A question for Occupy Wall Street. What is Government? Adapted from the State by Frederick Bastiat. Someone should offer a prize for a simple and accurate definition of the word Government. It would be a great service to society. What exactly is the Government? What is it capable of doing? What should it do? All we know for sure is that it is a mysterious entity that is expected to fix the problems in society. It must be the most solicited, tormented, overwhelmed, admired, accused and provoked of any entity in the world. But who should the Government listen to? The left wants one thing, the right wants another. The country is in a mess and the Government does not know who to listen to or where to turn. A hundred thousand protesters cry out all at once, protect the labour unions, end the tyranny of capital, perform experiments in space and advance medical knowledge, repair and expand the infrastructure, educate the youth, care for the elderly, lend money without interest to anyone who wants to borrow, free oppressed people, encourage the arts and provide musicians, painters and architects, control the borders and at the same time send troops everywhere in the world. The country has again and again changed administrations because they have each failed to satisfy our demands. Perhaps this is because our demands from the Government are contradictory. I know this is an outrageous proposition but if I am proven wrong I will gladly retract it. I would be pleased if someone had really discovered an inexhaustible entity calling itself the Government which has bread for all mouths, work for all hands, credit for all ventures, medicine for all sufferings, advice for all problems, courage for all doubts, truth for all minds. An entity which can provide for all of our needs, satisfy our curiosity, correct our errors, repair our faults and exempt us from the need to exercise prudence, judgement, organisation, frugality, self-control and diligence. How could I possibly not desire to see such a discovery made? The more I think about it the more I see that nothing could be more desirable. This is why I would like to see it simply and accurately defined, perhaps by offering a prize to the first discoverer of such a marvellous entity. Clearly no one has yet discovered it since each party keeps being overturned by the people precisely because it has not fulfilled our contradictory demands. There is an inclination which exists in all of us to divide our lives into two parts, throwing the trouble onto others and keeping the benefits for ourselves. Of course this is the motivation of slavery and theft, however they manifest themselves. We recognise slavery and theft is wrong if they are presented nakedly as such, but the political solution of having one group pay for the needs of another group is consistent with the idea that gave birth to the evils of slavery and theft. Nowadays the oppressor no longer acts directly and with his own hands against the victim, our conscience has become too sensitive for that. The oppressor and his victim are still present, but there is a middleman between them, which is the government, the law itself. What better way to silence our conscience? We each apply to the government for help. Look how much I have to work and yet how little I have. In order to fix this imbalance I would like to take a part of the possessions of others but only so much as I need and only from those much more fortunate than I am. But since stealing is dangerous, can you help me with this? Can't you get me a decent place to live?  I'm a student, can't you lend me money at zero percent interest? Can't you guarantee my retirement? Can't you guarantee that my medical bills will all be paid? With the help of government, I can achieve what I want with a clear conscience since it has all been done legally. I will have all the advantages of theft without the risk or shame. It is supposed to be only the destitute who receive help and only the wealthy who are asked to give help. It is impossible to feel anger towards an oppressor who is destitute or sympathy for a victim that is wealthy. It isn't the cause of all this unrest, the very fact that the government is really acting in the interests of the wealthy, by driving up the debt and causing inflation even as social programs are cut. Until I can find another definition of the word government, I'm going to give it my own definition. Maybe it will win the prize, here it is. Government is the great fiction by which everyone attempts to live at the expense of everyone else. It has always been the case that everyone is more or less profiting from the work done by others but today no one would dare say such a thing, we even hide this truth from ourselves. Every lobby, every pressure group, every racial or other minority group is always applying to the government. They say, you can take from the public legally and honestly, so take on our behalf and then spend the money in our district and by our products. The government is perfectly happy to follow this diabolical advice because the government is composed of administrators and elected officials who are also human beings. Like anyone else, government employees are tempted by the opportunity to increase their own wealth and influence. The government is quick to perceive the advantages it derives from the duties that the public entrust to it. The government will happily take as much as it can so that a large share will remain for itself and it will not stop until it has consumed a disastrous portion of the public's productive energy. Our contradictory requests place the government in a dilemma. If it refuses to grant our requests, it is accused of weakness, ill-will and incapacity. If it tries to grant them, it is obliged to load us with new taxes, new debt and to print more money. It ends up doing more harm than good and this results in even more public disapproval and unrest. Each election cycle, we throw the bums out, only to see them replaced by new faces that disappoint us yet again. Once they take power, the new politicians are just as unable to meet our demands as the ones we just voted out. They soon find that it is much easier to make promises than to keep them. They try to keep their promise to increase student loan subsidies to appease the youth vote. They try to keep their promise to cut taxes on low-income workers to appease the labour vote. But the contradiction is constantly confronting them. If they expand social programs, they must attend to the budget through taxes, debt or inflation. If they hold down taxes, debt and inflation, they must abstain from expanding social programs. Finally, the public will lose all patience with the government. At this point, what can the government do? It will take bold and decisive measures. It will unite all its forces in order to maintain itself. It will smother opinion, resort to arbitrary measures, ridicule its former policies and declare that it is impossible to do the right thing except at the risk of being unpopular. In short, it proclaims itself governmental. And it is here that other candidates for popularity are waiting for it. They promise the same allusion to the public, achieve the same power, fail to achieve the same success and soon meet the same end. It is not enough to make signs and issue demands to the government.  Instead, we need to truly absorb the meaning of the phrase, we are the 99%. For every 99 of us, there is just one crook or crony in big business and the corrupt halls of government power. We are the 99% means that things only got this bad because we let it get this bad. We are the 99% means we need to take responsibility for this mess and change our minds about what we will allow the government and its big business cronies and lobbyists to get away with. No more printing money without our permission. No more public debt without our say-so. No new taxes that we didn't approve. No more wars without our permission. No more bailouts without our approval. No new benefits or programs that we didn't ask for until you figure out how to pay for it within the budget we've already given you. The government is supposed to serve the people, not the other way round. This time we remind the 1% who's boss.


Hello and welcome to the session Oscillator, I am Mrs. Vaidya Higulkarni. Learning outcomes are at the end of session students will be able to explain the requirements of oscillations and they will be able to list out the types and applications of oscillator circuit. Contains are like this, before moving towards the definition of oscillator just recall what is mean by oscillations. Yes, it is an effect that repeatedly and regularly fluctuates about its fixed value or mean value. The circuit which generate these oscillations known as oscillator circuit. This is in general definition of oscillator circuit. But now we are developing this circuit electronically. So, it is a circuit that generates a periodic waveform at its output without any input signal or any external signal source. It produces a continuous input signal of some type without the need of an input signal. So, we need to set up some conditions to provide the oscillations to be generated. Here we have criteria to generate the oscillations. Startup mechanism, it consists of electronic amplifier, feedback network which should be obviously a positive feedback network. So, that you are able to provide signal to the oscillator which gives the noise signal generation and due to that it provides the oscillations at the output. So, this feedback is nothing but input to the oscillator circuit and this oscillator circuit will determine the frequency of oscillation. So, at the output you will get the particular waveform or wave shape of the signal and frequency is determined by the oscillator circuit. In some circuit, oscillator circuit and the feedback network are combined together and perform the task of calculation of frequency as well as feedback to the circuit. Now, we will see how this feedback provides the oscillation. Figure 2 shows the block diagram of oscillator circuit where components are arranged so that a standard form of closed loop system is observed. Where A is the gain of amplifier, beta is the feedback factor, VS is the input signal. As you know, if we convert this block diagram into a simple block diagram, it can be simply written as total gain that is g divided by 1 minus g h. This is the standard rule of control system that is this is gain divided by 1 minus g h. This negative sign is there due to the positive feedback applied in the circuit. So, we can say gain with feedback is equal to output voltage by input voltage which can also be represented as A by 1 minus A beta. But if A into beta is equal to 1, then this will become 0 that is 1 minus A beta factor will become 0. At that time, voltage gain with feedback will become infinite. So, we can say it is also known as V0 by gain. So, this will happen when input signal is upset. So, we can control or hear that we get the output without even the application of input signal. So, we can derive the two basic conditions from this criteria and that is known as Barkhausen's criteria. In 1921, the German physician developed these two conditions and once you satisfy these two conditions, sustained oscillations that is undamped oscillations are observed at the output of circuit. So, in that first condition is loop gain must be unity or slightly greater than 1 that we have seen just now. And second thing, nothing but phase shift of the signal or phase shift of the loop must be 0 degree or 360 degree or it can be a multiple of 360 degree. This is known as criteria for phase shift, nothing but condition for positive feedback. This positive feedback gives you error voltage, this error voltage is amplified and then sustained oscillations will get developed. So, this is Barkhausen's criteria for oscillations. To derive this oscillator circuit, you have to select some components for that you just find out or recall the difference between the amplifier circuit and the oscillator circuit. So, what the amplifier circuit is? Amplifier circuit needs the DC supply for biasing and the input signal for the operation and amplifier circuit will give the amplification of signal at the output which say here input must be present for the amplifier, but in the oscillator circuit we know need to give any input signal just with the biasing signal that is DC input signal we are generating the output signal which is nothing but your sinusoidal signal or sweep signal or any kind of oscillations can be generated at the output. So, if we compare these two, we can find out what could be the components of oscillator circuit means amplifier should be there as well as two signals or two different components must be present then and then oscillator circuit can be generated. So, as you know the block diagram for the oscillator circuit, first we need to have the amplifier that can be with the help of transistor circuit or fade or it can be a operational amplifier also, but it must satisfy the condition of back houses nothing but its loop gain must be equal to 1 or slightly greater than 1. So, this is the very first important design component of oscillator circuit. Second component it must have a feedback network which provides the positive feedback means it must give the feedback networks output which is phase shifted by the output signal of amplifier that is why we need to select the components of the feedback network in such a way that there is a phase shift in the signal that is from output of amplifier and output of feedback network signal must be having phase shift. Then third is frequency determining element as I told you sometimes these both will combine together and you must use the components that is passive components which affects the frequency of oscillations nothing but frequency of signal can be determined with these components broadly oscillator circuits are classified into sinusoidal oscillators and non sinusoidal oscillators. When we say these are the sinusoidal oscillators then this can be developed with the help of RC circuits, LC circuits and the crystal oscillator circuit. RC oscillator are also known as audio oscillators because it ranges from 20 hertz to 20 kilo hertz frequency and for that we have the two types as Vainbridge oscillator and phase shift oscillator. So, these two circuit will generate the audio signal at the output. So, when your requirement is greater than kilo hertz signal or in the range of kilo hertz to mega hertz then we should go for the LC oscillator circuit that is inductor and capacitor can be used and that must provide or that will provide you the frequency in the range of mega hertz. So, types are Hartley oscillator, Colpitt's oscillator. Now recall how the gain can be stabilized in an oscillator circuit is it with the low Q circuit that is low Q factor, is it with the positive feedback, is it with the negative feedback or is it with controlling the gain just think for a while and find the correct answer. Yes and the answer is gain stability in oscillator circuit can be definitely achieved by the controlling gain nothing but by controlling the components or selecting the components of an amplifier. It is not with any feedback network or not with the help of any kind of Q factor or low Q circuits. Applications of oscillator will be broadly in the communication circuit for the local oscillator to transform your RF signal into RF signals to generate the RF carrier in a transmitter. Very important application in the digital circuit to generate the clock signal and it is also used in the television circuit and CRO to test your instrument and that gives the sweep circuits or oscillator can be used as a sweep generator over there. So, oscillator is very important equipment in the testing equipment. So, testing can be done with the help of oscillator circuit. References are like this. Thank you.


Welcome to a tutorial of Hyphen Reader, version 1.2.3 on iOS. This video was created with support from the Government of Canada Social Development Partnerships Program, Disability Component. The opinions and interpretations in this video are those of the creator, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Government of Canada. It was produced with site of assistance. Hyphen offers a simple interface with a wealth of options for visual adjustment. It supports books in EPUB format. They can be copied to Hyphen right from the Nells repository, or even imported from Dropbox. It works fairly well with VoiceOver, though some controls are excluded from the swipe order. It also lacks a read-to-end feature, so VoiceOver's reading function must be activated at the beginning of each new chapter. Here we're looking at the record for Treasure Island on the Nells website. When we press Download EPUB, we're asked where to store the book. You may need to press More first, but we're going to select Open in Hyphen. The book imports after a few seconds and shows up in your list of available titles. To find new books, you can press the Add Books button found at the bottom of the screen near the right. This pulls up a list of supported online services, but because Nells is not one of them, you'll usually want to find new reading material in Safari on the Nells website. Then to start reading, just tap the book's title. Treasure Island is now open in Hyphen, showing up in the reading pane. To ask VoiceOver to begin reading, just swipe down with two fingers.  You'll die. To access reading features, just double-tap the reading pane. This reveals five buttons across the top of the screen. They are unfortunately unlabeled, but we'll now go through each one from left to right. To find text in your book, press Search, found at the far left of the button bar. Type in the phrase you wish to find, then press Search on the right side of the keyboard. Hyphen will then show you a list of sentences that contain your query. Move through the list by swiping left or right, and tap a sentence to be taken to that page in your book. To move to a different chapter, just press Table of Contents. Swipe through the list until you find the desired section, and tap it to go there in your book. The next button, Settings, has a wealth of options for visual reading preferences. You can also use it to change how you interact with the book. To go to a particular page in your book, press More. Select Go to ADE Page, type in the page number you want to read, and press Go. The final button is called Close. You can press it to return to your list of books. Swipe through the list to find the book you wish to read, then tap the title to open it. Hyphen has a clean and usable interface. Once you get the hang of it, it works well with VoiceOver.


FNN headline news update. Good afternoon, folks. Steve Rhodes coming to you live from the shores of Del Ray Beach, Florida. This is your 2 p.m. update, coming to get all the U.S. indices and just about everything. Trading to the upside. The only thing trading lower on Stevie's screens are the spotball hotel next, which is well below its 50 day expenditure moving average that puts winds that are back for the S&P 500 U.S. dollar index, which is down eight pennies trading out at $93.91. We've got the Dow at 531 points. It's one and a half percent S&P up 72, one and seven tenths percent, and the X100 one and nine tenths percent, 273, Russell's up one and four tenths percent or 31, Semi's are up three percent, two and seven tenths, two and eight tenths percent, really 89 points out there. In fact, let's go take a look at our indices charts out here. We'll change screens momentarily. We'll have the Dow Jones in the upper left hand corner. And what we'll see as we take a look at the Dow, we can see a small little rectangular consolidation. The question is, is price going to be able to take out the top of that consolidation? Top of the consolidation, really about the 34951 level. If we can take that out, then that would suggest that price probably moves back to 35475. That's its TD9 breakdown resistance level. The S&P 500, that should target right now its prior swing point high of about 4465. We're trading at 4435 now. If we take a look at the NDX100, where is it headed to? That's a great question. Look, this is as bullish as we've seen the NDX100 since the top on September the 7th. Trading into a gap right now, but looks like it wants to continue to up higher just as the Russell 2000 does, which wants to target the 2293 level. The semiconductors, they found their mojo, they had pulled all the way back and tested and rejected with lighter volume, their TD9 breakout level or TD9 pattern from back on August the 19th. Now price above its oscillator and change line suggesting a further move higher. The transports are on fire, but they are also going to form bar number eight of a TD9 count pattern today. That says the transports could top between today and Monday. Spot follow to this, you can see that is below the 50-day expenditure moving average. The XAU, she is going to be in bar number eight, but the XAU is signaling a change in trend that's signal to us. Why? Because price yesterday closed above 12869. That was the TD9 breakdown level over time. This suggests that the XAU wants to make a move to about 162.98. I say over time. Folks stay tuned. David White, your favorite polar bear, he's up next with the Power Trading Hour. Tom O'Brien will take us on home and join me tomorrow morning, really at about eight after eight when I report the Traders Edge Show and would love to see you there live. Have a terrific Thursday folks.


There is fashion and there are clothes and there are two completely different things. Fashion is effective when it makes you feel something. I moved to New York to go to college in 1989, and that was very much toward sort of the tail end of a certain kind of nightlife in New York.  The whole reason you went out at night was to show off your look. So it wasn't going out for the sake of going out, but it was going out for the sake of showing your fashion statement. That kind of passion for expressing yourself through this medium was something that was very inspiring to me.


xplanatory force in the better understanding is contemporaneous history event of mental history and the moral guide to foreign affairs but above all the principle category of analysis that introduced civilizations in the plural this seemingly subtle change provided the Archimedean point for his magisterial history and yet it rested on a deep suspicion of any kind of liminal hybridity or cultural mestizo blurring the need division between those distinct civilizations so the Toinby Affair does offers us a case which we can recognize to bore terminology of the French sociologist Jean-François Baillard and his work cultural imaginative the reinvention of differences in action and the ways in which he continued shaping our world of the West supposed borders and we are still living with the consequences of this method and of thought and historical imagination. Thank you so much. Thanks, I will take a chair. I spent meeting the current father of the Christ who is leaving the roof. I am kidding. I have an invitation.  Why are you not taking a chair? Just give me a phone. I think we are able to see me. Is there a sign? Should I move this? I think you are. You can get it again. That way you maybe will pick up my voice or it won't. Thank you very much. Thank you. I wasn't meant to present today but I couldn't resist the invitation seeing the paper. I will try to present a version of what I would like my paper to be. I hope you cannot hear it. I will pick up a version of what I would like my paper to be when they are fitting. What I thought I wanted to do or still thinking I want to do with this paper is essentially to zoom back in the early 1920s and try to see and understand the language of westernization that it used to think of from the Greek actors and from imperial actors like British. I would like to do that in my story. Before that, I should say he connects more with the first book I am trying to finish. One thing I picked up when I look at British sources is the story of Balkanization. I am sure Marietto D'Orva might come up but an interesting version of the Balkanization argument that comes in is a version of the problem we have discussed is the story of national fragmentation across Eastern Europe most predominantly and there is a discussion of some types of federations and that is why I brought these two quotes here connected one another and then Edward Benes came up with that language and offering the argument that to speak of Balkanization is a distortion of facts. Why? Central Europe is not the scene of disorder or in a different way. That is something I want to flag and that takes me here and that takes me to think about this moment early 1920s is it a moment of Balkanization is it a moment of the unfortunate distribution of greater bigger empires and economic problems come up? Here what is interesting and I will pick on a quote from Alpen Zimmer who mentions Putz in Ireland in his story that story of economic dependence that has been broken after the break-up of the ocean can carry it. He says it has raised a war between birth and doubly and what is the answer to this? It is that which British liberals co-operate to implement demands in Canada etc. What I want to flag here is an interesting debate that we find imperialist positions someone like Leo Emery agreeing on the diagnosis with anti-imperialist positions someone like praise for the radical you may think of him as and what is the problem is how the economy is to pick up in a fragmented world of East Central Europe and this is a very interesting debate that connects with action that allows us to think of different national contexts together and it brings up a discussion of federation on the table a second element I am very much interested in and that brings me to more to the local dimensions of my story is what I call the bridge enter Thomas Massory who was previously mentioned from the character of a patriarchal statesman the church constitutes the westernmost wedge driven into the German body quite military but he writes in 1915 or 1918 they constitute the furthest west in the zone of the small nations they are the western outposts of the non-German nations he is building he is seeing the task of Czechoslovakia and the world does some kind of language between a west enemy the way he understands that I am not going to get into details well a person of his actually someone very close to him that historiographers tend not to see the connections is Venizelius in this period that is slightly early in 1815 this is how Venizelius understands the task of kind of the Greek expansionist project to be again a version I am not going to read it, you can see a version of a bridge argument essentially Greece again becoming some kind of a vehicle for progress for western values in an east Venizelius's east is not quite the same as Massory's east but there is a very interesting bridging metaphor going on and actually that leads to as well remember Marcos paper yesterday where he talked about Mussolini fashioning Italy again as that kind of bridge I am fast to speak a little bit reduce the screen size I think maybe just get out of the full screen like that? So I continue and that takes us to the final bridge that I want to mention to the end of the story and that Mustafa Kemal's fashioning Turkey as the new Turkey, the successor state Turkey as again a land bridge so the story of westernization to me is interesting the metaphors of bridges and here there are two comments I have before I move on to what I mean and how long I have and the two comments I have is this for this paper to evolve what I want to focus on and what I want to juxtapose is actually what I would call the complicated but also interlocking natures of Greek and Turkish nationalism in the sense that we have here a blend in this moment of imperial projects we have a blend of versions of Wilsonianism that measure people that kind of try to find arguments for which element is kind of greater in this area and I just want to flag in the Turkish case, Jamil Aydin's work this is really influential in why because it shows how Turkish nationalism in this particular moment is quite contradictory with regards to self-determination there is pan-Islamist ideas that connect the language with self-determination and there are also more westernized regions and I would argue that in the Greek case we do have different varieties and sometimes contradictory varieties of imperial nationalism of Wilsonianism kind of converging in what is the Greek sort of expansionist project so in the context of the broader paper I'd like to explore these angles better now that takes me you may think that as I connect I just want to take you back to Smyrna I guess we spoke about the Smyrna fire yesterday and I want to bring in Toinbi in some way because what's interesting to me Ari laid the groundwork about Toinbi he's a very interesting imperial in some ways commentator who's a historian and journalist but he's also because he has worked with his imperial administration as an advisor he's really into the practical nature of trying to solve questions conceptualizing them first and trying to solve them secondly and Toinbi as Ari mentioned is in the region in 1921 when it's fairly clear that Turkish nationalism would not be eradicated by the Greeks and I'm not going to talk about the humanitarian side what I want to flag is a very interesting way he comes up as a means to solve the Smyrna question and why is his proposal he's in Smyrna 1921 he thinks of Lebanon 1860 why because that is the frame of mind and how do you solve national questions when you have to go back to the broader Turkey he thinks that well if Smyrna is to acquire a broader geographical length have an autonomous status by the autonomous status he means in 1921 now and some kind of millet system that's the one option and he writes that as Ari mentioned but then that's the interesting bit and this is the moment of transition in one way he admits at the same time that that's a difficult thing to happen practically and what would be the alternative well to place Smyrna under Ottoman territory and exchange populations it would inevitably entail a vast amount of suffering and economic loss and it's only a last resort that's how many progressives live present 20 is one of them, it's not a conservative how to put it Ari I think we agree a Victorian progressive complicated you know historian I'll skip that slide because it actually links to the Armenian question but actually I might bring that in because Toynbi writes to a wider public but also writes to his connections and people he knows in the foreign office and this is the foreign office, Kersen surely Lloyd George's government is not one thing I don't want to go into the details of what's going on at the time but this is the kind of mindset of the time that Kersen had he's being asked by the Armenians in Britain to help them out and here is how Kersen replies to that you can't expect this country to arbitrarily select a portion of Turkey and check all the other races will concentrate within the ring and so to organize an Armenian national existence at the immense expense of the Greek taxpayer this idea is Khmerida I just put this into to kind of give you a sense of what's the other end of the line which is you know that kind of imperial bureaucracy state you know that takes me so I would argue something following that why is Toynbi interesting because the question would be again why it may appear a figure but the book is interesting because it actually marks the end of a whole tradition of thinking about the question in a Gladstonean way and with it a big portion of what Wilson understands as a self-determination but also it doesn't quite reject self-determination it kind of uses self-determination as a tool to speak about a broader western context but a context that nonetheless would have nation states and here is the interesting for me fascinating point where Toynbi embraces Turkey's nationality and this is when after the exchange population during Lausanne he goes around the new Turkey and he offers a number of pieces in this journal which will then known as Asia I think now it's known as National Geographic and these are some quotes from what he writes today which links to broader patterns of the thinking that Ari knows we will speak to what Victoria's National History does today the rest of the Muslim world is going to do tomorrow I mean the bottom here is that story of diffusion of self-determination across western eastern boundaries the other interesting bit is obviously something he flags and I really the full version of the paper will engage with premise sources Turkey by all means is attracted by the French model of government, French connections and there is also a very interesting bit and also what makes Toynbi interesting that he co-authors the first piece in English after the war that actually of modern Turkey, the book of modern Turkey and there he makes an argument I don't have it here how Turkey could also follow British lines of national development more organic evolution rather than the rigid centralized French foundations upon which it's built and my final point and why Toynbi would be interesting is the point that's been that has been reverberated here which is the point about the embrace of population transfer as essentially a tolerant a way to protect minorities that's the paradox we kind of segregate people in order to protect them and what's interesting with Toynbi is that the books are in paper as early as 1925 so in where in the Royal Institute of International Affairs and that's the quote from there although the possible transfer of population was essentially inhumane, the mutual anti-pathy inflicted by nationalist religion made segregation that's the quote segregation that uses as a more tolerant alternative so international politics is a messy thing but as a last resort it's not that bad to resort to these measures now I'm kind of the conclusions of this kind of quite disparate paper that more wants to, from discussion rather than makes a specific point of that point and with two questions that would probably foreshadow my attempt to actually properly write the paper one would be you know how is the language of westernization mobilized as I said earlier by Greek and Spanish political elites to justify their country's place in the new shifting order and again how the western figures and commentators one of them is Toynbi there others which well employed the language of liberty and westernization to make sense of the imperial transformations in Southern Europe and the Middle East so that's kind of the broad range of where I want to go with this paper I hope I've said enough to cover this discussion so thanks well thank you so much for two fabulous presentations I'm just going to offer just a very very brief at the interest of time a very brief response on the whole I got to the floor I'm very you know I'm struck in reading this and also in hearing this that it's not just two visions of Toynbi here but multiple visions these things to say that are often contradictory perhaps perhaps actually incompatible and so I want to start with a question about kind of reception and timeframe and this is this is lowly made through whatever we're thinking about as the actual industry but I think it is worth reminding ourselves of it that we I think it's worth both of you are kind of pointing out ways that Toynbi's commentary is influencing two separate but related spheres one is public policy and international affairs and the other is the writing of history the intellectual history in particular and Ari is pointing to world history as a kind of you know ancestor or sorry descendant of Toynbi's thought so I think it might be worth articulating the reception in those two related arenas across his career not least because it's such a long time right it's such a long frame he has so many different positions you know what are the avenues through which his ideas are disseminated where are they found convincing where are they found wanting right and I want to just throw out with particular respect to Ari's presentation and I think it's important to remember that one of the things that came up for me in reading this was in thinking about the distinction between world history which are kind of as a field that comes out of the spot and international history which is really quite different right and so we might think about whether perhaps Toynbi is creating a field that is quite antithetical to another view and diplomacy even as he is quite specifically addressing issues of diplomatic approach and the making of nation states and the making of a global a new global political order in Georgia's paper I I'm very very struck actually this comes up a bit in Ari's as well I'm very struck by the prevalence the continuing prevalence of Ottoman laws of thought right that this is something Toynbi himself doesn't really acknowledge except in passing but it's something that other scholars have pointed out more recently that there are ways in which we can understand the post-war order and not just in the ex-Ottoman territories but across Europe as well as having progenitors in Ottoman political thought and thinking here particularly Lerna Ekmenulou's work on the way that minority rights reflects Ottoman practice which is something that Toynbi is in fact explicitly recognizing and is a millet idea for Lerna and also Amy Jeanelle's more recent work on the Ottoman origins of the mandate system that we have in fact kind of Ottoman friends in the way that these essentially European imperial interwar frames begin to emerge so despite his kind of active disdain and moments for Ottoman and not only his but the kind of British imperial practices active disdain that we do in fact see things that are a lot of it in what's being made to eat here so finally I think that both of these are tied together by an interest in the economics which is something that has come up in a number of instances across the last couple of days and it might be worth thinking about what precisely these federal systems have an economic justification that is not always terribly clearly laid out but clearly does have important ramifications for one of the major issues that comes up at all of the peace treaty negotiations and that is the rights of small nations so it might be worth kind of articulating that a bit more clearly and specifically and in greater detail since it's clearly very central to the thought that is being kind of constructed in the context of all of these treaties and their aftermath particularly for Greece and Turkey but often represents a kind of unsaid level unspoken set of assumptions about what a post-war global order might be so I'm going to close there and maybe we'll have just very very brief responses and then we can open it up to the floor so that's right yeah, but I'll go first then we'll see how it will turn my way but okay I hope you can hear me right lots of stuff I just want to okay let me start with the latter first because what I and I'm struggling with my other work now is like to make sense of these kind of you know the coming back of the discussion of federation especially from the great imperial world for their view and it seems to me that this is a throwback again in 19th century region for federation that the Nubian federation gave you one idea that God would know more about the Nubian these sort of structures and discussions about federation from the mid 19th century that that kind of essentially I was speaking the language of free trade I was speaking the language of of of how to essentially create order by allowing greater units to trade with one another going into these discussions I mean even during the first during the Balkan wars he's one of them who thinks the Balkan federation is a good idea I mean obviously the Balkan war and then he comes back to that again so you know the problem here is if we look at Central Europe and people like Massary the language of federation there is really meddled up there are instances where one reads these and then thinks it's just like small state nationalism he's talking about here where's the federation then he speaks about co-federation which makes it even weirder so there's a very complicated I think in this political elites at least understanding and very contradictory of you know what exactly are federation that we're talking about here I know it's not kind of a full answer but that's where I would be gesturing at very quickly I do agree on the point of the Ottoman political thought well on time he starts letting Turkish during the First World War and so I don't think he's fully conversed into Ottoman on Turkish but what's interesting is that at least in Britain after the Yankturt Revolution for two or three years for us for Balkan small state nationalist actually are taming making a U-turn and they're thinking that the moment of federation the moment of opening has come the westernization moment has come into the Ottoman Empire 1908, 1909, 1910 well that window closes by 1911 so he has these debates in mind which and obviously the kind of imperial practice that is around him I suppose because he's someone who's advising who's at the bias peace conference as a junior diplomat so that would be a final point something that's quite interesting and it has been the elephant in the room here I think it's Russia I think even for the time being it's interesting that the transformation that happens with the October Revolution going with regards that as a big turning point that also fits in the story of westernization in some way but it's not the westernization that you have in more than 30 years in Japan it's another kind of development but and the reason I'm mentioning this is that well that's a side note but it's a very interesting thing to think about in Britain the researches of the Ottoman Empire sorry of the Russian socialist experiment were quite surprising in some way or another and the final point that I'll stop and I might disagree here that it's slightly on this point I think with someone like Torbini did he creates this or starts a genre of world history I think I would agree that there are Victorian versions of universal history that Torbini picks up on Freeman it's an interesting case example Edward Freeman and yeah I'll stop here thank you I want to be able to touch on all the points you made but you were right that again we stuck on the term world history definitely for us thinking about how to do a history that acknowledges how ideas and practices do not recognize borders but at the same time not be divorced from the local specific conditions and so on Torbini is kind of a very interesting case that allows us I think that's sort of my point of entry here that might sound for someone from the outside as nuances of minor differences narcissism of minor differences but really for me there's a huge difference between transnational history and the world history the way he thinks about them and the world history that you asked about influences and so on it was valorized I mean it's not a coincidence that his most important biographer William McNeil that would later become the president of the American Historical Association and it was and I agree with the image I don't think it's had the image of something progressive beyond nationalism beyond this kind of a petty narrow mindset and it also allowed people to you know add things like you know ecological dimensions to history and so on and so forth so I'm not here to say world history is a branch that should be canceled out it moved in a different direction it says its own trajectory but it definitely has its own and I think that there's something to be said about we are for very good reasons are very suspicious of in a small nation nationalism especially when it our histories are predicated on that so the appeal is there but with our with our attacks it's amazing to see how our criticisms of the nation state project actually echo old imperial attacks against the nation the nation state so we're kind of a cut between rock in the hard place and so on and so forth so you write that international history developed differently but international relations do have a common origin so the so-called discipline is really rooted in that same moment with the same people yes and very very briefly on economics you write it's kind of a it's it's hidden there I think this is where also geography comes in especially is the new I mean access to a what you know to a port to water to a notion is is a major thing that is always discussed in these kind of questions about what makes a small nation say you know a little bit in state that is it's not only the size it's over what would make it viable and so that's definitely part of it but yes I will I will stop I will stop there and I'll open up for other questions as well thank you very much and I just wanted to to say something about a point to Laura made and area just replied to it I firmly persuaded that time it would have been a perfect to a perfect contributor to the journal of race development foreign affairs and this is where he belongs and this is exactly where I do see him not as a precursor of international history of world history but as one of the known acknowledged fathers of international relations as a racist discipline this is what we have to say this is my own take on that and I say it very bluntly and openly the second point has to do always with him and with Lebanon and it's more of the same and I bring it back to the point that the audience made on a Lebanese solutions for Spirnia but that's precisely the solution for the uncivilized and this is what and this is why we go back to geography and mental imaginaries and that's exactly why Lebanon comes to the mind of toying immediately and this is the perfect solution and by the way since we have been talking about Mark block and the obsessions with origin there is in the consular archive French archives there is so much to be said about un-mixing populations Lebanese populations in 1960 precisely because the French idea was to segregate and move the Maronites in Algeria where they could have become perfect producers of wine I stop here Are you going to respond to that? No I mean it's fascinating disturbing it's sort of my only response would be and to think about the way they were used in the area from that date and of course we can take it to 1982 and the Israeli invasion to Lebanon and where the Maronites are playing there so it's I agree with you I think that if I need to go back to my research notes I think that it's not only there was a conference on racial relations that Toynbee did contribute an article to so we tend to think about him as thinking about differences in a different way which is not racial we talked about it the entire mandatory system is based on racial hierarchy and ranking even class A, class B, class C so it's the language so the fact that he's not using it as explicitly tended to create this image of him as progressive that doesn't go there but not so much so I would say it's sort of in later years he's becoming really religious he's becoming very a pious religious Christian and it doubles down it adds elements that the young Toynbee in his 30s are not so prominent would really come up so some of his critics actually are arguing we deal here with a mix of theology and a Christian way of thinking about differences that's later on the criticisms that he will receive from British colleagues in the 50s and 60s I think we're running short on time so what I'm going to do is take Jay's question and then I'll come back to you is that reasonable? I want to raise the possibility that there's a strain of pessimism in Toynbee that you can see in not just regarding artists all of them in the library which you've gone through as well but if you will wasn't he anticipating Benjamin there is no monument to westernization which is not at the same moment a monument to barbarism this barbarism is what he saw and it was against the reign of his political outlook with respect to Greece and Turkey so that maybe this is a narrow thing to use in the discussion is this not a moment of what might be called the need to temper empire to measure the value and weight of different approaches to westernization and a moment of crisis and a moment of immense difficulty not indeed a moment of exuberance and a moment of what we learned is that we're mortal but I wonder if this is an appropriate annex to that and that occurred to me already when you're talking about the conversations with other classes including his father a lot to what extent is his conversation with Spain also with Spain though so that was about the second question answered so absolutely pessimism so I think not only that there is pessimism there are two type of pessimism one is the Oswald Spenglerian pessimism of the decline of the west it's very there's a very he talks about it very explicitly there's an irony to it because the person that introduced him to Oswald Spengler was his classmate a roommate in Oxford Louis Namier gave him here's the latest book that came out around I have the date in the article I can't remember it exactly when so that's one type of pessimism but you're absolutely right that he witnesses awful things and it's both the war between Greece and Turkey but also his work with Lord Bryce composing I linked the blue book and the Armenian genocide so the pessimism is absolutely there it doesn't contradict the fact that it really leads him to see the unmixing of population he won't use perhaps this exact language I used the kind of the tectonic plates kind of metaphor when two tectonic plates meet this is where the friction this is where you have earthquakes or volcanoes appearing I think that when he saw you know genocidal violence he would interpret it okay this is an indication that what we see here is kind of this collapse meeting point between civilizations so try to separate them and not mix one into the other otherwise you will have these awful atrocities so I think that you're absolutely right the pessimism that is driving the system of thought but it ended up in essentializing each civilization and so on and creating very distinct separation lines between the civilizations but in the early 20s to pick up from here this pessimism absolutely the only thing at that just to enrich the conversation Toinby as someone who's really thinking comparatively a vanilla letter is really that's what drives me what makes this case fascinating is also really much alert about what's going on in Ireland same timeline and then he speaks about moral organization in Ireland so the pessimism also comes from this angle it comes from the intellectual angle the you know the Spengler stuff it comes from the great the war angle it's some of those documents you know like atrocities not only the Armenians but also what the Germans to Belgium right so it comes from the greater war angle it comes from the angle of someone who sees nationalist violence genocidal violence and finds records to some form civilization discourse but that also has a promise westernization is a promise and that's modern Turkey here and that's what I find interesting to highlight that is an experiment for him it may have a promise on the geopolitical end to stabilize the Middle East but also it may has a promise as a new state that seems to embrace nationalism's discrimination in a way and don't be so open to this and that's what I want kind of bring to the table on this it's quite a confused relationship with religion I think this is one of the things that strikes me is that in the early part of his career he discusses you know when this federalist frame is strong right when he's really thinking that this might be a functional kind of path forward and he's not the only one it's confused because he is thinking about classical models for that represent the West and then you know Islam and Judaism right but then later on as he moves to the civilizational frame the classical frame is replaced by this Christian frame and that's actually when nationalism is as bold as a kind of solution right and Turkey is a very peculiar example of this regard right because it is an actively secularizing state in this period so that's not a question so much it's just the same as there are many kind of there's a great deal of kind of incoherence in terms of the role of religion and how it fits into the concept of civilization the concepts of federalism the concepts of the nation state so is that a thing 100% and you know just to bring the broader point he speaks about the abolition of the caliphate comparing me to the papal states in Italy which was amendment in the 19th century again you know that idea so that is a constant feature of the thinking and that's also we need to how that might understand the complicated that he has with nationalism and also the population transfer kind of being sanitized in some way you know being liberalized being seen as something that could potentially have a progressive thing which of course also is essentially drawn up religious rather than nationalized are there any further questions from the Sumer I'm seeing me further perhaps I'll just add Georgia mentioned briefly Jamila Den's excellent book which I agree is a phenomenal book and perhaps part of what is so confusing about Donby is the type of reception and admiration you received in the context of post World War II decolonization efforts and then he was valorized in what we would call today the national south and especially in the Muslim world and Jamila Den writes very persuasively about the way his subtly language was then appropriated as kind of a using civilization as if it's mapped on to sort of a Muslim concept of Ooma or a pan Muslim but that's a later development of course that's post World War II so a lot of what you know he becomes kind of later on and his symbol is kind of sort of a herald of either post colonialism or or maybe even a better description would be a sort of a British imperialist that is written by guilt feelings after the empire collapsed so that's a lot of this is the kind of the 1950s, 60s reception of Toin B that we shouldn't map on back on to 1922 well I think we have just a couple minutes left so maybe I'll take my take my prerogative as chair to just ask one last question which comes from dinner last night whereas someone said well no one reads Toin B anymore and I'm interested whether you both think that's true I think in the room we have a PhD working in Toin B I mean he damaged himself by writing 12 volumes who will read 12 volumes right but this said I think that I mean it's hard to say if we have like again because World History as a sub branch developed and evolved and I guess I don't know Val Noah Harari is probably the Toin B of our age or something like that and it's a different it's a different place and he's thinking about a global order based on Elon Musk but I think that in popular history I think that you will find sort of a weird take spin-offs on Toin B in sort of a history channels right sort of a very popular versions that still permeates there in the back of people's minds Can I just add something sorry I'm turning it but I like it so the way he comes in my story is as an astute commentator of national questions or rather the observer of national questions and offering solutions and what's interesting is how this the book he writes in Greece and Turkey it has totally different afterlives and you know that's something quite interesting which is not the story of what we're discussing now the Toin B thinker, the national thinker the broad range but it's the distant observer well the Brits have this fascination to think that they are distant observers so the distant observer who offers an interpretation and then these books have different reputations and they read differently and obviously they vindicate different national plays the Greeks read them in one way but they're similar All right well thank you all for this really fascinating conversation and I hope we'll all take away our warning not to make our back our focus while you respond and I'll close and say goodbye thank you thank you thank you thank you thank you thank you I've never once sat in the way he put up a coffee or anything hi thank you thank you thank you thank you thank you thank you thank you thank you thank you thank you thank you thank you thank you thank you thank you thank you thank you thank you thank you thank you thank you thank you Okay. Hey, I think. I think.  I don't think anyone. Yeah. Oh, I forgot. Yeah. Right. So we should have. So we can. Yeah. Oh, yeah. Oh, yeah. Oh, yeah. Oh, yeah. Oh, yeah. Yeah. Good. Yeah. I think the rest of this is pretty simple. Exactly. It's an appropriate illustration. Is that something that we can do? I think it's a really good idea. I think it's a really good idea. I think it's a really good idea. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. I'm happy to be here. I'm happy to be here. Chair. Yeah. Yeah. You know this story, are you going to the army? Yeah. Okay. Do you know it? But before we end, so I hope people online can hear me, just give us a wave so we know you can hear us. Okay. Great. I can hear you. Terrific. So my name is Dr. Hilary Berfa, I'm a lecturer in National Security Studies here at Keynes. As part of my research, I've done a lot of work on MOLTA, World War I, and I'm writing a global visitor in 1919, connecting the uprisings in MOLTA, India, Trinidad, Egypt, Belize, basically everywhere that wasn't an imperial power together. And so I've joined very kindly, especially in my role, by the means of coming on to this conference. Perhaps if you love listening to your talks. Although I wasn't in the room for all of them, I was online all day listening to a few. And it's been absolutely brilliant, even though you might not have seen my face, I've been listening to all of you very closely. It's my extra privilege to have the opportunity to share this slide with Anna, which is essentially an overview of our main takeaways or bring all of the strands of what we talked about for two full days together and hearing from senior participants in the conference that they think 1932 needs to dance. So we'll have a bit of a discussion. So we've lost each of our five panelists to speak for a maximum of 10 minutes. If they go for under even better because I'm going to get a chance to have a bit more of a discussion. I won't give them long introductions because you've actually heard from all of them already. So I'll just pass to each of them in their order. I just let you know their name and affiliation. And if that sounds good to everybody and the people online have told me they can hear me. I'll pass straight over to Dr. Nina Venturas from the University of Peloponnes. So straight over to Nina. Good afternoon from the University of Pandion, not the Peloponnes. I would like to comment mainly on a point that hasn't come up so much in our discussions these days, which is in my view is the much deeper entanglement of domestic and international governance that followed the First World War, especially in eastern and southeastern Europe and in mandate territories. Here I will only focus on the example of peripheral European regions where asymmetric political and economic power, long-term tutelage transnational European institutions and ideas and catch up modernization strategies developed by local westernized elites had a very long history and of course informed and facilitated international intervention during and after the First World War. This history, I think, weighed upon both the great powers and the newly formed League of Nations civilizational hierarys and decisions as well as on the peripheral states policies. During the war, moreover, both western European states and intergovernmental administrative capacities had been further enhanced. Two groups of bureaucrats and experts with a strong dive drive for efficiency and modern management techniques worked closely with policymakers in developing novel patterns of state intervention and transnational networks concerning issues of reform in which elites from the peripheral European countries often participated. The ideas and practices spread through their networks were still founded on the belief of the supremacy of the western civilization and of its civilizing mission, but the concept of civilization was now more closely associated to economic development and modernization or with the ethics of self-sufficiency. Infused with liberal internationalism, they also contributed to the establishment of international institutions such as the League of Nations to promote their ideas and interests. The League in turn became an important conduit for the expansion of practices of so-called modern rule of ideas concerning the best methods of governance and for the implementation of modernization projects. The League and the agencies it founded assisted certain countries of the region to stabilize their economies to raise funds to enhance their health care systems to implement policies for refugee resettlement and et cetera, thereby increasing the interpenetration of national and international government. But while the great powers and the League of Nations gave impetus to state and institution building, they simultaneously conscripted sovereignty with various means. In certain countries, the League and the agencies it created, even temporarily assumed many of the functions, a sovereign state was expected to be in a position to carry out according to western standards of the era, for example, the registration and allocation of resources and workforce development of infrastructure, undertaking of census, et cetera. By temporarily replenishing the often deficient and insolvent local and central government mechanisms and expanding their incomplete knowledge, the League enhanced these states' ability to penetrate territories and to control populations. And I will give an example from interwar Greece where the territorialization of state power that is mainly its institutional and infrastructural consolidation in the northern territories and refugee rehabilitation came to involve multiple foreign state, non-state and private business agents, the League of Nations and the Greek Refugee Settlement Commission established under its auspices alongside multiple domestic actors. By combining older and contemporary templates of land distribution, well-established practices of refugee rehabilitation which had been tried both in the Ottoman Empire and in Balkan states and of course in Greece before 1922, as well as the modern administrative methods introduced by sections of the Greek elites and the commission, the efforts of all these actors succeeded relatively well in redistributing a massive amount of resources in an extremely short period of time, thus removing the imminent threat of famine, social unrest and state collapse. This rapid redistribution of rural land would not have been possible to reach if the state had undertaken it alone or if the commission had not been so closely linked to the disbursement of the refugee loans and had not been accorded so many rights, privileges and exemptions. In Greece, therefore, the commission enhanced the state sovereignty by enlarging its ability to control and intervene in its northern territories, but this enhancement, of course, came at a cost as the commission took over large decision-making powers, economic management and various other state functions. Of course, the local political elites used foreign and international intervention to justify their own priorities. They both called upon and resisted foreign and international interventions. They both before overwhelming power balances, but also manipulated to leverage to their own advantage. They adopted ideas and practices and used them to promote their own interests. And finally, local actors, either by taking advantage of the gap between international and local authorities' ambitions and their capacities, or by other means, also managed to intervene in shaping their circumstances and future. So what I'm trying to say is that the intertwinning of the heterogeneous disarticulate and unevenly empowered domestic and international spheres, both public and private, with their multi-level and multi-actor components, all interacted in state design and consolidation in institutional organization, land reform and refugee settlement simultaneously strengthening and conscripting sovereignty. And I think this is one of the aspects that we should add in our discussion of this very short period of time, that after 1918 and up to 1922. Thank you very much. Thank you so much, Dr. Venturas. And perhaps it's our own. Myopia is the scholars of international relations, and sometimes we actually overlook this relationship between domestic and international. So thank you for introducing it into the discussion. Hopefully we'll have a chance to discuss a little bit further as well. And so my second speaker comes online as well, Dr. Davider Rodonio from the Graduate Institute in Geneva. Davider, are you still with us? Yes, I am. For you. So I have the floor for you please. Thank you. Thank you very much. I would be way less eloquent than the Lina and would make some impressionistic points on a few words that have been said. I'm wondering whether 1922 was particularly global or more or less global than 1921 or 1923 or 1924. This afternoon, one of our participant Aria referred to Janus, and I think that since we shouldn't be obsessed with origins, I think that this idea of continuities and raptures in 1922 and 1922 becomes really an excuse to study something else is fruitful, at least as far as I'm concerned. So this is my first point, how global 1922 really was. The second has to do with something that Jay Winter said yesterday on chaos. I think that the way we historians study it would deserve more attention. And I think that in the minds of so many protagonists of 1922, whether we talk about people that were forcefully displaced or policymakers or peacemakers, the idea of chaos and references to the Soviet Revolution, et cetera, et cetera, that bring us far away from the Near East or the Middle East or the Eastern Mediterranean Balkans is important and this would deserve more attention, which brings me to a third point, which is related to mental geographies and imaginaries, yet another word that was used in the last two days. We've been thinking and reflecting on zooming in. It seems to me that the vast majority of Western policymakers were utterly unable to zoom in and I connect with what Lena said on the domestic and so the idea of going to the more granular was something that they were either unable to do or unwilling to do. Because in these mental geographies and mental geopolitical landscapes, the future that they imagined for this region of the world was based and I here connect with Georgios with Victorian imaginaries. This seems striking to me. It was eventually the moment for show to the world that the Near East and Ottoman lands could eventually be civilized, Greece included had come through the Mondays and many different ways or through the refugee settlement commission in Greece. So this is important to me and the last point that I would like to make or mention very briefly, which I mentioned yesterday and this is also my way of connecting with Laura's paper yesterday has to do with sovereignty and the manipulations, instrumentalizations of sovereignty, which eventually led to immobility, which in my view is absolutely connected to these deliberate attempts to deprive communities of their agency and so force them somewhere after they've been displaced. And so this idea of a non-return and the three ingredients of sovereignty as we know our territory, people and government, and there was no such determination very often because these three elements were engineered and they were manipulated in so many ways. So that's a geopolitical design was forced on to people and communities of this large area that we have referred to as the Middle East and Near East, the Ottoman lands and post-Ottoman lands. I would stop here. Thank you very much. Okay, thank you so much. And so we're doing very well for time. So I think we will have time for discussion on all these points that are being raised. So I'll just move swiftly on. Dr. Jerry Winter from Yale University is going to share his views on what 1922 means to you where they can get to that discussion. Thank you. And again, thank the organizers for spending time. I want to be very modest in trying to see to what extent we can imagine the title of the book. And it may sound a little bit high-flung, but I'm sure we can whittle it down. I take it from Heusica and I would call it 1922 colon, the winding of the imperial world order. Heusica's way of being the Middle Ages is one of the classics and it also has its own historiography. The story about the contemporary meaning to the view of blood and roses. And I do believe that the imperial world order enables us to grasp Laura's essential contribution of economic difficulty. The restoration of the economic order of the world is unclear and unsolvable. Now, if that doesn't appeal, in other words, I have the imperial impasse, 1922 imperial moment, crises of empire, but they're all the same thing, which is that meetings like this have many different pieces. I don't know if you can tell, but I think the role of the array is where we can find a theme that can bring us success together between the covers of the book. And 1922 is a good title, it has its own cache, but we actually need a subtitle that describes the book should be all about it. So I leave you with the idea that inspiration, I put to you the best that I can think of is the wedding of the imperial order. So much. Are you offering to add in? I do have a word to... Let's sign off the graphs. More to the material side. There is a publisher, the thing I've been working for some decades that might indeed be the place to put this. I want to continue the discussion over there. But it speaks to the idea of just saying, you know, crisis. I want to think of the interwar period. Well, it's called the interwar period. I don't care what we talked about for two days. I think it needs more words to be said to your point. It was our first speaker. He's our last speaker for Kennedy. Thank you so much. Thank you so much. Thanks to the organizers. It's been a splendid conversation. I'm just going to highlight a couple of things. The first and I think probably the most central builds on Jay's point that he's just named, which is that I think this is the fundamental question about 1922 is the extent in nature of continuity with the older empires, right? And I think that one thing that I would stress in thinking about that, that theme is that we're not just talking about the active reformulation of the British and French empires, which is really happening in the form of nations and all the, you know, the very apparatus and all of the rest of it, but also about continuity is from the defeated empires, right? And I think that's one of the things that I would stress is that we're not just talking about the British from the Ottoman sphere, from the Russian sphere, even in a different way, you know, from the Austro-Hungarian sphere, but these are imperial presences that continue to exist in the political leader over the next at least a couple of decades that are going to be longer than that, right? I think that I think we're thinking about and then perhaps also something we have mentioned not at all, which is the emerging American empire, right? Which is in fact building itself up during this period before is the important moment of establishment for their imperial presence in the 20th century in certain ways. We might think about that as a theme that's necessary for at least as a presence as well. The second thing I want to talk about is something I've been hammering on about since the beginning and that is the role of economics and the vision for an economic world order. I think this is a more active conversation in the moment that we sometimes acknowledge and that the abstraction set out that ethnicities and nation states and borders can sometimes serve to obscure the essential material interests that underpin everybody's actions to every one of these multiple histories that I see. So I think I would just encourage a kind of consciousness in that messaging actively engaging forward with the forces that suggest the specifics of these visions and how they might work out, how they might work out, which is equally important. And last but not least, I want to pick up on this point of agency that has been brought up a couple of times, the local actors to meet these new demands to make this new geopolitical reality to gap between what is being said in the negotiable negotiations at the top and how those visions can be implemented. And I think this is a trickier question than we might sometimes think. We'd all like to believe in an agency, right? And there are clearly important moments where local actors and local settings and local contexts are changing and making and shaping the expression of these visions on the ground. But I think we also need to consider the question of agency in the context of the very real effects of violence and the real impact of violence, right? And the way that the kinds of realities of the war, this war era, this war opposition do in fact limit people's choices in very real ways. So I'm suggesting a kind of balanced approach to the question of agency, but simultaneously acknowledges the contributions and actions of local actors, regional actors, and also acknowledges the brutality of this period, right? We talked about the chaos, but we haven't. We also need to emphasize the violence, which is something that goes through 1922, past 1922, and as a feature of the interwar period that leads directly into the next major global population. So I'll close by our entrance, please. Thank you so much. And so we'll move forward. You know, let's say the best for us. I thought about, is somebody else joining in or is it just like, you're the only one who can speak to this. So we can move in your back to King's College, home team, over to Professor Milo to give you a final views on this topic. I'm not trying to get my final views on the topic. Yeah, look how nice. I just want to share. It's the last one. Okay. Some more thing, Ward. Thank you. And it's been a great two days. And I've certainly learned a lot and enjoyed it. So, you know, we, as organizers, all panelists take the time to thank us, but just take this opportunity to thank all the participants. I just want to, things in a different order here. One thing I do want to begin with this, particularly as one of the hosts, and in a sense we are in the Sir Michael Howard Center, the history of war, because this is, you know, it. I just want to say, of course, that I think Sir Michael Howard would definitely approve of this event at this center, because this was his conception of war. It was never narrow. It was never about, you know, guns and cannons and muskets, you know, all that kind of great military operations stuff. He had a very broad vision of the history of war, and this conference certainly hit that spot. Then I have a few other comments that are related, I think to how we might conceive of an edit collection emerging from this. And I have said, it's interesting you brought it to the title and the title you proposed, and Jay's conversation with Laura. And I think having listened to that, I think I would want to just modify your title, your subtitle a bit, with, you know, 1922, or global 1922, I would call it the reinvention of the imperial world order, because I'm not sure it ever disappeared. It just keeps getting reinvented. And if there is something, and you know, I don't know if you're still there, there's something particular about 1922. This is perhaps precisely it. This is the moment when a different kind of global imperial order is beginning to coalesce. Perhaps I'll have a bit more to say about that. Again, I'm just focusing on a potential text. One of the things that's striking, particularly looking at some of the PowerPoints, is just the potential in a book like this and how useful it is these days if we could do this, is to have some of the original photographs, for example, that Michelle Tuzan has in her collection, their other striking photographs, and particularly maps. I mean, I was fascinated to see just some of you pull maps out of the archives, whether it's the Anatolian Civil War or Trieste's sphere of economic reach, whatever. But they're a really fantastic illustration. And of course, the political cartoons that if we could draw parallels across that would be great. This lack of certain Soviet perspective and Soviet barclays has been mentioned by several times. I'll just underscore that. And I think we would have to look and recruit somebody specifically for that particular role. But I have sort of Terry Martin's work on the Soviet Union as a, I think it was supposed to be equal opportunity in the Empire or something. The sort of recreating the nation in form like socialist and substance. And that in relation to the Armenian questions, the foundation of the Armenian Republic, that all strikes as a potential line or avenue of research. I kind of assumed that that had been done, but I've been told by others it hasn't. Structure, agency, the Vienna order, the Paris order. I just, Eric writes, sadly we could never, can't have him join us now. But I think he would have obviously found a lot of interest here. His name has come up many times. But I just want to go back to that article for a moment because when he wrote that, if you look at sort of trace the intellectual lineage, thinking, I won't go down the pot hole of looking for origins, but there's one thing that stands out. It's Paul Schroeder's transformation here in politics as the inspiration for that Weitz's article. And the argument in both Weitz's article, as in Schroeder's work, is that there seems to be sort of one moment that could be sort of a global transformation can take place. And it's normative, and it's about what the emote can call the rules of the game. And what are the rules of the game? And I mentioned this, my own remarks on the opening papers. Putting populations, managing peoples or eliminating peoples at the center of international work from the background of periphery, but right square center. And thinking about organizing space and economic life in relation to populations. And a lot of the, what that would mean in terms of behaviors and behaviors across ideologies, religions, what's always struggling to meet our similarities of behaviors and responses to particular normative changes. And I think I will go into examples as lots from the conference today, and yesterday. What I would say though is, of course, and again, back to this question is, what's special about 1922? I'm not sure if 22 is special, except perhaps as a culmination of a particular range of peacemaking that might connect Treaty of China 1921, the Washington Conference, and the reimagining of China and relations in China. And I'm thinking about the nine-power treaty and the four-power security pact, but also, and of course, Lausanne, but then also bringing the story into China and thinking about how war and nationalism or the idea of the nation is created in the way that Waldron's book on the civil wars in China made, you know, his argument is what makes Chinese nationalism if the civil war is in. So 1922, 23 is deeply important, but part of that rethinking the nation, people, and space. And certainly Chiang Kai-shek thought about it that way. If there were two figures who tended to think about one of the civil suits and then it was Autotürk and the idea of visiting this screened out of all the discussions about Camel and I have that book and I thought somebody else will mention the author's name. I think it's called something like Autotürk and the German Imaginations and they said, do you know the title? It's a wonderful book. And just how the right and the left and the liberals all appropriate the image of Autotürk for their own purposes. He's a successful revolutionary against the Paris settlement but at the same time it's also a liberal modernizer. So anyway, again, thanks everyone for watching. Thank you so much. Thank you so much. So anyway, again, thanks everyone for a wonderful, fascinating two days and plenty to think about. Thanks so much, Joe. So with everybody being extra efficient we're actually left with about 25 minutes maybe we'll finish five minutes before because it's a Friday night but I think we should get, we will go as we did in response to some of these comments and I don't know if anyone wants to raise anything more online but if I can use chairs for a week if I get a question. Well, two questions I wanted to raise and so perhaps I could direct them at people but anybody can come in who would want to respond. So my first one is I was really struck over the last couple of days thinking about the themes of the conference. So in the first presentation we talked about the Travias faced by refugees and then today we'll talk about problems with citizenship and migration movement. I couldn't see that I miss in the newspaper today in the headlines today and we also had a number of themes that I could see to do with nationalism, to do with tensions in communities. So I suppose my first question that might be best directed at perhaps Laura and David there but anybody who wants to come in on this is, you know, is there anything that we can take from this that I know there is value of course as a historian is studying history for the sake of it or is there anything that we can apply which we can take from this? Is there anything you turn to policy makers and say, have you studied this and you know, we're a century on is there anything that we can apply the lessons for policymaking today? And then my second question which I suppose I'll put towards Mark, Joe and Jane and anyone who wants to come in is thinking about our students today on what they are studying in the world, essentially from 9-11 only they think about the impact of the Ukraine crisis today all of these kinds of things 1922 might seem very far far off in their imagination and we were thinking about it partly because of the centenary but also because we think there is value in understanding this moment and how it's shaped the international environment. So I suppose my question is what would be your pitch and I think this might help you to start thinking about a forward or an editorial for the book, why do we we've done two days, okay we've thought a lot about 1922 why do we need to keep thinking about why should we not just be thinking about what's happening in Ukraine today so those are my two questions on pitch to the panel and whoever wants to go first give us a wave and I'll go with whoever waves at me first I do think 1922 is about Ukraine I'm impressed with my presentation something happened to the institutions of war and of course in the first year we weren't crowded before of course with which we are struggling today it's easy to be moralistic and say evil matters to us but there's something we've learned that is making a modern army kill children and others all these are criminal acts the criminal acts come out of history in history I believe it's present, visible achingly visible, viscerally visible not to change you raise the applied history question and you direct it to Laura and then they don't mind, just jump in what I would say is the absolute lesser of everything we've heard is that when you dehumanize the person on the boat whether it's a refugee or displaced person or whatever terms you want to use you create a dispersive space to murder them or abuse them in some way and that is actually the lesson and to make it very specific shift them off to somewhere else even this is the lesson can I jump in? yes please go for it well first of all yesterday Jay began as he just said making several plans to the situation in Ukraine which I think was a great thing to do and very necessary for all of us and probably the wider audience I would also to add that there is a similarity there is a difference between 1922 precisely when it comes to comparing and contrasting Ukraine with the events of late 1922 and Greece and Turkey and all the rest it has to do with international organizations and the League of Nations and the UN we had the visit in Kiev of the Secretary General and the United Nations have been quite absent from this crisis just for very different reasons just like the League of Nations was absent or it was decorative I mean it was an ornament they didn't decide much and here there is something that we could think of because at that time that kind of international organization was brand new underfunded its human resources were extremely limited etc etc and its political leverage was what it was very little or insignificant when you look at the United Nations today you have plenty of questions and since I live in Geneva I have an awful lot of question marks when it comes to the role that the United Nations have not played so far in this conflict so it speaks to the current crisis of multilateralism as well precisely I think that I hesitate to answer your question because I am very skeptical about the idea of usable history I have been spending the year in DC the Wilson Center one of their fundamental models is actionable ideas I think it is not a functional thing because there is no universal agreement on what an optimal policy outcome is and so I think that my takeaway largely has been building on the excellent work that humanitarianism is essentially fraudulent and that in fact I think we could make the argument that much of the 21st century internationalism has also been essentially fraudulent and the hunger out of where national interests and so as a historian I think the best thing we can do is expose the actual interests that lie behind these kinds of decisions that lay behind the depressed that lie behind the present so that they are visible for action by others and that I am not sure that lends itself easily to a kind of practice of making policy recommendations from a different perspective I think that is not what we should be making doing here as historians in general but rather kind of laying there the impulses the practices the developments of these systems and acknowledging for whom we were built and what interests they served actually is an important forward act and so I think that this is a project that could contribute to that if not necessarily pointing the way towards some sort of better future absolutely and I think by saying I think there is also you know something moment for the sake of it but I think what we were speaking about in fact too was that there was a presentation of continuities and fractures so we can see what things were creating and serving those interests and perhaps where we might cause a lot of trouble where it is staying the same today where at least it is posing it might land us a bit weight that balance of humanitarianism a bit more the way is ideal yes George just like to be passing to black history here he is calling to not really so there is a centre for a grand strategy which I am part of which is what got me thinking about is where we work on a life history so we try to we all talk to each other yeah and I think just a footnote and I kind of work through what Laura said would be think think carefully of the vocabulary one uses to conceptualise problems as questions and then try to flash solutions because I think one take away from at least some time to speak from that you know the easiness the unthoughtfulness the kind of reliance that are really coming up in thought group of thought that commentators whatever it is you use to conceptualise something as a problem be it naturally for you and then come up with a fitting solution for that problem but partly in that solving the problem and that is I would find a partner in being able to think and conceptualising problems of international problems today and of being able to think and conceptualise things such as for instance the Ukrainian question I'm pretty sure if I ask all of you here we may come up with different finishes about the Ukrainian question maybe we're not in that kind of question I'm sure you're right but this year language is part of the history of 1922 the specificity of the language but I do think we actually have to break out of English you know the whole concept the word civilization itself is not the same in civilization having a range of linguistic categories I think is part of the essential place of the work that you're doing in understanding this particular matter so I see it as a broad based multidisciplinary matter with the necessity of having a focus around particular moments how do you define the moment is the class that I want to raise is the year really what would you call it icon civilising a bigger period it's catchy it's good or it is a collection of essays from the European university and there are good essays too there's room for more what about the idea of using one year as a what would you call it is anyone a Jagdman maybe it's worth raising it's a conceit well I think the first lecture I put this a while ago was when does world war II really begin so it gives you everything we're talking about does it begin in 1915 but certainly as a discursive point to think about I think what Davide said about continuities and lectures what's new about this moment there was somebody with hands raised on the chat Michelle are you with us did you want to contribute something well this is really interesting 1922 is a moment but I want to get back to what Lena started us with Professor Venturis we have to pay attention to the domestic and the local and this idea that humanitarianism is something imposed from above is something I think we as historians should be really skeptical about because humanitarianism takes place in a local context and we risk really reproducing the hubris of Anglo-American imperialism by saying it's not just the ones who get soup from the soup kitchen but the governments and the local actors and the intermediaries who are actually administering aid and I think that was the point of Professor Venturis idea here is that it isn't something that goes one direction it's not perfect and it's not like a government can just say yes to certain aid and no to other aid but to say that the project based on a set of premises that has no no counter in the local and the regional I think is too dangerously reproduced that American Euro Anglo-European hubris and I think one of the things that I think it's important about 1922 is it allows us to tell different stories about the war that have been outside of the narrative so when we ask questions about an event that really has been part of someone else's national history the Armenian genocide, Smyrna and we actually say this is part of a narrative of the war I think we are disrupting that narrative that privileges particular kinds of events in a context that have given us really the boundaries of how this war has existed and began and ended and I do think 1922 is a good moment for us to be disruptive with a narrative of the war that has been incredibly Eurocentric in its sensibilities and to allow us by talking about what's happening on the edges, what was once considered the edges and to center them and it allows us to get back to what this local regional context that there are other things happening and people are paying attention to them persons unmixing a population's idea does not come out of thin air it comes out of the context of engagement with these kinds of tragedies and Smyrna is not just one of many tragedies but I think we can really think of it as a sort of hallmark that is emblematic of the difficulties of thinking about a war that just won't and so I would really encourage us to not replicate this idea that the war narrative must fit within particular boundaries and privilege certain kinds of events and certain moments because we always have done it but what if we went from the perspective of national histories and said why do the Greeks care so much about Smyrna why do the Armenians care so much about the Armenian genocide what does that actually mean when we think about it in the larger narrative of the war and I think in that way we can in some ways disrupt which is I guess the language of the day disrupt, decolonize whatever it is our understanding of the war World War I as a European war and I think until we do that we're not really being honest with how we periodize this position so I would just encourage that kind of disruption and I love the idea of 1922 as a disruptive moment but I think that's absolutely valid, it speaks to you I think that's been the emerging theme which shows that even after two days new knowledge and new perspectives and this is definitely coming out but certainly even as a group I definitely concur with what you're saying about our own positionality in relation to the research we're doing because something comes from multiple which is a British colony whenever I study these topics I already automatically come at it either from a different perspective than perhaps some of my peers there and we try to see where do our biases and preconceptions and where are we finding those intersections so definitely agree with that so we've only got about five minutes and I want to leave you a chance to perhaps judge the space and find a word so what I would just do is last time and I had a great pleasure of saying the big thank you to you really and to the organizing team for putting together such a professional conference and such a rich program especially spread over two days it's been an absolute pleasure to participate and especially the doing it hybrid is extra challenging but it gave I took a lot of people the opportunity to participate and wouldn't have been able to otherwise so I hope this is only the start of many of these conversations certainly this side of the room are talking books already so there's a lot a lot of the air but you should you know all of us you should be thankful for everything you've done to put this together so one last slide and I was serious about the conference everything about the Greek Turkish where I too have got me thinking was from 1824 with a fire I was writing about the alternatives of the Greeks and he said history with all of our last knowledge has only plus one page so I hope we're going to be writing a new page on this topic and not just the same thing that's been said before so thank you for bringing us together for the chats to do this thank you so I think so okay well thanks everyone I just really want to thank any people for her magnificent help making this format work I really thank the 17 of you and those contributing it's been a challenge today technologically wise but I think we've made it work so this is great thank also to all of you for helping us out with the social media and I just really don't want any of course Anna thanks Anna is a writer and a student here at the Center for Hellenic Status for Hepinus II I'll just I'll say that our conversation will continue and you know we'll email you shortly about the next steps but you know the words we've expressed I mean in an island that actually bears the branch of the historical memory of this equation and kind of of these waves that's the island of Samus we'll be in touch with you shortly and thank you very much all for for this that's wonderful thank you


Cheerio, cheerio Israel won't stop to kill because if they do the whole world will turn their back on them and try to punish Netanyahu and his Laptop, I think the whole world's already turned on Israel Israel's done as a nation as far as I see it. It's going to be under blockades for Years decades.  I wrote I'm going to read this again.  So here's The article I'm about to read from right And this is sort of taking articles that I wrote From the mid 2000s putting all together compiling and getting some recent information coming around and I called this article I posted this article in 2014 Okay, and it's called and I've read this before I'm going to read it again Right synopsis of our present predicament what the future holds a final word And I wrote this article because I wanted this to be the last strictly geopolitical article that I was ever going to write because I'm not interested in Politics more than being able to just have a little justice in the world Have have less killing less murder less annihilation I think the best thing that could happen with society With the world is we have open trade across the globe where anyone Individuals can trade between each other and reduce government by 90 percent, right? That's my opinion All right, but this is what I wrote if you scroll all the way down.  So this is what I'm going to I'm going to read.  And then I continue with my article quote Why george carlin's words bring me comfort is because they imply that the problem has a solution Education hence my work on mathematics the alternative that we are aware of our history And are indifferent to it is unthinkable Since I have no desire to document the play by play symphony of carnage That is being unleashed and is to come and since I have said What needed to be said or as erin dotty roy would say quote I feel that I don't have anything Direct to say without repeating myself and quote We'll consider this post to be the introduction to politics on chicho And it will be the last strictly geopolitical discussion We have on this site for quite some time at least until russia china iran Or another formidable enemy of our choosing or making is duped into directly confronting nato Or until the next major false flag operation sends the world into a frenzy If you have any questions or concerns, please feel free to send me a message or post comments You can find additional information in the politics and economic sections of the table of contents Some of the more popular posts can be found in the right hand column of this site piece chicho, right?  You could see that coming in the mid-2000s right And in 2012 2014 I decided I don't want to write it. I don't want to document I don't want to I don't want to witness the symphony of carnage, right?  Not everyone.  To wage war on russia That's where we are. That's the summary of it