And I mentioned at the beginning that I think Tony's great characteristic is clarity of thought. And I think we've just had a wonderful example of that as we went through that. Very bleak, but I think very stark analysis. We move on to the Q&A, which Tony has agreed should remain on the record. So that I think is a very good thing. Who would like to start? My name is John, and I'm simply a member of this. No, in relation, you did mention one of our negotiating team, Boris, of course. The other two, Fox and David Davies. Simply, what do you think of them? Do you think that they would make a good job? Well, their inclusion in the government was probably necessary, given the role they played in the referendum campaign. And the need for Theresa May to incorporate the most significant strands of opinion in the parliamentary party with such a small majority. I think from what I gather, Liam Fox is perhaps not quite as much as Boris Johnson on the international stage. He doesn't rub people up quite as much the wrong way as Boris Johnson. But there are, one here is a few things to suggest that he can exasperate people a bit. He claims to be particularly well connected in America. But that was America before Trump won the election, so I'm not sure quite. But he's been busy. He's travelled there a lot. I believe he's been trying to set up sort of trade offices, small trade offices around America in anticipation of the time that there would be some serious trade talks. I don't think he's regarded with sort of complete confidence by everybody in the Parliamentary Conservative Party. As regards David Davis, well, he seemed to begin an office with a somewhat more abrasive tone than he's adopted more recently. But he's something of a more, I wouldn't say an unknown quantity in Brussels because he was once the European Minister. I would just have to say, I mean, he's seen, as I say, that ministry is bit by bit becoming something of a power centre in the government. So I think he's got to be taken pretty seriously. Whereas what we can say about Liam Fox, obviously, is that it's hard to see quite what he's doing until the moment comes when you can actually strike these deals.  So it isn't quite right. I mean, there are some countries that have been talking and he's been involved in that. Okay, the sequence is Alan Dukes, firstly, Neville Currie, and then Ron Hill, and then I'll move later on to Brendan. Okay, Alan, please. Yeah, Alan Dukes, a member of the Institute and former Minister of Finance during the Tatchery Era in the UK. One of the ironies of the situation, I think, is that it's been pointed out that Tatchery was a great proponent of the single market. And indeed, I remember Lord Cofield as a UK commissioner, pushing the case at Echo Finn, and it's a shame to see that being turned around. Mrs. May didn't speak about her great reform bill the other day. My understanding of that was that it would import into UK legislation all of the various directives that have been adopted in the last 43 years. Effectively putting regulation standards and so on in the UK at the same level as the European Union. Is there a basis there for at least a discussion about equivalences that would have the effect of maintaining some of the advantages of the single market for the UK? Second, if during the course of the negotiations the UK had the choice path to say once we're out we will offer you complete free trade, tariff free trade if you'll do the same for us, wouldn't it be very difficult for the EU to refuse that? And then linked with those two, I noted you said that you felt that there would have to be a certain parallelism in the negotiations between if you like the divorce agreement and what happens afterwards. It seems to me that we've got hung up about transitions and I recall that when the UK and Ireland joined the EEC we had a transition period for going from where we were before to the stated objective of full membership. It doesn't seem to me to be entirely impossible to imagine the reverse process. And if there is parallelism in that regard in the negotiations does that not give some hope of getting a more rational conclusion to the whole process? Yeah, I mean I understand it in precisely the way you did that you incorporate the laws as they've accumulated over 40 years and then if and when it's judged necessary to alter things then that would happen. But I mean I don't see a kind of storm of immediate changes happening after the incorporation of EU legislation. I mean we'll have to see where the pressures build up possibly from business, possibly from within the Conservative Party itself. But I mean I think one's got to look slightly beyond the initial period. I mean over time there will be changes adopted by the EU 27 to business regulation. And I think my concern would be that it's difficult to see the British Parliament matching those sort of tweaks in the legislation or even entirely new forms. I'm thinking of things like the digital sector and so on. So I think the scope for some divergent is actually quite real. But not in the early stages that's true perhaps so much. On the offer of a kind of total free trade there. Well I think the problem is that you can imagine things getting bogged down particular sectors. You know even something that might seem relatively unimportant from a British point of agriculture. Actually it has the potential for a lot of political friction. I mentioned Aerospace, she didn't in her speech but the scope for one side pushing back against the other and not in the direction of complete free trade has got to be fairly higher I think. It would at a minimum need intervention from heads of government to keep things on track if it was gonna go in the direction you suggest. That's not impossible of course. The parallelism of the talks. Well if as I suggested one of the first things that comes up once the discussion start is this question of the so-called bill for leaving. Well I don't think you can imagine trade talks happening similar to that. I mean it's a funny one the bill for leaving because even before you start talking about a number you've got to start talking about what are the areas that generate a bill and what timeframe are we talking about and I mean I'm not aware that an awful lot of work has been done on this. I mean I hope there are people looking at all this now but so I mean that's the problem I think. But let's say that somehow managed to be less bitter a discussion than is imaginable. Then I think yes there comes a point where you would need to start talking about the future relationships so-and-so because they become entangled together too much. I mean it just doesn't make sense to try and do the one without the other. But two years for it all right no I mean nobody I don't see that at all. Okay never please. My name is Neville Cary I'm a member of the Institute. I'd just like to make it what may seem a very crude and simple point. The more I try to follow this the more I think that Mrs. May has simply two questions in her head. One how can I keep the conservative party together? And two how can I keep it together in a way that will enable me to win the next general election? And I think that's the driving force and the questions she will ask and it's awful that it leads inevitably to the contradictions that you've so set out so well. Well what can you say party politics yes. That's the consequence of being in a democracy I suppose but it's also the consequence of the small majority she has in parliament. I mean it was party politics which partly explained the calling of the referendum in the first place. Was it not with the perceived threat of UKIP which turned out in the end not to be a bit of a phantom.  And one of the places where huge efforts are made I'm thinking of Germany to have a kind of consensus position on things like attitudes to eurozone priorities or attitude. The way one sees there that this is getting harder and harder to do and that does you know give one pause for concern about whether it would be possible to keep a level head on in the discussions and keep in mind what logically ought to be the common objective which is a close relationship in all areas including trade and investment over the long term. It's not, I didn't want to give you a sort of stark message. I didn't want to sound like I was being pessimistic about this I just think it's, the objective is clear the road there is not so clear but I don't want to suggest that it's all going to fail. I mean in the FT today there is a piece by Wolfgang Matta which is arguing that basically there's enough if you like high politics which require a basic deal to be made and that will win through. Yeah and I think that it's plausible to come back to the point of party politics I mean Theresa May is very, very conscious that it's been the European issue that has destroyed one Tory party leader after another. And she won't want to be the next one in line to be dethroned because of Europe. But even though the pro-remain at segments of the parliamentary party has kind of fallen in now behind the idea well this is what we've got to do. She's not entirely liked or trusted or views and don't chime completely with quite large sections of the party I think. And don't forget you have a king in waiting in the form of George Osborne. Ron, please. And then Brendan, after that. And then Portrick. My name is Ron Hill and I'm a member of the Institute I was a political scientist for many years. The question of the border. It strikes me that much of what Theresa May is up to is pursuing the agenda that she had when she was Home Secretary. Her obsessions are those of the court, immigration, the foreigners, the things that she couldn't allow, wouldn't allow her to do what she wanted to do when she was Home Secretary. Now, only one of her very few salaries out during the campaign, she was supposed to be remanded as she went to Northern Ireland a couple of days before the referendum, I think the 21st. And I distinctly remember her seeing her on television this hasn't been picked up I think very much in the mass media across the water, maybe because it was in Northern Ireland just two days before the referendum. She did say quite distinctly and I checked this on the internet yesterday that the inevitable consequence of Brexit is a border with customs control and all the rest of it. Yet, now she comes up with, I think, item number four wasn't it, not having a border. Which is the real Theresa May? Have you any real sense of where she's, and if the latter, then is there anything we can do about it? Well, yeah, I agree with you that because overwhelmingly her experience of government was in these areas associated with the Home Office that that has shaped her thinking quite considerably. Of course, the longer she's prime minister, the more she will, one imagines, get a more rounded picture of, and I think her apparent interest in redesigning British industrial policy is a sign that there's something there that wasn't associated with her before. So there are some signs she's broadening out of it. On the border question, well, I mean, the remain camp tended to make this point. You know, it would be irresponsible to vote out to be out of the EU because you immediately inject a severe problem into the relations with Ireland. You have a border, which is the last thing we want. She may have just been echoing that referendum campaign point without actually thinking that in practice that would be what happened. I recall the previous Northern Ireland Secretary in Cameron's government saying to me about a month or so before the vote. Absolutely not. We're not even going to consider anything that would jeopardize the common travel area. And so I think it might have been a kind of referendum campaign thing that she said. I mean, certainly the position now is very much not at all. We don't want hindrances to the CTA. Brendan, Lynch, and then Baldrick Murphy, and then Noldor. Tony Blair recently raised the possibility that the UK wouldn't leave the European Union in the final analysis. What do you think of the possibility that there would be no Brexit in the end? Well, I recall about a month or so after the vote meeting the president of Latvia who was passing through London. You might say, well, it's Latvia and not one of the larger EU states. But he said exactly the same thing. He said, I just can't see that this is going to happen. And at the time, I thought, well, you know, there are a number of people from Central and Eastern European governments who really were in the state of shock over this, because they'd seen Britain as a kind of pillar of support for the enlargement and then the defense and security angle. It was a terribly important form. And also the presence of so many citizens from their countries living and working in the UK. So there was a sort of state of shock. And I thought, well, he's just expressing that state of shock. But as time passed, well, you know, I've run into a few American policymakers admittedly from before the November election in the state who said something similar. And as you mentioned, Tony Blair, I mean, I've got to say I find this not very likely. I just can't see it. I mean, if things are driven, as we were saying, by party politics, in many ways, well, the dynamic of the party political scene in Britain is very much towards launching the exit negotiations and leaving. And what are the forces, politically speaking, that would resist this? I mean, they're concentrated in the Lib Dems, a rump minority in the Tory parliamentary party, and some in the Labour Party, although they're demoralized in the Labour Party because they don't know they're going to get wiped out in their electoral heartland the next time there's an election because of the EU's migration.  Of course, nothing is static in politics, to form a scene. The landscape could shift in coming years. But from the point of view of the political outlook in Britain at the moment, I didn't see it. Stephanie, I think you wanted to ask a question, and then know after that, please. Party Murphy, a member of the Institute. Well, yes, it's about party politics. Of course, it has to be, but it's about an awful lot more than party politics. And I want to mention particularly the element of Theresa May's speech in which she talks about engaging in cooperation on security and intelligence with the EU. This, of course, can be regarded as a way of giving herself negotiating leverage. But for 43 years, the United Kingdom and the European Union has been saying that security and intelligence is no business of the EU. And has been a proponent of the thesis that to develop a EU capacity in these areas would be to diminish the commitment of the United States to the security of Europe, which was regarded as quite crucial. Now we have a situation where Berlin and Paris are beginning to talk about developing a security capacity for the European Union against the background of a new American president who has said that NATO is obsolete and that, at a minimum, he is not committed to the European project. At the same time, Theresa May, it seems, is intent, and she's going to Washington, is it next week or later this week in order to advance this, to develop further her relations with precisely this American administration, it seems to me there's a kind of circle there that cannot be squared. You're right, of course, that the Prime Minister has been almost scrambling in the last few weeks to send signals that she wants the relationship with the Trump administration to be close. I mean, apart from the fact she's going there in a few days time, there was the very unusual criticism of the Obama administration's Israel policy. I think we've got to separate, when we talk about security, defense, counter-terrorism, intelligence, they don't fall under precisely the same headings. There's the NATO element, of course, which is the collective defense. And one imagines she's going to Washington just to try and make sure that there's absolutely no putting into question of that. Intelligence, well, the so-called Five Eyes arrangement between Britain, America, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, I think that is something that they value extremely highly in London. I mean, it's at a level which is beyond anything that goes on between European governments. And again, I imagine she'd want to be shoring up that. But then separately, there is the issue of crime-fighting, which includes counter-terrorism, to some extent, within the current EU. And of course, she's experienced in that area through Europe. And it's been noticeable that, since the referendum, the British government has taken such to keep Britain's place in the EU a problem. One could imagine that in some form or another, continuing, actually, because it is a useful way of pooling efforts to deal with terrorist threats. But that's something distinct from the collective defense of NATO. So to what extent would she find it difficult to knit these together into a coherent stance on what we broadly call security? Well, I think it really depends on what goes on in Washington under the Trump administration. I mean, this is the problem. It may not be the case that all bets are off, exactly. But there's a lot of uncertainty there. But that will be absolutely critical in determining what direction this goes in. No, please. And then, Murphy. I hesitate to intervene because Porig Murphy has asked almost exactly the question I was going to ask. With just a slight, and perhaps give a slight variant of it, his question, and you turned much more to the United States in intelligence and security in the sense of anti-terrorism. I was wondering if, as the talks begin, the UK will need to have cards to play. And one strong card is its armed forces and its defense role in Europe. And I just wonder, granted, the possibility of a hands-off approach from Trump, if that will play into a wish in France and Germany, and therefore a beginning to develop at least one set of links in the defense area that have not been very well developed so far, it will come out of the need for the UK to retain links which do not cut across the economic and migration areas. And perhaps a desire in France or elsewhere to build up the defense role. And I'm just thinking ahead, would that then be a way of building kind of new sort of links, even though Britain leaves the EU? It's a variant only of the question you've just answered, so you may have covered most of it. No, there are extra angles to consider on this. I mean, I know some people have said that the references she made to Britain's defense contribution in Europe and the quality of the intelligence work, the British intelligence services to all this, you out there and the rest of Europe, make sure you appreciate all this, as if it were a sort of card to play. If it is, I don't know, I think it's playing with fire a little bit, because as I say, the fundamental defense guarantee involves NATO and the US commitment to Europe. The British contribution is under that umbrella and to the extent that the American commitment is brought into question or diminished, well, that impacts the effectiveness of the British commitment. So I think one needs to think twice before making any sort of linkage like that. As regards whether all this would stimulate close to Franco-German defense cooperation and putting themselves at the front of some wider European defense initiative. Well, there are two things to think about here. I mean, one is, although we can't predict the outcome of the French presidential election, if we were to assume that Francois Fillon won, I'm not sure he would go down that road of a close to defense relationship with Germany. I mean, he's really a died-in-the-wall gaullist. And he says pretty clearly, one of my first priorities is to reassert France's sovereign role as a defense bar and get a better relationship with Russia. I'm not sure his priority is to defense cooperation with Europe. The second thing is whether modern Germany really wants to be put to the front on an issue like defense and the security of Europe in this way. I know they've produced government papers. Imagine sort of considering this and everything. But you know, overall, the kind of feeling in German society is far from united on this point. And indeed, polls have been done, I think by the Pew Research Centre, country by country, and to what extent do you take seriously the commitment to the collective defense of the Eastern European members of NATO and the support for military action, if one of them comes, I think it's pretty low in Germany. I mean, it's not that high in most of the NATO countries, actually. So I'm not sure that's really there in Germany. And then the third thing is, at a time of pretty severe budgetary strains all around EU member states, I mean, are we really going to see money being diverted into defense in any meaningful way? I mean, I can't say it looks doubtful to me. How much do we need to be concerned by the strand of thought whose ambitions go a lot further than just a good deal, but who would like Brexit to be the beginning of the unraveling of the EU? I mean, Michael Gove, perhaps we had a lucky escape, has talked about the liberation of Europe. And it's perhaps not without significant that the then president-elect, first of all, received Nigel Farage and wanted him to be ambassador and then gave his first important interview to a British newspaper to Michael Gove. I mean, you have the extraordinary situation of an American president who appears, or at least before he became president, appeared to be calling for the breakup of the EU. Well, I mean, yeah, it's very concerning. There's no question about it. I mean, one should keep in mind that, first of all, let's take the situation in Washington. I mean, there are people among the set of nominees for his administration who wouldn't agree with what he said. And then there would be a very, very large body of opinion in Congress that wouldn't agree with it, either, let alone the entire foreign policy and defensible establishment in Washington. So to that extent, one perhaps need and fear that the sky is about to fall in. As regards the British politicians who've made these kind of remarks about sort of setting Europe a fire and liberating it.  And it absolutely doesn't go down well at all. Andy, and then I, Mari, and I know Alan wants to go back in again with Andy first. Andy O'Rourke, I'm a member of the institution, former Irish civil servant. Looking on the bright side of things, one might perhaps say that after Lancaster House, the Brexit procedure has clarified itself a little bit and perhaps become a little more simple. In that before Lancaster House, it wasn't clear what the future relationship would be, which needs to be taken account of in the negotiations for Britain's departure. After Lancaster House, it seems clear at this stage, at least, that Britain's future relationship with the European Union will be that of a third country. So let us hope that to be optimistic that these negotiations will go well. The issue now is getting from its present status as a member state to that of a third country with or negotiating for a free trade agreement without any sort of train crash occurring. Mrs. May is going to Washington on Friday next and will be talking, among other things, with President Trump about trade. I just wonder whether a situation where Britain is negotiating trade agreements or talking about trade agreements with other third countries is going to complicate or even give an excuse for further complications in the negotiations taking place during the two-year period from March next. And I wonder, have you got a comment on that? Well, I've both had the occasional contact with people from the sort of countries that the British are thinking it would be relatively, it would be a good idea to do early trailers with them and which might not be too complicated. I'm thinking of places like Canada, Australia. The governments of those countries and the business communities of those countries are conscious that you can't jump the gun. You've got to wait and see how the negotiations between Britain and the EU unfold. That said, I mean, there is some enthusiasm. It's not just Liam Fox's imagination. There is some enthusiasm for doing something relatively soon when it's legally possible. I don't really see it complicating the UK-EU talks because I don't think a trade minister in Canada or Australia or wherever would be, I mean, they'd know there are certain legal processes that have to be followed. So you never know, of course. But I wouldn't expect it to be a matter of friction during the actual talks, no. By the way, I think it would be a lot harder to strike a deal quickly with the United States. I think that's more difficult. Marie Cross, member of the Institute and former member of the Department of Foreign Affairs. The Foreign Affairs Ministry in Britain seems to be pushed a bit down the pecking order, I'm afraid. Just my question, to come back, we touched briefly on the Labour Party in Britain. And it's almost extraordinary that we're kind of scrubbing it out of consideration because we're talking here of the main opposition party. So my question is, how do you see the Labour Party role in the Brexit negotiations and, in general, the sort of future of the Labour Party at the moment? Yeah, I mean, it's very important this. I mean, the short answer is that they are hobbled, of course, at the moment by the problem that they have a leadership, which is Luke Warren at best, was Luke Warren at best, but you may be in the first place. Tended to see the EU in those old kind of 1970s terms, as well as a kind of monster of, they used to be called multinationals, if you remember, I think we call them something else.  And the more kind of internationalist pro-EU side of the parliamentary party has been very demoralised by this and slowly but surely it's been losing its hold on the machinery of the party. So changing that quickly is not going to happen. The shadow of minister who is representing the Labour Party's stance on Brexit and the parliament, he's quite a substantial figure in his own right, but he doesn't have the full support of the party leader. So again, he's sort of somewhat hobbled. You know, we have just had the French Socialist Party first primary yesterday in which something similar was visible in a kind of division between a more radical left and a more moderate left. And people are expecting that no matter who the candidate eventually is in April and May, that they'll lose and that in the subsequent parliamentary elections in France that they will be absolutely decimated. And I think there is this very similar fears for the Labour Party in Britain. I'm not entirely convinced that this means that they're going to be to be eaten alive by UKIP. I don't think that is necessarily the case. I think that things change in the course of time, but it seems to me that UKIP has problems of its own in coming across as a sort of responsible, well-laired efficient. I mean, they're not, they're all over the place. And so I think the risk is perhaps more that you'd get a very large Tory landslide. We're coming towards the end and Alan usually wants to get in for a second by the cherry. Yeah, my apologies for that. No, it's okay. Thank you. There's a constitutional issue that seems to me hasn't yet been much examined. Nicola Sturgeon emphasised the fact that a majority of people in Scotland voted to remain. Sinn Fein and the SDLP had the same claim in Northern Ireland. The Welsh don't say anything because, of course, they voted to leave. And I wonder what the meaning is of that. This wasn't a series of simultaneous referendums in the jurisdictions of developed governments. It was a national referendum in a national jurisdiction where the responsibility for the issues involved rests with Westminster and with the government in London. And so the argument seems to me to be, and this trivializes it a little, and I hope I won't offend my good friend, John Connor. And I say this would be like saying that of all the counties in Ireland, Ross Common is the only one that doesn't have to allow same-sex marriage because they voted against it in the referendum. But it seems to me that there is an issue to be looked at there. We have concerns with the border. We have concerns with trade and all those economic relations with Northern Ireland. But it seems to me we do need to look at the whole of the Belfast Agreement and come to some clear view as to what parts of it, if any, would be affected by a Brexit and what parts will not be at all affected by a Brexit. In my ignorance as a simple economist and not a constitutional lawyer, it seems to me that references that I've heard to the implications of Brexit for the constitutional position of Northern Ireland are entirely misplaced because it seems to me that the reference in the Belfast Agreement to how changes might or might not come about in the constitutional position of Northern Ireland relate only to its constitutional position as part of the UK. Is that the case? And in any case, whether it is or not, do we not need to look clearly at each of the provisions in the North Belfast Agreement to see to what extent, if any, they are affected by Brexit? And you will have read the excellent piece in the FT this morning, linking some of these constitutional issues to the Supreme Court pronouncement tomorrow. Well, yeah, I mean, the issue that I think is bound to come up in some kind of legal test has got to be the fact that the Good Friday Agreement is embedded in any EU, it's in a protocol, is it not? A protocol to a treaty, I believe. And... Large with the UN. It was deposited at the UN. But everything about the agreement is predicated on the idea that you have each side in the EU. And it's easy to foresee a moment when there's some sort of challenge to... Actually, it would probably be to the European Court of Justice where somebody says, I have certain rights that call the streets of mind as a citizen of Northern Ireland, but it's within the EU framework. And they take it to the ECJ. And then what does the ECJ do? I mean, if they... So it would be precisely the sort of issue that would rile the forces in Britain who said, well, the whole point of leaving is to stop this sort of thing happening.  Of course, it could equally well come up, although we're diverging a bit from Northern Ireland here, but it could equally come up in the form of some, you know, an English person or a Scottish person saying, I've got certain rights and I want them up. But I think that, yeah, that's gonna be very, very awkward indeed to sort out. As regards the point about, well, it was a collective vote, you know, in the state of the United Kingdom of Northern Ireland and you can't just start unpicking it, saying this constituent country voted this way and the other way, that way. I mean, don't forget, there was a massive vote in favor of staying in the EU in London. And there's a lot of people in London who say, well, why don't we have some special arrangement? Because, you know, we don't feel anything in common but this is not gonna happen. Well, we've come to the end. It's been a fascinating hour and a quarter, Tony. Thank you. I mean, you did study modern history in Oxford and overlaying on this has, this starting point has been three decades of wonderful expertise about European politics. And all of that has been expressed here today. It's been a great contribution. We're really grateful to you for it and we hope we'll see you back again at some future stage.


Yn ym 15, 20, 25 o bryliant ym 15, 20. Llywodraeth hwnnw hwnnw ddim yn ei ddechrau, ond er�le mae'r problem ydym yn ymdweithio ar unrhyw y ffordd. Do nid o'r ffordd o'r ffordd. Yn ym 15, 20, 21 o bryliant ym 15, 20, 25 o bryliant ym 15, 20. Yn ym 15, 20, 25 o bryliant ym 15, 20. Rhaid i'r ddechrau a'r ddau am y broses ar y dyna yng nghyrch. Rwy'n meddwl i'n meddwl i'r ddau, yw'r ffordd o'r clubs. Mae'r ffordd o'r clubs yn y PYNG i525, y ffordd bwysig cymdeithas. Fy'n gydig y fideo, rydych chi'n gwybod i'n hyn sy'n gweithio yma, rwy'n wneud. Rydych chi'n mynd i'w iawn, a dyna'r bwysig sy'n gwybod i'r bwysig a i'n gwybod i'r bwysig, sy'n gwybod i'n gwybod i'n mynd i'n gwybod, maen nhw'n hynny yn y ddweud. set of irons in my opinion do not buy a full set and here's why. The irons in question the i525s but in particular I'm talking about the long end of the bag. In my hand is the five iron one of the biggest surprises I got when testing the i525s was how good or how easy it was to launch the five iron and get a distance that give me gaping in that long end of the bag which I often struggle with so I struggle with clubhead speed in generating from five six into that four iron those gaps between them and never really seen much difference and I did with the five iron and it launched the ball incredibly high we were getting like a 190-195 carry I don't normally do that with five iron in hand but I still feel there's a possible major problem in that long end of the bag and I'll explain as we go on but first of all let's see if we can find a fairway with the five iron and then we'll switch over to what I think might be a solution to the problem that I would envision for most average golfers just come right at side oh we just hit the end of the tree and moved over to the right hand side we still managed to get middle of the ferry but as you've seen from that really easy clip sounds fantastic no great swing speed as ever from the average golfer and the ball has absolutely flew so what's a problem hand you see the problem is long irons are difficult to play no matter what set you've got in your bag five irons four irons they're difficult for average golfers and no matter how good the i5-25s are in terms of that long end of the bag and they are good there is still better options for average golfers and they lie in the form of a hybrid and I'll show you exactly why you should be dismissing your longer irons and get those hybrids in your bag so the major thing that I want to point out at any average golfer is a very simple thing that I think most of us would be very much aware of I'm stating the obvious right now but at address surely there is a huge amount of confidence gained from having bulk and mass behind the ball so when you put a five iron in these i5-25s up against the ball it's asking a bit of a question you've got a longer shaft in hand you've got a thinner top line and all of a sudden you might be doubting your ability a little bit then you put the hybrid down and for whatever reason like I said it's a mental game golf is huge all about what's in the head but between the years I see one thing I see bulk and mass which means I don't have to make as much of an effort in terms of my swinging the club so I steady things down a little bit and I've already got a whole lot more confidence in my head which ultimately leads to generally a better performance so on one level alone there is hugely more confidence in the hybrid than there is along iron in the bag whether it be five iron four iron or even six iron for some golfers right so the perfect scenario for me that really sort of asks the question of which of these should be in your bag as an average golfer and I'm going to also refer back to some data we collected earlier on both of these two clubs when I play this shot or before I play this shot we're 200 yards out we've got a big tree that's in the way there on this par five it's effectively our second shot we've got a chance of going for it in two like I said 200 yard carry my average with the five iron is 195 and just creeping over that 200 with the five hybrid but for getting yardages for one minute look at the peak height of these two shots so the launch angle is slightly different with both of them but the peak height and the descent angle are really really key and you can see the differences in how high the hybrid gets launches the ball so it launches it it gets a real peak height but it's not stalling because we've got a great descent angle as well so the two reasons I want to go for I want to choose the hybrid is because A of what it does how it gets this ball from A to B in terms of its ball flight but then more importantly and especially for average golfers is the confidence level at address when I'm faced with that shot that I'm looking down there now what do I feel will has got me the best chance of getting that ball up and somewhere near that green and I think the math and bulk of that hybrid is the one that's telling me and that is the club to go for in terms of confidence it makes me swing that little bit easier and if you watch the two shots play out which I'm more than happy with to be quite honest with you'll see the five iron again good ball flight like I said this thing is performing incredibly well in terms of a long iron if there's one place on a golf course that tells me which iron or hybrid I would rather have in the bag or should have in the bag it was right here well I've said that on a number of occasions throughout this video in some ways I had it very much before we set out I had an idea of what I would think we were trying to do and that was to show that those long irons are certainly more difficult for average golfers to use and for the vast majority without doubt the hybrid is the way to go in my opinion but I have also got to say and I think I said it earlier on the videos I'm so surprised at how good the I525 long irons perform this is where we got to that was the that was the iron you can see the hybrid made the green which I'm really impressed with them from that distance out I'd take either of those shots any day of the week but perhaps a little bit surprised at just how well that five iron did on every level like I said ball flight distance all the rest of it so it's kind of whilst I'm going to continue with my push to suggest that more average golfers use hybrids I also think that I can't continue I can't knock this I525 for something it clearly does incredibly well surprisingly well now there's one other thing to mention about hybrids and why they're really important in terms of your flexibility of golf bag and that's the fact that a lot of them nowadays and in particular this G425 that I'm using are adjustable so wherever you find your situation like I have with my numbers earlier this is slightly longer the five hybrid than the five iron if that's the number of the gap I'm looking to make there's obviously a lot of flexibility in delofting or adding loft into your hybrid far easier than it is to be doing that with your iron set so the way in which to get your gap in right again is by going down that route of hybrids it's that key word again it's that flexibility well you can see there two totally different ball flights first one you're watching is that five iron and you can see it's done incredibly well from the rough because that's the next thing I want to talk about who wants to play 200 yards from a lie and that wasn't even sort of nestled down but we know the flexibility that a hybrid offers over an iron and I've got to admit yet again negatively impressed with how that ball of the iron picked up the ball out of that sort of light rough got the ball up and out there but the ball flight again a little low and even if it's coming into the green I did just land it at front edge then still it's going to either run all the way back through it's going to be tough to stop that land angle just isn't there you've seen the hybrid I've leaked the shot out slightly to the right hand side but so so different in its ball flight and yet again just shows how easy it is to not only pick it up and get it out of that slightly rough lie but what it does in terms of launch and ball flight it's still there and still gives you a chance of stopping on these greens so yet again another reason why five irons four irons don't really belong in many average golfers bags and why hybrids are by far a better option that's me done in terms of testing out here on the core so the very end of the video I'll throw you the data that I collected for for both clubs of quite a number of shots and you'll see sort of how we got to A to B the biggest difference was like I said peak height descent angle really key things in how that ball yes got to 200 yards ish but got there in totally different ways and they were one of the reasons why from a descent angle from a peak height perspective for me the hybrid again favours the average golfer and just shows that again with similar lofts it can get a much better launch angle or peak height or get the ball airborne which again what we struggle with with the longer irons we've seen the scenarios around the core so I think for me again what we've tried to do is highlight where from a confidence perspective from a percentages perspective the hybrid will always favour in my opinion the average golfer than it will rather along iron but also with these videos the idea is there's no definitive answers that I'm looking to give there's plenty of good golfers out there or plenty of golfers out there full stop that would prefer to use an iron and if that's where your confidence lies then I say stick with that and in the I525s in particular they do it incredibly well probably the best performing long iron in terms of five iron that I've tested it gets the ball up and airborne and out there very very well indeed so I'm not saying dismiss the five iron all I am saying is in most cases hybrids are the answer for me for average golfers from six iron into five four I reckon you should be considering hybrids a lot more often than we do and don't just be buying that straight forward historical way that we've always done which is pre-orderer a pitching wedge to five iron a pitching wedge to four iron stop doing that starts to have a look at that longer end of the bag and see how you can make some changes that might make the game a little bit easier for you right that's me done another test complete thank you for watching as ever tell me about your experiences have I got this wrong have I got this right what is your thoughts comments down below hit that like button subscribe if you don't already and I will see you all very soon bye for now


Hello everyone, this is Feynman. I come from Beijing, China. Come today I'm working at Microsoft. I'm also a CNCF ambassador and Microsoft product manager. You can find my Twitter and GitHub profile at Feynman Joe. So in today's webinar, I would like to discuss our daily security concerns and problems, and then I will share how to secure a container supply chain with Notary, Auras, and Radify. Specifically, I will first introduce what is software supply chain security. And next, I will talk about the challenges and the concerns from the industries and our end users. Next, I will walk you through the CNCF open source projects in this area, such as Notary V2, Auras, and Radify. For example, we can leverage Notary V2 to sign and verify artifacts. And we can use Auras to promote artifacts across registries. And if you are running applications on Kubernetes, Radify enables Kubernetes clusters to verify artifacts security prior to deployment. So if you want to automate and build a secure supply chain in CSE pipeline with GitHub actions, we will also provide our practice with these projects. Let's start from the real concerns we hear from our end users. And I guess you might also struggling with these problems in your software delivery process. Not only security engineers, most developers are also concerned about their security in their delivery process. For example, how to sign and verify your container image before you deploy it, how to promote supply chain artifacts from development to production, how to attach spawn file and the signatures to container image to ensure consistency and integrity. We also hear people want to make sure their deployment is secure and view their artifact references in secure supply chain. The most popular problem we hear is that how can we set up a secure supply chain in CSE Deworkflow? So in today's webinar, I hope I can resolve all of those questions and concerns. First of all, I'd like to briefly introduce the software supply chain. Actually, it starts from creation of content such as the building of content like binaries, packages and images. After you created that, you might need to distribute all of those content to different environments, such as you need to distribute the content to your end users and customers. You might also need to distribute and promote across different environments and registries. And finally, the consumption of those content. So you might need to deploy all of those artifacts and apps to the environment. It is interesting that you will find securing software supply chain is similar to secure the traditional manufacturing supply chain. Like the left diagram, it includes several rounds of quality check and testing from producing materials to deliver food to the customers. Ensuring the food is safe enough to the market, okay? When comparing the software supply chain with the traditional manufacturing supply chain, you will find it commonly includes the process of producing software based on multiple dependencies, build and distribute the artifacts and then deploy and publish the apps for customers to access. Looking at the Sensef landscape, you will find there are a lot of open source solutions and projects in the security and compliance section. The Sensef graduated projects like OpenProtestAgent, TUF, incubating projects like Falcon, Notary, Set Manager, and Kiverno. So security ecosystem is very glorious. You don't worry about there's no alternatives in the security projects. When we talk about the secure supply chain, software build of materials, AKA Spawn is also a required concept. US government has executive order to require software vendors to generate and provide Spawn file for customers. We can take a look at the SPDX type of Spawn file at the right diagram. Generally, it includes package file and licensing information and other information so on. Take this diagram as an example. We can introduce Notary to sign your image and generate signature. Then we can use Horace to promote the signed image with signature to a stage environment for deployment. Before you deploy it, you can leverage ratify and OPA can keeper to validate if the image is signed or not. So we will only allow the signed images can be deployed to the Kubernetes clusters and production environment. Okay, let's jump to the first project we wanted to cover in this webinar. Notary V2, which is used to sign and verify artifacts in an easy way. In general, Notary V2 includes three components. Notary CI tool, we can call it notation. It is used to sign and verify artifacts and manage certificates and policies. Okay, look back to the history of the Notary project. You will find it has very wide collaboration on the community. The Notary project was originally started at Docker back in 2015, which is used to provide a general signing infrastructure for containers based on the QA framework. So we can start it from Notation CI. You will find the Notation CI has provided some capabilities like sign artifacts, verify remote artifacts, list all signatures of signed artifacts, and the certificate management like add list or delete certificates. So I will give you a live demo to showcase how to sign and verify artifacts with Notation CI. Okay, let's get started. Before you try out this demo, you need to install Notation and have a container image in your registry. So you will find we are using Notation alpha four, and we have pushed and container image to our registry. So currently we can use Notation list to find the attached signature from this image. Okay, nothing to return. That means there's no signature attached to this image. Okay, next we can create a self-signed test certificate for these signings scenario. So we can use Notation search generous test. We can specify a certificate name. Yeah, it reminds us it is already exists. So it doesn't matter. That means I have already created it before. So we can use Notation key list to list the existing keys. And we can use Notation search list to list the certificates that created by Notation. Next we can sign the container image with cosy envelope. We can type Notation sign with envelope type cosy. So far it has generated a new signature and attached it to the container image. This shot 256, that means this is the digest of this signature. And we can use Notation list to list the attached signature from this image. Next, we can add a public key to this signature. Oh sorry, we can add a public key to the trust door and then we can use Notation search add to specify this public key. Next, we can use Notation search list to find if this key has been added. Next, we can use Notation verify to verify this signature and make sure it has not been tampered by others. Okay, we can type Notation verify with this image name. If it returns the digest, that means congratulations. You have successfully signed and verified this sample image. We just finished the introduction to Notation and bring a demo to you guys. So next, we will briefly introduce Aura's OCI registry as storage. As we mentioned earlier, we can use Aura's to promote supply chain artifacts across different registries. So Aura's is used to working with OCI registries but for secure supply chain scenario. So you can use Aura's to distribute artifacts across clouds and on-premise environments. You can also extend the registries not just for storing container images with Aura's artifacts back support. It also provides OCI registry clients to easily manage OCI artifacts in registries and provides Gola and Python, SDK, and API for developers. Meanwhile, Aura's also has fine-grade capabilities to alter the content of OCI supply chain artifacts. And recently, it has fully supported OCI reference types that means you can use OCI, you can use Aura's with any OCI compliant registries. Country, Aura's is a CNCF sandbox project. It has 76 contributors and has been adopted by Alibaba Cloud, Amazon ECR, GitHub, Microsoft, VMware Tensu, Red Hat, and Singularity Project. Help you to handle these use cases. That means you can use Aura's to pull and push artifacts from or to OCI registries. You can also attach spawn and attestation files to an OCI artifact. You can also use Aura's to migrate images from registry A to registry B. You can also use Aura's to operate repositories and tags in the registries. So as you can see from this diagram, you'll find Oura's has provided a bunch of CI commands like Oura's Attach, which is used to attach files to an existing artifact. Oura's copy allows you to copy artifacts from one target to another's target. Before we get started, let's take a quick look at this workflow powered by Oura's. So let's start from the development process. Developers always build and push their content images to a registry. Let's take doc hub as an example. After that, if you want to attach and spawn to the content image, you can use Oura's copy and Oura's Attach to do this kind of process. So Oura's copy can help you to copy this content image from doc hub to your local registry. And then you can use Oura's Attach to attach a generated spawn file to this content image. Finally, you can use Oura's Discover to view the tree diagram of this artifact graph. So let's get started with this demo. Assuming you have installed Oura's and prepared a content registry, we're using sensef distribution registry as an example. So let's type Oura's copy with source image registry and target registry. You can copy a content image from source to the target place. Next, we need to install a spawn tool which is open source by Microsoft, which is used to generate and create a spawn file. Just make it executable and then we can use it to generate a spdx type of spawn file. Okay, it has generated and exported to a specific folder. Next, we can attach this spawn file to a sample image. Let's type Oura's Attach with this sample image and the spawn file folder, okay? We have attached it to the sample image. Next, we can discover the referrals of this manifest in the remote registry. So we can type Oura's Discover with the image, okay? We can specify the latest tag and show it in a tree view. Okay, kind of we can see that there is a spawn file attached to this image in our local registry. Okay, let's delete this folder that stores the spdx spawn. Next, we can use Oura's pool to pull that artifact from our registry, which is used to improve, which is used to prove if Ouras can pull the artifact with the spawn file to our local folder. Okay, copy it and type it here. So here we need to specify the digest of this spdx spawn. Okay, if we can download the spawn file while Ouras pull, that means we can use Ouras to pull and push any OCA artifacts from the registry. Okay, in our previous two demos, we have generated signatures for our sample image and attached a spawn file to that image. So last but not least, how to verify artifact security prior to deploy it to Kubernetes cluster? I think, ratify is the answer. As we introduced at the beginning of this webinar, we can use ratify to enable Kubernetes clusters to verify artifact prior to our deployment. So as you can see from this part, ratify can work with OPA gatekeeper to enable the policy to check and validate if the contained image meets our verification policy or not. Is this contained image has been signed and validated by ratify? That means it can be deployed to the Kubernetes cluster. If not, it will pass failed and it will not deploy to the Kubernetes. So let's showcase a live demo to demonstrate how can we validate the image and the deployment. So this is the ratify project repo on GitHub and it has recently released beta one. I have already installed ratify beta one in my virtual machine. So if you want to try ratify, you can go to the GitHub repository and download the latest version of ratify. Well, let's go back to my terminal and yeah, I have installed ratify beta one and the next we can use ratify to validate if a signed image can be deployed to the Kubernetes cluster or not. Okay, we can use kukato run signed apps. With this sample image. So for the first time we use a signed image that has been signed by notation. So we can specify a sample image here. Okay, run it. Great, we have created this part with name signed app. So if we want to validate a image that cannot be deployed to the Kubernetes cluster, we can use a image that is unsigned. So we can run unsigned app with this S5 image. So actually we have prepared two types of image in advance. First one is signed and the second one is unsigned. So we can use it directly. Okay, that's it. We got an arrow from the server that is returns from the admission web hook. Actually, this is the OPA. Again, keep a policy we defined before. So it has denied the request to deploy this unsigned image to our Kubernetes cluster. So we can use kukato to get the plot. So as you can find the signed app container image has been deployed to the default namespace. So congratulations, we have finished the last demo. All right, I think we did three demos that demonstrated the workflow in this secure supply chain. So if we want to automate all of those steps in a script, how can we handle that? How can we automate this secure supply chain in a CSED? I think the simplest way is write a workflow script that in a GitHub actions. So actually we have our own practice in GitHub that can be used to create a CSED pipeline with GitHub actions. So you can find these sample actions in this repo, Wabbit Networks. Last but not least, let's quickly recap what we have finished in this webinar. So at first, we introduced the basic concepts of secure supply chain. And second, we walk you through the demos and the project concepts of Notary V2, ORAS and Radify. We have showcased three demos for each project. And last but not least, we presented how you can leverage our practice to build your own CSED pipeline with GitHub actions. So you can go to that repo and find the workflow demo and write it in your own CSED pipeline. That's all from my sharing. Thank you everyone for attending today's webinar. So you can find some resources and the project information from the website. Okay, see you guys. Bye-bye.


Friends, it's wonderful to have amongst us Akhil Bilgrammi, the Sidney Morgan Besser professor at Columbia University, and a close and for a very long period a friend of Samath. Akhil, as many of you would know, has been developing for some time now a left critique of liberalism, which is both novel as well as wide-ranging. A lot of the things which he has published, whether it is on the alternative renaissance, whether it is on alienation, whether it's on early marks, are really work which more or less add up to this theme of developing a fairly comprehensive and novel left critique of liberalism. And in a sense, his work on Gandhi really falls into that kind of a pattern. He sees Gandhi as belonging to a tradition, or locates Gandhi within a tradition, which stretches from Gerard Winstanley, the communist thinker in the English Revolution, the period of the English Revolution, to early marks, to Rosa Luxemburg, and so on. So that it's really a long tradition in which he locates Gandhi. And you can see that actually that way of reading Gandhi runs contrary both to the traditional Marxist reading of Gandhi, of which EMS Nambu Dripal's The Mahatma and the Ism is the classic exposition, as well as some of the writings on Gandhi that you find these days in progressive Dalit writings, and so on. So Akeel has been, along with a few others, including Irfan Sabin, others who gave the first lecture in this series, part of a certain tradition of looking at Gandhi from the left, which is quite different from the other ways that Gandhi has been looked at, which are, if you like, at the moment, the more dominant ways within the left. So it's with great pleasure that I really invite Akeel to give this lecture and to provide an exposition of how he sees Gandhi within this tradition. Akeel. There is a great and natural tendency to think that Hind Swaraj represents the reactionary Gandhi, who opposed modernity, a position from which he slowly backpedaled over the next few decades, as he allowed the experience of the long anti-colonial struggle he led to educate him towards more progressive ideas and ideals. I said this is a natural reading of Gandhi, but it's not a reading that shows much sympathy for or comprehension of his deepest intellectual and political motives. It is reading which, from the very outset, rules out the possibility that one might interpret his anti-modernism as itself being progressive. It might seem that there's something startling, something almost paradoxical about using the word progressive as I just have in that last sentence. After all, the whole point of the contrast between reactionary and progressive derives from an ideal of progress in which the past is overcome in one's modernity, and to heart back to it would be reaction, while to embrace one's modernity is to be progressive. How then can a stance of anti-modernity be said to be progressive without paradox? But this seeming paradox is amicably resolved if I replaced all occurrences of the word progressive in what I've said so far with the word radical. I don't mean radical in the very general sense of vehement repudiation of conventional thinking. Even fascism is radical in that highly general sense. I mean rather radical in the quite usual specific sense that left wing commentary intends to self-describe its own conception of politics. But which it often then muddles by equating that politics with what it describes as progressive politics, thereby ruling out from the outset, as I said, that one can be both anti-modernist and radical in this more specific sense that the left aspires to be. So to put it in a word, I'm asking, is there a left wing or radical Gandhi in the anti-modern Gandhi? And I'm casting doubt on the more natural but unsympathetic reading, which asserts that there's a left wing Gandhi despite the anti-modern Gandhi. One dialectic one that I've pursued, by which one might pursue this question, I've just posed, about the radical possibilities in Gandhi's anti-modernism, is to find continuities between Gandhi's opposition to features of European, or what he sometimes called Western, modernity, and the opposition in the early modern period, as Prabhat was disguising, by radicals in Europe, particularly England, which is my focus, to what they presciently foresaw as the alarming direction in which their incipient modernity was heading. Their alarms about that direction turned out to be entirely justified, given the passage in Europe from its early to its late modernity that history has recorded. In other words, their voices, the dissenting voices of a radical opposition in, say, 17th century England, lost out in history. And if Gandhi in Hind Swaraj was in some core sense, expressing a counterpart alarm, almost three centuries later, an alarm about an incipient modernity in India, heading in the lamentable direction that the early dissenters had foreseen, a direction being imposed on it by its colonial masters, then a plausible way to press on with this dialectic is to read Hind Swaraj as being written under the shrewd perception by its author, that in 1909 when he wrote it, he thought India was at just the crossroads that Europe was in early modernity. What I'm proposing, therefore, is a genealogical grounding of his radicalism in the radicalism of an earlier period in the land of his colonial masters, so as to set up a very specific historical dialectic within which to argue that what seems anti-modern in his thought would not seem so if we kept this dialectic firmly in our sights. In general, that elements with affinities to the radical dissenting ideas voiced in the early modern period should appear to us as anti-modern is due to a conference of two closely related factors. First, our tendency to think of the path from early to late modernity as a teleological inevitability and consequently second from the perspective of our lateness to stamp out the significance and the substantial presence of the dissenting voices in the earlier period which lost out in the arena of social and political and intellectual conflicts of those times. These two factors conspire to make it seem as if any assertion of some of the radical ideas to be found in early modern dissenting traditions. At a date as late as, for instance, 1909 when Gandhi wrote in Suraj, necessarily occupies a stubbornly reactionary position, something they would not seem to do if we viewed the teleology as uncompulsory as Gandhi certainly did. And if we kept fully in view, in our view of the past, the power and pregnant possibilities that those dissenting ideas possessed despite their having lost out. If it were possible to use the expression early modern as an entirely innocuous description of a period of time in Europe with no built in implications of describing only those antecedents that would unfold into the developments of late modernity, the radicalism of that period might give us a sense of the possibilities that Gandhi still held out for in the India of the early 20th century, which as I said, he took to be at the sort of cusp that Europe was in in the early modern period. So to repeat the crucial dialectical point, I'm sorry, at the risk of causing tedium, that we should see the stance as anti-modern rather than as the radical ideas they were with a serious potential for preempting in India in the early part of the 20th century, the path in political economy and aspects of political governance that had developed over the modern period in Europe is only because the directional certainties of an assumed teleology that have the effect of writing out of history the great significance that dissenting voices had at the earlier time, leaving the impression only of those antecedents that make our own conditions seem inevitable for our time. How to correct this tendency in us by elaborating this dialectical reversal of it is the chief preoccupation of this lecture. In past work, I've pursued this line of thought by working with a very specific question within intellectual history, the question whether what political philosophers and political economists widely considered a rational development in the history of politics and political economy is indeed rational. I will not repeat the details of that work here, but I will have to give just for two or three minutes at least a schematic summary of the argument in order to turn to the points I do want to raise about Gandhi's deep and sometimes quite hysterical anxieties regarding modernity. In the broad contours of my argument, I had started with Amartya Sen's by now widely cited response to the protest against the dispossession of peasantry, dispossession of peasantry in recent years in India. The remark that in India, that India in order to come into modernity would unfortunately simply have to go through the pain that England went through in order to create its London's and Manchester's. I probed what underlies this assumption that countries like India must go through what their erstwhile colonial masters did. An assumption which is very widespread, Sen was only articulating a tacit conventional assumption. And I argued further that in Sen's case, it was not based on some sort of commitment to iron laws of history that are sometimes attributed to Marx. Sen Sen is writing within a liberal tradition of thought, he appeals not to the notion of necessity as such iron laws were proposing, but rather to a notion of rationality. In other words, it is not by historical inevitability that India must go through what England went through, but rather because what England went through was rational, its erstwhile colonies ought to do so. That is a quite different position, though as we know in a tradition that primarily owes to Hegel, rationality and necessity cannot be entirely kept separate either. The obvious and celebrated initial location I had argued of that liberal claim to rationality of what England went through was the argument in John Locke's chapter on property in the second treatise on government. That was essentially a contractualist argument from Pareto improvement over the state of nature, whereby the privatization of the commons that came with the enclosures, he that too carried out by brute force, was literally rationalized, i.e. rendered rational by the thought experiment of a social contract in which all commoners were said to be better off than they were in the state of nature if some of them privatized the land and the rest were hired by them as wage labor to work on the land. As is well known, some years before Locke's treatise, there was widespread protest against the enclosures by popular religion, a range of Puritan Christian sects resisting the high Anglican orthodoxy which had aligned itself with the commercial classes keen to transform mere agrarian living into what we would now call agribusiness. These groups, the diggers, the radical levelers, not all the levelers, the radical levelers and a variety of others, memorably studied by Christopher Hill and other historians of that period, were appealing to ideals of communal and collective cultivation of the commons. So in my extended argument, I had anachronistically ventriloquized onto their lips a response to Locke. I say anachronistically because as I said, they predated Locke, which was essentially a response to Locke from opportunity cost. The radical dissenters could be attributed, I said, the thought, yes, Locke would be right to say that the commoners who were hired to work for wages in the social contract were indeed better off than they were in the state of nature, but they're not better off than they would have been had the commons not been privatized in the first place and if there had been a collective cultivation of the commons. I then argued that a great deal of the driving, conceptual and ideological backdrop to liberal political economy over the next few centuries may be seen as a sustained response to this counterclaim from opportunity cost. The claimers I've presented is a counterfactual claim and the counterfactual is based on one central premise. A refusal of privatization that presupposes the cogency of an alternative ideal of the collective cultivation of the commons. It is this cogency that became the target of attack by a fundamental outlook of modern political economy which in the mid 20th century was summed up in a celebrated paper entitled The Tragedy of the Commons. It is an outlook primarily expressing a certain view of the nature of human rationality. It is the ideal of rationality and the mentality or outlook that it expressed that Gandhi was constantly opposing from different angles, taking on all its ill effects on modernity. The particular paper I mentioned by Garrett Hardin, Tragedy of the Commons, elaborates the outlook in game theoretic terms in the form of a multi-person prisoner's dilemma. This is merely a formalization of a widespread outlook which sends remark is basically taking for granted. I won't repeat the elaboration here but its main thrust is to argue that no individual commoner could rationally commit to the cooperation that is entailed by a collective cultivation of the commons. Rationality requires each commoner to think that though it is certainly true that if all commoners cooperated, everybody would gain, there's the constant anxiety, and this is crucial, there's the constant anxiety, what if I cooperated and others did not? If one is thinking rationally, this anxiety is said, has no answer to soothe it, such as the situation of a multi-person prisoner's dilemma. So each commoner, if he's rational, refuses cooperation which in turn would of course entail the destruction of the commons, that is the tragedy, and therefore a better bit than its collective cultivation is the privatization of the commons. That is the game theoretic updating of luck. Gandhi's entire conception of Ashram life repeatedly expressed exactly the opposite view of rationality, and in my philosophical gloss on that view I had argued that Gandhi was providing a whole basis for saying that the qualms about the requisite cooperation expressed in the anxiety, what if I cooperated and others did not, that is so central to the epistemological outlook of a liberal political economy is itself that question, what if I cooperated and others didn't, is itself a deep going manifestation of the alienation that characterizes modern society. The finessing of this alienation was absolutely central to Gandhi's anti-modernism since he attributed such alienation entirely to the modern period. In this I had said he was Marx's intellectual partner, though unlike Marx who came to his ideas from a remarkable lifelong diagnostic study of modern industrial capital, Gandhi who lived and struggled in a quite different historical and social context sought the sources of an unalienated life in the same social and cultural field as his early modern precedents, the folk and spiritual traditions of popular religion. It is simply not possible to come to grips with the remarkable effectiveness of Gandhi's methods of mobilization, deploying the ideas that he did without understanding how much he was tapping the social outlooks of popular religion in India. The idea that he could abandon this fundamental source of his effectiveness for a more modern ground for anti-imperialism such as the loyally set of constitutional demands for Indian self-governance and eventual independence as many of its other colleagues aspire to or for the terror-based tactics of the insurgent anti-imperialists or for the more purely class-based formulations that sought to mobilize the masses is to simply miss the point of what was unique about Gandhi's strength and conviction. In fact, there's every reason to think that the mobilization of the 1930s, that targeted not the British but were more purely class-struggles by tenants and sharecroppers against their overlords on which Gandhi and the Congress often did not have control would not have emerged without the dynamism of the Khilafat movement whose reach extended to Kisans and quite generally the Gandhian non-cooperation of an earlier period, movements which by contrast with the more purely class-struggle mixed anti-imperialism, present consciousness and popular religion in a way that only Gandhi's mobilizational innovations could have devised. I will return to this point about popular religion when I take up some of the more controversial points about anti-modernism at the very end. Let me first raise a question about this dialectic that I've set up. In order to come to grips with Gandhi's anti-modernism as kelling a form of radicalism, which is of a piece with the radicalism of the Erdi Malin period in England, when Amartya Sen made his remark, whose uncritical assumptions about rationality have been skeptically addressing, other critics made an empirical criticism rather than the philosophical one I've just been making, an empirical criticism that seems so obviously right that it is surprising that Sen had not seen it. That's for instance Prabhupada Naik pointed out that the historical analogy that Sen makes is historically quite inexact. Since in England, those dispossessed by primitive accumulation migrated in very large numbers to other parts of the temperate belt, whereas there is no place for the dispossessed of Bengal or Chhattisgarh or wherever else to go, except to the slums of the already cluttered cities within their own national borders. In other words, the primitive accumulation in Europe led to the diffusion of capitalism to other parts of the world, whereas in India, given the restrictions on the mobility of labour, all it has led to is the further pushing of people into destitution. This point, this criticism, gives us a chance of Sen, gives us a chance to explore something that has significance for why Gandhi thought that the developments of the modern period in Europe were besides the point for countries in India. In Marx's 27th chapter of Capital and in the classical accounts that derive from it, primitive accumulation is seen as the curse of frequently brutal extermination of communities of a pre-capitalist form as a result of the deracination of petty producers from their means of production, who then morph into a proletariat, either in the form of metropolitan industrial labourers and their families, or as a reserve army. These classical accounts, though they observe the cursive and brutal nature of this destruction of pre-capitalist communities, are nevertheless also presented as their transformation into a new class formation in which the old hierarchical oppressive features of social life are undermined, even if they are replaced by the newly minted oppressive features tied to the specifically exploitative and alienation-inducing conditions that metropolitan capital imposes on industrial labour. In the extensive commentary on Gandhi, people tend to focus on his occasionally articulated normative stance that the worst aspects of pre-capitalist communities, the socially conservative primordial ties with their oppressive hierarchies, ought to be, that's why it's normative, ought to be addressed, this is Gandhi's normative stance, those oppressive features ought to be addressed, Gandhi thought, without the destruction of pre-capitalist communities and without the transformation into these new class formations. Gandhi often said something like that. Now, however we assess that normative stance in Gandhi, what I want to focus on instead is not this normative stance he took, I don't want to focus on the normative stance and assess it. What I want to focus on instead is something more purely descriptive that he might well have presciently foreseen which puts into doubt the universal applicability of a vision that is found in canonical accounts of primitive accumulation grounded in Marx. So I don't want us to be distracted by whether he was right or not in thinking that those pre-capitalist communities should not be morphed into something else, to a new class formation. What I want to focus on instead is something more purely descriptive that he might well have presciently foreseen which puts into doubt the universal applicability of a vision that is found in the canonical accounts of primitive accumulation grounded in Marx. The question that we might ask is whether this is falling upon Putnaik's criticism, Sen. The question that we might ask is whether what motivated Gandhi's normative stance, whatever we think of the stance itself, is an instinct that the conditions of large agrarian societies of the colonized regions of the south are not exactly the ground on which or to which the classical accounts of primitive accumulation apply. To explore this, let us ask a counterfactual question. What would have happened, let us ask, if the millions of dispossessed peasants who migrated to the settler colonies of the Americas, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, the hundreds of thousands of peasants who were mobilized to their death in the recurring European wars of the succeeding centuries? What of the thousands of deaths and famines and epidemics in Europe in the 19th century? What if all these massive numbers of peasants had lived and stayed sedentary in European society? In other words, served, survived as remnants of the pre-capitalist past, but outside the domain of capitalist production? On what terms would they have been described as an element of capital's present and yet as its external outside? Would they have overcome the oppressive hierarchical features owing to primordial ties? So really I'm asking whether Gandhi might have taken his normative stance whether or not we agree with it. Because of a canny understanding that in colonial and post-colonial capitalism the colonized lands were the factual version of something that was merely the counterfactual in Europe as I just presented it. As a result, though the industrial growth economy would be premised on primitive accumulation because it needs land for industry, mining, urban settlements, roads, railways, bridges, etc. just as it also needs new consumers for industrial products, Gandhi understood well that it cannot absorb the displaced millions as industrial labor or even as a reserve army sometimes. The population is literally redundant to the growth economy. In terms of its own economic outlook and trajectory it has a matter of utter indifference what happens to these millions. And so since the conditions for the industrial transformation of a large agrarian economy like India had not been created by colonial capitalism and its post-colonial legacy, primitive accumulation would not lead to the emergence of a relatively liberated even if differently subjugated industrial labor and instead even industrial laborers would continue to be enmeshed in ties of what looked like pre-capitalist community. Something we see everywhere in urban India today and the politics of identity that surfaces not just in rural but in metropolitan India as well. As sociologists have repeatedly observed communal riots occur predominantly in cities a symptom of the pre-capitalist community's metropolitan survival. As I said, I'm taking no position on whether Gandhi was right to take the normative stance he did on the matter of how he ought to overcome the oppressive hierarchical social features of pre-capitalist community without the destruction of those communities and their transformation into new class formation. Taking no stand on that. I'm only suggesting that the normative stance may have been expressive of an instinct that colonialism depended on something factual in the colonies even though it may have been merely counterfactual in Europe as I presented the counterfactual a little while ago. Therefore, Gandhi's anti-modernism reflected in his resistance to the destruction of pre-capitalist communities was not just a moralist's position it was not just a moralist's position but rather a stance that was driven by and contextualized by an instinctive understanding that colonial capitalism had not and would not create the conditions for the industrial transformation of large agrarian countries like India and thus an understanding that the effects of imperialism by their nature relied on the colonized world not possessing the transformative conditions that existed in European capitalism and its diffusionary spread. Part of the burden of my argument about Gandhi's anti-modernism being itself a form of radicalism is precisely the refusal to seem as a moralist and a philosopher independent of his anti-imperialism but rather constantly informed by his anti-imperialism. In fact, I think we can go so far as to say that from what Gandhi had glimpsed modernity and capitalism in the colonialism he experienced at the time he wrote in Suraj he could not possibly even have developed the hopes illusory in the end as we know expressed in the policies pursued in the Keynesian period in the countries of the North later on. Those policies and the hopes of a prospective constraining of capital only came into view in very special circumstances in a post-war context. For Gandhi, given the knowledge of capitalism that he acquired through the colonial experience nothing of that sort could redeem it from what he experienced. In fact, as he goes on to say I think it's in the light of that that we should go on to understand the other more specific things that he says which sound so excessive to us that it was not even redeemed by the development of railways which he explicitly saw as nothing but an instrument to connect the hinterland to the ports for the gains sought by his colonial masters not even by the professionalization of the concept of law in the person of lawyers which he explicitly saw as the commodification and debasement of the idea of justice not even the manifest advantages of modern medicine and drugs which he explicitly declared had brought just as many ill effects to the body as those they had cured and in fact failed to acknowledge that cure itself was much more than a restoring of physical function but also a restoring of an equilibrium of emotions and meanings and peace of mind. I'll return to some of the shill excesses of this letter, anti-modernism I've been describing before I close but before I do let me say something about my deployment of the term radical in describing Gandhi's anti-modernism. It might seem that this use of the term radical means precious little or perhaps I should say it would mean something merely precious if a certain kind of objection that is of some currency and in my experience of some insistence is not addressed. The objection is that the dialectical relation I've drawn between the radicalism I've claimed for Gandhi's reactiveness to the outlooks of modernity and the prescient radical dissenting voices of early modern Europe precisely because that harks back to a lost and distant past are an exercise in nostalgia. That's the objection. From the point of view of this skepticism the radicalism of the early modern period which may have had its possibilities for politics in a past time because it lost out could only have a taste for revivalist status at the time that Gandhi was writing and ever since because the plain fact is that those possibilities of the early modern period were never realized in subsequent modernity and political economy by now has advanced in directions in which the very thought of those ideals being realized is a nostalgic illusion. Before I begin addressing this line of objection a contrast is saying that in the face of such frequent sneering about nostalgia I almost always feel an intense irritation because it is most often to be found on the lips and pens of complacent people. Such people need to be reminded that the most creative efforts of the Renaissance were very likely dismissed by similarly frequent sneering on the part of medieval scholastics as a nostalgia for a bygone classical age. The fact is that the complacence from which this quorum is expressed is actually often not innocent. What people choose to be complacent about and what they therefore choose to be dismissive as nostalgic about is rather selective and the selectivity is driven by ideological considerations. Charges of nostalgia are a cousin of a phenomenon which we might call the it's too late phenomenon. If something is too late to reverse it's nostalgic to wish to reverse it. It's too late to return to 1967 borders in Israel. There have been far too many settlements over the last few decades. It's just one among any number of complacencies regarding present conditions that one can cite. But notice that no one ever said during the decades long Cold War it's too late. The Soviet Union is here and in a large part of the world private capital is simply a thing of the past. It would be nostalgic to aspire to return to it there. Instead, they unrelentingly put pressure even the pressure of untold violence in Southeast Asia and Latin America on any socialist experiment, whatever it's false decade after decade till virtually every such experiment fell apart. Thus, crimes about nostalgia of what is and isn't too late are made not only from the point of view of complacence but a complacence driven by ideological points of view with deliberate selectivity. Now, motives apart how shall we assess the charge of nostalgia brought against all efforts to associate criticism of capital with criticism as in Gandhi of the outlooks of modernity that is inflicted by the effects of capital on our minds and our cultures. Let me approach the subject by returning to such an outlook underlying liberal political economy that I had described earlier. I had said of such an outlook that the notion of alienation that Gandhi sought to overcome is the alienation of a social world in which an individual is prone by rationality, nothing less to ask what if I cooperated and others didn't. Gandhi's idea of an unalienated social world one that he sought to implement in ashram life but also thought was present in many other local contexts was a world in which that apparently rational anxiety would not occur to anyone. As I said, his notion of an unalienated life was not a moralistic critique of self-interest. It was rather an epistemological silence or preempting of a question that comes to mind, what if I cooperated with a certain conception of rationality. It was a silencing of a question. Can this Gandhian ideal of an unalienated life be convicted of a nostalgic hankering for a pre-modern social outlook? Gandhi's stubborn refusal to be dissuaded by all such dismissals of his position is based I think on a very insightful claim on his part that not just the prospect of but the reality of such unalienatedness is everywhere available, not in some outlook of the remote past but in the quotidian present. I emphasize both quotidian and present quite deliberately. To understand this claim of his I think we have to invoke the notion of a frame which I will borrow from the theoretical vocabulary of psychologists. Psychologists often talk of something they call the frame problem. Human subjects often find themselves thinking in two different frames. Because these frames are sealed off from each other we may have thoughts or responses to the world that were they in the same frame would be felt as being contradictory by the subject. But being in different frames they are not. The inconsistency in the thoughts and responses is therefore not felt by the subject. Let me give you a very, very simple and personal example to illustrate this. My mother-in-law is a conservative Republican. On one of her visits I had to pick her up from the airport in New York and drive her home. On the route from the airport to my home on the Upper West Side near Columbia University one has to traverse the slums of Harlem. My mother-in-law driving past the homeless poverty of the denizens of Harlem was genuinely upset by what she saw. More than once she repeated with heartfelt compassion this is simply terrible. Something has to be done about these conditions that the people are living in here. I was pleased about this. We arrived home. She being a New England Yankee. I fixed her a martini and for an old colonial such as myself a Scotch and soda. Over these drinks I asked her Dorothy, your response to what you saw in Harlem was wonderful. So do you think there should be public expenditure to improve the conditions that you saw? She looked at me with horror. Are you mad? Absolutely not. As I said this is the simplest of examples of what psychologists call the frame problem. In one frame Dorothy Rubin expressed real humanity. It was the quotidian frame of a subject responding directly to what she perceived in the world around her. In the other frame, no doubt a frame shaped by courses she took in economics in her American school, her response was quite inconsistent with the other response. Except that it was not inconsistent within her psychology. Because these two frames are sealed off from one another and from the subjective point of view there's consistency only within a frame not across frames. What made Gandhi impervious to charges of nostalgia about an unalienated existence is that he was convinced that there are many quotidian contexts in the present, not just in a bygone past in which we are completely unalienated. Let us take his understanding of unalienatedness as I expanded it. One sign of unalienatedness I said was in the question what if I paid the cost of cooperation and others did not, never so much as occurring to one. There are many contexts for instance in everyday Ashram life he said that such a question would never occur to one. Or we might say it would never occur to a father at least most fathers to ask such a question of his daughter what if I cooperated and she didn't. But in the very same people there are frames again frequently shaped by the sort of education provided by the zeitgeist of capitalist modernity that he was repudiating where that question does have and drives one's thinking and behavior and one has no awareness that one is being inconsistent because each response is in a distinct insulated frame. But his point was that the form of frame in which one's responses are unalienated is frequently possessed by subjects of society here and now. Not just societies of past to which he was nostalgically appealing. And it was his conception of a humane politics that we first need to remove the boundaries between these frames creating a unified frame so that people first come to realize their inconsistencies and then to publicly educate people into the importance of scaling up the sorts of response that were expressed in the quotidian frame to criticize and revise the sorts of response that occurred in the other frame more relevant to the domain where social principles and policies are articulated. For Marx the sort of humane politics was to be found in the solidarities that the military had forged in their revolutionary struggles. For Gandhi it was to be an extension of the outlooks forged in Arsham life and in the pluralist practices of popular religions all of which he brought to bear in a variety of movements he led and mobilized during the long freedom struggle. That differential politics, Marx and Gandhi, was inevitable given the different historical context about which they wrote and as well as the different political positions they took. Though radical was not a revolutionary socialist. But my point is that the radicalism in Gandhi was quite of a piece with Marx regards the moral psychology that lay behind their politics the ideas and ideals of seeking to overcome alienation induced by capitalist modernity. It is this anti-modernism in which his radicalism lies. Okay, now I turn finally with some trepidation to the feature of his anti-modernism that titillates everybody his occasional appeal to traditional superstition and myth to make a moral and political point. I do so not with a view to defending him at all but to steer people who disdain him for it to understand how much more sophisticated it was than it might initially seem. It is fine to criticize a philosopher who may be wrong but you have to first get right what it is that you think is wrong. Let's take the most spectacular example of this occasional tendency in Gandhi his deliberately provocative public assertion that the Bihar earthquake was a divine admonishment to us all for our complicity in the sin of untouchability a mythical theological lesson as it were in the attribution of collective responsibility. As you know it sent Tagore into heights of denunciation. Amartya Sen bent my ear over a seemingly interminable high-table dinner repeating Tagore's criticism at new heights of indignation. The chief criticism seems to be that he should not have been feeding as he did with that assertion the worst aspects of tradition and superstition in India since that is precisely what keeps us back from advancing into modernity. So let's look in a little more detail at the exchanges on the subject both private and public including with Tagore himself. In these exchanges Gandhi was sometimes told why don't you just say that you meant your assertion to be a metaphor. Gandhi blithely responded let it be a metaphor but there's no other way for me to put it. Consider that response. There's an insight in it that is worth recording even if in the end you side with Tagore and not Gandhi. An apt metaphor Gandhi was suggesting cannot be paraphrased away into literal statements. All theoretical linguists would agree on this point. A good metaphor is not paraphrasable away without some loss of meaning but if that is so it cannot merely be a point about language. It is a point about the world or about reality as well. That there is an aspect which is a point which says there's an aspect of fragment of reality that cannot be expressed by anything but that metaphor. That's just the other side of saying that the metaphor is unparaphrasable. The idea that a metaphor is unparaphrasable is a point about language but that point about language has a metaphysical counterpart about reality which is that there's an aspect of reality that cannot be expressed by anything but that metaphor. That's just the other side of the unparaphrasability of metaphor. That is what Gandhi was insisting on. Now of course there is no doubt that at least for all of us in this room Gandhi's assertion about the earthquake was saying something which you've taken literally rather than as a metaphorical attribution of collective responsibility is utterly false. There's no room for doubt about that for people sitting in this room but the fact is that almost all metaphors taken literally are false. Juliet is the sun said Romeo. Juliet is not the sun. In fact the only true metaphor that I've ever come across is no man is an island. Almost all metaphors are false. So far we are all square then. Gandhi was as off-being as Shakespeare but Shakespeare does not provoke Amartya Sen to heights of denunciation. So the point must be that some metaphors even if they get the point across as nothing else can are inappropriate for social and political reasons. As I said in a traditional society one must not be feeding the tendency to superstition. But Gandhi explicitly said to Tagore, I'm quoting, I'm not speaking to scientists and to scientifically educated urban elites. I'm speaking to the ordinary illiterate masses among our people to convey something in a social matter of the utmost importance. If I was speaking to scientists I would certainly say something different on this matter. So a question arises. Is this just the familiar relativism of different cultures? A traditional folk and spiritual culture of popular religion that Gandhi was constantly tapping as I pointed out earlier and a modern scientific culture? That is to say is it just the standard relativism about truth whereby what is true in the culture of popular religion is false in the culture shaped by scientific knowledge? I don't believe that that is what Gandhi's response, what underlies Gandhi's response to Tagore at all. You might think that I'm just projecting this onto Gandhi because of my own, I will admit it, emphatically anti-relativist views. But I'm not doing that. What Gandhi's suggesting here is not that familiar and implausible relativism at all. The relativism that says that truth itself is relative to a culture. But he's rather expressing a much deeper and more fascinating question. The question, why is it that something that is viewed as a truth in some cultures can only be viewed, sorry, why is it that something that is viewed literally as a truth in some cultures can only be viewed as a metaphor in another? One can surely show Gandhi the sympathetic courtesy of acknowledging that he is in the end asking Tagore to think about this deeper question even if one rightly refuses to follow the more familiar relativist in allying many assertions of the sort within the culture of popular religion, the prestige of truth. Thank you very much.