I want to take, since it's been so long, I want to take just a few minutes and take you on a quick tour of a little historical tour of how we got to where we are, just to try to put this in context so the discussions over the next couple of days make a little more sense. We're here to mark the 10th anniversary of the filing and trial of the case, but the case has actually been going on in some form for much longer. I don't have to tell for Dave Miner and the other folks at Microsoft that, Dave has lived the case even longer than I have, even longer than these 10 years, certainly. The underlying disputes, and the underlying conduct that issue goes back almost 20 years now, it was 1990 when the Federal Trade Commission began investigating Microsoft for possible monopolization. That better. It was 1990 when the FTC began investigating Microsoft for possible monopolization based on some of its pricing and licensing practices for docks that ancient predecessor to Windows and some of the ceilings with PC makers. After a long investigation in 1993, the FTC deadlocked two to two on whether or not to take action. And so in a really unprecedented move, the case, the investigation was handed off to the Justice Department antitrust division. Now, as we'll come back to a little later today, usually there's some rivalry at best, some good healthy competition, if you will, between the Justice Department and the FTC. It was really a strange and, I think, unprecedented into the state, not yet repeated thing for the FTC to give an investigation to DOJ. In July of 1994, the Justice Department filed a lawsuit against Microsoft for some of its licensing practices and at the same time entered into and filed a settlement agreement with the company that resolved that at the same time, the European Commission, which had been investigating along the way, filed a settlement as well. So it was all done jointly. The settlement in the U.S. didn't have to go through something we call the Tony Act process. Process for public comment and then approval by a judge to ensure that the settlement is in the public interest. Both the Justice Department and Microsoft had the not very good fortune to have as the judge overseeing the Tony Act process, Emily Sporkin, the former general counsel of the CIA, and just a generally skeptical guide. And in a really unprecedented Tony Act proceeding, Judge Sporkin spurred on by Gary Rieback, who represented a number of anonymous companies in Silicon Valley. Judge Sporkin dropped the bombshell and said that he had read the book Hard Drive about Bill Gates and how he did business and he was very concerned about Baverware and some other things that the government had not charged and therefore had not settled. And he thought that the government should have brought a different case and needed to bring a bigger case and therefore this was not in the public interest. Microsoft and the DOJ were suddenly in a very strange position being on the same side against this position. They appealed to the DC Circuit, the DC Circuit reversed Judge Sporkin saying that he had exceeded his authority in approving the settlement and in the decision, the first DC Circuit Microsoft decision, we sometimes call Microsoft one, and I'll keep counting as we go along, also removed Judge Sporkin from the case, that too, and you know, it began a bit of a pattern that we will come back to in a minute. So a new judge was assigned to the case, Judge Thomas Van Diel Jackson as the being noted at Harvard Law School alone. Judge Jackson took a different approach, quickly followed the DC Circuit's lead and approved the settlement and entered it. Microsoft was now bound by an injunction that limited their conduct. Fast forward to July of 1996, Netscape, anybody remember Netscape, it's been a while, Netscape now itself represented by Gary Veeback brought complaints to the Justice Department about a variety of Microsoft's conduct that it said was excluding it from the market to be able to distribute its new internet browser, a brand new thing in 1996, which is also very, very hard to imagine, reminds us how far we've come. Justice Department investigated for a while. In October 1997, we sued Microsoft in a small action accusing them of violating the 1994 consent decree, specifically the part that prevented Microsoft from requiring PC makers to take another product, in this case the internet explorer browser, as a condition of taking Windows. Microsoft said that it was doing no such thing, it was just improving Windows and that this was an integrated product which was expressly allowed by language in the consent decree. In December of 1997, after some back and forth in a hearing, Judge Jackson entered an order requiring Microsoft not to require PC makers to take internet explorer in order to get Windows. There was some back and forth about compliance and in the process, Judge Jackson appointed Larry Lessig, who's a professor here, as his special master. He wisely drew on now Professor Jonathan Zitren as his law clerk assistant, the person to help him figure it all out. Those were good times that week. Exactly. I'm surprised that Microsoft didn't particularly like this assignment and promptly asked the DC Circuit to remove Larry Lessig in his assignment improper. In July 1998, the DC Circuit issued another opinion, Microsoft too, in which they did just that, saying that the delegation was much too broad, Judge Jackson had given Lessig too much power and along the way, the court also reversed the order, the preliminary injunction that Judge Jackson had entered saying primarily that it was procedurally improper. He hadn't given proper notice and had had it appearing on whether or not it was the preliminary injunction. But in the course of doing that, two out of three judges on the panel of the DC Circuit expressed great skepticism about the ability of courts to get involved in software or other product design decisions and sounded a very, very, very skeptical note about whether or not that sort of thing should ever be within the purview of courts or the antitrust laws. During this time, the broader investigation went on, in May of 1998, part of the anniversary we now are commemorating here, the Justice Department and 20 state attorneys general, including folks from New York and Iowa, brought suit against Microsoft and a much larger suit alleging violations of section two monopolization. In attempt of monopolization in section one, tying in some exclusionary conduct against Microsoft, that case went to trial. Trial lasted from October, 1998 through June of 1999 with some breaks, 76 trial days of trial. Judge Jackson then issued some very, very harsh findings of fact, harsh from Microsoft's standpoint. In November of 1999, he then ordered the parties into a period of mediation with or Judge Posner out in Chicago, where Doug Meleman and I and John's, others, as well as Dave Heiner on his term spent a lot of time. When Judge Posner's mediation efforts failed on April 1st, ironically enough, April Fool's Day of 2000 after several months of very intense effort, Judge Jackson quickly issued his conclusions of law on finding Microsoft had a monopoly over PC operating systems and that it had illegally maintained that monopoly through a variety of anti-competitive practices in violation of section two and that it had illegally tied its internet browser to its Windows operating system and that it engaged in other exclusionary acts under section one. In June of 2000, moving ahead, Judge Jackson issued his remedy order and you may recall that that order required the break-up of Microsoft into two separate companies. The liability findings were big news and a big deal. The order sending Microsoft should be broken out was, you know, fair to say, a huge explosion in the business world and the technology world and in the legal world. And so of course Microsoft appealed. In late June of 2001, seven judges of the DC Circuit sitting en banc as they had heard the case issued their decision. This one is now Microsoft 3 and many of the arguments in that case were presented by Jeff Lanier who is here with us today who was at the time in the Solicitor General's office. The DC Circuit unanimously had a unanimous decision that affirmed Judge Jackson's finding of monopoly power, affirmed some but not all of the maintenance of monopoly conclusions, reversed and remanded the tying conclusion, reversed the attempt of monopolization finding and of course very firmly reversed the break-up order. The DC Circuit also had a lot to say very harshly about Judge Jackson's conduct during the trial speaking to reporters about the case and showing reporters his trial notebook and having some things to say that perhaps were not as judicious as it should be and so they removed Judge Jackson from the case. The patent. Judge Jackson was replaced with Judge Kohler-Catelli also in the District Court in DC. She ordered DOJ, the states and Microsoft into negotiations and mediation. That led to a settlement between the DOJ and nine of the then 18 states which was reached in October and November of 2001 following the Tony Act public comment period which went very differently this time and a record break in total of over 32,000 public comments many of which I had to read personally as well as others on the team. Judge Kohler-Catelli entered her final judgment November 2002, no break-up remedy of course but provided a variety of conduct and business restrictions on Microsoft also required them to license certain communications protocols that would let other rival servers inter-operate with the Windows desktop. Some of the states joined that settlement some of them felt it was too weak and the states continued to fight it out and litigate the remedy issue. They had their own separate trial. We could call this Microsoft 3 at the District Court level I suppose. This one lasted 32 days and the in Judge Kohler-Catelli refused all of the more ambitious relief the states saw made a few minor changes to the DOJ to strengthen it but essentially entered it as it was. All of the states except Massachusetts decided not to appeal and Massachusetts did to the DC Circuit which in 2004 upheld Judge Kohler-Catelli's remedy as being in the public interest that is Microsoft 4 from the DC Circuit. Regular monitoring of Microsoft's compliance and of course the degree has gone on and occasional skirmishes ever since in late January of this year, 2008 Judge Kohler-Catelli extended the final judgment which had been due to expire at the end at November 2007 for two years until November 2009 over concerns about Microsoft's compliance. Interestingly enough that extension was requested by the state Attorney General Group enforcing 70 was opposed by the Justice Department and Microsoft. Judge Kohler-Catelli entered it anyway even over their objections. And of course over much of this time the European Commission has been pursuing its own investigations of Microsoft for bundling Windows Media Player with Windows and for refusing to fully share or license all of the communications protocols between Windows and servers and between Microsoft servers. 2003, the European Commission found Microsoft in violation of European law and Microsoft's appeal. That decision was upheld and in November of last year Microsoft announced that it was not pursuing any further appeals. There is still a very big fine in place that is being disputed that we made or more about that. And finally back here at home based on the outcome of the US case there were hundreds of consumer suits against Microsoft and a number of competitor lawsuits against the company resulting in many settlements in the payment of some number of billions of dollars. I think Harry first will illuminate this a little bit tomorrow on some more of the specifics there. So that's the path that got us here today. The question that I find interesting obviously is so what? So what does all of this mean? What does it mean for Microsoft, for antitrust and for other firms in the future? There are obviously things happening in the business and antitrust world right now in the technology world that make one ask questions about how is this going to turn out? Looking back at Microsoft, what can we take going forward? So I'm really very happy at the prospect of spending the next couple of days trying to tease out some answers to those questions and debate some of those issues with you. We all know that there have been numerous books written about the case, hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of law review and economic articles written about it, many of them by some of you here. And then all those literally millions of words and lots of opinions and insights and perspectives and perceptions and we've answered some questions I think fairly well. There are a lot of others that remain, they're still very hotly debated even as we enter this second decade after the final of the case. And so to try to help us get to the bottom of that we're very fortunate to have the all-star lineup of panelists that we have, people we would hear from for the next two days. Before we go on we need to make a couple of administrative announcements that you need to know. One of them is we're recording, audio and video recording all of this so that we can post it on our website, post-archive webcasts of it. So when you participate as audience members and we very much hope you will, we want this to be a conversation not just what's happening now, me or us talking at you. We hope you will do that and we just want you to know that it's being recorded and will be made available to the public. All the events for the program will take place in this room except for the reception at six o'clock tonight, which is in the John Shipman Gray room which is not very far from here. We will get you there. And for the lunch tomorrow which is in Parton's Commons, the law school cafeteria which also is not very far. Just close by saying, we talked about Larry Lessig again and said that he had a conflict and he just could not get out of it and he's not here today. Both because of his deep substantive involvement in the case, both as special master for that brief shining moment with Professor Zittrin, as well as for an amicus brief, he submitted to Judge Jackson on his behalf on the integration issues and other writing and thinking he has done about the case. But also in part because this conference really was his idea arose out of a conversation he and I were having about a couple of years ago about this anniversary coming up and he really recognized that it was just not right to let it pass without some both commemoration and some attempt to really use it to try to get some answers and try to find out some things that maybe we haven't yet really answered. So we will miss him and miss all of his contributions. I'm gonna say to end before we get on with our first speaker that when I first thought about this program with Lessig I imagine a series of almost what if questions that might help frame the way one would think about these things. Questions that I wondered whether now that we're here 10 years out were really any closer to answering than we were five years back or 10 years ago. And very broadly, I can see that those as things like what if the Microsoft case had never been brought, what if the Justice Department had not stepped in and done anything and Microsoft had continued whatever it was it was doing. How would the computer industry look different than it does today? How would the internet as we know it look different? Would Google be here? Would it be the same? And why? Why do we think there's that difference? What if the government had in fact succeeded in breaking up Microsoft? How would the world look different there in terms of the products available, in terms of innovation, in terms of unleashing great value in the economy or destroying the goose that lays some of the golden eggs in the environment? How would that have been different? And finally, what if this same case were considered or brought today instead of 10 years ago? Would it be that the markets change too much or conditions so different that the things we worried about then just wouldn't make sense as our thinking, our own learning about economic models and network effects and platforms change such that we would view it differently? And intriguingly, in terms of timing, has the direction of the evolution of antitrust itself and section two in particular at the Supreme Court and at the DOJ changed such that the case wouldn't be brought today? We will be talking a lot over the next couple of days. I think you can begin with the first panel today about some fascinating developments. This week, this very week in section two law, the Justice Department issued a long, long, long awaited and overdue report on single-firm conduct in section two report and underway for a long time with hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of hours of hearings, lots of submissions and testimony by many of you in this room. Past reports like this have been done jointly in a nice combined consensus view issued with the Federal Trade Commission. This time, the Justice Department did a unilateral, they issued their own report without the Federal Trade Commission and more significantly, all of the Federal Trade Commissioners have issued statements to one degree or another rebuking the Justice Department for doing so and three of the commissioners doing so in fairly harsh terms, accusing it of acting not only unilaterally but essentially putting a thumb on the scale of an optimization analysis in a way that will benefit firms who are dominant and have power at the expense of all of the others that don't. That's unprecedented. That is more unprecedented than the FTC handing over an investigation for the Justice Department 13 years ago. And so it's a fascinating development that I think will tell us a lot about the next 10 years and I hope we spend some time talking about it and what connection, if any, it has to this case, the aftermath of this case as we go along.