My name is Clark Murdoch. I'm the Director for the Project on Nuclear Issues. I was just talking with one of the panelists here, Kingston, who actually attended the first debate, which I believe was in September of 2008 between myself and Joe Sorincioni over the RRW. I'm pretty sure it was there because the RRW was killed a little bit later in the year. It wouldn't have still had a debate on it at that time. I became infamous among many of my employees at the time who were former National Collegiate Debaters because I gave a long-winded oriation and they were saying, where's the question? Where's the question? I said, isn't that so, Joe? Not quite the spirit of debate. Anyway, I'm going to introduce Sarah Weiner. She is the Program Coordinator for Pony. This is her second-to-last function when she leaves in about a month's time to take a few months off before she goes to law school. And Sarah, am I not? Stand up, Sarah. I have another Sarah that's going to take Sarah Weiner's place and she's attending this event and another event and will be joining us full-time in a couple of weeks and taking over some very big shoes from Sarah. Anyway, Sarah, if you'd introduce the speakers. Thanks, Clark. Please, everyone, feel free to shuffle up. We've got plenty of seats up here in the front. Excuse me, I'm losing my voice a little bit. Thanks, everyone, for coming. Like Clark said, we've been doing this debate series for a while and I think it's a really valuable and interesting way to get people to move past what are sometimes shift-passing in the light, ships passing in the night. I'm going to really engage in some controversial debates. I'm very excited about the topic we have tonight. I think it will generate some good discussion. You all probably handed a handout like this, but the resolution that is being debated tonight is resolved in response to the Crimea crisis. The United States should reassess the strategic rationale for not placing NATO's tactical nuclear weapons into central and eastern European states. Pierre Duran, who's director of research at the Center for European Policy Analysis, where he also leads the Center's Eastern Lights and Energy Horizons programs. Excuse me, we'll be taking the affirmative. And Kingston Reef, director of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, will be taking the negative.  The format will go as follows. You'll have each of them make a 10-minute opening statement. Then they'll have an opportunity to ask questions of each other for five minutes each. I'll ask them a few questions, then we'll open it up. For about 20 minutes of questions from you, I also encourage you all to think about questions. Also for folks who are watching the live stream of this debate, you can email your questions to poniponi. at csis.org. And I'll read those questions for you as long as you identify who you are and where you're from. And then at the end, both debaters will have an opportunity to make a five-minute closing statement. So that's all the logistical information on how things will proceed tonight. And with that, I'll invite you to go ahead and start. Yeah, I think that's best. Thank you very much. I want to start by thanking CSIS and the opportunity to have this discussion. There are very few topics right now on the policy debate agenda that are as relevant or as timely as the one we have today. In framing some of my initial thoughts for this conversation, I thought it would be best to maybe channel a little of Winston Churchill when he spoke in 1938 to the House of Commons. He said, I will begin by saying the most unpopular and most unwelcome thing. The world as we know it has changed. After Crimea, that world is more dangerous, and we endanger ourselves and our allies by sticking to old assumptions, strategic templates, and yesterday's solutions to today's threats. So what's changed? Well, we live now in a more perilous environment than we enjoyed in, say, 1996 or 1999. That was a time, if you recall, when NATO's nuclear posture, as we know it today, was established. It was a time when NATO's basing concepts were finally formalized. It was a time when Russia was not an aggressive revisionist power. When Russia promised never to invade its neighbors and threaten the independence of its neighboring states. Or challenge the 1989 settlement of Europe. Remember those days? It was also a time when NATO's substrategic arsenal played more of a political role in the alliance instead of a deterring conflict the way deterrence should. This was the era of the three no's. When NATO promised that it had no intentions, no plan, and no reason to deploy its nuclear arsenal on the territory of the new members and we do not foresee any future need to do so. That was NATO back in 1996. It's difficult to imagine NATO today saying the same thing if Russian armies back in 1996 were redrawing borders toppling local governments and threatening the survivability of former Soviet states. Or for that matter, advancing a foreign policy that could threaten the territorial integrity of NATO due to the presence of Russian language speakers in some allied countries. But that was then. So what about today? Well, over the course of a single weekend in Crimea Russia broke at least six international agreements and treaties. These include some very significant ones such as the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, the Budapest Memorandum, UN Document A49-765, the Russo-Ukrainian Treaty and of course the NATO-Russia Founding Act. We can also count additional violations of the OSCE's Vienna document, the Open Skies Treaty and very plausibly the INF Treaty, although that's outside the immediate topic of discussion today. These aren't just any and old treaties however. These are the documents upon which European peace has been guaranteed for two and a half decades. They had produced the longest stretch of unthreatened peace in Europe since the French Revolution. That peace can no longer be guaranteed and I think we ignore this change at our peril. Georgia was the first demonstration of Russian revisionism at work. Ukraine is the second and from a US NATO perspective the Atlantic community fails in its duty to protect Europe if we do not reconsider some of the received wisdom and old assumptions of NATO's bygone era from the 1990s. So what are these old assumptions? First, we had assumed that concepts like extended deterrence were outdated. Second, we had assumed that keeping a nuclear stockpile was hazardous and ineffective and actually we would reach a time at some point in the future when the world needs such weapons anymore. Third, we had assumed that Russia would not act as a strategic competitor. Russia promised us as much in the NATO Russia founding act along with a promise never to invade neighbors like Ukraine or threaten their independence. But more than a long trail of broken promises something else has changed. Russia has changed the way in which it thinks about the use of its nuclear arsenal. In 2010 Russia communicated a transition to us through their new military doctrine. As Russia has told us through this doctrine Moscow's military planners know that conflicts like the one we're seeing in Ukraine can escalate very quickly and a conventional fight with an opponent like NATO could result in Russia's first use of nuclear weapons if the Russian state was severely imperiled. Russia has shown us what an operation against NATO would also look like both in 2009 and again in 2015. These were the largest military exercises held since the end of the Cold War. In 2009 they featured a simulated nuclear strike against America's covenant ally the Republic of Poland. This is where Russia began to develop what I believe what we've seen is more of this concept called this escalate-to-deescalate concept. It's built around the idea that the first use of nuclear weapons on a conventional battlefield would stop western policymakers in their tracks and force us to sue for peace on terms that were beneficial to the Russian state. Now maybe Russia's right in this calculation. Maybe Russia's wrong. The problem is that Russia is thinking differently about their nuclear weapons and our approach remains unchanged. In places like Ukraine, Russia is rewriting the security order of Europe before our eyes and injecting into the continent a new level of danger and uncertainty. So if we keep to the old assumptions and we make I fear we make Europe and more broadly the global commons a more dangerous place by not altering our thinking about NATO's sub-strategic arsenal. So how would keeping to the old ways, the old status quo be more dangerous? Well, for starters, I believe our failure to respond to a highly aggressive, nuclear-armed revisionist Russia increases its potential for escalation in a conflict rather than diminishing it. Without a rethink, NATO's showpiece nuclear arsenal loses its real world deterrent. Russia also has studied us, I believe, very closely. I'd say that Russian strategists have read us remarkably well. So far, they've correctly predicted how we'd respond to events in Crimea or eastern Ukraine. It is entirely reasonable based on our reaction so far that Russian planners can be confident that their escalate to de-escalate strategy would be successful given our response to date. Putting a real deterrent into extended deterrence would begin to change that calculus. But that's a serious conversation that NATO hasn't really had in decades. So far the Russians have calculated that success in Ukraine would result if they have a move-quick grab territory, hold territory and wait for western political divisions and diplomatic disputes to run their course. I think that calculation has proven to be very accurate. So changing the odds means bolstering NATO's credibility and, more importantly, the credibility of our nuclear deterrent. Now, let's talk about very briefly harms and costs. Some might think that a bolstered tactical nuclear deterrent in central Europe could raise the possibility of a crisis escalating to a strategic exchange. The thinking here is that NATO's sub-strategic arsenal introduces a new level of risk to our strategic interactions with Russia. Risk and instability, however, are not the same things. With the benefit of more sub-strategic options in central Europe, national security officials would have greater flexibility and, I believe, more room to slow down the escalation of an unforeseen conflict with Russia. More importantly, I think what happens in central Europe has more global ramifications, particularly when we look at countries like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Japan. Watching how NATO responds to new threat vectors in this part of the world, central Europe, new nuclear threat vectors sends either a radiating concept of stability, a concept of, it communicates to countries that are very worried about the threats they face from their neighbors that NATO and the United States are fully committed to our extended deterrent. Without that level of a strong, visible, and prominent demonstration of our nuclear deterrent, I believe we fail in our duty to show that what we have in the United States actually means something, namely a nuclear deterrent. So how do we do this? How do we make NATO's deterrent deterring to future action? Ultimately, what we want to see is a concept in NATO that evolves after Crimea. That concept would be based on three central pillars, one that reassures, one that deters, and one that defends against the 21st century threats that none of us expected to contend with, but we're now dealing with today. Increasing reassurance means putting some metal behind NATO's iron clad promise to uphold Article 5. Increasing that would be reassurance. Increasing deterrence means raising the bar for anyone to gamble against NATO in the future. And finally, defending Europe means doing exactly what NATO was designed to do in the first place. This is an alliance that was intended for the territorial defense of its member states, and we should be training for just that. Using tried and true communication mechanisms that convey transparency and readiness to Russia, NATO should train for a more robust Article 5 response using all aspects of its capability, including substrategic arms. I'd say as a result, given the balance of old and new ideas, adamantly yes. The United States should reassess the strategic rationale for not placing NATO's substrategic arms in new NATO states. To do nothing maintains the old status quo in our thinking and it will make for a far more dangerous world. That is a world that I don't think any of us want to live in. Thank you. Thank you very much. I'd like you to go ahead and stand up and give your attendance and then we'll have a couple of classics. Well, I want to echo Peter's thanks to CSIS for the invitation to debate this vitally important topic today. I just want to start by saying that Russia's annexation of Crimea and continued threats to Eastern Ukraine are unequivocal violations of Ukraine sovereignty and international agreements that have the effect of stability in Europe. Russia should face and is facing political and economic consequences for its actions until it ceases its aggression. In addition, the United States and Europe should take steps to support the new Ukrainian government and reassure allied governments in the states of the eastern most NATO members. Regarding Central and Eastern Europe, NATO should reinforce defensive capabilities in the region and strengthen deterrence to ensure that no NATO member suffers the same fate as Ukraine. Peter and I are in violent agreement on these larger objectives. The question is what means are likely to be most effective in securing these ends. And we strongly and fundamentally disagree on the wisdom of deploying tactical nuclear warheads and their associated dual capable aircraft on the territory of the NATO members that border Russia. In my view, such a radical step would be ineffective, provocative, divisive, expensive and counterproductive. For starters, the main Russian threat to Central and Eastern Europe is not nuclear. It's no accident that the approximately 2100 deployed strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons possessed by the United States did not deter Russian land grabbing in Ukraine. As Peter and his colleagues wrote in their March 25th SIPA analysis, which I commend to everyone here, quote Article 5 and the US, UK nuclear umbrella are ill-suited to dealing with Crimea-style tactics which are localized, low intensity and quick. These tactics fall below the threshold that makes threatening or using nuclear weapons rational or credible. Despite Russia's annexation of Crimea, there is no indication that there is an imminent Russian threat against NATO territory. In the unlikely event Russia were to make a large-scale conventional move against NATO, US and NATO conventional forces are capable of responding. More specifically, moving tactical nuclear weapons eastward would be ineffective because the roughly 180 non-strategic B-61s already deployed in Europe are militarily useless and don't strengthen deterrence. When asked in 2010 if there is a military mission performed by US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe that cannot be performed by either US strategic or conventional forces, General James Cartwright then Vice-Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff flatly said no. One senior official with European command told a task force created by the Defense Secretary that we quote pay a king's ransom for these things tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and they have no military value unquote. If there were an increased Russian imminent threat against NATO territory, the last place NATO military planners would want to move US nuclear weapons would probably be closer to that threat. Our nuclear forces do provide reassurance to our allies by extending deterrence but the heavy lifting of extended deterrence is done by our central strategic forces based in the United States and under the oceans not for deployed tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Even then, nuclear weapons are just one piece of the assurance puzzle. Our resolve to protect our central European NATO allies against potential Russian aggression is demonstrated first and foremost through our political commitments under NATO. If allies question our resolve more nuclear capabilities won't reverse the perception that our commitment is weak. In the current crisis over Ukraine the calls from Eastern European allies for reassurance has been for non-nuclear measures such as increased air patrols naval deployments and exercises airlift deployment of paratrooper regiments and development of new contingency plans. The allies are interested in visible signs of the Article 5 commitment, particularly boots on the ground, which act as a tripwire against any incursion. Most importantly, using tactical nuclear weapons to reassure Eastern European allies is dubious for the simple reason that they are the least likely weapons to be used against any of the realistic security threats that Eastern European allies face today. It would serve those allies and NATO if they focused on providing non-nuclear assurances that are symmetrical and credible. Examining an Eastern move for US nuclear weapons in Europe would also be divisive, threatening alliance cohesion at a time when cohesion is vitally important. The 1997 NATO Russia founding act stated that NATO had no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new member states and that the alliance will carry out collective defense and other missions without additional permanent stationing of substantial combat troops. Despite Russia's aggression against Ukraine the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in additional countries in Europe is almost certainly a political bridge too far, especially for the countries in the western part of the alliance. Such a conversation would also divert attention away for more realistic and effective steps to counter Russia and support ally. Indeed, NATO's existing nuclear posture is divisive as I'll discuss at the end of my statement. Deploying tactical nuclear weapons eastward would also be divisive because it would be extremely provocative. In response, Russia might remove some of its offensive, non-strategic warheads from central storage and mate them with delivery systems closer to NATO borders. For example, in the Kleeningrad region bordering Poland. How would triggering such a counteraction help pressure eastern, help reassure excuse me eastern NATO allies. In addition, building the sites necessary to house, store and secure B61s and dual capable aircraft wouldn't be cheap. At a time when U.S. and NATO defense spending is at a premium every dollar spent on nuclear weapons is a dollar that can't be spent to provide central and eastern NATO allies with the additional conventional military support that is more relevant to their predicament. For all these reasons, deploying tactical nuclear weapons eastward would be counterproductive and is the wrong response to Russia's aggression in Ukraine. There is no benefit in trying to increase the relevance of nuclear weapons to this crisis. Our goal should be to try to deescalate the crisis not escalate it further via nuclear competition. The current security environment in Europe does however raise an interesting question about the future of the existing U.S. tactical nuclear weapons already deployed in Europe. Some observers including advocates of unilaterally removing U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe are now saying that the debate over withdrawal is over for the time being. Let me make four observations about this. First, despite the current tensions the current NATO nuclear posture nuclear posture status quo remains untenable. The complete withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe over the next decade by political and financial default is still a distinct possibility. It is far from clear that the five NATO host nations will take the necessary steps to upgrade their aging dual capable aircraft. For many of the reasons I've already highlighting moving dual capable aircraft and weapons eastward is not a realistic solution to this problem. Second, NATO's nuclear posture remains divisive within the alliance. The recent reaffirmations of the continued forward deployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons reflects the lowest common denominator not consensus. Third, nuclear burden sharing is increasingly a misnomer. One of the main justifications for keeping tactical weapons in Europe is that transatlantic ties are strengthened when the risks and costs of deploying and securing nuclear weapons are shared between the United States and the respective host nations. However, the 2008 final report of the Air Force Blue Ribbon review of nuclear weapons policies and procedures concluded that host nation security at quote, most sites in Europe where U.S. nuclear weapons are deployed did not meet the Defense Department's security requirements. An alarming illustration of these shortcomings occurred in 2010 when a group of Belgian peace activists penetrated the air base believed to house 20 US B61 nuclear weapons. Although some European military officials still strongly report the retention of tactical nuclear weapons, political leaders and the host nations do not place a high priority on the nuclear mission and thus do not make a strong public case for the resources necessary to sustain the mission. Fourth, beyond security and political considerations, the financial costs of continuing the European nuclear deployment are growing just as budget austerity is putting pressure on defense spending in Washington and continuing to put pressure on NATO military expenditures. The B61 life extension program which could end up costing $12 billion is leaching resources from higher priority defense and national security programs. Last year congressional appropriators zeroed out the Pentagon's request to make the F-35A nuclear capable, raising the possibility that the refurbished B61 slated to be deployed in Europe may not have aircraft to deliver them after the existing European nuclear capable aircraft are retired over the next decade. Former Air Force Chief of Staff General Norton Schwartz recently argued that the Pentagon sure for a go making the F-35 nuclear capable and instead prioritize a nuclear capability for the long-range strike bomber program. Might the current Ukraine crisis change these dynamics? Perhaps, but in my view the clock is ticking and the sooner we stop relying on the forward deployed NATO military, the better we will approach and begin the difficult conversation about security and reassurance in the absence of these weapons the better off we and our allies will be. Thank you and I look forward to the rest of the debate. Wonderful. Now each of them will have five minutes to ask questions of the other one and start thinking of your own questions. So you get to go first. Okay. Thank you very much. I think we have a lot of questions made. I also think that this would have been a great conversation to be having along the lines of those would have been a great conversation to have along those lines in 2010. What's weird about this is that we're having this conversation today in 2014. There were a lot of assumptions embedded in that very masterful tour of the table of where we are with sub-strategic arms. So let's go ahead and isolate four, maybe four and a half. First, treaties. There's a lot of embedded assumptions that the Russians would keep their treaty obligations. We've seen over the course of the last few months a string of violations and it's in my view hard to assess Russia's intentions to keep to promises it makes. If Russia can't keep treaties and won't keep treaties with the sub-strategic arms on their part in the event of a crisis. I point that out because that's a second question I might have. What would you say to a country like Poland that is very close to Russia that faces the very real possibility of escalation from the Russians that there could be a conflict at some point in north-central Europe that could escalate very quickly. So what would you say to a country like Poland an ally like Poland who doesn't have the benefit of being protected by two large oceans being physically removed from this. How do you reassure allies that we are credible and they can take us seriously when we say our extended deterrence is real and we will use it to defend you. Another issue is this question of escalation. One of the fundamental gaps we have when we start thinking about removing NATO's sub-strategic arsenal is that we limit ourselves in a very important way. I mean this to say instead of going from 0 to 100 we insert a mezzanine level of escalation through sub-strategic options that prevents a conventional conflict from escalating very quickly and turning into a strategic exchange. Now that Russia has turned down the president in his offer to initiate a drawdown of Russian tactical nuclear weapons and we have very little indication to believe the Russians are willing to keep to any treaties they might make. My second question is I'm actually going to stop today and let him answer your first set of questions. So those are two. How would you reassure Poland and how do we approach Russia that really doesn't give us much options for negotiation? Sure. On the first question I mean you raise some very important points about how in the face of Russian revulsion over the past few months but even prior to that you mentioned Georgia in 2008 how do we reassure Poland of NATO's and the U.S. commitment to their security and I think that's a vitally important question and I listed a number of non-nuclear means of reassurance that I believe are more credible more relevant to the security situation that Poland finds itself in than placing greater emphasis on archaic forward deployed non-strategic nuclear weapons which I believe have no military value and in the event of an actual shooting war with the Russians these weapons could actually be a target and they'd be the last weapons that we would actually use. So I think there is space for and a need for important investments symmetrical investments, proportional investments to what the Poles face, cyber defense command and control interoperability, ISR NATO ran out of how quickly did NATO run out of precision guided munitions in the conflict with Libya before they had to come to the U.S. to ask for more I mean these are the kinds of investments that I would be making while at the same time continuing to express through conventional military cooperation through tying Poland security more closely to ours that we will make good on our article 5 commitments. Time for one more question. One more question. What happens when this fails? What happens when all of these ideas and concepts that we've built up on our old assumptions prove wrong? What happens when there is a conflict that escalates quickly and our options for escalation go from conventional to strategic very rapidly? How do we respond in the event that these ideas could be out of date, these ideas could be wrong? How do we retread the alliance to be more versatile and effective if none of these assumptions hold water in the end? So I've done something in the past about this idea that the different yields of new throw weapons can create flexibility and provide different options to the U.S. President or to NATO in the event deterrence fails or seems like it's going to fail. And I have yet to be convinced that the use of lower yield weapons or substrategic weapons as a way to enhance deterrence and attempt to control escalation won't result in response by the potential adversary that is worse than the initial move. I think that substrategic weapons, low yield nuclear weapons, don't offer an escape from the reality that nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. So I don't believe that these weapons give us meaningful additional options that strategic weapons, essentially based in the United States or conventional means can't fill. Now you have five minutes to ask some questions. Sure. So I guess my first question for you, Peter, you talked a lot about how the world has changed, how the security environment in Europe has changed. I heard more about how relying more on substrategic weapons would enhance deterrence and enhance reassurance. I mean, first of all, if you heard from any of our Eastern European allies that moving substrategic nuclear weapons eastward is something that they would like to see. I think the answer would be yes. I think that if you ask Poland or some of the other NATO member states if they would be willing to begin this discussion in the context of a NATO conversation, I think the answer would be very receptive. I think ultimately the problem we face is that these ideas are old. We have allies that are looking at two options. Either they radiate stability through the confidence that extended deterrence gives them or they will ingest increasingly toxic levels of visibility from NATO's eastern frontier. If we began this discussion inside a NATO context and simply began to reassess the options and assumptions that we once made and compare them against reality, I think that NATO's newest member states would be very willing to have that conversation about the old and 1990s assumptions that we've been working off of all along. Another question I would have for you is that the U.S. no longer relies on non-strategic nuclear weapons in the Asia Pacific. We have removed all of our substrategic weapons from that theater in the midst of some rather unsettling North Korean sabre rattling last March in the midst of some military exercises about potential nuclear strikes against South Korea and the United States. We took several steps to help to reassure South Korea and other allies in the region including flying to B-52 bombers from the United States over the Korean Peninsula or near the Korean Peninsula. So if we can maintain extended deterrence and reassurance in the Asia Pacific without tactical nuclear weapons why do we have to have them in Europe? Ultimately we're getting at the fundamental problem with what we're seeing in Central Europe. Right now we risk higher levels of proliferation not from rogue states but from traditional allies and partners countries like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, even Japan are watching what's happening in Central Europe very closely and making calculations about their own security and own nuclear options based on how credible they perceive the U.S. deterrent to be. Our fundamental problem is that if we don't effectively reassure allies through a robust strong and prominent demonstration of America's commitment to extended deterrence in Europe we can find increasingly difficult to deter aggression from other states that are in the Middle East and Asia and I think the solution to that is to maintain a strong and robust tactical option, that mezzanine option in any escalation scenario in Europe as a way of showing that we're serious we're going to use the big guns in the event that your security is threatened that speaking to NATO but other allies in different parts of the world will take that cue very seriously and they'll ingest it and they'll be more confident in America's extended deterrent rather than insecure. And then final question if there's still time just about a minute. Given some of the financial costs associated with not only just sustaining and modernizing the existing tactical nuclear weapons in Europe but also the additional costs that it would accrue from moving them eastward why is it why would it be more productive to spend that money on tactical nuclear weapons on nuclear conventional means of reassurance that would be more relevant to the types of threats that our Eastern European allies are currently facing. Well I think you can disaggregate the nuclear threat from the conventional threat that Central European allies face. We know this because of Russia's escalate to de-escalate thinking again this would anticipate a rapid escalation of a conventional conflict into the first use on Russia's part of a nuclear weapon. When it comes to cost I can't think of any higher priority right now in the world than the active revisionist nuclear tipped power that Russia is at this point. A Russia that refuses to abide by the international security order specifically in Europe. A Russia that seems willing to break the peace that has been established over the past two and a half decades. If the costs of maintaining security in Europe are too high then the United States needs to get out of the security business. I don't think we're at that point yet. In fact I think the world would be far more instable far less predictable and far more dangerous if we abandon the traditional role of extended deterrence to our allies in not just Europe but elsewhere in the world. Okay thank you very much. I'm going to take the prerogative to ask a couple questions both of you to try to parse out some of the things I think are underlying for this discussion. The first is if I understand correctly you've said that we should just remove tactical nuclear weapons entirely over some point in time from Europe and you think that we should put them farther to the east. So my question is could both of you talk about what you believe Russia's reaction would be either to removal or to more forward deployment? We sort of I think talked about that how would Russia perceive it and then what do you think Russia would do in response to either of those moves? Let me start first at the outside by saying I don't believe that the political conditions are particularly conducive to the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons US tactical nuclear weapons from Europe right now. At the same time I think we need to look at the long term I think we have to look past just the crisis of the moment and look at some of the current political and financial trends in Europe and attempt to get out ahead of what I think is a slow moving process of disarmament by default. Just one example of why I think that's the case. The Germans are currently procuring the Eurofighter which will be their next generation aircraft to replace the dual capable tornado. The Eurofighter is not going to be wired for a nuclear capability and in order to give the Eurofighter the avionics package that would be necessary to deliver nuclear weapons that's an expenditure that the German parliament would have to remove and I'm not particularly confident that the German parliament would do that and if the Germans get out of the nuclear business I think the Belgians and Dutch wouldn't be far behind leaving just the Italians and the Turks and if the three northern members got out of the business I don't think the Italians would be too far behind. So I worry that unless we get out ahead of the problem that the removal of these nuclear weapons could happen by default amidst recriminations amidst alliance disunity and fracturing. So how would Russia respond? I don't think this decision about our forward deployed tactical nuclear weapons should be contingent on how Russia feels. I mean Russia has thousands of tactical nuclear weapons to our tactical nuclear weapons provide them with an excuse not to not to engage more seriously on tactical nuclear weapons sure but they have tactical nuclear weapons for their own security reasons irrespective of just the weapons that we that we have in Europe. So ultimately it's about what's in the best interest of NATO financially and politically about what the Russians would say or do. On that point I think we very much agree regarding how would Russia respond I think that we should take the long view I think you're right but in that long view the genie the nuclear genie is out of the bottle. Kingston if you and I could wave a magic wand and achieve Ronald Reagan and Barack Obama's vision for a world without nuclear weapons that would be great except the first six months of a conventional war between two states would see their reintroduction almost immediately. This is technology and capability that if you have the right scientists and equipment and if you have the right means conventional war in a world without nuclear weapons but knowledge of them would eventually escalate back to where we are today if not worse when it comes to the deployment Germany and the Netherlands these used to be NATO frontline states. There was nothing about NATO that said we have to keep our nuclear arsenal back away from Russia the new frontline states are Poland the Baltic states that eastern flank from the Baltic sea to the Black Sea. So I think there's a compelling strategic rationale to appropriate these weapons to places where they might be needed and finally when it comes to Russia's response to a move like this it's not escalatory because it in no way endangers Russia's first or second strike capability. We will maintain nuclear stability in the balance between Russia and the United States. If Russia's first and second strike capability are no way impinged upon then I don't think that we have cause for some worst case scenario concerns. My last question and this is more taking a baseline reading there's been a lot of discussion recently especially after the sort of red line in Syria that was not about the credibility of U.S. threats. What do you think right now is the credibility of U.S. nuclear weapons in NATO. Do you believe that NATO countries believe that the U.S. would use a tactical nuclear weapon if Russia crossed a particular threshold? I'll take that one first. Ultimately I think that's the problem we're dealing with is this credibility of our extended deterrent. When it comes to would NATO use its sub-strategic options and by the way we're really speaking about the United States releasing these weapons for NATO's use in that environment. I think that's the real problem we face. Russia, as I said before, has read us extremely well. Russian planners understand the kind of security environment they face. They've developed a strategy that is ideally suited to exploit that permissive security environment. Their idea is that the first use of a nuclear weapon in a conventional conflict in North, let's say North Central Europe would give us pause and force political leaders to sue for peace on their terms. I think that's the danger we face at the end of the day. NATO's nuclear deterrent must not be a prestige museum piece that we pull out and look at and say wow that's great. It needs to be a real world deterrent that prevents conflicts from happening in the first place and isn't necessarily we should stop thinking about it in terms of eye for an eye. First of all, regarding the issue of red lines and is the U.S. how the U.S. responded or didn't respond in Syria, how the U.S. has responded or hasn't responded in Ukraine. There's a fundamentally different situation given the NATO Article 5 commitment and we should look at the steps that the United States is taking to support our Central European and Eastern European allies to help buttress their defenses and to help enhance deterrence in the conventional sphere. So that's point number one. Point number two in terms of whether or not our NATO allies believe would use our tactical nuclear weapons. Well first of all you have to ask them because they're going to be involved in the negotiation on whether or not these weapons are actually going to be used and I don't think their credibility or lack of credibility has anything to do with what may have happened in Syria or perceptions about U.S. resolve. I just don't believe the weapons are credible in this context. Like General Cartwright, I don't believe they have any military utility that can't be performed or if necessary U.S. strategic forces based in the United States and I talked a little bit earlier about I don't believe that the lower yield that these weapons apparently have gives us any real meaningful options or additional flexibility. Great. Now it's time for your questions. Just a couple ground rules. If you'd wait for the microphone please.  Let us know who you are and where you're from and you're addressing your question to one of the speakers or both. And again if anyone's watching online you'll see the emailed email your questions to at the bottom of your screen shoot them to me and I'll read them for you. So we'll open up for questions now. Yes. I do have a microphone. Thank you. I appreciate both sides of the argument here. I'm from the Luger Center. Alan Maggard from the Luger Center. Excuse me I'm new on this. But I would like to get both sides on recent developments within the within our congress regarding the development of a European phased adaptive approach to missile defense. I would specifically like to know the political ramifications as it applies in terms of international relations. I know that's a very broad question but it's something that seems very sensitive and at least pertinent to our current topic. Thank you. I'll take the lead on that. We talk about reassuring, deterring, and defending NATO against the kinds of threats we now realize we're going to be facing in the 21st century and in the context of EPAA this would be NATO's missile defense approach to missile defense. First and foremost absolutely necessary to say NATO's and by extension the US EPAA the European phased adapted approach to missile defense does not impede Russia's strategic deterrent to us. It maintains nuclear stability in Europe. There is no threat to Russia's first or second strike. There is no need to be worried about a nuclear escalation as a result of EPAA. More importantly if NATO starts thinking about fulfilling its own pledge that it's made now at two successive NATO summits to provide for the missile defense of all European NATO states we have to start looking more actively at lower and mid tier. This would be different from EPAA which is upper tier lower and mid tier air and missile defenses that protect countries like Poland and the Baltic states from the real threat they face not from strategic nuclear arms but from theater ballistic missiles. This is a technology that's proven we know it works and the United States has become very efficient at protecting countries through this defensive weapons system. A defensive system that in no way impedes Russia's first or second strike. So I don't see any complications in the context of air and missile defense from either EPAA or lower and mid tier air and missile defense. Let me just say that I agree a lot of what Peter said in fact I'd be opening to considering rotating a Patriot battery which we've done before in Poland or a THAAD battery there. In relation to the EPAA however and the current Ukraine crisis let me just say there's some in Congress saying that in response to Russia's aggression against Ukraine we should accelerate implementation of the phase adaptive approach particularly phase three which is going to see the deployment of SM two SM three two way Aegis shore missiles on the territory of Poland. I would just say first that the EPAA is designed to respond to a potential missile threat from the Middle East not the threat from Russia and the only apparent goal of an accelerated timetable is to upset Russia which as Peter got into opposes the system and despite our current tensions with Russia it's still in the US national interest in my view not to feed the Russian suspicion that the EPAA is directed at them an impression we've been spending years to try and dispel and moreover it's not exactly clear what the system would be defending against the SM three two way would have capability against intermediate range missiles and perhaps longer range missiles since the Pentagon says as Peter noted it would be useless against Russia's strategic forces just over again here you've asked about whether or not the EPAA are a perception that it's flexible to deal with other threats that arise not just the one it was built for so you talk about vis-a-vis Russia and not Iran ultimately the problem is eight and a half seconds eight and a half seconds is about how is how is the gap between a strategic launch from western Ukraine excuse me western Russia launch towards the United States launch towards the American homeland by Russia in this unwanted and arguably low probability scenario eight and a half seconds is the gap that exists between that Russia and ICBM and the fastest that an SM3 based in Poland can reach it because of that gap this is simply geography because of that gap Russia's first strike would get through Russia does not have any cause to be concerned and it sounds strange to say in a context here in Washington doesn't have any cause to be concerned about its strategic deterrent being upended in any way by EPAA the European phased adapted approach being deployed in Poland more importantly this does more than just protect European NATO from ballistic missile threats but it also does an important thing by conveying again that reassurance to allies we want allies that radiate stability that don't ingest ingest toxic instability as I said before when it comes to rotating a patriot battery yep absolutely this is an idea that has been put forward importantly that patriot battery must be armed and active when we rotated the patriot previously it was an empty training unit it said empty spray painted on the side of the patriot battery this did not send the kind of reassuring message that the United States should be sending to its allies given the kinds of threats that these countries now face so I think when we asses the preponderance of Russia's strategic deterrent is not threatened nuclear stability remains allies are stronger and bolstered by America's presence in their countries and we can protect against not just one but different kinds of threats that Europe faces in the 21st century I think the answer on that front is compellingly yes and I just want to add yes the Aegis missile defense system would have capability against ballistic missiles of other countries and the system is deployed in other parts of the world and the PAA the purpose of that system should remain focused on the ballistic missile threat from Iran yeah we're going to cut you out sorry yep we're going to move on to someone else thanks up here I'm Holly Ryan founder and CEO of Veritas LLC I'm actually in the midst of a publication that speaks specifically to the issue of the military utility of our weapons so I can certainly see the side of your argument Mr. Reef my issue is I think something that we can all agree upon and that is that for over a decade now our operational and tactical focus has been on counter-terrorism and counter insurgency and I guess the question I would ask is do you think that Russia assumes that NATO and in particular the United States is not prepared to fight a conventional war and if that's the case then would not perhaps the interim positioning of tactical nuclear weapons or extension of those weapons not at least by time or provide a buffer so that NATO and the US in particular can invest in preparing for and directing resources at developing a more conventional capability I'll start with Peter and then if you want to weigh in I think the Russians calculated probably rightly that the United States and NATO weren't willing to fight a conventional war over Ukraine but a conventional war over NATO is a totally different story so if the Russians were to make a major conventional move against Russia I think we would be compelled to act and we would act because the credibility of the alliance would be at stake so I think the Russians would be making a hugely unwise gamble if they were to do that now people have talked about less forward threats if you will to the Baltic states for example and how the Russians could use similar tactics that were used in Crimea to foment dissent against some of the Russian minorities in the Baltic states and attempt to destabilize them in that fashion but again I don't see how tactical nuclear weapons are relevant at all to either deterring that threat or potentially responding to that to that threat so I mean I would rather spend my dollars in the scarce defense resource in the Baltic states on things like cyber defense for example as opposed to weapons that aren't going to deter the kind of low level meddling and in the event there were a major conventional attack the United States and NATO are more than capable of responding with conventional forces which greatly exceed those of the Russians two points in response first our steps so far in the immediate aftermath of Crimea have been very temporary these steps are temporary because we signed the NATO Russia founding act saying that we would not make permanent deployments in new NATO members the problem with the current structure as it's unfolded is that easy in easy out our troops can move just as easily in as they we can pull them easily out is very unsettling to countries that are looking for signs of reassurance from the United States here in the United States we Americans go to bed every night knowing that we are protected by one of the most robust and capable extended deterrence on the planet the problem is that our allies in eastern central Europe they don't have that same sense of security they do question not that NATO will come I think a lot of them realize that in the event of a crisis a conventional crisis NATO will come the question that they face and that their security planners are grappling with is what's left of their country when NATO finally arrives how long does it take NATO to politically release the use of combat brigade teams for the defense of central Europe and I think that's really what we're going to be addressing here NATO a strong prominent and very visible demonstration of America's commitment to NATO's sub strategic arsenal and the extended deterrence it conveys allows our allies in central Europe to not pursue alternate strategies hedging strategies worst case strategies strategies that might be more destabilizing and secondly we have a global context here other countries in different parts of the world are watching what's happening and they're watching to see that how America protects its covenant allies they're watching to see that level of protection through our extended deterrence could be as credible to them as it is in NATO if America's sub strategic nuclear deterrent is not credible in NATO in a NATO context countries in the Middle East and Asia have very deep cause to be concerned I want to avoid that I want to prevent that level of proliferation that risk of proliferation and I think if we reexamine some of the fundamental originating assumptions that we've based our basing in nuclear posture on in Europe we can avoid those worst case outcomes elsewhere thank you I have a question for both speakers a related question not exactly on point the track record of countries possessing nuclear weapons or having US weapons deployed under territory for avoiding invasions and avoiding conquests and avoiding occupations is quite good with the exception of Israel and its undeclared capabilities none of these nations have even suffered major conventional attacks in that light perhaps Ukraine is having very serious second thoughts about having given up its nuclear weapons well there's no perhaps about it Ukraine has in fact this has become an issue in their current presidential election remember based on promises that Russia made never to invade Ukraine never to threaten their sovereignty or in any way impede upon their independence Ukraine gave up the inherited Soviet nuclear arsenal that it possessed Ukrainians are now asking themselves why did we do that and maybe we should go back on that agreement this is a very dangerous conversation to even watch take place in Ukraine it speaks to a level of insecurity that not just Ukrainians but other countries face we don't want the message to be you can't rely on the United States you must rely only on your own national strategic deterrent if that message is what everyone takes away from Crimea we risk a level of proliferation unlike any we've seen before I think that the best way to address that issue is to reassess the assumptions that we made early on and to show that no America's extended deterrent is credible for real world setting and countries don't have to currently possess nuclear weapons don't have to begin pursuing them or find insurance policies against the event that America renegs on its promises to allies it's a great question Clark one that's been hotly debated not only in Ukraine but among the expert community here in DC as well setting aside for the moment the question of whether Ukrainian nuclear weapons would have prevented Russia's land grab in Crimea and continued efforts to destabilize the rest of Ukraine I think we have to go back to the end of the Soviet Union and address the question of could the Ukrainians have maintained a nuclear arsenal financially well I know but it's relevant it's relevant and at the same time at what cost to do so and I think there are large questions about whether that would have been feasible now to get to your question I think this is one of the reasons that we have to strongly respond to Russia's aggression against Ukraine and support our allies because if security assurances are going to mean anything as a tool going forward I think it is important to demonstrate that that we're going to respond to what Russia is doing now that 1994 Budapest was not an ironclad legally binding military commitment and it was written that way for specific purposes because we weren't ready to offer such a commitment but at the same time if we were to do nothing and there were to be no response I think it would have significant negative consequences for nonproliferation more generally I'm going to ask a question from someone who emailed in this room Lieutenant Colonel Kurt and I apologize if you're still watching Shen Dizellos U.S. Air Force National Defense Fellow and Visiting Scholar at the Center for International Studies and Cooperation at Stanford this is a question for you although I'll give you a chance to chime in if you want he asked given that Russia well understands U.S. and NATO nuclear capabilities to date why would forward deploying tactical nuclear weapons help change the Russian calculations what is different about a B61 delivered by a fighter originating from a base in Italy or Poland versus delivered from a bomber or SLBM originating outside of Russia two-fold one I think having more options in the region in the event of an unforeseen international security crisis is beneficial to decision makers I think it decreases the the it decreases the geographic gap that would exist from say deploying a sub-strategic weapon from say the United States all the way to north-central Europe and I also think it speaks to the larger issue we have allies that see our responses that welcome our responses but they're at the same time very concerned that these are short-term fixes and the United States is not truly committed to upholding its article 5 commitments they're worried they might not live to see the time when in the event of a crisis and they are in a war and Russia does utilize that escalate to de-escalate strategy they're worried that many of their political elites and decision makers won't be alive to see NATO come to their assistance we can address that concern immediately by showing that NATO's credible and prominent sub-strategic deterrent is viable for Central European context I would just say I agree with the premise of the question we have time for one more quick question and quick answer Sam, do you have a question? let's go back here I think Richard White Hudson Institute a lot of what we know about Russia's tactical nuclear weapons doctrine comes from when they were more talkative about this in the 1990s I've not heard that they renounce this escalated de-escalate theory but I've actually not seen much evidence in the last few years that anyone's they're actually propounding that so I was curious if you've actually seen evidence that they still believe that or just because we're just assuming that they formally renounce it as a renounce their first use doctrine that they're continuing it To answer the question let's put ourselves in the minds of the Central European National Security Planning Team we are tasked with the protection of our own citizens on the front line of NATO when we have to uphold that task we have to be very realistic and we can't be impeded by how we protect our own citizens we can look at that security dilemma from the United States perspective and say well you know we can't see examples here or we are reassured there but that's the US perspective the problem that we face in a NATO context is that Central European National Security Planners are increasingly concerned that existing deterrence to that escalation in the event of a crisis that as the Russians themselves have identified small scale conflicts can quickly accelerate into larger wars and those wars can go nuclear very rapidly so if we're Central European National Security Planners and we're tasked with protecting our own citizens we have to be very real in addressing those threats one way in which we'd like to see NATO address those threats I'd imagine would be to have a visible and obvious demonstration of America's commitment best held in the context of NATO rethinking some of those original assumptions that it made back about 20 years ago and reassessing how those original assumptions apply today those assumptions would be rethought in the context of a country that crosses international borders violates the sovereignty of its neighbors and is very eager to revise the post-1989 settlement of Europe this is a reality that we can't ignore and we can't take comfort in because again we're on the front lines in the mindset of a Central European National Security Planner I think when we start thinking about it in those terms the comfort that we feel in the United States falls away we see the world through our NATO Allies' point of view and we can do everything from a US perspective in our power to ensure that they don't start pursuing options that include robust conventional build-outs that might undermine ultimately US policy objectives in this part of the world That's a good question Richard I haven't seen much either for your suggestion it's not clear to me whether this is a real doctrinal shift that reflects a conventionally weaker Russia it's not clear if this is aimed more at NATO or if it's aimed at other countries that border Russia that Russia is concerned about but to the extent Russia believes that it can get political and security benefits out of this strategy I think that it's likely to find that it can't safely get those kind of benefits from this and that the costs and obstacles of using nuclear weapons are significant so I think it's again it's something worth further explaining Nikolai Sokov I believe I have a good article on the bulletin of atomic scientists recently on this issue that I would recommend to folks Okay that's all the time we have for questions now we'll move to closing statements each of you will have 5 minutes and you get to go first The very fact that we're having this conversation right now is what matters Prior to 2014 it would have been very strange if Kingston and I were up here on this panel talking about old sometimes nostalgic in a way since these Cold War concepts haven't been dusted off from the shelves and examined in the cold real light of 2014 or the 21st century these concepts long developed over decades of US national security thinking are important because they convey what we're playing for what do I mean at the end of the day we have a US military might that completely out measures Russia's ability to really threaten us in a serious way our defense spending dwarfs Russian GDP so compared to the United States sure Russia's military threat isn't that significant however compared to our allies in Central Europe that threat is very real and they feel an urgency after Crimea that they're responding to what we'd like to see from a US policy perspective is that these allies develop strategies that are conducive to greater predictability and stability in Central Europe and not the alternative I believe that if we approach it from that three-pillared perspective an approach a policy approach that looks to reassure a policy approach that looks to deter and ultimately robustly defend European NATO in the event of an unforeseen or unwanted crisis I believe that we can have a safer European security environment and more broadly a safer global security environment if we don't act if we continue to maintain our old thinking we risk a far more dangerous world that's because our assumptions made at a very different time at a time when Russia was acting differently when Russia was communicating its intentions it was communicating different intentions those assumptions have to be reexamined to do otherwise I think is to be derelict in our own duty to protect Europe when we begin to assess those assumptions why did we promise this for that we create NATO's posture this way versus that when we begin to assess those assumptions I think the takeaway is that the world has absolutely changed we need to change to reflect the new realities of that world rather than the old realities of the 1990s I think there's some very practical minimalist and maximalist options that NATO can begin to consider at its upcoming summit later this year ideally the first line item on the agenda for NATO should be what does a robust territorial defense of the alliance look like after Crimea I think that it has a very significant conventional dimension to that defense I think it has a very significant air and missile defense protective dimension to it and I also think at the end of the day NATO has to stay in the nuclear business our US extended deterrent to Europe must be clear and undeniable not only to our allies also to Russia and also to the countries around the world that are watching for signs of weakness or hesitation on the part of the United States we don't want that if we don't reassess the organizing strategic dimensions of where NATO was then and where NATO is now we make a very grave error I'd like to see us avoid that mistake and it could begin and should begin at NATO's summit in Wales later on this year when it comes to what the United States can finally do in order to ensure that the world maintains that level of predictability and minimizes the threat of future proliferation I think at the end of the day we cannot rule out the predominance the predominance of a sub-strategic option in the event of a crisis so Peter and I agree on Peter and I agree on many things we agree that Russia's aggression against Crimea requires a strong U.S. NATO response we agree on the need to support Ukraine and assure our Central and Eastern European allies yet moving tactical their weapons eastward in response to the crisis reminds me of the offuse quote when all you have is a hammer everything looks like a nail similar such proposals made by some in Congress and the expert community to increase the role of nuclear weapons and missile defense such as accelerating implementation of the European phase adaptive approach stopping implementation of new start and speeding up the modernization of U.S. nuclear forces fit into a similar category but other than maintaining a core deterrent there is no role for nuclear weapons in solving the current situation the United States is appropriately responding to the crisis with a mix of sanctions against Russia economic aid to Ukraine and conventional military support to our allies and NATO the United States and NATO should not initiate an escalatory cycle that increases the nuclear danger in Europe meanwhile while NATO members are likely to be low to discuss the future of the existing roughly 180 B-61s and their associated dual capable aircraft in Europe and will lead up to this year's NATO summit meeting I don't believe that the alliance can continue to kick the can down the road in perpetuity we need to look beyond the current crisis of the moment and seriously assess alternative forms of nuclear sharing and basing including the zero option in ways that maintain alliance cohesion provide reassurance to the most vulnerable members of NATO and contribute to NATO's larger non-proliferation and disarmament goals sooner or later the weapons will be removed from Europe certainly not tomorrow maybe not even in 10 years but it would be far preferable if NATO gets out ahead of where the status quo seems to be leading rather than have to scramble when it is already too late thank you very much if everyone would please join me in thanking both of our speakers and thank you all very much for coming out tonight please feel free to stick around I'm out in the reception area to continue the discussions that we started tonight and we appreciate all of your time thanks