Good morning and welcome to the United States Institute of Peace. My name is Johnny Carson and I am a senior advisor here at USIP. We are extremely pleased to have you here this morning for a briefing and a discussion on a just released report on Gulf state competition in and around the Red Sea by the international crisis group. For all of you who are joining us in this building for the very first time, the United States Institute of Peace was established by the US Congress approximately 34 years ago as an independent and nonpartisan organization focused on promoting peace. Through a variety of programs, activities and research focused on doing everything possible to prevent, mitigate and resolve conflict around the world. In the Horn of Africa, the United States Institute of Peace has been engaged in mitigating conflict for over two decades. This volatile region lies along one of the most vital trade routes in the world and includes some of Africa's most fragile, economically weak and politically unstable states. In recent years it has become clear that seriously addressing the instability that has long characterized the Horn would require renewed attention to the evolving geopolitical landscape. A landscape in which Middle Eastern actors have stepped up their engagement and increased their influence to an unprecedented degree in the political, security and economic developments across Northeastern Africa. In looking at recent developments, the United States Institute of Peace concluded that an effort to resolve the region's conflicts would require looking at them in a broader and more holistic manner, not as a single country and not as a single region, but as a complex, intertwined and overlapping political mosaic encompassing the Horn, the Red Sea States and the Middle East. To respond to this new reality, two years ago the U.S. Institute of Peace launched a multi-tracked initiative focused on peace and security in the Red Sea arena. This initiative centers on bridging the gap in our understanding of the trans-regional dynamics between the Middle East and the Horn of Africa, leveraging the Institute's convening authority to work with policymakers in the United States, Europe and Asia to overcome the institutional divides that often impede the development of common strategies that can identify areas of collaboration with and among the external actors. And finally, exploring opportunities for inclusive multilateral formats to prevent, mitigate and resolve conflict in the Red Sea region. One of these institutes, other comparative advantages, is being able to host speakers and provide a platform for the presentation of fresh analysis, ideas and recommendations to address the challenges like those we see in the Red Sea arena. We are therefore very delighted this morning to host the launch of the International Crisis Group's most recent report, which is a vital and important contribution to understanding the momentous changes underway in this region, and in particular both the risk and opportunities presented by transitions currently underway in Sudan and Ethiopia, and the influence that external actors have on those transitions. I would now like to take this opportunity to welcome Mr. Robert Malley, the President of the International Crisis Group in Washington and the United States, for some opening remarks to talk about and introduce the report that the ICG has just released, been released. His remarks will be followed by a discussion of the ICG's findings and recommendations by the lead authors of that report. And following that, there will be a panel discussion and an opportunity for Q&As from the audience. It is my pleasure to introduce the President of the International Crisis Group, Washington, Mr. Robert Malley. Thank you, Ambassador. Thanks all of you for being here today. I want to say a few words about how I personally came to this issue. Some of you may know I spent some 20 years focused exclusively on the Middle East. 20 years is a long time, particularly for that issue, and I think one quickly gets tired of it. I think there are some people in the audience who would agree. And when I took this job as President of the Crisis Group, one of my first trips overseas was to Africa, one of my first field trips, and it was to Somalia, hoping to finally escape what I had lived for 20 years. Little did I know, I landed virtually on the day where the crisis between the UAE and Somalia exploded when a plane had been detained and the money had been taken. So rather than my escaping the Middle East, the Middle East followed me to Somalia. That just was, as I discovered, and as all of you know, just the tip of the iceberg, the interaction between the Gulf and the Horn had been going on for some time, and it is here to stay, and it extends far beyond Somalia. And in many ways, the story that we tell in the report that hopefully you got a copy of today, which is a fruit of many, many months of hard labor by at least two other people here, but more than that, it's a story of the clash of two regions in deep transformation, the Gulf. And when we say the Gulf, we include Turkey simply because they are also playing a key role and are so involved in the dynamics that we're going to be describing, and the Horn of Africa, both of them facing tumultuous times and both of them finding this encounter at this critical time in their history. In the case of the Gulf and of Turkey, this comes at a time of deep competition, both between the Gulf and Iran, and within the Gulf and on the one hand, the alliance between Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, Bahrain in Egypt, and the other hand, Qatar and Turkey. And those two rivalries, which have been playing out for a long time in the Middle East, kind of exhausted themselves in that arena. There's not that much more to gain. To a large extent, they'd exhausted the struggle. How much more is there to gain in Iraq, in Libya, in Syria? Those are bloody competitions in which they both tried very hard, and in the end, neither one of them won. And they were in search of new arenas for their competition, and the Horn of Africa in many ways is an ideal arena for that competition because it is a place where so much of what's at stake for them is at play. The competition against Iran, and very early on, from 2015 on, you see Saudi Arabia and the UAE pushing to see countries like Sudan and Eritrea cut their ties with Iran. Also, an arena of competition between Islamist and non-Islamist groups, something that mattered very much to the UAE to a lesser extent to Saudi Arabia. But they found an arena in which they could play that game, and Qatar and Turkey trying to push back in the Horn of Africa. A place where at the time when the Yemen War erupted in 2015, and if you look at a map, you see what I mean, finding military bases, finding cannon fodder, and obviously, many Sudanese are now fighting in Yemen, that also was a critical place for the inter-Gulf dispute and the dispute against Iran and against those that they felt that the UAE and Saudi Arabia saw as proxies of Iran, the Houthis in Yemen. Very important to find, to have a deep presence on the other coast side of the Red Sea coast. Commercial interests as well, given the wealth that was and the GDP growth in the Horn of Africa and the complementarity between what the Gulf has and what the Horn of Africa possesses. So to that extent, the Horn of Africa became a place of great import, of great interest to Gulf countries and to Turkey to wage their competition, to advance their interests at a time when they couldn't do so as much in the natural field of competition, which is the Middle East. But it is a two-way, excuse me, it's a two-way street. It's not as if the Horn of Africa players or passive spectators in this process, they too saw an interest and they too tried to take advantage of the involvement of Gulf countries, whether it was financial interests, patronage, support for certain and certain leaders against others, whether it's in terms of, you know, we look at Sudan, look at Somalia, which I mentioned earlier, leaders in the region seeing an opportunity to gain support from different sides of the Gulf competition. And so we see not just the Gulf inviting itself in the Horn of Africa, we see Horn of Africa leaders, whether they're state or non-state actors, trying to take advantage of the fact that there are entities out there that are prepared to give them financial and military support and sustain their hold on power. So this clash or this encounter between the Gulf and the Horn has been going on for some time. As we say, it's here to stay. And if you look at the map, I really urge you to look at the map at the end of our report, you see how intensive the implication, the involvement, commercial, military, and otherwise diplomatic of the Gulf is throughout the Horn of Africa, military bases, diplomatic presence, commercial presence. Now this interaction, as we describe in the report, could be for better or for worse. So far it's brought more grief than good. And we're gonna focus on two cases in the discussion that it's about to take place. Mainly Somalia, which I referenced earlier, where one side, the Qatari side, has been more supportive of the central government. The UAE has been more supportive of some of the regional governments that has torn the country apart at a time when it needs to be focused not just on its own development but also on the fight against the Shabbab and this has distracted it from that fight and distracted it from the exigencies and the urgency of rebuilding the nation. But also Sudan, where though things seemed to have taken a better turn, there was a time, not that long ago, where both Saudi Arabia and the UAE seemed to be supporting. Well, first of all, even before that, Bashir was playing on the competition between the Qatar group, the Qatar camp and the Saudi camp in order to make sure that he could get support from both and remain in power. But even when he was beginning to fall, Saudi Arabia and the UAE seemed to be more supportive of the military, more supportive of a more autocratic transition rather than the real transition that the protesters were supporting and trying to use again Sudan as an arena in which as long as the Islamists were out of power, they would be content. And so for the most part, as I say, this has been a story of grief rather than good, but there have been some examples, some cases, in which in fact we see that the interaction could produce a positive outcome. We saw it in Ethiopia. We saw it with the peace deal between Ethiopia and the Eritrea. And we see it even in a case like Sudan where once the Western countries and others and the African Union worked with the Gulf to try to get them to steer more towards a, to support a more civilian-based transition, some good has come out of it. So there are opportunities, there are also economic opportunities. There's a real complementarity between the Gulf and the Horn. But the key in order to get more good than grief is to make sure first of all, and these are the conclusions of the report that we'll be describing in a few minutes. First of all, that the Gulf countries stop trying to export their rivalry into the Horn of Africa. Second, that actors in the Horn of Africa don't try to take individually, bilaterally advantage of the interactions they could have with Gulf countries, but try to work more as a collective, build their own institution so they could deal in a position of strength with Gulf countries because so far the relationship has been asymmetric, more military power, more commercial power, more money on the Gulf side, far more than on the Horn side. So the more the Horn of Africa can work as one and put their own differences aside and deal with Gulf countries as one entity rather than allow them to play divide and conquer, the better off they will be. And here countries like the United States, countries like in Western Europe have a role to play and they've been largely absent from this dynamic, only recently awakening to the stakes that are at play in this competition on the other side of the Red Sea coast, so much because they focus so much on the conflict with Iran where so much is playing out in this arena. And they need to send the message as we try to in the report that so far it is true that most of the harm has been done, has been exported from the Gulf into the Horn of Africa. It's been the conflicts between Qatar and Turkey and Saudi Arabia and the UAE and Iran that have been played out in the Horn of Africa. But that could backlash, that could boomerang because if we see instability grow in the Horn of Africa, if we see political violence, chaos, migration, flows, terrorism, that could come back to the Gulf and the countries that today may see them as playgrounds for the competition may quickly see the backlash and the reverse effect of the chaos that they may have sowed in the Horn coming back to haunt them in the Gulf. So to talk about all of this, we're gonna bring on stage both Beth and Dino. Beth who's our senior Gulf analyst and Dino who is freshly arrived as our deputy program director for Africa. And all I could say is that if we could get our Middle East and our Africa teams working together on a report, there's no reason why the Horn of Africa and the Gulf can't work as well in a constructive way. So Dino and Beth, it's all yours. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you very much and also for the opportunity to speak to you and for taking your time during what I know is a very busy week for geopolitics and some of the issues that are somewhat close to this sort of on the other side of the Red Sea, let's say. So we're grateful for your time also. I am Elizabeth Dickinson with Crisis Group as Rob mentioned, for the last eight years I've been based in the Gulf States. And so I come at this from the Gulf perspective. So what I thought I would start with is we now have this situation where two axes of competition from the Middle East between the Arab States and Iran and within the Gulf itself, the sort of Gulf crisis have now grafted themselves onto dynamics in the Horn of Africa. So what I'd like to do quickly is walk you through a bit more about how we got here and the specific accelerators of that relationship. And then also very briefly again, walk you through what we've believed based on a sort of months of interviews to be the interests directly of the Gulf States, answering the simple question what is it that you actually want from this engagement and what are your red lines? What are you hoping to achieve? So this story of how we got here, I think, as Rob said it was really a question of sort of regional leadership and struggles that had run out of steam in the Middle East finding new geography. Let me take you a little bit into the mentality in the Gulf States following the Arab Spring specifically. This was, there was a feeling in countries like the UAE and Qatar and Saudi Arabia that they were really in the eye of the storm. They looked around them and the whole neighborhood was in turmoil and that turmoil seemed to be contagious, seemed to be spreading closer and closer to them. So they really had sort of almost a siege mentality. The reaction rather than sort of looking inward was actually to look outward, to have sort of an exporting their security abroad in order to widen the concentric circles of secure space around them. This was a really important shift in mentality, particularly in a country like the UAE that was previously very focused on economic issues, never took a sort of pivotal position or controversial position on sort of regional issues, suddenly looking outward to defend their own security at home. I think this was coupled then with a very real economic interest in seeing the Red Sea corridor generally as an emerging region, one of the regions with some of the fastest gross rates and also potential for some of the expertise of the Gulf States, for example, in logistics ports really to be transported and implemented on the continent in a way that would benefit the Gulf and also hopefully the Horn of Africa. So you had a sort of both push and pull factors, I would say, to this initial groundwork for the relationship. I would point to sort of three accelerators on the relationship, sort of the reasons that these groundwork sort of really seized the momentum beginning really in 2015. And the first one, of course, is the conflict in Yemen. The conflict in Yemen created both immediate and long-term strategic needs for Saudi Arabia and the UAE. And by the way, Qatar and Turkey were also a part of the coalition at that time. Turkey still is, Qatar is not. In the immediate term, Saudi Arabia began to see the conflict in Yemen as very much focused on its competition with Iran. They didn't want to finish the conflict in Yemen and wake up to find Iran on the other side of the Red Sea. And at the time, Iran had periodically accessed enable presence in Assad in Eritrea. Iran had strong links in Sudan. And so at the very beginning of the Yemen conflict, Saudi Arabia felt the immediate need to sort of flip these countries. And indeed it did so, sort of converting Sudan to its side of the coalition, Sudan agreeing to send troops to the war in Yemen. And these successes in the Saudi view really set the sort of laid the framework for how they continue to see the Horn of Africa as a place to push back against Iran. The second accelerator of quite obviously was the inter-golf crisis when Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt cut ties with Qatar. Again, there was sort of a scramble globally, I would say, but it was specifically in Africa, not just the Horn, but the entire African continent to sort of check boxes to make sure that countries were in your column and not the other column. And it really, in many cases, was that. Sort of showing up, are you on our side? Good. And then an aid pledge. And this happened with an incredible speed and aggressiveness that I think laid the groundwork for a lot of the blowback that we've seen since. I think a third factor, third accelerator, is actually the fragility of the Horn itself, which is something that both draws the gulf in and they also contribute to, unfortunately, at the moment. The fragility draws them in because, again, this mentality that all of these issues of instability, no matter how far away and even across the Red Sea, can spread. And so issues such as the transition in Sudan or Ethiopia ongoing transition, the ongoing challenges of Somalia, all of those things make the gulf sort of draw the gulf in as a way to contain that fragility. And as I think Rob outlined and you'll hear more from Dino, unfortunately, the exportation of the competition to lay a decisive footprint in the Horn of Africa has then reinvigorated that fragility. So going through the sort of various gulf states' interests, I think one of the reasons I think we wanted to do this is because there is often sort of a lumping together of the gulf. What does the gulf want in the Horn of Africa? I think it's very important to understand that even when they are tactically aligned, for example, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, what they ultimately desire in the Horn of Africa is different and those differences, I think maybe we don't see some of them now, some of them are obvious, some of them we don't see now, but they have the potential to manifest for years to come. One of the striking things also, when you ask these countries, what do you want to see in the Horn of Africa? Their first response is, oh, is the word stability. The problem is that they each define stability in a very different way. So on the one hand, you have Saudi Arabia and the UAE generally viewing stability as sort of political quietness and sort of no one on the street, coupled with economic growth and progress. On the understanding that economic progress can sort of wipe away the grievances that would push people to the street and create political turmoil. On the other hand, you have Qatar and Turkey who are more inclined to take a populist view, who are more inclined to support sort of popular uprisings or actors that they are closer to, including Islamists, but to be honest, I've come to believe that the word populist is more accurate description of sort of their mentality in terms of support. Beginning with Saudi Arabia, I think one of their interests in the Horn of Africa is this idea of reclaiming the mantle of regional leadership. The Yemen War coincided with the ascendance of a new king, King Salman, who more broadly saw Saudi Arabia as needing to take a greater position on the regional stage, and this is very clear in the Horn of Africa. Saudi Arabia describing it as sort of a missed opportunity to be a leader, and the corollary of that is as Saudi Arabia asserts its presence in the Horn of Africa, it should push aside Iran, creating less space for Iran to be a part of the equation. I think the UAE, in my view, one way to understand their thinking about the Horn of Africa is to think about it in contagion theory. So the UAE believes viscerally that extremism defined very broadly, really everyone from sort of the Muslim Brotherhood or Islamists all the way to ISIS, that these ideologies can spread and they can spread quickly and they can't be contained within borders. So the way they approach the continent really is a containment model almost. A very important part of this is looking at the economic piece. So there is almost a sort of very blind faith that the economic growth in the Horn of Africa and dealing with bread and brother grievances can sort of wash away the sort of political unrest that UAE finds very threatening and has the ability to enable groups like Islamists and the Brotherhood. What they can't fix, I think the UAE has shown they are willing to quarantine. As is very clear in Mogadishu in Somalia where their relationship with Mogadishu has been broken. As a result, they have sort of sealed Mogadishu off by doubling down on relations with the region and contributing to the further fracturing of the country. Qatar, briefly again, sort of I think after the Gulf crisis particularly saw Africa as a place to push back against the blockade imposed upon it both in the short term and the long term. In the short term, Doha woke up one day and realized that it was importing 80% of its products from the other Gulf countries who had closed their borders. So they needed to make a lot of friends very quickly. Africa was sort of a middle, a medium term investment for example in food supply and things like that. But it clearly opened their eyes to thinking about the region as a neighbor. And secondly, it was a place to sort of win back the friends who had been lost during the Gulf crisis. Initially, when the Gulf crisis took place, like a dozen countries in Africa broke ties with Qatar. And since then, Qatar has worked very hard to claw them back. And almost all of them have re-established relationships. Lastly, Turkey is sort of trying to stay above, float above all of this conflict. And this is a case of it's important to make a distinction. Turkey, of course, for many reasons, is essentially a part of the inter-Gulf conflict in the Middle East. However, in Africa, we sensed a real desire from Turkey to isolate themselves from that conflict and really being adamant about not being party to the Gulf conflict, that they're not working closely with Qatar and Africa, that they are independent and have laid their own roots. And this is largely because Turkey has established a very grassroots presence, both with the businesses that it has operating there and also politically. It has a real constituency of support because of all of the work that it has done. I think the Turkish strategy was described to us not as sort of any preemptively thought out position, but rather a cycle of virtual interests. So the sort of political interests came and they established a number of embassies. Then the flights started coming. So businessmen thought that it could be an opportunity. And then the business interests led to security ties. So it was sort of a snowballing effect of a really unnatural relationship with a region where they've been quite successful commercially. So I want to leave it there. And I guess I'll leave it on a final point that one of the challenges of managing these relationships is that they're highly asymmetric. And so most of the things that we've been thinking about in terms of how do you sort of limit the negative fallout from this and really push the Gulf states towards the constructive is how do you deal with the asymmetry? And that's a challenge that I would put before all of you as well. One of our solutions is to sort of think about multilateralism in a stronger way and encourage the Gulf states really to engage more strongly with multilateral organizations on the continent, like IGAD or the African Union. That's a long road. But I think that's the sort of fundamental pivot point that we're thinking about in terms of how do you push this towards the positive. Let me turn to Dino. Thanks. I'm new to ICG. So I got in on the tail end as this report was coming together. First of all, congratulations, Beth, for a really superb piece of work and to ICG. As we follow this issue through, we're also going to be on the Africa side putting out something in the coming weeks on Sudan, which will be a natural follow on from this piece. So stay tuned for that. I'm going to take some of what Rob has said and some of what Beth has said and try and walk us through the weeds of some of the ongoing developments in the Horn of Africa, particularly Sudan, Somalia, and Ethiopia, just to sort of see how some of these dynamics are playing out in the here and now. So let me just start by saying that Gulf rivalry unfolding now is unfolding now at a particularly febrile and eventful time in the Horn, the UAE, Qatar, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, all pursuing their individual bilateral goals. But their strategies do not fold necessarily neatly on the bumpy terrain of the Horn of Africa. And so each of these Gulf actors are pursuing alignments with either the rulers of or constituents within Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia. But these rulers and constituents have their own strategies and tactical priorities. So at times we're often asking ourselves, who is really using who when it comes to Gulf and Horn of Africa relationships? As political and security developments twist and turn in the Horn of Africa, we shouldn't expect necessarily stable or predictable alignments between Horn countries and their counterparts in the Gulf. You only have to look at how things have swung around, for example, in Eritrea, which was very tight with Qatar just a few years ago, and that's a complete U-turn. Although some alignments right now are more predictable going forward than others, that being said, predictability doesn't necessarily equate to stability or the prospect of stability. With predictable alignments, you can certainly imagine actors, however, bringing actors around the table in an orderly way or as orderly as possible to compromise and strike grand bargains where all parties can get up from the table feeling broadly satisfied. And that's the crux of where ICG is trying to sniff out these opportunities and try and unpack and lay them out. Sudan right now is where this might just be possible. Somalia is a much longer shot because of the way right now that tensions and conflicts are unfolding, with quite violent consequences. Ethiopia's troubles, it's of a different nature. Their troubles are driven much more right now by its internal, by the country's internal dynamics than necessarily between any aggressive jockeying between Gulf actors. But we should watch this space as much as yet to unfold in Ethiopia, which in many respects is the keystone country of the region. Looking at Sudan, first and foremost, KSA and UAE interest is clear. Some people have boiled this down to their interest is the rapid support forces, or specifically if we want to get even more detailed himeti. One way of looking at him is that he runs a useful mercenary force for the war in Yemen and is also an ally of Khalifa Heftai and Libya, who's also backed by the UAE. So when the RSF is not busy being a mercenary, however, a mercenary force for external wars, it also happens to be part of the Sudanese transitional government. So with that in mind, the UAE is likely to back the RSF and its leader to the hilt for the foreseeable future. And this could be part of a much bigger play, actually, that the UAE is drawing an alliance not just with himeti, but also slightly straying out of the patch, but I'm making a point with it. But also President Debbie of Chad and President Isufo of Niger. And these three countries, Sudan, Chad, and Niger, are the underbelly of Southern Libya where Heftai wants to clean up. But before coming back to Sudan specifically, the point I want to make there or underscore there is that while we make the distinction of the Horn of Africa, the Gulf doesn't. The Gulf countries doesn't. The Horn of Africa is maybe just the thin edge of a strategy that may be projecting, actually, way across the Sahel. So we should look when Rob says that this is here to stay, this shadow is going to be cast long and over a wide geographical space. It is a big deal. When it comes to Sudan specifically, the UAE and to an extent Saudi Arabia's rigid backing of himeti is therefore part of that grander objective. But therefore, they play this outsized role in Sudan's own transition. If you imagine them putting this much resources for such a wide agenda, what are the implications for that kind of support just within Sudan? And this is why himeti is probably here to stay. That being said, there's been a realization dawning that if the two Gulf allies want to preserve the integrity of its ally there, they can't have it constantly. They can't have that ally constantly at loggerheads with the street. And of course, a key turning point was the June slaughter of more than 120 people on the streets of Khartoum, which shocked the world, but also forced Saudi Arabia and the UAE into a position of contrition. While Qatar has been the Gulf loser of the post-Peshir environment, there was actually an attempted failed counter coup in July connected to ex-military and Islamist figures of the Bashir era, and also we hear. And that sort of prompted a rethink partially, even as fingers point in the direction of Doha from Abu Dhabi and Riyadh over that attempted coup. That's made them sit up straight in their chairs. So unless Qatar, the thinking goes, unless Qatar is pacified in some way, more trouble may be coming on that front. So one wonders also, just as himeti realizes that he cannot win out through coercion alone due to a very determined civilian opposition and splits within the military and risks lurking of an Islamist backlash that's driven by factions of the military, the UAE also simultaneously might have to come to some kind of accommodation with Qatar, just to keep that situation under lockdown. And if a compromise is possible on that level, will Qatar and the UAE, both of whom actually have a seat at the table on the influential friends of Sudan group, also start pulling in the same direction when it comes to drumming up the donor support to safeguard Sudan's transition? And we'll be actually addressing some of that, some of those details in the Sudan, upcoming Sudan report itself. I'll move on. While Sudan sort of offers therefore a glimmer of hope, things are looking considerably harder in Somalia. Mogadishu has undeniably grown closer to Doha in the last few years. I think that's been very clearly manifested in, for example, clear relationships between Doha and the head of Mogadishu's intelligence services. Qatar money being spent hand over fist to bind various Klan militias into the Somali National Army, just in the wake of UAE money being cut in 2018 when, as Rob said, that big package of money was seized at the airport. And right now, there's been most recently Qatar investment coming into the port of Hobio, which I may come back to in the course of this explanation. So this is happening as Mogadishu is increasingly at loggerheads with some of its federal member states, the most strident ones that are the opposition, the political opponents of Mogadishu, being Puntland and Jubaland, who have developed very clear relationships with the UAE, Puntland in terms of the development of its port in Borsasso and the development of what they call a Puntland Maritime Police Force, but what is actually historically was built almost as a paramilitary clan militia force that's very specific to the agendas of the Puntland ruling classes. And Jubaland also, where the election of the current president Ahmed Madobe has just unfolded amid increasing tensions between him and Mogadishu.  Where does it all go, the UAE and the kingdom of Saudi Arabia? So as those relationships have started collapsing, which are really driven by the disputes over power and resource sharing arrangements, we've also seen an uptick in the attacks over the summer by al-Shabaab. Notably the big suicide attack in Kismaya. There's been attacks in Mogadishu, in Dusimah Reb, where the Qataris have accompanied the prime minister recently to pay off and assemble militias and absorb them into the Somali National Army. And while that operation was going on, an al-Shabaab attack took place. So al-Shabaab, often acting in this context as subcontractors for political violence, notwithstanding the Somali National Army campaign, which is actually fast running out of steam. So that situation is really threatening to get very combustible, where these rivalries between Mogadishu and those member states threatened to unleash proxy clan warfare, even as Qatar and the UAE are doubling down on those alliances. And if you, you know, we wonder also how those Gulf actors are also going to behave, you know, in the run-up to the proposed elections next year. Formadjo, the president of the federal government of Mogadishu, an ally of Doha, is seen as an obstacle to the other Gulf countries' interests. They will want him out. But at the same time, how are you going to hold an election while all this security issues are unfolding? That will then compromise the credibility of it, leading to more contestation. So where is the entry point here then? And I just want to throw something new on the table. Well, I expect many of you have been looking at this issue, but the oil issue in Somalia is very interesting. And I don't think it's a coincidence that these political tensions have erupted just as Mogadishu has started circulating a whole bunch of seismic data to various oil companies, including the majors, interested in scoping the entire offshore shelf from Puntland down to the Kenyan coast. And this oil question has also aggravated a dispute between Mogadishu and Kenya, who incidentally back Madobe, the ally of the UAE, for offshore oil acreage that's in disputed territory. But there's opening there for pragmatism. Qatar, interestingly, has backed into three offshore Kenyan oil blocks, signalling it's diversifying its interest there and opening the door for a more multilateral approach to how the oil cake is cut. And actually the African Union Peace and Security Council has also issued statement signalling that this is a political issue, not withstanding Mogadishu's claim that this should be dealt with legally at the International Court of Justice. So to see the oil question coming as a political issue is very interesting. And so can that question be used, not that oil is going to start pumping anytime soon in Somalia, but can that oil question be used as a way to sort out the constitutional and legal provisions on resources that actually drive to the heart of many of these disputes, but which also pose an opportunity to build confidence between the parties, slow this hysteria down, and then start addressing the real federalist objectives, peace and security elections. I'll finish off with Ethiopia, the regional hegemon in many respects, but one that is showing signs of unraveling in the wake of a bold program of political liberalization by Prime Minister Abhi, which in part has opened space to previously repressed constituents to aggressively pursue increased autonomy and visibility often in violent ways. And some of the key fault lines that we're looking at are the shape of the ruling coalition, the EPRDF, the fact that the previous dispensation, the core leading party within that coalition, that the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front has sort of been purged, and many of those are selectively prosecuted, with many of those ex-intelligence chiefs, military figures retreating back into the Tigrayan hills around Mekele, folding their arms and saying, you know, we're going to sit here, and by the way, we're raising our own standing army, just in case. And while that is a fault line that's opening up, you then have these more specific fault lines unfolding across Ethiopia, the Amara Tigray territorial dispute, killings between the Amara and the Oromo, intra-Oromo contestation, which affects Prime Minister Abbey directly, because that's his own constituency. So a very fragile state of affairs there, but in the context of this Gulf story, and as I said, it seems to be, you know, Ethiopia's still calling the shots there. Abbey has been very clear about who his ally is there. But at the same time, there's a bit of double-dipping going on, to explain to you what I mean by that. So, you know, he's received a ton of money from the UAE as a stopgap measure for the central bank. UAE's played a fundamental role in bridging Ethiopia and Eritrea together in the peace deal. That's underwritten by the port investments on the coast of Eritrea. But at the same time, while that alliance is very clear, Abbey has some say perplexingly kept this conversation going with Qatar. He was there in March. There have been media reports, even as late as August, that there have been communications and discussions. It's not clear whether a material gain is coming from that. But he's also probably calculating that, you know, the UAE and the UAE in particular sees those Eritrean ports as fundamentally important. And if Abbey wants to diversify, he's also going to have the space to do that. There isn't going to be so much of objections from Abu Dhabi. But then at the same time, Qatar is also, we hear, flirting with TPLF communications going on there. So maybe Abbey is also trying to block the space where that discussion is going on. But the last thing I'll say is that, depending on how things shake out in Ethiopia itself, if the internal situation starts moving downwards, then Abbey's got to be very careful about how he manages both, or be seen to be managing both Qatar and the UAE. And of course, the obvious example of that is, you know, how Bashir was treated trying to satisfy all sides and then ultimately falling in between the two stools which pulled the rug from under his feet and paved the way for his ouster. So with that, I'll leave it there. But there you go, Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia. Great. Thank you so much to Beth and Dino for setting the stage for us here. I now have the pleasure of inviting our esteemed panelists to join me on the stage to have a little bit of a discussion about what we've heard already.  So could I have you come join me up here? My name is Susan Stegant. I'm the Director of the Africa Program here at USIP. And thrilled to be joined today by Fink Hasim, Special Advisor to the Secretary General, Ambassador Hisham Yusuf, who's currently a JR fellow at USIP, and Abdul Mohamed, who's the Chief of Staff to the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel. And what we wanted to do with this panel is to hear a little bit from perspectives of people who work closely in, who track, and who are leading initiatives, particularly from the horn, the greater horn, including Egypt, and ground that, some of the report that we've heard from Beth. So I'd like to open it up, and I think I'm going to turn to you first so initial reactions and thoughts to what you were able to read in the report and what we heard in the general presentation today. Hello. Yes, first of all, let me congratulate the authors of the report. I have to say that the report is very valuable, and your comments were absolutely spot-on in regard to the general dynamic. I think let me just echo some of them. I think the concern that African politicians, I was an Addis for a long time during this period in tracking the concerns of African politicians is that, firstly, the deep asymmetry between the two regions, just to, of course, take note that the Horn of Africa is that corner of the world, which has one-half of the world's peacekeepers or didn't or comparatively recently, that it's an area which has been largely characterized as not having a monocausal underbelly which gives rise to conflict, but being an area which is unable to assert its own collective interests and leaves its various member states kind of exposed to interference. And in addition, suffers from the extraordinary imbalance in resources between Gulf countries and Horn of Africa countries. Secondly, the concern, I think, is that what we've seen and you've sketched out quite adequately is that the Gulf divisions are being imposed on this vulnerable area. But, thirdly, that apart from the Gulf divisions, the divisions within the Horn of Africa are being exacerbated by the practice of taking sides. And that is all serving to align political forces within each country, but also to align the member states. And we've seen that with Eritrea and maybe Djibouti and others in the area. So it's a source of concern, but it's needed, and I think it's useful also just to reflect from the other side. And Anwar Gagash, the Deputy Minister of UAE, gave a presentation at the Oslo Forum this year in which, quite frankly, I think he expressed his shock, actually, at suddenly having UAE up to then kind of post a child of the sort of liberal consensus now being categorized as a potential troublemaker and international threat, was trying to explain their engagement at least in Sudan or in the Horn of Africa and what was apparent is that he didn't regard Horn of Africa as from another continent. It was part of the region in which the UAE itself lived and the 20 or so miles that separated various points, the Gulf from the Horn of Africa, he considered to be a relatively short distance next to the distance between, say, Namibia and Angola and parts of the Horn of Africa, which were supposed to be bound together within this mystical African Union. And he was, on the contrary, asserting that there were historic, cultural, and economic linkages between the Horn and the Gulf, which allowed the UAE to engage in African politics. And I should say I've learned subsequently that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the UAE doesn't have an Africa division. It doesn't have an African advisor. It approaches countries in Africa more or less as it does any place else in the world. And consequently, it has weak relations with the multilateral organizations, almost no interaction at all. And I think that says something that reflects the state of mind. In Sudan, if you want to meet a comment on that, I think the authors properly captured it. There was a deep engagement. I would just make one comment that I think are and are confide we have engaged with the Gulf countries in order to minimize the impact of a negative effect and negative influence on the developments in the Horn. But also, I think, and it's equally important to state this, to ensure that they have a positive impact. And to give you an example, Sudan is now engaged in its complex transition, managing a very difficult agreement, but from a position in which it can only be described as a deep economic crisis. And I'm not suggesting that it can escape its political constraints by means of an economic bailout, but in other words, a standalone economic solution would work, but the politics requires attention to its economic condition. It requires an effort which is bigger than that which Sudan can muster on its own. In short, it needs an international bailout, an international rescue package. And in our view, there is no international rescue package possible without the involvement of the Gulf states. And I won't go into the details, but just to indicate there's a clear short-term need, apart from the shortfall in aid for dealing with immediate humanitarian critical conditions. There's a need for money just to float the country with wheat and medicines and food over the stand-up of the transitional government. There's a need in the long-term to implement reforms which will tackle the underlying features, which have caused the crisis. And at the end of the day, there's a need to deal with the chronic and huge financial debt which Sudan faces. And that requires the involvement of the international financial institutions and the rest of the world. But just to say that the Gulf countries have a particular role to play, and it's best that they were in playing that role as part of an international package than standing outside. And we are certainly working on encouraging them to be part of that international solution. And I think they would welcome being seen to be part of an international solution than part of a standalone Gulf approach. Great. I suspect we'll come back to Sudan to go into further detail at some stage. Ambassador Yusuf, I'd like to turn to you. You've served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. You've served in some of the regional organizations. How does this analysis play from your experience and your perspective? Thank you very much. Well, let me start by indicating that this is a very important and timely report. I read a large portion of it because we just received it recently. But it includes very important elements in relation to this important issue because these relations, as Rob mentioned, are historic and they will continue. And we have to see how they will evolve and how they can evolve in a constructive way. I have three remarks. One remark about the question of asymmetry. The second remark is about the positive and possible negative aspects of how things would evolve. And finally, how to deal with this issue. And I'll be very brief. The first point on asymmetry, well, of course it is asymmetrical, and this is known, but this is the nature of these kinds of relationships. And this is not limited to the relations between the Gulf and Somalia. The relationship between the United States and any country in the world is asymmetrical. But this doesn't mean that this cannot be dealt with in a manner that can be beneficial. And there are limits to this asymmetry. I think the story that Rob said on the day he landed in Makdishu is something that could not have been foreseen before. Canceling all kinds of contracts in Djibouti with the ports of Dubai, or after reaching an agreement with Somaliland to have a military airport, it becomes a civil airport, and so on. So there is a pushback. It's not that there is asymmetry, therefore things go in a specific direction. And also the example that was given in relation to Qatar. Many countries in Africa were pressured and they moved in a certain direction as a result of these developments, but then they came back. So asymmetry is there, but then we should not, you know, overemphasize it to that extent. The second point is about the positive and the negative aspects. I think the report was, you know, mentioned the positive aspects as well, Ethiopia, Eritrea, agreement, and the situation in Sudan, and so on. And I think what needs to be done is to build on this work to see how we can emphasize and make sure that things move in this direction, in a direction where we can reach some understandings that would allow positive things to evolve rather than to get the negative things of the fallback within the Gulf and transform it to the Horn of Africa. Finally, the issue of the multilateral approach, because one of the main elements in the report is, well, let's see how we can multilateralize this question in order for us to help these countries. I think, as you mentioned, I worked in the Arab League for 13 years and in the organization of Islamic Corporation for five years, and I know what multilateral organizations do very clearly. I'm not sure that IGAD is the solution to this issue. IGAD is interested and is working on it, but I don't think that having considering that a multilateral approach through IGAD or through the African Union or even with the help of the Arab League would help in resolving this issue. I think it is a much wider issue. We need to see how we can have a discussion around the Red Sea in relation to security of the Red Sea and how to demilitarize the situation in the Red Sea that is becoming extremely dangerous. And we have to see, because there are all kinds of difficulties associated with a platform or a mechanism that would deal with this issue. All kinds of ideas, proposals, but all kinds of resistance to these proposals as to what can be done. There are those who only want the countries around the Red Sea to be part of this forum, but then you can't ignore others as we have seen from this report. How influential many of the players that are outside the real borders of the Red Sea play a role. So this is also important. So this requires a lot of work and I think this is an important piece of work and the report that we need to start working and building on in the near future. Thank you. Thanks, Ambassador. I mean, this question of how do you structure a response I think is one that many people are contemplating and there are various initiatives underway. I'd like to turn now to Abdul to hear some of his thoughts on the report and if you'd like to comment at all in terms of some of the initiatives that the panel is leading and draw from those experiences. Thank you. Can I stand up? Please. Because jet lag is kicking in. It's better that I stand to stay awake. First of all, I think thank you. Thank you, SIP for the invitation. And thank you also for championing this issue here in US where an attention to the Red Sea is very much needed in a constructive way. So it's very important that we're having such a conversation here. I just flew in from Djibouti and I was attending a meeting there convened by IGAD with the support of the United Nations and more importantly also by the African Union and member states to look into the Red Sea issue not only the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and then as a result of that what kind of a relationship we need to shape between the Horn of Africa and the Gulf states in this context. And we had a very, very fruitful in-depth discussion where Africans are led-comers to this conversation in some ways, late but not too late. But we are taking it extremely seriously trying to assert our interest in a positive way both in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. The starting point for us is that the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden is a shared space. It is both an African sea and an Arab sea. And because of that we need to play our respective role in a very constructive in a cooperative manner to bring that to that to fruitiation. So this is a very important exercise for that. I would like also to thank ICG for the report. This is a very welcome addition to the growing literature on this subject matter. My only regret is if it has come out a week ago it would have facilitated the discussion that we just had in Djibouti even better. But anyway, thank you for the report. We'll make use of it in, as I said, as we articulate our policies. Observations, two, three observations. One is, you know, kind of by the intervention of Dino, I think, I'm going to correct my initial assessment. I thought that the report was written by ICG Arab region. It was not co-authored. I thought it was not co-authored. I don't think it is still co-authored, but Dino's intervention kind of gave it a balance because some of the issues regarding the role of the African Union or IGAD was just got a kind of sentence or two here and there. But I am looking forward to a much more substantive supplementary to this report to articulate the African side of the story and not as receivers or as the receiving end of the Gulf policy that we are also trying to respond to it. So that's good. The other observation I had is that I wish, you know, the report is very good. I'm not complaining at all. I want to make sure. It's really a good addition to the debate. It sharpens it. It gives it clarity. I wish the report, however, covered the war in Yemen more forcefully, in a very informed way with some depth because the war in Yemen has made the African shore of the Red Sea into a key military security asset for the parties to the conflict. That was not captured. The way the war also was prosecuted and conducted by the Emirates and the Saudis the sheer destructive nature of it and the method utilized is a warning to the rest of us that if since they are exporting their conflict or they're exporting their ideas to our region and if that if things get out of hand and a war starts in our part in the Horn of Africa it gives me a glimpse on how they are going to conduct this war. That worries me. I wish you gave it more attention. Now, the one the aspect that really worries me is that their favorite methodology in prosecuting war is proxy wars. They hire mercenaries they hire armed militias most of the time opposing armed militias what we see now in southern part of Yemen therefore ushering endless wars. I wish that was captured because today Yemen if they do it to one of their own can you imagine what's going to happen to us if that's one. The second observation is the report by highlighting the policy pursued by the Gulf countries is very good the organizing principle is transactional in which money is weaponized to militarize assets like ports and preference for security states that was very well articulated and I subscribe to that and personalized approach to state foreign policy personalized and then the personal side leads to bilateral arrangement where as you know bilateral way of conducting foreign policy if you are a weak state or if you are susceptible to transactional politics that's where it's not transparent to begin with and number two it's very conducive to what you call this corrupt practices that's good that you may give attention to that in concluding let me say this I think your conclusion was appropriately titled a better way forward because the status quo is not going to get us very far so that's good the Horn should pursue a multilateral approach that was underlying to counter the asymmetric nature to strengthen a common bargaining position that's a very good observation let me say a little bit on that you see Africa since the advent of our independence way back 60 years 60 plus years ago our founding fathers the Nukrumas were obsessed how to overcome our fragmentation we were so small so fragmented we don't make sense not to the outside world but also to each other therefore how do we overcome this fragmentation that's where Pan-Africanism was incubated to overcome this fragmentation so African unity etc became a rallying cry because unless we overcome our fragmentation we will not be able to pursue development or be relevant in the great scheme of things which is globalization so multilateralism is part of our DNA without multilateralism we don't make sense and as a result of that we have a very well established multilateral tradition on the African side for the past 60 years unfortunately there is no such tradition on the other side of the Gulf if they have a multilateral institution like the GCC or the Arab League usually it is also weaponized against each other and they can move for common goods okay so we have a multilateral tradition that we need to preserve make sure it is not a casualty of the relationship that is evolving between us and the Gulf state I know it's very difficult to learn from poor people but if there is something that they can learn from us is the value and investment that need to be made in multilateral arrangement anyway they can transcend the words that are plaguing the Middle East at least one instrument alright so and the last observation is a positive one the Horn of Africa and the Gulf countries have a very firm historical relationship Professor Ali Mazrui who is a well known Kenyan but a Pan-African scholar said Africa and the Arabian Peninsula should be seen as one contiguous cultural block with the Red Sea as an Afro-Arabian lake not a continental divide we are of the opinion that the Red Sea arena should be considered a trans-regional shared space with its political and security governance and social and economic cooperation managed not only by bilateral relationship but augmented by multilateral arrangements thank you thank you for those great responses and clearly the report has energized a lot of thinking I want to put one question to the panel before we open it up to the audience to engage and we've heard that Sudan offers an opportunity in fact an imperative way to bridge between the Gulf and the Horn where these dynamics are creating facts on the ground and are shaping the way that the transition will play out and that can either be to prevent problems or for something that's necessarily constructive the other dynamic that's taking place very close by and that I think is seizing the attention of people in Washington is the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States relationship with Iran and so I'd like just to hear your reflections on what are the events what are the issues that could help to spark in a positive way towards this multilateral conversation that needs to take place what are the connection points and how can we leverage these moments to help to advance the conversation to help to advance what ICG has put out from an analytical perspective to move forward what everybody has identified as a need for a multilateral approach and whoever wants to go first can go first but you must remain seated for this answer well let me start then you see the multilateral mechanisms in the vision are facing all kinds of difficulties but they're also making some progress so we see the situation in the GCC that was promising to be one of the most effective sub-regional organizations but now it is suffering a huge setback now you can't get the countries that are members of the GCC to sit together in a room so it is a huge difficulty so this is one side of the spectrum the other side of the spectrum is the African Union that has made huge advances especially on peace and security and I think it has become a much more effective regional institution compared to the vast majority of other regional institutions in the world so this is very important IGAD has also made some advances and made some successes in relation to its efforts as well I think it is suffering from all kinds of difficulties and problems so multilateralism in this part of the world is important and can be used for all kinds of issues but then this will not solve the problem of the asymmetry of bilateral relations that was I think my point as for the situation between Saudi Arabia and Iran I think as Johnny Carson was saying in his opening remarks as well this maritime route is one of the most important maritime routes in the world as a result of a flow of 10% of the world's trade from this route and of course the oil exports through this route as well is huge and important and it is becoming a very tense situation we are at a stalemate because the positions between both Iran and the United States seem to be unshakable and we have the General Assembly that's going to meet in a few days where I think this issue would be the number one issue on the gen and we will have to see how this issue can be addressed but as far as I can see until today I don't see a movement of the solution on any of the ideas that were presented regarding this issue I'm not sure it touches precisely on intimately on Sidon's trajectory but I would just comment that it's hard to see a more appropriate and broader discussion in other words a multilateral engagement in a context where the principal players insist on a go it alone approach to national interests and so I think that while we can quite correctly point a finger at the weakness of multilateral institutions we also have to understand that the kind of global politics at the moment has never been so unfavorable for multilateralism okay I think on the Sudan what has happened in Sudan and the thinking of a number of us including the Sudanese themselves was a very profound change a very profound social event some call it a revolution I subscribe to that but no matter how no matter what label you give it it will be considered one of the consequential events in the annals of the history of the Horn of Africa you know it's a such momentous situation but like every revolution reality sinks in there was a rendezvous between the revolution and reality and that meant negotiation to get out of this predicament alright so the negotiation in the Sudan produced not an ideal situation okay by any account but what I consider a cohabitation arrangement alright the cohabitation between the civilians and the military so it needs to be managed very well transitional period is an exceptionally sensitive period in the life of any country and it requires everybody's cooperation to make a transitional period a success you mess up a transitional period you are messed up for 10 20 years alright so it is very important this is managed very well now one of the hallmark of a transition period is in addition to your state institutions being weak and legitimacy their legitimacy is questioned the other one is you are extremely vulnerable to outside interference okay you are very extremely vulnerable and Sudan is very much vulnerable to outside interference as this juncture what has happened I think people should study this very carefully is the multilateral institutions led by the African Union came up with principles that was nurtured in the past 25 years including no change of government unconstitutional and the expulsion or the what you call not expulsion suspension and all of that provided a framework for negotiation alright it provided a framework for the way forward this principle it's a multilateral institution that could do that and eventually by the diplomatic you know outreach especially by US, UK, Detroit as well as the united nation the aggressive impulses of some of the countries was condemned and constructively channeled and a transition was possible alright now we need to consolidate this period it's very important and there are outstanding issues like for example the agreement with the rebel groups is not consummated alright I think the rebel groups need to be persuaded and US can play an important role in that the situation in the Sudan is very different from the Bashir period you know these people who are now in power especially the civilians are not their enemies alright so they should not try to engage them in a very protracted negotiation they are part of the solidarity to write what is wrong in the Sudan to rewrite the history of the Sudan to have a new Sudan in which the periphery and the center is harmonized so the rebel group should be persuaded to join this transformative period not by negotiation by solidarity if they don't do that then they are going to miss the bus the bus is already left anyway so they have to join it in order to make sense out of themselves and make sense also of Sudan's the Iran issue I know it's a very sensitive issue in this country but this is a safe zone I think one thing I can say from the report the report that when you read it it starts off by saying one of the reasons why there is this very aggressive competitiveness in the Gulf is Iran it is to basically demonize them and try to get everybody to gang up to be part of this coalition they have their reasons and the event of the past two days proves it to a certain extent why they are very sensitive but the report starts off by putting Iran and after a few pages Iran starts to disappear and then who replaces them Turkey Turkey becomes the most important country actually in the Horn of Africa than Iran because the Iranians don't have roots in our region but I know that a very resourceful government one of their duty is to manufacture enemies and make them a virtual reality so Iran for the Horn of Africa is not really a big issue in the Red Sea they could be a manageable thing therefore let us try to bracket Iran out of the relationship between us and the Gulf countries it's helpful to them and it is very very helpful to us because you can always always get somebody especially since you have a transactional arrangement you can't pay somebody to make Iran an enemy and a factor in our region and they are not okay reasonableness I hope will prevail I think the crisis to make a general observation the crisis facing Iran all of this situation that we see now is fundamentally a crisis of diplomacy diplomacy has been ditched as an instrument of providing a solution so we are suffering the consequences so could I just make one comment on the report as a whole I thought Egypt is absent and certainly when we look at the issues that we've been looking at Egypt is a significant with its own particular problems and its own interests but definitely part at least operating as a troika with Riad and Abu Dhabi Thanks for highlighting that and of course being both African and Arab in this particular position in the IEU as current chair yes we're going to open it up to questions I'm going to invite Beth to join us back up on the stage we will ask people to stick with questions rather than speeches or long comments my colleagues have microphones so I will take hands I have one first one here musical chairs there we are well following your suggestion to make this a question I will start with the question and then make the attachment to the question we really just want questions so we can get as many out it's one question the question since Sudan has been centered in many of the reports and the commentary I'm a veteran Sudanist for 50 years so I have some idea about it and on the question of Hamati or Dagelo so the question is how shall we appreciate him this is the question and the context of the question is that past leaders of Jan Jouid Musa Halal he's out of the picture the leaders of Jan Jouid don't have a good life expectancy he's also a junior to Burhan really the architect of sending the mercenaries to Saudi Arabia the protest in Sudan is highly antagonized by Hamati and they would love to get rid of him because they see him as a hangover so we have those three domestic aspects and then on the international side we are assuming that King Salman will live forever which he's definitely not and we're assuming that all the people who've been antagonized in Saudi Arabia by Muhammad Bonsaw will somehow not forget that he has messed things up it's a paper tiger relative to Iran and the war in Yemen has basically failed so it becomes the new Vietnam for Saudi Arabia anyway with all those points the question is of course the one that I started with to be responsive is how much shall we think that Hamati Dagolo will still be the factor which apparently in the report I haven't received it so I didn't how much will he really be a factor or will the history of weak democracies in Sudan four cases after all will that be another failure as a witness to Tarir, as a witness to Hashmalata, personal witness to Hashmalata is a good story thank you thank you when we talk about the Red Sea in the Somali context what we are talking is 850 km that's owned by Somaliland and Somaliland was barely mentioned even the ICG authors did not mention Somaliland although I'm thankful to them that in July they made a report about Somalia and Somaliland talks thank you for Ambassador Yusuf because at least you mentioned Somaliland Mr. Abdel said the IGAT had an in-depth conversation about the Red Sea and the Red Sea issues but Somaliland was absent so I would like you to reflect all of you and Mr. Hayesom is there and he knows more about Somaliland to reflect on the status of Somaliland and the rights of the people of Somaliland who are very important, very strategic in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden thank you why don't we start with those two since I don't, I see one other hand thank you my name is Yohan I'm from the Eritrean community I'd like the panelists and others to comment where Eritrea does fit in this equation thank you, thanks for that the question was where does Eritrea fit into this equation sure we'll take one more and then we'll give her thanks, I'm a retired American diplomat and I had the pleasure of working with Ambassador Carson for many years we went an hour and a half before someone mentioned the United States what should the United States be doing here and what aren't we doing great, and I saw one other question in the back so we'll take that one and then we'll give our panelists an opportunity to respond thank you very much my name is Yohan from Ethiopian I'm a student at American University my question is have you highlighted the internal issues with Ethiopia is there a historical influence from the Gulf countries that you think has contributed to the current context and going forward you've mentioned the unique position Prime Minister Abiyaz in terms of sort of playing for both sides trying to curb the Qatar's flirtation with TPA life and things like that so going forward do you see these internal tensions being escalated in terms of this influence thank you thanks for all of those great questions I'm going to turn to our panelists please don't feel that you have to answer all of them but any particular ones that you think are a particularly good fit for you Beth do you want to lead us off? sure thank you and thank you to all of you for also reading the report which I'm grateful but also for your excellent comments let me start with the question about the US the striking features of this whole dynamic is how absent the US is and this is really a story about the region in the region and as Abdul mentioned there is this feeling I know the Gulf sides will speak from that that this is one region this is not a disconnected space where you have Africa and the Gulf this is all one region of which they feel both a part of and obligated to remain a part of and to shape so what we have seen however is the influence that the US can have when it does sort of make a play so in Sudan for example I think the US role was very important in channeling the Gulf players towards a constructive place and specifically through the forum of the Quad meeting that had been established for Yemen but was utilized in Sudan that has US, UK, Saudi Arabia and the UAE this was a forum in which those countries were able to state their interests explicitly the Gulf side and through which the US and the UK could be a little bit more sort of honest and forthright so when the US sort of made that effort together with the UK it made a big difference I can't say it's the only thing that pushed the Gulf into sort of a constructive way but it certainly helped so that's an example of how the US still can have an influence but only if it plays that role let me touch also on the issue of Dr. Abbey in Ethiopia because I wanted to highlight also that I think one of the things that Ethiopia demonstrates is how a country can utilize the Gulf's interests to their own interests, to their own advantage I think our understanding is you know Ethiopia had an interest in making peace with Eritrea and they sort of asked the Gulf just for a little nudge and that was a very productive and wise way I think for them to channel that interest into a productive way. Ethiopia in many senses is almost too important to both the Saudi UAE access and to the Qatar Turkey access for either of them to be zero sum about their competition so this is also an example of how a stronger state that can articulate its interests and can be an important regional player can balance these interests the UAE sees Ethiopia is too important to lose that it can tolerate a little bit of sort of Qatari Turkish influence and vice versa whereas in Somalia I think the state is not in a position to push back against that. Sudan also very much in a fragile position not in a position to push back I'll leave Sudan to others who know that case better. Take some of the Sudan question I think there's a bigger question which faces us all which is how to approach this agreement because on the face of it it's an agreement which while it ostensibly secures the right of civilians or the right of Sudan to be ruled by civilian government is an agreement which really puts the Prime Minister in a difficult position and as a careful balancing act between the military which is largely in many senses insulated from civilian rule so what should our attitude be towards the agreement and accepting the new government as a civilian government my view is that we have to accept that the Sudanese reached that agreement it's a difficult agreement it's a based on a sense of a partnership the precise terms we may disagree with but for the moment I would counsel against trying to have all that agreement and in respecting it respecting also the position of the military vis-a-vis the civilians so I think we're going to have to not embark on a frontal attack on individuals within the former transitional military council but allow the process to unfold but to give full political backing to the civilian authorities and by enhancing their legitimacy and their international standing I think is to give them some protection against counter coups and military adventurism as we go down the track we can expect that relationship to unfold and Hemeti's precise role will deter I don't think it can be read off right at the moment I do think though that the international community can play a role a constructive role in dealing with the unbalanced position of the military in Sudanese society both their occupation of the economic sector through companies and front companies the gigantic share of the budget that they consume are all issues which should come into view when the question of providing resources to Sudan comes up for example in my view one can take some pressure off Abdullah Hamdoch a need to challenge the military and the size of the budget by the World Bank saying if you want international financial loans you can't expect us to advance them when 70% of the money goes to the military you're going to have to cut your military budget so there is a way in which the international community can help rebalance that relationship just on the Sudan in regard to the United States role it has a very critical role at the moment because as you know the listing of Sudan as a state of terrorism has a dramatic impact on Sudan's capacity to access international finance and concessionary loans and the Sudanese I know are astonished that the fact that they've had some regime change take place is not recognized or they feel is not recognized by the international community and that sanctions are still in place and the US is still opting to take second phase negotiations as a way of lifting that label and they feel that we're expecting sort of greater international support I think the international community can go some way towards assisting that process politics in Washington is complicated it's complicated on the Sudan in particular I know especially in Boyd Don Booth I've been at pains to try and manage people's expectations that there will be a rapid lifting of that label but I think the international community can assist the Sudanese by making the point that the changes that have taken place they deserve recognition and as Sudan hits various benchmarks and meets certain targets for example establishes an office of the High Commission of Human Rights benchmarks or works on countering violence and extremism which is another benchmark these can be recognized and pressure again raised on why an acknowledgement of the changes in Sudan are not recognized great I'll just put a plug that look for a future question and answer piece from USIP that outlines the complicated both technical and legislative components of that because as you note managing the expectations beyond the politics I think is something that's very important so you can best leverage those benchmarks and hopefully those guardrails Ambassador Abdul well just two brief points first I think and I'll refer to what Abdul mentioned in his remarks about the fact that this region is an Afro-Arab region and it is important to see how the relevant African and Arab countries can talk together and deal with this issue and this is not happening and I think this is one of the challenges that I think pertains to the mechanism or the way in which the region is going to deal with this issue so I think this is important and the links between you know our man on one hand and the Horn of Africa has been around for centuries and they are very strong links and they will continue as a matter of fact and of course there are millions of workers from the Horn of Africa in the Gulf in general so this and this was mentioned before and I don't know whether you know or you don't know but when the war in Yemen started there were Yemeni refugees that went to Somalia so some people in Yemen during the beginning of the war felt that Somalia is safer than Yemen and this also is a reflection of how linked these areas are so we have to see how this can be managed both on a bilateral level and on a multilateral level and on a bilateral level in order to address this issue we have to strengthen the countries in the Horn of Africa in order to be able to deal with this kind of asymmetry in under owned terms in relation to what they view as their interest in advancing these relationships and of course Egypt was mentioned and for Egypt Babel Mandab is of strategic importance for Egypt and for trade as we mentioned before so and this will will not go away so Egypt will continue to be a party that has huge interest in having stability in this part of the world a final point on on Sudan I think the agreement that was reached was a very difficult agreement to reach and Sudan is passing through a very difficult and sensitive time and they have postponed the number of important issues to a later stage and they will come very very soon and I think the role of the whole international community is to see how we can help Sudan to be able to move rather than face a similar fate like the fates that we have seen in some of the countries that had revolutions whether it's Yemen Libya or Syria Thank you for your thoughtful questions and your observations I think a question raised by a written colleague and also in Somaliland I do have an opinion but I'll take the fifth because I'm going back and there are complications which I don't want to really I'm not happy to say that but they are very very important issues and we are grappling with it it's not like we are passive about it but that's all number two is I think the question of raised by ambassador regarding the US we are also puzzled where is the US is there a coherent tangible transparent US policy towards this region I don't know been searching as a matter of fact some of the reasons why this competition are getting deadly is because of the absence of the US in general the US policy towards Africa is it apparent I don't think so I don't think so the last time I heard speak about Africa is when he uttered no no sorry when he uttered that word that we are you know and then the next time I heard about Africa coming from the US in a very cohesive manner was the national security strategy and when you read the national security strategy it's not about Africa and Russia it's not about us we are seeing through the lens of this big power competition not on our own merits so that and the next time I heard about Africa is the former secretary of state visit to Africa where on the way back he got fired and then Ivanka visited us to promote a pet project that's it you know that's it basically there was also a visit by the former secretary of defense matters to Djibouti but that was security related okay so you know is there a comprehensive US policy towards Africa if there is one it's a subsidiary to somebody else not on its own is there a US policy manifested through activities of the NGOs maybe yes alright otherwise it's very very difficult to really see if there is a cohesive US policy towards the region if there is one it is really war on terror an extension of the war on terror you know et cetera et cetera now the other thing is Egypt Egypt in the report Egypt is mentioned but the tragedy is that Egypt is mentioned in conjunction with Saudi Arabia and with UAE Egypt is an African country with long standing commitment to Africa's integration Africa's development the founding member of the African Union of the OAU et cetera there is a deep mistrust between Egypt and some of the home of African countries that mistrust at some point need to be bridged through some form of strategic dialogue and that's not taking place as an African I really want to peel Egypt out of being lumped together with Saudi Arabia and with Emirating and stand on its own and play its rightful place in Africa's an institution it's an important country I am not in any way minimizing the mistrust but that mistrust need to be somehow overcome and this is the time to do so I don't know if the Americans are aware the significance there was an op-ed article yesterday I think on Washington Post about Russia and how they are coming back big time in Africa they are hosting by the way an Africa summit in Sochi between the whole Africa and Russia the Saudis are hosting at the end of November another Africa Saudi summit so what is it that they see that the US is not seeing to be more proactive I really don't know so with that there is a US policy and that is maritime there is a maritime policy on the Red Sea why because there is a great deal at stake there 10% of the global trade passes through the Red Sea and then the 40% of the trade between Africa not between Asia and Europe passes through so there is a maritime security policy to make sure that it is safe you know by my last count you know a yearly close to what $800 billion worth of goods and services passed through this small 19 kilometers Bab el Mandap that's almost a trillion that's more than the GDP of the entire region so they are concerned about security on the Red Sea that's it assets before we close I'd like to offer our other panelists a moment for any last reflections short last reflections if you have any only one first of all we definitely should have given more treatment to Egypt in the report but I thought our communications colleagues some of them are already there we're going to kill me at 38 pages so we had to sort of bound it somewhere but it's certainly an important piece of the equation and I would actually reinforce what you mentioned that actually and many of these concrete issues in the Horn Egypt isn't a very different place than Saudi Arabian UAE so to lump them together in one position like on Sudan it's wrong it's incorrect so I think they have very different interests to whom they are more closely aligned I want to just make two closing points another country that didn't come up in our discussion that I do think is very important to this picture is China we've been meeting with a few U.S. officials this week and one of the talking points that they always have on this issue is the Horde of Africa and the Gulf States need to push back against China more and more the Gulf States see China as the long game they're not China buys their oil China buys almost all of the Gulf's oil at this point and the Belt and Road Initiative in the Horn of Africa is becoming increasingly a way for the Gulf States to prove themselves as valuable partners to China for example the UAE has offered to China to do tripartite financing for projects so this would mean Chinese financing Emirati financing and sort of local government financing as well this is very attractive to the Chinese and it's very attractive to the Gulf who sees the relationship with China as their increasing anchor relationship economically but also they view that as China has more and more economic interests in that region they will soon become a security player as well so I think this is a very important piece of the puzzle and not to pitch it too much but if you look at the back of the report there's a map that actually shows just how intricately the interests of the Chinese and the Gulf States particularly but that's just one example so I think that's a major component of how this shapes sort of the opportunity that the Gulf sees in the Horn and I guess the last point that I want to make is I'm fundamentally a Gulfie so I come at this again from the Gulf's perspective so I don't mean to sound like I'm defending them but we need to find a way to constructively work with the Gulf I think a lot of the thinking on this issue if it weren't for the terrible Saudis or the terrible Emiratis that's not a way to approach this because they're going to be there as we've mentioned many times this is a region they see as their own and there is a real historical connection so I guess I would just beseech all of us to think about this in terms of where do we find the commonalities I mean one thing that we've discovered working on Yemen something I also work closely with in the Gulf is that when the Gulf States see their interests they can be the strongest advocates for a position now that can work in your favor it can also work to your disadvantage but if we can find those alignments I do think that there is a positive here and a way to push this out of it it sort of got up to a bumpy start I think if there is this perspective on it that it can take a positive direction okay I think okay regarding just two thoughts one is regarding the Horn of Africa okay right now we are talking we're paying a lot of attention to the to the security side of the issues and for all practical purposes I think the report also proves that we are one security zone alright but the potential to be one economic zone is also very very great there is wealth in the Gulf you know there is money there is capital that Africa is starving for you know so to find a cooperative agreement to balance our security and our economic interest and there is also why China matters China through the belt and the road initiative has you know as you know Chinese you know they don't they don't deal with you on election cycles for five years okay they deal with you 20 25 years at the minimum they have made a commitment to deal with Africa for the long haul alright and they are investing massively in infrastructure alright we want to integrate in Africa and integration in Africa cannot be led by the market because the markets are weak it can only be led by by infrastructure so they are building the infrastructure even in the Horn of Africa and the other thing is that the Emirates are sort of piggy-pugging on the belt and road because the belt includes port development alright and the Emirates are focused on ports that's why they are acquiring assets in the Horn of Africa either through lease or outright agreement you know buying of ports alright and that is to really you know align themselves with the Chinese policy you know so these are things that we need to develop and support of what she said look our elites ok people like me some of the Africans I see here you know our bureaucrats we are trained to deal with the west we are trained on how to negotiate with the west we know their language we know how they think and we can bargain alright our elites are not trained to deal with Gulf countries alright because they are susceptible to corrupt practices our elites are not trained to deal with the Chinese alright and as a result of that we may end up at the wrong side of the bargain alright so we need to have this capacity because of the interest that is now being shown by China by Russia and all of that to cope with that we need to be ready to to deal with this elites otherwise I think we should take advantage of the current realities and try not only be how do you say be prisoner of security issue but also economic issues in which the Gulf could be a major source of funding other than China to support our efforts and last word thank you US Institute for Peace you have to continue to be our champion the champion of this region here sooner or later somebody will pay attention here thank you think any last words just in retrospect looking at the totality of the report I thought you underplayed the fear of the Muslim brotherhood which is prominent both in Egypt and in UAE and if your study includes Libya which is a copy book case of Gulf divisions imprinting themselves on a country then that swims into view because at the heart of it all government actions come down to regime survival and this is an important consideration for them great we could probably have an entirely different conversation on that no last comment semester well let me thank all of you for spending time with us let me thank Beth, Dino and Rob for the tremendous report the forthcoming reports and the analysis to provoke these kinds of conversations and then Ambassador think Abdul thank you so much for bringing your perspectives to this conversation I think we probably only to come back in six months and maybe we can pick up the Somaliland and Eritrea and Muslim brotherhood conversations see where we are with multilateralism but we look forward to provide a space and help to nudge forward this conversation it comes through very clearly that there's a role for the U.S. in this there's a need for a more coherent policy approach on these types of questions and I think this has been so clearly underlined this links to such important transitions in the Horn of Africa and is central to not just the security but some of the economic and some of the longer term political relationships that the United States prioritizes so please join me in thanking our wonderful panel and our presenters