Okay. Good morning, and welcome to Vermont House Judiciary Committee. And excuse me this morning, we are going to be looking at H 133, which is a bill emergency relief from abuse orders and relinquishment of firearms. And we are going to start with Attorney Eric Fitzpatrick to do a walkthrough. Welcome Eric morning. Thank you. Thank you. Good morning. Good morning everybody. This is Eric Fitzpatrick with the Office of Legislative Council here to excuse me give a walkthrough and talk a little bit about H 133 which as the chair just mentioned is an act relating to emergency relief from abuse orders and relinquishment of firearms. The topic of relief from abuse orders I know is something that the committee has spent quite a bit of time talking about over the last couple of years. But it's been a while since we talked about it and there are some new members on the committee as well so I thought it would be helpful, given that for me to spend a couple of minutes at first sort of giving the lay of the land and let folks know what the what the current state of the law is so that in this case in particular, it's very helpful and really necessary to know what that current state of the law is in order to get a good grasp on what the bill is proposing to do. So I'll do that first. And actually even before I do that, as I mentioned here before when I do a walkthrough I like to take just a minute before we even look at any language and just explain in general terms, what the bill is doing that kind of gives everybody a big picture 50,000 feet view of what's the proposal being made in the bill in this case age 133. So, as I mentioned, it's addressing the topic of relief from abuse orders and a relief from abuse order, known as an RFA is the acronym. It's when a plaintiff and that's a person who brings a court action remember we have a plaintiff brings a court action and a defendant is a person against whom the action is brought who defends against the action. A plaintiff can be a family or household member can go into the court and get an order known as this RFA relief from abuse order issued against the defendant in order to protect the plaintiff, the family or household member from future harm. So if the plaintiff can show that there's a date that they've been abused, and that there's a danger of future abuse, then the court can issue this order an RFA that will direct certain things there's a long list of things. And in fact a very broad list of components that can be in the court's order that would essentially be saying, to the defendant for just to give you a few examples that could be a no contact order in other words you can't contact the plaintiff children you can could be an order to vacate you must leave the plaintiff's house. You have to stay a certain distance away from the plaintiff or the plaintiff's children. You have to provide child support there's there's a long list and not an exclusive list I might add of what could be in this order and the court would issue that order against the defendant. And that would limit the sort of conduct that the defendant can have with respect to the plaintiff and the plaintiff's children so that's how the RFA would work typically speaking. The, and this sort of brings up an important point for purposes of the bill to there's two types of these RFAs two types of relief from abuse orders. There's a final order. And there's also an emergency or temporary order. The emergency and temporary terms are sometimes used interchangeably but they refer to the same thing the temporary or emergency order, and you also have the final order. What's the difference the two main differences between the two things. The final order generally requires that there be notice provided to the defendant and an opportunity for the defendant to come to the hearing and argue against why the order shouldn't be issued. In the hearing and the emergency order, the temporary order can be issued ex parte. I know that's a phrase everybody remembers what it means from one side or by one party only. That means that an emergency order or temporary order can be issued, even though the defendant is not there at the hearing, the plaintiff can go go in individually by themselves, and showed an immediate. A word that's used in the emergency order statute but not in the final order statute. If they can show there's an immediate danger of further abuse, you can get this emergency order this temporary order issued without the defendant being present. So, because that's done without notice or the defendant being present. You remember that this implicates due process concerns, because it's important for people in order to have their rights affected. They have an opportunity under the due process clause of both the US and Vermont constitutions to have notice and an opportunity to be heard. There are limited situations in which proceedings can go forward without that kind of notice and an opportunity to be heard but there always has to be a quick opportunity for the person to come into court afterward. So you have to be able to get in the court reasonably quickly afterward, even though there's been an emergency situation to start with, and then argue, you know, why it is you don't think the order should issue. In this case, in the emergency temporary RFA situation, it only lasts for 14 days that emergency temporary order only lasts for 14 days and within that 14 day period, it has to schedule a hearing, so that the defendant can come in and have notice and argue, you know why it is they mainly think that the emergency or final order shouldn't issue. So that satisfies the due process requirement so they quickly get an opportunity to come in and make that argument. So, those are the crucial distinctions between this emergency order and the final order. The emergency order can be done ex parte with only the plaintiff present, and it only lasts for 14 days, whereas the final order, the defendant has to be present, there has to be hearing with the defendant there, and it can last for whatever period the court has to set the period in the order, the length of time, but can be as much as a year, but it's actually much longer than the 14 day limit that's on the emergency order. So what, with that bit of big picture background, as I mentioned, in statute, there are a list of different components and elements that can be part of this order. You know, what can the in the order contain what limitations on the defense ability to do, you know, as I mentioned, don't contact the plaintiff, move out of the plaintiff's house, etc, etc. What H 133 does is it adds one piece to that list. It adds a an additional component that the court can include in this emergency order, and this only applies to the emergency order the temporary one that's in effect for 14 days. And what it adds to that is basically a provision that says the court may order if there's evidence that certain particular evidence you'll see in the language when we look at it about the defendant having firearms or in that case, then the court can order that the defendant relinquish their firearms. So, again, it's not a requirement, but it's a permissive piece of the order that can be included. And what H 33 proposes to do is to add that ability of the court to the list of the court can include in this emergency relief from abuse order. I should mention that that in many ways that's a clarification of existing law, because some courts view some judges I should say and I think judge Grissom will talk about this in more detail. I would argue that the court sort of inherent power to address emergencies, and the court does have that authority, you know, for work to issue temporary restraining orders and junctions that sort of thing to address emergency situations that the court already has some authority to issue, for example, if there were a dangerous situation, a requirement that the defendant relinquish firearms, but I think other judges may not view it that that way and that there's also, at the very least, a lack of clarity in the statute about whether that authority exists. So the proposal here is to resolve any ambiguity that there may be out there and just make it clear that the court does have the authority to include firearms relinquishment as part of the emergency relief from abuse order. So that is the big picture of what's going on without having looked at any language yet. But my thought was now to take a moment to look at the existing statute and then that'll segue us right into the proposal being made in the bill. But I can also pause here if there's any initial questions if anybody wants me to slow down or address anything that might be on anybody's mind. Eric, when you do the walkthrough, will you have, will you be able to show us existing laws so 1104 a one through three or, or if not if you could post current law I think that would be helpful. The current law is posted. Yep, I sent that to Mike. And that's what I'm going to I'm going to when I share my screen in a moment I'm just going to go over to to that so you should on on the documents under my name for today's testimony, the current chapter on relief from abuse orders which includes all that language is posted. Great. And Eric, we're entitled 15. If you could just remind us what, because sometimes this committee is entitled 15 we're often entitled 13. That's right title 15 refers to family proceedings in the family division family proceedings and we're not in. We're not entitled 13 which is the criminal code. So these are not criminal proceedings. These are civil proceedings in the family division. Great. Thank you. Sure. Hey, I see Kate's hand up. Yeah, thanks. I just want to clarify what you were just referring to in terms of how things are currently operating within the court were you saying that currently judges are in some instances already requiring firearms be removed from homes during this temporary order, or did I miss understand that. I think Judge Greerson will testify about that in more detail but yes that is my understanding that in some instances, some judges do that is within their authority but others think the law on that is not so clear. So I'm not seeing any further hands so I think I'll start sharing my screen and look at the current statute now.  I can't see everybody. So if somebody has a question, feel free to just interrupt me I'll be happy to be interrupted if you've got something you want me to, you know, take a pause on or answer a question so please feel free to do that. Now is everybody is everybody seeing my screen. Yes. Good. Thank you. So I'm now looking at what you now see in front of you then is in as the chair mentioned in title 15 the domestic relations family proceedings chap title of the Vermont statutes. So we're looking at the abuse prevention chapter and this is the lengthy detailed series of statutes that you have addressing relief from abuse orders these are, this is not, you know, a short statute that addresses these types of proceedings at all they're lengthy quite lengthy, and are there with a lot of detail. So the first thing I'm going to look at is section. You'll see 1103. And this is the final relief from abuse order statute. It's quite understood. Even though chronologically the emergency or temporary order would come first, the final order is first in the statute, but it's been on the books since 1979 so I guess it's sort of ingrained as to that's how it is but I've always thought that was, you know, in terms of chronology it should be reversed so in terms of the final order though it is helpful to look at it. This one first. So the terminology that's used flows through both, both the final order provision and the temporary provision. In some sense, it seems like the temporary order can be viewed as sort of part of this entire proceeding that they're, you know, the same language applies to both they're all sort of part and parcel of the same action in many cases. So this is the language regarding the emergent, sorry, the final relief from abuse order proceeding. And you'll see it starts right off with what I was mentioning earlier any family or household member may seek relief from abuse by another family or household member on behalf of themselves or herself or his or her children by filing a complaint under this chat. Now that's the main crux of what's going on in all these proceedings that so that you see first of all, that it's not just anybody who can bring an individual to the petition file a complaint for relief from abuse has to be a family or household members they're the person who can seek relief from abuse. And that is a defined term so I'm going to go right back up to the definition section and you'll see family member is not defined because that's obviously whether or not someone is related in the same family but household member is defined. So that means people who for any period of time have living our living or have lived together sharing or have shared occupancy occupancy of a dwelling or engaged in a sexual or dating relationship and dating relationship is then defined as well. So, you have to fit into that definition of a household member or be a family member to even file a request for relief from abuse but assuming you do. You can go into one of those two categories, then you can ask the court for an RFA to direct the defendant to not engage in any further harmful behavior. And I have to say the last sentence there's a there's some particular provisions about how minors may file the petition. I'm going to pass over that's not really relevant to what we're talking about here. So it does talk about that the plaintiff has to submit an affidavit and support of their request so they have to, you know swear under penalties of perjury that the facts they're asserting are true. So there has to be this affidavit. Again, moving on to subsection be you'll see that Eric before you before you jump to be. Yeah, please. Yeah, this is this is Tom if you don't see me or my voice. Well, I figured but in at the right at the top of request for relief. We probably discussed it in the past, but why is that so narrow, because with this language, I can't get a RFA say on you. I think the idea is that it's meant to address this sort of evidence that of abuse between family members that has happened over time and that and that because of that evidence that's out there that's why it's targeted at that particular particular case where that occurs and now that's not to say that that not under this chapter but that you might be able to get an order against stocking for example against someone who may fall outside that category, or even just when I was referring to in the very beginning to the court's inherent authority to address an emergency you may you may be able to get the court to issue sort of a general temporary restraining order. A threat of violence by someone who doesn't fit one of these categories but I think this chapter in particular is as the chair was mentioning, being located in the family proceedings chapters really meant to address these situations between family and household members. I'm not dealing with it all the time I just couldn't remember any other avenues for people but but thank you for your explanation because it does show that there is other other ways people can get, if not an RFA something very similar. Right, that's right. So, yeah, as I mentioned earlier you'll see in the first sentence of subsection B says court generally has to can only give one of provide one of these final orders after notice to the defendant and hearing everybody see that in that first sense. You see there's the first clause except as provided in section 1104. That's because 1104 is the emergency temporary statute. Remember that's the one that I mentioned can be issued on an emergency basis ex parte without the defendant there so that there isn't notice to the defendant and hearing. So in that particular circumstance that is exempted. There can be an order issued without providing notice and hearing but remember it only lasts for 14 days. Within that 14 day period, there has to be hearing a hearing and notice to the defendant. Second sentence refers to the burden of proof which I'm going to come back to in just a moment before I get to that I wanted to look at some subsection C here. Now we know that the plaintiff, who has to be a family or household member can come into court, seek this relief from abuse order. And there has to be hearing and notice to the defendant has to be an affidavit. Now the court can make so you look at subsection C the court can make shall make such orders as it deems necessary to protect the plaintiff or the children or both. Remember that's that's a very broad statement right there to such orders as it deems necessary to protect the plaintiff or the children so that's broad authority any order that that's necessary to protect them. If the court finds and this is the crucial point, there's two things that the court has to find in order to issue this order first that the defendant has abused the plaintiff. That's number one, and number two, one of two things, either there's a danger of further abuse, or the defendant is incarcerated and has been convicted of one of a following and then there's a list of offenses there. So that one obviously is pretty easy to unpack and see that you know if they're currently incarcerated and has and has been convicted of one of those offenses, pretty cut and dry whether the person would be subject to an RFA under that provision. The prior one though is depends on the nature of the term abuse right because the court has to make this finding that. Number one, defendant has abused the plaintiff in the past, and two, there's a danger of further abuse. So that begs the question which is also defined in statute what does abuse mean. I'm paging back up to the definition section again you'll see abuse means the occurrence of one or more the following acts between family or household members crucial again only that group of people. And it can be one of those five things attempting to cause or causing physical harm, placing another in fear imminent serious physical harm abuse to children, stopping sexual assault. So any one of those five things counts as abuse. And if that has occurred in the past. Let's go back to what the court has to find again. The court finds defendant has abused the plaintiff. In other words, it's occurred before, and there's a danger of further abuse. It might occur again. Then it can issue this order that may include the following. See that subdivision to there. This is what I mentioned earlier. That this, there's a lengthy list. This is in the final order a lengthy list of what could be in the order. And I should also point out in subdivision to the order may include the following. There's not an exclusive list. Because remember, we also saw a language before earlier right in subsea there shall the court shall make such orders as it deems necessary to protect the plaintiff or children or both. So that's very broad court whatever is necessary for protection, but the order may include is a non exclusive list of what might be in the order. And this is, you know, reiterates some of what I mentioned when I did the big picture overview at the beginning. Right there, the defendant refrained from abusing the plaintiff or the children are both in the future interfering with the plaintiff's personal liberty, including restrictions on the defendants ability to contact the plaintiff. So that's what I mentioned that no contact order is frequently a part of these RFAs the defendant is ordered not to contact the plaintiff, as long as this order is in effect. Um, Eric, I'm sorry, I see coaches. Hand is up. Yes, please. Okay, thank you. Eric, just for clarification. I think the mandated reporters. How do they fit into that group of or do they fit in directly or indirectly into that group at the beginning. Yeah, I think that's a separate a separate issue coach. I think the, they could be fit into it in the sense that if, if someone was a family or household member of the defendant, the person who was alleging abuse, and they were a mandated reporter, then they could do, they would have if they were many who were a mandated reporter, they would have to make the report obviously. And if they also happen to be a family or household member of the person who was allegedly committing the abuse, then they could file for an RFA. So they could be the have the ability to sort of invoke both proceedings but they might not either depending on who the person is. Does that make sense. All right. So the, yeah, so this is the list of what could potential things that could be in the order just mentioned that the no contact piece of it. An order to vacate you see in subdivision be that's what I mentioned it could be in order to vacate the household subdivision see temporary award of parental rights and responsibilities D orders about parent child contact child support is an E. So there's a lengthy list here we don't need to go through each, each component but there's a lot of things that may be included in this order. So that brings us back to subdivision be for a moment because now we've seen okay. The plaintiff has to come in has to be a family or household member. The court has to find that it has to be an affidavit the court has to find that the defendant has abused the plaintiff and there's a danger of further abuse. In order for this order to be issued. So, you know, to what extent does this have to be shown in the affidavit and the facts to what what sort of burden of proof is there on the plaintiff to make the showing and for the court to make that finding an order that's addressed in the second sense of subsection be you see the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving abuse by a preponderance of the evidence now. That is an issue that the committee has dealt with many times over the years but I felt I should reiterate that now so that people can understand that concept. The point about here is the burden of proof the standard of proof, and there are three primary standards of proof in the law, the preponderance of the evidence is the lowest one, the middle one is clear and convincing evidence and the most challenging the most one that requires the most proof is the proof beyond a reasonable doubt. So, the proof beyond a reasonable doubt I'm sure is familiar to everybody that's the one that's used in criminal proceedings. Whereas this one preponderance of the evidence that you look, you're looking at now is used primarily is the primary one that's used in civil proceedings that's what's the default in civil proceedings is the preponderance and what preponderance means is that it means, I'm going to read from some definition in black slot dictionary and another treaties on evidence called McCormick on evidence. It's a degree of evidence that while not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt is still more convincing than the opposing evidence and is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue, rather than the other. This is the burden of proof used in most civil trials in which the jury is instructed to find for the party that on the whole has the stronger evidence, however slight the edge may be. Now that's an important point however slight because sometimes sort of this standard the preponderance standard when you're talking about percentages some people refer to it as 51% to 49%. In other words, a 51% of the evidence seems like it favors one side as opposed to the other, and even if 49% of the evidence favors the other side, that still would satisfy the preponderance standard. So, as I just said, the language from McCormick, it's whoever has the stronger evidence, however slight the edge may be. So that's the preponderance standard that you see that's used here in the RFA statute, just so you know for background, as you know, going forward clear and convincing is sort of a middle tier that is something that the legislature sometimes uses as a matter of policy, when they can put in statutes. When it wants a burden of proof to be higher when it wants it to be something more than 51% to 49%, for example wants there to be a higher standard a higher requirement of proof that needs to be brought the legislature does that sometimes and puts that in statute. Reading from an articulation of what the standard is clear and convincing evidence means evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable, or reasonably certain, because that highly probable or reasonably certain. This is stronger evidence than a preponderance the standard applied in most civil trials, but less evidence than beyond a reasonable doubt the standard for criminal trials. That gives you a sense of clear and convincing. And lastly, beyond a reasonable doubt. This is articulated as fully satisfied, entirely convinced, satisfied to a moral certainty, and in my favorite term, indubitable. So, so that's from, that's also from black squad dictionary. So that gives you a sense of what they are and again, referring back to the statute it's preponderance that's used for purpose purposes of the RFA. Eric, if I may. Yes. Yeah, I'm the per on the language here. The law. Now I just lost it. There it is. Propond, preponderance of evidence. So, concerning an RFA, if, if the, if there isn't that 51% you talk about is, is it a may or a shell as far as the judge goes for a, an RFA. I think I understand you represent bird. Are you saying that are asking that the, it is a shell in the sense that the court has to find that the plaintiff has met their burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. If the plaintiff does not satisfy the preponderance of the evidence standard, then the relief from abuse order can't be cannot be issued because the evidentiary threshold has not been met. Okay. Is that answer your question. Definitely. Thank you. Okay. Yep. Alright, so that's actually concludes what I wanted to say about the final order. Remember, this is all to do with the final relief from abuse order. So, again, this is only one of two possible RFAs this is the final order that can be issued for as long as the court determines. But there's also, as we saw in the except language above about how generally speaking there has to be notice and an opportunity for the defendant to be heard except for what remember it said except for section 1104, which is where we are now. So this is the 1104 this is emergency relief again a temporary order. This is when the order can be issued without the presence of the defendant you see the language. The very first sentence and accordance with the rules of the procedure temporary orders under this chapter maybe issued ex parte languages right there. Remember that's, that's from one side only one party only without notice to the defendant upon motion and findings by the court that defendant has abused the plaintiff or both so remember there's still that component of the required findings that's the same as in the in the final one has to be has to be a finding here that the defendant has abused the plaintiff or the plaintiff's in the past, again similarly the second sentence there has to be a nap the David. And there's that other language about proceedings for a minor that's in the last sentence there, but a key a key difference here again you'll see in subdivision one moving down just a little bit. This finding is different, because here it says upon a finding that there is an immediate danger of further abuse, everybody see that that word immediate is not in the final order statute that we just looked at. So that's gives you the sense that this is an emergency situation. Right. That's this is different, you can only issue this emergency order without the presence of the defendant that there's an immediate danger of further abuse and the court has to find that. And that's why the preponderance of the evidence. So, the findings in this case have to be number one, there was abuse against the plaintiff or the plaintiff's children that's the same as in the finding order those two are the same, but number two which is different, there's an immediate danger of further abuse. So if the court makes those two findings. Again, you'll see, as we looked at above. There's this list of things that can be in the order. In this final temporary relief from abuse order. You'll see and there's 123 and one has several components but there's, again refrain from abusing the plaintiff I'm in one a the plaintiff's children subdivision be refrain from interfering the plaintiff's personal liberty subdivision see coming refrain from coming within a fixed distance of the plane if you'll see that frequently in RFAs for example person can't come within however many feet of the of the plaintiff and no contact orders you see again earn subdivision be moving on to two and three. There's other things that can be in the order. The order can contain if there's a finding that the plaintiff her children have been have been forced out of the household then there can be this component included in the order that the vacate order that I mentioned earlier that can also be in the final one court may order the defendant to vacate that's the last line of subdivision to and subdivision three also provides for if there's a finding of immediate danger of physical or emotional harm temporarily awarding custody of the children. To the plaintiff. So you see that 123 correct that there can be in there. I'd say that because now that segues us perfectly into h 133 because what h 133 does is it adds a number four to that list to see those 123 this is existing law and the emergency order situation. And I'm going to try and see if I can switch now right to the bill. Let's see if I can do this. All right, everybody see the bill now. Hope that's a yes. So now we're back looking at. Okay good. Now we're back looking at this is the statute we were just looking at, except that this is the bill now. So this is where the proposal is to change that statute again we already looked at this language just now when we were looking at existing law here subsection a this is about the, the emergency order and what can be in it and how it has to how it can be issued sorry without notice to the defendant if there's a finding that there has been abuse in the past and that is an immediate danger of further abuse. And remember, we saw an exist in existing law there's components that can be in the order in the order and they were numbered 123. And the proposal of h 133 is to add another one subdivision for. And this says that okay that final emergency relief from abuse order. An additional provision, and that is, as you'll see in line five page two that the order an order issue under the section may, if the plaintiffs complaint or affidavit includes information that the defendant possesses owns or controls firearms so that has to be in the affidavit the plaintiff has to file an affidavit with their complaint under this RFA procedure. So if the plaintiffs complaint includes that information in the affidavit and line seven, the court finds it necessary to protect the plaintiff or the plaintiff's children. So the court has to make that finding as well that it's necessary for protection. If those two to preconditions are met, then line eight provides that the court can require the immediate relinquishment until the expiration of the order member the order is only for 14 days. Of all firearms that are in the defense possession ownership or control, or that another person possesses or controls on behalf of the defendant. So, that's the proposal in h 133 to add that authority to the court's ability when it makes when it issues an RFA order under this section an emergency RFA I should say temporary one. And that's the proposal I think that kind of ends my explanation of what the current law is and as I say it sort of segue this right into the proposal is for change to the current law in h 133 although add as well that in many ways it's a clarification, because as you'll hear from judge Greerson. There's at least an arguable basis that some some courts are already viewing their inherent authority to allow this to included to be included in the emergency final order or sorry the emergency temporary order, as it is. That clarifies the situation removes any ambiguity that there may be about that authority the court going forward. So, that's what I have I'm happy to answer any questions I'm, I'm going to exit my screen sharing unless someone would prefer that I stay on it and look at language for a moment. Thank you Eric. There we go. Now I can see hands. Thank you that was great helpful. Any questions for Kate, I see your hand. These are questions for Eric about the language and then. Okay, so we have Kate Felicia and Tom. Thank you. Thank you. I think we have a question, the language in section for So if the plaintiffs complaint or affidavit includes information that the defendant possess under control firearms and the court finds it necessary to protect the plaintiff or the plaintiff's child. So based on what you were just describing in terms of the law that is that just sort of like a redundancy like if they were to give this order they would they would have determined that they were necessary to protect them or is that language unique to other languages already in the law. No I think it is it is particular to that provision in that. In other words that that, for example, the, the language I think allows for the possibility that the defendant may have firearms and in their possession. But that it may not be a situation where there is that immediate danger as a result of the firearms. And so the, the court would have to find both in order for it to issue the relinquishment order. Does that make sense as far as an answer. Yeah, so it's sort of it's saying that that both of these things would have to be found to be true that the risk would be tied to the firearm is what you're exactly in that particular section. Okay. Exactly. Again, Felicia and then Tom. Yeah, thank you. So, a couple of questions. Starting with the most direct one, the last line and a half on page two lines 10 and 11, where it's directing that firearms that are in the possession of somebody. Other than the defendant are required to be immediately relinquished. How broad is that what's what's the total intent of scope there to a sphere of influence. Right, I think the idea there is that, you know that to prevent a situation where for example, someone has firearms it's a dangerous situation, but the firearms say with the person, you know, temporarily gives the firearms to another and so that they can say, All right, well I don't possess any firearms there. They aren't in my control, even though those may be the the the that the defendant may actually own those firearms but they don't want them to be able to sort of evade the law essentially by temporarily housing them with somebody else. Okay, so they would have to be owned by the defendant and in the control of somebody else, not somebody else's owned firearms that the defendant might have access to with or without breaking the law. Yes, because yeah I agree with that because of the last phrase on behalf of the defendant. Yes. That's still pretty ambiguous and in my opinion. I am willed firearms from my father's collection. Let's throw a hypothetical in there that other Vermonters have the same situation. They're technically mine. They're not in my ownership until he dies. However, if that rfa wherever leveled against me, and they required immediate relinquishment. Those are his. Technically he's controlling them for me until he dies. Are those looked in. I mean, what are the reasons are we looping in things that are not yet given but there's an understanding that they will be where are we drawing a line on ownership is an ffl transfer, the beacon of ownership, or is it more tenuous than that it's it's really So I'm looking to nail down exactly what the court order would be going after, especially for requiring relinquishment of things that are not actually into the defendant's possession or household. Yeah, that's an interesting, interesting legal question. I wouldn't want to say that I have the answer to that off the top of my head but but yeah it's an interesting question. What about a situation like you described where, where say ownership has not vested in in the recipient, whether as you say because of a trust or because of a will or perhaps because of a future transfer, is that being controlled yet does that yet meet the definition of on behalf of the defendant. That's an interesting question maybe the witnesses would have some some information for that as well and I can look into it, but I wouldn't want to say I have an answer to that right away. So that's that's kind of my first question is I just think that entire control on in the possession of the person is just far too broad and vague and leaves a lot of concern for me. My second question that kind of just ties to why we're we're taking this up in the first place is if the court currently has such broad authority in statute. And as you mentioned a couple moments ago there are courts that believe they already have this authority. Why is this necessary. Well, I think I'll, sorry, go ahead. I'll defer to the chair on that. I think perhaps our witnesses can testify to that especially Judge Gerson. That's really more of a question for not not so much for Eric. Thank you. I'll hold that for the judge then. That's what you're going to say or not but go ahead. Yeah. No, that's exactly right. Thank you. I think that's a question on on the on the drafting specifically it's just not specified is who's responsible for relinquishment is it on the defendants were cognizance is they must be honest and turn things in who's doing a seizure of these and that had outlined I believe this is an excerpt from a previous bill last session each 610, if I'm remembering correctly, and that had outlined who was doing the seizure and protocols. But this has nothing to that effect so it's wondering if that was an intentional leave out door. I think it just assumed that for enforcement of the court orders that, like with any other order that the, or any other component I should say, of the, of the courts order that the authority is that the court can, because the would be ordering the law enforcement enforcement that it can instruct a law enforcement officer to enforce the order. But again that's something that certainly if you feel that needs clarification we can always propose amended language for that. Thanks. And then, I guess just a final question for the chair and I'll hold the rest of mine for the appropriate witnesses. Are we going to be hearing from any law enforcement agencies. Are they doing that kind of provision, their ability to execute such an order. We can meet to execute just so in order that's not covered here. I'm specifically related to relinquishment or seizure of firearms. There have been similar laws in other states that have wound up to be very very deadly. And I would like to hear from our law enforcement as to what they would expect and what we would be charging them with. Sure. Thank you. That's all. Maxine did you say Tom. No, you broke up there for a second. Eric, going back to preponderance. And then there's clear and convincing what's what's the one in the middle. No clear and convincing is the one in the middle. The most that beyond or reasonable doubt is the. Okay. Okay. And this. I'm sorry, go ahead. No, no, I was finished. Thanks. Okay. And this question might not be for you. It might. I think it might be for the judge, but kind of thinking out loud with, with the way it's working now with. With preponderance or that that's the, the suggestion, I guess you could say, as far as relinquishing guns. So some judges are, some judges are doing it now. And they, they feel they have the authority and some, some judges don't, but. So with preponderance of evidence, say you've got two judges, the same evidence in front of them, they could come to different conclusions. I'm assuming. Yeah, I think that's, that's always possible regardless of the type of proceeding. Yep. It's, you know, a close question. And so it's a possibility. Yes. So it's going through my mind, say the judge that doesn't think that there's a, that it meets a preponderance is kind of in their mind. I got to believe that they're thinking more clear and convincing. And I just don't like the idea of pushing the judges that don't believe, you know, that a level is met to, to the re relinquishing the firearms thing but but again that may be more toward the judge but what have we in the past I know we've talked about storage. We've talked about confiscated firearms. Can you remind me, have we done anything as far as putting in statute that law enforcement agencies have to have storage. Yes, at least they not so much have to but yes you provided, remember you created the ability of law enforcement to have storage for and to get some, I think to have some storage spaces. But I thought there was an appropriation for some storage as well but yes, there is elsewhere in statute, some provision made for storage. Right. But I think that's still an issue of whether or not sufficient storage exists that that's kind of what you're getting at. Well, and that's exactly where I'm going say you know would say an antique firearm that, you know, somebody is going to keep under, you know, temperature and humidity levels or whatever you know to preserve them right you know just things like that even a regular firearm I mean, if it's not in the right storage I mean you know there's a chance of it, you know corroding and that type of thing but just having trouble with with the the preponderance piece on this. It just seems like it's to me it's not strong enough I mean at a minimum it should be clear and convincing in my opinion but but anyway that's, I'm kind of rambling and thinking out loud so thank you. That's a policy decision for the committee certainly. Yes. Thanks. Sure. Yeah, and we can speak to DPS commissioner about storage I know that in the past he said that that was something that was one of his priorities and that certainly taking care of and we'll be seeing him tomorrow so if we have time we can ask him about it and if not we can get him back in. And Maxine do you think he just came to my mind. I mean it's an emergency relief is for two weeks, but and maybe Eric or you can can answer it. I'm just wondering what the procedure would be to get, say if it was me to get my firearms back I mean are we talking. You know, I mean state, you know with governments and paperwork sometimes that can be quite burdensome. And I'm just wondering if it's going to take to say take me another week or two to to get my firearms back, or if it's just automatic. I can answer that I don't know Eric if you can or if that's again something for one of the witnesses. I don't think there's anything in the language about the procedure. It does say that the order can only be for relinquishment for as long as the orders in effect. So it gives a time frame for how long the relinquishment can be in effect but it doesn't say anything about the procedure for getting it back so that might be something the witnesses would have more information about. Okay, great thank you. Any other questions for Eric. Okay, great. So, I'm going to now turn to judge Greerson and we'll be late for our break I'd like to give judge Greerson opportunity to testify. Thank you. Welcome. Thank you. Good morning everybody and thank the chair and the committee for inviting me to testify today on each 133 for the record Brian Greerson chief superior judge. And before I get into this bill. I think just to respond to some of the questions I've already heard the provisions for storage of firearms are in other parts of the statute. There are essentially three vehicles if you will for doing that one is we can order firearms to be surrendered to the police officer who is serving an order on the defendant. There is a firearms registered certified firearms dealer available, they can be stored there. Or if the individual has a family member or friend who they would want to hold the firearms there is a process for doing that I won't go into details on those but the reason they're not in this bill is because there are two parts of the statute and the issue that representative bird up and raised on storage is an ongoing issue. I mean the statute provides for surrender but the storage issue is a continuing one. But I'd like to go back and represent a bird mentioned the burden of proof. What I think is important for the committee to understand is that this suggested amendment is not creating anything new. It is not creating a new cause of action. It's not creating a new form of relief. The purpose behind this bill and there is a long history here it does go back one of the representatives mentioned age 610. This bill or it's before you now has evolved certainly over the last year or more that it's been discussed and it has taken different variations in the wording up until this point. But I don't want the committee to think that we're all of a sudden changing or adding a burden. Because by far the majority of judges have believed that they have the inherent authority under the current law to order and in fact do order relinquishment and non possession of firearms on a temporary order. And in the source of that Eric and his reputation to go back to the 1103 says the court. Excuse me. I'm sorry. I hear you. Yeah. Leaning to fire away. This is in 1103 C1. The court shall make such orders as it deems necessary to protect the plaintiff for the children or both. If the court finds that the defendant has abused the plaintiff. That is a broad scope of authority. When you look at, for instance, the order that we can issue under 1104 under section one a one it says upon a finding that there is immediate danger of further abuse. An order may be granted requiring the defendant and then at least ABCD. Those things they include refrain from coming within a fixed distance frame from contacting the plaintiff. These are all forms of relief. This provision about relinquishing firearms or non possession of firearms, but very easily be paragraph E in that section, because what we have the authority to do now, as I indicated is to relinquishment or non possession of firearms during this period between the temporary order and the final hearing. This bill has been discussed. And at least from our perspective. It's an attempt to codify. Or if you will clarify what we can already do. My concern and the concern of many judges are that in an attempt to codify or clarify. You may be limiting the discretion the court already has. And that is a significant concern for the court. Because we believe now that we do have this authority. We think it's an important authority we think it's an important exercise of discretion for the very reasons that I've stated for the protection of the plaintiff and or family members of the plaintiff. And so I don't want the committee to think that this is when we talk for instance about the burden of proof. I agree that that's, that's a question the committee may want to look at but burden of proof shouldn't be any different for the relief that's being sought in this bill than it than it is for the overall granting of a relief from abuse order. In other words, the relief from abuse order is where the burden falls the burden falls on the plains to prove that by a preponderance of evidence. And, you know, someone mentioned or Eric I believe mentioned, you know, if it's 51 to 49. The key words that Eric brought up with respect to the burden of proof are however slight. So when you think of the thing of the image if you will of the scales of justice. If they tilt in just the least little bit. That is a preponderance of evidence. It's whatever tips that scale. And I've used the term and I think one of the witnesses is going to pick up on what I said, you can think of it as the weight of a feather, if that's all it takes to tip the scale. No magic to 51 49. It's that tipping of the scale. However slight the evidence is and the court often finds itself in considering the evidence before that the plaintiff has not met that burden. It's not every single case that is filed is granted I don't I don't have the numbers for you and I should get them for you. Madam chair so that the committee understands that this there's a process of requesting temporary orders. Some are granted summer denied. Most of these are requested after court hours so they're usually late night phone calls to the judges, but a significant number of those orders are denied. The final hearing is the final hearing it has to be held within 14 days. Every court has a specific day of the week when they schedule relief from abuse order so they are heard. Certainly within that 14 days. At that final hearing, the plaintiff still has the burden of proof, even if they've been granted a temporary order based on an affidavit. They have to offer testimony and evidence at the final hearing and satisfy the court by preponderance of evidence that they're entitled to the relief they're requesting. The interesting is that they're the proof is that they have been abused or there's a threat of immediate use. And all these things that you see in section 1104 under Roman numeral under one a through D are things that the court can order. They prove that someone needs to be out of the house by preponderance of evidence the preponderance of evidence goes to whether or not they're entitled to relief and then the court has the discretion to fashion the relief that is warranted in the given case. And in some cases, there is evidence before the court of firearms. There is evidence that firearms have been used in an incident that brings the person to the court. There are cases where there's evidence of ownership or possession of firearms, but maybe they weren't used in the incident that is before the court. Maybe they have been used in the past. And there are situations where there may be no reference either in the affidavit or complaint. The plaintiff's testimony about the existence of firearms or the use of firearms, but based on all of the evidence before us. And this is more in the final hearing. When people have an opportunity to testify that the the evidence of the potential for lethality is so great. Even if firearms are not part of that specific case or that incident, the relief the court can grant is to order a relink of firearms or non possession of firearms. And so I the committee and looking at this bill has to understand that this is just another element of relief that the court can grant. And the reason I am suggesting that that grant of discretion should be broad is because every case is different. And the circumstances of every case before the court are different and the relief granted in one case may not be the same as in another. And so when I look at this bill and I will tell you that that I have spent a considerable amount of time looking at this bill the various wording the variations in the language. It's been reviewed by the judges. This is not a review that I do on my own. And when I do that and I do that with every bill that comes before committee. There are some bills that get the attention of judges, and I get a large response. There are others that I get little or no response. This is a bill that I received a lot of response from judges and it has come in. Quite frankly, shortly before the hearing in other words it's still coming in as early as six o'clock this morning I was exchanging emails with judges about this bill, because the concern that I hear from judges is that, although this is a worthwhile attempt to codify what we're doing the concern what we can do already. And let me explain why I think some judges struggle with it. As I mentioned there's different circumstances different facts of how firearms come into play in these proceedings. And some judges feel that unless there is a reference in an affidavit or complaint or in the testimony to firearms the presence of firearms use of firearms in this incident or the history if there's no evidence before them. And some judges do not feel they have the authority under the statute to confiscate or order relinquishment of firearms or non possession of firearms. Other judges feel that you don't have to have that information in front of you to warrant that kind of relief. Because of the facts that come before them. And so, in looking at this bill if I can find my copy of it. Just give me a second to, I think there are three. I guess I'm going to say three options that the committee ought to consider. And this is truly a policy decision on the part of the committee. There's a language that is before you under the section for the concern that is expressed by many judges are that when you in the beginning of that section and talks about if the plaintiffs complaint or affidavit includes information that the defendant possesses owns or controls firearms and the court finds it's necessary to protect the plaintiff. Many judges are concerned because they feel that by referencing the complaint and affidavit and firearms in either of those documents that that would limit their authority to order a relinquishment or possession. If it's not in the affidavit or complaint. So they they're concerned that this could be limiting their, the authority that they now have. So there, there's one suggestion that has been made.  You have to be concerned that you may be limiting the judge's discretion. There's been some suggestion that in addition to the language if the plaintiffs complaint or affidavit includes information that the defendant possesses owns or controls, firms, or has threatened the use of a firearm. If you add that language and that may encompass a broader use of firearms, but there's still a concern that the, even the addition of that language is limiting discretion. So the other approach you could use is to eliminate the reference to the information the plaintiffs complaint or affidavit, so that the, the amendment would read an order issued under this section. If the court finds it necessary to protect the plaintiff or the plaintiff's children. The court could require the immediate relinquishment. And so forth, in other words, eliminate that reference to the information just being available and complaint or affidavit. So it clearly says if the court finds that it's necessary or to protect the plaintiff or their children, they could order relinquishment. That would remove, I think, an obstacle to the court exercising the discretion it has now. In my view, if you were going that route, you could actually take that language and put it under section E. And add it as a section E under 1104 because all it is is another form of relief that the court can order. And I think it would be as appropriate there as it would be in another paragraph. And I guess the other point I would make is that if you didn't do anything. If this amendment is not necessary, the court would continue to address these issues in the way it does now. In that is we believe the statute provides that inherent authority. If you truly want clarification of the court's authority to add this, then I think the plate it's to make it simple. I think it's complicated by adding it as a section E that merely includes it in the possibility of other relief the court already has that already can grant. And so it would fall under in a given case it may be appropriate it may not be, but it would allow the court to then consider each case on the facts that are presented. And oftentimes, what we find is that understand that, as I said, most of these orders are issued after court hours under significant oftentimes traumatic situations, but certainly periods of stress. And an individual may not want to include in an affidavit that they the existence of firearms, but the circumstances that the court has been made aware of in the mind of the court feels that this situation is potentially so dangerous that they think that firearms should be relinquished or the defendant should not be possessing firearms during this relatively brief period. And that's the concern. And I will say that I've spoken with representatives from the domestic violence I've worked closely with Sarah Robinson on on this bill and I've also spoken with Chris Bradley who I think is testifying later this morning. And discussed this bill with them and I know I've received emails from from Bill Moore and phone call from Tim me and and I guess the information in the position I'm sharing with the committee now is not one I've discussed in any detail with these folks because I have just found that this issue, the closer it got to this hearing, the more input I was getting from judges expressing their views. And so this, I don't think this issue needs to be complicated. If you're looking at I'll go back and I don't want to repeat myself but when we start talking about the burden of proof, you really need to be talking about the burden of proof for the underlying relief that's requested, not just an individual. And that relief is the threat of either physical harm or or abuse that has occurred, not an individual request that the court can grant to make the situation safe. That's not where the preponderance of evidence it comes into play. And so you don't want to confuse the issues as to how that comes into play, whether the committee wants to undertake a review of that standard is entirely in your hands. If there can be a separate standard for firearm relinquishment, then there is for any other relief that we grant. And in fact we as I've said more than once this morning, we can grant that relief now with it without this statute so my testimony may come as a surprise perhaps even to Sarah or to Chris or any of the others I'm glad to discuss this further with them as this moves along but I think there are ways that this this authority can be clarified without limiting it and that's that's really the concern that I have right now. I will stop. But obviously answer any questions. Great. Thank you. Thank you very much. I appreciate that and as you were talking and it did seem to me that maybe moving into e does does make more sense. So I appreciate you addressing that. Okay, so I see Barbara Selena and then Felicia. Thank you. Good morning. Good morning. So you started to say which is a question that I'm trying to ask with every bill we're doing. And you started to say it but I'm not positive you fully finished because you got into another interesting issue of what the problem is that this bill is addressing. I understand it to be that we're trying to codify something but that's more what we're doing and I heard some judges are interpreting it one way right now and some another in terms of feeling like they have the authority. So that I guess that's my first question but sort of a second question based on the answer to this but I mean I can't tell you why a specific judge would rule one way or another as I gather comments from judges. I think some of them I think some of them it's fair to say that if if evidence is not put it this way if the affidavit doesn't have any reference to firearms either in the incident that brings a person there or on a temporary basis. Some judges will say I'm not going to order confiscation another judge may so it's not a question of the authority oftentimes it's the evidence that comes before them. And so I think if you add this as a method of relief the judge can still make that decision doesn't mean that every time the cases filed it's going to be ordered relinquished if you remember going back and I when I talked about the evolution of this bill you remember some of our very early discussions was the idea if we granted a temporary order that it would be mandatory relinquishment of firearms whether there was no whether there was any evidence or not and so that's where we started and now we've evolved over this but that's the reason it's Thank you that's helpful so here's my here's my follow up question. Would it make sense to have it like you proposed a solution which sounded good but I was wondering before you had proposed that if the legislation assuming it passes would say if not mentioned in the affidavit the judge will inquire because like don't we want to just be sure like it doesn't So let me suggest this remember these are coming in after hours late night calls and they are based strictly on the affidavit and complaint filed by the individual we do not have contact with the individual in other words there's a there's a column court staff for the most part now they are contracted they're the ones that contact us and say we have an affidavit complaint so we don't talk with the with with the plaintiff. That's okay that makes sense and I want to say that I had a chance to sit in on relief from abuse order day when the ABA did the open visit your court day and it was it was incredibly eye-opening in terms of the variation of cases like I think I sat in on for and it was remarkable you know I highly recommend our committee try to do that it's so couldn't affidavit have a little box saying our firearms I could like could it there be a just so we're not like having something slip. I should have mentioned this before we have a standing judiciary committee it's we have one for every division family criminal civil and so forth. The family oversight committee is currently reviewing our complaint form an affidavit that will address these issues. It's up to the plaintiff obviously whether they check the box or fill in the blanks but there will be more more information available to the judges on this issue on whether or not firearms were used in the incident whether the person knows what they are or how many or the type so there'll be more information already and that's why I'm saying that the the bill as it reads now whether or not that clause is in there about information in the complainer affidavit it's going to be there. So it will be up to the judge to decide based on that complainer affidavit whether there's a basis in their mind to to order relinquishment so those forms are being addressed. That's great and you had mentioned also getting us the date on how many were denied and how many were accepted which would be help I mean it would just be helpful to have some information on that and I like the idea of some I mean not like we're trying to go fishing for guns and that's sort of a weird metaphor there but but somebody who just experienced a highly traumatic situation may not be thinking super clearly about everything and you wouldn't want someone to go afterwards. Oh my gosh I forgot about the gun that you know whatever so thank you. Yeah. Selena and Felicia. Thanks. I appreciate the thought about moving that to the section E2 I think that makes a lot of just structural sense. I just wanted to so my understanding of part of why getting more explicit about this possibility for judges in in statute is useful is that it might create more consistency in our sort of quest for geographic justice justice and just assurance for judges across the board that this is available to them and so you said at the start of your testimony most judges believe they already have this ability and then you also noted that if we didn't pass anything the ability would still be there but I'm I wonder if you can talk about that question of most judges versus all judges. I can but I you know I don't have an exact count. What I'm saying is in my experience has been that when I say most judges I think by far the overwhelming number of the judges believe they have this authority. I have not had a judge tell me that they didn't think they had the authority depends on the facts that are before them and that that's the difficulty in answering that question is that as I said before some judges if they if there's not some reference either in the affidavit or the complaint or you know in the plaintiff's statement to the court about guns then not that they don't feel they have the authority under the statute necessarily but they don't think that that is a situation that warrants it so this would just identify the fact that this is to me it's the reason I think it fits under E and I'm probably going a little bit away from your question is that when you're thinking about the safety of the individuals and that's what all those things and when you get when you start reading those sections a through D that's what they are. You've already determined that the person has proven their case and so you're trying to tailor the relief that this individual needs and so by adding this relinquishment or non possession I think it's important to remember they may not have firearms in their presence you don't want them to go out and purchase so relinquishment or non possession. But but there it is as an option and if the facts fit. Then it's there for the judge. To order. So I don't I don't think it's much I've said lack of authority. It's not in the statute. So the discussion I've had with the judges is that well it doesn't specifically say it in the statute but we believe we have the inherent authority and this is not unique. I don't want anyone to think this is unique to to relief from abuse or this particular statute. There are many situations where the court exercises its inherent authority in in fashioning relief. So this is not this is not a way to to single out firearms. As an issue it's just this is this is what we see in these cases and sometimes it's an elevated risk because of the presence of firearms. Sometimes it's an elevated risk even without that presence but it may be appropriate in fashioning relief to say well I haven't heard that there's firearms but this situation appears to me to be so potentially dangerous that I'm going to make sure the individual doesn't have access to firearms in this case. So remember this is a temporary order. It could be done in less than a week. And then the order goes away. What happens in that week is of course the final hearing. And that's when if a final order is granted then by federal law. They're not on title to possess firearms anyway so remember this is we're talking about temporary relief. Hopefully that answers your question. I think I think I think so I mean what I'm what I am trying to get at I guess is that I I hope that we can find sort of the balance in constructing this where you all in the judiciary feel really clear that we're not limiting your decision anyway I think that that's the last intention, you know, here, but that we are also making it really clear that that power exists and that the legislature. That's why hopefully we can get there. Yeah, that's why I think putting it under adding a section you just offering it as a relinquishment or non possession is the most straightforward way of saying this is just another form of relief there's something there may not apply in a given case that's not mandated it's still within the court's discretion like all the other things in that particular list. That makes sense to me. Yeah, thank you. Thank you Felicia and then Ken. Thank you judge. Good. I have a couple questions for you and the first thing that kind of sparked. My interest was you said that judges feel like they have the 30 now. Has there been a case that you can kind of point to where this has been ordered in current practice. Oh, I know there have I can't point to a specific case but I'm in in in. I'm doing this particular bill with judges I mean I'm hearing from judges that they do order this and that's that's why they're concerned that the way the bill is worded now they're concerned that it will limit the authority that they have been exercising. I mean I'm sure over the course of time it's been a while since I've sat in this docket but I'm sure I ordered it in an appropriate case there is currently in what's interesting and don't ask me how it. I'm sure but in the existing temporary order form that we use. Even though it's not in the complaint about firearms there is a provision in there that that allows for the relinquishment of firearms to the serving officer I forgot the exact wording but it's already preprinted in the interim. In the temporary order so that that judges know that it's available, I think, and I don't want to confuse the issue and I say they don't have authority I think it's the specific facts. Okay, so that kind of leads to some follow up questions that I hope just add clarity. I'm sure that this is already something that courts have the authority to do. So, digging into definition a little bit relinquishment is the word that keeps coming up not seizure is it relinquishment or when they serve the RFA do they have a warrant attached to that to search the home and the firearms that come across or is it upon the defendants own relinquishment. How is that played out in case you know that that's a topic that has certainly this committee has discussed before that that's part of the problem with with the statute said says relinquishment, I think the form order now says that guns will be turned to the serving officer. Remember, again, these are after hours so when the police get this order, they go to serve it. I cannot tell you and I would be surprised if any police officer obtained a warrant because you only get a warrant if there's a crime. And in other words, if there's evidence of a crime that's what a search warrant does. They really wouldn't have a basis to get a search warrant in advance of serving the order and they may or may not have one after so they go to the serving that they go to the residents where the individual is located and ask for surrender firearms and an ongoing issue when they talk about this subject is to what extent can law enforcement enforce or can anyone enforce the order of relinquishment. So that helps on clarity, but just crystal clear is an RFA serving an RFA does not come with authority to enter the domicile and open for guns. No. Okay, so next point is storage capacity. You had mentioned that it would be on the serving officer just to keep it at the storage billable at their station. I might have to tell you that I don't have a lot of information on storage I know that for individual, you know, your local police departments. It's a it's a very big issue for storage capacity and the ability to store. I believe and I don't know for sure but I believe the funding that may have been referenced earlier probably went to the state police. They might have some kind of central storage but I really don't even know how a local police department might be able to access that storage. So the storage of firearms is an ongoing and a difficult issue all the way around. Yeah, I do recall it being a statewide issue. Moving forward on just kind of feeding off of the nebulous around storage is who carries the responsibility for damage. Let's say I have heirloom pieces, they need specific humidity, they need specific storage. Maybe if that doesn't exist, if they're a linguist or sees who bears the responsibility for damage to property in that 14 day period. So all I can tell you is that that would be asking me for my legal opinion as to who is responsible and that I cannot give you. I mean it's just not our policy to offer an opinion. I will tell you that it is a significant issue, both for law enforcement, who's ever storing these firearms, whether it's law enforcement, the firearms dealer, or the neighbor or friend who's holding these under an order. I think some of the folks will be testifying later and probably give you more information on that than I can. I can only tell you that the question you raise is a one that has been raised a number of times. So liability becomes an ongoing question. I appreciate the answer. And then, because I'm just trying to get the idea of the process here, hearing from you that these are, and in fact done that 14 day temporary or order period isn't an automatic hearing at the end of the 14 days, or for the firearms to be returned, or is a separate hearing separate from the RFA entirely. What happens is when someone is issued a temporary order after hours, depending on which court it is. For instance, the Chittenden Court, anyone living in Chittenden County, they have a relief from abuse morning every Thursday morning. So, up to a certain point within that 14 days, if you're issued a temporary order, your order will tell you that there is a final hearing scheduled on X date within that 14 days. That day may vary from courthouse to courthouse, but every court has the same system, so that when you get that order as a as a defendant. You have the date and time of your final hearing. And so it's at that final hearing if at that final hearing, either the plaintiff doesn't show or the plaintiff does not meet the burden of proof that we discussed earlier, and the petition is dismissed, they're entitled to get their firearms back as soon as the order is dismissed. I think Representative Burdette raised the question of how long does it take well. It really depends at that point, did they surrender firearms did they surrender to the serving officer is at a local police department or state police. So I'm sure that varies but the reality is once that temporary order is dismissed. They're entitled to get their firearm back. If at the result of that final hearing, a final order is granted they will not get the firearms back. Okay, that feeds a couple questions I would love to get more in depth testimony from, perhaps, and I don't know if it's possible it would just kind of pipe dream, a judge that has issued an order of this manner. And kind of the related involvement of how it went out. I think if we're going to codify something that has precedent, I would like to know how the precedent works and there are so many questions about storage and liability, and simple operation that really seem outstanding for me. So, with respect to the storage and those liability questions. I don't think you're going to get any better answer than you're going to get from me in terms of once we issue the order. I'm generally not involved in what happens with that firearm unless the individuals come back sometimes to say that they've looked identified someone who will store the guns for them and then there is a separate proceeding, whereby the court will approve that person for storage. But if they if the firearms if the order says turn them over to the police officer. That our order is the end of our involvement with that issue unless some party brings it back to us in some fashion. So, judges will have very little information about where the firearm is stored. Okay, I appreciate that. I'm looking for testimony maybe it'll come from a different committee, maybe subbing the order. I would expect other questions. Hold it for now. Thank you. Thank you. Before I go to Tom and Bob. Eric I just want to give you an opportunity if you have I'm hearing the questions if you have anything to add at this point. I just wanted to circle back with you. No, I can, I can add at least one one point in response to one of representative left there's questions. And this sort of has to do I think with press the precedent point. There is a case that the Vermont Supreme Court decided in 2001, called Benson v muscari and I can send everyone that site or the case. And in that case, what the court held was that the, that the language in 1104 that I reviewed and that judge Greerson mentioned as well, that language that says that the court can make any orders that it deems to protect the plaintiff or the children or both remember that that broad language we talked about that that language does permit the court to prohibit the defendant from possessing firearms. So it was this very specific question the court answered it in that case. I think the issue is that that that the reason that there may still be an ambiguity is that that language applies to the final order in 1104. It doesn't appear again in the temporary order in 1103. So if you look at what the, what the language is in the temporary emergency order in 1103. Before the sort of ABCD pieces that people have been talking about the introductory clause says relief under this section shall be limited as follows that same language doesn't appear in the in the final order. So one possible way of interpreting that is that that broad authority clause that that the Supreme Court said did include the ability to prohibit possession of firearms doesn't apply in the 1103 temporary order situation, because it isn't there it isn't that that same language isn't there and the 1103 says it shall be limited. On the other hand, as judge Greerson said, that separate from the issue of the courts inherent authority, you know the court already may have the, and in many instances is interpreted as having this inherent authority to prohibit possession of firearms, but that's a separate issue from sort of the statutory interpretation of the language that I think it helps a little bit with what Representative Lefler and others have been asking is there any precedent out there on this and that's, that's one case that at least pretty squarely addresses that language in 1104. So it may be helpful, I can send it if folks want to look at it. I would love to see that thank you. Thank you. Tom and then Bob. Judge, I think you said it is, if this, say if this bill passed as written, does it potentially increase the number of firearms that are going to be confiscated or not confiscated but impounded or whatever the term is. I don't see why it would. It wouldn't increase it. I don't see why it would. Others may disagree with me but I don't see it as having an impact on on the court which I'm obviously usually testifying to, or an impact on on confiscation, because we have the authority now. Okay. But this would make it mandatory. No, no, no, no, no, not at all. That's what I'm trying to say. As Eric pointed out, that's part of the rationale, if you will, for courts or judges believing you have the authority. This would still just be an option. It is not mandatory. The court would still exercise its discretion in a given case as to whether or not relinquishment or non possession is an appropriate relief for that case. I'm suggesting that it go under that category I think that's the most appropriate place for it and then the court may not feel that it is necessary or warranted by the facts more importantly. It's not mandatory. I'm concerned right now, representative or that is that the language as the bill is written, which would seem to many judges by far the majority to limit their, their current discretion, and that's what they're concerned about that in the committee or the legislature's attempt for clarification they're really limit, potentially limiting the discretion that we already have. Okay. I mean, going back to storage I guess or, and I realize it's not in the bill but I mean, it almost seems to me at this point we need to look at storage again before we, before we do anything else to get a more detailed, I guess, statute around it or law around storage but so the way the way it works now if, if somebody has some of my guns that I get the emergency relief from abuse order. It's deemed that you know I need to give up my guns. If again if somebody else has possession of my guns, those need to be given up also right. If they're your guns they do. But then there is paperwork, or there's a way to. I guess I'll just say paperwork there's paperwork that can be filled out to to potentially make that same person. Yes, the keeper of those guns. I was saying there's three options generally police storage law enforcement storage of federal firearms dealer and there's only a few of them in the state that will will. The problem there is that that may be the best alternative when you talk about liability and, and potential damage to guns I think it's some other witnesses will tell you that the best alternative is the federal firearms dealers who know how to handle firearms. How to store them but the third piece would be those options aren't available for whatever reason, but they've come up with someone who they want to hold farms form that requires the court to approve of that person. And there's a separate, usually a separate hearing because on the day that this order is issued the final order. Remember, the final order is what dictates the long term storage of guns then. Then that becomes an issue and we would have a separate hearing usually on whether or not we approve a third party, if you will, to hold firearms for a person. So that that that person that has my guns. So they would, they would have to relinquish the guns in at a another undetermined time. It could be determined that they can get them back. Well they're. If the final order is issued. They're going to be prohibited from having the firearms anyway and as long as the order remains in effect. Right, right. But what I'm saying there is a situation where the firearms could be given back and forth. Not if they're under the terms of a final order. They cannot possess them under the federal law. Right but an emergency order that they would have to give up the guns. If that's what the court provides yes. Right. And then at some other point. Through the process they could be determined that they could store the guns. Yes, but the storage issue usually comes up in the context of a final hearing because remember, we issue will say tonight I get the phone call. And, and I, and I order the relinquishment of firearms. And they're to turn it over to the law enforcement because in the middle of the emergency order you're talking about. So in other words in the middle of the night, I don't, I can't authorize a federal firearms dealer I don't know who this person would approve so that the initial order and variably is going to say turn them over to the, the serving law enforcement officer. That person will be in court within, you know, less than less than the two weeks normally. And that's when we would have a determination if they're going to continue to be. Out of the person's possession, then what are we going to do for long term storage. Right, right. But physically they could go from one person to relinquishment and then back to the same person. I suppose but they're not going to. And likely they're going to be able to get a hearing before the court on approval of a third person from the time the order is issued until that final hearing because there's such a short time anyway. There wouldn't be time for another hearing as a practical matter. Right. Right. Okay, thank you. I'm going to turn to Bob. Just greasing that there is a request to have a judge an individual judge who has, who has ordered relinquishment come testify. My understanding is that generally, we don't hear from individual judges is that is that correct and it's generally the practice. Yes. And, you know, if there are specific questions. I'll try to answer them. That's why I was saying the storage question is not one that it'll help to have someone else come in. Thank you. Bob. Thank you. Good morning. Good morning. I am new to the committee. I'm actually new to this whole procedure here. Well, welcome. Welcome. Well, I've heard a lot of questions a lot of concern here, whatever else and I sort of don't want to minimize abuse in any way shape or form or be a domestic or whatever else my concern for the years has obviously been public safety. I have not had the opportunity to read House bill 610, which I plan on doing. And from your testimony today, it appears that our presiding judges already have the inherent ability to make these decisions. And this particular attempt to codify this this bill would restrict them and their capacities. I think they're concerned representative Norris in the way the bill is framed now that it may limit them to only issuing an order of relinquishment. If in the complaint and affidavit, there is a reference to guns. Because there it's not every situation where that evidence is is there number one, but a judge may feel that relinquishment or non possession is appropriate relief. Anyway, and so the language that is before you now for a lot of judges would limit the discretion they already have and that's their concern. And I'd like to follow up. I'm sure you're not asking your legal opinion here but I'll tell you if I can't answer it was put it that way. Okay, so it's my understanding. First of all, storage is a major concern throughout the state of mind. I can assure you that both the storage of the guns and the firearms and along with the liability goes along with it but I mentioned search warrants and so on so forth. Now, generally speaking, if there's the temporary restraining or comes after the fact nine out of 10 times. Police officers have responded to a residence and basically somebody has been incarcerated through my experience. The relief from abuse order comes after the alleged victim has been given the opportunities for the assistance that's available to them. So that's when a worker will come in, they let you appropriate form affidavit so and so forth and contact the court or more preferably the judge. So a crime an alleged crime has been committed but if the relief order is is issued. And this is a very strong piece of paper I might add if the relief order is issued. It gives a lot of protections for the victim. And if one of those conditions is that they that they the accuser who is probably now incarcerated for a short period of time is to vacate the property. For a period of 10 to 14 days until they have their final hearing. What would you think would be in your opinion, the purpose of of a removing any firearms within our residents. So, let me suggest to you that you would be surprised I think by the number of relief from abuse order requests that are made to the court that do not involve. underlying criminal offenses in other words, the individual who seeking the relief from abuse order for their own reasons have may have left the house left the residents, but have not sought police involvement in whatever issues that result in them coming to the court. So many, many of the cases that come before us. There is not underlying criminal charges, and the person, the defendant, if you will, is not under custody or under any, any restraints. I would agree with you that in those situations where crime has been committed that does change the parameters of what law enforcement can do or not do. What I was saying earlier was that remember this is a civil proceeding, the relief from abuse is not a crime, the behavior that is described in an affidavit may appear to you or to me as a basis for criminal charge. That's up to the individual to have reported that the police. And so not. Again, I, I don't think I have that data. But where where crime has been involved it does change the ability of law enforcement. In fact, they may in fact have a search warrant for other reasons as a result of a criminal activity, but they're really two different, two different proceedings. This is completely civil. Okay, I'll end with one, one final question and I hope that answered your question. It did. And there are times yes when the the accused has fled the scene social for them I'm fully aware of that. So I thank you for bringing that to everyone else's attention here. But in the case where somebody has been lodged and during the course of the, they obtained this this part time order temporary restraining order. Right in a judge orders the firearms to be removed. You had made a statement that basically they don't generally typically issue search ones because there has to be a crime involved. Well, there is an alleged crime involved because we've removed this individual or someone has removed this individual from the streets and incarcerated them. So, for the protection of the law enforcement officers and or departments individual departments, if the court was to issue something like this, don't you think it'd be prudent upon them to issue a search warrant. Just your opinion, not your legal, not your legal advice. No, no, that's all right, I'll be glad to go into this territory we, we cannot order search warrant unless law enforcement and it's usually the state's attorney and law enforcement contact us separately for a search warrant. There may be in a case where at the same time a person is requesting a relief from abuse order from us that the next phone call we get may in fact be from law enforcement. In that particular case looking for a search warrant so I'm not saying that it's not possible, but in my experience, it's rare for that to happen but it certainly it's possible, but we cannot order a search of a home. Based on a request for relief from abuse that's why the difficulty in any order of relinquishment confiscation whatever you want to call it to a great extent depends on self report. By the individual, when the police go to serve an order saying plaintiff X says that you have two long guns and a handgun, and the individual says I do not have any such firearms or they're not in the house. And the police are not authorized to go in the house to search for them at that point they would have to then perhaps, depending what evidence they have, then they may feel that they have a basis for a search warrant but it's a whole separate proceeding whole different standard of proof or evidence in order to get that warrant. So, wouldn't be anything automatic about that. And I agree it is. Thank you, your honor. You're welcome. Thank you. Judge, you said just jog something in my, my head for some reason but so these are civil proceedings and not criminal. And through a civil proceeding, there's potentially personal property that's confiscated. And so, I guess this, this is pretty narrow as far as firearms go but with the same thing happen if somebody was potentially threatened using some other type of weapon. You mean would we order a confiscation of weapons. Yeah, I suppose we could sure. So, so if somebody threatened to stab somebody, you could go for knives. Or you could, you could order that they surrender knives weapons. Right. What about if somebody threatened to run somebody over what it would a car be confident. I mean, it could be used as a weapon. I agree that it could be used as a weapon. I doubt that they would turn over the possession of a car. I just look at it as weapon and and I just for whatever reason, we're zeroing in on firearms when there's a large number of things that could be considered as being weapon or deadly or dangerous. I would expect some orders say exactly that that they cannot possess firearms or other dangerous or deadly, deadly weapons. I mean that that would not be uncommon again depending on the particular facts that come before the court you may be right I just I just think if they attempted to run someone over in a car that would clearly without knowing anymore. I will say that if that's the facts that come before me I would think it would probably warrant a relief from abuse but whether it would be another stretch to to to say that we're going to confiscate the vehicle. I don't know what we would do with it. I don't know where it would go who would pay for the impounding. I mean that there's all kinds of issues with that. That's why the the the orders are very specific as to where firearms can go. There is a process and I don't think you'll see any judge ordering a repossession of a vehicle. Right. Probably not. Great. Thank you. You're welcome. Okay. I just wanted to mention, Bob, you had said that you would take a look at 610. 610 was from last session. It's not in play anymore. Any bill that doesn't get get passed doesn't automatically get reintroduced so I just want to make that clear. Thank you for that Max. I just want to read up on the the storage. They make anything in 610 about the storage of firearms. We'll have somebody will certainly have witnesses on storage. So I'm not seeing any other hands for Judge Greerson. Your Honor, thank you. Thank you very much. I know we've we've kept you for quite a while. No, that's all right. I just wanted the committee to know when the other witnesses that will continue to work on this bill. I'm not sure if we're going to be able to get through this. I'm not sure if we're going to be able to get through this. Along some of the lines that I've suggested whether they're interested or not. And if you need me again. For testimony, let, let me know. I do have another meeting that I have to go to now. If that's all right with the chair. Absolutely. Absolutely. Appreciate your time. Thank you very much. And what I'd like to do is I'd like to take a quick break. Let's come back at 10 after 11. So we can get Chris Bradley on. Chris, I don't know if you need the whole 20 minutes or, or we'll need more, but certainly want to make sure we get you on. As I mentioned earlier, we have a hard stop at 1130. We have a lot of testimony, certainly all the people who are listed here and number of requests for other testimony made as well. So let's come back. 10 after and start with you, Chris. Just real quick Maxine. If we run out of time with Chris. Again, he would be able to come back. Okay. No, absolutely. Okay. Yeah. I just wanted to hear it out loud. Okay. No, no, thank you. Yeah. Like, like I'm saying, Chris, you can have the 20 minutes. If you need more, you could come back. If you don't need it, then we'll, then we'll move on, but just want to make sure we will get to you. All right. Great. Thank you. Yep. See you at 10 after. Thank you. Thank you. So as I said, I'd like to turn to Chris Bradley. We do have a hard stop, whether it's with you, Chris, or, or if we've moved to another witness at 1130, but certainly next week we will. We schedule this again. So welcome, Chris. Good morning. Good morning. Thank you. Chair grad vice chair, Burdett ranking member Christie house, judiciary members and distinguished viewers. For the record, my name is Chris Bradley. And I'm both the president and executive director of the Vermont Federation of Sports Miss clubs. And if you're not familiar with the Federation, we represent approximately 60 member clubs across the great state of Vermont with over 11,000 members and growing. Thank you very much for the opportunity to address you on each 133. Prior to launching into my testimony, I'd like to make the committee aware that starting this year, the Federation has made a commitment to try to establish working relationships with leadership, individuals, groups and organizations that are typically involved in the discussion about proposed firearm legislation. To that end, we have reached out to individuals like Senator Bruce and organizations like the Vermont network and others. These conversations are cordial and polite. We are completely open going into them that we may not be able to agree, but we believe that this is precisely the type of discussion and conversation we need before bills get submitted. And I commit to you that we will continue to seek pre committee dialogue. As for my testimony, I begin by stating that the Federation fully recognizes the need and what is hoped to be very rare situations where there may be a requirement to separate a person from their firearms by due process of law in compliance with the Vermont and US constitutions. We further understand that this is what is implied by 15 VSA 1103C1 when it states, the court shall make such orders as it deems necessary to protect the plaintiff or the children or both if the court finds the defendant has abused the plaintiff. Based on that, we fully understand the intent of H-133 is simply to codify what is essentially existing practice. And because of that, the Federation's initial reaction was that we could and perhaps should support this bill. Unfortunately, and after further consideration, we cannot support this bill in its current form. Although I will offer a five word amendment, which would change it into something we could support. The crux of our problem with both 15 VSA 1103 and 1104, as well as 13 VSA 4054, which if you're not familiar with it is the extreme risk protection order, emergency relief, ex parquet handling of repose. Is the standard of evidence in each of these stand statutes is preponderance. As a quick review and I know we've heard it from the judge, standards of evidence that gives our judges basis to make rulings. It is generally accepted that there are three basic standards. The lowest of as we've heard is preponderance. And to use the analogy provided by Judge Greerson, you can think of preponderance as being a feather dropped on one side or the other of a balanced scale. To have a preponderance, the scale only needs to move slightly, which means a level of certainty of something above 50%. Clear and convincing is the next higher standard. And if we think in terms of percentages, the weight on one side of the scale or the other would be a degree of certainty of about 71 or so percent. Or higher. Beyond reasonable doubt is still higher standard, which kicks in at about 91% certainty. And that's a criminal standard. As another point of concern under 15 VSA 1104, I believe that a defendant can be ordered out of their own house. A residence that they likely pay for. Based on only the weight of a feather. However, when it comes to seizing or relinquishing property specific to a constitutional right. And even though this is somewhat of a standard in current Vermont law, we do not believe that the weight of a feather should constrain a constitutional right any more than the weight of a feather should constitute constrain your right to free speech, religion or assembly. Just so we're all aware of the impact to Vermonters that are involved with RFAs. And in looking at data from the Vermont Judiciary annual statistical report for fiscal year 18, we see that there was 3,307 RFAs filed. Of those 617 were immediately denied. With the judge apparently not feeling the feathers wait. As a side note, then please remember that about one in five filings immediately fail for some reason. With such reasons, including frivolous and punitive actions that are not unknown in domestic relations. That leaves 2,674 RFAs where the weight of a feather was felt. And because of preponderance language and the fact that firearms are not available, every one of those 2,674 cases could have resulted in order to require the relinquishment of firearms. Of those 2,674 granted RFA cases, we then see that 1,469 or well over one half at approximately 55% were subsequently denied or released. We then see that 1,469 were subsequently denied or withdrawn for whatever reasons. That leaves 1,469 Vermonters which may have had their property removed due to nothing more than the weight of a feather. To me, it does not matter that this infringement on rights was only for a short period of time. To me, this appears that the effect is that almost 1,500 Vermonters lost their right to self-defense. Sadly, while we know the number of RFAs that do get filed and how that number breaks down across time, it appears that we do not know some rather basic numbers such as how many times are firearms an issue in RFA proceedings today? How many times does a court require the relinquishment of temporary RFAs today? When temporary RFAs are orders are issued that require relinquishment, how many are subsequently withdrawn or denied? If we don't have these numbers and I don't think we do, I think we might all agree that having accurate numbers such as these would make your decisions more informed and possibly easier to make. Perhaps that is something that this committee has jurisdiction over and can look into and I'm not aware that there's a Senate bill looking into this as well. As another concern that factors into our lack of support is the inconsistency between our new ERPO laws found in Title 13 in comparison to existing domestic relation laws found in Title 15. A rather glaring difference between the two is that in 13VSA 4058B2 there is language that provides a criminal penalty for someone making false claim or statements in an ERPO case with this being a criminal charge of not more than one year or fine to not more than $1,000. We see no similar language in Title 15 yet we know that these false claims are likely to be occurring as something must be accounting for the number of temporary RFAs being immediately denied as well as the number of temporary RFAs that had a temporary order issued but were later denied or withdrawn. Should we not have consistency for making false statements and claims when a constitutional right is impacted in existing Title 15 statutes? Back to the point, you may have noted that I previously referred to preponderance as being somewhat of a standard when handling hearings when the defendant is or is not in court. I phrased it that way because it is not universal and there have been differences of opinion between the House and the Senate when it comes to the standard of evidence required for legal confiscation of firearms. For example, you may recall that a couple of years ago the legislature passed S-122 with S-122 being a bill directed at extreme risk protection orders or ERPOs. In passing the ERPOs statutes, it was understood by all that these statutes were specific to removing firearms from individuals who may be a danger to themselves or others. S-122 created both 13VSA 4053 and 4054 with 13VSA 4053 handling an ERPO when the defendant is present and 4054 handling an ex-partee ERPO. Speaking very broadly, these two statutes do for ERPO what 15VSA 1103 and 1104 do for domestic violence in regards to hearing where the defendant is or isn't present. After much debate, I believe because both 13VSA 4053 and 4054 directly impacted the rights that are protected under the Second Amendment and Article 16. The Senate opted to set the standard of evidence as clear and convincing for both 4053 and 4054. I further believe that they did so knowing what the standards of evidence were in 15VSA 1103 and 1104. S-122 then passed the Senate with both 13VSA 4053 and 4054 being clear and convincing. It went over to the House. The House changed the standard in 4054 to preponderance but left 4053 as clear and convincing and they became law as things came down to the wire. It is not just the Federation or our associated groups that believe that the level of firearms requires a higher standard of evidence than just preponderance. The Senate initially decided on clear and convincing in regards to IRPOs and I believe that this was because a constitutional right was in the balance. As one more side note and just for your reference, when it comes to separating a person from their firearms and federal law, United States code that addresses this issue is that the defense must be present. As mentioned previously, with the inclusion of just five simple words, the Federation would support this bill and we suggest the following change. I'm quoting from the bill and I'll make reference to our change. As it reads now, in order issued under the Section May, if the plaintiff's complaint or affidavit includes information that the defendant possesses, owns or controls firearms and the court finds by clear and convincing evidence, it necessary to protect the plaintiff and the plaintiff's children, require the immediate relinquishment and the rest of it. What we suggest, in order issued under this statute, a Section May, if the plaintiff's complaint or affidavit includes information that the defendant possesses, owns or controls firearms and the court finds by clear and convincing evidence, as you consider that change and in the spirit of being fair, consistent with the removal of constitutional rights are being considered. We additionally ask that a new section for Title 15 be added into this bill that is specific to a criminal penalty being added for making false statements and claims. I very much thank you for your time. That is my written statement. I have submitted this to Mr. Bailey. Do you have any questions for me? Great. Thank you, Chris. Thank you very much. And I appreciate your suggested language, giving us suggested language to consider and also as well as, as you said, reaching out to us before, you know, before today, and I certainly do appreciate the communication. Martin. Yeah, thank you, Chris. Nice to see you again. Fairly narrow question actually at the bottom of your page three of your testimony, the you're citing to federal court, separating person from their firearms and federal court. I just was wondering what federal law or not federal court with federal law. I'm just wondering what federal law that is. I'm just curious. I believe that's 922. That is the law. Governing firearms in what situation is that I'm just this touches upon domestic violence. I believe I don't have the statute right in front of me, sir. Okay. If it's possible for you just to send that. I'm just curious. I appreciate that. Not a problem. I'd be happy to thank you. I make myself available to any committee member. If they have any questions for anything having to do with our perspective. Is there any other questions I can address? Um, Selena. Um, yeah, I so, uh, echo others appreciation to have you back and for the work. Um, thank you so much. Thank you. Thank you. I'm just curious about your proposed. Provision of clear and convincing. Evidence. And I'm looking at the underlying statute, which I know isn't posted to our. Page, but you know, there are a number of other. Um, recommendations to the order that can be granted. Um, such as. Uh, removal from your house. Yeah. Well, right. Contacting the plaintiffs, contacting the plaintiff for plaintiff's children. You know, et cetera. The fixed distance. Um, and I, so I am. I think it's a good proposal that all of those things should. Have a, um, No, no. Convincing evidence or just the relinquishment of firearms. And if the latter, why, why just that? Our argument or our discussion is on the legal possession. Firearms as outlined in the Vermont and. Um, I think for the removal of any constitutional right, there has to be a fairly high bar. I, I. It certainly can't be the weight of a feather. And I'm not going to tie into anything else. Going on. I had, I've already made a suggestion concerning a penalty. That that doesn't seem quite consistent across statute. And perhaps we should look at that. Um, in the hands of the constitutional right. I've already prefaced this all by saying that there are situations where we don't argue. Hopefully very rare. Where this may be required. Anything else happening to do is, is under your purview. With what is happening existing today with domestic violence situations. Um, however. removal of firearms. Everything else is under your purview for preponderance. But when it comes to removal of firearms, we think it clearer that there be a little bit higher standard than just a feather. And that's what we're really, as Judge Grayson mentioned, it's a feather. If you think in terms of an ex-partee hearing, you're going into a debate with one team not there. How can you not come up with a preponderance? Now, clearly, we see 617 being immediately thrown away, one in five, for some reason. And then we see almost half of the ones that remain being removed. We feel very strongly that the bar on a constitutional right should not be a feather. It should be higher than that. And just as a thought, when firearms are being confiscated, especially in a household situation, where does joint property enter in? I don't want to blaber my time. Is there any other question? This is a constitutional right, folks. It's a very high bar. Thank you, Chris. I do not see any committee members in any other hands. And actually, it's good timing. Bill, I do see your hand up. However, this is time for committee members. And I look forward to hearing your testimony when we continue this. Okay, so great. Well, thank you. Thank you very much. You're most welcome. Yeah, and I'm not sure what day we'll be continuing, but we'll get back to it soon. Hopefully, Wednesday or Thursday, because that's when we have the most time in the morning and we can get more folks in. Okay, great. So committee, we will be on the floor at one 15. And Tom, is it best for sending you emails, texts, if we have any thoughts or? Oh, what do you mean when when we're on the floor, if I get questions? Yeah. Yeah, let's do texts. Text would work best for me. I don't foresee too much with the the notes that I that I have informing into my presentation. I think most everything will be covered, but okay. Well, great. All right. Great. Thank you. Okay, so we will adjourn for the morning and go off YouTube. Thank you. Thank you. Thanks.