Okay, so we want to predict how human individuals behave and we can think of different situations where these apply. So you have a different situation in which people may interact with another person or more persons and each of these persons is confronted with a strategic decision because the outcome does not only depend on what he does but also on how the other people behave. Okay, and so in some sense what you have to do is to predict how other people are going to behave and behave in an optimal manner. Okay, so this is what game theory is about. Okay, so how do you formalize a game? One way of thinking about a game is you look at the prototype system of a game which is chess. Okay, so in chess you have the players and there are some rules and these rules have to do with what actions, what possible actions can each player do at each point in time and with information what does each player knows at each point in time. Okay, and then what agents choose is actually strategies and a strategy is a contingent plan of action. So for example if you think about chess, so players do not choose just actions independently at each time but they follow a particular strategy or for example for the openings, there are different codified strategies and a strategy is a contingent plan of action which means it's a sequence of actions that depend on the action of the other players, the previous action of the other players and depend on also on the information that the agent has. Okay, so a strategy is a function in a very high dimensional space and then you have also to define the outcomes, so when is it that the game ends and what are the payoffs that each player receives when the game ends. So one important, very important thing that you assume is what is called common knowledge.  So it's something that is common knowledge. Okay, and what we assume is that the rules of the game and the strategies and the outcomes and the payoffs, this is all common knowledge. So everybody, every player knows what the rules are. Okay, then also we assume that each player assumes that the other players is rational and they are rational themselves and they know that the other player knows that they are rational and they know that the other players knows that they know that the other player is rational etc etc. Okay, so rationality this common knowledge. So this is very important so and under this so a game theory is essentially a theory that predicts how players will behave, how players will play this game under these assumptions. Okay so let's see how it works. So this is a very simple game which is called matching pennies. There are two players, player one and player two.  And player one wins if the two coins are different, if the two sides of the coins are different and player two wins if they are the same. Okay so one way of representing this game is what is called an extensive form game. An extensive form game can be represented as a graph where you have the action nodes, so the nodes where each of these nodes, one of the two players, have to take an action. Then links correspond to the possible action that an agent can take. So here is player one, he has to choose whether his coin will be head or tail. And then depending on two, it's time for player two to decide whether his coin will be head or tail. And then depending on this, each of them will receive payoff. And here this is the payoff of player one, which is minus one because the two coins are the same. And this is the payoff of player two. Okay so as you can see, so this is the way which you can represent any game. Of course, you can also represent chess in this way, but you will have a very, very complex three, now a very, very complex graph. Okay so the strategies are, as I told you, are contingent plans of action. So in this case, a strategy for player two will be to play head if the other guy, if player one played head, then to play tail if player one played tail. So you see that a strategy is a plan, is a way to respond that depends on the action of the other agent. Okay now in this case, we assume that player two knows, so information is also important, here we assume that player two knows what player one chooses before he makes his choice. But you could also think about actually matching pennies game is typically played simultaneously. So where player two does not know what is the choice of player one. Okay so in this case, in game theory, in extensive form game theory, one represents this fact that agent two does not know whether he's in this position or in this position by drawing these information sets. So these information sets, you should think of them as a cloud of fog that makes it impossible for player two to understand whether he's at this point or at this point. Okay so these are extensive form game, but then given an extensive form game, you can figure out what are the possible strategies. And then you can represent the same game in terms of what is called a normal form game. And the normal form game is this form, so you have a set of strategy, SI, that as I told you are plans of actions. And you list all of them. And then you list all of them also for your opponents. Here this s minus i means the strategies of all the other opponents. So you have a set of possible strategy for agent i. And then you can build the set of all possible strategies for all the other players. And then the strategy of the opponent will be an element of this set. And so you can fully define your game by defining directly what is the payoff for each player i if you play strategy SI against strategy s minus i. And this is a real function that corresponds to these numbers here. So this is essentially how you define a game in game theory. So this is a celebrated example, which is called a prisoner s dilemma. And you can think this is a formalization of the situation of Bonnie and Clyde, which was in the first slide. And the story goes that, say, if player one and player two, imagine that player one and player two are, say, caught and they are charged of having committed a crime. So player one has the possibility of to confess to the police and to say that the other guy, player two, did commit the crime. And or to stay silent, not to say anything, not to confess. In this case, the strategy C is not to confess as the strategy D, which is called defect to defect and C stands for cooperate. I mean, cooperate with player two. So the GD is the one where player one confesses. And if they both don't confess, they stay in prison for a while, but then they are released. If player one confesses and player two does not, then he will get free. He will be free. But player two will go in jail for a long period, say nine years. Okay. But if they both confess, they both will go in prison for, say, six years. So you can represent, in this simple case, this play, this game in normal form with this table, where in each cell, you put the first number is the payoff of the first player, given the strategy that the first player chooses and the second player chooses. And in the second number, you put the payoff of the second guy. Okay. Okay. So now you can think clearly that if you look at this situation, well, it is clear what they should do. Because if they both do not confess, if they both cooperate, they would just spend one year in prison, say a small amount in prison, and then they will get free. But actually, what happens in this case is that whatever player one does, it is always best for player two to defect or to, in this case, to confess. Because imagine that player one does not confess, so he cooperates. Then if he cooperates, player two would get minus one. But if he defects, it will get zero. So it is better for him to play defect. Okay. Then what if player one defects, then if he cooperates, it would get minus nine. And if he defects, it would get minus six. Okay. So whatever player one does, player two will be better off by defecting. And the same is true for player one. So the outcome is that in spite of the fact that this would be the best outcome for both of the player, because they are rational, they will end up playing this, they will end up in this situation. Okay. And this is because this strategy C is dominated by strategy D, because whatever the opponent does, strategy D always gives a higher payout. So one idea of finding out how players play games is to look at dominated strategies and to eliminate these dominated strategies. And then the prediction would be that what remains is what players will play. And you can do this process alternatively and look for some strategy which is dominated by some other strategy and eliminate them alternatively. And in this way, you can think of solving the game. So maybe it's a good time to ask if there are questions. Yes, Professor, can you hear me? Yes. Okay. So I saw the lectures earlier and I'm loving them. I think they're really mind blowing, at least in my estimation. So regarding the prisoner's dilemma, for instance, but also other things that we discussed about, it struck me as a bit odd that we've now, this is maybe a naive question, maybe I'm getting a bit ahead of myself, but we never once mentioned the concept of a trustworthiness, trust. And it seems to me that by introducing this, a lot of the so-called dilemmas- So, Carlos, so now we are talking about Bonnie and Clyde. They love each other. Okay. And they say, and they can promise to them, to each other, look, I will, I will never betray you. I will never confess. Okay. Yes. But when they get into, when they are caught and they talk to the police, should they really trust the other guy or not? I mean, if they are really rational, and this is the assumption that we are making, then no matter what they promise to each other, they will behave in this way. I mean, the issue of trust is something that we will come back, we will come back, because it's a very important one. Yes. And also, it struck me also that, well, the argument for Bonnie and Clyde that seems to be true, but I think it can only hold up in isolated single instantiation, like in single games, because if the games are iterated, then this sort of argument cannot work, because if I work with someone and I snitch on them, exactly. Yes, exactly. You are precisely right. So we are talking about a single stage game, a situation where player one and player two, imagine they didn't meet before, and they will never meet again. Okay. Okay. And then in that case, everything that player one says to player two in this kind of game should not be trusted. Okay. There is no reason why player two should trust player one or vice versa. So it's not credible. Okay. Yes. Okay. Okay. So everyone is a bit psychopathic in these scenarios. Okay. Thank you. So concept of trust, there is a question from Ayush Gautam. Are all concepts concept like trust considered irrational? I assume rational decision take only the possible possible outcomes into account. So let me turn this question the other way around. So in game theory, you'll try to find whether there are incentives that support trust. So is trust supported by incentives?  Okay. And of course, you should not trust me because I mean jumping out of the window is against my own interest. Okay. Then of course, I mean, I'm not considering all the psychological dimension, the fact that I may be crazy, et cetera, et cetera. But if you just think of a rational behavior, then you should not trust me. Okay. Sorry, there was another question. So now there is a, there is a rajat asking why are, and precisely why they are not using backward induction. Okay. So this is going ahead. I mean, backward induction is one of the strategy in which you can solve in which you can solve games like this one, for example. I mean, if you start from the top of the tree, you can find out what is the best option for player two and then figure out what, what is the payoff that player two will get in this point and in this point. And then you can figure out what player one will do. Okay. So this is called backward induction. Now, in prison as dilemma, things are very easy because there is a dominated strategy. So you don't need to use backward induction. And if you use backward induction, you get at the same situation, at the same outcome. So players cooperate and they are charged for what they were caught for. Okay. So you are answering to another question. So, other questions? Let me see. So what is minus six, minus six? Yes. So you have been asked, answered by people. So we think about these numbers here as being a payoff. So you can think of this as a monetary reward or as anything, anything else. Okay. So, very good. So the problem with iterated elimination of dominated strategies is that it doesn't work always. So, and so what John Nash did was a certain point to formalize what is a good notion of a solution for a game. And this solution is called Nash equilibrium. So you say that a strategy profile, profile means that this is a, this S is a list of strategies for each of the players. This is a Nash equilibrium. If for all players and for all strategies of all these players, the payoff of player Y, if he plays another strategy, which is different from the strategy he plays in the Nash equilibrium, cannot be larger. So this means that each player has no incentive to deviate from a Nash equilibrium strategy. Okay. That's the early presented game concept applied for games with low amount of payoffs when the game is based on a morality question, based on experience, which participation with this types of game, it's easy to select the morality correct decision if the payoff difference is not large, especially monetary. So with respect to this, we will come to that about discussing about say morality. At the moment we are not considering morality, we are just considering what should rational players do. Okay. Okay. So Nash equilibrium is a situation such that no players have incentive to deviate from this setting. Okay. And one way in which you can find this Nash equilibrium is by finding the best response. So you define the best response of agent I to the strategy of her opponents as the strategy that maximizes easy utility or heavy utility, given the strategy of the other. So this is the best response. Okay. And if you think a little bit about it, so the Nash equilibrium is equivalent to saying that my best response. So I should play the best response to the best response of my opponents. Okay. Or in other words, that the Nash equilibrium is a fixed point of this best response correspondence of this best response mapping. Okay. And so, for example, in the prisoner's dilemma, you see that, well, the best response for player two is always the factor is the fact and the factor where player one plays C or D. And the same is true for player one. So that you see this is a fixed point of the best response correspondence. Okay. Very good. So now I want you to play a game. Just look at this game and find what is the Nash equilibrium. Then you should go to this site. And you should insert this code and submit your answer. So let's see whether you've got the concept of Nash equilibrium. So I'll wait until we have collected enough responses. Okay. See, we are at the moment, we are 118. Let's see, I want to see at least 50 responses. I think probably you also need to add. The screen has disappeared. Hello. The screen has disappeared. Yes. Let me put it again. What is it? Okay. Here it is. So here is the game. So I still see five answers only. So come on. Only five answers. You can do better. Okay. Six answers. Come on, seven. Okay. You are thinking very hard on this problem. So 12, 13. Come on. Okay. So, okay. Now I think you can vote. Sorry. It's the first time I'm using this thing. Okay. We have just two answers for the moment now. Okay. So seven answers.  So let me stop when there are 20 answers. We are 15. Okay. So maybe what I can do is to share with you, if I can share with you the results. Okay. So I think we are, so let me summarize for you what the results are. We have 34 answers. So the correct answer is this one. It's 33. Because this is the best response. You see, if player one plays B, then player two, the best option for player two is to play R. Okay. And if player two plays R, then the best response for player one is to play B. So this is the Nash equilibrium. So this got 44% of the votes. Okay. So at least the majority, I mean, almost the majority of you got it right. Then there was a large part of you, 36% said that the Nash equilibrium is this one. But you see that say if, for example, player one plays top, this strategy T, then player two would be better off by playing C. Okay. So this is not the best strategy of player two. And if player two plays L, player one would like to switch to five. Okay. So this is not a Nash equilibrium. Although the payoffs are larger than in the Nash equilibrium. Then Professor. Yeah. But if player one plays top, and player two plays center, then player one wins. So why would player two prefer C? No, because, because then T is not a best response. Sorry. C is not a best response to T. So the best response of player two, if player one plays T is L. Oh, yes. Okay. But if player two plays L, player one would like to play M. Okay. And if player one plays M, player two would like to play C. And if player two plays C, player one would like to play T. Okay. Okay. So, and you are in this, in this loop. Okay. So there is no, there is no Nash equilibrium in this sense. Okay. Is it clear? Yes. Yes. Yes. Thank you. Okay. So thank you very much for this exercise. I think you, since you liked it, then I think we are going to go to the issue of, okay. So this was the right response. And these are the best responses. You can see that there is no fixed point here. Now, let's go to another simple exercise, which is the ultimatum game. And this brings me to the issue of morality. Okay. So now the ultimatum game is as follows. So there are two people. So Alice and Bob. Alice has the possibility to get 100 euros. And the choice she has to make is to give an amount of this to Bob. Now Bob can decide either to accept or to refuse. So if Bob refuses, then they will both get nothing. But if Bob accepts, then he will get what Alice gives you. And Alice will keep the rest. Okay. So you should think again that Alice and Bob are rational and that they never met each other and they will never meet again. They are not brothers and sisters. They are not wife and husband or anything.  Okay. This is the game. So the strategy of Alice goes from zero, one, two, up to 100. This is how much she decides to give to Bob. And the strategy of Bob is either to accept or to refuse. So again, think about what is the Nash equilibrium, and then go to Slido and submit your answer. Okay. So very good. So we have five answers, 18 answers. Okay. This is very interesting. Okay. So we have almost 33 answers. But I think the result is very clear. Okay. So the vast majority of you thinks that the Nash equilibrium should be 50-50. So Alice should give to Bob 50 euros and keep 50 for herself. 66% think that this should be the rational outcome. Now, actually, the Nash equilibrium is when Alice gives zero to Bob. And Bob accept it, because essentially you see in this situation where Alice, what is the best response of Alice? What is the best response of Bob if Alice gives zero? Well, the best response is both accept and refuse. Okay. So that this, as a matter of fact, this is a Nash equilibrium. Okay. So the best response of Bob is always to accept whatever Alice offers, whatever Alice offers, because whatever is better than nothing. Okay. Is this clear? Now you see the tension between what is rational and what is fair. You may say, well, this Nash equilibrium is not very fair. Okay, because Alice is very stingy. So it is not behaving properly. Okay. So indeed, if you do experiments like what we have done on the ultimatum game, you find out that most of the people will not play the Nash equilibrium. And there is a lot of people who have been thinking about why is it that people do not play the Nash equilibrium? Aren't they rational? Aren't they play rationally? And there are a lot of answers to this. One reason is that actually when we are in a strategic context, we do not really think hard about how to behave, but we apply social norms. And as a social norm, being generous is a good social norm. Because essentially, and we have learned this because of reciprocity. So because if I'm kind with you, you will be kind with me. And if I'm kind with a person in the street, a person in the streets will be kind with me. This is a norm of the society. Okay. So but this has nothing to do with rationality or needs different explanation. If you want to explain this behavior, that is not explained by rationality. Excuse me. Yeah, please. In this game, does Bob know about the deal he knows about the amount of money? Yes, that is common knowledge. So he knows. He knows. Yes. So you would think that Bob refuses because he gets offended or because he wants to punish Alice. So these are not rational behaviors. But if Bob knows about the amount, it is very probable that refusing the deal when Alice gave him nothing. Yes. So indeed, the issue is exactly this. So that in this type of situation, Alice should not assume that Bob is rational. And so she should not behave in a rational manner. Okay. So that probably she should think, well, maybe if I give him 10, he will not refuse. Ah, I see. And so if I give him, say, then of course, maybe Alice can frame this offer in a particular way and Bob will accept. I don't know. But the point is that if Alice knows that Bob is rational and Bob knows that Alice is rational, then Bob should not get offended by Alice's behavior because she's behaving rationally. And he should accept even if he gets zero. I see. Okay, thank you. The issue is really game theory deals with describing the behavior of rational individuals. Okay. But there are situations where it is not reasonable to believe that people are behaving rationally. Okay. I have a question. Yeah, please. Can Bob use this model to actually bargain about the money Alice gives her? For example, if she gives me under 15, I always say no. Yes. So this is the same as in the as in the prisoner's dilemma. No. So Bob could threaten Alice and say, if you give me less than 50, I will refuse. Okay. Then Alice may offer him 49. Should Bob refuse or not? I mean. He should not accept. Sorry. He should not accept. If she gives her 49.9, he should not accept. Yes, but this is not rational. This is not rational. And it is not. I mean, if Alice knows that Bob is rational and Bob tells him, look, I'm not going to accept anything below 50. Then Alice should not find this statement credible. Okay. It is not credible because it is in the it is against the interest of Bob himself to behave in this manner. Thank you. Excuse me, Professor. So I only I can understand totally the argument that well, something is better than nothing. But so if I would if I would have guessed, I would have maybe put a one and 99 because I don't see. I don't know. I don't know. I don't see why zero and 100. So the box with zero and 100 is rational. But the box with one and 99 is irrational. Well, I don't know if the best is not the best response. Sorry. It's not the best response of Alice to the strategy A of Bob. If Alice thinks that Bob is playing A, the best response of Alice is to play zero. Okay. Could you repeat that, please? I was. If Alice, if Bob is playing A, the best response of Alice is to play zero. Oh, yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Okay. Yes. And so the fixed point of the best response is zero 100. Okay, I get it. When when you have to compute a Nash equilibrium in a game like this, you have to look at the fixed point of the best responses. Then you can think whether this makes sense, whether this you can make all the speculation, but the Nash equilibrium is defined in this way. And this is the way in which rational agents, rational individual will behave. Okay. I got it. Thank you. Awesome. Okay. So very good. So in the lecture notes, in the lecture that you find on the website, there is also this discussion about the tragedy of the commons, which is essentially the same situation as the prisoner's dilemma, but in a different context when there are many agents. And again, it's a situation where many players interact. And the social optimum is very different from the Nash equilibrium. So rational individuals end up overexploiting a system. And at the end of it, getting an outcome, which is much worse than what they would get at the social optimum. And this is essentially what happens whenever you have problems which involve common goods. Okay. Common goods are goods that essentially everybody can use. And everybody can exploit. Okay. But if everybody does so, then the quality of this good deteriorates. And nobody, there is no provision of this good by individuals. Okay. So this is a very interesting example and very relevant for economic behavior. Say for example, climate change is one of these problems, where essentially carbon emissions so the atmosphere is one and essentially everybody has incentives to emit because of industry production. But if everybody does so, then the atmosphere will get very bad and we will get global warming and okay, and we will have a lot of problems. Okay. So that is a situation where essentially the Nash equilibrium, the individual behavior, rational individual behavior leads to very bad outcomes. Okay. Okay. So now you can think about the Nash equilibrium that we define is always unique and the answer is clearly no. And one example of this is what is called the battle of the sexism. So this is the game between two persons and she wants to go to the opera and he wants to go to boxing max. And but they love each other. So they better go hang out together then just one go to the opera and the other goes to boxing. Okay. So the payoff matrix can be something like this. And so if this is she, she prefers to go to the opera to the boxing and he prefers to go to boxing and to the opera. And you see that there are two Nash equilibria. One is where both go to the opera and the other is where both go to boxing. Okay. And so there is another situation where you see that Nash equilibrium as we have defined it does not always exist. And this is the situation of matching pennies. So matching pennies is well the problem we have defined at the beginning. And you see that if I play head, then the best response of player two is to play tail, but the best response of player one is to play tail, then head tail, etc. So there is no fixed point of best responses. Then you ask why is this situation. So there is no Nash equilibrium here. Okay. But what you can realize is that when this is think you should expect this because this is the same situation as when you have a penalty kick in football. Okay. So the player has to choose whether to kick on the left or on the right. And the goalkeeper has to decide whether to go on the left or on the right. Okay. And the goalkeeper wins if he goes in the same direction as the player. And the player wins in the other situation. Okay. So what is the best strategy for the player in this case? Well, it should behave in a way that is as random as possible. So he should not, he should play this, he should kick this penalty in a way that the goalkeeper has no clue of whether he's going to go on the left or on the right. Okay. And he did, this is the idea also in this matching pennies. So then you should introduce the random randomized strategies. These are called mixed strategies. And a mixed strategy is nothing but a probability distribution on the possible strategies. Okay. So these strategies now are called pure strategies and these are probability distribution called mixed strategies. So you can define a mixed strategy of an agent, the mixed strategy of the opponent. And you can generalize the notion of the payoff matrix to the expected payoff. Okay. So this is the expected payoff under mixed strategy sigma i. Again, mixed strategy sigma j. Okay. And likewise, you can generalize the notion of the best response. It's just the best response to a mixed strategy sigma minus i is what maximizes the expected payoff. Okay. And then you can define and now what a Nash equilibrium is. And it's exactly the same as before. It's essentially a Nash equilibrium is a situation where whatever you play, you cannot increase your expected payoff. Okay. And then the final thing. So, okay, so this is an example of matching pennies, how you compute this for matching pennies. And maybe let me discuss this and then I'll just flash the result, the main result. Okay. So how do you compute the Nash equilibrium mixed strategy? So imagine that you have matching pennies and player one plays head with probability r and tail with probability one minus r. Player two plays head with probability q and tail with probability one minus q. Okay. So then what you have to do is to find out what is the expected payoff of player one if you place a mixed strategy r against a mixed strategy q.  And what you find is essentially that this is two r minus one times two q minus one. And this is the opposite of what player two gets. Okay. So given this function here, you can find out what is the best response for player one if he plays against q. Okay. And you find that this has this shape. So the best response of player one against q is this line here is essentially playing r equal to zero. So playing tail as long as player two plays head with probability less than one half because then it will get this one with higher probability. And then to play tail with probability to play head sorry with probability one if q is larger than one half. And the best response is exactly this line this yellow line here. Okay. You can do the same for player two and find what is the best response of player two against r. Then you plot the best response of player two on these axes and against r on the other axis. And here you get another line like this. And you find that the fixed point is exactly at the point one half one half, which means that the two players should randomize. And this is the only Nash equilibrium. Okay. So and to finish with this essentially so Nash proved in 1950 that any finite normal form games admits at least one Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. So if you have a finite game there will always be a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. Okay. So this is what I wanted to tell you about today. So as an exercise you can compute Nash equilibria all the Nash equilibria in the battle of the sexes. And I think we have to stop here maybe if there are a couple of questions we can address them. Let's see what is in the chat. So there are still discussing about the ultimatum games. I think this discussion can be endless. So is there any burning question? I remind you that you can find these things discussed more in detail on the website. And but if there is a burning question then we can address them or otherwise take a little bit of break. Professor I have a question. Yes please. I was just wondering what happens when our concept of rationality instead of relies on optimizing for the individual becomes objective for the coming out. Okay so this is so what I'm discussing here is actually called non-cooperative game theory. Okay non-cooperative because essentially players do not cooperate. Okay there is another branch of game theory which is called the cooperative game theory which is the branch of game theory that tells you how you should for example design a treaty between different parties between different nations for examples. And that is a different subject that I'm not discussing here. So what we are discussing here is non-cooperative games. Thank you. Thank you for the answer for the question because this is very important. Professor. Yeah. I have a question. I remember studying Nash equilibrium in the context of networks. Is there a difference between Nash equilibrium in networks and in this context of game theory or is it basically the same thing or is there a plus in studying with networks or something like that? Okay so this is the definition of games that you find in books of game theory. Okay so this is how a game is defined. Then there has been a lot of research and a lot of work by different people by studying games on networks. Okay so putting games on network means that you have to define this way of matrices and these strategies for agents on the network. Okay and which is not very so I mean what they would like to say is that as you have seen is that already in a simple situation the mathematics can be very complicated. Okay so if you and you can extend what I've been saying here to any complicated situation but the question is whether you will be able to compute Nash equilibrium or not. Okay in many cases people have studied simple processes like for example you can study what is called the water model. So the water model is a model of opinion dynamics and you can study it on the on the network on a network. Okay so this is not a game. I mean it's not a it's not a model that you can really define as being a really a game because if you think about it well there is no utility function there is no rational really rational behavior behind it. Okay so yeah so I don't know whether I upped something or I made more confusion. No I think I think it's it's it's clear right now thank you. Okay so for mixed strategies the Nash equilibrium is now dependent on the probability Q of using a strategy yes the Nash equilibrium specifies what is the mixed strategy. So by the way the strategies S is a particular case of a mixed strategy when Q is equal to zero or Q is equal to one. Okay so mixed strategy when you go from strategy to mixed strategy you enlarge the space of possible strategies. Okay but the original strategies are still there. Okay so I think we need to take at least five minutes break before Guido's lecture. So thank you very much and we'll meet again tomorrow.


This is stock number H8175B. We are here at Summit Automotive in Fond du Lac, Wisconsin. You're new and used SUV headquarters. Today we are checking out this super clean 2010 GMC terrain. This vehicle has the 3.0L V6 motor which pumps out 264 horsepower from this HD video. You'll be able to tell that for the age and miles on this vehicle. It is in really nice condition. It has a projector lamp headlamps, the factory fog lights, carbon black metallic is the color. This one comes with the 19 inch factory alloy rims with the chrome covers and it has Fuzion touring tires. These are 235, 55R19s and these tires have I'd say probably close to 80, 85% of the tread left. Lots of tread left on those tires. I didn't see any dents or dings on that front fender. The hood is nice and clean on this vehicle. I didn't see any dents or dings on that. We shoot all of our videos in 1080p so if you have HD capabilities on your computer tablet or smartphone device, turn them on now. Because it is like you're right here looking at the vehicle with me. Rims are very clean on this vehicle. And as we go down this side of the vehicle you can see just how clean the body is. How reflective and mirror like that paint is. We take these HD videos so if you are far away or even if you're close by and you just cannot make the trip down. You can still see the vehicle, hear the vehicle and have confidence in what you're looking at before you even get here. Down this side I can honestly say I didn't see any dents or dings. Very very clean. Back rim is in excellent condition as well.  And the back tires have just as much tread as the front tires. What's nice about these rims if you ever do a wreck or anything they're just little covers. So you can always just change those out pretty easily and inexpensively. As we go around to the rear bumper no dents, dings or cracks on that. Very nice condition. Does have the dual exhaust. There is a small receiver hitch on the back probably for a bike rack. Would be my guess. The rear gate is very clean. This is a power lift gate.  Back storage area is in very nice clean condition. Does have a speaker back here. Has a spare tire and the jack tools for it. Those seats do fold down for extra storage which we'll check out in just a minute. And it does have the power gates so you press that button and it will come on down for you. Also has a backup camera which we'll check out in a little bit. You can really see that metal flake in the paint. Got a nice sparkle to it. And as we go down this side of the vehicle just as clean as that passenger side. I didn't see any major dents or dings down this side. Very nice and clean and you can see just how reflected that paint is. Considering it is an eight year old vehicle just in really nice shape.  There are no rips or tears on these seats. Both of these seats are heated. Power driver seat, memory driver seat, factory floor mats throughout. Power windows, power locks and power mirrors. This one has the Pioneer sound system. And as we hop inside here you can see that indeed this vehicle does have 115,403 miles. So considering the miles on this vehicle just in excellent shape all the way around. Leather wrap steering wheel that's in great shape as well. Bluetooth audio controls, cruise controls on that side. This one has AM, FM and Sirius XM satellite radio capabilities.  Passenger floor mat is in nice shape as well. And the passenger seat is really clean as well. No rips or tears on that. Up here is where your backup camera shows up in the mirror. And then it does have on-star capabilities as well. And then this one does have the power sunroof which is up there. We will take a quick look at the back seats and then we will check out under the hood. Back seats are just as clean as the front seats. There are no rips, there are no tears back here. Does have the latch child safety system for your car seats. Floor mats back here as well. And these seats do fold down for extra storage. They go almost completely flat. They have this little plastic piece so nothing falls in but behind there. And we will take a quick look under the hood. Under the hood we have the 3.0 liter V6 motor. As you can see that shock holds the hood up nicely. This vehicle has been fully safe and inspected by our service shop. It has a fresh oil and filter change. All the fluids have been checked and topped off. This vehicle has been gone through 100% and is 100% mechanically ready to go. And to see more pictures of this vehicle or one of our other 400 new and used cars, trucks, SUVs, minivans, Wranglers, you name it, we got to go to our website. www.SummitAuto.com Full pictures and descriptions of every single vehicle on our lot. Videos of every single used vehicle that we have all at SummitAuto.com. Thank you so much for checking out this video. If you want to make this GMC terrain years today, give us a call right now at<PHONE_NUMBER>. Ask for one of our sales associates to make this vehicle years today. Once again, that number is<PHONE_NUMBER>. Thanks again for checking out the video. If you want to check out more, go to www.youtube.com. And the second you'll see a link to subscribe to our YouTube channel on your left. A link to more used inventory on your right. And if you haven't been to our website on the bottom, a link to this vehicle on our website, click those check us out. We thanks for checking out this super clean 2010 GMC terrain SLT. Thanks again.


Hi everyone, Joe for Jaspy's CaseBreaks.com doing a filler break, 2020 Tops Stadium Club Baseball Blaster Edition, Random Team Break number one, with eight of those chronicles baseball double header spots being given away. If you're watching live, we just have to sell out a handful of spots straight up and do one more of these, then we're in break, so we can get that done tonight. Alright, so two different dice rolls. The first dice roll will be for the break itself, and the second dice roll will be for the giveaway part. So let's roll it and randomize it. Four and a five, nine times for names and teams. Big thanks to all of these names here for making this happen. Thanks for taking the risk on this filler. One, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, and ninth and final time. Nine times for the teams. One, two, three, four, ninth and final time. Alright, no trade windows here, but here's the first half of the list. There's the second half of the list. And let's just print and rip. Thanks everybody here for getting in on the action. Appreciate it. And that's your wide vision box topper exclusive to this set. Let's see what we have in here first. I do like the look of stadium club. The photography is always pretty excellent in this. Power zone insert, Eloy Jimenez. Let's see how cool that photography is. That's awesome. And we've got Charlie Morton orange. It's pretty cool. That's for Colin and Tampa Bay. Got a red foil right here, Willie Castro. Like that elephant pat.  It looks like the same thing. I'll go to Oakland. That'll be for Monty. The red foil, Willie Castro will go to Detroit. That's going to be for Asa. There's an Ichiro, Chrome. Cody Belanger, red foil, and Adon, Matt Engling. Belly will go to Corey and the Dodgers. And then the Chrome Ichiro, that's Seattle edition. That's going to go to Brian. All right, and the wide vision box topper is going to be Glaber Day, Glaber Torres. That's pretty cool. All right, so that'll go to Carlos and the Yankees. And there you go, ladies and gentlemen, nice break now. Let's flip back here. Let's see who's going to win those spots. Let's grab everybody's names once more. New dice, new list. And it's going to be the top eight names after 10, four to six, 10 times. Good luck. One, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine. And good luck, 10th and final time. So it's the top eight. So from nine on down, it's sad times. But I appreciate everybody giving this a shot. Thank you. Much happier times, though, for the top eight, you're in. That Chronicles double header break. We can get that done tonight, jasphyscasebreaks.com. Eric, you're in. George, Steven, Ian, Brian, Colin, Corey, and Martin. All of you are in. Congrats to the top eight. And for everybody else, remember, we've got to do one more of these and sell some spots out straight up. We'll get them next time. I'm Joe for jasphyscasebreaks.com. I'll see you next time. Bye-bye.


What's going on everyone? Sam here with late in sports cards. We are ripping 21-22, Penino Mosaic, basketball choice, 20 mocks, full case break number two, tiered random team style. There's a look again at your random results. As always, you can find these on the website under the results tab as well as the link that's in chat. So good luck here everybody. Let's do it. Yeah, Flawless. You're talking about Flawless. Yeah, they still released those. Yeah. Yeah. Football came out like collegiate football came out relatively recently. Baseball came out a few months ago and then basketball was probably coming out within the next month or so I would think. It keeps getting pushed back. One at the end. Box one. Kind of. It's kind of like Spectra and Mosaic together to some degree smack. All right. Jayden Springer. The Sixers. Cade Cunningham for the Pistons. All right. Silver Jalen Green. Nice one there. And Mosaic is Marvin Bagley for the Pistons. That's so weird to see. Nice one here. Dominique Wilkins. That's going to the Hawks. Congrats on that. No, this is sick. Damon Lillard on the Black Gold. Go to the Blazers. There you go. Steven W. Four of eight. Let's go. Like this one. Sick one there. Congrats. We've got Dallin O'Bent and Rookie to 88 for the Raptors and Carl Anthony Towns to 88 for the Timberwolves. I have not actually, Joshua, is it nice or no? What are your thoughts? What's up, Jonathan? How you doing, buddy? Corey Kispert for the Wizards and Herbert Jones for the Pelicans. Silver Lucanard. That is a John and Kaminga. Otto Rookie is going to be Brandon Boston Jr. Nice one there. That's going to the Clippers. Jimmy Butler to 88 for the Heat. A Bradley Beale to 88 for the Wizards. And a Josh Hart to 88 for the Trailblazers. Yeah, it's a nice dame for sure. Really nice dame coming out of there. Very happy with that. Phoenix PYT. What team did you grab, Jonathan? Nice, dude. And I kind of want to grab the Ravens in a half case of Phoenix. See if I can chase some Kyle Hamilton. I'm sure Ray Lewis has something in there too. Trayman and Isaiah Jackson. We've got Lucanard, Silver, Mosaic, Cam Thomas. Nice one there, Pat. Smart, smart man. Keras Levert. That's going to be our first auto. Going to the Cavaliers. We've got Black Gold just in holiday. Two of eight. Going to the Kings. Nice one there. Sack Town. Joel B on the Tier 2 hit. Kentavius called Well Pope to 88. And a Devon Bissell to 88. 26 in the third. Good god, dude. JT Thor, that is for the Hornets. And Usman Garuba, the Goofy Garuber, going to the Rockets. Silver Evan Fornia. And nice, Cade Mosaic rookie. Nice one there for the Pistons. Grats on that, Pistons. We've got, going to the Knicks. Kenny Skywalker. Nice one there on the Mosaic Auto, or the Choice Auto I should say. Kenny Skywalker. We've got a THT to 88 for the Lakers. Isaiah Stewart, nice beef stew going to the Pistons to 88. And Jared Butler Rookie to 88 for the Jazz. Trying to be strategic. Smart, smart. Joshua Primo. And Davion Mitchell. Nice one there. Got a Silver Miles McBride. This is nasty. And Mosaic Clay Thompson. How about this? We've got going to the Celtics. Jason Tatum. Boom, let's go Tom B. Congrats, buddy, on the JT for Trey. That's nasty. Jason Tatum. Congrats on that. We've got Isaiah Jackson to 88. Isaiah Jackson to 88 again. And Ricky Rubio for the Pacers. 74 and 75 of 88 too. Look at that. 74 and 75. It's up, Chad. Owens to the next one. And Bones Highland. And Jeremiah Robinson. We've got Udo Autonomy. Jay Crowder. There's a Jaden Springer. Nice one there for the Sixers. Rookie Audit. We've got a Terence Ross to 88. A Black Gold Monte Morris. One of eight for the Nuggets. Nice one there. And Zair Williams to 88 as well. The Jago down. What is that? A little behind, probably. Oh, it's back, gotcha. Okay, that's not bad then. There's a Mobley. Exclusive. And Josh Giddy. Nice one there. We've got Jimmy Butler-Silver. Lonzo Ball Mosaic. Followed by Corey Kisper on the Rookie Audit. Nice one there going to the Wizards. Congrats Wizards. Tier 2 hit for Bobby. We've got a Miles Turner to 88 for the Pacers. A Cole Anthony to 88 for the Magic. And Evan Mobley, National Pride, 42 of 88 for the Cavaliers. There you go, Justin. Grats, buddy. I got the under on that game. Oh boy. Peacock coming out of here. Good luck, everybody. Evan Mobley, Exclusive. And John and Kominga, Exclusive. Silver, Luca Garza. And Laurie Markinen, Mose. We've got Chris Duarte. Choice Rookie Auto, that's going to the Pacers. Nice one there, Jaime D on the Tier 2. We've got Nikolay Yolkic to 88. Hey, Isaac Acoro to 88 for the Cavs. And a Mosaic Rookie, Usman Garuba, the Goofy Garuber going to Steve S. in the Rockets. Congrats, Steve. Usman Garuba for the Rockets. And Isaiah Todd. There's Isaac Acoro, Silver. Stuff Curry, nice one there. Nice one here going to Steven W. Evan and Anthony Davis on the autographs. The Brow. Congrats on that. Nice AD coming your way. There you go, Steven. We've got Justin Holliday to 88. Hey, Gary Trent Jr. to 88. And then Evan Mobley, another one, 36 of 88. That's the true Evan Mobley. Congrats on that there again. Justin. I know, so I was going to say speaking of is right. Scotty Barnes and Keon Johnson. Silver is Jalen Brunson as well as a Mosaic Rudy Gobert. We've got Jason Preston, nice one there for the Clippers on the Rookie Auto choice exclusive. We've got Boban to 88 for the Mabs. We've got Adil and Brooks to 88 for the Grizzlies. And a Frank Jackson to 88 for the Pistons. They'll do it for the first half of the case on to the second half of the case now. Usman Garuba for the Rockets. Isaiah Todd for the Wizards. There's Lonnie Walker, Spurs as well as a Monte Morse Mosaic for the Nuggets. Nice one here is going to be going to the Cavs. Mark Price on the Auto. Congrats on that again there, Justin. Love me some Mark Price. Such a beast. Super underrated point guard in the 80s and 90s. There's a Donovan Mitchell for the Jazz to 88 and another Peacock. Patrick Beverly to 88 for the Timberwolves. And RJ Barrett, nice one there for the Knicks on the Peacock. Congrats on that New York. That is Phil Kaye. I'm looking for the Falcons too. Falcons are a good price I'm pretty sure in the PYTs because they'll be a tier one team for sure. What's up? Thanks for the follow there Lucas. Austin Reeves. And Franz Wagner for the Magic. Silver Ebonforne, Franz Wagner Mosaic. Nice one there. Auto is going to be for the Pistons. Rookie of Luca Garza. Nice one there. Congrats Pistons. We've got another Evan Mobley. This time a debut to 88. We've got Keldon Johnson to 88 for the Spurs. And Jalen Brown to 88 for the Celtics. Alfred Schengun for the Rockets. And Sondro for the Bucks. Sondro Mamakalishvili. Cat and Yanis. Nice one there. Another nice one here we've got for the Sons. The Round Mound of Rebound. Charles Barkley going to Neil B. Congrats buddy. Nice Barkley auto coming your way. We've got RJ Hampton for the Magic. It's going to be a Black Gold Franz Wagner. Five of eight going to the Magic. There you go Bobby. Congrats buddy. Let's go. Nice one there. Franz will mad that one for you Magic. And a Primo to 88. Really nice hit right there. Gorgeous Franz. Let's get a Nebula out of this. Jalen Suggs. And Dearon Sharp. It's been a good case overall. It's been a very good case. Luke Canard and Josh Christopher Rookie. We've got next auto is going to be Jonathan Kaminga going to the Warriors. Nice one there. Golden State. It's tie end with the Warriors. Congrats buddy. You've got to 88 is Al Horford. Hey Jamarant for the Grizzlies to 88. Nice one there. And Gordon Hayward to 88 for the Hornets. Yeah this case is hot dude. This is a hot case right here. Trayman and Isaiah Jackson. I feel like we're not done yet either. That is Silver Tobias Harris and LaMarcus Aldridge. Got a Bones Highland Rookie Auto. Nice one there. Let's go into the Nuggets. There you go Denver. That's going to be Clint B. Got to 88. OG and not to be. Nice. Jalen Green National Pride to 88. And Black Gold another Franz Wagner. This time the debut. Go into the magic. Bob H. Oh my gosh dude. Back to back Franz Black Golds. That's nuts dude. That is so nuts. Holy cow. We'll get that one back too. That's insane.  Next one here. That's crazy. Crazy that that just happened. Jonan and Kaminga for the Warriors. And Greg Brown. Got Cole Anthony Silver. Denny Avdea. Back to back boxes that had a Franz Wagner Black Gold. There's James Bookknight. Nice one there. Going to the Hornets. Congrats Charlotte. Followed by to 88 Moses Moody. Taylor Horton Tucker to 88. And Isaiah Stewart. Beef stew to 88.  That's so insane. Hopefully there's a Nebula. Probably I mean I can imagine there probably won't be but hopefully there is. There's a Peacock as well. Herbert Jones for the Pelicans. And Jalen Suggs. Clinton Portis or Bobby Portis. Clinton Portis. Evan Mobley. Mosaic.  You just all got jingled. Joe Engels going to Stephen W. with the Blazers.  You just got jingled. Send this to three of your friends to totally jingle them too. We've got Giannis on Tentacumpo to 88. Nice one there. Hey Malik Beasley to 88 for the Timberwolves. And Peacock Mackismat. Nice one there. Going to the Celtics. Congrats on that Tom. Nice Peacock buddy.  Another Peacock. Trayman. And Isaiah Jackson. We've got a Silver Evan Mobley. And Eric Gordon. Nice one here. Manu Janobly on the auto. Congrats on that Spurs. That's going to Clint B on the tier two spot Manu. We've got Luca to 88. Hey Zach Levine to 88. And Peacock Desmond Bain. Nice one there for the Grizzlies. There you go Memphis. That's going to Jaime D. Nice uh second year Desmond Bain. Yeah four Peacocks. More than there was uh more than that.  Yeah there was probably like four or five black golds. Maybe even more. Davion Mitchell. And Jaden Springer. Got Miles Turner. Shack on the uh um black golds are number to eight. Yes they're number to eight. There's a Karris Levert. Nice one there for the Cavaliers. Congrats Justin. Karris Levert. We've got Nikolay Okich to 88. Michael Porter Jr to 88. And Usman Garuba Rookie to 88. My favorite player by Trey Young. Right now I'm a Hawks fan so I probably have to go with Trey Young or maybe Deandre Hunter. One or the other. Davion Mitchell exclusive. And Kade Cunningham exclusive. We've got Silverjaw and Mosaic Kyrie. Nice one here to end it too. Going to the Wizards. Bob H on the tier two. That is going to be Bradley Beale. On the auto. That's pretty cool. Take a Bradley Beale on. We've got Josh Giddy to 88 for the Thunder. Hey McCall Bridges to 88 for the Suns. And Ben Simmons to 88 for the Nets. 35 of 88 on the Simmons. Let's do a quick recap here everybody. This was awesome dude. This was really awesome. We've got Peacocks, Desmond Bain, Marcus Smart, R.J. Barrett and Usman Garuba. We had Autos, Anthony Davis Lakers, Chris Thuarte Pacers, John Nickmango Warriors, Corey Kispert Wizards, Jaden Springer Sixers, Charles Barkley Suns, Joe Ingalls for the Blazers, Karris Levert Kapps, Montage and Obley Spurs, Bradley Beale Wizards, Luca Garza Pistons, James Booknight for the Hornets, Bones Island Nuggets, Jason Preston Clippers, Mark Price Cabs, Kenny Skywalker for the Nicks, Karris Levert again for the Cabs, Brandon Boston Jr. for the Clippers, Dominique Wilkins for the Hawks. We had Black Gold, Damian Lillard, four of eight, Jason Tatumotto. How about two different Franz Wagner Black Golds, both numbered to eight. Four of eight and five of eight for the Magic. Unbelievable, dude. That will do it for the break. Thank you guys again for the fill. Next up, Ten Box Tuesday.


Jackie used the word perseverance to describe the last one. How would you just describe this one overall? Yeah, just overall, you know, we talk about the mental and the physical approach to today's game.  And our group did. We got punched early. I think we responded to different segments of the game, showed a lot of resolve and just stayed together. And we got rewarded for it, Megan. What was the difference, especially in those last two quarters, the third and the fourth, but in those last couple of minutes in that fourth quarter when you guys were able to rally down from 10? Yeah, I think overall, I think two things really stood out. We were able to turn them over in the second half, which we weren't able to do in the first half. So that showed our ability to really get into the basketball, create some havoc without filing. And then another piece of just staying together. It was too many times where, you know, we got down four late in the game. We still persevered. We were down 12 at half. We continued to push forward. So a lot of big plays by a lot of guys out there. Jock, to your point, in your experience when you have a win like this, down 17 against the champs and play the way you did down the stretch, how much of a carryover is that then moving forward, knowing that this group can do what it did? Yeah, Nick, it means a lot because, you know, you get in a position where, I think, we're starting to figure some things out. And so that's evidence to our guys what it looks like down the stretch, what our defense looks like. I think our guys were pretty... It's a tough team to play against. No style is like there. So your approach to the game has to be spot on. I think we settled in and did some really good things in the second half. So we've had some quarters that we've been able to stream together. And we want to stack some more quarters together. But it means a lot to finish the trip, especially you're down at halftime, not give in and be mentally tough enough to get it done. Yeah, I think guys are starting to figure it out together. I think the defensive in, I'll take that approach first, is we really cover for each other. Nick's been great at the rim. We've really gotten into the basketball. Schematically, we've been in a good place, whether that was the amount of threes that they shot tonight kept them under their average. So that was what we wanted to do. And then, you know, what groups we finished with, we've learned how to, like I talked about before, finish with Nick, with Ben, with Nick and Ben, without one of those guys, ball in Kai's hands, ball in Seth's hands. So guys are gaining confidence in each other of what we want to do, especially at the end of games. And the Warriors' game plan was to put Nick Clarkson at the free throw line. How would you just describe how he was able to kind of navigate through that? And can you discuss your decision of kind of keeping him into the game, just a few more extra more seconds and minutes there?  And this is great for Nick, because he's going to be counted on when the playoffs come around. And if a team wants to use that strategy, he'll continue to gain confidence in getting to the line and shooting. And so we kept him out there. He'll continue to be out there if a team wants to take that strategy. You guys didn't force a ton of turnovers tonight. You really haven't forced a lot all year. What were you able to do, though, late to get some timely ones? Usually you guys are more likely to come over to block than you are stills. What would you do there technically? Yeah, we really got into the basketball, Brian. So all their stuff was predicated on the freedom of movement and being able to pass the basketball. So we really climbed into whoever was going to be delivering passes. We got deflections that way.  And so then that pass has a little bit less timing. So overall, our pressure on the basketball, if there was one thing in the second half, was huge. So, Jock, how can you explain Kyrie's play? I mean, really amazing tonight and really care of your team. He's been really good. He's been really good at picking the spots of understanding when we need him to take over the game, of understanding how to be a decoy sometimes, how to be a screener. So different levels of the game that he's able to produce for us. And big buckets at the end of the game, whether it was getting fouled, rebounds, just big plays. I think he loves that moment. And he's continued to show so. Coach, what made you decide to finish the game by the way that you did? Yeah, good to see you, partner. I think overall, we've had some success when we've been able to space the floor, put the ball in Ky and Seth's hand, have the shooting around him. I mean, Joe hits a huge corner three ball because we're used to watching Abbey's in the game and spaces the floor and can screen and can run the floor. So capitalizing on our roster. And if the team presents itself, we can have space and attack downhill, we will. And with Kyree, it would appear that that Steph Curry-Kyree battle that we've seen for the years brings something added to what Kyree rises to that particular challenge. Are you seeing the same thing? It's just how can you not be a fan of basketball? This is a great game, unbelievable athletes, two of the premier athletes at their position, trying to get their team to win. And so I think it brings out the best and all really competitive athletes. That's one of the special things about this game. I talk about it all the time is being able to look across the guy that you're competing against and try to win against him. Jack, I think tomorrow marks the two-week update on Kevin. From the updates you've gotten and been given in the last few days, how is he coming along as he goes through his rehab? Yeah, Nick, I really kind of said in two weeks, let me know something. So you and I will know something the same time tomorrow, which is the two-week mark. So besides that, having asked for an update, and I'm looking forward to the two-week update. For Royce O'Neill at this point, how many game-winning shots like that do you think you'll have by the end of the regular season? And what can you just say to a guy who can always step in and knock a big time shot like down? Mega, everyone keeps asking, what is Royce bringing to the table? And I think another example of a guy that you trust at the end of a game who will take the right shot, who will make the right decision at the end of the game, who doesn't mind playing on both ends of the floor. I think he has the trust of his coaching staff, his teammates, and he's in the right spot. And great pass by Kai to reward Royce and to make the shot. Best clutch win percentage in the league. And one month away from the All-Star weekend right now. So what's your vision for the team, especially when Katie's missing from the games? Let me knock on some wood with that clutch percentage. We like to keep that going. I think overall, just our group continue to grow together and figure out things a little bit on the fly and also at the same time, take advantage of what we do well. And it's not going to go away from being simple on the defensive end of the floor, playing hard, being accountable. I think you saw that tonight. That's carried us without Kevin. That will continue to carry us. And then guys are getting reps and understanding of what's expected of them. That's huge for our team. Your expectations on a nightly basis. So no one's confused. So we're getting there. Because I think clutch win percentage really shows something. All the best teams have a really high clutch win percentage. So what's the key to the success of winning a game, knocking it down? Yeah. The coach doesn't try to mess it up and get in the way. Let the players do what they do. I get special players. Let them play with their instincts. Coach, don't screw it up and live with the results.


Hello and welcome to MIP TV, and in this edition of MIP TV, Bob Cook is joining us to talk about one of his favourite books, and this is a number of interviews in a series of reviews on books that Bob's read through the years that has informed his practice, so Bob, what book are you going to be reviewing today? I'm going to review a wonderful book by Inge Stuart, a fan joins. Inge Stuart is a well-known TA person, he's written many, many books, but he's probably his best known for this book, and it's called Transactional Analysis Today, often called TA Today, and I think it's sort of like pretty pertinent that I'm reviewing this book today because, of course, one of the founders of TA died a couple of days ago, and that was Claude Steiner. And, you know, Ian and Claude knew each other, and Ian's book really is a wonderful accessible book, with regards to all the TA concepts, the burn, and many of the other TA authors, or people that followed burn, and their concepts, he's put them all together, and him and Van joins have written this very accessible book for people interested in TA in the first time, or indeed students. This is a textbook, really, but I think it's the most accessible textbook on TA on the market. So that's a really solid introduction to the book, Bob. For those of you who are watching at home, we're going to put a slide up now so you can see the book and the title, and we're going to pop in the comments bar below, in the link bar below this video, a link to it, so if you wanted to examine it or buy it, you could have a look at it. And just to be clear, this isn't a sponsored video, so we're not sponsored by the book company or by anyone else, this is just Bob exploring his books. So, Bob, how do you use this book in teaching practice? How is it effective for students or indeed tutors? Well, you know, if you talk to, I think, most TA students or people who have gone on to be TA there because they all have this book on their bookshelf, it's usually the first year they're required to buy this book, and it's got a wonderful set of exercises after these chapters which brings the concepts alive. And it's the number one book in the 101, which is the TA introduction to the whole process, and I use it particularly to explain very sophisticated concepts easily and use the exercises they actually have at the end of each chapter, which is very good and allows a person to really live concepts as well. So, it's got a lot of experience exercises. There's a sort of book which you will probably keep with you for the whole of your training and dip in, especially for the essays. Yeah, I'd agree on that, Bob. I did the TA 101 with you, and I also taught TA as a comparative therapy. I'm not a TA trainer, but taught it as a comparative therapy. And one of the things I liked about this book was that it was just a treasure trove of information. It was easily accessible, but not only that, there were some really solid exercises, experiential exercises at the end of each chapter. And I know that we were talking earlier before we recorded this about scripts and the drama triangle. Do you want to expand on that, Bob? Yeah, I was just saying that the drama triangle, which is the three psychological positions used to analyse games, victim, persecutor, reshka, which a lot of TA therapists love, and it's really well explained in this book. And it's got some wonderful examples of the categories of games and how we out of awareness fall into these positions and what we need to do to be able to ask clinicians not only understand where we are, but actually be able to look at how we can help people change these psychological positions. And there's a wonderful chapter that I particularly like as well on rackets. I was just thinking of an exercise I've got there, which is you've been in a supermarket for an hour, buying all your goods, and you get to the actual checkout.  And of course, under stress, people often fall into what is called a racket or substitute feeling. And it's a really good exercise to look at what happens to people under stress and when they fall into the script position. So there's exercises like that, which bring the concepts alive. There's also case studies, which bring the concepts alive, and it covers all the major concepts within TA in a very accessible world, and it's very well written. And it's a wonderful bibliography at the back of each chapter, which shows all the relevant books in TA. So it's a goal of mine for students, but it's also wonderful people just coming to TA for the first time to get there. There are sort of hands on the concepts for the first time. And again, it's very useful to be able to reflect their skills and look how the concepts are used clinically and all round is a wonderful book. And that's why I see it as one of my favourites, because I've still got it, for example, after 30 years, I dip in again for myself. And I've certainly dipped in it when I teach people the 101 and students on my course. So I probably will have it until the day I retire and pass it on to fellow students alike. Like a holy grail past the cross, Bob. The wisdom of the ages shed. And if you get the book and it's got my autograph on it, you're even better. Well, there you go. Well, I think that watch out on eBay for the autograph copy by Bob Cook of TA today. Always a pleasure, Bob, and clearly a book that informs you, your practice and has for many years. And I know from my own experience of teaching and speaking to your students, everybody has a copy of that book. So again, just to remind everybody, we'll put a link down below so people can just click on it and have a look. And as always, Bob, a real pleasure and thank you very much.