Hello and welcome to this CUBE Conversation. This segment is part of our pre-IPO CEO series. Arctic Wolf is a company that provides managed cybersecurity services that are designed to help companies protect their technology infrastructure from cyber attacks. It essentially serves as a security operation center for the many, many companies that don't have a SOC. Last year, Arctic Wolf expanded the scope of its security services by acquiring incident response startup Tetra Defense, the company's president and CEO Nick Schneider joins us today to share some expansion news and give us an update on the market and the company. Nick, welcome back to the CUBE, good to see you. Great to be here, thanks for having me. You're very welcome. So what's new in 2023? What are some of the key milestones that you've achieved this year? Yeah, so I mean, in the last few months here, we've continued to grow quite a bit in particular internationally and obviously on our base here in the US. Just yesterday actually, we announced the expansion of our incident response services into our global customers in AMIA and ANZ and we're excited to bring this new functionality to the market, a functionality that we've had now in the US and Canadian markets for about a year and a half. We've added along with that security operations warranty to eligible customers within our base, which if they meet certain milestones, they can garner up to a $1 million cybersecurity warranty. We also just recently launched a new data center in Sydney, Australia. I think that speaks to kind of our commitment to the customers and partners in that region and we had done similar about two years ago in AMIA as well. So we continue to expand into these markets and when we do so, we do so in earnest. Along with that, I think for the second year in a row we've won the Forbes Cloud 100, which we're honored to be a part of. Gartner did a peer insight review recently, voice of the customer on managed sectional response and Arctic Wolf was named as a leader in that work. And we've just continued to grow and expand our customer base and the functionality and feature set that we bring to those customers, now well over 4,000 customers globally, 2,200 employees and working with, over 1,000 trusted partners throughout the globe. So business continues to be very good and we continue to make strides to improve the capabilities that we have to deliver to the customer base, but also the geographies and the routes to market that we leverage to do so. Yeah, thank you. So we have some data that I want to pull up here and share with the audience. So this is from our data partner, ETR, Enterprise Technology Research and it's data from their August survey of emerging technology companies, ETS, is Emerging Technology Survey. It's a survey of 1,488 IT decision makers and this is a sub-sector within the intrusion detection and prevention space. And so in the vertical axis is net sentiment, which is an indicator of intent to engage and then the horizontal axis is mind share, I have people heard of you and you can see the ends that your end of 571 divided by that 1,488 informs your position that's way out to the right, kind of like a quantifiable Gartner Magic Quadrant if you will with obviously different dimensions. And so obviously, Nick, you're well known, you've raised a lot of money, you're doing a good job here. To what do you attribute to success? Last time we talked it was, the market was more in sort of growth mode, spend, spend, spend to deal with hybrid and remote work. I think you've subsequently changed your strategy a little bit to fit the current situation, maybe more of a focus on profitability, but it seems to be working. Yeah, I mean, we're constantly paying attention to the way in which we grow and the way in which we manage the bottom line. And all the way through that is the objective of ensuring that we're delivering the outcomes to our customers and partners that we promise. And the market has evolved quite a bit, over time, we kind of cut our teeth in the detection and response space. And that evolved in the market from XDR to managed XDR and effectively what we've done for the entirety of our existence has been managed XDR. So the ability to detect and respond to threats kind of regardless of the attack surface and then being able to layer in what we call our concierge approach in a curated manner to give those customers peace of mind and give those customers a voice or a conduit into the business that can answer questions of them directly with some context or business context about their environment. And kind of through that engagement with the customer what we found was a lot of those entities were looking for us to also help them understand what their vulnerabilities were. So not just detect and respond to potential incidents but also understand their vulnerabilities ahead of time. Then how do we train and enable the employee base that we have, which is continuing to be one of the most prominent vectors for attack by the bad actors, which kind of led into, hey, it would be great if we could leverage and most of this is a non-article of customer incident response services by a trusted leader in the space and then work together to improve our posture over time which then subsequently kind of led us into engagement with the insurance community and how we could leverage what we know about the market, the way in which we engage with our customers by also inviting the insurance community in to help a customer understand their overall risk and how the transfer of risk kind of within their environment may or may not take place. So it's been an evolution I think of the market in conjunction with an evolution of kind of Arctic Wolf and the way in which we've approached it. And certainly through the past year and a half customers have really been looking for opportunities to work with a more consolidated set of vendors that can solve a broader array of problems that they would typically have in a security operation and that's really what we've been after from the onset of the company. I mean, you're definitely seeing the consolidation theme in cyber generally the companies that have a strong story there, tending the public companies anyway tend to do pretty well. At least you can see that in the earnings reports. And then as part of your TAM expansion you're sort of your news earlier today, February 22 you acquired Tetra Defense really bolstering your incident response. I want to talk about that news, why EMEA and New Zealand, why now? You mentioned some data center activity there. It's when you expand overseas, obviously it's expensive. You're in that balancing with the macro, you're balancing profitability with growth. Can you talk about why Europe or EMEA and New Zealand and why now? Yeah, so we've been in EMEA for two plus years now. So we've a pretty material business in that region and that region has done phenomenally for us. So I would say we're kind of beyond kind of the early entry point there where we're seeing really good both growth but also growth in an efficient manner. The expansion into Australia, New Zealand was really around customer request and demand that we were seeing inbound and our desire to begin to expand into the APAC region. And I think we've now been in that region for call it six months, two quarters. And already we have a pretty sizable team built out both in kind of the go to market functions but also in the functions that are there to deliver these outcomes to the end user whether it be through the technology or through this concierge curated approach. And for us being able to make those investments and be able to make them on top of the investments that we're making in other regions that have pretty massive scale is something that just makes sense for the longterm of Arctic Wolf and the longterm of the partnerships that we have both with our customers and the partner community. So, those regions have the same problems the US or North America has. Those regions, I think more often than not have less optionality with regards to who they work with. And I think we had the opportunity or have the opportunity to bring a brand as we just went through on some of the data you showed into those regions in a way that can provide not just the outcome of incident response but the outcomes of security operations wholesale to a customer base that is looking for it. So I think it's a great opportunity for us. The results thus far have been really strong and I would expect that we're going to continue to see the same success that we saw and are seeing in North America to happen in the other regions throughout the globe. Let's talk a little bit about the macro. Obviously it's been an interesting year. Cyber was somewhat insulated for a period of time and then it seemed to revert to the mean. It seems like it continues to do well. It's obviously the number one priority. People talk about that all the time. There's many, many surveys out there but at the same time, the overall spending climate has been somewhat capped. And so we're seeing with the craziness we're 10 minutes in, we have to now bring in AI, Nick. So you're seeing some of the uptick in AI spend detract from some of the other budgets. As they say, cyber seems to be holding up but what are the big changes that you're seeing at the macro? And then I want to get into your thoughts. I know you've got some on the impact of Gen AI, the hype around that and some of the cautions there but start with the high level. What are you seeing at the macro? Yeah, so I mean, I certainly see that or think that we've been seeing some improvement here especially over the last several months. I think there are some macro economic indicators that would show that were headed on the right trajectory. I think there are some results especially from some of the public, only traded companies, especially in cyber that would backstop both a healthy demand environment but also a spend environment that's improving. And I think with regards to cybersecurity as you alluded to, it's just an area of the industry or an area of a company's operation where there's so much going on, there's so much new and there's so much opportunity and available change that it just can't be put on the back burner even for a short period of time. There can be some reprioritizations in the way in which you solve the problem which I think we saw through customers looking for vendors that can solve a broader set of problems for them but I don't think cybersecurity as a whole would move into position B, if you will within kind of the overall prioritization within the company. I think as new trends have emerged, AI being the one that is most heavily talked about it's been an opportunity for organizations to leverage that technology in a way that betters them as a business or betters them with regards to their cybersecurity posture unfortunately it's also been an opportunity for the bad actors. So I think while AI has come into a vogue kind of within the market wholesale AI and machine learning has played a critical role in cybersecurity for quite a while and B, I think with the advent to some of the generative AI and some of the other stuff that's happening within the space there's also been an opportunity presented to the bad actors and kind of the marriage of those two opportunities is obviously driving hype within AI wholesale. So I think the macro is headed in the right direction. I think AI as it relates to cybersecurity is both a benefit to organizations but also a detriment because of the activity that the bad actors or the manner in which the bad actors may leverage it. And I think kind of how that all plays out is still a little bit to be seen but one thing is for sure AI is here to stay and you're going to have to leverage it both in your overall business operations but also in the way in which you protect your organization from a cybersecurity standpoint. So two quick follow-ups on that in our July SuperCloud 3 event the focus really was on cybersecurity meets generative AI. And one of the takeaways from those discussions was the problem with gen AI is it's generative. And it gives you a different answer every time. And of course we all know about the hallucinations. So the applicability to cyber you have to be very careful about how you apply it. And as you pointed out, AI is not new. It was not like it was invented in November of 2022. And certainly many cyber firms if not most if not all have been using it but generative AI introduces this sort of new capability that folks, I think the consensus was we have to be very, very careful about how we actually apply it. Would you agree with that? Absolutely. I think that we as a cybersecurity industry and as practitioners of cybersecurity need to be very careful about the way in which generated by AI is used. Now, I think there are some outcomes or some opportunities that are maybe less in the critical path that you could leverage generative AI in a way that is, you know intelligence and smart, especially as that technology evolves. There are also ways that it could be leveraged it would be very dangerous for the average end user or the average vendor because of some of the unpredictability or because of some of the, you know acknowledgement of, you know potentially the wrong outcome being projected to the customer with high competence. So it's certainly an area of the space that I think A, the bad actors, you know will use, you know so I think they will leverage it to, you know create and to, you know propagate really high quality, you know phishing emails or phishing attempts, for example but I don't think necessarily it's quite ready for prime time with regards to being in the core of the cybersecurity, you know stack, if you will now I think that'll evolve over time and I think companies that are smart about this will find ways to leverage generative AI in areas of cybersecurity or their outcomes to the customer that are not in kind of the main stream of the outcomes that they're promising but I think we'll probably also see some that, you know take a leap a little bit too far and the outcome will be that there'll be an incident or an issue that may arise with their end user. So I think that brings me to the second big takeaway of our, you know event and discussion with practitioners and experts and since the acquisition of Tetra Defense you've got a wider capability and observation space but the consensus was that prior to chat GPT being introduced the technology vendors sort of had the advantage with AI that sort of flipped that initially now post you know the AI heard around the world that attackers maybe have a near term advantage it sounds like you would agree with that at least in the near term. Absolutely in the near term I would absolutely agree with that you know the average employee is still the number one attack vector and the manner in which a lot of those bad actors are getting in and getting to information that's really critical is via you know fishing or business email compromise and a really well written really well articulated really relevant fishing email is a very you know strong tactic for those bad actors to use to get into the environment and chat GPT just made it that much easier and on the on the defensive side as we just talked about you know you're still going to be leveraging AI machine learning and kind of building out a security operation to protect those customers but I think the benefit to the bad actors outweighs the defense mechanism you know by the vendor or the end user. Have you been able to discern a quantifiable improvement in fishing emails? I'm not sure it's quantifiable numerically but certainly and I'm guessing you have seen this as well they have improved in not only the manner in which they're written but the context is very strong they're scouring the internet especially for folks that have a profile or that have more publicly facing you know material and that just makes that content that much more robust and it makes it that much harder to weed through what is real and not real now there are still some very obvious ways to protect against that you know have a security operation that makes sense make sure you understand who the sender is like all the stuff that you typically look at in the fish but it makes it harder when the email is really well written and has strong context Yeah no question I want to ask you about sort of the IPO market the IPO drought you've seen some recent action which I'm sure you're watching you know Databricks did a some private sale it looks like it got its valuation back up prior to its last round the ARM S1 was quite interesting Softman did an internal sale and there actually looks like they're pricing the IPO below that so it was a way to maybe tease people in and create demand what are you seeing potentially you know Instacart is going to go maybe Stripe maybe Sneak you know another security player how are you thinking about IPO strategies how has that changed your operating model maybe from growth to profitability maybe you could give us some insight as to your current thinking Yeah I think much like the majority of the market as the you know growth environment has slowed a bit people are paying a close attention to the bottom line I do think what we're going to see through the you know the back end of this is you're going to have a lot of large organizations growing at a healthy clip with a really strong bottom line and I think that that's probably a positive outcome of some of the you know macro turned down and I think what you're going to see is those companies will start to accelerate their growth again but in an environment with a much healthier bottom line so I think there's some really good companies out there and I think those companies probably look you know quite a bit more interesting now and especially I think as we progress forward I think you'll start to see some of that grow growth you know tick back up for at least some of them and I think you know a combination of you know the activity that's been done within that cohort of businesses along with what appears to be a you know improving at least macroeconomic climate you're going to see some folks enter the market I think it's still probably a little bit TBD on exactly how that's going to all shake out not just you know for the launch of the IPO but also how that plays out kind of over the subsequent quarter or two and you know I think if a few of those you know go well that you'll see the IPO you know markets start to open up in a more material way here you know after what has been you know quite a quite a drought in the IPO market so you know I'm you know positive in my outlook as to the direction in which that's headed and you know we'll continue as a business to keep a close eye on it and obviously when it makes sense for you know Arctic Wolf and if there's a you know willing dance partner with the market you know we'll take a hard look at it as well but right now we're really focused on building a strong business and executing for our customers yeah and you did a convertible I think a $400 million convertible so the balance sheet presumably is still pretty looking pretty good that's correct yep we did that roughly a year ago do you think I mean I know it's situational but do you think I mean given the current situation does a company have to be break even or you know cash flow positive to to go IPO is that kind of the assumption right now though the working assumption in the operating model yeah I'm not sure they have to be you know break even are profitable to go public I think the window post IPO with which folks have to be kind of in that window is a lot shorter than it used to be you know so I think you know whereas it used to be you know maybe a year or two I think you're going to be looking at you know quarters with regards to at least your ability to move into free free cash flow positivity so you know so I think you know the the manner in which these businesses are run kind of the offset against the the real growth that they're seeing and then the kind of market that they're approaching how much Greenfield is in that market what the opportunity is for them and the balance between you know going after that growth and you know staking your claim to new geographies or new product sets against this balance on the bottom line is going to be a top of mind for for most folks that are looking to enter the the public markets and I think those that have been paying attention will be in pretty good shape because they've you know had time over the past year year and a half to really formulate their their their plan and execute against it my last question for you is when I first was introduced to Arctic Wolf I was under the impression that you guys really served almost exclusively the small mid-sized market I think there's still some of that sort of latent DNA associated with your brand but when I first interviewed you Nick you told me no Dave that's not true we're actually moving upmarket and so when I go to all these events now you know whether it's uh I've seen you at reinforce obviously saw you at RSA I'll go by your booth talk to your salespeople see what they say because salespeople love to talk and it seems like you actually are moving you know upmarket you're having some good success there it seems like the repeatability of the business I'm sure you measure your NRR you know seems to be going in that right direction of course then when I talked to the GSIs they sort of poo poo Arctic Wolf you know the big you know big giant firms give us the update on your your target markets and the success that you're having not only an SMB but in what you call enterprise yeah so you know we continue to serve and work with customers kind of all throughout what I would call the SMB mid-market small enterprise but we've also made significant traction in the true enterprise and and even into the large enterprise with you know the Fortune 500 accounts I wouldn't say that we target the you know Fortune 500 I think there are specific you know instances where that really makes sense but we certainly have seen an uptick in our ability to work with and engage with you know larger organizations than certainly that we're engaging with you know a few years ago and I think that's just again a function of the way in which the market has unfolded it's gotten more and more complex and I think for the normal manufacturer or financial institution or healthcare organization even if they are of size you know building out a fully staffed security operation with all that's involved technologically or through you know the the human aspect of that build out is just not you know their their swim lane and they're looking for a trusted partner to help them build out you know the entirety of their security operation and that's why you know we've kind of built out our operation to ensure that we can deliver on that promise of a security operation I think security operations is going to end up being one of the largest if not the largest overall market within cyber security and as a result of kind of some of those trends and some of the way in which we built the business over the last few years you know over half of our business at least from a spend you know perspective would be viewed as you know enterprise customers and that's continuing to trend up quarter over quarter so so I think that perception is one that was built you know on the onset of the company in the first few years of the manner in which we attack the market I think that was due to the way in which the market was built at the time I think the market itself has changed and Arctic Wolf has evolved quite a bit and therefore we're seeing some good traction in larger customers you know in history of IT shows it's easier to go from small to large than it is the other way around so Nick congratulations on your success so far I know you got a lot of work to do but really appreciate your time and thanks for spending some time on the Cube you got it thanks for having me all right you're very welcome all right and thank you for watching this is Dave Vellante for the Cube Conversation we'll see you next time


Modern China is, by many measures, the greatest success story in the history of humanity. According to the World Bank, more than 850 million Chinese have been lifted out of extreme poverty in recent decades, with the country's poverty rate falling from 88% in 1981 to just 0.7% in 2015. Just this year, the country announced they had in fact eliminated extreme poverty, all while posting economic growth and leading the fight against Covid. Its GDP has tripled since 2008 and, already by one measure, it's larger than the United States. Meanwhile, China has constructed high-speed rail across the country, spanning some 35,000 miles in the last 15 years and is gradually seeing its economic might percolate through to cultural and political influence. In AI, synthetic biology, and renewable technology, it is starting to even take on the best of the West. Yet we're also told it is a repressive corrupt regime where workers and civil rights are non-existent and where minorities, particularly in Xinjiang and Tibet, face repression, forced labour and massive state violence. Leading companies like Huawei may be starting to compete with the biggest names in Europe and North America, but they are also, so we're told, a Trojan horse the Chinese Communist Party to extend its perfidious authoritarian reach. In short, the rise of China is bad news for Democrats and those who care about social justice. So which is it? Joining me to discuss that today is Martin Jack, also the best-selling when China rules the world, the end of the Western world and the birth of a new global order. Martin, welcome to Downstream. Thank you. The book was first published in 2009 as a hardback. 12 years later, does China now rule the world? Can we put a date on it? Was it 2020? Is it going to be 2025, 2030? I don't think we can really. I mean, I never meant the title literally. I just meant it as a sort of, you know, a sort of metaphor, if you like, drawing on a popular proposition, you know, if I rule the world and so on and all that kind of thing, to dramatise in a way just the extraordinary rise of China that's been taking place. And I think the world is now, in varying degrees, very aware of this phenomena. But actually putting a date on, let's say, when will China become, let's say, the most influential country in the world, I don't, I'd find that very difficult to, in two senses. One, there's a conceptual argument about what that means. And secondly, then placing a date on that would be equally, if not more difficult. I would put it like this, that China is already more or less on a par with the United States economically, but it depends how you measure it. But I think probably it's actually already, in terms of its size and reach, has already overtaken the United States. Certainly by primary purchasing power definition of GDP, which I think in this context is definitely the more important measure. And by 2030 China is likely to be something like probably pushing twice the size of the United States. And that's not so far off, that's only, you know, less than a decade away. We can all see as well now, whereas when my book came out, people didn't really know how to think about this, weren't even thinking in this way. But we can also see how China's influence in the world in all sorts of ways is growing. And I think that it helps to think of this in a slightly bifurcated way. In the developing world, China's influence has grown at pace. And we should always remember that the developing world accounts for 85% of the world's population. So most of the world lives in the developing world. And China rightly still regards itself as primarily a developing country, although parts of it, of course, are already of developed status. In the developing world, China has already overtaken of the United States, I think, in terms of its, certainly its economic influence, I think. But also in terms of certain aspects of political and cultural influence. I mean, China's whole rise has been predicated on the importance of development. This is their word. You don't get this word used in the West, really. But the Chinese emphasis the importance of development. And that's in a way what its offer has been to the developing world, development. And so if you look at the figures around the world in terms of Pew statistics and so on, then Africa, for example, China is ahead of the United States in terms of its influence. In East Asia, apart from Japan and South Korea, and perhaps Taiwan, basically China is, I mean, in Yassin countries, the 10 Southeast Asian countries, China is much more important in most respects than the United States. And that's home to, what is it, about 700 million people, for example. And if you look at the Belt and Road, which is their great sort of development project for Eurasia, this already has, I think, over 100 countries signed up for it. And this is the project to transform the infrastructure of a large part of humanity. So in all these senses, I think China already has surpassed the United States in terms of its influence. Now, in the developed world, I don't think that the situation is different. By the developed world here, I'm essentially referring to what we think of or is usually described as clearly China's influence there is much more limited. And there are a variety of reasons for this. I mean, first of all, China still had compared with the West has got much poorer living standards. So it's not an exemplar, because people don't think, oh, I'll go, it's not like going to America. You're going to America, you used to go to America for opportunity. But this is not really the case in relationship to China as far as the developed world is concerned. And there's another problem in Western attitudes towards China, and that is the West has dominated the world for a very long time. And especially in the recent past, say, let's say around about 2015-16, Trump's elected in 2016. The West, especially the United States has come to see the rise of China as a threat. So there's a great deal of the Sinophobia hostility towards China now in the West as a result of this. If we put it into historic context, how big is the rise of China? Because obviously, there's been a passing of the baton amongst the great powers since forever. You can think of the rise of the United States after the 1860s. You can think of the rise of Japan and Germany at the beginning of the 20th century, the ebbing of the British Empire. What's the analog here? Should we think of the rise of China like the rise of the Netherlands in the 16th century, the rise of the British in the 18th, 19th century, the rise of America? Or is it bigger than all of these potentially? Well, obviously, the characteristic it shares with these countries is that they rose to some form of prominence of power, regional or global, and China is doing exactly the same. But China's on a totally different scale. The nearest comparison is the rise of the United States in the 19th century up until maybe the middle of the 20th century. But its real dynamism in a way was the period up until, well, I could argue about this, but let's say 1939 for the sake of argument. Now, China is on a hugely different scale. Its population is four times that of the United States. So just by virtue of demographic weight, the rise of China is far more dramatic and far bigger than the American phenomenon. I would describe the rise of China as the most important and remarkable economic development in human history. Is that already the case? Or is that if by 2030 it's twice the size of the US? So do you think that's already been accomplished? This is the most important economic development ever already in 2021? It's already the case. I mean, we've never seen a country grow with the speed of China. Say from 1978 with Deng Xiaoping's when Deng Xiaoping's reform started until for 45 years, it grew at 10% a year. That is phenomenal. It means the size of the economy. And we're talking about 1.3, 1.4 billion people. It means the economy doubling in size every seven years. I mean, that is extraordinary transformation. Even in the peak of American growth in the second half of the 19th century, it never grew at about more than 4% a year on average. And that was for a much smaller population. So that's why China's rise is having and will have a huge impact on the rest of the world, a huge impact on the global economy. Because this is the rise of a people who, although historically have been very important and innovative and so on, were basically in four sorts of ways, partly as a result of poverty outside the system or marginal to the system. And suddenly they become the subject of change. They become the new subject of the global economy in a very short space of time. I mean, we're talking about 1978, it starts when the Chinese economy was about 5% of the size of the American economy. To say 2014 is when, according to the World Bank, China overtook the size of the American economy. Just to clarify for audience, I mean, there are two measures of GDP because they might look at the Wikipedia and they'll see nominal GDP and they'll say, well, China's doing very well, but it's not the United States. But there's two measures here, there's PPP and there's nominal GDP. Nominal GDP, China's probably going to overtake the US some point in the next 10 years. But we're talking here about PPP, aren't we, which is a different measure. And that's the measure you're referring to when you say it will be twice the size of the US potentially by 2030. Exactly. And that's the measure used by the IMF and the World Bank. China's certainly still smaller in terms of dollar exchange rates. But it probably will overtake the United States, you can't be sure. It depends. The difficulty with exchange rate measures is it depends on what happens to your currency. So let's say the dollar drops by 20%. Well, China's will be bigger. So it depends. But yeah, it's important that those two different measures people are familiar with. And the thing you say about 10% growth is obviously hugely impressive, but a number of countries have seen 10% growth at one point or another. But like you said, it's that compounding aspect for decades. I mean, I only realised this researching this show over the last couple of weeks that China's economy is basically tripled in size since the Beijing Olympics, more or less, which doesn't feel like that long ago. And you think, well, if that proceeds for another 13 years, we live in a very different world. And so for you, that really explains the enmity coming from the United States in particular since 2014-15. I think that there are two fundamental causes of Western hostility towards China. One is political, stroke cultural, which is that China is obviously has a very different system. And in the recent period, the focus has been on Communist Party, Chinese Communist Party, you know, the sort of implication or often stated actually, this is like the Soviet Communist Party and all that kind of thing. So that's a kind of retreat back into Cold War categories. So that's one source of hostility. But the other, I'm sure we'll come back to that, but the other source of hostility really, but it's lower key and less familiar to people, is that China's very different from the West.  It comes from a completely different history. As we will talk about later, I'm sure, China's not even primarily a nation-state in my view. It's a civilisation, well, it's part civilisation state, part nation-state. So China's never going to be Western. And the West finds this impossible to believe or understand because its whole notion has been a universalistic notion that the world will become and should be like us. We are the template. We are the model. And they're finding this extraordinary difficult to understand. As a result, the level of understanding in the West about China, including not least the elites, is abysmal. If you're enjoying this interview and would like to see more like it, go to navaromedia.com forward slash support. We only exist thanks to the generosity of our supporters. You can make a one-off payment or you can become an ongoing supporter. Either is fine. And we are incredibly grateful to everybody who helps us keep going. It's only thanks to your kindness that Navarra Media even exists. Now on with the interview. So that category of nation-state and civilisation state, can you explain that a little bit? I mean, the phenomenon of the nation-state is relatively recent. I mean, it all sort of starts with the Treaty of Westphalia in the 17th century. But really, the rise of nation-states was primarily a 19th century phenomenon. It's when empires like the Austro-Hungarian Empire and so on broke up and into nation-states. And the nation-states had very clear borders. And they were, it was an essentially a system which rested on a dominant race, a dominant ethnic group. And so there was a kind of intolerance, if you like, that went with the emergence of the nation-state that people don't talk about. But it was empires. In empires, you had many different peoples with many different languages, different religions, different races living alongside each other. That came to an end with the nation-state. Now China's history has been very, China has a very, very long history. I mean, it's as a modern polity, it's certainly existed since 221 BC, when the Qin dynasty succeeded in uniting what became China, if you like, eventually modern-day China. But China's actually existed a lot longer than 2,000 years, because its civilization is so old and has had a sort of remarkable coherence given one's going back so long in history. And the Chinese think, I mean, the Chinese did eventually were required to think of themselves as a nation-state. That was at the end of the 19th century, because they were, this was the century of humiliation. China was very weak in the world, being carved up by Europe and Western and United States and so on. And it was a force in that situation to accept the kind of European template as it was of the international system. So it started having embassies around the world, trying to draw some borders and so on. But actually, if you look at what the way the Chinese think about themselves and what matters about China and what is distinct about China, the relationship between state, very distinctive relationship between state and society, the importance of Confucian values, if you look at the language, if you look at the nature of the Chinese family, all of these things date back way before the end of the 19th century. They date back, you know, over 2,000 years or more in many respects. So China, the modern China has grown out of Chinese civilization, whereas you wouldn't really say that of Western countries, any of the Western countries in the same way. And Western countries, their sense of identity is about national identity. That's not really true for China. The primary source is Chinese civilization. So to understand China, I think you've got to think of it in a very, very different way. You got to rethink history. History has always been the history of the West. Sorry, that's over. You cannot think of the world in the same way. And of course, in the West, we're so ill-equipped that hardly anyone's ever studied in China at all. So they don't know anything about its history.  Oh, yeah, well, I remember that. So let's think of China in those terms. I'm sorry, you just can't make sense of China like that. This is just a kind of chauvinistic ignorance. Yeah. I mean, it's interesting you say that, because at the moment I'm reading a lot about as well what happened in the Western hemisphere after the late 15th century, you know, effectively a genocide of the indigenous people that some people say conscious, unconscious, whatever. It was clearly a bit of both. I mean, you don't need to talk about intentionality with the numbers involved. You're looking at maybe 100 million people died. And I didn't know this, but you know, the island of Hispaniola, you're looking at a population of between 100,000 and 8 million is the top, top number, the capital of, you know, the most powerful empire there to Nechlitan had a population of apparently five times bigger than Seville. And actually, at the same time as all that's happening, something very similar is, you know, is existing in China. So you have Zheng He, these giant ships far bigger than the ships that Christopher Columbus had discovering, discovering the Americas. And yet, like you said, it's completely absent in Western education. Let's stick with that for a second. I want to come back to the civilization state thing. Do you think that's going to have to become now necessarily a part of kind of the Western curriculum to talk about Chinese history, the history of the Western hemisphere, non European histories? Do you think that's inevitable if we want to remain relatively well informed world citizens? Or do you think that will be foreclosed by this chauvinism as you call it? Well, I think the reality, I mean, the location of power, the sheer importance of China and increasing the other developing countries like India and so on, will force in the West a requirement to know about, about in this instance, about China. I think this will be irresistible in the long run. But it's going to be very, very difficult. Because there's this kind of chauvinism, you know, I mean, we don't even want to look at our own history. If you listen to Boris Johnson, everything's frozen in time, you know, this is part of our history, as if actually history is never frozen, because history always lives in a dialectical relationship with the present. So your history is always changing. The way we study history now is different from the way we'll study in 20 years time. It's not frozen at all. It's a living organism. And I think you say about, because you're not just talking about China, you're also talking about the ASEAN countries, which is this group of countries, including, you know, South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, Thailand. And I think often in the conversation about China, that group of countries is also ignored because Indonesia, Philippines, you're looking at a huge market in the 21st century. You know, you're looking at a huge GDP between them. You're looking at massive natural resources and so on. And for all of them, China is the biggest trading partner. You know, it's not the United States, it's China. In that conversation of ASEAN, do you think that there's a little bit more of an informed conversation going on, or do you think it's just as ignorant as when they talk about China? I think it's still very ignorant, because it's a long way away. And we don't have that much to do with these countries. British trade is not, and it's not very important for the UK. And we don't know if you ask people, well, what's ASEAN? They probably wouldn't really be able to tell you. The most they'll be able to say is, oh, it's 10 countries. But yeah, yeah, but what is ASEAN? What is the nature of ASEAN? You could probably tell me something about the European Union, but can you tell me how ASEAN is similar to and different from the European Union? And I think very few people will be able to give you an answer to that. I mean, there are obviously people who study it, or diplomats, or academics, and so on.  I mean, ASEAN, you're right, is a very, in my view, ASEAN is extremely important, because actually, you know, modern Chinese diplomacy post-Dong started with ASEAN, in my view. The Chinese made a crucial approach to ASEAN, which was very, in many ways, very un-Chinese, which was to say, basically, no, let's have a relationship and we'll do it on your terms. We'll use your template. And that was the beginning of ASEAN plus one. And then Japan and South Korea came on board a bit later, ASEAN plus three. And the new RCEP agreement of 18 countries is, you know, the template for that is ASEAN. ASEAN has been the driver of it more than China, although, of course, China's absolutely critical to it. So there's a very special relationship between ASEAN and China, which is very, very important. And interesting, you see, Japan and South Korea in Northeast Asia are involved with it, but not like China. Yeah, it's just a huge, you know, these are trillions of dollars worth of economic value there. And I think it's just, again, you know, we're talking about China, like you say, because of the Cold War kind of motifs, but then the rest of East Asia, Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia kind of gets ignored. Can I make the civilisation state? Sorry, go on. When you say the importance of East Asia, by which we mean here, I think China and ASEAN and Japan and South Korea and Taiwan. Okay. Now, this is now the largest region in the world economically. It's bigger than Europe. It's bigger than North America. This is the driver of the economic driver of the future. And so the whole region is in motion. And, you know, so you've got to understand the rise of China in these regional terms, not just as China, but in the regional terms. And China, as you mentioned earlier, the biggest trading partner of all of these countries, including Japan and South Korea, is China, not the United States. The United States is less and less important. The United States has been in extraordinary rapid decline economically in the most important economic region in the world. That more or less tells you all you need to know about what the future is going to be like.  Thailand, I think 70, 80 million. We're talking about lots of people. Philippines 108 million. Yeah. Huge numbers of people.  Indonesia, 260 million. So, I mean, it's a massive thing. Going back to the civilisation state aspect. I mean, I suppose the councillor argument would be Martin, civilisation state. That sounds remarkably similar to Samuel Huntington, the clash of civilisations. Are you not essentialising Chinese culture? Is that fundamentally at odds with an idea of human rights? And I suppose you said the point about empire. And actually, I do agree with you. I don't think it's talked about nearly enough. The Ottoman Empire was more progressive than what came after it, for instance. The Austro-Hapsburg Empire was very progressive in many ways in terms of multicultural toleration and so on. But then equally, I suppose people could say, well, look at the British Empire, look at the French Empire, the Dutch Empire. This was a relationship of subordination. So, why is the British Empire not a civilisation state, but China is?  I mean, it came to account for about a quarter of the world's population and a quarter of the world's land mass. But we're talking about a tiny island off the northwest coast of Europe. So, its relationship with these countries was based on, you know, well, and it was made possible by the nature of the times, of course, was based on one of subordination. And, I mean, you know, Britain basically, you know, conquered these territories, sometimes with a lot of force, sometimes not with not much force, and required them to be, you know, based on the British model in varying degrees, you know, not always exactly the same. But that was the notion. And the Queen, or the king, was the king and queen of Great Britain.  So, I think that they, the problem with the British Empire, of course, the other thing that's very important to emphasise is race in the context of the British Empire. Because it was based on white supremacy, on white superiority. It was conquering lands that were not white. I mean, today Europe's population is only about 10% of the world, but in that time it was about 20%. But all the countries of the empire were originally not white. North America was not white. North America had its native population, likewise Canada, likewise Australia, and so on. So, I think one of the most, you know, one of the worst features of empire, and it wasn't just the Britain that did it, but we're talking about Britain for the moment, was the way in which the native populations of these countries were, by a combination of extermination and disease, were essentially, well, it was a supreme act of genocide, wasn't it? I mean, people are going to have that genocide now. So, let's start with the creation of the United States. Let's talk about Australia. You know, I mean, I think that the barbarism involved in Europe's expansion across the world, the British Empire, the French Empire, the Dutch Empire, and so on, you know, is something that we have, we are still to confront in the West. Yeah. Yeah.   But you said the British Empire's premised on an idea of white supremacy, I think that's inarguable. But again, the counterargument would be, well, this civilisation state that you're talking about from China, that itself is based upon us a form of racial supremacy, Han supremacy, you know, the Middle Kingdom, the Chinese nation being effectively elevated above all others. Is that a fair analogue, or do you think people are kind of mischaracterising any similarities? No, I don't think it is a fair, I think it's much more complex what happens.    The expansion of Europe was a global expansion. It wasn't an expansion simply within the European context, which would have been true, for example, of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. So this is fundamental difference. And I would underline this very strongly that actually China, unlike Europe, did not seek to expand across the world. It had an international system, a relationship to the tributary system, but it was neither military, it was primarily economic and to some extent cultural in terms of Confucian values and so on. But it was very different. Whereas, I mean, European university is required to conquer, you know, involve the expansion of Europe across the world and the imposition of its values, the soup, the notion of white superiority, the importance of Christianity, the convert, the missionary spirit and so on. That's very, very different from what happened in China. The second point is this about race, you see. The evolution of the Han is a very complex question, which you see as an interesting writer, Wang Hui, a Chinese writer, says, really in the Confucian way, Confucius was the most important single thinker in Chinese history, I think. The notion of Chinese values did not lay its emphasis on race, but on culture. This is very different, actually, very, very different. So it was about what sort of culture that China would have and so on. And this became, if you want to do the unifying bond of China, this is the unifying bond of China. A notion of cultural identity and coherence based on, ultimately, based on Confucian values. That's the cement that holds China together. It's not about race, not primarily about race. So what about the Han? Well, actually, the phrase Han only started to be used, as far as I recall, in the late 19th century. Partly because of Western intervention and carving up of China, and partly because during that period as China went down, the Qing dynasty started to become more and more popular. And of course, the Qing dynasty was not a Chinese dynasty in the traditional sense. It was a Manchu dynasty. It came from Manchuria. And interestingly, in this context, two of the three last dynasties in China were not Han. They were, first they were the Yuan, which was essentially Mongolian. Then you had the Ming dynasty, which people have probably heard of, which was Chinese or Han or whatever you want to call it. And then you had the Qing dynasty, which eventually fell in 1911. So you've got an extraordinary mix, complex, very different from the European or Western traditions taking place here. So today we come to today. So who are the Han? Well, actually, about 93% of Chinese call themselves Han. Now, of course, that as a racial category is meaningless. Because, you know, China comes from countless different races. But the historical process of the creation of modern China, very complicated to understand it or come to terms with it, is a process of the way in which the Chinese acquired an identity, the vast majority of them acquired an identity called Han. Now, there is a part of China, which does not regard itself as Han. And that above all are the Western regions. Now, the Western regions, we're talking here about Qinghai, and especially the Western audiences, you know, Tibet and Xinjiang province. Now, these were later additions to China. They constitute pushing half the geographical area of China, but they only account for 6% of the population. So if you draw a line down the middle of China, you know, the center and east of China is where the vast majority of Chinese live, and to the west are the Western regions. And they were conquered basically in a series of wars, not just involving China, but by the Qing dynasty in the late 17th, early 18th century. Now, in the most clearest example, I think, is Xinjiang and Tibet, which are clearly, apart from the Han populations that live there, which are, let's say, about half the population. The other half are not Han. They don't think of themselves as Han. They're not part of the Han tradition. So the Uighur, for example, are a Turkic minority. And they speak Chinese, but a fair number don't really speak Chinese. And likewise, the situation in Tibet. So this is a different part. You know, one thing you should never do is generalize from Xinjiang to try and understand the rest of China, because it doesn't work. Because historically, that's not the way that China grew and developed. And these were added later, very distinctive, extremely, I mean, extremely underpopulated area. Remember, Xinjiang accounts for one sixth of the physical size of China, but only 20 million people in a population of 1.4 billion, and only half of that 20 million are Uighur. So it's a very, very small group, really, really small group. So you're probably asking the question now, well, to what extent is racism a player in the attitudes towards the Uighur and so on? The way I would put it, and I think China has had serious problems with both Tibet and Xinjiang, is that they've been much less developed. I mean, historically, over a long historical period than the rest of China, even when China was poor. And I think that the Chinese mentality, the vast majority of the Chinese in this context, towards these areas is, well, let's modernize them. They're essentially pastoral. They need to speak Chinese because they're part of China. And if they don't speak Chinese, how can they do well? It needs to be urbanized. So I think there is a quite a strong kind of instrumentalist attitude amongst the Chinese to the modernization of Xinjiang and Tibet. To what extent do you think that would constitute colonialism? And obviously, again, we think of colonialism as something which is overseas, and this is a contiguous landmass. But like you say, it's a relatively new addition to the Chinese polity, different religions, Buddhism, Islam, different language, in the case of Xinjiang, like you say. I mean, that does sound a more powerful cultural linguistic group wanting to develop, assist, raise up the other. That does sound a lot to a European ear like colonialism. Is that an unfair characterization? I don't think I'd use the term colonial, but I certainly think that sort of sense of, you know, I think there's a patronizing attitude that you find towards these regions, because they're much less developed. I mean, it's not that these regions have been economically neglected. Xinjiang has been one of the top growing regions of China over the last 10 years, for example. So, by the way, I wouldn't include the term, I wouldn't say you've got to remember there are a lot of Muslims in China. The Uyghur constitute only quite a small minority of the Muslims in China. So, Muslim faiths have been, Muslim beliefs have been, you know, very present in China for a very long period of time. I mean, remember, Zheng He, where you mentioned earlier on, you know, his great voyages, Zheng He was a Muslim. So, there's a long, you know, there's a long tradition amongst sections of the Chinese population in the East, Central and Eastern China of the Muslim religion. No one normally talks about that. Yeah. And in terms of Xinjiang, I mean, the word genocide has been used quite frequently to counterbalance that. You've got people in the State Department saying, terrible things are happening, but we don't think that's the correct label. And then you've got the Economist saying something quite similar. Now, the Economist has got these things wrong before, so it's not necessarily a good authority on these matters. But it does seem that in Xinjiang in particular, you do have a repression of a particular religious group. Do you think that's, again, do you think that's a mischaracterization, for instance, the bulldozing of mosques or simply the changing of their outward appearance? There are claims that with forced labor camps and so on, to a significant extent, China took a lead from the U.S. and Europe with the war on terror. There was also, you know, you could argue domestic instances of a similar phenomenon going on in Western China. Do you, again, see that as an unfair analog or is that correct in so much as the racialization of Muslims in China? It's actually quite similar to something we see in Europe and North America. Obviously, it's being dealt with more viciously and aggressively. Or do you think, again, that's not quite right? Well, there's some interesting thoughts. I mean, I think that I have been to Aromchi, actually, the capital of Xinjiang. I think that it's very difficult to really, to be honest with you, to know what's happening in Xinjiang in the granular detail that one really needs to know about these things. And there's no question at all, well, there's no question at all in my mind that this has been a huge operation to dam the reputation of China coming from the top in the United States. I mean, I think that the CIA, the whole thing has been, why suddenly all this? I mean, because actually there's been problems in Xinjiang over a long historical period. It's not a new problem. It's come back a long time. We got back to the 1930s in relation to the difficulties in Xinjiang and China. I think the term genocide, to be quite frank, is precious little evidence for it.  Genocide does mean something. It meant something in the 1930s. It meant something in North America with the extermination of the native population there. Likewise, what happened to the aboriginals in Australia? Likewise, what happened in Rwanda? But these were on a huge scale. Do I really think that's happening in Xinjiang? No, I don't. I don't think we're talking about genocide. Then people say, well, cultural genocide. We shouldn't use the term genocide for cultural discrimination because genocide should be granted historically a very special meaning because it is so dreadful, if you like, in its consequences and its intent. I think this is a Cold War operation started in earnest under the Trump government, but which all sorts of people have rode in on. One of the things that also alarms me is the stance of human rights groups. To be honest with you, I think that human rights watch and so on, outfits like this, they do some good work. I'm not denying that, but they become an arm of American foreign policy in these situations, I'm afraid, and I think that's what's happened in relationship to this. Now, what do I actually think? Well, I think that first of all, let's go through it. First of all, there is a problem in Xinjiang and has been over a long period because a section of the Uighur do not want to be part of China. It's a small group, but it's an active group, it's a militant group, and it has got a terrorist component to it. There's no way the Chinese are going to accept separatist movement. I mean, that is not what's happened with China. Look at the emphasis they have on the return of the lost territory. It's like Hong Kong and Taiwan. That's the first problem that is that. Second problem linked to that is there's clearly a difficulty in the relationship between part of the Han population in Xinjiang and the Uighur population. There were the pogroms when over 200 people, I think it was Han, were murdered by Uighur gangs. It was an expression of very powerful racial resentment like happened in 1969 in Malaysia, when the Malays killed a lot of ordinary Malays, killed a lot of ordinary Chinese who were a substantial minority of the population. I think that's another component of the problem. The third problem is that the question of different religion, different ethnicity, a different language, and a feeling on the part of the Uighurs that they are not properly respected. And I think there is, I've always thought there is some foundation to this problem. Indeed, Hu Yubang, who was General Secretary of the Communist Party under Deng Xiaoping, he died just before Tiananmen Square. And he said to the Tibetans it was in this case, but I think the same problem more or less is a parallel problem exists as the Xinjiang up to a point. There's no terrorist problem in oil, separatist problem in Tibet, that we have granted your culture and we have granted your religion insufficient respect and insufficient rights. I think that's probably true of Xinjiang today. When I was in Aramchi, there was so many mosques. There are many, many, many mosques in Aramchi, even more in Kashgar and so on. Can I make one of the points from my own experience? I went to Aramchi in a few years ago, I can't remember what year, but let's say about 2015, something like that. When I was walking around Aramchi, one thing that really struck me, which did indicate a significant security problem, was that you've got walk around, it's a very modern city, and glass and steel, Chinese city, modern Chinese city.  In most countries it's the police, but it's an armed police in China. And I saw this several times walking around, you might be in a shopping area for example. And what it reminded me of was my visits to Belfast in the 1970s. In other words, that speaks to as there is a serious problem.  There's a problem of law and order, there's a terrorist problem. Now goodbye, use the word terrorist, I don't want to deny the Uyghur, I don't want to say all Uyghur are terrorists because that's nonsense, they're not. But terrorist groups, as in Ireland, had a legitimacy. And so that was a really graphic illustration for me, that there is an underlying problem of security and order and stability in Xinjiang. Sticking with Ireland though, I suppose the counterpoint is, well in Ireland there was ultimately a political solution, and there's the Good Friday Agreement. And if one day people in Ireland want to unify the North and South, there's a process for that. And I'm the first to criticise Britain or countries in Europe and North America, big W, Western values. But the right self-determination is something that is generally observed, the exception of Catalonia. But for instance, Scotland had a referendum on independence in 2014. It does feel again, the idea of self-determination is at odds with quote-unquote Confucian values. And so it can tend towards quite an authoritarian kind of politics, identity, subjectivity. Do you see what I mean? You've got 1.4 billion people and there isn't necessarily a right to self-determination, or even there isn't a political vehicle for even just greater autonomy. I mean, isn't that quite dangerous? It depends how it's interpreted. I mean, this has been true over a very long historical period. I mean, China's, the extraordinary thing about China is that it's this huge continent of a country, and it's existed basically in more or less this shape, sometimes bigger, sometimes smaller, for 2,000 years. So there are very powerful centripetal forces that hold China together, which are very, I can't think of another country in the world where you can really say this. And this has been through thick and thin.  I mean, Taiwan, Hong Kong, that's when they went as a result of foreign invasion, Japanese in the instance of Taiwan, and the British in the instance of Hong Kong. But one way or another, China does exist in this very, basically given its size, extraordinary cohesive and centripetal form, despite its size. And I think that speaks to, I think that's something we in the West is very, very difficult for us to understand, because it goes against so much of our own historical grade. And it's not been achieved simply through authoritarian despotism, etc. That's not true. Let's stick with that for a second. The focus is often on dissent. I mean, we just talked about dissent in Xinjiang and Tibet, but there's also a great deal of consent, as you've just talked about there, for the Chinese state, Pew Research, you talk about this in your book, it's old data now from 2010. But it's more or less, if anything, it's actually intensified in the intervening period. Chinese are generally very happy with their government. They're generally very optimistic in terms of their economic prospects for the future. And actually, that puts them really at odds with Europe and America. Now, I suppose, on the one hand, Pew Research is very credible, but then you get other people who say, well, it's China, it's a repressive authoritarian country. What else are people going to say? Of course, they're going to say the government's doing a fabulous job. You've obviously looked at a great deal of data. You've been in the country for many years, spoken to many people. Do you think that generally on average, the average person in China is more in favour of their economic system, their government, than is the case in the United States or in Britain? Now, I don't mean support for the government, as in people support the government, they don't want to overthrow the government, but they feel like the government is doing a good job at solving the problems which affect their everyday lives. I think there's absolutely no question that that is far more true of China than it is of any Western country. Basically, it's been growing until recently, a few years ago, at 10% a year, and then now, more like 6% a year, and living standards have been growing at the same speed, which Western government wouldn't die for those kind of figures. I mean, this has been the greatest period in Chinese history for the people. Absolutely amazing transformation, so is it surprising that the Pew survey figures or the Harvard stuff say over 90% of the population is very, very happy with the government, very satisfied with the government. That doesn't mean they like everything about it, but broadly speaking, they're far more supportive and enthusiastic about their government than is the true in the United States or the UK or France or Germany and so on. We've got to come to terms with this. We think that unless these countries like China have a multi-party system and universal suffrage, then they can't be democratic and the people, therefore, can't be happy. I'm sorry, just open your eyes. I mean, they are very happy with the country. They are very pleased. That doesn't mean they don't have their gripes. It doesn't mean that there's things they don't like. Of course, that is true everywhere, but this has been an extraordinarily successful political project, an economic project, a political project, a cultural project. That's why the West doesn't understand China because it somehow thinks, and the papers on the left, like the Guardian, for example, or the Observer are just as bad as the right-wing press. I can't really put a piece of paper between them. They just think that unless they're like us, unless they're like a Western liberal system, then they can't be happy. The only reason they still have this system is because they're oppressed and they're denied their rights and so on. The other thing is, by the way, also when it comes to personal freedom and rights, the Chinese people have experienced a huge expansion of their personal freedoms and rights since Deng Xiaoping.  They can travel anywhere. We're not talking about the Soviet Union. They can travel everywhere, anywhere and everywhere, and do, and their educational opportunities and their work opportunities and so on have been transformed. Absolutely transformed. You've only got to go on the streets of Shanghai or Beijing, et cetera, and you can feel it and enjoy it. I mean, this is the people that is not only very pleased with what's happened, but are hugely optimistic about the future, unlike the West. But this is very true. The thing about as well, in order to be a polity which serves the interests of the public, which historically we would talk about as a republic, which in Britain sadly is misrepresented because of course, republic just means not being a monarchy, but historically, republic was about serving the public interest, either people's interest. On the one hand, yes, I think all the data you point to in the book and you just mentioned their Harvard and Pewitt's all correct. But I suppose on the other hand, what are the mechanisms by which ordinary people can stop tyrannical government? Now, that's a conversation we've had in the West preceding liberal democracy. It's there in Hobbes or in Locke or in Jean Baudin, and we've talked about these ideas, or even in antiquity, people talk about these ideas. But in terms of an authoritarian overreaching government, I wonder, at least, yes, this system we have here isn't perfect, but it can stop that. But then on the other hand, my colleague Ash Sarkham made a great point. Yes, America is a democracy, but there's never been a political party in the 20th century, 21st century to on the ballot offering universal socialized health care in the United States. Does that mean it's a democracy? There's never been a major party in Britain offering a republic. Does that mean it's a democracy? Clearly, there are costs of entry into participation and barriers to entry and so on. So I agree with you, but I'm also not quite sure. And I do feel that if we jettison a certain idea of popular government, do you not feel that could have potential downsides, like Tiananmen Square, for instance? Yes, on the one hand, the Chinese government's done an extraordinary job of increasing people's living standards, and in many ways also just civil rights since the late 1970s. But on the other hand, that can get very ugly if people for whatever reason no longer want to continue down that path. Yeah. Well, then the question is to what extent, how does political change take place if things start going wrong? I mean, this is a very... Precisely. And there was a situation like this in China, and it wasn't, I mean, Tiananmen Square was a big moment for them, but not a huge moment. The huge moment was at the end of Mao, 1976, because the Chinese economy was not real. I mean, the Chinese economy didn't do badly under Mao. It did slightly better than the Indian economy, about the same over that historical period. But it was falling behind other East Asian countries, like Japan and South Korea and Taiwan, you know, the early Asian Tigers. And beyond a point, the system wasn't really working, you know, with this heavy central planning and so on. And so Deng Xiaoping comes along, and he basically goes in a completely different, very different direction. Deng Xiaoping says, you know, look, come on, China's got to do much better than this. And so he makes two fundamental reforms. One, he redefines Chinese socialism as not just the state and the plan, but also the market. And secondly, he said, until then China being pretty autarkic, China should be part of the world, should integrate itself. And this was very different, of course, from the long Chinese tradition. So these were two absolutely fundamental shifts.  And the MARA system, it was much more, you know, group identity and top down group identity.  We've got to change society.  No, don't take, think for yourself. Do it. And this was the beginning of the great revolution in a way in China, which is that this transformation of China has been done by the people. I mean, by a brilliant government leadership, I think I would say that perhaps it was short certainty, but the people have done it. And once you go, once you have an economy and a society changing as quickly as China's, then the people become, they are, they are empowered by it, but they are also the initiators, they are the agency of those changes.  You know, it's huge in China, where once the vast majority of people came from the countryside now, you know, it's a relatively small portion of the population. So what I'm trying to say here is that that was a huge change, a bigger change that any Western country has undertaken over the last, well, it's a bigger change than happened between Canadianism and neoliberalism at the end of, you know, around 1980 with Sacha and Reagan. So the capacity, there is an argument in the West, which I am going to deal with in my new book, which I've dealt with, I've written this bit, which is that the problem with a one-party system, I think we've got to be open-minded about these questions, okay? So because we're so used to thinking, well, about the problem with the one-party system, but we, it becomes a kind of, it becomes a mantra. The question is, the question of a one-party system is, you need another party in order to provide a choice which creates the opportunity for change. Now, is that really true? Or to what extent is that true? Maybe it's true in a liberal democracy, but is that true in a much more important sense in a global context, not just looking at the Western tradition? And I think that if you look at China over time, not just the Communist period, but a much, much longer period, including the whole of the imperial period, China's obviously been extraordinarily good at recreating and reinventing itself. I mean, you know, Britain has had one era in the sun, which was from the industrial revolution until, let's say 1945 or something like that. It's not true now. Will it ever be like that again? Will it ever have that position in the world extremely unlikely? I mean, it got lucky and used a bit of genius for a very small island at a certain historical moment when that was possible. The United States is clearly in decline. Will it survive? Will America survive? I'm not convinced that as America as we know it will survive, territorially, I mean, you know. So now look at China. Most countries then have maybe one, two periods of global eminency or even preeminence. China. China, you have the Han, part of the Han period, then you have the Tang period, then in some respects, the Song dynasty period, then you have the Ming period and a bit of the Qing. China's had at least five periods in its history where it has been the most advanced or one of the most advanced civilizations in the world. And we are seeing a sixth period now, which is happening under the Chinese Communist Party. So China as a culture is very capable of reinventing itself. Now, why? I'm not going to go into that now, but this is a very important and interesting historical question. But the westerners don't think like this. We have such a short-term mentality. We think democracy is an issue for now. We're talking about the capacity of a political leadership in a country to steer a country successfully over a long historical period. Well, the institutional framework and the culture which enables that. So China has great strength. We should probably leave on that note, because I think again, it's a very counter-intuitive point, but I think it's pretty compelling the way you said that actually, rather than China being incapable of adaptation, we're seeing it being perhaps one of the most adaptable countries in the world in recent decades, but also looking back over the broader sweep of history. Martin, we'll leave it there. You mentioned briefly a new book. When do you hope to have that published? I should think it will be probably 2023. It's a big book, because I like the last one, but probably a bit longer. Well, we'll get you one in 2023 for that. Thank you. Okay. Well, thanks for joining us, Martin. Have a good day. Thank you, Aaron. Thank you. Thanks. Bye. I've enjoyed that chat very much. Yeah, it was great fun.


and the tiger financial news network news update everyone basal chapter here on this wednesday the first of june we've wrapped up the month of may we're looking at those candles in my show the tiger technicians hour coming up in a few minutes and right now we're looking at the dow up 41 and 33 2029 it hit 33 272 i said to subscribers to my opening call i think there's gonna be some kind of a pullback today a digestive phase just like yesterday we should see the same thing today well we'll see what happens oh now the dow's only up nine the s and p is we're looking at the s and p up 11 at 41 43 earlier in the day it made leg b at 41 66 22 points off that very very good action a lot of technical indications that say that we've got at this particular point we've got a very strong liftoff from the 3810 level on the 20th of may we've already gone from 3810 to 41 66 that's magnificent now you can take some kind of a breather we'll see what happens qqq 123 there we go uh the end and dx 100 being helped by sales force which had good earnings essentially helping the down helping the q's they're up three at 311.32 uh great leg b this is good actions and need a lot more to really say it's out of the woods and it's going to have a really good couple of weeks we'll see what happens there i w m is a russell 2000 trading down 20 cents at 185 struggling a little bit interesting to see that gold is down two and a half at 1845 struggling a little bit and what's interesting about this is that the dollar isn't doing very much on the upside but it is putting a little pressure on gold 146 at 101.92 pullback four points from the high that was made well less than that uh less than four points from the high of 105.01 made it around about the 15 16th of may uh digesting huge gains we're looking at uh crude oil holding very well it's up 2.65 and 117.35 this is really quite incredible how it handles 120 is going to be important and the tlt that's bonds uh up 26 takes at 181 16.84 uh after that pd just not good actions the bonds at all i'll be back in a few moments for the tiger technicians that i'll check out for hope and call a daily newsletter actually have two positions that are up a few percent this morning anyway the day is young we'll see what happens i'll be back in a few moments hope


Minister for Housing, Owen Murphy has announced plans to tackle housing shortages and regulate short-term let-ins and home-sharing such as Airbnb. As of June 1st, 2019, professional landlords will have to secure commercial planning permission to lease their properties on short-term basis, which is unlikely to be granted in areas of high housing demand. It's a step in the right direction, absolutely. Airbnb needs to be regulated when we fall for that over the last few months since the student population crisis has really hit a massive breaking point. It is a step in the right direction and I do hope it follows on maybe adapting the Toronto model of how things were done there, but I hope it's not just hot air because what we found in the past is the government does like to say things and then actually not follow up with them with regulation, things tend to get postponed. Owners who operate a home share will also not be permitted to rent for more than 14 days at a time and for longer than 90 days a year. Yeah, I would like my fellow students to not have such a tough time trying to get accommodation, so if that helps them out I'm all up for regulation, but same time I understand that they have a business to run and maybe they have some other struggles themselves, but maybe some regulations and some dialogue between the two groups can hopefully work out a better deal for everyone. The way I see accommodation, the point of it is to accommodate and it seems like the landlords have the biggest advantage at the moment and I think residents of all types should have a voice and a say in the matter. I do think it will help the housing situation in Dublin, but I do think that it's only once properly should have the right to rent it out as they wish. A spokesperson for Airbnb has said that home sharing didn't cause Ireland's historic housing concerns and many will be disheartened to hear a false promise that these proposals are the solution. Karen Gaffney, DCU TV News.