay, does it come from, is there only one source? In other words, are you saying that everything comes from homesteading? Because if every property right comes from homesteading, then how do children become self-owners? Well, you see, that's a problem we discussed a few hours ago in the kitchen. And I think that the only person who has really seriously tried to tackle that issue is you. I only give you a 99 out of 100 on that article because I still feel a little queasy, the argument, if I remember it, and you correct me if I'm wrong, is the child consists of nothing more than the sperm and the egg plus a bunch of food, and the sperm came from the father and the egg came from the mother. So how does the kid get to own himself? And I don't know the answer to that. But you don't believe the kids are slaves or the parents. No, none of us believe that either. I don't believe it. So you think at some point the child gets rights. So you either have to think there's some act of homesteading or you have to think there's a separate source of rights to a body, which is what I believe. I don't know. I believe in homesteading. Yeah, but homesteading means acquiring ownership to an unowned resource. The child's body is not unowned. Well, you have a child, I have two children, and my advice to all new parents is get in as much kissing as you can because all too soon they start thinking they own themselves. And Walter, I've taken that advice and I'm doing it.  My kid's nine and hasn't petered out yet. I'm still taking your advice.   But when they were... Well, he's 36.  But when my children, and I'm sure this is true of Ethan, when they were six months old, you can kiss them all you wanted and they had no objection. But as they got older and older, they started going like this, putting their arms up and saying no. They learned the word no, and then all things deteriorated when they learned the word no. So you say they homestead their bodies. You have to admit they're not homesteading an unowned resource. Well, they're homesteading an egg in a sperm and some food. But it's not unowned. Until they homestead it, it's already an owned thing. By who owns it? By the mother or the parents. Okay, so let's say that the parents own the kid until he's six months old. So there's a transfer of ownership. It's not like homesteading. He's more like a contract or something. No, not a contract. He sort of takes control of his body before when he's six months old. Control matters. I agree. This is what matters. Control is what matters. Yes, we agree on that. Control is the key. And the kid sort of gradually wakes up into self-awareness and self-ownership. Yes, I agree. And when the kid is three years old. Yeah, I'm not debating on the transition and how we draw the line. What I'm saying is at a certain point, he becomes the self-aware sapient or sentient controller of that body. And therefore owner of that body. Yeah, but he's the owner because he's a controller. Not because he's homesteaded it. Right. But then I say, and here we diverge, I say he can sell it. You say he can't sell it. No, no, but this is my point. If you recognize that the rationale or the basis for ownership of a person's body, it's his direct control of it, right? Initially, yes. As opposed to ownership of a chair or a car or a table because you acquired it and it used to be unowned. See, what I'm thinking is ownership means the legal right to control, which means you're the person who has the right to make the decision about who can use this resource. You can consent or not. Sex, boxing match, whatever. In the case of something that you acquire that was previously unowned, because you acquired it and because its nature is external from human bodies and because it used to be unowned and because it is owned only because there is a human actor who intends to own it and asserts his domination over it or dominion over it, he can abandon that. He could release it back into the wild. He can abandon his ownership. Like committing suicide to me? No, I'm talking about a chair. Oh, sorry, sorry. I'm talking about the chair. You can abandon the chair. I say I owned it, now I can unown it. I unown it. So to me, if you can own something or acquire it, you can unown it or unacquire it. But you can also unown yourself by committing suicide. But that's not unowning yourself, that's ending yourself. Or you can unown yourself by selling yourself in the slavery. Okay, so that's where we disagree. Okay, let me raise a different point because we're starting to repeat ourselves. Now I'm sure you'll agree with me on this, I agree with you, of course. Certainly markets and used body parts, blood, kidneys, hearts, liver. Absolutely, of course should be legal. We have a right to alienate our liver or whatever we want. The question would be whether you can be compelled to go through with an agreed upon operation. Well, let's forget about that for the moment. Okay.  But yeah, I agree with you, of course. That should be legal. Certainly we can alienate parts of our body. Absolutely, once you sever it from your body, it's an alienable owned thing. Right, so what I'm trying to work you into is agreeing that if you can sell a toe and you can sell below the ankle and you can sell below the knee, you can sell below the hip. No, you can sell anything after it's severed. Why can't you sell the whole thing? Because... Because there's no one there left to agree to the transfer. I just agreed. I agreed because I wanted to save my son's life. Yeah, but I don't think I can agree now to sell my foot and have it be enforced. That's why I said who can be compelled to go through with it. If I choose not to go through the surgery, now I'll give you this. I think that there's some circularities in parts of your argument, but I'll give you this. The difficulty with my argument is this, which you haven't raised. So I'm going to give you what I think is... I need all the help I can get. Thank you. The hard part is this. I believe that you can alienate title to acquired objects or even future acquired objects. So let's suppose I agree that every piece of property that I ever come to own in the future is yours. You're my master. Right, now you're the slave I'm the master. So you can't beat me for running away, but you can snatch every morsel of food away from me and I get it. Interesting. Every dime I make from any job you can take it from me. You can garnish my wages. You can garnish my food. Interesting. So basically that would give you the ability to compel me to do what you want because if I don't listen to your orders you can cause me to suffocate to death or die, whatever. So... and I don't have a good argument against that except for some kind of libertarian bankruptcy type argument which is the ability to kind of have a little sphere of minimal living support that you can't alienate but that makes me uncomfortable because it's like a bankruptcy argument, right? Yeah, no, welfare for the bankrupt. So if you could compel someone to do what you want by having them alienate everything outside their bodies then you could achieve almost the same thing as with your body. Well, thank you. I appreciate it. I'm going to delete the last two minutes. No, no, no, don't you dare. I want to make a meta discussion now just for a minute and get back to this. One of the things I enjoy not only in this discussion but in every discussion I've ever had with you is that we're really not trying to beat up the other guy. There's no ego. We're really trying to get to the truth with a capital T and if you see an argument that can help me or vice versa, you will articulate it. Now, I just don't see anything that'll help you. No, I'm kidding. Thank you. But in truth, I'm actually not that upset by the idea of volunteer slavery contracts. To me, it's more academic because to be honest, let's say we achieve Walter Blocky in the libertarian world which would be 99.9% of what I want anyway.   Yeah, whatever. Wouldn't you want to save his life if you had a dread disease and I was rich and only I could save him? No. I'm going to tell your wife what you just said.  No, no, seriously.  Yeah. I would want to be able to do that, of course, but I would also want there to be an out for me to find a way to wheeze a lot of it later. I couldn't do it. Then the contract would fall apart. So if you love your son, you have to agree with me. I have to agree with you, I know. And I do love my son. If I don't agree with you, I'm a bad father and I know I'm not a bad father. You are a bad father if you don't agree with me. No, but my point is really, to be honest, this doesn't upset me too much because the worst case is we have a society where if you actually sign on the dotted line and you say, then you're a slave.  Your son died. No one's any worse off by having another option on the table. Hey, I think I've made a convert of you now. I'm just telling you, your world doesn't horrify me that much. No, it's not just that it doesn't horrify you. It's that bad fatherhood that is going to happen to you if you don't agree with me, boy. All right, well, I think we'll call this one a draw or at best. I'm happy to call it a draw. That was fun. All right, Walter, thank you. Now let's go watch some impermissible TV. Okay, sure.