ks So to try and come up come at these interactions from from both sides i'll start with a sort of pre-history and then history of aqim And and i think this will also reinforce the idea that that these movements oftentimes have their origins in specific local histories And then become implicated in broader global patterns or global networks So if we turn to to algeria we find algeria becomes independent in 1962 It's under a one-party rule by the national liberation front for the first several decades after independence Islam became one of the Arenas or or you know one of the channels through which people could could begin to mobilize politically And the you know mosques and and other islamic spaces become became places in in algeria Certainly by the 80s where activists could come together and and begin different kinds of political organization so when algeria Legalized multi-partyism in 1988 There was one of the strongest movements that emerged was the islamic salvation front or feasts in 1989 algeria held Two rounds of multi-party parliamentary elections in 1991 92 in the first round in 1991 the feasts performed extremely well And looked poised to perform very well in the second round, which was scheduled to be held in early 1992 The algerian military at that point Fearing what it might look like to have an islamist party Come to power via the ballot box the algerian military stepped in in a military coup and that action launched You know years of civil war and and the algerian civil war the end of it can be dated to To various points, but we'll say roughly, you know eight years or a decade of civil war So the proto-aq am comes out of algeria civil war out of armed islamic groups that emerged in the context of of the civil war between Muslim actors and and the algerian state and of course algeria is an overwhelmingly muslim majority country, so we're talking about Muslims on both sides in many cases So you have the the formation of the armed islamic group or the the gia in 1992 and then an offshoot of the Gia called the the Salafist group for preaching in combat or the gspc Formed around 1998 is sort of the proto aq am The both of these movements the gia and the gspc were were excluded from various amnesty programs that the algerian state had for militants And were sort of marginalized from algerian society because of their involvement in massacres of civilians Around 2003 the gspc began to take a seherin turn So they were involved that year in 2003 in an incident where they kidnapped 32 european tourists After 2003 the gspc was responsible for attacks For example on an army outpost in moritania in 2005 So we start to see this this seherin turn by the gspc In 2006 i'm an azoahiri the the sort of number two and and the global al-qaeda at that time Released a message, you know affirming sort of unity between the the gspc and and Al-qaeda and then in 2007 the gspc sort of formally rebranded itself as um as al-qaeda and the islamic margaret as a branch or a franchise of al-qaeda But again, I want to stress that Just because they've taken on the name doesn't necessarily mean that all of their orders come from pakistan or something like that And that it's a straightforward process whereby Aq am acts in the name of of al-qaeda central or or something like that um So now I want to get it at some of the mechanisms of of localization and particularly in northern mali And a qi am remains active or has remained active in northern algeria There have been periodic waves of bombing campaigns and attacks and and a qi am retains a presence in algeria But it's also conducted attacks um since its rebranding and and even before as I discussed Conducted attacks in mali In moritania in in nijer It's been responsible for kidnappings and and attacks In moritania for example attacks near the the french and israeli embassies So to turn to these mechanisms of of localization First of all one is is kidnapping itself Of course a qi am in some cases seems to have directly seized European tourists or european aid workers in other cases It seems to have been local criminal outfits that would kidnap these people So the interaction first of all between a qi am and local criminal outfits represents one dynamic of localization another Aspect of that with kidnapping localization is is ransom payments Ransom payments have sometimes been arranged by local intermediaries. So there's yet another way that the a qi am has been Connected with local networks are connected with local politicians even Who brokered hostage negotiations. So yad aghali The the leader of ansara dean one of the the primary players in the islamist coalition that took over northern mali in 2012 Was at one point in the early 2000s one of these negotiators one of these intermediaries between A qi am and and european governments or others seeking to secure the release of hostages So we have kidnapping as a mechanism of of localization Another one is drug smuggling. Of course the the sahara has seen, you know trade and smuggling for for centuries Or millennia even Since the 1990s there's been increased trade in or smuggling of of cigarettes and weapons in particular and then in the 2000s a a lot of trade or smuggling and cocaine And a qi am, you know, according to persistent reports and you know international media and other sources a qi am has become deeply implicated In these forms of smuggling and so I want to argue that smuggling is yet another arena where a qi am becomes implicated in local networks and connected to local actors So these two forms of criminality kidnapping and and smuggling have have been ways In which a qi am has been drawn into to local communities The third arena of localization that i want to talk about is is a qi am's efforts to reach out to people on the basis of local grievances So we saw the the rebellion in mali that began last year that was far from the first rebellion That northern mali has seen there was a prior rebellion Starting around 2006 one that started in 1990 Earlier rebellions one for example in 1963-64 Particularly after the 1990 to 96 rebellion. There were various grievances left in northern mali People who felt that they were marginalized by the state people who felt that the state had abandoned them particularly in periods of drought An a qi am reached out to people on the basis of of those grievances um The final mechanism of localization that i want to talk about is intermarriage So we see what appear to be strategic decisions by a qi am commanders to marry local women So mohtar bel mohtar who's been reportedly killed but who was at one time A major a qi am commander in the sahara married a woman from timbuktu There were recently In the the media there were Interviews with a woman who was married to abu dar dar who was another algerian commander In a qi am and this woman was from gow. I believe in northern mali So we see kind of a pattern or a strategy among algerian a qi am commanders Of marrying local women in order to to forge ties with communities and in order to build bonds and um, it seems that Uh, when a qi am commanders married these women. They're also marrying into families and they're marrying into networks So it goes beyond just a union of two people but but into really a union of two networks or two groups so these are four processes that That i've been looking at to think about how a qi am became implicated in local life um, and localized to some extent despite their Rhetorical affiliations with the global al-qaeda and their their stated objectives of of jihad and so forth that they also Were drawn into local communities in various ways So now i want to turn to looking at the process from a different angle and that's how individuals from Say northern mali have become implicated in regional and global jihadist networks So i'd like to look at the case of someone named umar old hamaha who's A militant commander who was identified in the international press especially early on as a spokesman for ansara dean But this has been increasingly identified as a spokesman and commander for mojwa Or the the movement for unity in jihad in west africa um A sort of splinter group of of a qi am that appears to have especially targeted or made efforts to recruit Black africans and other groups that weren't necessarily represented fully within the original a qi am So hamaha is ethnically arab was born in a place called bear, which is in the timbuktu region of northern mali He was born around 1965 Attended secondary school in timbuktu With many of these these militant figures and assembling their biographies. It's extremely murky and and so this is really just a A sketch and there's a lot that that i haven't been able to fill in But he attended timbuktu secondary school in timbuktu graduated in 1984 and then went To moritania for coronic studies until about 1990 Then returned to timbuktu in 1990 And was apparently denied permission by local authorities to preach in the mosque So it seems that already by the time he came back from from moritania that there was A different understanding or a difference of understanding between him and and local religious elites in timbuktu At the same time as i mentioned before in the early 90s. There was uh, one of these twareg twareg led rebellions The one that spanned from 1990 to 96 One of hamaha's brothers was was reportedly killed In that rebellion and so between these two factors These conflicts with local religious authorities and then Possible fear of repression from authorities for having had a brother who was involved in the rebellion Hamaha went into hiding and at this point his biography becomes extremely murky. So potentially he went to algeria Potentially he went to afghanistan in any case He seems to have left mali and become implicated somehow in regional and possibly global jihadist networks and by the time he resurfaces In the 2000s it's as an aqim fighter and then we see him Coming to even greater prominence during the 2012-2013 crisis as a spokesman for Ansara deen and and then as a commander and leader within mojoa And some of the Some of the confusion about which group he he belongs to may point to The difficulty of obtaining credible information and the difficulty of Using evidence in the media, but I think it also reinforces this point about localization if it becomes hard to differentiate between Ansara deen or mojoa or aqim I think that helps reinforce this point about localization and show that it's not necessarily easy to say Okay, ansara deen because it was founded by iad agali who's a malian national that that's a local group somehow And that these other groups aqim and mojoa are somehow foreign groups I really think that that we need to be much more careful about how we draw lines between local and foreign in these cases So these are actually the the main points that that I want to make and I think that I'll stop here, especially because I know that we're we're running a little bit behind But so just to reinforce my my key points. I think that I think it's unwise to make stark divisions between the local and the global and and to China understand extremism in west africa simply as a phenomenon that's been imported from the outside So I think it's important to pay attention again to these two dimensions one How groups maybe with a global or transnational agenda become tied to local communities? And then secondly how individuals from local communities may enter into these global networks very complicated ways. So thank you Thank you very much. Alex and terry over to you Thank you. Yeah, I'm also happy to be here and also want to thank the organizer for inviting me Uh, I'm going to speak about the horn of africa and in particular Focus on on the countries of Somalia and Ethiopia Every one of us who works on horn africa and I guess terry's would agree that Horn africa is unique But when it comes to religion is definitely unique because of the long history of both islamic christianity and the particular legacy of christian Muslim relations And the way this have had Implications for defining muslim identity and and also for current regional politics in the region Um talking about Somalia in Ethiopia Somalia is known to all of you the way it has shifted the conflicts have shifted from our clan based Civil war to a more religiously based insurgency and then we have Ethiopia Uh, which has not seen the same level of violence far from that But nevertheless have seen Intense debates among muslims Over legitimate religious practices There has been increasing Contestation of religious boundaries The christian muslim relations are becoming more fragile And then the last year we have seen huge demonstrations Within the capital Addis Abba and also other major cities And in both these cases what is dominating the picture is what we commonly label as Salafism There two very different representations of Salafism in two very too close attached countries Somalia and Ethiopia Which by themselves of course are also very very different Um, but in spite of these differences what we see is that local policy makers in the area and to some degree international policy makers tend to Um View them as relatively similar Uh, the al-Shabaab has been labeled and I think for good reasons that terrorist extremists And uh has been targeted militarily something I think would be Hardly could have been avoided Yet at the same time we see that the Ethiopian regime has also equated its Salafism With extremism and terrorism And treated and and reacted quite heavy-handed To the apolitical muslim demonstrations that we're seeing In in the last year and I will argue that this can have some serious implications When we talk about Salafism in Africa and also in general, I mean it's it's I think we all can Can agree that it's it's difficult to talk about a homogeneous phenomenon Uh, one interesting trend that I see is what I call the politicization of purity Um, while Salafism is best understood as a religious movement To maintain or secure religious purity or devoted to religious fear Uh, this politicization of purity means Means a movement or a shift towards trying to carve out symbolic and territorial space For the realization of purity Meaning that they try to establish political and territorial control over certain areas With the objective enforcing purity So what we see in in in contrast to What we used to call or maybe still call Islamism the Salafi the The Salafi thinkers of trying to politicize purity Does not have a similar elaborate political theory. It's more about trying to eradicate Sufism and trying to destruct Sufi shrines and then enforce and pose a certain Morality upon the people And al-Shabaab is a very good example of that al-Shabaab in Somalia The way it established control of a large part of southern Somalia And how it immediately started the programs of of flogging appetitions destruction of of Sufi shrines And moreover banning of cut and then even banning the world championship in soccer, which is Little hard to comprehend But it's important to underline. I think we talk about this that what we see here is that these are rather This trend is observable in some few cases. We cannot talk about this as being a dominant trend within african Salafism we have seen Like in Sahel, it has nevertheless had significant Consequences, but the majority of Salafis in Africa remain devoted To maintaining religious purity Through peaceful means such as Dawa and and education And then we have another interesting if we may use the word trend within Salafism, which is directly opposed To this increasing Policization or politicization of purity The movement has been labeled by some as the al-hadith movement And the Albanian born Nasser al-Din al-Albani has been a very important figure in this Um, and he has been directly opposed to any sort of Of political activism that stems from Thinkers like the the muslim brotherhood side cooked and so on Uh, and instead advocated for a quietest apolitical approach to how to advocate his program And it's been underscoring Dawa and education As the means to purify the individual and the society And here is the interesting point that when we talk about or see Salafism in Ethiopia Particularly the young generation of of Salafism Ethiopia We clearly see that this this uh, this movement draw much much inspiration From this apolitical quietest form of of Salafism They have been avoiding any kind of political engagement Uh, they have been relatively self protective And we may also say that they they entertain somewhat xenophobic attitudes towards Engagement in formal poly political life if we then talk about political institutions And and so on And the irony however is that when the Ethiopian government is Accusing Salafis of of becoming more politicized the irony is that It is those groups that most clearly are advocating this quietest approach that then are being accused of being political And what have been responses to to this in Horn of Africa And I want to hear focus on on the the policy of the Ethiopian regime of the last year or so Um, historically we may say that within Ethiopia that there has been inherent fear or Concern of Islam as as an outside force as a political threat, which we can trace back to the to the 16th century I will not do that here And but this this this constant this constant notion that Islam is a potential threat to this To to the Ethiopian polity And what we also have seen in in with the current regime is that over the last decade or so there has been an increasing trend um Or increasing Development where they have been more concerned over potential or or growing radicalization Among Ethiopian Muslims and what we see is that it's the Salafi movement that Has been brown been branded as those that As as as extremist And this took a new turn by summer 2011 where the so-called alabash movement were Brought in from Lebanon. I can maybe return to that in the q&a the movement has portrayed itself as the main advocate of islamic moderate moderate ism and it was brought in to contain the spread of Salafism and We may say it in the way was being Working together with the government. It was said to or could be seen to in Bring in some sort of a political governmental form of Islam um And the same time we have seen over the last decade or so how the regime has been um Co-opting major islamic institutions most uh, particularly the Supreme council of islamic affairs But even mosques they have been trying to monitor quite closely with the objective of curtailing any form of of expansion of Salafism But what we see I argue is this a blanket labeling of Salafi Muslims as one category and um and clearly I believe we see an regime that is very in an ill informed of what goes on within its own Among its own Muslim population They have no very little idea about the the logical features And most Much of its policies are based on pre-emptive premature assumptions And the demonstration we have seen over the last year has been a reaction to this and the demonstrators are accusing the regime of uh interference in internal religious affairs The regime uh, that the dream is is deciding what kind of islam is to be practiced in Ethiopia And the demonstrators are also accusing the regime of violating the secular principle of separation between religionists and state um, and What we see is that uh over the year or so The result has been increasingly tense relations between the Muslim population and and the state And and there is a clear risk that the labeling of Muslims or Salafis as extremist as politicized Could be a self fulfilling prophecy That the movement then would move in in the very direction which the government is trying to avoid And I think the the situation in a horn particularly when we talk about when you talk about Ethiopia, but also other areas There are two major points That that that are that are important to to to remind ourselves. The first is that Salafism or any kind of islamic reformism far is far from any homogeneous phenomenon And connected to that it is extremely important to be aware Of the ideological and social political nuances of each context secondly uh Local and international Actors policy makers regimes tend to ignore these nuances and often we see over generalized Uh labels such as extremism terrorism and then subsequent policies Being carried out that do not differentiate between more militant groups and those who are apolitical quietists who would be focused on religious reform rather political engagement and I think these have very Serious or very can have very negative implications as it creates new tensions And possibly situation of increased militancy What I talk about this is self-fulfilling prophecy when people are labeled as extremist They've been alienated and then They turn in that direction And finally, I I think the situation in Ethiopia is extremely worrisome We all know that Ethiopia has been celebrated as its model for peaceful coexistence between christians and muslims That is the truth with some reservations though But the regime's policies are clearly Aligning the larger parts of the muslim population They're being they're feeling that they're under attack And it seems so far. They're determined to keep on demonstrating against Uh the the regime's policies Christian muslim relations are coming in more and more fragile and what we see is that uh To a large extent the christian population is buying into the rhetoric or even propaganda from the regime Where they are portrayed as extremist and muslims are portrayed as extremist and I think this Um This is going to be something which is going to be hard to mend the way the two groups are now moving in a more polemic relationship And also given Ethiopia's size is strategic Place in the horn I think what happens there will have it can have Also region original implications in the way that other muslims and other areas of the horn are reacting to the way The muslims are treated within Ethiopia. So i'm worried about uh the future in terms of of Relationship within the state and the muslim populations and also the social fabric of christian and muslim relations within the area Thank you Thank you very much and uh over to uh pool to round us off pool. Thanks Thank you very much. Uh We'd like to thank you very much for inviting me. I'm I've just returned from uh 10 days in Nigeria and I can spend time on some of the in the q&a and And some of the points i'll make uh in the powerpoint. So i've compressed enormous amount of material here and uh edited it for the Time uh allocated here. So there'll there'll be some bumps in the transition which I I want to warn you about uh my uh take on uh Northern Nigeria and Boko Haram is centered on uh social movement theory and I view Boko Haram unlike other movements As an indigenous Urban insurrection. It is multi-class. It has members of the elites affiliated with it It has school dropouts It has a network Within the region of west africa and globally Also, it draws upon global sourcing of ideas resources I believe now funding And it is fragmenting like all Salafist groups It had the interesting aspect of Salafism Is nothing can be invented Or it would be An unacceptable innovation. So Uh innovation occurs by discovering that which was originally authentic and once pious ancestors So what i'm going to begin and talk about the situation in northern Nigeria, uh, which constitutes 72 percent of The land mass of Nigeria. I make this point because there will be No stability, I believe in Nigeria nor Economic growth nor security for american energy resources Unless the crisis in northern Nigeria is dealt with So much of my argument begins with a discussion of the nature of the crisis Which has multiple dimensions. It's been going on for decades And it has created the environment that has incubated Boko Haram The major feature of Boko Haram that is shocking the population of northern Nigeria Is the nihilist violence suicide bombings Uh, the amount of conflict that is unprecedented in previous periods Uh, so here's a brief summary on why Nigeria matters And most of us are aware of this. I won't spend time on it Nigeria especially in the Lagos region Southwest Nigeria is is doing very well economically innovating But the economic growth rate of around 7 percent is impressive It has many functioning institutions within Nigeria But its problems are As well as we know enormous disorganization and criminality including The petrol oligarchy who shares and redistributes petrol rents Enormous leading enormous poverty and corruption in Nigeria Which is not in a direct cause of relationship with Boko Haram But certainly creates the population of Potential applicants to radical movements This is true everywhere else in the world and it's been verified in the northern Nigerian case Now this map here summarizes The situation in the election of 2011 The Muslim northern candidate Buhari took these states here Those are the sharia states the states between 1999 and 2003 that implemented criminal sharia law Private and personal law in courts were available to Muslims Between 1999 and 2003 12 states Legislatures implemented sharia criminal law and it's very important for understanding the background to Boko Haram This is the old northern region here This area here is mixed middle belt and Christian and Muslim. They're Christian and Muslims here But the key to understanding the region is the enormous inequality Poverty and human misery in the far north here and I'll provide you some evidence for that The Pre-colonial states the Sokoto-Kelafate here Touches Niger all the way to Burkina Faso Cameroon down here southern Nigeria To Eloran and Yoruba speaking areas and Bornu the state here, which once stretched up into Chad and into Libya also in Cameroon and in Chad here All of these networks have not disappeared. I lived on the border once between Niger and Nigeria They're completely integrated porous flows Around these regions so that these networks were formed during these pre-colonial Regimes states they involve scholars pilgrimage routes Students trade And shared languages and culture. So this is clearly an environment for a regional movement This is a map of the old northern region again I've given you an idea of the scale The the Boko Haram arises from an unprecedented multifaceted crisis in northern Nigeria A crisis of legitimacy for the political elites You have the collapse of bargaining in the 2011 election the north feels marginalized Uh, there's no coordination between the 19 governors or the 12 governors of the muslim Sharia states There's a fracturing of the former Politically elite they had three or four four candidates for the presidency in 2011 And a fragmentation of Islamic authority where in earlier periods The politically elites Integrated and symbolized by the Sultan of Sokoto provided a common narrative At least one that was was hegemonic that hegemony is now Been destroyed by the fragmentation You have a realignment in the middle belt as Pentecostal Christianity What its roots in the United States has made enormous inroads, especially with the Christian Association of Nigeria Which northern muslims feel threatened by and its most radical elements They are anti ecumenical They argue that Allah is a different god than the god of abraham Uh, and I believe for that reason the catholic church has withdrawn from the christian association of Nigeria This uh, the outcome here is a loss of confidence on the part of the elites where they fear for their lives Uh, and you have a true legitimacy crisis Now we all know that crisis is the midwife of innovation So I think we have to look at the upside here and the possibility that the northern elites will face their problems and attempt to deal with them And I'll try to provide some of them. So The problem the heart of this problem I'll go to it with some data in a moment is a demographic crisis Jack Goldstone's work on this Is key reading for anyone wishing to understand northern Nigeria have an enormous increase in population Nigeria's overall population is barely 50 percent urbanized that means Every 14 years there'll be a new cohort Of people moving to cities So you have the urbanization of northern muslim youth One group that gets a lot of attention are the karanik students that wander And beg and then become part of the lumpen population of northern cities They were recruited into boko around but didn't play That don't they don't play leadership roles And you also have western school leavers filling the city and in large numbers of university graduates who lack any opportunity to use the Degrees that they had spent and devoted themselves to You have the collapse of industrial production in the industrial estates of northern Nigeria And the decay of agro infrastructures irrigation and others that Undermind the potential to grow food And the problem is the increasing number of states have produced economically Unviable states, so they're talking about doing the zones as a way to reorganize Nigeria And there's no recovery strategy So here's here's an example of the I've taken the sharia states Average fertility and separated them and compared them to Nigeria in general So the average birth rate in a number of children per woman the crude fertility rate is 7 0.3 to 7.4 On average in the 12 northern states in Sokoto it is 8.6 And when I was there in december I asked health workers that this was accurate and they thought it was an underestimate So the population Is growing and it is one Where the north is producing the conditions for increasing Misarization compare it to the southwest the most developed area And this is a dynamic that would be very difficult to stop It's also important that it cannot be uh Delt with unless the economic educational and social status Of northern girls and women are raised. That's the policy issue to solve the demographic Time bomb that is underneath the insurrection So that if you look at the genealogy and the origins of Boko Haram, Boko Haram Is the invidious term used by critics of The movement it arises from a Salafist movement Uh, and it combines two elements. I believe first is Restorationism to restore The golden age of the empires you saw earlier in return Northern Nigeria to good governance under sharia law given the failure of western law and the in the failure of governance by western educated elites who are known as the the Boko the yum Boko Uh, the Discourses and uh, which I'll go over with Muhammad Yusuf a charismatic leader In my dugary, uh becomes it's the key center He has a conflict with security forces in 2009 and then the muslim president yar adewa Calls in the Army and they level the area and then begin a purge over the Anyone who is seen to be associated with Boko Haram, which I'll talk about The insurgency then takes place after the suppression of 2009 The key event is in september 2010 would have very well organized prison break in In bouchie a Emirate of northern northern, ijiri this so kato caliphate And then you have movement Targeted assassinations of police Prison breaks taking of weapons from police stations Score settling against people they perceive As having taken their property or were involved in the suppression of the movement The strike against kano with six suicide bombers hitting all of the security centers Displayed a level of sophistication That the nigerian security forces could only admire admire for its organization They took out the triple s the regional security Immigration and then police headquarters opened up the prisons all Carried out with discipline without An announcements to the local population to avoid being attacked I'll talk about the breakup of the movement so the the movement culturally the The the theology and the ideology of this movement arises from a Salafist movement led by a Elite scholar abubakar gumi who very early on Develops contacts in saudi arabia He is an innovative preacher He returns to nigeria campaigns against sufi's particularly the tejani of brotherhood He has great networks within saudi arabia The petrol wealth of saudi arabia is funneled as patronage through gumi Gumi then Leads this campaign against magic and Other practices that he Defines as un islamic. He forms an organization as a long name Calling for the eradication of innovation and the return to the suna because under the name the azala And he spearheads a demand for sharia law in northern nigeria He also and this is a element that's taken up and described in detail by roman in roman lohmire But is available in field interviews Breaks what i would call the tech fear barrier Where he declares? Tijaniya followers to be apostates He recants on this later on but it's a key element in Boko haram's later evolution because they practice tech fear the condemning of other muslims Izala splinters after the death of gumi in 1992 A moderate jafar adam who is educated in teacher's training college in kano and in the islamic university of medina Preaches in my dugary and Muhammad yusuf the charismatic shake who leads Boko haram is one of his students They have a rupture Muhammad yusuf in about 2002 Sets up a Community in my dugary and it becomes a state within a state with its own shura He appoints Amir's for nijer chad To different states highly organized politically Yusuf then is a member of the ulama. It's important for people to understand He's accepted as a member of the ulama who is extreme He is invited to preach uh To just to not to preach but to defend his views in many video Exchanges with other scholars and he presents himself as a credible person. He doesn't present himself as a lunatic. He's polite and his literal reading of the Quran. I believe is consistent and he opposes western Education in his present form in nigeria because it mixes the genders and he opposes any belief that conflicts with a strict Reading of the his reading. I might add of the Quran and the hadith And he debates these issues quite credibly with scholars. These are on youtube if you wish to follow them He preaches the other other other element is a condemnation of what's called political sharia This is the political sharia. This is the sharia that was implemented from 1999 to 2003 Uh, he and because it is under secular judges in each state Ultimately and not a true sharia as he imagines it and as the majority of the population imagines What would true sharia be in this restorationist vision that motivates the sharia movement in nigeria? He also speaks Uh Vokes hostility towards the nigerian state and the way in which his followers are abused by the police He makes an alliance with the governor of borneau The governor of borneau appoints one of his members to be commissioner of religious affairs by 2007. They have a falling out Uh, there's mohammed use of his arrested his followers have conflicts with the police In june of 09 There's a traffic conflict over whether his followers are wearing helmets 17 of his of his followers are shot by the nigerian police This leads to a declaration of war of jihad A final sermon by mohammed use of which is on video And uh an insurrection begins there the insurrection he launches Shows the network of bokeh oram it occurs in bouchi. Yobe outside of kano city katsina Possibly so kato. So there's clearly a network of bokeh oram And I also found them early on and by 2005 throughout kano Okay, the part of what he's articulating is the voice voice Grievances of the urban poor in this radical insurrectionist ideology Now the next wave is a wave of extraordinary political violence in northern nigeria But it's a wave of violence not solely by jihadist but by criminals and then counter violence by the security forces there's uh One of the problems in northern cities and in northern states in nigeria is that local government Authorities are under governors. They are not Local government elections are only held and perhaps half of the local government authorities If governors Have local governments and no elections They get to appoint people and they get to gain control of the share of the petroleum revenue that goes to local governments So local governance collapses in this period because of the absence of A local government authority of any type the report after the commission In kano after the conflict of 2012 Describes the virtual collapse of governance at the community level people in cities are not Under any form of governance People do not know who's there. It is easy for insurrectionary cells to set up Because of the collapse of governance in northern nigeria security forces the other it is not a question of poverty leading to a causal outcome of Insurrection but a set of variables one of which is the Authority of the abuses of the nigerian police The with the absence of local government authorities the default relationship Youth and cities have especially if they're attached to unpopular sex that are condemning the nigerian state is the nigerian police and the nigerian police's reputation for abuse for violence for extortion Are is quite extraordinary and verified by human rights groups and ngos that have studied it both within nigeria and in international human rights groups so that the Problem of we have to explain then how a movement that actually begins in 2003 In yobi the so-called taliban Still continues to 2013 And the causal variable i believe that plays its role is the role of the nigerian police and security forces another dimension of the security forces is that they do not They allow Boko aram preachers to preach and convert within the prisons So the when the prison breaks occur led by boko aram They attempt to recruit the other prisoners in the that are incarcerated with boko aram followers So the prison system itself becomes part of the incubation of the movement Again, I think that the it's clear that the crisis of governance in northern nigeria Creates the conditions for boko aram for an insurrectionary movement like this And it's a symptom of a larger crisis of governance and development So I'm going to leave with what I think are the three factions that have emerged since 2009 with muhammad yusuf The first move group is under shakao and this is members of the original shura set up by muhammad yusuf in his interview that's on youtube muhammad yusuf States that he's designated shakao as his Both of them are from yobes state And and allegedly they were quranic students together Much of the biography of muhammad yusuf in shakao yet remains to be written They are much more focused on northern nigeria their Use of indiscriminate violence is their key characteristic and they are focused I believe and others believe On dismantling the nigerian state and making it ungovernable by the levels of violence They're inflicting on christian populations international Organizations like the un and newspapers schools enormous amounts of violence the second faction that's emerged is under someone named abdul aziz Who is calling for negate negotiations? I actually spoke to people who are part of the negotiations led by the northern governors In the past two weeks people are actually negotiating with this faction In my dugary But one of the big issues here is the boko oram has made it clear that it wishes to have The rule of law and accountability For those who murdered their leaders three of their leaders and many of their followers were killed in 2009 Videos by al jazeera are available on youtube where you can see the documented slaughtering of anyone that was perceived as a member of boko oram Lastly the ansaru faction has emerged they emerged With by kidnapping in kebi state later Attempt to save them by british and nigerian troops led to the killing of the two the key Evidence for the international connections for me came in the Kidnapping of the german engineer in january 2009 Where the video that appeared was an al qaeda in moritania and the videos In al qaeda in moritania. We're calling for a prisoner swap with someone in germany So you have someone in kano moritania and germany being involved here And by chance the nigerian security forces Rated the home Which they believed was boko oram, but it was ansaru, which is a splinter group and the german was killed But it shows the sophistication of ansaru. So ansaru is perceived from interviews as uh in a A much more international perspective widespread use of arabic Linked to al qaeda in the maghreb in a more direct way with trainings in mali and calling for Reduction and indiscriminate violence by the chicow faction. There's also Beliefs by security forces Western security that they've been assassinating each other So at this point the movement is Fragmented, but i would say endemic and deeply rooted in Nigerian cities as cells But certainly the majority of nigerians Northern nigerians are not supporting them But there's a Series of concentric circles if you wish with a large number of people that favor sharia and a large number of people that have grievances against the by the Abuses inflicted upon them by nigerian security forces So i'll stop and we can follow up more with q and a thank you very much Thank you paul and all of you in fact and time is very much up against us, but i want to give The floor open to some questions and let's start with the two gentlemen over there And the table and just behind Good afternoon, i'd like to i'm mr. Lloyd from Baltimore. I'd like to address my question to Dr. Lubeck You talk extensively about sharia law just how Qualified are sharia lawyers in the northern part of Nigeria and are they Members of the nigerian bar where they can Use sharia law in the northern part of Nigeria And number two if the purpose of this islamic movements is to create A peaceful society co-existent with north and south Nigeria Are they really law abiding people or they're trying to make Issues of their own so that they can make a war of their own as well And my next question is Is the Julian military really capable Of crawling the problems up in the north. Thank you Yes before this Meeting starts. I was in Bethesda, Maryland. I was watching live one internet then when Jennifer said like the other panel was not here. I just let me make my way there Then I made it here So originally I'm from Ethiopia. So my question will be focusing on Dr. Ostebo So he's From historical background Ethiopia was the first country even the islam rich's madina from Makkah Prophet Muhammad sent his messengers to Ethiopia to the abyssinian king with a message about In the verse of the Quran Mary and Jesus then The king led them to practice their religion as they want and they are they were served And then the other main point here why Ethiopia is important to Islam and Ethiopia are inseparable and the christianity as well. So Ethiopia is the second largest black African like when it comes islam after Nigeria the the number Even though the government constitutes the number is like 35 31 person They are not good in statistics our government. So They are like 50 50 the christian population is a muslim population These two great religion lived side by side 1400 years without any, you know bullet So now as you mentioned the ahbash is imported from Lebanon His originality was born in Ethiopia then kicked out from every country it reached it just it got to Lebanon and then it becomes Hafiz al-Assad and Bashar al-Assad's regimes promoting this religion now When you mentioned like the Ethiopian government muslim population in christian population is deteriorated I think that's I found it. It's wrong. That's the historical high time between the relationship between muslims and christians They are working together because this government came from one ethnic background And it wants like the muslim leaders has to come from that. Sorry to interrupt. Do you have a question? Do you have a question to us? Yes, I do have a question Oh, you don't have a question. Okay. Well, I do have a question. Okay, please. So Dr. Rostebo, you should advise us what the western government should advise The Ethiopian government before these 40 million People become radical and dangerous for the region. Okay. Thank you. Thank you very much Given the the time constraints anyone have a question on Mali so we can spread the questions are out for our Participants, okay. Let's go with the gentleman in the corner there My name My name is christian. Malanga I'm a new politician from the Congo raising Utah in Salt Lake City my concern is I heard like what the gentleman other than state about the extremists And we have a country which we call the democratic public of Congo Which we know the wealth of that country and what it's capable of doing We have people like the extremist like Asbolla that's the second To al-Qaeda in taking american lives which operating out there. We have a regime that is unpredictable okay, and My concern my question was, you know, looking at the climate right now in the Congo We have a lot of minerals out there. That's we're seeing people from Mali What in there extremists we're seeing people are coming there to buy from libya and Naming all this thing we just said right now. I did not hear anything about that You know, if is it possible you guys can start like a research On the Congo because you know, we don't want as I said, we don't want the smoking gun to be the mushroom cloud Because looking at that, we've seen what kong was capable of doing 1945 when it comes in Hiroshima Okay, and now we're seeing North Korea threatening my hosting country. That's america Okay, that's really concerned me the most and when we have a regime that cannot protect its borders Okay, it encourages and corruptions So to me, I feel more like it's a safe haven You know, it's not safe for my kids who are here and it's not safe for any other friends of Any friends of democracy sorry to cut you off again in the interest of time and Not sure if any of our speakers want to address the Congo, but I'll give them the opportunity to do so if they wish Let's let's address those questions on the table and see if we have any time for any more pools Do you want to go first? Yeah, I would be clear that I I'm a militant secularist myself here. I'm opposed to many of the ideas of the minority party In america I'm for freedom of religion and secular law. However in the case of nigeria They've had sharia law since some form of it since 1500 1450 it is Penetrated the house of language completely one of the words for justice is sharia Adilchi is another so it is It is part of everyday life. It is imprinted in how they think about their culture or what their practices are The 19th century movements of the sokhana caliphate and borneau Especially the sokhana caliphate were about the implementation of sharia. The british followed Ruled indirectly had a court system. It functioned The criminal law was taken away in 1960 the so-called compromise of 1960 It would be possible to have a system Of qualified judges is your question in northern nigeria. Yes, it is one of the interesting innovations that nigerian University are dual degrees in sharia law and What would be called common law? There I think the question you have to ask yourself is are the secular Judges that are operating in nigeria also qualified to be fair to the muslims because sharia law Gains traction in the populace because of the abysmal performance of transferred institutions And the judges it comes because of governance failures and a demand to have a system that they at least understand So I think it is possible to have them I don't think in the way it was set up Following here sinusi limito sinusi the central bank A director and his writings on that he has a degree in islamic theology and sharia law from cartoon also And he is for sharia as an ideal But believes it should not have been implemented because the way it was it became political sharia Were the only people who are convinced of crimes Convicted of crimes and punished were poor people and women While the while the elites pilfered the state Built massive houses wrapped in razor wire and cities And generated the resentment that fuels this generational rage that's driving bokeh around The military, uh, is it uh, the military is probably reformable Probably but it resists from talking to western military security people in the audience. I'm sure they can provide the details uh the the security Unilaterally consistently Refuses to recognize any human rights abuses when Uh, it is impossible to talk to people in nigeria and not find human rights abuses You can find them on youtube in great detail Uh, and I believe with the shifting from The national security advisor to the current national security advisor. You're beginning to get true counter insurgency where uh programs for entrepreneurship employment are finally being Brought up again. This is this movement began in 2003 and it's very late to decade later Thank you Thank you for your comments. I I have to disappoint you I'm I'm not in a position to to advise any western governor what they what they should do towards Ethiopia Um, I just want to calm a little bit on on the relationship between christians and muslims and I think it's Um, I think it's far more complicated than just to say that for for 400 hundred years Has been peaceful and tranquil. I think that is um, we have to to kind of keep two perspectives Balanced in the way that yes, you have seen, um Coexistence and peace yet at the same time also periods of intense conflicts. I am arguing that Things have become more fragile. You can see the from bollo to gondar to to jimma to to arsi Over the last 20 years arise in conflicts And I'm also I this is something we need far more research on but um The the clear sense I have is that over the last year The christian populations are becoming more wary about what is going on within the muslims and in the most recent event was The screening of the jihad jihad that we had to cut the documentary Which in fact was banned by the supreme court, but the government screened it nevertheless Which then portrayed the european muslims in particular demonstrators as boku haram as ansar al deen and and and What is clear is that? There are christians buying into that And kind of having a more tense Tense attitudes towards a christian and I think that is that is very worrisome Thank you, um, I'm afraid we're really out of of time and uh, as I'm sorry you've not been able to ask more questions Perhaps you can follow up with our speakers afterwards, but please join me in thanking our panel for a great discussion now We've covered an awful lot of ground This morning jumping from one side of the continent to the other and covering a lot of trends in islam as well And we're going to finish up as we started with peter manderville With the unenviable task of trying to pull some themes together and wrap things up for us This morning. Thanks, peter Thanks, richard. Hi me again So I I will be very brief because you've you've been very patient and bearing with our the rather aggressive pace with which we've worked through a lot of Material although I think you'll agree some incredibly rich And provocative discussions I I have the the task of trying to sort of draw out from amidst this richness some potential implications for policy not just in terms of Things that the u.s. Government might do But things that those who are concerned with are primarily in the business of trying to affect change in the world Be they governments be they non-governmental entities be they educational institutions What what might those of us involved in that kind of work take away from this rich set of discussions I think it's first of all worth noticing noting that a number of our panelists actually made quite specific policy Mech recommendations in the course of their remarks whether it be lin aleward Asking us to explore possibilities for building greater synergy and bridge bridging capacity between philanthropic entities and developmental policies in the international community in the west and counterparts in the muslim world Or paul lubek quite straightforwardly telling us that in his view One clear policy takeaway for dealing with the potential fallout of the dramatic Disjuncture in demographics in north and south nigeria is the need for a focus on the education and empowerment of women In the northern part of that country. I think that teria ostubo did a wonderful job of crystallizing for us A major gap what what I would take to be the major gap in us policy towards the the muslim world right now And that is coming to grips with the very complex phenomenon that is Salafism I think the u.s. Government this administration in particular has developed something of an industry in the realm of muslim engagement Broadly reaching out to the muslim in the street if you will Or trying to uh, it's certainly obviously Continued as the previous administration did to contend with issues relating to Islamic militancy and the tectonic political changes sweeping the middle east in the last few years Has also forced the u.s. Government to come to terms with its policy towards islamist parties of the sort represented by the muslim brotherhood, but I think that the phenomena of salafism And the varying ways in which it interacts with a wide range of broader social and economic issues in a wide range of countries in in africa Is still a space that that sort of needs some attention and where we need to get a better handle and basic understanding Of what this is about In terms of my own Quick list of of policy implications coming out of these comments Of these discussions looking over them. I I have sort of three broad categories and I noticed and it is perhaps testament to our long-time Collaboration and common worldview that they that they exactly mirror the three categories that terence lions Let off with this morning. First of all the idea that islam as a vocabulary or a discourse of social mobilization that Arises in situations in conflicts whose origins perhaps far predate the arrival of islam as an active Factor I think there's a clear policy flip flip side to this Which is to say that the u.s. Government for example when it observes certain forms of what it sees as islamic extremism Or militancy in various sub regions that we've talked about today Tends to recategorize that under the policy frame of ct counterterrorism or cve Countering violent extremism and the u.s. Government has a particular toolkit that it uses for dealing with those kinds of things Namely things that blow up and drones these days And you know we can have and there is going on today a very robust debate about the efficacy of those sorts of tools But I think something that's come out of the conversations We've had today is the idea that you perhaps deal with these things that we're coding as islamic militancy or islamic extremism By attending to the root problems that give rise to them in the first place So how do you deal with some of the things that we've seen in malia and the trans-sahel region? By perhaps paying attention to the legacy of only partly resolved conflicts from years past How do we deal with things going on in northern nigeria by by attending to what paul lubeck has flagged for us as a broader crisis of governance rather than as an isolated incident of islamic Militancy point number two And I think this really arises from the insights that we gained in panel number two Is the idea of religious organizations and religious actors As enormous repositories of social capital in many instances that there's great capacity there That can be brought to bear on all manner of problems in productive ways One idea there is then the need for policy space and policy makers to get more comfortable with the idea of integrating religion into foreign policymaking Religious engagement now the u.s. State Department has been trying to do this in varying ways In recent years, but I think it's still been pursued in a way that tends to ghetto eyes religious engagement as Having an event where you invite religious leaders, and that's religious engagement rather than the more comprehensive and holistic approach that Would proceed by trying to integrate attention to the need to talk to Consult with and engage with religious actors and organizations across all facets of of us diplomacy and outreach Although and I think this was the core insight that I took away from farid sacks quite unique presentation Because what he was I think drawing our attention to is the fallout of the legacy of What some have termed the politics of good muslim bad muslim that has followed the events of 9 11 The idea that if muslims seem to be supportive of pluralism and tolerance in human rights They're good muslims, and they're on our side and we can work with them And those that don't support those things are bad muslims I think what came out quite clearly from farid's comments is the idea that no no no no no hold on It's not that straightforward. There are plenty of muslims in this world who are supportive of tolerance, pluralism, women's rights, gay rights, the rights of all peoples, but yet who are politically opposed to Western policies Which means that engagement with religious actors, engagement with certain kinds of muslim organizations Whose capacities one might want to tap into and leverage towards the attainment of say american development goals Is not necessarily always going to be an easy conversation And finally, and this is the third of of terence's leadoff points this morning Is the idea of islam and africa as a thoroughly global and networked force And what that means is that when one is trying to bring influence to bear In in the region that doesn't necessarily Always involve or doesn't need to involve to today efforts to exert diplomacy engagement or to blow things up in africa itself and less you think i'm about to Encourage us to start going to blow things up elsewhere Really where i'm going with this point is to to to say that when one is seeking to have an impact on The ecology of islamic voices and actors that are present in a given situation There are ways of exerting influence At a point well divorced distance wise from the actual local context that you're trying to affect And this may have something to do with certain kinds of conversations that this country can have with the government of saudi arabia Those of you who follow saudi affairs know that there's a Well developed over the last hundred years set of tensions between the saudi government itself the administrative apparatus of the government and the wahabi religious establishment The wahabi establishment has this instinctive Propagatory Orientation that that it pursues both within the kingdom and outside Whereas the saudi government has a distinct marked preference for stability and security And it's quite possible to have a conversation with that governmental apparatus about the need to in certain cases reign in the excesses of the religious establishment Thinking of more recent events in the sahel and mali I think here we're also dealing with questions that have to be raised about the ways in which the fallout of the tectonic events sweeping egypt, tunisia, and particularly Libya are having effects in countries that Neighbor that region so again the idea that that having an impact on stabilizing Certain portions of northern sub-saharan africa has something to do with Working to anchor and consolidate the complex transitions that are currently sweeping the rest of north africa So I I want to end just again by by thanking my friends and partners at csis jennifer richard and farha for You know the the common vision we have of trying to provide a forum to have a rather different kind of conversation about Islam in africa than one might ordinarily hear in washington dc To thank our panelists some of whom came Quite some some distance to share their unique insights with us and of course to all of you for for for joining us Thank you so much


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Welcome! In this video, we will be introducing 16 CFR Part 1610, the standard for the flammability of clothing textiles. Flammability testing requirements are regulated under the Flammable Fabrics Act, also known as the FFA, and includes standards for clothing textiles, final plastic film used in clothing, children's sleepwear, carpets and rugs, mattresses, mattress pads and mattress sets, and upholstered furniture. The FFA prohibits the manufacturer, sale, distribution, and importation of any product or fabric that fails to conform to the applicable flammability standards. Today, we will be focusing on 16 CFR Part 1610, the standard for the flammability of clothing textiles. 16 CFR Part 1610 is commonly referred to as the general wearing apparel standard. The purpose of the standard is to keep the most dangerously flammable textile products out of the marketplace. This standard applies to all wearing apparel, except the following items listed under section 1610.1c. Hats that do not cover the neck, face, or shoulders. Gloves that are 14 inches or shorter and are not attached to a garment. Footwear that does not consist in a hole or in part of hosiery and is not attached to a garment. And inner lining fabrics when they are intended or sold for use as a layer between an outer shell and an inner lining. Additionally, children's sleepwear garments that do not meet the definitions of either infant garments or tight-fitting garments are subject to 16 CFR Part 1615 or 1616. The criteria to be defined as an infant garment or tight-fitting garment are based on sizing and measurement guidelines. See section 1615.1 or 1616.2 for more info. Fabrics that meet a specific exemption from the standard do not require testing. For the first exemption, plain surface fabrics weighing 2.6 ounces per square yard or more do not need to be tested regardless of fiber content. Weighing the fabric does not need to be conducted by lab and you can measure the weight yourself or check to see if this info is provided on the fabric roll you are using to construct the garment. For the second exemption, plain and raised surface fabrics made entirely of acrylic, mod-acrylic, nylon, olefin, polyester, wool, or a combination of these fibers regardless of weight are exempt from testing. Fabrics that contain any other fibers other than the six specified would not meet this exemption. Reminder, the first exemption could potentially apply to textiles with any combination of fiber content if they are plain surface and meet their weight requirement. Also, please note that regardless of fiber content, there are any chemical coatings placed onto the fabric and the fabric may no longer be exempt from testing due to the risk of finishes and coatings altering the flammability characteristics of the fabric. Coatings can include resins, plastics, melamine, or oil finishes and can change the way the fabric burns. It's important for manufacturers and importers to check the coatings applied to their textiles to ensure compliance with the standard. To help determine whether your fabrics meet a specific exemption, you should identify the fabric type, weight, and specifications including whether the fabric is plain surface or raised surface. A plain surface fabric is any textile fabric that does not have an intentionally raised fiber or yarn surface, such as pile, nap, or tuft. Whether the product has an intentionally raised surface is determined by the manufacturing process. For example, if the manufacturing process involves brushing the fabrics, then it is likely considered a raised surface fabric. Examples of plain surface fabrics typically include Oxford, Chambray, Searsucker, Jersey Cotton, and Spandex. Please note that these are common examples of plain surface fabrics. However, the manufacturing process determines whether it is a plain or raised surface fabric, so these fabrics may not always be considered plain surface. Some natural fibers, like wool, can be considered a plain surface fabric if they do not go through an additional process. A raised surface fabric is any textile fabric that has an intentionally raised fiber or yarn surface, such as a pile, nap, or tuft. Examples of raised surface fabrics typically include terrycloth, fleece, velvet, chenille, corduroy, velour, plush polyester, and flannel. Flannel and micro polyester are the most common raised surface fabrics. An example of a manufacturing process that intentionally raises the fibers would be the fabric going through an agitator that cuts and brushes the fibers on the top surface. As you've learned, the classification as a plain surface or raised surface fabric depends on the manufacturing process. If you are unsure of whether your fabric is plain surface or raised surface, please feel free to reach out to the CPSC's Small Business Ombudsman team for help. Narrow fabrics and loose fibrous materials manufactured less than 2 inches in width in either direction shall not be tested. This includes certain neck ties, bow ties, and belts. If a 2 by 6 inch specimen cannot be cut due to the nature of the item, do not conduct a test. This includes items like hula skirts and fringe. Only uncovered or exposed parts of wearing apparel shall be tested under the standard. An uncovered or exposed part is defined as a part of wearing apparel that might be opened to flame or other means of ignition during normal wear. The outer surface of an undergarment is considered to be uncovered or exposed. Examples of uncovered or exposed parts of wearing apparel include linings with exposed areas such as full front zipper jackets, sweatshirts with exposed raised fiber surfaces on the inside and capable of being worn, napped side out, unlined hoods, and rolled cuffs. For garments with exposed linings like these jackets, both the exposed inside lining and outside fabric need to be tested, unless they meet an exemption. Please note that the exemptions do not apply if only the outside fabric meets an exemption. For example, if you have a plain surface fabric that meets an exemption on the outside, but you have an exposed raised surface fabric lining that does not meet an exemption, then you will need to test the exposed lining. Raise surface fabrics can catch fire more quickly than plain surface fabrics. The inner fabric on garments that are intended or advertised to be reversible are considered exposed parts and must be tested on one or both sides of the garment if it does not meet a specific exemption. This also applies to any fabrics that are intended or advertised with rolled cuffs. Part 1610 specifies testing procedures to determine the flammability of textiles used in apparel as one of three classes of flammability. Two by six inch specimens must be tested to determine the class and hazard rating. Class 1 textiles are plain surface and raised surface fabrics that exhibit normal flammability and are acceptable for use in wearing apparel. Class 2 textiles are raised surface fabrics that exhibit intermediate flammability and should be used with caution for wearing apparel. This class is not applicable to plain surface fabrics. Class 3 textiles are plain surface and raised surface fabrics that are dangerously flammable and cannot be used in wearing apparel. There are additional requirements based on whether the garments are intended for adults or children. Adult wearing apparel does not need to be tested at a third party CPSC accepted lab. Adult wearing apparel is required to have a general certificate of conformity, also known as a GCC. Manufacturers and importers of general use products for which consumer product safety roles apply, such as adult wearing apparel, must certify an written GCC based on testing or reasonable testing program that the products comply with 16 CFR Part 1610. The commission issued enforcement discretion guidance related to adult apparel and GCCs. The CPSC will not pursue compliance or enforcement actions against firms that fail to issue a GCC for adult wearing apparel that is exempt from testing pursuant to section 1610.1D. Adults in general use wearing apparel that is tested will need to have a GCC. Children's wearing apparel that is subject to Part 1610 includes general wearing apparel and children's sleepwear that meets the definition of infant garment or tight fitting, as described in 16 CFR Parts 1615 or 1616. Testing that needs to be conducted on children's wearing apparel must be performed at a CPSC accepted laboratory. You can find the lab at cpsc.gov slash labsearch. However, if you are a qualifying small batch manufacturer, you may be eligible for third-party testing relief. Part 1610 falls under Group B requirements, which means that you may be able to certify compliance in alternate ways beyond third-party testing your product at a CPSC accepted lab. Such alternatives include first-party testing, which is performed in-house by the domestic manufacturer or importer, testing by a non-CPSC accepted lab, or by receiving a written assurance of compliance from your producer or supplier. You can find out more information about whether you qualify as a small batch manufacturer and how to register at cpsc.gov slash small batch. Once manufacturers and importers of children's wearing apparel have received any applicable passing test results for their products and gathered any additional compliance documentation, they must issue a children's product certificate, also known as a CPC. To learn about how to create a CPC, please watch CPSC's three-part education series for CPCs by visiting CPSC's business education playlist at youtube.com slash USCPSC. Although not part of the requirements for Part 1610, there are other common requirements that may apply to children's wearing apparel. Children's products and their packaging are required to have tracking labels. The tracking label is a distinguishing permanent mark that is affixed to the product and its packaging to the extent practicable and provides certain identifying information that is ascertainable, including the manufacturer, importer, and or private labeler, date and location of production, and batch code or cohort information that helps identify the specific source of the product. To learn more about the tracking label requirement, please watch CPSC's tracking label requirement video by visiting CPSC's business education playlist at youtube.com slash USCPSC. Children's products are also subject to the total lead content requirements of 15 USC section 1278A. Generally, all accessible components of a children's product must be tested to demonstrate compliance with the lead content limit of 100 parts per million. If the products have any metal or plastic components such as buttons, snaps, or zippers, they likely will need to be tested for total lead content at a third-party CPSC-accepted lab. However, please note the commission issued a series of lead testing determinations under 16 CFR section 1500.91 for certain materials, including dyed and undyed textiles that are not treated or adulterated. For more information, visit cpsc.gov slash lead. If the children's clothing contains any painted component parts, then lead and paint requirements under 16 CFR part 1303 apply. Such articles must not contain a concentration of lead greater than 90 parts per million in paint or any similar surface coatings and must always be tested at a third-party CPSC-accepted lab. Additionally, if there are any screen printing inks used on the garments, then they may need to be tested to either the total lead content or lead and paint requirements. The applicability of the tests depend on the types of inks used and the process for applying the inks. For more information, please visit cpsc.gov slash lead and paint. Congress permanently banned children's toys and childcare articles that facilitate sleeping, feeding, sucking, or teething in children ages three and younger that contain eight specified phthalates and amounts greater than 0.1%. Phthalates are chemicals used in plastics and plasticized components, such as buttons, snaps, or zippers. A common example of a garment subject to both the requirements of part 1610 and the phthalates rule are children's bibs. For more information, visit cpsc.gov slash phthalates. If you're new to product safety or need help, CPSC's Regulatory Robot is an online tool that will walk you through a series of questions to discover the likely applicable requirements in place for your consumer product. You can access the regulatory robot at business.cpsc.gov. We also recommend that you check out product safety recalls at cpsc.gov slash recalls. We hope you learned a lot about flammability requirements for clothing textiles in this overview of 16 CFR Part 1610. If you have any questions about wearing apparel requirements or any other requirements involving your consumer products, please contact the small business ombudsman by visiting cpsc.gov slash smallbiz. Submitting an inquiry through our contact form at cpsc.gov slash sbo-contact, calling toll-free at<PHONE_NUMBER> or emailing us at sbo-cpsc.gov. Thanks for watching!


You are lost in a London fog, uncertain whether the figures looming around you are real, or creatures of your imagination, and somewhere in the wet greyness lurks a murderer, from whom you must escape. Escape, produced and directed by William N. Robson, and carefully contrived to free you from the four walls of today for a half hour of high adventure. Tonight we escape to a fog-shrouded city, and the terror of a shell-shocked mind, as Algernon Blackwood describes them in his ghostly story, Confession. There was no doubt about it. The woman was dead. Her cheek was cold to my touch. The head of the long sharp hat pen protruded from her breast above the heart. She was dead. Murdered. And I stood there by the bed, my brain whirling crazily. I was alone in an empty house, with a murdered woman. And then suddenly fear flashed across my brain and cleared it. I heard the door below open and close. Footsteps. Someone was coming across the downstairs hall, onto the stairs. Coming up. Up here. In a moment I would be discovered. In a moment someone would walk into this room and see me standing over the body. In a moment my escape would be cut off. Quickly I slipped across the hall and into another of the empty bedrooms. I leaned against the closed door, breathing heavily. Listening to those steps come closer. Would he look into any of the other bedrooms first? Would I be discovered here? He passed my door and went into the room, straight in, close the door behind him. Then he knew where to come. I waited a moment, waited for some sound, some gas, but discovery. There was none. Then he knew what to expect. I must escape quickly before he came out of that room. I started down the stairs, carefully, to avoid any sound. And suddenly the door of that room opened. The beam of a flashlight set down the hall. I took the stairs three at a time, burst open the front door, and fled into the street, fled into the sanctuary of the fog. How long and how far I ran I do not know. I could see nothing, feel nothing but the clammy dampness of the fog. I don't know whether he was still following me or not. I ran out of sheer terror, up one street, down another, with no idea of where I was or where I was going. Perhaps I was running in circles. Perhaps I would run right back to the house. Well, I stopped. I leaned heavily against the wall. My hands were shaking as I raised them to my perspiring face. I held them there to steady them, ran them through my wet hair. My hat. I didn't have it. I'd left my hat back there in that room, on the bed beside that dead woman. And it had my initials in it. Nearby a street lamp formed a fuzzy ball of yellow in the enveloping murk. And now a figure loomed suddenly beneath it, just as she had materialized so short a time ago under another streetlight. Or was it the same one? Was it she again? Was it he, the one who was following me? Was it real at all? Perhaps it was only a creature of my madness. My dear sir, you're ill. Hi. Oh, hero, let me help you. Why, you're almost ready to fall. Yes, sir. Thank you. Yeah, just lean on my arm. Yes.  Well, I don't understand.  Luckily, too, you're just outside my very house. Come in for a moment, won't you? Why, you're very kind. Yes, I will if it's not too much trouble for you. None at all, my dear chap, please do. Within five minutes I was seated in a comfortable chair before a toasting fire, sipping a hot cup of tea. I could feel my nerves relaxing, but the traces of my illness must have been clear on my face, and the host observed your problem is shell shock, isn't it? Why, yes, how did you know? I'd been in the service, and I'm a doctor. Of course, I only meant I'm supposed to be recovered, or almost. But I got lost in the fog, felt ill suddenly. Terrified, you know? I know. You should never have been out in the night like this.  You're very kind, very kind indeed, but I don't want to be in any trouble. No trouble at all. I'd like to be of help. The least we veterans can do for each other. Ah, the blasted war. Thank goodness it's over. Not English, are you? No, Canadian. I haven't been demobilized yet. I'm still in the Army Hospital at Regent's Park under the care of Dr. Henry. Ah, yes, yes. Very good, man. I'd say he's done well by you, up till tonight, I mean. Yes, of course we had no idea there would be a fog. I still get in a panic when I feel all alone. Well, that's usual, but then there was something more than that tonight, wasn't there? What do you mean? Simply that you've had rather severe shock quite recently, haven't you? How did you know that? My dear chap, I'm a doctor. My business to know. You were in much too agitated a state when I found you, for me to suppose it could have been done simply by the fog. And if I may hazard another guess, I should say it would be a relief to you and wise as well if you could unburden yourself to someone who would understand. Am I not right? Someone who would understand. That's just it. I doubt if there is anyone like that. It's so incredible. The more incredible, the greater your need to tell it. Repression in cases like yours can be dangerous, as you must know. You think you've hidden it, but it bides its time and it comes up later causing a lot of trouble. Confession, you know. Confession is good for the soul. Yes, I suppose you are right, but it is so wildly unbelievable since where strangers, my belief or disbelief can make no difference. And I think I can promise you in advance that I shall believe all you have to say. Well, I've got to tell somebody about it soon anyway. Cigarette to help with telling? Thank you. Thank you. Well, I'd better start back at the very beginning of the adventure then. It started today at the sanitarium. I've been there for some months and today when Dr. Henry called to check on me, I knew it was coming. Well, young man, you're as fit as a prize here for a twice as frisky. The diet here must agree with you. I have no complaints, doctor, but if I'm well again, then I'd like to get back into circulation. Will you listen to him, nurse, rushing things as usual? You'd think he didn't like us here. The way he bothers us to let him go into town, I'm sure of it, doctor. He's getting so healthy he's bursting at the scene. There you see. How about it, doctor? Can't I just have a day or an evening in town? What's the great attraction in that dirty place? Some girl, no doubt? Well, yes, that isn't a way. I met her in France. She's a Red Cross girl. She's invited me to stop in for tea if I'm up in London. Well, it's just that I'd feel human again seeing a girl having tea, a cigarette, chatting. That's all. Young man, I not only approve of your day in town, I'm prescribing it. It'll do you good. You've got to start getting used to society again anyway. And you think I can manage it alone? Why not? You get around the neighborhood by yourself well enough, don't you? There's nothing so very different about London. Certainly nothing to be afraid of. No, of course not. Call the young lady and find out the directions, where to get off the underground, what turns to taken so on. Go in the daytime, return before dark. No danger of getting lost. It should be simple. Nothing to it. Do you good? Then this means I'm getting better. I'll be able to go home soon. There you go. Rushing things again. But yes, I think perhaps we're on the last leg. That'll be all, nurse. Yes, Dr. Henry. Now, tell me young man, what about your friends? No, doctor. I think they've deserted me. I don't see them anymore. No more ghosts. No more dead comrades stopping in for a chat. Good. For how long now? Oh, several weeks at least. I can hardly remember when I last saw one. Thought you saw. Yes, thought. Of course, in the dark room at night, sometimes the shadows... That's not quite the same thing. Lots of wild people fancy they see the shadows move at night. Especially after they've been reading some penny drift. Yes, I suppose so. At any rate, you can distinguish between the real people and the unreal now. And that's a big step considering how you were a few months ago. Well, it's only when I feel completely alone, cut off that the old panic begins a little, but not as much as before. Many people don't like to feel alone and cut off, but they can fight down that panicky feeling, nip it in the bud. So will you in time. But I must warn you, a severe shock could undo all our work. By all means, avoid shock. Avoid shock, he said. Very funny, isn't it? But who could have known then what would happen? How could I have suspected as I went about planning my day in town, my holiday? I called the girl, arranged our tea party. I was to be at her little house in Morley Place at four. Wood's instinct should probably manage it better than any Londoner. Yes, I'm sure I will. It's near South Kensington Station, then. Exactly. You'd change at Piccadilly Circus without leaving the underground station and come to South Kent. That's three streets left from there, then two right, one more left, and right again into Morley Place. It's really not far. Oh, I'll find it all right. Now, don't go to any great bother. Oh, you just leave that to me. This is a special occasion, you know. Till four, then. Thanks. And so it all started out as a cheerful adventure, and everything went well into the city. I made my change underground at Piccadilly, took the local to South Kensington Station, and there I came up at surface again. And when I walked out, I stepped into a solid, opaque blanket of white fog. I could hear the traffic, the rumble of the city around me. I could hear footsteps, an occasional muffled voice, but I could see almost nothing. This is how a blind man feels, then. The only objects of relief from that dreadful enveloping grey wall were an occasional blur of yellow from a street lamp, or a motor car headlight, a glimmering patch from some big-lighted shop window here and there, and the figures, the figures of other people passing by, dark and floating and indistinct. Or were they people? Might they not be those phantom figures again, just like the ones that haunted me before I went into the sanitarium? Ghostly blurred figures of dead comrades from Dunkirk and Abbeyville and the mud of Belgium. Here comes another one. I can hear his cane tapping. Look closely now, make sure. He looked real enough, didn't he? They are real, I'm positive of it, and I'm not alone. They're all around me. But even as I told myself this, the old panic was growing inside. Here now, old fellow, you've got to get hold of yourself. Next one comes along, speak up. Speak up to him, ask him the way to Molly Place. Ask, can you put me on the trail to Molly Place? Just like that. You'll see. Here now, here he comes. Ask away. Big pardon, can you put me on... I say, is this right to the tube station, you know? I'm utterly lost. I want South Kingdon. Why, yes, I have just come from there straight along, I think. Oh, thanks awfully. But I say, can you put me on the trail to Molly Place? He's gone. Well, no matter he was real enough, he spoke up like a real person, all right? Maybe the next... Oh, I say, I beg your pardon. Oh, I am frightfully sorry. I didn't see you and you standing still. I'm afraid I must be lost. Can you direct me to Molly, please? Oh, dear, I think you've missed your turning. You'll have to double back straight and maybe two and take the first turn to the right and go one street and then double back two and then left again on your turn. I say thanks. That was first right and then... She's gone. Disappeared. Like a ghost. The panic was rising in me. They were real people, yes, but they appeared and disappeared so disconcertingly quickly. And when I turned off down the main street, there were fewer of them, I turned again. And again. But I couldn't remember the directions. Suddenly, I knew I was lost. And now I was in some little backwater where passes by were rare, where no one came, where I was alone. Now the panic swept over me. I stumbled on a curb, my cane swept empty air. I felt the icy pavement. I was shaking so that I couldn't rise to my feet. I crawled across the open space of the street on my hands and knees. Only when I crossed the curb and felt a warm wall could I stand up again. And then I stood there, shaken and frantic. Molly Place must be very close, a little Red Cross girl waiting with her warm fire and hot tea. But where? Where? Suddenly in the yellow blur of a nearest streetlamp of faint darkening of the fog caught my eye. It was not a figure this time. Only the shadow of the pole grotesquely magnified. No. No, it moved. It came toward me. It was a figure, a woman. It came right up to me. Fear gripped me and then I remembered the doctor's advice. Don't ignore them. You must real speak to them and go with them.  And so I gripped the wall behind me and spoke to her.  Do you know where we are at all? Molly Place, I'm looking for. Where am I? I say you're more frightened than I am. May I help you? I'm lost. I've lost myself. I can't find my way back. Same here. I'm terrified of being alone too. I've had shell shock, you know. Let's go together. We'll find our way together, eh? Who are you? Name's O'Reilly. Canadian. I'm going to have tea with a friend in Molly Place. What's your address? Do you know the name of the street here? I came out suddenly. Unexpectedly. I can't find my way home again. Just when I was expecting him to. I say steady, ma'am. He may be there now. Waiting for me this very moment. And I can't get back. Any idea of the direction, ma'am, any at all? We'll go together. Listen. I hear him calling. I remember. Wait, ma'am. Wait. Don't leave me here alone. I'm going with you. Wait! She was running fast through the fog. It was all I could do to keep up with her. But I thought I must not lose her or my own nerves will go to pieces. How she found her way in the fog, running so quickly, I didn't know, but I kept close on my heels, running hard. I could smell a faint perfume in the air trailing behind her. A faintly familiar odor, but not pleasant. And then suddenly she stopped and turned into the gate. So suddenly that I almost bumped into her. Oh, is this in? You found it in. May I come in with you for a moment? Perhaps you'll let me telephone my doctor. Doctor? Yes, Dr. Henry at the Army Hospital. I'm in his care, you know. I must get back in time. For him, I must. He's coming to me. I say, ma'am. But she turned and walked out of the house. For a moment I hesitated. This woman was acting very strangely. But no matter if she was at least real and I needed help, quickly I followed her up the steps across the porch. The door was ajar. She slipped through and I followed him to the dark house. It was so dark inside I couldn't see anything at first. I stopped, groping. But she went on quickly easily as if she knew the way. She was ignoring me completely. I heard her steps across the hall. Go up the stairs quickly. I waited and listened. She walked along the hall upstairs. And now the hair on my neck felt as if it were rising. Was she, after all, another of my figures? Was she unreal too? I heard her open the door upstairs. Go in and close it after her. Then there was silence. Profound silence. And I was alone in the dark unoccupied house. The white covered furniture in the hallway loomed like ghosts. And there was no sound. I felt my panic coming back. But she was upstairs. And at least she was companionship. I groped my way up the stairs. Along the upstairs hall. There was no sign of life. Where are you? I want to help you. Which room are you in? There was no answer. But as I put my hand on a table to steady myself, I felt something. It was a candle stump. With a gasp of relief I took it up and lighted it. I could see a little. One by one I tried the bedrooms. They were dusty and unused. The furniture covered the mattresses rolled up on the beds. They were all alike. Until I opened the last door. Instantly I knew this was it. I smelled the perfume. Only now I recognized it understood why it was unpleasant to me. It was the smell of a hospital of chloroform. And there was the woman. Her dark fur coat wrapped around her. Her jewels just showing at the neck. And she was stretched out on the bed motionless. Instantly I knew she was dead. In the next instant I thought I would go mad. The blood on her face was congealing. Her skin was cold. I knew then that she'd been dead for an hour at least. And that what I saw in the street was not real. This was the shock that Dr. Henry had warned me to avoid. And what happened then? I heard the door open up downstairs. Someone came in. The one she'd been expecting no doubt. And suddenly I realized the danger of my being found there beside a woman who had obviously been murdered. I slipped into another bedroom and when he went into that room with her I slipped out and crept downstairs. I stumbled and he heard me and I came out. I ran down and out into the fog into the street and away. How long I ran or where I don't know. When I was exhausted I stopped. And then you came and found me. Well, what do you think? Tall tale, isn't it? Yes. Strange but not incredible. I see no reason to disbelieve anything you've told me.  I know from personal experience. Oh, I could give you many instances. But the woman I saw her and yet she was already dead. Such things are hard to explain. Perhaps cannot be explained except of course your mind in its present state may still play tricks on you. Perhaps you saw a woman in the fog and followed her. You may have missed her and only thought you saw her go into that house. But what about the dead woman? She was real enough. Perhaps, perhaps not. She too may have been just fantasy. You may never have left the street. No. No, I'm sure of that at least. I must believe it. She was real and the man who came up the stairs was real. If I didn't believe that I think I should go mad. Yes, perhaps that is important. Then let me see. Have you any proof of what you saw? Something perhaps that you carried away with you? None. But wait. I left something there. My hat. I left it on the bed beside her body. My initials were in it. And so if it was all real I shall be getting a visit from the police one day soon. Perhaps. And then I'll know. And I'll be charged with murder. I don't think so. You think the police would believe this fantastic story? As I told you, many strange things happen in a city like this. For instance, I knew of a similar case many years ago. Strangely similar case. Almost a coincidence. Would you like to hear it? Yes, I suppose so. It happened during the last war. A colleague of mine, a surgeon now dead, married a charming girl, young and beautiful. He was wealthy and they lived comfortably for many years. They seemed happy together. Then came the war and he went overseas. His income was stopped, of course. The big house closed. His wife found life not so pleasant as before. And somehow she blamed her new hardships on him. You see, she was devoid of imagination, without any power for sacrifice. But she was still young and beautiful. The inevitable young man came along to console her. He was rich. He planned to go off somewhere. Only by chance the husband came back from overseas suddenly. Just in the nick of time. Well, he should have let her go. He was well rid of her, I'd say. Well rid of her, yes. Only he decided to make the riddance final.  You see, he loved her. He planned the time and place carefully. They met he knew in the big house, now closed. He waited for them there. The plan failed, however, in one important detail. She came at the appointed time, but without her lover. She found death waiting for her. Completely painless death. The lover did not come. The door being left open for him. The house was deserted and it was a foggy night, like tonight. But he did not come. Instead, a stranger came. I... And where was the surgeon, all this time? Waiting outside. He concealed in the fog.  But the man was a stranger. He came in by chance, like you, to shelter from the fog. I think that I should... Why? What is the matter, sir? I really must be going. Of course, if you wish. Thank you for your kindness and hospitality. It's been a pleasure, young man. I enjoyed your story. Although I confess, I expected one little different. Your coat. Thank you. I'll walk with you to the door and give you the directions. Ah, you're in luck. I think the fog's lifting a bit. Doctor, may I ask... Your friend, the surgeon. Was he ever caught? Ah, that's the part of the story I don't know. He was clever enough so that I doubted it. Unless he told somebody, made a confession. I see. And even so, unless that other person had some proof. Oh, by the way, you can't walk about in the fog without a hat. Here, it's an extra one of mine. You needn't trouble to return it. Thank you. Thank you very much. I went out of his consulting room with a hat on my head. In ten minutes, I was at the tube station. It was only there that I permitted myself to take off the hat and look at it. It was my own. The hat I had left on the bed beside the dead woman. Escape is produced and directed by William N. Robson. And tonight brought you Confession by Algernon Blackwood adapted for radio by John Dunkel. With Bill Conrad as O'Reilly, Ramsey Hill as the Doctor and Peggy Weber as the Woman in the Fog. Music was conceived and conducted by Cy Fuhr. Next week... You are trapped in the dark maze of the native quarter of Mozambique.  And beside you is a girl with whom you must escape. Next week, we escape with Percival Gibbons' fast-moving adventure Second Class Passenger. Good night, then, until this same time next week when again we offer you... Escape! This is CBS, the Columbia Broadcasting System.