Question 22 of Summa Theologica Parse Prima Initial Questions. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. This recording is by Jim Ruddy. Summa Theologica Parse Prima Initial Questions by St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 22. The Providence of God. Having considered all that relates to the will absolutely, we must now proceed to those things which have relation to both the intellect and the will, namely Providence in respect to all created things, predestination and reprobation and all that is concerned with these acts in respect, especially of man as regards to eternal salvation. For in the science of morals after the moral virtues themselves comes the consideration of prudence to which Providence would seem to belong. Concerning God's Providence, there are four points of inquiry. Whether Providence is suitably assigned to God, whether everything comes under divine Providence, whether divine Providence is immediately concerned with all things and whether divine Providence imposes any necessity upon things foreseen. First Article. Whether Providence can suitably be attributed to God. Objection 1. It seems that Providence is not becoming to God. For Providence, according to Tully, is a part of prudence. But prudence, since according to the philosopher it gives good counsel, cannot belong to God who never has any doubt for which he should take counsel. Providence cannot belong to God. Objection 2. Further whatever is in God is eternal. But Providence is not anything eternal, for it is concerned with existing things that are not eternal, according to Damocene. Therefore there is no Providence in God. Objection 3. Further there is nothing composite in God, but Providence seems to be something composite because it includes both the intellect and the will. Therefore Providence is not in God. On the contrary it is said, But Thou, Father, governest all things by Providence. I answer, it is necessary to attribute Providence to God for all the good that is in created things has been created by God as was shown above. In created things good is found not only as regards their substance, but also as regards their order towards an end, and especially their last end, which as was said above is the Divine Goodness. This good of order existing in things created is itself created by God. Since however God is the cause of things by His intellect, and thus it behooves that the type of every effect should pre-exist in Him, as is clear from what has gone before, it is necessary that the type of the order of things toward their end should pre-exist in the Divine Mind. And the type of things ordered towards an end is, properly speaking, Providence, for it is the chief part of Prudence to which two other parts are directed, namely Remembrance of the Past and Understanding of the Present, and as much as from the Remembrance of what is past to the understanding of what is present, we gather how to provide for the future. Now it belongs to Prudence, according to the philosopher, to direct other things towards an end, whether in regard to oneself, as for instance a man has said to be prudent who orders well his acts towards the end of life, or in regard to others subject to him in a family, city, or kingdom, in which sense it is said, a fateful and wise servant whom his Lord hath appointed over his family. In this way Prudence, or Providence, may suitably be attributed to God, for in God himself there can be nothing ordered towards an end since he is the last end. This type of order in things towards an end is therefore in God called Providence. When Spoethius says, Providence is the Divine type itself seated in the supreme ruler which disposes all things, which disposition may refer either to the type of the order of things towards an end, or to the type or the order of parts in the whole. Reply to Objection 1. According to the philosopher, Prudence is what strictly speaking commands all that Abulia has rightly counseled and Cenesis rightly judged. Whence though to take counsel may not be fitting to God, from the fact that counsel is an inquiry into matters that are doubtful, nevertheless to give a command as to the ordering of things towards an end, the right reason of which he possesses does belong to God. According to the psalm, he hath made a decree and it shall not pass away. In this manner both Prudence and Providence belong to God. Although at the same time it may be said that the very reason of things to be done is called counsel in God, not because of any inquiry necessitated, but from the certitude of the knowledge to which those who take counsel come by inquiry, whence it is said, who worketh all things according to the counsel of his will. Reply to Objection 2. Two things pertain to the care of Providence, namely the reason of order, which is called Providence and Disposition, and the execution of order, which is termed Government, of these the first is eternal and the second is temporal. Reply to Objection 3. Providence resides in the intellect but presupposes the act of willing the end. Nobody gives a precept about things done for an end unless he will that end. Hence Prudence presupposes the moral virtues by means of which the appetitive faculty is directed towards good, as the philosopher says. Even if Providence has to do with the divine will and intellect equally, this would not affect the divine simplicity since in God both the will and the intellect are one and the same thing as we have said above. Second article, whether everything is subject to the Providence of God. Objection 1. It seems that everything is not subject to divine Providence for nothing foreseen can happen by chance. If then everything was foreseen by God nothing would happen by chance and thus hazard and luck would disappear which is against common opinion. Objection 2. Further a wise provider excludes any defect or evil as far as he can from those over whom he has a care but we see many evils existing either then God cannot hinder these and thus is not omnipotent or else he does not have care for everything. Objection 3. Further whatever happens of necessity does not require Providence or prudence and it's according to the philosopher prudence is the right reason of things contingent concerning which there is counsel and choice. Since then many things happen from necessity everything cannot be subject to Providence. Objection 4. Further whatsoever is left to itself cannot be subject to the Providence of the Governor but men are left to themselves by God in accordance with the words God made man from the beginning and left him in the hand of his own counsel and particularly in reference to the wicked I let them go according to the desires of their heart everything therefore cannot be subject to Divine Providence. Objection 5. Further the Apostle says God does not care for oxen and we may say the same of other irrational creatures thus everything cannot be under the care of Divine Providence. On the contrary it is said of Divine Wisdom she reaches from end to end mightily and ordereth all things sweetly. I answer that certain persons totally denied the existence of Providence as Democritus and the Epicureans maintaining that the world was made by chance. Others taught that incorruptible things only were subject to Providence and corruptible things not in their individual cells but only according to their species for in this respect they are incorruptible. They are represented as saying the clouds are his covert and he doth not consider our things and he walketh about the poles of heaven. Rabbi Moses however excluded men from the generality of things corruptible on account of the excellence of the intellect which they possess but in reference to all else that suffers corruption he adhered to the opinion of the others. We must say however that all things are subject to Divine Providence not only in general but even in their own individual selves. This is made evident thus for since every agent acts for an end the ordering of effects towards that end extends as far as the causality of the first agent extends. Once it happens that in the effects of an agent something takes place which has no reference toward the end because the effect comes from a cause other than an outside the intention of the agent but the causality of God who is the first agent extends to all being not only as to constituent principles of species but also as to the individualizing principles not only of things incorruptible but also of things corruptible hence all things that exist in whatsoever manner are necessarily directed by God towards some end as the Apostle says those things that are of God are well ordered since therefore as the providence of God is nothing less than the type of the order of things towards an end as we have said necessarily follows that all things and as much as they participate in existence must likewise be subject to Divine Providence it has been also shown that God knows all things both universal and particular as His knowledge may be compared to the things themselves as the knowledge of art to the objects of art all things must of necessity come under His ordering as all things wrought by art are subject to the ordering of that art Reply to Objection 1 there is a difference between universal and particular causes a thing can escape the order of a particular cause but not the order of a universal cause for nothing escapes the order of a particular cause except through the intervention and hindrance of some other particular cause as for instance wood may be prevented from burning by the action of water since then all particular causes are included under the universal cause it could not be that any effect should take place outside the range of that universal cause so far then as in effect escapes the order of a particular cause or fortuitous in respect to that cause but if we regard the universal cause outside whose range no effect can happen it is said to be foreseen thus for instance the meeting of two servants although to them it appears by a chance circumstance has been fully foreseen by their master who has purposely sent them to meet at that one place in such a way that the one knows not about the other Reply to Objection 2 otherwise with one who has care of a particular thing and one whose providence is universal because a particular provider excludes all effects from what is subject to his care as far as he can whereas one who provides universally allows some little defect to remain lest the good of the whole should be hindered hence corruption and defects in natural things are said to be contrary to some particular nature yet they are in keeping with a plan of universal nature in as much as the defect in one thing yields to the good of another or even to the universal good for the corruption of one is the generation of another and through this it is that a species is kept in existence since God then provides universally for all being belongs to his providence to permit certain defects in particular effects that the perfect good of the universe may not be hindered for if all evil were prevented much good would be absent from the universe a lion would cease to live if there were no slaying of animals and there would be no patience of martyrs if there were no tyrannical persecution thus Augustine says Almighty God would in no wise permit evil to exist in his works unless he were so almighty and so good as to produce good even from evil it would appear that it was on account of these two arguments to which we have just replied that some were persuaded to consider corruptible things that is causal and evil things as removed from the care of divine providence replied to objection three man is not the author of nature but he uses natural things in applying art and virtue to his own use hence human providence does not reach to that which takes place in nature from necessity but divine providence extends thus far that God is the author of nature apparently it was this argument that moved those who withdrew the course of nature from the care of divine providence attributing it rather to the necessity of matter as democratists and others of the ancients replied to objection four when it is said that God left man to himself this does not mean that man is exempt from divine providence but merely that he has not a prefixed operating force determined to only the one effect as in the case of natural things which are only acted upon as though directed by another toward an end and do not act of themselves as if they directed themselves towards an end like rational creatures through the possession of free will by which these are able to take counsel and make a choice hence it is significantly said in the hand of his own counsel but since the very act of free will traced to God as to a cause necessarily follows that everything happening from the exercise of free will must be subject to divine providence for human providence is included under the providence of God as a particular under universal cause God however extends his providence over the just in a certain more excellent way than over the wicked and as much as he prevents anything happening which would impede their final salvation for to them that love God all things work together unto good but from the fact that he does not restrain the wicked from the evil of sin he is said to abandon them not that he altogether withdraws his providence from them otherwise they would return to nothing if they were not preserved in existence by his providence this was the reason that had weight with Tully who withdrew from the care of divine providence human affairs concerning which we take counsel replied to objection five since a rational creature has through its free will control over his actions as was said above it is subject to divine providence in a special manner so that something is imputed to it as a fault or as a merit and there is given it accordingly something by way of punishment or reward in this way the apostle withdraws oxen from the care of God not however that individual irrational creatures escaped the care of divine providence as was the opinion of the rabbi Moses third article whether God has immediate providence over everything objection one it seems that God has not immediate providence over all things for whatever is contained in the notion of dignity must be attributed to God but it belongs to the dignity of a king that he should have ministers through whose mediation he provides for his subjects therefore much less has God himself immediate providence over all things objection two further it belongs to providence to order all things to an end now the end of everything is its perfection and it's good but it apportains to every cause to direct its effect to good where for every active cause is a cause of the effect of providence if therefore God were to have immediate providence over all things all secondary causes would be withdrawn objection three further Augustine says it is better to be ignorant of some things than to know them for example vile things and the philosopher says the same but whatever is better must be assigned to God therefore he has not immediate providence over bad and vile things on the contrary it is said what other hath he appointed over the earth or whom hath he set over the world which he made on which passage Gregory says himself he ruleeth the world which he himself hath made I answer that two things belong to providence namely the type of the order of things fore-ordained towards an end and the execution of this order which is called government as regards the first of these God has immediate providence over everything because he has in his intellect the types of everything even the smallest and whatsoever causes he assigns to certain effects he gives them the power to produce those effects once it must be that he has beforehand the type of those effects in his mind as to the second there are certain intermediaries of God's providence where he governs things inferior by superior not on account of any defect in his power but by reason of the abundance of his goodness so that the dignity of causality is imparted even to creatures thus Plato's opinion as narrated by Gregory of Nyssa is exploded he taught a three-fold providence first one which belongs to the supreme deity who first and foremost has provision over spiritual things and thus over the whole world as regards genus species and universal causes the second providence which is over the individuals of all that can be generated and corrupted he attributed to the divinities who circulate in the heavens that is certain separate substances which move corporeal things in a circular direction the third providence over human affairs he assigned to demons whom the platonic philosophers placed between us and the gods as Augustine tells us reply to objection one it pertains to a king's dignity to have ministers who execute his providence but the fact that he has not the plan of those things which are done by them arises from a deficiency in himself for every operative sciences the more it considers the particular things with which its action is concerned reply to objection two God's immediate provision over everything does not exclude the action of secondary causes which are the executors of his order as was said above reply to objection three it is better for us not to know low and vile things because by them we are impeded in our knowledge of what is better and higher for we cannot understand many things simultaneously because the thought of evil sometimes perverts the will towards evil this does not hold with God who sees everything simultaneously at one glance and whose will cannot turn in the direction of evil fourth article whether providence imposes any necessity on things foreseen objection one it seems the divine providence imposes necessity upon things foreseen for every effect it has a pair say cause either present or past which it necessarily follows happens from necessity as a philosopher proves but the providence of God since it is eternal pre-exists and the effect flows from it of necessity for divine providence cannot be frustrated therefore divine providence imposes a necessity upon things foreseen objection two further every provider makes his work as stable as he can lest it should fail but God is most powerful therefore he assigns the stability of necessity to things provided objection three further Boethius says fate from the immutable source of providence binds together human acts and fortunes by the indissoluble connection of causes it seems therefore that providence imposes necessity upon things foreseen on the contrary Dionysius says to corrupt nature is not the work of providence but it is in the nature of some things to be contingent divine providence does not therefore impose any necessity upon things so as to destroy their contingency I answer that divine providence imposes necessity upon some things not upon all as some formally believe for to providence it belongs to order things towards an end now after the divine goodness which is an extrinsic end to all things the principal good in things themselves is the perfection of the universe which would not be were not all grades of being found in things whence it pertains to divine providence to produce every grade of being and thus it has prepared for some things necessary causes so that they happen of necessity for others contingent causes that they may happen by contingency according to the nature of their proximate causes reply to objection one the effect of divine providence is not only that things should happen somehow but that they should happen either by necessity or by contingency therefore whatsoever divine providence ordains to happen infallibly and of necessity happens infallibly and of necessity and that happens from contingency which the plan of divine providence conceives to happen from contingency reply to objection two the order of divine providence is unchangeable and certain so far as all things foreseen happen as they have been foreseen whether from necessity or from contingency reply to objection three that in desolubility and unchangeableness of which Boethius speaks pertain to the certainty of providence which fails not to produce its effect and that in the way foreseen but they do not pertain to the necessity of the effects we must remember that property speaking necessary and contingent are consequent upon being as such hence the mode both of necessity and of contingency falls under the foresight of God who provides universally for all being not under the foresight of causes that provide only for some particular order of things End of question 22 Question 23 of Summa Theologica Paras Prima Initial Questions This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org This recording is by Jim Ruddy Summa Theologica Paras Prima Initial Questions by St. Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province Question 23 of predestination After consideration of divine providence we must treat of predestination and the book of life Concerning predestination there are eight points of inquiry whether predestination is suitably attributed to God what is predestination and whether it places anything in the predestined whether to God belongs the reprobation of some men on the comparison of predestination whether predestination is predestion whether predestination is predestined whether that is to say the predestined are chosen whether merits are the cause or reason of predestination or reprobation or election of the certainty of predestination whether the predestined will enthrallably be saved whether the number of the predestined is certain and whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of saints First article 1. It seems that men are not predestined by God, for Damascene says, it must be borne in mind that God foreknows, but does not predetermine everything, since he foreknows all that is in us, but does not predetermine it all. But human merit and demerit are in us, for as much as we are the masters of our own acts by free will. All that pertains, therefore, to merit or demerit, is not predestined by God, and thus man's predestination is done away. Objection 2. Further, all creatures are directed to their end by divine providence, as was said above, but other creatures are not said to be predestined by God, therefore neither are men. Objection 3. Further, the angels are capable of beatitude as well as men, but predestination is not suitable to angels, since in them there never was any unhappiness, for predestination, as Augustine says, is the purpose to take pity. Therefore men are not predestined. Objection 4. Further, the benefits God confers upon men are revealed by the Holy Ghost to holy men, according to the saying of the apostle, now we have received not the spirit of this world, but the spirit that is of God, that we may know the things that are given us from God. Therefore if man were predestined by God, since predestination is a benefit from God, his predestination would be made known to each predestined, which is clearly false. Objection 5. On the contrary, it is written, Whom he predestined, them he also called. I answer, that it is fitting that God should predestine men, for all things are subject to his providence, as was shown above. Now it belongs to providence to direct things towards their end, as was also said. The end towards which created things are directed by God is twofold, one which exceeds all proportion and faculty of created nature, and this end is life eternal, that consists in seeing God, which is above the nature of every creature as shown above. The other end, however, is proportionate to created nature, to which end created being can attain according to the power of its nature. Now if a thing cannot attain to something by the power of its nature, it must be directed there to by another. Thus an arrow is directed by the archer towards a mark. As properly speaking, a rational creature capable of eternal life is led towards it directed as it were by God. The reason of that direction pre-exists in God as in him is the type of the order of all things towards an end, which we proved above to be providence. Now the type in the mind of the doer of something to be done is the kind of pre-existence in him of the thing to be done. It's the type of the aforesaid direction of a rational creature towards the end of life eternal is called predestination, for to destined is to direct or send. Thus it is clear that predestination as regards its objects is a part of providence. Replied to Objection 1, Damascene calls predestination an imposition of necessity after the manner of natural things which are predetermined towards one end. This is clear from his adding, he does not will malice nor does he compel virtue once predestination is not excluded by him. Replied to Objection 2, irrational creatures are not capable of that end which exceeds the faculty of human nature once they cannot be properly said to be predestined, although improperly the term is used in respect of any other end. Replied to Objection 3, predestination applies to angels just as it does to men, although they have never been unhappy, for movement does not take its species from the term where from, but from the term where to, because it matters nothing in respect of the notion of making white whether he who is made white was before black, yellow, or red. Likewise, it matters nothing in respect of the notion of predestination whether one is predestined to life eternal from the state of misery or not, although it may be said that every conferring of good above that which is due pertains to mercy as was shown previously. Replied to Objection 4, even if by a special privilege their predestination were revealed to some it is not fitting that it should be revealed to everyone, because if so those who were not predestined would despair and security would beget negligence in the predestined. Second article, whether predestination places anything in the predestined. Objection 1, it seems that predestination does place something in the predestined for every action of itself causes passion. If therefore predestination is action in God, predestination must be passion in the predestined. Objection 2 further origin says on the text he who was predestined predestination is of one who is not, destination of one who is, and Augustine says what is predestination but the destination of one who is. Therefore predestination is only of one who actually exists and it thus places something in the predestined. Objection 3 further preparation is something in the thing prepared but predestination is the preparation of God's benefits as Augustine says therefore predestination is something in the predestined. Objection 4 further nothing temporal enters into the definition of eternity but grace which is something temporal is found in the definition of predestination. For predestination is the preparation of grace in the present and of glory in the future therefore predestination is not anything eternal so it must needs be that it is in the predestined and not in God for whatever is in him is eternal. On the contrary Augustine says that predestination is the foreknowledge of God's benefits but foreknowledge is not in the things foreknown but in the person who foreknows them therefore predestination is in the one who predestines and not in the predestined. My answer that predestination is not anything in the predestined but only in the person who predestines. We have said above that predestination is a part of providence. Now providence is not anything in the things provided for but is a type in the mind of the provider as was proved above but the execution of providence which is called government is in a passive way in the thing governed and in an active way in the governor. Once it is clear that predestination is a kind of type of the ordering of some persons towards eternal salvation existing in the divine mind. The execution however of this order is in a passive way in the predestined but actively in God. The execution of predestination is the calling and magnification according to the apostle whom he predestined, them he also called and whom he called them he also magnified. Replied to objection one, actions passing out to external matter imply of themselves passion for example the actions of warming and cutting but not so actions remaining in the agent as understanding and willing as said above. Predestination is an action of this latter class, therefore it does not put anything in the predestined but its execution which passes out to external things has an effect in them. Replied to objection two, destination sometimes denotes a real mission of someone to a given end and thus destination can only be said of someone actually existing. It is taken however in another sense for a mission which a person conceives in the mind and in this manner we are said to destin a thing which we firmly propose in our mind. In this latter way it is said that Eleazar determined not to do any unlawful things for the love of life. Thus destination can be of a thing which does not exist. Predestination however by reason of the antecedent nature it implies can be attributed to a thing which does not actually exist in whatsoever way destination is accepted. Replied to objection three, preparation is twofold of the patient in regard to passion and this is in the thing prepared and of the agent to action and this is in the agent. Such a preparation is predestination and as an agent by intellect is said to prepare itself to act accordingly as it preconceives the idea of what is to be done. Thus God from all eternity prepared by predestination conceiving the idea of the order of some towards salvation. Replied to objection four, grace does not come into the definition of predestination as something belonging to its essence but in as much as predestination implies a relation to grace as of cause to effect and of act to its object. Once it does not follow that predestination is anything temporal. Third article whether God reprobates any man. Objection one it seems that God reprobates no man for nobody reprobates what he loves but God loves every man according to wisdom. Thou lovest all things that are and thou hatest none of the things thou hast made therefore God reprobates no man. Objection two further if God reprobates any man it would be necessary for reprobation to have the same relation to the reprobates as predestination has to the predestined. It is the cause of the salvation of the predestined therefore reprobation will likewise be the cause of the loss of the reprobate but this is false for it is said destruction is thy own O Israel thy help is only in me. God does not then reprobate any man. Objection three further to no one ought anything be imputed which he cannot avoid but if God reprobates any one that one must perish for it is said consider the works of God that no man can correct whom he hath despised therefore it could not be imputed to any man were he to perish but this is false therefore God does not reprobate any one. On the contrary it is said I have loved Jacob but have hated Esau. I answer that God does reprobate some for it was said above that predestination is a part of providence. However it belongs to permit certain defects in those things which are subject to providence as was said above thus as men are ordained to eternal life through the providence of God it likewise is part of that providence to permit some to fall away from that end. This is called reprobation thus as predestination is a part of providence in regard to those ordained to eternal salvation. So reprobation is a part of providence in regard to those who turn aside from that end. Hence reprobation implies not only foreknowledge but also something more as does providence as was said above. Therefore as predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory so also reprobation includes the will to permit a person to fall into sin and to impose the punishment of damnation on account of that sin. Reply to objection one. God loves all men and all creatures and as much as he wishes them all some good but he does not wish every good to them all. So far therefore as he does not wish this particular good namely eternal life he is said to hate or to reprobate them. Reply to objection two. Reprobation differs in its causality from predestination. This latter is the cause both of what is expected in the future life by the predestined namely glory and of what is received in this life namely grace. Reprobation however is not the cause of what is in the present namely sin but it is the cause of abandonment by God. It is the cause however of what is assigned in the future namely eternal punishment but guilt proceeds from the free will of the person who is reprobated and deserted by grace in this way the word of the prophet is true namely destruction is thy own O Israel. Reply to objection three. Reprobation by God does not take anything away from the power of the person reprobated and when it is said that the reprobated cannot obtain grace this must not be understood as implying absolute impossibility but only conditional impossibility as was said above. That the predestined must necessarily be saved yet a conditional necessity which does not do away with the liberty of choice once although anyone reprobated by God cannot acquire grace nevertheless that he falls into this or that particular sin comes from the use of his free will and it is rightly imputed to him as guilt. Fourth article whether the predestined are chosen by God. Objection one it seems that the predestined are not chosen by God for Dionysius says that as the corporeal son sends his raise upon all without selection so does God his goodness but the goodness of God is communicated to some in a special manner through a participation of grace and glory therefore God without any selection communicates his grace and glory and this belongs to predestination. Objection two further election is of things that exist but predestination from all eternity is also of things which do not exist therefore some are predestined without election. Objection three further election implies some discrimination. Now God wills all men to be saved therefore predestination which ordains men towards eternal salvation is without election on the contrary it is said he chose us in him before the foundation of the world. I answer that predestination presupposes election in the order of reason and election presupposes love. The reason of this is that predestination as stated above is a part of providence. Now providence as also prudence is the plan existing in the intellect directing the ordering of some things towards an end as was proved above but nothing is directed towards an end unless the will for that end already exists once the predestination of some to eternal salvation presupposes in the order of reason that God wills their salvation and to this belong both election and love. Love in as much as he wills them this particular good of eternal salvation since to love is to wish well to anyone as stated above. Election in as much as he wills this good to some in preference to others since he reprobates some as stated above. Election and love however are differently ordered in God and in ourselves because in us the will and loving does not cause good but we are incited to love by the good which already exists and therefore we choose someone to love and so election in us precedes love. In God however it is the reverse for his will by which in loving he wishes good to someone is the cause of that good possessed by some in preference to others. Thus it is clear that love precedes election in the order of reason and election precedes predestination once all the predestinate are objects of election and love. Reply to objection one. If the communication of the divine goodness in general be considered God communicates his goodness without election in as much as there is nothing which he does not in some way share there is nothing which does not in some way share in his goodness as we said above. But if we consider the communication of this or that particular good he does not allot it without election since he gives certain goods to some men which he does not give to others thus in the conferring of grace and glory election is implied. Reply to objection two. When the will of the person choosing is incited to make a choice by the good already preexisting in the object chosen the choice must needs be of those things which already exist as happens in our choice. In God it is otherwise as was said above. Thus as Augustine says those are chosen by God who do not exist yet he does not err in his choice. Reply to objection three. God wills all men to be saved by his antecedent will which is to will not simply but relatively and not by his consequent will which is to will simply. Fifth article whether the fore knowledge of merits is the cause of predestination. Objection one it seems that fore knowledge of merits is the cause of predestination for the apostle says whom he foreknew he also predestined. Again a gloss of Ambrose on Romans I will have mercy upon whom I will have mercy says I will give mercy to him who I foresee will turn to me with his whole heart therefore it seems the fore knowledge of merits is the cause of predestination. Objection two further divine predestination includes a divine will which by no means can be irrational since predestination is the purpose to have mercy as Augustine says. But there can be no other reason for predestination than the fore knowledge of merits. Therefore it must be the cause of reason of predestination. Objection three further there is no injustice in God. Now it would seem unjust that unequal things be given to equals but all men are equal as regards both nature and original sin and inequality in them arises from the merits or demerits of their actions. Therefore God does not prepare unequal things for men by predesting and reprobating unless through the fore knowledge of their merits and demerits. On the contrary the apostle says not by works of justice which we have done but according to his mercy he saved us. But as he saved us so he predestined that we should be saved. Therefore fore knowledge of merits is not the cause or reason of predestination. I answer that since predestination includes will as was said above the reason of predestination must be sought for in the same way as was the reason of the will of God. Now it was shown above that we cannot assign any cause of the divine will on the part of the act of willing but a reason can be found on the part of the things will and as much as God wills one thing on account of something else. Wherefore nobody has been so insane as to say that merit is the cause of divine predestination as regards the act of the predestinator. But this is the question whether as regards the effect predestination has any cause or what comes to the same thing. Whether God preordained that he would give the effect of predestination to anyone on account of any merits. Accordingly there were some who held that the effect of predestination was preordained for some on account of preexisting merits in a former life. This was the opinion of Origen who thought that the souls of men were created in the beginning and according to the diversity of their works different states were assigned to them in this world when united with the body. The apostle however rebuts this opinion where he says for when they were not yet born nor had done any good or evil not of works but of him that calleth it was said of her the elder shall serve the younger. Others said that preexisting merits in this life are the reason and cause of the effect of predestination for the Pelagians taught that the beginning of doing well came from us and the consummation from God so that it came about that the effect of predestination was granted to one and not to another because the one made a beginning by preparing whereas the other did not. But against this we have the saying of the apostles that we are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of ourselves. Now no principle of action can be imagined previous to the act of thinking. Wherefore it cannot be said that anything begun in us can be the reason of the effect of predestination.  But these seem to have drawn a distinction between that which flows from grace and that which flows from free will as if the same thing cannot come from both. It is however manifest that what is of grace is the effect of predestination and this cannot be considered as the reason of predestination such that it is contained in the notion of predestination. Therefore if anything else in us be the reason of predestination it will be outside the effect of predestination. Now there is no distinction between what flows from free will and what is of predestination as there is no distinction between what flows from a secondary cause and from a first cause. For the providence of God produces effects through the operation of secondary causes as was shown above. Wherefore that which flows from free will is also of predestination. We must say therefore that the effect of predestination may be considered in a twofold light. In one way in particular and thus there is no reason why one effect of predestination should not be the reason or cause of another. A subsequent effect being the reason of a previous effect as its final cause and the previous effect being the reason of the subsequent as its meritorious cause which is reduced to the disposition of the matter. Thus we might say that God preordained to give glory on account of merit and that he preordained to give grace to merit glory. In another way the effect of predestination may be considered in general. Thus it is impossible that the whole of the effect of predestination in general should have any causes coming from us because whatsoever is in man disposing him toward salvation is all included under the effect of predestination, even the preparation for grace. For neither does this happen otherwise than by divine help according to the prophet Jeremiah's. Convert us, O Lord, to thee, and we shall be converted. Yet predestination has in this way in regard to its effect the goodness of God for its reason towards which the whole effect of predestination is directed as to an end and from which it proceeds as from its first moving principle. Reply to Objection 1, the use of grace foreknown by God is not the cause of conferring grace except after the manner of a final cause, as was explained above. Reply to Objection 2, predestination has its foundation in the goodness of God as regards its effects in general. Considered in its particular effects, however, one effect is the reason of another, as already stated. Reply to Objection 3, the reason for the predestination of some and the reprobation of others must be sought for in the goodness of God. Thus he is said to have made all things through his goodness so that the divine goodness might be represented in things. Now it is necessary that God's goodness, which in itself is one and undivided, should be manifested in many ways in his creation because creatures in themselves cannot attain to the simplicity of God. Thus it is that for the completion of the universe there are required different grades of being, some of which hold a high and some a low place in the universe, that this multiformity of grades may be preserved in things. God allows some evils, lest many good things should never happen, as was said above. Let us then consider the whole of the human race as we consider the whole universe. God wills to manifest his goodness in men in respect to those whom he predestines by means of his mercy as sparing them, and in respect of others whom he reprobates by means of his justice and punishing them. This is the reason why God elects some and rejects others. To this the apostle refers, saying, what if God willing to show his wrath and to make his power known, endured with much patience vessels of wrath fitted for destruction, that he might show the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, which he have prepared unto glory. And but in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver, but also of wood and of earth, and some indeed unto honor, but some unto dishonor. Yet why he chooses some for glory and reprobates others has no reason except the divine will. Once Augustine says, why he draws one and another he draws not, seek not to judge, if thou dost not wish to err. Thus too in the things of nature a reason can be assigned, since primary matter is altogether uniform, why one part of it was fashioned by God from the beginning under the form of fire, another under the form of earth, that there might be a diversity of species in things of nature. Yet why this particular part of matter is under this particular form and that under another depends upon the simple will of God. As from the simple will of the artificer, it depends that this stone is in part of the wall and that in another, although the plan requires that some stone should be in this place and some in that place. Neither on this account can there be said to be injustice in God if he prepares unequal lots for not unequal things. This would be altogether contrary to the notion of justice if the effect of predestination were granted as a debt and not gratuitously. In things which are given gratuitously, a person can give more or less just as he pleases, provided he deprives nobody of his due without any infringement of justice. This is what the master of the house said, take what is thine and go thy way. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will? Sixth article, whether predestination is certain. Objection one, it seems that predestination is not certain because on the words hold fast that which thou hast that no one take thy crown, Augustine says, another will not receive unless this one were to lose it. Hence the crown, which is the effect of predestination, can be both acquired and lost. Therefore predestination cannot be certain. Objection two, further granted what is possible, nothing impossible follows, but it is possible that one predestined, for example, Peter, may sin and then be killed. But if this were so, it would follow that the effect of predestination would be thwarted. This then is not impossible, therefore predestination is not certain. Objection three, further whatever God could do in the past, he can do now. But he could have not predestined whom he hath predestined. Therefore now he is able not to predestine him. Therefore predestination is not certain. On the contrary, a gloss on Romans says, whom he foreknew he also predestined. Predestination is the fore knowledge and preparation of the benefits of God by which whosoever are freed will most certainly be freed. I answer that predestination most certainly and infallibly takes effect, yet it does not impose any necessity so that namely its effect should take place from necessity for it was said above that predestination is a part of providence, but not all things subject to providence are necessary. Some things happening from contingency according to the nature of the proximate cause which divine providence has ordained for such effects. Yet the order of providence is infallible as was shown above. So also the order of predestination is certain yet free will is not destroyed once the effect of predestination has its contingency. Moreover, all that has been said about the divine knowledge and will must also be taken into consideration since they do not destroy contingency in things although they themselves are most certain and infallible. Reply to objection one. The crown may be said to belong to a person in two ways, first by God's predestination and thus no one loses his crown, secondly by merit of grace for what we merit in a certain way is ours and thus anyone may lose his crown by mortal sin. Another person receives that crown thus lost in as much as he takes the former's place for God does not permit some to fall without raising others according to Job. He shall break in pieces many and innumerable and make others to stand in their stead. Thus men are substituted in the place of the fallen angels and the Gentiles in that of the Jews. He who is substituted for another in the state of grace also receives the crown of the fallen in that in eternal life he will rejoice at the good the other has done in which life he will rejoice at all good whether done by himself or by others. Reply to objection two. Although it is possible for one who is predestined considered in himself to die in mortal sin, yet it is not possible supposed as in fact it is supposed that he is predestined. Hence it does not follow that predestination can fall short of its effect. Reply to objection three. Since predestination includes the divine will as stated above, and the fact that God wills any created thing is necessary on the supposition that he so wills on account of the immutability of the divine will but is not necessary absolutely. So the same must be said of predestination where for one ought not to say that God is able not to predestine one whom he has predestined, taking it in a composite sense though absolutely speaking God can predestine or not but in this way the certainty of predestination is not destroyed. Seventh article, whether the number of the predestined is certain. Objection one, it seems that the number of the predestined is not certain for a number to which an addition can be made is not certain but there can be an addition to the number of the predestined as it seems for it is written the Lord God adds to this number many thousands and a gloss adds fixed by God who knows those who belong to him. Therefore the number of the predestined is not certain. Objection two, further no reason can be assigned why God preordains to salvation one number of men more than another but nothing is arranged by God without a reason therefore the number to be saved preordained by God cannot be certain. Objection three, further the operations of God are more perfect than those of nature but in the works of nature good is found in the majority of things defect and evil in the minority if then the number of the saved were fixed by God at a certain figure there would be more saved than lost if the contrary follows from Matthew for wide is the gate and broad the way that leadeth to destruction and many there are who go in there at how narrow is the gate and straight is the way that leadeth to life and few there are who found it. Therefore the number of those preordained by God to be saved is not certain. On the contrary Augustine says the number of the predestined is certain and can neither be increased nor diminished. I answer that the number of the predestined is certain some have said that it was formally but not materially certain as if we were to say that it was certain that a hundred or a thousand would be saved not however these are those individuals but this destroys the certainty of predestination of which we spoke above. Therefore we must say that to God the number of the predestined is certain not only formally but also materially. It must however be observed that the number of the predestined is said to be certain to God not by reason of his knowledge because that is to say he knows how many will be saved for in this way the number of drops of rain and the sands of the sea are certain to God but by reason of his deliberate choice and determination for the further evidence of which we must remember that every agent intends to make something finite as is clear from what has been said above when we treated of the infinite. Now whosoever intends some definite measure in his effect thinks out some definite number in the essential parts which are by their very nature required for the perfection of the whole. For of those things which are required not principally but only on account of something else he does not select any definite number per se but he accepts and uses them in such numbers as are necessary on account of that other thing. For instance a builder thinks out the definite measurements of a house and also the definite number of rooms which he wishes to make in the house and definite measurements of the walls and roof. He does not however select a definite number of stones but accepts and uses just so many as are sufficient for the required measurements of the wall. So also must we consider concerning God in regard to the whole universe which is his effect for he preordained the measurements of the whole of the universe and what number would be fit the essential parts of that universe that is to say which have in some way been ordained in perpetuity how many spheres, how many stars, how many elements, how many species. Individuals however which undergo corruption are not ordained as it were chiefly for the good of the universe but in a secondary way and as much as the good of the species is preserved through them. When so although God knows the total number of individuals the number of oxen flies and such like is not preordained by God per se but divine providence produces just so many as are sufficient for the preservation of the species. Now of all creatures the rational creature is chiefly ordained for the good of the universe being as such incorruptible. More especially those who attain to eternal happiness since they more immediately reach the ultimate end. Once the number of the predestined is certain to God not only by way of knowledge but also by way of a principle preordination. It is not exactly the same thing in the case of the number of the reprobate who would seem to be preordained by God for the good of the elect in whose regard all things work together unto good. Concerning the number of all the predestined some say that so many men will be saved as angels fell. Some so many as there were angels left others as many as the number of angels created by God. It is however better to say that to God alone is known the number for whom is reserved eternal happiness. Replied to objection one these words of Deuteronomy must be taken as applied to those who are marked out by God beforehand and respective present righteousness for their number is increased and diminished but not the number of the predestined. Reply to objection two the reason of the quantity of any one part must be judged from the proportion of that part of the whole. Thus in God the reason why he has made so many stars or so many species of things or predestined so many is according to the proportion of the principle parts to the good of the whole universe. Reply to objection three the good that is proportion to the common state of nature is to be found in the majority and is wanting in the minority. The good that exceeds the common state of nature is to be found in the minority and is wanting in the majority. Thus it is clear that the majority of men have a sufficient knowledge for the guidance of life and those who have not this knowledge are said to be half-witted or foolish but they who attain to a profound knowledge of things intelligible are a very small minority in respect to the rest. Since their eternal happiness consisting in the vision of God exceeds the common state of nature and especially insofar as this is deprived of grace through the corruption of original sin those who are saved are in the minority and this especially however appears the mercy of God that he has chosen some for that salvation from which very many in accordance with the common course and tendency of nature fall short. Eighth article whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints. Objection one it seems that predestination cannot be furthered by the prayers of the saints for nothing eternal can be preceded by anything temporal and in consequence nothing temporal can help towards making something else eternal but predestination is eternal therefore since the prayers of the saints are temporal they cannot so help as to cause anyone to become predestined predestination therefore is not furthered by the prayers of the saints. Objection two further as there is no need of advice except on account of defective knowledge so there is no need of help except through defective power but neither of these things can be said of God when he predestines once it is said who hath helped the spirit of the Lord therefore predestination cannot be furthered by the prayers of the saints. Objection three further if a thing can be helped it can also be hindered but predestination cannot be hindered by anything therefore it cannot be furthered by anything. On the contrary it is said that Isaac besought the Lord for his wife because she was barren and he heard him and made Rebecca to conceive but from that conception Jacob was born and he was predestined. Now his predestination would not have happened if he had never been born therefore predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints. I answer that concerning this question there were different errors. Some regarding the certainty of divine predestination said that prayers were superfluous as also anything else done to attain salvation because whether these things were done or not the predestined would attain and the reprobate would not attain eternal salvation but against this opinion are all the warnings of holy scripture exhorting us to prayer and other good works. Others declared that the divine predestination was altered through prayer. This is stated to have been the opinion of the Egyptians who thought that the divine ordination which they called fate could be frustrated by certain sacrifices and prayers. Against this also is the authority of scripture for it is said but the triumphor in Israel will not spare and will not be moved to repentance and that the gifts and the calling of God are without repentance. Wherefore we must say otherwise that in predestination two things are to be considered namely the divine ordination and its effect. As regards the former in no possible way can predestination be furthered by the prayers of the saints for it is not due to their prayers that anyone is predestined by God. As regards the latter predestination is said to be helped by the prayers of the saints and by other good works because providence of which predestination is a part does not do away with secondary causes but so provides effects that the order of secondary causes falls also under providence. So as natural effects are provided by God in such a way that natural causes are directed to bring about those natural effects without which those effects would not happen. So the salvation of a person is predestined by God in such a way that whatever helps that person towards salvation falls under the order of predestination whether it be one's own prayers or those of another or other good works and such like without which one would not attain to salvation whence the predestined must strive after good works and prayer because through these means predestination is most certainly fulfilled. For this reason it is said labor more that by good works you may make sure you're calling an election. Reply to objection one. This argument shows that predestination is not furthered by the prayers of the saints as regards the pre-ordination. Reply to objection two. One is said to be helped by another in two ways in one way in as much as he receives power from him and to be helped thus belongs to the weak but this cannot be said of God and thus we are to understand who hath helped the spirit of the Lord. In another way one is said to be helped by a person through whom he carries out his work as a master through a servant and this way God is helped by us in as much as we exercise his orders according to 1 Corinthians we are God's co-adjuders. Nor is this on account of any defect in the power of God but because he employs intermediary causes in order that the beauty of order may be preserved in the universe and also that he may communicate to creatures the dignity of causality. Reply to objection three. Secondary causes cannot escape the order of the first universal cause as has been said above. Indeed they execute that order and therefore predestination can be furthered by creatures but it cannot be impeded by them. The end of question 23. Question 24 of Summa Theologica parts Prima initial questions. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org. This recording is by Jim Ruddy. Summa Theologica parts Prima initial questions by St. Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province. Question 24, the book of life. We now consider the book of life concerning which there are three points of inquiry. What is the book of life? Of what life is at the book and whether anyone can be blotted out of the book of life. First article whether the book of life is the same as predestination. Objection one it seems that the book of life is not the same thing as predestination for it is said all things are the book of life that is the old and new testament according to a gloss. This however is not predestination therefore the book of life is not predestination. Objection two further Augustine says that the book of life is a certain divine energy by which it happens that to each one his good or evil works are recalled to memory but divine energy belongs seemingly not to predestination but rather to divine power. Therefore the book of life is not the same thing as predestination. Objection three further reprobation is opposed to predestination. So if the book of life were the same as predestination there should also be a book of death as there is a book of life. On the contrary it is said in a gloss upon the Psalms let them be blotted out from the book of the living. This book is the knowledge of God by which he hath predestined to life those whom he foreknew. I answer that the book of life is in God taken in a metaphorical sense according to a comparison with human affairs for it is usual among men that they who are chosen for any office should be inscribed in a book as for instance soldiers or counselors who formerly were called conscript fathers. Now it is clear from the preceding that all the predestined are chosen by God to possess eternal life. This conscription therefore of the predestined is called the book of life. A thing is said metaphorically to be written upon the mind of anyone when it is firmly held in the memory according to proverbs forget not my law and let thy heart keep my commandments and further on write them in the tables of thy heart for things are written down in material books to help the memory. Whence the knowledge of God by which he firmly remembers that he has predestined some to eternal life is called the book of life for as the writing in a book is the sign of things to be done. So the knowledge of God is a sign in him of those who are to be brought to eternal life according to 2 Timothy the sure foundation of God's standard firm having this seal the Lord knoweth who are his. Replied to objection one the book of life may be understood in two senses. In one sense as the inscription of those were chosen to life thus we now speak of the book of life. In another sense the inscription of those things which lead us to life may be called the book of life and this also is two fold either as of things to be done and thus the old and new testament are called the book of life or of things already done and thus that divine energy by which it happens that to each one his deeds will be recalled to memory is spoken of as the book of life. Thus that also may be called the book of war whether it contains the names inscribed of those chosen for military service or treats of the art of warfare or relates the deeds of soldiers. Hence the solution of the second objection. Replied to objection three it is the custom to inscribe not those who are rejected but those who are chosen once there is no book of death corresponding to reprobation as the book of life to predestination. Replied to objection four predestination and the book of life are different aspects of the same thing for this latter implies the knowledge of predestination as also is made clear from the gloss quoted above. Second article whether the book of life regards only the life of glory of the predestine. Objects in one it seems that the book of life does not only regard the life of glory of the predestine for the book of life is the knowledge of life but God through his own life knows all other life therefore the book of life is so called in regard to divine life and not only in regard to the life of the predestined. Objects in two further as the life of glory comes from God so also does the life of nature therefore if the knowledge of the life of glory is called the book of life so also should the knowledge of the life of nature be so called. Objects in three further some are chosen to the life of grace who are not chosen to the life of glory as it is clear from what is said have not I chosen you 12 and one of you is a devil but the book of life is the inscription of the divine election as stated above therefore it applies also to the life of grace. On the contrary the book of life is the knowledge of predestination as stated above but predestination does not regard the life of grace except so far as it is directed to glory for those are not predestined to have grace and yet fail to obtain glory. The book of life altogether is only so called in regard to the life of glory. I answer that the book of life as stated above implies a conscription or a knowledge of those chosen to life. Now a man is chosen for something which does not belong to him by nature and again that to which a man is chosen has the aspect of an end for a soldier is not chosen or inscribed merely to put on armor but to fight since this is the proper duty to which military service is directed but the life of glory is an end exceeding human nature as said above wherefore strictly speaking the book of life regards the life of glory. Reply to objection one the divine life even considered as a life of glory is natural to God when in his regard there is no election and in consequence no book of life for we do not say that anyone has chosen to possess the power of sense or any of those things that are consequent on nature. From this we gather the reply to the second objection for there is no election nor a book of life as regards the life of nature. Reply to the third objection the life of grace has the aspect not of an end but of something directed towards an end hence nobody is said to be chosen to the life of grace except so far as the life of grace is directed to glory. For this reason those who possessing grace fail to obtain glory are not said to be chosen simply but relatively. Likewise they are not said to be written in the book of life simply but relatively that is to say that it is in the ordination and knowledge of God that they are to have some relation to eternal life according to their participation in grace. Third article whether anyone may be blotted out from the book of life. Objection one it seems that no one may be blotted out of the book of life where Augustine says God's foreknowledge which cannot be deceived is the book of life but nothing can be taken away from the foreknowledge of God nor from predestination therefore neither can anyone be blotted out from the book of life. Objection two further whatever is in a thing is in it according to the disposition of that thing but the book of life is something eternal and immutable therefore whosoever is written therein is there not in a temporary way but immovably and indelibly. Objection three further blotting out is the contrary to inscription but nobody can be written a second time in the book of life neither therefore can he be blotted out. On the contrary it is said let them be blotted out from the book of the living. I answer that some have said that none could be blotted out of the book of life as a matter of fact but only in the opinion of men for it is customary in the scriptures to say that something is done when it becomes known thus some are said to be written in the book of life in as much as men think they are written therein on account of the present righteousness as they see in them but when it becomes evident either in this world or in the next that they have fallen from that state of righteousness they are then said to be blotted out and thus a gloss explains the passage let them be blotted out of the book of the living. But because not to be blotted out of the book of life is placed among the rewards of the just according to the text he that shall overcome shall thus be clothed in white garments and I will not blot his name out of the book of life and what is promised to holy men is not merely something in the opinion of men it can therefore be said that to be blotted out and not blotted out of the book of life is not only to be referred to the opinion of men but to the reality of the fact. For the book of life is the inscription of those ordained to eternal life to which one is directed from two sources namely from predestination which direction never fails and from grace for whoever has grace by this very fact becomes fitted for eternal life this direction fails sometimes because some are directed by possessing grace to obtain eternal life but they fail to obtain it through mortal sin therefore those who are ordained to possess eternal life through divine predestination are written down in the book of life simply because they are written therein to have eternal life in reality such are never blotted out from the book of life those however who are ordained to eternal life not through divine predestination but through grace are said to be written in the book of life not simply but relatively for they are written therein not to have eternal life in itself but in its cause only yet though these latter can be said to be blotted out from the book of life this blotting out must not be referred to God as if God foreknew a thing and afterwards knew it not but to the thing known namely because God knows one is first ordained to eternal life and afterwards not ordained when he falls from grace. Reply to objection one the act of blotting out does not refer to the book of life as regards God's foreknowledge as if in God there were any change but as regards things foreknown which can change. Reply to objection two although things are immutably in God yet in themselves they are subject to change to this it is that the blotting out of the book of life refers. Reply to objection three the way in which one is said to be blotted out of the book of life is that in which one is said to be written therein anew either in the opinion of men or because he begins again to have relation towards eternal life through grace which also is included in the knowledge of God although not anew. The end of question 24 question 25 of summa theologica paris prima initial questions this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org this recording is by Jim Ruddy summa theologica paris prima initial questions by Saint Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province question 25 the power of God after considering the divine foreknowledge and will and other things pertaining thereto it remains for us to consider the power of God about this are six points of inquiry whether there is power in God whether his power is infinite whether he is almighty whether he could make the past not to have been whether he could do what he does not or not do what he does and whether what he makes he could make better first article whether there is power in God objection one it seems that power is not in God for as primary matter is to power so God who is the first agent is to act but primary matter considered in itself is devoid of all act therefore the first agent namely God is devoid of power objection two further according to the philosopher better than every power is its act for form is better than matter and action than active power since it is its end but nothing is better than what is in God because whatsoever is in God is God as was shown above therefore there is no power in God objection three further power is the principle of operation but the divine power is God's essence since there is nothing accidental in God and of the essence of God there is no principle therefore there is no power in God objection four further it was shown above that God's knowledge and will are the cause of things but the cause and principle of the thing are identical we are not therefore to assign power to God but only knowledge and will on the contrary it is said thou art mighty oh Lord and thy truth is round about thee I answer that power is twofold namely passive which exists not at all in God and active which we must assign to him in the highest degree for it is manifest that everything according as it is in act and is perfect is the active principle of something whereas everything is passive according as it is deficient and imperfect now it was shown above that God is pure act simply and in all ways perfect nor in him does any imperfection find place when it most fittingly belongs to him to be an active principle and in no way whatsoever to be passive on the other hand the notion of active principle is consistent with active power for active power is the principle of acting upon something else whereas passive power is the principle of being acted upon by something else as the philosopher says remains therefore that in god there is active power in the highest degree reply to objection one active power is not contrary to act but is founded upon it for everything acts according as it is actual but passive power is contrary to act for a thing is passive according as it is potential once this potentiality is not in god but only active power reply to objection two whenever act is distinct from power act must be nobler than power but god's action is not distinct from his power for both are his divine essence neither is his existence distinct from his essence hence it does not follow that there should be anything in god nobler than his power reply to objection three in creatures power is the principle not only of action but likewise of effect thus in god the idea of power is retained in as much as it is the principle of an effect not however as it is a principle of action for this is the divine essence itself except perchance after our manner of understanding in as much as the divine essence which pre-contains in itself all perfection that exists in created things can be understood either under the notion of action or under that of power as also it is understood under the notion of suppositum possessing nature and under that of nature accordingly the notion of power is retained in god in so far as it is the principle of an effect replied to objection four powers predicated of god not as something really distinct from his knowledge and will but as differing from them logically in as much as power implies a notion of a principle putting into execution what the will commands and what knowledge directs which three things are in god identified or we may say that the knowledge or will of god according as it is the effective principle has the notion of power contained in it the consideration of the knowledge and will of god precedes the consideration of his power as the cause precedes the operation and effect second article whether the power of god is infinite objection one it seems that the power of god is not infinite for everything that is infinite is imperfect according to the philosopher but the power of god is far from imperfect therefore it is not infinite objection two further every power is made known by its effect otherwise it would be ineffectual if then the power of god were infinite it could produce an infinite effect but this is impossible objection three further the philosopher proves that if the power of any corporeal thing were infinite it would cause instantaneous movement god however does not cause instantaneous movement but moves the spiritual creature in time and the corporeal creature in place in time as augustin says therefore his power is not infinite on the contrary hillary says that god's power is immeasurable he is the living mighty one now everything that is immeasurable is infinite therefore the power of god is infinite i answer as stated above active power exists in god according to the measure in which he is actual now his existence is infinite in as much as it is not limited by anything that receives it as is clear from what has been said when we discussed the infinity of the divine essence where for it is necessary that the active power in god should be infinite for in every agent it is found that the more perfectly an agent has the form by which it acts the greater its power to act for instance the hotter thing is the greater the power has it to give heat and it would have infinite power to give heat were its own heat infinite when since the divine essence through which god acts is infinite as was shown above it follows that his power likewise is infinite replied to objection one the philosophers here speaking of an infinity in regard to matter not limited by any form and such infinity belongs to quantity but the divine essence is otherwise as was shown above and consequently so also his power it does not follow therefore that it is imperfect replied to objection two the power of a univical agent is wholly manifested in its effect the generative power of man for example is not able to do more than to get man but the power of a non-univical agent does not wholly manifest itself in the production of its effect as for example the power of the sun does not wholly manifest itself in the production of an animal generated from putrification now it is clear that god is not a univical agent for nothing agrees with him either in species or in genus as was shown above once it follows that his effect is always less than his power it is not necessary therefore that the infinite power of god should be manifested so as to produce an infinite effect yet even if it were to produce no effect the power of god would not be ineffectual because the thing is ineffectual which is ordained towards an end to which it does not attain but the power of god is not ordered towards its effect as towards an end rather it is the end of the effect produced by it replied to objection three the philosopher proves that if a body had infinite power it would cause a non-temporal movement and he shows that the power of the mover of heaven is infinite because it can move in an infinite time it remains therefore according to his reckoning that the infinite power of a body if such existed would move without time not however the power of an incorporeal mover the reason of this is that one body moving another is a univical agent wherefore it follows that the whole power of the agent is made known in its motion since then the greater the power of a moving body the more quickly does it move the necessary conclusion is that if its power were infinite it would move beyond comparison faster and this is to move without time an incorporeal mover however is not a univical agent whence it is not necessary that the whole of its power should be manifested in motion so as to move without time and especially since it moves in accordance with the disposition of its will third article whether god is omnipotent objection one it seems that god is not omnipotent for movement and passiveness belong to everything but this is impossible with god for he is immovable as was said above therefore he is not omnipotent objection two further sin is an act of some kind but god cannot sin nor deny himself as it is said therefore he is not omnipotent objection three further it is said of god that he manifests his omnipotence especially by sparing and having mercy therefore the greatest act possible to the divine power is to spare and have mercy there are things much greater however than sparing and having mercy for example to create another world in the light therefore god is not omnipotent objection four further upon the text god hath made foolish the wisdom of this world a gloss says god hath made the wisdom of this world foolish by showing those things to be possible which it judges to be impossible whence it would seem that nothing is to be judged possible or impossible in reference to inferior causes as the wisdom of this world judges them but in reference to the divine power if god then were omnipotent all things would be possible nothing therefore impossible but if we take away the impossible then we destroy also the necessary for what necessarily exists is impossible not to exist therefore there would be nothing at all that is necessary in things if god were omnipotent but this is an impossibility therefore god is not omnipotent on the contrary it is said no word shall be impossible with god i answer that all confess that god is omnipotent but it seems difficult to explain in what is omnipotence precisely consists for there may be doubt as to the precise meaning of the word all when we say that god can do all things if however we consider the matter a right since power is said in reference to possible things this phrase god can do all things is rightly understood to mean that god can do all things that are possible and for this reason he is said to be omnipotent now according to the philosopher a thing is said to be possible in two ways first in relation to some power thus whatever is subject to human power is said to be possible to man secondly absolutely on account of the relation in which the very terms stand to each other now god cannot be said to be omnipotent through being able to do all things that are possible to create it nature for the divine power extends farther than that if however we were to say that god is omnipotent because he can do all things that are possible to his power there would be a vicious circle and explaining the nature of his power for this would be saying nothing else but that god is omnipotent because he can do all things that he is able to do it remains therefore that god is called omnipotent because he can do all things that are possible absolutely which is the second way of saying a thing is possible for a thing is said to be possible or impossible absolutely according to the relation in which the very terms stand to one another possible if the predicate is not incompatible with the subject as that socrates sits and absolutely impossible when the predicate is altogether incompatible with the subject as for instance that a man is a donkey it must however be remembered that since every agent produces an effect like itself to each act of power there corresponds a thing possible as its proper object according to the nature of that act on which its active power is founded for instance the power of giving warmth is related as to its proper object to the being capable of being warmed the divine existence however upon which the nature of power and god is founded is infinite and is not limited to any genus of being but possesses within itself the perfection of all being when whatsoever has or can have the nature of being is numbered among the absolutely possible things in respect to which god is called omnipotent now nothing is opposed to the idea of being except non-being therefore that which implies being and non-being at the same time is repugnant to the idea of an absolutely possible thing within the scope of divine omnipotence for such cannot come under the divine omnipotence not because of any defect in the power of god but because it has not the nature of a feasible or possible thing therefore everything that does not imply a contradiction in terms is numbered amongst those possible things in respect of which god is called omnipotent whereas whatever implies contradiction does not come within the scope of divine omnipotence because it cannot have the aspect of possibility hence it is better to say that such things cannot be done than that god cannot do them nor is this contrary to the word of the angel saying no word shall be impossible with god for whatever implies a contradiction cannot be a word because no intellect can possibly conceive such a thing replied to objection one god is said to be omnipotent in respect to his active power not to his passive power as was shown above whence the fact that he is immovable or impassable is not repugnant to his omnipotence replied to objection two to sin is to fall short of a perfect action hence to be able to sin is to be able to fall short in action which is repugnant to omnipotence therefore it is that god cannot sin because of his omnipotence nevertheless the philosopher says that god can deliberately do what is evil but this must be understood either on a condition the antecedent of which is impossible as for instance if we were to say that god can do evil things if he will for there is no reason why a conditional proposition should not be true though both the antecedent and consequent are impossible as if one were to say if man is a donkey he has four feet or he may be understood to mean that god can do some things which now seem to be evil which however if he did them would then be good or he is perhaps speaking after the common manner of the heathen who thought that men become gods like Jupiter or Mercury reply to objection three god's omnipotence is particularly shown in sparing and having mercy because in this it is made manifest that god has supreme power that he freely forgives sins for it is not for one who is bound by laws of a superior to forgive sins of his own free will or because by sparing and having mercy upon men he leads them on to the participation of an infinite good which is the ultimate effect of the divine power or because as was said above the effect of the divine mercy is the foundation of all the divine works for nothing is due to anyone except on account of something already given him gratuitously by god in this way the divine omnipotence is particularly made manifest because to it pertains the first foundation of all good things reply to objection four the absolute possible is not so called in reference either to higher causes or to inferior causes but in reference to itself but the possible in reference to some powers named possible in reference to its proximate cause and those things which it belongs to god alone to do immediately as for example to create to justify and the like are said to be possible in reference to a higher cause those things however which are of such kind as to be done by inferior causes are said to be possible in reference to those inferior causes for it is according to the condition of the proximate cause that the effect has contingency or necessity as was shown above thus it is that the wisdom of the world is deemed foolish because what is impossible to nature it judges to be impossible to god so it is clear that the omnipotence of god does not take away from things their impossibility and necessity fourth article whether god can make the past not to have been objection one it seems that god can make the past not to have been for what is impossible in itself is much more impossible than that which is only impossible accidentally but god can do what is impossible in itself as to give sight to the blind or to raise the dead therefore and much more can he do what is only impossible accidentally now for the past not to have been is impossible accidentally thus for socrates not to be running is accidentally impossible from the fact that his running is a thing of the past therefore god can make the past not to have been objection two further what god could do he can do now since his power is not lessened but god could have affected before socrates ran that he should not run therefore when he has run god could affect that he did not run objection three further charity is a more excellent virtue than virginity but god can supply charity that is lost therefore he also also lost virginity therefore he can so effect that what was corrupt should not have been corrupt on the contrary gerome says although god can do all things he cannot make a thing that is corrupt not to have been corrupted therefore for the same reason he cannot affect that anything else which is past should not have been i answered that as was said above there does not fall under the scope of god's omnipotence anything that implies a contradiction now that the past should not have been implies a contradiction for as it implies a contradiction to say that socrates is sitting and is not sitting so does it to say that he sat and did not sit but to say that he didn't sit is to say that it happened in the past to say that he did not sit is to say that it did not happen whence that the past should not have been does not come under the scope of divine power. This is what Augustine means when he says, whosoever says, if God is almighty, let him make what is done as if it were not done, does not see that this is to say, if God is almighty, let him effect that what is true by the very fact that it is true be false. And the philosopher says, of this one thing alone is God deprived, namely to make undone the things that have been done. Although it is impossible accidentally for the past not to have been, if one considers the past thing itself as, for instance, the running of Socrates, nevertheless, if the past thing is considered as past that it should not have been is impossible, not only in itself but absolutely since it implies a contradiction. Thus it is more impossible than the raising of the dead in which there is nothing contradictory because this is reckoned impossible in reference to some power, that is to say some natural power. For such impossible things do come beneath the scope of divine power. Reply to Objection 2. As God in accordance with the perfection of the divine power can do all things and yet some things are not subject to his power because they fall short of being possible. So also if we regard the immutability of the divine power, whatever God could do, he can do now. Some things, however, at one time were in the nature of possibility whilst they were yet to be done, which now fall short of the nature of possibility when they have been done. So as God said not to be able to do them because they themselves cannot be done. Reply to Objection 3. God can remove all corruption of the mind and body from a woman who has fallen but the fact that she had been corrupt cannot be removed from her as also it is impossible that the fact of having sinned or having lost charity thereby can be removed from the sinner. Fifth article, whether God can do what he does not. Objection 1. It seems that God cannot do other than what he does, for God cannot do what he has not foreknown and preordained that he would do, but he neither foreknew nor preordained that he would do anything except what he does, therefore he cannot do except what he does. Objection 2. Further, God can only do what ought to be done and what is right to be done, but God is not bound to do what he does not, nor is it right to say that he should do what he does not, therefore he cannot do except what he does. Objection 3. Further, God cannot do anything that is not good and befitting creation, but it is not good for creatures nor befitting to them to be otherwise than they are, therefore God cannot do except what he does. On the contrary it is said, thinkest thou that I cannot ask my father and he will give me presently more than twelve legions of angels, but he neither ask for them nor did his father show them to refute the Jews, therefore God can do what he does not. I answer that in this matter certain persons erred in two ways, some laid it down that God acts from natural necessity in such way that as from the action of nature nothing else can happen beyond what actually takes place, as for instance from the seed of man a man must come and from that of an olive an olive, so from the divine operation there could not result other things nor another order of things than that which now is, but we showed above that God does not act from natural necessity, but that his will is the cause of all things, nor is that will naturally and from any necessity determined to those things. When it is in no way at all is the present course of events produced by God from any necessity so that other things could not happen. Others however said that the divine power is restricted to this present course of events through the order of the divine wisdom and justice without which God does nothing, but since the power of God which is his essence is nothing else but his wisdom it can indeed be fittingly said that there is nothing in the divine power which is not in the order of the divine wisdom for the divine wisdom includes the whole potency of the divine power, yet the order placed in creation by divine wisdom in which order the notion of his justice consists as said above is not so adequate to the divine wisdom that the divine wisdom should be restricted to this present order of things. Now it is clear that the whole idea of order which a wise man puts into things made by him is taken from their end. So when the end is proportionate to the things made for the end, the wisdom of the maker is restricted to some definite order. But the divine goodness is an end exceeding beyond all proportion things created once the divine wisdom is not so restricted to any particular order that no other course of events could happen. Wherefore we may simply say that God can do other things than those he has done. Reply to Objection 1. In ourselves in whom power and essence are distinct from will and intellect, and again intellect from wisdom and will from justice, there can be something in the power which is not in the just will nor in the wise intellect, but in God power and essence, will and intellect, wisdom and justice, are one and the same. Once there can be nothing in the divine power which cannot also be in his just will or in his wise intellect. Nevertheless, because his will cannot be determined from necessity to this or that order of things except upon supposition as was said above, neither are the wisdom and justice of God restricted to this present order as was shown above. So nothing prevents there being something in the divine power which he does not will and which is not included in the order which he has placed in things. Again, because power is considered as executing, the will as commanding, and the intellect and wisdom as directing, what is attributed to his power, considered in itself, God has said to be able to do in accordance with his absolute power. Of such a kind is everything which has the nature of being, as was said above. What is, however, attributed to the divine power, according as it carries into execution, the command of a just will, God has said to be able to do by his ordinary power. In this manner, we must say that God can do other things by his absolute power than those he has foreknown and preordained he would do. But it could not happen that he should do anything which he had not foreknown and had not preordained that he would do because his actual doing is subject to his foreknowledge and preordination through his power which is his nature, is not so. For God does things because he wills so to do, yet the power to do them does not come from his will but from his nature. Reply to Objection 2. God is bound to nobody but himself, and when it is said that God can only do what he ought, nothing else is meant by this than that God can do nothing but what is befitting to himself and just. Would these words be fitting and just, may be understood in two ways. One, in direct connection with the verb is, and thus they would be restricted to the present order of things that would concern his power, then what is said in the Objection is false, for the sense is that God can do nothing except what is now fitting and just. If however they be joined directly with the verb can, which has the effect of extending the meaning, and then secondly with is, the present will be signified but in a confused and general way, the sentence would be then true in this sense, God cannot do anything except that which, if he did it, would be suitable and just. Reply to Objection 3. Although this order of things be restricted to what now exists, the divine power and wisdom are not thus restricted, whence although no other order would be suitable and good to the things which now are, yet God can do other things and oppose upon them another order. 6. Article whether God can do better than what he does. Objection 1. It seems that God cannot do better than he does, for whatever God does he does in a most perfect and wise way, but a thing is so much the better done as it is more perfectly and wisely done, therefore God cannot do anything better than he does. Objection 2. Further Augustine thus argues, if God could but would not begat a son his equal he would have been envious. For the same reason, if God could have made better things than he has done, but was not willing so to do, he would have been envious, but envious far removed from God. Therefore God makes everything of the best he cannot therefore make anything better than he does. Objection 3. Further what is very good and the best of all cannot be bettered because nothing is better than the best. But as Augustine says, each thing that God has made is good and taken all together they are very good because in them all consists the wondrous beauty of the universe. Therefore the good in the universe could not be made better by God. Objection 4. Further Christ as man is full of grace and truth and has the spirit without measure and so he cannot be better. Again created happiness is described as the highest good and thus cannot be better and the blessed Virgin Mary is raised above all the choirs of angels and so cannot be better than she is. God cannot therefore make all things better than he has made them. On the contrary it is said God is able to do all things more abundantly than we desire or understand. I answer that the goodness of anything is twofold, one which is of the essence of it thus for instance to be rational pertains to the essence of man. As regards this good God cannot make a thing better than it is itself although he can make another thing better than it even as he cannot make the number four greater than it is because if it were greater it would no longer be four but another number. For the addition of a substantial difference in definitions is after the manner of the addition of unity of numbers. Another kind of goodness is that which is over and above the essence thus the good of a man is to be virtuous or wise as regards this kind of goodness God can make better the things he has made absolutely speaking however God can make something else better than each thing made by him. Reply to objection one. When it is said that God can make a thing better than he makes it if better is taken substantively the proposition is true for he can always make something else better than each individual thing and he can make the same thing in one way better than it is and another way not as was explained above. If however better is taken as an adverb implying the manner of the making thus God cannot make anything better than he makes it because he cannot make it from greater wisdom and goodness but if it implies the manner of the thing done he can make something better because he can give to things made by him a better manner of existence as regards the accidents although not as regards the substance. Reply to objection two. It is of the nature of a son that he should be equal to his father when he comes to maturity but it is not of the nature of anything created that it should be better than it was made by God hence the comparison fails. Reply to objection three. The universe the present creation cannot be better on account of the most beautiful order given to things by God in which the good of the universe consists for if any one thing were better the proportion of order would be destroyed as if one string were stretched more than a dot to be the melody of the harp would be destroyed. Yet God could make other things or add something to the present creation and then there would be another and a better universe. Reply to objection four. The humanity of Christ from the fact that it is united to the God head and created happiness from the fact that it is the fruition of God and the blessed virgin from the fact that she is the mother of God have all a certain infinite dignity from the infinite good which is God and on this account there cannot be anything better than these just as there cannot be anything better than the result of question twenty five.