So the construction of states post conflict is a complicated and layered topic as we have seen discussion on in the previous two events. In this panel we will discuss important aspects of developing post conflict states relating to security institutions and economic development. We will have staggered presentations for the panelists first we will have a discussion on the role of security institutions. Our first speaker joining us today is political science professor Ila and that knock at the University of California Berkeley, her research examines a variety of international and domestic influences on the stability of fragile states, especially elections in these contexts, bringing together insights from international relations and comparative politics, as well as policing and community attitudes during crisis. She seeks to better understand how different actors can foster peace and improve governance outcomes. She's the author of electing peace from civil conflict to political participation. She will present first and we will have a brief q amp a, followed by professor skeptic us's presentation, which will be followed by open q amp a for attendees. Wonderful. Thank you so much, Mika. Thank you for having me. It's a pleasure to be here with you. I am going to share some slides. Wonderful. Okay, so what I want to present today is some work that is related to a new book project that I'm working on which is called inviting intervention state building by delegating security. And in it I'm going to talk about sort of different ways in which we think about state building with regard to security institutions and broadly to post conflict context in particular. And then I want to push for this idea about thinking about places where states themselves actually invite intervention by international actors in forums that are shared sovereignty. So what we're looking at thinking about today is state building broadly state building can be thought of as both domestic process or an international process.  So the main question in policy world has been can state building help and in particular what international policymakers usually mean about this is Ken intervening by an outside actor by an international actor into this state help. The fragile states often struggle to strengthen and reform their own institutions. And I call these fragile states that term is sometimes politicized but I really mean this in terms of having institutions that are not stable and sort of long lasting insecure, and especially today will be focused on the security institutions. Additional state building efforts have really mixed records about whether or not they help with these interventions or not. You know, when you think of state building you probably these days think about Afghanistan or Iraq, which have been you know notably problematic cases. And so thinking about going forward there sort of these geo strategic politics and resource constraints that make that type of state building and a minimum, pretty rare. The question is, are there other options. And what I want to highlight today is thinking about cooperative arrangements between host states and outside actors, which I think are an underexplored, underappreciated and yet pretty common mechanism of state building as I'll show you from some of my recent work. Okay, so what I want to do in the talk is talk about sort of four different things, thinking about the concept is what we're going to do mainly in these, you know, 20 minutes or so. And so we'll think about the concept of invited intervention, especially along sort of a shared sovereignty dimension. Why is the shared sovereignty how is the shared sovereignty when we get these particular types of arrangements. So the concept of state building versus state backing, which I think fundamentally is about reform. I'll talk more about that. And I'll show you just a little bit of preliminary data this is not the final cleaned version of the data, but showing that these invited interventions are actually pretty common in practice, and suggesting some ways forward that this concept should point us in terms of thinking about where we might go with state building going forward. The concept of invited interventions, particularly in terms of shared sovereignty. There is a little bit of work on shared sovereignty. Weak states often designated as weak states, maybe willing to relinquish some of their international sovereignty for domestic sovereignty so here we're especially thinking about what's often referred to as Westphalian sovereignty which is the basically the ability to host states to keep other actors out of their domestic processes. They're often willing to relinquish that in order to get better stability within their states. And so this work, you know, builds on especially Krasner Steve Krasner's work thinking about this in his shared sovereignty book, but also many others. And this is that David Lake's work and others. So what we want to think about though is how state share sovereignty so shared sovereignty is often sort of pretty general term that's used. And it's actually used to capture pretty diverse set of cases. What I think of as shared sovereignty or type of shared sovereignty that I'd like to highlight in this project is that there are these invited interventions in which host states consent to other sovereign entities these have to be foreign states or intergovernmental organizations, other actors that also have sovereignty, taking temporary authority to implement policies or laws within the host states own territory and over its citizens. It's not just deciding whether or not to give aid, but actually being part of the process of actually doing implementation of a policy within the state and that affects its citizens. So crucially, these missions have, you know, this foreign sovereign entity working in the host state territory with jurisdiction over its host state citizens right that sort of the fundamental executive function that these outside the host states in these cases consent to a contract. So what they're doing here is they're actually using their international legal sovereignty to sign some sort of deal these are often formal treaties that don't have to be there often formal treaties that allow this outside actor in for a set period. The whole process occurs in this system of sovereign statehood. And so by signing this contract they're actually in some ways reinforcing their own sovereignty, even as they're delegating some of their sovereignty and so this is why I think of these as very much shared instances. These don't have to be symmetrical bargaining processes right it may be that the outside actor has more capabilities like military capabilities for example than the host state does. So they can be asymmetric bargaining processes but they're still bargaining processes that are leading to a contract which in theory should improve sort of the status quo option for both sides. I think that these processes where you're getting a contract gives us sort of the best chance of sustaining the contract, given that it is with these two sovereign entities within what is an anarchical system but one that hinges on the sovereign statehood right so by through signing these contracts between these two different sovereigns. And they're actually sort of reinforcing the process by which they both are given their own power. And so this is what makes these arrangements to me very much shared sovereignty at its core and really interesting. My studies of the project that I have at specifically focuses on these invited intervention in state security institutions are thinking about policing investigating prosecuting and judging here. These can also operate in like banking or you know other sectors but these are the ones that I focus on in this study. So just to show you a little bit and give you sort of a better sense of the different types of sovereignty arrangements that we can be thinking of here. So what I'm thinking of on the on the y axis here is is sovereignty taken over by the international actor on the left hand side of your screen and sovereignty retained entirely by the host state on the right hand side of your screen. And what I really want to get into is sort of this middle area where you have shared sovereignty but let me just briefly say what I think is going on in the two side columns because I think that this is where a lot of the state building work actually lives currently. On the left hand side, we can think about foreign imposed regime changes or other invasions these are cases in which the states fight their way in and then take over the state, or simply depose the existing regime, and then leave it to chance as to who's set up afterwards. So these cases can spill over into neo trustee ships when you trustee ships can be a little bit separate from this so this is where you end in particular recent years sort of taken over a state, and administered it until it becomes independent. These are especially in new states so Kosovo and tomorrow less as they're emerging from, you know, being part of another state that they may be administered by an international system. There are some pro regime stability or status quo defending operations that can exist here, especially if perhaps like the leader has just faced a coup and has just been deposed and you might sort of see an international actor entering without formal permission from the from the state itself but basically assisting the regime that's in power. Almost all of these in the in the left hand side of your screen are what we refer to as international state building in most of the existing literature. They can have some sort of transitional administration whereby they hand power back over to the enter to the domestic state, and newly created domestic state in many of these cases, and that can be sort of the trickiest part of these operations, but all of them also of course are critiqued for imperialism and neocolonialism because these are sort of fundamentally operating at the international communities impetus maybe if they're un operations, or simply a foreign state, I'm going in and changing the regime of another state. So those are very much, you know, sovereignty taken over by an outside actor. On the right hand side of your screen, you have cases in which international actors are operating in which they're intervening in some way but sovereignty is retained entirely by the host state so these could be cases where the international actors are trying to change the state fundamentally so they might be giving aid to rebel groups and so they might overthrow the state. They might be giving conditional aid to the government so that it will change its policies and practices in order to get that conditional aid, or they might just be giving regular per regime aid. Or even this could be foreign contractors or personnel who are working just within the state as contractors right so they're just working on on what the state asks them to work on. In those cases the state itself may be trying to strengthen and perhaps change its institutions, but it's really not sharing sovereignty with anyone right it might be taking aid but it's not sort of sharing its authority with with any of these outside actors. Training operations slide a little bit into allowing the outside actor to have some say over how for example military operatives in their state are trained like what the rules are that they operate by. But even those tend to have mostly the sovereignty retained entirely by the host. So I think the interesting set here are these invited interventions which are really clearly shared sovereignty agreements right in that these are host states that are actually asking these outside actors to come into the state for a limited period of time and help with some of these security functions. So that gives us sort of a sovereignty concept of these international actors and what they're doing here. I think we also want to think about the state building versus state backing to mention of the concept that I'm defining in this book project. So, in practice I think these missions come in really different forms state backing missions can provide just capacity alone for these international of sorry for these domestic states. So, you know, if a state is facing rebellion, you know, in part of its country and it simply wants another country to come in and assist us with assisted with fighting that rebellion. It might have a state backing mission, right that would be very different from a state building mission that has a component of reform. So these reforms change, but usually also standardize the security process that contributes in some way to the rule of law. So in many cases, these could just change the institution so it could change from like favoring one group to favoring another group but in practice what they're usually doing is sort of trying to make everyone a little bit more equal in the eyes of the law right in the ways in which the security sector is applied. In practice, the ways in which international actors usually are involved in this it can involve changing personnel or particular policies within bureaus and so they might be operating within like the police department. It can involve changing bureaus themselves so it might demobilize some units, set up new units that maybe are going to be more multi ethnic for example in some contexts, especially post conflict context. And it can even be changing the laws that the bureaus put in place and potentially the ways in which the bureaus are overseen in their work right so it might be putting them under legislatures for example and showing them how to report to those legislatures. So, both of these types of missions I would argue fit in the central column in the shared sovereignty column, but they have these very big differences in terms of whether or not they have a mandate for reform. So the state building missions which I call in my work governance delegation agreements are the ones that have some sort of reform component to them. And they are invited interventions but they are state building invited interventions so mandate for reform is sort of the top part of this chart now on the y axis. And on the bottom part we have these state backing missions where you're just coming in and aiding a foreign actor. So you can see the other types of missions also break by this, you know mandate for reform or not. So foreign imposed regime changes, as well as most neo trustee ships are fundamentally about changing or setting up new institutions in these states, whereas pro regime stability or status quote defending operations would not be right they would just be backing sort of the administration that exists. And then with aid so aid to rebels, right would be fundamentally trying to change the state conditional aid and democracy promotion would also be trying to get some change in the state, where as pro regime aid or private foreign contractors or personnel would very much be just supporting the institution that exists so no mandate for reform there. I'm going to talk briefly about whether state building and in terms of invited intervention is common in practice, before getting to some conclusions and wrapping up here in the next few minutes. So, I wanted to identify possible cases of invited intervention and so I've coded data between 1980 and 2015 with the help of both undergraduate and graduate student research assistant here at Berkeley. What we did was we set up to code a set of all sources that we could think of that would help us identify any in all instances in which foreign troops police investigators prosecutors or other security sector personnel were sent into these host states. And so we looked at like the foreign forces and military balance which is notoriously unreliable so we always tried to cross validate those. And so we looked at these entities and agreements. We liked it via reported missions. We liked a particular categories of aid or training that are reported to see if they were particularly sending foreign personnel.  We then verified all of these cases they mentioned so through official mission or state websites through academic sources or policy literature and through news reports. We're still in the process of coding, but what we wanted to code in particular was missions all missions that are operating these countries and then coding whether or not they entered by consent. So confirming that these missions were carrying out executive functions in the policing or judicial sector. There are some difficult cases to define on this so many of you probably saw the tragic incident in the share where you a service person was killed. And I think that that is one of these cases that's a little bit hard to define in our data set because many of these are defined as training missions and they're stating that they're only training personnel, but in fact, especially when these operations go wrong we find out that they're also operating in these countries so we wanted to be able to detect any cases in which they are also operating in these countries and so we have coding rules that seek to do this and to give us the benefit of the doubt if we think they might be operating. We define both implicit and explicit consent so did the host state just cooperate with the mission or did it like formally ask for this through an agreement or a treaty. And then we determine whether or not their state backing which is just sort of this contributing capacity alone or state building which also has reform component. So we try to code some of these other factors like who's leading the mission their budget and number personnel but those are harder to find so we have more missing data on those variables. Overall, this is, I should mention a first cut at the data so please don't say these numbers, we are undergoing a second coding round. And so it's almost certain that these numbers will change and any bias in them is not known because we added a couple of different coding steps which I think we'll find more cases we don't know where they'll find more cases. But, but, so take this as preliminary data, please. But what we find is basically that there are a huge number of missions operating in general in Sub-Saharan Africa. So I should mention this is Sub-Saharan Africa. This is between 1980 and 2015 as I mentioned so of all of the missions that enter these countries, about 73% of them seem to enter with consent. So this is that they have some sort of consent from the host state. If we think about the way in which we define state building and for thinking about Afghanistan and Iraq in our minds. So that's actually at least in our data in the Sub-Saharan Africa data set in these preliminary data, a minority of cases right that's only these 27% of cases where states are kind of forcing their way in. In most of the cases they're actually being invited in by these host states, and then the state building and state backing missions are pretty equal so in about half the cases, little less than half the cases, these states are actually asking for reform, not just for city building. And overall the missions occur in about 77% of all these Sub-Saharan African states. And in about 10% of the country years total. Again, preliminary data so take this as a grain of salt but this is just to give you an idea of what's there in the data set. Okay, so where does this concept point us I've talked a lot about this concept which I think is important and a bit different than how we usually think about state building. So I think intervention seems to be often invited, at least in the data we've examined so far and some other cases that I examined in this book project in Guatemala, Solomon Islands, a very different context we're seeing this type of invited intervention. Intervenors can provide additional capacity and either a loyal force to back the incumbent or a relatively neutral or untouchable force to bind the leaders hands as I argue in the case of reform. This points us to some crucial characteristics of these missions they often add capacity, but they also lock in a more removed force from the state politics right they might not be unbiased in the general sense of the word. But they're at least not involved in sort of whatever system exists in the state, and that has both pros and cons. Finally it raises questions about when they occur and what effect like why would states want to invite in these foreign actors, especially to reform their institutions. I argue in the book project that it's about tying hands for these states that they can make credible commitments to their opponents that they actually will change. And so that's sort of the direction forward that's what I what I write about in the book but I wanted to give you especially an overview of the concept here to get you thinking about sort of how we change security institutions in states that have fragile security institutions. And I think international intervention remains pretty important here, but that we should often be thinking about this invited intervention these invited forms of intervention rather than just imposed invasions. So I look forward to your, your questions and the other presentation and general questions as well. Yes, thank you so much. That was such an interesting talk. I'm genuinely learning so much and as an IR major this, these talks are always so exciting to go to to learn more. And so, there is a Q&A option down the screen below so people want to collect their thoughts and submit questions so but while we wait for people to do that I have some couple questions of the things that you talked about so you said that, you know, host states or host states conduct and invited inviting and shared sovereignty to help build back their states. I'm just curious about some of the major incentives for some states to invite other states because personally I don't like I don't find that I didn't know is a common practice in the first place because it seems as if you invite some other foreign sovereignty or state into your country to cause, you know, like tensions or just more problems that could, you know, digress from the progress of of state building so what are some of the major incentives for states to do that. That's a great question I'm glad you have this question because that is the motivating puzzle for this book project. So I've talked a lot about the concept here but but the book is actually about why states would be willing to have this type of intervention, why they would be willing to invite this type of intervention. And so I think there are a few circumstances under which states with fragile security institutions really want to tie their own hands. One is post conflict context, especially if you have a power sharing regime set up. It's very hard for the government to trust the rebels and the rebels to trust the government as they're both demobilizing right and trying to set up a regime that sometimes having this external actor that's actually pushing and implementing the reforms that they've usually agreed on in the peace process but is actually like overseeing this. That can be one case in which we see these types of shared sovereignty arrangements right and it kind of makes sense there because the government wants it not to constrain themselves but to constrain the rebels and the rebels and not to constrain themselves but to constrain the government right so so those make sense to me at least hopefully to you all. And then I think there are other circumstances that are pretty similar under which leaders would want to tie their opponents hand so I think in many of these cases what we saw at we're seeing at least in the preliminary data will see if it holds as we finalize the data and we run the analyses is that places where leaders basically think they're about to lose to an opposition, they may be more inclined to set these up so either in the face of an election that looks like they're probably going to lose or when they have a really high coup threat that looks like they're about to be deposed, they may actually set up one of these with the outside actor. This gives them like a last ditch effort at showing that they're really committed to reform. So it might help them, you know, not get deposed or not get turned over in an election. But if they do lose then their opponent at least has their hands tied right and so that can actually prove them in those cases as well. So those are some of the circumstances under which I find that are I think that leaders will want to tie their own hands and we're finding that to be consistent instead of the preliminary data and the case studies as I mentioned they're in depth case studies here on Central America, where Guatemala has been a major case that has this type of intervention, and in the Pacific Solomon Islands has been a major case with this type of intervention where Australia took the lead on that. Great, thank you so much. So I'll ask one more question before we move on to Mr. Skipper does this presentation, but you earlier said that the state building changes, or the standardizing the security process contributes to changing or standardizing the rule of law. That involves changing the Bureau's and laws and so how do you think I'm curious on how that like reflects on the people and like this actual citizens of the states and have you seen examples of like backlash or he judge backlash from the people themselves against this shared sovereignty. That's a great question. I mean, I think that there are. I think we should almost expect backlash in these cases, you know there are a lot of sort of state building pieces that look at these and say, Oh, you know we're seeing this backlash sometimes why do we see this, like, maybe it's their cases in which the outside actors incentives are not aligned with the domestic actors incentives. But the way in which I'm setting up the theory here I think anytime that you're using an outside actor to tie the hands of the domestic actors like that is what they're setting it up to do right is inherently to have some conflict between the domestic actors and international actors because you're relying on this outside actor to tie the hands of the domestic actors. And they're inviting it they're setting it up this way right but like once you're the rebels and the government operating this and you're trying to like push your limits a little bit, you're going to criticize international actor inherently so I actually think that these sort of like processes of backlash especially from the leaders should be almost inherent and that's what we see like in the case of Guatemala. So I think that there have been a number of different actors have come like, not many many leaders but there have been a number of different presidents who have come through the sissig administration which is sort of the outside actor. And each one of them when they're campaigning they say oh sissig is really important, you know, lack of corruption really important. And then once again to office they start critiquing on sissig. And so I think it is almost inherently complexual relationship between the domestic and international actor in some ways that's the way in which it's designed. And as citizens in many of these cases they actually tend to be very supportive so there have been a huge protests in favor of sissig the outside actor in Guatemala, especially when these sort of leaders sought to suspend it so once it was in the country and operating, you know, even though leaders would say things like oh this is anti sovereign or this is colonialist, you know, critique it in many different ways, a lot of the actual citizens in the country saw it as being beneficial and it's cleaning up their justice system in ways that were really important to them going forward. So I think you can often get, you should almost get backlash based on the way that they're designed, but that in many cases the average citizens can be relatively supportive and actually be a stabilizing force as this goes forward over time. Thank you so much for thoroughly answering my questions so now we're going to switch over to discuss the role of economic development in post conflict states. So to facilitate this discussion we were joined by economics professor stereo scared us. Professor scared us holds the Clifford as Heinz chair on the economics of peace at the University of California Irvine. In July 2016, he was appointed director of the Center for global peace and conflict studies with the basic trade off between production and appropriation at its core, scared us has developed a theoretical framework that allows the study of a variety of economic and political problems, including those of organized crime, the emergence of states and governance, civil wars and other forms of domestic conflict, as well as the effects of globalization the presence of insecurity. His research has been published in a variety of economics and political science journals, including the American economic review, the American political science review, economic journal, the Journal of conflict resolution, the journal of economic theory and the Journal of international economics. Oh, Professor, I think you are on mute. Can you see the. Yes, yes, we can hear you and see your presentation. Let me try. Sorry, I was. I cannot find the the view. Oh, I believe. All right, let's slide so again. Yeah. Yeah. Okay. Well, I'm not exactly going to talk about economic development. I'm primarily actually focus on the role of national identity, something which is unusual for an economics I can talk a bit more about economic development for sure. But my talk is actually very much complimentary emphasizes a few different things but it's necessary what the professor of math and emphasized and discussed. So, what I will discuss first of all what is nation building because this is something that when I was invited about that your conference was about nation building, first of all try to define what nation building is. Talk about the role of national identity as an important component of nation building. If I have time, I might skip the, this part about nation building through war that we have there. And finally discuss whether how, or whether can external intervention build a nation, right, instead of just building a state or helping the state. So, this is what I'm discussing today is partly based on research that in collaboration with the scientists Nicholas some bunnies and bill as well as a former student economist online, which are too late. But of course, I'm my co authors are not responsible for this presentation because I'm emphasizing, and there are things that are not in the papers that we have. Okay, so first of all, what is nation building. I think there are three components that the one could put together or maybe two. One is state building. Building state capacity capacity to tax effective bureaucracy, legal capacity they both and in that we can include policing, as well as the rule of law. The regulatory framework for markets and other economic activities. So this is partly, I mean, mostly what the professor Martin emphasized, as well as something that sort of changing different trying to manage conflict. Develop institutions that distribute power so that you go from fighting in the battlefields to arguing in parliaments courts, the public sphere the public square, developing institutions of checks and balances, including possibly democracy and I think democracy is having is a big check on those in power, having civilian control of the military, and develop in the end the monarchy the whatever calls the legitimate means of violence in order to have a modern viable state. The thing that has not, does not receive as much attention and I'm emphasizing here is the instilling national identity having the citizens identifying with the state, and how this is complimentary sort of they go together with state building and managing conflict. So, what does national identity, what do we mean by that is first of all identifying with a nation, what is benefit Anderson called part of any feeling like a member of the of an imagine community. I mean, when we discussing public matters, what are we going to do in Europe if you are an American and you are thinking and when you do that you implicitly or explicitly identified as a member of a political community of a national identity. Additionally, they especially for European nation states, language, religion or ethnicity have been the building blocks of national identity, but you can have also more inclusive attributes that can form this basis, and you have many countries that from the United States to Mexico and Canada to Australia and India, where the basis of national identity is not what we consider primordial this kind of characteristics of the citizens. And of course, it doesn't even require that the citizens agree what is the basis of national identity. In the US, Americans say we are Americans, and when we have been surveys, they can be from all sorts of different things from the melting pot and diversity to being Christian or having baseball or something like that. So, as long as the citizens identified with the state with the state identify as part of this political community. As an economist I model this party with psychological payoffs. You have material payoffs or economic payoffs, but there are also psychological payoffs like status of the nation, the closeness of the citizens brings there to other citizens and that can play the issue of ethnicity and religion and language player all there. So, why do you have this national identity is almost universal in every nation state something that you usually don't pay much attention, but modern states, contrary to the modern states are universally having a well defined try or at least in trying to instill that national identity. It overcomes freerider problems and facilities collective action. If, if you know in a, in a pre modern society state, you have two villages that are next to each other that might be speaking different dialects might be belonging to different tribes. So sort of in at each other strokes through through history, they have tribal laws and other things that, well, a national identity overcomes these issues, and you have, you can have more easily collective action that reduces internal conflicts to the conflicts within the previously sort of communities that were much fragmented, it increases public good provision it allows us for it allows them to collectively organized and provide public goods at the, at the regional or national enhanced state building. And I think I would argue is essential ingredient of nation building and economic growth, and you can see that countries that do not have this social cohesion comes from national like the common national identity, do not have high levels of economic problems and countries that do, do have those things. The way that forging national identity in his sometimes often has involved a lot of coercion and, or propaganda mass education in the 19th century Europe, as to turn French men into sort of peasants into peasants. We have rituals from national days parades flags national Athens, you have economic cultural and sports and other national competence that enhance national prestige, the media has been enhancement of those through initially from newspapers in the 19th century, but in the 20th century we have radio TV and now we have new social media and other ways. So, internal conflicts often sharp identities, possibly including making national identity more salient but also, you can make some national identities more salient to national ones can enhance national identity, and that's something that many European states did that. And with the incest and welfare that the worker that had early in history but later in the 19th and 20th centuries was, was the first and second World War, of course, being important for that. So, so what is the relationship between nation building and national identity. It appears to be necessary for state building and therefore for nation building. You can think of state building as the hardware and national identity as the software of the nation building. State building itself takes long to achieve decades and it's a never ending process of course, always improve it, at least they decades. The bath party, for example, in Iraq, and afterwards during Saddam Hussein was able to build actually a pretty in terms of the nuts and bolts of state of the bureaucracy and state building was pretty affecting but not in reducing internal conflicts through checks and balances and other ways that would reduce that kept conflicts under wraps. But forging national identity is even more difficult than state in building taking many decades if not centuries to accomplish. France is considered the quintessential as a nation state, but and he had a long history of statehood. But even in the after the revolution, most French friends did not speak French, and they did not become French men according to some arguments until World War One, right in many ways. External actors, it's can hardly instill a national identity to another country except inadvertently except as when they you fight them, and in ways that are predictable often and it's difficult to figure out how. Exante, that is for the external interventions. Now traditionally in Europe for many countries in your national identity war forms in international wars. An example of that is the German unification that was took place after the Franco-Prussian war that Germany was not the state. It was Prussia was the dominant part of it. And so what you had at the time, you had Prussia, which was the dominant European state, German state and here is a picture a map of Germany before your unification the green parts are part of Prussia that were actually most of them in the west that were conquered very recently before 1878 70s. And it was the nobler state and Bismarck was attempting to unify Germany. But the southern especially the southern elites by various and places there were really very hesitant. In some ways, I mean there is a lot of historical and other social scientific arguments that said that Bismarck instigated essentially the Franco-Prussian war as a way of forcing the southern elites to unify Germany and sort of I will not go into details. It did not, Bismarck did not seek to achieve a more authentic national state similar to France, but instead he put to absorb the German nationalities without magnifying them. Okay, now, what about external interventions and what about new states that have come into existence in post-colonial times or earlier than that or a bit later, like in Eastern Europe, often in Africa and other places. They often have low state capacity. High German conflicts and no levels of national identification, they have either fragmented identities or polarized identities. It's acceptable as there is out to external interventions that political geopolitical overt covert or military outright military interventions and the worst cases. The most unlikely ones become proxy wars and battlegrounds of external powers. Here the examples Afghanistan repeatedly in its history has been a battleground of proxy, you know, during the great game between the British Empire and Russia. More recently, both the Soviet Union and now the US, you can say it's been a battleground for the US, although the US went and contested. In some ways Pakistan also was intervening in many ways that was contrary to the interests of the US. In Vietnam, Golan Carrago and other countries during the Cold War. You have the Democratic Republic of the Congo Zaire from 1995 on that you had Rwanda being the first one that intervened, external power that intervened, but then almost everybody from Libya, all the way to Zambia became involved somehow in the tragic war in the DRC where we had estimated more than 5 million deaths. And Ukraine more recently is another kind of example. And the result is often linked to instability, the low state capacity, the conflicts, the low level of national identification and the, of course, the economic effects are obviously not there. And they are subject to interventions. What about better cases are not battlegrounds. What about unilateral external interventions that you have sort of say one country goes in without not goes in but provides one type of external dimension without having a battleground with this. Well, they can improve the state's military capacity. They can improve the state capacity and state building of the country itself. So, for example, South Korea after Korean War is a successful example of the US helping in both these dimensions, but also South Korea had a national identity that was pretty strong already. And that was a thing in my view a critical factor on how a country like South Korea that in the 1950s had per capita income lower than say a country that Ghana, why it was able to develop so much partly because it did help from the US in state building in economic help in terms of opening up its markets and technical help that South Korea had, but it also because it had a very something to build on in terms of national identity pretty quickly. But if we accept that national identity is an important ingredient of nation building is can an outside power instill and solidify national identity out of the blue. I'm doubtful of that. And in many ways, it can actually sabotage national identity and nation building, as for example, the US did in Iraq, because there were the elements of. I mean, it was in the process of developing an Iraqi identity that now is probably more fragmented than before. The US intervention in Iraq, and at the same time, Ambassador Bremer actually abolished essentially the bureaucracy and the smallest state capacity that Iraq. So, you know, other external interventions are unlikely to succeed the nation building, unless you have ingredients like those in South Korea that were sort of aligned in many ways and you had huge amounts of effort on the part of the outside Okay, I guess that's it and can open it to questions. Yes, thank you so much.  So while we wait for attendees to submit their questions. I have a question for you professor so I know I learned in a class previously that some states use violence, especially war to maintain the control and influence over the state by using national identity and bringing together the people to kind of rally up the country and international identity. So how does that affect states that are like fragile, or in the middle of trying to establish a state. So when you do have a, you have civil wars, and you emphasize, you try to eliminate essentially another ethnicity. Extremely, it can be extremely brutal and violent, and often does not lead to effective results. So, even in countries like what you have in countries like the already pre established states nation states that have a strong sense of national identity, say for example, Spain. In periods of stress, you have things like Catalonia nationalism appearing. And what it does make I mean the, it usually creates interventions that have that are violent, actually enhance the sub ethnic identity. Right. There were Catalonians of Spanish descent, or residents of Catalonia Spanish descent, who really became almost Catalonians. Nationalists, after the intervention the violent interaction during the in a couple of years ago of the Spanish government. And this stays as a wound in there that can faster for years, decades, centuries, even in terms of grievances in other words. So, and you can have so it is not that's why a lot of the conflicts that you have civil wars and others so are so intractable and long lasting. Thank you for answering that question and I have one. Oh, I think we have a couple of questions from the Q&A so we'll move on to those so. So someone asked, how do you see the two professors compared us. How do you see the risk of too much national identity such as when national identity, these xenophobic policies, ethnic violence or similar things and how do you think states can balance national identity without going too far. Yeah, I mean, how you define there is not a unique way of defining national identity. So when you have, when you have in the US, when you survey Americans, they say, well, it's being an American is to be Christian, or sort of be an American football. So you have other Americans who emphasize the melting pot, or emphasizing the multiculturalism and other issues. So what you have then that there is not. It depends on what the state chooses and politicians choose to emphasize. And sometimes politicians can use one definition one way try to veer the definition of national identity through their own perhaps narrow ethnic group or narrowly ethnic source to gain politically, but at the expense of overall overall welfare for the country, or there are other politicians that can emphasize more universal identity. So what you have is for India, for example, it's been since its independence, there was an ethos of unity through diversity. And remarkably, you know, you have India that is a country that is in many ways in the linguistically, and in other ways more diverse than the whole of Europe, being able to have to sustain democracy for all these years. And now we see over the past. How many years is it now seven years since more than was a things we have a gradual move towards he do that being the primary way of defining, or at least not the primary ways that what the government in power tries to emphasize as the national identity of the country. So there is not national identity, there is not a unique way to define national identity. So, and a lot of it is part of the, of the political party depends on the political equilibrium the political process, but it is. But there is no, I mean we are, we are still are, and we will be for some time, sort of nation states, it will be very difficult, we cannot have all government and any time soon. We cannot have even a European government many times soon the European Union, there is no the European Union, it tries to define its supranational identity, but most Europeans, especially the rank of file most citizens do not feel primarily Europeans. So we are living in in nation states, and we will have by definition, a national identity the question is this national what kind of national identity does it stay here. Thank you for answering the question so I would like to ask a question that was posed to Professor Matt knock. So how does the reemergence of private military companies and other semi state actors alter this dynamic. I know specifically specifically that certain governments in the Sahel have turned to Wagner group and other unconventional actors to supplement traditional governments. Yeah, this is a great question. There's some really interesting new data on these questions as well so Debbie event at Denver University, and co authors have some cool new projects on actually measuring private military companies so we can actually look at this as a question, you know as a research question. But I think in terms of shared sovereignty private military companies are interesting because they really are more in this contracting framework right like we actually do have a lot of literature in terms of narrative politics about when it is that states will privatize or contract. What we see is like fundamental governance governance functions so everything from sewage and you know water services to schools to their security right exactly it is that they'll they'll use private military contractors is certainly interesting definitely fits in that literature. But I think in terms of like, building states. This can be a substitute to the state backing functions that allies can sometimes provide so like if you have a rebellion in part of your country and you just need more forces to be able to effectively fight it maybe more forces that you know better equipment, you might be able to hire one of these contracting firms. It gets a little bit murkier on the shared sovereignty friend. Once you're in sort of like an area in which you have a foreign state that's hiring this foreign company right to fight on your behalf so maybe that one of your allies is willing to pay for the foreign military company that then comes in and fights on your behalf and that gets a little bit murkier it's closer to the shared sovereignty dimension that we were talking about before. But in theory like these states have control over these military companies and that they can fire them and hire them right and so they're not sort of in the shared sovereignty that we really get to where we often get these like reform based changes right because that is basically just the state defy deciding on whether or not it's going to reform and implement a reform. If it's contracting out to do that to a private company. I do think it really speaks in very interesting ways though to what professors compared us is talking about in terms of forming a nation state right that you have these private military companies that maybe you know are fighting on behalf of the state but do they fight in the same way you might expect your citizens to fight do they have the same allegiance that you might expect your citizens to have so I think those are really good questions interesting questions to ask others but I think in terms of shared sovereignty. They fall much more into the contracting and privatization literature for me and thinking about why states would do that is certainly an interesting question but in some ways a different one from asking why especially states would ask for these reform based missions from other sovereign entities so foreign states or intergovernmental organizations. Um, so that actually makes me question whether. So would you categorize the, for example like the US intervention in Iraq or Afghanistan as an invited intervention. So no both of those would be invasions in the classification and so thinking about the charts that I was showing earlier those would be in the left hand category where outside sovereign actors taking over. And that's what I mean state building has been co-opted to mean those types of functions but I think these shared sovereignty these invited interventions are actually occurring much more commonly than we think of and in many more cases, but just sort of aren't often called the state building that we, we probably should be calling them. So, then what are some examples of sovereignty retain entirely by the host state without include like the US intervention in Latin America during the Cold War, or. So cases in which, so okay so we can think about the left hand column, those would be Iraq and Afghanistan right sovereignty taken over by an outside actor they also include cases like Kosovo and Tim or last to begin with right it's their new states, they're run entirely by the UN, eventually they're handed over in terms of power transition state building that happens where the host state maintains complete control of its own security forces. This is happening every day, anywhere that foreign aid is given right like so international actors might be involved in anyone's, you know policing systems like there's a decent amount of policing aid coming from the European Union. But in those cases, those foreign actors don't have any say over how these many many states take this aid and distribute it right so this this is happening. Many cases of aid provision just generally. So I would say like basically all places where they're receiving aid which is most developing countries right most countries in which in the sort of low income or middle income classification of the world bank standards are in where they retain control and then are doing some of this and state building functions right they're reforming their own security sectors, they're at least strengthening their own security sectors right it's all the same things that the US does every day or that anyone else does every day in terms of thinking about how to run their institutions, they just might be getting some foreign aid for that so those would be the right hand category it's this middle category that I think is most interesting because I mentioned a couple of cases this is invited intervention where we had like, for example, Guatemala has sysig sysig is these foreign prosecutors and investigators who are hired by the United Nations, and they run their own unit in Guatemala to investigate crimes that are related to corruption of the security sector. And so what they're doing there is actually investigating cases they can choose and investigate cases, and then they can co prosecute with Guatemalan counterparts cases that they're invited to co prosecute and so those are the sort of fundamental shared sovereignty cases where you're actually reforming institutions and changing process and ruling on these inside of the context and those are the cases where we really see the shared sovereignty. So a lot of like post conflict policing operations in places like Sierra Leone, where, you know, there are outside actors who are helping police and reforming the policing services. But they're not sort of like, there isn't, there is an autonomous state that has invited them to do this function after the conflict.  Thank you for the clarification. I have one question for Professor Scapades. You said that there were many problems that come with external intervention, sabotaging national identity. And this makes me think about how Western nation states intervening in non Western states are inherently just problematic or wrong or just doesn't work because of the religious or cultural differences that make up the national identity. Would you agree with that? Yes. Yes, I mean, going somewhere and thinking that you are going to do democracy and human rights, especially actually that's sort of more egregious than saying well I'm going there for the oil or I'm going there for the diamonds or something like that. Okay, you're going there for the diamonds, we know who you are. But then saying claiming that you are going to build democracy and then sort of destroying even the elements of the base, I mean to have democracy you need to create a state, to have a state. And if you dissolve the existing state instead of using it, right, then it's even more egregious because there is no chance of democracy really, I mean democracy that has any effectiveness. It's not just for the issue of destroying whatever equilibria that are there, it's between the different ethnic groups or other groups that are there, destroying even sort of the beginnings of a state or whether it could be authoritarian or not, it's better than having anarchy, right, and instead of having, it's better to have a state, unfortunately, even though it's an authoritarian, than having guns rule the place and having sort of very without any kind of even semblance of a legal framework or a recourse or policing or anything of that sort, you have your life is at the mercy of the mafioso or the gang leader sort of at any moment. And so, well, it goes beyond them, just simply harming the whatever equilibrium exists among different groups there, the society and state. Interesting, thank you. So another question that I have that you mentioned earlier about you were comparing state building as hardware and the national identity of software. So how do countries that have a specific religion that plays a very large role in their government such as Islamic countries. Consider religion or national identity then like would they, or would you consider religion and there's like in that context to be like hardware or even both. I mean, okay, that it was an analogy and I would think it's closer to software than hardware, yes, because it is religion is in the minds of people. It's not now that although there are structures but Islam does not have as much kind of hierarchy and bureaucracy like Christianity has and formal formal institutions as Christianity has but overall I would consider it more like a software with some hardware involved in it. And now, and the conception of Islam are sort of a varied conceptions of Islam as they are very conceptions of Christianity, and you see, you know if you look at the flags of the world, I would estimate a quarter of them have the cross and a quarter of them semi how do you call it the the crescent, the crescent which is the Islamic one sort of, they were originally built on religion, you know European states were originally built on religion. And a lot of Islamic states with Islam with Muslim minorities, they used Islam as a connecting force as they defining national identity, but you can have varied the types of to the extent of how national identity was defined. And for example until Erdogan, Turkey, although it has the crescent in its flag, it was highly secular state under Ataturk, right. And it is in many ways, even though Erdogan tries to formally show it is a secular state and and you have other states that are more religious, I mean, you have perhaps Saudi Arabia is the most one in many ways, but others are not. Thank you so much. So I know we're running short a little bit run time now. So before I pass off to Jackson, Professor Matt knock I one question about your collecting of data and coding whether that, no, no missions entered with with consent or not. And so by collecting data of how these states are operating. How do you, or like how are you going to use that information. Are we going to see this in your upcoming book and how can people or states use this information in future state building. Yes, yeah so the book, the data collection is both for the book and then we're writing a side project together with a graduate student here at Everglee we're writing a side project about it. I do hope that it will be useful for states. I also hope that going forward. There will be better data collection on this because as I mentioned we've had to go to like 12 different sources to try to figure out where foreign forces are going. And that's why you might not always want to make this overt there's been great work about like covert interventions in general in political science but I think that you know in there are some advantages to sort of thinking about this as invited intervention, especially for international policymakers. We'll be able to clarify the concept and then actually be able to figure out where this works and when this might be an option. And so hopefully going forward it will also be of use to policymakers, and we plan to release the data. Once we finish cleaning it and are publishing with it in this book and article project as well. Thank you so much. Okay, so I think I will thank you so much for talking and using your time and talk to us about nation building and nation identity and using nation national identity for security, and even coding and collecting information about these interventions so with that I'll pass it off to Jackson for final remarks. Thank you very much for the invitation and for exciting panel. Yes, thank you very much great to be here. Yes, I'd like to repeat Mika said thank you so much for coming. Thank you to Mika for monitoring the panel and thank you for all you attendees for coming to hear our wonderful speakers today. I certainly learned a lot I hope everybody else in the who attended also did. Thank you again to all of our other speakers who came today. And that's it for today. Hopefully, if you go to Tufts and you're attending this you can join us with simulation tomorrow. If not, then thank you so much to have one whole day. Thank you again to our speakers.


Good morning. Good afternoon. Good evening and welcome to a very special edition of OpenShift TV. This is the Corkus for IoT HackFest 2020-21 winners. And apologies for the early technical difficulties. Our streaming service of choice appears to be having its own technical difficulties this morning. So a little bit of a late start, but away we go. Natali, Andrea, how are y'all? Y'all are the usual suspects here, I feel like. How's it going today? Hey, hey, hey. Good morning, everyone. It's going very good. I'm happy to be here with Andrea, the winner of the Corkus for IoT HackFest. Wow. Congrats. Hi there. Thanks for the invitation. Happy to look forward to telling you more about the Q&A HackFest and what we have done. So if you don't mind, I would love to share a few info and a few slides about the HackFest and the outcome, and then we will hand over to our partners. Awesome. Yeah, we need to do intros of everybody after that for sure. Okay. Can you see my screen, the presentation? I see a very wide screen, yes. I see two screens. Is it two screens? It looks like one wide one to me. Could be wrong. No. Am I doing something wrong? No, it looks like you're sharing the whole desktop. That's all. Yeah, I think he has an ultra-mega-wide screen. Yeah, he has the monitor that I want, but won't get because I do this. Going on TV is always, you know. Yeah, I get it. I get it. Yeah, just a weak introduction, just to give you a bit of an overview of what these amazing people have done. This has been the second run of the HackFest, and these are the marvelous and fantastic technical people from Red Hat who contributed to the event. And these guys have contributed by passion, first of all. This is a, not just a community work, this is a teamwork, and people have shared lots of expertise, skills, and ideas. So thank you all. We have here Natalia and Mattia that, of course, will have their chance to share the feedback. We started one year ago, one year and a half ago. In Quarkus running natively on the Raspberry Pi, we used Fedora IoT, we used Podman. So all the latest and greatest from the community and the cloud native frameworks. What we have done is to put together a solution that is flexible, reliable. It is all for our MEA partners and for the community. That includes everything that falls and fits perfectly into an IoT solution. So that's what we wanted to bring to our friends, to our contributors, to the subject matter experts actually. And we form the community. So once again, it would be great to have more experts, more people who are just keen to learn and have fun with us. Please join us. This is a continuous implementation of our skills. A continuous implementation of the opportunities from the business perspective as well. What we are working at the moment is an extended version of the use case we worked on already. We would like to get more partnership from other big technology players on the enterprise market and adopt more latest and greater emerging technologies from the Red Hat portfolio. So we want to focus on the manufacturing use case that we are currently implementing and brainstorming on because there's lots of things to report from the previous experiences and lots of new things to add. And we expect to be able to use and reuse these to teach others, to give others the opportunity to learn and to actually extend and give back to other communities working on Red Hat products and other upstream projects.  So Beros who took the first place in the Reng, Oriental Logic and the Dronix, they are amazing partners and the teams who participated in the event gave us a fantastic chance to learn from them as well. So it's been a great collaboration and a fantastic mutual support on this path. Thanks a lot again. Awesome. So do you want to go around the room here and kind of introduce everybody or? Yeah, let's do it, let's start. Yeah, my name is Natalia Vinta, I'm a developer advocate for OpenShift. I joined the ACFES the last year with Andrea and all the participants and organizers this year. Again, with Andrea, Mattia and all the awesome Quarkus4IUT community. And that's me. So Mattia, if you want to introduce yourself. Yeah, thanks. I'm Mattia Magia and Principal Consultant in Red Hat Alps region. And as well I joined last year with Andrea and on the Quarkus IoT team. And it was very nice working together because again we were driven by passion. So it was very nice to deliver such as ACFES together also with the partner and teams. Wonderful. I guess the partner can speak up. The winner. We want to listen to you. The winner. Sorry, the winner. This is my turn. So my name is Simon. I was part of the peerless team for the ACFES and I work as a Java backend developer. First, it was very interesting to start working with Quarkus. See what's possible and start to use it more and more into projects. This was a great starting point for us. Hello, everyone. This is one of the head of software development at OrientLogic. OrientLogic is one of the biggest companies in Georgia, providing IT professional services for more than 25 years. It was a very nice project for us. New experience. And it was a real fun being part of it. Awesome. Hello. I'm Cesar. I'm a full stack developer and focus on backend Java. And we worked in Jetronis three years ago. And Jetronis is an IT service company with an employee in Europe. Awesome. Thank you all for joining today. We greatly appreciate you coming on. So what was everybody hacking on? That's the question. Yeah, do you want to talk about what all the people are hacking at this time? Last year we had this same show with all the winners. So we described a little bit what they've done. I think this year the architecture was more complete. Probably thanks to all the people that joined it. And also Mattia made a great work on HelmChart and the topology and the architecture. Chris, there's lots of stuff for this architecture and Andrea show a little bit before. There's Kafka, there's MQ, there's Quarkus in the server side, in the client side. There's even serverless at some point. So I think it's a really good example and a modern IoT edge use case. But I would like Andrea introduce more technical details. Yeah, absolutely. So last year we started with something simple because we wanted to pilot the initiative, right? So it's still important to discuss and showcase the radar portfolio. That's perfectly fine. But we are focusing from the architectural perspective on an edge computing use case, which means in turn being able to pay attention to lots of collaterals, which are not really covered from the radar portfolio, but must be integrated. And we talk, for example, about distributed security, which Mattia took care of. We talk about how to streamline data in a proper way because when you talk about edge computing, no matter what the vertical you are touching is, you still have to be able to handle millions of messages per minute. And that's very, very important. Another thing we wanted to cover was the integration aspects. Edge computing relies on one specific protocol, which is MQTT protocol for the event streaming. And we actually made sure all the enterprise products from the radar portfolio could handle those capabilities in conjunction with the security.  That could be suitable for a proper demo based on an edge computing use case. Of course, this is simple. If I may share my screen again, the demo is quite simple. We don't pretend to be or to cover everything. We have a look at this diagram. Despite work on the edge device, we covered the security, which is probably security involving the registration service and AMQ, so our broker, which is probably the most critical part when you must handle devices remotely. And I'm happy to hand over to Mattia as soon as he wants to share something. We tried to integrate third-party products like Search Manager. Search Manager will be integrated into OpenShift starting from version 4.9. But at the moment, there is no official integration. So we actually tried to give back to the community some information about integrating third-party products on OpenShift. We covered internal data flow. Security is a bit weaker because when you have an OpenShift platform with implementing an all-in-one solution, you don't really want to step into each and every connection between services unless it's a compulsory prerequisite. So we tried to avoid security steps here, storing the data within InfluxDB, which is another great reddit technology partner. And that could help us show gazing how fast and reliable and scalable it is to use OpenShift, even for such a complex use case. Last but not least, all the services are based on Quarkus. Nice. Please go ahead. I just said it was nice that all of them are based on Quarkus. Yeah, we tried actually, Chris, to emphasize everything that comes from the Quarkus universe. I know it's plenty of initiatives out there and the Quarkus community and the enterprise version of it. So the reddit build of Quarkus is amazing, definitely. We contributed to that as well, adding some minor improvement to the security and the automation of such processes. But still, the improvement the Quarkus framework gave to this POC was simply outstanding. Also, we tried to add some automation to that. So as Natale was correctly mentioning, and this is something you can definitely find and reuse in our community, all the services they were managed by customization of a single tecton pipeline template, meaning in turn, you deploy it once and you run it several times. So dedicating the pipeline to each and every service, we were able to upgrade the workload and perform in general all the day-to-operations like backup or software upgrade in an isolated way, in an isolated patient. So it's not just the workload running with a specific and very well-defined amount of resources in terms of memory, like press and volume claim and CPU millicores actually, because we didn't need more than a few millicores per service. It was also easy to manage and actually work on pipelines and day-to-operation. Please don't expect we did day-to-operation and management on each and every component of the architecture, but still the Quarkus services are performing quite well. The community, again, is open for feedback. So if anyone is keen to reuse the POC, if anyone is keen to know more, we have a blog as well here, which I'm keen to show, where we try to save and report all the technical improvement we added to the community. The most important part, of course, that I can mention I'm keen to share is the use cases section where we discuss each and every use case in detail. So everything we produce, and we usually start with the implementation of a use case every year, and we use it for two hackfests, is here. And usually second half of the year, so before we get to the second run of the event, we try to add more collaterals rather than additional products. And that works. That works because the use cases usually get the attention of such and other experts. The community is contributed not also by Red Haters, not also by the partner ecosystem, but an important contribution comes from the community, meaning plenty of people out there working for IoT companies who are definitely operating under the radar. This is an excellent opportunity to bring them on the spot and learn from them as well. So we manage somehow to share the value of the Red Hat portfolio, and on the other hand, to get as many information and acquire as many information as possible and contribute to the growth of the Red Hat upstream projects. The contribution to the enterprise product is not something we do at the moment, but it's definitely the innovation piece is the one we focus on the most. Mattia, would you like to spend a few words on the security side, because this is something I guess... Yeah, can you share back the architecture, will it be easier to explain? Yes, please. Or if you want to go to the blog as well, it doesn't matter. Yeah, architect this time. So what we announced from the previous act first was the introduction of the security, so we make it tough for the partner to integrate with Hava platform. And our choice was to, because we are running OpenShift, which is a Kubernetes certified platform, we choose certain managers. And certain manager is the standard de facto, it's becoming the standard de facto for certain certificate as a services. So we leverage certain manager to spin up the certificate for the edge device. And because certain manager is quite flexible, is able to integrate with several PKI, we choose Ashikorp just to simulate the industrial PKI. And based on this, we were able to spin up the certificate for the device. We extended the registration services, thanks to the Kubernetes client from Quarkus. We extended the registration services to be able to spin up the certificate when based on the request that's coming from the edge device. And based on this request, we define the common name, the sound, the alternative subject name. And then we created the certificate in PEM format as well in Java key store and trust store. And we're able to send this on the edge device as a response. When the edge device is ready, is received, the certificate is able to start the connection with MQ broker. And then MQ broker does this multi-tales authentication. So you recognize this device is allowed to send the data. And after verified, the client certificate, the device can start to send the data to our infrastructure. More or less like that. Cool, cool. That looks a very, very interesting architecture. From last year, I think that improved a lot. That was, you know, a POC. It was similar to that, but now it's more, I think it's more complete, but I would like to listen from the winners.  I know you work on the client side, but also I would like to hear from you your feedback about the wall structure, the architecture and the project. Don't be shy. I can say for our team, like it was very pleasant to work with the fact that we had the full environment ready already. So it really felt more like you're not playing with the software, actually building something with the software that has a use case to it, which was very interesting. The only problem we had was with the certificate itself, but that was good that you had those job in clinics each week that really helped us forward and like gave us a hint towards the solution that we eventually came up with, which was a very fun way to work, like very accurate to how it is in the real development workflow as well. Thanks for your feedback. That reminds, so Chris, all this topology, all this architecture is on top of OpenShift and we provided the access to the one single, let's say big OpenShift cluster to all the participants in a multi-tenant way. Nice. They work in their work project, they work in their kind of sandbox or quota-based system, right? So that we kind of did like a developer sandbox is doing, no? Dividing per project, the quota, the resources, and they all work in this OpenShift cluster. So that was a nice structure that we deliver and also a good example if you want to do the multi-tenancy, a cascade of multi-tenancy. In this case, you were a tenant, you cannot even go further in a sub-tenant system. It's also possible to send always same system, quotas, namespaces, and roll binding, those kind of permission, Kubernetes-based permission system. Cool. Any other feedback? Was it easy to work in this multi-tenant environment? Just out of curiosity, like how was that experience? If you let me say it, it was very easy because instructions were very clear and the dropping clinics were really helpful to enable us how to integrate with the platform. Also, definitely the system, this client side, you know, on this big diagram seems pretty easy to implement from the partner side, but believe us, it was not that easy because the edge device part was very kind of required some manual intervention. Also, dealing with the constraints of the edge device itself, so you have to compile everything to the binary and run it. Also implementing of the auto update service on the edge device was very interesting and was very helpful to use it in our future cases. And for us, as OrientLogic, we just mainly focus on the Java Enterprise stack traditionally and it was kind of a really good experience and we are really glad to have this opportunity to learn about corpus because we plan to use it in our future projects. And it was a really easy transition for us because technology stack is mainly the same. So overall, the implementation was not that easy, but we divided the parts between the members of the team and each member was doing their part. Somebody implemented the Python service, somebody the corpus service, and somebody the edge device part and we managed to assemble everything and run it. And the real pleasure was to see the results on the Grafana diagram that the sensor data is coming and accumulating it was very accomplishment from our side. Beautiful. That's awesome to hear. Thanks, thanks for your feedback and any other feedback. So we have the world round of people. We are missing Cesar here. Yes, Cesar. Cesar is the most shy of our partners today. We are learning the benefits in different workshops about corpus. Reduce memory, application on site, combine both redshift and imperative development in the same application. And finally, deploy container image with Pogman and nothing else. Nice, nice. So it was interesting for you the memory footprint consideration while with corpus and also working with Pogman, which is an alternative client for managing container. I was wondering, so I know you worked on the client side in the board. Did you enjoy also working with the Fedora IoT part and I know you were using Pogman and also corpus on the client side. I was wondering what was the most interesting part in the client side or knowing this server side architecture. Yeah, that's service. Okay, nice, nice. That's interesting, Chris. It also goes in the direction of the new rail for edge offering that start from the Fedora for IoT experience. Cool. It's good to hear. Yeah, and this light explain it a little bit better. Rail for Edge devices. We use Fedora IoT, corpus and Grail VM. So Andrea, that was a native compilation of Faricol correctly. Right. Yeah, exactly. So one of the main outcome of the community was the opportunity actually to deliver workload directly at the Farage. So let's start from the beginning. Edge computing architectures in general can be quite complex. Say the least. Yeah, but still we have to admit that OpenShift cluster and the entire platform itself makes you save quite a lot of time and setting up, configuring and managing the clusters. We have automation tools, installation tools and management tools. What it really changes and makes you, forces you to look at the architecture from different perspective and implementation as well, because that's not a joke at all, is the Farage and IoT side. Now, when you think of IoT devices, you think of all those small antennas and small sensors that usually you connect to something bigger, like it could be a Raspberry Pi or whatever kind of nice, nice IoT device. And that's easy, easy to manage, because in that case, you could have a REST API exposed by the small sensor, or you should just manage to connect the sensor to a serial port of a Raspberry Pi. And still, this is doable somehow. The biggest issues come in place when you have to provide the workload to your device station or the Farage or whatever. This leads into a series of issues that start from the different CPU architecture. Of course, you just think of Intel and standard X86 architecture and the ARM one, aka ARC64, which is just a different name for the same CPU architecture. In that case, you could definitely compile manually the workload. And we are talking about compiling it natively, otherwise with a standard Java application, it's easy. Compiling the workload natively takes lots of resources, lots of time, unless you are on the same architecture. So this means from the production perspective, from the enterprise perspective, we are talking provisioning an ARC64, aka ARM V8 server. Could help, but doesn't scale. And if you think of all those companies, you base their own data center on a public cloud provider, that of course doesn't work. What we achieved, actually, was to create a tool, which we actually distributed also to the Quarkus community. That could help compiling the Quarkus application natively. I can't say in a cross-compiler fashion, but in a multi-ARC fashion. And let me explain why. At the very beginning, when it was just myself and considering I'm a long-time developer, not definitely a platform expert or an infrastructure expert, I just set up a virtual machine on my Fedora desktop. Virtual machine using QAM and KVM, piece of cake, easy. And I was emulating the Raspberry Pi CPU. That was quite helpful because I was just installing GravVM on the target VM and compiling the applications. So that of course wasn't scaling. Of course, it's not the target of a cloud computing-based POC. But that was helping because I was able to generate the final image for my worker, for my Raspberry Pi, and then push it to Quay.io. So far, so good. When you think of, again, an enterprise environment, you have to imagine a series or a group of automated processes that produce the workload and could either notify the Edge devices the new workload is ready. As it happens, for example, with your router, with your mobile phone, so you get a notification and eventually you decide on demand to upgrade your software. Or the other way, you expect that your devices automatically update the workload as soon as the new version is available. And this is, for example, a fantastic feature provided by Podman, which is embedded on Fedora IoT. So what we did was to make sure that OpenShift could run this CPU emulation and we could compile the workload for a different CPU architecture on OpenShift running on AWS in our case. This was not easy. And so in order to simulate the CPU, you still need QM. So our big work was to make sure that QM was capable of running within a container. So we started from yet another upstream project available on Docker Hub, I guess, and GitHub, which is called MultiArc. So we emulated this different CPU architecture using QM running within a container and made sure we emulate what the Quarkus community provides. So a container that builds, that creates a container after the build phase of the Quarkus application native native native. In order to make this run on OpenShift, we had to apply some tweaks. Actually, Natale, if you want to get into the details, I'm more than happy to end over to you, Mattia. So we had to make sure that each and every worker node on OpenShift was capable of simulating a different CPU. So that based on QM. In short, we create a demon set running image node with running as a privilege because you need to change some underlined to activate the MultiArc. Yeah, and having each and every worker node capable of emulating a different CPU architecture was scaling from the compilation perspective. Because even if using a container image to build your workload image takes probably 30% of the time, using a virtual machine, it's still expensive. I mean, it still takes 8 to 9 gigs of memory for each compilation process and probably 18 to 9 minutes time. So we could scale the compilation processes and then update the images on the Raspberry Pi automatically through the Portman feature, which is called auto update. And this is something I encourage everyone from our audience to try because this helps quite a lot when you have to manage the workload on an IoT or edge computing installation. That's interesting. I think Ben was the one developing such pipeline. Ben Tagliar, colleague in the NSA in the Netherlands and he developed this OpenShift pipeline. So we basically use Tecton here in the OpenShift cluster with OpenShift pipelines to build such pipelines. And Mattia created this demon set, which was able to add this feature to the node. So in RELCOROS or such operating system, which are container-based and minimal surface, when you need to change something, you have to do the Kubernetes way, right? So it basically created a machine pool. So he created a new setting that has been propagated across the wall node to the cluster. So this is interesting for ops people cluster admin. How do I add features like this Cuemo feature or any other feature specific to the node? Well, you can do that in this way and you are always following the way to do things in OpenShift, which is the Kubernetes way. So we're managing even the operating system with Kubernetes Cloud API machine set. So this is how it works. And I think it's really cool together with Tecton OpenShift pipelines bringing such multi-arc or device architecture emulation, producing then the binary to be executed on the board. So that's why I was saying, Andrea, that this year the architecture was more complete. I think there are lots of improvement. And at this point, I'm looking forward for the next development because it looks the project is growing, the community is growing. So I was also asking to the winners today, what do you think about this project community? Did you have interaction with other participants? Did you have interaction with the organizer? How was this community interaction in your opinion? Interaction. Anybody can talk. Feel free. I have to say the interaction was very good. It was clear from the beginning that the organization was always available for questions, which was apparent especially on the Slack channel, although back and forth questions were also quick replies. So you didn't have to think a day in advance if you had a question. It was very quick to reply. And that was a very fun way to work because you don't feel like you're working on your island. You feel like you're part of something. Very cool. Yeah, I also agree to that and definitely thanks to everybody who replied on time, but special thanks to Andrea because he was really, really helpful, you know, in every situation. And definitely because very helpful for us, we definitely did not feel alone or some kind of desperate. We had one case when we could not do the compilation part, the native compilation part, is the accumulation and Andrea was really helpful in that moment to get through with it. Thanks again. Thank you. I was about to reply because you always ask questions around the purpose so I can reply easily. But that was very nice of you, but thank you. Cool. Thanks for your feedbacks. Yeah, Andrea, I was wondering at this point if we want to introduce what are the next steps for for the community for the project. Yeah, that's an interesting question. Thank you for this opportunity, Natale. We want to do more. We want to make sure we can cover each and every aspect of an extended edge computing or distributed architecture anyway. So we thought of actually we called for proposal and the call is still open. So just in case you have any idea or you need any support, or you would like to support in terms of not enterprise support supporting tackling any challenges you have, or just advices we are happy to help and share. We would like to make it a bit more complex in terms of interaction between layers, because honestly, just an open shift platform as a central place to store events coming from Raspberry Pi is a very simple POC. Okay, the implementation is complex. No, I could actually say it takes time, but complex not at all. It's elegant complex. Thank you. It's complex what Mattia did, what Ben did, though, creating, creating cool stuff that are stable and scalable, but the implementation of a Quarkus service running natively is not that complex. It's complex to have to distribute resources and responsibilities responsibilities in terms of what service does what or is responsible for in this kind of architecture. I'm just showing here on my slide. Now, of course, the community is called QAT, which stands for Quarkus and IoT, or Quarkus meets IoT actually. But that's not the key goal anymore. And we understood thanks to the experience coming from the Hackfest and what our partners share with us that the customer challenges and the partner challenges they stay more on the aspects we mentioned already. Distributed security, distributed workload, and mainly, let me say, distributed integration. So that's why this diagram is it's simple, but it says self-explanatory. The edge devices. So we are thinking of manufacturing use case of them and tissue production and this is one of my favorite t-shirts right so it's super Mario here. So if you let me just give you a quick, quick, quick background. Think of the way in, let's say, simple fashion of the way a t-shirt gets produced.  Then you have to color it. Then you have to print the drawing. And last but not least, the packaging. So this is a kind of state diagram that should be managed by the machinery, which could be identified here as an edge device. It's not the mechanical part. It's the way a Quarkus-based microservice running on the machinery so the real t-shirt production should handle. So this is not complex in terms of handling the mechanical part. It's more about making sure that each and every stage completes once the machinery gets the green light from a factory controller. And in this case is represented so it is the name here is wrong from the factory controller probably next time is better from the single node open sheet running as a factory controller. And here comes the first tough task, because you have to handle all the messages and the events going back and forth between the several edge devices or the machinery is producing the t-shirts and the central controller. This is easy if you think of the capability of single node open sheet to scale horizontally. Okay, so you can have single node open shift three single node open shift to make sure high availability and scalability is guaranteed as well. Once the t-shirt gets finally produced, the final production event has to be shared with the central controller. Okay, so the data center plant. The data center plant is responsible as well for the product line distribution, which means the new t-shirt with a new drawing, a new color, a different size, male or female, a different gender should be produced. And that's quite important because in that case, you have to make sure the factory controller maintains the information, secures the communication between the devices and the factory controller itself, while the devices are not allowed to access the services running on top of the data center plant. This can be definitely simulated using Podman virtual networks or Docker virtual networks. Our goal is to make sure we create tests and secure virtual private network between components installed on proper hardware. And that's the goal of the community. Of course, if you think of just the Quarkus or active and Q or Kafka based services, it's easily, this is easily replicable on the Docker environment piece of cake. If you want to do more like integrate this with distributed security in this case then you have something more to do. Also, because the distributed security should be something, for example, that is managed and is owned by the data center plant. And of course, in this case, the factory controller would behave as a pastor, just managing the existing devices and making sure the new devices or the new machineries spin up in the factory. They just receive the proper information for the production. And that's it. This use case is quite interesting. We are implementing the most complex part, which is probably the, again, the edge device because the production, it's interesting even from the pure development perspective. Now implementing state machines and making sure the device, the messages and all the telemetry gets delivered properly. So there are more than one protocol. It's not just in QTT anymore. It's transactional here are delivered correctly to the factory controller. Correct. But then, on the other hand, we are looking for contributors who are more into open shift data science or process automation manager so everything that that is related to decision management business process management, which is something we are missing as a skill. We'd love to get people with passion, but also with great skills to be able to solve challenges or find the solution to a specific task quickly. And also people who are happy to learn, but if we haven't got the skills actually we can share with others at the moment. This backed off course by our integration layer. So the, the complexity here is securing the integration between all the messages flowing through the data send the factory controller and going through the VPN in a secured connection through a MQ Streams AKA Kafka cluster. But yeah, probably you were mentioning this during one of our community because if you want to give more details about that. About integration between data management part and data center plan. Yeah, the idea was to leverage the MQ Streams platform. So to have a more even driven architecture. So when the data center send a request send an event to the production side. And then we have the consumer on the production side. They receive the request for printed the t-shirt or whatever we would like to print. And then it's going to send this consumer send the right direction, the right input to hold the IoT device on the production side. And when the production is ready we have as well on the other side we have a producer that is going to send back an event that the production side completed the order and they are ready for delivering that t-shirt. And that's it. So rather than using lots of microservices, validating the information and just storing them to InfluxDB from Kafka to InfluxDB. This time we're going to try properly the integration between Kafka so A and Q Streams and other third party services, which is something we are missing at the moment. So from our perspective, this is something we are keen to try more. Awesome. Yeah. So, you know, we're coming up on time here and we're free to go over if we need to. What are some of the like biggest takeaways people have learned on this, you know, kind of journey here during this hack fest. Is that what's important for me or for our partners? For everybody, right? You're welcome to say, hey, Andrea, this is what I learned, you know. Simon, if you want to reply. Well, for me, personally, it was mostly like working with Raspberry Pi because up till now like it was one of those things that never had much personal experience with. Right. But also at the same time, like it was also a professional, not quite an eye opener because like we already were eyeing corpus to use it in production on certain things. But to see how far it is and like also using it with the documentation is provided, which is also very nice. So it will push us forward to start using corpus more when applicable at the customers and stuff like that. Nice. Well, for me, again, I definitely also would agree with that that for me before this project, the IOT seemed something that was kind of unknown to us. And now we know what what what the edge device could mean and how to implement a solution running on it, configuring it and making some good use of it. Also, we learned that corpus has many kind of aspects of usage, especially we just mainly thought that it was good to be used for just microservices and just running on some server or cloud environment or Kubernetes and it appeared that it's kind running fine with Raspberry Pi with a small device and doing its job. So, I think for our future users, we just definitely think that the edge device use cases are will be interesting for our customers and we are looking forward to partner with Red Hat for potential use cases, which we can employ based on the experience regarding this project, how to approach new opportunities. Nice. Awesome. In the electronics and use IOT project for automation in a small building openshift and we use few JPMBM rules and we will try this new technologies, corpus, both man for the new new project. Nice. I think it's awesome. I don't know if you want to chime in here at all or I want to tell he's gone. Okay, fine. Yeah, yes. Next to webinar. Easy enough. Miss that message. Sorry, folks. So thank you very much to everyone joining today and participating in the Hackfest and congratulations on winning and I'm glad that everybody was able to get something out of it and kind of learn how to do things a little bit more differently and solid, you know, kind of practice environment. So, Andrea, you want to say anything before we sign off or You know, just thank you Chris again. This is a great opportunity and I'm looking forward to having more people joining us. And I have to thank our partners because it was an excellent opportunity to learn. And I had a lot of fun. Thanks to Mattia thanks to the whole community and the people who supported me on the basis running this this complex and tough event. Thanks everyone. Thanks Andrea for giving this opportunity. Thanks everyone at the party. Thank you all for coming on and showing off your stuff this morning. And without further ado, I wish you all well. Everybody out there watching, I'm sorry if we missed your questions we like I mentioned at the beginning of the stream we're having some technical difficulties this morning with our streaming service so feel free to email me short at redhead.com and I will get you routed to the right person if you have some questions on how to participate or anything like that. And that's all for this show, but have no fear there's another show coming up here in a little bit will going to be doing the developer experience office hour and talking about simplifying and standardizing developer environments. So that should be interesting. So thank you all, and we will see everybody soon.  Bye.