Thanks so much for your patience that you've been here the whole time. We're excited. We had a little bit of a glitch there. We're going to restart since we only had a few minutes of ask yourself for his opening statement. So we're starting clean. This is the whole debate right here. So want to say thanks so much for being with us, folks. If it's your first time, consider hitting that subscribe button. There's got a lot more debates coming up. But it's hard to say that I could ever top this debate. I've been really excited about this one, folks. This is a really, I think, one of the most important issues of our day. It's going to be a lot of fun. But with that, I don't want to take any more time. I want to let you know you can ask questions in the whole live chat if you tag me with that modern day debate. And with that, we are going to let ask yourself go first. So Isaac, thanks so much, both Isaac and Sterling for being here. And Isaac, the floor is all yours. Yeah, thanks, James. And obviously, it's good to talk with you, Sterling and Converse. Okay, well, I guess I'll just repeat what I said before. It's kind of funny. I feel like now I've spoken to Sterling for like an hour or something. I kind of know the guy. So let's see. I guess I'll describe how I think about morality and moral discussion generally. Sorry, you're hearing the repeat, Sterling, because I went on with this description after the stream had dropped. So Sterling's hearing this for a second time. I'll describe how I think about morality and moral discussion generally, and then the vegan discussion specifically. So when it comes to morality, I think we're really just talking about our desires, and we use moral language like, you know, good, bad, right, wrong, should, ought, we're really just saying that we have desires for or against different things to different degrees.  Now, because I see morality in this kind of way, I reach certain conclusions that might be counterintuitive to some people. So just to name three of them, give an idea of how I see this kind of stuff. I think morality is very relativistic. So that is to say, I don't see why what's good for me has to be what's good for you. I don't think that morality has to have some of the features that are, you know, kind of classically associated with consistency, but aren't really the same thing as logical consistency. So example would be transitivity. I don't think it has to be the case that because B is desired over a and C is desired over B that C has to be desired over a. You could just be the kind of person who given a choice between apples and blueberries would pick blueberries, given a choice between blueberries and cranberries would pick cranberries, but given a choice between cranberries and apples would in fact pick apples. I don't see where the logical contradiction or false belief or you know, anything would be until there. I also I don't see why morality has to be general. So that is to say, I'm open to particularism about morality. It could be, I don't see any reason to think that our normative ethics have to be described with the general principle. Now, having heard all that, you might ask somewhat reasonably how someone with that kind of view of morality would make persuasive moral arguments. And that was kind of warranted and kind of not warranted. So I'll just give you a little intuition pump. We all change our desires all the time. You might desire to eat right now after you eat, you're probably not going to have that desire might want to travel to somewhere on the earth right now. After, you know, going on the Google and looking up some facts about that place, you may not want to travel there anymore. So it's clear that our desires can change. And the thing that the impetus to change the desire could just as easily come from the noises emitted by another human's mouth, as it could the light rays emitted by a stream. So there's nothing on my view that would say that persuasion isn't possible. But I think the kind of kernel of truth in that criticism is maybe something like this. On my view, it's not ruled out. There's no reason that it's not logically possible to have two people who just have fundamentally different values where reconciliation is not possible. Now, I guess I'll talk for a second also about how I see the vegan discussion specifically. So when it comes to veganism, I think that most people are not vegan. I don't think that's because most people have reflected in depth on veganism and come to that conclusion. I think it's because they were raised that way. I assume Sterling probably agrees with that. Yeah. Okay. Now, we have a shared evolutionary history.  So I take it to be the case that a lot of our values are going to be the same. What I ask a Karnas to do in a discussion like this is just to reconcile their non-veganism with those kind of general human ethics that I think we all hold like we all hold something relatively like that. Now, if they can't reconcile their non-veganism with those general human ethics, I don't think that's going to look persuasive to anyone. And if they can, then I think that once we elucidate the means of reconciliation, it's not going to look persuasive to those kind of people who would develop vegan desires upon reflection. And maybe it won't look persuasive to some of the other group, also those who wouldn't develop vegan desires upon reflection because maybe they have a different kind of mode of reconciliation. But yeah, so that's the general idea. I think I'll just sum that all up. I think morality is pretty relative. I think that we're really just trying to persuade each other to develop different desires. And when it comes to veganism, I'm just going to be asking Sterling to reconcile his non-veganism with his human ethics. And if he can't do it, won't persuade anyone, I assume. And if he can, then I think it won't persuade those people who would develop vegan desires upon reflection. I yield. Thanks so much, Isaac. It's a pleasure to have you both. And with that, we will kick it over to Sterling. Thanks so much for being here, everybody. Want to let you know that the speakers are linked in the description. So if you're listening and you're like, I like that. Well, you can hear playing more where that came from by checking out these guys' links in the description. So Sterling, thanks so much. The floor is all yours. Thank you, James. Well, I'd like to thank Isaac for being here and, you know, hopefully we have a good discussion. I think we've already had a really good discussion so far. But yeah, so just because Isaac has presented his case in a certain way, I'm going to kind of talk about this in the context of what, in the context of veganism, basically. For me, at least, I'm a moral, I'm a moral objectivist. I'm a moral realist in the sense that I think that there are right things of wrong things to do and contrast kind of with Isaac's position where moral, moral theories are more or less inclined with our desires, right? We desire that things do or do not happen. So for me, it would be the case that there is something, there is something either about veganism, which, which such as we should be vegans or we shouldn't be vegans. Now, that's not an essential part of this debate because Isaac doesn't think that. He thinks that it's just, it would be inconsistent to not be a vegan because any set of values that would, that would be, would be amenable to the vast majority of people with the amenable that the vast majority of people would accept would logically entail veganism and that's essentially what the name of the trade is in so many words. So yeah, I think that that's all that's really necessary for me to explain. I'm going to try to give some examples of things I think are logically consistent with the name of the trade argument and we'll see where we can go from there. Thanks so much. With that, we'll jump right into open discussion. We'll have a short Q&A at the end folks. Thanks so much. Isaac, the floor is yours. Yeah, I'm not sure I tracked all of that, but there might be a slight misunderstanding. You understand that I think it's possible to have a consistent anti-vegan position, right? Yeah, okay. Okay, so I guess I want to allow you, if you want to open, like, do you have any arguments that you want to run on me? Well, I think that generally, so running the arguments is going to entail us going down a rabbit hole. I think that not all animals are worthy of equivalent moral protection.  I think that there's a continuum. For example, I think that it's fairly uncontroversial that fish have less moral value than birds or that birds have less moral value than mammals, which have less moral value than chimps, for example. I know that a mammal is a chip. I'm just saying, I'm saying, yeah, non-primates, basically. And so I think that, and especially when we're talking about beyond just meat, like there are other products that veganism entails that I think are less controversial to talk about. I think that you could say like animals have moral value, but we can still get honey, for example. I think that that wouldn't be an example of something that would be morally wrong. Even if you can see that animals do have moral value, if you can see that almost all animals have some moral value, even if you can see that arthropods like bees have some moral value, I don't think that even getting honey from them would be wrong. Or I don't think that, for example, if fish lack a sufficient amount of moral value, maybe it would be okay to eat them. Or even, for example, I think that there are certain cases where we're not talking about a factory farming situation where having a milk cow or knowing a farmer with a milk cow, I don't think that that would necessarily be wrong. And then, so I guess I actually would ask you to clarify what you think veganism entails so that I know what I'm kind of trying to get at. So we know we're arguing about exactly. Okay, well, I'll just draw your attention to one thing, which is your camera position is very weird. Half the time you're talking, it's just like a shot of your mouth, which I'm sorry, we are here to listen to you Sterling, but I don't want to see my beautiful face, right? So I can answer your question about veganism, but I think this started by me asking if you had an argument and not trying to be at all rude, but I didn't actually detect an argument there. Is there an argument in there? So do you want me to phrase it in terms of like premises and a conclusion? Or do you just want me to like do it as informal? If you can convey it informally, you're welcome to, but premises and conclusion is always preferable. Absolutely. Okay. So premise one, so premise one, if not all animals are worthy of equivalent moral protection, then some acts of use of animals would be permissible. Premise two, not all animals are worthy of equivalent moral protection. Therefore, some uses of animals are morally permissible. So it's weird because I agree with premise two, so I agree that not all animals are equivalent in moral value. And I don't agree with premise one, but I do agree with the consequent in premise one. So I don't see that it's entailed by all animals having, by animals not all having the same value that it's okay to use some of them. Now, for other reasons, like I don't really care, like use isn't the thing I'm interested in here, but I mean, it seems to me that that doesn't rule out this kind of situation, which I'm not taking this position, but I'm just showing a problem with that argument. It seems to not rule out the situation where they all have different levels of value that are sufficient to disqualify use, right? Okay. So the reason why that it's important that we have the definition of veganism is because I want to see, because that argument, so we can modify this argument so that it works in direct contradiction with whatever your definition of veganism would be, because I want to make sure we have a genuine disagreement. So what do you so do you think that any use of animals would be immoral or do you think that no, no, no, I don't think that. And I'm sorry, if that's important, you will come right around to that. Okay. But I just I just want to make sure that my point is clear. So it might be it might be useful to write it out so it's in my head, but like I'll agree that animals have different levels of moral value. To me, all that means is to have different like strengths of desire about how I would want them to be treated and stuff that seems obvious. But it's the first premise, it doesn't use the word veganism. So I don't think clearing that up is necessary for the first premise although I'm happy to clear that up. It just seems like you're saying if they have differential value, then it's okay to use some of them. But that's like saying, if five people have different amounts of money, then someone can't afford a can of Coke. It's like, well, they could all have enough money to buy Coke, yet they could all have different amounts of money. So what would be what would be wrong with someone replying like that to just to undermine the first premise? Right. So I think that there is- You want me to do the definition before we go into this? I think it would be helpful. I think it would be helpful. So I don't have like a super specific definition of veganism. You're not going to be able to really like hold my feet to the fire on this. I just think it refers to something general, like you know, not like generally speaking, not buying animal products, something like that. So what's really like the reason I use the word vegan is just because if I say I'm vegan, it quickly conveys the kind of preferences I have to most people. Most people have a pretty good idea where I'm coming from. I don't know what kind of word would be better to use, but I don't have some kind of rigid definition. And I think I'd actually agree with your kind of critique that there's problems with a lot of the standard definitions. And I guess I could say more about that. But yeah, I just use it as a general term.  Well, you can't sit on all chairs. Not all chairs have four legs, right? Like a lot of our terms have a bit of vagueness to them. I think that's the case with veganism. But I think we have a general idea what we're talking about. It's like it's got to do with avoiding a lot of animal products. Right. Yeah. And I imagine honey would be one of them that you would contest. I think honey is kind of gray, sort of like I don't have particularly strong views on insects. Oh, okay. So then we can just skip passing sex, right? We can go up, right? I do. I do want to keep in mind that there's an argument on the table, but I just I didn't want you to think I'm trying to get away from the definition thing. No, no, no, no. But I'm just trying to make sure that like, so, okay, on the argument on the table, like you said that you could argue that that for premise one, that even if some animals have different moral values than others, they might all have sufficient moral value not to use them, right? Right. Yeah. Am I actually don't take that view, but it's just a way to push back on premise one. It seems it seems really, for example, unintuitive. I don't think that anybody would grant that the smallest amount of moral value would equate like if you grant some moral value to being an animal just by definition, like, like what definition what animal is, I just don't see how it's morally relevant, right? Like, like for example, with arthropods or maybe like by valves, like they're technically animals, right? And so if you grant them any more value, like the smallest amount, I don't like, I guess you'd have to give me an argument for why I should think why I should think that like a smallest amount of moral value would be relevant. What I want you to understand is just that the kind of entailment there is sketchy. So when you try to say that it follows from them having different value that some of them are okay to use. Do you think it's okay just as one example to use like Neanderthals? So I think Neanderthals would have a sufficient moral value that it wouldn't be ethical to use them in some ways. Okay, okay. Now, well, wait, in some ways, like when we're talking about humans, you don't think it's okay to use humans, right? Well, the point, the point I'm just trying to reduce it, I'm just trying to reduce it, I'm trying to reduce it down to just two beings just to make this really obvious, right?  So it seems obvious if we said those were the only two beings in existence, right, that it wouldn't follow from them having different value. I assume you'd still value the humans more than the Neanderthals. It wouldn't follow from them having different value that either of them has sufficiently low value that it's okay to use them, right? So that's my criticism of premise one. Right, and I think that it's unintuitive that some like some minuscule amount of value, like what is the reason that any minuscule amount of value would be enough to grant moral rights or like non-use? What would they be? Someone isn't committed to that. They don't have to take that view to reject P1, right? So they say that it's just arbitrary? They, someone could say there is an amount of moral value that is so small that it justifies use, but no animals have that little moral value, right? Okay. I don't, again, I don't take that view. I'm just showing a kind of, the meeting has been upgraded by the host who now includes unlimited myth. Okay, I don't know what that is. That's something we're going to engage about soon. I'm just showing that that entailment just seems sketchy. That implication there, P implies Q, it seems, it seems like it's not the case that P implies Q, right? It seems like it's possible to just say, well, they have different values and none of them have such low value that it's okay to use them, right? And if your pushback on that is to say, well, then, then you're committed to the notion that any minuscule amount of value makes use impossible. You could just say, no, I'm not committed to that at all, right? I just think that no animal has that little value. Right. Go ahead. I don't need to repeat. Well, I'm just pointing out how someone could push back on that. Right. And I think that there are empirical examples which are, which are fairly clear, like buy vows, for example, or arthropods. But you understand that it doesn't follow in virtue of there being different value between two creatures that either of them have such low value that it's okay to use them. You follow me on that, right? Right. Okay. So P1 doesn't go through. Okay. So my argument, if we modify P1, right, that not all animals are worthy of moral consideration, you could just say that I think that you could just modify them to say that a specific animal, right? Like we could specify bees, for example. I think that, so like, you know, bees are not, let me go back and modify the argument. Do we have a clear concession that P1 there doesn't work out? Right. At least in that form, right? In that form, it doesn't follow, right? Okay. So we'll say that it's not like logically intact. Well, if it follows, it was a valid argument. It's a modus ponens, but the first premise is just not true. Right. Well, P doesn't imply you. Yes. Okay. I understand. Right. But there is an example. If we just modify all animals with bees, right? It seems like that then we have like something we can actually dispute on whether bees have sufficient moral value. What's the argument look like now? So I should say, Sterling, like, I'm in a way being obnoxiously pedantic with you because I don't even care about use, right? I'm just showing what I think honestly was like a problem with that framing of the argument. Right. So if you push pass it somehow and reformulate, you might be annoyed when I just say, okay, you finally got it to work out and I don't even care about use. Right. Well, but then is it relevant? I mean, like, if you really don't take that position, and since we're not really talking about... Well, it's your argument. I don't know if you're questioning whether your own argument's relevant. Well, but if it's not relevant to you is what I'm saying.  I'm just trying to be funny. Sorry. Do you want to reformulate it or change it? Well, I mean, but if you're going to just say that, well, use doesn't matter. If I reformulate it in a way that works. You changed the word from use to something else, I guess. It's not that use doesn't matter. I think a lot of use... I think use is a good way to... There's actions that are correlated with harm pretty highly. They're not intrinsically wrong. I don't think it's intrinsically wrong to stab someone. I just think generally speaking, as a heuristic, you probably don't want to stab. It's probably a similar thing with use. Probably a lot of forms of use are going to be bad, but you're not going to be able to hold me to... You are deontologically against use or something. Right. Well, I do think that the burden of proof is a little switched here, right? What claim have I made that I have the burden of proof for? Well, I mean, the resolution is supposedly... Because it is a moral obligation. But even if you don't want to take that... I take issue. And just to be clear, I took issue with that, never agreed to that proposition. And James understands that, but... And I'm not going to hold you to that, right? I know. You seem very fair. That's fine. I'm pointing out just for the people listening who are going to think if you get some kind of dunk on that argument that it's a dunk on me. I just want to be clear. I never agreed to that proposition. Right. But I think that it would seem like if the conversation is about veganism, we should have reasons for being a vegan, or at least have reasons that it would be logic inconsistent not to be a vegan. So beyond whatever reasons I give, I mean, a lot of what I'm going to say is going to depend upon why you think I should be a vegan, right? Or why you think that my position is logically inconsistent. I didn't say that your position is logically inconsistent. And when it comes to why you should be a vegan, all it means is that it's my desire. I desire for you to be a vegan. Yes. Why? Is there... I don't know why I have the desires I have. Fair point. Is there another argument? Because ultimately, I'll come around and I'll run name the trade. Maybe we'll close out on that. Unless we get really hung up.   Well, then here's the other thing. I want to get to name the trade because we started late. And I do need to leave by 11-ish. So we're going to only have like 30 minutes. And we're going to probably do Q&A too. Is there any other argument that it's going to nag at you that you didn't make? No, I don't think so. I mean, like I said, I think that the biggest problem is going to be name the trade. That's what it comes down to. Okay. Well, yeah, no, I can talk about that then. So human holocaust wrong, presumably, right? Right. So the formalization is like this, this, like if we break down the argument, right? It's a, we have to make a trade equalization between, I wish I could explain it so that I understand. Well, I'm starting by getting some initial statements from you that I would then be able to kind of like apply name the trade to. And it's not exclusively an argument. There's a component of name the trade that's an argument, but name the trade is also a dialogue process. Right.  What are you, okay, so it seems like that would be the case, right? That's the the intuitive thing. Okay. So the question is just what is it that's true of animals that if true of humans would justify holocausting them? Right. And what do you do if someone says, well, like if they're just a moral intuitionist, it just seems like to them that it that is the case that animals and humans have different moral values, even if they can't name what specific trade it is. Well, I understand that it seems that way to them. I'd be asking, what is it? So if we set up like a trade equalization process, where we gradually modify the properties of the humans until they become more and more like the animals, the question is, where in that trade equalization process, do you think that we'd be looking, we'd start looking at a situation where the holocaust and question is ethical? And just saying it seems like it's okay to kill animals isn't actually an answer to that question. So I just call it a category error. So but if they say like they can't point out a specific trade, they don't know because all the all like, or even like if they're a moral non naturalist, right, they think like of G more, like, do they have I can I have an idea what you're saying now, do they, are they saying they have no idea about the entire trade equalization process? Yeah, they don't know what what traits would make something morally relevant, even if they think that it like it, even if they think that it's by damage true, it's not just asking what traits would make something morally relevant. It's the specific question is where in the trade equalization process, do you think Valley's lost? When do you think we're looking? Yeah. So, oh, sorry. Well, can I just respond really quick there? Of course.  I think we should both interrupt anytime we think there's something that needs to be said. I don't mind interruption at all. Okay. Even so, they could say they would know when it was, but they can't point out any particular trait or like any, any point. I'm sorry. Well, if we're saying that we have no idea where in the trade equalization process Valley is lost, then the reductio you get there is that you're not sure if Valley is lost if we alter one molecule of the human. Right. And they could accept that. Yeah. And someone could also someone could accept a whole range of positions. Do you accept that though as the question? Well, I'm just saying that that seems like a logically consistent, like they would just say, well, they're not sure, but they would know if it happened. We're not, we're not debating whether there's logically consistent ways to answer name the trade. That was the very first thing I said at the start. I said, you don't think that I'm saying that there's no logically consistent way to be a carnage. Of course, you could, for example, name a trait like intelligence, right?  Bravo, consistent position, right? But presumably, we're trying to find a position that I shouldn't say presumably because I'm the one running the argument. What I am trying to do is find out what your position is, right? So it clearly isn't your position that you have no idea where the trade is because you wouldn't, you are not uncertain whether it's ethical to murder a human if one molecule was altered or are you? Well, I think the person would just say, like, well, it seems to me that the intuition would be if the one molecule was altered that again, you're trying, we're trying to say, let me just ask you a question is when somebody approaches this argument, does it have to be from a person? Well, I guess because you're a subjectivist, sorry. Now I'm thinking about the implication because I'm saying that there could be somebody not just that's logically consistent, but that it seems to be a, it seems to be perfectly fine, like there's no reductio for that moral indication. You don't think that it's a reductio to say that you're uncertain if it's ethical to murder a human if one molecule was altered? Well, they would say that they would know if they knew that one molecule was altered and then they would say like, oh, my intuition is that it's no. But then it's not the case that they have no idea where value's lost in the entire trade equalization process, right? Well, but you could like specify a whole list of examples and they just say, well, it seems like this one is the case and that one's not not. Wait a second, but Sterling, you understand like this follows straightforwardly. If they say that they have no idea in the trade equalization process where value's lost, I can take any frame and that's a frame that they are uncertain about, right? If they then alter their position and say, oh, I am sure about that frame, then we're talking about a new argument or a new position at that point, right? So the position that just says, the position that just says, I don't know. I have no idea, right? You understand the reductio there would just be you're uncertain if it's ethical to murder a human if one molecule were altered. Right. Well, they could say that they're certain about any particular frame. Sorry. I don't, I just want to push here. Do you understand that that follows? No, I understand what you're saying. But what I'm saying is that that's not what I was trying to imply in the beginning, right? I'm saying that they think that any particular frame, they wouldn't be able to judge. I'm saying that they think that they're not sure which frame it is unless you give them all the frames. No, no, no. We're saying if you have the whole, if someone says, I have no idea where in the trade equalization process value is lost, right? I have absolutely no clue. Then the reductio is just to say, okay, well, if one molecule were altered, we'd have a being who I guess you're not sure about because that's a frame in the trade equalization process. Yeah. And what I'm saying is that you misunderstood my position in the beginning that I think that it's not even my position. It's just like an example of a position. But I'm saying that they wouldn't say that there's any particular frame that they couldn't judge. What they're saying is that their moral intuition would have them judge it individually. And you have to give them, they're not sure, they can't point out in their head which frame it is. But if you point out any particular frame, they could judge it. Wait, but the question is where in the trade equalization process is value lost? Is the answer to that? I have no idea. I don't know which particular frame it is. I know there is a frame, but I don't know which particular frame it is. Right. And the reductio on that is that you would be uncertain if it's ethical to murder a being if you changed one molecule. Now, if you say, I don't see how it follows. Yeah, if you say I'm uncertain about the moral status of every being in this range, then for any being in that range, you're uncertain about their moral status. You just specify the amount of that frame. You could just say, in this particular frame, I'm uncertain. But then, if you say, oh, I now know about this frame, then the initial answer of I have no idea is not the answer anymore. That's a different position then. Well, they would know about, again, you could just specify that the frame is so small that it becomes meaningless. Right. I don't know the difference between. I don't think we're understanding each other right now. Okay. We'll try to reframe. If there's a range of potential worlds, possible worlds, and the position that we're given is I have no idea where in that world series values lost. I just have no clue. Then for any world, they don't know. So I can take whatever world I want. I can take the world where one molecule is altered and they're uncertain. If they then say upon reflection, oh, well, actually, I'm sure that that's not ethical. Well, then they're not giving the same answer that they initially gave. Right. Now, they do have some idea where the trade is. It's not there. Well, they know where it's not, but that's not the same thing to know where it is. Right. But saying I have absolutely no idea. Right. Well, then let's just modify it. We say because. Okay. Wait, no, no, one second. One second. Don't get to do that. We understand the initial framing has that problem though, right? If you want to reframe, that's fine. I think I was the position that I was proposing in the beginning. Look, if it was imperfect articulation on your part or an imperfect understanding on my part, that's totally fine. And I can see that. I can see that then. Okay. So what's the new position we want to try here? Because what I'm asking you, this is also, you can run theoretical answers, but I'd also like your answer. Right. I'm not asking a hypothetical person that's not you. I'd like to know what you think. Well, I don't see how the argument is filled. So the argument doesn't depend on my view, right?  I'm not totally clear on it. And I'm definitely not clear on it with respect to name the trade. Right. I don't know. I don't know what your answer to name the trade is. That's, that's what I want to know. How do you answer name the trade? Right. Okay.  Yeah, I'm not interested in some hypothetical person. I'm interested in you, Sterling. Well, but then when we're talking about an argument, whether it works, shouldn't we go down these hypotheticals to see if like it works in most cases or in all cases? Like it seems like if I can come up with like sufficient and not like a sufficient amount of doubt on the argument, because there are examples where it doesn't seem to work. Yeah, you can, I think you're misunderstanding me. You can raise whatever issues you want with the argument. And you can try as many answers that you don't actually believe in as you want. But at some point, I do want your answer. That's not unreasonable, is it? Okay. Well, I have a question about it. So I have a few questions about the argument. Sure. To make sure. What exactly is a treat? Something true of the being. So is it all predicates? I guess I would think of it mostly as like, I think of a big set of propositions.  You have the human Holocaust in the first possible world, the animal Holocaust in the last one. And there's a big stack of propositions in both worlds. And you're just kind of like altering those propositions bit by bit until you move from the first world to the last world. Okay, would it be true that anything, so for any trait, let's say, any trait that is applicable to trait equalize being A would be applicable to trait equalize being B. I don't know what it means to say a trait is applicable. Sorry, would it, it just is, I just I'm just talking about like a predicative type of existential existential like anything that's true of the one is true of the other. Exactly. Yeah. No, that that's the opposite of how the argument works, right? So we're starting with two worlds where, you know, World A and World Z, let's say, which is not the zombie apocalypse world. It's just the last letter of the alphabet. There's, there's a different set of propositions in those two worlds, right? If they're the same, if they're the same world, and I asked what's the difference between these two or something like, I wouldn't make any sense, right? They're two different worlds. And you have a gradual modification of one into the other. Mm-hmm. And at the end, there is there two or one object, or does it not specify? Okay, now, now, I'm not running the no, no, no, no. I'm happy. I'm happy to engage this. This is, this is my favorite sophistry, which I don't think you're being a sophist. But I think, like, you might actually believe that stuff.  Okay, I want to get your answer before this Q&A starts. How long do we have, James? I would say hopefully we can go into the Q&A in about five minutes.  I wrecked vegan foot soldier a while ago, look up forcing vegan foot soldier to concede a name to trade his sound. He conceded in three points in that video.  Now, with respect to that question, are there two objects in the end? I have no clue why someone would think that's the case, right? You're just talking about just a possible world where the animal holocaust happening. What is the argument for thinking there are two identical objects there? Right. And again, I'm asking you whether... So you're saying that... I'm not taking a position on it. I'm just asking. And I just want to pressure here, are you aware of any argument at all that establishes that? No, no, I'm not saying that. I'm just asking whether I'm trying to get clarification on this argument. No, as far as I can see, there aren't two identical objects. I don't even think two identical objects is a coherent notion. Okay, so good. So good. So then we... Just to make sure I understood. I want your answer before that timer runs out. So if they have all those same traits, so that I think that trait would be equivalent to like a predicate of like a property, what's the difference between a trait and a property? I just think of anything true of the being in question. So I tend to think in terms of propositions. There might be a way to frame it in terms of properties too, either probably is, but that's not exactly why I think of it. I just think of a world series and the propositions are different in world A and C and they modify gradually in the...  They're in between worlds. Right. The reason why I ask is because I think that there's a distinction between like accidental properties and essential properties. And so I think that if you modify enough of those traits, the individual undergoes substantial change and is no longer a human. Right. So this is another standard sophistry pathway, which again, I want to be clear. You know I'm not saying therefore you're a sophist. I'm just saying these are things that have been come up with by sophists. Now that, as far as I know, that originates with a sophist called Bo Bennett, who runs the fallacy webpage. I think your logical fallacy is or no, logically fallacious, sorry to the your fallacious guy, my bad. Now he also will not debate me. He failed to understand very basic concepts like what dualism means. That guy thinks that dualism, in fact, let's better stay on topic because there's just a bit of time. So argument is generated by a sophist. Now the specific argument is, let me just remember it. Oh yeah, the, sorry, you're going to have to remind me. What was the one you were just running about the human stuff? Okay, so it's actually a combination. So part of the essential and accidental stuff comes from a guy called Philo, philosophical vegan, who we're actually finding out we agree. But the thing about once you modify these traits, it's not a human. So the question, what's true of an animal that if true of a human would cause them to lose value begs the question by assuming that there is such thing as a valueless human. That's just based on not understanding. That's what, first of all, that is what you're saying there, right? No, I wasn't saying that. I wasn't going to say it doesn't follow. I wasn't going to say it doesn't follow because there's a change. Sorry, one second. But you're saying that there are things, like you're talking about accidental and essential properties, right? Which you can run the argument just fine. All these properties are things true of the animal. They can all be traits, right? But you're saying that if we change the essential properties, it's not going to be human anymore. Yeah, I would say that. Yeah, I would say that. And it seems like, yeah, and if you had to point out what problem that's supposed to show for the argument, presumably the problem that's supposed to show is that the argument is begging the question by assuming that it's possible that there is such thing as a valueless human. No, what I'm going to do is I'm going to apply the essential properties or what I was planning on doing is applying the essential properties and saying that, okay, once we get past this point, they lose more value because they're not a human. That's what I was eventually going to do. Oh, okay. So just to deal with, well, okay. So then that's a little different. Yeah, I did. Some people try to say, yeah, fair enough. Some people try to say that the question is malformed because it assumes that the value loss point occurs while the thing is still a human. And the only clarification that really needs to be given there is that we're not saying that the thing has to retain humanity throughout the trade equalization process. When you apply different properties to it, it may lose its humanity. We're just wondering where value is lost. I agree. Okay. Now, and sorry, what was your, oh, yeah, so you're, yeah, so you were just pointing out the values probably based on the essential properties and where they're, when they're gone, values gone. So, okay.  Are you saying that it's just human, being human is the trend? No. Okay. So, so what is, so I want to, I want to, I want to break down something. This is something that I wanted to, I don't know if we have time. Sorry, I don't want, I don't want to be rude, but I can just give you it. I do want an answer. Okay. Capacity, capacity for moral, capacity for moral reasoning. Capacity for moral reasoning. Okay. Capacity. And is it, is it ethical, is it ethical to holocaust the disabled people who can't, who we have no reason to think can reason morally to any greater degree than the animals we eat? Well, I think that there has to be a distinction between manifestation of capacities and the very concept of like, of what a, what a, so like, so just because somebody can't manifest its root capacity doesn't mean it doesn't have that root capacity. What is it? Okay. I follow. I have a question now though. Okay. What does it mean to say that a disabled, so we have a disabled person and we have a cow, neither of them are engaging in any abstract moral reasoning, but the disabled person is still capable. What's that supposed to mean? Okay. So the disabled, the disabled person has an essence. So like even, so for example, to even the concept of like disability or mental illness or immaturity, they presuppose the existence of capacities, which manifestations are blocked or destroyed. Like what it means to be disabled is that those manifestations are blocked or destroyed in some way. I don't understand how saying someone is disabled means that they have the capacity for abstract moral reasoning. I don't see any entailment there. Why would that follow? And what is, and to be clear, I actually don't know what you mean by having the capacity. What's it mean for them to have the capacity if they're unable to do that? That's one of the things is like, we have like these various degrees of realization.  Like, is that the kind of view? Yeah. Okay. You have to admit that sounds kind of funny. It sounds funny, but the capacities originate from nature or essence. Like having a certain nature explains why a being has a capacity. It means to have a nature. This might be the last question and then we jump to Q&A. So there's a construal, sorry, I'll let you get the, you can have the last word, you can go as long as you want, because I just want to say what I think about that. When it comes to nature, if you define nature in some kind of simple way, like it's about the sort of average characteristics of the species, I think you won't want to go that way. I think you're going to want to do some platonic, theistic, essential problem. Well, it's not theistic though. I'm teasing. I'm teasing. Okay. Fair enough though. But the point is I think you want to do what looks like a spooky move to me, although I know you won't grant that it's spooky. If you took some kind of simple definition, like it's just about what the species on average can do, then there's a straightforward reductio. We just say that they're a large quantity of people are disabled, and then the average properties are those of the disabled people, and then it's ethical to be the Holocaust.  So I just need clarity on those things. Right. And so this is like the last question, I guess, because we have to get to Q&A. So basically, I think that there's, so obviously, their capacities can be manifested in different degrees. Right. Like somebody who's sleeping doesn't have like, so I guess, but I want to ask you a question to see if we can make an agreement. But yeah, it's going to be a metaphysical argument. Right.  Oh, well, we can go into that. I'm interested in substance theory. Yeah. Sorry, I said I'd let you talk, man. You go, I will not say anything. Say whatever you want. It's okay. So capacities are characterized by their directness or they're like towards some end. So it's essentially like the final cause and Aristotle. And if directness towards something X is identical to X, then it would then make no sense to speak of failure to effects in order of that kind. So just because like, so it can't be just that the actual use of it is equivalent to what the capacity is. It has to be that it comes from the substance itself, comes from what it means to be a human. So for, so if we're going to talk about like all humans, like the cognitively disabled, those situated in situations where they can't currently use those sets of root capacities, they would still have them because those are the, just because they can't manifest, it doesn't mean that they don't have them inherently. Okay. So, oh, sorry. Fuck. It's so tempting to reply. Please. No, I understand. I mean, I didn't go further. Like maybe a few more minutes because we do have fewer questions than usual. So, I can say something I want to hear as well. Well, I'll just say something very quick and then let you kind of go off again. My question remains the same. If you're going to say that Helen Keller has the capacity to be an Olympic athlete, which I'm sorry to milk that, but it is a really funny statement in my point of view. If you're going to say that, and you're going to say what it means for her to have the capacity is that it's in her nature, that's a really just pushed the question back a step to what does it mean to say that it's in someone's nature. So, that's the question for you. And so, we can modify the Helen Keller example just to make it easier to see in terms of seeing, right? Like we can modify the fact that she has the structures which are obviously there impaired, but that doesn't mean that they don't have that capacity inherently. So, they're obviously defective, but it doesn't mean that that's not what they are. I mean, that's part of the definition of what it is to be able to see or being able to have an eye or something like that. She would still have those structures. Now, if you're saying that we take out all the structures, right, and so they're not even just blocked or just are like destroyed or something like that, then you don't have a human anymore.  So, when you say that something, what does it mean for something to be in someone's nature? I think I explained that. I mean, I said that it has to do with what it means to be essentially a human. Are you just saying that? Or essentially like anything. Anything that has a definition. I apologize for your error. Are you just saying that most humans have that property? No, I'm saying that in order to be a human, they have to have that property. But Helen Keller can't see. That's a manifestation of the potentiality. It's not the actual. But how does she have the property of sight? So, she had, well, the property of sight, the sight is an action, not a property. So, like, it's what somebody does. The property of being able to see. Well, she has the, she doesn't have the property, she has the capacity. Yeah, but I thought that the capacity means that she in her nature has the property or something. I don't know, I'm just not following. I don't know what it means to say that Helen Keller has the capacity to see or to be an Olympic athlete. I don't know what that means. So, she has the underlying structures, which, if they were not blocked, would be able to be manifested or, you know, obviously like an eye. So, like, even this is kind of like where we go into like medicine, for example, like it would make no sense that, like, if you don't grant that the capacity is there, what does it even mean when medicine is trying to resolve a problem? Right. Like, if I try to resolve the problem of somebody being able to see, right, I have to go in there and fix a problem, something that's being blocked, something that doesn't work currently now. We're going to make it work, right? So, that means that there has to be an inherent capacity already in the structures that are inside the eye or inside the brain or whatever you want to call it that could already do that, but is being blocked by something or is currently like malfunctioning or not working in the way it's supposed to. Yeah, I guess that all just seems very strange to me. I wish we had more time to actually go into the actual argument. Yeah, I'd like to hash that out.  Well, I mean, you can say what you want to say, but... No, feel free. Yeah, well, I guess I'm just not clear. Like, when you say they have the capacity, it's in their nature. Like, all I can really understand you saying there is that like a human would be like, I mean this, but you want to say this isn't what you're saying. It sounds like you're just saying that humans, generally speaking, have the ability to see. So it's like it's typical of humans. Right, and that obviously that's what I said was not the case. Yeah, so I just don't understand. Like, when you say, yeah... Well, can you address my like examples a little bit? Like, you know, I don't know if we have time, but do we have time, James? I think we have, um... I just need to go at around a little bit. Maybe a couple minutes. Okay, so we basically don't have any questions. Or very few. We do have very few, and I'm pushing it until I feel latest we can possibly go giving your schedule. Right, okay, cool. But can you maybe just talk about some of the examples I proposed and then maybe I can understand where the disagreement... Like, for example, the eye, like medicine in the eye. Like, what if they... If the eye didn't have the inherent capacity to see, what exactly is the doctor restoring when they fix somebody's eyes, for example? Capacity to see, what are they restoring? Are they restoring something? Seems like they are. If somebody was... Okay, let me put it this way. You could just specify on the example that they had the ability to see at one point and something is blocking that capacity. What if they didn't have the ability to see ever? Well, we're talking... I mean, I'm making hypothetical. I think you should address that hypothetical. But it's supposed to apply to all humans. Well, but I'm just using this as an example. I'm asking you for this particular example. Sorry, but does it apply to all humans? Well, I want to answer to the hypothetical first. What's the question about the hypothetical? What exactly is the person... What exactly is the doctor restoring in the example of somebody who could see at one point and no longer can see? The ability to see? They don't have... Right, so the capacity was already there and they're just restoring what was there. Alrighty. You can fix things essentially. If someone has... Okay, I guess I just need to think about what exactly you're saying. So why would it be the case that if you somehow get augmented in animals intelligence, why is that not them having the capacity for... If you're augmented them so they could have that? Yeah, why is that... Well, then they would. No, I would think they would be more relevant. Well, wait, but then we all have the capacity for all these things, unless you can show it's logically impossible to augment like animal moral reasoning or whatever your other properties were. Well, I guess I'm asking, what do you mean by augment? Like how would you do that? Not empirically. Not empirically. Which means like hypothetically.  The helmet on them? Right, yeah, yeah. No, I don't know. Um, sorry, what's the question? How would that work? Like how would you modify an animal so that it had those characteristics? And then I can tell you whether those characteristics are... I don't know. Say you do some kind of thing to their brain. I don't know. And then they're able to reason at a higher level. Well, then they've gone undergone substantial change. But so why is it... Why... But the thing is, if they have the capacity in virtue of the fact that it's logically possible for whatever X is to be augmented, that's going to apply to humans.  You said that animals have the capacity. It's not a logical possibility. It's a metaphysical possibility. I don't even... I think metaphysical possibility is a sketchy notion, so we might have to talk about that. But... What is Isaac thinking of the last word here? Well, I'll let Sterling have the last word, but like all I would say is like, you want to say that humans have the capacity for certain things and animals don't. But when we point to a human who doesn't have it and an animal who doesn't have it, right, I say both cases, there's some kind of augmentation that could happen that would give them this thing. So... And it sounded like you were saying that that would mean the animal does have the capacity because they can be augmented such that they would be able to do the thing. So if that's the case, then having the capacity for X can't be a differential property and is there for a category error answer to name the trade. Right. So, okay, so there's a little bit of a problem. We're conflating metaphysical and logical possibility. So I think that it's like... So you'd have to make it so that an animal inherently had... Sir, you got a... What is metaphysical possibility? So metaphysical possibility has to do with the nature of object, like what it means to be an object. Like if you take Kripke's a priori synthetic statement, like, yeah, I think... I don't want to get to like miss some of these questions, but yeah, like if you take a priori synthetic statement like Kripke has, those are metaphysically true, right? So you can drive conclusions from that. What it means to be... Like, are you familiar with Kripke's work at all? I don't know... I don't know Kripke's work, but I just want to understand what metaphysical possibility is. Right, but this is a necessary part of the story. You might not even need to answer that to deal with the more direct objection, which is just that you granted that if the animal's consciousness can be augmented, then they have the capacity for the property, right? So then the capacity... Having the capacity isn't a differential trade, right? So it's a category error to propose a non-differential trade as an answer to name the trade. Okay, so there's two things there, though. So, let's just ignore them. Sorry, can we just step by step that? Can we just step by step that? The animal has the capacity, if their consciousness can be augmented, such that they're able to reason morally, right? Are we talking about metaphysical or empirical? I think it has the last word here. Uh, okay. Okay, that's fine. Well, yeah, that's... No, you take it, go for...  It's all good. Well, okay. James, do we need to... I think we need to go. Yeah. We probably should jump to the question. I'm sorry, it's not that I don't want to answer the question. I would love to continue this conversation over, like, this court or something like that, just so we can clarify. But, yeah. Yeah, well, I guess, should we just say where we're hung up? So what I'm hung up on is, I'm trying to understand James' answer... Sorry, not James. Sterling's answer to name the trade. He said it's about having the capacity for, I think, moral reasoning. But when we need it actually to be a differential property for it to not be a category error as an answer to name the trade. And if animals also have the capacity because they could be augmented such that they're able to do moral reasoning, then both beings have the capacity. It's not a differential property, and therefore, it's a category error answer to name the trade. I'll close on that. And I just think that it's a metaphysical... It's not a metaphysical possibility, even if it's a logical possibility. Like, I could imagine it, but it doesn't make it a metaphysical. I can explain that in the packet, and then talk about the other answer in our Discord, in Discord or whatever. It's my Discord. Your Discord. My Discord. Appreciate it. We will jump through these as quick as possible. Lazy Kid, thanks for your super chat. Who asked, what happened to JHC? You should have a talk with him. Oh, JHC is great. He's got personal stuff going on. But he's around in the shadows. He might be watching this right now. You never know. Gotcha. Thanks so much. Next up, appreciate your super chat from our regular Michael Dresden, usually a troll, but said, thanks for being so persistent.  Well, thanks for that encouragement, Michael. And thanks for our guests for being super patient. So I can tell you folks really appreciate these guys. Apologize. I said, thanks for your super chat. They said, I agree. Thanks guys for pushing through for us. Sorry you have to deal with complainers. I can tell you, I promise it bothers me most of all when we have those tech problems. So thanks for your patience, both. Bent-Hovind. Everyone needs to bug James to get on Discord instead of this thing.  And I look kind of like at a holocaust or something. This is a feature of this app. I think you look terrific. Let's see. I look squished. Thanks for your super chat. Bent-Hovind, no relation, said, ask yourself what type of guitar is that? Oh, it's a no-name.  I just wanted to have an eight string so I can gent. But it's, yeah, we're putting out an album soon. I'll put a thing on my channel when I do. Sweet. Lewis, we're not. Thanks for your super chat. Who said, you guys getting FF7? Also, James loved the channel. Thanks for that, Lewis. I'll credit to the debaters. They make it fun. But what is FF7? Final Fantasy. I have an idea. Oh! Final Fantasy VII.  No, I'm not.  Agreed. Real-time all the way. I'm a real-time RPG player. Thanks so much. Then SwingblitzGH, thanks for your last question. Thanks for your super chat. They said, why is moral value based on a trait? Why isn't it based on intuition? Is that for, go for it. Well, I don't think it's based on either. I'm just, all I was suggesting there is that an intuitionist might have an objection with naming the trait in the sense that they, I think that they could find a consistent position that wouldn't be absurd. But I don't think, I mean, I don't think it's based on either traits nor intuitions. Yeah, so my answer is that the language of based on confuses me. I don't know what exactly is meant by that. I just think that we have different desires based on, I just said based on. So we have different desires based on what kind of situation we're faced with. Like if we're faced with, you know, a kid being beaten, we might have a desire for that not to happen. You know, I don't know, but I'm not sure if I'm committed to some kind of like anti-intuition position or something. Like I guess I just don't really understand the question clearly enough. It just seems like, seems like all I need is that our moral assessment changes based on what the traits are that we're faced with. I don't know that that has to mean that it's like derived in some kind of way from the traits or whatever, just that it like varies according to what traits the being has. Gotcha. And thanks so much. Last one. Pepe Bra 3 says, Sterling is a cutie. You have a fan out there, Sterling. And last, Yattrip4 says we need a part two. I agree. I think these guys might do it on Discord. We will link it and I'll get you guys that link if they do it on Discord or wherever it is, if it's on their channel, we will let you know about it and try to promote it. So I also encourage you to check out these guys' links. I've put their links in the description. So please, if you enjoyed your great opportunity to go hear more at those links. So thanks so much, though. Isaac and Sterling for being here. Yeah, thank you, James. I know that all this is super frustrating for you. It's like, I completely understand. Yeah. Thank you for hosting us. We, I really appreciate it. You having this channel here is amazing, you know, to be able to have these conversations on a reasonable matter. Super encouraging. I appreciate you saying that. And I think Congress Contender, if you're here, we are streaming from Congress's location. Congress, if you're hearing us, we are now good to wrap up the stream. So thanks so much for Congress Contender streaming from his location. Is this the part where we all hope that Congress is actually there to shut down the stream? Always here. I'll get you guys set up. All right. Thanks, everybody, for turning out. Thank you, Scott.