Welcome to the latest long-distance Lowey Institute event. I'm Michael Fulilove, the Executive Director of the Lowey Institute, and I'm delighted today to be speaking with a very good friend of mine, Richard Haas, Diplomat, Author and President of the Council on Foreign Relations. Born in Brooklyn, Richard studied at Oberlin College and then completed his Masters and Doctorate at Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar. He worked in the Pentagon under President Carter and the State Department under President Reagan. He served as a Special Assistant to President George H.W. Bush on Middle East and South Asian Affairs. He also served as the Director of Policy Planning at the State Department in the first term of President George W. Bush's administration. Richard has been the President of the Council on Foreign Relations for nearly two decades. He's the author of a dozen books, the latest of which is this one, The World, a brief introduction. Thank you very much for joining me today, Richard Haas, from your barn in upstate New York. Barn somehow sounds inelicate. That said, it's good to be with you, Michael. First, Richard, tell me what kind of pandemic have you had? The Council on Foreign Relations is based in New York City, of course, but you've been keeping safe in the Hudson River Valley. I've seen you on Zoom calls and TV interviews from exactly that position with those famous globes behind your shoulder that won you a 10 out of 10 score from room rater. Tell us how you fared over the past 18 months. The Council on Foreign Relations fared well. We had all the normal issues in the world to deal with, and in addition we had the pandemic, so there was no shortage of interest in our programs, the differences rather than meeting for sandwiches on the Upper East Side of New York or in Washington. We did it all via Zoom, and actually participation on the part of our members and others was higher than ever. Our magazine, which you've been known to write for every now and then foreign affairs, again, reached more people than ever before. Our websites did extraordinarily well. So essentially, like everyone else, I had the challenge of trying to lead an organization remotely. It's not easy. I think anyone who runs a business or an organization, we all miss the water cooler interactions. It's very difficult to onboard individuals to transmit organizational culture. But that said, we did extremely well. Our members stood by us. And for me, my family, we spent essentially the last 18 months up here. It was physically a safer and more comfortable environment. So I could do everything thanks to the wonders of Zoom. I could write my articles, work on books, and essentially do pretty well all things considered. It's interesting, Michael, to imagine what this would have been like if this pandemic had happened two or three decades ago, before the internet was such a part of our life, before Zoom even existed. And it's just a reminder of as bad as it was. And obviously it was bad in any number of ways. Technology has also helped, whether it's with the vaccines itself, or in this case, with allowing us to continue a pretty big percentage of our lives. All right. So the council's gone, okay, what about the United States? How is your country fared during COVID? Obviously, you've had 35 million cases of COVID. I think about 600,000 deaths. You had a pretty effective vaccine rollout, but you're still seeing a lot of vaccine hesitancy among unvaccinated population. How would you grade America's performance? Well, on the pandemic, I think you've got it about right. I think one has to probably divide it in some ways between the Trump administration, which was close to the first year of things, and then the Biden administration, the last half year. The Trump administration did not do it all well on a lot of the social behaviors that would have minimized the impact, the quarantining, the social distancing, the masking, the development, the testing as well. None of this was what it could or should have been. Where the Trump administration deserves credit was in the administration's willingness to take a risk to essentially order the production of lots of vaccines and put the money in behind it before they were demonstrated. And that was a risky, but it turned out to be we were fortunate that that was done. The companies deserve enormous credit, in particular Pfizer and Moderna. This new generation of vaccines that's based upon messenger RNA is really transformational. And that it was done, that it was as effective as it was, that it was done as quickly as it was done. It's really extraordinary. Where the Trump administration, though, did not follow up, was in pushing vaccination. There's almost the same reticence about acknowledging the pandemic, about masking. And indeed, one of the great ironies of the administration that had Mr. Trump and those around them, taken ownership of the pandemic, I believe he would have been reelected. Had they done everything they could have done, I believe they actually could have been reelected. They didn't do so for fear in many ways that it would delay economic revival. Exactly. That's exactly what happened. Many more people died and economic revival was delayed because of what they they didn't do. The Biden administration ramped up production, ramped up distribution. I think at our peak, we were probably vaccinating several million people a day between three and four million people a day. And the problem now is not one of vaccine supply. It's one of vaccine demand or the lack of it. And again, it's quite remarkable in ways I don't quite understand how all this has become a kind of cultural issue. And the resistance in certain pockets of the country to administering the vaccine. So we're having now new waves, new difficulties. But meanwhile, the economy has done extraordinarily well. The biggest economic debate, as you know, is whether the economy is overjuiced too much a quantitative easing for Mr. Powell at the Federal Reserve. Interest rates are low by any and every measure. Now a lot of fiscal stimulus from the Congress. I'd say the other thing you have to talk about in the last 18 months, Michael, is what else happened, which was the greatest challenge to American democracy since the Civil War. The events of January 6, the events that preceded it. You and I, when we write about democracies, one of the things, one of their hallmarks is the peaceful, lawful, if you will, ordinary transfer of authority from the incumbent to whoever wins the election. Whether the incumbent is defeated or has to step down because of term limits. And the fact that that didn't happen this time was a terrible precedent for American politics and a real reflection of how low in many ways our democratic culture has sunk. So to me, the two great stories of the year or the pandemic, which is a mixed story, and the political story that even though we got through it, I don't believe anybody can feel that somehow we've mastered it. In many ways, the same dynamics that brought about our political crisis are still very much with us. All right, staying with the first story, the pandemic, just for a little bit longer. A month or two ago, it seemed like there was a light at the end of the tunnel for the United States. But now with the rise of Delta, we're seeing the light at the tunnels then receding a little bit, if you were, and plans for returning to work and so on are being put off. How long will it take for the world to get through this thing, do you think? I mean, the honest answer anyone on talking to you would give is they don't know. There's too many variables. One is the emergence, the potential emergence of new mutants or variations on the virus. There is the question of vaccine availability and the willingness to take it. There's also questions of whether so-called therapeutics, new drugs come along. So even if one of us were to come down with COVID, we could go to, I don't know if you call it the chemist or the pharmacy, but we would call the drug store, you'd go there, you'd pick up a couple of pills, and in a few days you would be okay. So I think there's simply too many variables right now to sit here. What worries me is that vaccine production and distribution around the world has been woefully short. The willingness to administer vaccines in the United States has not been nearly what it should be. So we've created a global environment in which mutations are beginning to emerge because of globalization circle back on us. So it suggests to me that this is one going to go on longer than it should, and it may have more long-lasting repercussions. This is something that right now has dimensions of being open-ended, and that's got to be worrisome. I say one other thing. I'm also struck with the unevenness of the consequences. Some countries have done extraordinarily well because of instituted behaviors or because of vaccine availability and the willingness to get it. Other countries have done terribly. What seems to me to be the most interesting thread, and I don't know if you agree with this, has been that populist governments have done the worst, whether it's Brazil or Mexico or Turkey or India or the United States on the Trumpanist, the UK originally on the Boris Johnson, that populist leaders don't seem willing to take a long-term perspective and to pay the short-term price in order to get medium and long-term results. And countries which have been willing to pay something of a price in the shorter and medium term seems to me are coming out of this better. I agree with that. I think that countries that are well-governed, with good public officials who pay attention to the science in general, they've done better. But I also think that COVID is a humbling thing. And you also see this phenomenon where countries that initially did well, and in fact, I'd put my own country in that category, have then fallen away. And countries that, like your own, that didn't seem to do well initially have then sort of done well. So it's a confounding problem. Speaking of the unevenness, Richard, of the problem, there was a big article in The New York Times this week about failures with COVAX, which was the program to get vaccination across the world. And there have been problems with funding and supply and distribution of the vaccine. So we're in this somewhat obscene situation where countries like the United States and Australia are bidding against each other, rich countries are bidding against each other for preferred vaccines. And many of our citizens are not taking up the opportunity to be vaccinated. And yet, many people in large parts of the world don't have the opportunity to get vaccinated at all. How disturbing is that for someone like you who spent a lot of your career thinking about global governance and dealing with global challenges? Well, it should and is disturbing, I would think for anyone who's focusing on what's going on. One of the most common expressions in this field, you and I both inhabit is the that of international or global community. And what the response or a time's lack of a response to COVID-19 show is that the whole idea of international community is in many ways aspirational, rather than than actual. So here we are. It's now what the summer of 2021, 18 months or longer since this first emerge, it's getting closer to two years. And the failure to launch a successful independent investigation into the origins because the Chinese have pushed back the WHO's failures at various stages along the lines. What you were just talking about the global vaccine shortfalls, which are dramatic, the problems in producing and administering vaccines elsewhere. This is hardly reassuring about where we are today, where we might be in six months. And also, it's not obvious to me that we automatically are necessarily do better if and when. And I say that advisedly the next pandemic or potential pandemic comes along. There's a real question of what lessons will be learned. The more important what policies will be instituted. And for what I can see the challenges are growing faster than the governance. I think our only chance in some ways is that the technologies keep moving also very fast. All right, let me take you to the second story that you mentioned. And let me ask you a couple of questions about your own country, the United States. Obviously, Mr. Trump was significantly implicated in the January 6th attack assault on on the Capitol and all the culture wars that led up to that. I don't want to spend much time today on Mr. Trump because I'm sort of over him. But let me just ask you this. Is Mr. Trump finished? Is he finished as a force in American politics or not? I would say not. If you think about it, the Republican Party is a minority party. My numbers may be a bit off, Michael, but at the last I checked about a quarter of registered voters plus or minus are Republicans. The amount of people that who actually show up and vote in Republican primaries is a fraction of that fraction. Mr. Trump has a tremendous impact on those who are more likely to vote tremendous impact on those who are more likely to give money. He himself has a war chest, that is how we say considerable. So I think it's a big mistake to count them out. And if one looks at the Republican refusal to get serious about supporting and participating in a commission to look into the events of January 6th, one looks at the pressures being exerted on Republican either candidates or those who are in the Congress. I take Mr. Trump's position seriously. And this is separate from whether he decides to run or not in 2024. He very well might. And if he were, I think he would be very difficult to challenge, much less defeat in Republican primaries. And I think he would be a formidable candidate. I do believe that the Democrats are making mistakes. For example, what's going on at the southern border will be seen there. The crime wave and many of our cities calls for quote unquote to funding the police. Even some of the problems with dealing with COVID, even though for the most part it's Mr. Trump supporters who are refusing to get vaccinated. Still, incumbents do well politically when good things happen on their watch. Incumbents don't do well when bad things happen on their watch, regardless of whether they're directly responsible. All of which is a very long-winded way to say I would not count Mr. Trump out by any means. And you know, from your own study of history, if a week's a long time in politics, well, three years plus is a lifetime. So so much canon will happen over this time. We also don't know how Mr. Biden will do, whether he's the candidate, whether it's the current vice president who's the candidate, whether it's somebody else. There's just my crystal ball is not that clear. Well, let me ask you about the two Democratic figures you've just mentioned. You've known Joe Biden for a very long time. How is he performing as president against your expectations? And what about the rest of his administration, including Vice President Kamala Harris? How are they doing? Well, I would say that what Mr. Biden has going for him is an economy that's growing quite strong. As I said, the principle critique is he's allowing it to grow too strong. Then inflationary pressures are building. And at least initially his handling of COVID, the competence it showed was a real demonstration of executive capability. Some of that now has been lost. So we'll see. But all in all, I think he gets pretty high marks on those two issues, on the management of the pandemic and on the economy. Obviously, we'll have to see how it plays. And his numbers have been going down a little bit in the last few weeks simply because of concerns about the pandemic. The debate we're now having about remasking and the rest is not a welcome debate. I would say politically what surprises me and I underestimated is to what extent this is a quote unquote progressive administration. That when one looks at the sweep of American history, if you look at FDR and Lyndon Johnson, Mr. Biden is very much in that arc. What we're talking about is a significant expansion of two things. One above all is the safety net, the government role in the society, the provision of a floor for all Americans. And that's roots in the New Deal, something you know a lot about, but it's accelerated now. It's both getting deeper and wider and who and what it's covering. And then secondly, we're seeing a major expansion of the government role in the economy, a degree of industrial policy in the name of supply chain resilience and the name of becoming more competitive. So the status, I guess I would call it bias of the Biden administration in the economy and the society is something I underestimated. I just didn't see it coming anything like the degree to which it has. This is very much in terms of the administration. What I don't have an answer to Michael is I've known as you say now President Biden for over four decades. I knew him when he was a young senator. I was a young aide in the Senate going back to 1974. And he is governing more from the left again than I would have predicted. And so I don't know either has he had a transition or transformation or change of heart? Is it the people who populated his administration? Is this a political calculation about what's needed to keep party unity and the run up to the midterm elections in just over a year? Again, I don't know. Sorry to say in so many occasions it's hard to read, but I do think the clear reality is this administration is governing much more left of center than I would think most Americans predicted. And just quickly, what about Kamala Harris? What do you make of her start as VP? I think it's been a little bit bumpy mainly because of the southern crisis at the southern border and her involvement in it. It hasn't gone well for lots of reasons. I think there's been a surge, everything from administration signaling even before they were the administration during the campaign. There are powerful voices in the Democratic political establishment that want a much more open border. The fact that the U.S. economy has recovered as much as it has. And the differential between our economy and regional economies has actually made us into something of a magnet. Same thing for vaccinations. The fact that we're so far ahead of where a lot of the regional countries are again has made us something of a magnet. And the vice president has been focusing on the quote unquote root causes. The problem with root causes is by definition they take decades to fix and they also require a willingness to partner. And many Latin American countries beginning with Mexico and others have shall we say a finite willingness to work with us. I don't see other countries willing to assume the kind of intimate relationship that Columbia did decades ago when it really did partner with the United States to root out an internal terrorist or political military challenge as well as a drug challenge. So it doesn't seem to be the administration has a winning strategy on immigration. And the vice president is very much associated with that. All right Richard let's move westwards from the United States. I want to do a bit of a tour of the world as you do in your book. So let's move westwards and talk a bit about Asia starting with China. How would you characterize the role that Xi Jinping's China is playing in the world? How concerned are you about the direction of China's policy? Xi's China is a very different China. As others have pointed out this is not original. He is in many ways the most powerful Chinese leader since Mao. Some would say so maybe since Deng Xiaoping but he's obviously at that level. He's concentrated power in his hands in a very unchinese way. He's clearly more repressive at home and I think he's decided that China can afford to be more repressive at home. Say it's given the back of the hand to its commitments on Hong Kong. It can afford to be more assertive abroad. I believe he's calculated that China can get away with it. That the rest of the world is so dependent on or interested in investment and trade and commercial interaction with China that it gives him an enormous leeway to essentially do what he wants at home and abroad with very little in the way of adverse consequences. He's doing this at a time that China has grown enormously economically. Has grown enormously militarily. This is a much more assertive trend. It's as far from Deng Xiaoping's hide your hand, buy your time as you can get. Essentially, I believe China's decided its time has arrived. I also believe when they look at the world and particularly they look at us, they see this as a moment of some weakness and some distraction. Again, I think this adds to the sense of opportunity and we see China doing what it's doing within its borders. We see it vis-a-vis India, vis-a-vis Taiwan, vis-a-vis Japan. We see the way it's dealt with Australia. We see the reach of Belt and Road. We see the reigning in of Chinese firms, any signs of economic independence. The debate on decoupling ironically enough is now less of an American-Western debate about decoupling from China and now we see large elements of China almost preemptively decoupling from the rest of the world and what all this adds up to me is a leader who is focused heavily on his power, the power of the Communist Party and China's ability to withstand any pressures or sanctions or anything else from abroad. You mentioned the Australia-China relationship. Australia has taken a number of steps. We would argue to protect our sovereignty in recent years whether it's preventing China from building our 5G network or introducing foreign interference legislation and Australia, as you know last year, made that unilateral call for an international independent investigation into the origins of the coronavirus. The Chinese were very unhappy about that, imposed all kinds of sanctions on Australia. To date, at an aggregate level, that's hurt the Chinese more than it's hurt the Australians. Individual sectors in Australia are hurting, but because of the price of minerals and in particular iron ore, actually Australia's still doing very well out of it. But what would be your advice to a country like Australia, a liberal democracy, close ally of the United States, one with a lot of economic dependencies and interdependencies with China? How do you think countries like ours should square that circle? How do we maintain decent relations with China, but at the same time stand up for ourselves, stand up for our interests and our values? I think the general direction of your policy is more right than not. I would have limits on what I asked of China. I didn't agree with the previous Secretary of State when he essentially called for regime change in China. I don't think that sort of thing makes any sense whatsoever. It's not going to bear fruit. So I think Australia should speak up for its principles, for its policies, but also make clear the limits of what it is asking for. And second of all, particularly for countries such as Australia of shall we say limited scale, I hope you don't take offense, that it should try to do as much of it with partners. It's easier for China to pick countries off one by one and act harshly towards them than if countries act together. It's one of the reasons I think, for example, the United States continues to make a major strategic error by not being a member of the Asia Pacific economic organizations. That would be a great way to exert collective leverage on China, be it over political behavior or say it's fondness for coal-fired plants. In general, multilateralism is not a sign of weakness. It can be a real force multiplier and you could find partners to cooperate with and that's the best way to leverage China. So if I were Australia in every domain, I would be looking for potential partners. Well, one of the multilateral organizations that has legs at the moment is the Quad, the coalition of like-minded countries with clout, the United States, India, Japan, and Australia. Of course, President Biden convened the first leaders meeting of the Quad in March of this year. Are you a Quad believer? I'm a Quad skeptic. I'd like to become a Quad believer. I haven't ruled it out and it has to do more than anything with Japan and even more India. And the real question is, what are they prepared to sign up to? And India in particular has a history and a legacy of a strategic, what's the word? You want to call it independence? You want to call it autonomy? It's a kind of distancing, but it's a real lack of commitment. And to me, it remains to be seen how sustained a partner India will prove to be. Japan has been leaning more forward vis-à-vis China, particularly over Taiwan. And there to me, the question is, what will Japanese politics allow? And the current government is doing things that I admire. To me, the question is, will this be widely shared and sustained by others if and when they come into power? So again, I think the Quad has potential more than reality. And also it doesn't help us in some of the economic issues, which again, I come back to, this is an administration in my country which is beading its chest with a rather muscular anti-China policy. Yet, unless I'm hard of hearing, I haven't heard anybody talk about the United States getting into what used to be called the TPP or ARSA. And that's a missing dimension. So again, the Quad doesn't really function in that space. So sorry to rain a little bit on that parade. And I hope I haven't defended you. Well, we'll try to convert you to a Quad believer over time, Richard. But in the meantime, let me ask you about Taiwan. You mentioned Taiwan. We have a question from an audience member, Isabella Baker. She asks whether you think President Xi Jinping of China could invade Taiwan in the next five years? Whenever you look at those kinds of questions, and it's a good question, you've got to look at two things. You've got to look at capabilities and you've got to look at intentions. The capabilities are less difficult to measure. We can look at what China has. We can look at what Taiwan, the United States, Japan and others have. And then even there though, there's still the question then of will to use everything. It's the question of how prepared are you to act, to escalate. And that's why a lot of these war games, by the way, are useless. Because the way you play out scenarios in many cases is dependent on strategic choices you're prepared to make about which systems you use and where you use it. China has a great advantage. It's called geography. And there's that. What I don't understand or know is possible to read or Chinese intentions. And could they act tomorrow? Sure. Could they not act tomorrow? Absolutely. And it seems to me they would be undertaking tremendous risk in terms of what it would mean for China's economic relationship with the world and the delivery of economic welfare to the Chinese people would be put at risk. And I don't see the government of China doing that lightly. What I want to avoid though, is a scenario where China feels provoked. And that's why I do not share the enthusiasm of some in the administration and beyond for some of these symbolic gestures of upgrading interaction with Taiwan. That to me is a dangerous policy. What we should be doing is increasing our military ability to deter and if need be, defend against Chinese actions. By the way, not simply limited to the all out invasion or assault across the straits. That might be the least likely scenario, Michael. What about gray area techniques slicing this below differently, taking this or that isolated island and so forth? I think those are real scenarios we need to be very important. And we also need to pool, you mentioned the Quad and other countries, we need to think about what would be the economic reaction, what would be the military action. And I would say we ought to make that known to China. To me, deterrence by certainty is always preferable to deterrence by uncertainty. So I would want Chinese decision makers to know that if they were to act, it would be extraordinarily risky in terms of outcome and extraordinarily costly no matter what the outcome. All right, let's move northwards towards the Middle East or West Asia as we think of it down here. First of all, let me put a question to you from the chairman of the Lowy Institute, Sir Frank Lowy, who sends his regards by the way. And Frank asks whether you think Russia has a positive or negative influence on the Middle East when you think of Syria, Iran, Lebanon and the region as a whole. What kind of role is Russia playing in the Middle East at the moment? I do not think it has a positive impact on the Middle East for the most part. In Syria, Russia's use of force has been, these are war crimes.  And all on behalf of a government that itself commits war crimes. So that's just to me a fact of life. Iran could be conceivably somewhat different though up to now Russia's not been helpful, but I wouldn't see where it's in Russia's interest for Iran to have nuclear weapons. If I were Russia thinking about the long-term strategic consequences of that and what it might also mean for Israel and the United States acting. So I don't rule out that Russia, under certain circumstances, might be persuaded or might not even need to be persuaded. It might simply be prepared to put pressure on Iran, not to cross certain lines. But all things being equal now, Russia is to me not a benign force in the Middle East. I think primacovism, if you will, lives. There's a desire to re-establish the evidence that Russia is still a great power, willing and able to stand by its partners in the Middle East is a favored place for Russia to do just that. All right, we have a new government in Israel. What were your feelings on the departure of the ultimate survivor, Bibi? And what do you make of the new government under Prime Minister Naftali Bennett? They passed a budget this week for the first time, I think, in three years. What are his chances of holding together this government that's constituted of, I think, its eight very different political parties? Yes, I did not regret the departure of a Mr. Netanyahu. I do not believe he has been a constructive force in the region for the most part, including for Israel. I've always believed that Israel must remain a democratic Jewish state. And I believe that the drift that Israel, that is accelerated under Mr. Netanyahu has increased the tension between Israel's democraticness and its Jewishness. And I don't like the possibility that Israel will have to choose one or the other. Either outcome would be extraordinarily costly. There were some other things that Mr. Netanyahu did that I didn't have problems with, some of his actions in Syria against Iran and so forth, but I did welcome the new government. I think it was healthy for Israeli democracy. The problem is, as you say, it's a root Goldberg of a government. There's eight parties which share very little in common other than a certain shared animosity towards the previous prime minister. Now, they can get certain things done domestically, you mentioned the budget. The real question is whether the government can hang together if and when there are difficult decisions to be made about settlements, about Jerusalem, and so forth. Where I think there'll actually be a lot of continuity, though, will probably be towards Iraq. And there are very few in Israel, shall we say, are prepared to countenance in Iran with nuclear weapons or on the brink of having them. There's very little confidence in the 2015 so-called JCPOA agreement. I share that concern. I'm not an enthusiast for that agreement. I wasn't at the time. I'm not now. So I think you'll actually see considerable continuity on that issue. And the Israelis presumably will continue to undertake certain low-level actions to complicate Iran's efforts to move towards a nuclear weapons capability or at least the nuclear weapons option. Richard, what do you think of President Biden's decision to withdraw U.S. forces from Afghanistan by the end of this month? Regrettable. I disagreed with what the previous administration did, and there's virtually no difference other than a few months between the Trump administration and the Biden administration on Afghanistan. In both cases, the president committed to essentially a calendar-based withdrawal, not one based on meaningful conditions. And I was involved, as you know, Michael, I was the U.S. envoy for Northern Ireland. The conditions we placed, we and others, the British placed on the provisional IRA were far more onerous than anything placed on the Taliban. They're not being forced to disarm.  Other than agreeing not to become hospitable against the terrorists, they've given up nothing. This was all done behind the backs of Afghan governments. I think it's a terrible policy. I think it's nothing more than an American withdrawal policy. It's not an end of war policy. I disagreed with the president, and he and I talked about it, and I think I'm giving away any secrets a few months ago before he made the announcement. His view was that he was worried that conditions would never be met for the successful U.S. withdrawal, and I said, it depends what you... I said, you're right. If you mean that we will ever reach a military victory, that's not going to happen, and if you mean we're going to negotiate peace, that's never going to happen. What I thought we'd arrived at though, what Mr. Biden inherited, was a situation with a small number of U.S. forces on the ground, roughly what, 2500, three to four times that many allied troops, and the level of violence had really gone down involving them. United States, thank God, hasn't had a combat fatality in about 18 months, and so I thought we reached a point where our commitment was in many ways proportionate to the states. So right now we're taking these U.S. forces out. It's almost complete. They're not coming out of force structure, so there won't be significant economic savings. Already we're seeing the security situation in Afghanistan deteriorate, and I think in the short run what we're likely to see not just terribly humanitarian problems inside Afghanistan, massive refugee flows. I also think the possibility is that terrorists will come back to use Afghanistan real estate, and my longer term concern, and it's not one you hear about a lot, is Pakistan. It's ironic, Pakistan has provided the sanctuary for the Taliban for decades. I think there's a pretty good chance, Michael, that Taliban now provides or will come to provide the sanctuary against Pakistan, and what you might think of as greater Pashtunistan, and that will be a radical push for that. Pakistan as a country, as everybody knows, with hundreds of nuclear devices, and I worry about that, that we are sowing the seeds for a much greater problem in South Asia, even though Afghanistan itself will be a significant problem. So I thought we'd kind of reached a point where we had an acceptable outcome at an acceptable cost, and I don't understand the rationale behind this, and it's enough to, it's ironic that this is something that both presidents supported. If you will, there's an element of bipartisanship, and it's enough to make you question the, at least me question, sometimes the value of bipartisanship. All right, let's keep moving westwards towards Europe. It's been about five years since the Brits voted to leave the European Union. What impact do you think that has and will have on the UK's role in the world? It'll diminish it. It'll diminish the economic growth. It'll diminish its influence in Europe. It'll diminish its value to the United States, and the real question is ultimately whether it diminishes the UK itself by leading to the breakup of the country. I think whether it's Northern Ireland with Ireland or whether it's Scotland, but I believe history will be brutal in its assessment of Brexit. All right, one of the big shifts in Europe this year will be the likely departure of German Chancellor Angela Merkel. How much will Europe and the world miss Merkel, do you think? I believe the world won't so much miss the Chancellor as they will miss a steady German. The real question is, and we're seeing already signs of it, Michael, is the uncertainty about the leadership dynamics within her party and beyond. It wasn't as though she was a great visionary or led Europe in many directions, and there's aspects of German foreign policy. Quite honestly, I won't miss the commercialism of its ties with Russia or China, but the question is really Germany's political orientation and stability. Now, here's something I never thought I'd say in this conversation or another. Look at what's going on in the UK. We have now the post-Mercal era in Germany who knows what happens in France given their elections next year. The most stable country in Europe right now in many ways. The best-led country in Europe right now, I would say, is Italy. And that is not a statement I would have made, shall we say, had we done this conversation any time in the last 60 or 70 years? I think that's a good argument for a Council of Councils meetings in Rome as soon as we're allowed to travel again. Richard, let me take you to some global issues if I can. We started off talking about the pandemic. I want to ask you about climate change. The Brits will host the big UN Conference of the Parties in Glasgow later in the year.  I am entirely confident Michael the world will not do. The gap between the challenge of climate change and the global response is large and will only grow. And what's so frightening about this is this is not just an enormous potential future problem, it's now. Look at the heat we're seeing in my country, the fires, the floods, the storms. You don't need me to lecture you about fires in your country. We saw the floods in Europe and Asia this year. So even if the world did get its act together, and again I see no signs that it will, a lot is already happening and a lot more will happen because of what's baked into the Cape. But again the world won't get its act together. And we began the conversation talking about COVID. This is simply another example of the lack of any serious international community. And this is potentially existential and time is running out. What makes climate also so hard, it's a slow-motion crisis. It's a gradual crisis. The pandemic was relatively sudden, beginning say early last year. Climate is a, pardon the terrible metaphor, but it's a bit of a slow-melting ice cube. And it's very hard. In business, for example, there's a lot of literature about the friction between the urgent and the important. And what every CEO has to guard against is that the urgent crowds out the important in his or her inbox. Well, that's what's been happening with climate. But guess what? It's not, it's both urgent and important. And the world hasn't responded to it. And I just don't see the determination to do it. There's this tools out there, there are shifts to new technologies. I think carbon taxing or the idea of border taxes make a great deal of sense. But the question is whether there's the political will to do it. And thus far, there's a gap between the limited ambition of the steps that are going to be taken and the really large need that exists. You mentioned Australian bushfires. Let me ask you about the uncomfortable position that Australia finds itself in. You would think as the driest continent in the world that we would be a leader on this issue. But that's not the case.  The Australian government has not yet formally committed to a net zero target, the transition. They don't seem particularly enthusiastic about the transition to renewable energy sources. And I notice that we are somewhat isolated for a country that likes to be in lockstep with its big allies. We're now very much out of step with both the United States and Britain as well as Europe and many other parts of the world. So I guess my question to you as an international observer, what is the risk for here? What is the risk for Australia here in being left out and somewhat isolated, especially, I guess, with a new administration in Washington that takes this issue very seriously? I don't know if there's a direct risk. It may be at some point that Australia pays a price that a tariff is applied on some of its goods, getting into certain markets because of the way certain, you know, the fuels that are used to produce them. That's a possibility. But the risk, this will not be well received, I would expect. The risk is not as great as it should be. And there's a problem here. And here's what it is. Australia is essentially free-riding. By that I mean it is vulnerable to what happens in the world on climate change. Its own, if Australia were to go to no net emission, no carbon, tomorrow, its impact on the world would be modest given the scale of your economy and population. But the potential price of a transition could be high. So it's easier for Australia, thinking very narrowly, not to do certain things, and to basically hope the world acts responsibly because the world acts irresponsibly. Australia will pay a price. So Australia's future vis-a-vis the climate probably depends less on what it does than on what the world does. And that's a problem for us all. But I must tell you, as an outsider, given the price Australia is already paying and will pay physically, it's quite hard for an outsider to understand your politics and why a government wouldn't decide to get on the right side of this issue. Final couple of questions, Richard.  You've run the Council on Foreign Relations now for a long time. You've met many of the world leaders over your adult life, many of the American presidents and other world leaders. If you would nominate one or two that really impressed you, who would it be? Well, for a non-American leader, it would be Yitzhak Rabin. To me, he was extraordinary. His willingness to take risks for peace, even though it wasn't easy. And the fact that it was so difficult in many ways is what allowed him to lead his country. So Rabin would be my choice of a foreign leader who understood that different circumstances required different policies. And that to me was quite remarkable. From the American point of view, I would say the 41st president. In some ways, it's difficult to distinguish between him and the group around him, including Secretary of State Baker and Brent Scowcroft and others. But I think that was certainly the greatest constellation of a foreign policy hand since the Truman administration. But again, I thought the way the 41st president handled the end of the Cold War, the Gulf War and some other challenges was quite remarkable. And to me, Michael, what both Rabin and 41 prove is how much of history is dependent on individuals. I never bought into those schools of history that thought things were inevitable because of social factors. I actually think people and leadership matter. And finally, a question from an audience member, Richard, I'd like to end on this. We have a question from Victor Purton about optimism. And we've spoken today about a lot of issues that can generate pessimism. But Victor asks, what makes you optimistic? The word optimism does not roll off my tongue with great ease. What makes me optimistic though is that we've now managed what, three quarters of a century without a great power conflict. It shows what diplomacy and statecraft can do. I don't think US-Chinese or US-Russian conflict is by any means inevitable. We've had various successes dealing with this or that crisis. We know what to do in many cases, Michael, whether it's climate change or pandemics. To me, the question is less a design question than it is an implementation one. So that suggests to me, if the right people get into positions of responsibility, then we will get much closer to where we need to be than we are now. Richard, thank you very much for joining us. I always enjoy speaking with you. I've missed running into you at events and conferences over the past 18 months. So this has been a treat. I hope that globalization resumes soon and we can see each other in person. Until then, stay safe in the Hudson River Valley, which has many things going for it, including being the ancestral home of Franklin Roosevelt. Also, good luck in the Olympic basketball semifinals tomorrow. Australia's going to do its best to end America's unipolar moment in basketball. So thank you again, Richard Haas. Thank you, Michael. I think the French and others have already done their best to demonstrate that the unipolar moment was just that moment that we're in a world of distributed capacity, what I once called non-polarity. And I think we are paying a price for it in Tokyo. And thank you again, ladies and gentlemen, for joining us today for this event as part of the Long Distance Lowey Institute. The Institute has some terrific research, podcasts and events coming out in the coming months. So please watch this space. And in the meantime, whether you're in the Hudson River Valley or in Sydney, please stay safe and well.