Hello everyone, welcome to remote sensing and GIS for rural development. This is week 4 lecture 5. In this week, we have been looking at the data types for GIS and we have focused on vector data type in this week's lecture. So the data that we get from government resources and observation data is in the form of point line or polymer and that data is easily converted into a vector database in GIS. So moving on, we have seen the panel of QGIS and we also looked at some major tools that we can use for vector analysis. Some examples were given as in buffer width and the use of these tools were also discussed. For those who have to get more introduction of QGIS tools, I will share today's lecture time in looking through the documentation of QGIS especially for vectors. So these two links I have already given in the previous days lectures and I hope you had time to look at these links. These are the same links that we use to read about QGIS, look at the forums, login and create questions, wait for answers, etc. Now we will look at specific documentation that we can use for vector analysis in QGIS. Once we click this and through some steps, we will arrive at this web page which talks about working with vector data. So let's check it out. I am going to click this link, it will open a page. I will have to share the page, yes. So in this page what you see is the, in this page is where we went and downloaded QGIS, the first link. So you click on discover QGIS. In the discover you can get say get started again to remind this is the most recent version 3.28, but we have gone to the stable version. Stable version has been checked long enough on the system and so it is called stable. 3.28 will one day become a stable version when QGIS goes to 3.4, 3.5, etc. But for now most users find 3.22 to be more stable, so they use that. So click on the get started and then we have downloaded this checkout documentation connect with the community. So this is where as I mentioned you will go and discuss with community on your spatial data issues, tool issues, etc. And then you will get support. But we are going to go to the user guide. I will open it in another tab and then the menu and tutorials. In the first thing, the user guide, the left is the contents. What we are very sure about is the data source that we have discussed. How do you do the data source creating the data and putting it in the browser panel, etc., etc. Creating new vector layers is what I would like to go through here. So here there has been a tutorial given step by step and with an image of creating a point shape file with some data they have given. So you can see that they have used Airbus in Alaska as a tool. And then they go step, enter the name, enter the field and then create a new shape file by using the plus symbol, create a shape file button. If you don't know this, you can click and it will also open the image to zoom in. And then you go to the projections and coordinate system. You put in what is needed, etc., etc., okay. As I said, this is not a QGIS or GIS specific course. It will be introducing that. So I'm going to go to the data sources that this software looks at. So there are two data sources working with raster data, working with vector data, okay. In the bottom, you can see the 14.3, 14.3.1. They discussed the raster data. Let's click the raster data. What is the difference between the raster and then how it is continuous data? What kind of format it is stored, etc. Whereas the vector data is point, line and polygon. And they talk about the extensions that I have given. So this tutorial can also be reading material for you. And they do look at the S3 shape format. So S3 is a proprietary software for mapping. Like QGIS, there is an S3. It came before QGIS and hence it has more features, tools, user community, etc. But it's very expensive for a lot of people. So that is why open source has been created. So we promote a lot of open source in IAT Bombay through the FASI program, which is free open source software for science and education and engineering. So it is very, very widely accepted across the globe, this program. And so I would like to also follow that and take QGIS in this NPTEL check. So you could see some other formats and how it is being stored, etc. As I said, those who would like to brush up on the basics, the materials are here. You could go ahead and read through it. Okay, so we will go to working with vector data. Okay, so you will have multiple, multiple points to discuss. So the vector properties dialogue, what it means, then it will go through each and every point that you would like to discuss in using vector data. Let's say single simple render. If I click the single sample render, you could see that how you style your vector data in the database can be done. For example, sometimes the data may come in a particular style and format. It won't look that appealing in a map. So here's where if you right click on the data and then go to properties, you will get into this layer property, data visualization tool and dashboard. In the dashboard, you can see source, symbology, labels, masks, 3D view, diagrams, fields, attributes, etc., etc. The most key I would say is source where you find information about the data, which is called the metadata. Whereas the other important aspect in this properties is the symbology. Please understand that maps you can do to analyze and get data out or analyze the data. That is fine. But at the end of the day, you're also creating visualization tool. So you're going to visualize the results, maps. So the maps have to be well observed by the viewer and stakeholder, for which the styling is very important. In some software, it's called styling. Here's called symbology. And it gives you about, for example, here, the line is a simple line. It's not dash dash line or a star-star line. It's a simple solid line. And the color of the line is given. Opacity is when you place it on the top of a map. Is it blocking the data below it? Because maps are in layers. So these kind of very, very important aspects are given. The thickness of the line, what unit is the thickness? If you would like to have a template of design, you have dash black, dash blue, dash green, and effect emboss. These kind of things are there. These are saved styles that you can quickly use without changing color, opacity, width, unit, et cetera. Again, if you don't know all this, we can always go with a default setting. Some of the data here are default. So you can just click, click, and then say, accept, apply, and then it will come up. The other thing I would like you to notice, sometimes the dashboard visualized here on the page will not be the same as your software. This is because the software would have updated. The bullets, the points on the left-hand side would have changed. However, most of it will be there. So don't worry that the system, the way you use it will change. If that will not change. Only thing is there will be addition, and some tools will be removed, or some bullets on the left would be removed. So you could see how you could do categorization, and then rendering it with names, labels, et cetera, et cetera. It's very extensive. It runs through multiple pages. I would not, again, cover all this, but it'll be good for those who have limited basics to look at this. So then what you do is you can also come to the general tools where you have layer panels. What does it mean? Like it gives you the styling doc, new group, filters the legends tree, and then configuring map themes, show all layers, hide all layers, select layers, all these things. Because you will be layering your data, it is good to have only those data that are needed for your map to be visualized. You can have it in your stack on the background, but make sure that you don't have to show all the data upfront. It is not needed. So this is about your general tools about NQGIS, and more importantly, your user guide gives you how to work with vectors, symbols, and then all the symbols, styling, different symbols, drawing effects, label properties, et cetera. And then all the left-hand side that you saw, masks, label, join, attributes, everything are given here. So you do have attributes from properties where you can collect data and then add it in the attribute section. So you can customize your data. You can auto-generate your data. All these kind of things can be done. Again, we will be working mostly with data that is taken from government resources and then applied here as a tool. So we have already seen Boone, NASA data, et cetera. Most of them are raster data, but we can also look at how to collect data from observation data and then add it as attributes here. Then we also have vector tiles, which tiles are packets of geographic data packed together. Because as I said, when you send data or when you share data, sometimes it's better to share as a packed, as a database. That can also be done here, where multiple data are added. And then given as a vector tile. I'll go back to the vector data, working with the vector data, working with the attribute table. You have multiple table columns and rows. The columns define the objects, whereas rows are attributes, how many entries are there. And then you could do some spatial joining of tables. Because in one table, there'll be location like city name, whereas the other table will not have it. But you know that the ordering is linked to the city. So you can merge the tables. This is very important while working with vector data. Because sometimes government and non-government data has the city name and the district name implied, which means they'll have a code. City one, city two, like as pin code. The pin code tells you where the location is. For example, you have 400764IAT Bombay. And PoE is linked to that pin code. But if you don't want to label it as PoE, you can always label it as a number, if at all the government is collecting like that. So my point is, if you have a data with shapefiles of district cities and towns, you can merge these two together by joint tables or a joint tables function. These are kind of advanced. But again, sometimes your data requires you to join and merge the data. So that is what we are discussing here. So that is all about this function working with vector data function. Again, as I said, there are multiple ways you could label your data. There are multiple ways you can access the data. And there are multiple ways you can store the data. So all this have been given here. Please go through it. One tool that we will use more is the field calculator. It is actually used to create new fields or create new rows and columns based on an existing column. For example, you have length divided by 1,000. And so the function length, dollar length, is how you write it, the syntax. It returns a length of a nine string. If you need a length of a border of a polygon, use dollar perimeter instead. So here you could see that dollar length has given the output. The syntax is how you write the code. Here there's a lot of codes. Sometimes that is where proprietary software will have this as a tool. But here you will have to type it as a code. And if you just type it here in the search box and show help, it brings about a lot of lengths. And you know that you want to create a new field where the length of a particular shape file is stored. So if you can see here, it is create a new field. So in a table, you're creating a new field, a new column. And the column name is called length underscore kilometer, which means the output field is a decimal. It's a number with kilometers. So maybe it was in meters, the length. So length gives you the length of a nine string in meters. So what you would do is you would divide it by 1,000 to get the kilometer. So some simple coding you will have to do. And you have to tell which column, which field you are going to take and then map it. So you can also create a new field or update an existing field. If you update, the data will be corrupted or the data would be updated. So as I always said, it's always easier to have a create new field and then preserve the old field so that you don't, if you do a mistake in these kind of codings and stuff, you don't lose the initial information. So field calculator is where you would go and delete a field, edit a field, convert a field or even create new fields as given here. The multiple examples given, editing multiples field, how you would edit, use a toggle sign, the pencil sign, if you click and then say edit, and then it will start editing. So all these, as I said, you could go through these tutorials. It has been given in the videos tutorial also, but for those who would like to go through the exercise, you can go through this. It is like a cookbook recipe, we say, where we click, click, click, and then each picture, each image that comes is also given in the website. So you can compare and then work through these homeworks. They're given some example data and gone through these exercises for you. Okay. So I will close this and then the manual is about using QGIS tools, the multiple modules. I would like you to concentrate on the creating vector data. Okay. So here you would say first lesson is to create a new vector data set, feature topology, forms, actions. You can go through the create a new vector data set and then it will tell you the goal is to create a new vector set. It is not as difficult. It's green in color. So follow along, which means it just says open, very, very simple basic steps. They will give you open QGIS, create a new blank project, navigate to create menu, and then create the field. So each image is given to show you what we're going to do. So this is a create a new shape file and shape file type is a polygon. So you have three point line and polygon. They've taken the polygon. So then you also have, once you create it, you'll have to give a projection and a coordinate system where the reference coordinate system is given as WGS84. Again, if you don't know for your location, what to give, the forum helps you. You can go and say, for example, what is the CRS for Indian region and then you'll get it. So then you add fields. So once you create the polygon shape file, new database for vector, you will have to have columns where new fields or objects are going to be put. For example, you have a shape file of states. Then one of the field will be name. You want to give the district name or the state name, and then the area, the population, male, female. So all these are fields, objects, and within the field, you have data. The rows become the attributes. So it says, look at this new field. What type of field is it a string? Is it a number? You'll have to, since it's a name, it's a text data. How much length of the data you want to give, et cetera. So all these are kind of self-explanatory. You would give, within the field, there are two, in this polygon, there are two. One is name and then the other is ID. Name, for example, state Tamil Nadu and the ID is number one. Zero one would be the ID, and it is 10 in number. So maybe the zip code can also or the pin code can also be kept here for a unique identifier. Okay, so then you go to raster is another one, but we'll come to this when we discuss the raster. So we will keep this part alone for today. So moving on, they also have training materials in English, Brazilian, French, German, and Czech. There are a lot of tutorials that they say are available. So for example, it says official, training materials can be found here. If you click, it opens on the QGIS training modules, classifying vector data, creating vector data. We just went through this tutorial, right? And then there is a workshop written in English, translated in 450 languages, done by Ujwal Gandhi, who is like, as I said, a volunteer who gives a lot of time on these. So if you click this, you can also get into some of the tutorials, all open source free, based on QGIS. So you have different versions. You have basic operations. You have intermediate, advanced, and then water specific, et cetera. And then there is also a tutorial material developed as part of the workshop on Ecology and Evolutionary Biology program at Texas A&M University. So you can click here and then go in. Most of them are not videos. So however, it's still okay to go through and do like book book recipe, as I said, step one. They'll ask you to do, and then an image is there. So you will have it. It's written in simple English. It's not difficult. So please go through it. There's a fundamentals of GIS, intermediate of GIS with QGIS and post-GIS. And then a lot of coding, if you would like to do the advanced part, can be done here. So there's introduction, advance, and customized QGIS with plugins and Python. You could definitely use these. These are the training materials. And the training materials that we find online are also usable. For example, every entity, private or government agencies do spend a lot of time on these kind of tutorials to support students, researchers, and anyone who would like to use QGIS. So coming back, I would like to again stress the fact about QGIS. But before that, I would like you to look at how do you search for vector data? So you have to type shapefile download for India, just say for searching. So in QGIS, you can see that a lot of download shapefiles, boundaries, Diva GIS, et cetera is there. I will explain Diva GIS here. So how you have to search for if you want is just Diva GIS. It opens like this. It's a very useful data archive for point data and some raster data. Once you click Diva GIS or download data by country, you will go through the download program to look at what is this Diva GIS about? How is it free? And then documentation, English, and different language. And then how it has become free, spatial data. And out of this, what are the data that you can collect? Sometimes it also brings data from multiple resources. For example, here you have Eden Project, Landsat data from different resources, the elevation data is also here. So I would like to conclude by just going through this exercise of how do you get country-level data? So click Diva GIS. Again, the boundaries may be different. They keep updating. They keep changing these boundaries. So please be very cautious about using it. Use mostly the Indian government websites. Some data, if it is not available, yes, you can use these kind of resources. But be very careful on the northern boundaries and other boundaries of India because sometimes they do not have accurate information, which is the full coverage. But they'll give you what is the data about. For example, I've clicked India and they tell what are the data that they have and what is the source. So source is this one. So you have administrative boundaries. This is where I'm talking about. The boundaries may not be correct. There is no vouching of these who are the government agency telling that this is the correct data to use. Like this, there will be multiple data online. Please do not use them unless and otherwise it has been verified and the government of India approves it. Here, this has not been approved as the boundaries. So be careful in using it. Maybe if you go to the source and if that is approved, you can use it. But for the southern part, most of these data are accurate, especially the administrative boundaries, inland water, which is the rivers, canals, road, network, railroads. Elevation data is same. You don't have boundaries. It's a raster. It's a continuous data. So you can take it. The land use land cover is their population from the census and then put it as the years format. World climate data, world climate or world climate data is pretty good and well used by researchers around the world. It gives you rainfall, wind speed, temperature, humidity. Most of the parameters for climate are given here. And the visitor is also the name of the coordinates, which gives you some administrative data also. The formats, whatever formats, what is the resolution? All these can be obtained from here, the format and resolution. Resolution is mostly given as spatial resolution. It is not talking about temporal. For example, land use land cover is for a particular year 2000. It is not every year or every five years once and the units is 30 seconds. You can always convert the unit to metrics by using some formulas. Okay, so once you get okay, it will ask you to download the data as a zip folder. You can download it and apply it in GIS. But again, be careful on understanding the data. Is it been approved by Geometer of India? So one more link that I would like to share is data.go.in. So this is a good dataset that we can use. Okay, open data platform. Here also you can get a good amount of shapefiles and point data. The point data can go into, you can make a shapefile as discussed in the tutorials earlier. So for example, you can go here and click. I put the amount of water, you can click. And then it will tag whatever data it has. So for example, surface water quality from Putucherry, Andhra Pradesh, water bodies, number of water bodies, et cetera. You can, it's all in a dataset module like a table. And then you know that table is there. You know it's Tamil Nadu. You can link it with a GIS database. Okay, sometimes shapefiles are given as formats. So you can click shapefiles or reverse. So you can see here that the government of India. This is the government of India data. So you can use it. It has been approved and put as a data in the data.go. You can download as a zip through the URL, how many downloads, et cetera. So shapefiles, reverse, airports, and then rainfall points where exactly you can get rainfall points. If you can click here, more, more information about the data comes up. And then you can see that a published date, updated, what it contains the data about the data, grid rainfall points of the entire country. So all these are pretty well established. And it is also having a lot of other data. For example, here you have years, year-wise funds allocated under Jaljeevan Mission. So this is a very rural development scheme. We have discussed this in the first two weeks of the lecture.  Now for rural development, we need this information because we're going to put it in a map and show that this is the how much funds have come, but how is the benefit? So funds versus benefit ratio, you can analyze and work it through. It's shared in Twitter, but the links are coming. Take you back here. For example, I'm going to click this. It'll come back. Basically it's a Twitter handle there, but then it goes and comes back to the data.gold.in where the data is being stored. Some other, so you can see community data.gold.in. And then you'll have all the data in a visualized Excel sheet or some format. So you do have a running database. So you can also take these data and then put it in your computer new shape file. For example, if this is a year fund allocated central share for the entire country, you can see that around 390.31 pros has risen to 3,590 crores in 2020-2020. So in this, you can also type it as a attribute value in your database. So a lot of data can be taken. One goal of this is also to give students a link to where you can find data. So there's a visualization tool you can go through, which has been updated on 12th July when you're going to and then you can download the data as a table. So you can see here the table is there. As I said, you can convert the table back into shape file and put it across India. So these are the ways you could find data. I will cover two data sets. One is Diva GIS. A lot of people use it. However, the boundaries could be wrong and there is no guarantee the boundaries are working. But data.gov.in has most of the data scrutinized by the government of India. So it is actually a trustable data source. Sometimes there is a less speed in updating and that is why people use open source data like Diva GIS and other sources. But slowly this is also picking up because spatial data and mapping has been key indicators for nations development, which has been covered in programs like Datishakti and mapping of India, water bodies, et cetera. So with this, I would like to get back to what we have been discussing on the links. We have worked through these tools. As I said, QGS has been in use since 2002, 20 years at least. Public license works on all software opening, open source software and operating systems. And multiple agencies have been using it, the US, Switzerland, et cetera. The process is cycling in terms of using and defining the problem. But please understand that always there is a possibility of from the decision coming back into redefining the problem, creating more data sets and then updating the data sets. With this, I would like to conclude a week four's lecture. There will be a lot of discussions on agriculture and global development, which is put up by the Nithya Iovs vision of New India. And there's a lot of mapping and data that can be used, remote sensing and GIS. I will see you in a week five lecture. Thank you.


دعنا نبدأ أريد أن أرغبكم all to the Carnegie Endowment وفي هذا المنزل نحن نحضر بشكل جيد مع the Baker Institute ونحن نحضر ما أعتقد أنه جيد جدا كما يضعون على الطاول يجب أن نتحصل على الأسفل الأسفل عن المنزل الإسراني ويكون من المنزل في ماذا يفعل ننبدأ مع المساعدة بشكل جيد أم يا دي رجل ومصرون جيد أن أصبح على أن all of you know بعد أن أم باستر جير جير who will give his remarks on the Baker Institute's part of the report that has to do with the two-state solution. I will present the one-state scenario that the Carnegie Endowment has written, and then open up the floor for questions for both Ambassador Gerigian and myself. After that session, we will move to another session where we will have a panel discussion with Palestinians, Israelis, Americans that have either participated in the report or will comment on its contents and open the floor again for questions regarding that. So with that, I'll give the floor to Ambassador Gerigian. Thank you very much, Marwan. Indeed, a privilege for me and my colleagues from the Baker Institute to share the podium with the Carnegie Endowment. A very prestigious organization. I'm very happy to see the size of the audience. I thought the Palestinian issue was no longer relevant, but it seems that there is some relevancy by interest that's displayed by your coming. Marwan and I, you'll see in the report, co-authored a forward which frames the reference of the whole purpose of this report. As you all know, since the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991 went for the first time in the history of the conflict, the Arabs and the Israelis sat down in direct face-to-face negotiations which led to the Oslo process, which also led 1994 to the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty. The idea of a two-state solution emerged as the real aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. As we well know today, that concept is being severely challenged and its viability is being put into question, and our report basically addresses this, I think, in very realistic terms. Let's face it, the Israeli-Palestinian issue is not going away. Demographic trends and settlement construction mean that the two communities are growing ever closer physically, ironically, while remaining separate politically, socially, and economically. So our report attempts to look at the actualities and the trends with a fresh and analytic eye, as Marwan mentioned. A fundamental question I think that policymakers and people in think tanks have to address, and in our own minor way we're trying to address it as a report, do we need new ideas for new determination and political will behind the previous ones? We make clear that any solution must adequately address the interests and needs of both sides, and we also make clear that imposed solutions simply do not work. So the section that we authored on the Baker Institute side, we do not deny, as Marwan will expound, that a one-state reality is emerging, and a two-state solution is in trouble. But what we argue is that the two-state solution should not be abandoned, as it provides the most coherent framework in our eyes for a democratic Israeli state living in peace and security next to an independent and sovereign Palestinian state. Marwan will address the one-state solution. Let me briefly survey so we'll have time for questions the content of our report. First, let me make clear that no solution will be viable if it is not based on the fundamental concept of land for peace. According to the UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, I am dismayed by so much verbiage being given to concepts such as economic peace, devoid of progress on the core principle issues that have to be addressed in any Israeli-Palestinian settlement. Economic reconstruction, security arrangements are critical for any peace agreement, but the core political issues between the two sides is what the real aim of negotiations have been and should be. We also advocate in our part for the report for the United States to be an important trusted broker for both sides in the final status of negotiations. No, I'm no longer using the word honest broker because it has fallen into disrepute, a trusted broker on both sides. I still believe that the United States is the essential one power still in the world that can garner the trust of both sides in going for a final solution, but we must become a trusted broker. Now, there is a third option that we have, that's sort of the big gorilla in the room, which is the continuation of the status quo, the continuation of the occupation, the continuation of the intermittent hostilities, be it with Hamas or be it in the north with the Lebanon and his fellow boards, be it with the constant friction between Palestinians and Israelis. That is the option we are living with today, the continuation of the status quo, and if you're a realist you can make an argument that this status quo can continue for a much longer time, but I think it is replete with too much danger for that to be the objective of policymakers. So, the other key factor that both sides should understand is that there's a critical distinction between equitable political compromise in the negotiation and capitulation on your principles, and too often these two factors are confused. No side in any successful negotiation will capitulate on principles, but political compromise is not a dirty word. In fact, it's the essence of diplomacy, it's the essence of politics. Our report goes into the parameters of a two-state solution which are well known to everybody in terms of what the general contours have been. There have been different interpretations of that, but certainly the territorial aspect of peace, the settlements, refugees, Jerusalem, security, resources, state-to-state relations, infrastructure development, the parameters are there. And a key factor underlying any further negotiations is the Arab Peace Initiative, which should be maintained, should remain on the table and reinvigorated, although we were discussing just this morning, it's being hollowed out by the lack of progress between the parties. We have a section in our report by Samuel Abbott, who is a Baker Institute Fellow. He's the Hasib Sabah Fellow at the Baker Institute, who is a key expert in the Palestinian Authority on the territorial issues. Muhammad Abbas introduced me to him and told me, this is my man on territorial issues. And so I wanted him to have a very brief focus on the Palestinian perspective on the territorial components. And he says some interesting things, like first of all bringing the end to the occupation, but agreed modification of the border between Israel and Palestine could allow approximately 80% of Israeli settlers to stay where they are living today. On the Palestinian side, the definition of a permanent border is critical to state-building. It creates the certainty necessary to successfully manage refugee resettlement, economic state-building measures, and allows the Palestinian government to plan and construct an effective physical infrastructure to build a prosperous Palestinian state. He advocates, obviously, a settlement freeze during negotiations. But the territorial component of peace is essential. You cannot skirt around it. Now, we have another section on the domestic political considerations and challenges and opportunities. And while the political trends on both sides seem discouraging, public opinion on both sides is dynamic, changing according to the political atmosphere. And the public has shown that trust can be rebuilt, that leadership matters, that peace is possible is critical. So, in the following sections in our side of the report, Gilead Sher, who is just, I will announce, as a new Baker Institute Fellow, he is in the Rabin Chair at the Baker Institute. He will discuss his insights on the political dynamics in Israel and political opinion in Israel on the two-state solution. And Khalil Shikaki, who is also one of the authors of our section, who many of you, you know, is one of the best experts in the Palestinian community on polling, addresses the complex public opinion environment in Israel and Palestine, as well as the challenges and the opportunities. I will leave it to Gilead when he is up on the stage to talk about his part of the report on Khalil Shikaki. I think he makes some very interesting observations. Today, the majority of Palestinians polled, reject the two-state solution. However, while the public is not a force for peace, it is not an impediment to peace. If leaders do reach a peace agreement, polling that he has done suggests that the public is likely to support it. And there's great, as you know, distrust between both sides, which is growing every day. But based on public opinion research, according to Shikaki, among Palestinians, particularly during the past three years, findings point to one conclusion. Again, Palestinian public opinion will not be an impediment to peace. And the issues that they are focusing on on the Palestinian side is Jerusalem, the refugee issue, and the right of return. So, there are two important policy implications that arise from his analysis. First, the Palestinian public has not yet decided that the two-state solution is dead. That's an important conclusion. Regardless of the reality on the ground today, especially settlement expansion and the, let's face it, the erosion within the Palestinian Authority and the challenges of governance that the Palestinian Authority has. Second, as far as Palestinian-Israeli peace-making is concerned, public opinion is not in the driver's seat, and given each side's great distrust of the other, it may never be. So, those are some of his conclusions. Now, what's important, and I'm just going to glance over this, is that it's very interesting, and Gilead will talk about what his polling on the Israeli side have brought up, and some of this is shared polling, and what Khalil Shikaki. If you look at polling, and this I think is one of the most valuable contributions of our report, Marwan. I think you'll agree with me, is that if you add certain incentives to the questions you ask Palestinians in Israelis on whether they support a two-state solution or a one-state solution, these incentives play a critical role and are a very important insight for policymakers in crafting the way forward if there ever is going to be negotiations on an Israeli-Palestinian settlement. For example, Gilead Shikaki says if Israel agrees to release Palestinian prisoners as part of a deal, the support for a comprehensive agreement can be increased to 70% of polling in the Palestinian community. That's important. Access to Israeli labor market would be almost as effective in symbolic terms, recognition of the historic and religious roots of Palestinians in historic Palestine. But he also mentions that not all incentives require one-sided concessions. For example, freedom of movement on both sides, Israel and Palestine increased Palestinian support for the package to more than 60%. Guarantees from the United States and major countries on the implementation of a deal, of its reach, and of course that the deal has to be part and parcel and connected to the Arab Peace Initiative. So from the Palestinian side you see there are certain incentives that if you add it to the equation increase public support. And let me make one point. We did at the Baker Institute a lot of public diplomacy in the US public diplomacy in the Arab world. And as a former diplomat and negotiator, I understand that I know that Gilead and people in this room who have been involved in certainly Marwan that if the negotiators are out here and your public opinion is back here, when you get to the point of coming to an agreement the challenge you have politically and to whoever is in political position on both sides becomes very, very difficult. So you have to bring public opinion along in any excuse me future negotiations. I'll end by the last part of our report is looking ahead in the role of the United States. We believe that we should have a political horizon and the United States can help craft that but it's really up to the parties. There has to be a political horizon that the parties are negotiating toward. If you don't have a political horizon and those are the general parameters on land, Jerusalem all the core issues refugees, security you have to have a top down approach and a bottom up approach and sometimes those are confounded to be mutually exclusive they are concomitant you build up security arrangements you build up economic arrangements you build up regional cooperation but a top down bottom up approach is really essential and there's one thing that we some of us who've been involved in this we used to base our negotiations on that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed I think that was a fallacious approach our suggestion here is that what is agreed during the course of negotiations should be deposited put in a bank deposit built on if it's economic measures security measures, whatever but you keep rolling forward you build on successive successes in the negotiations so we advocate for a departure from this old preset that nothing is decided until everything is decided agreed upon no so I think I will I will end there with one statement that the continuation of the status quo is the current option as I said but in a short and long term is a formula for instability and intermittent conflict for Israelis and Palestinians I mean just look at the neighborhood but Hamas despite the efforts of reconciliation despite talks between the Israelis and Hamas now there is a danger of eruption of violence well there are demonstrations and there is eruption of violence but then I know in my recent visits to Israel what seems to preoccupy the security establishment in Israel is the potential while no side wants it now of a major conflict between Israel and Hezbollah on Lebanon's border that would be catastrophic so the status quo is dangerous can it be lived through? yes but is this the future? so that's why we think our report is timely in terms of sensitizing hopefully if anyone is listening policy makers that in our case the two state solution should definitely not be buried it should be considered as the way forward thank you so Ed has made the point for the two state solution and I want to talk about the one state scenario I realize fully that the title of the report that we chose might be seen as provocative in Washington and indeed it is meant to be this report is not an endorsement of the one state solution but rather a call to examine other alternatives even what was considered taboo until now that might become a reality if the two state solution is allowed to die I've always said thinking wishing something will happen because all the other alternatives are worse does not make it happen necessarily we have a reality today which is that we already have a one state and that state is called Israel and under that state most of the Palestinians are living not even as second class citizens but people under occupation the longest occupation in modern history anywhere in the world 51 years and counting there is also another reality called demographics the number of Israeli Jews and Palestinians in areas under Israel's control has reached parity already in 2017 according to official Israeli statistics 6.5 million each another reality is that the Palestinians have a 33% higher birth rate than Israelis which would make Israelis a minority of 44% in 20 years time no minority has been able to rule over a majority in history indefinitely there is also a third reality which is that the Palestinian people they have a majority and now they have a majority and because their living conditions are so poor they are not happy about that and because our life is like this because the majority of the Palestinians are living in that state لأننا نعتقد أن هذه are the only solutions that will work. The Trump administration today is rumored to have what they call a deal of the century. We don't know yet what the parameters of this deal is. We don't even know whether it will be announced or not. But we do know certain things about it, which is that all of the actions that the Trump administration have been taken today were all directed against only one side, the Palestinians. Whether it is the move of the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem, whether it is the cutoff of aid to UNRWA, whether it is the closing of the PLO mission in Washington, and all other activities. And this report candidly says that if the administration thinks this is the way to affect a deal they might be in for a big surprise. What is new in this world is not that it has been, I mean, both the two-state solution and the one-state solution have been researched before. What is new in this, and I need to say that our part of the report, the Carnegie Endowment Report, were written by myself and Nathan Brown, who is going to be on the panel later on. This report tries to frame the debate in this manner, putting together the different options of a two-state and a one-state solution for the first time, in my view, by very reputable think tanks in the U.S., and issues that were considered taboo before are being put on the table in an analytical and candid manner. If a two-state solution is indeed dead, how long can we continue to avoid looking at other options? How long can we keep saying the one-state solution is a taboo that we cannot discuss? And what do we exactly mean by a one-state solution? Because certainly there are many variations of the one-state solution from acknowledging equal rights for all individuals to acknowledging equal rights for individuals and collective rights for the two-state solution. And also collective rights for the two communities and variations of the two. This report goes through some of these variations in detail. The report is an attempt to face reality and bring into candid discussion what the future of this conflict might entail, away from the old frameworks which are crumbling as we speak against an ever-changing status quo. I hope it will positively contribute to the debate by realizing the pitfalls that the death of the two-state solution will bring, and by understanding the reality and challenges that a one-state solution will result in. With that, I want to open the floor for questions for Ed and myself before we move to the second part of this event. Please, over there, please. Good morning. I am from Argentina, National Expert Defense in my country. I'm former NDAU, National Defense University here. You can ask me why I'm interested in this subject, because my country has a problem between Arabs and Israeli people. So I have a question. You speak about geographic problem, political problem, economic problems. Have you ever, or those decision makers, considered to work with young people who are not embedded in hatred? Because Jerusalem is the problem there. And as far as I know, there are universities there. So what about working with them in the United States, but not focus on policy, economic, or things like that? Work with people, young people, that is the human factor important. Thank you. Let's take two or three questions at a time and then we will allow Ed to please. Yeah, I think we seem to ignore that Israel has all the power and there's no one to contend Israel's power and Israel can make any decision at once and the decision that seems to be made is a no-state solution. We talk about Israel as a state, but it really is not a state. It has no defined borders. It does not have a defined constitution, which it seems like it that way. It has a capital city that is not well recognized. And there is no such thing as Israeli nationality. There is a Jewish and Arab and Jewish nationality and it seems Israel wants it that way. So as we keep talking about one state solution and two state solutions, we seem to be ignoring that Israel has defined what it wants on no-state solution. Another provocative question. Any? Okay, sir. Thank you. I also accept the Carnegie position on this that we've entered a one-state reality and it's interesting enough that recognition of that reality itself constitutes out-of-the-box thinking. My question is in the event that a more cataclystic event happens in the sense, let's say, Israel Annex is part of the West Bank as the Likud Party has accepted as part of their official platform or let's say there's an official abandonment inside of the two-state option. How do you think the international community the Americans and the Europeans in particular would react to that kind of scenario in terms of their policy? Okay, one more question. Yes, please. Hi, my name is Naseba from World Affairs Council DC. My question is more for the ambassador. You said that America is the trusted broker. It's the one power to both sides but clearly recently as we've seen where they moved the embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and they closed a PLO office. I just want to know do you still think that it's the one true power the trusted broker to both sides because it kind of seems like it's more one-sided. I'll take the last one first. It's unfortunate I no longer have diplomatic immunity. The reason I didn't use the conventional term the United States is the honest broker between both sides and that was premised throughout the course of our negotiations in 67 on that given the special relationship that the United States has with Israel that we were the only power that Israel might even listen to. I remember when I was ambassador to Israel Yitzhak Rabin the prime minister was very uneasy when we were negotiating with Arab parties and representing Israeli positions he was very uneasy with that. He wanted Israel to be directly in the negotiations so the reason I'm telling you that is that even though the United States has this relationship with Israel I don't think that the Israelis are totally comfortable with the United States carrying their waterfall. I deliberately did not use the word honest broker in our part of the report I said trust should become a trusted broker because I agree with you we've lost some of our monofidis in being a valid interlocutor between both sides so I agree with you that's why I use that we have to aspire to once again become a trusted broker between both sides may I take the one on the Argentinian lady please you made a very valid point about youth and I think the polling will show especially on the Carnegie side of the report and I know Khalil Shatafi has also said that there's an emerging number of young Palestinians including university students who no longer are supporting the two-state solution because they're asking a question why does the world need yet another autocratic Arab state let's go for a one-state solution where we're part of Israel as citizen and we have equal rights and that we work within a you call it what you want a one-state by national state other it's a very interesting trend it's not a majority trend but I think that's a very interesting factor that's emerging from this polling let me take this question also first we've done some work on the young generation of Palestinians at Carnegie in fact we published that report last year and our findings working with a lot of young people under 40 Palestinian activists and the polls seem to support that is that while a majority of the young people still want a two-state solution a majority of them also don't think it is possible and there is a marked shift I think in the Palestinian occupied territories from by the young generation from focusing on the shape of a solution one state, two states to focusing on a rights-based approach they want the rights they want to get as much of the rights as possible whether it is support for the BDS campaign whether it is raising the cost of the occupation and taking Israel to the international criminal court whatever it means they possess they are focusing on that no matter what that leads to in the end and it's a marked shift that I think is missed by all of us they don't think that our generation does I agree with the part that today there is a no-state solution but I don't think that is sustainable I think the current administration has a sort of a plan to take off the table key issues particularly for the Palestinians like Jerusalem, like refugees for example and basically force a solution at the Palestinians expense arguing that the Palestinians have lost and they need to accept their loss I think that's very narrow and short-term thinking I don't think that will happen and I think that the Palestinians are going to be faced with the only option available to them if there is no no-state solution which is to ask for equal rights within the state they live in and I understand that this this kind of talk is considered too provocative and taboo maybe in parts of this town but I think it is a reality if the Palestinians are arguing if we cannot achieve separation let's call for integration if we cannot separate the two communities and have a Palestinian state then we want integration we want equal rights within the state we live in so the one-state solution comes with its own set of problems and challenges and both Palestinian and Israeli communities have for different reasons the reservations about the one-state solution but regardless of these reservations this seems to be the path we are on if there is no two-state solution and quickly let's take one more set of questions because no okay I'm told we are out of town out of time but you will have plenty of time to ask all your questions in the panel so with that we are going to have Joyce Karam moderate this discussion Joyce is of course the correspondent for Al Hayat the newspaper sorry the national I'm sorry shows you how many years it has been since I left Washington and then she's joined by Gilad Shair who was an Israeli negotiator is now as Ed said non-resident fellow at the Baker Institute Zaha Hassan who's a resident fellow at Carnegie and a Palestinian past Palestinian also negotiator and of course our own Nathan Brown who joined me in writing the report on the one-state solution so please welcome them well hi everyone great to be here thanks for the 2-hour break from the flood of breaking news it's really an honor to be here with the ambassador and Dr. Muashir but mostly reading this report was very insightful for me having followed this conflict for such a long time it challenges many assumptions that you may have had being in this city for so long and it is refreshing to see how honest and out of the box it is we used to hear whispers in Washington about a one-state solution but not spelled out like this report does it coming from Carnegie and Baker to major institutions and intellectual hops and the Palestinian is really a conflict and because of this we are here today I'm really hoping to have a very honest and casual and candid discussions with our experts joining me is Zahra Hassan a human rights lawyer and a fellow here at Carnegie Nathan Brown you've probably seen his work on the Palestinian conflict on Hamas of the George Washington University and Gelaad a former negotiator and now with the Baker Institute so because we are tight on time I'm going to allow two to three minutes opening remarks from each of you then I'm going to jump to questions and we are moving to the audience so Zahra why don't we start with you do you want me to go to the podium or how did you want it first I want to start off by really congratulating both Carnegie and Baker for producing this this paper and for having this discussion about the one-state-two-state solutions and their feasibility it is taboo to talk about this subject in this town in fact we have bills in congress we have bills in the state legislatures and we have a department of education that has just come out with a policy that certain discussions about Israel and its treatment of Palestinians is going to be equated with anti-Semitism so it's not theoretical when we talk about how difficult it is to talk about this issue I mean there are real challenges that are being mounted now to prevent these kinds of open conversations from happening so I really commend the Baker Institute and Carnegie for hosting this discussion I was only told just a few minutes before coming in that we were going to have an opportunity for opening remarks but what I wanted to open with was basically looking back at someone who's been on the side of a negotiating table to think about what went wrong during Oslo so that we can understand whether or not a two-state solution is still in fact feasible and I would say there's so much one could talk about when talking about Oslo but I want to focus on three things that really prevented insurmountable obstacles to hoping that we would get to a final agreement between Israel and Palestinians and that first one is that there was never any agreement on what was being negotiated about I mean the Palestinian side was pretty darn clear what they wanted they wanted a state and they wanted an end to the occupation on the Israeli side we never got that clarity it seemed to be negotiating about gradations of autonomy rather than the end game and it was never clearly stated in the Oslo Accords that that was the objective and if you don't know what you're negotiating about chances are you're not going to get that thing so that was sort of a clue from the very beginning that there was going to be problems in the negotiations and second was that there was an agreement of the the parameters in international law and there wasn't an agreement on the parameters and this is very problematic because when you're talking about a situation where you have an occupied people negotiating with their occupier that in itself tells you that there's an asymmetry of power here that's going to make it very difficult to have a fair agreement for those occupied international law would have provided that leveling of the playing field so that Palestinians might have had a fighting chance in terms of the negotiations unfortunately by not having international law as sort of the starting point with the parameters what happened was you could have things like settlement construction going on during negotiations and an inability to stop those and then the third thing I would say is you know not having international community as a part of the process from beginning to end Palestinians were expected to negotiate an agreement bi-latterally and maybe have us facilitation or mediation but leaving an occupied people with their occupier to negotiate an agreement without any international players or to call out the side that is constructing settlements or whatever side is engaging in bad acts is problematic and there's a reason why we have a provision in the fourth Geneva convention that makes it invalid for an occupied people to be negotiating an agreement with their occupier and that's because it's just patently unfair and unless you have these three things I outlined you know Oslo was doomed to failure and we saw that by the fact that settlements tripled during the time Oslo started until today and I can talk more about sort of the issues in the report but we'll get to that during the question your argument 25 years after Oslo it was doomed to fail because of absence of an international legal guarantees to the process okay thank you through all the 25 years we had only two and a half rounds of negotiations on permanent status the camp David and Taba 2000 and Annapolis in 2007 2008 and the half round was the carry around in 2013 and 2014 so it's not 25 years of negotiations stay in day out to me bottom line is that the two state solution the two state for two people solution is indispensable for both parties and I'll start with saying that the conflict can and should be resolved along this principle however in anticipation of this ultimate deal of the century that was proclaimed imminent in early May the administration should draw lessons from from past recalibrate the expectations to a lower but attainable set of objectives and provide both long term horizon for the two nation states and a practical way to reaching it my message today to President Trump is very simple to President Trump and the international community because he has to collaborate with the International Quartet the UN the EU, Russia et cetera well listen this is a kindergarten both Israel and the Palestinians need your hands on the systems not in a blitz of symbolic and financial steps to strangle the Palestinians and to rejoice not only in this but in a balanced continuous and binding fashion now whatever you may think Zionism never aspired to effectively rule in other people for not for half a century and not for less than that and the status quo the current status quo which is anything but static is leading towards a disastrous one state which would be a tragedy for both Israelis why it is very critical at this point in time to reverse the trend towards by national state and the most important thing and Marwan related to it is to draw a border even a provisional border it is urgent it is essential it is in priority because this will secure a democratic national home for Jewish people within secure boundaries alongside a viable demilitarized Palestinian state that would self determine the the Palestinian people and 40 years after the Cam David Accords of 1978 and 25 years after the Oslo Accords it is time to change the formula we've all been negotiating according to which is nothing is agreed until everything is agreed meaning that if you don't complete a full fledged resolution of all the core issues you don't have an agreement so it's about time that we change that and replace it with whatever is agreed or mutually coordinated should be implemented now first we have to differentiate between the the main settlement blocks as well as the Jewish neighborhoods of Israelis and all the other remote settlements outside the main blocks and eastward of the security fence the remaining the remaining settlers that reside outside or eastward of the security fence are likely to be relocated roughly 100,000 Israelis and and we have to differentiate that first in terms of any policy that would be implemented secondly the process should be gradual and transitional is kind of a one-off standalone full-fledged comprehensive agreement which is not in sight at present not in the foreseeable future and third I believe that the approach to the conflict resolution between Israelis and Palestinians should be three-prong comprising of course bilateral negotiations Israeli-Palestinian negotiations however not as an exclusive course of action second a regional dialogue within the framework of the R&P initiative that was mentioned by Ed and the third-prong would be constructive independent steps that are in line with the two-state solution and eventual two-state solution and do not negate the negotiations on the regional level and the bilateral level it is critical to have a hands-on international involvement throughout the process and there's a lot that we need to invest in attention and in funding in the public buy-in and the consensus building within the respective societies and any future package of for the long term should address the R&P initiative and be based on UN Security Council Resolution 242 and 338 in addition it would be very good to have some courageous and sound leadership but I have no control over that you mean leadership on which side on both sides on even on the three sides if you want so in any event such proactive phased approach will allow preserving the conditions for an eventual two-state for two-people solution throughout a gradual creation of a two-state reality even in the absence of a comprehensive agreement so this along with a pragmatic uncompromising approach to counter-terrorism violence in any form of extremism is the right way to be going thank you thank you Nathan thank you very much Joyce let me try and make three points very very quickly Marwan and I did work together on the report I don't want him to be settled by anything that I say but I want to start my first point simply by hooking onto one word which he used repeatedly in the mentioned as well and that is taboo there's a taboo on certain kinds of ways of thinking about it but I think that taboo is for a good reason right there was a fear that talking about any kind of alternative was essentially embracing the rejection of sun both sides but so I think the first point is that it's probably time to move beyond that if you take a look at the various solutions being including the two-state solution or one of the various one-state solutions and if you were to coin a phrase draw a roadmap from here to there all roads are pretty long and winding but it's not clear to me that the load to a two-state solution is any shorter than the others that's why to break the taboo the second point about public opinion we've got some very good people here working on public opinion Halil Shikaki's work is very very good on that and you can spin that very easily in an optimistic way for a two-state solution what strikes me when I look past the data and all the tables of percentages and asking the question and that way and this is very impressionistic but how much the public on both sides have simply moved on from that debate so public opinion gets you a very good idea of saying we would accept this and not that but it doesn't measure salience very well and it doesn't mention the debates that people are actually having among among each other what is taboo in this report is not taboo in the region and these are the sorts of discussions that people are having and a discussion that was predicated only on the two-state solution would seem very much out of place among publics in the region so public opinion regardless of particular positions I think has has moved on considerably and so again it is time to break the taboo here as well and the final point that I just wanted to make there is a sentence in the forward and I think Ambassador George you've got to hear what we're referring to as a report but it's not a report it's different reports so you think everybody must disagree but in fact they don't if you read the analysis it's actually fairly similar why are there different conclusions that people draw to me there's a very different flavor with a little bit of distance between the baker and the Carnegie Parts the baker part is really about diplomacy and we heard that from Gilead Shear as well it's really about how you approach this diplomatically and the Carnegie report talks an awful lot more about demography, about long term about generational changes and this sort of thing so they're viewing it very very differently so why is my name on the Carnegie part and not on the baked part but it goes beyond that people have talked about it being 25 years a quarter century since the Oslo process but there's something even older than that the Israeli occupation if you were a school child when the Israeli occupation began you are quite possibly even likely a grandparent today so at this point it's time to start thinking generationally and not what can diplomats do given the right conditions within the next 6 months but where is this conflict going and where can it be steered in healthier rather than unhealthier directions you do mention in the report I want to ask you to do things Nathan first you do mention senior officials in the region I don't know if that's you or Ambassador Muashir that they are hinting that the two state solution they realize that the two state solution is no longer realistic but you don't say if their Palestinian is really or others so can you enlighten us perhaps more on who these officials are if you can and then I want to ask you you mentioned very interesting three governing models for a one state solution one person one vote by national or federal the federal is interesting because it has come up in the Jared Kushner some of the Jared Kushner statements but not in this sense I think and then shared sovereignty why do you think any of these are realistic or as realistic as a two state solution today with regard to the first question I'm not sure I remember the particular phrase if it was senior level officials it was probably Marwan if it was mid level low level people those are the people that have time for me so I probably should but what I would say is that the discussions you have behind closed doors and I do not have them with senior people but I do have them with people one level down tend to be much more wide ranging much more realistic and nobody is under the impression that this is a conflict that is amenable to a two state diplomatic solution anytime soon I haven't met many people who talk that way with regard to your second question and it's a great question the problem might be the person you're asking it because in a sense these are decisions if you take my observation seriously that what we're looking at are much longer term trends it might be a little bit premature to ask in which direction things are most likely to go no one particular model is how long? 10 to 20 years so it's not very difficult to come up with a beautiful model on paper that gives everything to everybody I shouldn't say it's not difficult but it's not impossible to do that but to me the real question is which way are trends going and when I look at that what I see are two societies that are still very much invested with issues of national identity so the idea that you could have one person vote and a totally equal citizenship within the next 10 or 20 years seems to be unlikely just because of trajectories and how things could develop and that's where I would probably fall back on something looking like the shared sovereignty model but you'll notice in a sense a very general model and what we are saying there is people here are initiating discussions about this and they're talking about what that means and essentially what we're saying is let's give those discussions some space let's take them seriously and let's encourage them because it's discussions on that level just as I would say years of informal and track 2 discussions gave birth to the hostile process we might be witnessing something similar on the ground right now and it's just premature to sketch out any final endpoint زهر the report the خليل شكاكي it mentions that 89% of Palestinians today find Israel untrustworthy they the numbers are as low on the peace process so how do you rebuild trust among the Palestinians in the process and what do you think would be acceptable to bring Abbas to the table well let me step back a little bit about the polling because I just want to point some things out that may not be completely apparent on the شكاكي poll which is that it covers the West Bank and Gaza Strip and it talks about the peace agreement that Palestinians would accept and the Palestinians are represented by the PLO which represents Palestinians not just the West Bank and Gaza Strip but in the Diaspora and in various host Arab countries living in refugee camps and so if you're going to talk about a peace agreement one needs to look at the world of Palestinians and not just who the Palestinian Authority might represent and at this point they can't say that they represent those in Gaza so that's a little bit problematic what concessions Palestinians would accept as it relates to the refugee issue you know 2 million refugees live in Jordan as registered refugees and Lebanon and Syria that's another million so that's 3 million out of a world of 5.3 million Palestinian refugees that are outside of historic Palestine and their preferences and opinions aren't included in the polling and that needs to be to be recognized I'm not surprised of that high number we are talking about 25 years after the signing of the Declaration of Principles in the beginning of the OSL process people have seen things on the ground now that are difficult to erase we've got a permit system set up we've got terminal style checkpoints between cities Palestinian towns are fragmented from each other Gaza, West Bank, Divide and no end in sight so it's not surprising that there's 11% that are still feeling somewhat optimistic I don't know there isn't a two-state solution to the negotiations going on so I'm not sure what would President Abbas be coming back to the table before and who's setting the table what we've seen so far is that things are being taken off the table and at this point what's left is cutting off the legs of the table there's nothing left on the table to be negotiating about so I can't see that any Palestinian and I think Nathan's work in the paper and the polling that's been done indicates just that frustration Giliad you mentioned in your opening remarks that basically the Trump approach the forceful approach the unilateral actions against the Palestinian Authority will not work and the administration nothing else worked beforehand and you've said since Camp David we've seen this report mentioned since even 1948 what would work and why do you say that putting pressure on the Palestinians will not bring them to the table they might come to the table but what kind of table would it be it's when you speak about what Trump likes to speak about the second carrot you can't always have just a stick you need to have carrots as well and I believe that the right approach to resolving this conflict because I beg to differ with the second part of the report to the Carnegie Park I believe that one state solution will not eventually look as you would like it to be seen when equality from wall to wall when you talk with Israelis from the extreme left or the extreme right especially when you talk to them about the one state solution they say yes of course equal rights from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean to whoever inhabits there except for voting so so to me you know I work at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv and every year we redo a research about all the alternatives the so called alternatives to the two state solution be it the confederation be it the one state and on all the parameters of stability and self-determination and long term interests of both parties the two state solution gets the highest score every year for the last maybe 12 years and we check every single option that is on the table or within the public discourse so you know it's been losing even through the numbers like here you say it was 58% in 2010 it's 43% in 2017 okay it's declining I mean the public opinion or the public support for the two state solution in the respective societies by the way in the Palestinian camp and in the Israeli camp both are declining throughout time I mean it's understandable isn't it but still this is the single option that gets the most support as compared to the other options and by the way if there's no two state solution or no two state reality on the way towards two state solution then you know as the democratic nation state of the Jewish people is over it will be either a non-Jewish state or a non-democratic one it cannot have both because the figures the demographic figures were presented here and are correct and the Palestinians will not have a self-determination as a people if there's no two state solution so what I would like to see Trump doing I would like to see him doing that not as a series of as I said of blows to one side and a series of hugs to the other but as a consistent ongoing binding continuous and reasonable process of negotiations on several levels along with the international community and not to forget the public because as Marwan as you rightly put as well there needs to be a convergence between what could diplomatically be achieved throughout an imposed process not an imposed solution and what the public might support eventually and you know all together we are 13 million Israelis and Palestinians between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River that's not a lot of people you can reach out to each and every one of them throughout I don't know social networking all kinds of methods to affect and get them readyer for an eventual two-state solution I could have 10 follow-ups to that including does this Israeli government is it even interested in a two-state agreement if you just keep Trump aside but we can go back to that are the Palestinians interested I'm asking you are the Palestinians interested in that I mean you've seen in all the junctures of the negotiations when really we arrived into the final phases of negotiating the two-state solution the Palestinians took always one step backwards so it's questionable whether the two parties want it but we need to know if this is the best solution and now let's work out the way to get there do you think this is really government think this is the best solution I'm very yes or no I hope that it does and now we're going to go to the floor for questions please make sure you identify yourself keep it short and make sure to have a question so let's start with ambassador Rahman here I'm Hassan Abdul Rahman former PLO in Washington and the witness to not only the process but I was with Marwan and Madrid long before before there was a Palestinian delegation at all with Arikad but it was like today but I also was one of those who believed and worked towards Palestinian state as early as 1974 when Saltawi Abou Mazen and all those guys were talking about how we should engage the Israelis in discussions in order to reach a political settlement and I'll tell you I stayed here in Washington in 2005 and I was witness and participant in many of the negotiations that took place during that period when Gilaad was himself a member of those negotiations you know when I came to the following conclusion after so many years that when we spoke about the two states we had a certain concept of the what a Palestinian state should be and the Israelis had a different concept of what a Palestinian state should be or should look like and what the Palestinians want was much more than what the Israelis were willing to give and what the Israelis were willing to give or concede or was much less than what the Palestinians expected and I think this margin was the reason for not arriving at a settlement whether it was at the time of the war or later on 2007-2008 even in the discussions between Abou Mazen and Olmert 2007-2008 because the Palestinians thought to themselves that they made their historic compromise by accepting 22% of historic Palestine for the Israelis so 22% you have to accept less than that and that was a serious problem my question to you Gelad you was part of those negotiations when we started in Oslo there were 100,000 settlers in the West Bank and I believe that the major obstacle actually it is probably the only to reaching an agreement is the settlements why and the labor as well as Likud the number was of settlers increased rather than decreased during the high days of the negotiations and when we were closer to reaching an agreement and we were talking about I myself have an answer I sat down next to Shaman Peres and I asked him that question I said why don't you rule the settlers and he said there will be a civil war in Israel that's what he said when Rabin was asked about the same question he said exactly the same thing that according to Yossi Berlin that the Israeli public is not ready for that so and the situation has become much worse today we have today 700,000 Israeli settlers in the West Bank out of a population of 2.8 Jerusalem is occupied as far as the Palestinians is concerned so it cannot be taken off the table as Mr. well he took it but we did not take it yes I want to come that's why I believe I believe that unfortunately 2 states is no longer 1 state is not possible at the time so the status quo will continue unfortunately we hope that we can break this impasse and move forward but I don't see that happening thank you Ambassador we're going to do 3 questions at a time so we're going to go right there in the middle and then over here thank you my name is Nzar Farsak chair of the board of the museum of the Palestinian people here in DC but in fact a former negotiator I was in sessions with Mr. Shear my question is more practical it was something you referred to but also Mr. Jajan mentioned which is that you think the formula of nothing is agreed until everything is agreed needs to be taken away how do you do that when the practical implication of that is that I know from actual experience from being responsible for territorial negotiations is that Israeli courts have actually used Palestinian conversations and negotiations as ammunition in confiscating Palestinian land that is Palestinians would take a case confiscation case to the Israeli court the Israeli side would say while the Palestinians in the negotiations gave up quote unquote that territory it's okay to confiscate that land from Palestinians so there are actual practical implications to the daily lives and the rights of Palestinians because of the way the negotiations are conducted and the reason this term what article was put there was precisely not to have that impact and the impact was there regardless of that law so what do you think is a better way to protect the final status solution during the negotiations or the transition period okay thank you we're gonna go right here mic behind you to your right I'm Tom Bradley from George Mason University for Professor Brown I'd like to ask what are the effects of international brokers on the negotiation process between the two parties what are the good aspects what are the bad aspects that you have when they're in the room or just outside the room great you all have 90 seconds to answer the three questions so Gilad you had two directed to you but you don't have to maybe you answer one I'll wrap them up I think it's agreed to go ahead first let me say that the territorial issue is not the most contentious issue between Israel and Palestinians the issue there was a sticking point the sticking point was always Jerusalem and the holy sites and the old city not urban Jerusalem but the center of this problem and territory wise you are right the settlements this is why I differentiated between those who will become part and parcel of Israel will be a land swap in order to compensate for the 22% and 78% of the British mandatory Palestine but I don't think that this is the sticking point in the negotiations as to the question of the final status versus interim we need to have the final status parameters and vision on the wall described on the wall within the negotiation in the negotiation room take the Clinton parameters of December 2000 more or less with small modifications but that's it there's a division of the land between the Jordan river and the Mediterranean sea there is a division of Jerusalem with a special regime over the old city there is a compensation and rehabilitation for the refugees with an individual application of the right of return under Israeli sovereign exclusive discretion and there is a security arrangement set of guarantees and the militarization of Palestine and all kinds of other issues that's it you have it on the wall but in order to get there you have to go throughout a transition throughout a series of agreements, understandings and even coordinated unilateral constructive steps that layer over layer provide a solid ground to walk towards that vision that's the way I see it okay question about international community international brokers what I would say first is that when Israelis and Palestinians have made progress in negotiations they sometimes talk directly to each other but they've always needed somebody else in the room so they certainly can play a little that way my worry is that when you don't have a viable diplomatic process like right now the ghost of those agreements and the ghost of those processes for people that's exactly one of the reasons why I think using the phrase I'm breaking the taboo there is no viable diplomatic process going on right now and the heavy international involvement I think masks at just a final point there actually is a fairly robust set of international guidelines general international legal framework and there's also a very very particular I mean the roadmap which I made the joking reference to earlier is endorsed by the UN Security Council who is fairly robust again in the absence of a viable diplomatic process that really doesn't seem to find much traction over the longer term I'm not sure that international legal framework will be completely irrelevant when your talks about kind of where things are going if we don't have a two-state solution I think that is where things are going and that international legal framework may become relevant again because it's basically only things that is there absent a viable two-state process that is going to that provides any kind of framework for the two societies to deal with each other okay we'll do another but can we just add to نزار's question about the issue of settlement construction during negotiations in theory the idea that what's agreed should be implemented immediately you know sounds good because then we can get some progress on the ground and that's a good thing in general but on the issue of territory it's very problematic for the reason you say and also because there's no guarantee we're going to get to a final agreement so if Israel's allowed to build on territory that has been defined as going to be part of the Israeli state and we never get to a final agreement that means there's more facts on the ground because the Israeli side has then legitimated a war crime because settlements are all war crimes and so this is very problematic and that's why we have that rule where we wait till the end and there's also the complicating factor that under Israeli law Israel can't seed territory its own territory without a supermajority in the Knesset so there's no guarantee that you're even going to get Palestinian some land swapped by Israel because if they can't get that supermajority in the Knesset it's not going to happen so for that reason we wait till the end of the agreement and not while negotiations are still taking place on other final status issues okay so we're going to we're going to go over here hi thank you very much to all of our panelists my name is Hilal Zand I'm a student at GW thank you Professor Brown my question I was sort of alluded to this towards the end but my question is from a philosophical point of view how is the one state solution not the funeral of both people's aspirations for self-determination because it seems to me that the one state solution sort of negates self-determination for both people and that if and Professor Brown alluded to this that each side is still very much focused on their national identity so how does the one state solution not negate both people's aspirations for self-determination it's actually not a question that's a correct comment we're going to go to the far back take a second the last seat the lady on the right the back back yes I have a question to the gentleman on my right introduce yourself my name is Liliana Rodriguez I'm from Argentina and the national defense expert if you are the president of a supranational organization and you have the total power to open the door for a first step in a short term which would be that first step declare the region non-conflict region which would be your first step okay and we're going to get a third question from the gentleman okay thank you very much thank you very much first of all for sharing your thoughts I have two very brief questions it's very short first of all how do you interpret the law that was recently passed in Israel you know about the Jewish nature of the state for you is it something that's for another conference yeah but I mean it's connected to this and maybe one for Nathan Brown can you just elaborate more on who are the people on both sides is red and Palestine this one state opportunity who are they educated religious, secular all the young because the ambassador to the region has started to mention the impact of the youth but if you have some information thank you very much okay thank you so who would like to take the question that the one state is almost a funeral for self-determination Nathan okay let me actually combine that with the other question about the Jewish nature of the Israeli say in a sense there is a considerable truth to that and there would be you've got two national communities that have invested their national identity at least large parts of them with the idea of statehood but that still does exclude certain people non-Jewish citizens of Israel for instance get excluded so it's not an ideal solution for everybody involved but the other thing that I would say is that and this gets back to the question about sort of demography I can't say on the Israeli side nearly as much but what I can say and this has come up in the discussion before on the Palestinian side I do see a generational shift where older generations were very much invested in the idea of some kind of form of Palestinian statehood it has to be a Palestinian state exactly where and on what terms that was the whole aim of the national movement I don't think that's the case nearly as much for younger Palestinians who still have a very strong sense of national identity but don't invest it in any particular kind of sovereign political arrangements there has to be some kind of national self-determination but it doesn't necessarily have to take place in a traditional nation-state framework I would be surprised if you see the same kind of movement on the Israeli side but again that's the kind of thinking that makes a one-state solution or I should say Marwan actually used the phrase one-state scenario which I actually think is better it makes a one-state scenario a little more realistic it's definitely not it's definitely not a solution a scenario yes but not a solution so the other question well the question of the one-state solution as I said it's not really a question even if you look at the Oslo legacy the Oslo legacy was to separate the two people into two national national entities that are distinct from one another with a border between them without specifically stating that the Palestinian entity would be eventually be a state but to me it's clear as the sun in the midday that it would be a state with full statehood etc but from an Israeli perspective this is the end of Zionism of the aspiration to have a democratic nation state based on democratic values equality universal values and Jewish values with the Jewish majority within secure and recognized boundaries in Eretz Israel in parts of Eretz Israel not in the totality the entirety of Eretz Israel and that would be the end of it now to the very tempting question of the lady from Argentina the one thing that I will not do is give any kind of statements and bring the parties together to a conference an international conference and all kinds of photo ops for the parties to participate in and the leaders and roll up my sleeves and call the parties to come and talk to one another there's no preliminary and preconditions to this stock while knowing that there's going to be a process it's not a one time kind of event it's going to be a long process a problematic full of obstacles and a myriad spoilers on the way but I'm going to be here with you with rolled up sleeves and I think that this is the only that needs to be done not more not less knowing that the final objective of such a process is a two state for two people solution okay well with that I did have actually sorry I'm going to use my ultimate privileges here I did have a question for you Nathan inside the Palestinian house when you see this debate playing out there is a very interesting interview today in Tablet magazine with Hamas senior figure and he feels vindicated that with all the US pressure coming on Habas that they were right how do you see Hamas emerging from this space from this period really quickly before we wrap up Hamas is Hamas is a movement is in trouble they have their own vision but they have absolutely no strategy on how to get there I think at this point they will be feeling vindicated in a sense the world that is emerging the world that we're describing this report is a world that still will have a place for Hamas and to me the very interesting thing about your question we talked about this earlier was not what he said but that Tablet magazine is doing an interview with a Hamas leader that tells you something about the trajectory of where this conflict is going excellent well thanks everyone please join me in thanking the panelists read the report excellent analysis and please stay engaged and stay dry thanks everyone I just moved here I haven't got my card but if you have your card I will contact you by email and then we can connect you have one thank you very much and it was good to be on a panel with you it was a pleasure thank you very much so where are you now tomorrow night tomorrow night tomorrow night tomorrow night


It's the International Day of Friendship, a day to recognize the importance of friends as a significant aspect of our shared humanity. It's also a day to recognize friendship as a force that can contribute to global cooperation, solidarity and peace. Our correspondent, Ungozika Ohai-JC, went out to find, you know, about friendships in Lagos. Today, I am visiting Chinasa Anacanimo, two good friends of two years. Their friendship is a kind admired by the people who know them. These two ladies share their friendship journey. They were in so close, even though they worked together. We did not like ourselves at first. What did you love at first sight? Now, if there's anything that our friendship has demonstrated is growth, gradual growth. When you say something is organic, this friendship is really organic. In the sense that it just grew from seeing that this person, like, you know, and we kind of have the same principles, and the journey has been slow and steady. There's no forceful attempt to make, you know, either of us friends. So it's not like, sit down and tell me everything about your life. If not this friend. We can become friends. Yes, we can become friends. So we catch up on it. And as we go, we take it every day. And till today, I'm still learning some things about Nasa. She has friends from different circles that probably know more stories than I do. You get. And the same thing. Right, Fasa? But, you know, there's that steady growth. When it comes to personal development, we've been on journeys together. The foundation of this friendship is being our shared development goals. Personal, you know, we're talking. And like, you know, I want to do this. Like, yeah. I mean, public speaking started with, you know, what even, how did that even start? We're going to be, you know, prepared to next level. Yeah, we're going in life. We're going in life. Like. Dami Lola, a Wallabiesi life coach, who believes that friendship can be great, but explains that humans need to be intentional about being the right kind of friend before seeking real friends. Friendship is a broad thing. But these days, people have abused and misinterpreted what friendship really is. So you hear things like, are they really true friends? Is there anything like friend and all of that out there? Yes, there's still something called true friendship. Or depending on how and what we do to sustain that friendship. Good friendship and buddies' empathy, compassion and concern of other people. It requires time and work and could transcend race, culture and national boundaries. By valuing and celebrating friendship, we foster selflessness and gratitude. And these individuals share what friendship means to them. It's a form of companionship, a union between two or more people. Like, do things together, play together, eat together. So you can rely on, call upon, be dependable to like someone that can be there for you. Happy International Day of Friendship. Happy International Day of Friendship. Happy International Day of Friendship. We all need friends. We all need friends who are very supportive. We need friends who are very reliable. We need friends who can be there for us at any time. But what kind of friend are you? Happy International Day of Friendship. Please, love, laugh. Ngozi Kaohai, HSE for Plus TV Africa. Hello. Hope you enjoyed the news. Please do subscribe to our YouTube channel and don't forget to hit the notification button so you get notified about fresh news updates.


Hello and welcome to the STM32L4 MOOC online training. My name is André Barata and I'll guide you through the independent watchdog hands-on session. IWDGs tends for independent watchdog. The independent watchdog is used to detect and resolve malfunctions due to the software failure. It triggers a reset sequence when the counter reaches its timeout value. The name of the peripheral refers to the feature working independently on the system clock. And thus it remains active even if the main clock fails. The low-speed internal oscillator is used for clocking this peripheral. Once enabled, it cannot be disabled except for a reset. The independent watchdog is clocked directly from the low-speed internal oscillator. Therefore, when the MCU enters a low power mode, the application still has to be refreshed on a regular basis. If application restrictions do not allow to do that, the application can make use of an option byte which allows to freeze the watchdog in stop, standby and shutdown low power modes. The peripheral can be started either by software or by hardware when a dedicated option byte is configured accordingly. Once enabled, it cannot be disabled except for a power-on reset. Here we can see a block diagram of the independent watchdog peripheral. The reset is generated when the 12-bit down counter underflows. It also features the possibility to be used in window mode. And as you know, the peripheral is clocked from an independent low-speed internal oscillator. In the down counter, the 8-bit prescaler, the reload register and the window registers are implemented in the VDD domain, which allows the peripheral to be operational in all stop modes as well as in the standby low power mode. The objective for this session is to learn how to set up and refresh the independent window watchdog. After configuring the peripherals in the STM32QBmx, we will make use of an LED to observe the behavior of the independent window watchdog. The hands-on is going to be very simple. A part of the peripheral initialization, we are going to implement 200 milliseconds of delay and a right-pin function which will drive the LED. If we do not refresh the independent watchdog, the program will be constantly restarting, leaving the perception that the LED is tackling. In the other case, if the watchdog would be refreshed, the LED would just be simply turned on. Let's start our STM32QBmx to initialize the peripherals. When the STM32QBmx is loaded, we are going to start a new project. We are going to type our part number STM32L476VG and we will start a new project. As a first step, we will configure the pinpe812put mode and we will also enable the independent window watchdog. On the clock configuration tab, the independent window watchdog will become available and as you can see, our program is being clocked by the MSI. Let's now configure the independent watchdog with a 12-bit down counter set to its maximum and not making use of the window feature if we set the pre-scaler to 4 and using the 32kHz LSI as a clock source, 496 ticks will take about 512ms and this is the timeout value for our watchdog. As we just finished to configure our peripherals, now we just need to save the project and generate our code. As always, we are going to use system workbench for STM32 to program our code. After the system workbench for STM32 loads, we are going to source to our main file and here we should see our peripherals initialized. We are going to the independent window watchdog configuration and the parameters should match what we input in the STM32QBmx. We will proceed to add our delay function and we are going to configure it with 200ms. After this, we are just going to drive the LED and to do so, we are going to use the HAL GPIO write pin function. The input parameters are the pin port, the pin itself and the state that you would like to drive. With the program all written, now we are just going to build our project and debug it. After launching our program and if we would look at our board, we will see our LED tagging which means that the independent window watchdog is causing the program to restart and for as user it seems that the LED is tagging. Now we will terminate the debug session and we will add the independent window watchdog refresh function. Here for this function will be the pointer to the handler of the independent window watchdog. Build once again our project and we will launch it. As you can expect, since now we included the refresh function, the LED will be constantly on. Thank you for watching this session.