Good morning, everyone. My name is Barry Robinson and I'm pleased to welcome you to this IEA webinar on the theme of building up Irish defence. On the 9th of February this year, the Commission on the Defence Forces released its report against the backdrop of the controversy around planned Russian naval exercises in or around the Irish Exclusive economic zone and amid the Russian military build up towards the invasion of Ukraine, which was launched on the 24th of February. The latest and most severe challenge to the post Cold War European security architecture, which has been under increasing strain for a decade and a half, and more broadly a further blow to the international rules based order. The coincidental confluence of events has increased the topical currency of the Commission's report. This morning we proposed to consider the implications for Ireland and how we should respond to our changing international security environment. We're very fortunate to be joined by two expert speakers, whom we thank for taking time out of their very busy schedules. Each of our panelists will speak for about 10 to 15 minutes, and we will then proceed to a Q&A with our audience. You will be able to join the discussion using the Q&A function, which you should see on your screen. We encourage you to send your questions in throughout the session as they occur to you, and we will come to them once our speakers have concluded their addresses. A reminder that all exchanges today, both the presentations and the Q&A are on the record. Please feel free to join the discussion on Twitter using the handle at IIEA. I will now formally introduce our speakers. Renata Duane is Deputy Director and Senior Executive Officer at Chatham House. Previously she was Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. Before that she had a very distinguished career at the United Nations in senior positions on peace and security issues, shaping policy and best practice, and working on peace operations and complex emergencies in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Mali and Syria. Ben Chandra is Professor of International Relations at the UCD School of Politics and International Relations. He is a leading academic authority on European foreign security and defence policy, and on Irish foreign security and defence policy, as well as international relations, on which he teaches, researches and publishes. He previously worked at the University of Wales in Aberystwyth, Trinity College Dublin and the Centre for Strategic Studies in Washington DC. Their presentations will offer complementary perspectives. I understand that Renata's opening remarks will primarily be concerned with the present international security environment and the range of threats that Ireland is facing in that context. Ben's contribution will likely centre on the specific recommendations of the Commission on the Defence Forces and the funding, capability and staffing requirements they entail. I will first hand over to Renata. Good morning everybody. It's great to be here today and it's a really timely moment to discuss the questions of the future of Ireland's security in a context that has perhaps never been quite as complex and turbulent as we see today. I'm looking forward to also learning and listening from Ben and your questions and engagement. So maybe what I'll do is just describe a little bit some of the features of the current geostrategic environment and what that might mean for Ireland in thinking about how to respond to first, what do we define as security and then second how do we go about protecting it. The four features that I'll first flag I think is really pointing to a complex and unpredictable world that makes it very difficult to assess at any point what threat is priority and where is it coming from. So what are those four features? Well, the first is obviously complex systemic threats.  And Ireland at the UN Security Council has prioritized discussion and debate on exactly those systemic threats and perhaps in some ways planetary futures. The second I would flag is a fractured and increasingly competitive international system characterized by great power tensions and shifting relations between states. And I'll come back to that particularly in the context of US China strategic competition and the extent to which Russia's invasion of Ukraine upends that or reinforces that. The third is profound technological advances that are changing the political, the economic and the social fabric of societies and international cooperation and perhaps I think I would almost bring that factor out a little bit more than it was perhaps highlighted in the commission's report on the first forces and look forward to your thoughts and comments on that. The fourth feature that I wanted also to highlight is that I think the structures and the systems developed after World War Two to organize society and to deliver public goods, whether at the international level, whether at the regional level in the context of Europe, or whether at the national level. Those systems, those tools, those mechanisms are being contested and challenged. In some cases, we're seeing deep political, economic and social divisions in countries, think of the rise of popular nationalism think of the fissures and societies over how to organize themselves think of the debate in the US right now. So even if we look closer to home in the context of brexit, and we're seeing even in the rise of European elections, fracturing off political systems institutions and parties as we knew it. All of this is leading to a profound rethinking of what constitutes security, and how can we respond and generate that security. I want to start with that because I think it's important that we frame Ukraine in that context Ukraine and the Russia's invasion of Ukraine is not I think so much cause of insecurity, but really encapsulates and amplifies all of those trends. It's both a new and an old war. We're seeing territorial invasion on that par with a world what we haven't seen in Europe since World War Two. We're having seen heavy weaponry and tanks being used indiscriminate fighting heavy civilian death tolls, but we're also seeing that combined with cyber attacks with drones with satellites including private use of satellites and 24 hour seven convergence so it's a new and an old war. It's a regional and an international war, a massive war on Europe soil, the most regulated and structured region that we in the world. So far in terms of international order, but it's also a proxy internationalized conflict with considerable military support coming from the NATO allies in the context of defense. And then we're seeing regional war with global economic implications food prices and shocks international dependence on Russian Ukraine for wheat for maze fertilizer oil, and of course the energy prices and transitions that have dominated the European nations over the last month. And then we're seeing the tools that we have developed to regulate crisis to second crisis and to manage food and security shocks, being challenged to navigate and respond, whether that's the UN Security Council, whether the G seven and the G 20, whether we've seen sanctions and how they'll be navigated managed and implemented. So I do think that when we think about Ukraine, and when we navigate that we do have to frame it within that broader context. I'm going to unpack just a couple of the themes those four features as I described, and the particular challenges that I think presents for Ireland as an open trading nation. The first is UK or US, excuse me. That's that that's the effect of being in London, but US China competition. Not withstanding Russia's actions. I do think that the rise of China is perhaps the most profound and central question of our age in terms of international political order. It's a whole of state competition between the US and China where we see put economic competition as between the number one and number two economies of the world, where we're saying it being framed as a challenge and a contest over the international society in types of governance democracy versus authoritarianism. We're seeing it defined in terms of Alliance competition and framing we've seen China's BRI Belt and Road Initiative, and the competing new vision of the Biden administration whether that's the global summit on democracy in which Ireland has participated, or we're seeing the call for the beat three W the build back better world and a new emphasis on infrastructure support to countries in the developing world. This has been reflected again in the UK's new development strategy that came out just two weeks ago and which sees itself as competing with China's infrastructure or dominant support to developing countries. In that context and in that competition that has been emerging since I think the 2000s 2000 very much seen first in the Obama administration continued in the Trump administration into the Biden administration, and indeed one of the few areas where there's consensus bipartisan consensus across the US political sphere, but in that there's an increasing sense among countries that they're being forced to choose between the US and Chinese alignment. Many countries and we see that particularly in Asia are trying to avoid that choice, trying to maintain economic and trading patterns and relations with China, while maintaining political and reinforcing indeed military alignment with the US. This is a particular case on this point. This has implications for Ireland. China is Ireland's sixth largest export market, and it's the third largest export market outside of Europe. The trade with China has continued to grow over the years the past five years and 2021 was Europe 10.5 billion euros value. And we've also seen Chinese foreign direct investment into Ireland grow, especially in the context of tech. Ireland has tried to avoid many of the debates over Huawei, where we've seen three R&D centers in Ireland that have has been increasingly part of that global competition. I think the challenge for Ireland when we think about security is how to navigate the increasingly fractured world between the US and China phrase of dominance or or frames of dominance, and how to align its position, its security and its values, its economic relationships, while maintaining those open patterns. So in that context, of course, the second thing that I wanted to highlight that perhaps wasn't emphasized so much in the report on the Defense Forces is whether we are in a deglobalization moment. And whether we're in a moment where Ireland will have to make choices over its relationships as an open trading nation. Now again, this isn't new to Ukraine and this isn't even new to US-China relations. We've seen these globalizing, deglobalizing tensions and patterns since the 2008 financial crisis rise of populist nationalism, declining FDI, foreign direct investments, challenges to multilateralism, whether in the US under the Trump regime, Brexit, China at in the international sphere and playing its role introducing a differing approach to cyber regulation and governance. And of course, big challenges over big tech. We've seen some countries respond to that by developing ministries for economic security. Japan is one debates around economic security very much part of how the UK is thinking. But I think it's important not to overstate the deglobalization trend. We're still seeing the overall volume of world trade continuing to grow and state sales and profits remain globalized, even as we're seeing some shoring up of sectors deemed to be in national security. So what does this mean for the Irish economy, which is one of the most open economies in the world and which has benefited considerably from globalization. I think we are going to see increasing challenge and defining what is national security as defined by economic resources and strategies. How does Ireland understand that as a as a country reliant on tech services as a country reliant on pharmaceutical industry. How do we understand what is economic priorities and how do we defend those while maintaining those open trade relations. That is going to, of course, have a huge impact on tech advances and technology being built a vehicle for globalization and the currency of great power competition. Again, that has significant implications for Ireland as the fifth digital society ranked country in the European Union with significant digital competitiveness and broadband access. I would just flag a couple of points. I would flag that first Ireland is vulnerable to IT services to the large pharma sector and as we saw in the attacks on the healthcare system. And that vulnerability is likely to grow as Ireland takes political positions on Ukraine and its alignment with EU values and Western values on in the context of the invasion of Ukraine. We've seen these Russian based and nation state based attacks on government agencies and think tanks international organizations grow in particular in 2020 and maybe we can come back to how we think about that. So that will be a significant issue for Ireland in the context of cybersecurity and rightly got a lot of emphasis on the in the commission's report. I would just only flag if I could one particular point that Ireland is also open to misinformation and disinformation and its vulnerability isn't just one about its technological and economic sectors, but its societal sectors. One of the things I find fascinating and Ireland is the statistics with regard to Ireland's as a free and fair society is judged by things like Freedom House Index, or if you look at the economist intelligent unit democracy which ranks Ireland seventh as in terms of democracy. And yet if you look at data on public trust and institutions in Ireland. Ireland has relatively lower figures compared to other EU nations in terms of public trust in political institutions and actors. So is that a vulnerability that one needs to think about in terms of information and disinformation. I won't go into right now how Ireland's responding but I will just flag its free points. The first is that I think, when we think about Ireland's security, we need to think about an integrated concept of security, not just territorial defense, not just malicious attacks and cybersecurity, not just context of our defense and forces and internal external security alignment. But I think we really need to think about values, politics, economics, defense and development in an integrated way. We see that in many countries that development we've seen the UK produce an integrated strategy combining its defense development and political foreign policy agenda. We've seen Germany currently working on an integrated strategy, but how we understand security I think in Ireland needs to be framed in a much more integrated way. The second dimension of integration means understanding an informed and resilient society as critical for defense and for security and stability in Ireland. That means that the debate on Irish security policy needs to be comprehensive and it also means I think that we need to understand our societal values as a critical component in Irish security. The second point I would just say that even as Ireland thinks about and remains a strong European identity and commitment and thinks about it's aligning its security with European defense and I look forward to hearing more from Ben about that. It will need to understand its trading relationships as requiring continued engagement beyond Europe. And that means bilateral relations with three countries, the US, the UK and China has been critical, not just within them through the EU, but on a bilateral level. And also how it thinks about its multilateral posture and engagement. And here we come of course to Ireland's traditional emphasis on the UN, Ireland's traditional role in peacekeeping. And I would just add one note of caution here that I think we need to be careful about implying and how much we assess that we can put our in international identity and defense and security engagements into UN peacekeeping and indeed into overseas peace operations. I think we haven't seen a growth in peacekeeping, whether in the UN or indeed even in the context of EU crisis management operations. We have seen UN operations decline both in number and in size. We haven't seen a new UN peacekeeping operation since 2015 and in the Central African Republic. The idea that somehow we can present and export our security commitments in a multilateral UN forum will be questioned in the context in which agreement within the Security Council on what types of international crisis management responses and where it will be all the more difficult after Ukraine. That goes to for the European Union, where while we think about the strategic compass of the EU and a commitment to 5,000 strong rapid deployment force and Ireland's relationship to European security and defense policy. We are also seeing a moment of a deeply introspective tendency in Europe, likely far much more likely going away from thinking that Europe has a global power and I would vary a power to a much more focus on Europe's borders, Europe's defense, Europe's territory and challenges for how Ireland defines its role within that and engages in those discussions. Lots more there but and I've done a whistle stop tour but very much look forward to the discussion over to you Barry. Thank you very much for a very comprehensive overview of the of the scene I think a number of points there you've made are very telling and I'm sure we'll be picking them up later on the debate. Then can I turn to you now. Yes, thank you very much Barry. First of all, my thanks to the Institute for the invitation to speak at this webinar today it's a it's a special privilege to be speaking here with Dr a matter to on with our professional paths having first crossed as far as far back as I mean, Dr drawn has already provided a really terrific overview of the strategic challenges that Ireland faces in a very new security environment. And I placed particular emphasis on her definition of, of a wider security that we need to be appreciated, appreciative of, and we need to plan for, and I think that's really really important. This morning is somewhat narrower to look at what the Commission on the future of the Defense Forces has proposed in the light of the immediate and medium term crisis in European security, caused by Russia's second but even more brutal invasion of Ukraine. We should recall that the defense on the commission of the future the Defense Forces did not undertake its own security threat assessment. It was implied on previous government policy statements. Nonetheless, the commission correctly in my view highlighted the multiple threats faced by Ireland across what is now typically characterized as the five defense domains of land, see air, cyber and space. It also highlighted for key integrated trends underpinning those threats, several of which were not has already highlighted. First, deepening great power competition. Second, greater security instability in Europe, and a reduced us engagement there in as the US pivots in the medium to longer term towards the Pacific. Integrating threat threat that the that the Commission identified was accelerating overlaps between internal and external security, particularly in areas such as cyber and terrorism. And forth, the Commission highlighted a much more challenging environment for the overseas deployment of peacekeeping troops, and the need of the international community for those troops to have a higher level of capacity and higher level of engagement. Comparing the states declared purpose of the Defense Forces with their actual capacity, the Commission was generous to a fault, really to a fault. The Commission declared that the state's high ambitions for the Defense Forces were and I quote, not supported by the resources actually provided for defense. As I say, that's expressing things exceptionally generously. In other terms, the Defense Forces are incapable of providing the level of defense that the state demands. And this is entirely the fault of the state itself and consecutive governments over the last number of decades. Now in response to this defense gap, the Commission picked up on suggestions that have been made elsewhere, and which have traditionally been fended off by the Department of Defense. For Ireland to identify a specific level of, level of ambition or LOA for the Defense Forces. This requires the state to identify its headline capacity goals, thereby defining the level of resources that are required. Now this is a methodology that's a long standing precept in defense planning globally, but it's one that's awkward for civil servants, who much prefer to start with the available envelope of funding. And cut the defense cloth to measure. Now as we all know the Commission specified three of these level levels of ambition. One, two and three. Now I have to say, I prefer to give each of these are somewhat more tangible and descriptive title. Level of ambition one, as outlined in the Commission report, can best be described as no effective defense. And two, can be understood as partial defense. Only level of ambition three represents an independent defense. Now my own view expressed in advance of and then with the publication of the Commission's report was that even the suggestion of level of ambition one was objectionable on the basis that the existing status quo is simply untenable. And aside, and being thankful for the fact that no serious contributor to the current debate has advocated for that option. Let's consider where the debate rests today, considering the current crisis in European security. The Commission itself effectively states that level of ambition to is the minimum credible requirement to fill the most egregious gaps in order to meet some existing national policy objectives. And I don't understand Ireland's current international responsibilities in peacekeeping. But again, it does not amount to a national defense, and I say that deliberately. As the Commission states the level this level of ambition will allow the level of ambition to that is this level of ambition will allow the defense forces to identify and detect attacks on Irish sovereignty in the air and at sea for example. It will identify the defense forces with the wherewithal to respond to such attacks only level of ambition three amounts to a modest full spectrum defense of the state. It is also the only level of defense by the way, which respects a policy of national military neutrality, in which the state provides entirely for its own defense. And since the report's publication, government spokesperson's have been cited as talking about level of ambition to plus, or in some some quarters they've talked about level of ambition 2.5. Now, this would center the government's target at level of ambition to, but pick up targeted isolated elements from the wider defense menu associated with level of ambition three. For example, encompass a more substantial maritime fleet, some element of strategic or tactical airlift, and perhaps a more robust mechanized component with heavier armor for the armory, all of which might be able to contribute to more robust international security engagements on behalf of the UN or the EU. However, my concern here is that is at this 2.5 approach is response which was suitable perhaps in January of this year, but has already seriously outdated. As we're not has already suggested the assumption that have guided European security for the last 30 years have been utterly shattered several of our European partners now face existential threats. We have overturned or reversed decades, even centuries of established defense policy. And I have to ask, has Ireland even noticed in terms of our current debate on defense. It's as if Ireland has been living in a quiet leafy cul-de-sac. Suddenly one of its neighbors homes has been attacked, burgled, and is being burned down before our eyes. Everyone else in the neighborhood is scrambling to assist while reinforcing the locks on their doors and windows, installing new alarm systems, and if you will, joining the local neighborhood watch. Ireland, meanwhile, appears to be debating whether or not it will even bother to close its front door at night. The security tsunami that has engulfed much of the rest of Europe appears to amount to little more than a gentle seaswell. Once it reaches these geographically and psychologically distanced shores. However, the key issue that arises from this is the following. The government does pursue what's being called level level of ambition 2.5. Who or what is supposed to fill the gap between that and level of ambition three. In other words, the gap between a partial and a full defense. Where does Ireland expect to get the missing point five in defense capacity, or in hard financial terms as defined by the Commission, who's going to pay the missing 1.5 billion in Irish defense spending. Now there are only two options, neither of which unfortunately is made explicit in the Commission's report.  This is where Ireland currently is. Its defense is essentially provided either multilaterally by NATO or bilaterally by agreement or indeed and not in a wink to bilateral partners. And yes, here I'm tipping my hat in particular to Her Majesty's Royal Air Force. This is not just a demeaning national policy. It is also potentially dangerous. Those strangers are not disinterested. They will defend what is critical to them, but they will not necessarily defend Irish strategic interests. If, for example, that might reveal their hand to potential adversaries. Is the he is the HSE it system of strategic importance to anyone else is Ireland's banking system of strategic importance to anyone else is the use as we're not a suggested of disinformation in Northern Ireland of concern to anybody else. These are rhetorical questions but they're critical ones that need answers in terms of Irish defense planning. The second unspoken option to fill in the defense gap that I've identified earlier is deeper defense cooperation and potentially a defense agreement with other European partners, either through NATO, the EU, or bilaterally. Now this could of course mean the end of Irish neutrality. That is not a step to be taken lightly, any more than the Finns or the Swedes took their respective decisions lightly. However, then leaving Irish defense in the hands of strangers. It would at least in this case be agreeing to collective defense with partners bound in law, institutions and democratically accountable politics. If Ireland is not to provide its own defense through level of ambition three, which of the above options is it to be. This is just a handful of remarks on the commission's report, as are immediately relevant to Ireland's capacities respond to some of these contemporary security threats that we're not a spoke of. First, I think there needs to be much more substantive work done on the single force concept and the jointness of the defense forces. There's some significant structural suggestions in the report, but these need to be developed on the ground and embedded in command structures. The restructuring of the Army Air Force and Navy must work as a single unit, breaking down silos and traditions that frustrate that integration. In that connection striking to see to the proposed restructuring retitling of the Army Ranger wing to include integrated marine and air elements, there's huge potential there. The importance of this need to be specified to ensure that this can be a genuinely integrated special operations unit, capable of working seamlessly in different defense domains with different defense partners in multiple theaters overseas on behalf of the UN or the EU. The volunteer overseas deployment is also under question. There's a strong argument made in the commission's report that creating mix and match units for overseas peacekeeping and security missions abroad has to come to an end, especially if such deployments are to be reinforced at a higher operational level than are currently available to us. It's also significant to see proposals for a national intelligence infrastructure that would encompass a redefined and equipped a military intelligence structure. In addition, no one can doubt the urgent need for a joint cyber defense command, working hand in glove with civilian authorities. The proposal to create a chief of defense role is arguably long overdue and urgently necessary. I have to say, I did note this, the small hand grenade that the commission lobbed in footnote three of their report. This is the footnote that acknowledges that the chief of defense role will require a reengineering of the governance between the Minister for Defense, the Department of Defense, and the Defense Forces. You should certainly bring your popcorn for that conversation, if and when it happens. I would have disappointment in the failure of the commission to tackle the army's territorial brigade structure. I think the commission dodge that bullet effectively only calling for a further review. And this is a tough nut, and the commission couldn't or wouldn't crack it but the hammer is certainly needed here. In summation, then I think the commission has given Irish policymakers a high resolution map and a choice of paths to navigate itself through the security threats that it faces. In the meantime, however, as Renata has outlined earlier, we have witnessed an earthquake, which has upended the security landscape. At large scale, the commission's map remains largely accurate, but there are also strikingly new challenges ahead, which are larger and more dangerous than were thought even 12 weeks ago. The state has now to make choices, difficult choices, all of which have adverse and positive consequences to assess and to balance. And with that, I'll close. I do look forward to the Q&A and the discussion. Thank you, Ben, and also to Renata. I think your presentations have been both being very rich. I think they've set the scene for what should be a very interesting discussion. If I could just make a gentle offer a gentle reminder that members of the audience can post questions through the Q&A function at any time throughout the section. Some questions have begun to come in, but we've certainly come to them shortly, but we'd certainly welcome a lot more. Just if I could maybe turn to our two panel members and pick up on one or two of the themes that you mentioned. I was interested, Renata, in making your point, which I think is valid, that we shouldn't overplay the investment that we've been making in peacekeeping, given the fact that peacekeeping itself, there haven't been any new emissions in recent years, the prospect of new ones going forward is not good in light of the blockages on the Security Council. But I just want to explore with you a little bit of how we can, should we say compensate for that because from the Irish perspective over the years, I think we may have under-invested in national defence, but we have invested very heavily in multilateralism in the kind of the wider security, more comprehensive security concept that you outline. For example, we had leadership roles on arms control and disarmament, human rights, development cooperation as well and focus on Africa. How can we build on this, are there ways in which we can up our game further at the multilateral level or do we have to begin to think a little bit differently? No, thanks for these very much and Ben, fascinating also to listen to you and I definitely will agree with many of your points and maybe love to debate a couple of other ones. Barry, I think the question that I would like us to think about is whether we can frame it as an either or. Ireland has for a long time said we're investing in multilateral peace and security, in international peace and security as almost a way of navigating national defence and I think I would agree with Ben that that question cannot be avoided any longer, nor can that question be framed as somehow multilateral because international peace and security is a way of ensuring our security. I think it's an important way to maintain a rules governed order. It's an important way to demonstrate Ireland as a player in international system. It's an important way to ensure that we contribute to the order on which we have benefited and on which our economy and our society is very vulnerable and engaged in. Somehow the idea that it can replace a national security or even contribute to it I think needs to be questioned. Second, the, the suggestion that I'm making is that if that's the basis for investment in the defence forces, if a more contested international environment is the basis for investment in the defence forces, well, that's a limited capacity to defend to invest for investment. And the reason I'm raising that is not that the, the international conflict environment isn't significant and growing and we have more crises and conflicts around the world. It's just that we don't have the same consensus that we had in the post Cold War World to use international peace and security instruments to respond to them. So I think the risk is that everyone was to invest in having capacities for international deployments. It raises the question whether they will be used, and they can be used, given where we are within the EU and at the UN. I would flag in that respect that the EU's proposals that came out in, in February just before the conflict February March on the strategic compass calls for a 5000 force rapid deployment force. But you know, we, we do need to have some skepticism about those questions because if you look at the context of previous European Union calls the creation of the battle groups, which were supposed to be rapidly deployable forces for overseas operations, never used the extent to which we had the call after possible for 60,000 capacity force again never come to light. And therefore, there's somehow the notion that you Ireland can even if the UN environment isn't so promising can turn and navigate its defense through participation in CSDP in Europe. I'm also questioning for that for those reasons. And therefore I think I come to this position that it's no longer an alternative route to pursuing one's defense, even if it's an important strand for to to as part of that. In terms of just your question as to what are the alternative ways to engage with with globally and how to have an influence. I do think there's there's three areas I would flag. The first is Ireland's development strategy, Ireland is a high performer in a both its design and its development in the politics of its aid strategy, which combines a good focus on working through multilateral institutions like the UN, like the EU, but also retaining a bilateral identity. That's an important and critical tool. And again, a big challenge for me is, can we spend more on defense as Ben says we need to work while also investing in some of these other soft power tools, including development of which that is critical. Second, can I don't think about its role in navigating some of the implications of the Ukraine crisis, can I don't be a food security provider, can I don't think about assisting countries and responding to the shock of what is a huge reliance on wheat and oil from Ukraine and Russia in parts of the world like Somalia, like Lebanon, like Egypt, cannot be seen to be shaping the contours of food and security. While the Ireland was on the Security Council, it did place big emphasis on looking at hunger and conflict. It has been an active actor and that it is a food producing nation. Is that a space that we can engage in. And the third area I would say as a tech society that cannot and be part of the debate around cyber governance cyber structure and efforts to that the UN is currently pursuing on digital fairness, digital access, misinformation and disinformation. That's very much part of the STU's agenda. Is that something Ireland can can be actively engaged in. Okay, thank you very much. I wasn't actually positing the investment in the international in multilateralism as an alternative to but just wondering. And I think you've indicated very clearly ways in which we could up our game there. I want to turn to Ben, obviously set out a very dare I say a very pungent and clear analysis and thought provoking a maybe reaction provoking analysis of the situation. And obviously, you know, like you, you correctly point out that the, the state has not made the provision in this area, and the, in that the provision or in of security and defense is a core function of the state. But in order to sustain that a broad national consensus needs to be formed around the need for a higher level of investment, a higher level of investment in defense, not least because of the other very heavy demands on the public purse. And I suppose defense is a little bit like an insurance policy. You take it out and invest in it in the hope that you won't need it, you won't or that you won't have to use it. It's a contingency. Whereas other areas of expenditure like investment in the health service in housing attenuation the cost of living prices can be seen to the immediate kind of immediate benefits for at least certain parts of the population. So it's a question of competition for resources. Now, I suppose the question is how do you make the case and build the case for that at the domestic level. I would have thought that the cyber attack on the HSE, for example, would have illustrated as you pointed out the compelling need to build greater, greater and more effective resilience in that area. But is there there still despite Ukraine, perhaps not the sense of a clear and present threat of a physical nature, such as for example, the Baltic States Poland or Finland and Sweden might experience. So how do you in a public debate try to build that sense that investment, great investment is needed in this area. I think it's a question largely political leadership. It's a question leaders who present an honest assessment of the kinds of threats that are out there certainly in no way shape or form to to frighten an electorate or to or to raise to raise, you know, unreal fears in people's minds but to be very frank and open, and to talk about the specific kinds of threats that the state faces. I think part of the problem that we've had has been, you know, as I spoke earlier about a geographic and psychological distance from on the one hand that's a pure blessing. I mean, you know, for 800 years soft Ireland suffered as a result of its geopolitical position for the last 80 years we have benefited from our geopolitical position so I'm in no sense or do you need to apologize for that for that reality, but you do need to make prudent planning. And for me as I say I think the sweet spot here is not necessary that Ireland would jump to level three and provide itself with a full all encompassing certainly against all potential threats, but that Ireland would indeed work with partners that you know you would share the insurance burden with other colleagues who already have certain kinds of capacity that we will probably never need or hopefully would but are there in extremists, while Ireland might invest precisely as we're not is saying I might invest in things like cyber in wider definitions of security in food security injustice overseas in a way that could complement and provide sort of a greater collective security for us and our partners in Europe. Because again, you know, and I hear it all the time in terms of in terms of the Commission's report you know people saying oh Ireland doesn't need, you know, an air force you know fighter jets to attack jets. That's true but by the same token, Ireland has a responsibility to govern its own airspace to govern its own sea space. And if we can't do that by ourselves and if we choose not to do that by ourselves, then I think we need to look to partners. The problem that I've had with Irish policy going forward is we've not even bothered to have those conversations. And as I said you know intimated as a as a as what you might style a provocation you know our airspace is defended by the Royal Air Force. We need to have the decency to put it on the table to allow the Irish people to understand what is being done in our name, why it has been done in that in that in that shape fashion or form, and to draw the necessary conclusion so in a sense and conclusion I think one of the one of the more interesting proposal we've seen flow to the last number of weeks is this idea of a of a citizens assembly on defense and or on neutrality. Again, as a means of having the kind of conversation we've just never had to have and haven't bothered to have for the last 50 60 years. I come in there just on that Barry because I'm also a big fan of the idea of a citizens assembly on a wider security policy, not just in relationship to Ukraine but to understand what it is that we mean by security and that's why I put the emphasis on Ireland, both benefiting from open trading, but then also I think, being relatively parochial and have it understand security in its part of the world. I just wanted to emphasize one point though if you were to have a citizens assembly. I probably wouldn't agree with Ben that Europe is facing a security tsunami as you called it Ben. Somehow this is the most significant upheaval. It is Ukraine and I don't want to anyway underestimate the scale of Russia's attack and the nature of the fighting, but it's important to remember that Russian Ukraine have been at war since 2014. We've have an attack of Crimea 15,000 troops, Ukrainians have been killed in this context. And I think the reason I raise that is because as soon as we get some sort of stalemate or settlements there's a risk that in Ireland the perception is well the emergency is over. Whereas I think we need to have a much more long term consistent approach to how we understand the world moving, and how we understand our political economic security and values based societies, needing to respond in that so it's just that I wouldn't frame it only in terms of what's happening in Ukraine now and what that might mean for us because I think that might provoke major reactions. So I think you're absolutely right on that point with that I think I think the point that I was trying to make is that the assumptions that have governed European security for the last 50 60 years, those have simply been shattered. I mean, up until this most recent invasion by Russia of Ukraine. There was, and as you know there were there were expectations in European capitals that the post Cold War order could be held together that conversations debates discussions agreements with Vladimir Putin, could be held and could be made to work. And I think that has been shattered and that is why I think that's why I speak in terms of tsunami in terms of the expectations and understandings of European security order being overturned and requiring profound rethinking in in many European capitals which, as I say we just haven't seen a double yet. Okay. Okay. Thank you both the questions are coming in thick and fast now so from the audience so I'm going to move to those one or two have already been anticipated in the discussion so I might just pass over those for the moment. I'll begin with one for Renata at this comes from john bigger, who's an IEA member for my security policy director in the Department for Foreign Affairs. I own. And his question is what impact of any would a decision to move away from neutrality have on our ability to be an effective contributor to UN peacekeeping organizations perhaps first of all for you Renata. Yeah, and thanks for the question john. In real terms, it will not impact the acceptability or not of Irish forces for UN, having worked in the secretariat for many years there's a huge interest in Irish forces not just because of general approach and training but also an understanding and in particular in the civil military dimension of Irish forces makes them very welcome in multi dimensional peace operations. If Ireland were to rethink its neutrality, the UN secretariat would be silent on that, and most countries that contribute forces are have alignments have alliances are part or not part of countries. I think it would mean is practically, there would need to be discussions over where Ireland could be deployed at certain cases. So, in a contrasting point, if one was to consider a UN peacekeeping force in Ukraine as part of any settlement between Russia and Ukraine, myself I think that's fairly unlikely, but Putin himself did propose that back in 2015 in the context of Crimea conflict. If you were looking at something like that you could have Russia designate Ireland as a NATO aligned country or NATO and insist on non NATO participating countries or non NATO line countries, for example. You could have host country elsewhere raised questions so I don't see it as a practical impediment to participation in peacekeeping in fact one could argue that it could reinforce it by virtue of having training and capacity and interoperability. I saw when NATO countries participated in Minusma and common intelligence cell, but I do think it would have to be looked at case by case in terms of specific locations and places. I think the bigger question, John is probably about resource direction, and if one wants to increase one's investment in the potential for overseas deployment how that impacts the spending and commitment to defense at home. Ben unless you've got something to contribute on that I might just move on to to another question which might involve a bit more you might have more to say about. It comes from Dan O'Brien the chief economist of the IIEA, and this one in a way goes to both of you. He says supports of Irish neutrality often claim that it bolsters Ireland standing in the world, particularly in the global south. What do the speakers think of this view and how strong is the evidence underpinning it. Do you want to go first on this one better. I think the evidence frankly is anecdotal, and you'll hear different things from different people on the ground, but I do sometimes think that we overestimate the attention that those in the global south pay to the to the alignment status or non status of Ireland. And I also as a provocation to my students every year I'll very often say to them that you know, you can pick any area of Irish farm policy in which Ireland, genuinely and legitimately claim some level of excellence whether it's development or human rights or international peacekeeping, and I can find you a NATO member who does more and more consistently than does the Irish state. There's one exception there and that is and that is in terms of nuclear deterrence which which we might come back to. In terms of the perspective of Ireland's general persona in terms of the global south I think that is that is rooted in our history in our experience of colonialism and imperialism. The track record of Irish farm policy and as a matter says the kinds of things that we have done on the ground in terms of development aid and UN peacekeeping. So I think our credibility is born of experience, less in terms of any particular alignment status. I would say I absolutely agree with the broad thrust of Ben's point I don't think the rest of the world sees us as unaligned. I think the rest of the world sees us as a wealthy European country that is lucky enough to be located where we are geographically and therefore a relative free rider under a NATO defense without having to have that difficult connection. And my point on where the European Union is now on Ukraine. The pronouncements it's made about essentially the defeat of Russia, as well as where we've participated in alignment on questions of summits of democracies really puts us in a camp that we need to own and acknowledge that reducing Garland has sought to stand out is in relation to a couple of issues, then highlighted one I'll highlight one also Palestine and Israel past Ireland has taken a strong stand on on the right of Palestine to exist on its claims to stated and on those perspectives that has when I want to significant friends in particular part of the world, but relatively disengage on engage in other parts Asia, parts of Africa, and then I would just flag nuclear weapons nuclear disarmament. Ireland has a strong record in this space it is considered a leader in this and it is a long track record since it's joining that of the United Nations 1955. That is an issue where alignment with NATO and or you defend will raise some significant questions particularly for Ireland as a signature and ratified the treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons. And it's funny to just think about how our world has been upended, but up until I would say January of this year. We were looking at the one of the most contentious issues for the NATO summit and the revision of its strategic concept for the first time in 10 years. The issues around nuclear weapons and positions of countries around nuclear weapons was going to be one of the most contentious issues that's off the agenda right now but in, but but it will come back this summer in the context of the non proliferation treaty review conference. I'll move on to a quick to a question quite a complex question from Donald O'Brien of the IAA. So key question is what conception out of the state our governing networks have now that the existing frameworks are broken, and the multi multi lateral order cannot be put back together. This is the centenary of the foundation of our state with the speakers point to examples, in addition to Finland and Sweden, where this issue is being faced. Who wants to start. I say that I think every state that as the question was is navigating the question of what does the concept conception of the state look like after covered where we've seen in a massive expansion of the state state support and state interest the return of the state in countries after a decade many decades in which we discussed the disappearance of state and the rise of non state actors, whether that's big tech, whether that's multinational companies, whether it's non state armed groups. I think we're in a curious moment where we're seeing the state as omnipresent, and especially around the debates around energy crisis response, but also in the context of of defense even again and the nature of the war. At the same time I do think we have a very different concept and nature notion of the state as a who constitutes it, how it's organized and who shapes policy within that and I don't think we've answered those questions. We haven't looked at the role of non state actors political civil society actors in the processes of policymaking beyond consultation. I would just flag it you said Finland and Sweden are rethinking the state but I think there's also a series of countries thinking about their, their, their navigating of the state I think I would have put one country being again Japan I think is doing some very interesting thinking about the concept of the state as open and closed at the same time if you look how it defines defining security in a new way. If you look at the case of Singapore, as to how it's tried to develop itself as a center of excellence around cyber security management and navigate its small position as an open trading nation in the context of US China rivalry. But I think that the profound questions about the future of the state have to be framed in the context of the state being back in a big way. And I'd say you know the state coming back in a big way the multilateral system, at least in certain aspects of it coming back in a very big way as we see before us but at the same time that matched with a deep level of distrust in those very same structures that are expanding in terms of their, their remit of responsibility. And I would link that then to the third issue of the quality of our democracy I think we have a real real and genuine problem. Not just in terms of trust and institutions but also democratic participation. A lot of positive things happen at the grassroots level but I do think we need to rethink our models of democratic accountability, the ways in which our democracies operate, and to face more robustly some of the challenges that we have from from democratic and authoritarian states, who really are striking at some of the foundations of democratic accountability and are using actively using means of disinformation to destabilize democracy in many of our states so while I don't have any any particular affinity for you about democracy or that sort of thing. I do think we need to have conversations amongst like my partners, as to how we defend butters and develop our democracies, and perhaps pursuing in more in more structured way. The kinds of ideas through deliberative democracy that we've seen working very effectively over the last number of years in some European countries. I've got a comment and a question from David Donahue, former Irish permanent representative to the United Nations. He says under NASA's reference to quote integrated security concept. He agrees in principle would point to risks for some of its components and he mentions the UK strategy has subordinated UK development cooperation to strategic security considerations, and Ireland would agree with. He considers a narrower integration would be preferable. Could the panelists comment on this might begin over NASA on this one. So I'm lovely to hear from you David. I think yes, there's a very real risk that integrating everything into what's defined as a broadly speaking foreign policy or security strategy risks risks, focusing development as a means and an end toward security and I think that's highly highly important. We've seen that already with the UK's development strategy that came out that mentions the sustainable development goals once in the entire text that mentions human rights, never that doesn't use the word governance but tries to frame in context of a bilateral contest for influence over malign with malign actors read China, without it being quite said and with a strong emphasis on infrastructure to contest with China's vision. So I agree that that's a risk. David, I don't think it's a risk in the sense of Ireland's engagement in part because Irish foreign policy or Irish development assistance is very much shaped and framed in cooperation with civil society with the strong emphasis on commitment to civil society and I think that's a little bit different, where I think I was encouraging us to think about a more integrated notion of security and defense is partly because what struck me reading the Commission the Defense Forces report is the almost non presence of economic factors in it. And that's I think significant I don't think you can talk about the security of a country that particularly a security of one of the most open trading countries in the world like Ireland, without without thinking about global economics. And the second dimension is it doesn't say anything really about values. And again to Ben's point about democracy and thinking about those values if Ireland wants to maintain a position of a strong commitment to human rights, a strong commitment to open rules governed order. It does need to think about what the implications of that for its international posture on these statements around values but also within its own democratic order and while Ben talks about the attacks from the outside on democracy. I would also say that we need to look in Europe more internally within our own societies and our challenges to democracy. Yeah, only really to add one thing to that and that is to say that the way in which you respond to these to these issues, particularly if you frame your concept of security in broader terms such as human security there is that danger that if everything becomes a priority nothing is a priority. And, you know, to be fair to the to commission the future the defense forces you know their emit was extraordinarily narrow not even not even encompassing defense policy, broadly, broadly speaking. So I think really, you know, if we can get the defense aspect of this right. And obviously, you can't do that in isolation but if you can get that defense strategy right I think there's huge space there for Ireland to define for itself in terms of a broad base security what are the elements of that and as you said Barry how how you divide the pie between the defense, the broader security issues and the human security issues and I think that is something that could be very very good at in terms of offering models in terms of offering experiences. And as we've seen in the UK you can do that very very badly. But I think you can do it also very very well. Okay, thank you both question from Adrian palm the ambassador of the Netherlands in Ireland he observes that the Commission on the Defense Forces stayed away from the issue of strategic focus and neutrality leaving that to the politicians in fairness, I think that's outside their remit, and the myth that they were given. He says Ben said that cooperation over the countries inside the EU or bilaterally should be considered, which might have an impact on neutrality. And the question is, where does he see possibilities and desirability for such cooperation, and what advice would he give, what do you have for Ireland's politicians. I'd be very slow to advise politicians any advice but what I would suggest is, whether bilaterally or multilaterally, I think it's entirely open to the Irish state to say either explicitly to the UK, or to the French or indeed to the Dutch and the Belgians you know, can we come up with defense cooperation which allows us to, for example how primary radar and in the event of an intercession in Irish airspace, we can lift the phone to the Hague or to Paris or to London, but do so in a programmed way that is based on on a formal agreement based on treaty commitments, rather than as we have done in the past on a not in the week basis, or on the basis of secret memorandum that aren't properly publicly discussed and interrogated. So again, it could be bilateral, it could be multilaterally, it doesn't have to involve a mutual security guarantee. But I just want the Irish state to think through the implications of not having a comprehensive national defense, and identify where we get that defense from, and put that on a public basis, so that we can have public conversations debate and agreement on where our defense comes from. I might just move on to another question we've just just come in from Patrick Finnegan of the University of Lincoln. Quick questions what does Ireland need to do to ensure it can populate its defense forces at level of ambition 2.5 or otherwise in the face of retention problems. How could it recruit to a higher establishment I think this is one for you, Ben. And I'll and I'll be very frank with you I mean, one of my fears going into the Commission on the future of the defense forces was precisely that this would turn into a very detailed report on on human resources. There are critical issues in terms of the pay, the conditions, the status and the role of members of the defense forces, all of which have been circulated and aired very extensively publicly. There's a necessary building block to rebuilding our national defense but it is not the only building block. There's no point in in paying people well, providing them with good, good conditions and maximizing retention. If they don't have the equipment with which to defend the state, and they are unclear as to their role in the defense of the state so it's, it's it's two sides of the same coin and I don't think you can take the HR issues. Without discussing the strategic issues and my fear was that this would be imbalanced. I think the Commission did a very good job in identifying that balance and keeping that balance. But as I say I think that the HR issues are something that have to be addressed as a matter of urgency but they're not the whole question. I'll just actually toss in a comment and a question of my own just on that like you're you're a leading educator at the third level in Ireland Ben. What, and some of these you know the upgrading us will require very high high end skills and in the cyber area, not least, what can be done do you think to make a career in the defense forces either in the core or in the reserves, more attractive to to younger people in Ireland. I think it's first of all it's a recognition that the defense forces have a very difficult job to do a very specialized job to do. And that the defense forces, you know, in the light of our recent difficulties at Dublin airport. The defense forces are not a reserve labor force for inefficient public or private sector activities that these are, these are men and women who've made an extraordinary commitment to their country, a commitment that includes they're they're being willing to risk life and limb in defense of the state security. They deserve, not just recompense but recognition and status and resolved to give that proper effect and proper profile. So that I think you get very tangible things in terms of as I said paying conditions and so forth. But I think another element that we sometimes forget is, you know, if someone wants for example to join the reserve defense forces and become part of part of that and as you say some of these skills are very very expensive in the cyber area so you could only, the defense force could only afford this through participation in the in the RDF. People who joined the RDF if they were to go on deployment have no guarantee of getting their own job back.  So there's a lot of infrastructure a lot of thinking that we have not that simply we have not done before that needs to happen. So those who are willing to make this extraordinary commitment to the defense and security of their fellow citizens that they have the respect, they have the resources, and they have the strategy necessary to go along with that. I would only add Barry if I could that that I think the Commission sets out some avenues that could make the defense forces a more attractive option for especially university students but not limited to that. There's a lot about the investment in intelligence, defense attaches abroad, cybersecurity components investments that to really invest in people with tech skills. And I don't think enough is made of that, in addition to all the points with which I entirely agree with Ben on respect and resources. Colin Rafter, retired Department of Foreign Affairs, official and former colleague of mine. Yossi if the panel is up to choose this is a provocative one if the panel is up to choose between a much enhanced EU defense structure or NATO membership for Ireland which option would they choose. Ben maybe first. I think I think purely for the nuclear issue, it would have to be EU. If only because there is a there's a broader menu of security that the EU tries to cover, which I think would suit Irish policymaking better than the NATO context. I think secondly, you know because of Ireland's position on nuclear deterrence and I think, you know, the rightful moral position that Ireland has taken on nuclear deterrence I think it would be unconscionable for the Irish state to rely explicitly on nuclear deterrence within the EU context we also have an opportunity to shape the security concept to shape the security tools in a way that we would not have within NATO so for me, if on balance that is the way that the state goes that I think would be the preferred forum within which to do it. Yeah, I would just add to that, that I think it's important to understand what is the basis for EU power. It is a trade block one of the most important trade actors in the world and it's also in a tech regulatory power. What are the interests of Ireland as it for its prosperity is very much on trade and increasingly on tech services. So, being part of the largest or the second largest trade block and engaging on tech regulation would be I think a very much a security as well as broader national interests and as Ben says, a little bit potential for more voice and a more comprehensive notion of security. I have one final question which I'm going to pose myself, and then we'll then we'll wrap up, and it relates to Brexit. And, and it's about really how we frame the debate in Ireland, you know, in terms of increased engagement on defense. So the challenges enjoyed on allied on allied and on wavering solidarity from from EU partners over the special arrangements for Northern Ireland in the context of Brexit, and other member states have shown themselves willing to stretch considerably to accommodate our perspectives and reconcile these with the protection of the integrity of the single market which obviously is concerned to us. Do we think this solidarity being a two way street do we think that, or do the panelists think that with this argument could be used to show that Ireland also needs to show a reciprocal degree of consideration for countries facing existential threats of their own. That's a good question Barry, and indeed I remember around some of the debates in Ireland around the Northern Irish protocol, the question was being being punted as to what's the price to be paid for Ireland, and for the support provided by others. But I would flip your question, a little bit and ask, is the crisis in Ukraine a means and an opportunity for the UK and the European Union to reforge a relationship, and to help develop contours of our relationship based on shared interest shared and a common security threat. And in that context might defense and defense and security be a vehicle for the UK to navigate its future relationship with the European Union, and to that extent, Ireland navigate its security and defense issues in the, as a member, but with an important bilateral relationship with the UK. So I would frame it in that context. Initially, I don't think myself that the EU will force, or there will be pressure to force Ireland into a position that challenges military neutrality, it's not the only neutral country in the European Union. And I think there's a lot of respect for the sensitivities around domestic public debates in each country. And then I would just note that Ireland has itself mean very much into the crisis in Ukraine and to alignment and has been one of the more active speakers globally in condemning Russia. So I think to that extent, it has lined up closely with European allies. Three quick points. First with respect to the UK. I have my doubts in terms of in terms of UK EU defense cooperation, if only because from the perspective of the current administration in London, you know, all road lead to greater differentiation, all load, all road lead to greater competition with the EU to prove how much better how much more global UK is than the EU. So I would say the appetite in London for that for that, although I think the EU's doors is relatively open on it. With respect to the European Union, I think we have to bear in mind, you know, with the ref, if the referendum in Denmark goes the way that the polls are telling us with Swedish and Finnish membership of NATO coming into the UN into the EU. We now see that then diagram of membership between NATO and the European Union becoming only ever closer. And I think there's going to be a lot more cooperation of coordination between the European Union and NATO and Ireland needs to find its feet and find its voice in that conversation. And I am concerned that, you know, the only remaining neutrals alongside us are not aligned alongside us are Cyprus, Malta and Austria. So the ground has shifted in that respect. And to speak directly to your point, Barry, and again, I like, like or not, I don't think the EU is going to be banging on our door demanding Ireland jump the common defense. Anytime soon they'd be perfectly happy for us to opt out of that we chose to do. But I think the moral question is, you know, the perspective Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, for example, they have taken genuine economic hit in defensive Ireland's security interests as we define them in effective Brexit. They got a much worse bilateral deal with the UK that has hit their GNP in a way that is that is tangible and which is real. And I think we do have to ask ourselves tough questions that if Estonia left in Lithuania tell us as they do that they face existential threats that Putin has said that these are not proper countries, you know, what is our response to that. You know, you're on your own lads, because that that really would reveal a poverty of our EU membership which I think would be quite profound but I also think those against those against the grain of Ireland's natural generosity and I would hope and I would think that if that call were to come from those EU partners that Ireland would respond in a positive way. I would also clarify that I was the point of my question or the intended point my question was that we should be as a voluntary gesture and to show consider the consideration for others that they have shown for us when we face to the international issue. We've come to the in fact be slightly overrun the allocative time so I'm afraid I have to bring this very interesting and stimulating discussion to a conclusion. With just a comment that the, the Commission of the Defense Forces, and concurred that just quoting now conferred with the widespread view it heard in his consultations that there's a paucity of real debate about security and defense matters in Ireland. I hope that they hope that their report might fuel a more informed and grounded debate. And I think that the key thing coming out of this morning is that there is a need for an urgent national conversation on these issues, based on this and a realistic assessment of we're not what we're now facing. It should be reasonably comprehensive in scope and should look at the economic the trading as well as the defense dimensions because our economic prosperity is dependent on the external security environment which our defense policy intends to contribute to. So with that, I would just just like to thank our panelists, Renata and Ben, both for their very insightful presentations but also for their very interesting responses to the range to the very varied questions we received from our audience, and also thank our audience for their contributions to the discussion as well.