Write down the heading, spontaneous and non-spontaneous process. So what is a spontaneous process? Spontaneous process is the process which happens on its own. We can say on its own or after a proper initiation. So in this, you write down spontaneous process. See, first of all, you understand what is spontaneous process. I'll give you the definition also of it. The spontaneous process are those process which happens on its own or after a proper initiation. For example, I have this pen in my hand, right? When I leave this pen, it will go down, right? It will fall down. It is a spontaneous process, right? Water flows down the hill. Spontaneous process, rusting of iron, spontaneous process, diffusion of gas from high pressure to low pressure, spontaneous process, right? Flow of current from high potential to low potential, spontaneous process, right? So these are the processes which happens on its own, right? Now, when you talk about the burning of fuel, right? It just need an initiation. You have to spark it. Once you spark it, it is done, it will burn on its own. It does not require a continuous support, correct? That is also a spontaneous process. Are you getting it? So spontaneous process are all those process which happens on its own or after a proper initiation. Means continuous support is not required. You just, you know, help the process to start with. Once it starts, it goes on its own. It does not require your or any external continuous support. Okay? Examples I have given you. I will just dictate the definition also I will write down. Now, you see one thing. This is the candle. Suppose we have it's burning, right? Now, if I cover this with a vessel, completely cover. What happens after some time? We have this candle is burning and when we cover this up properly, what happens after some time? Yes. Yes, the flame is extinguished, right? Yes, the candle goes off, correct? Why it is happening? Why it is happening? Because it requires for the burning of candle, it requires the continuous supply of oxygen. Yes. Once you've covered it up properly, then the supply of oxygen is not there. You cut off the supply of oxygen. So whatever oxygen was present inside it, it will get burned once it's over. The flame goes off, right? The fire extinguished, you know, the candle or the flame extinguished. Right? So why it happens? Because the burning of candle or the flame, it requires the continuous support of oxygen. Correct? And that is why, you know, this process is non-spontaneous process. Because it does not happen on its own or after an initiation. It requires continuous support of what? Support of any external support, you can say. Right? One very good example of this also you can consider for the understanding of the two processes, spontaneous and non-spontaneous. You must have heard boiling and evaporation, right? So tell me, I think you have a fair bit of understanding what is spontaneous, what is non-spontaneous, boiling and evaporation. Which one is spontaneous? Which one is non-spontaneous? Or both spontaneous, both non-spontaneous. Tell me. So evaporation is spontaneous. Evaporation is just a second, guys. Yeah. So, yeah. So boiling is non-spontaneous and the boiling happens at a fixed temperature. Like for water it is 100 degrees Celsius. But spontaneous happens at normal temperature, right? At room temperature. Correct? So you need to heat water and its vapor pressure when equals to atmospheric pressure, whatever the temperature it is, that temperature is called the boiling point of that particular liquid. Right? So boiling water requires continuous support of heat but evaporation requires nothing, correct? So evaporation is spontaneous, boiling is non-spontaneous. So you cannot remove sun, Gayatri. Right? It's something like you're talking about if I say this pen, if I leave, right? It will go down, correct? It will go down. And then you will say, sir, if I remove gravitation, then what happens? The process won't be spontaneous then. So there is something which is there, which is and everything is based on these universal facts. Okay. So you cannot remove the universal facts itself. Yes, Gayatri understood. Correct. So there's something that you need to take as it is. So all the theory based upon all these facts that we had already. Evaporation is spontaneous. That's right. Evaporation is spontaneous. No doubt. So I hope you understood the difference between the two processes. Let us write down the definition with you for this. Write down spontaneous process, a process which has, which has a natural tendency, natural tendency occur either by its own, either by its own or after, or after a proper initiation. Initiation, you know, let's be required here, maybe required proper initiation, right? Under a given set of condition, set of condition examples, write down flow of water down the hill, flow of current, high potential to low potential, high potential to low potential, diffusion of gas from high pressure to low pressure. Okay. Diffusion of gas from high pressure to low pressure burning of fuel, burning of fuel, it requires external support. Okay. Rusting of iron. All these are spontaneous process. Yes. Nuclear fusion reaction also you can consider spontaneous. Once it starts, it will go on. Yeah. That's right. Correct. So all these are examples we have. Correct. Of spontaneous process. Non-spontaneous process to write down. Write down. This is the process. This is the process, which neither occurs. This is the process. See, you are applying some condition here, right? Like humidity and all, but how do we define evaporation? Evaporation is just a process by which liquid converts into its vapor form on its own, right? At room temperature. So we are talking about that process. Correct. Now, if you're talking about high humidity, less humidity, or suppose, you know, in the atmosphere, if you keep the glass of water in vacuum, then obviously there it will be difficult. So condition, we are not applying. We're just, you know, trying to understand the term evaporation. What is the definition we have? And that process is spontaneous or not. That is what we are talking about. If you apply some condition, if there is some unexpected condition there, then it then that's a different case. But as far as evaporation is concerned, the definition of evaporation is what? It is a process of conversion of liquid into its vapor form at normal temperature, right? So that process is spontaneous. Okay. So right now, non-spontaneous process, a process which neither occur, on its own, a process which neither occurs on its own, nor by initiation. Neither occurs on its own, nor by initiation is called non-spontaneous process. Example, write down, flow of heat from, flow of heat from cold to hot body, diffusion of gas from low pressure to high pressure, diffusion of gas from low pressure to high pressure. So obviously these things are not possible on its own, right? But it does not mean the process is not possible at all. Correct. The process is possible. We can do some external work in order to get these kinds of processes, like we can push gas from low pressure area to high pressure area by applying pressure, right? That is a process, what we call it as, have you heard reverse osmosis or osmosis? So osmosis and reverse osmosis process are two different types of process, two different way to move, right? Opposite to osmosis. So both are possible. Both are happening. Osmosis is also possible. Reverse osmosis is also possible, right? So it does not like, you know, that non-spontaneous is not possible at all. It is possible, but it requires continuous external support. Candleball example, you see. Candleball example, if you continue, you know, providing oxygen, it will burn, right? It will never extinguish. Once it gets over, it's a different thing, but it will, you know, the flame will continue, right? So that's how the thing is, non-spontaneous process does not mean that process is not possible. If the continuous support is there, then process is possible there, okay? That's what you must keep in mind. Okay, now these are the two processes here. Now, why we are discussing this process here and what is the use of this, correct? So for your board exam and all, sometimes in comparative exam also, they will give you the four different options, like which of this statement is correct or wrong for spontaneous process or non-spontaneous process. So you must have the understanding of a true process. Then you can answer these kinds of questions, correct? In a school exam, they ask sometimes, you know, what is the difference between this spontaneous and non-spontaneous process, right? So all these points can help you. Now, why this process is happening? Okay, whether it is spontaneous and non-spontaneous process, why this process is happening, correct? What is the driving force for this kind of process? So what is the driving force for this kind of process? Right? There must be something which, you know, which is driving this process to take place. What is the actual reason, actual factor for this kind of processes? Like for example, you see, if you talk about some process which is exothermic in nature, right? The process which is exothermic in nature. Like I'll give you some examples you see here. Suppose I'll write down this reaction. Okay, listen to me carefully here. H2 gas plus half of O2 gas. Hydrogen-oxygen combines, forms H2O liquid. This delta H is negative. Delta S is negative. Means the process is exothermic. Is exothermic. The process is exothermic. Is exothermic. Spontaneous also. I'm giving you the example of spontaneous process. Spontaneous. If I take this example, carbon solid and O2 gas converts into CO2 gas. Delta H is again less than zero. Right? This one is also exothermic and the process is spontaneous. So spontaneous process means what? Exothermic process means what? That the energy is decreasing, right? Because amount of energy is releasing. So overall the energy of the system decreases. Right? So what we can say in exothermic process, the entire system is going towards the lesser energy state which we can say it is more stable. Isn't it? Can we say that? This is the process is exothermic. Right? Exothermic process. Hence we can say energy releases in this process and the entire system is going towards the lesser energy state. Isn't it? Right? And since it is going towards the lesser energy state, which is more stable state, hence we can say the process is spontaneous. It is going towards more stability. Right? Okay. So exothermic process to we can understand that the energy is decreasing and hence the stability is increasing. That's why it is a natural process. So till here the thing was fine because logically we can correlate things that stability is increasing. Hence it is spontaneous. After that the problem is there are some endothermic process also which are spontaneous in nature. Like for example you see, this one I will go to the next slide. You need to write down all these examples. Okay? There are some endothermic process, endothermic processes which are spontaneous. Which are spontaneous. For example you see, if you take ice from the freezer, after sometime what happens? It melts and converts into liquid. Is it a spontaneous process? Is it spontaneous? Conversion of ice into liquid? Yes it is spontaneous. It is taking heat from the surroundings and converting into ice. Happens on its own. So it is the endothermic process but what? But spontaneous. Similarly we will take the example of evaporation. We have discussed it. It is also spontaneous. One more reaction you see. CaCO3 calcium carbonate, solid interest. And when you heat this, it converts into CaO solid plus CO2 gas. So all these processes are spontaneous process. So now the problem is when we were talking about exothermic process that is understandable because the energy is overall decreasing and stability is increasing. Here the thing is exactly opposite. It is consuming energy and the energy of the system is increasing. So logically it should be less stable and the process should not be spontaneous but this is spontaneous process. Correct? So freezing requires low temperature, right? Yes, Gayatri? So if that temperature is not that low it won't... the liquid or whatever it is it won't get freeze. So you need to have that condition continuously. So if you talk in terms of spontaneity and non-spontaneity the process won't be spontaneous over there. Because we are considering for a spontaneous process we are considering normal condition basically. Not at extremely low temperature or extremely high temperature because minus below 0 degrees Celsius that temperature is not normally it's not there we need to have that arrangement to achieve those kind of those temperatures, right? Yes, normal condition we have. STP you can consider to some extent NTP you can consider basically under normal conditions. Okay? Yes, so here the point I am trying to make you understand is exothermic is fine clearly we were getting it why it is spontaneous but why endothermic process are spontaneous that we did not understand but since it is a spontaneous process and this information I am giving you so obviously you can understand this that delta H is still less than 0 for isothermic process delta H is not the only criteria for spontaneity of any process can we say that? Yes, tell me guys right? If delta H is the only criteria then this these processes should not be spontaneous process but since it is so obviously delta H is not the only criteria we have for spontaneity also for is spontaneity right? And that criteria is what is randomness have you heard this talk? Apart from enthalpy randomness is the another criteria we have randomness is the another criteria we have this means what the process always goes in that direction where the randomness is increasing randomness or randomness both are same thing actually right so everything is it is moving randomly in all directions there is no fixed pattern nothing is there that we call it as randomness or disorderness right down this point here any process has natural tendency to go towards maximum randomness to go towards maximum randomness okay correct that is the natural tendency we have that process will move towards more randomness now how do we measure randomness of any subsystem to measure randomness we we have given a new thermodynamic term that is entropy okay so listen to me first of all very very carefully here we have two criteria of spontaneity what are those criteria's what are those criteria's of spontaneity yes that is enthalpy delta H and randomness these are the two criteria we have for spontaneity how do we measure randomness to measure randomness a new thermodynamic term is given which we call it as entropy represented by S so entropy is the thermodynamic quantity which measures randomness of any system right down it is a thermodynamic state quantity right down it is a thermodynamic thermodynamic state quantity which measures randomness randomness or disorderness randomness or disorderness randomness or disorderness molecules of the system right next time it is an extensive property and state function the state quantity you have written already right now it is an extensive property since it is state quantity so change in entropy s is delta s equals to s final minus s initial this is a change in entropy unit of entropy is is calorie per Kelvin or joule per Kelvin the unit of entropy entropy also we say that it is a number of possible ways by which the energy is distributed within the system or once again I said it is the number of possible ways by which the energy is distributed in the system so if you talk about the entropy of gas because gaseous particles will have maximize or maximum random motion so entropy of gas is more than to that of liquid and entropy of liquid can move easily is more than to that of gas sorry gas liquid and solid here this is the order of entropy we have for solid liquid and gas okay the mathematical definition of entropy you write down mathematically it is defined as it is defined as as the integral of of all integral of all terms involved in involved in terms involved in reversible process with just a second all terms involved in in heat exchanged in heat exchanged divided by divided by the absolute temperature divided by the absolute temperature in a reversible isothermal process in a reversible isothermal process so here ds is equals to dq reversible by t heat exchange in reversible process so delta s equals to since it is reversible isothermal so temperature outside dq reversible this is the change in entropy we have copied this is the mathematical definition of entropy and you see if heat absorbed by the system by the system so what happens temperature increases entropy also increases temperature increases entropy also increases if heat is released by the system if heat is evolved once again heat is evolved then what happens temperature of the system decreases and hence entropy change also decreases less so keep that in mind we have two terms here for you know to understand the spontaneity of any process one is enthalpy other one is entropy this one entropy we use to measure the randomness or disorderness of the system right now you see for an spontaneous process in isolated system condition we are applying here okay for an spontaneous process spontaneous process in isolated system right since the system is isolated so there's no exchange there is no exchange of energy or matter energy or matter between system and surrounding between system and surroundings like hence delta s would be zero in this case but what happens here only suppose system is isolated and gases are mixing suppose we have a system here isolated system right no nothing is that there's no interaction between system and surroundings but this gases particles are there and these gases particles are mixing with each other right they're interacting and it's mixing with each other so under this process only if you have mixing of gases if we have mixing of gases then delta s total greater than zero because of gases it is mixing so these are some facts we have if the system is not isolated is not isolated then we can write the change in system entropy of the system total is equals to the change in entropy of you know system plus the change in entropy of surrounding I've written delta h here by mistake just let me correct it delta s total is equals to delta s of the system plus delta s of surroundings this is the relation if the system is not isolated next point write down during spontaneous process write down all of you first of all you copy this huh all of you copy this down during a spontaneous process the entropy of the system goes on increasing the entropy of the system goes on increasing till the system attains the equilibrium state till the system attains equilibrium state attains equilibrium state so at equilibrium next line so at equilibrium the entropy of the system is maximum so at equilibrium the entropy of the system is maximum and there is no further increase in entropy right I'm repeating so at equilibrium the entropy of the system is maximum and there is no further increase in entropy should I repeat this is again let me just check This is second try. Let me just finish this. I'll repeat the entire point again. So at equilibrium, the entropy of the system is maximum and there is no further increase in entropy. Okay, so I'm repeating from the beginning here. During a spontaneous process, the entropy of the system goes on increasing till the system attains the equilibrium state. Till the system attains the equilibrium state. So at equilibrium, the entropy of the system is maximum and there is no further increase in entropy. So what happens when there is exchange in energy between system and surroundings? So what we can say, if the entropy of system is increasing, then the entropy of surrounding will decrease. So for one, the entropy is increasing, for the one, the entropy is decreasing. So you will have an equilibrium state in between somewhere. So if you talk about the system whose entropy is increasing, its entropy will be maximum when the equilibrium is achieved. And at equilibrium, what we can write? The change in entropy is what? At equilibrium, delta S, at equilibrium, the change in entropy delta S equals to zero because this is the maximum value. More than this, entropy cannot increase. One more factual statement we have here, like for non-spontaneous process, the entropy change is negative. This also you must keep in mind. Now you see, we have different different conditions and in different different conditions, we'll find out the entropy change. So first one we have entropy change in isothermal reversible process, isothermal reversible process. What I am assuming here, I'm assuming suppose a system absorbs q amount of heat from surroundings at temperature T. So since the system is absorbing heat, so its change in entropy is positive plus q by T. This is for system, delta S for system is this. Equal amount of heat is being lose by surroundings, so it will be minus q by T. Right? System loses, surrounding loses heat and system gains heat. So it is minus, it is plus. What is the total entropy change? Delta S total is equals to system plus surroundings plus delta S of surrounding. This would be equals to zero. So delta S total is zero here. Total entropy change is zero in isothermal reversible process. So this is what we need to keep in mind. If it is reversible isothermal process, then entropy change is total entropy change is zero. Then, okay. Now, if you have reversible adiabatic process, then what happens? Write down heading, reversible adiabatic, reversible adiabatic process. Okay? For adiabatic process, we can say q is equals to zero. There is no heat exchange. When q is equals to zero, delta S of system is what? That is also equals to zero because this is q reversible by T. Right? So this is equals to also zero. Delta S of system is zero. Delta S of surroundings is also zero. Delta S total that is system plus surroundings equals to zero. This also you can keep in mind for a reversible adiabatic process. Again, delta S system zero, delta S surrounding zero, total delta S equals to zero. Copy it. Yes, done, guys. Are you getting it? All of you, respond? Yes, anyone there? What happened? Are you sleeping? Now you see the next third condition what we have. The entropy change in reversible process, in irreversible, I'm sorry, in irreversible process, irreversible process. I'm assuming system is at temperature T1 and surroundings is at temperature T2. See, guys, one thing you must understand here, we are just trying to understand the entropy change in different, different conditions. And one of these conditions you will get in the question in the test. Right? So what are the conditions we have? All those conditions we need to understand. And based on conditions, how we can apply in this concept of entropy, that is what we are doing here. So I'm assuming irreversible process, both system and surroundings at different, different temperature T1 and T2. What I'm assuming next, I am assuming T1 is greater than T2. You can also assume T2 greater than T1, anyone you can assume. You will get the same answer. Whatever you'll assume, you'll get the same answer. This is also our assumption we have. So I'm assuming system is at more temperature than surroundings. So obviously what happens? Which one will lose heat here? Which one will lose heat? System loses heat to the surroundings, right? Minus Q to the surrounding because system is at higher temperature, correct? Q amount of heat is released by the system. So can we write delta S of system equals to minus Q by the temperature of system that is T1, is it correct? Similarly, delta S of surroundings would be what? Surroundings receives heat Q amount by T2. And what is the total entropy change? Delta S total, that would be equals to this plus this plus Q by T2 minus Q by T1 and then we'll write Q T1 minus T2 by T1 T2, okay? Now you see, what is, we have this condition, right? T1 greater than T2. So what we can write? T1 minus T2 is greater than 0 from this condition. This means this term is greater than 0. So delta S total is also greater than 0. Means if you have an irreversible process, a total entropy change always increases. That is what the conclusion we have, clear? Done? Okay, done. Can you move on? Tell me? Yeah. Now, heading right down, calculation of change in entropy. Basically, we are going to have some formula of entropy and that is what you have to memorize and you will get questions based on this formula only, right? On calculation of, calculation of change in entropy, that is delta S. How do we do this? You see, we know the definition of entropy change. It is delta S is equals to DQ reversible by T, okay? If you calculate DQ from this, DQ reversible is equals to TDS, okay? DQ is equals to TDS. Now, from FLOT, from FLOT, what we can write? DQ is equals to DU plus DW. DQ is TDS is equals to DU is NCV DT and DW is PDV, okay? DS is equals to NCV DT by T plus, we can write P is NR T by V into DV into T, right? Any doubt in this, can I tell me? So, DS is equals to NCV DT by T plus NR DV by V. Tell me any doubt here? Till here in doubt, clear? Now, we can integrate it, very simple. We can integrate it and we will get the change in entropy for this, right? So, what formula we get here, you see? The formula we get here is delta S is equals to NCV ln T2 by T1 plus NR ln V2 by V1. This is the formula we have for entropy change if temperature and volume are variable. Any doubt in this? If temperature and volume are variable, then you can use this formula. I'll write down here. Yes, yes, sign you will get on your own. We always use sign convention in the data which is given. For the term which we need to find out, we won't put sign from our own side, right? Whatever answer comes, it will come with the sign which is required, positive negative, okay? So, this formula of entropy change will use for when temperature and pressure are variables, okay? Now, you see one more thing here. You can directly V2 by V1, you can substitute in terms of pressure and temperature. So, another formula that you get here is delta S is equals to NCP ln T2 by T1 plus NR ln P1 by V2. This is another formula we have which we can easily derive from the given one, right? And this formula we use when temperature and pressure is the variable. This two formula you need to memorize, then rest all conditions you can apply in this formula to find out the entropy change formula over here. Tell me how many of you understood this two formula? How did we get this? First one to be derived. How did we get the second one? Yes, right. So, what we need to do here, we can write down, I'll just write down short over here. We can write down P1 V1 by T1 is equals to P2 V2 by T2. So, V2 by V1 from this, you substitute here in terms of pressure and temperature. Then you use log formula, you'll get Cv plus R over here which becomes Cp over here. It should be a volume, yeah. So, mistake, it should be volume here. When temperature and volume are variable, correct. Yes, all of you understood this? Now, if you know this formula, you can derive other formula easily. Now, suppose we have the condition for isothermal process, for isothermal process. So, isothermal process, what we can write T1 is equals to T2, there's no change in temperature. So, this becomes ln1, this becomes ln1 which is 0. This term and this term you have to ignore. You have to eliminate, remove. So, the formula of delta S would be, in this formula, if you remove this, it becomes nR ln V2 by V1 in terms of volume is equals to nR ln, what we can write? P1 by P2. Tell me any confusion in this? You'll get direct question on this, all the data will be given just need to substitute and get the answer. Any doubt here? Now, for isomeric process, what we can do? Look at the first expression, correct. Look at the first expression, delta S is equals to nCv ln T2 by T1 right and pressure is constant here. So, we can write V1 by T1 is equals to V2 by T2 for isomeric process. So, what is T2 by T1? T2 by T1 is nothing but V2 by V1. So, another expression is equals to nCv ln V2 by V1. This is the formula. Is it clear? Any doubt in this? In the first expression, we remove the volume term, we get this and temperature we convert into volume since the pressure is constant by this expression. So, how many formula we have done? We have done here 1, 2 isothermal isomeric. If it is isochoric, then what happens? Volume constant. So, first term, just a second, we have isomeric. Isomeric is constant, so this is 0, nCp ln T2 by T1. I think I have done a mistake over nCp ln T2 by T1. Isomeric pressure is constant. So, this term will be 0 by mistake. I have taken the first term. This won't be there. This expression will be there. So, nCp ln T2 by T1 delta S equals to nCp ln T2 by T1. And T2 by T1, we can write this as V2 by V1, nCp ln V2 by V1. This is the expression we have. If the process is isochoric, then this volume term would not be there. This volume term won't be there. So, it is nCv ln T2 by T1, nCv ln T2 by T1. So, delta S equals to nCv ln T2 by T1. And this T2 by T1, we can apply in terms of pressure. Volume is constant. So, pressure and temperature directly proportional. So, nCv ln T2 by T1. This is the formula. Just we are substituting nothing much with the help of gas law. Tell me it's fine. Now, let's see the next condition we have. Mixing of ideal gases. Suppose A and B, two gases are mixing. You can have more than two also. I am assuming two over here. So, delta S of the mixture is equals to minus 2.303R na log of xA plus nB log of xB. Where na is the number of moles of A, xA is the mole fraction of A. So, n is simply, I'll write down number of moles. x is the mole fraction. Correct? If you have C, another guess also. We write down nC plus log xC and so on will go. The last three formula we have here, the important one on this, they have asked question also in when there is a phase change. So, entropy change during phase change. So, delta S of fusion. What is fusion? Fusion is the process in which solid converts to liquid. Correct? Solid to liquid. Then whatever energy involved in this process, delta H of fusion divided by the temperature at which the fusion is taking place. Right? That is a fusion temperature. Right? Similarly, delta S of vaporization, liquid to vapor. Again, same formula, delta H involved in the process of vaporization divided by the temperature which is the boiling point of the liquid. Because vaporization takes place at boiling point in general. Delta S of sublimation. What is sublimation? It is solid to vapor. So, whatever, again the enthalpy exchange in this process divided by the temperature at which the sublimation is taking place. Right? So, this is the three formula we have during phase change. The first one on this, the question has been asked in JEE. All the data will be given. You just need to substitute and get the answer. Copy this down. Done? Yeah. So, on these basics, changing and property formula, you will get numericals. Okay, that you need to solve. We will see some questions here. Try this. Yeah. Did you get the answer? Tell me. 19.4 you are getting. That is close. It is right. Okay? Approximately 20. Yeah. So, basically this question, this kind of question is to write down the data given and use the formula of entropy. Right? So, you see in this question, entropy change is given, temperature change is given, volume change is given. It means delta S formula, you need to write down in terms of temperature and volume. That is Ncv ln of T2 by T1 plus Nr ln V2 by V1. If you get confused, you just, you have to do this. Suppose formula, you forgot in the exam, what you need to do, you see. You know, first law of thermodynamics, dq is equals to du plus dw, right? From here, you can get anything. dq is Tds, Ncv dt is du, it is pdv is dw. Just you divide this by T, Ncv dt by T, p is Nrt by V. So, it is Nr dv by V. Then you have to integrate this. You will understand that what would be here. Either it is T1 by T2 or T2 by T1, you will understand. Okay? There are two steps you need to do. So, let me just remove this, not required. Basically, you understand from where, which expression we derived this particular formula. There are two steps you need to write, and it is done. So, Ncv, it is 3 mole. Cv is 12.5. Take care of units in this kind of questions. For temperature, you do not have to bother because it is the ratio. So, it is 320 by 300. 320 by 300 plus 3 into r is 8.314. Don't take it in 0.021 into ln. V2 by V1 is 10 by 5. Just you need to solve this approximately. The answer you would get 19.71 joule per Kelvin. Without calculator, it is a bit difficult to solve ln value. See, you can do two, three things. If there is complex expression, the values of antilog will be given in the question. So, that value you have to use. Antilog value will be given. If not, then you should know the value of these three things. That is a log 2 value you should know, 0.30. Log 3 is 0.48 approximately, and log 5 is 0.70 approximately. So, with these three values, if you know, you can do some, you can use some mathematical tools, some mathematical formula, and you can find out the answer, the expression you will get in such a way, the data will be given in the question in such a way, so that you can calculate with the help of these three values. If not, then the value would be given in the question itself. Yeah, understood. Sometimes what happens, here you see, what is, you need to take care over here because you will get this kind of question.  You can do it on your own after the class. What is the key point that you need to understand over here, that sometimes what happens here, they will give kilojoule. Okay. So, R value you are taking in joule here, you see, it is joule per mol kelvin. So, either you convert this joule into kilojoule here, or this kilojoule into joule you need to convert. So, this kind of, you know, alertness you must have while solving these kind of questions, because there only you can make some mistakes, if you do not take care of units. Correct, understood. See, one more thing you must understand over here. Sometimes they won't ask you to find out the absolute value like this. Okay. But in the options, expression will be given in and dropping. Like, suppose this obviously you can substitute in terms of CP, right? CP minus CV is equals to R. So, CV you can substitute in terms of CP. And then you can multiply and take this NR common, because what happens? CV is equals to what we can write. We have CP minus CV is equals to R. So, CV is equals to our CP minus R. So, if the expression is given in terms of CP, then this CV here, you can substitute as CP minus R. So, this would be CP minus R over here. Then you multiply from N ln T2 by T1 to this term. And then you see this NR, this NR you can take common and there you will get a different kind of expression probably in terms of pressure you may get. Okay. So, that also you can do, or they can give you the expression that way in the option. So, you can do that once you know the relation. Got it? Clear? Understood? Okay. Fine. So, we have done with this. Okay. Next, we need to start with second law of thermodynamics. Okay. So, this part probably will finish today. Second law of thermodynamics we need to start. That we'll do after the break. Okay. So, we'll take a break now. We'll resume at 6.30. Take a break, guys.


The following episode discusses issues surrounding terrorism in the United States and abroad. It was recorded before the San Bernardino shootings. Welcome to Free Thoughts from Libertarianism.org and the Cato Institute. I'm Trevor Burrus. And I'm Aaron Powell. Joining us today are co-authors of a new book, Chasing Ghosts, the Policing of Terrorism. John Mueller is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, and he is a member of the Political Science Department and Senior Research Scientist with the Merchan Center for International Security Studies at Ohio State University. Mark G. Stewart is Professor of Civil Engineering at the University of Newcastle, Australia. Welcome to Free Thoughts, gentlemen. Thank you. Nice to be here. Thanks, everyone. Your book kind of begins, I mean, as most terrorism discussions begin with 9-11. What was the mindset, immediately post-9-11, what was the mindset of the defense security establishment about terrorism? Well, it was just hysterical. Basically, they were fighting ghosts, we call them, but terrorists under every rock. In 2002, they were telling journalists there between 2,000 and 4,000 al-Qaida operatives at Lewis in the United States, and the number we now know is very close to zero. So they were constant, everybody seems to have been in intelligence ready and worrying about an immediate second wave, which never happened, of course. Were you ever able to figure out how they got this 2,000 or 4,000 number? No. Well, that's sort of the hysterical aspect of it. They were apparently finding them all over the place or the thinking they were finding them. They talk about when we hear them talking to each other, and there's a few cases where they might have done that, but what's bizarre is people haven't gone back and said to these people, you know, you should ask the intelligence community, where did you come out 2,000 to 4,000?  Is it that they were intentionally inflating that number or just so paranoid in the months and years immediately following that they just weren't, I guess, thinking rationally if the number's off by that amount? I think the latter, institutionalized paranoia, and you get reports of people saying that everybody believed that, everybody in the intelligence, which is bizarre, you think there's a few people saying, well, you know, maybe there won't be a second wave, maybe they aren't at all there. I mean, George Bush opens his book saying that right after 9-11, the director of the FBI comes in and says, we know they're 331, Al Qaeda operative is working in the United States, and Bush is writing his book 10 years later, and he doesn't say, whatever happened to those 331, so the thing is that no one goes back to these people and saying, where did you get, how come you're so wrong? Is the security establishment as such that you could have this kind of swirling misinformation where no one knows where anything actually comes from? Everyone seems to believe that it's 2,000 to 4,000 Al Qaeda operatives because their friend in the next cubicle told them that, and their friend in the next cubicle told them that, and that's just basically the source of the belief is sort of a self-sustaining delusion that they all work off of and they can't gain say? Yeah, that's a major problem in intelligence, basically. You're tied into a small number of people who can look at the classified intelligence. The classified intelligence is overwhelming, so that's all you read, that's all they read, and you get into this mindset. Nonetheless, it's absurd that no one was saying, maybe there won't be a second wave, maybe we've overestimated them. That should just be a hypothesis, who knows? You can't be sure, but you'd think somebody would say that. A year after 9-11, I did an article, it was a national interest and got picked up as an op-ed by the Washington Post, suggesting that maybe 9-11 was an outlier, that it was not a harbinger, but basically an aberration. I didn't say, well, I just said we ought to consider the possibility that it might be an aberration. They published it in the national interest and it was labeled a 9-11 provocation, that someone is a very provocative, that you could even bring up the possibility that this was an aberration. That was very much the mentality and it continued on. Why would it be an aberration? If it is an aberration, it seems odd that it would be given how common terrorist attacks are all over the world. There hasn't been that much in the whole world outside of war zones. It seems to me there's only 200 to 400 people killed each year by Muslim extremist terrorists outside of war zones each year. That includes London and Bali and Mumbai and so forth. It's not that there's a whole lot of it going on. The countries like Canada or Australia, obviously, they've found virtually none. This observation is never really made publicly. The politicians don't really like to think about that. They just want to think about what might happen next, rather than actually what is happening and what does the data actually show us and what's the evidence? We often get the sense, we hear stories in the newspaper that it seems like the U.S. government is always stopping another attack. We're constantly hearing stories about the FBI arrested this particular guy who was planning something or were told there was a threat and then the assumption is and therefore government stopped it. If you take the front page of the major newspapers at face value, it does feel like there's a fair number of threats on a fairly regular basis and we've either just been lucky or really good. There's extensive sections of the book dealing with the homegrown terrorists who've plotted supposedly been arrested or have actually consummated violence in the United States. And the more you look into these cases, the more pathetic and trivial they become. Over half of them have had an FBI informant who has been egging the would-be terrorist on. That doesn't mean, of course, a terrorist wouldn't have figured out on his own completely, but that seems to be a very common phenomenon. And there's a British movie called Four Lions, which I strongly recommend, which basically seems to get much closer to what the average terrorist is like. Basically four bumbling or five bumbling actually terrorists in Britain directed by Chris Morris. And so anyway, when these things do get put forward, they do tend to be exaggerated. The police want to indicate what they might have done and what they had intentions of doing. And they often had grandiose schemes like toppling the Sears Tower, or something like that. Less commonly talked about is the fact that they didn't have a remote capacity to do it and that most of them didn't even know where Chicago was. What is the... You open up your book discussing the threat matrix in the sort of briefing system of the establishment. How did that system work? It came out... I talked to one of the former CIA guy, Glenn Carl, about it and he said it emerged initially because after 9-11 George W. Bush said, give me your 10 most wanted list for terrorists and they didn't have anything like that. And so literally overnight they invented the threat matrix. And what it is is any squib of information, any tip, in other words, that might lead to terrorism has to be examined and it gets it put in this massive matrix. And the number of tips in the FBI and other government agencies have followed up since 9-11 is well over 10 million. And the number... We know certainly the number of those who have proved fruitful and they're incredibly small.  And what seems to happen, there's a very good book on this by Garrett Graf called the FBI... Called the Threat Matrix about the FBI. And he goes into chapter and verse about these tips coming in and you basically are surrounded by them all the time and you just... Your whole life is on these tips and many of them are horrible, nuclear weapons in the Bronx and things like that. The fact that hardly any of them pan out to be anything is less considered. And there's also a book by Jack Goldsmith, a Harvard law professor who came in somewhat later after 9-11 into the Republican administration and said that you read this stuff and it literally scared you to death every single day. And he quotes... That's a fairly direct quote from George Tenant who is head of the CIA. And Goldsmith says that's the view of everybody who ever read the Threat Matrix.  And maybe there's anything out there. My favorite one is the one entry in this, a quoting from the book, one entry in the Threat Matrix is crisply cited as quote, a threat from the Philippines to attack the United States unless blackmail money was paid. It turns out that this entry was based on an email that said, dear America, I will attack you if you don't pay me $99, $99, $99, $99, $99 dollars. Is that a fair... Is that representative of the kind of threats or is that a little bit... Yes. No, I think it's... That's pretty representative because every... People have written about this and they say every squib of information goes in. Previously, what would happen, something like that, say this is some nutcase and some kid in the Philippines who's got his finger on the nine key, which it basically was. The FBI had it, but they from the get-go, every single tip has to be followed up. And I talked to one top FBI official just a few months ago and I mentioned to him, do you still do that? Follow up every tip and he said, unfortunately, yes. And he said that twice, unfortunately. And so even people within the FBI seem to think that maybe we could use our resources better by only examining something by basically triaging the tips, which is what they did in the past. But everything gets followed up. And many of them are bizarre, very common as people sending in tips because they're trying to get even with somebody. My ex is a terrorist. He's also a communist. And he's also a prevert. But you have to follow it up. Do you have a favorite of the threat matrix? I mean, that was definitely my favorite. But in terms of that dichotomy between the stories that were told, Aaron mentioned these stories that come out and say, we recently captured a pterousel wanting to topple the Sears Tower, which I'm just picturing that my mind is bizarre by itself. But we know the transatlantic flight or the bomb in Times Square, do you have a favorite one in terms of the biggest difference between the story that was told and then the actuality of the story? You too, Mark, if you have a different favorite one. Yeah, mine would probably be that Sears Tower one. The guy, I mean, it's a really interesting case when you get into it. What's really fascinating, I did a casebook which is available on the web called Terrorism Since 9-11, the American Cases. So there's about 60 cases in there. And they're all worked out in a fairly elaborate case studies. And it's been really interesting to write the book because each of these cases is different. Many of them are just bizarre beyond belief. In the case of the Sears Tower case, what happened was this guy goes into a Yemeni grocer and says, I'd really like to be connected to al-Qaeda. Can you help me out? He just happened to see one on the street. Well, Yemenis, they must have all about al-Qaeda. So the Yemeni grocer helps him out. And he also tips off the FBI because he's actually an FBI agent or an informant. He just happened to find a Yemeni grocer who was an FBI informant. Yes, right, an informant. Or he was tied in. Or he was served on the pipeline for the FBI. So the FBI, you know, sigs a informant on him. And this guy has this little group of about seven or eight people. He's mostly a failed businessman in Miami, but he used to be from Chicago. And he's trying to create his own religion and so forth. And he also thinks that he might be able to get some money out of al-Qaeda. So the operative comes in and says, hey, you want somebody from al-Qaeda? Yemeni grocer told me, here I am. I'm from al-Qaeda. And even some of these informants are really clever. In this guy, for example, right at that time Osama bin Laden sent out a message saying very soon there's going to be a big attack in the United States because we've got people working on it. And so the informant tells this guy, he's talking about you. You're already world famous. And the guy basically, his argument is, to make it turn it around further, that he was actually trying to con, he needed money desperately. And the guy was constantly dangling tens of thousands of dollar potential from al-Qaeda, of course, got deep pockets and so forth. Not as deep as the FBI, but nonetheless. And his idea was basically we'll just string this guy along. That's what he says today. We're going to string this guy along and get the money. We won't do anything, of course. And as he gets pushed further and further, he gets more and more valuable. And he comes up with this idea of what we want to do is go to Chicago, which at least he knew where that was. He was from Chicago. They have a girlfriend of mine.  And then it'll topple over and fall into Lake Michigan, creating that tsunami, which you'll then wash back on. I'm sorry. I feel like I'm laughing too hard at this, but continue. All this is totally true.  And from that, we'll free prisoners and with it we can create a new Moorish nation. And someone asked me, Trout, where'd you come up with that? And he said, oh, I'm putting some movie or something like that. So the informant says, wow, that's really interesting. But maybe we should start with something a little bit easier. And so then they have this idea, we're going to bomb the FBI headquarters in Miami. And the plot ends up basically in an incredibly bizarre way. Somebody should make a movie of this. In order to humor this guy who's trying to create a new religion, the FBI informant says, well, they would bring in an expert on creating religions from Chicago at the request of the guy he's doing it. So he comes in. That's a strange expertise. Yes, right. We have an expert. It's from the south side of Chicago, where lots of religions have been created over there. You know, it's a hot spot. So he comes in and he brings his wife, who he calls Queen Zebediah. And so he walks in and he's basically a live wire because he immediately spots the, unlike these guys, spots the informant as an informant. So that guy's from the FBI. And they start to get really antsy and say, yeah, that's right. The plot starts to break up. So this long period of time in which they're trying to get this plot worked out by the police is about to go down the tubes. And then the informant, then the informant gets, I mean, not the informant, but the Queen Zebediah husband guy gets into a gunfight with one of the guys and shoots him.  No one gets killed. He gets arrested. And then he tells the police, these guys are about to do terrorism, which is totally nonsense. And so then the police swing into action, they arrest the group. And it went to trial three times. It failed twice.  Do you have a favorite one, Mark? On The Sears Tale is also my favorite because when you read about the media, it sounded like it could really happen. So the first thing I thought was, well, this must be really a tall building. So, you know, so then I went to Google Maps just to see where it was. And it would actually have to topple over and then slide downhill for more than a model. People would actually hit the lake. It must be very steep hill. It's kind of astounding. But, you know, we're laughing here. But, you know, we are also recording this a few days after the horrible tax in Paris. So we, I mean, how do you, when people say we're being too flippant about this? Well, sometimes they get lucky. 9-11 was getting lucky big time. But no one else has. I mean, it's been very few successful attacks. And the worst one in the United States has been shooting at Fort Hood. It killed about 13 people. So the damage is obviously unacceptable, but it was quite low. And the other cases where there's been, you know, one guy tried to ram a, tried to kill people by driving through the University of North Carolina campus and running over people and he missed everybody somehow. And then he telephoned saying, I did that and the rest of them. Anyway, most of you look at the, what's strange about the cases is they're serious in the sense that these guys are not phonies. They really believe this stuff. What's comical is their incapacity to do much about it. But it, and if you look at them all and say, you know, if all these guys had succeeded what they're doing, I mean, what they're practically capable of doing, which would not include taking down the Sears Tower. But if they were capable of doing something, how much damage would be done? And it's likely pretty small because they're just not very competent. And so, but sometimes you get lucky. 9-11 was, they got lucky. And it's, and of course, in the Paris thing, the Paris thing is also, if the information is not very fully out yet, but it looks like a guy who had set up several other terrorist attacks in Europe, all of which became, were abysmal failures. So finally, he got it right, unfortunately, and put together this plot. The current news reporting is correct on that. We can, this incompetence seems odd given, you know, so maybe toppling the Sears Tower is really hard. But getting a gun and shooting up a lot of people seems to be, I mean, just based on the last few years, something that Americans are pretty good at. And, and so why, I mean, is even that beyond the capacity of these people? And if so, why, why are they so bad at it? Well, it's obviously some of these school shootings are worth the kill far more people, and they're just by kids than, than all the, the terrorist plots. But many of them have visions about getting guns and shooting people. Some of them have actually had experience with guns. Many of them have not. Most of them have angled their way more toward, toward explosives because they think that's more, I don't know why, because it's much more, more difficult to do. And they also get tied in with the FBI informants so that there's one guy in Baltimore, for example, who email or posted on Facebook that he was looking, he wanted to do Jihad. And he wanted to have the, he wanted, he needed help. He needed help. So he gets three messages. The first is from somebody telling him to stuff it. The second is from somebody trying to convince him not to do it. And the third is from an FBI informant and says, I just happened to have this car bomb in my garage and maybe we can work together and we can make beautiful terrorist music together. So they get connected. And of course, the guy eventually does try to use the car bomb, but does not. But obviously it's a dud and, and he gets arrested. So in their case, he got this guy, you know, it's kind of, it's, it's funny in a way, but it's also dangerous in the sense this guy really did push the button, which he thought would blow up a, in this case, a military recruiting station. So they're serious in that sense most of them. But their capacity is very limited. He never in a million, and he said he never in a million years would have been able to put together a bomb on his own. Have the number of threats or plots or stated intention to blow things up gone up as social media use has climbed. So you mentioned this guy just put it out on Facebook, asking for help. And one of the things that Facebook and Twitter and other social media sites do is make it much easier to broadcast threats, make it much easier to have conversations with other people all over the place. And so young men, especially angry young men, often have these rich fantasy lives about their own capacity and these elaborate plans that they're going to put together and whatever else. And so has social media, has it grown with that? And what portion of the threats that say the FBI is monitoring are people spouting off on Twitter? Twitter didn't even exist for not very long ago. And it, there's been three or four different studies of this academic studies. And they basically conclude that the social media stuff is to the benefit of the police overall. The communications, they like this guy in Baltimore. They're able to pick up people, find people and use the evidence. It must be about a third of the cases involve some sort of social media. It doesn't have to be Facebook, we just having a website, which frequently they were able to put together and they spout their views, which is perfectly legal, obviously, just about your view. But then the implication is maybe they actually do something and then the FBI follows up. Yeah. And it's also been, it has, it's been a big help to the police services in Australia. Quite regularly, the Smanford police will pick up, um, Australian national, so at the airport, about to catch a flight to five Isis, because I told all the other friends that they're going. You know, because I think it's a good thing. And so they're happy to tell their friends and obviously that the police can actually tap into that information as well. Yeah, they didn't have to talk to the friends. They just catch any electrons that's going through the air. And this is open. This is open. This is not spying. I mean, anybody can look into Facebook. It's not a restricted thing particularly. Again, the bumbling. So I've talked to people who have said, so I've talked to some people who've worked in the government of the more conservative bent and they have said to me, when I've criticized our terrorist terrorism policy, they've said, you don't know what it's like to see the threats that are facing this country. And until you do, you can't really have. So that's one version. And then on the same page, some people say, well, why do presidents post-election, they often change their rhetoric from, from being maybe somewhat, you know, less attacking on terrorists or saying this is maybe more civil libertarian. But then when they get in the office, they, they stop that. And someone says, well, it's because they see, they, they, then they get the secret folder. So they see what's really going on. And so that's another explanation for this. And then another one is... You wouldn't be thinking about Obama, would you? Well, exactly. And then another one is, is, is sort of the Dick Cheney explanation that we haven't had a terrorist attack because the intelligence establishment has thwarted tons and tons of these.  Now, it seems one of those three seems to be a more common opinion amongst, I don't know if it's scholars, if it's more common scholars, but amongst the defense establishment for the explanation for terrorist attacks. Yours is just that the simplest one. It's not that common. It's hard to do.  Yeah, that's probably pretty good. Well, I think that it's actually easy to do. And that was touched on before.  So the fact that it's happening sort of suggests to us that maybe there aren't many people out there who really wish us harm. Because if they wanted to, they could do it pretty easily. Now, how do people react to that thesis though? I mean, in the defense establishment and in the scholarship, how do the scholars wind up on this issue? Your first issue about them seeing all these threats, and that's exactly what the threat matrix is. You see all the threats. And the question is, no one is saying, you know, this is a lot of garbage, or even 10, it says, even if half of them are wrong, it's scary. Well, come on, they haven't been anywhere near half that have led to anything. And the quantitative issue basically doesn't even come up overall. They just get this institutionalized paranoia. So when they're talking about all this stuff, it's like that. What we tried to do is actually sort that out. What you have is, first of all, the disclosed plots. These are the ones we know about because they've been arrested in their court cases or and or like the guy at Fort Hood. He actually did shoot somebody. Then you get basically the idea that there are these plots that are not out there that are out there, but they have been stopped. And if there are any, but they didn't get arrested. And the question is, if there's real plots, why weren't they arrested? And I've talked to two people. One is Glenn Carl and also also working with lots with the CIA is Mark Sageman. And they basically say, there aren't any of those out there.  So it's either three words or two, depending on you look at it. And I asked, can I use that? And he said, yes, yes, yes. So then what happens is they do find a lot of little teeny plots that are just beginning. And they also close them out frequently by arresting on something else. Again, they don't, there's enough to arrest them on terrorism charges, essentially. But there's, you know, they did check bouncing and I end over immigration violations. And so they do send these people out of the country if they're immigration violations are given short prison cells. Prison sentences because for, you know, forging driver's license or something like that. So there's a group like that. But those plots are even more embryonic than the ones that have come to trial. Because if they weren't embryonic, they would have come to trial because they would arrest them on terrorism charges. So the question is they're dealing with very extremely embryonic plots. And then there's the plot, then there's the positive issue about deterrence. There's people who don't, who don't do anything that they'd like to because they got those great security apparatus. Well, as Mark just said, it's very easy to do if you want to shoot somebody and stab somebody through a brick through a window. It's very easy to do. There's some things which is very hard to do, which is like commandeering an airplane. So in that sense, terrorists have not tried very hard to commandeer airplanes like 9-11 for good reason. It's very hard to do so. There's a lot of security barriers, both ones that are created because of the act and also because the ones that put them by TSA. So this means basically, okay, one thing they can't do is commandeer an airliner. Now the argument about deterrence is that if people agree that they can't do an airliner thing, then why don't they do something else? There's, as the Paris thing showed, an infinite number of targets. I mean, some of the people who were just walking on the streets as drive-by, they shot at a couple of restaurants and then on people on the street.  So the question is, they may be deterred from doing certain things like hijacking airliners, but they certainly could do other kind of terrorism. So the implication of this whole line of reasoning about deterrence is that a terrorist says, you know, I want to be a terrorist. I want to, what do I want to do? I think I want to blow up an airliner. And then they think about that. That's really hard to do. Okay, I won't be a terrorist.  I mean, it doesn't show you exactly a whole lot of dedication. So the deterrence argument makes sense in the sense that certain things are awful and it's also, many of them would like to shoot up military bases because their main motivation is anti, is basically from hostility to American foreign policy. And that's really hard to do because military bases are not exactly easy targets.  Right, yeah. Yeah, though they still look at it. They still obviously do that. Yeah. So essentially the deterrence thing that, you know, there may be deterred from attacking certain targets, but if they are deterred from all terrorism, which is, you know, it's very easy to do because they can't get certain targets, it's hard to see how they're really, you know, dedicated terrorists. But that seems really bizarre because someone who really does want to blow up a plane and then thinks they can, they're a little confused by your deterrence thing. They would be, wouldn't they then go into the shooting? Yeah, that's right. That's what they would do. Yeah, okay. So they would, they would deterred from a certain target, but they wouldn't, they shouldn't, that shouldn't deter them from doing terrorism. So we should see a lot more shootings almost and we don't. So that's interesting. Yeah. Now what about, of course, everyone here is thinking here, listening. Small probability high cost.  This has been a problem. This has been talked about consistently. People thought this would be one Harvard professor, you quote, said that he pretty much thought it was a certainty that this would happen.  But this is the one guy is all it takes for a nuke to be part in Central Park and then it's just game over at that point. Well, I'm sure it'd be game over, but I did another book called Atomic Obsession, which is somewhat summarized in the Chasing Ghosts book. It did difficult, I mean, these guys have had difficulty putting together bombs.  They, so they finally actually got a bomb to go off, but it wasn't exactly terribly lethal. So the more I looked into the more the difficulties of creating nuclear weapons or stealing them or something or so horrendous that they may have had and many terrorists don't even have much interest in that. And basically, if you're going to be successful, it's like in Boston, like in Paris, which would do things which are really pretty simple.  It's a common idea. No, no, it is like the suitcase bombs. Now, even if they are out there, they demand constant maintenance. And so, if they are not being used, they're just deteriorating, essentially, but there doesn't seem to be very little evidence there are in the out there. Now, what about suitcase bombs? Suitcase bombs. Yeah, we talked about beforehand, but what about those? Do those exist? That's the same thing. They don't seem to even exist, as far as I can see. I think at that one time, the Russians made one in the 60s that weighed like 180 pounds and was a pretty small yield itself. But there may be some around, but they're not loose, essentially. And it basically is not, you know, the whole hysteria that came out after 9-11 about the many nuclear weapons. They're really good with box cutters. Therefore, they must be able to make nuclear weapons. It doesn't exactly follow. How many – we've talked about the FBI being involved in counterterrorism, the CIA and NSA, but it seems like basically everyone who works for the federal government now is in some way involved in counterterrorism or at least claiming they should get more money for counterterrorism. So, outside of those three, what other agencies are involved and how is this all working? If you're spending something like $115 billion per year, there's a lot of agencies involved, a lot of snouts in the trough, essentially. Yeah, that's the other way of asking questions. Where is all the money going? Excellent question. First of all, the diffusion of Homeland Security is so broad these days. So, everyone wants to say that they're in that nexus.  The Coast Guard has a substantial Homeland Security sort of role as well. So, it's pretty hard to find a government department that actually doesn't have some aspect in terms of Homeland Security in their role. And that's part of the issue is that there's a lot of money being spent in agencies that really don't have much expertise or much really capability in that area as well. I mean, if you take the FBI has a budget of something like $3 billion for counterterrorism, that's about 3% of the total federal spend, essentially. They're a fairly competent agency. They tend to be, they're the lead agency for counterterrorism in the United States. They're responsible for most of the convictions and everything else. So, even we wonder, where does the other 97% go and what are they really achieving? You're telling about the local police too. Yeah. I mean, local police budgets on Homeland Security is no more than about one or two percent of the total police spend. So, even an agency like the New York Police Department, which is always the media about how they're the main role against counterterrorism and everything else, they only spend about 2% of taxpayers' money, their taxpayers' money on counter-ism. And probably another 2% comes from the federal government in terms of protecting the UN and grants. Does that indicate how much of a problem they think it is? Exactly. So, actually when, because most police departments are funded by local taxpayers and it sort of shows that local taxpayers are more concerned about crime and traffic, you know, traffic and much more mundane issues than actually terrorism. But also, but if the federal government says, we'll give you this money to chase terrorists, they're perfectly willing to accept it. Well, do we have that? This is my tactic. Exactly. Here's some other money. In Eisenhower's speech, he warned about the military industrial complex and he was at the height of the Cold War and the actual sort of traditional nation-state model. Do we have like a terrorism industrial complex? I mean, mixed it with the military since 9-11? Yeah, I've called it the terrorism industry and they're trying to get the money. But the Eisenhower thing is really interesting in my respects because Eisenhower really believed correctly that, as it turned out, that the Soviet Union was not likely to strike the United States. It basically didn't want another war with or without nuclear weapons. And he was appalled at how much money is being spent on defense. And what he didn't say was the threat isn't really that big. We don't have to spend that much money, which would be totally true as far as I'm concerned. And I think as far as he is concerned, instead what he did... This is a general, it's a reminder. Yeah, he's on a peacetime. But there's a whole bunch of evidence about talking to friends and so forth. You know, they're not going to strike us. I've seen these guys at Geneva, come on, they're not going to start nuclear war. They might do subversion and stuff like that, class warfare. They're not going to start World War III, come on. And he really believed that, and he thought, therefore, we didn't need this huge defense establishment. But instead of saying that publicly, what he did say was that it's all basically done through the influence, wanted or unwanted, of the military-industrial complex. So what he did was he attacked the messenger, the people profiting from it, but not their premise. And they say, yeah, but the Russians are going to attack any minute now. And if the Russians are going to attack any minute now, then you say, we've got to spend a lot of money on that. And so if you accept the premise, you're dead. Basically, the money's going to go. And the same thing is happening with terrorism now. Because what we try to do is say the threat is really very limited, not zero, but limited. And so when Cheney says these measures have saved thousands, hundreds of thousands of lives, and the ACLU says, well, yeah, but they've invaded our privacy. People say, well, wait a minute, invaded our privacy versus hundreds of thousands of lives. You don't have much of an argument. And the people attacking the NSA, for example, and other intelligence things, they basically keep saying legalistic arguments, the Fourth Amendment and so forth. Is it reasonable seizure? Is it a search and seizure? Well, if the search and seizure saves thousands of lives, most people won't say that proves that it was reasonable. It's not an abstract thing. And you have to attack that argument. You can't just let Cheney say a hundred thousand people have been killed. Lives have been saved. And they basically rarely do it. And so then it becomes a new role of an argument basically about something. You have to go after it, like Eisenhower, attacking the military industrial complex, but not its premise. So the military industrial complex in the Cold War and afterwards, we can see the incentives. We can see how these companies were making money. You inflate this threat, and then, oh, well, that means we need to build a lot of planes and a lot of tanks and a lot of missiles and all sorts of other equipment. But for terrorism, who is profiting off of this? And what are they selling? And what are they trying to convince us to buy more of? Well, anything that the market will bear, if the TSA or the Department of Homeland Security says we need a whole lot of X-ray machines, everybody's got X-ray machines to sell, is in Washington in an Algenblik. And when they get there, they say, you know, you don't really need these X-ray machines because the terrorism threat isn't so bad. They don't have much of an incentive to say that. So it's the vendors who are creating it. And if I were selling X-ray machines, I'd be there. I mean, that's my job. And who's am I? They want the X-ray machines. I have X-ray machines. They're really terrific X-ray machines. And who am I to tell them that we don't... That's their problem. They say, I think there's a need, so we'll supply the need. It's capitalism working perfectly. Well, I mean, with the government, it's forced money. Particularly if it's government money and it's free. So when local police departments, when they're offered free money from the federal government, they say, ah, we wouldn't mind an armored vehicle. That could be quite handy. You never know. And then they say, well, actually, we might need a boat and something else. And so it's like a shopping list. And that's the area that I went on. I mean, that's one of my areas that I wrote on our policy handbook about the militarization of local police, which came to light in Ferguson, but it was always directly tied. I mean, first it was the drug war and then it was terrorism. Yeah.  Same with mayors, of course. And Mayor Bloomberg frequently, when he comes up with the case, twice, in fact, he came up with cases, which the culprits were so trivial that even the FBI wasn't interested in them. Was one of those the Times Square Palmer? No, no. That wouldn't actually happen. The one is a guy named Pimentel, another guy, which I call a pair of lone wolves, because that's what they call them. Say, I don't know if you can have a pair of lone wolves. That's what they call them, who are going to bomb some synagogues and stuff. And in both cases, these guys, one guy in the synagogue case, one guy was certifiably crazy.  And the FBI said these guys aren't worth going after him. Pimentel, the other guy who was going to do pipe bombs, was similar. But anyway, they rest these guys, and they do have enough evidence eventually to convict them, at least on our New York state laws. And then they sort of hype the thread. They say they're going to give a big press conference, and they show how a bomb that Pimentel might actually work, and so forth. And then at the same time, they say, we really need a lot of money down here in New York. And they're experts at weedling money out of the United States, government. And they have obviously, because of 9-11, of course, they have a good deal to work with. Now, for other, I wanted to ask about two more things, because for listeners who aren't convinced yet of the threat inflation, we talked about nuclear weapons now, dirty bombs. What about the problem of dirty bombs? Well, we keep waiting for that to happen.   Dirty bombs won't. That is a big difference. Yeah, you notice that. It's right there on the surface. What they can do is cause an inconvenience, and they can increase nuclear radiation in a certain area. In some cases, the calculations are that if you stay in that same area where the dirty bomb has gone off for 40 years nonstop, your chance of getting cancer might go up by one percentage point. If that's your idea of a good time, okay, you know. So, they're basically not very... In fact, people who look at it frequently say they're not male evidence of mass destruction, because they aren't destroying anybody in terms of property or people. Their weapons of mass disruption, that if you have an area which has elevated radiation risk, then, and we have extremely conservative standards about that, you might have to evacuate it, and that would be really costly. And the cleanup would take forever, because the cleanup has to go down to super, super clean standards. I had heard that if you put a dirty bomb in Central Park, most people... I mean, it may not have been how it was made, but it's easy to die from making them, too, if you're trying to get that much concentrated material. But because I'm from Denver, I have a higher level of radiation because I'm from Denver. So, it would be... Most people would get about the level of radiation that I got from living in Denver. And that's another really fascinating thing in your book. You discuss Jose Padilla, arrested in 2002. This is quoting, who apparently mused at one point about creating a dirty bomb, a device that would disperse radiation or even possibly an atomic one. His idea about isotope separation was to put uranium into a pail and then to make himself into a human centrifuge by swinging the pail around in great arcs. This seems unbelievable. It's fairly typical mentality of these guys. It's unbelievable. Now, what about biological weapons? This seems to be... We have anthrax and small, but these would devastate the world. Yeah, but these have been known for centuries, essentially. And there's been very little use of it. The problem is they're very hard to control and they're very often very unstable. Anthrax spores do last a long time, but most of them don't. They can... The effect can be massively reduced by having just some wind in the area. And the military hates them because they're so hard to control. And they also contaminate the area they're in. And terrorists have seemed to... I mean, the case with Amshunariko, for example, is a really good case.  And so they first tried to get nuclear weapons. They even bought at least a uranium mine in Australia, for example. And they couldn't get off first base on that. So then they went to biological weapons and they actually worked on some and even set some off a couple of times. The weapons were let off. Not only did they not do any damage, but no one even noticed, which has got to be really deflating. And in fact, the head of Amshunariko said, all this stuff about biological weapons is disinformation coming out of the SCA. They wanted us to work on biological weapons because they're so difficult. And then they moved eventually to chemical weapons and had great difficulties with that. And then finally set off a few very crudely in the subway and in the closed area in Japan, killed a few people and then were arrested and then finally closed down. So the difficulties are very high. If you want to be a terrorist, some people, some terrorists have said, keep it simple. Use things you know how you're doing. And that's why if there's a scary thing about the, particularly about Mumbai or about the Kenya attack and particularly now with Paris, it's that relatively simple, easy to manage. You don't have a lot of training or leadership or anything else. It can be pretty spontaneous and it can be improvised as you go along and doesn't take advance technology. You just have to have a gun or it can be a knife or something else and know how to use it and it doesn't take a lot of training. You're not trying to shoot careful targets or anything.  It's not rocket science. So given that, given that terrorism is, we've been talking about the threat is overblown, but there still is a threat.  What would an alternative, much more effective and efficient way to fight this threat look like? That's a real question. Well, I suppose the first thing to think about is actually what are the risks of terrorism and then how that, and has that compared to other hazards that we're exposed to? Then that gives us a basis for actually, do we need to invest in this area or maybe we should invest in tornado shelters or flood levees or some other way that can save lives? So that the risk of being killed by terrorists in the United States over the last 30, 40 years, including 9-11, is about 1 in 4 million. In Australia, it's about 1 in 7 million. Per year. Per year. If you look at in the United States post 9-11, the risk of being killed is 1 in 110 million. They're very low numbers. If you're looking at aviation security, the risk of being an airline passenger that gets killed and a flight that's either hijacked or blown up is about 1 in 90 million. 1 in 90 million. Or in other words, you have to fly every day for 68,000 years before you're being involved in any sort of terrorist incident in a plane or airport. And yet we never hear these facts discussed openly at all. John, I go to a lot of security conferences and quite often the byline is risk, you know, risk management, security risk management. Risk-based. And we are the only speakers who start the talk by saying these are the numbers. This is the basis for a discussion. Now, maybe you're happy with these numbers, maybe you think they're too high. If you think they're too high, why do you think they're too high? And then what can be done about it? Or maybe you think that there might be something that we can tolerate.  No one likes to accept any risk. But there's a large amount of research and consensus in terms of low probability, high consequence events with nuclear power, medical technologies, environmental pollution, where difficult choices have to be made about where do we invest the resources and funds to maximize the life-saving potential of any regulation? And we just don't see that debate happening at all. That's really absurd. It should be because basically if you want to put seat belts in the back seat of a car, you have to explain how many lives it's going to save. And what's the cost? And that's not being done for terrorism. So we have that debate in other areas, like with cars. Absolutely. And medicine. So you can say, well, if we wanted to cut down auto accidents, we could force everyone to drive five miles an hour. And people are like, well, it's not worth that in order to prevent these things. But it does seem like there's something different about a terrorist threat versus a car accident or the threat of hurricanes if you live in certain parts of the country or other kinds of risky activities you can engage in. And that's that there's an agency behind it. Like terrorism is scarier because it's another person who wants to do us harm. And it's not the kind of individual personalized harm of like, oh, my ex-spouse may get mad and attack me. But there are people out there who want to hurt a lot of us indiscriminately. And that's legitimately potentially terrifying in a way that the threat of earthquakes or car accidents is not. Is there something to that? And does that difference in the nature of the threat, should that factor into the way we approach preventing it? Well, I wanted to actually add to that, too, because we have people who shoot people obviously too much in America in bad situations. But they don't have in their mind hating America or hating us for our freedoms or these sort of like things that people say that the Harris want or wanting to destroy America. There are people who kill people, but that's not their goal. They're just psychotic. So we don't worry about that. But then if you do the same thing, but you have something in your mind that's different, it's somehow worse. So connect dovetails off of Aaron's question. Yeah, that's a really good point. Yes, terrorism exposes so many emotions and risk aversion, particularly. But then so does like nuclear energy. And so there's been a large amount of debate over the last 40 years in the US. There's a debate in the state at the moment and elsewhere about where do you put a nuclear power station? What are the risks of something going wrong? How do you safeguard it? Who pays? Who benefits? You know, local jobs versus versus the risks. And there's and there's public meetings and it's very controversial and people people get angry and they take and they take different sides. But it's all done in an open, transparent manner. No one's no one's trying to hide anything. And so you really have a mature debate about it. You might you might not agree with it with the outcome. So terrorism should be treated in a similar aspect. Sure, there are there are things that make it unique. But there are aspects that are very similar to rather highly motive public policy decisions out there. And I suppose I mean, the work in our book is really trying to save with this is a framework that's been used for other emotive issues. And if you apply the same framework for terrorism, this is sort of where where it tries to lead us. And particularly when it comes to risk aversion, you know, you know, I can be risk averse, I can decide I don't want to clone mountain because I just don't think it's not all go skiing. Well, I can't ski, but anyway, back in Australia. So but governments, they need to be they don't need to be quite as pessimistic when they're spending public money. So, you know, if there's a way that you guarantee to save excellent of lives by investing in tornado shelters, rather than maybe only saving a couple of lives, maybe for some new counters and policy, then they should pick the tornado shelters. Now, there may be concerned about how that looks in terms of their politics and their electoral chances. But that's that's not what they were meant meant to do. Yeah, let me just add to that. There's a study by the by the then is commissioned by the Department of Homeland Security about how much a life for terrorism is worth, which other agencies do all the time. How much is life worth? It's not it's not infinite.  I mean, you have because you can save lots of lives with the same amount of money, what you might do to one. But anyway, they conclude roughly, which is fairly standard about human life is worth about five or six or seven million dollars. And they suggest that to add to that because the terrorism proposes exactly what you've been talking about special anxieties and so forth, that it be doubled. So it's like 14 million dollars per life or 15. So you can do that. And we do that. We also the it's a little bit tricky because some terrorist attacks, like 9 11 or like the French case really create a huge amount of anxiety. But the shootings at Fort Hood at the worst attack in the United States since 9 11. It's hard to see that people got very anxious. There's definite costs. Obviously some people were killed and property damage, but it didn't cause people to not to go to Texas because they're afraid of being shot or anything. And they didn't create a lot of anxiety. So what we usually prefer to do is look at certain kinds of attacks that seem to have some of them have basically look at them individually. This seems to have a fair amount of this emotional impact and others don't and to deal with in those terms. So you can you can include it, but you can't do is simply say life is infinitely valuable.  And they tell you that, you know, and so and so that kind of calculation is there, should be there and is very important. And the fact that no one talks about acceptable risk is bizarre. The only time we found really a public discussion of acceptable risk is by John Pistol of the Lenny's Head of Transportation Security Administration. And they were calculating that there's that they were trying to put in these scanners that had x-rays in and the x-rays could give you cancer. So they had it checked out and said, can I give you cancer? And he said, no, it's perfectly safe. It's not perfectly not perfectly safe. He said, acceptable be safe, because we've looked at it very carefully and you had experts at MIT and so forth look at it and they say the risk is perfectly okay. So a mark basically looked there's it's pretty straightforward to figure out what the risk is because you know what the dose is and there's standards things that are also extremely conservative, but they're out there and they're accepted by the Nuclear Regulatory Agency and the government agencies. And so what's the chance of getting cancer from a single scan? And it comes out to be one in 60 million. Well, then as Mark said and pointed out, what's the chance of being killed by a terrorist? It's one in 90 million. And if one in 60 million is acceptable risk, why isn't one in 90 million acceptable risk? But that's with, I mean, the idea is that it's one in 90 million when you have scanners in airports. It's lower if you didn't have scanners in airports. Well, the having scanners in airports raises the chance that it makes it less likely you'll be killed by terrorists. Yeah, except that the data come from before, mostly before scanners even existed. So it's not clear that they've added that much to the risk, to reduce the risk that much. So we have again a sensitive situation now with Paris and we also have a situation with which has captured the world's imagination probably more than almost any terrorist attack since 9-11. We, or at least the Western world, we also have a sensitive situation with what France is going to do. And we also have a Syrian refugee issue that's all getting wrapped up in this. What do you fear about what will happen in post-Paris and then also how we're going to deal with the refugee problem in light of this horrible event? Yeah, what the concern is basically overreaction. I mean, the overreaction in 9-11 included not only the huge amount of increase of security spending without the examination that Mark noted, but also the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which have ended up with the deaths of far more Americans that died in 9-11, not to mention obviously the far higher death tolls for Afghans, Afghanis and for Iraqis. And so the French are making all kinds of screaming, hollering things and including increasing surveillance and being able to arrest people just because they don't look right and so forth. And so there's a danger of that, basically that overreaction which costs a lot of money and also has a lot of civil liberties implications. And if it involves getting throwing things at the wars in the Middle East, it can be extremely costly. I mean, the war in Iraq has cost several trillion dollars and it's still going on. And so that's that, I'm worried that that might happen, that the experience suggests probably that it won't be as bad as that. But the most important, the actually what you find is the most effective counterterrorism measure is to not overreact. That doesn't mean don't react at all. Terrorism is a problem. You want to deal with it. It's a, the terrorists do exist. They do kill people. And so it's a public hazard that should be dealt with by people in charge of public safety, but should be done in a responsible manner the way other hazards have been examined and simply hasn't been done. Thank you for listening. Free Thoughts is produced by Evan Banks and Mark McDaniel. To learn more, find us on the web at www.libertarianism.org.