Hi everyone, Sean with jaspyscasebrakes.com here doing a 2019-20 Panini Don Russ basketball hangar one box break random team number two where at the end We're gonna randomize list of customers give away two spots in the flawless 1718 flawless briefcase break coming up next random hit break. So thank you to Mike Sommich and John Canuto John Canuto got the very first spot Mike Sommich cleared it out for everybody else. So Dice roll there. You've got list of teams from the Washington Wizards up to the Land of Hawks four and a six ten times on both lists one two three four five six seven eight nine and 10th and final time from Mike down to Mike now ten times on the teams one two three four five six seven eight nine and 10th and final time from the Toronto Raptors down to the Dallas Mavericks So let me make this a little bit easier for everybody to see Make this easy Mike Sommich has every team except for the Washington Wizards who John has But let's put it all on video just to make sure Bunch of Mike Sommich and other teams Sort by team print and rip then randomize at the end Here is It happens hey Nick all it takes is one one spot right as the list is printing Let's go ahead and open up the hangar box since 1920 List lots of Mike Sommich and somehow at the very bottom the last team alphabetically Washington Wizards John Canuto Wonder how many times we can do this and have that Never happened again So 1920 so we are looking at the Zion John Moran LeBron James Going to Mike Sommich Seiku D'Amboya relic Troy Pistons Mike Sommich Grant Williams rated rookie green Chumo Kiki Josh Richardson green Ty Jerome Cameron Johnson played really good in the bubble Seiku Youngest player in basketball this year So no John no Zion Couple nice cards there for you Mike John no Rui Hachimura there now let's do the randomizer back to the list guys Here is the original list Once again Mike Sommich back up to John Canuto for spot purchase dice roll Top two names after two and a six eight times Spots in the upcoming flawless random hit break Seven and Eight and final time Good luck Well, you can see John's name right there. So I don't think the surprise is One and two Mike Sommich congratulations Mike guys. That was 1920 Pignini Don Russ basketball hangar one box break random team number two I'm Sean Jasby's cakes break calm Mike Sommich two spots coming up in the flawless 1718 briefcase random hit break Jasby's case breaks calm. We'll see you next time


Everybody Matt here for Leighton sports cards are up in 2021 contenders optic football. This is 10 bucks half case break number 36 Pick your team. We have Bryant R Ravens. David S. Saints Don G. Bills Derby Seahawks and Titans Edgar B. Washington James P. Chargers Jesse O. Niners Jim a Browns John C. Raiders John L. Jags John S. Patriots John G. Bears Josh T. Bucks K F. Vikings Kenny H. Falcons Luke S. Cardinals Giants Mark S. Chiefs Mark Anthony H. Bengals Mason V. Colts Michael M. Dolphins Nicholas L. Texans Paul O. Packers Q. Nomai Cowboys Ryan L. Panthers Ryan V. Steelers Sal P. Jets Sam R. Rams Stephen D. Broncos Stephen H. Eagles and Thomas S. Lyons. Good luck everybody. Here we go. NT football is up after this. Texans and Patriots were left when I when we checked just a minute ago. Chubb Anthony Schwartz Redemption that is that dolphins rookie ticket autograph Jalen Phillips you go Miami and Lyons rookie Otto Amon Ross St. Brown Sam Ellinger rookie silver Quinn Williams and Joe Naimov that is pink to 75 let's fill up that NT football break and then we'll do that one and go into flawless Jones Estevanta Williams Redemption that is Lyons rookie ticket autograph Silver Penang Swell and Titans rookie Otto Des Fitzpatrick this is green pulsar to 30 Nick Chubb here you go Browns is that orange no that's green oh my it round numbers Travis Etienne Jr. Najee Harris we'll do a dice roll one two three top four five six bottom that is two so that'll go top Jags looks like the Patriots are gone in NT so just the Texans to go thank you Drew appreciate it good luck hopefully we pull you a monster David Montgomery Justin Fields rookie Texans that's rookie Otto Revan Jordan and redemption nice Jags that is rookie ticket RPS autographs variation orange Trevor Lawrence congrats Jacksonville there you go Jags I think that's 75 it's a variation also though just give me just a sec I want to make sure uh you got a Jalen Phillips Mike Jalen Phillips redemption no waddles yet orange is to 20 nice so that'll be to 20 very nice Gratz Jags Russell Wilson Silver and Kenneth game well Amir Smith Marseille round numbers pink that is to 75 top one two three bottom four five six that is also two that'll go top Eagles Aaron Donald rookie Eli Mitchell and Niners 15 of 25 that is rookie ticket Otto Tralance awesome hit Niners congrats that is is that a throwback 2011 2011 throwback very nice that's a bonus hit to have Falcons rookie Otto Richie Grant yeah for sure let's keep it rolling you gotta say this one right now yeah say it right Seahawks is 75 that is rookie Otto Teal Dwayne S. Gridge or or what's his nickname Gridge Mike Evans red and Green Pulsar Kyle Trask Terrace Marshall Jr. round numbers to 30 top one two three bottom four five six that is three that goes top bucks Vonte Adams Michael Carter rookie hackers rookie Otto Kylan Hill and Washington this is to 30 legendary contenders Otto Green Pulsar Joe Theisman nice hit Washington we actually had to have Sam sit in a room and practice saying Washington he kept calling it Washington he's he's never even been to Missouri I don't know what's up with this branding cooked silver and optic illusion Nick Bosa that's an awesome looking card you know Niners Eagles are gone in flawless number 58 Vonte Adams Chuba Hover rookie just the Texans left in NT football and then we have six to go in each of our flawless football full case breaks this is Jags rookie Otto Jay Tuffle or Tafeli and Jets to 15 rookie patch Otto Green Pulsar Zach Wilson congrats Jets awesome hit with the color match there you go New York Sal P Sal P Green Pulsar Wilson in both both half cases yeah this is Miami Brown 99 blue there's Dwight Freeney Peyton Manning X's nose I think that's number now Mike Carter redemption that is Rans rookie ticket autograph variation teal 2-2 at well there you go Rans and Chargers to 149 rookie ticket Otto red Josh Palmer Kamara Silver round numbers Anthony Schwartz trade trade Thurman 12 top 123 bottom 456 that is two top haven't got the number up past three yet Sam will be doing personals after the group breaks hopefully we can keep this rolling and leave him with a decent amount of time to get through as many as possible there's a Tyreek and rookie Jalen waddle this is Rams rookie Otto 2-2 at well that one's pretty smudged that's smudged in several spots we'll send you a box Rams so if you want to contact and you need to try to get that replaced this is Ravens rookie Otto Tylen Wallace nice one here this is to 13 rookie Mojo Rondale Moore winning ticket blues to fondigs 99 yeah I'd probably try to get that one replaced it's just it's smudged in several spots or not several but like three spots yeah two boxes to go let's see something crazy I've already seen some really awesome stuff I want to see like a gold final or something there's Jalen hurts Rashad Bateman Raiders rookie Otto Trayvon mooring and Panthers rookie Otto Chuba Hubbard rookie Silver Twain Eskridge and winning ticket pink 75 Dak Prescott Patrick Mahomes MVP contenders last box then we're going to get into some NT we'll do a hit recap after this Tom Brady Kellan Mon rookie this is Bills rookie Otto Boogie Basham Steelers rookie Otto Pat Friar Mew Bengals took 30 that's Green Pulsar Joe Mixon and Chiefs to 50 winning ticket Orange Tyreek Hill I'll do it for the break recap the hits here and Steelers Pat Friar Mew Bills Boogie Basham Raiders Trayvon mooring Panthers Chuba Hubbard Ravens Tylen Wallace Silver that's Rams 2-2 Atwell Chargers Red Josh Palmer Variation Teal for the Rams 2-2 Atwell Jags J Tockely Silver that was Green Pulsar for Washington Joe Thysman Packers Kylin Hill Seahawks Teal Twain Eskridge Falcons Ritchie Grant Texans Brevin Jordan Titans Des Fitzpatrick Lions Silver Panacea Lions Amon Ross St. Brown Dolphins Jalen Phillips and we had a few big ones here this is all out of a half case Jags Orange Variation rookie ticket Otto Trevor Lawrence Niners 2011 throwback rookie ticket Otto Tray Lance Niners that was to 25 and Jets Green Pulsar rookie patch Otto Zach Wilson that was 15 great break thank you everybody appreciate Texans sold out NT is full we're going to roll right into that here in just a couple minutes thanks everybody


So, the idea is that we have talked about chemical kinetics. So, let us say these are two species x and y and they have some sort of interactions amongst themselves. So, for example, let us say that x up regulates itself, y up regulates itself. So, there is some maybe ups maybe some is a down regulation some is an up regulation. So, there is some sort of cross talk between this x and y. And let us say you know what how to write down this k-ons and k-offs and whatever. So, you have written down a chemical kinetics equation. This is very this is a toy model of course, this is a toy model which was actually proposed by Turing himself. It is just to illustrate the point. So, let us say these are my chemical kinetics. So, basically what it says is that. So, if these two species x and y and I have 5 x minus 6 y. So, the more of x I have the more of x I produce. So, x up regulates itself let me write that by an arrow, the more of x I have the more of y also I produce. So, x up regulates y, ok. Then the more of y I have the less of x and the less of y itself. So, y down regulates itself which let me draw by this sort of an arrow and y down regulates x as well, ok. So, x in some sense is an activator, it activates itself, it activates y, y is an inhibitor, it represses itself and it represses x. So, that is the basic chemicalkinetics that I have and I have written down an equation like this to correspond to this chemical kinetics. So, I can say that well given this sort of a chemical kinetics, so what is the steady state, ok. What will be in steady state? What will be the concentrations of x and y? So, you can solve dx dt equal to 0, dy dt equal to 0 and get the steady state of this model, ok. And because it is chosen in such a simple way that the steady state is just x equal to y equal to 1, ok. If you put 1, 1 it will be both of these will just cancel out. So, the steady state of this sort of very simple kinetics is that x equal to y equal to 1. So, now this is this is simple enough. So, now the idea is this that ok I have this sort of a I have this reaction, but now let me say that I have this reaction is going on in every cell. So, let us say this is one cell where this reaction is going on. I have a neighboring cell where the same reaction is going on x, y, up regulation, up regulation, down regulation, down regulation, ok. And these x and y they can diffuse between cell to cell, ok. So, they there is exchange between these cells, ok. So, what was purely a chemical kinetics model? The moment I build in space that I have multiple cells, these concentrate these different molecules can now diffuse from cell to cell. So, I bring in some sort of motion as well. And I could now ask that well oh I have again jumped the gun. So, before I do that this is also a trivial check that the steady state that I got you just check that whether it is a stable steady state or unstable steady state. So, you the you do the standard sort of analysis, you consider deviations from the steady state.  So, these are my perturbations away from the steady state, you write down the how do these perturbations evolve in time. So, you get this 2 cross 2 matrix, you find out the eigenvalues. If the eigenvalues are positive, the perturbations will grow in time, if the eigenvalues are negative, the perturbations will die away in time standard linear stability analysis. So, you find out in this case again the matrix is chosen such a simple way that these eigenvalues it is a degenerate. So, both the eigenvalues in the same it is minus 1 ok, which means that this steady state is a stable steady state. If you if you are looking at this inside a single cell and you perturb the concentrations away from this 1 1 steady state, it would come back very quickly to that steady state, it is stable against perturbations ok. So, now what I want to do is that you want to couple these. So, you introduce space use let us start with a single simple 2 cell model. Let us say there are only 2 cells and they are coupled to each other, the 2 species can then hop between these 2 neighboring cells with some sort of a diffusion coefficient dx and dy. So, in addition to this chemical kinetics, I introduce this diffusion and the idea is this that when when there was no cross talk, I know that 1 it was 1 1 over here and it was 1 1 over here ok. So, I might naively assume that even when there is cross talk ultimately what diffusion wants to do is that it wants to get rid of any sort of inhomogeneities right, it wants to smoothen away any fluctuations. So, I naively I might assume that it will remain at 1 1 throughout provided right. So, if these were already in steady state just by because of the fact that I have coupled them should not change anything, maybe it will remain at 1 1 2 throughout. What Turing did was that he realized that this is not necessarily the case. What was a steady state in the absence of diffusion? Once you introduce diffusion, you can make that steady state unstable ok. So, that is what we will try to show in this simple model. So, now I have two cells. So, let me say that the concentration in cell 1 I write as x 1 and y 1 and the concentration in cell 2 I write as x 2 and y 2 is the same kinetics 5 x minus 6 y plus 1 5 x minus 6 y plus 1 except now I have a diffusion light term. It is not really diffusion because it is just two cells, but whatever it is a diffusion light term it wants to sort of erase out any inhomogeneities. If one is greater than the other, it will flow from the greater side to the lesser side with some sort of a diffusion coefficient x for this x species y for this y species. So, when I have these two cells I now have coupled these I now have these equations ok. And now I want to ask that whether does this state 1 1 continue to remain stable against perturbations ok. So, again you define your sort of perturbations.  So, now, because you have four species x 1 y 1 x 2 y 2 you have a 4 cross 4 matrix. So, I am not doing the as it is a simple enough and then you ask that what are the eigen eigen values and so on of this. So, you can do this numerically. So, you need some values of dx and dy to find out the eigen values. So, let us say I choose dx equal to half completely random because this is anyway a toy I just want to illustrate the idea and then you vary your dy. So, remember my x is the activator in this sort of a scenario y is the inhibitor. So, for the activator I have chosen half for the inhibitor I will choose I will vary that ok. And I will plot the largest eigen value of this matrix. So, what it shows is that there is a range of values of dy. So, let us say dy which is greater than roughly 1 ok where this largest eigen value becomes positive right which means that you have now destabilize this steady state this 1 1 steady state you have now destabilized it against perturbation. Simply by introducing a differential diffusion you cannot do it if the diffusion coefficients are exactly the same. But if the inhibitor diffusion constant is actually greater than this activator diffusion constant if it is lower also it will not happen. But if it is greater than this activator diffusion constant then you will have a regime where this 1 1 state will become unstable ok. So, this was sort of Turing's main idea that you can take a steady state which is steady in the absence of any coupling and once you couple it to various cells or basically you introduce space you introduce diffusion you can make that stable steady state unstable with respect to perturbations. You can now extend this. So, you can now say that well of course, there are many many cells for example, introsopilar whatever organism that you are thinking of there are many many cells like this and there is a diffusion between diffusion of this x and y between these many cells ok. And of course, you can write any chemical kinetics whatever is the appropriate chemical kinetics that you have between this x and y f and g are this 5x minus 6 y and 6x minus 7 y. So, I have just written it generically in this case some f and g this is my chemical kinetics and it is some steady state h and k x y equal to h k. So, again I can look at perturbations away from this steady state and look at how to describe those perturbations.  If you are writing in continuum this is just d times del 2 c del x 2 right and you consider perturbations away from this steady state and you see what happens to these perturbations.  So, a is like del f del x at h k b is del f del y at h k and so on what else do I have a b a 1 b 1 a 2 b 2 a 1 b 1 a 2 is del g del x and so on right. So, you do a linear stability analysis all right I already have this here. So, you do a 1 b 1 a 2 b 2 are just the partial derivatives of these chemical kinetics terms around the steady state. And then again I consider this sort of trial solutions and I find out what are these eigenvalues lambda. So, this is what this dx dt and dy dt gives me typically if I. So, what I have done is that I have just said that lambda is large and expanded these exponentials and I get some sort of an equation. So, I will do this concretely for some values of f and g I just want to show the main idea now ok. So, you look at how these perturbations grow with time and you can find out the eigenvalues.  So, this is plotted for some particular choice of a 1 a 2 b 1 b 2 and again x is the activator y is the inhibitor. So, I have taken the diffusion coefficient of y to be much higher than the diffusion coefficient of the x and again you will see that the largest eigenvalue there is some regime where the largest eigenvalue is positive which means that you will have this steady state becoming unstable. Not only that you will have some the perturbation that will grow that will grow with some characteristic wavelength and you can find out that characteristic wavelength as well and there is some particular wavelength which has the highest eigenvalue which means that if you waited long enough this eigenvalue would be the this wavelength would be the wavelength that you would see in your in the steady state in the infinite times of the limit all other wavelengths would sort of die out ok. So, at small times you would see solutions which were combination of all these eigenvalues which have all these wavelengths which had positive eigenvalues if you waited long enough only this one would survive and that is the dominant wavelength that you would see. So, that that is basically the idea. If you now so, if you now see a particular choice of this F and G. So, here is one particular model it is called the Schnackenberg kinetics. So, you put some sort of chemical kinetics between F and G you start initially from a uniform steady state ok and what you so, this axis is sort of time this axis is space ok. So, you start off with initially everything well mixed and then as time goes on you will see you will get patterns. So, red let us say I am plotting one of the species. So, red is the highest concentration blue is the lowest concentration. So, you will get some sort of patterns that are emerging. So, starting from an initial well mixed state depending on the whatever particular chemical kinetics that you choose you will get some sort of pattern. This is a 1D example you can do this similar business for example, in 2D again for that similar sort of kinetics the same kinetics as before Schnackenberg except now I have two dimensional space. So, this is x and this is y and then in certain limits for certain parameter values of this diffusion coefficients you will see that you will get maybe the spot like patterns ok. So, in in these regions the intensity is very high in between in this blue regions the intensity is very low and again these forms spontaneously. So, you start from the steady state which was steady state of this uncoupled models and then that is you give a small perturbation. The steady state is unstable against perturbations and you get some sort of wavelength which is maybe the distance between these spots and so on you get some dominant wavelength in the large time limit which will slowly emerge. So, this was basically Turing's idea that how do you get this large scale pattern formation starting from spontaneously in some sense starting from this sort of chemical kinetics and adding in diffusion. So, what Turing wanted to do was to sort of Turing was thinking about these various patterns that occur in nature like zebra stripes and various you know animals and so on. It turns out that this is not a very good model maybe for these sort of things because if you think about if you say that well I have a tiger and I have to form the spot stripes of a tiger and some chemicals are diffusing and so on you could ask that what is the time scales it would take given the size of the tiger and it turns out diffusion is not a good mechanism for that. The diffusive time scales are too small, but on the length scales of an embryo and so on. So, for in the context of this development these processes are actually important. So, what happens in this animal coat patterning and so on is slightly different it is not really this sort of a thing, but in the context of this development of embryos and so on where this length scales are some tens or hundreds of microns may be not very large. The initial sort of patterning that happens like this hunchback or whatever you can think in terms of these sort of reaction diffusion systems. So, I think I will stop here. So, what I will do is that I will take this generic so you can ask that well will I always get a pattern right. So, what are the conditions? So, given chemical kinetics some given some dx dt and dy dt equal to some f and some g x comma y plus some dx dy. When will I actually what I have shown is that it is possible to form these sort of orders. So, I have chosen the parameters such that you see these nice sort of spots or stripes or whatever coming out. It is not true that whatever dx dy or whatever rate constants you choose in your chemical kinetics you will always see order ok. So, there are some constraints on that and that one can work out very nicely mathematically analytically you can show very nicely that when you will get nice order like this that emerges. So, that I will leave for next class because I do not want to break in the middle. So, what I will do is the generic theory of these sort of reaction diffusion systems and try to answer the question that what conditions must this f and g and this dx and dy satisfy in order to destabilize this steady state and form some sort of a pattern. So, that is what I will do next class. I have this code for this Schneckenberg kinetics in MATLAB I can upload that on Moodle and you can play around with it and check that when these patterns come and when do they not come and so on ok.


that leads us to a question from one of our viewers, Marvin, who asks, how does one approach a friend, as you're saying, Josh, or someone who is born Protestant, who, if you know fault of their own really and they're raising, doesn't know about the church, how do we introduce them to Catholicism with charity and truth? Father? Actually, I think that's a good question for Joshua, but I think that the primary thing is two things, truth through with charity. I mean, it really does boil down to being charitable to them because then they see there's no animus if you actually see what's what they, what's, what you're seeking, what's good for them. But then also the truth, I think, I think a lot of times they're, especially if they're, a lot of the Protestants today are uncatakized even in their own religion. So a lot of times they're actually more open if you just, if you're just very rational, calm, and they see that you're a normal person and you just want the best for them. A lot of times just presenting them things here and there will get them thinking and then they'll actually, that will, that's kind of a segue because I think that, you know, even though they're Protestants, they still have reason, they still have use of reason and as a result, if you appeal to that, I think that's the segue into getting them to give, you know, serious considerations to what they believe. Josh, that sounds like what you were saying before. Yeah, I mean, I can tell you from my experience, the way it really started for me is I had about a decade's worth of just studying scripture carefully and I couldn't reconcile Paul and Christ if, if what Paul meant was what most Protestant sects in one form or another said that he meant. And so I actually tell my Protestant friends, reading the Bible carefully is what really sent me toward Catholicism. And I could give a million examples of that. But, but I didn't read a single church father until June of 2017. But by that time, I was already convinced pretty much that some Protestant ideas were wrong. And I will say the Lord has seen fit to, I mean, I'm constantly having new conversations with Protestant friends. And a lot of it has happened, you know, social media brings a lot of evil into this world. But not, it doesn't necessarily have to. I mean, as Steve knows with census Fidelim and whatnot, but I just posted church father quotes, all the time. So many conversations, so many conversions, I've had a number of friends who have already converted. Some were very close. I mean, just today, I don't know him, but a famous Protestant was not really anymore, but named Cameron Batuzzi has a channel called capturing Christianity. And he just announced today that he's converted, because he did an in depth study of the papacy. So, but in my experience, many thoughtful Protestants have actually already kind of maybe thought about some of the issues like, well, how do I get the Bible? Why are we endlessly dividing? There's clearly no basis for that in scripture. So if you kind of scratch the surface with some Protestants, I've often found that there's an openness, not with everybody. And I think Steve definitely knows that. And I definitely know it as well. But if you just present the truth and love, it can go a long way. Steve, we have another question from one of our viewers, Merike. She asks, why did Protestants remove the seven Deutero canonical books from the Bible? And that's a question a lot of apologists field all the time, but go ahead and walk us through that one. Well, let me just think back on what they said on the last one, because I was, I mean, I've been doing that for years going straight, St. Paul Street team, giving out medals of rosaries. I mean, I had the people had mentioned the anti-Catholic Bob Jones University. We had the festival walk around with rosaries. All blessed. The many, many festivals here in the South. Uber, I have, you know, people get in my car, I had rosaries, I had miraculous medals, I had CDs strategically. So when I'm doing 70, I could figure out which CD that person needed is, and it was color coded. So if they were black, I had a black thing on it. No kidding. White at white, Spanish had green. I had it so I could easily see it and give it to them. And I remember having one guy, he was, he was from Valahara. And we were talking about the Cresteros. And by the end of the trip to the airport, he was wanting, he was looking at the movie trailer and was talking about wanting baptism. So


Good morning, everyone. Good morning. My name is Bill Burns, and I'm the president of the Carnegie Endowment. And I am delighted to introduce today's conversation between two terrific friends and colleagues. On the surface, Jeff and Jake might seem pretty unelect. One an Irish Catholic kid from Minnesota who went to Yale, won a Rhodes Scholarship, clerked in the Supreme Court, and became the trusted advisor of a Secretary of State, a vice president, and someone who won the popular vote for president. The other, a Jewish kid from the south side of Long Island who dropped out of college. And his resume includes stints as a farmer on an Israeli kaboots, a humor columnist, a guard at a military prison, a mob reporter, and a foreign correspondent in the Middle East, the latter two I should add distinct but eerily similar assignments. But however varied their paths, Jake and Jeff have emerged as two of the most significant and influential voices of this generation. Engines of new ideas and initiatives in areas like foreign policy and journalism in desperate need of new ideas and initiatives. So we're extraordinarily fortunate that they're sharing the stage this morning to talk about Jake's important recent essay in the country's most important magazine, The Atlantic. It's time. Say that again. You can repeat it. It's time, indeed I think it's past time for some honest stock taking. It's time for a more concerted effort to ensure that America's role in the world reflects the changing international landscape and our enduring strengths. And it's time for American foreign policy to be more intimately connected and responsive to the needs and aspirations of the American people. It's tempting in this era of profound Trumpian dysfunction to think that all we need is a change of presidential leadership to return to normalcy. But it's not that simple. While he has made things far worse, Donald Trump didn't invent all the challenges before us, nor did he create the domestic disconnect between the conceits of all of us in the foreign policy establishment and the frustrations of too many citizens who see too much indiscipline in the way in which we've pursued American foreign policy. The president's three most recent predecessors each began their term with a sharp focus on nation building at home and a self-conscious determination to be rigorous about overseas commitments. But each, in their own way, struggled to marry those words with deeds and build a compelling case for American leadership in the world in the midst of deeply confusing change. So the challenge before us is not just a communications challenge, it's not just a Trump challenge, but a deeper policy challenge. Defining a role for the United States in a world in which we're no longer the singular dominant power, but still the pivotal player, a role which reflects new realities at home and abroad and resonates with the broader American public. That will remain an uphill battle. But I can't think of a better starting point for the conversation than Jake's characteristically thoughtful and eloquent argument. And I can't think of a better partner in that conversation than our favorite former mob reporter, now the remarkable editor and chief of the Atlantic, Jeff Goldberg. We've been extremely fortunate at Carnegie to count Jeff and Jake as two of our own, and we're delighted to have them here with us today. Thank you very much. Thank you, Bill, very much. Leader of the world's most important think tank. Thank you. And thank you, everyone, for coming. And thanks to everyone at the Atlantic and Carnegie for helping set this up. And thanks to Jake for writing a great piece for our magazine. I think all of you have a copy of that issue, or many of you have a copy of that issue. If you haven't read it, please do. It's incredibly thoughtful. We have a lot to talk about, and we can talk about things that are happening even this morning, because the news is the velocity of developments is chaotic at this point. But why don't we start by just stepping back and have you explain, just for a couple of minutes, the core thesis of your argument and explain your view of American exceptionalism and what that means in the making of foreign policy and national security policy. And also try to place your arguments, if you can, on a continuum, not only within the Democratic Party, but on the continuum of how Americans think about our role in the world. So first of all, Bill, thank you for giving us this opportunity and Jeff for giving me space to write the piece in such an august publication as the Atlantic. And thank you all for being here today and look forward to the conversation. You know, as I say at the outset of the piece, the reason I wrote it in part is because I think the pressures on and the questions about America's role in the world go far beyond just Donald Trump's presidency. We are in a moment right now where those of us who believe in an engaged, effective, internationalist orientation to American foreign policy have to define with greater care and purpose what we're aiming for. And so my piece basically argues for reclaiming and renewing the idea of American exceptionalism as a response to this notion of America first. And what I mean by American exceptionalism is not that the US is superior in any kind of innate way, is not better than other countries, nor some notion of sort of love it or leave it, but rather it's a words and all definition, a definition which says the United States has unique capacities and attributes distinct from any other major power today. And I would argue pretty much any other major power in history that allow us at our best to contribute to the national interest and consistent with that also to the global common interest. And basically what the piece does is try to define with some care what those attributes and capacities are and then talk about how we put them in service of an effective American foreign policy. Now, one of the observations I make towards the beginning of the piece which I've struggled with is what is American foreign policy for? We used to have clear answers to this question, particularly during the Cold War, but since the end of the Cold War it's kind of been about just remaining the leader. And the argument that I make in the piece is that when you strip away all of the complexities what it comes down to is trying to protect and defend the American way of life, which by the way is up for debate and grabs right now in its own way. But fundamentally my view is that the main threats and challenges to America's way of life have a common denominator and that is that they all require some form of international cooperation to address. Whether you're talking about the ravages of climate change, the spread of nuclear weapons, the possibility of pandemic disease, the chance that we end up having a recession turn into the next Great Depression. All of these things require concerted action by many actors around the world. And my view is that the United States has a singular capacity to catalyze that cooperation. And that has to be at its core what American foreign policy is about. And where exceptionalism fits into this is that to play that role the rest of the world cannot perceive the United States to just be a normal country acting like a normal great power with normal great power dictates. They have to see something unusual, something exceptional in the attributes and capacities of the United States. And at our best, I believe we have demonstrated that in the ways in which we have helped design and uphold international institutions. And here at home, my argument is that the American people have to believe that we are not just a normal nation with normal responsibilities. And in this way, exceptionalism is an answer to the false choice between globalism and nationalism that Donald Trump has offered us. It is the way that you reconcile a sense of patriotism and purpose about our country and internationalism, a sense that we have some commitment to the larger common interest in the world. Just two last thoughts which kind of connect to where I fall on the spectrum and kind of where I would situate my argument in the current moment. The first is that one kind of segment of the foreign policy community I think is still gripped by nostalgia. It's like we got to get past Donald Trump and get back to doing things the way we were doing them before. I reject that. Even though I have a lot of nostalgia as a child who grew up in the eighties and nineties and I have to confess that part of my argument is rooted in my own personal experience as a kid from Minnesota at the end of the Cold War and after the Berlin Wall falls and I have priors based on that. The way that young people today have priors based on a totally different world in which post-911 you've had a series of failures and follies attended to American foreign policy. But what I basically conclude in the piece is that when a hurricane like Donald Trump comes in and kind of causes great damage to institutions and policies you don't just build back the way you built before. Any mayor of the city hit by a hurricane will say you have to build back better. And that goes for everything from how we get a sharper sense of priorities, how we reconnect our foreign policy decision making to the fortunes of the middle class, how we rebalance the roles of the military and diplomacy, how we think about a genuine conception of burden sharing. And then finally, how we integrate a sense of our own failures, shortcomings, blind spots and weaknesses because the idea that the United States screws up a lot is not in my view a counter argument to my thesis on American exceptionalism. It is built into the argument part of what makes the United States a unique actor I believe is a capacity for self-correction and that exceptionalism in a way is not a definition of reality or a description of reality, it's an aspiration of an ambition. And so even when critics of US foreign policy say but what about this but what about that but what about the other thing all credible critiques of things that have happened in the distant past and the recent past they are in a way I think validating the argument I'm making because they are holding the United States to a different standard. Even America's critics feel the United States should be doing different and better than other great powers and wouldn't say the same thing about why Russia is doing X or Y or why China is doing X or Y. That is a good thing. So just to close out and I'm sorry to have gone on for so long. I don't know exactly where to situate myself largely because I think the spectrum has been warped in a really dramatic way in the last few years and everybody's scrambling to figure out okay where are they situated on it. I think the traditional categories no longer apply and efforts to place people in those categories kind of run aground on like kind of odd anomalies. So just one example in the piece is I make a case that really we should be ending our major military engagements in the Middle East not precipitously but at some point. Now you would say like in the old category that would put me in the retrenchment camp somehow but in fact my whole argument is about less retrenchment and more being out in the world. So how does how to assign me a place right now is I think very difficult. And in our own party the where people are kind of sorting themselves out is still very much in flux. So I don't mean to evade the question but it is I think uniquely hard to answer it in this moment. Right I'll press you to not evade unless you're announcing your candidacy for president in which case please please please evade away. I'm just talking to my family. I just you know are you taking long road trips by yourself and live streaming them to make you. There's a lot to unpack here. Let me start with an undergirding supposition of what you said you talked about when it comes time you implying that when it comes time to rebuild our foreign policy you're setting certain conditions for doing that but we're in the 28th day of a government shutdown. We have a president I'm trying to say this in a nonpartisan way who we have a president about whom there is a debate whether he is an agent of Russian intelligence. We are not scaring anybody in the world. We're not the right we're not gaining a respect of anybody in the world. Why do you believe or why do you suppose that we're not in terminal decline right now and that this question is in itself it's it's it's irrelevant. So it's interesting there is a certain kind of other than that Mrs. Lincoln how is the play quality to this whole argument. I accept that. On the other hand I believe passionately that actually America's metal has been defined not in the periods of as much in the periods of great disruption and chaos when we're struggling and suffering but in their aftermath when we actually have done a good job of cratering out and then finding our way back. And so I think we have the capacity to do that. Number one, number two, I still believe that a lot of the fundamental underlying elements that power America's unique capacities are very much present whether you're talking about our continuing edge and innovation or you're talking about the resilience of our institutions which I believe to this day as much as Donald Trump has tried to assault them have stood the test or whether you're talking about in my view a continued demand signal from many parts of the world that the United States not long does that demand signal not forever does it last for two more years or six more years. Well you know I've said in other places that I actually believe the difference between one term of Donald Trump and two terms of Donald Trump is not the difference between one X and two X. I think it's like one X and then X to the N power because the idea that we've made a colossal mistake which will never be erased off of the blotter sheet of American politics. We still talk about Buchanan and Andrew Johnson. Sure and we will never be the country that didn't elect Donald Trump but I think having the American people go ahead and ratify that choice a second time will cause in my view a much more fundamental readjustment of relationships and expectations about the US whereas if someone else is elected in 2021 they are not gonna walk into a world where they can just reclaim the mantle that existed five or 10 years ago. They are going to walk into a world where a refined and effective style of American leadership still has a real place and I'll just give you one example on this. If you look at the Trans-Pacific Partnership which my former boss Hillary Clinton and her primary opponent repudiated and Donald Trump walked away from the other 11 countries went ahead with it with a minimum number of variances to what the US had negotiated with the hope that the United States will come back and be a part of that. And I think there are other examples like that in the world where it's not just people are sitting around waiting by any stretch but where they are continuing to factor in the hope and expectation that the United States can rebound from this as we have rebounded from significant failures and screw-ups in the past and that this capacity for self-correction which I think is at the heart of exceptionalism is a real thing. The last thing I would say is I'm very mindful. I'm not rosy-eyed. I mean I've been out in the world at times when the US has been showing less than its kind of most effective face to the world. So during the debt ceiling crisis in 2011 when it looked like the United States might not be good for its debts. Hillary was Secretary of State and was on a trip that included a stop in Greece where we were trying to tell the Greeks why don't you get your house in order. And they kind of looked at us like, are you kidding me? And then she ended up in Hong Kong to give a big speech about America's economic strategy in Asia and had to pause midway through the speech and say I just want to tell everyone here America's going to be good for it. We're good for our money which kind of had this feeling of like holy cow. But when you have to tell somebody you're good for the money. Yeah, it really felt that way and then you know Dai Binguo who she met with the next day in Shenzhen China just kind of lecturing her about how screwed up democracy is is a form of government that it could come to this. And so there were real questions about whether what we're showing in respect to our model is eroding something in a more secular way as you say on the sort of downward trend line. Keep on that subject for a minute because I mean three years ago three, four years ago when Barack Obama said the arc of history is long but it's bending toward justice, quoting King. Most people in the foreign policy community still believe that democracy had the wind at its back. Do you feel fundamentally differently about it now? Is history not an arrow going forward toward democratic market capitalism or are we just destined to cycle endlessly through periods of autocracy and democracy? Well, I guess the way that I look at this is that... That'll be your only essay question. So as you contemplate running for president. Yeah, history did not end in 1989 or 1991 or 1993 but it also didn't end in 2016. I mean I do think that we have a tendency in the West to lose sight of the fact that confidence is itself a commodity, that like having faith in who you are and what you are has a big impact on the answer to your question. And the more we say to ourselves like, oh, it's just all over. It's Brexit and Trump and the EU's going to pot and look at how powerful China is in this state. But all those things are true. They are and they aren't, this is kind of the argument that I'm making. The jury is still out on whether all of those things are true. Are there immense pressures at every level on America's democracy right now? There are. Has the story been written as to whether we come out the other side of this in a way where we've either resolved or managed to ameliorate some of the worst stresses and pressures? I think that's still very much a possibility. And I think things like the way the midterm elections played out, as I said before, the way that the American judiciary has responded. And for me, even when you look at Europe and see so many kind of negative trends and factors, I see resilience, like signs of significant resilience there as well. And the other thing is if you look back through history, even through the history of the Cold War, there have been times before where the story has been, it's kind of over for the US or it's over for this particular model and we've come back. And I do think things are different today than say when we were grappling with the rise of Japan, but I do not accept an argument which says, well, it turns out actually the state authoritarian capitalism model is just gonna be a better and more effective model or that we're gonna be locked in a permanent contest forever on this. I don't believe that democracy is going to sweep the world but I do believe that the kind of current thinking around how badly it is eroding is drawing conclusions prematurely. Talk for a minute about what our friend Ben Rhodes referred to as the blob. The foreign policy elite that is located within 500 feet of this building. Amazingly, the Massachusetts in 17th Avenue. What, in retrospect, what did the blob get wrong about the American people and their proclivities? You know, I find it's so hard to answer the question today about what the American people's proclivities are with respect to foreign policy because I think there's such a deep ambivalence.  Everyone would be like, yeah. Well, that was an Obama position. That sounds right. Articulated slightly differently than Donald Trump articulates it but that was an Obama position. Exactly, right. And Bob Gates went out and his farewell tour was essentially castigating our NATO allies for not paying up. People say, yeah, that's right. Then if you said NATO's been the most successful military alliance in history and it is super important to the long-term sustainment of American power and influence and to your own safety and security, they'd say, yeah, that's right. And that's not because they're fickle or something. It's because I think the American people actually do have, in a more instinctive way than sitting and doing the study that we do of these issues, a fairly complex but fairly accurate picture of kind of American internationalism. And so I actually believe that while there are parts of Trump's America first that certainly resonate, some of these underlying arguments about the United States engaging in international cooperation, having alliances, needing to step up to play a key role on some of these big issues, that there continues to be a real current and that we should not caricature the American people as essentially all having kind of bought into or embodied Trump's argument. That being said, I think the single biggest failure, and I say this in the piece, of the foreign policy community, and I have to count myself among this, is to sharply divide between foreign and domestic. To say we do all the foreign stuff and those domestic people let them figure it out. And that even goes for something like the negotiation of trade agreements. So I went around saying TPP is the best thing ever and if someone had actually asked me to write down on a piece of paper, what exactly is in TPP and what are the trade-offs between corporate interests and labor and I'd be like, well that's someone else's job, I don't do that, I just kind of think about big strategy. And I think that the blurring line between foreign and domestic is an absolute feature of our age and that the situation room should be a place where the question what in our foreign policy can help strengthen, sustain or reverse the hollowing out of the American middle class, that should be a much more paramount question than it is today. Well let's bring it to the growing democratic field for 2020 and I'll step back from it and say obviously I covered the 16, covered you in fact and wrote pieces about the difference between the way Hillary Clinton viewed the world and the way Barack Obama viewed the world. Hillary, to use the cliche, Hillary always presented as more muscular in her approach to foreign policy, a little bit more rambunctious, a little bit more in the exceptionalist camp. Obama had a different definition of American exceptionalism. It was our ability to self correct internally that made us different than other countries and Hillary had a more outward looking, we won the Cold War, we defeated the Nazis, we did all of these things, we guarantee the safety of the sea lanes. The party moved in Obama's direction. Today it seems in the field that's the growing field that your views, certainly Hillary Clinton's views are would be in the minority, that I'm not saying that everybody is close to Sanders yet, but there is a growing feeling in the democratic base as it moves left that America does not play a good role and that America historically has not played a useful or good or healthy moral role in the management of the planet and therefore it's manifesting itself as a kind of doppelganger, kind of reflection of Trump's own isolationism. I mean, because Trump articulates it in a populist way, we're not so great anyway, who thinks we're so great. So analyze if you can and you can depersonalize it or it'd be more interesting for the audience if you actually personalized it and talked about the individual candidates. But what's the trend line and what makes you worried about the trends and what gives you some comfort about the trends? I think there's a fascinating thing happening right now where the debate between Hillary and Bernie in 2016 has not in a real way carried forward into 2018, 2019. It's a fundamentally different debate. It's not the debate between more of the kind of come home America, why are we doing all these wars in the Middle East divide where I think there is very much shrinking support in the Democratic Party for the kinds of policies Hillary was putting forward in 2016, including things like a no-fly zone in Syria. But that's a shrinking core of the party. But what's intriguing is that in 2019, it is the left of the party. It is the Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warrens of the party who are arguing that there is in a way a clash of models in the world that to defend progressive policy at home, you need to take on the Chinas and Russians of the world who are not just acting defensively against American encroachment of democracy, but are acting offensively in the world to advance their own models. And if you read Bernie Sanders' speech at Seis from a few months ago or Elizabeth Warren's foreign policy article, they are not in the mode of the post-Iraq war Democratic Party. They're in the mode of a new geopolitical competition and how do we go about defining the terms of that competition, Democratic Party. And so to me that some of the kind of fundamental underlying questions about allies, about values, about whether the United States needs to be engaged in the world, those are now points of consensus. And the real divides are gonna be about how much of it is the more traditional modes of dealing with a China, South China Sea, Taiwan, et cetera versus how much emphasis are we going to place on the kind of economic policy being the dominant mode by which the United States engages in the world. But from an orientation perspective, I think it's very hard to find someone in the Democratic Party who's not kind of stepping up right now and saying America first is wrong and the US has to be up and out there. It's just now to me, the left is trying to figure out in this slightly uncomfortable space, what are the parameters around that? One of the big ones is no use of military force but beyond that, if you just look at the rhetoric, it sounds in a pretty muscular aggressive take on the current nature of America's competition with its main adversaries in the world, including from the standard bearers of the left side of the Democratic Party. Right, well, I mean, especially on the Russia question, there's a new understanding and new emphasis on Russia's adversarial role for some set of obvious reasons. There are a lot of old cold warriors and hawks who are sort of saying to these left Democrats, welcome to understanding the Kremlin, to our understanding of the Kremlin. But that's true with Russia, absolutely. And there's a part of the left, there's a part of the sort of intercept left that would kind of question that on Russia but you're not gonna find a candidate. But the Rachel Maddow left is all there. Yeah, you're not gonna find a candidate who a significant candidate for president other than Tulsa Gabbard in the Democratic Party who is going to espouse something different on Russia which is interesting. And then on China, if you asked Elizabeth Warren or Joe Biden to give a lay down of China, its intentions, their perceptions of what the nature of the US-China relationship is and then you took the name off the top and I handed it to you, you might be able to tell the difference based on the emphasis on say the economic side versus the strategic side. But you wouldn't be able to tell based on a sense that this is now a competitive relationship. We're not gonna have a debate in the Democratic Party about kind of accommodation versus competition. The whole party sort of moves there because it's all centered around this argument of the model and the idea that these state capitalist systems have found ways to make common cause with elements within Western society to advance corruption and kleptocracy and the like and we need to root that out. That's kind of the argument on the left. We're gonna go to questions from the audience in a minute but let me just follow this with one other question. There's a fear on the part of let's say centrist Democrats, whatever that means at the moment that the narrative, let's say certainly of the it's of the young activist freshman congresspeople who just came in and of the internet Democratic left that the narrative about America's role in the world is America has been a force for, it's not evil then malign intent and that American history can be understood, American history overseas can be understood in kind of a Howard Zinn model. It's a series of incidents in which America did bad things to indigenous peoples from Iran to Latin America, et cetera. And I'm wondering you're deep in the discussion now about how to orient the Democratic party in 2020. Do you feel like that narrative is taking hold or do you think that the candidates including those who drift to the left have another understanding of this? Because that will define the policy vis-a-vis Trump's sort of instinctual isolationism. I think that when candidates go from either being sort of outside activists or even freshman members to saying I'm seeking the presidency of the United States, in a way they're almost already buying into the idea that that can be a positive thing, that the instruments of power they would get if they got that job or something that they could use as a force for good. And so I don't believe you're going to hear a lot of that kind of rhetoric in the presidential race. And the other thing that I would say is teaching young people now who have real questions, like they look at me like I have two heads when I first raised the issue of American exceptionalism. They're like, what about the war on Iraq, the global financial crisis, Abu Ghraib, Gitmo and it's like these are all pretty fair points. But what they believe passionately in, and I think this is true of many of the young freshman members in Congress who do see the American story as being one of original sin, is a view that of interconnectedness, that the great challenges of our time have to be grappled with through building kind of cooperative networks to solve problems. And especially with young people, this is such a powerful mindset. It goes beyond just servicing government. It goes to every sector of our society and our economy. And so I think an argument that accepts the failures and flaws in US foreign policy stares them in the face and then says, okay, how do we correct from that? And then how do we harness this incredible energy to do the thing that American strategy has to do? Which is to build those networks and participate in those networks to solve these big problems. I actually believe there is scope for the kind of argument I'm making to have real purchase with even people who come at this from a deeply skeptical perspective about the history of American foreign policy, who don't buy the Hillary Clinton we defeated the Nazis in communism, but think much more about Iran and Guatemala and the war in Iraq. When finally, which of the Democrats in the field are coming into the field now, strike you as having the most sophisticated foreign policy understanding and the best chance of countering Trumpism on the global stage? Whoa. Limit yourself to like eight. Well, I'll answer the first one. I think it is very hard to argue that anyone can't come close to matching Joe Biden's foreign policy experience. I mean, and look, I'm biased. I served as his national security advisor, but I actually watched him with... That was the golden age of Biden's understanding of foreign policy. That's right, so of course I taught him, no, no, not at all. I learned just a ridiculous amount from the guy. I mean, he's in a different class in terms of experience, understanding relationships in the whole nine yards, and is also someone who, because he didn't have to go through the debate in 2016 vis-a-vis Bernie, has been able to step back a bit and watch how this is unfolded. And I think he's very much grappling with, particularly the intersection of the foreign and the domestic and how to build and affect a policy. But beyond that, you have a whole lot of really exciting candidates who don't have a lot of foreign policy experience or exposure. And yet recognize that this is gonna be part of the ante to being taken. So I can't tell you right now, but let's come back here in six months and we can kind of handicap them. My view is a lot remains to be seen from many of the people who are sort of seen as top tier candidates because their experience in respect to foreign policy or even their way of talking about it is very limited. And even people like Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders do not have a long history of talking about and framing a coherent view on foreign policy and are just working through that now. So I think the next six months are incredibly exciting from the perspective of seeing how this debate gets shaped and who's coming forward, not just with kind of abstract ideas, but with kind of interesting and creative new agenda items that could give real voice or force to... And if they use the term exceptional, describe what role they want America to play in the world, will the base accept that or were they rejected? I don't think so. I mean, look, I struggled with using the phrase exceptionalism in this piece and I would ask anyone who just is like, I don't like the word, to take the underlying argument and say, do I basically buy what he's saying? Because I think the argument works with the word or without the word. The reason that I feel it was important to rescue this concept or to try to lay down a marker for rescuing this concept is maybe at the end of the day, we all move to say, okay, we can come together around the idea of unique attributes and capacities and a leading role for the United States and the world along these lines, but let's put the word aside, that'd be a fine outcome for me if that's where we got. I think we have mics and there's a hand over here, so let's just go right there in the back and then we'll come down in the front. And please make your questions in the form of a question. Right. No mind for a time. Joe Bosco formally with the Defense Department. It's nice to see you again, Jake. Mr. Burns in his introduction made the statement that Trump inherited a mess in foreign policy, but he's made things worse. I would ask you, Jake, if that is an applicable statement to East Asia, given what Trump has accomplished with Taiwan, North Korea, and China. I'm not sure what he's accomplished with Taiwan. And I think with North Korea, probably the best that can be said for Trump is that he has ameliorated a crisis of his own making in ratcheting up the possibility of war and then ratcheting it down. But on the underlying question of whether he's made any progress towards reducing or eliminating the stockpiles of missiles and nuclear weapons, of course, the answer to that is no. He's faced the same conundrum on that issue, by the way, as President Clinton did, President Bush did, and President Obama did. I don't think he's done better or worse really on North Korea. And then when it comes to China, I think there are two ways of looking at this. One way is to say, are we going to get them to make modest adjustments by imposing these tariffs that when they buy some more American products and shift their market access rules slightly, I think we will get there. And if you're judging success vis-a-vis China based on that, then that's one for the Trump column. But I think in terms of overall Chinese influence in the region and the overall sense from the Chinese perspective that their strategy is advanced by having an American president who's undermining alliances, pulling out of a Trans-Pacific Partnership, having no vision for any kind of multilateral architectural arrangements in the region, they're sitting there thinking, yeah, that's probably pretty good. We don't like how this is going on the economic front, but from the overall long-term strategic position in the United States and China, I think it has been a series of steps over the last two years that have put us in a manifestly worse place. That being said, one of the things that I constantly struggle with when I watch Trump is the question of how much leverage the US actually has in the world and how to use it. And people said at the beginning of this trade war, well, obviously China has all the leverage and the US is gonna have to give in. People today are not saying that anymore because I think there is a broad misperception of just America's weight and gravitational pull and strength and so forth. And so if you want a more benign, effective, enlightened kind of approach in the world, but yet you want to also be able to use your leverage to get outcomes, how do you take lessons from the Trump administration about where maybe we left things on the shelf that we could have put to use? Could we have been tougher on China vis-a-vis intellectual problems? Put it. Could we have thought about how to accompany the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran with the tougher strategy vis-a-vis Iran across the Middle East? I think we probably could have. So these are things that I think we have to grapple with as we try to orient away is is there stuff to learn from how nations react to someone like Trump that can be more positively applied if we get a different president. On the shoresline from the Atlantic Council, I have a question about trade policy. Traditionally, the Democrats have been predominantly protectionist and the Republicans thoroughly pre-trading. Now Trump has managed to turn the GOP extremely protectionist. How do you see that influencing the Democratic Party on trade policy? Thank you. Yeah, I mean, look, I basically believe that advancing a major trade agreement during an election year is gonna pull out, put a lot of antibodies out that otherwise don't necessarily exist. The story of the Democratic Party, even over the last 25 years is more complicated than I think your question allows for. That there is much more openness to free trade among Democrats than it has historically been. It's just when you have TPP land in the heart of an election season and you're kind of fighting. If this is the only economic policy coming out at the end of the term, it's obviously gonna take on added weight. I believe that even trade skeptical Democrats in running in 2020, even those who say, yes, we should be getting tougher on China are going to advance an argument that says we need to deepen our trading links and set the rules of the road with like-minded states in both Europe and Asia. I think that is going to be a kind of common denominator and the question will just be, okay, what are the content of those rules? Where a warren or a Bernie is gonna have a more aggressive view of what a new style of trade arrangement or economic arrangement looks like than some of the other candidates. But I don't believe you're just gonna get the same kind of protectionist rhetoric that you hear from Trump on the Democratic side. And I think the Democratic electorate is going to be very open to an argument which says, yes, let's drive a hard bargain for a level playing field, but for goodness sakes, let's work with our allies and partners on rules of the road that can help us accomplish that and not just try to do it all by our own. There was a question over here. Thanks very much, Lin Weil. Thanks to you both for a fascinating and important conversation. Ambassador Burns indicated at the beginning that this is not just a Trump question, not just a communications question, but a policy question, but it is also a Trump and a communications question. And with all due respect to the blob present company included, this case needs to be made to the American people in a broader sense and beyond the nation's most consequential magazine, perhaps before the presidential campaign really starts heating up for 2020. What ways do you envision making this case to the broader American public through means that will reach more people in a timely fashion? Well, first of all, I think this is in my view. YouTube, he wants to say YouTube. He's just going on YouTube. That's what he means. My YouTube channel. Yeah, the Jake Sullivan YouTube channel. I'll be on, yes, I'll be, I'll be just live 24 hours a day speaking about. Jake Kardashian. I actually think it is incumbent on the policy debate in 2019 for better or worse is going to be defined by the Democratic primary combined with its interaction with Donald Trump and how those things intersect. That is where the locus of energy, activity and attention is going to be. And therefore, for those of us who care passionately about these issues, trying to elevate the degree to which candidates who are going to be largely focused on domestic policy actually lift up this case is going to be the only way I think you are going to credibly break through to people. And I also believe that it has to come down to a pretty simple proposition around a view of America standing in the world. That when you kind of look at the numbers or look at the focus groups, however much people have complicated and mixed feelings about what we're doing here or there on this issue or that issue, the one thing that resonates with folks is they care that America is respected and that America has friends and that America can be able to effectively work with others to enhance security and prosperity. I think a very simple argument that there has been a loss of that, a degradation of that and we need to get that back is a place to start. And I think if that is happening in stereo for Democratic candidates, even as they hash out some of the differences that we've been describing up here, it will make a huge difference to setting the table for effectively debating Donald Trump in 2020. And there are things like, the fact that people literally were laughing in the UN has a visceral kind of quality to it. People don't want the American president to be laughed at by the world literally. So I think that's, for me, stripping away a lot of the larger high-minded stuff, just driving hard at that argument is incredibly important.  I mean, we've known for years, everybody in this room knows that if you take a poll of the American people, people believe that we spend 10, 20, 30% of our budget on foreign aid. And we've seen this and people are impervious to some degree, these polls, at least, are impervious to distribution of accurate information about that. We're in a unique and challenging environment. And I think the more responsible gatekeepers, this isn't, I'm talking about the MSM and for all of its flaws, it's still functioned as a filter for a lot of bad information. The gates have come down and you combine that with, and these are not unrelated, you combine that with a president, with a unique relationship to the truth, which is to say, when he's caught in a lie, he simply doubles down on the lie and just keeps pushing it out and it penetrates.  I just, it's not. You know, it's interesting you say that because I, why, you know, when I was struggling with this idea of American exceptionalism, part of what was motivating me was a basic view that we've got to evoke a feeling. Donald Trump evokes a feeling in people and just making kind of cold arguments about how it's in our national interest to be part of the Paris Climate Agreement because we're getting every country to put its, you know, their commitments down on paper. Doesn't motivate in a way that I think kind of calling people to a sense of patriotism and purpose can. And the question is, are we at a moment right now where people are so kind of cynical and fed up they won't buy it? I believe, and I think there's some evidence for this, that Trump has produced a set of antibodies where people are more, not everyone, but more people are more open to that kind of argument than before. And that's, that is part of what was motivating me to write this, was not the policy argument, but more the argument just to break through this miasma that Jeff has described with something that's just more visceral, more about. And what's strange about that, okay, but what's strange about that is that you have the Secretary of State publicly renaming his department of swagger, you know, which is, it's, but there's something, it's odd. But put it this way, it's not something that Bill Burns wouldn't necessarily say. But it does go to that visceral like we are, I mean, he has a feeling that we're number one. It's a different understanding of exceptionalism, but it's not a feeling that Trump, who's much more transactional in his understanding of the world, has. So there's some weird evidence of that feeling still in the, even in the administration. There was a question over here and then I wanna go Bill Galston if we can. I don't know how many questions we have for the talk. My name is Gararoba, I'm a Rotary Peace Fellow at Duke and I'm from Minnesota. So my question is about Trump's policy on Africa, which is the last on the bucket, I think. And the argument is about really encountering China or other influence in Africa. So I don't know if you have a chance to read what Grant Harrison, your colleague, wrote basically saying it's kind of destined to fail. So if you have any comment on that one. Thank you. Yeah, I mean, I think, look, it's hard for me to speak to Trump's policy towards Africa because I think he's just sort of let whatever was running run more or less on autopilot and if you look at the documents that this administration has prepared around Africa, they look pretty similar to what's come before. When I was working for Secretary Clinton, she went to Senegal and gave a speech kind of comparing an investment strategy for Africa versus an extraction strategy for Africa with her argument being if we do it right, the United States, the European Union, other significant donors from around the world, the Koreans, the Japanese, Latin American countries could really double down on a strategy that invests in people in human capital and institutions while the Chinese have an approach that is very fundamentally about extracting resources, basically. We are not gonna be able to compete with China on money in Africa. It's just not going to happen. But when you can't outspend somebody, you have to be able to out persuade, out inspire and ultimately out vision them. And I do think that is something that is available to the United States and like-minded friends and partners around the world if we elevated that priority over time. And don't just think about Africa as a chessboard for great power competition, Cold War style, but rather think about a more positive vision for how you put to work. What have been good words but too often not followed up by good deeds. So my take is we have assets to bring to bear that don't show up on the straight balance sheet where we can't compete with the Chinese that we aren't fully putting to use but could and would I think have great receptivity in a set of countries that's looking at China right now and kind of saying, is this a good deal for us at the end of the day? We have only time for one more question. I'm sorry, I asked Bill Galston to ask it. Thank you. Oh, Bill is over here. Let's do two questions then. I'll make it really quick. Ownership of 90%. Thank you very much for- Thank you two together. We'll hands it out, yeah. Thank you very much for an excellent dialogue. And I wanted to ask, if you wanted to know in administration's security strategy, international relations strategy, you can look not at the most ridiculous recent tweets but at the actual national security strategy and the Trump administration's national security strategy, national defense strategy is the first since the end of the Cold War to refocus the United States towards countering great power rivals, Russia and China. You saw during the Obama administration in his debate with Mitt Romney in 2012, yucking it up about Russia being a threat. You saw Hillary Clinton's reset with the Russians. She not only misspelled the word and wrote it in the wrong alphabet showing a certain derision and contempt for Russia and lack of taking- So can you get to the question? Yeah, so the question is what do you make of the role of the Trump administration's official words and actions, restructuring the military and restructuring defense to the greatest extent since 1973 in terms of the future direction of America's role in the world? And why don't you just let ask Bill to just ask his question and Jake can wrap it up. That's Bill Ballston. Yeah. My question was evoked by what you said, Jake, about the need to appeal to something more visceral than high-mindedness. Has there ever been a major mobilization of American power and foreign policy in the world that wasn't guided by fear? Is it possible to have the kind of engaged foreign policy that you're talking about without naming our enemies in a way that ties into the question you just got? I think the answer to that question is no, but you may disagree. Well, it's interesting. I've thought a lot about this. So first, I think this is what's so dangerous about the trend lines in the US-China relationship because turning China into the big great enemy works for kind of everybody. It works on the left in it's the galvanizing force for major investments at home and things. The Chinese do early childhood education. We have to do it too kind of thing. It works for people on the right for obvious reasons. And I think that is ultimately going to be a self-defeating approach to an incredibly complicated, interconnected relationship. But to me, that may be where we're headed if we are not careful and don't think hard about it. To more directly answer your question though, there is an example. It is a very checkered example and it's basically TR bringing the United States into the world where he wasn't saying there's some great enemy out there. He was basically saying we, the United States of America, have to become a global player. Now, that involved colonialism. It involved jingoism. It involved racism. But if you go back and look at that period, it's quite interesting because there was a certain character to his argument starting with Mahan in 1890 and then through Roosevelt that was very much just about a view that said the U.S. is this young, energetic nation that has to be out there engaged in the world for our own interests but also for the betterment of the world. And what I'm arguing in a way is if you can strip away some, and these were court at the time, so I'm not saying they were peripheral, but some of the elements of what was driving that and captured the spirit and the essence of it, you actually saw major changes in U.S. foreign policy and a president willing to implement them without us having some sense of a single great adversary. That being said, I agree with you, especially post-Cold War. We have a certain muscle memory for how this works and if you don't have an organizing villain to fight against, it's harder to just do it in a disembodied way. So I would like to thread the needle and not turn China into the great enemy and see them for the challenge that they are, but still galvanize this and whether that's possible or not. I'm a little less just dismissive of the idea that it's completely impossible than maybe your question suggests, but I totally respect and validate that you may be right. Just the final word on the Trump administration and the national security strategy. I mean, I guess the way that I look at this is if you look at the gap between the words on the page about investing in alliances or even about defense modernization and then what's actually happened. I don't think that gap is just the difference between what he writes in tweets and what's written on the page. There is a significant body language, priority, posture, signaling and policy gap between what the administration's actually done and what's contained in those documents. I do think them having the corrective of saying the great powers are at peace and the real threats are transnational, which was kind of the early Obama mindset that that had to adjust over time. That was a useful corrective on paper. I am less convinced that the way the administration is pursuing its strategy and practice is effectively taking that competition forward against either Russia or China in an effective way. So Jake mentioned Mahan's writing in the 1890s about U.S. global naval power. Oh, that was in the Atlantic? Mahan wrote those articles in the Atlantic. We've been doing this. A little product place for the time. No, we've been doing this a long time. And I think Jake's piece and the issue that you have in your hands is a worthy addition to a long line of great pieces that helped us to understand America's role in the world. So I thank Jake for doing the piece and coming with us today. And thank Bill and everybody here for showing up. I thought it was great. Thank you very much. Thank you.


Next question is from CJ Grundy Fitness. What is the most optimal way to rest between sets? Sit and wait, walk around, light stretching, et cetera? Is there a best way? Not scrolling on Instagram. You know what's crazy though? So I'm guilty of this. So I have had the last week and a half, two weeks has been pretty good as far as training again for me. And yesterday I was in here training. And I've had this habit recently because we're here at work and so much of our business is on the phone and online. And I've catched myself working in between sets, responding to DMs or emails or whatever. And it definitely affects my training. There's a total difference than when I'm like music, I'm blaring rage against the machine or tool in my ears. My phone's nowhere next to me. And I'm like resting is resting. It's a total different space. Yeah, I'm lifting. And when I'm lifting, I'm completely focused on the lift. When I'm resting, I'm enjoying every second of the rest because I know I'm about to get after it again. And there's a total different feel of that workout versus kind of like going through the whole workout with this, I'll get to my set or let me answer these questions. Oh, wow, that 90 second rest period turned into a four minute rest period. And so I mean, for me, I think this is an individual thing too, by the way, because I think there's value in doing some dynamic stuff in between as far as stretching and being connected or whatever you want to do in between. But personally, I like to be in a zone where I'm completely focused on what I'm doing and not being distracted. It's totally individual. It's rest the way that makes you feel best. Now, I'll tell you how not to rest by doing other exercises. And that sounds funny, but when I would train clients, especially clients that want to lose body fat, they thought rest was a waste of time. So they'd be like, oh, can I do something in between? And they don't realize that the rest is part of the workout. I've seen trainers throw rubber band exercises in between just to kind of maximize the rest. I'm like, they're not resting. I'm glad you brought that up because it's actually really common. Super common. Yeah, it's very common. Part of that is part of it's the trainer's fault. It's also clients that demand that. Exactly. They're putting pressure on the trainer to do that. No. The reason why you rest isn't necessarily because you need the rest. I have to take a break because I can't breathe. That's part of it. But really, the rest is to allow you to train the right energy systems to elicit the right response or the right adaptation. If you're lifting weights, the goal that you have is to speed up the metabolism, build muscle, and build strength. That's what your goal is. Now, if your goal is endurance, totally different. But if your goal is I'm doing this so I can speed up my metabolism, I'm sculpting my body, I'm building muscle, I'm building strength, which is what resistance training does best, better than anything, then you rest in between because it allows your muscles to replenish their ATP. ATP is the muscle energy that you're training that elicits, that spurs on the strength and muscle gain. If you don't rest, it becomes glycolytic.  You're just doing lots of endurance work. So the rest part is just as important as the exercise part in terms of the effectiveness of the programming. Now, my opinion, I think you should rest, however, makes you feel best.  When I used to work in gyms, the way that I used to love to rest is I used to do a set, I'd put my towel in the machine or on the barbell or dumbbell, and then I'd walk to the water fountain. I never had water with me because this is what I would do. I'd walk to the water fountain, get some water and walk back and that was always the perfect amount of rest for me.  In between rest periods, I don't go on social media necessarily, but I like to write, so I like to write notes because when I'm working out, my mind is typically on fire and so I'll write stuff that I'm going to talk about on the podcast or ideas that I have and then I have a timer go off. I can see that it's been a minute and a half. Then I go back to my workout and it's the same zone for me. It's not a different space or head space. If going on your phone takes you out of that, like if you're working out and it's fun and then you're stressed out because you're on your phone and back and forth, probably not a good thing. I've had to check myself on that quite a few times because I have been pulled into social media and just like kind of meddling on my phone and it does get me distracted in my mind in a different place where it's like, if I am focused and I'm just truly resting and I'm just trying to now bring my heart rate down and just listen to my body and really, like for me back in the day when I would train at my best, I was walking and I was really slowly kind of breathing and myself recouped and then focusing. Then I would take towards the end of the rest. I'm starting to now visualize that next set that I'm about to perform. I mean, it's no different than being out of a game competing and I get that one minute to like kind of watch the game. Now I'm going to go right back in and I'm really focused and I'm ready to attack. I also have another example of what I might do different like in between sets where if I'm really focused and squat, this is very common for me with squats, right? I'm still trying to improve my squat and I'm still in search of having this perfect, beautiful squat and I'm still not there, right? Some days I'll come in and that is the focus, right? It's just movement focus. I want to keep getting better, better at the movement and so in between sets sometimes it's more priming, right?  Yeah, this is good. I may do all my priming and then get into my squats but still feel myself letting the shoulders collapse forward a little bit and so then between sets I might be still doing band pull-aparts or doing some sort of a row to really, really pump. But it's not a workout. No, no, it's not. I'm lightweight or bands, you know what I'm saying? And it's not about reps. It's more about being connected to that area and so you know, if that day I'm really focused on improving form especially like I said, if it's a squat day or that's what I'm doing you might catch me doing things like that in between the movement to improve the movement. So I see value in that if that's your focus and then I also see tons of value in not doing anything and being very focused on the workout when you're trying to get after. I think it really depends on the mindset you're coming into the workout with.


Hello and welcome to CMC markets on Friday the 22nd of March and this quick look at the week ahead beginning the 25th of March and it's been a rather mixed week for global equity markets. US markets closed a fresh month high in the wake of this week's unexpectedly dovish tilt from the US Federal Reserve when it comes to monetary policy and I think what was more surprising about the Fed's statement and guidance on Wednesday was the fact that in the space of less than three months we've gone from having the prospect of three rate rises in 2019 to none absolutely zero and it's really prompting the question from investors and markets in general I think as to whether or not the next move in Fed policy is likely to be a rate cut as opposed to a rate hike that's how far we've come in the space of three months and I think that's been really reflected in the performance of the S&P 500 and US markets in general that I think an optimism over the US economy because even when you look at the US economy that still appears to be the best of a pretty disappointing bunch still expected to grow in excess of 2% in 2019 and as such when compared to say for example the Chinese economy or the European economy it's still still pretty much outperforming relative to the rest of the world and I think that's really being reflected in some of the data that we've seen outside of the US because if you look outside of the US the picture isn't anywhere near as rosy so say for example we look at the Germany 30 the DAX and that does appear to be looking to test the uptrend line that we've been in since those lows in December and I think some of the pessimism around the European economy hasn't been helped by a very disappointing German manufacturing PMI number flash PMI number for March coming in at 44.7 lowest number since the summer of 2012 and that really does point to a global manufacturing recession if and when we see the PMIs out of China and Japan and the rest of the world essentially at the beginning of next month and I think what it does also underscore is the possibility that we could well see much more aggressive easing by the European Central Bank going forward if you actually look at the German domestic economy it's still looking fairly positive with services PMIs in the mid 50s but manufacturing points to a very grim outlook for the manufacturing sector overall I think the key level for me on the DAX is these key lows around about 11,400 that this low these lows through here and the 50 day moving average so I think the failure to get through the 200 day moving average could precipitate further declines if we break below 11,400 so as we look ahead to the coming week it won't surprise you to know that the main focus will continue to remain on Brexit yes the B word and that would appear to have moved on a little bit it now looks much less likely that the European Union sorry the UK will be leaving the European Union on the 29th of March this coming month at the latest European Council meeting a decision was taken to extend the UK's departure date to the 22nd of May on the condition that MPs are able to pass Theresa May's very unpopular deal withdrawal agreement in the event that that is voted down again and that looks increasingly likely then MPs will have until the 12th of April to come up with alternative solutions so so as we look ahead to the coming week there will be votes in Parliament to extend article 50 from the 29th of March to the 12th of April assuming that Theresa May's deal doesn't actually pass and that would appear to be the likely outcome after the response to the Prime Minister's speech earlier this week in fact I'll be surprised if it actually doesn't lose by more votes than the number of votes it lost on the second reading and as a reminder it was 149 votes so it's highly likely that that vote will that would be the deal will get voted down again and really then it really comes down to MPs to vote on a series of alternative solutions which does has a majority does have a majority because at the moment while we have complete clarity on what MPs don't want we don't as yet have any clear idea of what they will be happy with so we saw a big bit of a sell-off in the cable over the course of the past couple of days what we haven't done as yet seen is a break below the 200-day moving average and I think that really is the key level for me the 50 and the 200-day moving averages at the moment we're finding the upside pretty difficult in any way or an error one the 133 area but we are we do appear to be finding at some level of support between 12980 and 130 the figure so if we can hold above 130 the figure then we could well I see a continuation of the move higher if on the other hand we're unable to sustain levels above 130 then we could see a broader correction back down to these lows here which we saw during the middle of February around about 12780 128 so parliamentary votes are going to be the key the key arbiters I think for the direction of sterling over the course of the next week so political risk we do have a number of economic data items to keep an eye out for but they're all pretty much dated in terms of their relevance UK fourth quarter GDP final number which is chew out on Friday but as I say I mean that's likely to show that the UK economy had a disappointing end to 2018 with half the level of economic activity that we saw in Q3 so that's expected to come in around about 0.2 0.3% business investment is again expected to be the largest drag on that we've also got the final fourth quarter GDP numbers out of the US on the 28th we've got flash CPI from the European Union also on the 29th and that will once again refocus market attention on ECB policy going forward which in the wake of those really disastrous PMIs out of France and Germany on the manufacturing side it's really likely to refocus attention on the risks of to the EU of no deal this is not a zero-sum game here Emmanuel Macron can talk all he likes about the fact that the France is ready for no deal those PMIs numbers give the lie to that statement we've also got German IFO business sentiment a survey in light of those PMI numbers they that that particular number will be very interesting and that is due out business sentiment due out on the 25th and a couple of number key items out over the course of this week apart from full-year earnings we also have the Lyft IPO ride-sharing app Lyft is due to IPO on the 28th of March CMC markets will be covering that IPO we will be pricing that IPO in the afternoon of that day and that will value on the NASDAQ with the valuation coming in around $20 billion 30.77 million shares will be listed between $62 and 68 management are hoping to raise a total of around $2 billion now we could we'll see a decent pop hire we certainly did on the Levi Strauss IPO this week but looking at the numbers and I got to say this could be more a case of mimicking snap the mimicking Facebook so be interested to see how that goes and we've also got an Apple event on the 25th where Apple is expected to unveil a new subscription based video streaming service which is expected to take the fight to Amazon and Netflix I can't help thinking that Apple are playing catch-up in this regard but what we have seen on Apple shares over the course of the past three months is a significant move higher despite the fact they posted that profits warning earlier this year we've broken above the 200-day moving average we're looking to retest the 61.8 retracement level of the entire down move from the peaks that we saw in October to the lows that we saw in December so that's going to be around about $198 $200 a share keep an eye on Apple shares in the wake of that event so that's it for this week as I say catch up on all the details of what's going on in the morning update on the news and analysis section of the website you can click on that otherwise thanks very much for listening Michael Houston talking to you from CMC Markets