Thanks, everyone, for coming out. You guys having a good time? Yeah. Awesome. I appreciate you guys coming out to the last talk tonight. So my name is Scott Urban. This is a quick real brief background. Associate director of productivity. I focus solely on healthcare and medical device security. Also, a security researcher. I spent 15 years Infosec IT. I've spent five of that directly working for healthcare organizations running security programs. So is there anyone show of hands, works for a healthcare provider? All right. Anyone manufacturer side? Awesome. Great. So yeah, definitely come with the industry background as well. So hopefully some of that will reflect in my understanding of the situation. But I've spent about three and a half years now researching medical devices. Anyone come to Shawn Merdinger and I just talked last year that we did? Couple folks. Awesome. So we're going to recap it really quick this year. But I'll go ahead and turn it over to Mark to introduce itself quick. Awesome. I'm Mark Haleo, senior consultant with productivity. Mostly do pentesting or anything security. So you want to be a red team. I have pretty good interest in offensive power shell stuff. I like bots. Botnets. Been running hunting pots for the past five years. Been in security for about five. Low fun fact, this is my first talk ever. So thanks. Awesome, right? Come to DEF CON first time, right? Do it right? Yeah. All right. So really quick is what we're going to cover. First off, why are we looking at medical devices? Why does it matter to us? Why are we passionate about it? Secondly, kind of cover really quickly like phase one where we started like three years ago. Just general three level security hygiene vulnerability issues that we're seeing. Secondly, do a recap of Shawn and I's talk last year that we did on some of the internet exposure and healthcare organizations that were vulnerable to direct attack and pivoting into medical devices. And then we're going to look at how do you get admin access to these devices. Finally, Mark's going to talk about some of the honey pot research we've been doing over the last six months to see if these are attacks are intentional or unintentional. Some of the data that we're seeing hitting these emulated honey pots that we've got set up. And finally, just quick diagnosis treatment plans. What can you do to mitigate some of these risks if you do work in industry or you're a consultant for healthcare organizations, that type of thing. So why research medical devices? Who in here is reliant on a medical device every day? Anyone? Yeah, a few. Diabetics. Yeah, absolutely. So there's definitely that, right? That's a very personal impact for folks. And if not, probably many of you either know family member who's reliant on those or you've been to the hospital at some point in your life. So there's a real personal connection. Also for me, because of my background in healthcare, that's when I kind of got a passion about this, right? I started to see medical devices becoming connected. And it wasn't just from a patient privacy aspect, it was also looking at it from a patient safety aspect. So that's kind of what a lot of the research has been focused on is more looking at patient safety versus patient privacy. I will touch on some patient privacy stuff that I'll call out independently. Really quick, just to set the stage, so everyone has the right mindset here. I often get challenged or question of what type of person is going to attack these devices. And so I think it's really important to set that stage up front that malicious intent is not a prerequisite to a patient safety issue. So a good story here is, and actually Sean, who's in the audience here, found this story of two individuals that presented for treatment in Austria for gunshot wounds. And they were hooked up to a infusion pump, a PCA model, which is like the self-controlled clicker. They didn't feel that their pain management was under control. Nursing staff felt otherwise. So they did, kind of what I'm going to show you and did, went online, found service technician manuals, found hard coded credentials, got into the device and up the doses and suffered from OD effects. So it could be a patient themselves that causes an adverse event or a patient safety issue. So don't think that it's just malicious intent. We'll show you some of that stuff when we get into the honeypot research too. So really, what are we doing? Ones discover patient safety issues, not hippo focus, not privacy focus. Help equip defenders. That's really important for us to give you the information that's meaningful so that you can go and protect your organizations. Secondly, alert effective party. So we've been working with ICS CERT, the FDA, actually was anyone out of B-Sides? If you have you. So we did a quick update on state of medical device security there. And we had Dr. Suzanne Schwartz, who leads CDRH over at the FDA, kind of call in. They've been great. We've had a lot of progress over the last year. Did anyone see? We had a first ever last Friday, where the FDA actually put an advisory out to healthcare organizations, some research that Billy Rios did on hospital pumps and actually alerted healthcare organizations and advised them to pull these things out of production. So that was a massive win. It was precedent setting. Not only was it precedent setting for the FDA to do that, they actually did that before harm was proven, which is very important. Usually recalls happen after a patient safety issue has occurred. So that was a big win. And then inoculated against future, yeah, big round of applause, massive win. Yeah, the FDA has been, you know, they've been really great to work with. So phase one really quick, you know, what do we see high level? Was it all these kinds of crazy attacks? Absolutely not. This is what we were looking at, you know, 90% of these security hygiene items, right?  We default hard-coded admin credits. That's what I'm going to talk about later on here today. No one's software vulnerabilities, inability to update patches on devices. Legacy systems heavily utilized in healthcare. You know, many XP, SP2 boxes, 2,000 boxes, those types of things that are not patched. And unencrypted data transmission. This is a big one that at first you may say, okay, this is one of those patient privacy things because you're pushing PHI data. But these devices, as they become connected, we're using what's called medical device integration. So we're taking these devices, we're connecting them, and through web services we're pushing stuff in real-time data for like ventilators, anesthesia cards, critical systems down into the medical record. Well, a lot of times that transit doesn't use encryption. So you can sit man in the middle, you can see the XML files, most of the stuff is just XML files that are calling and pushing, alter that, replay it, no app sack on them, and ultimately alter what ends up in a medical record. So then it becomes something that may be a patient safety issue. There's been lots of research on individuals presenting as you potentially. And the results of that, the research show are a very high probability of misdiagnosis, mistreatment being prescribed the wrong drugs. So phase two, this is a recap really quick of one of the issues that Sean and I, you know, uncovered and kind of presented on last year. So we did some research through Shodan, John Matherly runs that, if any of you aren't familiar with it, it's an absolutely awesome tool to utilize for research and find things. So I was sitting on the phone one night with Sean, and I was like, Sean, check this out, I did a search for anesthesia and got all these returns, and it's clearly not a medical device, I know that. The only indication it was medical devices that I was running XP. But other than that, I was like, Sean, this isn't a medical device, like what's going on? And what we found is that this system had a misconfiguration on this external system that had SMB open and had anonymous read into the organization, and it was leaking intelligence on all their hosts, medical devices, supporting system and applications, gave us all this stuff that is a treasure trove for an attacker. So we found this huge healthcare organization, over 12,000 employees, exposed intelligence on over 68,000 of their systems. So it wasn't just medical devices, it was their entire network. Sean and I's research was really, we want to look at medical devices, so we scrape that out, but it was everything, it was their financial systems, domain controllers, every single device. It also exposed third party organizations that are traditionally contracted in healthcare for services such as laboratory services or radiology, imaging, reading services. So that's the type of information that we were getting out of there. So did we just find that one organization? Did we just randomly have one organization in the world that we happened to assemble upon? No. We found hundreds. So this is like showdown queries that we were doing. We were doing org searches on SMB and you can see here just key indicators like health star, so anything with health in the org name, those are some of the hits. Once you started changing those to specific stuff like podiatry, pediatric, neurology, then you ended up with like thousands of organizations that had this misconfiguration that exposed this intelligence on their medical devices supporting systems. And on top of it, it ended up being a system that was XP2 and was vulnerable to MSO8067, which what's that run on? SMB. So you had a direct attack vector, knew exactly what systems to pivot into, what those devices were associated with and host names and doctors names associated with them, office floor location, oh this isn't OR7, this is this type of anesthesia card. Very detailed information. So what type of systems did we find in this one organization? So here's a recap of the number of devices, the types of devices that you can directly attack and pivot from this external system into. So this organization had a very large cardiology institute, see 480 systems, infusion systems, MRI, Pax, Pax is used for image storage from radiology systems. So we'll talk about this a little bit later. I think this is a good one that I think a lot of attackers are actually going in to these systems that have pretty poor security on the back end, through the application, almost always get prompted for a username and password. But in the back end, if you hit that thing, very rarely do they have like NTFS permission set up or accounts password set up, or they use a hard coded call that you can get in to grab some of that, some of that PHI. So I think attackers know this, I think this is one of the ways a lot of PHI is getting leaked out of healthcare organizations. So it's a little remark, kind of talk about, you know, attack vectors here with this information real quick. Awesome. So now we have all that information, okay, we can do short inquiries, we can do a lot of recon passively with our open source intel. How can somebody, for example, take advantage of this? So the first attack vector would be physical. So through the example before of our SMB, you know, we can start querying active directory in the back end, we can start pulling information on users, their roles in the organization, all that fun stuff computers. Also where these computers are, where they sit, and most importantly, lockout policy. So whoever's been in the hospital, I mean, it's pretty lack security, you walk in, you get a little badge, and you're pretty much free to roam anywhere.  Just start brute forcing, next thing you know you're in, you're in a doctor's console, and if you got loads to wealth of information. Second attack factor would be phishing. Again, this whole pretext of, we know the OS, we know the IP, we know the users names, easily build the phishing campaign against those users or computers. So we know the OS, we can start crafting pretty specific payloads, we know the underlying system, it's pretty easy, especially if it's windows, start Excel attacks, and you just keep going from there. And the next one would be Pivot. So we had physical, we had phishing, okay, but why don't we just go for the easy ones? So we know that 0867 is running SP2, why don't we just lob an exploit over the net and see what happens. Nine times out of ten, maybe it'll crash, what if it works? If it works, you've got a foothold there, you've got a foothold within the hospital organization or whatever, you know, research facility it may be, and you start pivoting from there, and you know you can take over the organization from that way. Alright, so let's get into the super awesome credentials that are super hard to crack that you all came to see. So phase three is, well, now we know the vulnerabilities in these systems. We know you can reach them directly from the internet. So what would it take an attacker to get remote admin access on medical devices? So that's what we're going to talk about quick. Before I do that, I just want to go over disclosure timeline. I also want to note, before I go over the disclosure line, that all this information was actually publicly available on GE's website. So it didn't require any type of banner, any type of authorization to go into any type of account. It was publicly available. Obviously, since there's a lot of information, I chose to be responsible about it. We contacted CERT, we contacted GE. So you can see back in August last year is when this was initially disclosed. They responded very quickly. September 16th, this was an additional disclosure. So the first one in August was a disclosure of about a hundred sets of credentials, administrative access. And then September 16th, I've had some more time on my hands and decided to sign in another 30. December 3rd, this is when we got confirmation from CERT that GE had closed their investigation and closed the issue. So we'll talk about that here. So what was that response like? Well, GE, the team over there, the security team, they're actually, you know, I want you to know they're doing a very good job. They are much more mature and they've put a lot more resources into this recently. So does anyone know Mike Murray? I mean, he comes from the hacker community. He's building a team over there. You know, they're doing good things. Every, this is a systemic issue. So although I'm showing specific issues, this is across the board. We could grab, you know, any medical device manufacturer with similar results. So I want to make that clear that it's not just a GE issue and they have been very proactive about it. Now, GE, after the investigation, their response was that all of these credentials are default and they're not heart-coded. So I want you to know that's the response that they gave. I'll talk a little bit later and show some potential contradictions with that through their documentation after we get through these. So let's sit back, enjoy the show. This is going to take a while. I thought it was a really good idea, like, hey, it would be awesome to drop 30 CVs in one talk. And then I realized, like, we've got to go through, like, 40 slides here really quick. So stay with me. I'll point out some of the highlights. So here's the first ones. So what I've got on here is the nuclear imaging system. Up top, what you'll see in each one of these slides is the CVE. You might quickly be like, oh, CVE 2006. Scott, you've been sitting on this thing for nine years? No. No. How that works is, like I mentioned, those are publicly available documents. So when that's sent in, you look back at the earliest iteration that's available publicly and you reserve a CVE back to that date. Why I also put these in here is as we go through these, I'm not going to point them out, but I want you to note, some of these are legacy. I started at 2000 and newer. You'll see some of them are new. 2014, I think maybe the next one or a couple in is 2014. It was updated documentation as of a month prior to me coming across this information. CVSS scores. These majority of these CVEs were published two days ago. They hit the National Vulnerability Database yesterday. Everyone that's been assigned so far has been assigned to CVSS of 10. So that's what CVSS score is. It's a remote administrative credentials admin access. Alright, so another nuclear imaging system here. You start getting into some interesting stuff here. Telnet, ROOT. I mean, they're pretty super awesome passwords. So, another thing of note is it's kind of cool, like look at the passwords, like pound big guy one. And as we go through them, like look at how many different products they're utilized on, cross products, cross years to see, you know, oh were these developers like switched on these products and move product lines, those types of things reuse. Okay, keep going. Still new imaging system, service logins. So, Windows admin accounts. Those are great. Oh, the bottom one's really awesome too. You know, from a clinical perspective, these systems are heavily supported and because hospital staff doesn't necessarily know every single product, it's outsourced to the vendor for support and so they need to remotely be able to get into them. So this one happens to use super awesome VNC with a super awesome password. Here's some cameras. Some more stuff. More new imaging systems. CT scanners. So now we're getting interesting. Now we're getting the SU logins on these types of systems. MRI systems. Same thing. Repeats the passwords. X-ray systems. More X-ray systems. Centricity. So this is where it starts to get interesting. Never mind this. Centricity, like I was talking about packs before. This is, you know, a system that does patient monitoring type stuff as well as it also does packs imaging storage. So that's what we're getting into here. So here's the centricity image vault. Oh, that's where all the images are stored. Super awesome SQL SA password of nothing. Admin logins. License server if you don't want to pay for it. Archive audit trail. So this is actually really good. Like, okay, this is CVE for 2014, SSL. Hey, you can actually use encryption. Like, made a good decision. We're using encryption now. Oh wait, the key store server and the key manager server have really bad passwords. SQL SA logins for the analytics servers. Analytics server logins themselves. Gonna be a treasure trove of data in there. That's where all the data is dumping. That's where you want, taking all of your data out from the data warehouse. Pack SQL SA logins. Directly into imaging. And more packs. And here is what I was talking about the backend. Not through the application, but in order to get into the actual storage server, if you want read only, please put RO. If you want read right, please end with RW. Two characters, GE. And some more packs. And oh, here's some IIS. So here's some web server stuff if you want in. Just type in IIS. Gamma cameras. CT scanners. More SU, more logins. Emergency logins. Obviously there's a reason for that. I think we don't always know the best answer. But we do know what's failed. And we need to not continue to use failed practices. Even if we don't solve the problem, we should be trying something new that is not a known failure. And I think that's a big message, you know, going forward is we can't continue to use failed approaches. More x-ray. This one's interesting. This is like custom scripts for you. Like, you want to create user accounts? Just run a script. The first one, techusers.bad, it will create two service tech logins with service tech as the password. The rest of them will create user accounts one through 100. So, all right, you guys survive. There's 130 CVs there, 130 sets of creds. Multiple different radiology equipment. So what do you do when you have all kinds of credentials? You create a word cloud? Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. So, there's a bit of a, I don't know if it's funny. You guys probably think it's funny. But I, when I went to these word cloud sites, I kept pushing it in. If anyone, like putting all the information into the word cloud site, and they all kept coming out and saying big guy, right? And big guy won. But there's actually, if you look at the real password, it's like pound big guy won. So apparently word cloud websites have better app sec and sanitize input. Much better than medical device software. So, all right. So, now, you know, again, you know, the official response was these are default. So, you know, I want to make the case, are there still issues? So we're going to go through a couple examples of that. So, some cases, documentation instructs do not change these credentials and do not allow password resets on these accounts. Some cases, documentation instructs do not change this password to the account or we will not be able to remotely support that application or that system. Documentation also, in many cases, does not have instructions on how to change many of these accounts. Secure configuration documentation is very lacking. Because of that, third party integrators or the manufacturers themselves that are supporting it or if the healthcare organization is implementing the cells, they're going off this documentation. So, they're following it. So, these credentials are heavily utilized in the industry. When we go do assessments on this type of stuff, it is massive success rates using default, hard-coded, you know, service and technician credentials. So, let's look at some of these examples to show you. So, you can see on the very top, user cannot change password. Make sure you check it. Password never expires. Make sure you check it. Down in the bottom, changing passwords. Big important flag for the person doing it. Do not change the insight password. Remote access will be disabled for support if this password is changed. So, if you're saying it's default, this is a little contradictory in my opinion. And here on acquisition again, big bold letters with an exclamation point. Do not change this password. As a healthcare organization doing this, if you're reading this or an implementer doing this, you're probably going to follow this. This is big and bold and called out, never change this password in some of these cases. You know, it's not an all of them. There's definitely someone that's absolutely a default and they document how to change them. Password, tech support. Here's PCNW, not VNC. The bottom one, super awesome, because physicians love typing passwords, so they would never click the yes, remember this password forever.  But station operator, hey, just call them up. They can always give you a username and password into that system. And we'll go ahead and reset that password to password. This last one, I want to be very clear, but I want to show you, this is theoretical. I have not done anything on this device. But I wanted to, I've done stuff on other devices and other systems, obviously. But I wanted to kind of give you the mindset of an attacker or even a researcher, how we started looking at documentation and seeing are there potential issues. Can we think, get this system to do something unintentional? And so this bottom one you can see in the snow, to perform the following steps, you must generate X-ray radiation. So with radiology equipment, dosage, radiation, that's where there's a safety issue. Now obviously with this step, there's probably some very good controls in that system, so that under intended use, it emits a low level. But they're still telling you make sure you follow up to safety precautions and you're emitting radiation. So if you can get remote access and you follow this, and they're not using encryption and they have these web services and all of that, can you then potentially, as an attacker, sit in on that? Look at that? Like I said, a lot of these things call XML files and feed parameter values for dosing levels in the XML. So once you figure that out and you figure out, okay, this is how you can get it to go low, could you potentially, as an attacker then, when you're thinking, change that parameter and replay that.   But warning, the editors and producers claim no responsibility for its accuracy. So of course, there hasn't been a liability case to set precedents yet. If something does happen, I think that will take place, but right now there's this type of contradictions that you see of, you know, and again, all of this stuff is not, this is GE specific, but this is systemic across the industry, across vendors. So I'm going to turn it over to Mark. So now that we got the simpo, we know they're internet accessible. We've got credentials. So what we wanted to do over the last six months was set up and emulate honey pots to see if we were seeing intentional target attacks, unintentional, just random noise. And so Mark's going to kind of talk high level about some of that data that we're seeing and some of those statistics to give you an idea. So Mark, I'll turn it over to you. All right. So like Scott said, we've got all this data. We've got all these passwords, the fall creds. We know this information about the data and all that stuff. Let's figure out if this is actually happening. So what we kind of wanted to get out of this research was are people using this data, like somebody else scraped GE's website or any other default vendors website before we did or Scott did and started looking for these devices on that and logging in. Have they, were they using Shodan as well, looking for 4.5 and other SMB attacks to 4.6.7 and trying to exploit those? Were they developing custom malware for the different vendor devices? And if they did get access, was there malicious intent? And was there any campaigns against specific vendors? Because, you know, it could be political or geo, if there were just attacking vendors for certain reasons. So the whole setup.  So we definitely use some of those. The open source ones kind of forked in, made it our own way. So to include, we got a bunch of information on the vendor devices. So just HTTP strings, different protocols they use, the web front end, so to make sure if an attacker hits it, you know, it'll actually say a vendor name, user login and password and give the right error messages back, just in case if anybody was doing any type of fingerprinting, or maybe even heuristics. Replaced existing vulnerabilities. So, like I said, 0867, those application level vulnerabilities, some have vulnerable versions of Telnet on there, or open VSC. And also, of course, default creds for SS agent web. And also custom services and scripts. So we kind of had to emulate the whole stack on the Honeypot itself to make sure that when these vendor devices are communicating with each other within the operating system, that, you know, these types of protocols are actually there and set. So if there was a pretty sophisticated attacker who was looking at it, this isn't going to look like some ordinary Honeypot that they found. This is going to be some bona fide traffic on there and potentially juicy information. So internet presence. So obviously Shodan and Google would be your go-to. We're setting this up about six months ago. And like we need some quicker results like that just because I wanted it quicker. So we utilizing previous talks, really CVEs and obviously all these vendor creds, they're out there so we can use that information also to kind of speed it up.  So we set up a bunch of credentials for each of the systems that were unique to the systems and just let it rain.  Here's this dump of the file system and everything. It made no sense, but hopefully somebody's like, yeah, like, I want to hit that. I would. So the data. So we sampled about 10 different honeypots, you know, from D-Fibs, MRI machines and kind of spread them all across the world. So just to get kind of a balance in there. There was over 55,000 successful logins. So that includes web and SSH. These are, a lot of it also includes your typical admin admin, even though those creds are probably valid somewhere, as we saw earlier, you know, the default passwords for these are pretty terrible.  So successful exploits. So how many people exploited the telnet, the 0867 or, you know, some sort of FTP. There was about 30 or 29 of those. There was 299 pieces of unique malware dropped. Most of these were sort of like C2 callback strips. So they just plant there until they were in Pearl or Bash or what have you and just kind of establish some sort of persistence and have some callback to an IRC server somewhere. And a Honeycred. So out of those, all those fake pacepin and Twitter dumps that we did, eight of those hits, unique hits actually came back to us and were successful login. So we had alerting set up. So when I saw that come by, I got out of bed. It was like 4 o'clock in the morning. I was like, I got to check this out. So what happened when those people logged in? You know, who's trying to attack this and they're obviously here for a reason. I think it was interesting to just to point out the, you know, the source countries that, you know, who would have thought like Netherlands was the top country. And so, Mark, like, I know you kind of looked at that a little bit like the IP. It seemed to be like an ISP sitting there that they were hopping through that they had C2. Yeah. So, you know, so we have the source countries, Netherlands, China and Korea. The latter two, okay, we can kind of see like if for anyone else who owns Honeypots out there you see a lot of traffic coming from those types of countries. The obviously, you know, we kind of do a little more research on that. It actually came from one web host provider. So, why that is coming from there? I don't know. Probably definitely going to follow up on that and see if there's anything going on there. And we were just going to roll the attribution die, but Netherlands are not on the attribution die yet, so we may have to get them at it. All right. So, what did the attackers do when they logged in with their Honeycreds? Absolutely nothing. A lot of them just let the shell blink or ran a ping to 999.999.999.999.  How did your logs fill up? Yeah, logs were... I had to get more space. So, obviously really saddening, but I mean, when we were doing previous Honeybot research unrelated to this, this is the type of stuff we saw. So we can sort of conclude from that. Okay. Like, these metal devices that we copied to a tee, we're going to do a search and we are pretty much vulnerable to any other, you know, typical Linux or Windows box that's out there that's just chillin' with direct access to the net, getting pulled into some C2 or some RSC botnet. So, very similar types of attacks. Did the attacker know that they, you know, had Bruton MRI machine? No, because they didn't do their proper enumeration. If somebody would have cared, they realized this is an MRI machine and I have Bruton, what can I do? These honeypots were actively connecting back and talking back to that C2 server. So, we can conclude from that. Are there currently medical devices that are owned and talking back to a C2 server? Yeah! Which is scary. So, you know, because these devices check in, they can be part of a DDoS, so if anybody sees a, if one of us does like network level stuff, you see a defibrillator DDoSing you, that's interesting. There's somebody's pacemaker just going nuts. Let's be crazy. So, yeah, so these C2 owners or the bot owners or whoever is sitting on this and calling back, they don't know what they have. So, once they figure it out, once they figure it out, what can they do with it?  Like, when it starts getting into news, it's high profile. Once it's high profile, people are starting to look, okay, they put the pieces together, interconnect devices, this is a typical UNIX box or a windows box, probably, you know, out in the internet, do some light fingerprinting versioning, I realize, okay, can I sell that? Can I do malicious things with that? That's what we're trying to conclude. So, our next steps definitely is to sort of go on the hunt and realize, okay, which bots, which bots are talking to what and try to kind of like tell them, hey, we are an MRR machine, or make it more obvious to increase interaction, but yeah, this is all stuff that's going on right now, which is pretty scary. That's a really quick diagnosis, those types of things. So really, you know, I think we've shown, you know, we know there's exposed vulnerable systems out there, right? And we all know in this room that all software has flaws, we're not going to increase that to zero. That's not our goal.  I mean, you don't need to really, you know, that vulnerable exposed system that we're looking at. And there's really this lack of patient safety alignment, because healthcare organizations overall have been heavily focused on, you know, patient privacy and those types of things. So problem awareness, just some really quick things, you know, increasingly accessible, right? And as connectivity increases, so does that exposure to, you know, potential vulnerabilities or interaction. And again, HIPAA focuses on privacy. It does not focus on safety. So we need to change our mindset and look at, you know, real safety. Number three, two, well, the FDA has been very forthcoming and been very good to work with over the last year. And we've done a lot of things and had some of these landmark things happen. They do not validate cybersecurity controls or, you know, safety controls or requisite. What happens, one of those systems that we see in the Honeypot, this is a device and it gets malware. Well that malware is actually meant to, you know, scrape card data or something like that. But how do we know? They lack forensic evidence, capture evidence, those types of things. So treatment plans, one, if you work for a healthcare organization, I would highly recommend that you go and grab the credentials now that they're in CVE. Get those credentials, tag the manufacturer and ask them how we're going to get them fixed. Secondly, working in healthcare, many organizations want to solely put it on sometimes on the manufacturer. And they will ask the manufacturer, hey we've got these credentials or we need this update and the manufacturer gives them an answer that says we can't do that. They take their word for it. They don't press it any further. So it's not a spectator's sport. You need to get involved. If you work for a healthcare organization, we guarantee you patient safety, quality care is in your missions and in your values. And if it isn't, you press and work for the healthcare organization. Right. Profit first, no. It doesn't happen. So engage with stakeholders. You know, whether you're consulting side like I do now or whether you're in industry, you as information security people, you need to reach out to clinical engineering. You need to reach out to legal contracting. Under selection, prior to cutting that check, to put requirements in place for certain security controls, to validate them up front, to put penalties into the contract, come up with service level agreements for vulnerability and that coordinated disclosure. Those are very good things. We've had some big wins on coordinated disclosure. So when Sean and I talked last year, we had that formal statement from Phillips in November. So that's awesome, right? That was the first medical device manufacturer. They released coordinated disclosure. And it's a really good one. So, you know, round of applause for those guys. Yup. And not only did they get it implemented on the healthcare side, they got it implemented like Phillips wide. So that was a big win too. I mean, they have a lot of IoT stuff as well. Medtronic is another one. They're working on something now have a dedicated way if you go to their website to contact them. And it says, hey, if you're a security researcher and you find a vulnerability, this is how you get a hold of us, a separate way to communicate with us and report it. We just had it besides Las Vegas two days ago when we did the update. Hans, who works at Drager Medical out in Germany, very big medical device manufacturer do a lot of ventilators and stuff. They came on, we've now committed to come out with the coordinated disclosure policy. So we're having some big wins there. But it's not a spectator's sport. We're reaching out. You've got to collaborate with those allies, those internal stakeholders, and those external stakeholders in order to solve this problem. So if we continue down this road that we're in, right now it's very interesting. So the FDA receives, and this is quoted from their website, and it says, if you want to do adverse events, it could be medical device malfunction, associated death, or just an adverse event. Right now, we can't do forensic investigations very easily. So evidence capture is not something that is historically built into these devices. So when there's an event, it gets adjudicated clinically. So it's like, oh, was it a clinical cause of death? Instead of medical device malfunction. But when it goes to that medical device malfunction, generic bucket, it doesn't then get looked into a, oh, was it something at a security level? We don't know that. And so it just goes in this generic bucket. It was a malfunction. So we got to get better of that. Going forward, what can we do, right? I think overall, to treat this, again, we have to look patient safety should be the overriding objective. Privacy, for most parts, if we do security properly and look at it from patient safety, should be incorporated. There are some cases where it won't, and we'll have to address it. But I think we got to look at patient safety more than patient privacy. We need to avoid failed practices. That is a huge one. We continue to see it. We know they're bad practices. We know they're terrible security and we keep rolling out product and we need to integrate those safety concepts into existing security practices, governance structures. If we do that, we're going to have more reliable medical devices coming to market. We shouldn't have undue delay or cost. We're going to have better collaboration, which has been awesome over the last 12 months, 16 months. And they're going to be much more resilient against accidents, against adversaries, unintended use. And lastly, how can you get involved? If you're interested in this, if you're a researcher, if you work at a health care organization, if you want to acquire devices and test them, my wife has not let me buy an MRI system and put it in the basement yet. So I don't have one of those. But some of these devices, patient monitors, those types of things, you can go on eBay or MedWild and you can purchase those. So that's a lot of researchers how they acquire devices. There's a handful of them. And there's not just that, like the FDA held a workshop this year, first time ever in October, brought in all stakeholders. There was security researchers there, there was providers there, there was manufacturers there. That was awesome. Release guidance. There was also an IEEE NSF building code for secure medical device software that was held in New Orleans the month following that in November. So there's a lot of industry working groups working together to speak. Speak at industry conferences. And not just security conferences like DEF CON. I spent a large majority of my time now actually going out to health care conferences and speaking to that C level and going to HIMs and the HIMs privacy and security events. And I did a talk this last year, actually it was just health care procurement guides and helped them out and kind of gave them hey, this is what you can do during procurement recovery. It's kind of a grassroots organization focused on public safety and security issues that have the potential to impact human life. And so medical is obviously one of the cornerstones of ION the Calvary as well as automotive IOT. So get involved if you're not involved with those guys. It's really good if anything else just the collaboration interact, meet new people that are interested in doing what you're doing. They're dropping a bunch of research and then walking away from the problem but getting involved to actually solve the problem because the people in this room are the ones that are uniquely qualified to fix that same problem that they find. So please get involved, do your best. Thank you guys for coming out. I know we're already out of miscommunication about time and it was so we'll try to hang out somewhere out here if anyone has any questions but thanks a lot guys for coming out and have a great DEF CON. Thank you.


I don't know if you have seen this plant in my videos, but I've had it for a long time. And one thing that I can say is that it has been a struggle. After having her losing leaves, I just didn't know what to do. And another thing that was really bad with it is that it was lacking a lot of light. What I did, I decided to cut the branches. It was a very sad moment for me, but I thought, okay, maybe I can cut it and see if I can restart again. I placed my cutting under the plant spectrum 32 grow light. And I can tell you, after one week of being there, I started seeing new grows. Guys, this light is amazing. And it is a full spectrum LED grow light that simulates the sunlight. And I am not kidding you guys, this light really looks like natural light. On top of that, one thing that I love about this grow light is that it is made with sustainability in mind. For example, the housing of the grow light is made of 100% recycled aluminum. And aluminum is a very good material for passive cooling. So this prevents your LED board from overheating over time and it makes your light last longer. After 10 years of intense use, you can easily replace the LED board so you don't have to replace the whole light module. You replace the LED board and you're good to go. The plant spectrum comes with sliders so you can easily mount it however you choose. Or you can use a disc also included for vertical lighting or even mount it under a cabinet. So wherever you have your plants, you can mount your light. If you want to try this amazing grow light, make sure to follow the link in the description below and use the code PLANTSENLUCIA for 10 euros off any 150 euro purchase. And now let's get to winter care. Talking about winter care, as I always say, plant care is actually also self care. So the first thing that I do in my plant care routine in winter is something that helps my plants and also helps me. And this is to clean their leaves. I can tell you for me cleaning the leaves of my plants is really calming. You get to live with your plants and being present with them cleaning each one of their leaves. It is not only very good for me but also for my plants. Cleaning the leaves will prevent pest infestations. As the windows in our homes are closed, dust is going to accumulate on the leaves and this is perfect for pest to hide. So I usually clean my leaves on the top, also on the bottom and I also clean the stems of my plants. It will also keep the leaves clean of dust and it's going to be easier for your plants to receive the sunlight that lets be real is not so much during these times. Ok, let's talk about watering. In winter we want to reduce the frequency of watering with our plants. This is because most of our plants are not growing or growing very slowly. So the water that we provide for them is going to be used slower. Now to be honest to make sure when to water my plants I always check with my finger. I use this tip no matter what season we are in and this is because it has proven to work for me. So all I do is every week I check the soil with my finger until the second knuckle and once I feel that the soil is dry or drying out depending on the plant I water again. And I can tell you in the winter it takes longer so I may be checking every week but I water every two weeks or even every three weeks depending on the plant. Checking the soil will help you understand your plant and exactly when she needs water and this is great to prevent over watering. As the temperatures go down outside we want to bring our tropical plants inside. I brought my plants inside about one and a half months ago and this was when the temperatures were getting below 10 degrees Celsius. Anyways once we have our plants inside we want to protect them from the cold weather outside. So make sure that your plants are not close to a window that you're going to be opening and closing and cold drafts are going to come in. Another tip that I can give you is that if you place your plants close to the windows for a light make sure that the leaves are not touching the window because these tend to get really cold. And if the leaf is always touching the window that's going to burn it and your plant is just not going to be happy there. So if you place it closer to the window for a light just make sure that the leaves are not touching the window and just don't put it too close to the window. Now I get this question a lot because as we want our plants to be in a warmer space some people tend to put them closer to the heating vents. And again this is not a very good idea because the air around the heating vents tends to get really dry. So for example we placed this senesio right here because of light but as you can see the heating vent is right underneath it so the leaves started to dry out. So again in order to prevent this try to avoid placing your plants very close to heating vents because the air will be very dry for them there. Which brings me to humidity. If you have tropical plants like Alacias, Monteras, Alocasias, Ferns they like to be in very high humidity levels. Especially with my Alacias I have to keep the humidity between 50 to 60% around them. If not you will see that your Alacias is going to start to get very brown and dry edges on the leaves. This is because these plants really like high humidity. You can increase humidity around your plant by placing it on a humidity tray or place all of your tropical plants together because they will help each other with humidity levels through the process of transpiration. You can also move them to more humid spaces like your bathroom but if you do this make sure that they have enough light there and if this is not enough you can also place them in a room with a humidifier. For example with my Alacias I have to do this because they really need lots of humidity and the humidifier provides this for them. Now a very important topic when it comes to plant care in the winter especially if you live in a place like myself like Berlin is sunlight. I can tell you here in Berlin we have sunlight maybe until 3.30 in the afternoon and on top of that the majority of the days are very cloudy so the sunlight that we get is very little. So for sure we want to increase the light that our plants get. You can do this in various ways. First you can place your plants a little bit closer to the windows. The closer you get to the windows the more light they will receive. The other day I was measuring the light that my plants receive right in front of the window and then I compared it to one meter away and guys it made such a big difference so placement is very important. If you have lots of sunlight coming in depending on where you are in the world make sure to check your plants and observe how they react to the new placement. If the leaves are getting drier or losing color maybe move them away from the window. But if you live in a place like me being closer to the window will be very beneficial. Another thing to increase the light that your plants receive is to clean your windows. You want to make sure to get rid of all of the obstructions to the light. So we want to clean the windows we want to clean the leaves that way the dust is not going to be obstructing the light from getting to your plant. Now as I said here in Berlin even if I place my plants closer to the windows they will still be lacking sunlight because we don't get so much sunlight in the winter and this is when grow lights come in hand. If you're like me you may want to invest in a good quality LED grow light. This is because this is going to last longer and it's just better for your plants because you make sure that they're getting the full spectrum that they need. This is the reason why I love my plant spectrum LED grow light because I know that the spectrum that it provides is the full part spectrum so I know my plants will thrive with this light. Some grow light companies will explain to you how to use their grow light with different plants. For example mother has an app where you can actually check out your plant and see how to use your grow light with that specific plant. So they tell you how many hours you should have it on as well as how far you should have your grow light from your plant. This has been incredibly useful for me when I use my plant spectrum with other of my plants for example my strelitzia or my calesias. That way I know exactly how much light to provide and how to use this grow light which is really great for plant beginners like us. As you may know grow lights can be a very complex topic so I really like that mother made it a little bit easier for us so our plants can thrive. Now the last topic on this video is a little bit annoying but it's also very important and this is pest prevention and pest management. Unfortunately the winter has proven to be the time when pests come in and attack my plants but you know what I've tried to tell myself that pest prevention and management is part of plant care and once you accept it it becomes a little bit better but I can tell you that there are many ways that you can prevent pests from just becoming a very big problem. The first again is to always clean your plants. Seriously I cannot repeat this enough this has helped me so much preventing pests because I'm checking my plants almost every week or you're going to check them every two weeks whenever it's best for you and just clean them really well. This is going to be very good to prevent pests from really hiding there. If you do have some pests I also have a playlist with all of the pests that I have encountered in my life with plants and how I have dealt with them so if you want to learn more about it make sure to check out that playlist. Also if you would like to support me and the work that I do here we do have a Patreon page where we actually meet every month and we talk about our plants so we talk about issues that we may be dealing with or any gains that we have with our plants so if we have any leaves or we just saved a plant. There are very nice conversations so if you would like to support this community and get to know other people in the community make sure to check out the link in the description and yeah I hope to see you there. Again thank you so much to Mother for sponsoring this video. I can tell you I'm very happy working with them because you can see that this is a company that really cares about bringing sustainability to plant care and also making it more accessible to plant beginners like us so I'm just very happy to be working with them and thank you so much. And yeah if you have any questions any comments make sure to comment down below and as always I will see you in the next one. Okay adios!


Hi, I'm Kanika and I'm going to help you to solve the following question. The question says, find R, F first part is 5 PR is equal to 2 into 6 PR minus 1. Before solving this question, we should know that NPR is equal to N factorial upon N minus R factorial. The knowledge of this formula is the key idea in this question. Let's now begin with the solution. In this question, we have to find R if 5 PR is equal to 2 into 6 PR minus 1. We know that NPR is equal to N factorial upon N minus R factorial therefore 5 PR is equal to 5 factorial upon 5 minus R factorial and 6 PR minus 1 is equal to 6 factorial upon 6 minus R plus 1 factorial. As N factorial is equal to N into N minus 1 factorial therefore 6 minus R plus 1 factorial is equal to 6 minus R plus 1 into 6 minus R into 6 minus R minus 1 factorial and 6 factorial is equal to 6 into 5 factorial. Now we will substitute 6 minus R plus 1 into 6 minus R into 6 minus R minus 1 factorial in place of 6 minus R plus 1 factorial and 6 into 5 factorial in place of 6 factorial. So by substituting we get 5 factorial upon 5 minus R factorial is equal to 2 into 6 into 5 factorial upon 6 minus R plus 1 into 6 minus R into 6 minus R minus 1 factorial. Now this implies 5 factorial upon 5 minus R factorial is equal to 2 into 6 into 5 factorial upon 7 minus R into 6 minus R into 5 minus R factorial. Now 5 factorial cancels out from both sides and 5 minus R factorial also gets cancels out from both the sides. So now we are left with 1 is equal to 12 upon 7 minus R into 6 minus R and this implies 7 minus R into 6 minus R is equal to 12 and this implies 42 minus 13 R plus R square is equal to 12 and this implies R square minus 13 R plus 30 is equal to 0 and this implies R minus 10 into R minus 3 is equal to 0 and this implies R is equal to 10 or R is equal to 3. We have to find value of R in the expression 5 factorial upon 5 minus R factorial is equal to 2 into 6 factorial upon 6 minus R plus 1 factorial. If we put R as 10 in this expression then we will get 5 factorial upon minus 5 factorial which is not a possible situation as factorial of negative numbers is not possible. So this implies that the value of R is 3 hence a required answer is R is equal to 3. This completes the session. Bye and take care.


Today's video is about Yu-Gi-Oh! Sealed collecting and investing. Gone wrong. What's up guys? We're back with a very sad video. This is not the kind of video I usually want to make because usually I want to be opening stuff. I want to be happy, but I was looking at some product trying to decide what I wanted to make a video about and I looked over at one of my ghosts from the past box and noticed that there is a little bit going on. Look at this. I have no idea what happened here. I think it may have gotten wet somehow. There's no leak in the ceiling or anything. I think maybe I walked by with like a cup of water at some point and it slung it all over it or something. That's the only thing I can think of. I don't know because I looked at everything else around it and there was nothing wrong with it. So we're going to be talking a little bit about the risks of investing in or even collecting, you know, whether it's for money or if it's just for pleasure, in the all-sealed product. But before we actually keep going into it, we have a giveaway. I'll be giving away these three cards. These are not sealed. So you can protect these a little easier. We have an original Secret Rare Magic Cylinder. All you have to do is like the video, be subscribed, turn on notifications. Let me know down below. Do you keep sealed product? How do you protect it? And if you do, I want to know what your method is. All right, let's check this thing out. I'm really curious. Like, I hope their packs are fine. But as you guys can see, I'm just going to like show you one more time.  Like, it's gross. I don't know what happened. It goes around the side. I'm not going to weigh my background, but we got stuff there. Let's see if there's anything on the back. Back looks fine. That's got a little bit going on on the top. Just does not look good. So there's like a Ghost Shard Dark Magician and it got damaged in here. I'm going to be extremely upset. All right, let's open this thing up. Let's see what the damage is. I'm guessing there is some to some level. At least the sealed product is now forced to be open to even try to salvage anything. Obviously, when you buy sealed product, it may or may not be for opening. And a lot of people buy sealed product to keep as like an investment and stuff. I mean, Yu-Gi-Oh! is not the best. We've seen some videos about that recently, but this is the risk. Like if you put it into some sort of fund or something, you know, there's not as much risk of your money just like getting damaged. You can't damage your money. It can go away, but you can't really have this kind of thing happen. Let's see if it made it to the next level. I had not noticed this till recently, so I don't know if it's a new thing. This thing is not going to open. It's all stuck together, probably because it's wet. It looks like we might be okay on the packs. The good side about opening this up is I am still trying to pull that Dark Magician again. Let's check the inside. So, as you guys can see, it made it through there and came through. And if this was like not a two-year-old product, you know, let's say this is like a really old box. We're talking a pharaoh's servant, something like that, like way back then. It would be devastating. I mean, this would be a really expensive product, but fortunately, it just goes from the past one, which is still, you know, a pretty awesome, you know, thing I wanted to keep sealed for the most part, you know, save it for future videos or just keep it sealed because it's going to be harder and harder to find what I can anymore. We've got to open it up. So, fortunately for us, it looks like we're going to inspect all these. We're going to be going through. I grabbed a couple extra packs, too, just so we can have a fun opening looking for that Dark Magician because we're continuing that search. And maybe talk a little bit about the scary part about having sealed product. Because, yeah, you guys know I have sealed product because I need it for videos. I am really far in on Yu-Gi-Oh! And generally, you know, I spend a lot of money on Yu-Gi-Oh! every year because it is part of the job, as well as an interest of mine, obviously a very major interest.  And as we saw, like, I mean, it didn't completely destroy it because we could have opened it up and had these, and these would have been okay. But in theory, if I'd waited longer if it had been a little bit worse, it could have been completely destroyed, gone straight down to the cards. So, it's definitely something that you have to consider when you're buying sealed product, where you're going to put it, how you're going to protect it. I do my best to have some protection for it, but it is not that easy to actually protect this kind of stuff. Legatus, that's a good card because one, they take up a ton of room, you know, every, that one box was like from like space to actual cost ratio, not exactly that crazy.  And it takes up like a huge amount of space. So, I think only people who were really interested in like cardboard really should like buy and hold on to stuff to like try and invest in it because otherwise it's simply not worth it. The reason it is worth it for people like us is because we really like the cardboard.  They just did it for money. It's like, they're not going to open it up and get any enjoyment out of it. They're just going to be angry about it, you know. I don't remember there being this many like flaps in here. All right, there's only three packs too. I kind of forgot about that. Three packs instead of four and ghosts from the past one. I haven't actually opened one of these like mini boxes in a while. I've had some loose packs, but the mini boxes are something I've not touched in quite a while. We're in a prison backup secretary. We've armed dragon level 10. Also, let me know in the comments, did you miss ghosts from the past three this year? Do you think they should bring it back? Or do you think that ghosts from the past one and two is enough? It's an interesting question because it is an extra reprint set. I think it did take the place of something at some point like the, the March reprint set or whatever evenly matched. There's a great card. We'll take that. It takes many of those as we can pull, but it does add another reprint slot. So a lot of times ghosts from the past just didn't have awesome reprints, especially ghosts from the past one. Red supernova dragon. That's a good one. So it made the value inside kind of tough, but oh wait, so far I haven't seen any damage. I thought I might have saw something. These look pretty good for the most part. Looks like we got lucky enough that we can at least make a video out of this. You know, that's the plus for me. Like if you're just holding this on the side, you don't make videos. It's like, it's just a huge bomber when it happens. Oh, I know why. Cause I'm opening these the wrong way. That's why I'm confused about it. You're supposed to open them like this. I forgot. Yeah, they changed that in ghosts from the past too. Got a little confused there. All right. Three packs of dark magician. Not pulled a ghost draw out of here in a very, very long time. I do have those extra packs. I'm going to open up in just a second. Chateau, salamangrates, sunlight thrasher. Okay. I've had a lot of loose ghosts from the past for a while. We are finally getting towards the end. We have not pulled a ghost rare from them in a very long time. So that opened very weird. Maybe that means this is a ghost rare. I hope it does. Miss Valley baby rock. Metapholes. Time thief retrograde. Sun vine. Arm dragon level 10. Remember what arm dragon level 10? Like four prints in like three months. It was insane. Such a weird card to get printed that often. Metapholes fusion. We have the... Oh, the dragon I drank go aqueese. And as a ghost rare print. Not in this set though. We have hieratic seal. And the vampire of the old day. What if they made a set where my ghost from the past three, it had to be a card that has had a ghost rare at some point. And then they add, if it was a new one that didn't have a ghost rare, the set would contain a ghost rare. That would be interesting actually. So you could get like stardust and stuff like that, but it would be a different rarity. It wouldn't be ghost rare. Or it could be, you know, it could overlap. I would say no, because you wouldn't want to have a second ghost rare. And then the rest would be all... It probably wouldn't do well because some of those ghost rars are pretty bad, you know? Unless they made the new ones really good. That's possible. So it would be interesting though to consider. Time thief. We have photon thrasher. And starry knight and bail fire. Still searching for cards. I'm glad so far that none of the cards have been wet or damaged or anything like that. Sun vine, because obviously being wet just completely ruins the card since it is cardboard. And cardboard does not hold up so well against wetness. But speaking of wetness, we're going to pull the ghost rare. Don't know what that means, but we're just going to try and pull a ghost rare. How about that? Nojama country, Madolche. Dragunity remiss. That's a good card. We are pulling all the decent ultra rares, but we have not pulled a ghost rare in this video, which I would love to do. All these are some extras I had. And fortunately, no risk of being damaged or anything. Thankfully. I'm really scared, honestly, to figure out what did that, because I don't want it to damage any of my other product. And there's no, I got to figure it out. I think it was right by a door, kind of in a weird spot where I keep some random things. So I think there's a good chance that it had came out of a water bottle or something like that. Because it was very specific spot and there was stuff right next to it. Fog blade is a good card. That didn't get wet. I think that's probably what happened. Mine mole and starting night arrival. At one point I did spill stuff and I couldn't figure out where the water went. Maybe this was it. Got to be more careful. I'm using a water bottle now for the most part, but yeah, water cups can be dangerous. Elemental. Elemental. Emergency trant. Elemental. Emergency teleport. Why can't I say this? I want to say elemental over and over. Sunsea, why do I want to say elemental? Is there a flame wing man in this coming up or something? I don't know. This is insane. Emergency teleport. I want to say trant. That's a trant. I can't. I'd say transport. Element. I can't speak. CRU. I don't know. We have a business here. Maybe the water came out of my head. My head is just... Total water. I don't know what's going on. There's no brain in there anymore. We have a Neuron doll. Evil Thorn. Resonator call. Salamangrayfoul. And Neshadal Genius. Another good card. I think it's about a dollar. A few more packs. Then we have those last two mini boxes that hopefully are good to go. Will we get a go? We've been searching for so long. Maybe this sealed investment gone wrong. We'll turn into an opening gone right. Huh? Anybody? Anybody in? Could be fun. Could be interesting. I want it to happen. Sunvine healer. Time thief. We have the Sunseed. Sun Avalon. Okay, come on. Come on. Two more packs. Then two more mini boxes. We've got eight total packs left. Will any of them contain a ghost drive? Technically, we could have multiple. I'm just saying. Two different sources. Star and Eye Balefire. Okay, last source here. Our last of the first source. Or second, whichever one you consider it. That goes from the past one. Let's go. Time thief retrograde. We have the Sun Avalon Dryadus. The Obelite. We have the Essence. And the Necros Avalon. All right. Two more of these. They're looking okay for the most part, which is very, very good sign. Let me know in the comments. Does anybody do any of you guys invest in Yu-Gi-Oh! Silk product? I think at the moment it's a pretty rough investment. I usually buy obviously some of the new set every time, but I buy a decent amount compared to most people I think. And oh my goodness. I opened this wrong again. And at the moment, you know, we've talked about this in multiple videos, but the stuff is just not holding up very well. So it's really sad because stuff like Pokemon is like doing so well, even with the recent sets being bad, but buying a Pokemon pack or Pokemon box, it just does so much better in the long run. And Yu-Gi-Oh! is just not keeping up with that, with all the reprints and everything like that. I know it's like, oh, it doesn't have to make money. Yeah, sure it doesn't, but it is nice when you can like buy something you like and then it like goes up. You know, that's pretty cool. We've got Ironix Seal. It's also pretty nice. Goes from the past one. Let's go. Come on. Time Thief. Time Thief. Let's go. Trinome. We have Dragoonity. And Dark Magician. No, Ironic. Sky Dragon Overlord of Heliopolis. One more box. The Sealed Product investment gone wrong or whatever you want to call it. It's still gone pretty wrong. I mean, we pulled a couple of decent cards, but it's definitely not going to make our money back, which is just the case of an opening. That's just normal, but we were forced into this opening thanks to the elements, but that's okay. I needed to make a video anyway, so I'll consider it a blessing. Okay, these are kind of bunched up. It's kind of weird. Okay, they feel fine. I thought I felt a little wetness for a second. I was like, oh no. Ironic Dragon. Let's pull a Dark Magician. Watch this. It's just going to be soaking wet. It's like dripping. We have the Medulce. And Cyber X. That's good. I think that's like three bucks now. So that's actually very solid. $3 card. We'll take it. Two more packs left. These just feel weird. I feel like it might have started getting to these, but it didn't quite get to the pack. Didn't penetrate the pack. Good to see it. Gear Town. We have the Metapoles. We have the Ironic Dragon of Tefnuit. And the Starry Night Flame out. Last pack magic. Here it comes. If you guys have enjoyed this video, don't forget to subscribe to the channel for more content like this. And hopefully, the more damaged product. Hopefully, it's all just normal stuff we want to open up, you know. Last pack. Here we go. Dark Magician. I believe in you. Let's do this ghost. It's right here. That's a Dark Magician. Okay. We have Hieratic Sky Dragon Overlord of Heliopolis. Sun Vine. These names are insane. I'm getting choked up now. It's rough. The Time Thief Flyback. It's all done. Very nice. Organized Return. That's the last card. I thought there was one more. I ruined it. I ruined it, guys. I'm sorry. Shout-out to Tomefo Show, Daxter, Tomato Juice, Puffins of Doom, Ernesto Dina, America Doisier, Supreme Sage 21, CJ, and then a Thai show Ian Moosa Jr. Barting Robert F. and Thomas McLean. Thank you guys for supporting the channel. I'll see you guys in the next video. Peace.