The next item of business is a debate on motion number 14820, in the name of Bruce Crawford, on changing relationships, parliamentary scrutiny of intergovernmental relations. Members wish to take part in the debate, should press a request speak button now, and I call on Bruce Crawford to speak to and move the motion on behalf of the devolution for the BERS committee. Mr Crawford, 14 minutes. Thank you, Presiding Officer. When the report on the Smith commission was published, I noted the comments of Lord Smith with regard to intergovernmental relations in his foreword to the commission's report. I did not, however, anticipate that the intergovernmental relations would form such a significant strand of the devolution committee's workload. I was wrong. In that work, I would like to thank the clerks, particularly Stephen Emery and Stephen Herbert, for all the work that they have contributed to this report. It is worth repeating the comments of Lord Smith at the outset of this debate, when Lord Smith said, throughout the course of the commission, that the issue of weak intergovernmental working was repeatedly raised as a problem. That current situation, coupled with what will be a stronger Parliament and a more complex devolution settlement, means that the problem needs to be fixed. Both Governments need to work together to create a more productive, robust, visible and transparent relationship. The need for a more visible and transparent relationship has been a recurring theme in the evidence that we have received from the outset of the committee's consideration for further devolution. The committee in its interim report on the then draft legislative causes agreed with Lord Smith's view that the currently largely non-statutory machinery governing intergovernmental relations in the UK needs significant reform. We also highlighted that the committee intended to undertake further work on the issue of how parliaments can scrutinise the arrangements that reach between Governments in this sphere. In order to gain a better understanding of the issue, the committee commissioned external research on how such scrutiny is undertaken in other countries. The academic research was led by Professor Nicola McEwen at the Centre for Constitutional Change, based at the University of Edinburgh. It considers scrutiny in places in a number of countries, including Belgium, Canada, Germany, the USA, Spain and Switzerland. The research reached two broad conclusions. First, intergovernmental relations, as you would expect, are dominated by Governments, with the opportunities for parliaments and parliamentarians to engage in scrutiny of those processes being relatively limited. Secondly, the dominance of Governments in this area was found that in almost every country examined, parliaments in these countries had a bit more of a role in scrutinising intergovernmental relations and the role of parliaments here in the UK. I want to thank Professor McEwen, who is also the committee's adviser on intergovernmental relations, as well as Dr Bettina Petterson and Corrie Brown-Swan for their work in producing an excellent research report in such a short period. Through the course of taking evidence on parliamentary scrutiny of IGR, we received some fairly depressing messages from our witnesses. I would like to share some of that evidence with the chamber. Firstly, in response to a question about whether there were any countries that would provide a good example of parliamentary scrutiny of IGR, Professor Michael Keating commented that no, but there are lots of bad examples. Secondly, Professor Bert Maddens from the University of Louvain commented that the issue of intergovernmental relations is so complex and technical that the involvement of politicians in Parliament is doomed to be marginal. That was a good start, wasn't it? We on the devolution committee are made of stern stuff. We were not deterred. Sorry, I have some giggling going on behind me here. They do not recognise stern, obviously. We were not deterred when we sought in our report to make a range of recommendations that seek to improve parliamentary scrutiny of IGR. I hope that other members of the committee will no doubt want to discuss in more detail the recommendations that we unanimously agreed and will be interested in the views of members who do not sit on the devolution committee with regards to the suggestions that we propose. Before considering the committee's recommendations, I want to stress that the committee's report is called Changing Relationships for a Reason. Without a greater degree of willingness on the part of all Governments across the UK to be more open and transparent about intergovernmental working, I say this as a former Cabinet Secretary for Parliamentary Business, then parliamentary scrutiny will not improve. The rule requires to be a significant culture change on the part of all Governments in regard to how they view the role of parliamentarians in the sphere. The Deputy First Minister reflected that perspective in his comments to the committee when he said, One of my criticisms of the intergovernmental mechanisms is that they have been rather rigid and scripted and not particularly relevant. I hope that we can improve on them. In a similar vein, I believe that we as parliamentarians have to be honest about our role. We need to ask whether we have taken sufficient interest over the 16 years since we were established and how Governments work together and what we can do to improve our scrutiny practices. The evidence that we received from Professor Aileen MacArthur should provide us with food for thought. She commented that Parliament's scrutiny has been one of the areas in which current system has not worked. Neither the Scottish Parliament nor the UK Parliament has taken any consistent interest in the scrutiny of intergovernmental relations. There have been some ad hoc inquiries, but that is all. In that regard, relationships have to change both within Governments and parliaments, as well as between parliaments and governments. The committee's report seeks to help to begin that process of change. We recommend that two guiding principles should inform the process. The new structure of intergovernmental work, which is being reformed through work led by the UK Government's Cabinet Office, will be critical to the success or otherwise of the proposals for further devolution. In the committee's view, the impact of IGR will be most critical to the operation of powers in the areas of taxation and the frisco framework, as well as more generally in the implementation of well-powered powers and European decision making. Accordingly, if this Parliament and indeed parliaments across the UK are able to scrutinise the actions of their respective Governments, then that new structure of intergovernmental working must be more transparent. That must involve transparency around the policy objectives that Governments are seeking to achieve, the agreements that reach between Governments and decisions that are made. Secondly, those relationships must be accountable. In our view, that means that agreements that reach between Governments must be subject to scrutiny and clear mechanisms that are developed for the scrutiny. To enable that to happen, the principles of transparency and accountability must be included in the memorand of understanding that governs IGR across the UK. In the words of no lesser statesman than President Obama himself, a democracy requires accountability and accountability requires transparency. In order to embed those principles that, in the committee's view, should underpin the operation of IGR from the outset, the committee recommend that those principles of transparency in the county be placed in statute in the Scotland Bill. The committee recognises that the process of revising the memorand of understanding impacts on all four legislators across the UK. In our view, in the Scottish context, we consider that a new written agreement between the Scottish Government and the Scottish Parliament should be reached. The agreement should cover the detail of the information that the Scottish Government would provide the Scottish Parliament with in regard to formal IGR meetings and agreements. However, what matters here is that relationships change. How that is achieved, whether by placing principles in statute, revising memorand of understanding or creating a new written agreement between the Scottish Parliament and the Government will not in itself effect change. What will be required is a significant culture change in relationship between legislators and executives across the UK with regard to transparency around inter-governmental relations. We recognise, however, the need for Governments to have a private space in which negotiations can take place and agreements be reached. In that regard, the devolution committee respects the need for there not to be a running commentary in relation to the current inter-governmental discussions that are taking place. Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our view that there has to be improved transparency around those processes put in place and we sought to establish a means of how that can be achieved. As I said earlier, changing relationships in this area is not just about Governments changing its approach, but critically, Parliament also reforming our own scrutiny structures in order to be more effective in this area. In order to improve Parliament's scrutiny of IGR, the committee recommended that parliamentary bureau in the next session of Parliament should give careful consideration to establishing a specific parliamentary committee tasked with scrutinising IGR or providing an existing committee with such a role. The approach of establishing specific committee tasks with scrutinising inter-governmental relations is a common approach among Canadian provincial legislators, Belgian regions and communities and some of the Spanish autonomous parliaments. We recommend that this committee should report to the Parliament on any inter-governmental agreement entered into by the Scottish Government. In addition, such a committee should take evidence from the Scottish Government prior and following formal inter-governmental meetings. The decision to form a new committee or to alter the remits of existing committees are not matters for the devolution committee to decide. For the devolution committee, a role will cease at the end of this parliamentary session. It will be for a new Parliament to consider how best to ensure that appropriate scrutiny mechanisms are put in place. However, the current negotiations that are taking place on a quadrilateral basis regarding the revision of the memorand of understanding and on a bilateral basis regarding the fiscal framework are critically important to the work of the committee. I again want to put on record the committee's view that we will require adequate time to scrutinise both those agreements in detail. As we all know, the fiscal framework in particular is absolutely critical to our understanding of the Scotland bill and its subsequent implementation. I want to conclude on my map today by emphasising that the subject of inter-governmental relations may appear to be summed to even many to be obscure, technocratic and of little relevance to the real issues that we all have to deal with as elected representatives. I may even ensure that view at the beginning of our considerations, but my view has changed. The proposals in the Scotland bill for new powers on tax and welfare will make the operation of inter-governmental relations the most critical aspect of the proposed new arrangements. The current negotiations on the fiscal framework provide us with our first indication of that as we shift from a model that is about reserved powers to a shared powers model of devolution. As a Parliament and as parliamentarians, we have to be able to respond to that shift. In this vein, our idea is to make a contribution to the reforms of the Scottish Parliament and its committees that you yourself have championed. Our report was not just about this current parliamentary session. It is also about the experience that we have had as parliamentarians across all four parliamentary sessions since 1999 and how we shape the experience of the future. All of us here in this Parliament, because of that hinterland, because of that back down, can make a significant contribution into the next session of Parliament as new parliamentarians come to this chamber to do their work. Our ideas for reform do not just affect any of my committee but all committees. Accordingly, I will be interested in hearing the views of members from other committees. I want to thank my fellow committee members very much for agreeing unanimously our view on how that change can take place in the future, and I move the motion in my name. I begin by thanking the convener of the Devolution for the Powers Committee for the presentation of the committee's report this afternoon. Mr Crawford has served, as he indicated in his speech, as a cabinet secretary with responsibility for inter-governmental relations. It is a valuable insight that he brings to this debate through the combination of that experience and the role, as convening the Devolution for the Powers Committee, which has given such detailed scrutiny to the next stage in the devolution journey by the scrutiny of the Scotland Bill and associated proceedings that have taken place in the course of the last year or so. I would like to thank the committee for bringing the issue to the chamber today. I have read the committee's report with interest and have already provided an initial response welcoming the recommendations, which I hope the committee found helpful. My perspective on this discussion is largely formed by my experience over the last eight and a half years in being involved in many discussions between ministers in the Scottish Government and the United Kingdom Government on bilateral and multilateral issues. In relation to my specific responsibilities as the finance secretary, I have valued the opportunity through inter-governmental discussions to be able to make representations to the United Kingdom Government in partnership with my colleagues in Wales and Northern Ireland and on certain occasions to be successful in advancing those perspectives, which are largely shared between the devolved administrations and in changing the perspective of the United Kingdom Government. My perspective has also been informed by my participation in the Smith commission, which certainly spent a great deal of time discussing the issues of inter-governmental relations. The nature of those discussions had such an effect on the proceedings that led Lord Smith to remark, as he did, in his own commentary on the need to improve those relationships in the way in which they operate. That is, and I agree very much with Mr Crawford in this respect, an area that is constantly evolving. The devolution settlement has changed significantly from the contents of the Scotland act, as it was legislated for in 1998. We must acknowledge the importance of changing the nature of the relationships between the different administrations of the United Kingdom to reflect that changing settlement over the course of 16 years and four parliamentary terms. Mr Crawford used the term that we are now in a space where we are more habitually sharing powers with the United Kingdom Government. That brings a challenging set of issues around inter-governmental relations, because they involve the necessity of changing mindsets and ways of undertaking inter-governmental business, which might be different from how administrations have been accustomed to exercising those responsibilities. I confirm that, on behalf of the Scottish Government, our willingness to be part of addressing how that change in culture and mood might be taken forward. The Scottish Government is committed to opening up transparency in our joint working both bilaterally with the United Kingdom Government and, on a wider basis, with the United Kingdom Government and other devolved administrations. We are committed to working with other parties across the chamber to ensure that the Parliament has strong working relationships with our sister institutions across the United Kingdom. The Government is committed to ensuring that this Parliament plays a proper part in shaping the formal agreements that we enter into and holding us to account for the conduct of business with other administrations. In that respect, it is not the proper role of Government—I have highlighted that in the response to the committee's report—to specify how the Parliament should exercise those responsibilities other than to signal the willingness of the Government to respond to the demands of Parliament for effective and transparent scrutiny of this area of activity. Against that backdrop, I can assure the chamber that the committee's recommendations and the points that will be made in the debate today will be fully taken into account in our discussions on the development of intergovernmental working as we seek to continue to improve the arrangements that prevail. I would like to acknowledge the need for change in those relationships. I am sure that all members will agree with the conclusions in the Smith agreement that the additional powers that we hope will come to this Parliament as a result of its successful implementation will require change in our intergovernmental machinery. The Scottish Government will play its part in making that happen. We recognise our duty to the people of Scotland to do so and we hope and expect to see that same approach on the part of the United Kingdom Government. Whilst we are keen to strengthen our working relations arrangements with the UK Government, we should acknowledge that the formal liaison machinery is based on agreements across all devolved administrations and the UK Government. We are not alone in gearing up for significant change. The Silk Commission, like Smith, called for enhancement of existing mechanisms for improving relations between the Welsh and the UK Governments, and the Government of Wales Bill promises significant changes in the Welsh devolution settlement. Our friends in the Northern Ireland Executive face a distinct set of circumstances, of course, and they inevitably shape how they approach the agenda. Our current intergovernmental processes need to be understood against that backdrop. The Parliament, quite rightly, will wish to see the current liaison arrangement strengthened and to hold the Government to account, and we are clearly moving into substantially more complex territory compared to when the machinery for intergovernmental relations was first established. Our arrangements must evolve with the times, but they must also be negotiated with our partners and to meet our collective interests. There are, of course, clear political differences between the Administrations, but, through the Edinburgh agreement, we have previously demonstrated how we can put those to one side to enable progress when it is right and necessary to do so. Against that backdrop, I remain hopeful that we will be able to secure the changes that this Parliament will expect to see. I have already referred to the growing complexity of the devolution settlement in Scotland, Presiding Officer. As more powers, especially around tax and welfare, are devolved, so it will be important to ensure seamless joint working across the border to ensure that the different policies and priorities that this Government and this Parliament will pursue in relation to those powers and the different services that are accordingly put in place are implemented and operate effectively alongside continuing services provided by the UK Government. That will put an onus on the Scottish Government to be willing to discuss our proposals and delivery plans openly. I can assure the chamber that we will do so through the existing liaison machinery and by establishing new arrangements where necessary. We are taking forward some of that work through the joint ministerial committee on welfare, for example. However, that is a two-way street, Presiding Officer. We must see a willingness on the part of the UK to similarly discuss proposals with and be prepared to listen to the alternative perspective of the Scottish Government. There are few, if any, areas of policy where the Scottish Government does not now have a legitimate interest and our expectation is that our views will be taken into account in that process. Recent events suggest that there is some way to go before we can be confident that we genuinely have the kind of partnership-based approach and willingness on the part of the UK Government to respond to distinctive Scottish concerns. As the chamber is aware, the Scotland Bill completed its common stages on 9 November and will now be considered by the House of Lords. I would like to acknowledge the work of the committee in scrutinising the bill. I agree wholeheartedly with the conclusions in the convener's recent letter to the Secretary of State. I agree that there have been improvements made to the bill, but there are still significant shortfalls in the drafting in which we will continue to press the UK Government to address. The substantive changes that we saw at common's report, devolution of the power to create new benefits and equality's provision that will allow us to set gender quotas for public boards and some progress in ensuring the permanence of this Parliament are in no small measure the result of the representations made by the Government and the committee. The Scottish Government will continue to work with the UK Government to secure further improvements to the bill with the aim of being able to recommend it to Parliament. However, as I and the First Minister have made clear, we will only support a legislative consent motion if there is a satisfactory and fair fiscal framework agreed between the Scottish and United Kingdom Governments. To that end, I will continue to meet with the chief secretary to the Treasury to discuss the transfer of fiscal levers that will allow this Parliament to responsibly use the new powers promised to us. That will have to be done with consideration to the UK spending review later this month and the subsequent Scottish budget. Governments agreed at the commencement of those discussions that the details of the fiscal framework would not be announced until they are finalised. However, with the aim of creating transparency and accountability where reasonable topics discussed are published after each particular meeting, once the negotiations are complete, the details of that agreement will be laid before Parliament as a legislative consent memoranda. I recognise, of course, the point that was made today and previously by the convener and others about the need for proper parliamentary scrutiny of the fiscal framework. I commit myself once again to ensuring that Parliament is satisfied by the level of parliamentary scrutiny that we make available to ensure that Parliament can be properly convinced that effective parliamentary scrutiny has been exercised over the discussions that are taking place at intergovernmental level. In conclusion, as I noted in my opening remarks, I have provided an initial written response to the committee expressing my broad support for the recommendations contained in its report, subject to us being able to make them work effectively. Consideration of those recommendations will form a key element of the review of the formal intergovernmental machinery that was commissioned by the joint ministerial committee last December in response to the report of the Smith commission. The Government is determined to work constructively through the joint ministerial committee review with the objective of ensuring that we have arrangements in place that can enhance intergovernmental working and ensure that Parliament can be satisfied that the effective exercise of parliamentary scrutiny has been applied in that and in other cases. Thank you, Presiding Officer. I thank the committee members for their work in producing the report. Our politics and our Parliament are changing. We are about to increase the powers of this Parliament not just to make decisions alone but to enter more frequently into relationships of partnership and negotiation with the UK Government. We also need to devolve power and decision making. New powers coming to Scotland are not the exclusive domain of politicians, Government or off this Parliament. Since 1999, there has been a working relationship between the UK and the Scottish Government. As the report recognises, those were mainly informal and they were founded on good communication, goodwill and mutual trust. There are some examples of how that operated. I am currently a member of the Scottish Government's working group on post-work study visas. The forerunner to this, the fresh talent scheme, was created through a series of negotiations and compromises by the then Scottish Executive and the Home Office. That was an example of intergovernmental relationships and action. However, no one would argue now that the currently largely informal relationships that we are used to are capable of addressing the key issues around where policy responsibility overlaps, whether there are going to be common challenges or to prevent or resolve disputes that are fit for current or future Governments. The new powers that are coming to this Parliament will require a greater deal of power sharing between two Governments and Parliaments, as well as with the electorate, particularly in the areas of social security and welfare. As Lord Smith identifies, a more productive, robust, visible and transparent set of relationships are required, we have to guard against creating a further democratic deficit. While the Governments agree a new memorandum of understanding between the UK Government and the involved Administrations, we, as Parliamentarians, have to be able to scrutinise decision making. Just because the structures may be more formal, it does not mean that we necessarily make any progress on what is seen as Government-to-Government deals. A brief example of that is the current discussions on the fiscal framework. I appreciate that those negotiations can be difficult, they may even be delicate, but, outside that process, everyone else can only rely on the reporting or the interpretation from each partner. That might be fine when there is agreement, but if there is a conflict, it is difficult for others to form a view of a process that has been exclusive. Even when there is agreement, we are then presented with a done deal that allows for little scrutiny. I appreciate that the Deputy First Minister has recently shared discussions with some members, but I would like to see greater transparency of the process. As John Swin identifies, it is an area that the committee report has also raised. I welcome the committee's call for scrutiny of the revised memorandum of understanding and the fiscal framework. However, once the process is finished, the committee explores how the parliamentary scrutiny can be exercised in intergovernment relationships going forward. It recognises that it is an area that we are weak in, identifying that a whole range of policy areas are rarely questioned. Professor Michael Keating described it as, whenever there is intergovernment working, things disappear into rather opaque areas. We have very poor parliamentary scrutiny of intergovernmental relationships. The committee report is useful in exploring some of the ways in which the Parliament can respond to the challenges that it faces when providing scrutiny. The report considers what kind of information would be required from government for effective scrutiny and sets out a number of options, both statutory and non-statutory. It provides a good basis for consideration of how this Parliament maintains a healthy, open, transparent democracy going forward. The Deputy First Minister's comments on the devolution of land and buildings transaction tax in the report are illuminating. Although he outlines a process between officials, the Deputy First Minister said, ultimately, however, the resolution came down to a 15-minute conversation between the chief secretary to the Treasury and me. Such questions will be resolved politically by ministers, as long as there is willingness to do that. Greater parliamentary scrutiny will not necessarily change that kind of situation. The European and international examples in the report may show greater parliamentary scrutiny of government relationships, including providing mandates for positions, but it appears to remain that these are ultimately executive decisions. Even Belgium, where parliaments can have a more formal role with the capacity to reject or accept, that role is still seen as very limited. There is clearly a difficult and complex balance to be struck to determine the level of Parliament influence or involvement or even knowledge in the negotiation between two Governments. However, as Bruce Crawford said, we should not be deterred. Scotland is so far behind our other European partners and we are starting from such a low point of engagement that there is space for us to develop greater scrutiny and transparency. Clearly, we need to consider the most effective way of achieving that, and the committee considers three options—entire Parliament debates on agreements, a specific Parliament to the committee that could scrutinise the relationships and mainstreaming scrutiny across different subject committees across the Parliament. However, the report recognises that there needs to be relevant information shared and political incentive, and there must be the will to undertake scrutiny to make it effective and to have a purpose. It is as much up to us as a Parliament as it is up to the Government to respond to these challenges and maintain our status as a transparent and open Parliament. Yesterday, I took part in a futures forum discussion led by SCVO and What Works Scotland. We considered the potential for participatory budgeting and greater involvement in national decision making. We often reflect on the fact that the past year or so in politics has enlivened and generated political awareness and debate in our country. How we effectively scrutinise the future of inter-Government relationships is part of that agenda. The new powers coming to the Parliament will bring new challenges. We may have a more engaged electorate and we should involve people in the debate in understanding of those new powers. The report is right to say that the role of legislatures in scrutinising those relationships will be critical to the public understanding of the proposals for further devolution. In reflecting on international examples, the committee says that increased scrutiny of inter-governmental relationships was considered as being beneficial in raising public awareness of and debate regarding inter-governmental decision making. Let us ensure that this Parliament matures both in the extent of our powers and our relationship with the UK Government and Parliament and that we develop high standards of transparency, scrutiny and public engagement. This may not seem the juiciest morsel that this chamber has ever delighted in chewing over, but, as is often the case with plain fare, it matters. Not that I would ever describe Mr Swinney or Mr Crawford as plain fare. I thank the devolution further, further powers committee for their hard work and also for the recent report enabling this debate to take place, because it is important. I want to focus my remarks on the arena of inter-governmental relationships. I think that this matters because without some framework to structure that engagement between Westminster and the devolved Governances, in our case Westminster and the Scottish Government, I think that both are the poorer. It seems to me that the framework should be both sufficiently robust and resilient, that it accommodates administrations of different political beliefs indeed. I think that that is almost a default test by which it should be measured, and ether is not dissimilar to the civil service. I am not going to dwell on what has happened over the last 16 years other than to observe the framework seems to have operated spasmodically. I think that the starting point for this debate should be the Smith agreement and the devolution further powers committee report of 6 October of this year. As members will know, I was a member of the Smith commission and, interestingly, I thought that commission was itself a good model of how people with very different political perspectives can actually have intelligent, informed and respectful discussions. Indeed, I think that the commission got to the heart of the matter when it stated. Mr Croft has already referred to this, and I quote from the commission document. It said throughout the course of the commission that the issue of weak intergovernmental working was repeatedly raised as a problem, not by the members but by those making submissions to us. It also went on to say that current situation coupled with what will be a stronger Scottish Parliament and a more complex devolution settlement means that a problem needs to be fixed. It finally said that both Governments need to work together to create a more productive, robust, visible and transparent relationship, and there also needs to be greater respect between them. Lord Smith of Kelvin recently stated that the Scotland Bill honoured the Smith agreement and commented on intergovernmental relations, because he said, and I quote, that it has never been good enough. There is really a lot more that could be done here. He went on to say that what was needed was, and again I quote, at government level, ministerial level, respecting each other. I thought that, to be fair, Mr Sweeney's contribution this afternoon was very encouraging in that respect. Basically, what we have at present is the memorandum of understanding, which, since 1999, has been the written underpinning of intergovernmental relations in the UK, between the UK and all the devolved administrations. Its current version was agreed in 2013. We also have the joint ministerial committees. That memorandum of understanding is currently the subject of a quadrilateral review, not just between us and the UK Government, but involving the other administrations as well. I am not going to detail, Deputy Presiding Officer, the existing structures and their bodies, but there are various quadrilateral groups and some bilateral groups comprising just the UK and Scotland. What I think is important is not so much as what is there at the moment, but before we contemplate specific proposals or changes, we should be clear about what purpose the intergovernmental dialogue is meant to serve. I think that it should be two-way, and within the UK it will sometimes be a four-way flow of information. For example, I think that the Scottish Government is entitled to know if Westminster proposes change that affects Scotland. What are those changes? In turn, the Scottish Government should be able to feed in its responses, suggestions of its counter proposals. There needs to be a framework and a process to facilitate that. Importantly, the Scottish Government may be able to contribute research data, information, experience in relation to a variety of policy areas and government responsibilities that may positively inform Westminster. Likewise, Westminster may be able to do the same, but that all needs a transparent visible structure. Where we need to strike a balance is ensuring that the structure serves an identified purpose and is not just a cosmetic box-ticking exercise. Both Westminster and the Scottish Government ministers are busy with their own responsibilities. We must avoid them being distracted by the process and ensure that their involvement is to add value to the process. Some debate has ranged over the formal versus informal, the statutory versus the non-statutory. I thought that John Swinney made an insightful contribution to the committee. He pointed out with some authority that structures can have their place, but his particular experience with reference to land and building transaction tax arrangements ultimately depended on a resolution arising from a 15-minute conversation between himself and the chief secretary to the Treasury. That illustrates that we need both the formal and the informal. The nature of politics is that politicians can strike up relationships with other parties and with other Governments. I am grateful to the Scottish Government for giving way. Her citing of that example is instructive about the importance of being a willingness to try to find some basis of understanding the motivations and the concerns that will be in the minds of both the devolved administration in trying to advance its arguments and to have those heard by the UK Government. I wouldn't disagree with that, Mr Swinney. That is why it is so important as we contemplate significant new powers that we begin to open up these avenues of dialogue and we do that, as Lord Smith himself said, with an umbrella of mutual respect. While there is universal recognition that we need to improve into governmental relationships, improve the flow of information and create a visible structure, there is still a journey to travel to develop the shape of the structure. I conclude by saying that I have two anxieties about the statutory road. The first is a practical one, because I do not think that we have a coherent shape at present that we could commit to statutory. Of course, it is not just England, but Scotland and the UK. It is also England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Secondly, more important, resilience and flexibility are not the realm of statute. I remember learning that lesson clearly as a law student when I studied constitutional law, so I would counsel caution before going down that road. However, I do think that the committee has identified five useful areas to investigate and I hope that we can take forward those discussions in a constructive manner. Many thanks. We now turn to the open debate. Speeches of six minutes please. There is not a lot of time in hand. I call Mark McDonald to be followed by Mark McDonald. Has already been stated by more than one speaker today that, on the face of it, what we are debating today is very technocratic, very dry, all about process, but process is important, particularly when it comes to looking at the devolution process and the underpinnings of that. I think that we are entering a critical phase in relation to intergovernmental relations, because, as the Deputy First Minister outlined, many powers will now operate on a shared basis. We will enter a much more complex series of interactions between Governments being required compared to previous years during the devolution process. I think that that will certainly be true in terms of how financial decision making takes place in relation to the fiscal framework and in relation to how money is allocated to this Parliament beyond that which we will be responsible for raising. That has raised some questions from the committee's perspective on how to scrutinise in those areas. I think that there have been some difficulties for the committee in that process. I think that the first from having read Nicola McEwen's paper and also from the committee report would be that there are a lack of directly analogous examples out there, as evidenced by the submissions that we received and the research that we commissioned. I think that that bears out in terms of looking for an example that could be lifted and applied to Scotland. In some respects, that presents a challenge, because, as the convener noted from Michael Keating's evidence, there are plenty bad examples out there, but he could not identify a good example. At the same time, that also presents an opportunity that I will come back to. The other challenge that it presents is that a lot of the evidence that we received and that we took was that, when looking at other areas where intergovernmental relations were being examined, intergovernmental relations can often be tokenistic. There was a feeling that the mechanisms to facilitate them were often flimsy and could be very easily and very readily disregarded often by the central or federal government, depending on the example that we were exploring. That tended to be a consistent theme of the evidence that the committee was taking, so there will be a need to guard against that. To that end, I think that the committee sought to try and balance the need for discussions to be able to take place with a degree of confidentiality. We would accept that there does need to be a degree of confidentiality around some discussions that take place between Governments, but at the same time, there is an expectation that Parliament should be able to take more of a role in scrutinising the discussions and outcomes. I think that, most importantly, the impact of those outcomes on the ability of this Parliament to deliver policy and to operate within its financial capabilities. The other opportunity element is that, alongside the difficulty that we face in not having a directly analogous example that we could lift and supplant into Scotland, it presents us with an opportunity to develop our own model and to develop a unique model and one that perhaps avoids some of the difficulties and pitfalls that have been faced in other areas and allows us to shape something a little bit more dynamic in that respect. However, the other difficulty that the committee has faced is that, often, during our deliberations and discussions, there has been a lack of clarity and a lack of definition around what exactly it is that is to be scrutinised, because intergovernmental relations in and of itself covers a multitude of areas, a multitude of discussions that are taking place between Governments. I think that what the committee has tried to wrestle with is to get a clearer understanding of what it is that is to be scrutinised and then how best that can be scrutinised. I think that there is still work to be done in that respect, and it will be interesting. I think that we have had a response from the Scottish Government outlining its thoughts on the matter. In terms of the UK Government position, it seems to be a case of that we are currently thinking about this in relation to the overall UK devolution framework. That, I think, will need to see a little bit more of the thinking of the UK Government, because, obviously, there is more than one player in those discussions. However, that will be a challenge to those who are tasked with the role of scrutiny, should the recommendation of either a new committee or an expanded remit of an existing committee be taken forward by Parliament. That will be something that will need to be examined there. I think that the first key challenge in this will be around the fiscal framework. There is undoubtedly a need to protect the confidentiality of negotiating positions in relation to the fiscal framework and ensure that those discussions can take place. However, I think that the Deputy First Minister has been very clear to committees of this Parliament and to the chamber of this Parliament that Parliament will have a role in scrutinising. It is on that scrutiny and the analysis that will take place that much of what we are discussing today is going to either stand or fall. It is fair to say that inter-government relations have been important ever since the advent of devolution, but they are about to get a whole lot more important, particularly with the new tax and social security powers that are coming to this Parliament. Of course, that was recognised by Lord Smith in the course of his commission. In the sense of starting point for today's debate, it is the words that he said that have been quoted already that the issue of weak inter-government relations was repeatedly raised as a problem, he said. Of course, the fundamental answer to that, as Bruce Crawford emphasised, is culture change on the part of both governments. However, I thought that Bruce Crawford also made a very interesting point that we need to take more interest in that, as well as parliamentarians, because I have to say that I agree with Annabel Goldie that I have never regarded that as a particularly juicy morsel. In fact, I have to make the shocking confession that I am speaking in this debate out of a sense of duty rather than pleasure. Maybe that is because I was immersed in the bad old ways as a minister, although there was much useful relationships between governments. In those days, I remember, for example, meetings that we used to have of all the health ministers in the four UK countries, although we had very different health systems. Those meetings were very useful, and that is just one example. However, I suppose that I was more surprised when Ken Thompson, who is the lead civil servant on these matters, came to our committee and said that even now it is the informal meetings between officials and ministers that really matter. I suppose that I should have been pleased about that, that the ministers are still having those meetings. Of course, it was much easier in the old days when you had ministers of the same party here and in the UK Parliament. In fact, interestingly, in the external research that has been referred to by Nicola McEwen and others, they pointed out that, in fact, it is very common in European countries to have informal networks within political parties when those networks operate at the central and sub-state level. That is really what we are trying to move beyond, although there is no harm in that, of course, in itself. I give way. Mr George Stevenson, just briefly and seriously, is it not more difficult to disagree with colleagues than opponents? Welcome to the floor. I certainly disagreed with the English Health Minister on many occasions. Of course, Nicola McEwen's research came up with two central conclusions. I think that there were lots of detail. First, the other countries' intergovernment relations are also dominated by the executives, but it is also crucial that every country examined and allowed Parliament a greater role in scrutiny. That is the challenge for us. Three forms of scrutiny were highlighted still in the research. Debates on the whole Parliament-specific committees are mainstreaming with all the committees. The external research identified five key issues for consideration, timing and access for information, setting up a committee, hearings and evidence sessions, consent votes by the whole Parliament, which have not come up very much today. However, I think that that is particularly going to be important with the fiscal framework and transparency. Of course, it was the principles of transparency and accountability that were up very much in flashing lights for the committee as its central recommendation. In fact, it recommended that it should be in statute, and that cannot happen now unless Baroness Goldie will go down to the House of Lords and move an amendment that the principles of transparency and accountability should be in statute. There were several other recommendations in the report, mainly for the Government, but two that were not for the Government. We cannot be quite so firm in our recommendations when it is only to the Parliament, but we suggested that the Parliament should give careful consideration—we were not so gentle with the Government—careful consideration to a special committee, so I am sure that the Parliament will. However, it is also interesting that it said that there should be greater inter-Parliament co-operation that would be useful as well. Again, when I was convener of the European Committee, we had useful meetings of all the European committees of the four nations. I do not know whether that still happens, but that is an important suggestion as well. The harder recommendations are clearly for the Government. The next two are central, in that there should be a written agreement on the oversight of inter-Government relations, and that would provide the detail of how and what information should be given and how the views of Parliament should be incorporated. Crucially, that scrutiny should happen before inter-Government meetings, as well as afterwards, probably in the form of taking evidence from the Government. That may be harder for the Government to accept, but Michael Keating said that all the arguments about not showing your hand or about confidentiality are just special pleading by Governments that do not want to be held accountable. The immediate issues that we have before us are the fiscal framework and the memorandum of understanding. I have already said that I hope that there will be a vote of the whole Parliament on the fiscal framework, but I also hope that the Government will consult us on that before it is formally agreed. I can see that there will have to be an interim agreement, but it should not be formally agreed, we are saying, until the Parliament has been involved. Also, there must be adequate time for scrutinising the memorandum of understanding. Crucially, we are saying that there must be a specific section in the memorandum of understanding on parliamentary oversight, but, unfortunately, it seems that old habits die hard, and Professor Eileen McHarg last quote I've got time for said. Once again, it's being treated as a matter for negotiation between officials rather than something in which there is legitimate parliamentary and public concern. So we haven't really moved forward any distance at all in the last 16 years, so I think that this is an important report that is actually saying, now is the time to take a significant step forward. Having spoken for six minutes, I've actually become quite interested in the subject, so I'll follow it with interest. Many thanks. Before we move on, I could ask members just to check the press to request to speak buttons if they're intending to speak in the debate. Thank you. Rob Gibson, to be followed by Tavish Scott. Well, thank you, Presiding Officer. I think that we all understand from each of the speeches we've heard so far that the powers promised through the new Scotland bill are increased and, indeed, far more complex. Therefore, the question of scrutiny of the processes and the relationships between our two Governments and, indeed, with the four Governments within the family of nations of the United Kingdom is all the more critical if each member is to prosper and if each of the Governments is to feel that they're being dealt with fairly. The partial devolution of the Crown Estate assets to Scotland is an example that contains certain vetoes, particularly by the Secretary of State for Defence. The discussions about a memorandum of understanding that contains those powers of the Ministry of Defence to overrule Scottish policies is one where delicate discussion will have to take place. If the name of national security is to be upheld and to be believed by people, the practical implications of that have to be discussed at a local level, too. I'll give you an example of that to show why it's essential. Last week at Keilavocalsh, my colleague Ian Blackford MP, who represents both Sky and Apple Cross in his and Dave Thomson's constituency and mine on the Apple Cross side, met the MOD with regard to proposals to quadruple the size of the torpedo range there. It was accompanied by local fishermen. They were seeking a change of behaviour in the way that the MOD behaved. In the Scottish National Marine Plan, a single framework for managing our seas, it says that the MOD can use exemptions in planning law for purposes of national security and to retain a statutory right to close areas in internal waters and create bylaws to complete closures and exclusions. In this day and age, if those powers are going to be adopted and continued, we're going to have to change the way in which we discuss them. Of those 70 fishermen, it's possible that much of their livelihood, especially in winter, could be destroyed if that decision was taken forward. What was agreed at that meeting was to get the Ministry of Defence to consult over a period of time, but to do what the Scottish Government does in any proposals to consult people about the social and economic impacts of the way in which decisions of government are taken. This is complicated by the fact that it's not a matter of the Scottish Government, which is closing the waters, but the UK Secretary for Defence. Therefore, in the event that the MOD has agreed partially to change its behaviour rather than to make the decision by diktat. That is an indication to me that, when we are approaching the questions of inter-governmental relations, we will be looking for the kind of openness that allows for those kind of issues to be carried forward at a decision making level in which the Government of Scotland has a part in and so on. The defence secretary has an absolute power over certain of Scotland's assets, air, sea and land, but it's important now that those kind of discussions can take place between the relevant Scottish Ministry and the Ministry of Defence to see that. Scotland's fishermen in this case are not materially affected by this arbitrary decision. When Enoch Powell said that power devolved is power retained, that was an indication of the way in which the UK saw the partial devolution of powers back in the 1970s when it was discussing things then. Inter-governmental relations, on the other hand, must develop from that truism of Enoch Powell's and develop the kind of transparency and democratic scrutiny that actually treats people as equals and as partners and not as the ruled and the rulers. That is why the inter-governmental relationship example that I have given suggests that, when we pass the draft statutory instruments about the crown estate transfer, for example, are passed, that the vetoes that the minister of defence has over parts of those assets are things that will have to be discussed in this Parliament before the decisions are taken by this Parliament as a whole about whether we accept the terms of that. That is why I believe that it is essential for us to treat this subject as more than mere dry constitution making. That affects people's lives and jobs, and that is why it is so important that we get it right, and that is why I raised this example today. Many thanks. I now call Tavish Scott to be followed by Stuart McMillan. To paraphrase Sannabel Goldie, the subject of inter-governmental relations is hardly a whirlwind of excitement, although, to describe John Swinney and Bruce Crawford as tasty morsel, certainly brought a certain fuysol to this afternoon's proceedings. The convener confirmed that he hardly saw this as a political whirlwind either in the early discussions in the committee, but I suppose Dr McNeill and I take a bit of credit if I write the word for boring our colleagues into submission on this one, but it does matter because, and the Deputy First Minister mentioned it, the discussions in Smith were underpinned all the way through by actually how Governments just talked to each other, how they respect each other and how they relate to each other. I noticed at the start of the debate that there were 23 members in this chamber of which 11 were either current or former ministers as a smattering across all the benches. Now, probably the ones who should speak are not the ministers, because those of us, and Malcolm Chisholm was quite open about this, those of us who have done that job probably remember some of the tricks of the trade, although of course the current ministers would not possibly use such mechanisms to stop Parliament seeing what is going on. However, the reality of it is that I am Ken Thomson, Philip Rycroft, in the most illuminating evidence that the committee had of any, were quite open about that. Both I respect both men very considerably, they are both very able civil servants, but they both effectively said that what was in place in a parliamentary sense, and not that they were trying to say how Parliament should scrutinise those things, but they were effectively saying that what's there is fine. I think that as the committee has gone into some detail on this, it's not fine because, as the Deputy First Minister rightly said, the whole thing is changing and evolving. No better example of that than the financial system that will allow the Scottish Government, the UK, Wales and Northern Ireland to deliver on their policies and programmes within the resources available. We will, as a Parliament, at some stage deal with the fiscal framework, but the point that Duncan McNeill consistently makes in committee, and he's right to, and I agree with him on this, is that the fiscal framework in many ways is the striking current example of whether we have begun to even think about how Parliament scrutinises adequately Mr Swinney's deliberations with his colleagues in different jurisdictions and in this context in the UK Government. Now, it is a bit messy. Mr Crawford was absolutely right. Ministers, of course, have to have the space with which to consider these issues, but we, as a Parliament, have got to think about the way in which we do this because we have, and I think that Mark Mitchell has illustrated this, taken a pretty transient view to how Governments talked to each other since 1999, and it hasn't worked as openly and as accountably as we, as a committee, are now asking that it needs to do. Lord Smith on ITV's representing border said last week, I hope I've got the words roughly right, Governments must co-operate, they must make IGR work in good spirit, and I also think he said they need to keep doing that for years and years to come. Now, that, I believe, is so. He said instantly some other things about decentralising power within Scotland, which I was very attracted to, but I'll leave that for today. Why this matters is because of the point that the Deputy First Minister made in his remarks, that we are now in substantially more complex territory. That is true, but it's even more so true, not just because of what's happening between Edinburgh and Cardiff and Belfast and indeed Edinburgh, but what's also happening in Manchester, Newcastle, Liverpool or the west country of England. The IPPR, that August research organisation, produced a report this week on empowering counties, and I know it's not a lot of interest in this place, but I'm just arguing it should be because things are starting to change and happen in England, which I think in time will lead to fundamental changes for the UK as a whole. Now, I'm not naive enough to think that we're suddenly about to have a quasi-federal UK, much as I think that is the intellectual answer to most of the challenges that day-to-day we deal with, but, nevertheless, because of the changes that are now happening south of the border, and it's very important that that's not driven by a centralised government in Whitehall, but driven by a process from beneath. I believe that there are some profound changes that will happen across the country as a whole, just two seconds, and that will lead to the point that the Deputy First Minister made, which is that this is a messy process, having to be constantly evolving and indeed refined. I wonder if the word beneath is itself perhaps an issue. It's perhaps more about co-decision making rather than the hierarchy of decision making. Tyrus Scott. Stephen Boyle might understand that I was describing what I think is going on in England at this time, although Sutton Scottish local government might take his point as well on beneath. If we put aside politics at the moment in the context of the kind of changes we believe are right for Scotland, I think that that's a fair point about the relationship between central local government in Scotland as well. One, two final points if I may, Deputy Presiding Officer. The first is on the new Prime Minister of Canada, who could have been a star at the G20 in Turkey over the weekend, but obviously was not because of what has happened in Paris. However, there are some very interesting things happening in Canada now because of the very different kind of administration that he is leading compared to the Harper government of the last 10 years in terms of the provincial and federal relationship, and I just think that that's worth looking at. Finally, the point that I wanted to finish with is that it was a good indication that some things are clearly moving in the right direction. In the First Minister's statement just an hour or so ago about Paris, she mentioned that she had been involved in Cobra meetings over the weekend. I took that to be a very appropriate and good sign that the Scotland's First Minister, and I presume others as well, were involved in a meeting involving, I presume the Prime Minister, although it may have been the Home Secretary given the Prime Minister's absence overseas in what must have been fundamentally important discussions and continued to be so. That is an illustration, is it not, that some work that we have all played a small part in is showing some fruits of improvement? That is the challenge that we all have, both in and particularly in a parliamentary context. Many thanks. I now call Stuart McMillan to be followed by Lewis MacDonald. Thank you very much, Presiding Officer. Intergovernmental relations are essential to all political systems with multi-level governments, and that's something that's been a message that's come across strongly today. They do come in various forms, as I've ever reported, and also the paper commissioned by our committee certainly indicates. However, one thing is clear however, that there is no panacea for intergovernmental relations in existence. Indeed, to quote the convener of the committee, if we, which we are, are all made of sterner stuff, if we can actually use that sterner stuff to actually help to create something, then it could be groundbreaking and also world-leading in terms of IGR. IGR does involve the interplay of high politics, which is particularly charged if, I'm sure that we all agree, if governments involved are of different and competing parties, inevitably the high politics plays a major role, but underlying interests of particular units of government often mean that their approach to IGR processes remains similar over time, even as some governments may change. I must ensure therefore that all aspects of IGR are taken with the benefit of the nation and not merely reflections of party politics. The Smith commission called for existing intergovernmental machinery to be reformed as a matter of urgency, to enable more effective collaboration between the Scottish and the UK Governments. However, academics have suggested that the effective intergovernmental relations require a basic level of equality and status between the participants to be effective. For example, Professor Nicola McEwen quoted in the Herald of Ella this year. She said that, unless joint working can be conducted on the basis of equality of status and mutual respect, the complexities of interdependencies are likely to create new sources of attention and dissatisfaction and lead to growing pressure for a further revision of the devolution settlement. The complexity of the new funding model as a result of the Scotland bill means that there is a fundamental need for as much transparency as possible. The sad and shocking events in Paris last Friday night highlight the importance of security, particularly in this matter. In his response to a report, the Deputy First Minister highlighted that providing some information in relation to the British Irish Council would be impossible to publish due to security requirements. That is something that I am sure that we can all agree on across the chamber and that no one wants to place others in harm's way. A second point regarding IGR is that it is crucial that progressing improved working relationships is at concerning the Scottish block grant. The block grant will change as a result of the tax changes proposed in the Scotland bill. The whole financial framework underpinning the Scotland bill is crucial to the progress of the bill, as has been indicated. Discussions on the financial framework are still under way, and it is not yet clear how the adjustment to the block grant will take place. The Royal Society of Edinburgh and the British Academy identified a number of issues around Barnett, which are considered a required clarification. However, including how reductions in the block grant will be determined. It is quoted as saying that it is, in our opinion, essential to the enduring character of the settlement that the future of the block grant is fully resolved. We continue by saying that this must take into account the nature and scope of new devolved powers, the on-going mechanism for calculation of changes to the block grant, related to the no detriment proposition and the way in which decisions by either Government will be reflected in future changes to the grant. In the future of the Barnett formula and in clarity around its operation, Professor Michael Keaton commented that it is difficult to see how he can talk about assigning and devolving taxes to Scotland and then not look at the other side of the equation, which is how the Barnett formula works out. That is a matter of principle, but it is also very important when you work out the details because there is a lot of money involved there. There are a lot of questions simply unanswered about how Barnett is going to work in the future and how the income tax base is going to be calculated in a federal system. Normally you would have some place where there is a trusted source of calculations and you may not agree on the policies, but at least you will agree about the basic facts and the basic statistics. Professor Keaton said that when he was giving evidence in the House of Commons, another element of that is the situation regarding the principle of no detriment. That principle is outlined in the Smith commission report, and that was the exercise of the new powers for Scotland that should cause no detriment to the UK as a whole nor to any of its constituent parts. The principle loves those two applications, which have been discussed on many occasions certainly in this Parliament, that the Scottish Government and the UK Government budgets should be unchanged as a result of the decision to devolve further powers to the Scottish Parliament and that there should be no detriment as a result of UK Government or Scottish Government policy decisions post devolution. Arguably the first application of the no detriment principle is straightforward and that it applies at the point of power when it is devolved. However, the second application is potentially more problematic as it would apply on an ongoing basis to all policy decisions that affect tax receipts or expenditure. Professor Keaton highlighted some concerns about the no detriment principle. Writing for the Centre on Constitutional Change is stated that, while fair in principle, it is a minefield. He further stated that determining what should count as detriment will remain politically contagious and technically complex. In the evidence to the House of Commons committee, he explained that the notion of detriment, which is a normal constitutional idea, is the idea that if one Parliament does something that imposes a cost on another Parliament, that should be compensation. Potentially it should be a very wide-ranging indeed. It is nowhere defined and it is nowhere limited. The effectiveness of parliamentary scrutiny of IGR will depend in part on its ability to be informed on the subject matter, timetable for the discussions and also the goodwill between the Governments. I welcome today's debate and I hope that it assists in the delivery of an improved set of working arrangements between the four Governments in the UK, as well as between this Parliament and the Scottish Government. Systematic and sustained parliamentary scrutiny of intergovernmental relations by legislatures in the United Kingdom is notable by its absence. That comment from the committee's report neatly summarises where we are now and the democratic deficit that is a non-intended consequence of the evolution of devolved Governments and Parliaments in the United Kingdom. That committee report is welcome in looking at the experience of the Scottish Parliament and the accountability of the Scottish Government, not just in one wider context, but in two. First in the context of the devolution of executive powers and legislative responsibilities to three of the four countries of the United Kingdom since 1997, Scotland's experience of devolution may be unique, but it does not stand alone. Second, by seeking to learn lessons from a number of other countries in Europe and North America where powers are shared between different tiers of central government and similar issues of scrutiny and accountability also arise. The growth in responsibilities of this Parliament has not been accompanied by a growth in accountability of Scottish ministers, at least not as far as their engagement with the UK Government or with the devolved Administrations of Wales and Northern Ireland is concerned. As has been said, that issue becomes all the more important now because of the Smith agreement and the new Scotland bill. I served on the devolution committee when the Smith agreement was signed and when it came to the committee for scrutiny. I think that all members agreed that the new devolved and shared powers demanded a new machinery of scrutiny and accountability. What is there now is not fit for purpose. As the committee's interim report on new powers concluded, reforming that system is the most urgent challenge to be addressed in implementing the Smith commission recommendations. It is significant that the need for increased scrutiny is felt at Westminster as well as here. I gave evidence a year ago to the political and constitutional reform committee of the House of Commons as MPs sought to understand the implications of change in Scotland for the wider UK. Philip Rycroft of the UK Cabinet Office has predicted that there will be increased scrutiny on intergovernmental relations in the months and years ahead from relevant committees of both the Commons and the Lords, and I have no doubt that he is right about that. That desire for increased scrutiny will not just apply to the engagement between Scottish and UK ministers. Devolution in Wales and Northern Ireland is also, as John Swinney said, a dynamic process, and its success also depends on the engagement between devolved and union Governments. Scrutiny will be vital there, too. As we have also heard this afternoon, devolution of greater powers and responsibilities to cities and other authorities in England will also raise similar issues there as well. The potential mechanisms for increased scrutiny are summed up neatly in the external research that the committee commissioned from Professor Nicola McEw and our colleagues at the Edinburgh University Centre for Constitutional Change. Some of those prospective mechanisms are built on structures or approaches that are already in place—publishing minutes, debating outcomes in Parliament, calling ministers to account for agreements that are made or not made with other administrations—but others will require further debate. The formal role of legislators in endorsing or rejecting intergovernmental agreements placed before them by the executives and whether or not a legislator should have a dedicated committee for dealing with such issues and with constitutional issues more generally. The Constitutional Committee of the House of Lords summed up what is needed in terms, quoted directly in this report, effective scrutiny of intergovernmental relations requires both greater transparency than currently exists and the necessary structures and desire in Parliament and the devolved legislatures to scrutinise those relationships. The Devolution Committee I think was right to endorse that summary because this is not only a matter of structures or even of openness, although it is important to get both of those right. It is also a matter of political will. The desire for scrutiny has to be there as well as the means for achieving it. The best institutional arrangements in the world will count for nothing if a majority in the legislature sees their right to scrutiny as simply another way to endorse the decisions of the executive. Relations between Governments must necessarily involve decisions on policy, agreements and disagreements, disputes and compromises. Effective scrutiny will be measured by how often ministers in the respective Governments are really held to account for things that they do or fail to do in those negotiations. The limitations of structural reform alone are well brought out in the evidence gathered by the committee and the research reported by Professor McEwen. The Belgian example has already been quoted. Belgium has highly devolved structures of government, scrutiny of intergovernmental relations is on a statutory basis, and the Belgian Parliament has a formal role in accepting or rejecting intergovernmental agreements. Yet Professor Madden of the University of Leuvens is quoted as saying that he does not know of any instance where Parliament has ever disagreed with an intergovernmental agreement, while the disengagement of sub-state legislatures from the centre tends to result in a lack of political will to scrutinise intergovernmental relations. That in turn creates what he describes as Belgium's democratic deficit. Statutory requirements for scrutiny and transparent processes are not enough on their own. Just as sharing and decentralising power can only work if we want them to, so effective parliamentary scrutiny of intergovernmental relations requires all parties to sign up to make it work. Just thinking about Parliament agreeing or disagreeing with international agreements, the Government is negotiating. I wonder if when Ireland voted against one of the European treaties and it escapes me which one, whether that was an example of that. There are one or two others, particularly in European domains, where what Tavish Scott described as the bottom has disagreed with the top to good effect perhaps. Lewis MacDonald, you must begin to conclude. Indeed, the point is well made that Parliament can indeed pass judgment and do so in a way that it is effective. My point is that simply having the institutional machinery there is not enough in itself. We should welcome that report but recognise that it is work in progress rather than a final plan for a future scrutiny. Like devolution itself, parliamentary scrutiny of intergovernmental relations can work if we want it to, but in the final analysis, its success will be down to political will. As we have heard, the devolution committee has dedicated a considerable part of its work programme to the issue of intergovernmental relations. Although I suspect that the finer details of the processes of intergovernmental relations is unlikely to spark passionate debate in homes, pubs and cafes across the country, it is an important issue nonetheless and one that I am pleased to have the opportunity to discuss today. The conclusions outlined in the committee's report draw from an extensive evidence base. The research undertaken by Professor McEwen and our colleagues at the Centre for Constitutional Change has been very useful indeed in informing the committee's work on the complex issue of IGR, as has the written and oral evidence provided by a range of international experts. The committee has undertaken to learn from the processes and principles that underpin the scrutiny of IGR in other jurisdictions. The research on international comparators suggests that there are limited opportunities for effective scrutiny of IGR by parliaments. However, the report also highlighted that the level of scrutiny in the majority of other countries is significantly greater than that in the United Kingdom currently, therefore demonstrating that there is room for improvement from a UK perspective. That has been a recurring theme in the evidence and was also recognised in Lord Smith's report as an area of needing substantial reform, especially as the further devolution of powers will create a number of overlapping areas of responsibility, as a number of other members have already indicated. Of course, we need to remember that the whole point of devolution is to allow different administrations to pursue different policies. In evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Professor Michael Keating of the University of Aberdeen made the point that not everything has to be joined up and good IGR should mean differences in policy being made through the active choices of government rather than due to lack of consultation or communication. The Scottish Government has been working in conjunction with the UK Government to improve the Scotland bill and ensure that the Smith commission recommendations are delivered in full. However, there are still a number of areas where the bill falls short, including improving transparency in IGR. The committee made clear in its letter last week to the Secretary of State that there is still work to be done, and I strongly urge the UK Government to pay careful attention to the conclusions outlined in the committee's report as the bill progresses to its final stages. During the committee's oral evidence session in September, my colleague Linda Fabiani made an interesting point about how poorly the joint ministerial committees have served Scotland in the past. With issues concerning Scotland previously categorised under the heading of any other competent business. Perhaps we should be grateful that it was a competent business, but as Linda Fabiani highlighted, it was not too long ago that the Scottish Parliament had to ask PQs just to find out the date when the GMC would be meeting. Things have clearly improved since then, but it is a reminder of how lacking relations have been at times between UK Government ministers and Scotland's elected representatives. I am quite sure that MSPs across the chamber will have experienced difficulties, like I have, when trying to contact certain UK Government departments on behalf of constituents, being informed that they would only deal with issues raised by MPs. MSPs are certainly not in the best interests of a desperate constituent needing urgent assistance. However, the need for mutual respect and good communications between central and devolved Governments is important. However, if we are serious about strengthening the role of parliaments, we also need to see greater respect for the representatives elected to serve in those parliaments. Unfortunately, Tavish Scott has left the chamber, but I was interested by Tavish Scott's comment about there being 11 former ministers in the chamber and questioning whether they were the best members to speak in this debate. I am not sure that not everybody has spoken yet, but I think that we will end up with probably seven former ministers speaking in this debate. I understand what he means by that argument and why he said that, but I am going to disagree with him because I think that perhaps former ministers are ideally placed to see both sides of the argument. I understand the arguments that we have made in the committee and I agree with him about strengthening IGR and the important role of parliamentarians. However, I also understand the difficulties and the requirements for Governments to talk in a private space and have that room for discussion. I was certainly very interested to hear Ken Thomson's suggestion during the overall evidence session that it was the election of the SNP to Government in 2007, which really brought into focus the need for improved IGR. Previously, of course, the Labour Party had been in power at both Holyrood and Westminster, and it appears that most discussions took place through party political channels rather than formal structures of inter-governmental relations. Times have indeed changed. My view is that there is undoubtedly a need for greater openness and transparency in IGR. The committee's evidence gathering suggests that much collaboration at the moment between Administrations in the UK is carried out in an ad hoc and unstructured manner. That must be improved, although the balance needs to be struck between enhancing transparency on the one hand and still allowing space for free and frank private discussions between Governments. Philip Rycroft, who represented the UK Government in the committee's evidence session, accepted that there are advantages to the public gaining greater insight into the depth and range of discussions between the UK Government and its devolved Administrations. Parliament is a key part of play here in terms of improving transparency. It seems to me that enabling the public to have a greater understanding of the processes involved in IGR would also facilitate a better public understanding of the devolution settlement and what areas Hotherwood has control over compared to Westminster. However, in conclusion, the devolution package, as many others have said, is changing, although perhaps not to the extent that many of us had hoped. However, when the people of Scotland voted no in last year's referendum, I believe that they voted to give the UK one last chance. If the Westminster Government is serious about making devolution work, then it needs to demonstrate that it is treating its devolved legislators fairly. Better inter-governmental relations and indeed better scrutiny and public understanding of what goes on in those discussions is an important part of ensuring that devolution works not only for Scotland but also for the rest of the UK. Presiding Officer, in this week of all weeks we know that Governments in these islands can and do work together. Tavish Scott referred to the First Minister's reference to her participating in Cobra. Indeed, when I was a minister, I did on it certainly on one occasion and I think more than on one occasion. I still have the UK transport minister's mobile number in my mobile telephone—that is from when I was a transport minister. In practice, co-working is perfectly possible and perhaps it is a little bit more common than is sometimes imagined. Sometimes the ministers are quite happy to bypass the civil servants to make things move just that little bit faster than others might want. For our part, some co-decision making is already embedded in law. The former British Waterways Board was a cross-border authority that required both Scottish and UK ministers to sign off decisions that were required to be made by ministers. Thus, I found myself when I was responsible for Canals signing off a decision that related entirely to a transaction in Birmingham. The deal was that I would do what the UK minister wanted to do in England and he would sign off anything that we wanted in Scotland. That co-decision making crucially enabled us to protect Canals in the public sector in Scotland when south of the border they wanted to travel in a fundamentally different way. That shows that it can be done. Similarly, appointments to the United Kingdom Climate Change Committee are jointly made by the Northern Irish, Welsh, Scottish and UK ministers and require unanimity on appointments. On one occasion, where there was a serious discussion on the matter, I found that I conducted the interviews with the candidates for a vacancy on that board and, thereafter, we were able to achieve the unanimity that had not been there initially. There already are some legislated areas, but the point is that they show that the principle of accepting that legislating co-decision making is already something that we have. Practical experience shows that it can be done. On finance, it would be particularly dangerous to imagine that there is no scope for legally embedding co-decision making, but equally, as others have said, there needs to be respect between individuals of different political parties, parliaments and Governments, and carrying different objectives. Bernard Goldie is correct in saying that one cannot legislate for everything, but there are some things that we could do differently on a unilateral basis that would deliver shared benefit. There has been some reference to that already. The Government that most promptly publishes details of intergovernmental meetings and the subjects that are discussed will create the opportunity for both parliaments who are interested in the subject to engage in their proper process of oversight that the laggard loses. That is a message to Governments both here in Edinburgh and in London. Neither Government is perhaps as rapid as it could be in publishing that kind of information and it did Belfast and Cardiff as well. I note in the report that Professor McHarg said that parliamentary scrutiny has been one of the areas in which the current system simply does not work. I think that that has got to be correct. A shared acceptance of the need to legislate over intergovernmental relations is vital. We cannot simply leave it to memorandum of understanding. There are old arguments that flexibility delivers benefit, and, yes, it does, but probably to Governments substantially less so, I suggest, to Parliament. Professor McHughan floats the idea of an additional Parliament committee on intergovernmental relations, and others have made other suggestions for new parliamentary committees. On the other hand, the Standards, Procedures and Public Appointments Committee's inquiry into our committee structures has almost universally attracted comments saying that we have too many committees and that too many members are in too many committees. Some are actually on three committees, and who knows, the Standards, Procedures and Public Appointments Committee may bring forward the suggestion that members should only be a member of a single permanent committee. There is a little weasel word in there, so there might be a way out. On negotiations between Governments, I think that the Scott work process, which is the standard that is used in most commercial negotiations, is called limit, like in 10 must, it. In other words, you can go in with three lists. It is perfectly possible to publish in advance the must. In other words, I go into the negotiations and see what I need to get from my side. The like and intent, which are the dice that are played as the negotiation plays out, I suspect that you cannot publish, but I think that there is more scope to publish the must intentions of various Governments. I am one of those former ministers, and there is nothing more X than an X minister, I have to say, but I did not realise how much ministers had power until I became a minister, and I suspect that I share that with others. However, there are opportunities for Parliament to take more interest. There are a couple of things that are coming in my concluding remarks here. Supermajorities are coming to us, and we are going to have to look at that. We have got the opportunity in this debate and beyond to think about doing things differently. Perhaps, just perhaps, X ministers, at least on the benches, are untrammeled by the prospect of offending anyone and not being appointed to the House of Lords. Perhaps we on the benches can be quite radical, where others might be more cautious. Many thanks. I am afraid that I must now ask members to keep to their six minutes. Drew Smith, to be followed by Linda Fabiani. I am grateful to the Devolution Further Powers Committee for the opportunity to take part in this committee debate on parliamentary oversight of intergovernmental relations, an opportunity that surely makes the case again as to why Bruce Crawford is held in such esteem and affection by us all, not least by Annabelle Goldie, even if Malcolm Chisholm felt that it was perhaps more of a duty than a pleasure to take part in the debate to date. Those of us who are in opposition and those who serve on the Government's backbenches suffer or benefit, depending on your point of view, of having proximity to power without the chance or the danger of actually wielding it. When it comes to intergovernmental relations, the whole Parliament suffers a similar predicament, being not so much observers as outsiders to much of the process of ministerial negotiation and deliberation on which our constitutional arrangements make necessary, if not always exciting. That is an area of policy making and development that, as Bruce Crawford said, has never been served by much in the way of transparency or accountability, and that is a problem that has been lamented for some time. Lawson Smith of Kelvin did bring greater prominence to this with his timely call for improvements when he made personal recommendations based, I presume, on his experience of broken the Smith agreement. However, the committee's report makes clear that, although our oversight of intergovernmental relations is perhaps particularly poor, it is not a challenge that is unique to our own devolution settlement but is in fact a feature of similar relationships in many other jurisdictions around the world. There are, of course, important reasons why we expect, so far as we have ever consciously considered it, to allow ministers so much leeway to consider such matters largely in private. The matters, though, are more than administrative or diplomatic, because often it is through such channels that disputes of high importance are settled or indeed continued. The committee's report, I believe, makes a cogent case as to why that needs to change. I am therefore minded to agree with it and I suppose to share Lord Smith's frustrations. Like others, I was struck by two competing views or two interesting quotes contained in the committee's report, which held a lot of truth, but they have already been rehearsed, so I will not repeat them again. One of them was the Deputy First Minister talking about his experience of resolving things through conversation more than some of the other elements of the formal channel, and the other was Michael Keating chiding the defence of politicians that things should not always be discussed in public until they have been agreed. As I said, it was interesting to see in the report that there were not any particular parts of the world doing this really well that we could use as examples, but there are examples of where it has perhaps done better than here. I suppose that the point that I would also make, Presiding Officer, about our own situation is that, despite that last year's referendum and, in my view, a pretty clear result, the constitution in Scotland remains a contested issue. It is therefore difficult to put in place mechanisms and processes that can establish fairness to all parties, since there will always be a political driver that negates against solutions other than when issues become acute or when time is at its most pressing. We have to accept that that is simply a fact of Scottish politics. I have not devoted any time so far to particularly talking about the fiscal framework in it. I do not intend to, simply because I do not feel that I know enough about the nature of what is being discussed in order to make much of a contribution. However, I certainly agree that it is important, and I am certainly not insympathetic to the arguments that the Scottish Government has made around the fiscal framework, but that is perhaps a mark of the problem. I think that the resolution of issues around the trade union bill and legislative consent around the trade union bill may present a further example of when some of those relationships will be tested. I would argue that the scrutiny of both parliaments might actually strengthen the hand of whichever Government had the best arguments. Those are all areas in which I think that Parliament should be more jealous of the privileges and rights that it holds, and that should be true regardless of whether we are supporters of a particular Government or not. I would also make the point that one of the consequences that has been made by others—one of the consequences of a post-Semit devolution settlement—is that the clear distinctions between reserved and devolved matters has been eroded in favour of quite specific competencies that are being moved around in what is essentially a shared policy competence. Parliament should therefore be much more bold about the possibilities of joint scrutiny and, indeed, open to the possibility of co-decision within our framework. Lord Smyth, in highlighting all those things, has recently made the point that we need not just greater scrutiny of intergovernmental relations, but that this place also needs to do better at actual scrutiny of Government actions in areas in which they are accountable, and perhaps in response to Mr Stevenson's early point about the difficulty of disagreeing with colleagues, there are lessons for us all there, too. Astonishingly, my time is almost at an end. In summary, the committee's report is a useful contribution to what is perhaps a dry but nonetheless important debate. I certainly take the view that the recommendations that have been suggested are modest but welcome all the same, and I suspect that there will be an issue that will be returned to us in the next Parliament. I am sure that all members of that Parliament will all benefit from the opportunity to debate. It has been a cold and dark winter afternoon. We perhaps have not generated much heat, but I am sure that we have shed a little light on that issue this afternoon. Thank you very much, Presiding Officer. It is quite a difficult debate to be in, because an awful lot has been said already, so I suppose that if I cannot be original, I will try to be quite quick. I was struck by what people were saying about how things have been changing anyway. Stuart Maxwell mentioned some comments that I had made during committee about how joint ministerial committees were used and how they were put together. We can be a bit rougher in ourselves here, because we have to recognise that, as a fairly new institution, a lot of those things are always going to evolve anyway. That has been happening as the Parliament has been going on. It has been happening between Governments, but it has also been happening between Parliaments. What I think we have been bad at is not recognising the good practice and giving it enough space to move on. The reason that I say that is because I was reminded through someone speaking about when I was convener of the European Committee a long, long time ago now, but we did set up regular meetings with the convener of the European scrutiny committee in the commons and, indeed, in the lords. I thought that it was a useful and very good system, but it fell into non-use because I was busy and they were busy and probably suffered from not making enough of an effort to keep those things going and gain the benefits from them. If we are serious about setting up inter-parliamentary with respective Governments and with each other, we have to recognise that, if it is not in statute, it takes a lot of hard work and we have to work at it and try to get mutual benefit from it. Back to what we were talking about at the committee, it certainly did come up in the Smith commission. I remember quite clearly that it was Tavish Scott and referred to earlier, who felt very strongly on the Smith commission that an awful lot of what we were trying to do could not be properly implemented unless we strengthened up the structures that we had in place for inter-governmental relations. That was why Lord Smith felt strongly about it and put it in his report. That is why we ended up in the devolution and additional powers committee looking at it. It was an interesting discussion because, again, we started from that point where we thought that other people must be doing it a lot better than we were and found out that, in fact, there is nowhere that we could find anywhere in the world that actually does it very well at all. Here we are again with the possibility of setting up something fairly new. Looking through the recommendations that we came up with, I am pleased to see that the Scottish Government has already given quite a detailed response. That has not arrived yet from Westminster that I can see. I hope that it does fairly soon because it will be good to look at the different opinions that are coming from the respective Governments about what we can achieve here. I was interested—there are general ones—about openness, transparency, etc. I was particularly interested in some of the other ones. People have covered the idea of establishing a specific committee or looking at the remit of committees that already exist. I wonder whether Linda Fabiani wanted to expand on this point of discussion. We do not have come to a final view on whether it should be an additional committee or it should be done through existing committees. Clearly, with the additional powers that are coming to this Parliament, an additional committee may on the face of it seem to be quite a difficult thing to establish given all the extra powers that are coming to the Parliament. It is quite difficult for the 129 members to cope with that. I suspect that the Deputy First Minister was very glad that he was able to respond to that with, I recognise this as a matter for the Scottish Parliament to decide. It is an issue that is certainly in my role on the corporate body. We are very aware of the additional constraints and strains that will be put on the institution by the extra powers. There is a lot of discussion to be had there about how we managed that. Stewart Stevenson touched on some of that. The recommendations that I particularly think are very, very important are number seven and nine. Number seven is the one in which our committee affirms that we agree with the Deputy First Minister that it is absolutely essential that we have a fiscal framework that is robust, coherent and subject to Parliament and scrutiny before any legislative consent memorandum can be considered. I think that that is very, very important. In fact, it is probably the most important thing that has come out of the recommendations in this committee. It is absolutely essential that this Parliament knows exactly what is an offer from Westminster, because I strongly believe that things have not yet met the Smith agreement, let alone the aspirations of the Scottish people. Let us make sure that that particular clause that has come from the recommendation from the devolution committee is taken extremely seriously by everyone in this Parliament. I am pleased to have the opportunity to contribute to this afternoon's committee debate on devolution and parliamentary oversight of intergovernmental relations. I would first like to congratulate the committee members for their report on the changing relationships between the UK and Scotland, and more specifically the process of parliamentary scrutiny of intergovernmental relations. I would also like to thank the committee members for preparing such a comprehensive and thorough report on one of the most prominent issues for debate in Scotland today. As I am sure that members across the chamber will agree, devolution is among the most common conversations that we have had in the chamber over the past year. The relationship between the Scottish Government and the UK Government has always been dynamic and open, and that trend has not changed over the last 15 years. Our intergovernmental relations are built on good will, positive communication and mutual trust, and they must continue to uphold this high standard moving forward. The report of the devolution further powers committee on changing relationships reveals several areas in which our relationships might be improved ahead of the recommendations of the Smith committee. It is crucial for the productivity of this Government that those areas be improved as our relationships with the UK Government become more and more complex. An increase in shared and devolved powers must be met with an increase in the development of intergovernmental relations between Scotland and the UK. At present, most intergovernmental relations take place between ministers in ad hoc meetings and in everyday communications between the ministers and officials. Those types of informal relationships will always be important to the building of relations between Scotland and the UK Government. However, there are serious concerns that the formal relationship between our Governments is not as strong as it should be. With the possibility of a new and stronger devolved powers for the Scottish Government, it is important now more than ever to work to strengthen and support the formal relationships and communications that we have with the UK Government. A strengthened system of formal intergovernmental relations will necessitate closer communication, collaboration and compromise between our two Governments, where each side will be held accountable for their actions. In order to improve this partnership to be implemented, our processes for scrutiny must be enhanced. Our Governments must work past our historical weaknesses in the scrutiny in order to improve and expand the effectiveness of our relationship. The current lack of transparency in the scrutiny is not sustainable for the future development of devolved Scottish powers. The only way that we can expect to improve is to promote robust, direct and meaningful discussion on concerns. The absence of a formal mechanism for raising such concerns only contributes to the lack of clear discussion and problem resolution. We must ensure that increased transparency and accountability are built into the fundamental underpinnings of the new devolved powers that Scotland will receive through the Smith commission. With a strong formal framework to support communication and accountability, I believe that that will only be improved. While informal communications will remain a vital part of our partnership, that type of statutory framework provides a solid foundation on which to build with the UK Parliament. Further, in an effort to improve the process of scrutiny, the introduction of a formal permanent committee to examine the relationship between our two Governments can only enhance our open and transparent communication. In conclusion, the devolution settlement proposed in the current Scotland bill marks a significant step in Scotland's political journey. It is also very clear from the report and today's debate that there is a vital need for both Governments to work together to create a more productive, robust, visible and transparent relationship. With an increasing complex relationship between the Scottish Government and the UK Government, it is essential to create the necessary mechanisms and structures to maintain clear, focused and transparent communication. I appreciate greatly the work of the devolution committee to address the changing dynamic of inter-governmental relations and to develop our collaborations for the future. I am grateful for the opportunity to take part in this afternoon's debate. It is hard to envisage a debate on inter-governmental relations, setting the heather on fire, except perhaps in some parallel universe inhabited by political anoraks, academics and, of course, Stuart Stevenson. However, in stating that, I intend no disrespect to Mr Stevenson or to those who have been most closely involved in scrutinising this issue, because the members of the Devolution Further Powers Committee have done an excellent job in interrogating the existing arrangements and making very clear and cogent recommendations on specific ways in which the institutional infrastructure can be improved. I should also like to place on record my appreciation of the work undertaken by the Centre for Constitutional Change, based at the University of Edinburgh, whose comparative analysis of inter-governmental relations in other jurisdictions has informed the work of the committee. The common theme throughout this debate from members across the chamber has been the recognition that the existing inter-governmental machinery requires overhaul. That is hardly surprising given that the current arrangements date back to 1999 and, of course, we have had since then the 2012 act, the Smith commission and the Scotland bill soon to be an act. However, it is also worth acknowledging at the outset that there are whole swathes of policy making where there is no formal requirement for inter-governmental decision making. This was a point touched on by Stuart Maxwell. Although I would hope that there would always be the opportunity to share good practice and to learn from each other across all the four administrations, there is no formal requirement for inter-governmental decision making. There are non-comparable policies where an issue only exists or largely only exists in one part of the UK. Land reform in Scotland might be thought of as a good example of this. There are other issues where there is a high degree of policy autonomy, predating legislative devolution but, of course, much more pronounced since the establishment of this Parliament, areas such as local government, education, social care and the operation of the national health service. While obviously here we need to recognise the continuing importance of health in reserved areas such as immunisation and vaccination, the pricing of medicines, the regulation of medicines and medical devices and the regulation of the health professions. That is a good example of where the two Governments in the UK, Scotland and the UK talk to each other and where there is a highly developed level of co-operation across the countries and the health systems of the UK. Having an institutional framework and machinery that allows decision making involving the Scottish Government and the UK Government to be effective and timuous is clearly necessary as part of the devolution However, where there are issues of disagreement or potential disagreement between the two Governments, it is surely vital that we have arrangements that command the support of both parties are based, as Anne McTager said, on mutual respect and perhaps most crucially of all, which are capable of gaining the support and confidence of the public. That is certainly important if those arrangements are to be stable and durable for the medium to longer term. The principles as well as the practice underpinning good intergovernmental working have been touched on by a number of members this afternoon. Foremost among those has been the issue of transparency and the related issue of accountability. Professor Michael Keating put it well when he said, whenever there is intergovernmental working, things disappear into rather opaque arenas. That is really not necessary. It is a peculiarly British habit that we like to have our arguments in private before presenting things to the public and Governments will sometimes exploit that in order to stay away from the public gaze. That is a message that we would all do well to take heed of. That applies as much to the Governments, ministers and officials engaged in this process as much as it does to the parliaments and parliamentarians responsible for scrutinising those arrangements. We had, of course, the admission from Bruce Crawford that he was wrong, but only insofar is the importance of intergovernmental relations are concerned. That led us into an important contribution with the insightful observation that intergovernmental relations are dominated by Governments with limited scope for parliaments to scrutinise those arrangements and processes. Relationships must be accountable and subject to scrutiny was a clear message coming through from the committee. It appears to me that accountability and transparency are, in effect, the opposite sides of the same coin. It is here that we can see the tension between the two. The recommendation to the committee that the principles of transparency and accountability should be placed in statute in the Scotland Bill, although the opportunity to do that may have passed, is in tension with the Scottish Government's view expressed in its response to the committee. I quote that it would require careful consideration and drafting to preserve private, internal and intergovernment space. Clearly, that is a challenge for the Governments and the parliaments as we move forward. Recommendation 3, that a new written agreement be taken forward, is one that we would all support. However, as Bruce Crawford rightly said, having written agreements, having memorandums of understanding principles embodied into statute is not sufficient. What we need is the trust to underpin those arrangements. I would like to have commented on the other contributions but time does not permit, Presiding Officer. In conclusion, we need to ensure that the rules of the game, as they apply to intergovernmental relations, are understood by all, are fit for purpose to quote Lord Smith, are robust, visible and transparent. Whatever else we may disagree about in this chamber, we should all agree on that. Thank you for 3D. We move to the winding-up speeches. I call Alex Johnson. Thank you very much, Presiding Officer. I welcome the opportunity to respond to this debate for my party. I have to say that there have been some interesting comments made, not least of which was the one made by Malcolm Chisholm, who told us that he was participating in this debate largely out of a sense of duty. When those exciting debates come along, duty is much a motivator for many of us. However, if we go back to the beginning of the debate, Bruce Crawford pointed out that it was Lord Smith himself, in his comments after the Smith commission reported, that suggested that intergovernmental relations were going to be a very important part of everything that we did going forward. I also agree with Bruce Crawford that it was something that, perhaps on the Devolution and Further Powers Committee, we did not take all that seriously at the outset, but very quickly came to realise that yes, intergovernmental relations were a critical part of what was going to happen as the new Scotland Bill progressed and relationships developed. However, it has to be said that our first attempt to find out what was going on in other parts of the world, how other parliaments dealt with executives that had to indulge in intergovernmental relationships, the news was not good. It seems that, across many countries in the world, those arrangements have evolved gradually over time and that, by and large, they are arrangements that exist between executives but do not have very much in the way of parliamentary scrutiny to back them up. Therefore, having discovered that there was not much in that we could base our activities on, it is important that we understand that there is a desire within all the committee to ensure that, if there is going to be parliamentary scrutiny of intergovernmental relations here in the United Kingdom and on behalf of the Scottish Parliament, that we are starting from scratch, we need to get it right and we cannot allow a system to evolve that excludes parliaments and leaves executives exclusively involved in that process. However, I will begin to argue with myself by saying that it is not easy and the evidence suggested that it will not be easy. It will not be easy for a number of reasons, not least of which is that I actually believe in the concept of executive authority. We as a parliament, once we are elected, appoint a Government and ministers in that Government to take decisions and take actions on our behalf. Therefore, it is an important principle of my belief of that structure of government that, when we, even I, delegate Minister John Swinney to negotiate with the Westminster Government on my behalf, he has with him my executive authority to make agreements on my behalf, even though we may not have a great deal in common with some of the things that we would like to achieve. Nevertheless, that principle is key. It is important that whatever we do that this Parliament, and I personally, am not on John Swinney's back leaning over his shoulder at every step along the way. That principle of the executive authority is one that we must defend. Nevertheless, when you look at the changes that are on the way regarding taxation and welfare powers in particular, the fiscal framework will be vital, and that will be, I believe, as many have said, the most vital piece of intergovernment relation that we are likely to see in this Parliament or the next. For that reason, it is important that we have recognisable structures, and the committee in its report has taken forward a few ideas for things that can be achieved. Simply knowing when meetings take place is important. If possible, knowing what is on the agenda is important. If we can get it into practice, having a minister come before a committee and discuss matters before negotiation takes place so that the subject of that negotiation is slightly better understood by Parliament in advance, if those things are not possible, then post-agreement scrutiny must be our option. Of course, we can do both, but it is important that when we hold ministers to account, we hold ministers to account for agreements that they have made on all our behalf. The suggestions that have been put forward by the committee give us the option to go in that direction. The idea that we should have a separate committee dealing with that matter is perhaps an ambitious proposal. Given the many responsibilities that this Parliament is about to acquire, the size of the Parliament and the nature of the existing committee structure, it may not be possible to have an individual committee for every purpose. However, committee scrutiny is vital, and a committee of this Parliament must have the responsibility for that intergovernmental relations scrutiny. The final thing that needs to be said is that when we go forward with this, we must understand that there are other things that can happen to improve the structure. We have a very asymmetric system of devolution in place, and symmetry within structure will never be possible. However, I would like to see a similar system of scrutiny existing at the other end. If it is possible for Westminster to conduct scrutiny of their ministers in their relationship with other Governments in the United Kingdom, it is also possible that we, as a Parliament, through our committee structure, can strengthen our relationships with our committee, our parallel committee structure in Westminster. We have already heard at some length from Linda Fabiani about the relationship that she has managed to achieve at times in the past. I honestly believe that, if we are going to make this work at its most effective, we can finally square that circle by working hand-in-hand with Westminster committees and the Westminster Parliament on the scrutiny profile. Thank you, Presiding Officer. I thank the Devolution and Further Powers Committee for bringing this debate to chamber today and for the very well-written report that has been the focus of our discussion. The report has given us the opportunity to assess where we stand as a Parliament in line with the four nations of the United Kingdom. With the substantial new powers that are coming to the Scottish Parliament, we must ensure that we have the right structures in place to allow this chamber to properly scrutinise the bilateral and multilateral relationships with the United Kingdom Government and the devolved Administrations. I know that it may seem a small point, but I think that we should not neglect Guernsey, Jersey and the Isle of Man. I know in particular that Guernsey has current serious issues with the power that the UK Government has to veto any of its legislation on policy grounds. I think that there is a bigger picture even beyond the four that we often talk about. I thank the member for that useful and constructive intervention. As usual, Mr Stevenson always comes up with something that no one else has thought of. Thank you for that. Claire Baker, in her opening remarks, stated that the whole debate around intergovernmental relations should focus on openness and transparency, and rightly so. Malcolm Chisholm made a number of points that were reflected by other members in the debate, including issues around weak intergovernmental relationships, the challenge of scrutiny and the principles of transparency and accountability. In her contribution, Anne McTaggart pointed out that the possibility of new and stronger devolved powers for the Scottish Government is crucially important now, more than ever, that we work to strengthen and support the formal relationships and communications that we have with the UK Government. A strengthened system of formal intergovernmental relations will necessitate closer communication, collaboration and compromise between our two Governments, where each side is held accountable. Our country, our politics and our Parliament has changed dramatically since the re-establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 1999. As the report states in the opening lines of the executive summary, the formal structures of intergovernmental relations between the UK Government and the devolved administrations have undergone a process of evolution and expansion, and we cannot be caught out in this new era in Scottish politics. As with everything in politics, evolution is a necessity for change, so we must continue that evolution in line with the further expansion of the Parliament's powers. With the process of agreeing a new memorandum of understanding, I commend the committee on commissioning the external research and evidence of the structures and levels of scrutiny of intergovernmental relations in other jurisdictions. The committee acknowledges that there is no model or template from around the world that can be replicated here. Instead, we must learn from processes, procedures and principles of other jurisdictions and use them in negotiation of a new memorandum of understanding, one that also opens up the transparency of how our elected Governments work with one another. External research also offers us five issues from a comparative assessment of practice and procedures in other jurisdictions, some of which I believe we should consider and others I do have some concerns around, primarily those focus once more on transparency and accountability. The first issue is about timing and access to information, which we should have no reason not to support. The second issue, a committee on intergovernmental relations, gives me cause for concern, as I believe, as the Presiding Officer and many other MSPs in this chamber do, that the committee's system needs its own reform. We currently have too many committees that are overstretched and unable to carry out the scrutiny of the Government and pre- and post-legislative scrutiny effectively. The third issue, hearings on evidence sessions, does appeal to me to promote transparency. However, my concerns around who will carry out those sessions merge in with my concerns on a committee for IGR. Concern is the fourth issue, which suggests that there is a case for extending the Scottish Parliament's consent powers, given the increased significance of intergovernmental agreements over the block grant adjustments and the fiscal framework. That is one area that would need to be assessed further. The final issue is transparency and public engagement. Committing to report the outcome of intergovernmental meetings would open up the opportunity for MSPs, Welsh Assembly members and members of the Northern Ireland Assembly to debate such outcomes and further increase public awareness of what is going on behind the scenes. That would clearly be preferential where joint ministerial committees are debating matters that would not reveal sensitive matters such as state intelligence. Finally, the Scottish Parliament must be able to effectively scrutinise intergovernmental relations, whether the new memorandum of understanding results in relations being placed on a statutory footing, the Scottish Government and the Scottish Parliament must work more closely together, as the Deputy First Minister has said in evidence to the committee. Transparency and accountability are at the heart of our debate today. As parliamentarians, we should welcome this report and embrace the evolution of intergovernmental relations with that in mind. I feel greatly strengthened by the debate today, particularly by the ring endorsement from Alex Johnson of the fact that he is going to enthusiastically support everything that I do in my discussions with the United Kingdom Government. It was almost like the issue if one can imagine such a prospect of Alex Johnson issuing a blank cheque. It generated a somewhat more giddy reaction from Baroness Goldie sitting at his side, who looks slightly more suspicious of the concept. Nonetheless, I will take Mr Johnson at his word and will make sure that he does not criticise anything that I do at any stage in the future. On a serious note, I pick up the point that Tavish Scott and Stuart Stevenson made about the point that the First Minister made just a few hours ago in relation to the Cobra arrangements in which she was fully involved over the weekend, as Parliament would expect. In my experience, on a whole host of different issues over the years, when these emergency situations arise, the intergovernmental discussion is open, transparent, regular and frequent. My point is that it is totally possible to have good intergovernmental working when the need arises. When we all realise that this is a very difficult situation, whether it is about the atrocities of Paris on Friday or whether it is about a weather incident or about whatever, we can actually find the mechanisms of good intergovernmental working. I think that we should take some heart from that in notwithstanding the criticisms that have quite clearly been made about the formality and the order of existing intergovernmental relationships. Malcolm Chisholme made the point that he thought it was easier for those arrangements to work when ministers from different administrations were from the same political party. I completely disagree with that point totally. I remember vividly an interview given by one of my predecessors and one of my dear friends Andy Kerr who bemoaned the fact that he thought the SNP finance minister had got a better hearing from the Labour-run Treasury than he had ever managed to get. Equally, I have to say that my experience of dealing for the last five years up until the United Kingdom general election in May with a Liberal Democrat chief secretary to the Treasury, Danny Alexander, was a relationship driven by courtesy in both directions and very effective dealings on issues. Not that we managed to agree on everything, but I certainly couldn't complain about the courtesy and the nature of the dialogue that was implicit in that direct relationship. I don't accept the point of view that it needs similarity of political backgrounds to agree good relationships. The main point that I was making on that was referring to the research, because I think that the comment that you are referring to was based on the external research and about the way in which that worked. I think that I pointed out that I quite often disagreed with colleagues as well. I will allow Mr Chisholm's remarks to stand, but I think that the point for me is that we have responsibilities as ministers whatever our political backgrounds in our citizens expect us to be able to work our way through those politics to get good outcomes for citizens, although I accept that there will be genuine issues upon which we cannot reach agreement because of different interests. Mr MacDonald made the point that—this is the first of a number of remarks that I would like to make about more the culture of intergovernmental relationships—arrangements for intergovernmental relations can be put in place in the formality of documentation and rules and processes, but they need political will to make them work. I agree with that. We can have all the rules that we want, all the procedures, all the kind of notification and agents, but if the political will is not there to deal with courtesy and openness and to deal with things swiftly, then those arrangements will not work effectively. In the same springs way to Mr Scott's—of course, Mr Crawford. In his speech today, Tavish Scott described the fiscal framework as the striking example of the type of agreement that is reached between Governments. The worth of that framework is fundamentally affected by the UK spending decisions. I hope that I have that about right and I agree with Tavish. Given how it has been said today about respect between Governments and the need to share information with parliaments, just how much notice did we get of the proposed £2.5 billion of cuts to the UK Government departments so far and the plans to cut the big lottery? We have no notification other than what has been in the media about spending decisions made at the UK Government level as they affect departmental arrangements. Of course, I will wait to hear what prior notice of the announcements come before the spending review on 25 November. However, I was coming on to make about Mr Scott's remarks. Mr Scott made the point that there is a whole variety of different changes in the nature of governance within the United Kingdom, whether it is the Scottish powers under the Smith commission or whether it is the Northern powerhouse or whether it is the west country, Cornwall or wherever it happens to be. To me, that will require a change in political culture for all of those arrangements to work properly. If we operate in a system that Mr Gibson highlighted slightly more bluntly than I would ever manage to say, where people are treated as equals, not as rulers unruled, we get close to realising that the political culture has to fundamentally change where there might actually be a remote possibility that something that I say as a Scottish finance minister might have more validity than what the Treasury happens to believe on a particular issue—heaven for fine—if that was ever to come to pass. The point that I am making is that when we have these different and distinctive changes in political accountability and relationships, political culture needs to change to take account of that. That requires some of the attitudes whereby UK departments and UK Government might think, well, we take the decision and that is what others have to get on with. That attitude has to change if we are to make progress on intergovernmental relationships. Finally, let me just close on the issues about the fiscal framework, which were referred to by Drew Smith, Tavish Scott and others in the debate Linda Fabiani and others. I have endeavoured to keep Parliament as full