We'll begin with Dr. Briggs, please. Good morning. And oh, how I'd love to chat. But I've been informed that I have exactly 15 minutes. And based on the timing, I'm about at 16 or 17. So I'm going to proceed. So for nearly six years, I had the pleasure of working at US Africa Command. And my main function as a J2 social scientist was to closely observe, deduce, report, and offer recommendations on an array of topics that support Africa Command's objectives and priorities related to interoperability and the development of partnerships and relationships between US military and militaries in Africa and other countries. Basically, I was boots on the ground throughout austere, unclassified, non-kinetic engagements. And as a result of my work, I ate a lot of MREs. I drank a lot of water because soldiers told me again that it is the elixir of life. I inhaled Primo fine red dust until it hurt. I ran around with general field officers. And you can imagine what that was like. I got sun poisoning a few times. Lots of different types of food poisoning. I ate probably way too many Cipro, which cleaned your system out quite nicely, I'll add. I also listened to hundreds of stories. And I learned a lot of military acronyms and swear words. And in short, I became an adept and patient observer of important cultural exchanges. And it wasn't quite the same as in my earlier and probably more formative years in Africa in the mid 90s. At that time, I was a little bit different. I didn't have a battle buddy. I wore Birkenstocks. I had braids. And I wore one of those colorful African skirts. And I spent years on end with local populations. And I pretty much went native. I think either way you look at it, both of those things were complementary experience sex that helped inform the type of person and the way I see things now. I ended my tenure with Africa Command about two weeks ago. And I'm excited. It's a new venture for me. And I look forward to sort of continuing disseminating insights and lessons learned and sharing the important takeaways from my experiences at the command. This morning, I want to share the results of a small study, as I call it, done on women, peace, and security. The paper is titled Challenges and Opportunities in our Military's African Military Women's Perspectives. And for the sake of time, I've organized my presentation into three areas. I want to first tell you a little bit about the background of the study, give you some context. I want to summarize the key findings, of course. And I also want to touch on the so what, which is an important term, military and DOD, so what part of the study, to include some comments that reflects the nexus, I think, between the study and the conference theme. So moving forward with context, the anthropologist in me is a consummate observer. And when I began working with the Africa Command Women, Peace, and Security Working Group on the study, I sort of scribbled notes in one of my green books about the group. And I'm going to share what I wrote. Powerful group, dominated by high-ranking women, Ambassador Helen Reline, Dr. Barbara Sorteran, now retired Marine General Tracy Garrett, and a few smart folk who are the backbone and threat of continuity for the group. Very goal-centric. Think they know everything already. So even with that is to start with this very powerful group. Through continued participation and observation and a consultative process, we were able to agree on a study that I think builds on recent literature on women in African militaries, and there isn't much. And common understandings about women in African militaries derive from insights gleaned by those people in that working group, from conferences and other formal exchanges, like things like this, actually. I think the study was envisioned not so much to tell something that no one ever heard, but rather to validate or nuance what is already known. Again, they had the idea they already knew a lot, and that's OK. The objective of the study was to gain a deeper understanding of the issues, constraints, and concerns experienced by women in African militaries. And I think it represented a deliberate attempt as a research to feature African women's opinions and points of view. And I think in that sense, it moves away from mainstream analysis because it is narrative, descriptive, and qualitative, the key word. I think the study presumes, and if you read it, that you have to actually analyze and interpret the opinions yourself. And I think that's often an underutilized and marginalized approach in USG and DOD ways of understanding problem sets and understanding what is knowledge and what is information. But we did it anyway. I think that the findings and descriptors were meant to offer concepts and ideas that had utility. In other words, they were actionable, which is also an important difference. The results were designed for country team members in the countries that we focused on, which was Uganda and Liberia, to be able to incorporate them into their way, their doings, and their work. It was also designed to start as a sort of start point for future research and possibly in other countries, because after all, it was only two countries.  Time and funding were constraints, and you can refer to the paper for more on that. Still, we were able to talk with 82 people, with participants from government organizations, both US and African, African academics, and male and female members of African militaries in both Liberia and Uganda. And although non-African participants were included, the findings focus on African points of view and opinions, and women in particular, which I think is pretty unique. There were three broad guiding research questions, and I'm giggling to myself because I've actually gotten all this way without a PowerPoint, something I couldn't have done at the command. The first question is, what do female military personnel need and want to succeed in African militaries? And by that, we were talking about recruitment, retention, training, attitude, social, cultural, roadblocks, promotion policies, anything that we could get them to talk about. Secondly, what are the perceived benefits and gaps, value added, missed opportunities, and overall impact of US and other investments supporting women in African militaries? And finally, what lessons learned and best practice examples could we draw that would inform and improve US-Africa command, as well as the Women, Peace, and Security Working Group, as they tried to support women in African military? The findings. These are summaries. Again, I refer you to the paper because it's descriptive and so it has a lot of richness to it that I can't really share in my time. What we found through the background questions, not actually the key questions that, is that women had diverse and primarily pragmatic motives for joining the military. So women joined to secure a job. And their expectations then, their frustrations, the challenges, and the way that they made sense of their military experience were really linked to that pragmatic basic thing. I wanted a job. And I think it was important. It seems like, OK, yeah, of course. But if our mantra and what we're going for has to do with things like rights, when really women's messaging is about a job and access and security in a job, there might be a misalignment there if we're not careful and don't think through it. So I thought that that was important. It actually caught me by surprise when I realized that. The women in the study were frustrated, very frustrated. There were tears. There was angst. People stood up and marched around. And they articulated, both non-verbally and verbally, that they were angry about their experiences in the military. They were frustrated because they were not advancing in their respective careers. Many aspire to work in advance on a merit-based system, despite the reality that corruption is prevalent and widespread in their countries, as well as in their militaries. One story, one example. I won't do too many quotes. One officer noted, the chief of staff of the Coast Guard is a male. This is in Liberia. There is a female in the Coast Guard who has been there since the beginning of its creation. The female has a bachelor's degree in training. He is new to the job, and he does not have the same background as she has. Yet we saw him get promoted. Now she is training him and backing him up in the job. Another offered, women have been doing the work. We are always in the back supporting. If I am in the back and I am doing the work, why can't I be in the front? Another finding, most women believe there are deliberate and systemic roadblocks that undermine their access to training and promotion opportunities. They go hand in hand. No training, no promotion. These participants identified access to job training and promotion opportunities as their primary needs. So when we ask the question, what's your challenge? Those were the two biggies. In Liberia, however, they expressed a belief that women in the military have symbolic and political importance but are not valued for their skills and abilities. And that was pretty profound and pretty sad. And I have to share this quote, and I promise I won't keep doing this. They said, we females are used as big picture. What I mean is we get dressed in our BDUs, battle dress uniforms, and attend ceremonies. They get pictures of us on TV and talk about us. They use us to inspire when we are outside the barracks. People stop and talk to us. They love us. Another said, that is all we are, therefore. They use us to get people to join the army. We should not just be big picture. Being in the military should be a good thing for us. And that was a female captain's comment. Training and opportunity were common points of frustration for these participants. And I think that some of the gender disparities also have linkages to the civilian education system. And that's important to note, because DOD and the military can't fix that. That requires working with other aspects of US policy to sort of collaborate on it to fix the problem. I think that, though, if you read the study, the way the military overlooks women likely mirrors what happens in the civilian sector. I think that there are subtle and systemic mechanisms for inclusion mentioned in this study that can offer descriptions that can be used to sort of confront and maybe challenge some of these behaviors. And in terms of utility, that's the kind of fodder for training opportunities and scenarios, the kind of things that we share with others, because they're actually real. And the study offers material that can be used for that. Study participants, they want US Africa command and probably women peace and security to support them by advocating for better accountability, merit-based programs, equal opportunity, and training access. So that's the second research question and response. They want advocacy. The Liberian participants added, want a greater acknowledgement of their challenge and deep frustration related to the military's inability, their military's inability, to provide for their basic needs, lodging, sanitation, and health care. And while not related to the study, if you want people to focus on maritime security and terrorism, and you're not addressing their basic needs, they're probably not going to be very attentive partners, no matter how willing and capable they are. Basic needs matter, and it was clear that that was an issue for these women, and likely issues for people who are not women in the military. Some participants mentioned quota systems and alternative credentials to support women's success in the military. But like some of our folks here who talked earlier, most expect and prefer a merit-based system. They don't want special rules for them as women. They actually don't want that. Despite the challenges, women recognize and describe the value they bring to the military. So it wasn't all doom and gloom. Male and female participants detailed attributes, they believe they, women bring to the military setting. They actually argued for those. Nearly all participants acknowledged lingering negative stereotypes and stigma associated with women who served in the military, usually from outside people. Joining the military helped me because I became somebody. I have a career before joining. Some of us were not making a living, but now some of us are building houses. We are involved in businesses, and we can pay school fees for our children. Some of us are respected. People honor us in our towns. We are invited as speakers. I am a role model, and not everyone can be that. That's a female staff sergeant said that. Evidence exists that goals, policies, and rhetoric associated with external and internal international ideals about women, peace, and security issues have not adequately trickled down to most of the women who participated in this study. And there remain opportunities and interests in partner education and mutual exchanges on WPS issues. They don't know about 1325. They don't know the language. They don't know a lot of the verbiage that we use. They may have heard about some things on TV, but they don't really know. They don't necessarily disagree, but there's room there. WPS ideals often highlight women's inclusion and empowerment. However, participants in this study express that they are capable, and they gave example after example of their agency and their personal power. When asked what they wanted, they asked for assistance, brokering, accountability, and opportunities to advance that they had already identified for themselves. These participants are not experiencing a crisis of confidence, but rather a crisis of opportunities to compete. I think efforts to support these women can easily dovetail on their momentum, and they should. Efforts are more sustainable in my mind and in my experience when they come from within. So what? So what? Uganda and Liberia have approached the challenge of inclusion in their respective militaries. Each has a varied context, culture, and history that define and shapes its problem and solutions. I think there's more baseline research that we can get to further focus efforts to support WPS objectives in more countries. Baseline research could consider broad contextual data that include the number of women in each military, for example, their roles, both historic, cultural, and current, and identifying key women leaders in the military where applicable. And they usually know who those people are. Just have to ask them. The study notes important values, and I think it provides descriptive information about two countries, but descriptive nonetheless. And I believe assessments that should include NAP benchmarks and objectives that demonstrate progress informed by similarly diverse types of data. In other words, I think we need to move beyond checklists of what was accomplished, how many programs we did, how many countries were represented, and how many attendees we had, and focus on the impacts of the programs. And yes, we do that sometimes, but then I'm gonna say we need to go a step further and start looking at what the inputs mean from the perspective of the intended recipients. That is how change is sustained. The study suggests the need to assess whether efforts and messages align with target audiences. I think the study also includes the perspectives of women who serve both enlisted and officers, because they're not the same, and we all know that. Most have never had the opportunity to talk about their needs or to consider WPS issues. Future assessments, engagements should continue to seek new and diverse perspectives on what women need to succeed in their militaries. The source of feedback on WPS needs to consistently move beyond women or others selected to attend conferences and workshops, and those who are considered experts like myself to include everyday women from a range of ranks and occupations, look around us. Researchers engaging women in African militaries like myself will find that they're pretty animated. There is a lot of angst and anger. They're tired of talking. These women want action. Finally, with regard to the conference theme, constructing pathways, stimulating, and safeguarding components of women, peace, and security, I just have a few phrases that I think directly kind of align or at least give us something to think about as we consider the theme. The first advocacy and willingness are alive and well in women in so-called less developed countries. We don't have to give it to them. They have it. These women are experts, and they have expertise. We should include them. Not every woman needs to be empowered. Sometimes we just need to listen to them, identify their construct of what they need, use their terms, and advocate for them. We need to become the learners. We need to move beyond counting events, counting the numbers, talking about how many countries, and start counting the impacts and what those impacts mean to women and other key stakeholders who are the supposed benefactors of our efforts. And the final question, the critical person, critical analyst I am, I pose, and it's rhetorical, are we in the business of doing WPS on and for women, or are we doing it with and through them? And I'll stop there. Thank you. Thank you very much, Dr. Briggs. Mr. Prescott. On behalf of my co-authors, Dr. Aiko Awada, National Institute for Defense Studies, Japanese Ministry of Defense, Dr. Becca Pincus, US Coast Guard Academy, ladies, if you would raise your hands. We want to thank you for being invited here today to address this conference on a subject that's very important to us. In terms of identifying constructive pathways to foster increased protection of women and girls in armed conflict, it would be hard to find a more appropriate venue at which to address the imminent Japanese National Action Plan and its importance to the growing relationship between the Japanese self-defense forces and Western military forces than here at the Navy Boer College in Newport, Commodore Perry's final resting place. We admire and we are mindful of the great work being done in so many places to meaningfully implement the Security Council resolution that has brought us together in large part, mindful of the history that got us there, Ambassador. In fact, we're mindful and we admire the work that's done by so many of you who are with us in this room today. We, however, take a glass, have empty approach. In our assessment of Western military implementations of National Action Plans and their equivalents, we do not do this to lessen what has been accomplished, but rather to emphasize how much farther we still have to go. This is the gist of our presentation today. Japan faces two very important security challenges today. The growing assertiveness of China and the decrease in vital cohorts of the Japanese population. We note, first of all, that no Western National Action Plan of which we are aware requires militaries to apply UN Security Council Resolution 1325 in the kinetic portions of kinetic operations. Instead, Western implementation has it most focused on those areas where human rights and the law of armed conflict have commonality, such as the prevention of sexual violence against protected persons. Further, despite significant progress in implementing Western National Action Plans in these areas of overlap, from our perspective, they all have characteristics at this point in time that keeps them from being models for the implementation by the Japanese National Self-Defense Forces of the Japanese National Action Plan when it is published. From our perspective as outsiders, there appear to be significant gaps in the DOD's implementation of the US National Action Plan. First, the training for military personnel appears to take a very narrow approach to focusing on avoiding trafficking in women. This is, of course, important, but it focuses on off-duty personal activities rather than on-duty operational matters. We worry that this could tend to marginalize the effect of US implementation. Second, at the moment, strategic-level, human-centric operational doctrine simply fails to address the requirements of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 in terms of armed conflicts differentiated and more severe impact on women and girls. Third, the US appears to have not mainstreamed in doctrine the lessons learned from the employment of female engagement teams or the cultural support teams or the women's initiative training teams have been used in Afghanistan. From my perspective, such teams are likely crucial or would be crucial if they were better resourced and supported to developing a useful collection system for sex and gender-disaggregated data, which, of course, is the bedrock for meaningful operational analysis that's gonna be of any use to commanders. Becca and I are particularly interested in the environmental components of national security and the similar failure to include the agriculture development teams with their gender-differentiated approach to sustainability troubles us. Why? These are National Guard assets. These are not active-duty military assets and we worry that they're marginalized despite the very important role that they have played. Likewise, we see troubling gaps in NATO's implementation by strategic command directive 40-1. First, we assess that it relies too heavily on gender advisors as the means to accomplish transformation in thinking about women and girls in the battle space or gender men streaming in an operational sense. Second, it tasks gender advisors with assignments that simply are not realistic to accomplish the transformation they are expected to achieve. Third, because of the great variety of the force composition, focus, and doctrine of the different troop contributing nations, we fear that its implementation is and will be uneven for the foreseeable future throughout the Alliance. Empirical assessments of NATO gender mainstreaming and operations have found little evidence that it has been meaningfully implemented, but NATO continues to drive forward with a plan that appears to focus on areas of human rights law and the law of armed conflict where they have things in common rather than also embracing the kinetic parts of kinetic operations in order to achieve the full realization of the promise of UN Security Council Resolution 1325. Although the U.S. is the largest troop and equipment provider in the Alliance, it is difficult to see at this point in time how NATO's efforts and the scheme that NATO has come up with, in fact, would translate into the U.S. force structure or into doctrine. Captain Whitworth, Lieutenant Colonel Lawson, we are impressed with the deliberate and comprehensive manner in which the Australian Defense Force is implementing the Australian National Action Plan. The Australians have achieved what appears to us to be a broad consensus at the highest levels of both the civilian and military leadership to move forward on these tasks. Importantly, they have put into place clearly identifiable and fairly transparent bodies and processes to keep the momentum going as they move forward. Importantly, there also appears to be accountability. The ADF, in fact, appears to be outpacing its original planning on how comprehensive its review of doctrine and operations was going to be. But at this point in time, we believe it is perhaps too soon to measure effectiveness empirically in terms of the Australian efforts. We note that the drivers for change, similar to those in the U.S. and parts of NATO, are perhaps even more pronounced than Australia because of the very high level of attention being paid to gender equality in the ADF. Importantly, for purposes of our paper, these drivers are not present in Japan at this point in time, and this makes a big difference in terms of implementation. Women do play an important role in Japanese self-defense forces day-to-day work. However, their numbers are fairly low and although technically eligible for all military positions, different policies and customs in practice keep this from occurring. We cannot separate our consideration of the role of women in Japanese society today from the role of women in the Japanese self-defense forces. To address the need for more Japanese workers in the economy and in government, the administration of Prime Minister Abe is pushing hard to increase their level of participation and this, of course, has a ripple effect into the JSDF. The imminent Japanese National Action Plan should be viewed fairly as part of this effort, although, of course, feminist Japanese civil society organizations played an important role in jump-starting this process. How might we best develop constructive pathways within the Western militaries to bridge potential gaps between Western implementations and what Japan does? In terms of the Japanese NAP, in our paper we have provided a description of the evolving draft of the Action Plan as it stands at this point in time. It is important to note that its objectives and measures are consistent with current Japanese self-defense force missions, which internationally generally take the form of participation in peacekeeping operations and humanitarian assistance after natural disasters. Japan, of course, has a constitution that only allows it to use force and self-defense. The administration of Prime Minister Abe is also pushing to allow Japanese self-defense forces greater flexibility in responding to threats and self-defense, but these changes have not yet occurred. Our best information is that the Japanese National Action Plan might be released in August or September. We will not know exactly what the implementation requirements of the Japanese self-defense forces will be, obviously, until that time when it becomes public when it's promulgated. So, if we are correct in our assessment at this point in time that the Western models for various reasons are not good fits for Japanese self-defense force implementation, what will actual implementation really look like? Might it use some facets of Western implementation as part of the solution, if not a whole-scale adoption of any particular Western model? We remain concerned that a sufficient empirical basis for the operational relevance of gender has not been developed. Sure, there are legal and policy drivers for gender mainstreaming, and we reasonably expect that it's relevant in the field of operations, but until we can show that it actually does make a difference in the field in a measurable way, whether we're using quantitative means or qualitative means standing as proxies for them, we will not fully realize the promise of UN Security Council Resolution 1325. Part of this should be broadening the implementation of gender-related measures into the areas of law of armed conflict that are not shared with human rights, and by this I mean the application of kinetic force. For now, even though we believe that Western implementation models are not likely useful for Japanese self-defense force implementation, we do see an opportunity. We chose the woodblock print on the first slide, America, to emphasize that when different cultures engage in a new area, lasting impressions are formed that color the developing relationship for a long time. We think potentially that gender is such an area with regard to the Japanese self-defense forces. We see an opportunity for Japan's Western allies to constructively begin tracing pathways of understanding in the implementation of gender considerations and combined operations and missions, pathways that perhaps lead toward a greater role for women in the Japanese self-defense forces over time. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you again for the opportunity to present to this important conference. I, Gossan, Becca, and I look forward to your questions. Thank you very much.