Patriot Prime Reviews is a channel for adult collectors and may not be suitable for children under 13 years of age. Viewer discretion is advised. Hey, what's going on guys? Patriot Prime here once again with another video review. But before I get started, I need you guys to do me a favor. If you're watching this video right here and have not subscribed to Patriot Prime Reviews, please hit that subscribe button right now. It won't cost you a thing, but will help me and my channel out tremendously. Also, I am proud to announce that ToyHacks.com is sponsoring this review. You know me. I absolutely love ToyHacks decals. About 75% of my collection has benefited from their products, all the way from Generation 1 to the new modern figures. ToyHacks provides label sets, upgrade kits, and display backdrops for Transformers toys of all types and generations. New for 2020, ToyHacks is introducing the ToyHacks Armory, where they'll be offering a variety of weapons for your favorite bots in multiple colors. Also this year, ToyHacks is introducing Robo Points. For every purchase you make, you'll earn Robo Points that you can redeem towards a voucher for future purchases. ToyHacks is a company run by collectors, for collectors, so check out ToyHacks.com and make your collection stand out from the rest. And tell them Patriot Prime sent you. Now, on to the review. This video's featured bot is another Dark of the Moon character, Studio Series 51 Soundwave. Now I really dug how Soundwave looked in Dark of the Moon. I wasn't a real big fan of his satellite look from Revenge of the Fallen, but I wasn't a fan of Revenge of the Fallen anyway. Who was? Well, except the forest fight scene. That was cool. So anyway, in Dark of the Moon, Soundwave was a Mercedes. And he was actually voiced by Frank Welker, who did his voice in the original Generation 1 cartoon. Granted, he didn't have that synthesizer effect that Soundwave is known for, but he still used the Dr. Claw voice that is what he used for Soundwave, pre-synthesizer. Soundwave reporting, Lord Megatron. Now let's take a quick look at the packaging. Front of the box, you've got Soundwave in robot mode. Laserbeak down here in the corner. Transformers, Studio Series 51. Side of the box, you've got an up close shot of Soundwave's face. Back of the box, you've got robot mode, vehicle mode, and a holographic sticker here that says licensed by Domler. I guess they own Mercedes. This side of the box is Soundwave in robot mode once again. So let's go ahead and eject this figure from the package and see if this is a superior Soundwave toy. And welcome to Patriot Prime Reviews. Now, once you get Soundwave all opened and out of the packaging, you'll see he comes with a sheet of instructions, and these are those Studio Series instructions. I mean, they're all right. They're not the greatest. I still prefer the Siege instructions over these, but it gets the job done. He also comes with this little Laserbeak figure.  There's no articulation to him whatsoever other than underneath his legs move back and forth, and that's so he can either stand up or be posed on Soundwave. He does have a little bit of paint applications right there on those beady red eyes. But I wish he had a little bit more other than that, really, really nice details. Now, Soundwave is a Mercedes sports car. And this vehicle mode looks really, really good. Lots of great detailing. Look at the details there on the side, the tires, the rims. Front of the vehicle looks really good. I love the grille. Got the Mercedes symbol right there, the off-collared white or maybe a little yellow for the headlights. He's got clear windows. Now, I'm not a big fan of clear windows that show off all the robot junk on the inside. You know, if that's the case, I wish they kind of had like an opaque window or maybe just paint it over. I just, I'm not a fan of that. Back of the vehicle, lot more molded details. You got the exhausts on the back, nice paint applications there for the taillights. Got Mercedes. I think it says Mercedes. That says something I can't really tell. Anyway, that's molded in there. Molded detail there on the side. Not sure if that is a ding or more molded detail. Hell, maybe that's where they put the key in to open the trunk. I don't know. I don't know Mercedes. More details here along the side. And he's got those side mirrors that look really, really cool. Now, rolls real good. I mean, those wheels, those wheels are awesome. Now that's pretty much all there is to say about vehicle mode. I don't understand why they give Soundwave a Mercedes mode. There I go again trying to understand a Bay movie. Bad patriot prime. So anyway, let's go ahead and get this guy transformed into robot mode. And now we have Soundwave in robot mode. And let me tell you guys, the amount of details on this figure is just amazing. They went nuts with the sculpting. I love the arms. You've got the discs there on the forearms, the gears up here on the shoulders, the face sculpt. I love that face sculpt. That is so cool. That's kind of a rubbery plastic up there. The grill on the Mercedes really shines through. Details there on the torso, the claws. This thing is awesome. This is so much better than what I was expecting. Details there along the thighs. Got the gas cap. Legs look really good. Very, very spiky, which of course that's what the old Bayverse figures are known for. But this dude is really impressive. I mean, I love the molded details on him. Now articulation, you've got the head is on a ball joint and can rotate slightly. He's got this high collar right here. So move the head up like so. You can rotate around, but you can kind of move it back forward. Your preference, I kind of like it back. Arms can go up and down. They can do a complete 360. It feels like they're on a, no, I thought it was a ratchet, just a tight joint. He's got a elbow swivel, elbow bend, no wrist rotation, no waist rotation. Legs can go up, back, and out slightly. He's got this little piece right here that does stop it unless you kind of angle behind a little bit. He's got a knee bend and no ankle articulation. So fairly decent articulation. I'm not going to complain. You can get some pretty good poses out of him. Now you can also utilize laser beak with sound wave. You've got the little feet down here. You actually flip from, here's how you're having position for the car. You flip forward.  And sound wave has these little bars right there on both forearms that you can attach laser beak to. So just clip him on the little bar there. And there we go. And now we have sound wave with laser beak on his arm ready for battle. Now for some quick size comparisons. Here is Studio Series 51 Dark of the Moon sound wave with Generation 1 sound wave, Transformers Siege sound wave, and Studio Series 34 Dark of the Moon Megatron. Transformers Studio Series 51 Dark of the Moon sound wave is a figure that really impressed me. He is so much better in hand than the pictures doing justice on the internet. There is so much molded detail and personality in this figure. It amazes me. And the minimal paint applications he has really, really worked. Though I wish he had a few more specifically on his energy discs that's shown in the movie. The laser beak figure is a nice addition. I wish it had a little bit more painted details on him. And I wish sound wave came with his blaster that he was going to use to execute Bumblebee. Vehicle mode. I found vehicle mode a little lacking. I usually can't stand a vehicle mode where all the robot parts show through in the windows. But other than that, there's not really a lot of faults with this figure. So there you go guys, Studio Series 51 Dark of the Moon sound wave. I cannot do a Frank Welker. So does the Studio Series 51 Dark of the Moon sound wave belong in your collection? Well, if you're a sound wave fan and by that I mean an OG sound wave fan, this figure may not be for you. But if you like the way he looked in Dark of the Moon and are a Studio Series collector, absolutely. This is a fantastic figure. He's got some outstanding molded details. I was absolutely floored when I first opened him up and really got a close look at him. I love the details on this figure. Even the face sculpt is amazing. Now granted, he could use some paint applications. Some blue highlights on these discs right here would really make him pop. And for Laserbeak, Laserbeak could use a lot of work. But other than that, I love this robot mode. Though I thought he'd be taller. Now as far as vehicle mode is concerned, it's a Mercedes sports car. I could really care less about that. I prefer my Decepticons to be military vehicles. But as far as a robot mode is concerned, this figure is going to be proudly displayed on my wall. And guys, I want to thank you for stopping by and checking out my video. Don't forget to like. Don't forget to subscribe. And don't forget to click that bell icon to get notified when I upload new videos. Guys, I appreciate each and every one of you. This is Patriot Prime, signing out. Hello!


possible to use five frequencies at the same time instead of one at a time. They say it's more powerful that way. So what they're doing is they're they're playing a harmonic of frequencies. When they say frequencies, it's like one frequency, right? So it could be like 100 hertz. That's one frequency. And they play, let's say 200 hertz as in our frequency. So what they're saying is they play multiple frequencies, they're creating a harmonic. So what that is, is like our quantum frequencies. Okay. So it's, it's like a basic level of harmonics. Just it's more powerful than one frequency playing harmonics. They're at this level, whereas we move a couple of levels higher than that, because we're actually playing up to 5,000 frequencies in our free, in our program. Does it make sense?


I'm going to need some assistance down here. An impending confrontation, a potential threat. Every day all over the country, law enforcement officers are placed into situations such as this one, where they must take immediate action to neutralize the danger. It's a way of life for everyone with a bag. Split-second decisions they must make regarding the use of force necessary to control a situation that can change people's lives forever. The responsibility is monumental, because human lives truly do weigh in the balance. But the training professionals at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center recognize the critical nature of these day-to-day decisions. As a result, they've designed a use of force model which can help identify and interpret various levels of resistance within a given situation, and which suggests corresponding standardized responses to each of these perceptions. The purpose of this program is to provide officers and students alike with a graphic illustration of that model. The use of force model is a graphic illustration which will be referenced by all of the FLETC divisions throughout your training here at the Center. It describes the escalation or de-escalation of the required force based upon a demonstrated level of compliance or resistance from a subject. Its purpose is to help create standardized responses based on an officer's reasonable perception of a threat. Now as you can see, it's a colorized, five-tiered model illustrating five levels of threat and their corresponding responses. The bottom level is blue and illustrates the lowest level of activity in the model. This activity includes normal day-to-day, non-threatening activities such as verbal communication with complaint citizens. The green level describes the perception of passive and nonviolent resistance by a subject, which calls for an increased level of verbal communications by the officer in conjunction with the physical response of the contact controls. Moving up the model to the yellow tier signals the need for increased officer awareness due to a recognized threat of active resistance. At this point there's been no assault on the officer, therefore the use of control techniques only should be employed to handle the situation. The orange tier defines an officer's perception of imminent bodily harm to himself or to others based on an assaultive posture or hostile resistance by the subject. This level calls for self-defense techniques along with threat elimination strategies. The highest level of threat is depicted here at the red tier, where imminent serious bodily injury or death may result. With a threat on this level as perceived, the officer must maintain the highest level of risk assessment and be prepared to use survival skills, including the use of deadly force. As you can see, the model also supports double-sided arrows running from the blue tier all the way to the red tier. These arrows represent a logical and legal cause and effect based upon a reasonable perception of risk. They illustrate that an officer has the option to escalate, de-escalate, jump between tears or maintain the level of force that he or she deems appropriate to gain and maintain control of the subject and the situation. It's a dynamic model, isn't it? In theory it effectively defines enforcement electives as a function of a reasonable officer's perceptions. But what about the real world? Does the use of force model apply in real-life law enforcement operations? Let's continue the scenario we saw earlier to see if it does. Saving our jobs, stop, management greed. Management greed is regreed. Saving our jobs, stop, management greed. Saving our jobs, stop, management greed. Save our jobs, stop, management greed. I'm special agent Dave Hale. Can you all quiet down so we can talk about this? You know, quiet, quiet, ma'am. Listen, I don't like the idea of the plant closing any more than you do. And you all certainly have a right to voice your opinion in this matter. But this is not the place to do it. You're gonna have to take your signs and move along. You're creating a hazard here. Not a chance. We're not going anywhere until we get some answers here. Listen, I understand how you feel. I know that times are tough, but there are better ways to deal with this. Right now what you're doing is you're breaking the law.  What do you know about tough times?  I've put my heart and soul into this plant. For 17 years, I've worked myself to death with our clummy wages and now they're closing. I'm shot moving out of the country. What about us? What about our families? What about our retirement? I know that you're upset by this, but there are better ways to deal with this problem. You can take it to the courts, or you can hold legal demonstrations in authorized areas, but you cannot demonstrate here. It's illegal and it's creating a hazard to other people. Don't listen to this guy, Harry.  We didn't come down here to talk to you, mister. We came down here to talk to somebody else. All our lives we've been doing things the right way. We wanted a guess on employment. Well, we're here to do something about it now. Listen, hold on. Let's just cool down and let's talk about this. We're through talking about it, mister. We're here to do something. For the last time, I'm telling you to move away from this area now.  All right, that's it. You're under arrest. Turn around and put your hands in the rest. You're just a free country. Hey, come on, man.  I've got every right to be here. No, sir, you don't.  Don't give me that. I'm a taxpayer. I pay your salary, pal. You're supposed to be protecting me. You don't even do this, harassing me. I'm not going anywhere.  All right, that's it. You're under arrest.  I'm not going anywhere, man. You want a piece of me? All right, drop the knife. Drop the knife. Drop the knife.  Come on. Drop the knife. If I have to, that's up to you. Drop the knife. I'm not going to let those keep my job. Drop the knife. I've got my heart on my life. This isn't fair. Drop the knife now. Drop the knife over there. Now. I put your hands over your head. Turn around. Don't move. Well, were you able to distinguish the tears of the model? Remember this. Compliance, passive resistance, active resistance, assaultive with a threat of bodily harm, and assaultive with a threat of serious bodily harm or death. Let's look back and see if we can locate them. Save our job. Right at the beginning, when our demonstrators have just arrived at the steps, we are at the first tier of the model. Officer Bryson utilizes her communication skills in the hope they will be compliant and leave the area without incident. She is not successful in that attempt. When Special Agent Hale arrives in the scene, he again starts on the first level, trying to resolve the problem by gaining their compliance. We know that didn't work either. The demonstrators continue in their posture of passive resistance. However, one of the demonstrators crosses the line, becoming actively resistant. But by escalating his level of enforcement tactics in response to this active resistance, Agent Hale was successful in taking control of one of the demonstrators. A second subject also becomes actively resistant and charges Agent Hale. After being pushed away, the subject becomes extremely belligerent. Agent Hale continues in his effort to gain compliance, but to no avail. The subject escalates the situation to the fourth level of the model by pulling a knife. Recognizing the risk of bodily harm and that intermediate weapons such as batons or chemical sprays are inappropriate due to the level of threat, our officers draw their weapons in response to the assault. The threat de-escalates quickly from here. Our demonstrator becomes compliant and our officers take control of the situation. Or do they? Remember, there are five tiers to the model. So far we've witnessed only four. In addition, orderly escalation or de-escalation up and down the tiers is not always the way enforcement electives work out. We all know that situations can begin at any one of the levels of the model or move from one level to the other in an instant. An officer must be prepared both mentally and physically to administer the proper response based on the level of resistance he perceives. With that in mind, let's rejoin officers Hale and Bryson and see if the situation is really under control.  It's not often that an officer is forced into a response from the fifth tier of the model but he must nonetheless be ready to take that action. If an assault by a subject places an officer or anyone else in danger of serious bodily harm or death he has the right and the commission to protect himself and the others around him. The use of deadly force is a serious matter but it's an option which sometimes becomes necessary. So in the final analysis, the goal of the use of force model is to help officers maintain a high degree of enforcement readiness. That readiness manifests itself in two ways. First, in a willingness to keep enforcement responses on the lowest tier possible through skillful use of physical and communicative strategies. And second, in the resolve to escalate to the appropriate level of response whenever necessary to protect human life and to maintain control of the situation. It is absolutely essential that all law enforcement officers understand the precepts of the use of force model and are fully confident in their ability to navigate up and down and in between its five tiers. So let's briefly recap what the tiers represent. The blue level is the lowest level representing day to day non-threatening activities. The green level represents passive or nonviolent resistance and calls for an increased level of verbal communications and contact controls if necessary. The yellow tier signals active resistance and calls for increased awareness and compliance techniques. Orange warns of hostile resistance and imminent bodily harm to the officer or to others and calls for self-defense techniques. And the red tier represents the threat of serious bodily injury or death and calls for the use of deadly force if necessary. These standards defined by the tiers of the model go to the very heart of the law enforcement philosophy taught here at the Center. And so you will see this illustration often during your training here. Learn it well. The decisions you make regarding the proper use of force will play a major part in your career as law enforcement officer.


Η πραγματική στιγμή της δεξάμεθος was a progression-free survival and it was met because in the control arm in the protegeum in the methexamethosone arm the median progression-free survival was 9.46 months whereas in the selinexor protegeum in the methexamethosone arm it was 13.93 months. Η δεξάμεθος was statistically significant with the p-value of less than 0.01 and a hazard ratio of 0.7. Περδερμόρ, there was a higher overall response rate associated with SVD at 74.6% versus 62.3% associated with VD. The most frequent treatment related adverse events were cytopenias. For example, there was a grade 3 or 4 thrombocytopenia in 40% of the patients treated with SVD, anemia, gastrointestinal toxicity such as nausea and diarrhea which were mostly grade 1 or 2. Cytopenias were not severe and the bleeding events and the episodes of neutrophinic fever were low so there was a higher incidence of adverse events in the triplet in the SVD arm. However, the occurrence of really severe adverse events that necessitated treatment discontinuation was low so this is why we have approximately the same treatment discontinuation in both arms. Of course we know that there are fewer hospital visits or visits to the clinic to receive the subcutaneous cortezomib and we know that there is less peripheral neuropathy associated with one squiggly cortezomib, less frequent hospital clinic visits so this is associated with an improved quality of life. It was of interest to see that in this particular trial patients who are considered to have high resettles genetics such as patients with 17p deletion or patients who have for 14-thousand locations, 14-16th-thousand locations and other abnormalities did better, performed better with the triplet. τρύπλετ. We know that for this particular patient population we are in constant need to find more active regimens, so this is an additional benefit of the study to show that there was a benefit which was even greater for patients with 17p deletion with the addition of selinexor to proteasomy and hexamethasone. Yes, selinexor has a completely different mechanism of action than other drugs and when it is used once weekly at the lower dose there is a better tolerability because we know that the major limitation of the use of selinexor is the gastrointestinal toxicity of the drug. As we use more and more selinexor we learn how to prevent or to treat this side effect so I believe that having a class of agents that has a different mechanism of action from other drugs from immunomodulatory agents from proteasome inhibitors from monoclonal antibodies is a benefit for the treatment of patients with myeloma.


Hi everyone, my name is Yanis and I will present our results on messaging lay security This is a joint work with Joel, Sandra and Evgeny. First I'll give some context by comparing secure messaging with secure communication and highlight the differences. So in secure communication, we assume reliable channels between parties So there is no message loss Communication is synchronous and sensors are typically short lived Parties are online during sessions and resilience to compromises of minor concern On the other hand on messaging Channels are unreliable. So messages may be lost Communication is a synchronous users might send messages and then go offline Sessions are long lived they might last for years and this is why state compromise is very likely to happen over the lifetime of a session In the two-party setting for messaging we have the success story of the signal protocol Which is loosely based on the of the record protocol it is used by billions of people and By many applications like signal Facebook Messenger. What's up and Skype? It won the Levin prize at real-world crypto And its security is very very well studied and very well understood So what about security of messaging for groups? So the naive approach would be basically to use a two-party protocol in a pairwise manner however, this solution Is highly inefficient it requires complexity and square So we need something much better than that and this is the purpose of message-less security So I'm a less started about two years ago and currently we have its night version The goal is to standardize a protocol for secure group messaging With all again message complexity where n is the number of users There are many contributors in this project both like from the academia like many universities and also the industry The functionality provided by MLS is like the following parties can basically Join a group when they're invited by group members. They can leave group at any time They perform updates to refresh key material And they can also send and receive messages The attacker controls the network and the server He sees all packets transmitted in the network. He can change packets and he also controls message delivery It can also leak the state of group members The MLS design considers several modular components and there is lots of inspiration from the two-party setting This is similar to the ACD-19 paradigm in ACD-19 The offer show how to modularize the double ratchet using three primitives namely continuous key agreement Which is the public ratchet Forward secret of the negated encryption, which is a symmetric ratchet and also the glue between them, which is the PRF PRNG So ACD-19 shows how to compose those three primitives and build to party secure messaging Now the good news is that the ACD-19 paradigm also applies to MLS Of course by considering the group variants of the corresponding primitives So here we have a continuous group key agreement and and party forward secure authenticated encryption and also signatures for authentication in our work we focus on the continuous group key agreement primitive In more detail the contributions of our work are the following We provide a formal security model for CGKAA We also proven that security of the CGKAA protocol that is proposed by MLS Which is called Trichem and their main surprise is here And we also propose a modified version of Trichem that achieves better security So now I will present the simplified version of our CGKAA security definition Our primitive supports the following functionalities group creation first of all so user you can create a group G A member you can add a non-member V to the group by executing add and similarly for remove So a member you can remove another member V from the group We also have the update operation which basically refreshes the group state and this is important for security as we will see later and Then we have the process operation which enables processing of control messages generated by the above operations The goal is to synchronously maintain a search secret in a dynamically changing group So protocol execution proceeds in epochs And with each operation we have a new epoch and a new group secret So for instance consider our example So here we have group creation by party a and we're an epoch number one with group secret I1 Then B is added and we move to epoch number two and new group secret and Then B updates C is added C updates and A is removed So the group secrets are basically used by full messaging by the high-level protocol to refresh keys now the adversary Controls the network and the server. He sees all packets transmitted in the network, but he cannot modify them so this is one restriction another one is that It controls message delivery, but it must deliver all messages in the same order to all users So those two points are basically handled by the high-level protocol How basically using signatures? So the adversary would not be able to modify packets if messages are signed and also You can protect the order of messages by passing the transcript So besides that the adversary fully controls the sequence of operations you can ask users to update their state To add other users or to remove users from the group and also he can leak the state of group members The privacy guarantees that we require is that group secret should look random to the attacker unless they are trivially known and Since Sessions are long-lasting. We also require post-compromise security. So we should be able to recover from state compromise Via normal protocol execution and also we require forward secrecy which basically Means that privacy should hold even against future state corruption state compromise Now consider an adversary that challenges epoch I So the question is like is epoch key also known as update secret of epoch I secure Let's see the notion of optimal security optimal security which implies PCS and FS Requires that all users that are corrupted at epoch J prior to I or less Vanu equal to I issue an update operation at some epoch T in the rates J plus 1 comma I so basically this means if you have corrupted users before epoch I Those users just need to issue an update operation Before epoch I we also allow corruptions after epoch I and we also consider Two weaker notions of security forward security in isolation in which first corruption Can happen only after the challenge epoch and Also PCS in isolation Which is like optimal security like optimal security, but no corruptions are allowed after the challenge epoch Now I will present The cgk protocol which is proposed by MLS called tricking Tricking was initially proposed in the MLS mailing list in 2018 and it's based on an early work on asynchronous ratcheting trees The bucket size is all again And we also have subsequent work, which is causal tricking Tainted tricking and also actively secure cgk which is a completely different protocol For this talk, I will omit add and remove operations and I will assume that no user is left behind Meaning that all users process instantly all messages all control messages generated by operations Our paper handles the general case So we only focus on update and corrupt operations for study groups and as we will see this is still on trivial and captures the main difficulties So the goal is to maintain a shared secret in a study group tricking uses a tree-based structure So members group members are arranged at the leaves of the tree. So here we have eight members each note consists of a public and sacred key for public encryption and The invariant is that part is known only the secret keys on the path to the root So this party here knows the secret key for this note this note this note and this note The root note is a special note, which I will Refer to it In more detail later So here we have eight parties and the I'd leave corresponds to the I'd party from the left to the right Let's see how the update operation works on tree game Assume that party one which is the first leaf Executes an update operation the operation is basically using Calls to a PRG which is denoted by age So what party one does is the following it samples s0 a uniformly random seed s0 and computes the PRG over s0 This gives a new seed s1 which will be used in the higher layer and Also gives and secret key SK0 This is the secret key the new secret key for this note From this secret key we can also derive pk0, which is the public key of the note then we go to the next level and Then using s1 we compute the PRG over s1 and we compute the seed For the next level s2 and we also compute the secret key for this note and Using us through here We can compute the seed for the next level and the secret key for this note now The thing is that s3 is basically the update secret Is the secret or the group secret is the secret that is being computed that needs to be computed by by all group members So this is how the update operation works from the view of like party one and this is how party one updates that The tree how do other group members compute i how do other members compute the group secret? What party one does is that and it encrypts the seeds as i using The public keys of what we call co-path nodes so basically s1 is encrypted Under the public key of node a and since party two knows sk a it can recover s1 and compute all the secrets to the root Similarly Party one encrypts s2 under pkb and since all those two parties 3 and 4 they know skb because this keys in their path to the root They can decrypt the cypher text recover s2 and compute s3 again and the same for node c and those four parties those four parties here from 4 to 8 they know skc and they can directly recap decrypt the cypher text and recover s3 For forward secret c we need to delete intermediate values So the SI values that we computed earlier need to need to be deleted and also Forward secrecy as soon as the group secret is being processed by the high-level protocol. It needs to be deleted from the state However, we observe that the cypher text that have been generated by the update operation Have been are known to the attacker because the attacker has access to the network traffic So what we observe here is that if at some point in the future the adversary via some corruption Manages to learn ska or skb or skc, then he's able to compute The update secret generated by party one now. Let's see an example that illustrates issues with three games forward secrecy From now on we just write epoch numbers and We use the cross for blank nodes. So initially all nodes in the tree besides the leaves are blank we still have eight users and the leaves store the public and secret key of each user which Like we refer to as a need keys. This is a term used by MLS So party one executes an update along the brown path and refreshes all keys along the brown path and also computes a new update secret and We move to epoch one Party three executes another update operation. So we have fresh keys along the red path Then party five executes an update along the green path and Refreshes all those keys and finally party seven executes an update along the yellow path now the question is whether The update secret for epoch four is secure We introduce the notion of a bomb. So a bomb is a key that lets the adversary recover The update the update secret for epoch four So observe that information about epoch four update is encrypted under keys of nodes with a Yellow bomb So when party seven executes the update operation, it basically encrypts this secret Under the secret key of this node. This is why we have a bomb here Also, this secret is being encrypted under the secret key of this node This is why we have another bomb here and finally the update secret is being encrypted under the secret of this node So we have a third bomb So each update operation generates log n bombs. Are those the only bombs that we have? The answer is no and We can see why by checking previous update operations When party number five issued the update operation the secret for this node was encrypted under the secret key of this node So here we have a green bomb. This green bomb basically says that the secret key of this node Enables the recovery of the secret key and the update secret for epoch three, but the recovery of this secret Basically enables the recovery of the secret for epoch four Similarly for previous update operations like for the red path for this update When user number three executed the update operation he encrypted this secret under this secret key This basically implies that we have a red bomb here that allows the recovery of the red path But if you recover the red path you can recover this secret key and the discovery of this secret key Enables the recovery of epoch secret four due to this bomb similarly for for this node and Of course for the first update and the bomb that we have here So forever for every level I we have two to the I minus one active bombs Which implies that half of the leaf keys are bombs So by corrupting any user Still holding a bomb implies Security breach for a pop for secret What if users update so can the update operation help us, you know make things better Assume Parti six issues and update operations operation alone along the great path Then this update operation overrides all the keys in this path. So some bombs are diffused Making critical keys inside those bombs no longer accessible since we override this path Those secret keys are erased so are no longer accessible the thing is that At most one bomb is being diffused per level I with each update operation We have n over two leaf bonds and this implies that we need at least n over two updates to diffuse all bonds So every update has n over two keys at least which allow to recover new secrets Why is this a problem because forward security takes a long time to kick in and Each update overhead at most one leaf key So we need n over two epochs to get forward security even in the best case even if nobody's corrupted yet however forward secrecy Requires Security after a single update So in the worst case We will never achieve forward security if the right people don't perform and don't perform an update operation So trick em achieves less than ideal forward security even under the most favorable circumstances In our paper will characterize precisely the set of secure keys given the sequence of attackers queries We use the notion of graph reach ability on key graphs And we basically saw that The level of security achieved by trick em is very far from optimal The question is can we do better? Can we do optimal? And the answer is yes, we can By replacing standard public encryption in trick em with updateable public encryption. We get an optimal secure scheme For cdka This notion of updateable pke is closely related to key updateable pke, which is used in the two-party setting for secure messaging by JMM 18 Our idea is inspired by proposal of Conrad in the MLS naming list And basically the intuition is that this updateable pke It gives you practical forward security Let's compare updateable pke with standard pke So in standard pke we have key gen which generates public and secret key the encryption operation generates a ciphertext Over the message in the public key and the encryption recovers the message for correctness Senders need not to be synchronized and cpa security requires encryptions of any two messages to be in distinction Now for updateable public encryption the cdx has as follows key gen Outputs a new public key secret key pair pk0sk0 then the initial keys and The encryption operation receives public key and message and outputs a ciphertext together with a new public key So the encryption operation refreshes the public key became Refreshes the public key the description operation receives a secret key and ciphertext and produces the message But also produces a new secret key which basically this secret key needs to be synchronized with this public key here for correctness we require all senders to be synchronized and this is guaranteed by the MLS assumption and And also Encryptions of any two messages are indistinguishable like for cpa security even given the secret key Obdained after decrypting the challenge ciphertext So the idea here is that even if the adversary is given see I SKI and pki he cannot recover any information about SKI minus one and Basically, this means that mi is still protected. So this it gives you like forward security our update of public encryption Construction is based on El Gamal and the random oracle model and is similar to jam jam and 18 And now let's see how this new protocol works our tricking which stands for a re-randomized tricking As soon party one executes an update operation The update operation is very similar You generate basically the seeds along the direct path and then you encrypt with respect to the circle nodes as we did before However, the scheme that you use now is a bit of public encryption instead of standard public encryption So as one here is encrypted under the public key of node a The encryption operation generates CA but also re-randomizes the public key and produces a new public key pka a prior also the description operation over CA Recovers as one but also produces a randomized Key SK a prime and the same happens for nodes B and C like encryption other PKB of s2 produces CB and a new public key PKB prime and also the encryption of CB Produces a new secret key and now the idea is that if you have corruptions If the states of the users are linked to the adversary, let's say for this node Then the adversary learns SK prime a but By recovering SK prime a does not break security of Of the scheme right so SK a remain secure and S1 remain secure and the same happens If you have States that are leaked for those nodes and also for those nodes So here if you if you have users Compromise users here then the adversary learns SK prime B, but it's not recovering SK B or s2 So this is the main idea in the paper. We have more results We have security against that adaptive adversaries and we also propose future directions and open programs for secure group messaging There are also other stuff like multiplicative UPK for a little girls You can check the post by jail in the MLS mailing list and Also a draft on this topic and basically the that's all I had to say and This is our imprint version of the paper and thank you