All right. Hello, I'm David Sturman, a senior policy analyst with the Future Security Program here at New America. And we're about to start. So please take your seats. Thank you for coming to this event, which is an event with New America's Future Security Program and Arizona State University's Future Security Initiative in partnership with the Army Strategist Association. Just a little bit of housekeeping for our people online and for you all. Books are on sale at the registration desk or online via the button at the bottom right of your browser window. For those online, you'll be able to ask questions when it comes to Q&A by putting your question into the Slido box. And with that, thank you all again. And I will turn our event over to Dr. Ken Clayman, Professor of Practice at Arizona State University's Future Security Initiative and President of the Army Strategist Association. Thank you. Thanks. Well, thank you everyone for joining us today. Thank you for those who are joining us here in person and those who are joining us online. I have the pleasure to introduce to you somebody who many of you already know, but Dr. Andrew Krepenevich, who he's certainly known to all Army strategists, but also very well known. So I will be very brief with my introduction of you, sir. Dr. Andrew Krepenevich, I think first came to fame for his wonderful book, The Army in Vietnam, which if you spent any time in professional military education, you read it. But he's also written several other books, including The Seven Deadly Scenarios, one of my favorite, and also one about Andrew Marshall, which I'll also mention here briefly. But Dr. Krepenevich spent a lot of time in the Office of Net Assessment, the Department of Defense think tank where he actually worked for the great Andrew Marshall who most of us know by his nickname Yoda, which I think makes you a padawan of Andrew Marshall, which is certainly a compliment. But beyond that, he's done some amazing work since then, still for the Office of Net Assessment, but also for the Hudson Institute, fairly recently with Archipelagic Defense. But here our main topic tonight is about his recent book, which I'll still call it a recent book, but it actually came out one year ago today, and we didn't plan that, it just so happened. But The Origins of Victory, and so we're gonna talk about that today. Most importantly though, I do wanna say, Dr. Krepenevich is, we like to call him the godfather of army strategy. Sorry, we gave you that name, but before the army designated, or had a career field, a functional area designated to strategy, you were an army strategist long before that was a thing. So, the book did come out a year ago, and you and I were talking about this book over two years ago. We're sitting in the open area of the Pentagon, and I think we were talking with Ben Fernandez, and you had mentioned the book, and I said, we really need to do a book event with the Army Strategist Association. Things happened, time passed, but you've been able to do a few events, but now finally we've been able to have this event, and I know that many army strategists have already read the book. I read it once when it came out, and then I read it again for this event. But if you could, can you give us a brief synopsis of the three sections of the book? Sure. So the book, part one, it makes the argument that the US military in particular, but the world in general, is in a period of disruptive change in the character of warfare, and there are three big changes. One for us is what I would call the maturing of the precision warfare regime. So in the First Gulf War, you could argue we introduced precision warfare. What are Soviet adversaries at the time called a reconnaissance strike complex, okay? And basically it has three components, what is sort of the scouting or the ISR, one is the strike, and one is the C4, the battle network. And when we looked at the, I was working in that assessment at the time, we looked at what the Soviets were saying after that war before they collapsed, it was this is what we've been talking about. So we had sort of the first early rudimentary version of the reconnaissance strike complex. At the time we thought, well, this won't last long, other militaries will catch up because we're onto a good thing here. Took over 20 years, but that revolution, if you will, that occurred, we found now that it's maturing. And my mentor Andy Marshall used to say, this precision warfare regime will be mature when somebody else has what we have. For those of us who are familiar with military terminology, it's when we no longer operate in relatively permissive environments, it's contested environments. And of course the leader in that, in terms of our rivals are the Chinese. So that's a very big adjustment. It's not just innovation that we have to undertake to deal with this particular situation, this change. It's disruptive innovation. And there's a lot of work in the business literature by people like Clayton Christensen who differentiates between innovation, which is kind of the air mobile division, and disruptive innovation, which is something like blitzkrieg, where the whole thing changes. And a huge boost to military effectiveness. So that's the first problem. Second problem is, or change, is this overlapping, emerging, we don't know what it's going to look like at the end of the day revolution that is being driven by the broad advance of technologies. And we all see it just about every day. What's going on with AI? What's going on with synthetic biology, quantum computing, robotics, additive manufacturing, directed energy? So it's advancing on a broad front. We don't quite know just how it's, who's going to gain the most advantage? Who's going to basically take this raw technology and transform it into military effectiveness? So that's the second. The third, which is not in the book, is this transition from a bipolar to a tripolar nuclear rivalry in terms of great nuclear powers. And I wrote a piece on that a couple of years ago in foreign affairs and just starting to give that more now. But so that's the first part of the book. The first part is two big changes. It's not going to be a matter of innovation. We're going to have to engage in disruptive innovation, large scale innovation. And provides a little bit of context to that. So it says the rate of change began to accelerate with the industrial revolution. And up until that time, we fought in two domains, basically the land and the sea. It wasn't much you could do if you wanted the land to influence what was going on at sea and vice versa. Well, middle of the 19th century, we move into the electromagnetic domain with the telegraph, okay? Really improves military effectiveness. Toward the end, we move into the undersea, early part of the 20th century, and excuse me, into the air, okay? And so we're moving into more domains. What am I missing here? In World War II, we're basically operating in five domains. There's the air, the sea, the land, the undersea, and the electromagnetic. And since World War II, we've added three more by my taxonomy. We've added space, the seabed, and cyber. So not only that, but you have these increases, these rather dramatic increases in the range, the speed, and the accuracy more recently of weapons. So we can operate over much greater ranges with much higher speeds than we could, say, two centuries ago, and with the precision revolution, far greater accuracy. And what this really enables is what I would call not multi-domain, because we've been doing multi-domain for, but cross-domain warfare. And so when we think about the Chinese, controlling the seas around Taiwan, if they were doing it 200 years ago, and it was the Royal Navy, you'd have a bunch of wooden ships. Now, they can pull from all eight domains to different degrees and in different ways to exercise sea control, which is really great because it gives you a lot of options. But it's really challenging because we've gone from playing one or two-dimensional chess to eight-dimensional chess. So what is the optimum mix for any particular operational problem that you have for how you're going to address it? So, looking at all that, part two of the book says, well, if you buy the argument that you need to engage in disruptive innovation, what do we know about militaries that do it well? And so part two says, well, I really don't know. And so I've looked at four cases. I tried to look them in as great a detail as I could. In fact, most of the book is part two. So one is the Royal Navy and the so-called Fisher or Dreadnought Revolution. What is the German military with Blitzkrieg? One is the American Navy, the transition from the battle line to the carrier task force. And what is the American Air Force going from sort of the World War II era into the era of precision warfare and stealth and PGMs and so on? And basically, and fortunately, for me, writing the book, there were some common characteristics. It would have been awfully disappointing if I got to part three, but there were. There were about, I don't know, eight or nine. And so part three talks about, well, these four militaries that led the way in exploiting a new way of warfare through disruptive innovation, they have these common characteristics. And there's a little, the editors at Yale University Press and we have to tell about, you know, say something about how the American military is doing. And it turns out that we have a ways to go yet. Looking at these metrics, these sort of indicators that these four militaries exhibited. So that's kind of the book in a nutshell. That's great. Reading some of the reviews of the book that have come out, Lawrence Friedman actually reviewed the book and gave it a very good review. But I did notice that in it, he had a little bit of a criticism or caution. And he said that, referring to you in your book, his approach risks overstating technology as the driver of change. Perhaps wisely, he has not yet sought to incorporate lessons from the Russian war in Ukraine, although these might challenge some of his assumptions. Okay, so let's be unwise for a minute. And let's ask how you think the war in Ukraine and perhaps even the war in Gaza is challenging some of your assumptions. But I also wanna give you the opportunity to respond to that point that you might be overstating technology as the driver of change. Well, as you might have observed, I'm pretty old. So I, as a major in the 1980s, I had the good fortune of being assigned to the office of the Secretary of Defense as Secretary Weinberger's at the time, assistant for special projects. And so got to see how strategy was made at a very high level and then worked to work at the office of that assessment before I retired. When I was at the office of that assessment, Mr. Marshall, we were leading up to Desert Storm and he said to me, I was the guy who was working on the military balance, it was sort of the crown jewel. You looked at the central European military balance, which was NATO Warsaw Pact. And he said, I'm taking you off that. I want you to look at what the Russians have been writing about since the 70s and early 80s. They say that there's a military technical revolution coming and this war is gonna give us some data.  I had one of my fellow officers, Ned Kavanis, Colonel Kavanis, we had these bilaterals going with the Indian armed forces. And so Kavanis is looking at this stuff, we're worried, I mean, really, really worried. And he went to talk to the Indians and he said, you know, he's really gonna be rough. It's good, a lot of casualties. And he said the Indians practically left him out of the room.  And Kavanis comes back, they're crazy. They were right. But anyway, we do, the war happens and we do this assessment of the military technical revolution which is out there somewhere, you could find it. And one of the interesting things that comes out of it is that technology while an enabler is not the be all in the end all. In fact, I wrote a piece in 1994 for the, I think it was a national interest, is that it? Okay, pretty sure. And it made the point that, while technology may be an enabler, if you look at, for example, the period between the world wars, the mechanization, aviation, radar revolution, those are the technology that underwrote that revolution was out in the commercial sector. It wasn't as though you had this proprietary technology and that's what the railroad rifle telegraph revolution of the mid 19th century, railroad telegraph commercial sector, the nuclear revolution was kind of special. And I think everybody sort of sets that to the side. But if you're looking at this revolution that might be occurring now, if you look at the technology that is in the book, it talks about basically except for, I guess, hypersonics and some aspects of directed energy. A lot of this technology, additive manufacturing, which goes by 3D printing, the biosciences, quantum computing, someone down the line, it's most of it is occurring out of the commercial sector. So the point I tried to make in that article and the point I tried to make in the book and in other venues is if you've got technology that's widely available and you think it's going to lead at some point to an enormous boost to military effectiveness, then the two key metrics, if you're a military, one is who figures out how to put this stuff together better than the other guy first, okay? Who figures out Blitzkrieg, who figures out the fast carrier task force, who figures out long range gunnery and flotilla defense which is what Fisher was working on. Who figures out the reconnaissance strike complex and that has a lot to do with what's mentioned in the second part of the book which is it's about technology but it's about organizations and innovation and how they figure this out. And then the second metric, you want to figure it out first, but particularly now because it's so complex you're playing this eight dimensional chess, okay? And the other guy may be asymmetric. He may not fight you the way that you think about fighting him. It's going to be a, the book argues it's kind of dueling reconnaissance strike complexes, us and the Chinese. But the Chinese have, as they would say, reconnaissance strike complex with Chinese characteristics, it's not the same as ours. And so, and neither of us are going to get it perfectly right even if one has an advantage over the other. So the second key issue is if and when we go to war we're going to figure out, this is not working, this is working and so on. Who can adapt faster to fix the problems that are revealed in the crucible of war? So I thought Larry Friedman's point there was a little, certainly you don't want to overemphasize technology. And in fact, Mr. Marshall when we were finishing up the second version of the military technical revolution he found that when I would go out and present it to folks that they were, they were calling it the military technology revolution and that really ticked it off. So the Russians were using another phrase, revolution and military affairs. Marshall said, well that's what we're going to call it now. Okay, so that's the first part. The second part about Ukraine is, you know it's, I could say it's too, too to tell. But just a couple of observations. One is the book really talks about warfare at a high level. And I would argue that this, if you want to say World War II, you know the Germans and the French, the Germans and the Russians, we and the Japanese. This is not that, this is more like the Spanish Civil War. It's, the Ukrainians do not have a reconnaissance strike complex. The Russians, if they do, can't seem to execute it very well. I think there are some interesting aspects of what's going on in the war. One is it really brings home what Sir Michael Howard in his famous 1979, four affairs article calls the Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy, the Social Dimension. What if Zelensky had fled the country? What if the Ukrainians hadn't rallied to the flag? To me that's what if it's Lord Halifax and not Winston Churchill in 1940. And what if it's Alph Landon and not Franklin Roosevelt in 1940. So people, leaders really do matter. Second is there's a lot of drone stuff, a lot of writing about drones that I'm following, you get to find out stuff. When I was chairing the CONO Executive Panel, we actually had a fellow, Brand Farron, who runs Applied Binds. He also was, early on, he was head of Disney Imagineering. So really fascinating guy. And he would keep, every meeting, he had to give Brand 15 minutes. He was talking about drone swarms. And that, for him, that was one of the next big things. And it's, I talk about a bit of the book and it might be a big thing. I'm not quite sure. We have sort of a definitive result, sort of a Blitzkrieg event. France gets defeated in six weeks and there's something very new and different going on here. One of the things we ran into in the discussion on the CONO Executive Panel, was you have these trade-offs with drones. And so, the small drones, the quadcopters and so on. If you want to, you have to trade off between range and payload, the more fuel you put on, the more range, but the less payload you could have. Okay, well, if I have less payload, of course, if I want to make the drone lighter, then can I use it in all kinds of weather? All these issues. And you find out, there's some interesting stories coming out. They have drones now with AI, drones that are remotely piloted and they see this guy and the drone goes and kills the guy outside the tank. And some really fascinating things going on. I'm just not sure that this is a game changer. Again, to me, it's too soon to tell. And people say, well, this is more like World War I. Well, a lot of it depends on the military balance and how you plan to fight and these sorts of things. But yeah, in some ways, it is a lot like World War I because it's very static warfare. It's a war of attrition. And one of the issues that comes to my mind is you're gonna have to find a way to, as the Germans did after World War I, how do you reintroduce mobility on the battlefield? And they found out how to do it. And again, it was a metrics thing to some extent. They looked at tanks. I would argue significantly different than the French did. So if you think you're replaying World War I, you want tanks that emphasize armor and armament. You want a tank that can take a hit and add to the artillery firepower. If you wanna fight Blitzkrieg, you want tanks with speed and range because your stormtroopers and the tanks are gonna break through, but you have to be able to get deep and quickly before the adversary can reform the trench line. So even with common systems, and you think about that today, our drones, their drones and so on, our hypersonics, what trade-offs are we going to make? The British carriers emphasized armor plate and guns for defense. Our carriers had wooden decks, and they emphasized getting as many planes on the carrier as possible because they said the best defense is a good offense. Plus, they were fighting in the med, and we were fighting in the Pacific, which makes a big difference. So, you know, I was glad Friedman wrote a good review, and we would have an interesting discussion if we were able to get together and have dinner. Fantastic. I will say that the case studies are rich, and in each of the case studies, there is a conflict, a smaller conflict where a lot of learning takes place and deliberate learning, so I think that's... One, today, sometimes I run into people and they, oh, we're already doing that. And one indicator, if you're really doing disruptive innovation, is there's going to be blood on the floor, okay? When Fisher tried to engage in disruptive innovation with the Royal Navy, which was... He had something called the scheme, and there were everything from education to communications to operational. And there was something called the syndicate of discontent that formed against him. Admals, politicians, people in the press, and it got so nasty, it was headed by this fellow Admiral, Admiral Beresford, that there was actually hearings in the Committee of Imperial Defense that we're asked with. The Prime Minister was basically chairing them, where Beresford and Fisher were having it out and basically destroyed both their careers. They said, one of the architects of Blitzkrieg, Junior Officer, this guy is crazy. This guy is nuts. He doesn't know what he's talking about. Same thing with carriers. There was something called the gun club, the battleship animals, and Admiral Moffitt, who was head of the Bureau of Aeronautics in the Navy, had to basically do all sorts. The guys who succeed in these histories actually engage in some shenanigans to actually advance the ball. So there's a whole soap opera going on behind the scenes as these people, and it happens out in the business world too. There's a great piece by Michael Cotter in an issue of Harvard Business Review that talks about why transformation efforts fail, why these big attempts at innovation. So not only do you have to have the good idea, not only do you have to have the resources and the political support, but you also have to fight the political opposition. So when somebody says to me, well, the American military, we're moving out. If you're moving out, well, the one example I can give you is the Marines because there is kind of a knife fight going on in the Marine Corps right now, or force design 2030. And whether you like it or you don't like it, you at least know the Marines are trying to do something right now. That gets us kind of to today. So I actually want to... I'm going to turn to a page in the book. It's actually the last page, because I think it's pretty strong in the way that it's phrased, and I'm just going to read you the last paragraph of the book. So finally, we have a preliminary assessment of the U.S. military's efforts at disruptive innovation. It finds that from the Revolutionary Military Affairs and efforts at transformation in the decade following the Soviet Union's collapse to the rise and fall of Joint Forces Command to the repeated attempts to develop operational concepts over the past decade, the United States Armed Forces exhibit few, if any, of the characteristics of military organizations that succeed in this endeavor. Okay, so that's kind of a harsh indictment. But I'm an optimist, and this book came out a year ago, and so I'm kind of interested to know, have you seen any encouraging signs that lead you to think that the U.S. is on a path or at least promising small paths to correct some of these errors? For example, are we any closer to identifying that key challenge? Have we clarified the problem in the joint warfighting concept and clarification in joint warfighting concept going together as, you know... Have we resource testing and evaluation? Have we solved this issue of the turnover of key leaders? I mean, these are some of the items that you found were key in seizing these opportunities in disruptive innovation. Have we gone backwards? Are we getting better? I would say we're getting better, but not fast enough, not anywhere near fast enough. So I mentioned, you know, some indicators, some common indicators of these four militaries. And I'll mention... I guess there's about eight or nine. I'll mention a couple and just give you an example because they kind of stand out in my mind. One is extended tenure. Basically, you're talking about an effort that's going to take probably 10, 12 years to bring about. And we give most of our senior commanders two, three years. I was involved in creating joint forces command when I was served on the National Defense Paddle back in 1997 and then served on its advisory board until it went belly up, which I recommended along with a couple of others because it wasn't doing what we hoped it would. So you give a senior general, say the person heading joint forces command this job, but you don't give them enough time to do it. So I'll give you an example. Fisher is number two in the Royal Navy, that he's head of the Royal Navy for six years. He leaves for a couple of years after the bloodbath with Beresford. And then they bring him back. Vonsect is head of the shadow... the tropodon to the shadow German general staff for I think six years. Moffat's head of the Bureau of Aeronautics for 12 years. The only reason he leaves is he dies in an airship crash. You know, there's Rick Over, which is not one of the case studies, but holy cow. And then there is General Creech, who I had never heard of before. I said he was head of TAC from 1978 to 1984, and he actually gets the Air Force reoriented in a way that helps it win Desert Storm. When Mattis was getting ready to shut down joint forces command, he asked me to come down and spend a couple of weeks, and so I did. And one of the things I said is if we really did this right, I said you would have a person come in, they would run GIFCOM for three years. And if we thought that they were on to something, we'd give them another three-year tour. That's six years. And then, you know, if progress is still being made, we'd fleet him out to be Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs for four years. That would be the 10-year run. The Navy has something, in fact, one of his key deputies at the time, John Richardson, head of naval reactors. I think the tour is six or seven years long. You can't do some of this stuff. And so what you do is you tell a guy or a gal, you know, you have two or three years, and you sort of bend the whole effort into what can I get done in a couple of years? And the, of course, what you also want, even if a person is not going to be around for 10 or 12 years, you give that person time to institutionalize. So Fisher had something called the Fishpond, which were his acolytes. And he was very good at placing them in key positions. General Creach, American Air Force, same thing. Moffat made sure that they changed the personnel system so that if you were going to command a naval air, yeah, a naval air station or a carrier, you had to be a naval aviator. So he would carry command slots, paths to Adble for these people. That's a big part of the effort. So I just don't see that right now. And when I was chairman of the CO&A executive panel, we really tried to resurrect. I was calling it, they had something called the Strategic Studies Group that walk-ins set up in the 80s to do strategic planning. And you got some really good people in there. They became animals. They became leaders of the service. They kind of lost their way. They were disbanded, but creating something like the Strategic Planning Group, resurrecting that up in Newport, and things like that for the other services, I think would be a good thing. So that's one. Another is how are you going to find out how you can bring all these elements? How you wage cross-domain warfare across eight domains with all these different capabilities? And the way it's done in the book is... The way I... I guess I realized how it was being done by these four militaries was something I called the virtuous cycle. So you would do it now... Somebody would have a vision. You know, this is the next big thing. Okay. They would do analysis. Then they'd do a war gaming. And then they would do exercises. But they would do these exercises not at the tactical level. They would do it at the operational level. And then they would feed... It was a constant feedback loop. Over and over. The American Navy is the poster child for this. Between the two World Wars, they ran something like 130 war games on War Plan Orange at the Naval War College. They ran fleet problems every year where they took most of the fleet out of the Pacific and the fleet fought the fleet. Some of these ran from Alaska down to Hawaii and to the West Coast. That's the area they were conducting these exercises. And they were finding out what worked and what didn't work. And they were building momentum for change because these officers who were out there doing these things, they would see what was working. And you couldn't unsee it. The big example with the Germans was in 1937, the first time they used a Panzer Division and the North German plane exercises. The Panzer Division was tearing up the whole exercise. They had to shut down a two-week exercise after three days. And General Beck, who was head of the German General Staff, had a mini-fit. But again, you can't unsee what these people were seeing. And so to me, that's the way you find out faster and better than your adversary what's going to work. So that was another issue. So these, again, I've been campaigning for a combined training center. In fact, about 20 years ago, I talked to Hugh White. He was then basically our USDP for the Aussies. And I said, we need something big so we can radiate. Because a lot of this is going to be jamming and counter-jamming and so on and trying to break up the battle networks. And I said, Australia, that's what I want. I want Australia. And he said, we have big parts of the country that are basically empty. He said, the only reason you don't have that kind of a center in Australia is because you haven't asked for one. And I don't know. 25 years ago was a long time. Actually, it was longer than 25 years. And I think this is what Admiral Harris was. I've had some conversations with him when he was, in fact then, I guess, that was Pekong, wasn't Syncfac. Yeah, that's what we need to do. We need to find out. Now, one of the problems you're going to run into, one of the problems we ran into at Joint Forces Command is when you do something like that, if you are engaged in disruptive innovation, if you think that things are really going to change big time, you're going to create among and within the services some big winners and losers. And the losers tend to see things, I would think, that's where you get the syndicate of discontent. That's where you get the fighter mafia and so on. That's where you get the gun club. So that's, I think, one of the key reasons why we have not seen this kind of capability created.  But if you look at the administration's budget that's just come out, and if you look at our strategy that goes back, I think the NDSS 2017 or 2018, we're only going to fight one big war. Well, think about World War II. We fought two big wars in World War II, but there was no patent third army out in the Pacific. There was no task force 58, 38 in the Atlantic with Halsey and Spruince running it. A war with Russia is very different than a war with China. And you can't just say, well, we'll go here and we'll go there. Well, no, unless you want to be suboptimal for both. So unless you're going to actually spend the money that we need and which we could if we got our fiscal act together, you're going to have to make a choice. And I came up with four metrics, you know, Russia, China, Russia, China. And the metrics are who has the greatest military potential over the next 20 years because if we go to war today, you know, we go to war today so we have to think about what we're planning. And it's clearly China. I mean China's economy is just ginormous compared to Russia. There are so many other ways. So that's one. Two, where do we have strategic depth? Well, we have it in Europe. We don't really have it.  Okay, so those two for China. Third is, do we have a great power ally that's on the front lines? Well, we don't in Europe, but we do in Asia. We have Japan, arguably Korea, maybe even Taiwan with their Jippies, you know. So, again, it's China. And fourth is, you know, if there were no United States, who would stand a better chance of defending themselves? And it's the Euros. The Euros have a much bigger population. They have great technology. Britain, France, Germany, and Italy all have GDPs bigger than Russia's. So, you know, whether, you know, we tried to coddle them. We tried to encourage them. We tried to beat on them. You know, no matter what we do, the Euros don't seem to be stepping up. And in the past, we could kind of get away with that, but we can't do that now. So, if it's China, then we have to begin to focus on that. But we can't have a joint operating concept that's got to fit everything because you're not going to fight in the Pacific the way you fight in Europe, let alone the Middle East. I'm going to stay one more question, and then we're going to go to the audience. And I have to ask it because in the book, you talk about, you know, one of the great things to have is a little bit of serendipity, so a little bit of luck. And then, of course, you also talk about the difference between a first-mover advantage and a second-mover advantage. So, you know, I'm curious because, you know, when I was in Dopecom with Admiral Harris, we had a lot of concerns about the INF treaty and what it was doing to us.  But, you know, do you agree that that happened and do we gain any second-mover advantage from, you know, what, in mine and others' opinion, we may have lost about 10 years in development. Well, so far, we haven't lost anything. So, one of the things that you look for in developing strategy are symmetries or advantages, okay, and how important are they? And so, but it goes back into, well, what are you trying to do? You know, are you trying to defend the first island chain or are you trying to defend Europe, okay? Second, how do you think you're going to do it? And, in fact, I brought a couple of copies. The operational concept. So, this is Archaeologic Defense 2.0. And it says, this is how we're going to defend the western Pacific. This is sort of an air-land battle for the western Pacific. Okay, for those of you who remember the Cold War, which I'm looking out there and I'm saying probably not too many. So, anyway, what do these missiles give you? Will they give you prompt targeting over great rages? You know, very fast. Maybe you wouldn't need them if you had hypersonics, but there's a lot of issues to be worked out with hypersonics. I don't like the fact that the Chinese have them and we don't, because if I have INF missiles and the Chinese know that I could hit targets over great distances very quickly, then they have to take that into account in their planning. They either say, you know, these critical targets, whether it's command posts or air bases or what have you, we're going to have to disperse some of the stuff. We're going to have to harden it. We're going to have to do something, make it mobile. But I'd rather have the Chinese doing those sorts of things than building more missiles to strike me or building more submarines and so on. So, to me, these missiles that they have are driving us to do things that we don't want to do and they're costing us more to offset than it is for the Chinese to create this problem for us. A problem we have with INF missiles right now is we pulled out of the treaty because the Russians were cheating according to the Obama administration and then the Trump administration pulled out. But we don't seem to have any interest in fielding this kind of capability. And, of course, part of that might be because you'd have to base them forward. You know, they're not ICBMs. And so the question then is, who will take them? And I can tell you, I talked to Abe's former, well, he's a former prime minister, was his deputy national security adviser last week. And, you know, they're thinking about these sorts of things for themselves. So they see an advantage in this. And again, but there... So I wouldn't call that necessarily serendipity. Serendipity is something like in the book. So has anybody ever heard of a flying deck cruiser? And the Navy wanted to build a flying deck cruiser in the early 1930s. Arms control limited what we could do. 25,000 tons of aircraft carrier. That's how much you could have with the Washington Naval... Washington Naval Tree, right? So Moffat, who's head of the Bureau of Air... He's scheming... He's an incredible schemer.  And so how can I get more air power out to sea? And so they come up with this idea of building... taking a ship that's building to be a cruiser and making it a cruiser on the front end and having a flight deck on the back end. And they're going to build, I don't know, five of these things. And the depression hits. And so we're not going to build these things. And you could have... I suppose you could have sat there and said, okay, well, you know, these... Oh, you don't remember the King Kong movie. Goodness, if you don't remember the Cold War. Anyway, they're these biplanes, you know, and they could take off with just about anything. They could take off in this room. But aviation technology was going like this. And so, you know, planes were getting bigger, engines were getting bigger, you know. And so they needed longer runways. They needed a longer carrier deck to be able to launch these things. And so these things are horrible. If you would have built them, you would have wasted your money. Same thing with the carrier ranger. The carrier ranger was going to be the first designed from the Keel-Up aircraft carrier, okay? It was going to be 14,000, around 14,000 tons. We had these two mistakes, Saratoga and Lexington. They were converted cruisers. You could convert cruisers under the treaty. There were some like 33,000 tons. These were too big. It was 14,000 tons. We could build a lot of rangers to get up to 175,000 tons. And that's what Moffitt wanted to do. He wanted to build five rangers. He was not particularly happy with the Saratoga and Lexington. Well, you go to World War II, and who do you read about these days? You know, read Ian Toll. Well, it's all about Saratoga and Lexington. The rangers, often the Atlantic, you know, because it's too small. You know, you need long runways for these big planes. You need big carriers because you want big airwigs. You want 100 planes. And one of the things that's interesting about early on in World War II is when you get radar and radio, you get long-range radio, long-range radar. What starts out at midway is offense dominant. I got to find the other carrier before he finds me to the Combined Operations Center. We can see them coming long way away. And so the whole air wing changes. It changes from emphasizing attack aircraft to a much greater emphasis on fighter interceptors because you know when they're coming. And so that was, again, you run into these lucky sort of, geez, you know, we could have had a lot of flying deck cruisers and rangers. That wouldn't have been very good for us. So there's serendipity. There's serendipity, you know, the Germans had to choose between von Zicht, who was Mr. Blitzkrieg, and this guy, Reinhardt, who said, we got to figure out how to fight World War I better. Well, you know, somebody made the choice for the Germans at Hitler. It was good that they made it for von Zicht. So again, luck. You know, there's a certain amount of luck involved. So we're going to go to questions. So for those of us joining online, you should have the Slido app. So you want to use that for your questions and we'll make sure to take at least one question from online. But let's start with folks in the room for questions, please. Sir, when we talk... Use the microphone because that's for folks online, so they'll be able to hear you. Sir, when we talk about the origins of victory and, you know, all of these inputs that come to that over time, one thing that I've wondered about recently and some people are writing about it is like a lack of imagination when we think about, you know, what could happen? Like one example is the 9-11 report. In the lack of capability that we necessarily had, it was our lack of imagination that didn't allow us to think that terrorists could hijack planes and attack our cities. Where do you see lack of imagination playing out now? And is there anything that we can do to zap us into thinking more imaginatively, you know, at the strategic level to maybe get after some of these things and push some limits a little bit? Well, the Scenario's book has actually held up pretty well and there were some... They actually talked about a... The book was published in 2009 and talks about a pandemic and talks about problems at the border. So anyway, I would say you have to have... You have to have the right kind of thinkers. There's people who are particularly good at that. There's a book by Nobel Prize winner named Daniel Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow. He talks about the difference, you know, thinking fast, those are the fighter pilots, you know, I've got to make decisions real fast. Thinking slow, you know, people like me, very slow, very reflective, you know. The slow thinkers typically come up with this stuff. Maybe they have more time to smoke weed or something. I don't know. It's... It is interesting when we ran... So Archipelagic Defense comes out of the 2014 summer study and... So this may help a little bit. So OSD... So let me read... In 2008, I'm running the Center for Strategic and Vegetarian Assessments and we do... With ran, we do a... a PACAF game out in Hawaii. And we're just starting to look at the Chinese because it's sponsored partly by Mr. Marshall in that assessment. And Bob Work comes back. He was working with us at the time. And Bob said, we need something like Air Land Battle for the Western Pacific. Again, I'm... This is how we were going to fight the Cold War in Europe. And... So we did something called Air Sea Battle. And the Pentagon picked it up. They had an Air Sea Battle office and so on. And so... But one question I have is, why didn't the Pentagon pick this? Why aren't these really bright military officers? So that was one issue. But by 2014, about five years later, the Air Sea Battle office has been folded into the Joint Staff, you know, mega... Joint Battlestory Galactica operational concept. And... By the way, there's a great short story called Complexity. And it is by Arthur C. Clark, you know, the 2001 guy. You can probably find it online. It was written in the early 50s. But anyway, I just commend that to you if you have time. It's about technology and its uses and its misuses. But... And by 2014, OSD policy said, well, you know, we have the Air Force and the Navy talking about how they would fight in the Western Pacific. Why not the Army? Where's the Marines? And the Army is doing stuff like, well, the Army is a strategic force with anti-manned power, and everybody's got an Army, but not everybody's got a Navy. And it doesn't... We'll tell us how you're going to fight in the Western Pacific. And so we ran this summer study, and we resurrected kind of the color plans that we had prior to World War II. We said, OK, plan orange is how we're going to defend Taiwan against a blockade. Plan green is we lose Taiwan. We're going to use the Philippines as a staging area for a counteroffensive. And the idea was how are we going to blockade China? And so, you know, we were looking at these. So what happens if a war starts in Korea and we start funneling forces into Korea, but the real attack is coming in the South China Sea? And so we're looking at these sorts of things. And, you know, there's no monopoly on thinking about this stuff. If you looked at the Cold War, so I'm working for Weinberger and Carlucci, you know, back in the day in Cheney when they were Defense Secretary. And we had three different mobilization plans for Europe. OK. We had, you know, the big war. We had one called the Hamburg Grab. Anybody know what the Hamburg Grab is?  Never mind. So it was, what if the Soviets, Hamburg was, anybody know how far, oh, you know, how far is it? From the inner German border. It's not far at all.   You want to risk that? Oh, the Euro's no, no, we don't. So, you know, the idea was how are we going to stop from doing that? Because if they do that, you know, does that fracture the alliance? Another one was they had the Soviet forces in Hungary. We thought they were going to go south. But they said, well, you know, they could go through Austria, you know, up the chute there. What are we going to do about that? So there was a whole range of contingencies that were being looked at. I went and was talking to some Navy admals recently, and this is another thing. We glad to get some feedback from the audience. So there was something, and this wasn't secret stuff. This is appearing in what we call the posture state of Echel. So it's 2, 4, 10, 14, 21, 30. And 2, 4 was we get two days warning, the war starts on day four. We get 10 days warning, the war starts on day 14. We get 21 days warning, the war starts on day 30. So we would look at, you know, in terms of the mobilization buildup, where bumps were occurring, where they would suddenly get an advantage, a big advantage, and that would be the point where we need to either hammer it down or they would have incentive to go to war at that point in the mobilization process. And that's where the Army got pompous. Anybody know what pompous is? What's pompous? It's preposition, overseas material, configured in unit sets. So we had about four or five divisions of just equipment. As I was stationed in Texas, they said, go check out our equipment in Germany.  You know, the German's very neat, very clean. There was all set to go. So just fly the troops in. And there's one thing I would say positive. It seems to me that General Flynn is doing about as good a job as he can given. So they're, you know, trying to preposition stuff forward. For example, you know, the pompous of the 21st, Westpac pompous or something. But again, here's a commander who's got a couple of years. And if he has a vision, you know, can he transmit it to enough people? And, you know, one of the things I always experienced with commanders in the Army when I was in is, well, if, you know, if Krepitovich made his mark doing this, I'm going to make my mark doing that. He's already done this. So again, it's going to take some serious leadership from the top to make some track, get some traction here. Sorry for going on for so long. No, that's great. If you want to make, General Flynn's a good friend of the association. And if you want to make him go high and right, tell him that ask him about Indo-Pacon being a maritime theater. Anyway, just to emphasize it is absolutely a joint theater because of that has to go on there. Well, we did. So this came out of the summer study that year. And the question was, go tell us, you know, what can the Army do? So we said, well, what's the Army's competitive? Well, ground forces, deep magazines. You can harden ground forces ways. You can't harden maritime and air forces. You can harden their communications.  And so you begin to look at that. And you find that Secretary Hagel, I don't think, Bob Work really pushed this, but Secretary Hagel, I don't think, really grasped that as well as he might have. We said air defense, Army. We said missile defense, coastal defense, which was anti-ship cruise missiles. And I went over to Japan and they were working on that. When I came out with this, it was okay. So if the Chinese say they have to control the air and the sea and the information domains to invade, to conduct an offense, then we have to deny them that, right? The question is how are they planning on doing it and so on. But the Army can play a big role in that. Another issue which I came up with this is, okay, so suppose the Chinese get ashore, then how are you going to, you know, basically try and slow them down. And I came up in this version with, I called it turtle defenses and G-RAMR regulars. So turtle defenses come from reading Ian Toll's trilogy of the Pacific War. And there was, when they invaded Iwo Jima, one Marine captain reported to his superior that the Japanese were not on Iwo Jima. They were in Iwo Jima. Basically, they had buried themselves. And we had total control of the air, total control of the sea, and it took us months to get those guys out.  Hezbollah. Think about what Hezbollah did in the Second Lebanon War. Think about what's going on with the Houthis these days. And I think, so G-RAMR has guided rockets, artillery, mortars, and missiles. And so irregular forces, whether it's Hezbollah or what's going on with the forces in Yemen and so on, especially with precision, you can do a lot, you can make people's lives miserable. And, you know, what about that in Taiwan? What about that in the Philippines with ground forces? And then if you're going to conduct a counteroffensive, and this is something that Bob Work and I talked about, it's the Marines don't have the capacity, I don't think, that they would need to do it all on their own. You know, a forcible entry operation, say to take back Pala Long in the Philippines. So we have Rangers. We have Air Assault. We have Airborne. You know, what about at Krepenevich's Training Center? You set the task of, okay, we have the Chinese up for, they've got Chinese equipment. They're going to set up their A2AD bubble. How do we go in and take it back? And, you know, do we have the right force mix? You know, we have these various types of forces. What would work and what wouldn't? You know, where would you do your prep fires? In World War II, we had battleships, you know, off the coast of Ibu Jima. Where would the fires come from today? You know, incredible distances. You know, obviously we saw that in Afghanistan right after 9-11.  I think that we're getting close to time, if I'm not mistaken. But do we have enough time for maybe one, at least one from online? David, please. So we have a question from online about how one should go through the process of integrating or learning lessons from allies who have learned them, or not allies, as well without duplicating their process or reinventing the wheel. Why don't you understand that question? I think... I think what we can learn from allies that are fighting or allies that are working on operational concepts as well. Well, obviously, say the Ukrainians are our allies. Right now the Israelis, you could say both countries are de facto allies. Obviously we would want to get any lessons learned because if you look at, say, the situation in Israel, more and more the world is becoming urbanized. And so, you know, there's a... And of course, even in the Pacific in World War II, the battle for Manila was extremely costly, both militarily in terms of human life and so on. Always good. It's good to learn from your allies, good to learn from your adversaries, good to learn from anyone that you think has something to offer. So I certainly wouldn't write off our allies with me focusing primarily on the problem posed by China and the need to defend our allies along the first island chain. I certainly have talked to the Australians and they're doing some interesting work, more so the Japanese. So when... when archipelagic defense came out about two weeks later, the Japanese invited me to go to Japan, went to Japan, and went to Okinawa, went to the Western Army headquarters and briefed them on this stuff. But they briefed me. It was General Badjo at the time. And he briefed me on the things they were doing and they were ahead of us in areas like coastal artillery, for example. And they were in the midst of basically transforming one of their army brigades to do marine kind of work. They showed me videos of their exercises where they had anti-ship mines. They were dumping them in the water like tic-tacs. I mean, they were identifying the choke points and they were just flooding those areas with anti-ship mines. That's a good idea. So in this version of archipelagic defense, it's, well, how do we lay that stuff down? If the Chinese get to go first, we may have to do it with bombers, which we can do. There have been some recent experiments with mine lane using bombers because it may be too risky to get surface ships in there to do it. What you'd like to have, again, is army forces at critical choke points, positioning this stuff. So certainly a lot to learn from what the Japanese are doing. How are we on time? I think we're about done. Okay. So Dr. Krepeniewicz, thank you so much for doing this event and for being with us here. Thank you to all the people who joined us online. And then a big thank you to David Sturman and the whole crew here. It's New America for doing such a fantastic job, as well as Arizona State University's Future Security Initiative, who's also a sponsor of this event. For those who are here, there's a reception afterwards. For those who are at home, go pour a drink, and the person will be able to talk to you. But the book is called The Origins of Victory. It's still available. I think it's available on Audible now. I don't know if it's available on paperback yet. Not yet, but Yale called me the other day. They said they're coming out. The sales have been good enough that it's coming out on paperback sometime, I guess, around October. By the way, I brought three copies of Archipelagic Defense. I have to say Archipelagic at least several times a day, to get how to say it. So if anybody is interested, I just have three. So first come, first served. All right. Well, thank you all very much.


Welcome to a video. Well, we're gonna be looking at YouTube and in my space being the sort of animals Dinosaurs that sort of thing there has always been a certain genre of videos that have performed wealth views But not really for engagement or any sort of longevity when it comes to content and that is top 10 scariest violent Biggest creatures ever when I first started they were very obviously Created with one goal in mind and that was to make money You basically just make a top-10 list of the biggest secretures And you knew what they were just a slideshow and they had like Fast-forward to today where we have a way more access to softwares that can basically facilitate any need or any clickbait You want you want to make a really enticing thumbnail and cost you nothing? I don't know AI art That's some where you can go. I would say don't do that It's incredibly obvious But that's something I've seen popping up on my feed every now and again But the past few years YouTube has been flooded with AI art and just terrible chat GPT Generated kind of thumbnails and things like that However, there is one channel out there that I'm still flabbergasted Makes videos and that's one we're gonna look at today and that is a channel known as final affliction And if we just quickly look at the thumbnails for these wow are we talking about? Tasteful content here all of this is a hundred percent photoshopped and in fact a lot of the stories never even existed We're gonna take a look at one to just see how laughable these really are and how low effort they are in this modern era of just taking content from everything and Making whatever you want to me making up a story is fine But then there is a line that these sorts of things cross the lines very blurred between you know Documenting a terrible thing that happened in this case You know animal attacks for the sake of money. That's all this channel is it is just like an AI generated voice Talking over an event that happened in some cases didn't even happen But when it comes to content like this there needs to be an air of self-awareness Humanity decorum, you know, you've got to be very careful when it comes to these things because these are real people that either died Injured maimed by an animal and I don't know doing stuff like this. Yeah Kind of feels really disingenuous to me. I mean we could just have a scroll through You know when it comes to YouTube you have to be very careful when it's monetizing things However, YouTube seems to be fine with all of these I some of these I just want to blood in fact Maybe they are all blood. I don't know but they are horrendous and this YouTube channel has been doing it for months And every now and again, I'll see something pop up in my news feed Which just really irks me with all that being said there was one video that Picked my attention when it popped up in my sort of home feed I think it was and that's this one this family gets eaten by a pack of sharks after crashing Into the water such a circumstance I would have thought would have been well documented or at least, you know For someone like me who sort of knows a lot about animals and dinosaurs and all this jazz I would definitely know if something like that happened because how crazy is that a car going off the cliff and then just so Happens that there's a bunch of sharks at the bottom of it We have to check this out, right? And if this is real this is an absolutely Terrible situation that ever unfolded on the most unlucky family you can ever imagine So let's watch it in this episode a car crashes through a safety barrier and dangles precariously on a cliff ledge One of the passengers plummets into the sea below only to be devoured by a pack of 14 hungry sharks I didn't say like this is the thing right if it's real me laughing at that it's like The hell man, you'll see just just way already you can tell the amount of different footage This is pulling from especially the car flying through there they crashed through a barrier and fell off a cliff Moments later the car tumbles downwards Will the remaining passengers meet the same ferocious end Get that like button and subscribe right now, you know This is the thing when you're talking about a horrible event like this Supposedly happening because that's how you're presenting it and then going will they survive hit that like button and subscribe to find No, I don't need to do any of that You're gonna tell me whether they survive or not just even adding that in there It just leaves such a bad taste in your mouth like oh god so tacky and horrible anyway Let's continue this is one of the most terrifying and unique shark attack stories. You'll ever hear so there we go That they're presenting it that this is a real thing that happened like I said earlier I've never heard of this and I feel like that is just crazy that I even happened so, you know, let's see how it happened It was 1967 in Sydney, Australia. Okay 1967 we have a date now remember this we're gonna take notes There will be a test 1976 Sydney Australia there we go. Some friends were heading out for the day. Cool. We don't even have names made Some friends who are heading out for the day. Good god They were a group of three adults and one child This is what I mean when it comes to AI content They were a group of three adults and one child who speaks like this I see so many videos. I'm like, that's just it's AI and the thing is YouTube should tell you if this is actual Content or if it's just come from an AI farm because it's what a hundred percent has just been a chat GPT prompt that said okay family falls off clothes gets in by sharks Tell the story and then they just put the voice over and grabbed a whole bunch of clips And they made this within a couple of hours They climbed into the car chatting happily as they made their way along Australia's coastline I want receipts. How'd you know on this particular day? However, the visibility was poor shows footage of lovely clear day This is what I mean. They just don't care. There's sort of content needs roasting needs.  There you go That that's better as the car motored along as the car motored along Who wrote this? I know who wrote it. It wasn't who it was it voted the child in the backseat began acting up He had dropped something on the floor and couldn't reach it in an attempt to calm the child down The driver tried to reach into the footwell behind him and find the toy hold on hold on So we have a car filled with three people, right? So there's one driver I'm assuming the other person is in a passenger seat and there may be another adult as they said in the back why on earth Did the driver turn around to try and get the child's toy car or something out of the footwell when there was a Perfectly capable at adult Able to help you just have to love it Just have to love the script. He took his eyes off the road for a second They just use all this content all like I saw BBC pop up there for a second Tiktok is anything anything they can use to just every sentence find a video specific for that someone in the footwell someone dropping their phone Good God, it's it's beautiful. It was a second that proved fatal. Oh, no He misjudged his speed at the oncoming He slammed on his brakes, but it was too late The car crashed through the safety barrier Oh off a bridge passengers screamed as the car flew through the air for a few seconds The thing is I will go in the comment section just see what people say But I bet a hundred percent people are believing this it became caught on some rocks sticking out from the cliff edge The rocks held the car in a terrifying vertical position. That's not vertical. That's horizontal Slightly diagonal. We could call that the front passenger hurtled forwards She smashed through the windscreen and fell to the water 100 feet below. Oh, at least she was riding a bikini So she she smashes through the window. Everyone else is fine I'm assuming we would have had you know, you would have said something like they were wearing a they weren't wearing a seatbelt Right something like that. How did that even happen only seconds later? Did she hit the cold hard surface of the ocean right she lay still Lifeless on top of the water. Oh, well, that's kind of terrifying, but she looks fine There were shadowy shapes making a beeline for the woman in the water. Oh, no drawn by the scent of blood There was a frenzied attack on the woman's body Eyewitnesses reported seeing 14 sharks thrashing around in the water I mean we are we're a hundred percent saying that this is real right the saying there were eyewitnesses 14 sharks were there Attacking a horrendous this should have been everywhere on the news I'd imagine even one shark attack reaches makes headline news The car hung precariously on the cliff above if the passenger hadn't died on impact She was torn to shreds in seconds by the sharks below like there are pack of piranhas tearing meat of a chicken bone The driver could see the commotion in the water He could see the ocean bubble and boiled turning red as the woman disappeared from sight The seat belt bit into his chest Look, we've got this guy again. Oh, he's just lost his frappuccino and his coke This day couldn't possibly get worse for this guy now his seat belts jumped. Oh god It was holding him firm. He heard the car creak and groan under the strain Every time he made the slightest movement the car rocked and swayed. It was hanging on by inches No, no, no, no, no that the term is it was hanging on by a thread AI not by inches you almost had it very close though very close a for effort When the driver glanced over his shoulder He could see the child and the other passenger were not moving He tried to reach them Desperately trying to wake them But they didn't respond if he somehow managed to climb out of the car He was still stuck on a sheer cliff a hundred feet above the sea People rushed to the cliff top. I mean, they don't look like they're rushing They look like they're just on a stroll I feel like I need to comment on every bit of footage that's used because it has been specifically picked out for these Sentences, but why why are you even using things that don't even look like the things you're saying?   Wow really struggled to get over that sense His vision was blurry and his head was oozing blood Oh, no, you could feel it throbbing The pounding of his heart sounded in his ears I mean, we're just trying to stretch this out for as long as possible to get over the eight minute mark Only for mid rolls is 100% what you guys are doing But after 30 minutes clinging onto the edge of the cliff the rocks finally gave way He was there for 30 minutes and then finally the rocks gave way didn't do any Didn't do anything specific to make the car fall in the water, but just They fell after 30 minutes. I assume the rocks just lost their grip on the mountain side Car crashed downwards. Some are salting down the cliff It smashed into the water below and bobbed there for a few minutes Few minutes Excuse me. How long does it take a car to let that's been in an accident? Mind you, it's not even like sealed at this point. I'm assuming there's damaged doors Water's going to be able to get an easy it bobbed there for a few minutes a few seconds Maybe a minute tops. Good god The man felt the rush of water entering the right He desperately pulled at his seat belt, but it wouldn't oh well He's gonna die then I assume the water kept rising. He panicked more and more He felt it creep up over his feet. Oh discovery channel. That's like myth busters Oh the irony of using like clips from myth busters in this real situation. Good god Then something swept past his side It was a greenland shark Good god Fin sliced through the water The sharks had gotten a taste for human flesh and they were hungry for more Even though pretty much all sharks do not like human blood There's a certain scent or chemical. It's in fish blood that they read alike, but human blood I don't think has the same effect. I could be wrong. I'm not unknown like biologist at this But uh, I think the only ones that may act that way are bull sharks Just because they're so high on their own to testosterone either way. We'll presume these are 14 adult crazy The bull sharks that have hit the gym one too many times man tugged at the seat belt Will it give eventually he was able to ease the tension and unclip it. Oh, well, that's lucky Finally, he eased the tension don't know how but after 30 minutes of you know Trying it and being in the water. It just gave the car was now half submerged There was no way out Except to dive under the water and swim out through the half smashed windscreen Okay, so now we're seeing that the car's upside down and it was half filled So he would have drowned then because he would have been upside down He can't undo a seat belt half filled. Well, that's his head then. I thought he was in waist deep water Why is it upside down? Why are we what's going on? He knew the second he exited the car. He would likely be devoured He heard thrashing and splashing around I love that he's not even paying attention to the the passenger like the child in the back seat The or the other person who's also in the back seat He looked at them when they're on the cliff was like they're dead. I'm just gonna do me now I think the sharks were trying to get through the smashed back windows They were trying to get to the two passengers in the oh there we oh we're now calling sharks calculated killers That know there are people in the back seats. They're not going for the drive. They're going for the people in the backs Oh my god He took one deep breath near the roof of the car and dived underwater. I thought the car was upside down How that would Oh Oh The blurry shadowy figures of the sharks came into view as they swam past the open windscreen He watched as they swam from left to right and back again circling the vehicle looking for a way in Like they know what a car is hold on the winds the windscreen's out. Let's go through there boys When he could see no sharks in front of him. He chose this moment to go for it Wait, wait, so hold on. He's he's typed in the windscreen So he's like on the bottom of the car and he's waiting there about salt water How much can you really see he's waiting for the figures to go and they're just like a video game After waiting for the right moment. There's no sharks and he's gotta go when he surfaced. Oh, there he is Oh, it was a vw. Oh finally. He's got some context. He scrambled onto the roof of the car It was barely above water now. He looks completely fine It was wet and slippery But he clung on hauling himself onto the steel top Where are all these videos coming from man blood dripped into his eyes He wiped it away and looked at the shore. It was tantalizingly close Oh I love how the ai just somehow can't say tantalizingly close All around him dorsal fins broke through the surface of the water They were having a feeding frenzy. They had found their way into the car now Oh, they'd found their keys. No, I bet they'd opened the doors and had made their way into the back seats As the car gurgled and rocked and the tail fins of the sharks thrashed and splashed The man knew he had to make a break for it If this is a real thing that happened, which i'm pretty sure it's not the way this is presented is lazy and Horrendous how the narrator is saying the things as well. So they don't care that they were people They're just things they gain but like a horror movie like we're dealing with fiction It's more okay.   I would have thought like there's no saving this guy at this point It was only feet. Oh, there's only a few feet away We're talking like a distance like that to this point Oh no, the sharks are gonna like get him as he leaps over the tiny gap He hurtled the water Kicking his legs friends inching closer and closer to the wow this guy's going so slow inching closer He was sure he would suddenly feel a sharp bite as one of the sharks grabbed him and shook him around briefly I mean, he should be right at this point like Everyone who's touched the water has been instantly moulded by a shark and actually i'm kind of curious about the footage Like this footage here of a big shark Legit going for a guy or at least if it is it's a clever idea I want to know the story behind this one not this made-up fairy to is that real? That looked real But miraculously he made it to shore he grabbed hold of the rocks and scrambled onto dry land When he made it he looked around just in time to see the car sink The swirling and the bubbling of the water was all that was left as it swallowed the car The thrashing and splashing of the sharks continued for some time as they followed the car downwards When emergency services reached the man he was taken to hospital He had a serious head and neck injury and was also treated for shock But luckily he went on to make a full recovery treated for shock He should be he should have PTSD. He just saw his friends getting eaten in front of him fall over Oh, no, but it was all okay. It was all fine He lost his friends that day in a tragic and terrifying event that would haunt him for the rest of his days I thought you said he was fine It was his fault that like they all died He's the one that took his eyes off the road apparently to fetch something the child Would a whole life in front of it Is she god knows we don't even know there had been a lot of reported shark attacks in sydney harbour And its surrounding beaches over the decades The exact species of shark involved was never identified because it wasn't real That's why though marine biologists theorize that this might be the work of the bull sharks since they occasionally hunt in groups called school Oh, we're learning guys and there we go already. We have after surviving a shark attack This man was mauled by a lion probably Oh the works of fiction But the thing is I looked at some of the videos and they look to be based on real things So the some of the videos are completely fictional and other ones are based on real people that died But just so you know for my own sanity, we're gonna look up 1976 or whatever it was Australia sydney Shark attack, you know, we're gonna see if we can find anything because this would be documented with 100 percent So We have right away the story of shark attacks in australian waters. So that's just generally everything publication 1976, right? We have oh the 26th of august 1976 shark provided her most exciting day That sounds like a good thing Not my family and friends were ripped apart by a shark It was the most exciting day of my life Although I was very frightened at the time jude aldridge said after a white pointer had attacked the cutter Arraying her and david whiter. Okay. That is definitely not it We've got a list of all of the fatal shark attacks in sydney. So all we need to do here is go on 1976 there is no documented fatal shark attacks between 1966 and 1982 I think that's pretty concrete. This is 100% made up. And here we go So I found a vacation crashed their car into the ocean after accidentally driving off a cliff by doberheids in australia Pack of sharks eats them as they try to escape. They're sinking. We have a family now on vacation not friends a family This video contains graphic Descriptions of animal attacks and may include dramatic reenactments of the attack That sounds like something that was just copy and pastes from a legit program and disclaimer The pictures audio and video used in the videos on this channel are a mix of paid stock By attribution of royalty free public domain and other copyright free sources Don't know if the bbc is copyright free sources or discovery channel No copyright infringement is intended, but definitely has happened If you are or represent the copyright owner of materials used in this video and have an issue with the use material Please send an email to cartoonsreactbusiness.com I will respond immediately This isn't like final affliction is not even the channels that cartoons react is the channel Or at least the umbrella of this but what I'm more interested in is what the comments have to say This is probably the most terrifying scenario ever and they even liked their own comment Oh god, things are happening in this world. Oh, they're definitely happening in this world But mainly inside this guy's imagination. He should be in jail for killing so many people that the shark or the guy Here we go. We've got someone who's caught on these lazy low effort ai videos are trash a real pain to listen to Just for a few bits of information embedded in endless fluff. Well, unfortunately Um, it's not even bits of information. It is completely fabricated There is no such instance of this shark attack that ever happening In fact, I'm gonna call this video the most brutal shark attack that never happened In short of the driver killed all passengers saw the title and had to confirm that this actually happened WTF if you just watched the video Despite the terrible footage You would think that this was something that happened because it's presented as such and even has eye witnesses There is nothing Absolutely no evidence not even the video itself Sites any sort of information now back in the day when I did animations I even made a video on this topic because it was so infuriating to me that people were just able to Make this sort of thing and everyone would believe it I think it was like the biggest great right shark has ever been discovered and it really annoyed me I mean this will always be a thing But now that you've got ai helping people write scripts do thumbnails All this jazz these channels are popping up left right and center and youtube is just happy to let them proliferate It doesn't even matter if they put gore in the titles or the thumbnails This channel or at least it seems to be has been doing this for month and Has been getting away with it If anything there needs to be some sort of way for viewers to know if that content that they're looking at Is ai generated because a lot of these people are learning or at least are going away from this video Thinking that a family or friends whichever one they decide to read the description or listen to the video died In a horrendous way in australia, but they definitely did not thank you Matthew frost who is desperately trying to spread the good word that none of these existed By replying to two guys who will in all honesty never read his reply But I I appreciate him doing the good fight there at least trying to get the information out But that this did definitely never happen. Anyway guys, I just want to make this video They've existed since I started youtube and it seems like they always will It's always going to be a thing that will get views But it's just something that seems incredibly distasteful And I was expecting even in the description to find some sort of hint that you know, this is fake Because at least then they complete ignorance that you didn't read the description But they're not even doing that or at least with this channel. Anyway, there we go. Yeah, that's pretty much it I'll I'll see you guys in another video. Bye


The Director General has mentioned the fact that the notion of migration pathways was crucial to the analysis that we present in the report. It is through that notion of pathways that we look at the notion of well-being, which Nellie is going to talk to us about. Question, why did we choose the four pathways of migration? Well, first of all, because in migration and development discourse, there is an inordinate attention given to one of the pathways, south-north, as if that was the only axis along which migration occurs. And we thought it would be useful to give attention to the other dimensions. As the Director General has mentioned, there is migration between developed countries north-north. There is a very great amount of migration that occurs between countries of the south, between developing countries, and increasingly, particularly as the result of the economic recession, there are indications of a sharp increase in the number of people who are moving from the developed north to seek opportunities in the developing south. So this is what led us to look at the four pathways. And to compare and see whether there were differences. We started with a Nell hypothesis. I guess we would have been very disappointed if we had seen no differences. But we didn't want just to look at the global picture. We wanted to see how those different pathways led or did not lead, since it was a Nell hypothesis, to differences in outcomes in terms of well-being. And of course, once that decision had been made, we had a challenge. Unfortunately, countries such as the ones I see on the name plates in front of me do not come with very convenient labels saying country X, north, country Y, south. So we had to decide how to divide countries between the north and the south. In fact, there are three ways in which the division is made. UNDESA divides countries into developing and developed regions. That would have been one way of doing it. The World Bank does the division in terms of GNI per capita and makes a difference therefore between high income countries and other countries which are low, middle or upper middle income. And UNDP comes up with a different way of dividing the countries based on the Human Development Index. For your interest, you will see that in fact we provide the three divisions. We give you what the outcomes would be at least in terms of north and south countries under each of these. But for our analysis of well-being, we have chosen to follow the World Bank way of dividing up the countries if only because that one seemed to be most relevant to a discussion on migration and development. A few other considerations to leave with you while you look at that analysis. Of course, bear in mind that these are constructs. That means that while the report tries to highlight common characteristics along each of the pathways, there are of course large significant differences within them. Secondly, of course, let's not conclude that these are standalone pathways. They interact and they all form part of a global migration system in which all of the pathways are interlinked. I should also like to highlight that the description of the four migration flows represents a snapshot of the situation in 2010 as these countries were classified at that particular point in time because that can change from year to year. Let me give you some very quick glimpses just to tease you. Some of the interesting insights we come up with and some of them are new. Some of them are counter-intuitive. First, most international migrants, it's true, move from the south to the north or between countries of the south. If there is one snapshot that I would like you to bear in mind as you read that report, it is that one. To show that movement goes in all directions. North-north, 22%, north-south, 5%, but increasing, south-south, 33%, almost as much as movements from the south to the north, 40%. Most international migrants live in the north, roughly 56% of all migrants. Most represent between 10% and 12% of the population in the north while they represent only 2% of the resident population in the south. So bear that in mind. The proportion in the north is much higher than in the south. This perhaps explains the reason why the issue of migration as a political, social and economic issue tends to be more visible and more prominent in the north because of those differences in proportion. The number of south-north migrants increased the most during the last two decades. So where there has been increase, it has been, in fact, along the south-north axis. But that particular pathway represents less than half of all international migrants. South-south migrants are, and I underline that fact, represent a very large proportion. They are also deserving of particular attention because they are economically important. And I think because in the past, that's been a blind spot in research. And in this particular report, we have tried to redress that. We draw attention that all the most international migrants originate in the south. Now I underline that people in the north are much more likely or at least more likely to emigrate. Again this is a very interesting finding. Which goes counter to a lot of the thinking according to which it is lack of development that underlies much human mobility. In fact, the statistic that we come up with is that development, in fact, is in itself a cause of great mobility. That may be for reasons that we are yet to fully understand. It may be that people in developed countries have more resources to use in order to move about. These are some of the questions that we would like to follow through. But it's a very interesting finding. The next slide shows that a small majority of international migrants are male. There, we knew that, so that has not changed very much. Except in the case of north-north migration, where the majority are female. Migrants in the south are more likely than those in the north to be at the low and high extremes in the age distribution. Whereas migrants in the north are more clustered within the working age. Perhaps at this point I should also mention that the survey shows that migrants are represented across all skill levels. Lower skilled, middle skilled, higher skilled. However, there is a higher representation among low skilled workers. 44% of migrants are low skilled, if you're interested in the figures. 33%, it's estimated, have intermediate skills. And only 22% are highly skilled. But I repeat that shows that there is, in fact, representation right across the levels of skills. One quick little insight, which doesn't appear on the screen. Contrary to public perception, the majority of refugees not only originate but also live in the south, not in the north. They originate in the south, that was known, but it's also interesting to note that they live in the south. Four out of every five refugees were born and were living in the south. While we did not, in our study, focus very much on specific countries, our analysis enabled us to look at the important migration corridors across the world, illustrated here by arrows. The red arrows, 12 of them, are south-south movements. And please bear in mind that the notion of south-south is not geographic. It's in line with the construct I mentioned before. So south-south arrows, red. South-north arrows, they're the black arrows. And there is one arrow, which is gray, north-north, which is essentially from Europe to North America. Now, if you're interested in knowing some of the more specific streams of migration, for south-south movements, the largest corridor is between Ukraine to the Russian Federation, followed by Bangladesh to Bhutan, and Kazakhstan to the Russian Federation. In terms of south-north movements, there's no surprise. The largest corridor is between Mexico to the United States, 12 from 12.2 million, followed by Turkey to Germany. And if we look at north-north movements, the largest corridor is Germany to the United States, some 1.3 million migrants, followed by the United Kingdom to Australia. In terms of north-south movement, although they're not in the top global corridors, I did mention that this was something of a new type of movement, significant numbers of migrants have been recorded in recent times. With nationals, for instance, of the United States moving to Mexico, that's 0.6 million, and perhaps somewhat more surprisingly, to South Africa, 0.3 million, and Germans to Turkey, again, 0.3 of a million, and Portuguese to Brazil, 0.2 million. This is a flow which we are monitoring with particular interest because it's a newly emerging phenomenon. My next slide focuses on remittances. I'll go over that very quickly. What we find is that south-north migrants remit proportionately more than migrants on the other three pathways. So most of the remittances come from migrants in the north sending remittances back to countries of origin. These results may be explained by difference in transfer costs, the way differentials that exist between north and south, and perhaps there may be more remittances being sent south to south, but they go largely unrecorded. Again, this is something that requires greater attention. I've mentioned our interest in the emergence of movements from north to south, and I'd like to draw that to your attention. It has led us to ask questions about why this should have happened. And we propose, we propose only because much of that is speculative as possible reasons, that the people who are moving from north to south are essentially looking for economic opportunities. There is some evidence that as companies establish presence in parts of the emerging world, more and more workers, more and more employees are being transferred to the south. There are indications that some of the migrants moving south are in fact long-term migrants returning home. Having decided either that there are opportunities, they want to look back there. We're really not sure, but we think that that may be one of the reasons. Student migration is another one with the universalization of universities, of opportunities for study. More and more young people are looking elsewhere, sometimes out of a sense of adventure, out of a sense of curiosity. They want to study not in the country in which they were born, but elsewhere. Finally, there is also the notion of retirement migration. This is what we call people looking for havens of rest. They're the retirees who've worked themselves very hard in developed countries and are looking for places where it is perhaps easier to live. Perhaps there's also a search for a slightly more exotic environment to retire, but certainly, whatever the reason, this is a clear trend. Now, that allows me to make a transition to Nelly, who will really talk about what is at the center of this study, the notion of well-being. And I'd like to once again highlight the fact that we made that choice to focus on well-being very deliberately. All of you who have been following the discourse on migration and development will realize that very often that discourse, those debates, focus on fairly abstract notions. We talk about migrants and their impact on migration, but we talk on their impact on GMP, for instance. We talk about their impact on employment, on wage levels, then we look at their remittances and we try to understand whether there's remittances lead to sustainable development in countries of origin. In all of that, there's a very real danger of losing sight of the human beings. So to us, the notion of well-being was a concept that enabled us to make that return, to find that new focus. And so this is where our report asks the question, does migration really make a difference to the lives of the migrants? When they leave home and they go somewhere else, what happens to them? And no, we didn't want to do that in the abstract, but we wanted to focus very much on their personal, individual well-being. And this is where our partner Gallup helped us in finding the answers we were looking for.