Hello and welcome to this special long-distance Lowy Institute launch of the 2021 Asia Power Index. I'm Sam Rogovine, Director of the International Security Programme here at the Lowy Institute. I'd like to begin as always by acknowledging the traditional owners of the country where I am today, the Gadigal of the Orinatian, as well as the traditional owners of country throughout Australia and pay my respects to elders past and present. In just four years since its launch, the Asia Power Index has become a flagship product for the Lowy Institute. It's now a widely quoted source, the most credible resource available for this region on national power in all its dimensions. In fact, it's fair to say that there's nothing like the Asia Power Index anywhere in the world. The Asia Power Index meets an important need in our present moment. Perhaps as little as a decade ago, the idea of measuring power might have seemed anachronistic, a vestige of an age of military and political competition which we left behind when the Berlin Wall fell. But if Asia ever had a post-Cold War holiday from history, it is now surely over. Nuclear weapons have proliferated throughout Asia. Explosive economic growth in the region has upended our mental models of an Atlantic-centered world order. China has far surpassed the Soviet Union as an economic power and as a challenger to U.S. hegemony. And Korea remains divided and tense. It's more important than ever for us to grasp the essentials and the intricacies of power in Asia. The Asia Power Index ranks 26 countries and territories in terms of what they have and what they do with what they have, reaching as far west as Pakistan, as far north as Russia, and as far into the Pacific as Australia, New Zealand and the United States. The 2021 edition, which covers four years of data, is the most comprehensive assessment of the changing distribution of power in Asia so far. With me today to discuss the 2021 edition of the Asia Power Index are Hervé Lemayou, Director of Research at the Lowy Institute, Director of the Power and Diplomacy Program, and the founding researcher behind the Asia Power Index. Alissa Leng is a research fellow and economist at the Lowy Institute. Alissa produces data-driven projects and analyses, principally the Asia Power Index, but also the COVID Performance Index, and we'll be talking about COVID over the coming hour. And lastly, Roland Rajar, Lead Economist and Director of the International Economics Program at the Lowy Institute. Roland was previously an economist with the Asian Development Bank, and earlier he was based in Indonesia with the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.  The format today is very simple. I'll be asking my three guests some questions. We'll occasionally throw up a few charts on the screen for you to look at from the API itself, and we'll also be taking some questions from you, the audience. But to begin Hervé Lemayou, let me start with you. Can you take us through some of the major findings of the 2021 Asia Power Index? Thanks, Sam, and it's a huge relief to get this one over the line. My fourth edition of the Asia Power Index, and my last one as well, because I'm transitioning full-time into the Director of Research role from January. But essentially, just to remind the audience, the index measures the ability of states to shape and respond to the external environment. In other words, we define power very broadly as the capacity of a state to direct or influence other state actors, non-state actors, and the course of international events. So that's what we're after. That's what we seek to measure, and that can be done in two ways. What countries have in terms of the resource-based determinants of power, whether that's their military strength or the size of their economies, and what countries do with what they have in terms of the influence-based determinants of power, and that's where the index gets its geographical relevance because we look at influence flows in our region. So it is influenced specific to Asia. There's a lot to unpack in 2021, and I thought I'd just begin by mentioning the pandemic. It's obviously been the story of this year and last, and it has continued to negatively impact the resources and influence of a majority of states in the region in 2021. So far from this being erased at the top, it's perhaps more accurate to describe it as erased at the bottom, whereby countries are out competing each other by degrees of underperformance, largely as a result of the pandemic, both the primary economic effects and the secondary effects in terms of interrupted exchanges, diplomatic and cultural influence being somewhat undermined and compromised by border closures. The big story continues to be the uneven economic impact and recovery of the pandemic, which has already altered the balance of power in our region and will continue to do so well into this decade. So at the moment, it looks as if only the United States, Taiwan and Singapore are set to have larger economies in 2030. Then we had forecast prior to the pandemic. Everyone else will be, by degrees, smaller than we had forecast prior to the pandemic and developing economies. India being perhaps the largest one seemed to be hardest hit relative to their pre-COVID growth path. So that's a fundamental story, which we're continuing to track, which we saw unfold last year and continue to do so this year. The biggest surprise is probably the fact that the United States has managed to beat this regional downward trend and, in fact, registered its first upswing, its first growth in its power in four editions of the Asia Power Index. It reminds us that there is nothing inevitable about the U.S.'s decline or inexorable about China's rise. It is really the function of both how countries respond to their circumstances, political as well as structural trends in the region. The U.S. now tops six out of eight measures of power. So it overtook China and two critical rankings in terms of its diplomatic influence and our assessment of its future resources. So that points to both a political and a structural turnaround in the United States, nowhere near enough to claw back. I should add the losses that the U.S. sustained last year, but sufficient to make us think that there are signs of a resurgent United States in the Indo-Pacific. And it is also a sign of both the Biden and what you might call the Biden effects on a U.S. diplomatic standing globally, the fact that Biden has put a concerted effort on trying to put the United States in the middle of answering transnational challenges, whether that's climate change, the pandemic or development finance in ways that the Trump administration never really sought to do, but it is also structural. It is to do with a faster than expected U.S. economic recovery and improved prospects through the decade to 2030 at least. So that is a big, a big story in itself. But within that, I would say modest upswing in U.S. power this year. There's a lot of volatility. We're seeing the fact that U.S. gains in some areas, such as in diplomatic influence, have almost completely been counterbalanced by a loss of relevance in the U.S.'s the U.S.'s loss of relevance to the political economy of Asia. And that is a key continuity between Trump and Biden. So it's not all been changed. Some some real continuity and an alarming rate of decline, I would say, in terms of the U.S.'s economic influence, its clout, its relationships in the region. So domestic renewal and coalition building point to a more competitive United States, but just how influential in Asia will really depend on whether on the quality of U.S. economic engagement with the region, which also in turn depends on the administration's ability to overcome the anti-trade tilt in U.S. politics. So the sources of U.S.'s revival are domestic, but the sources of the U.S.'s weaknesses continue to be domestic as well. China is also incredibly interesting this year in the sense that it lost ground in overall power, as well as in half of the index measures in 2021. Everything from diplomatic to cultural influence to its assessment of our assessment of its future resources. That contrasts with the year before when Beijing was essentially holding ground despite emerging diplomatically diminished from the pandemic and to 2019 when it netted the highest gains in the region. So this too is an interesting change in direction. What we don't know yet or what we can't predict is how durable that decline will be. But it certainly suggests that there are inherent limitations in the ascendancy of China, that its power is rooted in narrow but deep foundations of economic capability and economic relationships in the region with sort of very varied results in other measures of the index. Beijing is, for example, now the primary investor in as many countries in the Pacific as Japan and the U.S. combined. And we still think the Chinese economy will overtake the United States at some point towards the end of this decade at market exchange rates. But it appears less likely that China will ever be as dominant as the United States once was. So a bipolar future beckons. And depending on how the U.S. plays its cards, it may well remain the top superpower, but we'll have to see how that plays out. There are inherent limitations on the speed at which China can continue to grow beyond 2030. And I'd be happy to go into that later on in our discussion there to do with the contraction and its workforce that to do with diminishing returns over time in China's investment heavy approach to driving economic growth. But here's the hitch. China is down relative to the United States fractionally, but its lead over the rest of the region has not been substantially undermined. In fact, there is a growing power differential between the two superpowers, the U.S. and China on one hand, and nearly every other emerging power in the region. Asia has become more bipolar, less multipolar in 2021. And you see that first and foremost in terms of how Japan and India are performing relative to China. Both of these major powers have lost more ground in 2021 than did China. In fact, neither are really, really qualified major powers anymore, simply high performing middle powers. They don't really meet the 40 point threshold. And again, we can go into the details as to why that is, but suffice to say Japan remains a smart power. It uses limited resources to very great effect in terms of wielding significant economic clouds, cultural influence, but its margins of influence are steadily eroding, whereas India remains an underachiever relative to both its resources and potential. And it has been hard hit by the COVID pandemic, as I've already mentioned. So what does greater bipolarity mean? It means that U.S. allies and balancing powers, such as India, have never been more dependent, essentially, on U.S. capacity and willingness to sustain a military balance against China's rise. China's defense spending is now 50 percent larger than the combined outlays of India, Japan, Taiwan and all 10 ASEAN countries. So that's quite a staggering figure. And it's China has also used its growing military strength to good effect, I should add, certainly viewed from Beijing's national interests, pressing its sovereignty claims in the East and South China Sea, jostling with with India on the Himalayan border, intimidating Taiwan. These are all signs of a very confident military power. Australia is ranked sixth and it has not changed. In fact, it's whether the pandemic better than most middle powers over the past two years. You may remember it was up last year. It's this year, it's down. And the net effect of that is that we're basically exactly where we were prior to the pandemic. We haven't lost ground. Neither have we particularly gained ground. On one end of the spectrum, we've seen improvements in our resilience, despite sustained Chinese sanctions. And on the other, we're down an economic influence due in part to investment trends. We've lost our status as the primary foreign investor in Papua New Guinea to China in 2021. So paradoxically, Australia has also lost a few points in military capability and in our measure of defense networks. The latter, though, remains its highest ranking overall and hasn't changed. But the fact that it is trending down is curious, given the major diplomatic achievements this year, AUKUS being the primary case in point. But what it suggests is that AUKUS is still more of a political rather than a physical reality. It has not yet registered in our data. It also marks a deepening rather than a widening of Australia's defense diplomacy. So greater reliance on the United States and a greater investment towards integrated deterrence with the United States will take several decades for that to come to fruition, not in a way that we can capture at this point yet. Last but not least, in terms of how the countries have done, Indonesia makes it into the top 10 in 2021. It's it's curious that it hasn't been in the top 10 prior to that, but it does reflect the problem that a lot of developing countries have, which is that they face constraints in their ability to project power and leadership abroad. They tend to be more inward looking, more focused on domestic development agendas. That's certainly been the case with President Jacoé's priorities to date. But the fact is that Indonesia has now gained in its diplomatic standing. It has become the most diplomatically influential player over succeeding Singapore in that regard. And it does suggest that Indonesia's overall importance within the ASEAN grouping will grow and is growing. But the overall story for Southeast Asia is rather grim. So in the graph that you'll probably see in front of you, you will see how Southeast Asian countries in particular have been hardest hit in terms of their economic prospects. In fact, if you look at Myanmar, Myanmar will be 40 percent smaller in 2013 than we had anticipated a couple of years ago. That's a combination not only of the pandemic, but of political instability and highlights the fact that for a lot of emerging countries, the problems still emanate from the unresolved nation building agendas. The fact is, militaries are much more geared towards addressing internal threats than they are towards addressing external threats. So a combination of internal weakness within the ASEAN grouping and power politics outside of it has really started to undermine the collective diplomatic clout, the ability of ASEAN to hold the region together, to have the superpowers at the same table through its network of multilateralism. What we've seen is instead this year is a real rise in mini-lateral coalitions, again, that mirrors the bipolar reality that we are starting to experience. And I should also say for all the talk of war and potential conflict, the biggest threat to the region remains a non-traditional one. It remains the threat of a pandemic disease, and therefore vaccine diplomacy has emerged as a key conduit of foreign policy. And my colleague, Elisa, has done quite extensive research on that so she can talk to that as well. Hurley, thank you. And that gives me the perfect segue to ask you, Elisa, about vaccine diplomacy, which has become, well, vaccines have become a new currency in effect in Asian diplomacy and geopolitics. Can you tell us about the findings of the the power index in regard to vaccine diplomacy? Sure. Thanks, Sam. And thanks, Herve, for that overview as well. So as both both have mentioned, vaccine diplomacy has become this major channel for countries to exert geopolitical influence over the course of this year. To reflect this, we added two indicators to the index to reflect this new development. The first is total donations that have been delivered to the region, as well as donations made on a capita basis. So on the chart, you'll see in front of you now, you'll see that of the actors that are from the region, so IE excluding Europe, etc., we find that the US is the largest donor of vaccines and has exerted the most influence through this channel to date. This reflects data coming up to October this year. So we can see that it has delivered about 90 million doses to Asia so far, and this is one of the key planks that has supported the rise of its diplomatic influence in Asia, as well as the Biden effect, as noted by Herve before. You can see as well that countries like China, Japan and India have also given large amounts of donations, while smaller countries like Australia and New Zealand have also been relatively generous once you account for differences in size. Really, what you can see now here as well is that it's this kind of per capita generosity that has really been recognized across the regions. So as we capture in one of our COVID-19 related surveys in the index, we see that larger per capita donations from countries like the US, New Zealand and Japan, generated a lot of good will. We saw that these countries were rated quite highly on their contributions towards global efforts in ending the pandemic. Interestingly, though, despite, as I mentioned before, China and India making significant, fairly significant donations on this front, their contributions, while still considered to be broadly constructive, were not really rated as highly by the policymakers and analysts that we talked to in the region. So there are a couple of possible reasons for this. The first is that while they have been generous in aggregate, they have been less so once adjusted to size. And the second sort of underlying factor here as well is that China and India have done a lot of commercial vaccine supply deals across the year. In fact, this is probably outstripped their donations by quite a large margin. So it's quite interesting because this result suggests that donations are better received than commercial supply deals, which makes sense, particularly as it took time for all those commercially supplied doses to actually get down to the region. Whereas in this respect, we're talking about donations that have already have already gotten onto the ground. So what does this mean more broadly outside of the index world? I would say the first key implication is that there are real rewards here for being generous, real geopolitical rewards, and therefore, you know, putting aside the economics, the health and the other moral reasons to give doses, this extra incentive also exists to exert geopolitical influence through this channel, and that giving quickly matters. And I'd say the second implication of this vaccine diplomacy for the broader balance of power in the region is that we know that in general, it is richer countries that have higher rates of vaccination than poorer ones. And in this case, China falls into that higher vaccination rate category. But as we've just as we were talking about before, India and Indonesia are both big emerging powers that are relatively poor still compared to countries like the US and other more developed middle powers like Japan, Korea and Australia. So while this means it's somewhat unsurprising that they're behind in relative terms in vaccinating their populations with India at about 50% fully vaccinated and Indonesia at about a third, it does and bearing in mind as well that economic recovery and control of future outbreaks in the years to come will be heavily dependent on vaccination. This put together with broader concerns around India and Indonesia's economic rise in the coming years just raises extra question marks. And if we combine this with the narrative that Hervé was talking about before that gap between China and the US and everyone else in the region really beginning to widen, this does not help in that front either. And we could very well end up with a more stratified region in which it's really the poorest countries that miss out. So let me turn now to Roland Raja and Roland. I know you and Alyssa have written together about vaccine diplomacy in Asia. So I would just invite you broadly to fill in any gaps that Alyssa might have left, but also specifically Alyssa said that going going quickly matters in terms of vaccine diplomacy. So I want to ask you for Australia. Is it already too late? Have we left our run too late and have we missed an opportunity to not only do good in the region, but to increase our influence? Thank you, Sam. And let me just at the outset congratulate Hervé and Alyssa on a really another really great launch of the API. I think the narrative that the two of you are explaining really captures what's going on in the world right now in a really excellent way, but backed up with data. So that's certainly a real achievement. And I think just going to your question, Sam, on Australia, is it too late? No, I don't think it is too late. I mean, we've seen with say Omicron that new variants are going to keep arising and they can potentially be more dangerous and that will have ramifications for the rest of the world, but also for ourselves. So it's not too late to be doing something constructive about that. You know, Australia has made some fairly generous pledges on a per capita basis. According to the calculations, Alyssa and I have been doing second most generous on a per capita basis amongst global donors in terms of giving vaccines overseas. We have been slow to get those vaccines overseas, but that's changing very rapidly now that Australia is basically given up on rolling out the AstraZeneca vaccine domestically. And so that means the AstraZeneca vaccine supplies that we do have, which are being produced domestically, they're able to be shipped overseas much more rapidly. So we're catching up in terms of our delivery on those pledges. But the reality is that no country is doing enough. So as Alyssa said, some countries are more generous and generosity is being rewarded in the diplomatic stakes, so to speak, but no country is doing enough from the moral and self-interest perspective when it comes to trying to achieve the quickest, most efficient end to the global pandemic and bringing it under control for Australia and more broadly than Australia as well. The big gap for the world is in Africa. That's where the vaccine, not only the rollout, but just the pure supplies. I mean, they haven't even secured enough supplies at any point in the future to cover their population. So it's not just about how many vaccines they're getting now. And I mean, that does matter and versus how much, how quickly they're able to roll that out at the same time, which does face constraints. It's also simply a matter that they don't have, even over the coming years, according to the WHO, that vaccine supply isn't even there. So something has to be done about that. Otherwise, we're going to be stuck in the situation for a lot longer. And that's not good from anybody's perspective. But to bring it back to the sort of Indo-Pacific and the power stakes that Herve and Alissa are talking about, I think the argument that Alissa just mentioned and that she's written up on the interpreter as well on our website. I mean, I think this is an absolutely crucial one. It's that it's not just about making friends and improving, getting some diplomatic wins out of providing vaccines overseas. It's not just about stopping the pandemic. It's also about helping countries countries like Australia see as key partners in terms of the balance of power within the region, in terms of countries like India, Indonesia, Philippines and most of the countries in the region are developing countries at their heart. What we've seen with the pandemic is that reality has been deeply exposed. China has proven itself much more resilient in many ways than countries like India and Indonesia have in the end. And so there's a weakness there and there's a need for responding to the needs of countries like that within the regional order that is currently being being reshaped. I think what we've seen with COVID-19 is that really there's been a vacuum. There's a vacuum that where the West and the United States weren't providing what was needed. But I think very shocking thing that's come through the last two years is that this was a great opportunity for China to provide a lot of those things and China also failed. And here we're not talking about just about vaccines. That's very important, but we're also talking about things like emergency credit lines. Last year we saw capital being sucked out of emerging economies, including this part of the world. And that was a very destabilizing effect. The US didn't really step up. China had been talking a big game for a long time about being useful in those sort of situations. Also didn't step up. Look at debt relief. China has not been particularly forthcoming in terms of the provision of debt relief either. And then if we look in terms of the recovery, not just on vaccines where China has given a lot of vaccines commercially, not so much on the donations front. But also we talk about things like infrastructure and development finance. On the one hand, the West is trying to talk a bigger game in terms of Biden's Build Back Better World initiative. It's not clear whether or not there's going to be actually any new money or ideas put forward on that front, although Europe is now looking like they might be stepping up. But on the other hand, China had been again talking a big game about the Belt and Road initiative and how it was going to be the big new provider of this kind of economic development assistance. But we haven't seen anything again in the aftermath of COVID. And in fact, we've seen a retrenchment of Belt and Road as well. So there is a vacuum there and it is affecting the regional order. And I think, you know, it is incumbent on all the players in the region to think about how the regional order, regional architecture and actions that we can take, you know, can generate a more favorable, more favorable outlook. Roland, thanks. Having zoomed in there on COVID, I just wanted to zoom out again on the index as a whole. And I'll stick with you for a moment, Roland, and just ask you of the results that you saw in the 2021 Asia Power Index. What surprised you the most? I think, you know, I think the surprising thing for me of role was how well it captured what's going on in the world right now. I mean, the key storyline there that, you know, the United States and the Biden administration, by getting things right at home, they've done the biggest favor they can for themselves in the immediate term for boosting their global standing. You know, they got the vaccine out reasonably and they've been pouring a ton of fiscal and monetary stimulus in that so much so that the concern now is about the overheating of the US economy and overheated recovery. And, you know, that's a much better position the United States to be in than anything else, frankly. So, you know, there's that story, but there's also the story about China and the question marks of the index is pointing to in terms of the assumptions about China's rise in both in the short term and in the long term. And I think, you know, it's tempting to blame that on certain short term issues in terms of COVID-19, certainly in China's zero COVID policy and the energy crunch that they're currently going through. But I think the deeper issue is that, you know, the cracks and weaknesses in China's growth model are starting to become a little bit more obvious, partly due to COVID, but it's really just the passage of time. And a lot of the time, I think, you know, people are willing to give China the benefit of the doubt in thinking that, you know, they've got this track record of policy success. And so the new wave of reform is somehow around the corner and that. And so they can keep kicking the can down the road in terms of deep adjustments they need to make, because at some point these reforms will deliver the productivity growth that they need. And we just haven't seen that occur, basically. And reform progress is mixed at best, possibly going backwards. And so now we're seeing the cracks and problems start to emerge. And we're seeing that in the housing market in particular, you know, this is a cyclical downturn in the Chinese housing market. You know, it's the start of structural decline. And, you know, housing has been so important to the Chinese economy that that's going to have only posed big financial risks, but have big ramifications for China's longer term China's longer term outlook. The key question, though, which again, the API raises again, is that what matters is less the race between the US and China and the fact that maybe China is slowing down in America maybe is speeding up. But also the other emerging Asian players, India and Indonesia, I'm not sure how well that's necessarily can be captured in the data just yet. But my sense is that not only these countries struggled through this crisis, but their medium and longer term prospects are becoming much more uncertain than I think we typically take for granted. Alyssa Lange. Roland says the cracks are becoming more obvious in China's economic model. So I wanted to ask you about China's economic prospects going forward.  Yeah, I think what's interesting here is putting China in context of the US. As you know, Roland and her they've alluded to earlier, we've seen that, you know, change can occur. We've seen that the US its efforts at home have sped it up not just today, but that has implications going up further into the decade. And I would say that the long term picture on China looks not grim, but increasingly there are there are more and more question marks. Of course, it's well known that its demographic outlook is not great. The population is aging at a much earlier point in its development trajectory than other East Asian miracle economies saw that happen. And there are few policy levers around how it can turn that around. We're also seeing that returns will diminish to its investment heavy approach. Roland talked about the housing market, but the same applies also for public investment. So I think that it's difficult to to reconcile that with the general consensus that China's rise is inevitable. And I think there's a bit of tension there and it's more worth examining more. What actually are the basis of those kinds of assumptions? So Hervé Lemme, I wanted to ask you about the about the United States and in regard to China as well. So you you talked about the fact that China's strengths are deep but narrow. If I've understood the results of the 2021 Asia Power Index correctly, could we say the same about the United States and that the United States is the only major power to have made gains in this index in this years index. And yet those gains have been purely almost solely on the military side, right? Not on the economic side. I would say the US's weaknesses are narrow, but deep. So it is a more well rounded superpower in the sense that it's if you look at it on top of China's results, it's when there's a graph that we can point to, it's still clearly demonstrate it's a better all rounder in terms of the eight measures of power as a whole. It does it does have one significant Achilles heel. And that is the quality in depth of its economic relationships in Asia. And that just happens to be one of the key metrics of the changing distribution of power and influence in the region. So what we're saying is essentially if the United States plays its cards right, it can remain a very competitive and perhaps even marginally the more competitive of the two superpowers within what looks said to be a bipolar region. However, that will really depend on the quality of the US's economic engagement with the region. And if you think about it in two ways, if you think about it in terms of you have just as US military is eroding its primacy is eroding slowly but incrementally in the region to China. But the US is offsetting that through reliance, greater reliance and investment in its defense networks. And something similar could be done in terms of economic influence for the United States, which is to say it will be very difficult for the United States to match the market pool or the geographic proximity of China's economy that it is increasingly difficult to compete with that. Nevertheless, the types of economic engagement we're referring to are the kind of multinational trade agreements which in this region acquire more that it's more than just about trade. This is institution building. This is regional order building. And it really goes to the heart of what the region will become and how it will be structured and who will dominate or influence. And at the moment, what you have is a CPTPP the what's left of the Trans-Pacific Partnership deal minus the United States. They are a sort of shallow sort of very deep but narrow grouping minus the United States. And it's not clear that given that the US is no longer there to really anchor that agreement that they can really sustain their lofty goals of setting the rules base, the rules of the road for the for the trading environment in the region. And then you've got the much wider 15 countries, the largest multinational trade agreements ever reached other than the WTO itself which will come online in January, which is an ASEAN-led initiative the regional comprehensive economic partnership. Now, that is an initiative that springs from the region, springs from Southeast Asian countries and still speaks to a degree of their sort of importance in clout and ASEAN centrality is important here. But what it will do is, you know, very few commitments on labor, the environment, intellectual property, state-owned enterprises, but it will succeed in deepening the trade, investment and supply chain integration between 15 countries with China first among them. So there are competing visions and of how trade integration is working in our region. But neither the TPP nor RCEP involves the United States. In fact, the United States is becoming increasingly irrelevant when it comes to these discussions. And it's unclear whether this so-called or nascent Indo-Pacific strategy for an economic strategy, US economic strategy for the Indo-Pacific, which has been sort of vaguely alluded to so far by the Biden administration. It promises to put down some details in the new year, unclear whether that will be able to surmount both the US anti-trade tilt in domestic politics in the United States, as well as convince the region that it's offering anything of real substance. So that I think is the real Achilles' heel, the key continuity with the Trump administration and the one reason why the US gains this years are not more pronounced. So I began in my question by talking about American military power and that that had been a significant factor in the overall rise of its status in the power index this year. In terms of Australian defense policy and foreign policy, actually, there's been no bigger story this year than AUKUS. So tell us, how does something like that show up in the Asia power index? What effect does it have, actually, on the standing of the United States and Australia as what is a major initiative, but effectively at the moment is little more than a piece of paper? Yes, which makes it very difficult for something like the index, which is data driven to capture that. So it remains to be seen. And I think, you know, once you do have, if it does results and we expected to in a deepening of cooperation on multiple levels between the United States and Australia, as well as the UK, but obviously the UK is not captured within the index countries that that should result in in sort of arms transfers going up in the number of dialogues at a senior ministerial level going up the range of sort of metrics by which we by which we judge the depth of a partnership. But the fact is the US and Australia already probably the two closest partners in the region. And that is already a key strength of Australia. So what it is is it's doubling down on a on a comparative advantage for Australia. But at the same time, AUKUS promises results. But but at an uncertain point in the future, perhaps as far as two decades away when it comes to the nuclear powered boats and without the French deal, we are left with an aging fleet of conventional submarines. And our platforms are not keeping pace with the military modernization efforts in the rest of the region, which is why we're incrementally down on military capability. So there is a sort of medium term problem here, which is what we do in the next 20 years. And I realize that AUKUS is more than just the nuclear submarines. And there's been, you know, there have been multiple promises that it will encompass many other areas, including AI and cyber and and and other areas of naval power projection. So that may well start to change the reality in terms of Australia's military capability. It's just we haven't seen it yet. So it does remind us this is a political vision, more than the physical reality, not to undermine the political vision. It may well result in great gains. But at the same time, I think Australia shouldn't lose sight of the fact that the region is more than the United States or more than its alliance. And the pandemic and border closures in Australia has disrupted the normal pace of our defense diplomacy in the region. So if you look at, if you compare Australia to Japan, for example, Japan has established itself in 2021 as the lead defense dialogue partner for more countries in the region than any other. And that goes from Mongolia to Vietnam. And perhaps we could be doing a bit more of that because ultimately the US Alliance is probably our biggest failsafe. But there are big question marks around both AUKUS as well as the political trajectory in the US in decades to come. Sam, I might just jump in briefly on that point as well. And I think it's really important as well on AUKUS to think about the cost benefit in terms of the year as well as the future. So what I mean by that is that, of course, we talk about these positive long-term effects on defense capabilities and on engagement more broadly in the defense sphere. We've also got to stack that up and see how much that's offset by the current implications of AUKUS that we've seen in the region's reactions. So we've seen several countries in the Southeast Asian region in particular, not very happy about this development. We've seen Indonesia and Malaysia in particulars that are be quite vocal on this front. So I think it's important to remember that we will have long-term benefits possibly, but the diplomatic ramifications of really locking into the Anglosphere, I think those can't be ignored and the index might be able to measure how Australia's perceptions change in the coming years as a result of this. But I think it's important to think about those two differing time periods as well. A very good point. And actually just to add one more point on top of that because Alyssa and I have a way of sort of thinking along the same wavelength, but it also highlights another interesting indirect finding of the index, which is that as Indonesia rises, and we've seen it now for the first time emerge in the top 10, there is a lot of hope on the part of the United States and its partners that it will contribute to an overall sort of Indo-Pacific bounce of power, assimilate anxieties about China, and join essentially what is a US, maybe not US-led, but US-centered coalition in the region. And I think what Orcus has highlighted is that there is very little prospect of that happening either now and actually little prospect of that happening ever. Southeast Asian countries will continue to hedge as a way of managing their, competing influences by the United States and China. They are neither inclined strategically nor really suited in terms of the military capability to contribute to a collective military deterrence. I mean, even a country the size of Indonesia wouldn't be able to match China's military outside of Indonesia's jurisdiction, and often even within Indonesia's EEZ and jurisdiction. So no Southeast Asian power is equipped for this sort of concertive power approach. And I think we have to understand that they see the world very differently. That's not to say that they're necessarily succeeding and carving a path which is essentially non-aligned. I mean, they're facing more challenges in trying to carve out a space between US and China. But I think fundamentally, neither their power nor their inclination suggests that that will be the case. I'm so pleased you mentioned Indonesia because I did want to talk about it. And Roland, as Herve mentioned for the first time in the history of the index, Indonesia has entered the top 10. There are observers in Australia. I'm among them who are fond of talking about Indonesia as a nascent great power. So it's tempting to read this as a kind of harbinger of the future. But is it or is this just an anomaly? Is Indonesia gonna drop out again or will it inexorably rise in status in the Asia power index? Yeah, and I don't think if the 2021 index reminds us of one thing, it's just that nothing is inevitable. And even long-term projections that seem to be based on sound assumptions can be challenged by the reality of events such as a pandemic. But I think what Indonesia, I mean, certainly in terms of our assessment of its future resources, it ranks fifth just behind Japan. And it's one of the few countries really with the capacity or the potential to one day become a major power in our region in the way that we conceive of India and Japan. When that happens, if it happens, difficult to predict. But what we can say is it has the potential capacity, whether it actualizes that capacity is another question. Let me jump in for Roland there and get his perspective on that one. Thanks, Sam. I think, you know, Hervé hits on a lot of interesting points there. I mean, it is interesting what you said beginning Hervé about that it's surprising that Indonesia wasn't in the top 10 previously. And one of the things I note is that in the APIs scores, the reason Indonesia has gone up is one because it's been more active diplomatically and two, its resilience score has also improved. And that second one, the resilience thing I think is very interesting because Indonesia is historically seen as a very fragile country. Everyone's always worried that, you know, the next crisis is just around the corner and that the place could collapse or disintegrate. And I think what we've seen through COVID in particular is Indonesia has really come a long way.  So huge capital outflows at the same time just like everyone else around the world they needed to fund a massive fiscal stimulus and really just financial relief to the economy to keep the economy and people's livelihoods afloat. They needed money. Typically they relied on financing their debt, their budget from overseas that wasn't available. And what they ended up doing in the end was just printing the money themselves by the central bank. And the interesting thing here in the broader context is that if you'd even just gone just before this crisis just a few months before this crisis or even a week before this crisis and said that's what Indonesia was going to do a lot of people would have said that they couldn't do it and that they were probably going to invite a deeper crisis as a result of that as markets panicked their currency collapsed and who knows what else would happen. In the end, they were able to do that they were able to get through it and they've managed it actually quite well so far on the economic front. So the resilience story in Indonesia which is coming through on the index I think is very true. We saw it also in the global financial crisis so over a decade ago, but even more so I think this time with COVID-19 in terms of how the government is able to manage it on the economic front and then, you know, on the health front I mean, they haven't done so well. And this is something that Ben Bland our resident Indonesia expert and I debate over which is in my view, the fact that Indonesia hasn't done so well is unfortunately that's about half of the course for what you would have expected before the crisis. So they haven't necessarily underperformed against my own expectations unfortunately on that front where they have overperformed though is on the economic front at least so far. And that's I think where the key question marks start to emerge. I mean, we'll see what happens. Everything is always virus dependent in the current, in our current times Indonesia's not rolling out its vaccines that fast but they're, you know, they're getting there. It depends what happens in terms of new variants and these sorts of things. I think the deeper concern is two front. One is that, you know, all countries in order to make the recoveries the economic recoveries happen which as we can see through the index is key to what kind of role these countries are gonna play both here and now and in the future. That depends on being able to continue to provide a fair amount of fiscal support to the economy. What we see in a country like Indonesia but also a lot of other emerging economies including India is that fiscal retrenchment is just around the corner. And that's born of two big factors. One, you know, global interest rates are set to rise and that's got to do with what's going on in the United States in terms of the strength of their recovery and concerns about inflation. And that's a problem for emerging economies but also there's a happy degree of fiscal conservatism also which has been abandoned in the advanced Western economies but still heavily subscribed to in countries where recent crises like in Indonesia are still front and center of mind. That's really gonna hamper, I think their short to medium term recoveries. And then if we look longer term certainly a country like Indonesia has got a lot of promise as Herbe has mentioned whether they're gonna capture that. I think, you know, as time goes on it becomes increasingly questionable. You know, in the past year or so we've seen Jacoey and the Indonesian government pass what they've called the omnibus law which was supposed to be a big set of economic reforms. In reality, it's probably not as big a deal as they've made out, but at the same time they had to ram that through parliament and politically there were protests and now it's just been deemed potentially unconstitutional by the constitutional court. And so may not be completely unwound but its implementation is now completely uncertain. And, you know, that was the biggest, one of the biggest reforms Indonesia has been able to deliver in a really long time they had to ram it through and now it's already uncertain. But those are the kinds of things that are necessary for it to fulfill the kind of potential that outsiders looking at Indonesia and of course indeed Indonesians themselves want to see happen. So I think that, you know, there are a lot of concerns here in the short term, Indonesia's getting the recognition deserves for how far it's come since, you know, 20 years ago with the Asian financial crisis it's really come a long way. On the other hand, you know, probably the outlook again is getting much, much more difficult. We've got time just for a few audience questions and Alyssa Lange, I'm gonna throw this first one at you it's from Liam and it's kind of a methodological question about how you built the Asia power index. He asks, is the US considered to be in Asia? If so, what proportion of its national power is implicated? And I guess we could broaden that question to ask about how you account for the fact that nations that are the 26 countries and territories in the Asia power index are not purely Asian countries they all have global interest to some extent. So how do we account for that in the Asia power index? Who can we? Sure, Sam. Geographically, as you mentioned in the intro we do include countries as far into the Pacific as the US, Australia, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea. So in that sense, in our conception of the region it's definitely there. And it's obvious through the influence it's had not just through the vaccine donations but all costs and all these other measures that it is playing a very active role in the region deserves to be measured as a result of that. And as Herve alluded to in the beginning that involvement is very heavily weighted towards the military and the defense partnership side of things. And so we do see that the US is weighted towards that rather than the economic side. Yeah. Herve, go ahead. Yeah, I mean, this is actually, I mean, difficult and a perennial question. In a sense, I think or we think that power is often best understood in regional context. Power is often situational. US's global standing in sub-Saharan Africa is not the same as what it would be in Europe is not the same as what it would be in Southeast Asia. And therefore geography matters in our index and that's why we've also limited our index to what you might call either the Asia plus or the broader in the Pacific region going as far west as Pakistan, as far north as Russia and as far east as the United States. But the fact is that all of our influence measures are about how those countries perform in relation to counterparts in the region. So this is US influence and standing in Asia or in the Indo-Pacific rather than a reflection of US influence and standing in sub-Saharan Africa. That's why when we look at vaccine diplomacy that 90 million figure for the number of donations and deliveries that US has committed in the course of this year that is limited to the countries of our index. And you'd have to do another index to figure out where and how US is performing in say Latin America. So yes, I think certainly when it comes to measurements of influence, geography matters and that's where the geographical definition of our index really comes to bear. There is another question related to that which is what portion of the US's military power, for example, applies to Asia? And there are two ways of answering that. I mean, you could look at just the Indo-Pacific assets, the bases and fleets that the US has at its disposal in our region or you could look at US global military power and assume that theoretically, if there were a major war that were to break out between the US and China, there would be at Washington's disposal, its global military posture. I mean, and so you can't, I think sort of assume that that doesn't exist. I think it would exist. It would become relevant. Of course, there'd be difficulties in terms of placing those assets in the region, in a fast enough manner to respond effectively to China. We also alluded to the fact that China has a home ground advantage in terms of its focusing its assets on its near abroad in the way that the US simply can't do with its global security commitments. But I think it would be naive of us to sort of discredit the global assets that the US brings to bear and could theoretically mobilize within the Indo-Pacific were to need to, you know, given the situation. And Hurley, I just wanna stick with you very quickly for one final audience question. Just a very quick response from Ramana. This question comes, what would Japan and India need to do to turn around their falling power scores? Yeah, that's a very good and challenging question. I think for India, it's quite clear it is an underachiever relative to its current resources, not just its future potential. So it could be doing a lot more with its current resources, where India lags notably in terms of its economic diplomacy, it's improved in terms of its defense diplomacy. And you might remember India was sort of proudly non-lined if anything closer to Russia than it was to the United States. But now I think we have seen a significant shift in the form of the Quad, but these things are not enough. These things will not guarantee India an equilibrium unless it gets involved in economic diplomacy. And that's where we've seen shortcomings partly by design, not by, I think in the sense that India is still a more closed off economy than many other economies in East Asia, for example. And self-sufficiency has acquired greater meaning and importance as a result of geopolitical competition, but self-sufficiency is a two-edged sword. Self-sufficiency means that you're actually investing and trading less with the region, and therefore your economic influence is diminishing, not just in terms of India's unwillingness to participate in the major trade institution building ventures of our region, whether that's RCEP or the TPP, but also in terms of it's near abroad. I mean, we're seeing in Nepal and Bangladesh and Sri Lanka and elsewhere a diminishing of India's economic diplomacy. When it comes to Japan, far harder to beat the trend. And in fact, it's very good at beating the trend of its long-term decline. So I'm not sure what more it could be doing because it is such an effective and quintessential smart power to begin with. However, where we have seen Japan take a slight step back is it hasn't really recovered or Tokyo hasn't really recovered its diplomatic standing on the regional stage since the departure of Shinzo Abe. So perhaps a sort of, again, a more durable, longer-lived prime ministership in Japan would inject more continuity in its foreign policy and perhaps stand that way is one way that Japan could notch up its points somewhat, but otherwise very difficult to see how Japan could turn around. The facts as they are, which is that it is in long-term decline and as an economy, it's as a share of the global economy and the regional economy, it's also declining. Thank you, Herbert. Just a quick final question for all three of you. I'd ask you to just confine your answers to 20 or 30 seconds. The headline result this year is that the United States is the only major power to increase its status in the Asia Power Index. China went down slightly. When we come back here in a year's time and the four of us are discussing the 2022 Power Index, do you expect to see that's the same result or something different? Roland, let me start with you. The risk of being somewhat boring, I think I expected to be sustained at least for another year or so. I think China is still working through a lot of difficult economic issues for themselves. I think the United States is still got some way to run in terms of the stimulus that is flowing through their economy and they'll be managing that. So a year from now, the US should be doing still pretty well economically. China might still be having some troubles. Unfortunately, I think also, a lot of the other emerging Asian economies also will be struggling. So perhaps more of the same next year. Alyssa, how about you? I have to agree with Roland on that one. I'd echo his points and also add that the Biden administration will be even more settled into the reins there and there might be more scope for them to continue the traction that they've had on their efforts in the region. So I'd echo the same points as Roland. Hervé is the mastermind behind the Asia Power Index. How did you get the final word? Yeah, well, I can't fix the results for next year, unfortunately. Now, it will be, I think largely again, an index driven by the US and China in ways, you know, in the sense that it has reinforced that bipolarity. I expect that to continue. But I do think that the big bump for the US this year was in terms of that shift in administration, a turnaround in its economy. And I'm not sure that there will be as big a net effect next year, given that we've already registered that dividends this year. So the key challenge for the US is not to sustain its ground and to prove that this modest upswing in its power is not simply a short-term reprieve on a longer term trend of relative decline, but more an emerging situation of strength for the United States. And again, that really determines, that will really be determined by the quality of its economic engagement with the region. Thank you, Herve. Thank you, Alyssa. Thank you, Rowland. And thank you, the viewers, to all of you for joining us. This is the Lowy Institute's final event for 2021. So on behalf of everyone here at the Lowy Institute, I wish you a happy Christmas season. And we look forward to welcoming you again in the new year. Bye for now.


No is no. Kikari was a vivacious young girl living with her mom in a busy part of Okukumaiko in Lagos, Nigeria. It was not unusual for her mom to ask her child to go and buy biscuits from Mamabisi, Huskyosk, served as the local grocery store. It was also usual for the neighbors to watch TV in each other's homes as not everyone owned one.  The family did nothing and so the police did nothing. Hush! No one must know. It's your fault. You've brought this grace to us as though this was the fault of Kikari and not the wicked act of a pervert who should be locked away and the Kishtron away forever. Did you know that in Nigeria in 2020 alone there was nearly 40% increase in rape and domestic sexual violence against women? Are you aware that in 2018 the official Nigerian demographic and health survey found that 30% of girls and women aged between 15 and 49 reported suffering sexual abuse in one form or another. So this means that one in three women that you know, a child, a sister, a colleague, a friend, a cosmet, a relative has been sexually assaulted or violated. The scary part is she may never speak about it to you or anyone. For fear that she is ridiculed and humiliated because of our culture of shaming and because we live in a society which says why were you dressed like this? What were you looking for there? Good girls don't get raped. How can you say you did not want it? What were you doing there?  Under the criminal code of Nigeria section 357 and 358 rape is defined as having unlawful canal knowledge of a woman or girl without her consent or with her consent. If the consent is obtained by force or by means of threat or intimidation of any kind or by fear of harm or by means of false act or in case of a married woman by pretending to be her husband. Now this offence is actually punishable by imprisonment for life with or without caning.  However, this code is only applicable in the northern states of Nigeria. Yet, according to the International Center for Investigative Reporting website, there have been only 65 rape convictions between 1973 and 2019 in Nigeria. What an abysmal number considering the prevalence of this crime, considering that one in three women, you know, have been sexually molested or assaulted. Is it that the victims are not reporting for fear of shame? Is it that we've kept inadequate records? Or is it a poorly administered judicial system that protects a perpetrator over a victim? How can we explain to people that no is no? How can we remind everyone that the child is not a sex toy? How can we hold our courts accountable when cases are actually reported? How can we read our society of this despicable act? How can we support rape victims when they actually do come forward? The time has come for changes to the criminal code to be more stringent to punish perpetrators of this crime. There is urgency required in changing the mindset that a rape victim is somehow responsible for this offense. We actually need a sex offenders register where those who have been found guilty can actually be listed to protect us from future occurrences. However, we only have less than 70 names. We need to learn to speak up when we hear such accusations. We need to empower people to actually speak up when they have been victims of this crime. We need to teach everyone that no is no. This is one topic that tears my heart. I have a daughter. And even I, as you were right, I think I don't think there's any woman is in Nigeria that has not been a victim of sexual assault or indecency exposure. I don't think there's any because we are in a society where it's almost as if the woman is just there for, you know, for the taking. And I think the major issue here, apart from the judicial system is the conspiracy of silence. And unfortunately is the women who drive the conspiracy. You have mothers in homes that know that their fathers, the husbands are sleeping with their daughters. But she wants to save her marriage because society has said she must be married and if she and it is somehow her fault. And so it's a vicious circle. You have aunties that know you have sisters that know and everybody says be quiet.  I think even some of our laws have been amended to reflect that a man can be raped too. But because the prevalence of the crime is on the side of the female, I feel so disheartened that women are not playing the, you know, the role in nothing. I think the most recent case we have is that Baba Ijasha case and one of the women just came out two days ago and all the woman to say that she begged Iyabo not to talk. Why? Why? If there's something that was done to this girl that needs to be reported, why is it that we think that these things should be hushed and kept quiet unless we break the circle of conspiracy of silence? Honestly, there's nothing that can be done. Honestly, we probably will not even see any rape case in another 10 years, any conviction. So we need to speak to women, we need to empower our girls, we need to also tell them that even if it is because they said the girl was walking naked, it does not give any man, any woman, any right to rape. Go and report instead that there's a mad person running from the street, a kind person, but not to rape. Absolutely agree with you, comfort.  You know, a lot of men are so uneducated and so ignorant, a lot of families are so, I mean, these neurons are astounding. I have two daughters, I mean, there are certain places I don't hit my daughters when I'm playing with them. So they understand that touching this part of your body is not like it's given by your father.  No, so it's mister. So they're setting boundaries that we have to start. My daughters are seven and two, you know, from that level, you have to start indoctrinating these things. So they realize that, you know, even if their mother wants to be unfortunate or any other family by themselves because they may be empowered, they understand there are some things that should not be allowed. So we have to start looking at these little things. So someone comes in, I also come and say, no, don't sit on this lap. No, there's a chair, sit on the chair, you know, because, I mean, maybe 50 years ago or 100 years ago, it was OK to sit on your own. But today, there are so many people around that even have these tendencies that even they don't know until they, you know, until they start to exhibit those things. So it's very important that very early on we start to indoctrinate our daughters. It's like that's the way we have to start now because we want to go to the 70 men that have been represented since 1970, you know, that's what I'm going to go into. I think dealing with our daughters and again, dealing with the men as well. Because, listen, there is nothing for me as barbaric, as inhumane, as use any word, any adjective you want, as rape. Because what you are saying is it's demeaning, in my view, it's an insult. It's great, it's bigger than saying, like we say, your mother, this is the height of it. Because you're taking someone, sex is so important that it's price. If he's giving it to you or she's giving it to you herself, fine, but you're taking it. I personally feel that, but I feel any man that is able to rape, she's not just being the sex offender's register, register, she'll be castrated. Fine, because listen, I'm telling you, because they said without killing, I don't understand. I mean, that's it. And that's how bad it is for me, but I like to go on a touchy bit of it, which we are a lot of time, we don't like to talk about. And I'll start this way, so that we can understand. Listen, if I drive a G-Wagon 2020 model and I drive it, go to Oshodi or, let's say, any other place. And I leave the ignition in, the key in, I wind down, I come down from the car and I cross the road to buy something. And my car is stolen. I'll be called careless, but that doesn't mean the police is not the responsibility to go look for the car for me. I think looking at the demand over time, looking at the mind frame of men, even some women set these women up for rape. We need to, and some men are so careless and so weak mentally that anything they see, they must touch. And we don't have a security to protect you. I think are women, not the kids, but the women who have control over their body, who can go to any place at any time. We need to start watching how we appear in certain places most importantly. I know, yes, I know a lot of times we say, is my body, the fact that my body is this doesn't mean if it turns you, it means you are weak. Yes, we know it's weak, but when it affects you, the law is not strong, not the law this time, because the law is there to protect you, although we don't apply it. But the security and the condition there is not strong enough to protect you. Because listen, I saw on TV yesterday about city guys, they were accused of raping a girl and killing her in a law university of Eloring. Looking at them, it's obvious they were on drugs. The amount of drug abuse we have in the system right now, and the man seen a lady that already undressed in a particular way. It doesn't mean you don't have your right. The same way you have your right to drive your car and park it anywhere, in some places in Lagos and when you're driving you hide your phones. You don't hold it. It's your phone. You bought it with your money. But for your own safety, you keep it just to avoid anything going wrong with you. I think we need to look at that piece as well. I disagree. I said this touchy. I completely disagree. I don't agree because that's not a sustainable solution. It's not even a solution.  If you see a man walking naked, a man, there are mad men that walk up and down the street naked because they are mad. Do women go after them and say they want to? Because you don't have that problem yet. People women, I don't think that it's a sustainable solution. And it's not even a solution because how do you say I should control what I wear based on somebody. There are women that are hijacked from head to toe but they get raped. No, hold on. And that's why I use the car as an example. The fact that you're keeping your car on the road and installing. Now you can even park your car in the house, put your fence and people will still jump. But when you are in town, you don't say okay because I park it at home and everybody can still leave it. I think we need to look at that piece as well. That's the most sensitive part and should not be discussed. Most of these things happen when they are little. The highest percentages are from a certain age bracket and they are mostly young vulnerable girls. So are you saying a child wearing certain things is going to appeal to him? No, that's what I'm saying. There are different aspects. We can discuss this on and on. I know this has no end. Just to speak a bit of what he said. In my understanding of what you're saying, let's educate both young and older women. So what you educate them on is also important. So if you say to them, don't wear this or don't wear that, that's not really the conversation. It's not about really what you're wearing. It's first there's a male species that has a problem. Exactly. So if you understand, if you're going to lion's den, you're not going to say a dog, you're not going to say a dog. Children who don't have these. Those are exceptional cases. They are not exceptional cases. They are the most rampant cases. You know right, a woman's body belongs to her. If she says no, no is no. There are no excuses to it. We need to start to educate the men to do better. We need to start to educate the men. There are many women willing to give it up for free.  So we hope that this conversation triggers something in you. It's never enough time for us to deep dive, but we want it to be a conversation starter. Go and have those conversations with people and let's start to fix our nation one problem at a time. So join us again next week on another edition of The Advocate. The Advocacy continues on our social media platforms on Facebook plus TV Africa. Hashtag The Advocate NG. And on Instagram it's plus TV Africa. Hashtag The Advocate NG. And to catch up with previous broadcasts, go to plus TV Africa dot com slash The Advocate NG. Don't forget to subscribe to our YouTube channel on plus TV Africa. Join us next week, same time on this station and let's keep advocating for a better society. Bye everyone. Bye. Bye. .


I'm hungry. Yes But this one is different same guy. So the best food ever review show which we've seen a few of is we love it Yep, we like but this one's called how India cooks lunch for 50,000 people for free What the miracle in Punjab, India?  Well, we see they do that at the Golden Temple Yeah, that might be what this is talking about. Okay, I didn't know the numbers of people who eat there But it's in the thousands and I know maybe that's what this is I knew it was the Punjabi people that there you go. I think that is it. So maybe that's we're about to find out But it's either that or they've made one hell of a pancake But 50,000 people That's like Dodger state every single day every single day.  I mean look at the size of it. It's bigger than a swimming pool I'm a czar home of the largest Sikh temple in the world. Oh, look at this Just take a moment. Maybe a hundred people making Chabati by hand on an average day over 100,000 people are fed here and over 150,000 during holiday and then another I'm here to see how they do it How does a place almost completely run with the help of volunteers and donations managed to provide unlimited food for visitors? 24 hours a day. Welcome to the Golden Temple here in Amritsar. I am a simmering. Thank you so much for joining me It's my pleasure simmering a member of the Sikh faith is guiding the way All that you see today was started with about 20 rupees and a few volunteers Now this kitchen could be the entire town I grew up in in a single afternoon and it still manages to be one of the cleanest most well-organized places I've ever been. I mean you wonder like how can they make so much food in one day, but everything is so smooth Today we're getting a close-up look at the miracle that is Amritsar's Golden Temple To the Sikh temple, but first we need to get our head covering so we are All those who enter the temple must wear a head covering It can be as simple as a handkerchief or a four meter long turban This is the turban store that we've come to. Basically Sikh represent this color because it's a orange color When you go to the Golden Temple or any other temple, you just can find out the flag which is flying here It's also of same this color. It's represents the color of Sikh community. Do you wrap your own turban?  I think it's getting ready Can I talk yet? Sikh men must wear a head covering when in public, but the color and the length are up to the individual Um, so I keep pulling this in my mouth. I kind of need that most of the show at some point They said it's a blessing of God. It's a blessing of God That feels sturdy. I like it Thank you, so we're ready to go into the temple now, right? Before entering the temple, we check in our shoes here Then before entering we must wash our hands and then our feet washing our feet before entering and then right here is entrance Inside the temple is massive built around a holy pendant people worship here collect water to take home And some completely submerged burning merge themselves We are right on near the holy ground of Golden Temple People are coming here and take a deep in a holy bath and they feel that the almighty souls god are blessing us And they are not sick, they are well. Amrit means holy water. Pound means sir. So holy form Amrit sir We are here The women are they over there because of modesty Like some special respect for the women. There is a separate separate area. They can take bath here. We can take bath So from here we're gonna go see the kitchen, right? Yes Into the kitchen On behalf of Lullar going on right now the meal. I mean look at all these dishes. There's already thousands of bowls Yeah, the women here who are just cutting the dining table. All volunteers here. This is literally uh 100 volunteers here. Hello Here they're peeling some garlic right here as all these people work together to make this meal happen Into the kitchen.  What is this one? It's a rice pudding. It's a rice pudding This is only the serving area. We haven't even seen the kitchen yet Immediately what I see all this wood right here on this side here. They're stoking the flame They have embers going and in these giant Pots it's a giant pot underneath. They have the fire or whatever is cooking inside, but this is so huge. Hello, sir What's your name? Sharon PC. All right, nice to meet you. Sunny Cooking specials is big.  It's just it's more than I can comprehend It's more than I could eat in a year. They're cleaning a pot that already don't look like a huge pot right here What is this one? It's called Dal in Punjabi language Dal Pulsis, grumpuls and black pulsas are cooking together And we just want to hit the bottom yeah, I see you coming up look at this. It's beautiful It looks like a glorious honey soup. It smells so good How long does it take to cook this from beginning to end? Three hours It's a unique recipe you can try at your home also, but you can't cook such kind of things because you are Chilling on the deck is which is a land of food. So this is a land of food on the recipe side of that The recipe from God himself. Thank you so much. It's such an honor to learn more. Thank you The chapati by hand, maybe we can help them out a little bit volunteer. Oh, wow I mean look at this just take a moment maybe a hundred people all coming here to help together making chapati by hand So that there's enough food for the people who come here to eat Let's go say hi each station. It has a kind of dough person and after that Going forward to another lady. They can just put a dry floor in it and after that She's rolling and make the chapatis and food one by one another. Can we sit down somewhere next time? You can smell it We got a rolling pin right here. We've got our dough and we can roll some of these Do this first of all. Oh, yeah, make it more comfortable Well, I don't mind talking about that So I want to ask a little bit more about the Sikh faith people of the Sikh faith I understand that there are certain things that a Sikh person must wear Can you walk me through some of those one of them is a turban? Yeah, we have two beer It's a wooden comb.  We have to wear His bangles for I heard about like always having a blade or a knife.  Not everybody is doing that. Just some people not some people Many people many people many people Yes Nice I didn't know this was like an older tradition. That wasn't so common anymore, but that was a bit of a surprise That's awesome. That is awesome. I'm a little scared to screw this up now. Everyone here has got to let it But how is this? Yes, it's a puppet. Oh god. Thank god. You just have to roll one more Joy, I apologize. I'm sorry. I'm gonna get a platter. Sorry, everyone Cooking station here. We got my man here. He takes the raw ones. He throws it up She moved it down the assembly line and by the time it gets over here It's finally cooked very very fast because look at the he takes very high tops of some all in a bucket down there So fast.  Even three in the morning Somebody's here cooking. Yes After cooking the bread is slattered with ghee to keep it from drying out and because ghee is delicious Then the thousands of chapatis are transferred to the dining hall The real miracle of this place isn't the unfathomable amounts of food. They're producing each day It's the principles upheld within these walls.   There is nothing no matter your religion income gender Nationality as long as you are a human with a beating heart You may come here sit shoulder to shoulder with others and enjoy this meal at no cost Now after having the privilege of seeing how this food is made we get to experience it for ourselves What is this one? It's a kidney beans They have a machine here to fill up the water and then another kind of lentil That's how it's a rice pudding. Thank you. There's so much food. Yeah Can I do it? How much? I'm gonna give you one. Shall we try some? Yeah, just get one more so they can go back and forth. Oh, that's great. Did you just say that? It's delicious and the roti is so perfect. I'm so far away right now. Yes, no but the kidney beans.  We have that there is one question That's called a security. Are you telling you we need more of this in the world? I came here for the experience Yeah, but also enjoy some fabulous food after getting early drop off our trays and that's when it really hits you Look at all these people here to help with the same first hand the wide-scale Selfless contributions that go into making this kitchen possible and army of volunteers collecting trays so rapidly It creates a thunderous rule Men and women sending trays down six consecutive washing stations until they're carefully stacked and brought back to the entrance Ready to serve another meal For this incredible experience My pleasure Being able to be here with somebody of the seek faith and kind of see this whole experience through your eyes And then of course seeing how all this food comes together to be thousands and thousands of people every day Such a treat for me. So thank you and for you guys This video was made possible by one trip vietnam one trip is the highest rating tour company in vietnam Doing tours from north to south in all major cities including hanoi and cheong, danang, hoyang, and saigon You can experience food tours adventure tours and more to learn more about one trick Check out the links in the description down below. I will see you next time A piece All right, man. I'm all about peace now. Thank you. All right, let's go Wow He I like him a lot. I like him. I like his videos. He seems like a genuine person Yeah, he obviously we've seen his his food videos and And he does really well with those but also the fact that he just wants to learn And I know he doesn't just stick to any he's gone all over the world. Yeah, and and done what he's done but That what they do in india every single day and not out of because there's Shelters here and there's especially during Thanksgiving Thanksgiving. It's a big time Yeah, big thing here in la and all over the united states on Thanksgiving is a lot of people will start their Thanksgiving morning off Going to shelters and feeding the homeless. That's a big thing in america on Thanksgiving day. Um, and so What makes it so insane is the amount of people Every single day. Yeah, yeah, volunteer their time. Yeah. Yeah We do it once a year on Thanksgiving. Yeah to make ourselves feel good They do it as because they love and people Like And yeah, like yeah, that's the thing is when we do it here on Thanksgiving It's it's it's almost always definitively a hundred percent of the time. It's to feed the homeless That's it The criteria for most people is it's the homeless are going to go there and eat Whereas this place is for anybody and everybody who wants to come and it's also usually especially if it's done by a church or something They're using it as a as a platform to Spread their message regardless of if that's from the heart or not correct. Um It's just so amazing is that they're not doing this for any of that They're doing this because People need to eat regardless even if even if you're not homeless, right? You're welcome Right because like if if you if you weren't homeless and you try to go to a homeless feeding You would be turned away Yeah, exactly for these are for needy people. You don't write it. You don't need it exactly Yeah, and there's nothing I mean the inclusiveness as well as the fact that there's nothing few things more personal than breaking bread with somebody shoulder to shoulder and to experience that with To know that you're meeting a practical need because everybody needs to eat It's just it's both encouraging and it's also disheartening. Yeah, it's it it's encouraging that it exists You see the differences Also, like you could never I I've only done a few doing the math on something right now But I've only done a few but like you usually can't get seconds No No for multiple reasons. Maybe they just they want to have enough for everybody But also they have a limited amount of resources Right. That's one of the things I want to know are all their resources donated. How do they get those resources? That's I wish you'd covered that. I really wish you'd covered that I'm doing math on something about the number of because like That's a lot of food That is a lot of food Okay, so yeah And you could if you if you were to do this Say for example in LA which in LA Los Angeles city, there's approximately four million people in in just the city Not the county, right? But let's say you had four million people, which is actually that's a low number That's probably just the San Fernando Valley. Let's take San Fernando Valley If you had 80 of these things around Stations around LA Everybody would eat every day all the time You'd have you'd have nobody hungry in the city Yup, that's all it would take is 80 of them with that level of love and contribution and selflessness and sacrifice And giving and it's and it's obviously possible and you can see the difference culturally like people At least seen the love that people in India give to just other people they treat a visitor as a god Visitor to God and they treat humans as humans, correct Uh, I know foreign concept But it's not something that's it's done here If there's stuff like this done, it's it's there's usually different motives behind it. It's Uh publicity It's because they feel bad.  So there's people there who've said I'll take the 3am shift You know, it's it's remarkable. I would love to go there to want to just see it happen Um, and do they just let anybody volunteer? Yeah, that's what I would love to know when he was there Is that go mean go wash the dishes because that's what I'd like to do I'd love to be able to volunteer and help that help feed the dishes and yeah, Honestly, we can't we can't cook the food. No, but I know to call to call it if we were and that's what I would want to do I would want to either like be handing out the bread.  Yeah, do something everybody Plants a bunch of trees love it all over the place I love up to talk to different organizations so we can kind of just have a meet up and we can meet everybody but also Help one with yeah, what's going on in the world I'd love to do I'd love to do something I don't know if you guys could connect us with anybody who does this when I went to Papua New Guinea We were connected with a church there who every week on wednesdays does a Food-cooking thing and anybody who wants to can come to to eat and it's usually The homeless and there's a lot and and port mores be the capital city. There's a lot of Little orphan kids who are living on the streets And they come to eat so you cook and you feed them and you hang out with them and They also let them the church there is open air This gets me emotional every night at the church The little kids who are living on the streets They come the church is open. There's no walls So they all come and they sleep under the ceiling. There's a couple hundred kids Every night and port mores be who come and sleep And once a week they feed them Yeah He's right. We do know more of this in the world. Yeah, this type of mentality of the people and then also this type of Organization. Yeah, it's inspiring on it's it's in saying great video Love it. Yeah, this the sixth man. I just the more we learn about him the more I'm in love with They're amazing people amazing people


Scaffolding students as they undertake assessments by providing them with formative feedback will encourage them to do the work themselves and maintain good academic integrity standards. By supporting students to learn as they progress through the assessment process and by providing them with formative feedback at different points, they will feel encouraged and motivated to continue with the assessment process themselves. Let's look at how you might do this by taking DCU's Virtual of Learning Environment Loop as an example. Loop uses a text matching tool called Erkan to analyse students' written work and compare the content with external sources. You can give students access to this analysis report before a submission deadline so that they can act upon it and improve their work. On your loop course page, click turn editing on and click add an activity or resource and select assignment. Populate the necessary fields for the assignment such as name and description, dates and so on. Proceed to the area called text matching and expand to look at the options available there. Ensure that enable text matching is set to yes and that show similarity score to student is set to always and show similarity report to student is set to always. Click save and return to course. The assignment is now ready and students can begin to upload a draft before the submission deadline to avail of the text matching. Now let's look at text matching from the student point of view. Students click into the assignment as normal and proceed to upload their work. In this case the student is uploading a PDF document and that PDF document will be text matched but if they were submitting an online text submission that too would be text matched. After uploading the draft the student needs to wait for text matching to occur. This can take anywhere from 20 minutes to 24 hours. After that the score will be returned to loop. Clicking the similarity score opens the analysis report in a new tab. The student looks through each of the matches in the analysis report and judges for themselves if they need to do something about it. For example a student may choose to rewrite some of their work to improve their paraphrasing if their similarity is too high. Or a match might show that a student didn't quote or cite an author correctly and they need to rectify that. This feedback can help students improve their writing and adhere to academic integrity standards before they make a final submission.