Book 1 of the Nicomachean Ethics. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Jeffrey Edwards. The Nicomachean Ethics by Aristotle. Translated by Thomas Taylor. Book 1. Chapter 1. Every art and every method, and in length manner, every action and deliberate choice, appear to aspire after a certain good. Hence, it is well said that the good is that which all things desire. Of ends, however, there appears to be a certain difference, for some of them are energies, but others of them, besides these, are certain works. But in those things in which there are certain ends, besides the actions, in these the works are naturally adapted to be better than the energies. Since, however, there are many actions and arts and sciences, there will also be many ends. For the end of medicine is health, of the shipbuilding art a ship, of the military art victory, and of the economic art wealth. But such arts, as are of this kind, are arranged under one certain power, just as the bridal making art is arranged under the equestrian art, and such other arts as pertain to equestrian instruments. Both this art, however, and every war-like action, are arranged under the military art, and, after the same manner, other arts are arranged under other powers. But in all these, the ends of those arts, which are architectonic, or master arts, are more eligible than all the ends of the arts which are subordinate to the master arts. For the latter are pursued for the sake of the former. It makes, however, no difference whether the energies themselves are the ends of actions or something else besides these, in the same manner as in the above-mentioned sciences. If, therefore, there is a certain end of actions which we wish to obtain for its own sake, but we desire other things on account of this, and our choice is not directed to all things for the sake of something else, bracket, for thus there would be a progression to infinity so that appetite would be empty in vain, close bracket. If this be the case, it is evident that this end will be the good, and to that which is the most excellent. We'll not, therefore, the knowledge of this end be of great importance with respect to life, for, by having, like archers, a mark at which we may aim, we shall obtain what is fit in a greater degree. If this, however, be the case, we must endeavor to adumbrate what it is, and show to what science or power it belongs. But it would seem that it belongs to that power which is the most principal, and is especially architectonic, and the political power, or science, appears to be a thing of this kind. For this ordains what sciences ought to be instituted in cities, and which of them ought to be learnt by the several individuals, and to what extent. We likewise see that the most honourable of the powers or faculties are arranged under this power, as, for instance, the military, the economical, and the rhetorical powers. Since, however, the remaining practical sciences use this political science, and since it also legally establishes what ought to be done, and from what it is required to abstain, the end of this science will comprehend in itself the ends of the other sciences, so that this will be human good itself. For though the good of an individual and a city is the same, yet to obtain and preserve the good of a city appears to be something greater and more perfect, for we must be satisfied, indeed, if we can affect the good of an individual alone, but it is more beautiful and divine to affect the good of a nation and cities. These are the things, therefore, which the method being political requires. Chapter 3 Which will, however, be discussed sufficiently, if it is rendered perspicuous, according to its subject matter. For accuracy must not be similarly investigated in all discussions, as neither in all the works of art. Things beautiful, however, and just, with which the political science is conversant, possess so great a difference, and are involved in so much ambiguity that, to some persons, their subsistence appears to be from law only, and not from nature. What is good, likewise, possesses a certain ambiguity of this kind, because it happens that many persons are injured by it, for some have perished through wealth, but others through fortitude. We must be satisfied, therefore, in speaking about and from such things, if we can indicate the truth by a rude adumbration, and, if our conclusions in discussing things, which have a frequency of subsistence, are similar in accuracy to the things themselves. After the same manner, likewise, it is requisite to admit everything that has been said, for it is the province of an erudite man so far to investigate the accurate in each genus of things, as the nature of the thing will admit, since it appears to be a similar thing to a sent to a mathematician, when speaking probably, and to require demonstrations from a returition. Everyone, however, judges well of those things which he knows, and of these is a good judge. Hence, the man who is learned in anything, judges well of that thing, but he in short forms a proper judgment about everything, who is learned in everything. Hence, a youth is not a proper auditor of the political science, for he is unskilled in the actions pertaining to life, but reasonings are from and about these, and besides this, if he yields to his passions, he will in vain, and without any advantage, be an auditor of ethical doctrines, since the end here is not knowledge, but action. It makes, however, no difference whether a person is a youth as to his age, or has juvenile manners, for the defect is not from time, but from living, and engaging in every pursuit from passion, since the knowledge of such persons in the same manner as that of intemperate is useless, but a knowledge of these things will be very advantageous to those whose appetites and actions are conformable to reason, and thus much by way of preface concerning the auditor of ethics, how he ought to admit discussions of this kind, and what we propose to consider in this treatise. Repeating, therefore, what we have said, since all knowledge and deliberate choice aspires after a certain good, let us show what that is, which we say the political science desires, and what the supreme good is of all actions. By name, therefore, it is nearly acknowledged by most men, for both the vulgar and the learned call it felicity, but they conceive that to live well and to act well are the same thing as to be happy. Concerning felicity, however, what it is, they are dubious, and the multitude do not form the same opinion of it as the wise. For some of them indeed conceive it to rank among the number of things which are clear and evident, such as pleasure, or wealth, or honor, but others assert it to be something else. Frequently, likewise, the same person forms a different opinion of it, for when diseased he conceives it to be health, but when poor riches, and those who are conscious of their ignorance admire those who assert something grand and above their comprehension. Some, too, besides these many goods, are of opinion that there is another good subsisting by itself, which is the cause to all these of their being good. To examine, therefore, all the opinions would perhaps be a vain undertaking, but it will be sufficient to consider those that are most eminent, or which appear to be in some respect reasonable. We must not, however, be ignorant that arguments from principles and two principles differ from each other. For Plato well doubts about and investigates this, whether the way is from principles or two principles, as in a race, from the president of the games to the goal, or the contrary. For we must begin from things that are known, but these subsist in a two-fold respect. For some things are known to us, but others are simply known. Perhaps, therefore, we should begin from things known to us. Hence, it is necessary that the auditor of discussions about things, beautiful and just, and in short, about political concerns, if he is to be benefited, should be adorned with worthy manners. For the principle is this, that the thing is so, is, that certain actions are worthy and others are unworthy. And if this is sufficiently apparent, it is not at all requisite to know why it is so. But such a one either possesses or will easily acquire ethical principles. Let him, however, who has neither of these, hear what Hesiod says. He, the first rank of excellence maintains, who from himself in everything is wise, and what even to the end is best foresees. He, too, is good, who yields to wise advice. But he who neither from himself is wise, nor to assent, to others can endure, is but a useless, despicable man. Chapter 5 Let us, however, return from once we have digressed. For it seems that men do not unreasonably form an opinion of good and felicity from the different kinds of lives. The vulgar, indeed, and the most worthless part of mankind, place felicity in pleasure, and on this account they embrace the life which consists in the enjoyment of pleasure. For there are three kinds of lives which especially take the lead.  The multitude, therefore, appear to be perfectly servile, deliberately choosing the life of cattle. And they support their opinion by the example of many persons in power, who have referred of eluptuous life, and have lived like sardinopolis. But men of elegant minds, and those who are addicted to practical concerns, place felicity in honor. For this is nearly the end of the political life. This, however, appears to be more superficial than the good which is the object of our investigation. For honor seems to be rather in the persons that honor, than in him who is honored. But we prophesy that good is something appropriate, and of which it is difficult to deprive its possessor. Farther still, it seems that men pursue honor in order that they may believe themselves to be worthy persons. They seek, therefore, to be honored by wise men, and by those to whom they are known, and with a view to virtue. It is evident, therefore, that according to these men, virtue is more excellent than honor. Perhaps, however, someone may apprehend that this virtue is rather the end of the political life. But even this appears to be more imperfect than the chief good ought to be. For it appears to be possible that he who possesses virtue may sleep, or be unemployed through the whole of his life, and besides this may be afflicted with evils, and experience the greatest misfortunes. But no one would proclaim a man thus living to be happy, unless for the purpose of defending his position. And concerning these things indeed enough, for we have spoken sufficiently about them in our miscellaneous writings. But the third life is the contemplative, which we shall make the object of our consideration here after. The life, however, which is engaged in the acquisition of riches, is a certain violent life, and it is evident that wealth is not the good which we investigate. For wealth is useful, and for the sake of something else. Hence, the things which have been before mentioned may be considered as ends rather than wealth, for they are loved on their own account. It appears, however, that neither does felicity consist in these, though many arguments are reduced to prove that it does. These things, therefore, we shall dismiss. Perhaps, however, it is better to consider universal good, and inquire how it is said to subsist, though such an inquiry as this will be arduous, because the men who have introduced ideas are our friends. But it may perhaps seem to be better, and indeed necessary, to the salvation of truths, to subvert the opinions even of our friends. For both being our friends, i.e., Plato and truth, it is wholly to give the preference to truth. Those, however, who have introduced this opinion, do not make ideas of things in which they admit there are the prior and the posterior. Hence, neither do they establish an idea of numbers, but good is predicated of essence, of quality, and of relation. That, however, which has a subsistence per se, and essence are naturally prior to that which subsists as a relative. For this, i.e., a relative, resembles the branch of a tree, and an accident of being so that there will not be a common idea in these. Again, good is predicated in as many ways as being, for it is predicated in essence, as God and intellect, which are essences and are said to be good, and in quality as the virtues, in quantity as the moderate, in relation as utility, in time as occasion, and in place as a habitation, and after the same manner in the other predicaments. It is evident, therefore, that there will not be a certain common universal and one good, for it would not be predicated in all the categories, but in one alone. Farther still, since of all things which subsist according to one idea, there is also one science, of all goods, there would be one certain science, but now there are many sciences of things which are under one category. Thus, for instance, with occasion, the art of commanding an army is conversant in war, but the medical art in disease, and with the moderate indeed, the medical art is conversant in food, but the gymnastic art in labor. It may, however, be doubted. What their intention is, in denominating every idea itself, since in man itself, and in man, there is one and the same definition of man. For so far as man, there is no difference between them. But if this be the case, neither so far as good will be good itself, and goods differ, nor will it be in a greater degree good from being eternal, since neither is that which is white for a long time, more white than that which is white only for one day. The Pythagoreans, however, appear to speak more probably concerning the good, for they place the one in the coordination of things good, whom Spusipus also seems to have followed. But the discussion of these things pertains to another treatise. A certain doubt, however, presents itself concerning the particulars we have just mentioned, because reasons are not assigned concerning every good, but things which are of themselves, the objects of pursuit and love, are predicated according to one species, and those things which are effective of these, or in a certain respect preserve them, or impede their contraries, are predicated on account of these, and after another manner. It is evident, therefore, that goods may be predicated in two ways, and that some things indeed are good per se, but others are good on account of these. Separating, therefore, goods per se from things useful, let us consider whether they are predicated according to one idea. But what kind of goods can be said to be good per se? Are they such as are pursued alone, apart from other things, such as to be wise, to see, and some pleasures and honors? For these, though we pursue them on account of something else, yet at the same time, may be ranked by someone among goods which are good per se, or is the good per se nothing else except idea? Form, therefore, or idea will be vain. But, if these also rank among goods which are good per se, it will be requisite that the same definition of the good should be conspicuous in all of them, just as there is the same definition of whiteness in snow and sea roose. But of honor and prudence and pleasure, there will be other and different definitions, so far as they are goods. The good, therefore, is not something common according to one idea. In what manner, however, is it said that there is one idea of the good? For it does not resemble things which are fortuitously homonymous. Is it because all goods are from one and are referred to one good? Or is it rather according to analogy? For as sight is in the body, so is intellect in the soul, and another thing in another. Perhaps, however, these things must be omitted at present, for the accurate discussion of them will be better adapted to another philosophy, and in a similar manner concerning idea. For even if there is someone good which is predicated in common, or which is something itself separate by itself, it is evident that it can neither be practicable nor acquired by man. But now that which is practicable by man, and which he may obtain is the object of investigation. Perhaps, however, the knowledge of this separate good may to someone appear to be better with respect to those goods which may be acquired and which are practicable. For, having this as an exemplar, we may in a greater degree know those things which are good for us, and by knowing may more easily obtain them. This assertion therefore has indeed a certain probability, but it seems to be dissonant to the sciences. For all the sciences aspire after a certain good, and investigate that which is wanting, omitting the knowledge of it, though it is not reasonable to suppose that all artists are ignorant of, and do not search for an aid of such great importance. It is likewise dubious what advantage a weaver or a carpenter would derive to their arts from the knowledge of the good itself, or how he who surveys the idea of the good will become more skilled in medicine, or in commanding an army. For it appears that the physician does not in this way consider health, but that he considers the health of man, and perhaps rather the health of this particular man, for he restores to health an individual, and thus much concerning these things. Chapter 7 Now however, let us return to the investigated good, and show what it is. For it appears that there is a different good in a different action and art, since there is one good in the medical art, another in the art of commanding an army, and in a similar manner in the remaining arts. What therefore is the good of each? Is it not that for the sake of which other things are affected by that art? But this in the medical art indeed is health, in the art of commanding an army is victory, in the art of building a house is a house, and something else in another art, and in every action and deliberate choice it is the end, since all of them perform other things for the sake of this. Hence, if there is one certain end of all actions, this will be the practical good, but if there are many ends, these will be practical goods. The reasoning, however, in its transition arrives at the same thing, as was asserted by us in the beginning, but we must endeavor to render this still more clear. Because, therefore, it appears that there are many ends, and of these we choose some on account of others, such as wealth, flutes, and in short instruments, it is evident that all ends are not perfect. That, however, which is most excellent appears to be something perfect, so that if there is only one certain perfect end, this will be what we investigate, but if there are many, it will be the most perfect of these. We denominate, however, that which is pursuable for its own sake, more perfect than that which is pursuable for the sake of something else, and that which is never eligible on account of another thing, than things which are eligible both on their own account and for the sake of something else. In short, the completely perfect is that which is always eligible on its own account and never on account of something else. Felicity, however, especially appears to be a thing of this kind, for we always choose this on its own account and never on account of anything else, but we choose honor and pleasure, intellect, and every virtue on their own account. Indeed, bracket, for though we should derive no farther advantage than what the possession of them affords, yet each of them would be the object of our choice, close bracket. Yet, we also choose them for the sake of felicity. No one, however, chooses felicity for the sake of these, nor, in short, for the sake of anything else. The same thing also appears to happen from that which enables a man to be sufficient to himself, for perfect good appears to be self-sufficient. But we call the self-sufficient that which is not only sufficient to him who lives a solitary life, but which is also sufficient to parents and children, to a wife, and in short, to friends and fellow citizens, since man is naturally a political animal. A certain boundary, however, must be assumed of these things. For, if good is to be extended to parents and their offspring, and the friends of friends, there will be a procession to infinity. But this, indeed, we shall consider hereafter. We call, however, the self-sufficient that which subsisting by itself alone makes life eligible, and in want of nothing. But we think that felicity is a thing of this kind, and, besides this, we think that it is the most eligible of all things, and is not conumerated with any other good. For, if it were conumerated, with even the smallest good, it is evident that it would be more eligible, since that which is added would become an excess of good. But a greater good is always more eligible. Felicity, therefore, appears to be something perfect and sufficient to itself, being the end of actions. Perhaps, however, to say that felicity is the best of things is to assert that which is acknowledged by all men. But it is requisite that we should yet more clearly say what it is. Perhaps, therefore, this will be affected if the work of man is assumed. For, as to the player on the flute, to the statuary, and to every artist, and in short, to those who have a certain work and action, the good and the excellent appear to be in the work. This also may appear to be the case with man, if he has a certain work. Whether, therefore, are there certain works and actions indeed of a carpenter and a shoemaker, but of man is there no work, and is he naturally indolent? Or, shall we say that as of the eye, the hand, and the foot, and in short of each of the parts of the body, there appears to be a certain work? So likewise of man, shall we admit that besides all these there is a certain work? What then will this work be? For to live appears to be common also to plants, as well as to man. But the peculiar work of man is now investigated. The nutritive and augmentative life therefore must be rejected, and a certain sensitive life will be consequent to this. It appears, however, that this also is common to a horse, and an ox, and to every animal. A certain practic life, therefore, accompanied with reason remains. But of this, one kind is obedient to reason, but the other possesses reason and energizes discursively. Since this life, however, is predicated in a two-fold respect, i.e., according to energy and according to habit. It must be admitted to subsist according to energy, for this appears to be predicated according to a more principal mode of subsistence. But if the work of man is the energy of soul, according to reason, or not without reason, and we say that the same thing is the work of the human species, and of a worthy man, just as the same thing is the work of a harper, and of a good harper, and in short, this is the case in all things. Excellence according to virtue being added to the work, for the work of a harper is to play on the harp, and of a good harper to play well on it. If this be the case, and we admit the work of man to be a certain life, and this to be the energy of the soul, and actions in conjunction with reason, but by a worthy man, these things are well and beautifully performed, and everything is well accomplished according to its proper virtue. If this be the case, human good will be the energy of soul according to virtue. But if there are many virtues, it will be the energy of soul according to the best and most perfect virtue, and besides this, in a perfect life, for as one swallow does not make spring, nor one day, so neither does one day, nor a little time, make a man blessed and happy. Let this, therefore, be a description of the good, for it is necessary, perhaps, as in a picture, first to delineate and afterwards add the colors, but it would seem that anyone may be able to adduce and distinctly arrange things which are well delineated, and the time is the inventor of, or a good co-operator with, things of this kind. Whence, also, accessions are made to the arts, for anyone may add to what is wanting. It is also requisite to call to mind what has been before said, and not to search for accuracy, similarly in all things, but investigate it in each according to the subject matter, and so far as is appropriate to the method pertaining to the inquiry. For a carpenter and a geometrician investigate a right angle differently. The former, indeed, so far as is useful to his work, but the latter explores what it is or what the quality is which it possesses. For he is a contemplator of truth. After the same manner, therefore, we must proceed in other things, lest what is superfluous should become more abundant than the works themselves. Neither must the cause be required similarly in all things, but in some, as, for instance, concerning principles, it is sufficient to have shown properly that they are, but the subsistence of a thing is the first thing and the principle. Of principles, however, some are surveyed by induction, others by sense, others from a certain custom, and others in a different way, but we should endeavor to discuss everything so far as its nature permits, and should earnestly apply ourselves to define well, for this is of great importance with respect to what is consequent. The principle, therefore, appears to be more than half of the whole, and many of the things which are objects of inquiry become manifest through it. Chapter 8. Felicity, therefore, must be considered by us, not only from the conclusion and the particulars from which its definition consists, but also from the assertions of others concerning it. For everything which is inherent in a thing accords with the truth, but what is true is rapidly dissonant with what is false. Since goods, therefore, have a twofold distribution, and some of them are said to be external, but others pertain to the soul and the body, we call those pertaining to the soul the most proper and principal goods, but we place the physical actions and energies about the soul. Hence, it is well said, according to this opinion, which is ancient, and assented to by those who philosophize, that felicity is the energy of the soul according to virtue. It is also rightly said that certain actions and energies constitute the end, i.e., felicity, for thus, felicity will consist in the goods pertaining to the soul and not in external goods. With this reasoning, likewise, the assertions accord that the happy man lives well and acts well, for nearly felicity will be a certain living well and acting well. It appears, moreover, that everything which is sought for in felicity is inherent in the definition we have given it. For, to some, indeed, felicity appears to be virtue, to others prudence, and to others a certain wisdom, but to others it appears to be these things, or some one of them, accompanied with pleasure, or not without pleasure. Others also comprehend, in the definition of felicity, external affluence. But, of these opinions, some are supported by the authority of many and ancient men, and others by a few and renowned men. It is not, however, reasonable to suppose that either of these have wholly erred, but that they have erred in some one particular and are right in most things. With those, therefore, who say that felicity is every virtue, or a certain virtue, are assertion accords, for it is the energy of the soul according to virtue. Perhaps, however, it differs in no small degree to conceive that what is most excellent consists in possession, or to conceive that it consists in use, and that it consists in habit, or in energy, for it is possible that habit, when inherent, may be effective of no good, as in him who is asleep, or who in some other way is inactive. But, this cannot be the case with energy, for he who possesses virtue and energy necessarily acts, and acts well, but, as in the Olympic Games, not the most beautiful and the strongest are crowned, but those who contend, for some of these are victorious, so those who act rightly obtain those things in life which are beautiful and good. The life also of these is in itself delectable, independent of external pleasure, for to be delighted is among the number of things pertaining to the soul, but to everyone that is delightful of which he is said to be a lover, as a horse to a lover of horses, and a spectacle to a lover of spectacles. After the same manner also, just things are delightful to a lover of justice, and in short, what pertains to virtue to a lover of virtue. Things, therefore, delectable to the multitude are hostile to each other, because they are not naturally delightful. But, to the lovers of what is beautiful in conduct, those things are delectable, which are delectable by nature, and such are the actions according to virtue, so that they are delectable to these, and are so per se. The life also of these is not at all in want of pleasure, as a certain appendage, but contains pleasure in itself. For, in addition to what has been said, he is not a good man who does not rejoice in beautiful actions, for neither would anyone call him just, who does not rejoice in acting justly, nor him liberal, who does not rejoice in liberal actions, and in a similar manner in the other virtues. If this, however, be the case, actions according to virtue will be of themselves delectable, but they are also good and beautiful, and especially each of these if the worthy man judges well concerning them. But he judges in the way we have said. Felicity, therefore, is a thing most excellent, most beautiful and most delectable, nor are these to be separated from each other according to the Delian inscription. Quote, that which is most just is most beautiful, but to be well is the best of things, and for a man to obtain the object of his love is the most delectable of things. Close quote. For all these are inherent in the best energies, but we say that Felicity is all these, or one of them, and that the most excellent. At the same time, however, it appears, as we have said, that external goods are requisite to Felicity, for it is impossible, or not easy to perform beautiful actions without the assistance of externals, since many things are indeed performed as it were through instruments, by means of friends, and wealth, and political power. The privation also of some things, such as nobility, a good offspring, and beauty, defile a blessed condition of being. For he cannot be entirely happy, who is very deformed in his body, or of ignoble birth, or who leads a solitary life, and is deprived of children, and perhaps he can in a still less degree be entirely happy, if his children are very vicious, or being good, die. As we have said, therefore, a completely happy life requires such a prosperity as this, whence also some arrange prosperity, but others virtue, in the same place with Felicity. Chapter 9. Hence also it is doubted whether Felicity is a thing which may be acquired by discipline, or custom, or in some other way by exercise, or whether it is seeds by a certain divine allotment, or from fortune. If, therefore, any other thing is the gift of the gods to men, it is reasonable to suppose that Felicity also is the gift of divinity, and especially because it is the best of human concerns. This, however, will perhaps be more adapted to another discussion, but it appears that though it should not be sent by divinity to men, but is procured through virtue, and a certain discipline, or exercise, it belongs to the most divine of things. For the reward and end of virtue appears to be most excellent, and something divine and blessed. Felicity also will be a thing very common, for it is able to be present through a certain discipline and attention to all men who are not mutilated with respect to virtue. But if it is better that Felicity should be acquired after this manner, rather than from fortune, it is reasonable that it should be so acquired, since natural productions subsist in such a way as it is most beautiful for them to subsist. And in a similar manner, things which are produced by art, or by any other cause, and especially such as are produced by the most excellent cause. To commit, however, the greatest and most beautiful of things to fortune would be very lawless and reprehensible. The object of investigation likewise is apparent from the definition of Felicity. For we have said that it is a certain energy of the soul according to virtue, but of the remaining goods some indeed are present from necessity, but others cooperate and are naturally adapted to be useful organically. These things also will accord with what we have said in the beginning, for we established the end of the political science as the best end. But this pays the greatest attention to the citizens in order to render them characters of a certain description, and that they may be good men and practicers of beautiful actions. Reasonably, therefore, do we neither call an ox, nor a horse, nor any other irrational animal happy, for it is not possible that any one of them can partake of such energy as this. Through this cause, likewise, neither is a child happy, for he is not yet, on account of his age, a practicer of things of this kind. But those children who are said to be happy are proclaimed to be blessed through hope, that when they become men they will obtain the rational energy in perfection. For Felicity, as we have said, requires perfect virtue and a perfect life. For many mutations and all various fortunes happen in life, and it is possible that he whose affairs are in the most prosperous condition may in old age fall into the greatest calamities, as in heroic poems it is fabled concerning Priam. But no one would call him happy who experiences such misfortunes and who dies miserably. Chapter 10. Shall we say, therefore, that no other man is to be proclaimed happy as long as he lives, but that according to Solon, it is requisite to look at the end of life? If, however, we admit this, is a man, therefore, then happy when he dies? Or is this perfectly absurd? Especially to those who say, as we do, that Felicity is a certain energy. But if neither we call him who is dead happy, nor was this the intention of Solon, but his meaning is that a man may be securely proclaimed blessed as being now out of the reach of evils and misfortunes. Even this also is attended with a certain doubt, for there appears to be a certain good and evil to him who is dead, if there is also to him who is alive but without sensation such as honor and ignominy, and in short the prosperity and adversity of his descendants. This, however, also presents us with a difficulty, for it is possible that to the offspring of him who has lived to old age blessedly and has died rationally, many mutations may happen, and that some of them may be good and may obtain a life according to their deserts, but that the contrary may take place with others. It is likewise evident that there may be an all various apostasy in them from the manners of their parents. It would, therefore, be absurd if he who is dead should also be changed together with them, and should at one time become happy and again miserable. It is likewise absurd that the affairs of descendants should not, for a certain time, be of any consequence whatever to parents. Let us, however, return to the former subject of doubt, for perhaps that which is now investigated may be surveyed from it. If, therefore, it is necessary to look to the end of life, and then to proclaim each man blessed, not as being now blessed, but because he was so before, is it not absurd when he is happy, i.e. while he is living, that what is present with him, i.e. felicity, should not be asserted of him with truth, because we are unwilling to proclaim the living happy on account of the mutations of life, and because we apprehend felicity to be something stable, and by no means easily to be changed? But fortunes frequently circulate about the same persons, for it is evident if we should follow fortune, we must frequently call the same man happy and again miserable, thus evincing the happy man to be like the chameleon and possessing an infirm stability, or shall we say that it is indeed by no means right to follow fortune? For living well or ill is not among the gifts of fortune, but human life, as we have said, requires the goods of fortune. The energies, however, according to virtue, are the mistresses of felicity, but the contrary energies are the mistresses of the contrary. That also which is now the subject of doubt bears testimony to our assertion, for in no human affair is there so much stability, as in the energies, according to virtue, since they appear to be more stable than even the sciences themselves. And of these very energies, those that are most honorable are also most stable, because blessed men principally and most assiduously live in these. For this appears to be the cause that oblivion does not happen concerning them. The object of investigation, therefore, is present with the happy man, and he will be such through life, for always, or the most of all men, he will perform and contemplate things pertaining to virtue, will bear the changes of fortune most beautifully, and in the most perfectly elegant manner, as being truly good, and a square without blame. Since, however, many things happen from fortune, and which differ in magnitude and parvitude, it is evident that prosperous and in a similar manner adverse circumstances, when they are small, are of no consequence to the life of man, but that such as are great and numerous, if they are indeed prosperous, render life more blessed. For they are also naturally adapted to adorn life, and the use of them is beautiful and good, and that, on the contrary, if they are adverse, they oppress and injure beatitude, for they bring with them molestation, and are an impediment to many energies. At the same time, however, even in these, the beauty of good conduct shines forth, when a man bears many and great misfortunes easily, not through an insensibility of pain, but in consequence of being generous and magnanimous. But if energies are the mistresses of life, as we have said, no one who is blessed will become miserable, since he will never do anything that is odious and base. For we are of opinion that the man who is truly good and wise will bear all fortunes in a becoming manner, and from existing circumstances will always perform the most beautiful deeds. Just as a good general will use the army under his command in the most warlike manner, and a shoemaker from the leather with which he is supplied will make the most beautiful shoes, and the same thing will take place with all other artists. If this, however, be the case, the happy man will never become miserable, nor yet if he should fall into the calamities of Priam, will he be blessed. Nor again is he various and easily changed, for he is not easily moved from felicity, nor by any casual misfortunes, but by such as are great and numerous. And after such calamities as these, he will not again become happy in a short time. But if he does recover his felicity, it will be in a certain long and perfect time, in which he will become a partaker of things of a great and beautiful nature. What then prevents us from calling the man happy, who energizes according to perfect virtue, and who is sufficiently supplied with external goods, not for any casual time, but through a perfect life? Or ought we to add that he must also thus live and die conformably to nature? Since the future is unapparent to us, and we admit that felicity is an end, and entirely and in every respect perfect. But if this be the case, we must call those among the living blessed, to whom the particulars we have mentioned are and have been present, but we must denominate them blessed as men, and thus much concerning these things. Chapter 11. Let the good or bad fortune, however of descendants and of all friends, should contribute nothing to the happy man, appears to be a thing very unfriendly and contrary to the opinions of mankind. But since many things happen, and which possess an all various difference, and some of them pertain to us in a greater, but others in a less degree, to discuss them severally appears to be long and an infinite undertaking. It will, therefore, perhaps be sufficient to speak of them universally, and to adumbrate what they are. As of the calamitous circumstances then, which happen to the happy man, some have a certain weight and are of importance in life. This is likewise the case with respect to all his friends. It makes a difference, however, whether each of the calamities happens to the living or the dead, and the difference is much greater than whether the illegal and dreadful deeds, which are the subject of tragedy, have been formally perpetrated, or are perpetrated now. In this way, therefore, the difference may also be collected. Perhaps, however, it ought rather to be doubted concerning the dead, whether they partake of any good or ill. For it appears from these things that though something should arrive to them, whatever it may be, whether good or the contrary, it is something debile and small, either in its own nature or to them. But if it should possess a certain power, yet it cannot be so great, or of such a kind, as to make those happy or not so, or to deprive those of blessedness who are. The prosperity, therefore, and in a similar manner the adversity of friends appears to contribute something to the dead. Yet, with respect to them, they are of so little consequence as neither to make those that are happy unhappy nor affect anything else of the like kind. Chapter 12. These things being discussed, let us consider, with respect to felicity, whether it is among the number of things laudable, or rather of things honorable. For it is evident that it does not consist in power. It seems, therefore, that everything which is laudable is praised because it possesses a certain quality, and is in a certain respect referred to something. For we praise the just and the brave man, and in short the good man, and also virtue, on account of works and actions. We likewise praise the strong man, and the racer, because they are naturally adapted to possess certain qualities, and have reference, in a certain respect, to something good and worthy. But this also is evident from the praises which pertain to the gods, for they appear to be ridiculous when referred to us. This, however, happens as we have said because praise subsists from relation. But if praise is given to things of this kind, it is evident that no praise can be given to the most excellent things, but something greater and better pertains to them, as also appears to be the case. For we proclaim the gods to be blessed and happy, and we also proclaim the most divine of men to be blessed, and in a similar manner we celebrate what is good. For no one praises felicity in the same way as he does justice, but he proclaims it to be blessed, as something more divine and excellent than justice. Eudoxus, likewise, in his defense of pleasure, appears to have given it the palm of victory in a proper manner, for, in consequence of its not being praised as being among the number of good things, he considers this an indication that it was more excellent than things that are laudable, but God and the good are things of this kind, for other things also are referred to these. For praise indeed is given to virtue, since from this we are enabled to perform beautiful deeds. Encomiums, however, pertain to deeds, and in a similar manner to bodies and souls. The accurate discussion, however, of these things is perhaps more adapted to a treatise on Encomiums. But to us it is evident, from what has been said, that felicity is among the number of things honorable and perfect. It seems, likewise, that it is so, because it is a principle. For, we all of us do everything else for the sake of this, but we admit that the principle, and the cause of what is good, is something honorable and divine. Chapter 13. Since, however, felicity is a certain energy of the soul, according to perfect virtue, we must direct our attentions to virtue, for perhaps we shall thus also speculate better concerning felicity. But it seems that he who is skilled in the administration of public affairs, labours especially about this, for he wishes to make the citizens worthy persons, and obedient to the laws, and as an example of these, we have the legislators of the Cretans and the Lacedaemonians, and any others that may have been of this kind. If, however, the speculation itself is of the political science, it is evident that the inquiry will be conformable to our intention from the beginning. But our discussion must be concerning virtue, fizz, human virtue. For, we investigate human good, and human felicity, and we call human virtue, not the virtue of the body, but of the soul, and we say that felicity is the energy of the soul. If, however, this be the case, it is evident that he who is skilled in the administration of public affairs ought to know whatever pertains to the soul, just as he who intends to cure the eyes ought to have a knowledge of the whole body, and this in a greater degree, by how much more honourable and excellent the political is than the medical science. Of physicians, likewise, the more elegant are busily employed about their knowledge of the body. He, therefore, who is skilled in the administration of public affairs must direct his attention to the soul, but he must direct his attention to it for the sake of these things, and so far as is sufficient to the objects of inquiry. For, to consider the soul still more accurately, is perhaps more laborious and difficult than the present discussion requires. We have also said some things sufficiently concerning it in our popular writings, and those who must be consulted, such as that one part of the soul is irrational, but another rational, but whether these parts are separated in the same manner as the parts of the body, and everything which is partable, or they are two parts in definition, alone, and are naturally inseparable, as in the ferrifory of a circle, the convex and the concave, is of no consequence in the present discussion. Of the irrational part, however, one part resembles the common and vegetative power. I mean the power which is the cause of nutrition and the increase. For such a power as this may be admitted to exist in everything that is nourished, in embryos and also in perfect animals, since it is more reasonable that this power should exist in them than any other. The virtue, therefore, of this power appears to be common and not human, for this part seems especially to energize in sleep, but a good man and a bad man can in the smallest degree be distinguished in sleep, whence it is said that the happy differ in no respect from the miserable during the half of life. But this happens reasonably, for sleep is an inactivity both of the worthy and the depraved soul, except so far as certain motions gradually arrive at the soul. And on this account the phantasms of worthy are better than those of worthless men, but of these things enough, the nutritive part, therefore, must be emitted since it is naturally a destitute of human virtue. There appears, however, to be another certain irrational nature of the soul which nevertheless participates in a certain respect of reason, for we praise the reason of the continent and also of the incontinent man, and that part of the soul which possesses reason, for it rightly excites to the most excellent deeds. There appears, however, to be in them, i.e., both in the continent and incontinent, something else naturally contrary to reason, which wars against and resists reason, for, indeed, as the paralyzed parts of the body, if we wish to move them to the right hand, are, on the contrary, moved to the left, thus also it is in the soul, for the impulses of the incontinent are in a direction contrary to the dictates of reason. In bodies, however, we see that which is moved contrary to the intention of the will, but in the soul we did not see that which is moved contrary to reason. Though perhaps we ought nevertheless to think that in the soul also there is something opposite to reason which is adverse and proceeds in a direction contrary to it, but it is of no consequence in what manner it is different from reason. This part, however, appears as we have said to participate of reason. It is obedient, therefore, to the reason of the continent man, and perhaps it is still more obedient to the reason of the temperate and brave man, for all things are in concord with his reason. It appears, therefore, that the irrational part is twofold, for the vegetable part in no respect participates of reason, but the part which desires, and, in short, the erectic part, participates in a certain respect of reason, so far as they are attentive and obedient to it. In this way, therefore, we say that a man has a regard for or pays attention to his father and his friends, and not after the same manner as he has a regard for the mathematical sciences, but that the irrational part is, in a certain respect, obedient to reason, admonition and all reproof and exhortation indicate. If, however, it be requisite to say that this part also possesses reason, not which possesses reason will be twofold, the one indeed properly and in itself, but the other resembling a child attentive to his father, virtue likewise is distributed according to this difference, for we say that of the virtues some are dinoetic or belong to the power which reasons scientifically, but others ethical, and we denominate indeed wisdom, intelligence, and prudence, dinoetic virtues, but liberality and temperance ethical virtues, for when we speak concerning the manners of man, we do not say that he is wise or intelligent, but that he is mild or temperate. We likewise praise a wise man according to habit, but we call the laudable habits virtues. End of book one, recording by Jeffrey Edwards. Book two of the Nicomachean Ethics. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Jeffrey Edwards. The Nicomachean Ethics by Aristotle. Translated by Thomas Taylor. Book two, chapter one. Since however, virtue is twofold, one kind being dinoetic, but the other ethic, the dinoetic indeed, for the most part, receives both its generation and increase from doctrine, on which account it requires experience and time. But the ethic is produced from custom, from whence also it derives the name, which declines but a little from ethos, custom. From which likewise, it is evident that no one of the ethical virtues is ingenerated in us by nature. For nothing that has a natural subsistence can by custom be brought to act differently from its natural tendency. Thus, a stone, which naturally tends downward, cannot be accustomed to tend upward, though someone should hurl it upward 10,000 times, nor can fire be accustomed to tend downward, nor can anything else among the things which have natural tendencies different from these be accustomed to any other tendency than that which it has from nature. The virtues, therefore, are neither from nature nor are ingenerated in us preternaturally, but they are produced in us in consequence of our being naturally adapted to receive them and becoming perfect through habit. Again, with respect to such things as are ingenerated in us by nature, of these we first receive the powers, but afterwards employ the energies of those powers which is evident in the senses. For it is not from frequently seeing or frequently hearing that we receive these senses, but on the contrary, having these senses we use them, and we do not have them by using them. With respect to the virtues, however, we receive them by first energizing according to them in the same manner as in the other arts. For those things which it is necessary to do, in consequence of having learned how to do them, these by doing we learn how to do. Thus, by building we become builders, and by playing on the harp we become harpers. Thus, too, by acting justly we become just, prudent by acting prudently, and brave by acting bravely. But what happens in cities bears testimony to the truth of this. For the legislators, by accustoming the citizens to virtue, render them worthy characters, and this indeed is the intention of every legislator. But such as do not affect this well, err. And in this one polity differs from another, the good from the bad. Farther still from the same things, and through the same things, every virtue is generated and corrupted, and in a similar manner every art. For from playing on the harp both good and bad harpers are produced, and analogously builders of houses, and all other artists. For from building well they will be good builders, but bad from building ill. Since if it were not so, there would be no occasion for a preceptor, but all men would be naturally good or bad artists. The like also takes place in the virtues. For by acting in our compacts with men, we become some of us indeed just, but others unjust, and by acting in things of a dreadful nature, and by being accustomed either to be terrified or to be confident in danger, some of us become brave, but others timid. The reasoning, likewise, is similar with respect to desire and anger, for some men indeed become temperate and mild, but others intemperate and irascible. These from being in this way conversant with these things, but those from being conversant with them in that way. And in one word, habits are produced from similar energies. Hence, it is necessary to render energies endued with a certain quality, for habits follow from the differences of these. It is of no small consequence, therefore, to be thus or thus accustomed, immediately from our youth, but it is of very great consequence, or rather it is everything. Chapter 2 Since, therefore, the present treaties is not for the sake of theory, like other discussions, for our attention is not directed to this business, that we may know what virtue is, but that we may become good men, since, otherwise, no advantage would be derived from it. This being the case, it is necessary to consider with respect to actions how they are to be performed, for, as we have said, they are the mistresses of the qualities which habits possess. To act, therefore, according to right reason is common, and is now assumed to be so. We shall, however, hereafter speak concerning this, and show what right reason is, and how it subsists with reference to the other virtues. But this must be previously granted, that every treaty of practical affairs ought only to be an adumbration, and not an accurate discussion, as also we observed in the beginning, because reasonings are required conformable to the subject matter, and in practical affairs, and things contributing to them. There is nothing stable, as neither is there in things which are salubrious. Such, therefore, being the universal reason, in a still greater degree, will the discussion of particulars be deficient in accuracy, for it neither falls under art nor under any precept. It is, however, necessary that those who are engaged in practical affairs should always direct their attention to an opportune time. In the same manner as in medicine, and in the pilot's art. But, though the present discussion is of this nature, we must endeavor to give it assistance. In the first place, therefore, this must be observed, that things of this kind, viz, actions which produce in us the habits of the virtues, are naturally adapted to be corrupted by excess and defect, as we see in strength and health, which are the virtues of the body. Bracket, for it is necessary to use things apparent as testimonies, in things which are unapparent, close bracket. Since exercises, which are excessive, and also those which are deficient, corrupt the strength of the body, in like manner, meet and drink, when taken in too great or too small a quantity, corrupt the health. But these, when commensurate, produce increase and preserve it. This, therefore, is also the case in temperance and fortitude, and the other virtues. For he who flies from and is afraid of all things, and endures nothing, becomes timid. And he, who in short is afraid of nothing, but marches up to all things, becomes audacious. In a similar manner, he indeed who gives himself up to the enjoyment of every pleasure, and abstains from none, is intemperate. But he who flies from all pleasures, like rustic men, is an insensate person. For temperance and fortitude are corrupted by excess and defect, but are preserved by mediocrity. Not only, however, generations, increments, and corruptions are produced from and by the same things, but the energies also of the virtues will subsist after the same manner, since this likewise is the case in other things, which are more apparent, as for instance in strength. For strength is produced by taking much food, and enduring many labours, and the strong man is especially able to do both these. Thus too it is in the virtues, for by abstaining from pleasures we become temperate, and having become temperate, we are especially able to abstain from them. The like also takes place in fortitude, for by being accustomed to despise things of a terrible nature, and to endure them we become brave, and having become brave, we are especially able to endure terrible things. Chapter 3 It is necessary, however, to consider as an indication of habits, the pleasure or pain, which is attendant on actions. For he who abstains from corporeal pleasure, and is delighted in doing so, is a temperate man, but he who is grieved when he abstains from them is intemperate, and he indeed who endures dreadful things, and is delighted with his endurance, or feels no pain from it, is a brave man, but he who feels pain from the endurance of them is a timid man. For ethical virtue is conversant with pleasures and pains, for we act basically through the influence of pleasure, but we abstain from beautiful conduct through the influence of pain. Hence, it is necessary, as Plato says, to be so educated in a certain respect immediately after our youth, that we may be delighted and pained with things from which it is requisite to feel pleasure or pain, for this is right education. Farther still, if the virtues are conversant with actions and passions, but pleasure and pain are consequent to every passion and action, on this account also, virtue will be conversant with pleasures and pains. The punishments likewise, which are inflicted through these, indicate the truth of this. For they are certain remedies, but remedies are naturally adapted to operate through contraries. Again, as we have also before observed, the nature of every habit of the soul is referred to and conversant with those things, by which it is adapted to become better and worse. But habits become depraved through pleasures and pains, by pursuing or avoiding these. Either such is ought not to be pursued or avoided, or when it is not proper, or in such a way as is not proper, or in as many other modes, as such things are distinguished by reason. Hence, some persons divine the virtues to be certain epithes and tranquillities, but they do not define them well, because they speak simply and do not add in such a way as is proper, and when it is proper, and such other additions as are usually made. It is admitted, therefore, that virtue is a thing of this kind, which is conversant with pleasures and pains, and practices things of the most excellent nature. But vice is the contrary. From what has been said, likewise, we may obtain still greater evidence about these things. For, as there are three things which pertain to choice, and also three which pertain to aversion, vis, the beautiful in conduct, the advantageous, and the delightful, and three, the contrast to these, the base, the disadvantageous, and the painful, the good man indeed acts rightly in all these, but the bad man erroneously, and especially in what pertains to pleasure. For pleasure is common to all animals, and is consequent to everything which is the object of choice. For the beautiful and the advantageous appear to be delightful. Again, pleasure is co-nourished with all of us, from our infancy, on which account, also, it is difficult to wipe away this passion, with which our life is imbued. We likewise direct our actions by pleasure and pain, as by a rule, some of us integrator, and others in a less degree. On this account, therefore, it is necessary that the whole of this discussion should be conversant with these things. For, to rejoice or be pained properly or improperly is of no small consequence in actions. Farther still, it is more difficult to fight with pleasure than with anger, as Heraclitus says, but both art and virtue are always conversant, with that which is more difficult. For, that which is well done, is better when it is effected with greater difficulty. Hence, on this account also, the whole business, both of ethics and politics, is conversant with pleasures and pains. For he who employs these well will be a good man, and he will be a bad man who employs them badly. We have shown, therefore, that virtue is conversant with pleasures and pains, and that it is increased and corrupted by the same things by which it is produced, when they do not exist after the same manner, and that it likewise energizes about the things from which it originated. Chapter 4. It may, however, be doubted what our meaning is in asserting that men by acting justly become just, and temperate by acting temperately. For, if they act justly and temperately, they are already just and temperate, just as those who perform things pertaining to grammar and music are grammarians and musicians, or shall we say that this is not the case in the arts? For it is possible that a man may do something grammatical, both from chance and the suggestion of another person. He will, therefore, then be a grammarian if he both does something grammatical and grammatically, that is, according to the grammatical art which he possesses. Again, neither is the thing similar in the arts and the virtues, for things produced by the arts contain in themselves efficient excellence. It is sufficient, therefore, to these to be affected with a certain mode of subsistence, but things which are performed according to the virtues are not done justly or temperately if they subsist in a certain way, but if he who does them does them in consequence of being disposed in a certain way, and in the first place, indeed, if he does them knowingly, in the next place, if with deliberate choice, and also deliberately choosing to do them on their own account, and in the third place, if he does them with a firm and immutable disposition of mind. These things, however, are not conumerated as requisites to the possession of the other arts, except the knowledge of them alone. But to the acquisition of the virtues, the knowledge of them is of little or no efficacy, while the other particulars pertaining to them are capable of affecting no small thing, but are all-powerful, and these are obtained from frequently acting justly and temperately. Things, therefore, are said to be just and temperate when they are just as a just or temperate man would perform. But he is a just and temperate man, not who merely does these things, but who does them so as just and temperate men do them. It is well said, therefore, that a man becomes just from acting justly and temperate from acting temperately, but that from not doing these things, no one will ever become a good man. The multitude, however, do not thus act, but, flying towards, they fancy, they shall philosophize, and thus become worthy characters, acting similarly to sick persons, who, attentively indeed hear what the physicians say, but do nothing which they order them to do. As, therefore, these, by such a method of cure, never have their body in a healthy condition, so neither is the soul of those ever well who thus philosophize. Chapter 5 In the next place, we must consider what virtue is. Since, therefore, three things are produced in the soul, viz, passions, powers, and habits, virtue will be some one of these, but I call passions, indeed, desire, anger, audacity, envy, joy, love, hatred, cupidity, emulation, pity, and, in short, those things to which pleasure or pain are consequent. And I denominate powers, those things according to which we are said to be susceptible of the passions, viz, according to which we are able to be angry, or pained, or are inclined to pity. But I call habits, those things according to which we are well or ill-disposed towards the passions. Thus, for instance, with respect to being angry, if we are vehemently or remissly disposed towards it, we are badly affected. But, if moderately, we are well affected. And, in a similar manner, with respect to the other passions, neither the virtues, therefore, nor the vices are passions, because we are not said to be worthy or depraved according to the passions, but we are said to be so according to the virtues or vices. And, because, according to the passions, we are neither praised nor blamed. For neither he who is afraid, nor he who is angry is praised, nor is he who is simply angry blamed, but he who is angry after a certain manner. But we are praised or blamed according to the virtues and vices. Further still, we may be angry and afraid without any deliberate intention of being so, but the virtues are certain deliberate elections, or are not without deliberate choice. In addition to this also, we are said to be moved according to the passions, but we are not said to be moved according to the virtues and vices, but to be disposed in a certain way. In this account, neither are the virtues powers. For we are neither said to be good nor bad from being able simply to suffer, nor are we through this either praised or blamed. And again, we possess powers indeed from nature, but from nature we do not become either good or bad. We have, however, spoken concerning this before. If, therefore, the virtues are neither passions nor powers, it remains that they are habits, and thus we have shown what virtue is generically. Chapter 6. It is necessary, however, not only to show that virtue is a habit, but likewise to show what kind of a habit it is. We must say, therefore, that every virtue renders that of which it is the virtue well disposed, and causes its work to be well accomplished. Thus, for instance, the virtue of the eye causes both the eye and the work of it to be good. For, by the virtue of the eye, we see well. In a similar manner, the virtue of a horse causes the horse to be good for the race, for carrying his rider ends sustaining the enemy in battle. But if this be the case in all things, the virtue of man will also be a habit, from which man becomes good, and from which he accomplishes his own work, and how this indeed will be affected, we've already shown. But it will again be now manifest if we consider what the quality is of the nature of virtue. In everything, therefore, which is continued and divisible, it is possible, indeed, to assume the more, the less, and the equal. And this either with respect to the thing itself, or with reference to us. But the equal is a certain middle between excess and defect. I call, however, the middle of a thing, that which is equally distant from each of the extremes, and which is one and the same in all things. But with reference to us, the middle is that which neither exceeds nor falls short of the becoming. This, however, is neither one nor the same in all things. Thus, for instance, if ten things are many, but two a few, six are assumed as a medium, with reference to the thing, for six equally surpasses and is surpassed. But this is a middle according to arithmetical proportion. The middle or medium, however, with reference to us, is not thus to be assumed. For if to eat ten pounds is to eat much, but two pounds a little, it does not follow that the master of the gymnastic exercises will order six pounds to be eaten. For, this perhaps will be too much or too little for him, who is to take food. For Milo, indeed, it would be too little, but for him who is beginning the exercises it would be too much. And the like must be understood of the course and wrestling. Thus, therefore, every scientific man will avoid excess and defect, but will search for the medium, and make this the object of his choice. He will, however, explore that medium, which is not the middle of the thing, but is a middle with reference to us. If, therefore, every science thus well accomplishes its work, when it looks to the middle and refers its work to this, whence it is usual to say of works that are well finished that nothing can be added to or taken away from them. Acknowledging by this that excess and defect corrupt that which is excellent in them. But that mediocrity preserves this, and if good artists, as we say, operate looking to this, but virtue, in the same manner as nature, is more accurate and better than all art. If this be the case, it will tend to the medium as a boundary. I speak, however, of ethical virtue, for this is conversant with passions and actions, but in these there is excess and defect in the middle. Thus, for instance, it is possible to be afraid, to be confident, to desire and to pour, to be angry and to pity, and, in short, to be pleased and pained in a greater and less degree, and to be both these improperly. But to have these passions when it is proper, and in such things, towards such persons, and for the sake of that which, and as it is proper, this is the middle and the best, and pertains to virtue. In a similar manner, also in actions, there is excess and defect, and the middle. But virtue is conversant with passions and actions, in which the excess indeed is erroneous, and the defect is blamed. But the medium is praised, and possesses rectitude, and both these pertain to virtue. Hence, virtue is a certain medium, and tends to the middle as a boundary. Again, to err is manifold, for evil, as the Pythagorean's conjecture, belongs to the infinite, and good to the finite, but it is only possible to act rightly in one way. Hence, the one is easy, but the other difficult. It is easy indeed to deviate from the mark, but difficult to hit it, and on this account, excess and defect belong to vice, but the medium to virtue. For simple the good, all various are the bad. Virtue, therefore, is a pre-elective habit, or a habit accompanied with deliberate choice, existing in a medium with reference to us, and which is defined by reason, and in such a way as a prudent man would define it. It is also the medium between two vices, the one being characterized by excess, but the other by defect, and farther still, it is defined by this, that some of the vices fall short of, but others surpass the becoming, both in passions and actions. But virtue both discovers and chooses the medium. Hence, according to the essence, and the definition which explains the very nature of a thing, virtue is a medium, but according to that which is best, and subsists well, it is a summit. Not every action, however, nor every passion receives a medium. For some passions, as soon as they are named, are complicated with depravity, such as malevolence, rejoicing in the evils of others, impudence, envy, and in actions adultery, theft, and murder. For all these, and others of the like kind, are thus denominated, because they are themselves bad, and not the excesses, nor the defects of them. Hence, it is not possible at any time to act rightly in these, but they are always attended with error. Nor does acting well, or not acting well, in things of this kind, consist in committing adultery, when, and as it is proper, but simply to do any of these things is to act wrong. To acquire, therefore, a medium in these, is just as if someone should think it proper, that there should be a medium, excess and defect, in doing an injury, and in acting timidly, and intemperately. For thus, there would be a middle of excess and defect, and an excess of excess, and a deficiency of defect. As, however, there is no excess and defect of temperance, and fortitude, because the middle is in a certain respect of the summit, so neither is there a middle, excess and defect, in those passions and actions, but in whatever manner they are exerted, they are attended with error. For, in short, neither is there a middle of excess or defect, nor are there excess and defect of the middle. Chapter 7 It is necessary, however, not only to assert this universally, but also to adapt it to particulars. For, in what is said concerning actions, universal assertions indeed are more common, but those that are particular are more true, since actions are conversant with particulars, with which assertions ought to accord. These, therefore, are to be assumed from description. Of fear and confidence, therefore, fortitude is the medium. Of the characters, however, which exceed, the one indeed which exceeds by a privation of fear is anonymous. But that which exceeds in confidence is audacious, and he who exceeds in being afraid but is deficient in confidence is timid. In pleasures and pains, however, though not in all pleasures, but in such as are corporeal, and in those especially which pertain to the touch, and in a less degree in pains, the medium indeed is temperance, but the excess in temperance. But those who are deficient in the pursuit of pleasures do not very frequently occur, on which account neither have they obtained a name. They may, however, be called insensate. In giving and receiving money, the medium indeed is liberality, but the excess and defect are prodigality and illiberality, in which men exceed and are deficient, in a contrary way. For the prodigal indeed exceeds in spending money, but is deficient in receiving it, and the illiberal man exceeds in receiving, but is deficient in spending money. At present, therefore, we think it's sufficient, summarily, to adumbrate these things, but afterwards we shall discuss them more accurately. With respect to wealth, however, there are other dispositions of the mind, and the medium indeed is magnificence. For the magnificence differs from the liberal man in this, that the former is conversant with greater, but the latter with small things. The excess, however, is an ignorance of elegance and decorum, and illiberal profusion, but the defect is an indecorious parsimony in spending money, and these vices differ from those which surround liberality, but in what they differ we shall afterwards show. With respect to honor and ignominy, the medium indeed is magnanimity, but the excess is called a certain inflation of the mind, and the defect, pusillanimity. As we have said, however, that liberality corresponds to magnificence, but differs from it in this, that it is conversant with small things. So to magnanimity, which is conversant with great honor, another certain virtue corresponds, and which also is itself conversant with what is small. For it is possible to aspire after honor in such manner as is proper, and more and less than is proper, but he who exceeds in his desires of honor is said to be ambitious, but he who is deficient is unambitious, and the middle character between both is anonymous. The dispositions also are anonymous, except the disposition of the ambitious man, which is denominated ambition. Hence, the extremes contend for the middle place, and we indeed sometimes call the middle character ambitious, and sometimes unambitious, and sometimes we praise the ambitious, and sometimes the unambitious man. But from what cause we do this, we'll be shown hereafter. Now, however, conformably to the manner in which we begun, let us speak about the rest. With respect to anger, therefore, there is likewise excess, defect, and a medium, but since these are nearly anonymous, we call the middle character a mild man, and the medium mildness. But of the extremes, let him who exceeds be wrathful, and the vice be wrathfulness, and let him who is deficient be a man void of anger, and a defect a privation of anger. There are likewise three other media, which have indeed a certain similitude to each other, but differ from each other. For all of them are conversant with the communion of words and actions, but they differ because one of them is conversant with the truth, which is in them, but the others are conversant with the delectable, and of this, viz the delectable, one kind consists in jest, but another in all the concerns of life. We must, therefore, also speak concerning these, in order that we may in a greater degree perceive that in everything the medium is laudable, but the extremes are neither right nor laudable, but reprehensible. Of these, therefore, the greater part also are anonymous, but we must endeavor in the same manner as in the rest to give names to them for the sake of perspicuity, and the facility of understanding what follows. With respect to truth, therefore, the middle character may be called voracious, and the medium truth, but of dissimulation, that kind which exaggerates may be called arrogance, and he who possesses it an arrogant man, and that which extenuates may be called irony, and he who employs it may be denominated ironical, or a dissembler. With respect, however, to the delectable, and that kind which consists in jest, the middle character indeed may be called facetious, and the disposition itself facetiousness. But the excess may be denominated scurrility, and he who possesses it a scurrilous man, and he who is deficient may be called a rustic man, and the habit itself rusticity. In the other species of the delectable, which pertains to the concerns of life, he who delights in such a way as is proper, is a friend, and the medium is friendship, but he who exceeds, if it is not with a view to any advantage, is studious of pleasing, but if for the sake of advantage is a flatterer, and he who is deficient and in all things unpleasant is contentious, and difficult to be pleased. There are likewise media in the passions, and in things pertaining to the passions, for bashfulness is not a virtue, and yet the modest man is praised. For in these things one indeed is called the middle character, another is said to exceed, and another to be deficient, and he indeed who exceeds, and is bashful in all things, is as it were astounded, but he who is deficient, and is not ashamed of anything, is impudent, and the middle character is the modest man. Indignation is a medium between envy and joy for the calamities of others, but these habits are conversant with the pain and pleasure arising from what happens to others, for he who is propensed to indignation is indeed pained from those that do well undeservedly, but he who is envious, surpassing the indignant man, is pained from all that do well, and he who rejoices in the calamities of others is so much deficient in feeling pain from the prosperity of bad men that he is delighted with it. These things, however, are discussed by us elsewhere, i.e. in the second book of the rhetoric. With respect to justice, however, since it is not predicated simply, we shall make it the subject of discussion hereafter. Vis the fifth book, and show how each of its parts is a medium. In a similar manner also, we shall speak concerning the rational or intellectual virtues in the sixth book. Chapter 8 Since, however, there are three dispositions of the soul, two indeed of vices, of which the one subsists according to excess, but the other according to defect, and since virtue is one of these dispositions, and is a medium, all these three dispositions are in a certain respect opposed to all. Four, the extremes are contrary to the middle, and to each other, but the middle is contrary to the extremes. Four, as the equal is, with reference to the less, greater, but with reference to the greater, less. Thus, the middle habits exceed with reference to the deficiencies, but are defective with reference to the excesses, both in passions and actions. For the brave with reference to the timid man appears to be audacious, but with reference to the audacious man, timid. In a similar manner also, the temperate man, with reference to him who is insensate, appears to be intemperate, but with reference to the intemperate man, insensate. But the liberal, when contrasted with the illiberal man, appears to be a prodigal, but when compared with the prodigal, illiberal. Hence, the extremes propel the medium each to the other, and the timid calls indeed the brave man audacious, but the audacious man calls him timid, and analogously in the other extremes. These, however, being thus opposed to each other, there is a greater contrariety in the extremes to each other than to the medium. For these are more remote from each other than from the medium, just as the great is more remote from the small, and the small from the great, than both of them from the equal. Farther still, in some extremes, there appears to be a certain similitude to the medium, as in audacity to fortitude, and in prodigality to liberality. But in the extremes, there is the greatest dissimilitude to each other. Things, however, which are very distant from each other, are defined to be contraries, so that those things which are more distant are more contrary to each other. But to the medium, in some things indeed, the deficiency is more opposed, and in others the excess. Thus, to fortitude, audacity, indeed, which is an excess, is not opposed, but timidity, which is a defect. And to temperance, the want of sensibility, which is an indigence, is not opposed, but intemperate, which is an excess. This, however, happens from two causes, one indeed from the thing itself, for one of the extremes being nearer to, and more similar to the medium than the other, hence not this, but the contrary is more opposed to it. Thus, for instance, since audacity appears to be more similar and nearer to fortitude, but timidity appears to be more dissimilar, on this account we oppose the latter to fortitude, rather than the former, for things which are more distant from the medium appear to be more contrary. This, therefore, is one cause from the thing itself, but another cause is from ourselves. For those vices, to which we are naturally more adapted, appear to be more contrary to the medium. Thus, because we are naturally more adapted to pleasures, we are more easily impelled to intemperance, than to moderation in the pursuit of pleasure. Those things, therefore, are said to be in a greater degree, contraries to which a greater accession is made, and, on this account, intemperance, which is an excess, is more contrary to temperance than the other extreme. Chapter 9 That ethical virtue, therefore, is a medium, and how it is so, and that it is a medium between two vices, the one existing according to excess, but the other according to defect, and that it is such inconsequence of looking to the medium in passions and actions, as to a mark, has been sufficiently shown. Hence, also, it is laborious to be worthy, for in everything it is laborious to obtain the middle. Thus, the middle of a circle cannot be discovered by everyone, but by him who is skilled in geometry. In length manner, to be angry, and to give and spend money, is in the power of everyone, and is easy, but to be angry, and to give and spend money to whom, and as much, and when, and on what account, and as it is proper, cannot be accomplished by everyone, nor is it easy, for this is to act rightly, and is rare, and laudable, and beautiful. Hence, it is necessary that he whose attention is directed to the medium, as to a mark, should first recede from that which is more contrary, as Calypso also admonishes. Far from the smoke, and waves direct the helm. Four of the extremes, the one indeed is more erroneous, but the other less, since therefore it is difficult to obtain the medium accurately by making a second navigation, as they say, the least of the evils must be assumed, but this will especially be affected in the way we have mentioned. It is likewise requisite to consider what the vices are to which we are most propense. Four different men are naturally prone to different vices, but this will be known from the pleasure and pain with which we are affected. We ought, however, to draw ourselves to the contrary part, for by removing ourselves very far from air, we shall arrive at the medium, which those do who straighten distorted pieces of wood. But in everything we should especially avoid the delectable, and pleasure, for we are not uncorrupted judges of it. In the same manner, therefore, as the Trojan nobles were affected towards Helen, we ought to be affected towards pleasure, and in everything where pleasure is concerned, to employ their decision. For thus, by dismissing it, we shall air in a less degree. By thus acting, therefore, in short, we shall be especially able to obtain the medium. Perhaps, however, this is difficult, and principally in particulars, for it is not easy to determine how, and with whom, and on what account, and for how long a time, it is requisite to be angry. For we indeed sometimes praise those who are defective in anger, and call them mild, but at other times we praise those who are exasperated, and call them virile. He, however, who deviates but a little from rectitude, whether he inclines in the more or the less, is not blamed. But he who deviates much from it, for the air of such a one is not latent. It cannot, however, be easily determined to what extent, and how much he is blameable, as neither is this easy in any other sensible thing. But things of this kind rank among particulars, and the judgment of them pertains to sense. Thus much, therefore, is indeed manifest, that the middle habit is in all things laudable, and that it is necessary at one time to incline to excess, and at another to deficiency, for thus we shall easily obtain the medium, and rectitude of conduct. End of book two, recording in memory of Mitchell Edwards.