Welcome everyone, thanks for coming. First of all, I apologize because the chief economist is not available today, but I'm going to replace him. I'm going to introduce, it's a pleasure for me to introduce Professor Megan McGarvey. She's a researcher and professor at Boston University School of Management and also fellow National Bureau of Economic Research. Publish a lot on leading economic and management journals and topics related to the IIP, but also trade, FDI and so on and so forth. And also high-skilled migration, which is the topic of today's presentation. I have a particular interest in this, in this, in her presentation, and my, the economics and states division has a particular interest in her presentation, because as you might know, we have been working in the last two years on a project of the International Mobility of Inventors, and we have produced a lot of reports and working papers that are available in our website. But we also are interested in serious research, and that's why we brought Megan here, who's gonna, who's gonna talk about high-skilled migration. I think it's better way if she explains a little bit the content of her research. So Megan, the floor is yours. It's a great pleasure to be here. Thank you so much for inviting me. It's a really wonderful opportunity for me to to present my work and to meet with some of you and to hear about your interests. So it's a really special opportunity. The topic of my talk today is Do Return Requirements Increase International Knowledge Diffusion? And this paper is co-authored with my colleague Shulamit Khan at Boston University. The background for this paper really comes from the fact that in the United States and in other countries as well, many, and in some fields most, of the people who receive doctoral degrees in Sciences and Engineering come from outside of the United States to study. So these two charts come from another paper by Bound, Turner, and Walsh, and they show that in the life sciences, a large share of doctoral recipients are non-U.S. students, so they come from other countries, and in engineering actually a substantial majority of those students come from other countries. The primary sending countries being China and India, but you know all the countries of the world are represented in American University's doctoral programs in Science and Engineering. Now the chart on the right comes from a publication by Finn, and he has documented the stay rates of these foreign students in the United States. So after they complete their PhDs, most of these students actually remain in the United States. So the most recent estimates are somewhere around 70, 60, 60, high 60 percent, close to 70 percent, which I think really raises the question for the home countries of, you know, what are the effects of having such a large percentage of their citizens educated in the United States and remain in the United States? So that's a question from the sending countries perspective. I think it also raises a question for the United States, because if you notice this chart shows that the stay rates of foreign students in the United States have really plateaued in recent years, and there may even be a bit of a decline in the stay rates of those students. And so I think the United States really needs to consider what might happen if we started to see substantial declines in the stay rates of foreign students who are educated in the United States. So as I alluded to, a moment ago, in many sending countries have concern about the possibility of emigration of the most talented, which was sometimes known as a brain drain. And, you know, a number of countries have policy initiatives to try to bring back people to those countries who have left and studied abroad. The most common policy lever for bringing people back is to make their graduate fellowship funding conditional on the eventual return to the home country. And we're really going to focus on policy like that in this paper today. So the specific question I'm going to try to answer today is what is the impact of return requirements, so a policy that requires a student to return to his or her home country after finishing their dissertation? What is the impact for science and engineering PhDs on home countries? So you might think that there are positive impacts for the home countries in the sense that, you know, we're bringing these students have been educated abroad and they're bringing sort of truth and light to the home country. But it's possible that there were also negative implications if, by requiring people to return to their home country, they are being forced to leave the place in which they could have been most productive in their careers. On the other hand, from the US perspective, if the US encourages or allows policies that require students to return to their home countries, it's possible that we could be losing out on the contributions of some of the most productive members of the scientific community. So, you know, many of the most productive members of the scientific community, whether measured by Nobel laureates or other measures of the productivity of scientists, many of them have come from abroad to the United States. And I full disclosure, I did not put these two pictures in the presentation because I was going to Switzerland. They just happened to have a Swiss connection that's CERN on the right-hand side. So on the one hand, we may be losing the contributions of some of the most productive scientists. On the other hand, when people leave the United States and go abroad, they may maintain their connections to scientists in the US and this may enable scientists in the United States to tap into knowledge production in foreign countries. So we think that there is a possibility that there could be both positive and negative effects for the United States when people go back to their home countries. And let me just say that, you know, I'm going to be talking a lot about the United States in this presentation because this is where our data come from, but I think that the results that I'm going to be describing today are applicable to any advanced economy. Okay, so there's a prior literature that suggests that these negative effects of brain drain could be important. I won't spend a lot of time talking about these, but just to summarize, a number of papers have suggested that that location is very important for knowledge diffusion in science and technology, okay, that when people are located in a particular place that other inventors or other scientists have privileged access to the innovation created by the innovator. On the other hand, there's a literature that suggests that there might be something called brain circulation rather than brain drain, which is that when people from, for example, India move to the United States and start high-tech startups, that they may then go back to their home countries and source inputs or do outsourcing in their home countries. They may share knowledge about technological innovation that they've acquired in the United States with their home countries and that this can have potential impact, about positive impacts for the home country. There's also some research which suggests that the ties, the social ties between inventors are persistent over time and that when an inventor moves to a new location that that inventor's colleagues in his former location are still aware of the research that the inventors doing in his new location, which might suggest that when people return to their home countries their former colleagues in the U.S. may still be aware of what they're doing, may still be in contact with them and learn about their research. So I think that the prior research has evidence both for and against the idea that location is going to be very important in sharing knowledge between the home country and the scientist. So specifically what this paper does is we compare foreigners, so people who come from outside the United States, who have PhDs in science, technology, engineering, and math from U.S. universities, who are Fulbright Fellows, and these Fulbright Fellows have the requirement that they must go back to their home country when they finish their PhDs if they ever want to come back to the United States and have a work visa. We compare these Fulbright to other students of foreign origin who do not have return requirements, and then we're going to look at a variety of measures related to their research publications in science and engineering journals, and we're going to look at how productive they are, how many papers they author. We're going to look at who they collaborate with, and we're going to look at the citations to their work. We're going to look at whether they're cited by people in the home country. We're going to look at whether they're cited by people in the U.S., and then we're also going to look at who they cite. Now the reason why we're interested in citations is because we think of citations, so when I write an academic paper I list all the other prior papers that have influenced my research of that I'm building upon in my research, and that list of prior kind of like prior art in a patent, or maybe not exactly like prior art in a patent, but you know the citations in an academic paper can be used as an indicator of the influence of one group of scientists on another group of scientists, or one individual scientist on another. So we're going to use those citations as a way of tracking what scientists in one location learn about scientists in another location. So just a little bit of background on the Fulbright program. So the Fulbright program is created in the post-war period, and it's brought a large number of students to study in U.S. programs. It's the major program that funds foreign students to study in the United States. And they receive what's called a J1 visa, and that visa has the condition that they must spend two years in their home countries before they can apply for a permanent or work visa in the United States. We've collected a data set of 249 foreign students who had Fulbright fellowships in the mid-1990s, and we match each Fulbright with another international student from the same program in the same university. Most, much of the time, but not in every case, because we couldn't always find a person with the same advisor in every case, but much of the time what we call the control student who's matched to the Fulbright student has the same dissertation advisor as the Fulbright, but they're always in the same scientific field as the Fulbright. They received their PhD generally in the same year, but sometimes within three years before or after the Fulbright, and then we follow their locations and their research publications and the citations to those publications through 2007. So we're going to track these people over time and look at where they got where they moved and what they wrote. Our data sources come from a variety of places. We started with the list of foreign Fulbright fellows. We then look them up in a database of dissertations and theses in the United States. We then use that database to identify the controls. We Google them. In other words, we look them up on the web. Generally, we found their CVs and use their CVs to track their locations over time. And then we collected publication data from ISI's Web of Science, which is the Thompson Reuters database, and we also got citations from Thompson Reuters. So this is just showing a the distribution of sources for our location data. We got most of our location information from CVs, but also from LinkedIn profiles and web bios. And then there were and some people we identified through the affiliation that they listed in their publications. There are a few other types of sources in there. The regions from which Fulbright's and Controls come are similar in some cases. So for example, for Europe, we have similar sort of balance in the region from which they come, but we have a large number of Latin American Fulbright's. And this just reflects the foreign policy objectives of the United States during the time at which these fellowships were granted. The years in which these people received their PhDs, the median year is 1998. Average is somewhere between 1997 and 98. And this is the distribution of year of PhD is similar for Controls and Fulbright's. And the fields in which they obtain their PhDs are engineering, computer science is the most common field followed by biological and life sciences and agricultural sciences are also a large share of the PhDs in our database. So it's certainly possible that Fulbright's could be different from the controls that we find. But the controls that we identify come from, as I said, the same program, often have the same dissertation. They're working in the same field and they graduated around the same time. So we feel that this is going to give us a fairly close similarity between Fulbright's and Controls in the quality of their training and in their general attitude for research. Although it's certainly possible that there are some differences left over between Fulbright's and Controls in their ability to do research, we think that we've accounted for most of those differences through this matching procedure and that the major difference between Fulbright's and Controls in this sample is that the Fulbright's are required to go back to their home countries while Controls are not. And if you have concerns about whether there is this quality bias in the match between Fulbright's and Controls, I think we can address those when we actually look at the results because I think we can think about them in the context of what we actually see in the data. Okay. So I'm going to talk about three different types of evidence of the impacts of return requirements. So first I'm going to tell you a little bit about what we know about how return requirements affect the productivity of these scientists. Then I'm going to talk about what, how they influence the collaborations between Fulbright's and other scientists. And then I'm going to talk about the citation data. So how does, how do return requirements correlate with the diffusion of knowledge both from the Fulbright's or Controls to other scientists and then from other scientists to the Fulbright's and Controls. So let's start with productivity. The productivity regressions that I'm going to tell you about are Poisson regressions with, with Control variables and the main variable that I'm going to focus on is going to be a dummy variable that's equal to one if the person is a Fulbright and zero if the person is a Control. So the coefficient on this Fulbright variable is going to give us information about the average difference in the productivity of the Fulbright's relative to the Control scientists. And that's going to tell us something about how return requirements, which are important for Fulbright's but non-existent for Controls, how those return requirements influence the productivity of scientists. But we're also going to control for or hold constant the field of study, the year of PhD, the rank of the PhD program that the scientists graduated from, their gender and some information on their, the GDP per capita of their home country and how productive they were as a graduate student, how many articles they wrote as a graduate student. So this table, I mean let's start by focusing on this column of this table. Okay, so this is giving me the percentage difference between the number of publications written by a Fulbright student who must go back to his or her home country and the number of publications written by a Control scientist who doesn't have to go back after holding constant those other variables that I mentioned in the last slide. And it's broken down by the percentiles of the GDP per capita of their home country. So a country at the 25th percentile of GDP per capita is a pretty low income country. A country at the 90th percentile of GDP per capita is very high income country. And what we see here is that for a country at the 25th percentile of GDP per capita, a scientist that is has, that's trained in the United States Okay, but is required to go back home by the conditions of their fellowship is 50% less productive in their subsequent research careers than a scientist who doesn't have a return requirement, but is otherwise similar. Okay, at the 50th percentile the scientists, the Fulbright is 34% less productive than a control who has again all the same training and all the same care you know most of the same characteristics or that we've held constant with those control variables um and uh However, when we look at the 75th percentile and the 90th percentile There these numbers are negative, but they're not statistically significant So that means we cannot reject the hypothesis We cannot statistically reject the hypothesis that there's no difference in the productivity of controls and Fulbright's So controls and Fulbright's look to be about as productive um Even though the Fulbright's are required to go back to their home countries and that's only true for the high income countries Okay, and this is true across several different measures of their publications So first authored publications may give us a better sense of first authored and last authored You know in some in some cases scientists have large collaborations in which there may be 10 people Who have all contributed to an experiment and they all get listed on the article and often The ones who were really most responsible for the article get listed either at the beginning of the author list or at the end of the author list And you know we try to control for that by distinguishing between first authored and last authored publications And we see the same effects. It's the effects are particularly large for last authored publications And that may be because in many fields the person who's the head of the laboratory gets listed as the last author Um, and if we look at publications in high impact journals only we drop all the low impact journals We still see similar results. Okay, so this I think This these results suggest that when people are required to go back to their home countries They produce fewer scientific articles than if they're allowed to remain in the united states But this is only true for people who are required to go back to low income countries Requiring someone to return to switzerland has zero impact on their subsequent productivity Maybe it has a positive effect now our results suggest if you're at the 95 percentile of gqp per capita, there's really zero impact Okay Now let's look at collaboration. So this is a measure of How scientists work with other scientists. So do fulbright's Work mainly with people in the home country. Do they continue to work with people in the united states? And the reason we think this interesting is because we believe that knowledge is shared When people collaborate with each other because they exchange ideas and they influence each other's work We're going to look at the number of articles that have at least one author in the home country And then we will try excluding the author's current location. So Because the author is himself may himself be in the home country We want to look only at collaborations that don't involve the institution of the author himself now. Unfortunately, we can't Identify each author's exact location in the article data that we have but we can rule out Collaborations that are with people at the same institution that the author is working at We'll do the same thing for collaborations with u.s. Authors And we'll look at collaborations between home country authors and u.s. Authors And what we see here this is controlling for their Their productivity in graduate school. So how productive they were as a as a phd student We see a doubling again. These are percentage effects. We see a doubling of the number of Collaborations with people in the home country and this is true even after excluding the author's own institution So it's not just explained by the fact of the author's collaborating with himself You know, we really do see that there are substantially more collaborations in the home country For fulbright's than there are for controls Then we see that There are fewer collaborations with People in the united states although this result is a little bit less robust It's not quite as statistically significant as the other result However, we see More collaborations between the home country and the u.s For fulbright's than we do for controls So these results suggest that the return requirements of the fulbright program while they do appear to reduce the productivity of scientists After we account for that productivity difference. We see much more collaboration Between the home country and the united states When the person is a fulbright and has a return requirement Okay, so this is the first indication that we have That home countries may be gaining access to knowledge produced in the united states through the return of Scientists facing return requirements Okay, that's just summarizing what I just said now. I want to talk about knowledge diffusion Okay, so collaboration as I said is giving us the first indication that there may be knowledge diffusion Created by this return requirement And now we're going to dig a little bit deeper into that using citation data We'll look at two types of Citation data. Okay. Now. I apologize if this is a little confusing But we're going to call one type of citation a forward citation and a forward citation is a citation To a particular scientist's work So if I write a paper and earnest cites my paper Um in his own paper saying that my paper has influenced his paper Then we earn it that we call that a forward citation forward citation is earnest citing me Okay, if alternatively julio writes a paper, uh, which maybe he's doing it right now Uh, and uh, and I cite his paper So my citation is to julio's paper, uh, will be uh considered a backward citation. So forward citations are Are citations that represent knowledge that i'm sending to earnest and backward citations represent Knowledge that julio is sending to me. Okay, so we're going to look at both types of citations here Um So the number of forward citations just to be specific is the number of citations to scientist eyes articles published in year t That are then cited by articles In year capital t And we'll look at citations that come from the home country and citations that come from the united states How do we identify the country or the country of the citing article? We'll use the reprint authors address. So when a scientist submits an article for Publication, there's a corresponding author. Okay, and we use the corresponding author as the one The as a way of identifying the location of the article And this is because we believe that the corresponding author is usually the person who is has the most ownership For the paper now, obviously it could be shared equally among all of the co-authors it could be that all of the co-authors had sort of an equal contribution and equal Authority in in the paper But because authors can come from multiple countries. We had to identify the country Uh of the article in some way and this is we believe a sort of reasonable approximation to the country of the article the citing article We'll restrict our sample to the set of Journals that are listed in the web of science although We didn't find any evidence that foreign publication that people living in foreign countries are That their publications are undercounted when we examined the cvs of those Scientists and compared them with what's listed in the web of science We drop individual citations to their own papers And we again, we're going to use this Poisson model because A Poisson model is most appropriate for count data and we're going to be counting up the the citations made to these papers and we'll cluster the standard errors by scientists because That just Allow accounts for the facts that we have multiple observations on the same scientist over time And we don't want to overestimate the precision of our results by just because we have lots of observations on the same person The backwards citations are going to be very similar only it's going to be Citations to publications in the home country or publications in the u.s So the key variables that we're going that i'm going to talk about and then in the coming slides Include a dummy equal to one if the person is a fulbright And then that dummy Interacted with uh another dummy for whether the person is from a low-income country So that second interaction here Um So actually we'll have two of these we'll have one for fulbrights from low-income home countries And we'll have another variable for fulbrights from high-income home countries And those variables are going to give us Uh an indication of the difference the average difference in citations holding constant other factors between the Fulbright from a high-income country and a control from a high-income country And then the fulbright times low-income home country variable will give us an indication of the The average difference in citations between a fulbright from a low-income country and a control from a low-income home country And again, we think that the major difference between fulbrights and controls Is that the fulbrights have the return requirement and the controls do not Um We'll also look not just at income the gdp per capita of the country But we'll also look at what we call the science base And we'll do that either by looking at the number of articles per capita produced in the home country So the number of scientific articles in the scientist's particular field Uh written by authors in the home country Or we'll look at the number of citations per article that those Scientists receive so the first is a measure This is a measure of just sort of the amount of science produced in the home country per capita and this is uh, we take as a measure of the quality or the importance of that science because A country that receives a lot of citations in a particular field Is a country where a lot of people are paying a lot of other scientists are paying attention to that country's work And then we'll in some regressions I'll show you will also incorporate information on where the scientists are actually located to to try to really nail down The fact that this these results that we're seeing Really are due to the location of the scientist rather than some other aspect of the fulbright program Now it's important to account for the number of potential citations that could have been made and The reason for this is that countries vary in the number of articles that they produce And we want to make sure that we don't just Count over overestimate the number of citations the scientists receive just because they come from a country where a lot of work is going on So we'll control for the number of papers in the country in the field in your tea Because that those are the number of papers that That could cite the articles the scientists articles And we'll also control for the number of papers by the author in your tea because those will be Measure of the number of articles that could be cited Okay And we control for these two variables in logs in their regressions Again, we'll control for field of study The rank of the phd program gender and so on And these are just some summary statistics So one thing that's important to note When i'm for when i show you some of the results that come a little bit later Is that the there's a really small number Of citations coming from the home country on average. Okay. Most most articles are not cited in the home country Most articles are You know Close to almost all Many articles are cited in the united states And then also similarly scientists Oh wait, wait, i'm looking for this one scientists tend To cite their home country to some extent but not as much as they tend to cite the united states And again, this has to do with the scale of the number of potentially Citable papers in the home country relative to the u.s Just a few other things to note um Our scientists publish about 0.8 articles per year um and About exactly half the sample is a fulbright And it's sort of uh We have a little bit more low-income fulbrights than high-income fulbrights. Okay So this first table shows me That if I don't Hold constant The number of publications in the home country or the number of publications by the scientist On average, I see no difference between fulbrights and controls In the tendency of the home country to cite their work. So on average, we don't see Uh any effective return requirements when we don't control for those things however Once we account for the scale Of the home country the size of the home country in terms of the number of publications in the field We estimate a statistically significant and uh pretty large impact of the return requirements on citations from the home country And this is also true when we hold constant the number of publications by the scientists What's most interesting I think is that when we um distinguish between fulbrights from high-income countries And fulbrights from low-income countries That positive and significant effect which is associated with about 200 and more citations Okay, again, remember that we had the average citation rate is 0.05 So the actual increase in the number of citations is is a small increase, but it's a large percentage increase Okay, so this this uh, oh, okay this um this fulbright effect is um only positive and significant For the low-income countries, which means that it's only the people who are required to return to the low-income countries That see more citations from the home country And it's not we don't see an effect for people who are required to return to high-income countries Um this result is robust to looking at the distinguishing rather than by income But by the accord the science base of the home country in terms of the number of articles published Or the number of citations to those articles we see the same results That it's the low income and the low the countries that are have weaker science bases And not the countries that have the strong science bases that seem to really benefit from the return requirements These uh results these in this this increase in citation seems to go up over time And over time meaning number of years since the graduation of the person When we look at citations coming from the united states We see uh no effect on average We only see an effect for fulbrites from low-income countries and there's a negative effect Associated with 36 fewer citation 36 percent fewer citations So if people are required to return to a low-income home country scientists in the united states Make fewer citations to their research suggesting that scientists from the united states may lose May lose May lose access to what they're doing, however when we distinguish but according to the The science base of the home country we don't see statistically significant results So and and i'm not going to go into all of the results from the u.s But it turns out that once i um control for some additional variation in The fulbrites and controls, uh, we don't see a robust result for the united states so There i think the evidence on how the return requirements affect Knowledge sharing with the united states is more inconclusive than the results that we see for scientists going back to Low-income home countries and sharing knowledge with those home countries Um And this just talks about those robustness checks those those additional controls that we've looked into so we found that the The the benefits for the home country for the low-income home countries are robust to controlling for what sector the person works in Using more precisely defined scientific fields Controlling for whether they cite the home country themselves in their work We try dropping journals that are regional journals like the um Australian review of natural sciences So we drop that and we still see these results and we think that agricultural and environmental science is particularly focused on Certain regions of the world and so you might expect expect to see a bigger impact In those fields and we find that we still see the results when we drop agricultural and environmental sciences We also still see this again sharing of knowledge with the home country low-income home country when we Control for publications in high-impact journals when we control for The number of citations coming from other countries So in other words, we are looking at the share of citations that come from the home country And we also still see the result when we exclude the most highly cited articles in our data set when we drop The articles above the 90th percentile of citation Okay, so now this is looking at backwards citations and I realize we don't have a lot more time. So So i'll just try to summarize this With backwards citations. What's interesting is that we see Uh positive and significant effects of return requirements for both low-income and high-income countries Actually, this is a typo. This these two should be switched. This should be this high income This is low income. It doesn't really matter because they're essentially the same What we see here is that when fulbrites go back to their home country They seem to be redirecting their own research towards research that's going on in the home country They're citing more articles by other scientists from the home country And this is true as I said for both types of scientists, which I think is quite interesting And those also go up over time that the more time a person spends in the home country Or the longer it's been since they graduated from their phd program the more citations they make to the home country With when we look at citations to the u.s. On the other hand They continue to cite again. There are no there's these these numbers are not statistically significant That means that we cannot rule out the possibility that scientists who Go back to their home countries continue to have The same amount of access to research produced in the united states as scientists who do not have any requirement to return to their home countries So we see that people go back to their home countries They seem to be sharing knowledge with those with other scientists in the home country But they and they're paying more attention to what's going on in the home country But they still have The same amount of Access or attention paid to research by scientists in the united states And This just looks this just adds the location variables to the regression and here what we see is that Most of this fulbright effect seems to be mainly explained by location And that That the the results that we saw before are just kind of again reflected In the in the actual in the actual location of these people Rather than just by looking at their status as fulbright Okay, so the last thing i'm going to show you because i we're running out of time Is that this is a this is a regression in which we Regress a variable equal to one if the person is located in their home country On a dummy equal to one if they're a fulbright from a high-income country And another dummy equal to one if they're a fulbright from a low-income country And what we see here is that the fulbrites from the low-income countries have a bigger coefficient the four There's a 46 percentage point Increase in the probability of being located in your home country after you finish your phd If you are a fulbright from a low-income home country Whereas for fulbrites from high-income home countries, there's only a 27 percentage point increase And that's because scientists who come from high-income home countries Are more likely to go back home Independent of the return requirement But scientists from low-income home countries Are are less likely to return home than those other And in other words the return requirement has a bigger impact in the probability of returning home For the fulbrites and we think that this is a part of the reason for the results that we've estimated in the In the rest of the paper about the bigger impact for low-income countries because The return requirements change the behavior of people from low-income countries more Than they do the people from high-income countries So to summarize what we see in this in in these results is that for low-income countries or countries with weaker science bases Scientific articles by fulbrites are cited more frequently in the home country And this appears to be because they spend more time in the home country than control scientists But for high-income countries There's really not much difference Between fulbrites and controls in most across most of the measures that we've looked at And so this suggests that return requirements may actually not be necessary for the high-income countries and For all countries return requirements do seem to redirect the research agendas of the scientists towards the home country From the u.s. Perspective returning to a high-income country doesn't impact Diffusion to or from u.s. Scientists and so this this may be consistent with prior research Which has shown that the there are these persistent Relationships between inventors that through which knowledge continues to flow even after the inventor has moved to a new location And overall from kind of a global perspective Return requirements for countries from high for scientists from high-income countries are not associated with any decline in productivity Although return requirements for scientists from low-income countries are associated with a large decline in research output So this suggests that That if we're going to impose return requirements for scientists from low-income countries Perhaps there should be additional policies that are Directed towards supporting them and helping them maintain their Research productivity when after they return to the home country okay, so Thank you very much. And if you have questions or comments my email address is is listed there and I'd love to hear From you. Thank you


Hey, Psych2Goers, welcome back to our channel. For those struggling with a mental illness, it can be great when someone reaches out to talk about what you're going through. But sometimes, people can say some really unhelpful things. People who are suffering from a mental illness often hear the same type of unhelpful remarks. At some point, it can become annoying. It's important to spread awareness about mental illness, and to help those who may not know what to say to someone who has one. So, here's a list of some annoying things you should not say to someone with a mental illness. Although your intentions may be good, they've simply heard these ones before. A lot. 1. You're not even trying. Try? You mean, I can try to not have a mental illness? I never thought of that. Everyone with a mental disorder has likely tried to improve their mental health at some point. For many, they're always struggling with it, even though they might appear fine on the outside. To assume that someone hasn't or isn't even trying? At all? Not that helpful, my friend. 2. Just snap out of it. Snap out of it? Or clap out of it? Maybe clapping could be the new key. Because yeah, you know, we've tried snapping before. It just doesn't work. 3. Attention seeker. Boy, this one. There's nothing wrong with you. Stop baking it. Such an attention seeker. Is that why they've been faking it for the last 20 years? Somebody give this person an Oscar. 4. Other people have it a lot worse than you do. Everyone fights their own battles. And we can't imagine everyone's pain. Everyone has their own experiences, so a good idea would be to stop comparing. Because although some may have it worse, it doesn't stop the pain from being any less real. Everyone goes through their own struggles. We all do. And at the moment, it can seem like one of the worst feelings we'll ever experience. So just because someone else is going through something terrible as well, doesn't make another's own struggles any less valid. 5. But you have such a great life. Shall I count the ways in which celebrities and successful people have struggled with mental illness? There are quite a few. Both is no matter how rich, successful, or happy someone looks, you never know what they're going through. Many people struggling often wear a mask of confidence or happiness in order to appear fine to everyone else. One really no matter how great their life can seem to you, odds are you won't know what it is that they're going through. Everyone is different. I think we learned that in kindergarten, right? Mrs. Simmons class? So it's best to stop expecting everyone's situations to be the same. You can be grateful for what you have in your life and still be going through some serious struggles. 6. Everyone can be a little moody, sad, OCD sometimes. Bruh. Really?  Some people like to underplay someone else's mental illness as nothing. To them, it's just a strong reaction to a problem everyone has. And really, there's a chemical imbalance going on in their brains. Some can say you're just being sad or moody and need to move on like normal people.  Now, some people who are going through a mental illness often use humor as a defense mechanism or simply because they're so used to living with a disorder. But others really don't know what realm they're dipping their toes in. I'm so OCD. I'm so bipolar. I wish I was anorexic. Yikes. Don't even get me started on these ones. 7. There's no way you have a mental illness. Some people have an idea built up in their heads of what mental illness looks like. Guess what? They could be right about some things, wrong about others. Because not everyone is the same. Remember, we learned this in kindergarten? Some people can appear happy on the outside and be struggling with something internally. Someone can be exhibiting strong physical symptoms that may come across as their worst to you when actually it's their best. Their symptoms have improved a lot compared to before. But you wouldn't know that, right? Because we may never know who or who doesn't have a mental disorder. 8. You're being overdramatic. Overdramatic? If you think this is overdramatic, you should see how I was last year. That might be existential crisis terms to you then. Oh, yeah, it was. 9. Other people's lives are hard too, and they're not crying about it. Similar to saying people have it so much worse than you, this one seems to get thrown around a lot. A lot of people like to say you should toughen up and get over it. How crying became something that's used against others, to weaken them. When really, it's something we often need. It's natural, it's cleansing, it's powerful, and it's something we often need to help build ourselves up again. And number 10. You're wrong. I have a different experience. Some people have experienced mental illness differently. That's normal. But to say someone else's experiences are wrong simply because they're not your own. Why is your experience the only right one?  Everyone's experience is valid, but don't think your experience is the only one. Everyone has a different story, coping mechanism, a different defense, a spectrum of symptoms. Some line up with a textbook definition, others don't. Some can be a combination of many. So you hold on to your experiences, but don't invalidate someone else's, simply because it's not your own. When in doubt, take it from Mrs. Simmons kindergarten class. Everyone is different. So much of these have you heard.  Did you learn something new? Share with us in the comments down below. If you found this video insightful, don't forget to click the like button and share this video with someone who could use it. Subscribe to Psych2Go and hit the notification bell icon for more content like this. And as always, Psych2Goers, thanks so much for watching. We'll see you next time.


Hi everyone, Joe for JazzPiesCaseBreaks.com doing a team random randomizer. What does that mean? That means we took out a bunch of teams from stature pick your team number one and we're essentially turning into a random team break except We don't randomize the teams in this scenario. So the Rangers were probably the most expensive team Remaining so we just order them by by value the most expensive down to the least expensive but You are guaranteed a team. So that's the that's the good news Big thanks to this group for making it happen. Now. We also are giving away a few extra spots So some of you may encounter a little buy one get one situation, which is great. That's the first dice roll second dice roll will be for the teams so top three After four and a one five times one two three four and a one fifth and final time So Matt Matt D Matt L and Brian extra spots for you May come in handy When we're doing the randomizer For the teams, so let's see how those extra spots work out for you. Let's gather up all the names again second dice roll Remember name on top Rangers Let's roll it randomize it four and a five nine times one two three four five six seven eight and Ninth and final time So four and a five after nine times top few names will get some of the top teams Jordan Brian Adam after nine times Boom Adam you get your Rangers Clear that list out so Adam with the Rangers Brian with the Senators Jordan with the Stars Mike with the Blackhawks Matt with the abs Adam with the Canadians Jordan with the Maple Leafs and Sabres David with the Canucks Chris with the Bruins Matt D with the sharks Matt L with the Golden Knights Adam with the Blue Jackets Mike with the Hurricanes and Panthers Jordan with the Flyers Joe with the Flames Brian with the Jets Matt D With the Ducks Matt L with the coyotes and Matt D with the Predators. There you go I'll see you in the next break for the break or I'll see in the next video for the break itself Jasper's case breaks.com


Good afternoon. I'm here to speak about the gem that was launched upon the unsuspecting mining markets when Goldman Sachs came out with a soundbite that Lithium is the new gasoline. This came out a month ago, maybe now. I've actually tracked down the document in which this statement came out. You know, one's used to Goldman Sachs as one of the world's leading investment banks, if not the leading investment bank, of being weighty, etc. But in fact, it was contained within a document that was sort of like a circular that was sent out to seemingly private clients that would have frankly made even a Vancouver promoter blush because it was really a gush about a subject which, unfortunately, Goldman didn't seem to really know all that much. Now, you know, we've had this tendency in recent years for Goldman to be able to call the shots, and either in the case of self-fulfilling prophecy back in the late last decade, they came up with the BRICS concept, which was Brazil, Russia, India and China. And that concept really lasted until about the last year or two when it was suddenly realised that Russia was totally underperforming the others and that Brazil was also having the wheels falling off it. But for a little while there, one could live the delusion that the BRICS statement by Goldman really set the tone for a decade and a half and may have indeed spurred the commodity supercycle, which I believe was not invented by Goldman but was actually invented by Citibank, an analyst at Citibank. But it definitely set a tone and emerging markets boomed and this was attributed back to the fact that these four economies were dragging the emerging or developing economies along. In one sort of rather amusing side effect, you know, there was a reference to the BRICS and many people thought that the S stood for South Africa. South Africa wasn't part of the original conception and South Africa was definitely not one of the world's most exciting economies as it wallowed in labour problems, collapsing currency and perpetual energy dilemmas. So when Lithium is the new gasoline came out, it was really pouring gasoline on an already quite nicely burning fire of its own in the Lithium space. But let's just look at the claim because Lithium is the new gasoline makes out that Lithium is actually an input that makes the vehicles move because that's what gasoline does. It's put into the engine of combustion engine and it powers the vehicle. But Lithium is not that. Lithium is actually the storage device into which the electricity that is put into the car. So electricity is the new gasoline in the Lithium battery space because you're not really comparing apples and oranges when you make this claim. There was a chart that was produced a while back last year by Signalbox, the party that produces research in the Lithium chemical space with their estimates of where demand would be going and if anyone wants to find it they can see it in the October PowerPoint of Neo-Metals. And it's an interesting chart which I'd hope that we could have had up on the screen because the conclusions of Signalbox, who are a one of the, well if not the leading gurus on statistics in the Lithium space, differ dramatically from the prognostications of the analyst at Goldman. So the statistics guru at Signalbox had been projecting that Lithium chemicals used in cathodes within rechargeable batteries would be increasing by increments rising from 10,000 metric tons of Lithium carbonate equivalent LCE per annum, the moment to around 25 to 30,000 tons per annum by 2025. That's the increment, the amount that the previous year's production was, well demand was being augmented. The Goldman piece without a source for their projection, which I presume was basically themselves, said that total Lithium today is 160,000 metric tons of Lithium carbonate equivalent per annum. We estimate that a 1% increase in battery electric vehicle penetration will increase Lithium demand by 70,000 metric tons of LCE per year, or roughly half the current global demand for Lithium. However, according to the Signalbox numbers that I referenced from the NeoMetals presentation, the LCE used in rechargeable batteries was only 75,000 tons per annum, so less than half of what Goldman was claiming was being used. So then we know that we need to ask ourselves a question of whose numbers would we trust. So essentially I think that there's an exciting story in the Lithium space. There's a rising demand for the product and a limited supply so far, but it is not helpful that Goldman should have come out with this statement because this really just panders to pushing a story without any solid foundations. So that's just my little introduction to the subject of Lithium is the new gasoline. Thank you.


Now, today we're honored to have Neil Stegason here. His latest role is chairman of the European Fiscal Board, which is probably even less known than the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council, partly because it's only set up last October. And he will refer to the board to some extent in his talk. But he goes back a long way to being a member of the DeLore Committee on Economic and Monetary Union back in 1988, 1989. So he has a long record on economic and monetary union. And he's been chairman of the Danish Economic Council, advisor to the governor of the Danish Central Bank. And he is Professor Emeritus of International Economics at the University of Copenhagen. So he has a great track record there. His speech today is on the future of the euro area and how we can make the euro more, euro area more robust. So I have great pleasure in introducing him. And I've suggested to him that he might start, which is a little anecdote from a discussion with the taxi driver this morning, which I find quite extraordinary in Dublin. But it's worth repeating in this group. So over to you. Thank you very much, Mike, for your hospitality here. And this morning, indeed, with the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council, I arrived at that meeting with a taxi driver who didn't know what the Council know. He knew the economic and social research institute. He knew that. And he said, well, where are you going? Are you an economist? He said, this country ought to be run by economists. It is not. It's run by school teachers. It should be given over to the economists. We are having problems again. And they don't seem to learn. Prices are going up. House prices are going up. My rent is going up all the time. So I was quite impressed by that coming. I know nothing, of course. I know nothing about it. But he also said, you must be a genius if you're an economist. You must be a genius. There you are. And when I told I was going also to the Ministry of Finance, he almost bowed. So there's some support for economists, at least, in this country, I can see. But thank you very much for the invitation. When I got the invitation, I thought this would be optimal timing late May because there would be a lot of things to comment on, both European semester, this complex process that the European Union goes through twice a year with detailed submissions by countries that are then evaluated and criticized and so on. There would be a lot to talk about then. The Commission had announced it would publish a so-called deepening EMU paper in May that now turns out to be only the 31st of May. And I learned that other Commission's comments on individual country positions in the current round was only published this morning. So I don't know about really what is in there. I won't be that topical. Another factor that I couldn't quite foresee was that we have a new president in France that will create a new constellation of influences on the topic of how to move economic and monetary union forward and even to make it more robust. So there's always something to talk about, even less so than one might have expected some time ago. The flagship publication of the Commission on Europe by DG Ekvind, the Director General that deals with economics is the European economy. But the question, of course, is the European economy or are there still economies? Do we have to distinguish a bit more carefully all the time when we talk about developments in Europe? There are some features that are common to the European economies at this stage. There's a steady, slow recovery from the depths of the low, in fact, double deep recession we had. The last leg was in 2013. And the word now resilient about that upturn is becoming increasingly used. That is maybe a bit overstating it. Apart from Ireland and to some extent Spain, growth rates are still very moderate. They are a little bit faster than apparently the estimated rates of growth or potential in our economies. So the slack degree of slack in our economies is no doubt being reduced. And at a somewhat similar pace, apart from the two countries I mentioned, austerity is clearly fading somewhat further into the past. But this upswing has two unique features. It is underpinned by extraordinary stimulative monetary policies from the European Central Bank for now quite some time. And also in some, let's say, conversion of fiscal policies from the major corrections and consolidations in 2011 to 2013. Since 2014, there's been a switch into more neutral stance in some periods, slightly expansionary stance in most European countries. That is one feature of the economy. It's been stimulated by policy changes, particularly in monetary policy. It's a strange recovery in a second sense. It is one where the signs that, as I said, slack is being gradually eliminated, but there's little wage pressure, no signs of any pickup in inflation of any size. And the current account surplus of the euro area countries as a whole is sizable. It's aging down slightly to about 3%, which is historically high. And that is explained mainly by a shortfall in investment. In all countries in Europe, more or less, both public and private investment. So it is maybe a resilient recovery, but it's a highly atypical recovery. There are a couple of different interpretations that one can make of it and thereby what one should do about it. Some would say there is an underestimate. There must be something wrong in this calculation. The slack in our economy is surely greater than what is accounted for by the official statistics, the so-called output gap. The second one says no. That is not really just probably a reality. We are just in a period of much lower growth, partly for demographic reasons, partly for the reason that there's been a long period of low investment. So we cannot expect growths to be much faster than it is. And you can identify easily who are defenders of these positions. I should mention first that the ECB has been a defender of looking more broadly at the measures of slack in our economies. They have difficulties understanding why it's so difficult for them to get inflation up towards the 2% or just below 2% that they have indicated. And already in 2014, President Draghi was, in fact, the first senior policy officials to claim that monetary policy needed some relief from other forms of policies, notably fiscal policy. Yet there are further process because unemployment in some of the central countries in the Euro area, in Germany, in the Netherlands, in Germany, unemployment is now below 4% and in the Netherlands below 5%. There's still no wage pressures. We can look at participation rates in some of these countries as there's some reserve labor waiting to join the labor force that keeps the downward pressure on labor. I will not discuss this in detail. There's quite a bit of no doubt in voluntary part-time unemployment that could be mobilized. But on the whole in the ECB and the strong currency countries such as Germany and the Netherlands, say we are already close to having eliminated the slack and therefore the emphasis now should be on not doing much on demand without doing at the same time more effort in the form of reforms to improve our productive capacity. That should have been done maybe for quite some time ago. The weaker countries, let me be more specific, Italy, Portugal, France, to some extent Spain, believe that there's a need for more stimulus on the fiscal side in particular. And they stress the underestimation of the slack in their economies that the commission is relying on. There was recently a letter from the four finance ministers of the four countries I mentioned to the commission saying you must revise your methodology. This was a letter from earlier this month so I don't quite know what the reaction is. But there's a surprising attention in even at the highest political levels in the Eurogroup in discussing this kind of fairly technical issues and here clearly more work needs to be done both by commission and national officials. One could say that the former group, the stronger countries, they are more anxious to be in a situation where they prevent or make future crisis more unlikely. And they think the times are already good enough to attempt some consolidation to prepare for that eventuality that's making it more robust in a sense. The Germans point not least to their experience in 2005 to eight when Mrs. Merkel was elected for the first time and took over Germany economy on the upturn but with weak public finances which lasted ever since unification in the early nineties and she made rather major consolidation between 2005 and eight that enabled us to stimulate our economy without any major risks to it in 2009-10. She might not enter into that kind of argument but Mr. Schäuble and others in Germany would put it that way, no doubt. And that's why the Germans and the Dutch say, no, no, we don't need more stimulus at this point and we even critical that the monetary policy of the ECB is becoming too expansionary. You may also have seen that President Draghi when he was in the Dutch parliament last week, I think it was, had a rough time with parliamentarians who said about the same things as the German. Hold back now a little bit, the side effects of being so stimulative on monetary policy are now outweighing the benefits that we have from the stimulus. The weaker countries are more anxious to get out of the current crisis that they still feel they're not the crisis, maybe the low-growth tribe they are in and they have had great difficulties. They have used the benefits they have had from some relaxation of the rules and from the low interest rates that have saved them quite a bit of money in borrowing costs for the public sector. They've used that somewhat defensively rather than by expanding their future capacity. They have not really used their fiscal space very well. Now, in the most recent discussion, the commission again relies on the presentation of the measures that some countries are really doing better than they were expected to do. Germany and the Netherlands both have so-called outperformed their own targets in terms of public finances. Not very massively, but enough to give some significant stimulus if they wanted to. But all of this divergence in situations, of course, shows that it is somewhat questionable to talk about the European economy. One still has to use, I think, the plural, even in a period when growth rates are not too far apart. They start simply from very different points. So it's a bit of a dialogue of the deaf, the over-performers are very critical of so-called the under-performers and distrustful of the role of the commission that is supposed to be the independent monitor of performance. They are not as bound by the rules as they should have been and they should be held more responsible, accountable for maintaining the current system. They should become less political. That goes against what Mr. Junker has said when he was dominated. This is gonna be a more political commission, he said. That, of course, raises a problem if you want to have the role also of being an independent monitor, relying primarily on economic arguments. And that is no doubt one of the main reasons why the European Fiscal Board also was set up to tighten the economic-sense principles by which the commission evaluates countries. That's a tall order. We'll see how we can live up to that. But that inspiration was already around in the so-called five presidents report from the five institutions, the European Parliament, the Eurogroup, the Council, the ECB, and the Council of Ministers. That was already here in 2015. It's not very new. I think in order to go back to why there is this divergence over the interpretation of fiscal policy in particular, one has to go back to the Master Treaty itself and the compromise that was struck in that treaty, which is often labeled as faulty by most observers. You centralized monetary policy, but you didn't centralized fiscal policy. On the contrary, you left them almost entirely in national government hands. And critics not least from the US and the UK are very ready to say that this is not a tenable position. If you don't have a well-functioning integrated area that is truly one economy with mobility of capital and labor very well developed, then you need some kind of fiscal mechanisms to make up for that deficiency. To understand that, I think we have to look at the treaty itself. There was certainly oversized in Maastricht, particularly on the financial side that was totally underestimated. That was certainly the most serious defect from my perspective, also the absence of any safeguards. But the fiscal framework was discussed very carefully and there was agreement that there had to be some disciplinary role on fiscal policy now that countries were no longer on their own and could experience currency crisis. The risk that they would lose access to international financial markets as a result of the principle of not bailing out individual governments was seen as a bit remote and therefore there had to be some rules of behavior for fiscal policy. The DeLore Committee, which I had the honor to participate, there was some recognition that at times there could be a need for also looking at the aggregate or collective stance of the euro area to see what is really the outcome of all these recommendations that we make on the size of budget deficits in individual nations. That would be necessary was also said to take part effectively in international cooperation in the G7 framework. Somebody had to be able to say what fiscal policy is in the area as a whole, not just to refer to, this is left to national member states. So, but that principle was left aside in Maastricht. It was seen as a bit too vague. How can one stabilize a large area like the euro area is difficult enough to do it in individual countries and the idea that through oversight we can correct so how the sum of national policies is simply analytically too difficult. It will also be difficult, I think it was recognized at the time to reconcile it with the national fiscal rules that were put in place. So the basic bargain was a simpler one. I think Germany, for Germany it was essential that they had the impression they finally were able to export their so-called stability culture to the rest of Europe, which they had failed to do in earlier arrangements, looser arrangements. For the French to some extent for the Italians it was essential to share monetary leadership with the Germans. There was a constant irritation to particularly the French that Germany was the decisive factor. The Bundesbank was the decisive factor in monetary policy. But on the fiscal side they thought the Germans that they had designed an appropriate framework or helped to design that and got the others to accept it. One where the central bank was oriented towards stability and was independent of political influences and the fiscal rules were largely meant to maintain public finance sustainability for long periods of time. Not to limit the ability of countries to stabilize their own economies but precisely to leave them aside, recognizing that they would have different needs and that they should maintain a sufficient margin to the limits of action so that they could stabilize through mainly automatic stabilizers in their fiscal policies, their own economies. But that was in a sense the basic compromise. I think it was also a compromise that many economists were involved in. It was not just a political compromise, of course it was more or less what was politically feasible also at the same time. The arguments were made on economic grounds as well and if they had not been seen as reasonable compromise and feasible also by the Germans, they would not have been, EMU would not have happened. And that's I think these ideas were quite consistent with the experience that led up to the formation or the master treaty and the formation of EMU. Has the compromise worked? It's easy of course to say initially if you look at public finance sustainability, the answer must be no because we have debt levels that are now on average 90% plus in the Euro area, Greece is at 170 something, Portugal and Italy seem stuck at about 133, 233, Belgium more than 100, France and Spain in the high 90s. So the average is something like 90 plus. It has become a club of highly indebted countries, just contrary to what in a sense the Germans had decided. On the other side, we have to say that the compromise worked very well in creating a truly independent and well-functioning central bank, the only federal institution that currently exists. And that was quite an achievement given what had gone before that. So it's a mixed picture, but in a sense the German element of the compromise further from being realized than the French one of getting into monetary union and having a shared responsibility. The French of course, exaggerated the role they would play in making monetary policy because there would not be under political instruction, there would not be a government representative that did that, but an independent central bank from France as well. So, but should we be as concerned as we are and as critical of the environment? I don't think so personally, but I don't want to sound too sanguine. Some say it was in any case a totally arbitrary level of public debt that was used as a reference or as a norm in the Maastricht Treaty and as a requirement for entering EMU 60%. It was not totally arbitrary, it was had a certain link with the deficit rule, but it was linked to the assumptions at the time that economists would grow by 5% a year, then it would be quite easy, even if you were close to the 3% most of the time to end up with a 60% debt ratio. Now when the growth rate is only three to three and a half percent, maybe at best 2% inflation, one and a half percent on average real growth, then the deficit is still there, around 3% as it is in the Maastricht Treaty, then you would converge to about 100%. So that seems to be verified by the experience. So in that sense, the rules were too easy. But on the other hand, and maybe more importantly, there is some things that have made the system more stable, both the safety mechanism that now exists through the European stability mechanism and the efforts are not least and particularly of the ECB in its asset purchase program and earlier in its willingness to give a conditional support to national bond markets through its OMT arrangements in 2012 that had never been used because no country has ever taken on the political commitments that would be required for that, but it has had clearly a major stabilizing influence on markets and it has worked extremely well. So as the IMF also is beginning to sound more and more openly, maybe higher debt levels are sustainable than 60% on average. They must be individually assessed. They are clearly not the same, not even within more homogeneous areas such as Europe, but there is no precise critical threshold at 60%, which still is the main basis in the European semester for assessing country performances, where, how far you are from that. So where does that leave us? Do we have a little bit more freedom of maneuver? The commission tried to spin out, they had used a lot of flexibility, gradually introduced, not least at the instigation of large member states to delay adjustment to the 3% and to now particularly the 60% debt ratio where the PACE was finally prescribed in 2012 for the acceptable PACE, satisfactory PACE. So the commission has used that flexibility quite extensively, but clearly by last year it was not quite enough, so they proposed instead that under the heading of a Euro area fiscal stance there should be some extra effort to bring the whole of the fiscal policy stance in the Euro area in better balance with monetary policy and to eliminate a bit more quickly the remaining slack in our economies. Did not get much support in the Euro group. There were one or two countries that spoke up in favor of it, but not more than that. It was seen as coming in a sense too late in the upswing, the output gap was being too close to being eliminated, that is disputable as I said, but it looked a bit too much like the fine tuning that most government think is outdated as a fiscal strategy. And there was still the argument from the Maastricht days that Euro area fiscal stance sits somewhat uneasily with nationally formulated rules. How should one translate them into national recommendations and allocate them between countries? We now have the commission's latest forecast the spring 2017, it's just being digested. And we can see there that with no policy changes there would be a deterioration of the fiscal balance in the union. But without the corrections of course that countries are expected to do even within the flexible administration of the rules. If maximum flexibility is administered, one would get almost to the neutral stance that is suggested as broadly appropriate also by the Eurogroup, but only if the countries that have some fiscal space are overperforming use that fully in 2018. At least because refer to 2018 now. So there would still be next year a need for that kind of action that removes the current asymmetry between the strong countries and the weaker countries. Now, France and Italy are particularly difficult countries, Portugal too, because they have come to rely primarily on just observing the nominal principle of the 3% deficit, Italy with a slight margin to it. France apparently now according to the latest forecast getting slightly above 3% deficit in 2018. And that would indeed require even in the case of German expansion some reaction. How that would be resolved, I don't know. I think the commission had difficulty coming out with even tentative recommendations for 2018. That would not be necessary at this point because it's only in the fall that the definite recommendations will come out. But that will be the real I think clash if there is to be one. It passed more in silence or without much discussion also in public when a similar situation arose in the summer of 2016. Some would say it's too difficult to think of a rule for the fiscal stance that we could then allocate between countries until there is more of a federal system of public finances in the Euro area. And that's why of course the commission's reflections extending what was in the report from the five presidents two years ago. Why that is awaited with some interest and it's due to be exact on the 31st of May this year. That would be a more focused paper than the very broad ranging and other vague white paper that the commission published on a number of EU issues in February this year. There are basically two main options I think that will come out and that's what one can assess from what has been said by President Dombrovskis who is the main person in the commission responsible for this document. One is indeed the follow up to the federalist model of a more central capacity but in what form then that is the next question that raises I come back to that very shortly and briefly. And secondly and that would shoot more the point of view of the stronger countries. Let us return a bit more towards the original ideas of Maastricht that's complete the other things of banking union including also deposit insurance and that is then recognized that we cannot get any further with the rules and have some greater element of market discipline. I come in first on the first one of these models. There again there are several possibilities of moving towards central fiscal capacity. One would be to enlarge the so-called younger plan to do it by borrowing and lending under the broad heading with some leverage through contributions from the private sector some element of guarantees as is in the younger plan. Secondly some countries particularly Italy favor the idea of an unemployment fund or an unemployment reinsurance fund if some countries have a larger rise in unemployment than others there should be temporary transfers to that country but that should be reversible in the course of the business cycle. Thirdly there should be some allocation to your area budget with an allocative and distributive function. The latter is of course the most radical but it does have the particular interest that it seems to be among the things that the new French president has in mind how the Germans will react to it. I will not try to predict at this point but let me say one more thing about the two first ones. The borrowing and lending and extension of the younger plan is in a way a bit in the cars and would not require major technical revisions it is not very effective. The younger plan has not been a great success in terms of bringing forth projects that would not have been realized anyway or are not ready for being implemented anyway. So it's the least controversial the most politically feasible but also probably the least effective. The unemployment fund is too difficult probably to design because it would at times lead to transfers between countries that were in a sense counter-intuitive in terms of the justification you would give for them. Spain with now rapidly falling unemployment but still at 17, 18% unemployment would be transferring for example in the current phase to a number of northern European countries where unemployment is stable and low. It's a bit difficult to foresee and to manage it requires further standardization of labor market practices and it's therefore I think unlikely to be implemented. So the choices really between I think the more simple one of extending the younger plan which is not very effective or the radical longer term one that would really be also for the long term in terms of agreeing on it. Then about the return to Maastricht that I mentioned as a possibility favor still by the Germans. I don't think that would be certainly desirable at the present time given the differences in debt levels that we currently see. The interaction of the rules-based system and the market discipline has always been an easy one. At times the market's totally disregarded the building up of tensions inside the area then they reacted very strongly during the crisis as I don't need to remind this audience also respect to Ireland, certainly to respect to southern European countries. And subsequently they have again under the impression not least of the ECB actions compressed margins between sovereign bonds very considerably. So it's an unstable system and with the still unresolved issues in the banking sector and political risks it would be very dangerous to move to, in my view, to increase market discipline at an early stage until some more ideas have been developed on how to consolidate the debt position of the more exposed countries. So I think the former set of issues on the more federalist line are certainly the most satisfactory from an economic point of view but also politically extremely difficult. So that goes well beyond my time horizon. Thank you very much.


From Boston, Massachusetts, it's theCUBE. Covering Red Hat Summit 2017, brought to you by Red Hat. It is day three of the Red Hat Summit here in Boston, Massachusetts. I'm Rebecca Knight, along with Stu Miniman. We are wrapping up this conference, Stu. We just had the final keynote of the morning. You, before the cameras were rolling, you were teasing me a little bit that you have more scoop on the AWS deal. I'm interested to hear what you learned. Rebecca, first of all, may the fourth be with you. Well, thank you, of course, yes. And also with you. Always, yeah. So, you know, day three of the keynote, they started out with a little bit of fun. They gave out some may the fourth, you know, be with you t-shirts. They had a little Star Wars duel that I was periscoping this morning, so love their geeking out. I've got my, you know, Millennium Falcon cufflinks on. You're into it. I saw a bunch of guys wearing t-shirts. Princess Leia was walking around. Princess Leia was walking around. There were stormtroopers there. Yeah, Carrie Fisher. Absolutely. But the Amazon stuff. Sure, I think this is the biggest news coming out of the show. I've said this a number of times and we're still kind of teasing out exactly what it is because partially, you know, really this is, you know, still being built out. It's not going to be shipping till later this year. So, you know, things like how pricing works. We're still going to get there.  That's great. But then I can do AWS services on-premises. Well, what that doesn't mean, of course, is that I don't have everything that Amazon does, you know, packaged up into a nice little container. We understand how computer coding works and even with open source and you know, how we can make things serverless. And it's not like I can take everything that AWS is and shove it in my data center. It's just not feasible. What that means though is it is the same applications that I can run. It's running an OpenShift and really there's the hooks and the APIs to make sure that I can leverage services that are used in AWS. Of course, from my standpoint, I'm like, okay. So tell me a little bit about how kind of, you know, what latency there's going to be between those services. But it'll be well understood as we build these, you know, what it's going to be used for certain use cases. You know, we already talked to like Optum. Was really excited about how they could do this for their environment. So it's something we expect to be talking about, you know, throughout the rest of the year. And you know, by the time we get to AWS, re-invent the week after Thanksgiving, I expect we'll have a lot more details. So we'll be comfortable with that. And it will be rolled out too. So we'll have a really good sense of how it's working in the marketplace. So other thoughts on the keynote. I mean, one of the things that really struck me was talking about open source, the history of open source. It started because of a need to license existing technologies in a cheaper way. But then really the point that was made is that open source taught tech how to collaborate and then tech taught the world how to collaborate because it really was the model for what we're seeing with crowdsourcing solutions to problems facing in education, climate change, the developing world. So I think that that is really something that Red Hat has done really well in terms of highlighting how open source is attacking many of the world's most pressing problems. Yeah, Rebecca, I agree. We talked with Jim Whitehurst and watched him in the keynotes in previous days and talked about communities and innovation and how that works. And in a lot of tech conferences, it's like, okay, what are the business outcomes? And here it's, well, how are we helping the greater good? How are we helping education? It was great to see kids that are coding and doing some cool things. And they're like, oh yeah, I've done Java and all these other things. And the Red Hat guys were like, hey, can we go hire this seventh grader? Had the open source hardware initiative that they were talking about and how they can do that, everything from healthcare to get a device that used to be $10,000 to be able to put together the genome is I can buy it on Amazon for, what was it, like six, seven, $100 and put it together myself. So open source and hardware is something we've been keeping an eye on. We've been at the open compute project event which Facebook launched, but these other initiatives, they had, it was funny, she said, there's the internet of things and they have the thing called the thing that you could tie into other pieces. There was another one that weaved this into fabric and we can censor and do that. We know healthcare, of course, lots of open source initiatives. So lots of places where open source communities and projects are helping proliferate and make greater good and make the world a greater place, flattening the world in many cases too. So it was exciting to see. And the woman from the open source association, she made this great point and she wasn't trying to be flipped but she said, one of our questions is, are you emotionally ready to be part of this community? And I thought that that was so interesting because it is such a different perspective, particularly from the product side where this is my IP, this is our idea, this is our lifeblood and this is how we're going to make money. But this idea of no, you need to be willing to share, you need to be willing to be copied and this is about how we build ideas and build the next great things. Yeah, if you look at the history of the internet, there was always, right, is this something I just share information or do we build collaboration? Back to all the old bulletin board days through the homebrew computing clubs, some of the great progress that we've made in technology and then technology enabling beyond have been because we can work in a group, we can build on what everyone else has done, that's always how science is done and open source is just trying to take us to the next level. Right, right, right. And in terms of one of the last things that they featured in the keynote was what's going on at the MIT Media Lab, changing the face of agriculture and how they are coding climate and how they are coding plant nutrition and really, there's just going to have such a big change and how we consume as food and how where food is grown, the nutrients we derive from fruit. I was really blown away by the fact that the average apple we eat in the grocery store has been around for 14 months. Ew, ew. So, I mean, just exciting what they're doing. Yeah, absolutely right. If we can help make sure people get clean water, make sure people have availability of food, shorten those cycles, the amount of information, data, the whole farm to table initiative, a lot of times data is involved with that. It's not necessarily just the stuff that's grown on the roof next door or in the farm, a block away. I looked at local food chain that's everywhere is like Chipotle. They use data to be able to work with local farmers, get what they can, try to help change some of the culture pieces to bring that in. And then they ended up the keynote talking more about the innovation award winners. You and I have had the chance to interview a bunch of them at the program I really like in talking to some of the Red Hatters. There actually was some focus to work with, you know, talk to governments, talk to a lot of internationals because when they started the program a few years ago, it started out very US centric. So they said, yeah, it was actually, it's not, it was a little bit coincidence that this year it's all international except for Rackspace. But it's, you know, we should be blind when we think about who has great ideas and good innovation. And, you know, at this conference, I bumped into a lot of people internationally, talked to a few people coming back from the Red Sox game and it was like, how was it? And they were like, oh, I got a hot dog and I understood this, but that whole ball and things flying around and, you know, I don't get it and things like that. So they're learning about international code but also baseball. So this is- Yeah, what's your take on the global community that you've seen at the show this week? Well, I mean, as you said, there are representatives from 70 countries here. So this really does feel like the United Nations of open source. I think what is fascinating is that we're here in the States and so we think about these hot beds of technological innovation. We're here in Boston, of course, there's Silicon Valley, then there are North Carolina, where Red Hat's based, Atlanta, Austin, all Seattle, of course. So all these places where we see so much innovation and technological progress taking place here in the States. And so it can be easy to forget that there are also pockets all over Europe, all over South America, in Africa doing cool things with technology. And I think that that is also, when we get back to one of the sort of the sub-themes of this conference, I mean, it's not a sub-theme, it is the theme about how we work today, how we share ideas, how we collaborate, and how we manage and inspire people to do their best work. I think that that is what I'd like to dig into a little today if we can and see how it is different in these various countries. This show, what I like is when it's 13th year of the show, it started out going to a few locations now. It's very stable. Next year, they'll be back in San Francisco. The year after, they'll be back here in Boston. They've got the new Boston office opening up within walking distance of where we are. Here, GE is opening up their big building. I just heard there's like, lots of startups when I've been walking around the area every time I come down to the Zeeport District, it's like, wow, look at all the tech. It's like log means right down the road. There's this hot little storage company called Wasabi that's like two blocks away, really excited, and one last thing back on the international piece, next week's OpenStack Summit, and I'll be here doing the cube, and some of the feedback I've been getting this week, it's like, look, the misperception on OpenStack, one of the reasons why people are like, oh, the project's floundering and it's not doing great is because the two big use case, one is the telecommunication space, which is a small segment of the global population, and two, it's gaining a lot of traction in Europe and in Asia, whereas in North America, public cloud has kind of pushed it aside a little bit, so unfortunately the global tech press tends to be very much, oh wait, if it's 75% adoption in North America, that's what we expect, if it's 75% overseas, it's not happening, so. It's kind of interesting. Right, and that myopia is really a problem because these are the trends that are shaping our future. So today I'm also going to be talking to the women and tech winners, that's very exciting. One of the women was talking about how she got her idea, or really her idea became more formulated and more crystallized at the Grace Hopper Conference. We of course have a great partnership with the Grace Hopper Conference, so I'm excited to talk to her more about that today too. Yeah, good lineup. We have a few more partners, another customer, EZRAG who did the keynote yesterday, looking forward to digging in, kind of wrapping up all of this, and Rebecca, it's been fun doing it with you today. I am with you, and may the fourth be with you. And with you. Thank you, we'll have more today later from the Red Hat Summit here in Boston. I'm Rebecca Knight for Stu Miniman.