Hi, everyone. I'm just going to wait for everyone to come in and settle before we start. Right, so good evening from London at the Centre of Grand Strategy School of Security Studies at King's College London. And I welcome to our seminar on Myanmar's current crisis as Asia's next failed state and the first for Southeast Asia. My name is Anna Tan and I'm a doctoral student at the Law China Institute School of Global Affairs at King's and will be chairing this event today. Our panel will speak about the international and regional implications on the currently deteriorating situation in Myanmar following the coup on the 1st of February a couple of months ago, as the state is now verging towards total collapse as we speak. So I just want to notify that our audience, our third speaker, Dr. Mariah Baraki as initially listed has been unable to join us on short notice due to illness. So we have two speakers remaining for this event. And it is a timely event as well given that we have just several days ago we had the UN Human Rights High Commissioner Michelle Bashar that we just stated that Myanmar is heading towards a Syrian style civil war with several parallels that could be drawn from the 2011 initially peaceful protests in Syria that eventually turned into a large scale armed conflict and the protesters picking up arms out of desperation. And we are also aware of the upcoming ASEAN summit on the 24th of April with the commander in chief of the junta invited to the summit and not the members of the exiled government. So our panel discussion will try to take both of these things into account. And the way the panel is that our speakers will give their individual remarks, and I will be asking the panel if you nagging questions before opening the floor for questions from the audience, which you can send through to us during the panel at any time. It doesn't have to be until the speakers finish speaking. So if you feel free to specify in your questions if whenever you feel appropriate if your question is directed to a specific speaker or for the panel in general. So before we begin, I am very honored to introduce our speakers for today. We have Mr. Charles Petrie. Charles has had a very long distinguished career in the United Nations previously having served as an assistant secretary general. From 2003 to 2007 he was the UN humanitarian and resident coordinator for the Myanmar country team. And after leaving the UN in 2010 he led the Norwegian support to the peace process in Myanmar from 2012 to 2016. During his time in Myanmar he has previously served in numerous failing and fragile states during his time in the UN, including Sudan Somalia Rwanda during the Rwandan genocide, the DRC and Afghanistan. And also the head of the Secretary General's internal review panel IRP on the United Nations actions in Sri Lanka in 2012. Mr. Petrie was appointed officer of the Order of British Empire in 2014 for his services to international peace, security and human rights. We also have King's very own Dr. Alessio Patelano from the Department of War Studies. Alessio's research focuses on maritime strategy and doctrine, Japanese military history and strategy, East Asian security and Italian defense policy. In 2006 to 2015 he was a visiting professor in strategy at the Italian Naval War College, ISM in Venice. He is also currently an adjunct fellow at the Institute of Contemporary Asian Studies, Temple University, Japan and visiting professor at the Japan and maritime command and staff college. At King's Dr. Patelano is the director of the Asian Security and Warfare Research Group, the leading UK forum for research and education in East Asia. He is also a senior fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, RUSI and Policy Exchange, the leading think tanks on defense and security matters in the UK. So thank you both again very much for joining us and I now leave the floor to Charles Petrie, our first speaker. Thank you Anna and thank you for inviting me. I guess I'll start off by making two very obvious observations. The first is that the coup has failed and the second is that the Tatmado is losing the war. While through the utilization of overwhelming force, increasing firepower and unrestrained brutality, the Tatmado can probably defeat the peaceful protesters and bring down the civil disobedience movement. It will be at the cost of the destruction of the country. Unless urgent action is taken by key players, Myanmar is rapidly hurtling down the path of becoming ASEAN's first failed state. The coup launched on one February has opened up Pandora's Box. The commander-in-chief probably believed that the Tatmado could follow the old playbook of oppression and military occupation that had worked in the late 1980s, early 1990s and even 2007. But he hadn't counted on the fact that Myanmar today is a fundamentally different country. The people of Myanmar and especially the young have tasted the relative freedoms that came with the opening up of the country in 2011 and they are not prepared to give these three freedoms back. The young are leading this revolt and in so doing are following the examples of similar peaceful protest movements in Algeria, Belarus, Bolivia, Chile, Egypt, France, Georgia, Haiti, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Sudan, Thailand, Ukraine and even the US. In all of these places, the peaceful protests are led by a generation who through the mastering of the technology of social media are able to mobilize as never before and give voice to frustrations and articulate hopes. The coup today is a clear overreach by the military. Not only did it completely upend the progress towards democracy that was underway, but it threatens the interests of many from within the former regime of Senior General Tan Shui as well as regional players with major geopolitical stakes in the country. The coup has failed in part because the current Tatmado leadership has not realized how much less in control of the country they are when compared to the SPDC period of their forebearers. Today, many sectors of the economy are under the control of ruthless individuals or individuals or groups. What we're known as former cronies warlords and international criminal networks who have been allowed to operate with far greater independence. In the past, the regional commanders legitimize these operators, but since 2011 there has been no more, this is no longer being the case or there's been no more need for that. If the center implodes as a result of the misguided heavy handed Tatmado response to the protests, forces will be unleashed that would be impossible to contain. Compounding this bleak assessment of an economy in shambles, compounding this bleak assessment is an economy in shambles. The banking sector already extremely exposed before the coup is all but imploding. Activity is grounded to a halt. As a result, businesses are no longer able to make or receive payments. Individuals cannot access their cash and payrolls aren't being processed. Most imports and exports have come to a halt as custom staff and port workers have gone on strike and containers are backed up at ports. Possibly the most concrete evidence of economic collapse was reported to me by the academic and friend, Mary Callahan. It is to be found in the wet markets. Starting the second week of March, there have been days when it has been impossible to buy any form of protein. The reason being that farmers are hoarding everything in the rural areas, knowing hard times are ahead and not daring to drive the highways because of the Army checkpoints. The uncertainty of whether the markets will be stopped means that everyone in the wards, the basic administrative units of which tens of thousands exist around the country, show up adorn. Most are unmasked as they enter these enclosed spaces to crowd around sellers whose goods are priced at at least 25 and sometimes as much as 75% more than prior to the coup. On the health front, not a single surveillance PCR test has been carried out since February 1. All the while COVID rages almost out of control in Thailand and Cambodia. But even that is very hard to track, as all of the morgues are now under heavy surveillance and crematorium staff are being watched in case they tell anyone how many bodies they are moving through a day. May the April the Tatmador even declared COVID over and lifted stay at home restrictions. But in the midst of this strategy, there is another much more hopeful reality. A new political age has emerged in Myanmar. The socio political landscape that existed before February 1 has now fundamentally changed. A new generation of political activism has come to the fore. Until February 1, politics in Myanmar were basically in the hands of two separate groupings. On the one hand, there was the Bamar driven democracy movement that for the most part concerned the center of the center of the country and was led by Dao, An Sang Suu Kyi and the NLD. On the other, the search for an end to the insurgencies that concerned other ethnic nationalities and neither were really attuned to the struggle of the other. The ethnic armed organizations remained for the most part silent during the saffron revolution of 2007. And the democracy movement basically did not get involved in the subsequent peace processes. This reality of a new and transformative political awakening may not be sufficiently appreciated by the West, nor even adequately understood and taken on board by the opposition government, the NLD dominated CRPH. The CRPH and now the national unity government are focused on getting formal international recognition for its legitimacy. Almost it seems at the expense of other aspects of the crisis that affect ordinary people. The movement risks making the same mistakes as those made by the Syrian opposition. Such a strategy is even risky. Where this not to be achieved in the near future, the very success of the operation movement, opposition movement could actually be put in doubt by those who wish it to fail. Instead the CRPH and national unity government should engage in a more, in a much more effective, inclusive and sustained manner with the broad coalition of civil society, the protest movements, ethnic organizations and the civil disobedient movement. Such engagement has to be understood as the very essence of its legitimacy. Situations of state failure are not that easy to recover from. As examples elsewhere in the world have shown, a failed state is an environment of widespread corruption, criminality, involuntary movement of populations, sharp economic decline and violence. To paraphrase the 17th century philosopher Thomas Hobbes, life for the individual in a failed state is one of continual fear and the danger of violent death. It is basically solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, brutish and short. In Myanmar it is the most vulnerable, day laborers, people of South Asian descent, Muslim members of the Muslim community, upland farmers, the growing number of IDPs, peri urban slum dwellers who are inevitably the hardest hit in this economic and political crisis. It is critical to understand that the emergence from a failed state is not a simple question of filling a void. It demands the destruction of an existing criminal equilibrium as a pre-condition to even starting to establish forms of accountable governance. Compounding the complexities of any eventual re-establishment of governance in Myanmar is the seemingly systematic destruction of public documents. Every day wards or village offices are burned to the ground and all of the documentation contained within them destroyed. In a number of the most densely populated areas of Yangon, there are wards that no longer have records on any one of the inhabitants. It will take an extraordinary amount of effort to re-establish the local structures of administrative governance. The destruction of documents to preserve anonymity is only one facet of the emergence of armed struggle, which has paralleled the continuation of the peaceful protests and civil disobedience. The trajectory of an awakening of armed resistance has been easy to follow. Initially, in the first days of the coup, the confrontations were spontaneous encounters between the peaceful protesters and the police. But in early March, as the numbers of peaceful protesters killed started to mount, there was a turn to defensive postures. The peaceful protesters finding ways to protect themselves from the live ammunition. And then after mid-March and specifically the horrendous number of killings on the 27th, a growing number of young departed to prepare for potential urban guerrilla warfare. Myanmar is rapidly hurtling down, rapidly hurtling towards becoming a failed state, and the Tatmadaw is probably oblivious to the extent and consequences of their initial miscalculation. One should not underestimate the inability of the military to understand how desperate and volatile the socioeconomic conditions that they have created are actually becoming. Under the SPDC, the military lived with the fiction of double digit growth rates. During the period 2002 and 2007, the official GDP growth rates ranged from 12.2 to 13.6%, which would have put Myanmar on par with Singapore, which it clearly has never been. Literary literacy rates of more than 96% were also officially reported during the same period, figures that were never reflected in the realities encountered on the ground. It was this inability to understand the socioeconomic realities of the population that triggered the safton revolution following the dramatic price increases of fuel and compressed natural gas in August 2007. The Tatmadaw today is no different. It is an institution completely unable to comprehend the structural destruction of the state that it is causing. There is a very serious risk that Myanmar becomes ASEAN's first failed state. This will have dire consequences for regional peace and security. Immediate action is required to avert that Myanmar turns into a playground for foreign powers and criminal networks. The international community needs to start preparing a contingency plan for providing assistance in the new environment that will have become the failed state of Myanmar. The contingency plan will need to accommodate the deferring realities of supporting existing local governance structures of rural communities and assisting vulnerable populations caught up in an urban guerrilla war. Similarly, the United Nations must be made to assume its responsibility. Since the coup on 1st February, the UN has been constrained in its ability to play a strong and constructive role. This has been in part due to the unforeseen absence of its resident coordinator on sick leave, but also the UN special envoy not being able to gain access to Myanmar and the key players, a situation which is unlikely to change following the very strong, even if correct remarks she made to the Security Council. The UN needs to immediately develop a comprehensive strategy that includes close collaboration with ASEAN in the finding of a political solution, the complete reconfiguration of its presence on the ground, and a redefinition of the role of a future special envoy that focuses on coordinating the implementation of a comprehensive humanitarian plus response. Finally, the upcoming ASEAN summit provides a unique opportunity for the region to act. This opportunity must be seized. Five suggestions. First, ASEAN needs to convey to the Tatmador leadership very clear insights on what is state failure and expressed to the commander chief in the deep concerns that its neighbors have on how the situation in the country is evolving. Two, an immediate cessation of violence needs to be brought about so as to put a stop to the slaughter of innocent populations and to save what remains of administrative structures. Three, some form of consultation and dialogue needs to be initiated between all parties. However unpalatable it may seem for many that Tatmador has to be part of the discussions. Four, in the framework of a cessation of violence and other discussions, the deployment of UN ASEAN civilian observers need to be considered. And finally, five, the wider international community needs to start now preparing a contingency plan for providing large scale humanitarian and other vital assistance. Where the UN to have demonstrated its commitment and ability to engage with the broader international community, consideration should be given to offering the lead of such a collective effort to the organization under the auspices of a newly redefined special envoy role. Thank you. Thank you very much, Charles, for your insight on this very urgent issue. And I just wanted to remind our audience, and audience members that this event is recorded live. And just just to bear in mind that the recording will be available after the event ends on on the Kings YouTube channel. Secondly, we want to introduce our second speaker, unless you are from from Kings and messy off you go. Thank you very much for the opportunity to join the conversation today. First of all, I agree with everything that Charles just said so from the perspective of creating some sort of a controversial panel discussion. I'm afraid it's going to be pretty boring because if anything I'm going to double down or place what Charles just said in a broader context that fundamentally overlaps with his suggestions. And before I do so, I'd like also to make the point that I'm particularly pleased that that the event is taking place now. As things continue to evolve so it's a particularly timely opportunity to start exploring the conversation and I think the conversation and has to cushion important dimension. The one that really focuses on me and my and the situation on the ground and the inclusion of the political and fabric if you want. And based on what Charles just mentioned, but there is also second dimension and how Myanmar fits into the broader geopolitical landscape, both within Southeast Asia and Southeast Asia as part of the broader structural geopolitical that we can relate to the conversation over the in the Pacific evolution of the Asia Pacific sort of region as a whole, or as the United States of Japan and many of their allies including the UK today have it as as in the Pacific. And this is important because in some ways it raises key factors that might actually have an impact on how the situation evolves in particular, in reference to some of the suggestions that Charles was making in having different regional actors pushing different parties within Myanmar to try to come to an element of a conversation among themselves to improve the situation and preventing facts, the country from spalling into a situation of a failed state. I will touch upon three fundamental points. First, the, the, what I think the sort of the place where the local national links to the regional, and that is the, the, the military power imbalance within Myanmar, and who is contributing to create that imbalance because that is important in terms of how we explain, not with the standing and the role that Tom Maddow has had in precipitating the political and social situation to the place it is today. It also remains by far the most heavily harmed and therefore the stronger if you want voice in terms of material capabilities within the context of Myanmar. The second point I will touch upon concerns, something that towards the end of Charles also was talking about and that is the relationship between so first of all this about the national linking to the regional, the second how, how we define that regional space, because that is important, Myanmar being sort of within the context of Southeast Asia in particular within the context of the primary remits for political action of as an, brings about the role that as an has in Southeast Asia, and in managing sort of regional stability within that context. And this is an important point that links to the meeting that he's out coming in three days time, 24th one for this time. And what kind of expectation, we can have and that there's a third sort of element to this which is how Myanmar fits into broader sort of geopolitical dynamics that relate to the so called sort of changing structural circumstances of the in the Pacific so let's start with with the first point. In order to understand the fact that the top models approach has been in many ways gauging a playbook that is being familiar to them and for that very reason, completely out of place for where Myanmar is today. You can see the realities also that the top model remains a particularly heavily armed, and they prove this just in the last couple of days when in the northern part of Myanmar, they launch a series of ground and air attacks and operation, pretty sort of pretty robust type of military initiatives that are just sort of pushing back on on protesters. This is going after some of the ethnic regional armies. Interestingly enough, the Kashinian independence army was the component of that hack to suffer the most from these air and ground operations. And it's interesting because, and it tells us two things one, and that the military home that has diversified its military stockpile provisions over the past few years in particular. The general leading the home that has developed over the last decade or so, much stronger ties with Russia, which in turn have provided a considerable amount of flow of new capabilities, some of which were used a couple of days ago in this range, the MiG-29 and the helicopters, the Mi-24 and 35P helicopters were part of their offensive. These are part of this package of capabilities that they've been procured from Russian, which at the moment stand around $800 million. Now, why this is interesting because it tells us that they have a firepower and they also have the willingness to deploy it in order to retain control. On the other hand, it is also interesting where they do not deploy that firepower, because it means that they are perfectly aware of the fact that they are happy to use heavy weapons against the population of Myanmar, but also they're going to be very careful depending on how the particular region they're going after and the particular grouping they're going after relates to other bodies. Why do I say this? Because one of the, along the border with the, you know, the back of Yunnan region with China, the area controlled by the United States Army, which is also one of the more supplied ethnic armies from the Chinese themselves. They have been relatively sort of largely touched so far and the top of my door has been very careful not to sort of upset, if you want, a certain delicate balance that exists, particularly in the border areas with China between Chinese government authorities and local regional setups. China remains the single largest suppliers of capabilities to the top of my door as well. About 50% of the overall sort of military equipment that they possess comes from China, and even though they've been sort of trying to diversify that to reduce dependency on China and therefore increase their ability to more freely operate within Myanmar, these remains an important constraint with that. And this matters, because on one hand, this military imbalance speaks to one of the key ways in which the top of my door seems to be wanting to carry on this conversation as generally, a chance to eloquently put out. It also presents a limitation in terms of how far they can push it and above all, it presents them with the needs to keep a constant element of interaction with actors that are underwriting the position of power of relative power that the top model presents itself. So in this respect, the rule that China and increasingly more Russia have, which at the moment has been predominantly negative by sort of blocking any sort of major conversation inside the context of the United Nations, moving against the actions of the top model. Nonetheless, at the very least it tells us that it from a domestic dimension if we look at the power imbalance that exists in Myanmar, certainly Russia and China are two important actors. And so far, we know for sure that politically China has a play to roll and perhaps there is there is something in there of engage also in with Russia and China in trying to reduce the tension and certainly meet one of those important suggestions that Charles make that is the secession of hostilities as they stand at the moment. And the relationship between this domestic sort of national level and the broader sort of international sphere as it is manifested in actors or specific actors with clear influence in Myanmar in determining sort of the military balance within the country that links to a second point to my second point, the one that concerns the sort of the broader regional context and how it relates to Myanmar. Here, we cannot go about it and I think Charles was absolutely right that even if the United Nations and International Committee needs to step up their game. At the same time, it needs to do so with a clear understanding that ASEAN has the sort of self created rights to stay at the center of that process, because it is the main multilateral framework existing and also contrary to past situation whereby ASEAN has been standing still. And there are a number of different sort of crisis that we can discuss at length here. Not least the broader crisis around the maritime territorial disputes in the South China Sea, which the world of ASEAN has been very much constrained in terms of solution, but here what we've seen is that Brunei having the chairmanship of ASEAN with the proposition of Indonesia and to get with Singapore, Malaysia, they actually have proposed to have this meeting and whilst there is no reason to have an expectation that the meeting will generate an outright condemnation of the Tatmadao, I think the expectation that they will want to work very closely to push the military junta to close the gap of sort of the ability to engage with other parties, certainly with those within the NUG, the national unity government and restart some sort of political dialogue to stabilize the situation of the country. This is certainly something that I think will be very important to ASEAN's agenda. Because there is a consciousness that Myanmar being on the brink of collapse and ASEAN not being able to do anything about it, not even politically in trying to get people around the table and talk to each other, would be an absolutely damning sort of verdicts on the inability and the junta has been out there on ASEAN's ability to address Southeast Asian problems for a long time. But right now, I think they understand that the spotlight is on them and I certainly believe that whilst sort of they will negotiate how statements will come out, one key focus would be absolutely the assertion of hostilities and in particular taking into consideration starting to provide humanitarian aid inside Myanmar because as Charles was pointing out, the situation is becoming particularly dire and so some sort of ability to intervene and provide some measure of privatization is going to be important. But again, this creates a tension between what kind of expectation we can have particularly in the short term from ASEAN and how much other institutions, most notably the United Nations, can and should operate either through ASEAN or together with ASEAN or with ASEAN but also having their own parallel agenda. And I think the jury is out with the best way to get about it is, but I think nonetheless a key point here is ASEAN will define how far the process can go and how everybody else can engage with it, therefore having a clear sense on how best in particular to assist the ASEAN political process. I think it's something that should not be discounted, not with the same importance of addressing these matters, particularly from a human rights perspective in other bodies that for their very nature like the United Nations should speak to these issues regardless of the political dynamics. But in terms of the political dynamics in Myanmar, ASEAN will want to claim a degree of centrality on how from a regional multilateral perspective this question is addressed. This also raises the question of what kind of other organisations and institutions can and should be involved into this. And of course here, Myanmar's role in the broader geopolitical context of the Indo-Pacific provides an interesting sort of point of discussion. Why? Because we know that from an economic term even though the economy in Myanmar is quickly sort of imploding in that sense and certainly the data of growth as chance was saying, given in the past, we're not necessarily gauging or accurately gauging the situation, the reality of the ground. It must be said that Myanmar has been at the centre or certainly has been an important destination point for economic investment of the two most important visions that have been proposed in a broader sense across the region over the last decade or so. And these are the Belt and Road Initiative proposed by China and a free and open Indo-Pacific initiative proposed by Japan. Some of the most sort of glaring results, Chinese investment into the development of a pipeline that goes into the port of Kiao Kpyu and that is designed to in a way allow the Chinese to have access through the Bay of Bengal to shorter routes for the procurement of energy supply as certainly being an important part of how the Belt and Road Initiative has taken shape in Myanmar and Myanmar being at the receiving end of investment through the Belt and Road Initiative. And in a not too dissimilar fashion, Prime Minister Abe is free and open in the Pacific Initiative aimed at developing greater prosperity through connectivity and a connectivity that is based on investment into new and emerging economic areas has seen a considerable amount of investment into the Tilawa special economic zone around Yangon, led by Jaika and that over the last sort of half a decade has seen a considerable growth in investment from Japanese companies. Now, what is interesting about this is that very recently, quite a bit has been changing in this respect, large Japanese companies like Toyota that had invested almost 60 million dollars into a new plan in this special economic zone, as well as a number of other major conglomerate Japanese conglomerates that have invested considerably and have people on the ground have been during the first days very cautious about pulling people out and sort of because of the of the evolving situation. But clearly, open source media suggests that that at the moment that is a quick sort of change of heart and not with the standing, the fact that Myanmar has been the sort of the center of attention, and of for the perhaps be right because of the pipeline and because of the type of infrastructure and seeing the Chinese much more committed for the time being, but investment into long term projects from Japan are seeing a moment of pause and certainly of reassessment given where the situation is. And whilst the military hunger at the moment has its own has its own ways of financing itself. Just today, there was a couple of pieces covering how auctions about precious stones and stones and gems and jades worth 6.4 million per day were conducted on a regular basis in long term. There is an important consideration in terms of how Myanmar's geopolitical importance within these visions for the broader in the Pacific is quickly fading away because of how the situation is deteriorating and in the long term. It's not good for anyone that wants to stay in control and and and Charles raised a very good point, whether it would extend top model realizes that whether it would extend they realize that the social destruction of the national fabric will make that possible to to sort of reestablish in the future. It's a difficult question to assess, but certainly it's a great risk which in turn raises the question whether it would extend. And the people get more involved to prevent areas that are in the north part of the country that are closer and around their long term investment will call for other organization, most notably the quad, because of the Bay of Bengal and how that links to sea lanes of the ocean and mountain routes in the sort of Indian ocean side of the in the Pacific, to raise question as to what extent the members of the court so India, United States Japan and Australia, want to be involved into a conversation around how to prevent Myanmar to prevent the need for the Chinese to step into an extent from having the country sort of drifting towards a particular sphere of influence, not withstanding all of this. And this is where I go towards the conclusion of minor marks. I think these are all interconnected points and points that when we place sort of Myanmar in the broader context. Perhaps, I don't want to be the one sound study less sort of pessimistic, but I do believe that not understanding the absolutely essential needed to address the humanitarian crisis that is taking place in the country. I think at the same time, because Myanmar does not seem in a geopolitical vacuum is part of the broader political process that is the one concerned Southeast Asian as in particular, and one in which there are other actors Russia, China, as well as a broader geopolitical actors, such as Japan, the United States and to an extent also India that because of how the sort of structural and geopolitical dynamics of the in the Pacific are evolving, and actually an interest in a Myanmar that does not quite sort of collapses and implodes but is a Myanmar that regains the degree of political dialogue and eventually a degree of political stability. So if anything, I think, particularly in the short term, it's going to be extremely difficult, and certainly as and will be an important axis of the change the changing nature of the conversation that exists at the moment, one in which bombs stay silent and political sort of engagement starts gaining weight and interaction. And it's not going to be easy and I think expectation should be coming with with some sort of limited the whole before a lot to be achieved in the short period of time, but certainly doesn't address the long term question that perhaps within the context of the geopolitical importance of Myanmar in that broader structural fabric of the inter Pacific, a place where we might find additional sort of energy from multilateral and particularly important actors in international community to try to do something to change the current course of the trajectory of travel on this I stop here. Thank you very much. Thank you very much unless you for your very insightful regional implications on Myanmar state failure. And I just wanted to build on to the points that both of you have mentioned today, regarding the international on a multilateral level and also on the implications of us, especially when it comes to responding to human rights crises, and Western countries faces, you know, any sort of intervention and it's in a broader sense of definition this cliched responses expected from us young countries and more importantly China which argues for the need to quote unquote safeguard national sovereignty. And remarkably, this was a response that was used by the former State Council or on San Suu Kyi herself back when the UN Human Rights Council wanted to be present in the region for a fact finding mission and during the court proceedings at the International Court of Justice, but they were hinge crisis in particular. And so the West I think should be aware of this, this responsive sovereignty and human rights interventions as a form of neocolonialism, because this is this is a narrative that was that was used by the former president things in himself. And I think it's still like widely held as a belief by by many members of the top middle, and especially the elites and. And so, in tackling human rights crises in post colonial societies. This is this sort of a narrative is perhaps routine and so if we want some any kind of coordinated action from international actors. How should Western countries acclimatize to this narrative and take this into account. And so we just sort of, you know, and this cycle, repeating for a change because at the moment we only have statements being churning, being getting churned out and nothing more. Do you want us to answer one after the other or to both of you, honestly. I think that I really like your, your, your term cliched response, because I think that's that's in a way that's the message I think we're trying to give is that there has to be a complete paradigm shift. In terms of the engagement with with Myanmar that that that it's since the first of February, there's been a transformation of the context and, and that's, and that's I think very few of the actors currently involved in this in Myanmar have have been involved in situations like Libya, Syria, or even the Central African Republic. I think we're seeing we're seeing emerge exactly the same, the same dynamics of, of internal destruction and the emergence of different power. So, so, so I mean I, I don't have a very specific answer as much as to say that that I think the situation in Myanmar today demands a wake up call on the part of ASEAN needs to understand that that they are looking at a situation that is no longer under the control of the world. Even where the Tatmada are able to defeat a lot of the opponents they're trying to defeat, they have lost control of the country, the dynamics within the country. I think similarly in the West sort of the traditional approach of getting people together and the rest. It's insufficient. You know, you're, you're looking at different levels, different dimensions of, of, of disarticulation and violence. So, so for me the most important right now. And that's why I come back to your word, the the cliched response. The most important thing right now is for everybody to wake up and realize that what's happening in Myanmar is, is dimensionally different than anything that happened before the first of February. The destruction. You know, there's the just because I saw there was one of the questions, the destruction of administrative records. Why I don't know, but you could very well see it as a way because people are being picked up at night that the wards are so so that the where people live are so well documented. You can see it as a spontaneous attempt to try and limit that capability of the Tatmada, but it has far reaching consequences in terms of trying to reestablish forms of governance. Urban guerrilla warfare. The once that, and it's already started to a certain extent, a completely different new dimension in terms of trying to bring peace, what one trying to help people caught up in the middle of it, but secondly, trying to rebuild an accountable governance structure. So it's a wake up call that's necessary right now. I just wanted to, I just want to go back to the to the original question about how do you balance the issue of that that sort of post colonial mantle that that a human rights sort of lead intervention of sorts, right, carries as a risk. And I think you're absolutely right, raising that question. And because, and again, I think we have to sort of separate two different type of conversation, the one about why do we have, you know, legal ethical and moral frameworks about the importance of human rights, which in a way becomes a potential carte blanche for intervention anywhere these are violated on the scale and the nature that we've seen in a number of places including Myanmar, and that's one conversation that we have it. And that is the sort of like the human rights element of discussion with human rights as a tool for political engagement and for deciding where it would extend one wants to engage in a place rather than another one. And I think it's a lot more to that sort of new wave of post colonial perception as in like, well, you know, it's not that you do it all the time you just do it in places where you really care there's some sort of additional reasoning behind it. Right. Now within this context. We, we understand, or we have had that sort of preliminary conversation at what it is that we're looking at when we place into conversation over human rights in the context of Myanmar. We also have to accept, I think, that as an and not just as a because not interference in the domestic affairs of foreign country is also one of the pillars of Chinese foreign policy, and the number of other actors in Asia as such. We understand that there is a reality, and as it does believe in the idea of non interference. So the next question is, if we want to make sure that we're not forgetting the moral obligation that sort of emerges from addressing violations of human rights, but at the same time we respect a political culture in which foreign policy has constraints around the extent to which you can intervene or accept intervention into the domestic affairs of foreign country. That means that one needs to subordinate if you want the former to the latter and try to work with actors such as Asia. So that as Charles was saying, they pick up a sense of responsibility. It's like, guys, it's show, you know, it's showtime. You need to step up to the plate. You consider this and that there are boundaries that you cannot sort of go beyond the big cause it would become an interference into domestic affairs in another country. Great. But at the same time, they shooting people. They actually bombing planes. Right. As a proportion that that is really beyond what anything and anyone can actually accept. As a result of that, I think that that medium point is, I think was recommendation number three or four that Charles had. And what I was mentioning also that I think he's something that he's a good level of expectation to have from us and and that is one to be able to push the top model to stop hostilities. All military operations. And to start providing the possibility to have humanitarian assistance in terms of AIDS brought to people in Myanmar to prevent the economic crisis becoming into an absolute complete implosion of the social fabric of Myanmar as a whole. The basis of that starts sort of seeing the options that exist for some sort of political conversation among the various parties within Myanmar, because on the other hand I don't think you know, you're absolutely right at placing this in the context of the post colonial perception, and that you have locally and I think it's essential we have to do this. Because otherwise, we kind of miss track of what really are the, so the moral question as opposed to the political question, and why they both matters but for different reasons. And, but at the same time, I do believe that when we're talking about a situation such as the one in Myanmar, there are limits to what the appetite in broader international organization exists to take action. Today, as I was saying earlier on, Russia and China are two important actors within the United Nations. And so raising the expectation bar, and I completely agree with Charles that within a world where the sort of the paradigm shift, it's becoming something that we should really sort of take at heart. But is it going to happen. I'm not necessarily sure. So in that sense, raising placing the bar at the level that pushes the ambitious, the ambition to achieve an objective, a bit more that compared to the past but at the same time without creating the circumstances for everybody to sort of go, you know, raising your hands like this is a bit too much or calling on. Yeah, but this is really that sort of like a new colonial forms. It's like because of human rights, you want to go in there. I think it's an important consideration. It's an important factor. So pushing ambition, prioritizing sort of the, the moral and political question, and above all, mobilizing and engaging with regional actors who have a much clearer understanding of how to walk this theme lines. I think these are sort of the places where one needs to focus the attention as a way to understand precisely what Charles is talking about that is a paradigm shift that perhaps is not as absolute as we might sort of want right now, but at least is the first step towards a new direction of travel. That is absolutely essential. Thank you, Alessio. I think I want to move on to one of my next questions which I believe might answer some of the questions that are asked by the audience regarding the Syrian comparison. Michelle Bachelet, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights recently said in her statement that the Syrian comparison is actually pretty close and but also at the same time it sparked a lot of debates amongst observers and analysts that are closely following the Myanmar crisis. And some such as Dr. Van Minu said that the state is more likely to become just as a failed state instead of a full blown civil war and that the Syrian style comparison is incorrect. Also still bearing in mind that we've already got a 70 year long over 70 year long peripheral civil conflict, but also there's this growing sentiment within the civilian dissidents, even though it's marginal at this point but still fairly consistent that it's increasingly becoming difficult for the protest to stay peaceful. And I think, even though it's premature to say how likely does a panel think that the opposition will take up arms, and will the military splinter as well because defections are again they're happening at a low level, but if they do increase the Syrian comparison might not be too far fetch after all. I guess I start again. I mean of course I agree with that. I think one shouldn't use comparisons as blueprints and to see Syria, Libya and I even mentioned Central African Republic as these are the blueprints of what's going to happen. Rather I think we should draw from them the types of dynamics that can help us sort of look or provide us a lens to look at what's happening in Myanmar and how to address. I mean I think the Libya example and the Central African Republic example it's much more looking at sort of the functioning or how a failed state. I wouldn't call it functioning, but what's the landscape? What are the governance landscapes of a failed state? Very much focused on resources, enrichment, warlords, fragmentation, communities are still able to survive. So it's more looking at what does the landscape eventually look like. For me the Syria example is a lot more and as I think Anna you know I spent two years working with the Syrian opposition. And so for me the example or Syria is a lot more relevant for the people in Myanmar to get a better sense of how much they can depend on the west. And the answer is not much. I think the problem with what I find extremely, what I find heartbreaking is all of the protesters with R2P written on their shields with this belief that R2P will materialize, that it will result in something. And I find also very disingenuous many of these western politicians who actually mouth the same thing, knowing full well that it's not going to happen. They only need to talk to the civil society in Syria, the members of the local councils and how let down they were by the west. This is not to say that the people in Myanmar, the forces in Myanmar should despair. It just means that there needs to be a focus on something different. R2P is not going to be the solution. I think what the people in Myanmar need to understand is that western governments are as driven by the need to be able to show their local constituencies that they're doing something as they are actually by trying to find a solution to the problem. So in that sense, I think there needs to be much more of an alert that when engaging with the west, there almost needs to be much more of a cynical view in terms of what the west is actually going to do. This said, I think there are very specific things that can be asked of the west and one is getting western donors to sort of assume more risk in the provision of financial support. I think right now with all of the accountability frameworks and all that, the donors remain very risk averse in terms of financial engagement that they have to be able to overcome. Similarly, I think what comes out of the lesson from Syria is that the UN must be pressured into having a more coherent and comprehensive approach. In the UN now, mechanisms have been put in place following Sri Lanka, following Gert Rosenthal's report on the Rohingya crisis and the UN's repeated failure. There are mechanisms in place. The UN has no excuse not to be able to operate. It's just the will that's lacking right now and that pressure needs to be placed on the UN. And this idea that the UN can't do anything is not acceptable. It's absolutely not acceptable. The final for me lesson that comes out of Syria is the danger for the opposition and the danger for the opposition that they get so caught up in the western dynamics that they actually lose touch, they lose their grounding with the people. That they're so much trying to believe that they're addressing a western agenda, which ultimately is not as focused on them as they would like to believe that they actually lose this contact with the people. And it's not just the people, it's forces within Myanmar, the civil disobedience movement, the strike committee, of course the different ethnic armed organizations, the different ethnic organizations. Civil basically community groupings, civil society groupings. So for me, one of the most starkest lessons that have to be drawn from Syria by the opposition is to be very conscious of the need to establish a much more engaged relationship with the groups on the ground. That I think was one of the tragedies of the Syrian opposition. They lost that ability. Sorry, very briefly, because there's little to add there perhaps two points, chance sort of is, it's absolutely right when you're saying that there is no excuse for the United Nations to stand by or do nothing. And I agree. It's hardly disagree with that. But where does the initiative, the push comes for states need to provide that and they need to get a sense that they have to be involved, they have to sort of push for action in this regard. And I think at the moment we're looking also at a place in time and and I know this goes back to a question, a broader question that you were raising earlier about, what is the repetition of the West and here I'm using West as you know, you know, Western Europe and US led type of coalition or alliances, or sort of whichever you recall them. It's a long term repetition of damage in a way that has changed this is no longer 1999 Tony Blair Chicago speak type of intervention. And not even the 2013 type of David Cameron humanitarian intervention sort of orientation like values as as a driving force to intervene and try to do some good. That we're not that leading governments in the West definitely are no longer in that space, because they've realized over the past few years that one of the things that often they get thrown back at them is that yeah you only go to places you want to go. So there is that there is no, we lost part of credibility. So part of the question is, okay, how do we actually create an agenda for action. And we do so with the credibility that we have in the sense that we have to rebuild the sense of credibility that that's been lost. And, you know, as someone who has the opportunity very often to engage in non European or North American led activities where it is confidence centers where you know that's the you don't always have the moment of look at the 20 year long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and and the regime change in Libya in Iraq. So there is a sense here that the constituencies at home in the West that supported in the past, the fundamental idea that a value led to the constituencies about intervening and changing for good. It doesn't doesn't it doesn't come across as the same same type of currency, because it's been sort of prove the not to work on one hand to be instrumentally used on the other and above all, at the receiving end, it's not seen as such. It's the exact elements that has nothing to do with me and my is nothing to do with with Syria, but it's more like, if you want the longer pendulum of history, swinging the other opposite direction in which there is a reluctance to have heavy intervention. So this needs to be born on the back of our mind as we sort of engage, but if I could link this question to a couple of questions that I've seen in in the chat. For example, Remus and Wendy was saying, and so when he's talking about the current national, the current national union, which has been at the receiving end of a lot of the fighting and they really are sort of, they want to hold this they are a piece of all way forwards to an extent she asks us and can be a place where that sort of conversation can be brought back on the table. I think this is the sort of thing where as in really can make a difference, because as in meets the requirement of what Charles was saying that you need to be able to understand who are the different parties on the ground, and how to engage them. And both are in countries in Southeast Asia understand that. So I think this is absolutely one of the places where even if not the country as a whole, moving forward, I do believe that the different sort of regions have internally different stakeholders, and I was around the sort of ethnic armies of not that can actually be part of how you carry on a conversation that slowly brings things to a different place. And so in that sense, I think this also addresses this point that Remus is asking about the concept of non interference, non interference. I think is is is how you interpret this non interference as in you do not want to see how the new political the domestic political arrangements comes about. You certainly want to favor a process that leads to that point. And that's not interference. That is about promoting that fundamental idea that is within as of a greatest ability, greater prosperity, and above all use of non violence means in terms of solution to this dispute and these agreements. This is a space where, again, let me put this way, I want to translate Charles calls for the United Nations to step up to the plate into implicitly a call for asian to step up to the plate because it has the local knowledge. It has the connections. It has the interest because instability inside of Myanmar means also refugees, potentially people that going into neighboring country. And again, this is a massive going to to a question that perceives is asking. This is a massive motivation, particularly for China to keep an eye on things from and then preventing things from totally sort of unraveling because that would be a problem for them. They would have to be monitoring the borders. They would have to control refugees going right left and center. This is something nobody wants. Right. So, in this respect. Not with the standing what we know from as in historical behavior. I think what we are looking at. It's a situation in which without thinking in terms of interference into the domestic affair of another country. We still bring action to bear and create the conditions for a process where the nationally where the different parties can manage to move forward more quickly than others. That is really something that is difficult to assess at the moment. But certainly, again, this is not only possible, but it's something that one should expect as in to be able to do and to deliver on. So if anything, failing that, at least contributing to create the condition for the succession of fire and military activities, and the possibility to have humanitarian aid coming in as a preliminary conditions towards this step that is sort of favoring a greater dialogue among different stakeholders. Thank you very much, Leslie. I think I'm going to go on to some of the remaining questions in the Q&A box, although I believe quite a lot of them have been covered by the panel so far. So one person, I think, I think. Leslie, if I pronounce it correct. So she's asking what sort of documents are being destroyed and who is responsible and is the situation likely to become so bad that a temporary UN trust territory status should be considered for Burma? I mean, I think it's, well, the documents issue, again, I don't know. I mean, there could be multiple reasons for it, but the fact is that it does make the rebuilding of the state extremely difficult afterwards. In terms of a UN trusteeship, I mean, I think those are, I mean, the answer is no. But also it's not something that should be wanted. I think much more is to find, you know, and taking Alessio's point, you know, using ASEAN, using neighbors to try and find ways to bring the people inside to try and find, to try to bring an end to the killings. I mean, the killings, the collapse of the whole ceasefire process, I mean, the bombings and the killings that have been going on in Bagot and the killings in the third, the KNLE, the third brigade area are, this was highlighted as one of the symbols of the success of the ceasefires. It was the epicenter of the Norwegian investment in the peace process. The fact that you have mortars being fired, you have planes coming over going into the fifth brigade, I mean, the thing is, the country is falling apart. But it has, it can only, the dynamics have to come from inside. So I think one shouldn't even want or want a UN trusteeship. I think the UN has yet to demonstrate its seriousness. So I think we're, you know, so it shouldn't even be wanted. Thank you, Charles. So we have another question coming from Surin Pio, who is a Burmese studying at the LSE. They ask, they're asking the panel what sort of implications, what are the implications that Burma to follow a similar path like Syria has walked down. And with the CRPH and the NEG, does this change the causal effect of the final outcome? And additionally, he or she would like to ask, rather than the CRPH NEG claiming random names, would it be more effective to reinstate the name Burma to make an international impact? And they believe that this is the way to show the restoration of the prosperous Burma before the tough middle. I mean, I would say that I fear that the situation is too far gone to be able to envisage something like that. I think that what's very, very clear is the CRPH and the national unity government are emanations of a political will. They are representatives of the people and they are a dimension, a political dimension of Myanmar's face. But there are also other dimensions of the politics, let's say in Myanmar. The strike committee, I think the young in the strike committee are having remarkable in how they've demonstrated the ability of all people to come together to address civil disobedience movement, the absolute refusal to operate under another dictatorship. There is now, as your previous question, I think it is becoming clear that there is now, you know, there are urban guerrilla fighters now. There's the emergence of its very sort of, I mean, there is that phenomenon. It's been released. So again, I think what's needed is the willingness to completely rethink and view Myanmar through a completely different lens now. I completely agree with Charles. I think, and I also want to challenge that question through rain if I may. Because if you, I'm not sure if you've read of the works written by Dr. Thaminu, but I do believe that the situation in Myanmar is incredibly complex more than just the issue of names, but also more importantly, there's this very widely held myth that Myanmar or Burma, whichever you call it, is this very, you know, in had a bright future ahead of it until the 1962 coup, but to be honest, if we look back into the history, just three months after the independence, Myanmar collects into a civil war. And I think that sort of that part of history is not as much taken into account that Myanmar, even before during the days of the Tamil Nadu have been a very, very weak state. And Leslie, would you like to comment on the question? No, I mean, I was, as a military historian, I've really got sort of into, I'm stuck with the question that Leslie is asking about why documents are being destroyed and, you know, widening the question beyond the boundaries of Myanmar throughout history, this is actually something that happens quite regularly. And particularly under military regime and dictatorships, you have a tendency to burn things up because mostly, you know, accountability becomes just something that you produce afterwards. And it is instrumental to those who are in power. History is the enemy of dictators and authoritarian forms of political control, because it will tell the story. It will tell the story of the responsibilities that will account for acts of violence, acts of insufficient power. So in that sense, and also in weekend's opposition, it weakens the sense of where you're coming from, the sense of community, what makes us together, what makes us who we are, right? So in a way, it sort of creates, it reinforces your sense of responsibility in accountability, and it increases your power to redefine and shape things as they are, because it takes something away from whoever is the target of that destruction of documents. So, so in that sense, am I surprised this is happening, not necessarily, but at the same time, at the same time, I think, once you're not despair. Again, this is the sort of thing that, when the time comes, today, there are so many other different ways to account for a compliment, a compensate to an extent for the destruction of documents, whether it is sort of mapping the composition of society, trying to understand and sort of bring back to history for future reference of the experience as it is lived at a particular point in time. But these are important questions and questions that will have a time will have their day in court to be addressed. And I understand, as I said, it doesn't surprise me that they're doing this. But I do believe that that should not be a reason to despair. It's a horrible manifestation of behavior, certainly not as horrible as, as, as, you know, the military operations conducted against civilians on an armed or largely armed civilians. And I do think at the same time that when the time come, and me and I will have a chance to recover history, engage with history, and make it part of the prosperous society, even when that comes. Thank you, Alessio. We have time for one more question. So I'm just going to pull this one out from the Q&A box. So someone anonymous said that, asked to the panel, would the NLD be prepared to negotiate with the army to return to some sort of power share for a while to avert a bloodbath? And is the NLD now prepared to grant citizenship rights to the Rohingya and full autonomy to the areas where ethnic groups inhabit so that there would be a loose federal Myanmar. I think presumably, I think they want to say presumably what the ethnic groups want. With all humility, I think neither of us are in a position to answer those questions. Well, those questions, because it's very much the CRPH, the National Unity Government, and these structures that are emerging, bringing the people together, and it's up to them to answer. But maybe since we will be closing, I just maybe three sort of last points. Well, the main thing is, I think what's remarkable about Myanmar is the vibrancy of the population, and the example that the young have shown since the 1st of February. So for me, the three things that I think are important to do. The first is that the international community needs to come together to come up with a comprehensive humanitarian plus strategy to assist the people of Myanmar. And the international community needs to be willing to take financial risk to do it because what's fascinating about Myanmar, what's beautiful about Myanmar are the people and their ability to resist. So you have the networks, you have the dynamics. We even saw it during the ceasefires, the interim arrangements that communities had put in place in order to take care of their local government. So I think that's the first is there needs to be, immediately there needs to be a concerted effort to come up with a strategy, a strategy to support the people of Myanmar. The second and I pick up what Alessio said is I think it's very, very important to document, document abuses and to there are mechanisms that are in place, but this has to be reinforced because there's no, there's no long term peace without any form of accountability.  So I think there needs to be documentation account of abuses and centers. The third and I say it as a former UN official, but I say it because I always believed that I was working for an organization that emerged from two world wars, and an organization that was not just the the manager of international relations, but actually embodied the will of enlightened leaders at the end of the Second World War to not to combat the scourge of war, and to help people to help we the people. So, so, so what I say is don't give the UN a pass. You know, the UN has absolutely no justification to be where it is now. I think, but at the same time, don't, you know, the UN has to demonstrate, has to prove that it is going to take this this issue seriously, has to prove that it has learned the lessons from from Sri Lanka, it has learned the lessons from the failure towards the ringer, and there is absolutely nothing more than for the UN to have the will to implement the lessons. I think those of you who can, I would, I would, I would encourage you to listen to the former Secretary General Ban Ki-moon's statement in the Security Council. He gave some very, very clear advice to the UN on on how it should move forward. Those, those would be my, my three points. Anna, just as a way to, to converse just just a couple of points and I want to pick up on what Charles just said about the people of Myanmar. I don't have any direct experience but having looked at how Japanese investment has completely changed in Myanmar. One of the things that kept coming back all the time was how welcoming as as as a place Myanmar is for the growth of new business because of the youth of the people because of the welcoming atmosphere because of the potential and possibility and the fact people want to get on with this. Right. So I think this is absolutely right. And perhaps, and certainly the experience of Japan is one in which there is a sense of being on the way precisely because countries that already been investing in Myanmar are just waiting for the opportunity to go back there and continue to work with the country and the people of the country. So in that sense, I'm actually kind of optimistic as in, if we can create the conditions for that to happen. Perhaps things might actually improve more than we can currently imagine in light of what has happened. In the last point, I think James is asking a question about COVID and how COVID or reacting to COVID might be an opportunity for us to do something, you know, actually that is a very good idea. I think we haven't talked about COVID and how it's spreading across Southeast Asia, but definitely the need to address that, particularly if it's spread across the urban area might present an indirect way for us to actually sort of camouflage an opportunity to not intervene but facilitate the process of political re-engagement across different parties through the need to address this public health crisis. So in that sense, getting creative and reinforcing the point that both Charles and myself have been sort of making over and over again tonight that really we need a little bit more of creativity and commitment. And without sort of exceeding too much in terms of the expectation that we're setting certainly we need more and more needs to be done. As in as much as the United Nations have a test in front of themselves, and it's a test that they cannot really fail if they want to maintain some degree of credibility. That is true for the United Nations is even more true for as in. And so in that sense, I look forward over the next few days when the meeting, seeing what the meeting will generate on Saturday and after that what kind of consequences. In a month's time, we might be in a better place for this conversation to carry on or in a sadder place I do hope not. That's not the case. But I do believe that there is the centrality of Myanmar to a number of different questions. As I mentioned tonight, regionally and more broadly structurally in the direction of travel or the Pacific means that people will pay attention. So just keeping an eye and ensuring that accountability for those who have to take action is one of those things that we all trying to do. I think it's a desirable and indeed a possible thing that we will sort of own to ourselves and to the people of Myanmar. On this I stop. Thank you very much. And I saw you had the question that's being raised on China and Russia.  I mean, right now, of course, it's blocked, but I think if everybody is willing to, to, to acknowledge that that there is a paradigm shift that's necessarily an understanding Myanmar and understanding that the country has to be saved from and that, and that there's a concerted effort to try and save this country from self-destructing. I don't think you know I think nothing's impossible. Well, thank you very much Charles and unless you for your very thorough insights on on this issue I mean this conversation could go on forever but obviously we have time limits. So I just want to thank our audience for joining the event today and thank you for your interesting questions to our panel, and also just a disclaimer that while some of the panel's remarks may paint quite a bleak picture and moving forward with the situation and on some particular issues we want to clarify to our audience specially to those who are watching from Myanmar that these are not definitive answers but more postulated reflections and and on the less optimistic remarks we do hope that we are wrong. And I thank Charles and unless you again very much for speaking for us and for the audience for joining us today. And thank you all and goodbye.