Welcome to an upcoming webinar, the title is make $1,000 a day training gaps. I'm going to be doing this lecture in a few weeks, it's going to be an exciting lecture because I'm going to talk about the method that I train, which is gaps and I love to train gaps. If you'd like more information, you can email me at Melissa at thestockswish.com. Feel free to go to Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, Pinterest, Skype, and like me at any one of these places and you can join my LinkedIn group gap traders as well. Or you can reach out and call me at<PHONE_NUMBER> if you have any questions too. So the lecture is going to be on Wednesday, January 28, time is 1pm Eastern time. If you want to sign up, you can just go to this link right here and sign up. Registration is free, registration is required ahead of time, and you can go there and sign up. There's going to be a bunch of speakers at this live lecture, not just me, however, I'm going to be talking as part of the panelists and speaking about my strategy on gaps and how you can day train and make $1,000 a day and that's a good living. $1,000 a day comes out to be $5,000 a week on average, that would be $20,000 a month and that's a really nice living. That could pay a lot of people's bills and be enough money for people to quit their day and drop and train for a full-time career if it's something that they really want to do. So ask yourself, have you ever thought about day trading?  Do you want to day trade but you really don't know where to start? Like you have no idea what the next step would be where to really begin. I can teach people how to train from the ground up. I've taught people that have never traded before. So even if you've never traded before, you can learn from me. Do you trade now but do not have a reliable strategy? Maybe you're trading now, you're very experienced but you don't have a reliable strategy that pays you on a regular basis or not this kind of money. Do you desire to earn $1,000 a day? Of course, who wouldn't? I call these common days, gaps give a lot of common days because of the momentum. Have you been searching for a new career? Maybe right now you are in something that you are not that happy with. You're really not that interested in the job that you're doing and you want to find something else to do. Are you feeling financially behind the A-bomb in your life like no matter what you do, you are just flat out getting nowhere. If this is you, then come to the webinar and learn more. It's time. It's 2015. It's time to give yourself a lift up, a new start, a new career, a new life and not only that, a new you. It is 2015 and now is the time. If you think it sounds too good to be true that you can make $1,000 a day day trading, then stop and think again because it can be done. Billions of dollars run through the market daily.  Day trading is a very profitable way to trade and after you book the trade, the money is yours. It's right there. It's your account. You can take it out the next day if you want to. Trades take three to five days to settle, but a lot of brokers will let you actually take the money out the next day. It is a highly lucrative and expeditious manner to trade and profit. It's not like you're in a trade, you're an investor and you're waiting for weeks and months and years for the trade to actually go. You don't need to do that with this type of trading. The thing is, it really takes more than hard work, more than hard work to get to this level of success as a day trader. To be able to earn this kind of consistent money $1,000 a day, it's substantial. It takes ingenuity and a detailed plan of action. The number one key ingredient to becoming successful as a trader is having a specific strategy that can offer you reliable and consistent profits on a regular basis. This type of trading success and financial success in the market is by pure design. What does it take? It takes having a niche, which is what I have. If you want to trade like everyone else out there, then your results will be like everyone else. If you want to have outstanding results in your trading, then you need to be different. You need to grab hold of what works and learn from a trader who has a special talent for reading the market. Learn a method and a system that is unique. That's what I do. I have a unique method and strategy that I trade, which I alone created. I have an edge. I have an edge in the market with what I do. The people that are coming and learning from me are gaining that edge and they're absorbing that and they're learning that from me and they're gaining the skill set. Learn to work smarter, not harder, specifically this year in 2015. You've got to be able to do that to reach the income level you desire. Otherwise, you'll work yourself to death. What's the point of that? Nowadays, it's kind of like you can work so hard for a company, it doesn't even make a difference. You can't even paint over time. Making $1,000 a day-to-day trading is achievable if you set yourself on the right path because the longer you wait, the more you're pushing out the further achievement of your goals and your own financial success. Time keeps ticking. The market keeps moving. Every day, time in the market marches on. Will you get on the right path to success? Do you have what it takes? I have what it takes to do it. I did it. I have what it takes to get up and do it every day. I have the goods. I've got what it takes. Do you? You have to ask yourself this. You want to make $1,000 a day-to-day trading? You want to trade the market actively? You want to be in there? You want to make the money? Do you have what it takes? You've got to decide. Do you want to learn a unique method or a stale one? Well, there's lots of stale methods out there. You can learn from boring people too, which is not me. Will 2015 be a big year for you or a year like every other one before it? Think about it. 2015 equals the big year. The big year. When you're going to be able to achieve your goals and everything is going to work out and finally things are going to start to line up the way they should. There's a movie out. It's called The Big Year. I love it. It's about birds, but it's a cute, adorable, funny, just fabulous movie. I love it. It's starring Steve Martin. I think of this every time when I think about the beginning of the year. There was a gap play, this was just on the 15th of January, that I want to show you here as an example of how something that doesn't even work that big can make you $1,000 a day. There was one quick trade in BAC. This was the other day. You would have shorted this year. This is a short. You're going short. You shorted this year. You want to get out on the first drop. You would have been in a trade five minutes or less and you could have made $1,000. If you had taken an advanced risk of $500 and $5,000 shares, entered this trade at $15.62, you shorted it, but the stop at $15.72, exit $15.42, enter $6.02, exit at $0.42, $0.20. That's it. This trade didn't even go to the target in this trade, although it did have a bigger move in the day. For the quick trading, for the gap trading, you're in it and you could have made $1,000. Just like that. Just like that. Risk reward is two. Many gap trades give more than two risk rewards, but it's a size here that helps you make the trade the exact entry, the right sizing, and the perfect exit. This set up to do it. This told you how to do everything. You learn this from me like it was there, boom, boom, boom. There's an example of a trade that wasn't amazing and it wasn't an amazing gap. This wasn't anything special or fabulous or wonderful or unique. This is just a trade and you could have made $1,000. This happens all the time in the market. It's really about finding the consistency and having an edge to do it. You have to have an edge to make $1,000 a day. Consistently, this means you're going to set yourself apart in the market. I do this every day. Making money in the market really is about having a specific strategy and a plan of action. That's how you're going to do it. You're going to have the strategy, the plan of action. You're going to go into it and you're going to grab the trade and take it, book the money and be done. It's about empowering yourself to trade. Empowering yourself to trade and make the right choices for yourself financially to go into 2015 and do what you need to do to accomplish your goals. You don't want to get into December at the end of the year and then regret things that you did this year. You want to be happy and feel good about yourself. This is about empowering yourself to do it. I'm just a vehicle to get you there which is teaching you the information in the class. I teach a class that's called the Golden Gap course. It is a full today course on how to strategically find pick and play stocks that are professional and bearish gaps. Retakes are free for this class. The class is online. You can be anywhere in the world and take it. You can be a non-US citizen and trade the US stock market. If you learn how, it's the same thing. It doesn't matter where you live in the world. You can be anywhere in the world and take the class and anywhere in the world and trade the stock market. The class is called the Golden Gap. And the class of the class is $29.99. If you are interested in signing up, email me at Melissa at thestockswish.com. And I do not have the next dates for the class as past January. The January class is January 24th and 25th. If you listen to this video and you want to sign up for that class, there are spots available to do the course in January. I do not know the next dates. You can keep in touch with me, watch the videos, email me if you'd like more information. I will be doing classes later this year, but the next one is January 24th and 25th.  And if you know how to trade and if you don't, you're not gonna have a good year. And if you know how to trade, you will have a good year. Same as always, except for the fact that this year is gonna have a lot of opportunity for people that really, really, really, really know how to hit it because the market's gonna move this year up, bullishly, have a lot of momentum and be powerful. So again, the webinar is Wednesday, January 28th, one o'clock Eastern time. Just go to this link here, sign up. It's free, and that's all you have to do. I'll see you at the free webinar. Any questions, email me or Melissa at thestockswitch.com. Thanks, everybody, and have a great day.


The homicide investigation continues for Little Falls Man, who was found dead while hunting last November. Terry Brisk was found dead on his property due to blood loss from a gunshot wound. And April law enforcement officials discovered what they termed a couple of interesting items. Tomorrow, the Morrison County Sheriff will give us an update about the homicide investigation and we'll have the latest tomorrow for you on Lakeland News. If you've enjoyed this segment of Lakeland News, please consider making a tax deductible contribution to Lakeland Public Television.


Girls only cherry pick the rich guys. They have no emotion. They do not want nice guys like us. They only want to marry rich guys and then boo-hoo when it is having problems. Actually, this whole idea of just picking the rich guys, that's a patriarchal thing. Girls are very emotional. They tend to fall in love with whoever they like. It's from the heart. It's the men in their family, the fathers, the uncles, etc. who only want the rich guys. And you've seen this happen over and over again, whether it's in a film, whether it's the story of a regular family. Girl falls in love with ordinary guy. Father throws him out and replaces him instead with a rich and powerful man. So when you talk about girls not wanting to pick nice guys like you, the point is not whether the girl would pick you. It's whether you as a guy will meet the standard of the other guys. Will her father pick you? Actually, forget even her father. Ask yourself instead, would your father pick you if he was looking for a boy for his daughter? So yeah, this is not girls picking rich guys. This is a patriarchal thing.


Good? All right, perfect. All right, folks, let's keep on going. There'll be a brief red split in homework assignments. So you'll have a new homework assignment on Thursday. It will be breaking crypto. It should be very fun going in a different direction. So, yeah, I don't know. Submit your assignment, too, if you're late, please. Yeah, I don't know. I guess I could tell stories about how six hours beforehand a hundred of people hadn't even submitted a secure house. I was a little concerning. It got much more, and I think the closer and closer it got to the deadline. But I would highly recommend in the future for future assignments and future classes, including this one, do not wait till six hours before the deadline to submit for the first time. But I don't know. I can say that until I'm blue in the face, so. You will just go on. Cool, OK. So we've been talking about more classical encryption systems, and now we're going to shift and see what modern crypto systems are like. And essentially under the hood, they're product ciphers. So what was a product cipher? Combinations of substitution and transposition ciphers. So we talked about these before. There is a long and very complicated history into symmetric encryption. We won't go into all the details. We'll try to hit some of the interesting highlights. It's also a very active area of development, so it's not like the cryptographic schemes and properties are kind of set in stone. They're evolving over time, and new cryptographic algorithms are created, particularly when old ones are seen as undiscovered to be broken. So what properties do we want from a modern symmetric encryption algorithm? Really, really hard to brute force. So you'd be more slightly like, what is really hard to do? I'm on board, but I just want more details. I worked with RSA stuff, research projects, so that's like a digit number to a 10 digit power. Yeah, so looking through maybe thinking through some of the key sizes that we looked at of brute breaking a, so do we want, let's say, brute force for a Caesar cipher? 25 keys? Is that very large? No, very easy to test, right? 10,000, what would be a good, so how long would you want maybe one machine to have to take to brute force your key? Years? How many years? Well, it was just one year, is that enough? Are there active adversaries on their types of communication that would still be worth to devote the resources to break it in one year? Like what, let's not give you an example. What was that? Google? What about Google? I know they have all your information. OK, cool, although all of your, yeah, have you ever, I already said this, right? You've checked your Google Maps app. You can go to Location History and it shows you literally every location you've been using Google Maps, right? So, in fact, if it took them a year to break that data, maybe that would be worth it if you're a high value target. Yeah? I got a capture of credit card numbers from a credit card number. Yeah, credit card numbers would, and the thing on that creation date would likely be valuable in a year, so maybe spend a long time to do that. So if it takes one machine a year, how long would it take 365 machines to brute force? A day? It could still take a year. If you have one year-long computation, you can't make it parallel. So for the keys that we're looking at and we've been looking at, if we assume that we know when we've broken the algorithm, is it a parallel algorithm that we can just distribute and say, you look at E's, what they see with that. I'll look at A through F, and you look at whatever the rest of that is, so we can split up the work into two. Or similar with the visionary cycle, we could say. I'll go A, A, A to C, C, C, D, and you'll go from there to D, D, D, D, and we can split up the key sizes into tight-year cards. So as long as we're equally searching the search base for a lot of these algorithms, I think, I won't say most of them, but I don't like making any hard and fast claims on crypto algorithms, would be the case that you could split that up and you just buy 365 machines on Amazon. And we know how much an Amazon machine costs. On AWS, EC2, now like 10 cents an hour. So for 24 hours, what's that, 250? I'm just 300 roughly, what is that, I don't know, 600, 6,000, if all my units are right or not. So somebody should check this. Right, so let's say rough out of order of $1,000, we could break some encryption algorithm that should take one machine a year to break. And then what's our target then? So is that secure enough, let's say? How secure is secure enough? Yeah, longer than the heat death of the universe. So you're talking, I don't know what exactly that number is, if somebody's in physics currently, if they can give us an estimate. But you can think of, I don't know, 100 million years. Right, it's gonna be very difficult to parallelize that enough to where it's going to actually be feasible to compute. Okay, so we want it to be that the key size is gonna be so large or configurable maybe or something that it would take a very long time to brute force. What else, what other properties do we want? I mean, that's actually an interesting question. Would it be easier to parallelize if you're talking about brute force? It's a question would be, maybe an inverse question would be, would you want to parallelize the encryption process? If I gave you 50 gigs of data, we'd have to start at the beginning and encrypt all of it until the end or could you split it up into chunks and encrypt those? Any possible, any possible requirement like that? If you want that. So I guess that's another question to talk about. So the question is, do I want, let's say I make an encryption algorithm that requires you to have a gigabyte of memory to do this encryption operation. And that means that in terms of brute forcing, you can slow down the attacker because they can't make FPGAs or something like that because it's hard to get any of your memory there so you're slowing down the attacker in some way. But now, I don't know, what kind of computing devices don't have a gigabrain? We have a watch. Our watches don't have a gigabrain, what else? Credit card processors probably don't have a gigabrain, although they could, yeah, calculators. Calculators, yeah. Your phone charger? Your phone charger, yeah, which has a lot of weird stuff in it. Or IoT devices, maybe have a smart home, like my friends in San Francisco have this Alexa thing that I was going to say Alexa turned on the lights and the lights go on, kind of weird. So they have three different lexas and they're all different things in different rooms. Sorry. Yeah, so the question would be if you made this kind of encryption system that required a massive amount of memory to either encrypt or decrypt, now you're limiting the applications where you can use encryption, right? So you're using encryption and now, well now my watch can no longer securely communicate with my phone because it can encrypt or decrypt anything. Right, so actually it's kind of unintuitive, but for a lot of these algorithms, we want them to be as fast as possible so that they use the least amount of resources so that people start using them everywhere. It's actually a big complaint against using HTTPS, so in securing websites so that the website communication was secure, people said, well, I don't want to spend all the CPU cycles on this encryption operation, I'm going to waste CPU, so, and it's going to delay, increase the latency from my client to the server and eventually what Intel did is they added support for encryption algorithms in the chip set, so now the chip itself does encryption very quickly, power efficient, everything like that. And so yeah, so we want something that's a very large key size that is fast and so we'll look at some of the algorithms here. So the, and we'll kind of, we're not going to, I don't know, I guess, I should never say never, but I probably won't have you implement one of these things, but I want you to understand how they work and how they relate to the classic cryptographic algorithms that we've used so far. So DES was one of these first encryption standards and it was proposed by IBM as a standard for encrypting sensitive or unclassified government information, or something like that. Yeah, okay, so sensitive, unclassified government information, so not something that was required for top secret information, but that was sensitive and unclassified and super interesting things. So this is 1976, right? So this is the dawn kind of of, well, way closer to the beginning of computers than we are now. So you're talking about machines that have less power than your iPhone or Google phone or whatever you have in your pocket. It's only about this is weird, so they proposed this, so they had this, they wrote up the standard. So why is a standard important for a cryptographic system or algorithm? It makes it so that other people can use it? Yeah, so it makes it so that other people can use it and implement it, and you can have, at least if nobody knows how to decrypt that information, the point is you have to have the key to decrypt it, so you want as many things as possible to support this system. So this is really weird, there were tweaks to it from the submission after consultation with the NSA. Seems kind of sketchy, right? So you're seeing the rest of that in there? Yeah, it's not that. The natural kind of response to this would be probably somebody at the NSA make the algorithm to give them essentially a backdoor, so that you can think of that there was, so you encrypt it with one key, and you can think of there's two keys that decrypt it, that same key and then the NSA's key could always decrypt that. So yeah, we'll talk about that later, we'll leave that lingering in the air. It also, okay, so looking more at the specs, it has a 64-bit data block size, so the idea is this is an algorithm that takes in 64 bits of data along with a 56-bit key. So how many possibilities are there in 56 bits for the key size? What was that? Yeah, two to the 56, what is that number roughly? Somebody? 100 trillion trillion. 100 trillion trillion? Yeah, so this would be a, so this is, again, so this is, again, you can see this is a better, gives us much more in terms of increasing our key space size than we had with necessarily a vision air cipher, right? We've increased it to two to the 56. 100 trillion trillion. Yeah, I guess we can scope that out, but I think that's not even fast enough by today's standards, and I think we'll see some breaks later. But essentially, so important thing is you can think of these crypto systems at a, essentially it's a black box. So what gets put into them is 64 bits, and this one and a 56-bit key and out comes garbled encrypted 56, 64 bits. So what are some of the issues there? Let's go draw this picture, I like drawing. Oh no, okay, just like. All right, so one way to conceptualize and to think about this is you have this VES box that does crypto stuff, and what you put in is 64 bits of data, and you put in the 56-bit key, and then out comes, so we can think of as we thought of in our model, so this is the message, this is the key, and then here we have the cipher text. So 64 bits, cipher text. What's the problem here? Trust it. All right, let's assume we'll get into how it works. We've been working into it with the algorithm, but if I want to send you the message again, well you can't, so that's interesting, so maybe you don't know which to which. What about, so I want to send you the message hello, can I encrypt that with this, but how would I do that? All right, I have the message hello, but this takes in bits, so how do I deal with that? Yeah. Yeah, just pad it. So I may need to pad it, but first I got translated to bits, so how do I do that? Yeah, right, there's ASCII values for each of these. Let's see, we can look at the ASCII table, hexadecimal. Can I put these side by side? I can, nice. Okay, so I have, I'm gonna go all lowercase here, because I can, 68. So why am I doing zero x before this? Because that is such a distance. Yeah, so it's representing it in hex, right? So these represent bits. L is 6C, C and O is 6F. Okay, do I have a 64 bit number? Or 64 bits, where? Five times eight, 40, I have 40 bits here, but I don't have 64 bits. I'm still, I still can't use this yet. What do I need to do? Yeah, I need to have some, I need to have some way to deal with the fact that I'm trying to send less than 64 bits, right? So I need, anyway, so let's at least ignore the padding problem for now, because that is actually a real difficult problem. Let's say I want to put zeroes at the start. We'll put it up zero bits, and then the rest is H-E-L-L-O. But now we have 64 bits. We generate a random 56 bit key, and then we encrypt it. We have some ciphertexts. It's great, the only thing that I can decrypt that is now the person with the key. Awesome. What if I want to send the message, hello, space, c-s-e, space, three, 65. What if I want to send this message? Can I do the same thing I had to do before? All right, I can turn it into ASCII, six-a, six-f, sorry, five, six-c, six-c, six-f, space is 20. I don't know what this is, so we'll just do three there. 20, whatever, one, two, three, four. So can I put this in my DES algorithm now? What's the problem? What's the problem? Yeah. Somebody. You have to jump in. Oh, not everyone. Yeah, it's more than 64 bits, right? So we have this building block that does encrypt it only on 64 bits, so we have some way to figure out what to do. What do we do with this message? Do we chop it up into pieces? We'll see different ways of doing this that have actually different security properties, but this is, I want you to start thinking about when we look at these cryptographic algorithms, they're essentially designed to analyze at this level of 64 bits, can I'm inputting here 64 bits, I have a 56-bit key, so it's all around this here and these other notions of, okay, how do I actually send a real message so that's much larger become interesting factors. But now let's kind of zoom in to the DES and break apart that a little bit and just see what kind of crazy stuff gets up to here. Okay, so essentially plain text comes in, so we have the very top of the 64 bits, there is the IP is the initial permutation, so that's a transposition step you can think about. And at the end, so looking at there, there's a final permutation and then the plain text, where's the key? Yeah, okay, there we go, okay. So then parts of the key come into this F function that has been encrypted with the previous step and essentially the 64 bit key comes in and the key has 16 different rounds where the bits are shifted and different parts of the key are used in different steps of this algorithm. So there's basically 16 steps of this process starting from this permutation. We'll see this F is basically a substitution cipher, each of those different Fs do different things and do different substitutions, basically swapping bits for other bits. We could actually see it's really cool, you can see this mapping, so this is a PC1 that takes the 64 bits of the key and permutes them, so that's, remember when we were drawing the transposition ciphers, so we had the original one and we drew arrows of where they would go, this is the same thing, but on 64 bits to 48 bits. Oh, the key isn't different, no, the key is 65 bits, that's wrong. And then in these other steps, you have other permutations that go on, so you can actually look at all of these things, implement all of them, then digging even further into the F function. So 48 bits of the key are taken with half of the block of the plain text. Then they're XORed, so this circle with the cross in it kind of is, this is the XOR operation, and then each of those bits is spread out and passed to a different, what they call an S box, and each of these S box stands for substitution, so it's just each of them have different substitution tables for what substitutes were, and they each have different output, and if you see it's kind of crazy, there's one, two, three, four, five, six bits in and four bits out, so you put in six bits and four bits come out, and then that is subject to another permutation where things are all mixed around. And then digging into the S boxes, you can basically use this table to look at and figure out for every S box, and this is, so the crazy thing to go into the NSA scheme. What the NSA changed is one, I think, one or two values in one of these S boxes, to kind of use as part of this algorithm, as part of this substitution, so the goal here is to show you that this is essentially very complicated, and that's why we're not gonna go into the details. But at the end of the day, it's all just transitions and substitutions, so there's nothing fancy than, from what we've previously seen, it's just different, and so let's go back. Let's go back here and let's talk a little bit before we talk about how it got broken. Let's talk about what we want from it. So we talked about properties a little bit, right? We talked about wanting it to be difficult to do for, which is good. We wanted it to be fast, which is good. Low memory, which is good. Want to be able to encrypt all the things. What are some other properties that we want to be true, and maybe from a tax that we saw on visionare and Caesar ciphers? Difficult to figure out that's a ciphertext. Let's say, no, let's say we tell people it's a ciphertext and we still want them to break it, or we assume that they know that it's a ciphertext. Maybe that's a better way of putting it. Yeah. There go patterns and frequencies. Yeah, patterns and frequencies, right? Essentially, if you think about it, the problem with all those previous algorithms was patterns, frequencies, statistics from the input data would manifest still in our ciphertext. So essentially what we, kind of what we want is essentially no relation between the message and the ciphertext, right? We want it to be, essentially, you can think of as random. We want every bit of the ciphertext to be equally likely to be flipped. Another way to say that is, what if I send, let's say the message hello, right? What if I change one bit of this message and I change this to e? So I had the original hello message. I have some ciphertext c. I encrypt this with the same key. I have some ciphertext c-prime. What should the relationship be between c and c-prime? Should they vary by one bit? No. Why? You could try and brute force messages and get there a lot quicker by knowing how quick a message is. Yeah, what was it? Or maybe that would tell me either information about the ciphertext. I could compare different messages and I could see which ones were different by one bit. It's leaking significant information from there. So what do I want to be true about, in this case, c and c-prime? C-prime is completely different from c? Yeah, completely different, right? Every bit has an equal probability of being flipped just from one thing having changed, right? So this is kind of why we're coming back here is to tie that to everything you saw with all those permutations and everything is essentially the idea being that one bit flip will diffuse throughout all of the ciphertext and change with equal probability all the resulting ciphertexts. So the attacker has no way of knowing that c1 and c are related by only one bit. Questions on this? We're talking about breaking for the fall, I guess. Mm-hmm. Ah, yes. So just like it's a similar exact same problem we have with Caesar ciphers and Vision air ciphers. So you needed to have shared the key with somebody privately first. Yeah, this is the classic. We'll get into another crypto system maybe today. We'll talk about that, yeah. Maybe, you may have to go again. If you have to break up your message, it's actually the blocks of the size of the union crypto. Let's talk about that in a bit. We'll get to that. Okay, so DES has several problems. So believe it or not, the key size is actually too small. So just doing two to the 56 or 72, what do we say, trillion and trillions? Is actually too small, which is kind of insane to think about because that's such a large number. When we think about how fast computers are and that we can do this calculation in parallel, it turns out way back in 1998, the EFF, so the Electronic Freedom Foundation. I think that sounds right. Building a custom DES cracker for roughly $250,000 that can break a key in roughly two days. Now that price has basically significantly dropped. So now in 2009, there's a company that built a machine out of 120 FPGAs, so programmable hardware machines, for about $10,000 building off the shelf components that can break a DES key in about that time. So we're breaking the price of breakage now way down. Actually, interesting, I don't know if maybe you can use a GPU for this better. And one of the really interesting things, okay, so if we go back when DES was proposed in 76, 77, then basically the field of crypto analysts advance and discover this technique called differential crypto analysts, which was discovered in the late 1980s. So roughly a decade after DES was proposed, and it turns out that the first version of DES that was submitted for standardization was vulnerable to differential crypto analysis. But after the NSA put their changes in, it was not vulnerable to differential crypto analysis. So what does that tell you about what capabilities the NSA had? Yeah, they had the ability to crack it in 1976, which the public didn't have until the late 80s. So this shows you how far ahead the NSA was in terms of crypto analysts than the general, I mean, not general public, but you're talking like smart mathematicians who were not working for the NSA. It was a super cool instance. So despite what we would think that they actually, so why, so now if we say, okay, our initial instinct was the NSA put in a backdoor there, but we have evidence here that they actually did it. They strengthened this algorithm. Why did they do that? Yeah, or it was for sensitive and unclassified, it's for sensitive, unclassified documents. So they knew the government was going to use this and they didn't want it to be trivially breakable like techniques they already had, right? So they actually had an incentive to fix it. And the other interesting thing is they fixed it in a way that nobody can actually reverse engineer and figure out why. So nobody knew why they made these changes. So they didn't release their technique of how to break it. And basically the unclassified research space had to discover these techniques before realizing that's what actually happened. So I think this is a fascinating example of, nope, not you. This is like a fascinating example of a case where the NSA fixed something based and we have documented evidence that they were basically a decade ahead of public research. Which is super cool. And then there was a new area called linear crypt analysts that, or a new technique that was created in 1993 that's even more effective. And it was basically withdrawn as a standard, it's no longer a standard now. So now to do symmetric encryption. And oh, this is getting into, okay, what we talked about. So to actually do this in practice, right? So with DES or any type of algorithm, yeah, okay, cool. We'll do this and then we'll talk about DES. So we looked at that, right? The basic algorithm, DES only encrypts with 64 bits. But we wanna be able to send messages of arbitrary sizes. We wanna be able to send as much and encrypt as much data we want with the same lick. So you're tasked with this. How do you do it? So now let's go back here. So I give you this magic DES box. It takes in 64 bits as a key. What did we say? 56, 56 bits and output 64 bits. So now you have a message M that's much larger. What do you do? Pretend you're in an interview, what do you do? Think of it. Yeah. See four bit output as the input. Okay, let's think about what's the easiest thing you could do. Yeah. 64 bit chunks. Yeah, take the message, break it up into 64 bit chunks. So abusing Python syntax a little bit. You could have the first 64 bits in one message. You could have then 64 to, what's it, 128 and so on. So split the message up into 64 bit chunks. So take the message, split it up and then pass in each of those to DES with the key and then out comes maybe like C1. So we'll call this message one, message two, message three, so on. That's input here, this is input to DES here. C2, C3 and the key goes into all of these. So it's the same key. And then you combine all of these into the cyber text. So just append them to get the cyber text. Pretty simple. So what's one of the benefits of this? Yeah, okay, so all the pieces of the message are inside one thing, so now I don't have to, well the other side's got to do the same thing, so the decrypt, they have to take the cyber text, split it up into chunks, but at least we can just send them everything, assuming they have to heave you the way to decrypt the message. It's easily parallelizable. Yeah, so you can run each of these DESs, right? They have no dependencies on each other. You can run each of them in parallel on the same machine, different machines, whatever. So you can encrypt a file, 50 gigs, if you're running five of these, you can do a five x fact. However much processing you have, you can just encrypt it super fast. And I guess the other benefit is it's pretty simple, right? It's not crazy complicated. Are there any downsides to this approach? There's only one key than a downside. Or I guess then what does that mean? What is the implication there? Decrypt the entire message if they find it different. They have more keys than- Yeah, okay, so the strength of the message, let's see the possibility of brute force is limited by the size of the key. So here is 56 bits, which is bad. But we can replace this with AES or whatever standard currently is and then we'll get whatever 256 bit key or whatever size key we want. We can do that to get rid of that. But yeah, so in some sense it's nice because we're relying on the algorithm. Yeah. Why does that matter? But I encrypted it, right? So all of this cyber attacks is all random, right? So C1, C2, C3 are essentially both random if you don't know the key. Okay, so yeah, it's kind of maybe the key argument. So the key side is I can break any of these chunks and maybe that gives me an accurate advantage. It's more, it's not as good against the statistical analysis of any particular 64 bits that were committed. Yeah, but why would that be true? Because I'm encrypting each of these as the key so it should be randomly, like essentially random. Yeah, okay, so this is the important point. So here, so what if, so in this example, what if M1 is equal to M3, right? You're sending a message. It just so happens that the first 64 bits and the last 64 bits of your message are exactly the same. What does that then say about the cyber attacks here? It's all been encrypted by the same key. Yep, which means what? Which means it's vulnerable at one point. Not quite, we're almost there. Yeah, in the back. Does this just become the E-derivatory counter to this cyber attack? Not quite. Okay, let's think about it like this, okay. So I have my, I'm gonna think like this. I have DES, I pass in M1 and key. What does that give me back? C1. C1, great. I have DES, M2, key. What does that give me? C2. C2. Now if I have DES, M3, M3 key is equal to what? If M3 is equal to M1. C1. It has to be C1, right? It can't be any other value because those two things are the same. The DES is a function. If you give it the exact same inputs, it will always give you the same outputs. So now I here have C1, C2, and C1. So now if the attacker has essentially this, so if the attacker has this cyber attack, but to C1, C2, C1, what does that tell them about the original message? Yeah, the first and the third parts are the same, which I think is where some of you were going, if you're, yeah, so you could maybe try to do visionare or something, or figure out something based on similarity here, and we'll actually see how that essentially crumbles in a second, but yeah, the key problem is, and it's likely with messages that you have, you will have repeating chunks, right? You could have a bunch of zeros that repeats, you could have all kinds of different things. Actually, let's go look at the Penguin. So this is kind of a famous picture. Oh, and so you just invented a thing called electronic code book. So this is a way to encrypt a plain text message, split it up into the block sizes, pass each one to your encryption algorithm DES with the key, get cyber text, and append it all together. So this is exactly what you just did. I don't want to do this. The problem goes in, so this is a great example of this is an original encryption of, I think it's Tux, the Linux Penguin, and this, a little bit, you have to massage this a little bit to get it to work exactly right, but if this is saved as a raw image file, so the pixels are not JPEG compressed or anything, it's all raw pixel data, when you encrypt it with ECB encryption and view it, it looks like this. So why is that? A lot of the data is the same. Yeah, a lot of the data is the same, and essentially in this case, every white pixel is essentially encrypting to something that looks like a gray pixel, but all the white pixels essentially do this, and similarly the black pixels encrypt to something that looks blackish for whatever reason. So all these pixels are getting encrypted to the same value and they're the same thing. So you can clearly see, even though we've encrypted this with, I think this is a AES encryption, we'll talk about it in a second. Even though we've encrypted this with this nice encryption algorithm, we still, these massive patterns from the plain text are showing through in our cipher text, which seems insanely counterintuitive, I don't know about for you, but for me it's kind of crazy, you're using this cryptographically secure building block that it's not due to the fact that there's a problem with necessarily DES here, the problem is how we're using that in order to send a message. So you can go check us out here, there's a good blog post that talks about this if you want to look at this, tucks more. Okay, so can we design a better algorithm then? Let's go over here. One of you mentioned something? Yeah. Yeah, so fundamentally we need some way of doing different keys for different blocks, but at the same time we don't want to have more than one key, right? So I don't want to have to share with you 10 keys because what if I send you a message that has more than 10 blocks? Or, so we need some way without actually using more keys, but we want, the key thing is we need to encrypt each of the blocks with a different key. Maybe we can change the key every time? Yeah, I'd go. Actually, maybe a thing, but let's ignore that for now. Yeah, you could use part of the previous ciphertext as a key for the next. Yeah, so we know this ciphertext is essentially random and depends on this key. Or I could maybe, if I can't use it exactly, maybe I can use it in combination with the key, like X or part of it in with the key. I think my diagram here will be my diagram. Okay, so we can do something like, so we have our message, I'm gonna say M1, M2, M3. Okay, so something's gonna happen here. We're gonna get some ciphertext C1. And, well, another thing we could do rather than messing with the key, we could actually use the same key and change the message itself. So kind of similar property. We could take the ciphertext, bring it up, X or the second message with it, then pass it to DES, which we'll now get some ciphertext two. So remember we talked about X or, especially encryption, so we can X or, if we X or M2 with C1, we'll get something. And then if we take that something, we'll call it X, and we X or ciphertext one with it, we'll get the message. If we X or the message with it, we can get the ciphertext so we can recover that back. And then we can keep doing this, so we can do this up here. So now if we have some kind of design like this, if I have, if M3 and M1 are the same, what does that tell you about the ciphertext? Yeah, okay, so let's see, M1 and M3, okay. So M1, in this current, in this design, so we have M1 with the key, we get C1, cool. We take ciphertext one, X or it with M2, pass that to DES, encrypt it with the key. So let's think about this, what if they're all the same? What if our message is just repeating A's, right? So this is basically, everything is M1. So we have M1 with the key into DES, and let's draw our little, let's do it like this. So we have DES, M1 key equals C1, right, everyone agree? Got that, cool. Now in this next one though, we have DES, we'll still use M1, so they're all M1. So but it's not M1 getting passed in a DES, what is it? M1 X or C1. Yeah, M1, I think I should probably draw it like this. Ah, no, I'm gonna use the carrot, that's easier. M1 X or with C1, okay. And so now will that give me C1? No, likely not. Likely not, I mean it's possible there's a one, where's it, one in two to the 64 chance? Wait, is it possible? No, it shouldn't be possible, because it gave me C1 and that means M1, can I actually prove this? Okay, M1 X or with C1 is equal to M1. Okay, so perfect, okay, so if, oh that's good. Okay, I wonder if it deals with that somehow. Anyways, okay, so I guess that is technically possible, but so yeah, okay, it does make sense. So there's a one in two to the 64 chance that the cybertext happens to be all zeros. But we can, let's just ignore that case for now. So we can think, okay, so DES M1 X or C1 is equal to K, so that's gonna give us some cybertext C2. And then so in the next block, now I have DES of M1 encrypt X or with C2, C2 with a key. So similar argument, this is gonna give me something like C3, so even though the every message is the same, all of the cybertext will be different because we are X oring them with the message. All right, so did we solve our original problem? Yeah, okay, let's think of a different scenario. So I have, let's say I have two messages now. So before we have one message, right, that we said was basically M1, M1, M1, and now I have a new message, I'm just gonna use M prime. So we have a new message M prime that happens to be, let's say M1, M2, M3. So we know from this message the very first block will always be, is C1, M1, okay? We'll look for M prime, so for M prime we're gonna do the DES of M prime, or no, not M prime, yeah, M1, K, which is what? C1, and then we have all the rest so we're gonna mix that in there, it's gonna be different cybertext. So if I get these two different cybertexts, what do I know about these two messages? M and M prime, let's go with this. So okay, so I encrypted this, so C, the encrypted of M is gonna be C1, C2, C3, and then actually let's go and do this, okay? So we have, so DES of M2, Exord with C1, okay? So what's this gonna be equal to? Is it gonna be C2? Or, you know, different? Yeah, so it's different, so we have M2 here whereas before we had M1, so it must be different if we're saying that M1 and M2 are not the same, and this must be this thing, it must be something like C4, and then we'll have DES of M3, Exord with C4, okay? And this will be C5, so now C prime, so my next message is going to be C1, C4, C5. So if I just have access to the psychrotex, what can I tell you about those two messages? Yeah, they start with the same characters, or they start with the same block, right? The first block of each message is the same. Why is that? Yeah, our first block is different from all the other blocks, right? Our first encryption block doesn't have anything that Exord into the first part of M1, and therefore M, it's consistent, if the M1 block and the first block is the same, and we interpret the key that psychrotex will always be the same. So we can actually solve this by essentially creating a fake random first block. So they call it an IV for initialization vector. So the idea is I generate as part of my message, so I have my message and my initialization vector, which is randomly generated. That goes in Exords with M1, passes it to DES. So now I have, in this case, so I will have not just the mess, so I'll have the message and the IV. And now here my equation changes, it's not M1, it's M1, Exord with IV, comma K, which will give me some psychrotex one, good. M1, there, everything else is good. So now my message becomes clear. So now I have my psychrotex, my initialization vector, and I have C1, C2, C3. Now I will need to generate a new initialization vector, so I need the M prime, IV prime. And the question is, what does my psychrotex look like? So now in this equation, I got M1, Exord with IV prime, comma K, and what's that gonna give me? Yeah, C6, let's re-number these, I don't like this. All right, so this will give me C6, where, so it's not going to be the same thing because the two initialization vectors are different, so it's gonna give me something different. And then now I have that in here, C6 will give me, wait, why did I do C6? I should do C4, getting in my head. So C4 will give me C5, C5 will give me C6, and now I have C prime, IV prime will give me C4, C5, C6. So absolutely no relation between those messages, right? So now I've gotten rid of that property even, and the great thing here, even if I encrypt the same message multiple times with different initialization vectors, the resulting psychrotex will always be completely different. But what did I have to give up, did that come for free? So we've increased, let's say, the security of our scheme, but did that come for free? Wouldn't you then have to communicate the initialization vector somehow? So you have to change your communication style, you have to pass the initialization vector and the psychrotex, but that's okay, that's, you know, we can figure that out, that's just protocols. Maybe it's slightly more complicated, but we're willing to do that for security here. What else do we give up? Yeah, why? Yeah, we can no longer execute each of these steps in parallel, right, at the same time as currently, because now we've created an implicit dependency on each one. So we have, yeah, we have the message, we have the initialization vector, we encrypt that, we need to XOR that, and then we need C1 before we can do the next block. And then we need C2 before we can do the third block, right? So this is something we've given up in terms of doing this, but we get nice security properties. So this is called Cypher block chaining that we just came up with, or CBC. So one is electronic code book, ECB. This is CBC Cypher block chaining. So yeah, we've basically, yeah, we've arrived at all of this, it's the same, cool. All right. So after DES, there was a strong need once it, and the cryptographic community, as we've seen kind of with the cost of, a break of DES cost $250,000 by the public sector in 98, and then in 2009 dropped to $10,000. Essentially we see that attacks against crypto systems continue to get faster and cheaper, so as soon as there's an indication that things are breaking, it's time to switch to the next algorithm. So AES is the advanced encryption standard. There was a competition that they held in order to decide which was gonna be the next standard. It was originally called Bridgendale, maybe. I don't know if anyone can pronounce that better than me. Please feel free. It was standardized in 2001. There was a five year process with 15 different competing designs, and they were all open to interpretation analysis and discussion from the community. It had now 128 bit block size, so what's the benefit of increasing the block size here? What was that? Block size? We can have a two bit key with a huge block size, but we still gotta, we would only need to break, try the different keys, right? But for two bits, we need to try four keys and we're done. Yeah, less blocks to encrypt, right? We can do, data has grown significantly, so we need to do less necessarily encryption operations. The other nice thing is you can choose different key sizes, so you can choose 128, 192, or 256 bit key sizes. And so from, I like reading this, it's pretty cool. This is from the process. So the design and strength of all key lengths of the AES algorithm are sufficient to protect classified information up to the secret level. Top secret information will require use of either the 192 or 256 key lengths. The implementation of AES and products intended to protect national security systems and or information must be reviewed and certified by the NSA prior to their acquisition and use. So this is the government's restrictions on this algorithm. So we went from an algorithm that was only useful to be used in sensitive and unclassified documents to now AES can be used in top secret documents and is, I'm fairly certain. And the other important thing that I mentioned is Intel extended the x86 architecture, so the chip will do AES encryption on the chip, saving you a lot of time. Cool, but we won't go into the design of AES, it's very similar to DES. But one thing I want to think about is, okay. I want to talk for a second about a vision air cipher. It seems simple, we've already done that. So we talked about a vision air cipher where I had the IG with the key, key, and let's say I have a message, foo. So what's this going to shift to? Can anybody do this really quickly, please? A, you can also just shout out random letters, I think that's fine too. But if you actually do it, you know. W. W, is it W? No, it can't be W, it's the same, same with a different key. There's one letter you can't say. What was it? Okay, cool. So let's say that I give you the cipher text, AWU, and I tell you the key length is three. What's the message? Any three letter message. Any three letter message, why? Don't have any restrictions for the cipher text or the key? Yeah, so the way I think about it, right, is depending on what the key is, the first letter can be any character from A to Z. The second letter can be any character from A to Z. The third character can be any character from A to Z. So you could get a bat or run out any other three letter words that are appropriate, what? Bye. Bye? Yeah, all of these are valid decryptions of this cipher text. Why? They're all real words and they're all equally likely, right? Previously, like if this was a Caesar cipher, we only had 26 possibilities, but here we have every possible combination of three letter words to choose from. So we literally have no idea which one the original message is and which one the original key is, except maybe if we had multiple messages that were encrypted with the same key, then maybe we could use that information to determine, but if we only have, and if let's say we find another three letter word, a cipher text that's encrypted with a random three letter key, we have the same problem. We have no idea what of the words the adversary was trying to send. And so I guess the question is, did I just invent a perfectly secure cryptography algorithm? Should I just quit and start a company and become a millionaire? Yes. Ooh. Sorry, just wait for him. He's on the page to block me if I quit. Okay. Yeah. It's perfectly secure only for messages of length three. Yeah, so what if the, exactly. So, okay, so now what if the key, so what if the key length is three, but the message is six or nine or 12 characters? Could you break that? Yeah. Yeah, we saw techniques to do that. The only reason this works is the key size in the exact length of the message that you're trying to send. And the key cannot be reused in multiple communications, right? You have to have a random key per communication and that key must be the exact length of the message. So when we went back to and we said, okay, so what's the, how do we share a key secretly? Take it offline and give it to them in person. Yeah, take it offline and give it them into person. But then you have to, so think about this. You have to share a key with them that's long and random enough that later on you can communicate with them, but only the length of the size of the key that you already shared with them. So on one side it's like, well, why wouldn't you just, why would you just share that message then? Could you have a secure channel for them then? But so it turns out though, what this is called is a one-time pad. So this is actually a type of encryption algorithm that requires the key to be the same size as the message. You can either use Visionair or XOR, but the trick is you can never reuse the key and this is provably secure. I mean, we just did a brief proof with Visionair Cypher with three characters. It's provably secure and possible essentially to prove for us if and only if, and this is a key, the key is truly random. So you actually need randomness and random here means every letter of the key or is equally likely. So it needs to be drawn from a uniform distribution. If there's any bias in what the key is, you can use that to break the cypher. The key is as long as the plain text and it's never reused in whole or in part and it's kept completely secret. So this is, and allegedly systems like this were used, I think even between the US and Russia. So they have the, they used to have during the Cold War like a secure, like a red phone that was a phone directed to Moscow so they could communicate. What they do is they share a book, like literally a book of code words or whatever, or keys, random keys.  So it was never, the key was never disclosed and it was never reused ever again. But this is actually used if you really need high value communication but then your problem is you're limited to basically like that book. So once you run out of keys you need to exchange new keys but you can do this in very specific circumstances. Okay, this is gonna be great. So we're talking about several things. What's one of the main drawbacks of this symmetric crypto systems?  Like how do you securely communicate with someone? Well first establish a secure communication with them and share a key. Like okay, but how do I get there if I need to establish a secure communication? So sure, we talked about meet in person. We also talked about all of the insane recording devices that are on us every day and everything that's trying to listen to us and record us. Meeting in secret is difficult. What if the person lives far away? How do you actually meet in person if you can't actually meet in person and securely share that information? So yeah, we have this key problem and I guess now we'll introduce the classic crypto people, Alice and Bob who want to communicate. So they're gonna try to start sending messages. We're gonna use them for our, and I mean I guess, maybe I'm theorizing a little bit, but I feel like kind of with the, this was seen as almost like an impossible problem. Like well of course you need a key. How else can you talk in a secure manner if you don't share some secret with somebody else? But it turns out there's an invention of asymmetric crypto systems where essentially we'll see that the goal is how can I encrypt information that I can share with you without requiring a secured shared key which is kind of insane. So to get there we're gonna first talk about a box. So actually this is perfect. I should actually build one of these things. Maybe one of you can do that. So okay, imagine on this table there's a box and it has a special kind of lock. That lock has three states, so A, B, and C. And it has two keys, but these keys are special keys. So normal keys, right, open door, closed door. So one key only moves, will only move the lock to the left. So if you're all the way in the right most state which is locked, it can move it to the left of unlocked and then to the left of locked. The other key is the right key. So we have two keys. And the other key is the right key. It only turns the lock to the right. So let's say that this key, the key that turns it to the left is public. I give it to all of you. You all have copies of this key on your key ring in your pocket. Maybe it's on the door of this room. I don't know. The other key is one that I keep secret to me. So it's a secret key that only I have the copy of. Let's walk through some scenarios. So you come to this room. The first person here looks in this box. The box is unlocked. You go open the box and there's a message in there. What do you know about that message? Who did it come from? Anyone, right? The box is in unlocked state. You have no idea who wrote that message, where it came from. No idea at all. Now, what if the box is in all the way to the right most state? It's all the way to the right. It's locked. You get to that box. You know it's in the right most state. Do you have a key that can move that to an unlocked state? Yes, you all have this key and it all moves you to the unlocked state. You do one turn to do an unlocked. You open it up. There's a message in there that says, if you found this, you got an A. The rest of the message I'm doing. Is this a prank from one of your fellow students? Or is it true that I actually wrote that? It has to be from me? Why? Yeah, so I'm the only person that can turn this lock. I'm the only person that has a key that turns it to the right. I'm the only person that can turn this key all the way to the right. So then you know at that point that you found the golden ticket and you don't have to do anything else. Okay. What about another scenario? I think that's gonna get too dark, but you've discovered a cheating ring in the class and you wanna tell me but only me. You don't want any of your other students to know you've read them out. So you write up a message. You make it anonymous or maybe don't put your name on it. Let's go with that. But you have a message that you only want to be for me and you want no other students to read it. How could you use this box to do that? Or can you? If it's already in the unlocked state, you just put your message in and turn it up. So if the box is already in the unlocked state, you open the box, you put your message in, you turn the key to your left. Now can anyone else with that key that turned to the left open the box? Who's the only person that can open the box? I'm the only person that can unlock this box, right? So when I get that message, I can look into it. I can unlock it, open it, read the message. Now, what do I know about this message? Yeah, do I know who put the message in there? No. But what do I know about that message? Only one person saw it and broke it. Yeah, only one person put it, from when that person put it in the box and locked it, nobody else of all of you students could have tampered with that box or that message, right? So it's a private communication from at least one person. I don't know who it is, but somebody, and I know that they put it in the box and nobody else touched it. So this is essentially the way to think about asymmetric crypto systems. So you will have a, every party will have two keys, a public key that everyone knows, and a secret key that that user keeps secret. So here we have Alice and Bob. They each have public keys of Alice and a public key of Bob, and they each have a secret key that they never share with anyone else. The other thing that this is called is public key cryptography. So if you've heard of public key crypto, the same thing as asymmetric crypto systems. And so we, and this is exactly what this scenario essentially is, and this is why this is a great example of how to, and this is where I got this from, it's great. So of how to think about this and how does it even possible, and how it's possible to get into math and different things that are being more difficult or hard to do without knowing some secret information. But the important thing is to think about and understand how we're gonna use these systems. I can't believe I'm saying this. I guess I'll let you out a minute early. We'll get into public key, like the properties of these public key crypto systems. And we'll dive in more. Very good.


All right, next up, some main New York City factory footage. Is a sunrise or sunset right outside our windows? There's more cranes outside. And as you can tell, Disney's growing. All of the, if you watched Black Widow over the weekend... That's where your $29 went. That's where it went.


Welcome in the Celtics post game live. Eddie House, Amina Smith here with you. The tough, chippy, hard fought battle between the Celtics and the Pacers. However, Indiana walking away with the win, 133 to 131, a back and forth match. I'm starting to feel like a rivalry between both of these two teams. But Eddie, what made the difference tonight? Well, it was the third quarter. Again, the third quarter has been one of the places and point of emphasis, I think, for this team, for their success. Whether it be winning or losing games. And this one, you know, giving up 44 points. You know, they gave about 40 points against OKC. And you could always point back and say, we had to be better than that third quarter. We could have been better defensively in that third quarter. And to me, that's the main thing. And it doesn't come down to the ref making a call or not making a call if you take care of your business for 48 minutes or however long it takes. But that third quarter is the thing that stuck out to me. The third quarter was definitely a high point. Well, I guess a low point for the Celtics team in this matchup. But that fourth quarter, a lot went down. Let's take a look at how it all unfolded in that fourth quarter. Starting with Aaron Neesmith, getting the layup right here. And the foul, that makes it 129 to 124, five point lead for the Pacers. Look at all this emotion. You know, it's always a little bit of extra emotion for Aaron Neesmith whenever he plays the Celtics. Then the Celtics, they go on a 7-0 run. It starts with a JV layup right there. And then Jalen Brown, again, trying to get something going for this Celtic team. A jumper puts him at 129 to 128. And then his guy, Kristaps Porzingis, on this play right here. That connection very strong. A three-pointer from Kristaps Porzingis. And then the Pacers trying to hit that. TJ McConnell, check him out on this way. That is not easy to do on Jew Holiday. That's a tough play right there from TJ McConnell. And then getting back on the other side of the court, Jalen Brown takes a shot. But then take a look at this. Buddy Hill looks like it. You know, there's a foul right there. But then the Pacers, they want to review it. Rick Carlisle, he gets the challenge. And they win this challenge. He got hit upside the head. They say that Buddy Hill didn't touch him. That's what they said. They said he did not touch him. Celtics fans obviously upset about that on Twitter. And then you take a look at this next play right here. The Pacers, Matherin gets it off. Then they call a foul on Kristaps Porzingis. Another critical play here for the Celtics. And this is where things start to go downhill for this Boston team. It felt like the refs were kind of getting in the way down the stretch. Kristaps Porzingis obviously mad about that. Derrick White tries to inbound it, tries to get Luke Cornette to tip it in, does not work. And that's how we land at 133 to 131 for tonight's matchup. And Eddie, a lot of back and forth in this game. Drew Carter and Scow joining us right now as well. And I guess, Scow, I'll start with you. How did things fall apart for this Celtics team down the stretch? I don't know if it fell apart down the stretch. I thought they played well. Missoula waited until that under seven timeout, brought the guys back in. I thought they executed well.  Those guys really made some big shots. But I can't complain about the way the Celtics played in this game. I thought that they battled the third quarter. And I know Eddie is really hard on the Celtics about the third quarter. The third quarter killed us. I think TJ McConnell had a big impact on that. But I like the way that they played down this stretch. He just got, you know, like, in the animated shot ten. I thought that was a foul. I thought he got hit in the back of the head. I can't believe they missed that. I do want to go back to that, Drew, and want to talk about that foul that Buddy Hill had on Jalen Brown. Did not call it a foul in real time in the game. But what are your thoughts about that? Well, I'm just surprised that after how many times they looked at it, they didn't see the contact on the back of the head. Either they didn't see it, or they thought he hit the ball first. There are three Pacers around him here, and they called it a foul initially. So to me, to overturn that, it's got to be clear and obvious that it's clean. And that's the furthest thing from clear and obvious that it's clean. That he got hit, as Eddie said, upside the head. So I don't know how you overturn that, to be honest with you.  That Joe referee, James, Williams, Michael Smith, and Derek Richardson need to go to Zinni and either get some contacts or some new glasses, because they definitely, I mean, he got hit upside his head, tilted, and everything. And that last play on poor Zingas. Poor Zingas touched the ball first, but since he wasn't vertical, I could see them making that call. But he did touch the ball first. But it should never have came down to that. But they did show fight. And at the end, they played hard. They did execute at the end. It's that third quarter again. And these are the things that, you know, these are building blocks, man. You can look back and say, hey, man, we've got to be better than the third quarter. But I thought they got jobbed right there the last couple of plays. Skal, what did you think about the foul called on poor Zingas? I mean, I think that's a 50-50 call. Like, if that was the start of the fourth quarter, I'm like, OK, I get it. But at the end, I don't know. It could go either way. I didn't think it was not a foul, put it that way. It's one of those things where you can't make a compounding error if you're an official, because you blew one. Now all of a sudden, you want to blow the other one. So I didn't have a problem with that call. Let's just be fair. Like, I think that's a foul on poor Zingas. I mean, he hits him on the arm. He's in his airspace. You're not worried about people not liking you for saying that? I think it's good to be fair. Let's be honest. They were both fouls. I'm with you. They were both fouls. I'm with you. I'm worried about people not liking me, because I'm wearing this vest. Or as you called it, a life preserver earlier. I'm not worried about it because of the call. Let me tell you why I called it a life preserver. Because I didn't know if I was going to say it. I kept going back and forth. But the question you asked me, I forgot the answer. So I was like, dang it. I've been called a life preserver. Oh, my god. That's what you came up with? One of us that needs a new shirt. By looking at it, you called it a life preserver. That's old school. OK.  I'm not mad at you for the vest, OK? And Amina, you're the best dressed person on this show. So I appreciate you saying that. That means a lot. I'm just glad that I'm not doing Drive January, because that finish, I'm going to need one on the way back. Yeah. But you're not doing Drive January? I'm not doing Drive January. I thought everyone was supposed to do Drive January. What's the point when you don't drink in January? But also, it's like, I don't get it. It's like, why don't you drink in January? Then you drink for the rest of the year. I don't know what sense that makes. But that's just me. We're trying to turn the calendar. We're trying to get it. We're trying to reset the system. Everything magically. They lying to themselves. That's what everybody's doing. Exactly. That's exactly what's happening. All right. Let's take a break here on something supposed to be live. Look at that final score, 133 to 131.


Garrett, I can imagine this has been a whirlwind week for you trying to gather as much information as possible. But what were you feeling walking out of Dr. Eletratch's office upon receiving what he told you about your elbow? Yeah, I was feeling pretty good. It was a good visit and so feeling good. Can you describe the difference in emotions you may have had on a six-hour flight to LA compared to the six-hour flight back to Tampa? Yeah, it was a little different.  So it was, it's not something that I have, you know, had to do very often. But it's what a lot of guys have to go through all the time. So what are the next steps for you? Yeah, three to four weeks, no thrill, rest and rehab and go from there. Is it full no rest in that three to four week period? Yeah, we're going to keep the arm live, keep it moving, keep it in shape so that we can hit the ground running when we're ready. Can you at this point, maybe pinpoint a timeline when you can be back on a mound? No. Too soon, right? Yeah, I'm just trying to take it one step at a time. And throughout all this week, when you look at some of your teammates who may have some elbow issues in the past, how have they been able to guide you through this? Well, they've just been really supportive, offering, you know, some wisdom from their personal experiences, but mostly just encouragement and just putting their arm around me. Glad to have the week behind you. Yes. Kerry, thanks for the time. Thank you.


Hi guys, this is Alex with my first ever YouTube video on locks. It's my first ever YouTube video at all. Today I'm talking about the Yale 5000 series high security cylinders.  And I popped one out and tried to pick it and it wasn't having any luck. And then I sort of looked more carefully at it. And if I can get the light properly on this thing and get this thing to focus for me, hopefully you can see at the bottom of the keyway there's some little levers in there. Let's see if we move to more of a macro setting. There we are. There's some little levers down at the bottom of the keyway and I'll show this, there's one you can see it. I'll show this to you in more detail in a moment. Let's see. Yeah, you can see one sticking out just there. Okay. Now those levers interact with some side-bidding on the key and it's kind of a neat side-bidding. So this is a key that I produced by hand, first by dropping it on the floor and then by filing it back to macro zoom mode here. There we are. I think. Maybe. Okay. And then we'll focus. Okay. Now this is a quick set KW1 blank.  There we go. You can see it now. Which happens to fit the keyway and having trouble finding anything that fits this keyway. I've got some keys on order.  But the interesting bit is if you look at the bottom of the key, so that's the bottom ward along here, the bottom ward of the key, there are some little cutouts, okay. And this may be clearer if I stick it into a plug for one of these guys. Okay. Get it back in frame. You can see that these cuts line up with these little slots that are milled in the side of the plug. Those interact with little levers, which I'll show you in a second, which interact with a sidebar providing a secondary locking mechanism. Which makes this, gives this one of the properties you probably want in a high security lock. And to cut these, I simply scribe lines the points where these slots are and then used a Swiss file to cut these down. Now if you're playing along at home, the cuts are, a zero is nothing, take nothing away from the ward, a one is twenty thousandths of an inch and a two cut is forty thousandths of an inch. And those are the three sizes of the little levers, okay. So what you end up with is a key that has a profile on the side and that profile is active in that if you have the wrong profile the cylinder won't turn. Now let's see if we can get a shot of the little levers, oh that's actually pretty good. Okay. Zoom in a little, move in a little bit more. Okay. So I've got, Jesus fuck, okay. I've got one of them staged in the sidebar which hopefully you can see. And then I've got a couple of the others sitting over here. And what you can see hopefully is that there are three different depths in this little notch. This little notch is where the sidebar engages. These little bits of the sidebar, there's five of these old guys. So this one wants a zero cut. So it wants to be pushed all the way this way in the key way. So by the full board, this one here, which I cleverly don't have, the one that's in here now, the notch is on the other side. And that guy, actually, it might be, well never mind, not just on the other side it doesn't want to be pushed in at all so it's a forty cut. And then one like this, I believe, if I can see straight, yeah, that's a number one cut. And so you can see that the little slot is in the middle, okay. These little guys ride inside the grooves, okay, that are in there. They rotate, they kind of rock around in there because obviously they can't pop out as when it's in the core. And those little slots move back and forth with respect to the sidebar. And when they all engage as such, there's a little shot of one engaged. I would have one of these assembled for you, but they have a nasty habit of falling apart. And I've not gotten one on camera yet that didn't, but all those little guys engaged. The sidebar is able to fall in too. Let's see if we can get some light on there. There's a little groove inside there, okay, just like a medico or any other sidebar lock. A little groove on the side and that lets the plug rotate. In addition to that, there's some other security features, so hopefully I can get this in frame. Forgive the incredibly ghetto little pin organizer that I made out of a piece of styrofoam. And let's see, let's fine-tune the focus there, there we go. You can see there were a few master wafers in there. I don't think I got them back in the right positions. We've got two standard top pins, four spools, and all the bottom keypins are regular. These little springs here, which I have actually lost one, I'm trying to get some new one. Those sit, and I don't know if you can see this, but let's see if we can focus on that. If you look carefully, there are little holes just above where the sidebar goes, and those provide spring bias on the little levers so that they move around properly. And those, along with the levers, like to fall out continuously. So it's a pretty cool lock. Other security features, if you've studied high security locks, there's usually a few layers of prevention or protection against a variety of attacks. In this particular lock, in addition to the sidebar and the security pins, which are going to help against key profiles, bumping, that sort of thing, we've got a couple of steel pins here protecting the sidebar, and then also three of them along here protecting the shear line, anti-drill pins. Now I don't know if this one has it, but they make a high security version of this. This is, I think, just the security version that is, and I know that this is not the high security because it doesn't have the UL marker on the plug, but if it did, it would have some additional security, it would have some additional bits of steel and so forth in there that would prevent it from, make it harder to bypass. Just to show you this key with a slightly doctored lock, because this is only a five-pin key, a six-pin cylinder, but that actually turns this lock. Now my challenge to you, my friends, I've not been able to pick one of these things. They are extremely fiddly. In order to pick it, you have to, there we go, you have to simultaneously obviously pick the pin tumblers, which have spools so it wants to fall set and all kinds of fun stuff, and set all of these little levers. You have to apply a good bit of torque in order to get the levers to set because there's just not a lot of surface to engage on the sidebar, which is right over here, and then that, of course, once you have some of those set, you go picking the top pins, these guys drop, you go set those, the top pins drop back and forth, back and forth. I've not had the skill or patience yet to pick one. I have picked just the levers, taking all the pins out, all the top, all the pin tumblers out, but I've not been able to pick it fully, but it's in its full security mode. So I'm a decent lock picker, but I'm sure some of you out there could get past this. So if anyone wants to give it a go, I've got, I don't know, half a dozen of them, and it's certainly been willing to lend one out or trade for some other kind of fun lock to torment myself with on uklocksport.co.uk, one of my, some of my favorite lock pickers on there. So anyhow, that's the Yale 5000 series and a challenge to the pick wizards and others of the world who probably can defeat this thing. For those of you in Britain, the, according to the book High Security Mechanical Locks and Encyclopedic Reference, which I recommend, this particular lock is also, the same pattern is also used by a company called Bannum in the UK, though I have not been able to find any locks made by them that have this feature, but so you might be able to find one locally that, or possibly blanks locally that would work in this guy. So anyhow, I posted a PDF from the Yale catalog that shows some better diagrams of how this thing works and part numbers and so forth, so maybe those of you that are locksmiths can get your hands on a few of them. And I hope this was fun and educational and maybe one day we'll have a video of me picking it. That would be kind of cool. So thanks for watching and please give me a plus one on the video if you thought it was fun. And thanks to everybody for all the great content that's out there. Having, this is about take ten on this video. So yeah, the skill involved in doing this by yourself is, I had underestimated it, so I have a lot of respect for you folks, in addition to your amazing picking abilities. So thanks so much and hopefully there'll be more videos coming up soon. Cheers!


All right, let's check this out comes in it looks around Worried way it's here. It's great. I know this was my idea, but Actually people like this because it it tells us more about how he feels because he goes to the back of it cool Watch out. We are looking here and then across the cuts Looking here. I think you could easily have his body here So it matches across to cut a bit more and then when he sits back down I'm assuming he sits back down. See then he can still move his room back and he ends up here Which is then a more balanced composition because he gives him more room here because he's looking this way That's good. Yeah, it's gonna be great. I like it. I like it a lot. It's really cool And then in your in your blocking too When you start with this how fast this door opens how he comes in like what comes in first Is it gonna be his leg his arm his head peeking in all that is gonna tell us something about his state of mind How he closes this is he just I mean you're telling me already looking back, but you know imagine he would just walk and then you know, like there are different things where how many times has it been in a church does he walk and Keep his hand behind him to kind of make sure he closes softly But that means it's almost like he knows how to walk through a door like this Which you know again story telling wise is he coming back to a church or is this kind of the first time for him? If it's kind of the first time this is kind of neat because he has to kind of look how he closes Is he gonna let it bang?  Which I'm assuming that's what you're gonna do Which is cool and then that's cool. All that is cool, too and even here like That little swing I know I don't know your intention right now in this but it's could be neat where he might almost feel the back of Of that thing here like he's trying to like he's he's looking this way But he brings his arm back and almost kind of taps his hand to kind of feel where is it? All right, he kind of wants to blindly sit down like it reaches arm out to hold But he doesn't quite know where it is like little details like that, which will also make some frail And you can always do that and then stop and move on to this arm, which is fine, too And then what I said here Yeah, that's kind of thoughts and then you're asking about just for starting blocking being efficient to me the way I do it is I Do you know imagine I'm gonna bring this down here Imagine this is my Maya timeline. I said a key roughly every four it's pretend this is four frames every four frames I said a key and I key the whole character except hands and facial stuff So I got my major poses, you know, however, whatever you're doing if that's your your passing or if you know If someone's jumping and you got a squash and then you got your full extension and you got your squash at the top Whatever it is. I do my major poses that kind of tell the story of course depending on your actions You might have obviously a lot more Poses, you know, not that broad, but I don't really care about timing as much I mean I kind of make sure that after four frames that's where the body will be after four frames It will be here, but then I move these guys around in the timeline So that ends up being going from every four frames to you know, this might be Might be like that You know, this might be this might be my timeline at the end so that I'm doing Roughly the timing that I like so after the main pose I go, okay This is kind of timing now this moves the way I want it and it kind of works for me and then I go layered So then I concentrate. Okay, let's do the root first Make sure everything works with the roots and then the chest and then the head so that because the root is going to influence Everything else in on your rig So once I fix that it's going to be much easier to fix this So I go big big body parts first right and then this and then arms and legs if you do a walk which you do here I would probably do this Conjunction with that and then the chest but I always kind of go back and forth between feet and roots because of You know and then just something I would see the pelvis as well for weight shifts, but I can whoops I kind of go through that I kind of set the main timing and then I shift around the These guys in a timeline to get my main Movement and timing right and then I go layered and I go body part by body part just to make sure And that has served me pretty well so far in terms of blocking and being efficient because by keying everything like this and Moving just those main keys and because the whole body is keyed It's very fast. I can make very quick changes If I move for instance this key over to be here, but then the pose is kind of weird I just adjust the pose on this right if I need more drag or more offset already put this all in my main blocking I don't do drag overlap and stuff in the layer path. It was all in the first pass Especially offsets because why not? I mean, I don't need to wait. I know what needs to be offset So that has helped me pretty well and obviously shooting reference or finding reference We're just making sure that you know what you're doing not going blindly in it every time I just start a shot without a plan I'm definitely not as efficient as I would be if I had a planned out and then for ultimate efficiency For something like this. I would set up my camera. I will find a bench Act exactly this one out right you want to shoot your reference to look like it's exactly like a shot a camera angle Why is prop wise and I would sit down and do all the acting I will bring this footage into Maya Right and basically rotoscope this whole thing and it sounds like blasphemy But basically that way I know is the acting going to work with my rig the scale of my rig with my camera angle and my set And I notice within five minutes because again, I just gonna rotoscope everything every four frames every three frames But then when you're done, it's gonna rotoscope So then what I do is I go you know when you shoot reference or whatever and you do thumbnails to look at the best poses I basically do this but because I have everything keyed out. I start deleting things so I go I like this pose. I like this pose. I like this pose and I start deleting everything in between And maybe at some point I like like a specific head move exactly the way I rotoscoped it and I must so I might keep a lot more keys and Then once I have you know, usually I delete like seven percent And then I go in and put in offsets and key frame and do the proper easins and outs But that is when I'm in big crunch at work I I do that because it's you're never gonna end up being Using the rotoscope stuff but for blocking I mean I basically block stuff out in five ten minutes and it's or yeah I mean depending on your on your complexity and how many characters you have But if you just if you have your footage and you copy your footage take a couple keys out spline and you go like yeah That could work.  No, I hope that makes sense. If not, you can always All right All right, there's an email you can sign up you can start whenever you want You can submit whatever you want you get 16 submissions either way a like and subscribe would be awesome. All right. Thank you


This is stock number 7T510A. We are here at Summit Automotive in Fond du Lac, Wisconsin. You're new and used light duty truck and Ram headquarters. Today we are checking out this super clean 2017 Ram 1500 crew cab 5 foot 7 inch short box. This truck has the legendary 5.7 liter V8 Hemi motor and has been fully safety and inspected by our service shop. It has a fresh oil and filter change. All the fluids have been checked and topped off and this truck is 100% ready to go. Bright silver metallic is the color we shoot all of our videos in 1080p, 60 frames per second. So if you have HD capabilities on your computer, tablet or smartphone device turn them on right now because it is like you're right here looking at the truck with me and definitely your best way to check out the vehicle quality and condition wise before seeing it in person. If you want to check out more photos of this truck in the upper right hand part of your screen is a link right to our site where you can check out all the photos. It has a 20 inch factory alloy rims with chrome covers. It has newer hand-cooked Dynapro ATM 275 60R20 tires with just about all the tread left. I mean that's probably 90% of the tread left on those tires. Drive aside front fenders in excellent shape. I didn't see any dents or dings on that. Headlight lenses are nice and clear. Has a chrome trimmed grille, front bumper parking sensors. I didn't see any dents or dings on that front bumper and the hood is in excellent condition as well. Passenger side fender, no dents or dings on that and the passenger side rim, no scuffs or scrapes. As you go down this side of the truck you can see just how clean the body is, how reflective and mirror like that paint is. We take these HD videos so if you are far away or even if you're close by and just cannot make the trip down but you're still interested in purchasing the vehicle, you can still see the vehicle, hear the vehicle and have confidence in what you're looking at before you even get here. So that when you do get here there's absolutely no surprises. You can do shopping from the comfort of your own home. In fact we offer a Summit Auto Fastpass in the upper right hand part of your screen, a link where you can apply for financing, get pre-approved, see a payment quote. Even appraise a trade if you have one all from the comfort of your own home on our website. Framing underbody is in excellent shape. These back rims are in excellent shape as well, no scuffs or scrapes. And the back tires have just as much tread as those front tires. You can still see the little wear knobs on the side of the tires from how new they are. It has the plastic wheel well liners which keeps your frame and underbody looking good. Rear bumper is in really nice shape. I didn't see any dents or dings on that. It has a full towing package which includes a receiver hitch four pin and seven pin wiring. And you can see that the back tailgate is in excellent shape as well. Chrome tip dual exhaust has a Mopar soft tonneau cover. No rips or tears on that. That's a very nice shape. And it does have a sprain bed liner as well as the LED bed lighting which is right there. Pretty cold out today. Tailgate shuts nice and solidly. Locking tailgate back up camera. And down this side of the truck just as clean as that passenger side. No dents or dings on the box. And for full disclosure this back rim no scuffs or scrapes on that. Down the rest of this side. Very, very nice and clean. Has the heated mirrors with the built in directional signals. Inside the big horn package gives you the gray cloth interior. Both of these front seats are heated. No rips or tears on the seats. They are in excellent shape. And you do get driver side lumbar factory floor mats throughout. Power windows, power locks and power fold in mirrors. A power fold in like so. And power fold out. Has the auto headlamps. And as we hop inside the truck here you can see that this one has 42,357 miles. You get the digital spinometer, outside temperature and compass display. You can change those corners to whatever you want. Comes with the heated leather wrapped steering wheel. No scuffs or scrapes on that. Cruise controls on the right. Gear selector on the right as well. And Bluetooth and information center controls on the left. Audio controls on the back of this steering wheel. Comes with the 8.4 3 seat radio. Which gives you AMF, MN, Sirius XM radio capabilities. You can also do your heated seats and heated steering wheel right here. You can check out your backup camera without even putting it in reverse. You can do your climate control here as well.  This one does not have factory navigation on it. But the cool thing about this radio is that you can install the navigation on here for $595. If you want to do that we can do that here at our shop. See your sales professional for more details. But we can do that here for $595. 8 speed automatic transmission. Push button 4 wheel drive. Heated seats. Heated steering wheel buttons. And your stability controls down there. And you do get more tactile climate control buttons right there. Comes with a 115 volt, 150 watt plug in. Passenger seat and format are in excellent condition as well. No rips or tears on that. And the headliner is in great shape too. You do get your map lights. Your power side and rear window button. And your power home like buttons for your garage door security systems and lighting systems. And you do get 911 NSS buttons in the rear view mirror. Which are features of the vehicle that you don't have to pay for. We'll take a quick look at the back seats. And then we will check out under the hood. Back seats are just as clean as the front seats. There are no rips. There are no tears back here. Very nice condition.   I don't think these seats were ever saddened back here. Very nice and clean. Has the load floor which is nice if you got pets. You can put both sides down. They got a nice flat place to lay. Or if you got muddy boots or tools you put them on there. Not going to wreck your nice seats. Also if you put both sides down.  And they're not going to move around on you. You do get in-floor storage right here. With two easily removable bins for easy cleaning. You can put ice and drinks in there.  Comes with the child safety locks in the back as well. And we'll take a quick look under the hood. I would personally like to thank you for checking out the video today. And hopefully from this HD video you will have been able to tell just how clean this truck is. All the way around inside. Under the hood we have the legendary 5.7 liter V8. Hemi motor. Engine bay is very clean. Runs very smooth. This truck has been fully safety and inspected by our service shop. Has a fresh oil and filter change. All the fluids have been checked and topped off. The truck has been gone through mechanically 100%. And this truck is 100% ready to go. To see more pictures of this truck or one of our other 450 new and used cars, trucks, SUVs, minivans, Wranglers. You name it we got it. Go to our website. www.summitauto.com. Full pictures and descriptions of every single vehicle from two locations all at summitauto.com. If you'd like to check out more HD videos you can go to youtube.com. Slash Summit Auto. Remember to like, subscribe and share on this video and all the videos that you see there. In fact in a second you will see a link to subscribe to our YouTube channel on your left. A link to more light duty truck videos like this one on your right. If you've not been to our website on the bottom link to this vehicle on our website. Click those check us out. We're super excited to help you with this really clean 2017 Ram 1500. Crew cab 5 foot 7 inch short box. Big horn with the 5.7 liter Hemi. Thanks again.