the understanding or skeptical suspicion concerning every conclusion which is new and extraordinary though conclusions can be more agreeable to skepticism then such as make discoveries concerning the weakness and narrow limits of human reason and capacity 60 and what stronger instance can be produced of the surprising ignorance and weakness of the understanding than the present for surely if there be any relation among objects which it imports to us to know perfectly it is that of cause and effect on this are founded all our reasoning concerning matter of fact or existence by means of it alone we attain any assurance concerning objects which are removed from the present testimony of our memory and sense the only immediately utility of all sciences is to teach us how to control and regulate future events by their causes our thoughts and inquiries are therefore every moment employed about this relation yet so imperfect are the ideas which we form concerning it that it is impossible to give any just definition of cause except what is drawn from something extraneous and foreign to it similar objects are always conjoined with similar of this we have experience suitably to this experience therefore we may define a cause to be an object followed by another and where all the objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second or in other words where if the first object had not been the second never had existed the appearance of a cause always conveys the mind by customary transition to the idea of the effect of this also we have experience we may therefore suitably to this experience form another definition of cause and call it an object followed by another and whose appearance always conveys the thought to that other but though both these definitions be drawn from circumstances far into the cause we cannot remedy this inconvenience or attain any more perfect definition which may point out that circumstance in the cause which gives it a connection with its effect we have no idea of this connection nor even any distinct notion of what it is we desire to know when we enter into the of what it is we desire to know when we endeavor at a conception of it we say for instance that the vibration of this string is the cause of this particular sound but what do we mean by that affirmation we either mean that this vibration is followed by the sound and that all similar vibrations have been followed by similar sounds or that this vibration is followed by this sound and that upon the appearance of one the mind anticipates the senses and forms immediately an idea of the other we may consider the relation of cause and effect in either of these two lights but beyond these we have no idea of it 61 to recapitulate therefore the reasonings of this section every idea is copied from some proceeding impression or sentiment and where we cannot find any impression we may be certain that there is no idea in all single instances of the operation of bodies or minds there is nothing that produces any impression nor consequently can suggest any idea of power or necessary connection but when many uniform instances appear and the same object is always followed by the same event we then begin to entertain the notion of causing connection we then feel a new sentiment or impression to wit a customary connection in the thought or imagination between one object and its usual attendant and this sentiment is the original of that idea which we seek for for as this idea arises from a number of similar instances and not from any single instance it must arise from that circumstance in which the number of instances differ from every individual instance but this customary connection or transition of the imagination is the only circumstance in which they differ in every other particular they are alike the first instance which we saw of motion communicated by the shock of two billiard balls to return to this obvious illustration is exactly similar to any instance that may at present occurred us except only that we could not at first infer one event from the other which we are unable to do at present after so long a course of uniform experience I know not whether the reader will readily apprehend this reasoning I'm afraid that should I multiply words about it or throw it into greater variety of lights it would only become more obscure and intricate in all abstract reasonings there is one point of view which if we can happily hit we shall go farther towards illustrating the subject and by all the eloquence and copious expression in the world this point of view we should endeavor to reach and reserve the flowers of rhetoric for subject which are more adapted to them end of chapter 10 section 8 of an inquiry concerning human understanding this is a liverbox recording all liverbox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit liverbox.org reading by Daniel Polanco an inquiry concerning human understanding by David Hume section 8 of liberty and necessity part one it might reasonably be expected in questions which have been canvassed and disputed with great eagerness since the first origin of science and philosophy that the meaning of all the terms at least should have been agreed upon among the disputants in our inquiries and the course of 2000 years been able to pass from words to the true and real subject of the controversy for how easy may it seem to give exact definitions of the terms employed and reasoning and make these definitions not the mere sounds of words the object of future scrutiny and examination but if we consider the matter more narrowly we should be apt to draw a quite opposite conclusion from this circumstance alone that a controversy has been long kept on foot and remains still undecided we may presume that there is some ambiguity in the expression and that the disputants affects different ideas to the terms employed in the controversy for as the faculties of the mind are supposed to be naturally like in every individual otherwise nothing could be more fruitless than to reason or dispute together it were impossible if men fix the same ideas to their terms that they could so long form different opinions of the same subject especially when they communicate their views and each party turn themselves on all sides and search of arguments which may give them the victory over their antagonist it is true if men attempt the discussion of questions which lie entirely beyond the reach of human capacity such as those concerning the origin of worlds or the economy of the intellectual system or region of spirits they may long beat the air in the fruitless contest and never arrive at any determinate conclusion but if the question regard any subject of common life and experience nothing one would think could preserve the dispute so long undecided but some ambiguous expressions which keep the antagonist still at a distance and hinder them from grappling with each other this has been the case in the long disputed question concerning liberty and necessity and to so remarkable a degree that if I be not much mistaken we shall find that all mankind both learned and ignorant have always been of the same opinion with regard to the subject and that a few intelligible definitions would immediately have put an end to the whole controversy I own that this dispute has been so much canvassed on all hands and has led philosophers into such a labyrinth of obscure sophistry that it is no wonder if a sensible reader indulges ease so far as to turn a deaf ear to the proposal of such a question from which you can expect neither instruction or entertainment but the state of the argument here proposed may perhaps serve to renew his attention as it has more novelty promises at least some decision of the controversy it will not much to serve his ease by any intricate or obscure reasoning I hope therefore to make it appear that all men have ever agreed in the doctrine both of necessity and of liberty according to any reasonable sense which can be put on these terms and that the whole controversy has hitherto turned merely upon words we shall begin with examining the doctrine of necessity it is universally allowed that matter in all its operations is actuated by a necessary force and that every natural effect is so precisely determined by the energy of its cause that no other effect and such particular circumstances could possibly have resulted from it the degree and direction of every motion is by the laws of nature prescribed to such exactness that a living creature may as soon arise from the shock of two bodies as motion and any other degree or direction than what is actually produced by it would we therefore form a just and precise idea of necessity when you must consider whence that idea arises when we apply it to the operation of bodies it seems evident that if all the scenes of nature were continually shifted in such a manner that no two events for any resemblance to each other but every object was entirely new without any similitude to whatever had been seen before we should never in that case have attained the least idea of necessity or of any connection among these objects we might say upon such a supposition that one object or event has followed another not that one was produced by the other the relation of cause and effect must be utterly unknown to mankind and for instance reasoning concerning the operations of nature would from that moment be at an end and the memory and senses remain the only canals by which the knowledge of any real existence could possibly have access to the mind our idea therefore of necessity and causation arises entirely from the uniformity observable and the operations of nature where similar objects are constantly conjoined together and the mind is determined by custom to infer the one from the appearance of the other these two circumstances from the whole of that necessity which we ascribe to matter beyond the constant conjunction of similar objects and the consequent inference from one to the other we have no notion of any necessity or connection if it appear therefore that all mankind have ever allowed without any doubt or hesitation that these two circumstances take place in the voluntary actions of men and in the operations of mind it must follow that all mankind have ever agreed in the doctrine of necessity and that they have hitherto disputed merely for not understanding each other as to the first circumstance the constant and regular conjunction of similar events we may possibly satisfy ourselves by the following considerations it is universally acknowledged that there is a great uniformity among the actions of men in all nations and ages and that human nature remains still the same and its principles and operations the same motives always produce the same actions the same events follow from the same causes ambition avarice self-love vanity friendship generosity public spirit these passions mixed in various degrees and distributed through society have been from the beginning of the world and still are the source of all the actions and enterprises which have ever been observed among mankind would you know the sentiments inclinations and course of life of the Greeks and Romans study well the temper and actions of the French and English you cannot be much mistaken in transferring to the former most of the observations which you have made with regard to the latter mankind are so much the same and all times and places that history informs us of nothing new or strange in this particular its chief use is only to discover the constant and universal principles of human nature by showing men in all varieties of circumstances and situations and furnishing us with materials from which we may form our observations and become acquainted with the regular springs of human action and behavior these records of wars intrigues factions and revolutions are so many collections of experiments by which the politician or moral philosopher fixes the principles of the science in the same manner as the physician or natural philosopher becomes acquainted with the nature of plants minerals and other external objects by the experiments which he forms concerning them nor are the earth water and other elements examined by Aristotle and Hippocrates more like to those which at present lie under our observation than the men described by Polybius and Tacitus are to those who now govern the world should a traveler returning from a far country bring us an account of men wholly different from any with whom we were ever acquainted men who were entirely divested of avarice ambition or revenge who knew no pleasure but friendship generosity and public spirit we should immediately from these circumstances detect the falsehood and prove him a liar with the same certainty as if he had stuffed his narration with stories of centaurs and dragons miracles and prodigies and if we would explode any forgery in history we cannot make use of a more convincing argument than to prove that the actions described to any person are directly contrary to the course of nature and that no human motives in such circumstances could ever induce him to such a conduct the veracity of quintus curtius is as much to be suspected when he describes the supernatural courage of alexander by which he was hurried on singly to attack multitudes as when he describes the supernatural force and activity by which he is able to resist them so readily and universally do we acknowledge a uniformity in human motives and actions as well as in the operations of body hence likewise the benefit of that experience acquired by long life and a variety of business and company in order to instruct us in the principles of human nature and regulate our future conduct as well as speculation by means of this guide we mount up to the knowledge of men's inclinations and motives from their actions expressions and even gestures and again descend to the interpretation of their actions from our knowledge of their motives and inclinations the general observations treasured up by a course of experience give us the clue of human nature and teach us to unravel all its intricacies pretax and appearances no longer deceive us public declarations pass for the spacious coloring of a cause and though virtue and honor be allowed their proper weight and authority that perfect disinterestedness so often pretended to is never expected in multitudes and parties seldom in their leaders and scarcely even in individuals of any rank or station but were there no uniformity in human actions and were every experiment which we could form of this kind irregular and anomalous it were impossible to collect any general observations concerning mankind and no experience however accurately digested by reflection would ever serve to any purpose why is the aged husband man more skillful and is calling than the young beginner but because there is a certain uniformity in the operation of the sun rain and earth towards the production of vegetables and experience teaches the old practitioner the rules by which this operation is governed and directed we must not however expect that this uniformity of human actions should be carried to such a length as that all men in the same circumstances will always act precisely in the same manner without making any allowance for the diversity of characters prejudices and opinions such uniformity in every particular is found in no part of nature on the contrary from observing the variety of conduct in different men we are enabled to form a greater variety of maxims which still suppose a degree of uniformity and regularity are the manners of men different and different ages and countries we learn thence the great force of custom and education which mold the human mind from its infancy and form it into a fixed and established character is the behavior and conduct of the one sex very unlike that of the other is it thence we become acquainted with the different characters which nature has oppressed upon the sexes and which she preserves with constancy and regularity are the actions of the same person much diversified in the different periods of his life from infancy to old age this affords room for many general observations concerning the gradual change of our sentiments and inclinations and the different maxims which prevail in the different ages of human creatures even the characters which are peculiar to each individual have a uniformity in their influence otherwise our acquaintance with the persons and our observations of their conduct could never teach us their dispositions or serve to direct our behavior with regard to them i granted is possible to find some actions which seem to have no regular connection with any known motives and our exceptions to all measures of conduct which have ever been established for the government of men but if we would willingly know what judgments should be formed of such a regular and extraordinary actions we may consider the sentiments commonly entertained with regard to those irregular events which appear in the course of nature and the operations of external objects all causes are not conjoined to their usual effect with light uniformity an artificer who handles only dead matter may be disappointed of his aim as well as the politician who directs the conduct of sensible and intelligent agents the vulgar who takes things according to their first appearance attribute the uncertainty of events to such an uncertainty in the causes as makes the latter often fail of their usual influence though they may meet no impediment in their operation but philosophers observing that almost in every part of nature there is contained a vast variety of springs and principles which are hid by reason of their minuteness or remoteness find that it is at least possible the contrariety of events may not proceed from any contingency in their cause but from the secret operation of contrary causes this possibility is converted into certainty by farther observation when they remark that upon an exact scrutiny a contrariety of effects always betrays a contrariety of causes and proceeds from their mutual opposition a peasant can give no better reason for the stopping of any clock or watch than to say that it is not commonly go right but an artist easily perceives that the same force in the spring or pendulum has always the same influence on the wheels but fails of its usual effect perhaps by reason of a grain of dust which puts a stop to the whole movement from the observation of several parallel instances philosophers form your maxim that the connection between all causes and effects is equally necessary and that its seeming uncertainty in some instances proceeds from the secret opposition of contrary causes thus for instance and the human body when the usual symptoms of health or sickness disappoint our expectation when medicines operate not with their wanted powers when irregular events follow from any particular cause the philosopher and physician are not surprised at the matter nor are ever tempted to deny in general the necessity and uniformity of those principles by which the animal economy is conducted they know that a human body is a mighty complicated machine that many secret powers lurk in it which are altogether beyond our comprehension that to us it must often appear very uncertain in its operations and that therefore the irregular events which outwardly discover themselves can be no proof that the laws of nature are not observed with the greatest regularity and its internal operations and government the philosopher if he be consistent must apply the same reasoning to the actions and volitions of intelligent agents the most irregular and unexpected resolutions of men may frequently be accounted for by those who know every particular circumstance of their character and situation a person of an obliging disposition gives a peevish answer but he has the toothache or has not dined a stupid fellow discovers an uncommon alacrity in his carriage but he has met with a sudden peace of good fortune or even when an action as sometimes happens cannot be particularly accounted for either by the person himself or by others we know in general that the characters of men are to a certain degree and constant and irregular this is in a manner the constant character of human nature though it be applicable in a more particular manner to some persons who have no fixed rule for their conduct but proceed in a continued course of caprice and inconstancy the internal principles and motives may operate in a uniform manner not withstanding these seeming regularities and the same manner as the winds rain clouds and other variations of the weather are supposed to be governed by steady principles though not easily discoverable by human sagacity and inquiry thus it appears not only that the conjunction between motives and voluntary actions is as regular and uniform as that between the cause and effect in any part of nature but also that this regular conjunction has been universally acknowledged among mankind and has never been the subject of dispute either in philosophy or common life now as it is from past experience that we draw all inferences concerning the future and as we conclude that objects will always be conjoined together which we find to have always been conjoined it may seem superfluous to prove that this experience uniformity in human actions is a source once we draw inferences concerning them but in order to throw the argument into a greater variety of lights we shall also insist though briefly on this latter topic the mutual dependence of men is so great in all societies that scarce any human action is entirely complete in itself or is performed without some reference to the actions of others which are requisite to make it answer fully the intention of the agent the poor stratificer who labors alone expects at least the protection of the magistrate to ensure him the enjoyment of the fruits of his labor he also expects that when he carries his goods to market and offers them at a reasonable price he shall find purchasers and shall be able by the money he acquires to engage others to supply him with those commodities which are requisite for his subsistence in proportion as men extend their dealings and render their intercourse with others more complicated they always comprehend in their schemes of life a greater variety of voluntary actions which they expect from the proper motives to cooperate with their own in all these conclusions they take their measures from past experience in the same manner as their reasonings concerning external objects and firmly believe that men as well as all the elements are to continue in their operations the same that they have ever found them a manufacturer reckons upon the labor of his servants for the execution of any work as much as upon the tools which he employs and would be equally surprised where his expectations disappointed in short this experimental inference and reasoning concerning the actions of others enters so much into human life that no man while awake is every moment without employing it have we not reasoned therefore to affirm that all mankind have always agreed in the doctrine of necessity according to the foregoing definition and explication of it nor have philosophers ever entertained a different opinion from the people in this particular for not to mention that almost every action of their life supposes that opinion there are even few of the speculative parts of learning to which it is not essential what would become of history had we not a dependence on the veracity of the historian according to the experience which we have had of mankind how could politics be a science if laws and forms of government had not a uniform influence upon society where it would be the foundation of morals if particular characters had no certain or determinant power to produce particular sentiments and if these sentiments had no constant operation on actions and with what pretense could we employ our criticism upon any poet or polite author if we cannot pronounce the conduct and sentiments of his actors either natural or unnatural to such characters and in such circumstances it seems almost impossible therefore to engage either in science or action of any kind without acknowledging the doctrine of necessity and this inference from motive to voluntary actions from characters to conduct and indeed when we consider how aptly natural and moral evidence linked together and form only one chain of argument we shall make no scruple to allow that they are of the same nature and derive from the same principles a prisoner who has neither money nor interest discovers the impossibility of his escape as well when he considers the obscenity of the jailer as the walls and bars with which he is surrounded and in all attempts for his freedom chooses rather to work upon the stone and iron of the one than upon the inflexible nature of the other the same prisoner when conducted to the scaffold foresees his death as certainly from the constancy and fidelity of his guards as from the operation of the ax or wheel his mind runs along a certain train of ideas the refusal of the soldiers to consent to his escape the action of the executioner the separation of the head and body bleeding convulsing motions and death here is a connected chain of natural causes and voluntary actions but the mind feels no difference between them and passing from one link to another nor is less certain of the future event than if it were connected with the objects present to the memory or senses by a train of causes cemented together by what we are pleased to call a physical necessity the same experienced union has the same effect on the mind whether the united objects be motives volition and actions or figure in motion we may change the name of things but their nature and their operation on the understanding never change where a man whom i know to be honest and opulent and with whom i live an intimate friendship to come into my house where i'm surrounded with my servants i rest assured that he is not to stab me before he leaves it in order to rob me of my silver standish and i no more suspect this event than the falling of the house itself which is new and solidly built and founded but he may have been seized with a sudden and unknown frenzy so may a sudden earthquake arise and shake and tumble my house about my ears i shall therefore change the suppositions i shall say that i know with certainty that he is not to put his hand into the fire and hold it there until it be consumed and this event i think i can foretell with the same assurance as that if he throws himself out at the window and meet with no obstruction he will not remain a moment suspended in the air no suspicion of an unknown frenzy can give the least possibility to the former event which is so contrary to all the known principles of human nature a man who at noon leaves his purse full of gold on the pavement at charring cross may as well expect that will fly away like a feather as that he will find it untouched an hour after above one half of human reasonings contain inferences of a similar nature attended with more or less degrees of certainty proportion to our experience of the usual conduct of mankind in such particular situations i have frequently considered what could possibly be the reason why all mankind though they have ever without hesitation acknowledged the doctrine of necessity in their whole practice and reasoning have yet discovered such a reluctance to acknowledge it in words and have ever shown a propensity in all ages to profess the contrary opinion the matter i think may be accounted for after the following manner if we examine the operations of body and the production of effects from their causes we shall find that all our faculties can never carry us farther in our knowledge of this relation than barely to observe that particular objects are constantly could join together and that the mind is carried by a customary transition from the appearance of one to the belief of the other but though this conclusion concerning human ignorance be the result of the strictest scrutiny of the subject men still entertain a strong propensity to believe that they penetrate farther into the power of nature and perceive something like a necessary connection between the cause and effect when again they turn their reflections towards the operations of their own minds and feel no such connection of the motive in the action they are then apt to suppose that there is a difference between the effects which result from material force and those which arise from thought and intelligence being once convinced that we know nothing farther of causation of any kind than merely the constant conjunction of objects and the consequent inference of the mind from one to another and finding that these two circumstances are universally allowed to have a place in voluntary actions we may be more easily led to own the same necessity common to all causes and though this reasoning may contradict the systems of many philosophers and ascribing necessity to the determinations of the will we shall find upon reflection that they dissent from it in words only not in their real sentiments necessity according to the sense in which it is taken here has never yet been rejected nor can ever I think be rejected by any philosopher it may only perhaps be pretended that the mind can perceive in the operations of matter some farther connection between the cause and effect and connection that has not placed in voluntary actions of intelligent beings now whether it be so or not can only appear upon examination and it is incumbent on these philosophers to make good their assertion by defining or describing the necessity and pointing it out to us and the operations of material causes it would seem indeed that men begin at the wrong end of this question concerning liberty and necessity when they enter upon it by examining the faculties of the soul the influence of the understanding and the operations of the will let them first discuss a more simple question namely the operations of body and a brute unintelligent matter and try whether they can there form any idea of causation and necessity except that of a constant conjunction of objects and subsequent inference of the mind from one to another if these circumstances form in reality the whole of that necessity which we conceive in matter and if these circumstances be also universally acknowledged to take place in the operations of the mind the dispute is at an end at least must be owned to be thence forth merely verbal but as long as we will rashly suppose that we have some farther idea of necessity and causation and the operations of external objects at the same time that we can find nothing farther in the voluntary actions of the mind there is no possibility of bringing the question to any determinant issue while we proceed upon so erroneous a supposition the only method of undeceiving us is to mount up higher to examine the narrow extent of science when applied to material causes and to convince ourselves that we all know of them is the constant conjunction and inference above mentioned we may perhaps find that it is with difficulty we are induced to fix such narrow limits to human understanding but we can afterwards find no difficulty when we come to apply this doctrine to the actions of the will for as it is evident that these have a regular conjunction with motives and circumstances and characters and as we always draw inferences from one to the other we must be obliged to acknowledge in words that necessity which we have already avowed in every deliberation of our lives and every step of our conduct and behavior footnote 17 the prevalence of the doctrine of liberty may be accounted for from another cause namely a false sensation or seeming experience which we have or may have of liberty or indifference and many of our actions the necessity of any action whether of matter or of mind is not properly speaking equality in the agent but in any thinking or intelligent being who may consider the action and it consists chiefly into the determination of his thoughts to infer the existence of that action from some preceding objects as liberty when opposed to necessity is nothing but the want of that determination and a certain looseness or indifference which we feel in passing or not passing from the idea of one object to that of any succeeding one now we may observe that though and reflecting on human actions we seldom feel such a looseness or indifference but are commonly able to infer them with considerable certainty from their motives and from the dispositions of the agent yet it frequently happens that in performing the actions themselves we're sensible of something like it and as all resembling objects are readily taken for each other this has been employed as a demonstrative and even intuitive proof of human liberty we feel that our actions are subject to our will on most occasions and imagine we feel that the will itself is subject to nothing because when by a denial of it we are provoked to try we feel that it moves easily every way and produces an image of itself or as it is called in schools even on that side on which it did not settle this image or faint motion we persuade ourselves could at that time have been completed into the thing itself because should that be denied we find upon a second trial that at present it can we consider not that the fantastical desire of showing liberty is here the motive of our actions and it seems certain that however we may imagine we feel a liberty within ourselves a spectator can commonly infer our actions from our motives and character and even where he cannot he concludes in general that he might where he perfectly acquainted with every circumstance of our situation and temper and the most secret springs of our complexion and disposition now this is the very essence of necessity according to the foregoing doctrine end of footnote 17 but to proceed in this reconciling project with regard to the question of liberty and necessity the most contentious question of metaphysics the most contentious science it will not require many words to prove that all mankind have ever agreed in the doctrine of liberty as well as in that of necessity and that the whole dispute in their suspect also has been hitherto merely verbal for what is meant by liberty when applied to voluntary actions we cannot surely mean that actions have so little connection with motives and inclinations and circumstances that one does not follow with a certain degree of uniformity from the other and that one affords no inference by which we can conclude the existence of the other for these are plain and acknowledged matters of fact by liberty then we can only mean a power of acting or not acting according to the determinations of the will that is if we choose to remain at rest we may if we choose to move we also may now this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to everyone who is not a prisoner and in chains here then is no subject of dispute whatever definition we may give of liberty we should be careful to observe two requisite circumstances first that it can be consistent with plain matter of fact secondly that it be consistent with itself if we observe these circumstances and render our definition intelligible i am persuaded that all mankind will be found of one opinion with regard to it it is universally allowed that nothing exists without a cause of its existence and that chance when strictly examined is a mere negative word and means not any real power which has anywhere a being in nature but it is pretended that some causes are necessary some not necessary here then is the advantage of definitions let anyone define a cause without comprehending as a part of the definition a necessary connection with its effect and let him show distinctly the origin of the idea expressed by the definition and i shall readily give up the whole controversy but a foregoing explication of the matter be received this must be absolutely impracticable had not objects a regular conjunction with each other we should never have entertained any notion of cause and effect and this regular conjunction produces that inference of the understanding which is the only connection that we can have any comprehension of whoever attempts a definition of cause exclusive of these circumstances will be obliged either to employ unintelligible terms or such as our synonyms to the term which endeavors to define footnote 18 thus if a cause be defined that which produces anything it is easy to observe that producing is synonymous to causing and like manner if a cause be defined that by which anything exist this is liable to the same objection for what is meant by these words by which had it been said that a cause is that after which anything constantly exists we should have understood the terms for this is indeed all we know of the matter and this constancy forms the very essence of necessity nor have we any other idea of it end of footnote 18 and if the definition above mentioned be admitted liberty when opposed to necessity not to constraint is the same thing with chance which is universally allowed to have no existence end of section eight of liberty and necessity part one recording by Daniel Polanco chapter eight part two of an inquiry concerning human understanding this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org an inquiry concerning human understanding by David Hume chapter eight part two of liberty and necessity there is no method of reasoning more common and yet non more blameable than in philosophical disputes to endeavor the refutation of any hypothesis by a pretense of its dangerous consequences to religion and morality when any opinion leads to absurdities it is certainly false but it is not certain that an opinion is false because it is of dangerous consequence such topics therefore ought entirely to be foreborn as serving nothing to the discovery of truth but only to make the person of an antagonist odious this i observe in general without pretending to draw any advantage from it i frankly submit to an examination of this kind and shall venture to affirm that the doctrines both of necessity and liberty as above explained are not only consistent with morality but are absolutely essential to its support necessity may be defined two ways conformably to the two definitions of cause of which it makes an essential part it consists either in the constant conjunction of like objects or in the inference of the understanding from one object to another now necessity in both these senses which indeed are at bottom the same has universally though tacitly in the schools in the pulpit and in common life been allowed to belong to the will of men and no one has ever pretended to deny that we can draw inferences concerning human actions and that those inferences are founded on the experienced union of like actions with like motives inclinations and circumstances the only particular in which anyone can differ is that either perhaps he will refuse to give the name of necessity to this property of human actions but as long as the meaning is understood i hope the word can do no harm or that he will maintain it possible to discover something farther in the operations of matter but this it must be acknowledged can be of no consequence to morality or religion whatever it may be to natural philosophy or metaphysics we may hear be mistaken in asserting that there is no idea of any other necessity or connection in the actions of body but surely we ascribe nothing to the actions of the mind but what everyone does and must readily allow of we change no circumstance in the received orthodox system with regard to the will but only in that with regard to material objects and causes nothing therefore can be more innocent at least than this doctrine all laws being founded on rewards and punishments it is supposed as a fundamental principle that these motives have a regular and uniform influence on the mind and both produce the good and prevent the evil actions we may give to this influence what name we please but as it is usually conjoined with the action it must be esteemed a cause and be looked upon as an instance of that necessity which we would hear established the only proper object of hatred or vengeance is a person or creature endowed with thought and consciousness and when any criminal or injurious actions excite that passion it is only by their relation to the person or connection with him actions are by their very nature temporary and perishing and where they proceed not from some cause in the character and disposition of the person who performed them they can either redound to his honor if good or infamy if evil the actions themselves may be blameable they may be contrary to all the rules of morality and religion but the person is not answerable for them and as they proceeded from nothing in him that is durable and constant and leave nothing of that nature behind them it is impossible he can upon their account become the object of punishment or vengeance according to the principle therefore which denies necessity and consequently causes a man is as pure and untainted after having committed the most horrid crime as at the first moment of his birth nor is his character any wise concerned in his actions since they are not derived from it and the wickedness of the one can never be used as a proof of the depravity of the other men are not blamed for such actions as they perform ignorantly and casually whatever may be the consequences why but because the principles of these actions are only momentary and terminate in them alone men are less blamed for such actions as they perform hastily and unpremeditatedly than for such as proceed from deliberation for what reason but because a hasty temper though a constant cause or principle in the mind operates only by intervals and in facts not the whole character again repentance wipes off every crime if attended with a reformation of life and manners how is this to be accounted for but by asserting that actions render a person criminal merely as they are proofs of criminal principles in the mind and when by an alteration of these principles they cease to be just proofs they likewise cease to be criminal but except upon the doctrine of necessity they never were just proofs and consequently never were criminal it will be equally easy to prove and from the same arguments that liberty according to that definition above mentioned in which all men agree is also essential to morality and that no human actions where he's wanting are susceptible of any moral qualities or can be the objects either of approbation or dislike for as actions are objects of our moral sentiment so far only as they are indications of the internal character passions and affections it is impossible that they can give rise either to praise or blame where they proceed not from these principles but are derived altogether from external violence I pretend not to have violated or removed all objections to this theory with regard to necessity and liberty I can foresee other objections derived from topics which have not here been treated of it may be said for instance that if voluntary actions be subjected to the same laws of necessity with the operations of matter there is a continued chain of necessary causes preordained and predetermined reaching from the original cause of all to every single volition of every human creature no contingency anywhere in the universe no indifference no liberty while we act we are at the same time acted upon the ultimate author of all our volitions is the creator of the world who first bestowed motion on this immense machine and placed all beings in that particular position whence every subsequent event by an inevitable necessity must result human actions therefore either can have no moral turpitude at all as proceeding from so good a cause or if they have any turpitude they must involve our creator in the same guilt while he is acknowledged to be their ultimate cause and author for as a man who fired a mine is answerable for all the consequences whether the train he employed be long or short so wherever a continued chain of necessary causes is fixed that being either finite or infinite who produces the first is likewise the author of all the rest and must both bear the blame and acquire the praise which belong to them our clear and unalterable ideas of morality establish this rule upon unquestionable reasons when we examine the consequences of any human action and these reasons must still have greater force when applied to the volitions and intentions of a being infinitely wise and powerful ignorance or impotence may be pleaded for so limited a creature as men but those imperfections have no place in our creator he foresaw he ordained he intended all those actions of men which we so rashly pronounced criminal and we must therefore conclude either that they are not criminal or that the deity not man is accountable for them but as either of these positions is absurd and impious it follows that the doctrine from which they are deduced cannot possibly be true as being liable to all the same objections an absurd consequence if necessary proves original doctrine to be observed in the same manner as criminal actions render criminal the original cause if the connection between them be necessary and evitable this objection consists of two parts which we shall examine separately first that if human actions can be traced up by a necessary chain to the deity they can never be criminal on account of the infinite perfection of that being from whom they are derived and who can intend nothing but what is altogether good and laudable or secondly if they be criminal we must retract the attribute of perfection which we ascribe to the deity and must acknowledge him to be the ultimate author of guilt and moral turpitude in all his creatures the answer to the first objection seems obvious and convincing there are many philosophers who after an exact scrutiny of all the phenomena of nature conclude that the whole considered as one system is in every period of its existence ordered with perfect benevolence and that the utmost possible happiness will in the end result to all created beings without any mixture of positive or absolute ill or misery every physical ill say they makes an essential part of this benevolent system and could not possibly be removed even by the deity himself considered as a wise agent without giving entrance to greater ill or excluding greater good which will result from it from this theory some philosophers and the ancient stoics among the rest derived a topic of consolation under all afflictions while they taught their pupils that those ills under which they labored were in reality goods to the universe and that to an enlarged view which could comprehend the whole system of nature every event became an object of joy and exaltation but though this topic be specious and sublime it was soon found in practice weak and ineffectual you would surely more irritate than appease a man lying under the racking pains of the gout by preaching up to him the restitude of those general laws which produced the malignant humors in his body and led them through the proper canals to the sinos and nerves where they now excite such acute torments these enlarged views may for a moment please the imagination of a speculative man who is placed in ease and security but neither can they dwell with constancy on his mind even though undisturbed by the emotions of pain or passion much less can they maintain their ground when attacked by such powerful antagonists the affections take a narrower and more natural survey of their object and by an economy more suitable to the infirmity of human minds regard alone the beings around us and are actuated by such events as appear good or ill to the private system the case is the same with moral as with physical ill it cannot reasonably be supposed that those remote considerations which are found of so little efficacy with regard to one will have a more powerful influence with regard to the other the mind of men is so formed by nature that upon the appearance of certain characters dispositions and actions it immediately feels a sentiment of a probation or blame nor are there any emotions more essential to its frame and constitution the characters which engage our approbation our chiefly such as contribute to the peace and security of human society as the characters which excite to blame are chiefly such as tend to public detriment and disturbance once it may reasonably be presumed that the moral sentiments arise either immediately or immediately from a reflection of these opposite interests what though philosophical meditations establish a different opinion or conjecture that everything is right with regard to the whole and that the qualities which disturb society are in the main as beneficial and are as suitable to the primary intention of nature as those which more directly promote its happiness and welfare are such remote and uncertain speculations able to counterbalance the sentiments which arise from the natural and immediate view of the objects a man who is robbed of a considerable sum does he find his vexation for the loss anywise diminished by these sublime reflections why then should his moral resentment against the crime be supposed incompatible with them or why should not the acknowledgement of a real distinction between vice and virtue be reconcilable to all speculative systems of philosophy as well as that of a real distinction between personal beauty and deformity both these distinctions are founded in the natural sentiments of the human mind and these sentiments are not to be controlled or altered by any philosophical theory or speculation whatsoever the second objection admits not of so easy and satisfactory an answer nor is it possible to explain distinctly how the deity can be the immediate cause of all the actions of men without being the author of sin and moral turpitude these are mysteries which mere natural and unassisted reason is very unfit to handle and whatever system she embraces she must find herself involved in inextricable difficulties and even contradictions at every step which it takes with regard to such subjects to reconcile the indifference and contingency of human actions with prescience or to defend absolute decrees and yet free the deity from being the author of sin has been found hitherto to exceed all the power of philosophy happy if she be then sensible of her temerity when she prized into these sublime mysteries and leaving a scene so full of obscurities and perplexities returned with suitable modesty to her true and proper province the examination of common life where she will find difficulties enough to employ her inquiries without launching into so boundless an ocean of doubt uncertainty and contradiction end of chapter eight part two of liberty and necessity section nine of an inquiry concerning human understanding this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to find out how to volunteer please contact LibriVox.org an inquiry concerning human understanding by David Hume section nine of the reason of animals all our reasonings concerning matter of fact are founded on a species of analogy which leads us to expect from any cause the same events which we have observed to result from similar causes where the causes are entirely similar the analogy is perfect and the inference drawn from it is regarded as certain and conclusive nor does any man ever entertain a doubt where he sees a piece of iron that it will have weight and cohesion of parts as in all other instances which have ever fallen under his observation but where the objects have not so exact a similarity the analogy is less perfect and then for instance less conclusive though still it has some force in proportion to the degree of similarity and resemblance the anatomical observances formed upon one animal are by this species of reasoning extended to all animals and it is certain that when the circulation of the blood for instance is clearly proved to have a place in one creature as a frog or fish it forms a strong presumption that the same principle has place in all these analogical observations may be carried farther even to this science of which we are now treating and any theory by which we explain the operations of the understanding or the origin and connection of the passions in man will acquire additional authority if we find that the same theory is requisite to explain the same phenomena in all other animals we shall make trial of this with regard to the hypothesis by which we have in the foregoing discourse endeavored to account for all experimental reasonings and it is hoped that this new point of view will serve to confirm all our former observations first it seems evident that animals as well as men learn many things from experience and infer that the same events will always follow from the same causes by this principle they become acquainted with the more obvious properties of external objects and gradually from their birth treasure up a knowledge of the nature of fire water earth stones heights depths etc and of the effects which result from their operation the ignorance and an experience of the young are here plainly distinguishable from the cunning and sagacity of the old who have learned by long observation to avoid what hurt them and to pursue what gave ease or pleasure a horse that has been accustomed to the field becomes acquainted with the proper height which he can leap and will never attempt what exceeds his force and ability an old greyhound will trust the more fatiguing part of the chase to the younger and will place himself so as to meet the hare in her doubles nor are the conjectures which he forms on this occasion founded in anything but his observation and experience this is still more evident from the effects of discipline and education on animals who by proper application of rewards and punishments may be taught any course of action and most contrary to their natural instincts and propensities is it not experience which renders a dog apprehensive of pain when you medicine or lift up the whip to beat him is it not even experience which makes him answer to his name and infer from such an arbitrary sound that you mean him rather than any of his fellows and intend to call him when you pronounce it in a certain manner and with a certain tone and accent in all these cases we may observe that the animal infers some fact beyond what immediately strikes his senses and that this inference is altogether founded on past experience while the creature expects from the present object the same consequences which it is always found in its observation to result from similar objects secondly it is impossible that this inference of the animal can be founded on any process of argument or reasoning by which he concludes that like events must follow like objects and that the course of nature will always be regular in its operations for if there be in reality any arguments of this nature they surely lie to obtruse for the observation of such imperfect understandings since it may well employ the utmost care and attention of a philosophic genius to discover and observe them animals therefore are not guided in these inferences by reasoning neither are children neither are the generality of mankind in their ordinary actions and conclusions neither are philosophers themselves who in all the active parts of life are in the main the same with the vulgar and are governed by the same maxims nature must have provided some other principle of more ready and more general use in application nor can an operation of such immense consequence in life as that of inferring effects from causes be trusted to the uncertain process of reasoning and argumentation were this doubtful with regard to men it seems to admit of no question with regard to the brute creation and the conclusion being once firmly established in the one we have a strong presumption from all the rules of analogy that it ought to be universally admitted without any exception or reverse it is custom alone which engages animals from every object that strikes their senses to infer its usual attendant and carries their imagination from the appearance of the one to conceive the other in that particular manner which we denominate belief no other explication can be given of this operation in all the higher as well as the lower classes of sensitive beings which fall under our notice and observation footnote since all reasonings concerning facts or causes is derived merely from custom it may be asked how it happens that men so much surpass animals in reasoning and one man so much surpasses another has not the same custom the same influence on all we shall hear endeavor briefly to explain the great difference in human understandings after which the reason of the difference between men and animals will easily be comprehended when we have lived any time and have been accustomed to the uniformity of nature we acquire a general habit by which we always transfer the known to the unknown and conceive the latter to resemble the former by means of this general habitual principle we regard even one experiment as the foundation of reasoning and expect a similar event with some degree of certainty where the experiment has been made accurately and free from all foreign circumstances it is therefore considered as a matter of great importance to observe the consequences of things and as one man may very much surpass another in attention and memory and observation this will make a very great difference in their reasoning where there is a complication of causes to produce any effect one mind may be much larger than another and better able to comprehend the whole system of objects and to infer justly their consequences one man is able to carry on a chain of consequences to a greater length than another few men can think long without running into a confusion of ideas and mistaking one for another and there are various degrees of this infirmity the circumstance on which the effect depends is frequently involved in other circumstances which are foreign and extrinsic the separation of it often requires great attention accuracy and subtlety the forming of general maxims from particular observation is a very nice operation and nothing is more usual from haste or a narrowness of mind which sees not on all sides than to commit mistakes in this particular when we reason from analogies the man who has the greater experience or the greater promptitude of suggesting analogies will be the better reasoner biases from prejudice education passion party etc hang more upon one mind than another after we have acquired a confidence in human testimony books and conversation enlarge much more the sphere of one man's experience and thought than those of another it would be easy to discover many other circumstances that make a difference in the understandings of men and footnote but though many animals learn many parts of their knowledge from observation there are also many parts of it which they derive from the original hand of nature which much exceed the share of capacity they possess on ordinary occasions and in which they improve little or nothing by the longest practice and experience these we denominate instincts and are so apt to admire as something very extraordinary and inexplicable by all the disquisitions of human understanding but our wonder will perhaps cease or diminish when we consider that the experimental reasoning itself which we possess in common with beasts and on which the whole conduct of life depends is nothing but a species of instinct or mechanical power that acts in us unknown to ourselves and in its chief operations is not directed by any such relations or comparisons of ideas as are the proper objects of our intellectual faculties though the instinct be different yet still it is an instinct what teaches a man to avoid fire as much as that which teaches a bird with such exactness the art of incubation and the whole economy in order of its nursery and of section nine of the reasoning of animals this recording is in the public domain chapter 10 part one of an inquiry concerning human understanding this is a labor box recording all labor box recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Leon Meyer an inquiry concerning human understanding chapter 10 part one of miracles there is in Dr. Tillitson's writings an argument against the real presence which is as concise and elegant and strong as any argument can possibly be supposed against a doctrine so little worthy of a serious refutation it is acknowledged on all hands says that learned prelate that the authority either of the scripture or of tradition is founded merely in the testimony of the apostles who were eyewitnesses to those miracles of our savior by which he proved his divine mission our evidence then for the truth of the christian religion is less than the evidence for the truth of our senses because even in the first authors of our religion it was no greater and it is evident it must diminish and passing from them to their disciples nor can anyone rest such confidence in their testimony as in the immediate object of his senses but a weaker evidence can never destroy stronger and therefore were the doctrine of the real presence ever so clearly revealed in scripture it were directly contrary to the rules of just reasoning to give our assent to it it contradicts sense though both the scripture and tradition on which it is supposed to be built carry not such evidence with them as sense when they are considered merely as external evidences and are not brought home to everyone's breast by the immediate operation of the holy spirit nothing is so convenient as a decisive argument of this kind which must at least silence the most arrogant bigotry in superstition and free us from their impertinent solicitations i flatter myself that i have discovered an argument of a like nature which if just will with the wise and learned be an everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion and consequently will be useful as long as the world endures for so long i presume will the accounts of miracles and prodigies be found in all history sacred and profane though experience be our only guide in reasoning concerning matters of fact it must be acknowledged that this guide is not altogether infallible but in some cases is apt to lead us into errors one who in our climate should expect better weather in any week of june than in one of december would reason justly and conformably to experience but it is certain that he may happen in the event to find himself mistaken however we may observe that in such a case he would have no cause to complain of experience because it commonly informs us beforehand of the uncertainty by that contrariety of events which we may learn from a diligent observation all effects follow not with like certainty from their supposed causes some events are found in all countries in all ages to have been constantly conjoined together others are found to have been more variable and sometimes to disappoint our expectations so that in our reasonings concerning matter of fact there are all imaginable degrees of assurance from the highest certainty to the lowest species of moral evidence a wise man therefore proportions his belief to the evidence in such conclusions as are founded on an infallible experience he expects the event with the last degree of assurance and regards his past experience as a full proof of the future existence of that event in other cases he proceeds with more caution he weighs the opposite experiments he considers which side is supported by the greater number of experiments to that side he inclines with doubt and hesitation and when at last he fixes his judgment the evidence exceeds not what we properly call probability all probability then supposes an opposition of experiments and observations where the one side is found to overbalance the other and to produce a degree of evidence proportion to the superiority a hundred instances or experiments on one side and fifty on another afford a doubtful expectation of any event though a hundred uniform experiments with only one that is contradictory reasonably beget a pretty strong degree of assurance in all cases we must balance the opposite experiments where they are opposite and deduct the smaller number from the greater in order to know the exact force of the superior evidence to apply these principles to a particular instance we may observe that there is no species of reasoning more common more useful and even necessary to human life than that which is derived from the testimony of men and the reports of eyewitnesses and spectators this species of reasoning perhaps one may deny to be founded on the relation of cause and effect i shall not dispute about a word it will be sufficient to observe that our assurance in any argument of this kind is derived from no other principle than our observation of the veracity of human testimony and of the usual conformity of facts to the reports of witnesses it being a general maxim that no objects have any discoverable connection together and that all the inferences which we can draw from one to another are founded merely on our experience of their constant and regular conjunction it is evident that we ought not to make an exception to this maxim in favor of human testimony whose connection with any event seems in itself as little necessary as any other we're not the memory tenacious to a certain degree had not been commonly an inclination to truth and a principle of probity were they not sensible to shame when detected in a falsehood we're not these i say discovered by experience to be qualities inherent in human nature we should never oppose the least confidence in human testimony a man delirious or noted for falsehood and villainy as no manner of authority with us and as the evidence derived from witnesses and human testimony is founded on past experience so it varies with the experience and is regarded either as a proof or a probability according as the conjunction between any particular kind of report and any kind of object has been found to be constant or variable there are a number of circumstances to be taken into consideration in all judgments of this kind and the ultimate standard by which we determine all disputes that may arise concerning them is always derived from experience and observation where this experience is not entirely uniform on any side it is attended with an unavoidable contrariety in our judgments and with the same opposition and mutual destruction of argument as in every other kind of evidence we frequently hesitate concerning the reports of others we balance the opposite circumstances which cause any doubt or uncertainty and when we discover a superiority on any side we incline to it but still with a diminution of assurance in proportion to the force of its antagonist this contrariety of evidence in the present case may be derived from several different causes from the opposition of contrary testimony from the character or number of the witnesses from the manner of their delivering their testimony or from the union of all these circumstances we entertain a suspicion concerning any matter of fact when the witnesses contradict each other when they are but few or of a doubtful character when they have an interest in what they affirm when they deliver their testimony with hesitation or on the contrary with two violent separations there are many other particulars of the same kind which may diminish or destroy the force of any argument derived from human testimony suppose for instance that the fact which the testimony endeavors to establish partakes of the extraordinary and the marvelous in that case the evidence resulting from the testimony admits of a diminution greater or less in proportion as the fact is more or less unusual the reason why we place any credit in witnesses and historians is not derived from any connection which we perceive a priori between testimony and reality but because we are accustomed to find a conformity between them but when the fact attested is such a one as has seldom fallen under our observation here is a contest of two opposite experiences of which the one destroys the other as far as its force goes and the superior can only operate on the mind by the force which remains the very same principle of experience which gives us a certain degree of assurance in the testimony of witnesses gives us also in this case another degree of assurance against the fact which they endeavor to establish from which contradiction there necessarily arises a counterpoise and mutual destruction of belief and authority I should not believe such a story were told to me by Cato was a proverbial saying in Rome even during the lifetime with that philosophical patriot the incredibility of a fact it was allowed might invalidate so great an authority the indian prince who refused to believe the first relations concerning the effects of frost reasoned justly and it naturally required very strong testimony to engage his assent to facts that arose from a state of nature with which he was unacquainted and which bore so little analogy to those events of which he had had constant and uniform experience though they were not contrary to his experience they were not conformable to it footnote no indian it is evident could have experienced that water did not freeze in cold climates this is placing nature in a situation quite unknown to him and it is impossible for him to tell a priori what will resolve from it it is making a new experiment the consequence of which is always uncertain one may sometimes conjecture from analogy what will follow but still this is but conjecture and it must be confessed that in the present case of freezing the event follows contrary to the rules of analogy and is such as a rational indian would not look for the operations of cold upon water are not gradual according to the degrees of cold but whenever it comes to the freezing point the water passes in a moment from the utmost liquidity to perfect hardness such an event therefore may be denominated extraordinary and requires a pretty strong testimony to render it credible to people in a warm climate but still it is not miraculous nor contrary to uniform experience of the course of nature in cases where all the circumstances are the same the inhabitants of Sumatra have always seen water fluid in their own climate and the freezing of the rivers ought to be deemed a prodigy but they never saw water in muscovy during the winter and therefore they cannot reasonably be positive what would there be the consequence in footnote but in order to increase the probability against the testimony of witnesses let us suppose that the fact which they affirm instead of being only marvelous is really miraculous and suppose also that the testimony considered apart and in itself amounts to an entire proof in that case there is proof against proof of which the strongest must prevail but still with the diminution of its force in proportion to that of its antagonist a miracle is a violation of the laws of nature and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws the proof against a miracle from the very nature of the fact is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined why is it more than probable that all men must die that lead cannot of itself remain suspended in the air that fire consumes wood and is extinguished by water unless it be that these events are found agreeable to the laws of nature and there is required a violation of these laws or in other words a miracle to prevent them nothing is esteemed a miracle if it ever happened in the common course of nature it is no miracle that a man seemingly in good health should die on a sudden because such a kind of death though more unusual than any other has yet been frequently observed to happen but it is a miracle that a dead man should come to life because that has never been observed in any age or country there must therefore be a uniform experience against every miraculous event otherwise the event would not merit that appellation and as a uniform experience amounts to a proof there is here a direct and full proof from the nature of the fact against the existence of any miracle nor can such a proof be destroyed or the miracle rendered credible but by an opposite proof which is superior footnote sometimes an event may not in itself seem to be contrary to the laws of nature and yet if it were real it might by reason of some circumstances be denominated a miracle because in fact it is contrary to these laws thus if a person claiming a divine authority should command a sick person to be well a healthful man to fall down dead the clouds to pour rain the winds to blow in short should order many natural events which immediately follow upon his command these might justly be esteemed to miracles because they are really in this case contrary to the laws of nature for if any suspicion remain that the event and command concurred by accident there is no miracle and no transgression of the laws of nature if the suspicion be removed there is evidently a miracle and a transgression of these laws because nothing can be more contrary to nature than that the voice or command of a man should have such an influence a miracle may be accurately defined a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the deity or by the interposition of some invisible agent a miracle may either be discoverable by men or not this alters not its nature and essence the raising of a house or ship into the air is a visible miracle the raising of a feather when the wind wants ever so little of a force requisite for that purpose is as real a miracle though not so sensible with regard to us end footnote the plain consequence is and it is a general maxim worthy of our attention that no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle unless the testimony be of such a kind that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavors to establish and even in that case there was a mutual destruction of arguments and the superior only gives us an assurance suitable to that degree of force which remains after deducting the inferior when anyone tells me that he saw a dead man restored to life I immediately consider with myself whether it be more probable that this person should either deceive or be deceived or that the fact which he relates should really have happened I weigh the one miracle against the other and according to the superiority which I discover I pronounce my decision and always reject the greater miracle if the falsehood of his testimony would be more miraculous than the event which he relates then and not till then can he pretend to command my belief or opinion end of chapter 10 part one chapter 10 part two of an inquiry concerning human understanding this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Leon Meyer an inquiry concerning human understanding by David Hume chapter 10 of miracles part two in the foregoing reasoning we have supposed that the testimony upon which a miracle is founded may possibly amount to an entire proof and that the falsehood of that testimony would be a real prodigy but it is easy to show that we have been a great deal to liberal in our concession and that there never was a miraculous event established on so full an evidence for first there is not to be found in all history any miracle attested by a sufficient number of men of such unquestioned good sense education and learning as to secure us against all delusion in themselves of such undoubted integrity as to place them beyond all suspicion of any design to deceive others of such credit and reputation in the eyes of mankind as to have a great deal to lose in case of they're being detected in any falsehood and at the same time a testing facts performed in such a public manner and in so celebrated a part of the world as to render the detection unavoidable all which circumstances are requisite to give us a full assurance in the testimony of men secondly we may observe in human nature a principle which if strictly examined will be found to diminish extremely the assurance which we might from human testimony have in any kind of prodigy the maximum by which we commonly conduct ourselves in our reasonings is that the objects of which we have no experience resembles those of which we have that what we have found to be most usual is always most probable and that where there is an opposition of arguments we ought to give preference to such as are founded on the greatest number of past observations but though in proceeding by this rule we readily reject any fact which is unusual and incredible in an ordinary degree yet in advancing farther the mind observes not always the same rule but when anything is affirmed utterly absurd and miraculous it rather the more readily admits of such a fact upon account of that very circumstance which ought to destroy all its authority the passion of surprise and wonder arising from miracles being an agreeable emotion gives a sensible tendency towards the belief of those events from which it is derived and this goes so far that even those who cannot enjoy this pleasure immediately nor can believe those miraculous events of which they are informed yet love to partake of the satisfaction at second hand or by rebound and place a pride and delight in exciting the admiration of others with what greediness are the miraculous accounts of travelers received their descriptions of sea and land monsters their relations of wonderful adventures strange men and uncouth manners but if the spirit of religion join itself to the love of wonder there is an end of common sense and human testimony in these circumstances loses all pretensions to authority a religionist may be an enthusiast and imagine he sees what has no reality he may know his narrative to be false and yet persevere in it with the best intentions in the world for the sake of promoting so wholly a cause or even where this delusion has not place vanity excited by so strong a temptation operates on him more powerfully than on the rest of mankind in any other circumstances and self-interest with equal force his auditors may not have and commonly have not sufficient judgment to canvas his evidence what judgment they have they renounced by principle in these sublime and mysterious subjects or if they were ever so willing to employ it passion in a heated imagination disturb the regularity of its operations their credulity increases his impudence and his impudence overpowers their credulity eloquence when at its highest pitch leaves little room for reason or reflection but addressing itself entirely to the fancy or the affections captivates the willing hearers and subdues their understanding happily this pitch it seldom attains but what a tully or dimostinies could scarcely affect over a roman or athenean audience every capuchin every itinerant or stationary teacher can perform over the generality of mankind and in a higher degree by touching such gross and vulgar passions the many instances of forged miracles and prophecies and supernatural events which in all ages have either been detected by contrary evidence or which detect themselves by their absurdity prove sufficiently the strong propensity of mankind to the extraordinary in the marvelous and ought reasonably to beget a suspicion against all relations of this kind this is our natural way of thinking even with regard to the most common and the most credible events for instance there is no kind of report which rises so easily and spread so quickly especially in country places and provincial towns as those concerning marriages in so much that two young persons of equal condition never see each other twice but the whole neighborhood immediately join them together the pleasure of telling a piece of news so interesting of propagating it and of being the first reporters of it spreads the intelligence and this is so well known that no man of sense gives attention to these reports till he find them confirmed by some greater evidence do not the same passions and others still stronger incline the generality of mankind to believe and report with the greatest vehemence and assurance all religious miracles thirdly it forms a strong presumption against all supernatural and miraculous relations that they are observed chiefly to abound among ignorant and barbarous nations or if a civilized people has ever given admission to any of them that people will be found to have received them from ignorant and barbarous ancestors who transmitted them with that inviolable sanction and authority which always attend received opinions when we peruse the first histories of all nations we are apt to imagine ourselves transported into some new world where the whole frame of nature is disjointed in every element performs its operations in a different manner from what it does at present battles revolutions pestilence famine and death are never the effect of those natural causes which we experience prodigies omens oracles judgments quite obscure the few natural events that are intermingled with them but as the former growth in or every page in proportion as we advance near the enlightened ages we soon learn that there was nothing mysterious or supernatural in the case but that all proceeds from the usual propensity of mankind towards the marvelous and that though this inclination may at intervals receive a check from sense and learning it can never be thoroughly extirpated from human nature it is strange a judicious reader is apt to say upon the perusal of those wonderful historians that such prodigious events never happen in our days but it is nothing strange I hope that men should lie in all ages you must surely have seen instances enough of that frailty you have yourself heard many such marvelous relations started which being treated with scorn by all the wise and judicious have at last been abandoned even by the vulgar be assured that those renowned lies which have spread and flourished to such a monstrous height arose from like beginnings but being sown in a more proper soil shot up at last into prodigies almost equal to those which they relate it was a wise policy in that false prophet alexander who though now forgotten was once so famous to lay the first scene of his imposters in pathogonia whereas lucian tells us the people were extremely ignorant and stupid and ready to swallow even the grossest delusion people at a distance who are weak enough to think the matter at all worth inquiry have no opportunity of receiving better information the stories come magnified to them by a hundred circumstances fools are industrious in propagating the imposter while the wise and learned are contented in general to deride its absurdity without informing themselves of the particular facts by which it may be distinctly refuted and thus the imposter above mentioned was unable to proceed from his ignorant pathogonians to the enlisting of votaries even among the grecian philosophers and men at the most imminent rank and distinction in Rome they could engage the attention of that sage emperor Marcus Aurelius so far as to make him trust the success of a military expedition to his delusive prophecies the advantages are so great of starting an imposter among an ignorant people that even though the delusion should be too gross to impose on the generality of them which though seldom is sometimes a case it has a much better chance for succeeding in remote countries than if the first scene had been laid in a city renowned for arts and knowledge the most ignorant and barbarous of these barbarians carry the report abroad none of their countrymen have a large correspondence or sufficient credit and authority to contradict and beat down the delusion men's inclination to the marvelous has full opportunity to display itself and thus the story which is universally exploded in the place where it was first started shall pass for certain at a thousand miles distance but had alexander fixed his residence at Athens the philosophers of that renowned mark of learning would have immediately spread throughout the whole roman empire their sense of the matter which being supported by so great authority and displayed by all the force of reason and eloquence would have entirely opened the eyes of mankind it is true Lucian passing by chance through pathogonia had an opportunity performing this good office but though much to be wished it does not always happen that every alexander meets with a Lucian ready to expose and detect his imposters I may add as a fourth reason which diminishes the authority of prodigies that there is no testimony for any even those which have not been expressly detect that is not opposed by an infinite number of witnesses so that not only the miracle destroys the credit of testimony but the testimony destroys itself to make this the better understood let us consider that in matters of religion whatever is different is contrary and that it is impossible the religions of ancient Rome of turkey of Siam and of China should all of them be established on any solid foundation every miracle therefore pretended to have been wrought in any of these religions and all of them abound in miracles as its direct scope is to establish the particular system to which it is attributed so has it the same force though more indirectly to overthrow every other system in destroying a rival system it likewise destroys the credit of those miracles on which that system was established so that all the prodigies of different religions are to be regarded as contrary facts and the evidences of these prodigies whether weak or strong as opposite to each other according to this method of reasoning when we believe any miracle of Muhammad or his successors we have for our warrant the testimony of a few barbarous Arabians and on the other hand we're to regard the authority of Titus Livius Plutarch Tacitus and in short of all the authors and witnesses Grecian Chinese and Roman Catholic who have related any miracle in their particular religion I say we're to regard their testimony in the same light as if they had mentioned that Muhammad and miracle and had in express terms contradicted it with the same certainty as they have for the miracle they relate this argument may appear over subtle and refined but is not in reality different from the reasoning of a judge who supposes that the credit of two witnesses maintaining a crime against any one is destroyed by the testimony of two others who affirm him to have been 200 leagues distant at the same instant when the crime is said to have been committed one of the best to tested miracles in all profane history is that which Tacitus reports of Espion who cured a blind man in Alexandria by means of a spittle in a lame man by the mere touch of his foot in obedience to a vision of the god Serapis who had enjoined them to have recourse to the emperor for these miraculous cures the story may be seen in that fine historian where every circumstance seems to add weight to the testimony and might be displayed at large with all the force of argument and eloquence if anyone were now concerned to enforce the evidence of that exploded in idolatrous superstition the gravity solidity age and probity of so great an emperor who through the whole course of his life conversed in a familiar manner with his friends and courtiers and never affected those extraordinary heirs of divinity assumed by Alexander and Demetrius the historian a cotemporary writer noted for candor and veracity and with all the greatest most penetrating genius perhaps of all antiquity and so free from any tendency to crudility that he even lies under the contrary imputation of atheism and profaneness the persons from whose authority he related the miracle of established character for judgment and veracity as we may well presume eyewitnesses of the fact and confirming their testimony after the flavian family was dispoiled of the empire and could no longer give any reward as the price of a lie atroom kwa kui interfuera nun kwa kwa memorand post quam nullum mendakio pretium to which if we add the public nature of the facts as related it will appear that no evidence can well be supposed stronger for so gross and so palpable of falsehood there is also a memorable story related by cardinal doratz which may well deserve our consideration when that intriguing politician fled into spain to avoid the persecution of his enemies he passed through saragasa the capital of aragon where he was shown in the cathedral a man who had served seven years as a doorkeeper and was well known to everybody in town that had ever paid his devotions at that church he had been seen for so long a time wanting a leg but recovered that limb by the rubbing of holy oil upon the stump and the cardinal assures us that he saw him with two legs this miracle was vouched by all the cannons of the church and the whole company in town were appealed to for confirmation of the fact whom the cardinal found by their zealous devotion to be thorough believers of the miracle here the relator was also co-temporary to the supposed prodigy of an incredulous and libertine character as well as of great genius the miracle of so singular in nature as could scarcely admit of a counterfeit and the witnesses very numerous and all of them in a manner spectators of the fact to which they gave their testimony and what adds mightily to the force of the evidence and made double our surprise on this occasion is that the cardinal himself who relates the story seems not to give any credit to it and consequently cannot be suspected of any concurrence in the holy fraud he considered justly that it was not requisite in order to reject a factor this nature to be able accurately to disprove the testimony and to trace its falsehood through all the circumstances of navery and credulity which produced it he knew that as this was commonly altogether impossible at any small distance of time and place so was it extremely difficult even where one was immediately present by reason of the bigotry ignorance cunning and roguery of a great part of mankind he therefore concluded like a just reasoner that such an evidence carried falsehood upon the very face of it and that a miracle supported by any human testimony was more properly a subject of derision than of argument there surely never was a greater number of miracles ascribed to one person than those which were lately said to have been wrought in France upon the tomb of Abbe Paris the famous Jansenist with whose sanctity the people were so long deluded the curing of the sick giving hearing to the deaf and sight to the blind were everywhere talked of as the usual effects of that holy sepulcher but what is more extraordinary many of the miracles were immediately proved upon the spot before judges of unquestioned integrity attested by witnesses of credit and distinction in a learned age and on the most eminent theater that is now in the world nor is this all a relation of them was published and dispersed everywhere nor were the Jesuits though a learned body supported by the civil magistrate and determined enemies to those opinions and whose favor the miracles were said to have been wrought ever able distinctly to refute or detect them footnote this book was read by Monsieur Montgeron counselor or judge of the parliament of Paris a man of figure and character who was also a martyr to the cause and is now said to be somewhere in a dungeon on account of his book there is another book in three volumes called Rue Caillie des Mericulis de la Baie Perrie giving an account of many of these miracles and accompanied with preparatory discourses which are very well written there runs however through the whole of these a ridiculous comparison between the miracles of our savior and those of the abeys wherein it is asserted that the evidence for the latter is equal to that for the former as if the testimony of men could ever be put in the balance with that of God himself who conducted the pen of the inspired writers if these writers indeed were to be considered merely as human testimony the French author is very moderate in his comparison since he might with some appearance of reason pretend that the Janseness miracles much surpassed the other in evidence and authority the following circumstances are drawn from authentic papers inserted in the above mentioned book many of the miracles of abeys perrie were proved immediately by witnesses before the officiality or bishops court at Paris under the eye of carnal noia whose character for integrity and capacity was never contested even by its enemies his successor in the archbishopric was an enemy to the Jansenists and for that reason promoted to the sea by the court yet 22 rectors or curé of Paris with infinite earnestness press him to examine those miracles which they assert to be known to the whole world and undisputably certain but he wisely for bore the mullinist party had tried to discredit these miracles in one instance that of mademoiselle affront but besides that their proceedings were in many respects the most irregular in the world particularly inciting only a few of the Jansenist witnesses whom they tampered with besides this I say they soon found themselves overwhelmed by a cloud of new witnesses 120 a number most of them persons of credit and substance in Paris who gave oath for the miracle this was accompanied with the solemn and earnest appeal to the parliament but the parliament were forbidden by authority to meddle in the affair it was at last observed that where men are heated by zeal and enthusiasm there is no degree of human testimony so strong as may not be procured for the greatest absurdity and those who will be so silly as to examine the affair by that medium and seek particular flaws in the testimony are almost sure to be confounded it must be a miserable imposter indeed that does not prevail in that contest all who have been in France about that time have heard of the reputation of Montsour et Roe Lieutenant de police whose vigilance, penetration, activity and extensive intelligence have been much talked of this magistrate who by the nature of his office is almost absolute was vested with full powers on purpose to suppress or discredit these miracles and he frequently seized immediately and examined the witnesses and subjects of them but never could reach anything satisfactory against them in the case of mademoiselle T. Beau he sent the famous de Silva to examine her whose evidence is very curious the physician declares that it was impossible she could have been so ill as was proved by her witnesses because it was impossible she could in so short a time have recovered so perfectly as he found her he reasoned like a man of sense from natural causes but the opposite party told him that the whole was a miracle and that his evidence was the very best proof of it the Mullenists were in a sad dilemma they durst not assert the absolute insufficiency of human evidence to prove a miracle they were obliged to say that these miracles were wrought by witchcraft and the devil but they were told that this was the recourse of the Jews of old no Jansenist was ever embarrassed to account for the cessation of the miracles when the churchyard was shut up by the king's edict it was the touch of the tomb which produced these extraordinary effects and when no one could approach the tomb no effects could be expected God indeed could have thrown down the walls in a moment but he is master of his own graces and works and it belongs not to us to account for them he did not throw down the walls of every city like those of Jericho on the sounding of the ram's horns nor break up the prison of every apostle like that of St. Paul No less a man than the Duke de Châtillon a Duke and peer of France of the highest rank and family gives evidence of a miraculous cure performed upon a servant of his who had lived several years in his house with a visible and palpable infirmity I shall conclude with observing that no clergy are more celebrated for strictness of life and manners than the secular clergy of France particularly the rectors or curays of Paris who bear testimony to these imposters the learning, genius, and probity of the gentleman and the austerity of the nuns of Port Royal have been much celebrated all over Europe yet they all give evidence for a miracle wrought on the niece of the famous Pascal whose sanctity of life as well as extraordinary capacity is well known the famous Racine gives an account to this miracle in his famous history of Port Royal and fortifies with it all the proofs which a multitude of nuns, priests, physicians, and men of the world all of them of undoubted credit could bestow upon it several men of letters particularly the bishop of Tournay thought this miracle so certain as to employ it in the refutation of atheists and freethinkers the Queen Regent of France who was extremely prejudiced against the Port Royal sent her own physician to examine the miracle who returned an absolute convert in short the supernatural cure was so uncontestable that it saved for a time that famous monastery from the ruin with which it was threatened by the Jesuits had it been a cheat it had certainly been detected by such sagacious and powerful antagonists and must have hastened the ruin of the contrivers our divines who can build up a formidable castle from such despicable materials what a prodigious fabric could they have reared from these and many other circumstances which I have not mentioned how often would the great names of Pascal, Racine, Arnaud, Nicole have resounded in our ears but if they be wise they had better adopt the miracle as being more worth a thousand times than all the rest of the collection besides it may serve very much to their purpose for that miracle was really performed by the touch of an authentic Holy Prickle of the Holy Thorn which composed the Holy Crown which etc etc in footnote where shall we find such a number of circumstances agreeing to the corroboration of one fact and what have we to oppose to such a cloud of witnesses but the absolute impossibility or miraculous nature of the events which they relate and this surely in the eyes of all reasonable people will alone be regarded as a sufficient refutation is the consequence just because some human testimony has the utmost force and authority in some cases when it relates to the battle Philippi or Farsalia for instance that therefore all kinds of testimony must in all cases have equal force and authority suppose that the Caesarean and Pompeian factions had each of them claim the victory in these battles and that the historians of each party had uniformly ascribed the advantage to their own side how could mankind at this distance have been able to determine between them the contrariety is equally strong between the miracles related by Herodotus or Plutarch and those delivered by Mariana, Bede or any monkish historian the wise lend a very academic faith to every report which favors the passion of the reporter whether it magnifies his country his family or himself or in any other way strikes in with his natural inclinations and propensities but what greater temptation than to appear a missionary a prophet an ambassador from heaven who would not encounter many dangers and difficulties in order to attain so sublime a character or if by the help of vanity and heated imagination a man has first made a convert of himself and entered seriously into the delusion whoever scruples to make use of pious fronds in support of so holy and meritorious a cause the smallest spark may hear kindle into the greatest flame because the materials are always prepared for it the evidem genus auricularum the gazing populace received greedily without examination whatever sues superstition and promotes wonder how many stories of this nature have in all ages been detected and exploded in their infancy how many more have been celebrated for a time and have afterwards sunk into neglect and oblivion where such reports therefore fly about the solution of the phenomenon is obvious and we judge in conformity to regular experience and observation when we account for it by the known and natural principles of credulity and delusion and shall we rather than have a recourse to so natural a solution allow of a miraculous violation of the most established laws of nature I need not mention the difficulty of detecting a falsehood in any private or even public history at the place where it is said to happen much more when the scene is removed ever so small a distance even a court of judicature with all the authority accuracy and judgment which they can employ find themselves often at a loss to distinguish between truth and falsehood in the most recent actions but the matter never comes to any issue if trusted to the common method of altercations and debates and flying rumors especially when men's passions have taken part on either side in the infancy of new religions the wise and learned commonly esteem the matter too inconsiderable to deserve their attention or regard and when afterwards they would willingly detect the cheat in order to undeceive the deluded multitude the season is now past and the records and witnesses which might clear up the matter have perished beyond recovery no means of detection remain but those which must be drawn from the very testimony itself of the reporters in these though always sufficient with the judicious and knowing are commonly too fine to fall under the comprehension of the vulgar upon the whole then it appears that no testimony for any kind of miracle has ever amounted to a probability much less to a proof and that even supposing it amounted to a proof it would be opposed by another proof derived from the very nature of the fact which it would endeavor to establish it is experience only which gives authority to human testimony and it is the same experience which assures us of the laws of nature when therefore these two kinds of experience are contrary we have nothing to do but subtract the one from the other and embrace an opinion either on one side or the other with that assurance which arises from the remainder but according to the principle here explained this subtraction with regard to all popular religions amounts to an entire annihilation and therefore we may establish it as a maxim that no human testimony can have such force as to prove a miracle and make it a just foundation for any such system of religion I beg the limitations here made may be remarked when I say that a miracle can never be proved so as to be the foundation of a system of religion for I own that otherwise there may possibly be miracles or violations of the usual course of nature of such a kindness to admit of proof from human testimony though perhaps it will be impossible to find such in all the records of history thus suppose all authors in all languages agree that from the first of January 1600 there was a total darkness over the whole earth for eight days suppose that the tradition of this extraordinary event is still strong and lightly among the people that all travelers who return from foreign countries bring us accounts of the same tradition without the least variation or contradiction it is evident that our present philosophers instead of doubting the fact ought to receive it a certain and ought to search for the causes when it might be derived the decay corruption and dissolution of nature is an event rendered probable by so many analogies that any phenomenon which seems to have a tendency towards that catastrophe comes within the reach of human testimony if that testimony be very extensive in uniform but suppose that all the historians who treat of England should agree that on the first of January 1600 Queen Elizabeth died that both before and after her death she was seen by her physicians in the whole court as is usual with persons of her rank that her successor was acknowledged and proclaimed by the parliament and that after being interred a month she again appeared resumed the throne and governed England for three years I must confess that I should be surprised at the concurrence of so many odd circumstances but should not have the least inclination to believe so miraculous an event I should not doubt of her pretended death and of those other public circumstances that followed it I should only assert it to have been pretended and that it neither was nor possibly could be real you would in vain object to me the difficulty and almost impossibility of deceiving the world in an affair of such consequence the wisdom and solid judgment to that renowned queen with little or no advantage which she could reap from so poor an artifice all this might astonish me but I would still reply that the navery and folly of men are such common phenomena then I should rather believe the most extraordinary events to arise from their concurrence then admit of so signal a violation of the laws of nature but should this miracle be ascribed to any new system of religion men in all ages have been so much imposed on by ridiculous stories of that kind that this very circumstance would be a foolproof of a cheat and sufficient with all men of sense not only to make them reject the fact but even rejected without further examination though the being to whom the miracle is ascribed to be in this case almighty it is not upon that account become a bit more probable since it is impossible for us to know the attributes or actions of such a being otherwise then from the experience which we have of his productions in the usual course of nature this still reduces us to past observation and obliges us to compare the instances of the violation of truth in the testimony of men with those of the violation of the laws of nature by miracles in order to judge which of them is most likely improbable as the violations of truth are more common in the testimony concerning religious miracles then in that concerning any other matter of fact this must diminish very much the authority of the former testimony and make us form a general resolution never to lend any attention to it with whatever species pretense that may be covered Lord Bacon seems to have embraced the same principles of reasoning we ought says he quote to make a collection or particular history of all monsters and prodigious birds or productions and in a word of everything new rare and extraordinary in nature but this must be done with the most severe scrutiny lest we depart from truth above all every relation must be considered as suspicious which depends in any degree upon religion as the prodigies of Livy and no less so everything that is to be found in the writers of natural magic or alchemy or such authors who seem all of them to have an unconquerable appetite for falsehood and fable unquote I am the better pleased with the method of reasoning here delivered as I think it may serve to confound those dangerous friends or disguised enemies to the Christian religion who have undertaken to defend it by the principles of human reason our most holy religion is founded on faith not on reason and it is a sure method of exposing it to put it to such a trial as it is by no means fitted to endure to make this more evident let us examine those miracles related in scripture and not to lose ourselves and too wide a field let us confine ourselves to such as we find in the Pentateuch which we shall examine according to the principles of these pretended Christians not as the word or testimony of God himself but as the production of a mere human writer and historian here then we are first to consider a book presented to us by a barbarous and ignorant people written in an age when they were still more barbarous and in all probability long after the facts which it relates corroborated by no concurrent testimony and resembling those fabulous accounts which every nation gives of its origin upon reading this book we find it full of prodigies and miracles it gives an account of a state of the world and of human nature entirely different from the present of our fall from that state of the age of man extended to near a thousand years of the destruction of the world by a deluge of the arbitrary choice of one people as the favorites of heaven and that people the countrymen of the author of their deliverance from bondage by prodigies the most astonishing imaginable I desire anyone to lay his hand upon his heart and after a serious consideration declare whether he thinks that the falsehood of such a book supported by such a testimony would be more extraordinary and miraculous than all the miracles it relates which is however necessary to make it be received according to the measures of probability above established what we have said of miracles may be applied without any variation to prophecies and indeed all prophecies are real miracles and as such only can be admitted as proofs of any revelation if it did not exceed the capacity of human nature to foretell future events it would be absurd to employ any prophecy as an argument for a divine mission or authority from heaven so that upon the whole we may conclude that the Christian religion not only was at first attended with miracles but even at this day cannot be believed by any reasonable person without one mere reason is insufficient to convince us of its veracity and whoever is moved by faith to ascend to it is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person which subverts all the principles of his understanding and gives him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience End of Chapter 10 Part 2 Chapter 16 of an Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer visit LibriVox.org An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding by David Hume Chapter 16 of a Particular Providence and of a Future State I was lately engaged in conversation with a friend who loves skeptical paradoxes where, though he advanced many principles of which I can by no means approve yet as they seem to be curious and to bear some relation to the chain of reasoning carried on throughout this inquiry I shall here copy them from memory as accurately as I can in order to submit them to the judgment of the reader Our conversation began with my admiring the singular good fortune of philosophy which, as it requires, entire liberty above all other privileges and chiefly flourishes from the free opposition of sentiments and argumentation received its first birth in an age and country of freedom and toleration and was never cramped even in its most extravagant principles by any creeds, concessions, or penal statutes for, except the banishment of protagress and the death of Socrates which last event proceeded partly from other motives there are scarcely any instances to be met with in ancient history of this bigoted jealousy with which the present age is so much infested Epicureus lived at Athens to an advanced age in peace and tranquility Epicureans were even admitted to receive the sacerdotal character and to officiate at the altar in the most sacred rites of the established religion and the public encouragement of pensions and salaries was afforded equally by the wisest of all the Roman emperors to the professors of every sect of philosophy How requisite such kind of treatment was to philosophy in her early youth will easily be conceived if we reflect that even at present when she may be supposed to be hardy and robust she bears with much difficulty the inclemency of the seasons and those harsh winds of calamity and persecution which blow upon her You admire, says my friend as the singular good fortune of philosophy what seems to result from the natural course of things and to be unavoidable in every age and nation This pertenacious bigotry of which you complain as so fatal to philosophy is really her offspring who, after lying with superstition separates himself entirely from the interest of his parent and becomes her most inveterate enemy and persecutor Speculative dogmas of religion the present occasions of such furious dispute could not possibly be conceived or admitted in the early ages of the world when mankind, being wholly illiterate formed an idea of religion more suitable to their weak apprehension and composed their sacred tenets of such tales chiefly as were the objects of traditional belief more than of argument or disputation After the first alarm therefore was over which arose from the new paradoxes and principles of the philosophers These teachers seem ever after during the ages of antiquity to have lived in great harmony with the established superstition and have made a fair partition of mankind between them the former claiming all the learned and wise, the latter possessing all the vulgar and illiterate It seems then, say I, that you leave politics entirely out of the question and never suppose that a wise magistrate can be jealous of certain tenets of philosophy such as those of Epicurus which denying a divine existence and consequently a provenance in a future state seem to loosen in a great measure the ties of morality and may be supposed for that reason pernicious to the peace of civil society I know, replied he, that in fact these persecutions never in any age proceeded from calm reason or from experience of the pernicious consequences of philosophy but arose entirely from passion and prejudice But what if I should advance farther and assert that if Epicurus had been accused before the people by any of the sycophants or informers of those days he could easily have defended his cause and proved his principles of philosophy to be as salutary as those of his adversaries who endeavored with such zeal to expose him to the public hatred and jealousy I wish, said I, you would try your eloquence upon so extraordinary a topic and make a speech for Epicurus which might satisfy not the mob of Athens if you allow that ancient and polite city to have contained any mob but the more philosophical part of his audience such as might be supposed capable of comprehending his arguments The matter would not be difficult upon such conditions, replied he and if you please I shall suppose myself Epicurus for a moment and make you stand for the Athenian people and shall deliver you such a harang as will fill all the urn with white beans and leave not a black one to gratify the malice of my adversaries Very well then, pray proceed upon these suppositions I come hither, O ye Athenians, to justify in your assembly what I maintained in my school and I find myself impeached by furious antagonists instead of reasoning with calm and dispassionate inquirers your deliberations which of right should be directed to questions of public good and the interest of the commonwealth are diverted to the dispositions of speculative philosophy and these magnificent but perhaps fruitless inquiries take place of your more familiar but useful occupations But so far as in me lies I will prevent this abuse We shall not hear dispute concerning the origin and government of worlds We shall only inquire how far such questions concern the public interest and if I can persuade you that they are entirely indifferent to the peace of society and security of government I hope that you will presently send us back to our schools there to examine at leisure the question the most sublime but at the same time the most speculative of all philosophy The religious philosopher is not satisfied with the tradition of your forefathers and doctrine of your priests in which I willingly acquiesce indulge a rash curiosity in trying how far they can establish religion upon the principles of reason and they thereby excite instead of satisfying the doubts which naturally arise from a diligent and scrutinous inquiry they paint in the most magnificent colors the order beauty and wise arrangement of the universe and then ask if such a glorious display of intelligence could proceed from the fortuitous concourse of atoms or if chance could produce what the greatest genius can never sufficiently admire I shall not examine the justness of this argument I shall allow it to be as solid as my antagonists and accusers can desire it is sufficient if I can prove from this very reasoning that the question is entirely speculative and that when in my philosophical dispositions I deny a provenance and a future state I undermine not the foundations of society but advance principles which they themselves upon their own topics if they argue consistently must allow to be solid and satisfactory you then who are my accusers have acknowledged that the chief or sole argument for a divine existence which I never questioned is derived from the order of nature where there appear such marks of intelligence and design that you think it extravagant to assign for its cause either chance or the blind and unguided force of matter you allow that this is an argument drawn from effects to causes from the order of the work you infer that there must have been project and forethought in the workmen if you cannot make out this point you allow that your conclusion fails and you pretend not to establish the conclusion in a greater latitude than the phenomena of nature will justify these are your concessions I desire you to mark the consequences when we infer any particular cause from an effect we must proportion the one to the other and can never be allowed to ascribe to the cause any qualities but what are exactly sufficient to produce the effect a body of 10 ounces raised in any scale may serve as a proof that the counterbalancing weight exceeds 10 ounces but can never afford a reason that it exceeds 100 if the cause assigned for any effect be not sufficient to produce it we must either reject that cause or add to it such qualities as will give it a just proportion to the effect but if we ascribe to it farther qualities or affirm it capable of producing other effects we can only indulge the license of conjecture and arbitrarily suppose the existence of qualities and energies without reason or authority the same rule holds whether the cause assigned be brute unconscious matter or a rational intelligent being if the cause be known by the effect we never ought to ascribe to it any qualities beyond what are precisely requisite to produce the effect nor can we by any rules of just reasoning return back from the cause and infer other effects from it beyond those by which alone it is known to us no one merely from the sight of one of Zeuxis's pictures could know that he was also a statuary or architect and was an artist no less skillful in stone and marble than in colors the talents and taste displayed in the particular work before us these we may safely conclude the workmen to be possessed of the cause must be proportioned to the effect and if we exactly and precisely proportion it we shall never find in it any qualities that point farther or afford an inference concerning any other design or performance such qualities must be somewhat beyond what is merely requisite for producing the effect which we examine allowing therefore the gods to be the authors of the existence or order of the universe it follows that they possess that precise degree of power intelligence and benevolence which appears in their workmanship but nothing farther can ever be proved except we call in the assistance of exaggeration and flattery to supply the defects of argument and reasoning so far as the traces of any attributes at present appear so far may we conclude these attributes to exist the supposition of farther attributes is mere hypothesis much more the supposition that in the distant regions of space or periods of time there has been or will be a more magnificent display of these attributes and a scheme of administration more suitable to such imaginary virtues we can never be allowed to mount up from the universe the effect to Jupiter the cause and then descend downwards to infer any new effect from that cause as if the present effects alone were not entirely worthy of the glorious attributes which we ascribe to that deity the knowledge of the cause being derived solely from the effects they must be exactly adjusted to each other and the one can never refer to anything farther or be the foundation of any new inference and conclusion you find certain phenomena in nature you seek a cause or author you imagine that you have found him you afterwards become so enamored of this offspring of your brain that you imagine it impossible but he must produce something greater and more perfect than the present scene of things which is so full of ill and disorder you forget that the superlative intelligence and benevolence are entirely imaginary or at least without any foundation and reason and that you have no ground to ascribe to him any qualities but what you see he has actually exerted and displayed in his productions let your gods therefore philosophers be suited to the present appearance of nature and presume not to alter these appearances by arbitrary suppositions in order to suit them to the attributes which you so fondly ascribe to your deities when priests and poets supported by your authority O Athenians talk of a golden or silver age which preceded the present state of vice and misery I hear them with attention and with reverence but when philosophers who pretend to neglect authority and to cultivate reason hold the same discourse I pay them not I own the same obsequious submission and pious deference I ask who carried them into the celestial regions who admitted them into the councils of the gods who opened to them the book of fate that they thus rashly affirm that their deities have executed or will execute any purpose beyond what has actually appeared if they tell me that they have mounted on the steps or by the gradual ascent of reason and by drawing inferences from effects to causes I still insist that they have aided the ascent of reason by the wings of imagination otherwise they could not thus change their manner of inference and argue from causes to effects presuming that a more perfect production than the present world would be more suitable to such perfect beings as the gods and forgetting that they have no reason to ascribe to these celestial beings any perfection or any attribute but what can be found in the present world hence all the fruitless industry to account for the ill appearances of nature and save the honor of the gods while we must acknowledge the reality of that evil and disorder with which the world so much abounds the obstinate and intractable qualities of matter we are told or the observance of general laws or some such reason is the sole cause which controlled the power and benevolence of Jupiter and obliged him to create mankind and every sensible creature so imperfect and so unhappy these attributes then are it seems beforehand taken for granted in their greatest latitude and upon that supposition I own that such conjecture may perhaps be admitted as plausible solutions of the ill phenomena but still I ask why take these attributes for granted or why ascribe to the cause any qualities but what actually appear in the effect why torture your brain to justify the course of nature upon suppositions which for ought you know may be entirely imaginary and of which there are to be found no traces in the course of nature the religious hypothesis therefore must be considered only as a particular method of accounting for the visible phenomena of the universe but no just reasoner will ever presume to infer from it any single fact and alter or add to the phenomena in any single particular if you think that the appearances of things prove such causes it is allowable for you to draw an inference concerning the existence of these causes in such complicated and sublime subjects every one should be indulged in the liberty of conjecture and argument but here you ought to rest if you come backward and arguing from your inferred causes conclude that any other fact has existed or will exist in the course of nature which may serve as a fuller display of particular attributes I must admonish you that you have departed from the method of reasoning attached to the present subject and have certainly added something to the attributes of the cause beyond what appears in the effect otherwise you could never with tolerable sense or propriety add anything to the effect in order to render it more worthy of the cause where then is the odiousness of that doctrine which I teach in my school or rather which I examine in my gardens or what do you find in this whole question wherein the security of good morals or in the peace and order of society is in the least concerned I deny a provenance you say in supreme governor of the world who guides the course of events and punishes the vicious with infamy and disappointment and rewards the virtuous with honor and success in all their undertakings but surely I deny not the course itself of events which lies open to everyone's inquiry and examination I acknowledge that in the present order of things virtue is attended with more peace of mind than vice and meets with a more favorable reception from the world I am sensible that according to the past experience of mankind friendship is the chief joy of human life and moderation the only source of tranquility and happiness I never balance between the virtuous and the vicious course of life but I'm sensible that to a well-disposed mind every advantage is on the side of the former and what can you say more allowing all your suppositions and reasonings you tell me indeed that this disposition of things proceeds from intelligence and design but whatever it proceeds from the disposition itself on which depends our happiness or misery and consequently our conduct and deportment in life is still the same is it still open for me as well as you to regulate my behavior by my experience of past events and if you affirm that while a divine providence is allowed and a supreme distributive justice in the universe I ought to expect some more particular reward of the good and punishment of the bad beyond the ordinary course of events I here find the same fallacy which I have before and ever to detect you persist in imagining that if we grant that divine existence for which you so earnestly contend you may safely infer consequences from it and add something