My name is John Bell, I'm the Director of the Centre for Public Law and it's my pleasure to welcome you on behalf of the law faculty to this Sir David Williams lecture. The Sir David Williams lecture series was started in 2001 to celebrate the contribution to legal scholarship and to legal life of Sir David Williams. Sir David was an eminent public lawyer who specialized in the control of public power. He was one of the founders of modern administrative law and he was also passionate about civil liberties. His interest was not just in broad principles or slogans but was involved in careful attention to the practical steps needed to secure real liberty in practice. From being Rouseball Professor and President of Wolfson College Sir David moved to be the first full time vice chancellor of this university. And in his retirement he was energetic in raising funds for the university, for law and for the Squire Law Library. But he was equally energetic in his support and encouragement of younger scholars. We're very glad to have today Lady Sally Williams and her daughters to celebrate his achievements. We're also very grateful to Mr John Nolan, Ms Michael Ross who have helped fund this lecture and who unfortunately cannot be with us this evening. It's very fitting that our speaker Professor Jeremy Waldron is delivering the lecture tonight. His passionate commitment to genuine liberal democracy is apparent from his work. Professor Waldron has written and published extensively in political theory and jurisprudence. He's written on general aspects of political liberalism in his works on the right to property, liberal rights and god, lock and equality. But he's also had the courage to challenge practices in the United States which sully the standing of liberal democratic society. In particular his essays in 2010 are entitled Torture, Terror and Trade Offs, Philosophy for the White House. His interest in the proper conduct of liberal government fits with Sir David's attention to the detailed arrangements for governing society. And his works on law and disagreement and dignity of legislation are testimony to his careful attention of how legislators should conduct themselves. Professor Waldron is the Chichily Professor of Social and Political Theory and a Fellow of All Souls College. For 2011 and 2012 he will hold this position in conjunction with a professorship at New York University. But he's been in this post only for a very short while. He was born and educated in New Zealand and you will tell that from his accent. We won't say anything about the rugby which may link him even more to Sir David Williams. He was educated at the University of Otago and then studied for his doctorate under Professor Ronald Dworkin at the same time as I was doing but in different faculties. He taught in Oxford at Lincoln College where he was a fellow from 1980 to 1982 and then was a lecturer at the University of Edinburgh before moving to the United States in 1987 as Professor of Law in the Jurisprudence and Social Policy programme in the School of Law at the University of California Berkeley. He's therefore well known across the world as a champion of liberalism. His topic for tonight is how law protects dignity. A liberal society must treat the human person as valuable in their own right. Whether that person occupies a high social position or is homeless, whether that person is law-abiding or a suspected or proven terrorist, the topic is a challenge for modern societies across a wide range of fields from police and military law to medical law and childcare. It's therefore my great pleasure to invite Professor Jeremy Waldron to give this year's Sir David Williams lecture. Thank you. It's a great honour to be invited to give a lecture in this series celebrating the life and work of Sir David Williams. It's a huge pleasure to be here in Cambridge, which I've lived in the UK for a long, long time. I was saying to some colleagues earlier this afternoon, I think I've only ever spent about two weeks in Cambridge, so it's a huge pleasure to be here. It was a particular pleasure to get to meet Lady Williams at lunch today, and I pass on my greetings to her. I would like to thank John Bell not only for his kind introduction, but for making the arrangements for this. It's been a very easy task to organise the details of this occasion. So my topic is the way in which law protects dignity. The most obvious way is that law protects dignity by proclaiming and enforcing specific norms that prohibit attacks on it. So some of these norms, I've mentioned one of them on the song sheet that you have here. The Common Article III of the Geneva Conventions prohibits, among other things, outrages upon human dignity, and that's very clear to us because it uses the word. But other provisions of international law and human rights law protect dignity even when they use slightly different words like the prohibition on degrading treatment and punishment plainly that is intended to protect dignity. We could easily spend a session like this, and I would love to, debating and discussing what degrading treatment has come to mean, for example in Article III of the European Convention and in the jurisprudence associated with that. But in my lecture today I want to do something different and talk about some less obvious ways in which law protects dignity, but ways which are deeper, more pervasive and more intimately connected with the very nature of law itself. Because when you look at Common Article III of the Geneva Conventions or Article III of the European Convention on Human Rights, it may strike you as a matter of historical contingency that dignity is protected under these provisions. Sure, we could argue politically that any worthwhile bill or charter of human rights ought to protect dignity as an important value, but it's notorious that at the level of positive law many bills of rights omit things that ought to have been included and include things that ought to have been omitted. There is no mention of dignity, for example, in the United States Constitution, and to the extent that the ideal has had any influence at all in American constitutional law, it's had to be, for example, an Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, it has had to be important as judge made doctrine, and that too is historically contingent, not to say vulnerable as Justice Thomas would say to passing fads and fashions. Some people have suggested not only that dignity ought to be protected as a human right, but the dignity is itself the ground of rights, it's the premise of rights, it's the basis from which all our human rights flow. The international covenant on civil and political rights, and I've quoted a piece from the preamble there under heading 2, the preamble begins with the acknowledgement that the rights contained in the covenant derive from the inherent dignity of the human person. That's a common theme in philosophical discussions too, particularly recent philosophical discussions of human rights. Even if this is not a connection between dignity and law as such, it's a connection between dignity and a whole area of law, namely the area of human rights law. Some people have remarked that, maybe in a more skeptical spirit, that dignity is just a word we use, and use relatively indiscriminately whenever we are engaging in human rights talks. So it's no accident that it turns up all over the area in the content of the provisions and the preamble to the provisions and a lot of the jurisprudence associated with the provisions and in judicial declarations of various sorts. In a very influential paper published in 2008, my Oxford colleague Christopher McCrudden remarked that dignity, the word dignity, operates mainly as a placeholder for the absence of agreement in human rights discourse. So that in this preamble it's evident that the framers of the international covenant wanted to say something very, very solemn and serious about human rights. But they couldn't agree exactly what it was that they wanted to say, but dignity works perfectly well. It sort of can mean all things to all men and can therefore occupy this role as a placeholder. Maybe that's overly pessimistic, but it does alert us to the fact that dignity may not necessarily be a load-bearing idea. I think it is, but I am conscious of this alternative possibility. A term that is pervasive is always in danger of platitudeness. Nys is always in danger of becoming a platitud. And if we are tracing the pervasiveness of dignity, we must take care that we are not just on the trail of some meaningless, embedded, rhetorical bombast. So we need to despair that in mind as a sort of alternative possibility. So everybody needs definitions. What do I mean by dignity? What is it that we are supposed to be tracking in its relation to law? It's notoriously difficult to define, but I've taken a stab at it under heading three on the sheet there. Dignity, in my view, is a sort of status concept. It has to do with the standing, perhaps the formal legal standing, or perhaps more informally, and perhaps more informally, the moral standing, the moral presence that a person may have in a society, or in his or her dealings with others, or in his or her dealings with the state. So what I mean by the term that I ask about the various ways in which law protects, recognises, vindicates, promotes human dignity is something like this. Dignity is the status of a person. That means that she, I'm going to use a feminine pronoun that obviously is supposed to apply to men as well. Dignity is the status of a person that means that she is recognised as having the ability to control and regulate her actions in accordance with her own apprehension of norms and reasons that apply to her. It means that she is capable of giving and entitled to give an account of herself and of the way in which she is regulating her actions and organising her life and account that others are bound to pay attention to. And it's a status that means that she may reasonably demand that her agency and her presence among us as a human being must be taken seriously and must be accommodated in the lives of others and other people's attitudes and actions towards her and in social and political life generally. Now it's a rough definition and I don't want too much to hang on it. And I imagine that if one were writing a treatise on dignity one would want to add volumes to that definition. I'm not sure that one would want to take anything away from it and that's basically what I want to emphasise here. I can deduce no canonical provenance for this definition but it's not simply a stipulation in the way that Humpty Dumpty stipulated a meaning for glory. I believe that the definition I've given captures much that is already present in our ordinary usage of dignity. But just before we go on to the main line of our inquiry let me remind you of one way at least in which it's controversial. I'm using dignity as a status idea rather than as a value idea. It was used as a value idea by Emanuel Kant in the groundwork of the metaphysics of morals where it appeared to refer to a certain kind of value beyond price. Something might have value in which case we could trade it for something of equivalent value. But certain things he said have dignity which meant that they couldn't be traded for anything of any price. They were non-fungible with other values and they were in a sense infinitely precious. I think that's a very important idea but I'm not really sure that that's what we want to convey with dignity. Even in ordinary language dignity has a connection with bearing the way you hold yourself, the way you present yourself to others. We talk about allowing people to present a dignified presence to other people and much of the work that we do, for example with regard to degrading treatment has to do with various ways in which the law might interfere with that. So I want to distinguish myself. Nothing much hangs on this but I want to distinguish myself from the sort of enterprise that I would be undertaking if I were working in the Kantian tradition. 12 years after the publication of the groundwork Kant wrote again about dignity in the Doctrine of Virtue which is the second part of his late work, the metaphysics of morals. Everything seems to have metaphysics in its title with Kant but this is not the groundwork of the metaphysics of morals but the metaphysics of morals. And there he spoke of dignity much more in terms of status. He talked of the respect that a person can exact as a human being from every other person and that respect is no longer simply the quivering or excited in a person by his own moral capacities which is what you find in the groundwork and in the second critique for example but a genuine making room for another on the basis of sure thought and equality and an acting towards other people as though he or she too were one of the ultimate ends to be taken into account. That's more a sort of status spin on the Kantian idea and I'm more comfortable with that. My definition doesn't directly capture all the work that dignity does in law. I mentioned rules against degrading treatment and outrageous upon personal dignity in the Geneva Conventions. And those are sometimes used as I said to vindicate elementary aspects of adult self-presentation. Care of self, taking care of elementary physical needs and so on and to protect against forms of humiliation impinging on this interest. So a person's dignity is affronted when they are left lying naked in their own urine for example in a cell at Guantanamo Bay or when torture or other maltreatment induces a sort of regression into an infantile state. People have lost control of the most elemental provisions of their own self-presentation and I think this is a connected idea cognate with my definition via this notion of being recognised and treated as a being capable of self-control, as a being capable of conforming action to norms and being able to present a genuine adult presence in society. And so too we might consider the doctrine in European Convention jurisprudence which holds that it is degrading to parade criminals or suspects and shackles, chains, in the way that we routinely do in the United States. It's degrading to parade criminals or suspects and shackles unless they pose a clear and immediate danger to themselves or others. Again this requirement is connected to the idea that we must treat people in principle unless there is compelling evidence to the contrary that they are capable of self-control. People are not to be treated leashed, held back like wild animals but are to be allowed to present themselves in public even in the most fraught circumstances. This we shall see is very important towards the end of what I'm going to say today when I want to talk in section 10 on the topic of dignified coercion which might strike you as an oxymoron but I'm going to try to argue that it's something we should take very seriously. There are many aspects of the proper treatment of people that have little or nothing to do with dignity on my account. I believe that our basic duty to respect and sustain human life duty to refrain from killing, for example. Important though it is, is not really connected with dignity. I think little or nothing is gained by adding to the preciousness or sacredness of human life some sort of dignitarian idea. I know that in the Roman Catholic literature in natural law jurisprudence and in some bioethics literature human dignity is used just in the sense of the special worth or sacredness of human life and so people talk about the dignity of embryos or they talk about the dignity of stem cells or they talk about the dignity of human life in relation to practices like abortion and so on. In my view the problem with this account is not the political implications that it has the problem with this account is not the theological background that it evokes. The problem is that it appropriates the term dignity to do work that worth or sacred worth might do just as well and distracts us from these other aspects of presence and presentation that seem to me to be done and importantly done under the auspices of the way the phrase is used. Now look again at the definition I've given when you read it I hope the sense in which law inherently promotes dignity may begin to become apparent and I have to acknowledge that I tailored this definition for the purposes of the lecture. So we talk about a person capable of giving and entitled to give an account of herself and I want that to convey an image of something like a litigant or a defendant who is not just hauled before the call and subject to a determination but is given a moment to speak to induce evidence to make arguments on his or her behalf. That's the sort of idea that I want to pursue in this lecture. Dignity I think although it is a pervasive idea and goes beyond the law it hooks up in obvious ways with juridical ideas about hearings and due process and status to sue and the basic aim of what I'm going to say here this evening is to elaborate those connections and make them explicit. Here's a preliminary foray. At the beginning of the lecture I considered the idea of a specific right to dignity. Then a few minutes later I considered the idea commonly expressed in the preambles of major human rights instruments where dignity might be the ground of every human right. A third possible connection is that the very form and structure of a right the very idea of having a right being the holder of a right conveys an idea of the right bearer's dignity. This will be familiar to some of the philosophers and jurors prudes in the room and explicitly so in what is known as the choice theory of rights once advanced by Professor HLA Hart Hart believed that having a legal or a moral right was not just a matter of being the object of legal or moral concern. He rejected what is sometimes known as the benefit or the interest theory of rights. He favoured instead the description of the right bearer as having a power to determine what another person's duty should be or having the power to determine what another person should have to do about the duty that they owed to him. So, as he said, the right bearer is morally in a position and often legally in a position to determine by his choice how the duty bearer shall act. The right bearer can choose to sue or not to sue. The right bearer can choose to waive the right or enforce the right. The right bearer has a certain sort of little local sovereignty over another person's moral or legal position. Hart developed this argument first for natural rights but he thought at least for a while that it was true of legal rights although he began to tipto away from this position in the 1980s. Something similar can be found in the American philosopher Joel Feinberg's account of rights as claims. To have a right in law is to possess the dignity of a recognised claimant so that when you make a claim for a certain form of treatment or a claim to a certain amount of good you just simply say, well what is that to us? Why should we take any notice of this? A recognised claimant is a one who can insist that a claim be heard and responded to. So, to the extent that rights are pervasive in law the recognition and respect that claimants are entitled to as such is going to be a pervasive aspect of law's commitment to dignity that is we insist on the dignity of somebody who has been able to stand up unapologetically for their own interests and to a certain extent control use their own free will to control what society and what other people have to do about those interests. It's sometimes said that we can imagine law without rights. I think that's false. Even if heart is wrong about rights generally I think any legal system will characteristically and not just contingently establish and respect individual positions that have the features that heart's theory or Feinberg's theory attribute to rights. For example, law will recognise potential plaintiffs and defer to their dignity, their standing in allowing them to make decisions about whether some norm violator is to be taken to task or not. It's even more evidently false if my colleague Ronald Dworkin is right in the basic rights thesis that he set out years ago in his book Taking Rights Seriously amidst the plethora of other propositions Dworkin argued that when you go to law when you come in as a plaintiff and make some claim or as a petitioner you don't just enter the courtroom in a lobbying mode you don't just try to convince the court that it would be a rather good idea for you to have this money paid for you or this remedy given to you. You walk in in the mode of somebody with an entitlement and it may not mean that you're entitled to bang the desk but you are demanding something for which you have a right. You are holding your head high and insisting that your presence and your claims must be taken seriously and if need be, peremptorily in the determination of what others are to do. So in those ways the very being of the very nature of litigation the very sense in which people inaugurate and pursue claims at law pays some sort of tribute to the way their dignity is recognised these are people, the law doesn't often work certainly private law doesn't work on its own motion it is put in motion by plaintiffs who have the power and the authority to pursue things in this way. Of course their claims may be false or controversial but the controversy is a controversy about entitlement not just the controversy about what it would be a rather good idea to do so there is all of that but I want to go even more deeply and more closely to the concept of law in this so in section 5 which as you see is entitled Fuller and Raz guiding action and the dignity of self-application famously in a book based on his 1963 stores lectures the morality of law the American jurist Lon Fuller developed an account of what he called the inner morality of law the inner morality of law insisted that laws must be phrased in general terms they must be clear they must be reasonably stable they must be prospective and they must actually determine what officials do and he said that these principles the observance of these principles is bound up with the basics of legal craftsmanship it's going to be some internal gossip here which those of you who are uninterested in controversies and jurisprudence can take a little nap but those like my friend Professor Cramer over there who are interested in these matters may want to be alert to positivist legal philosophers beginning with HLA Hart have sometimes expressed bewilderment as to why Fuller called these internal principles of prospectivity and generality clarity and so on why did he call them a morality I think this bewilderment is disingenuous and I said so in an article about Hart published in the New York University Law Review in 2008 Fuller called these internal principles a morality because he thought they had inherent moral significance it's not only that he believed that observing them made it more difficult to do injustice something that Professor Cramer has contested not only that but that he did believe it was also because he thought observing these principles of generality, prospectivity clarity and so on was a way of respecting human dignity he said this to embark on the enterprise of subjecting human conductor rules involves of necessity a commitment to the view that man is or man can become a responsible agent capable of understanding rules and following them and answerable for his defaults when you communicate a rule you've tried to communicate a rule to a dog you can't do it you can communicate a rule to a human being you are treating that human being as having a certain agency a certain ability to understand things and control action accordingly and he went on every departure every departure from the principles of laws internal morality is an affront to man's dignity as a responsible agent to judge his actions by unpublished laws or retrospective laws or to order him to do actions that are impossible is to convey to him your indifference to his powers of self-determination that are so important to dignity and not just platitudes Fuller is referring here to a very specific aspect of law in my view widely neglected in jurisprudence which is laws general reliance on what American legal philosophers have called self-application that is laws are addressed to people and the primary application of the laws is by the ordinary people themselves to whom the law is addressed self-application extraordinary extraordinarily important feature of the way in which legal systems operate they work by using rather than short-circuiting they work by using rather than short-circuiting the agency of ordinary individuals they count on people's capacities for practical understanding they count on the fact that they are communicating rules to beings capable of self-control beings capable of memory beings capable of internalising rules beings capable of self-monitoring which is monitoring how their behaviour is at a given moment in relation to given circumstances and beings capable of the moderation and modulation of their behaviour in response to their self-monitoring and their understanding of the rule from traffic laws to tax laws from property to criminal law self-application is absolutely crucial we don't have anything remotely like the power that would be required for the forceful application of laws to people the law relies on self-application and laws are primarily communicated to people on the basis that they will engage in self-application I don't mean that you can do whatever you like with the rules that are given to you there are chaps there are police there are tax auditors plaintiffs who will respond if they think you are not self-applying the laws in the appropriate way and disputes will break out about this but by and large at every moment in your driving and whatever dates are laid down for the return of your income tax returns in almost every aspect of criminal law and almost every aspect of private law we rely on self-application not only that but in constitutional law I need self-application now of the officials to whom the laws are addressed even when the self-application of general norms is not possible and institutional determinations are necessary either because of disputes about application or because application inherently requires an official determination so laws about divorce cannot be self-applied I can't do anything to make myself divorced I have to await an official determination and when there are conflicts sometimes we have to have official determinations even when the application of laws is done by an official body still the particular orders that are issued look towards self-application in their turn unsuccessful defendants in private law litigation are expected themselves voluntarily to pay the damages that have been decreed rare is the case where the bailiffs come up and take the property from them I don't mean to deny the ultimately coercive character of law as I said I'm going to come back to that under section 10 say much more about that but even in criminal cases where the coercive element is front and centre it is often the case that we rely on individuals to anticipate in their own actions the coercion that is being applied to take him down when the criminal turns around and goes with his waters usually have to be dragged you will be taken to a place of execution they say in the United States but usually people walk to their execution in the United States I'm not sure whether this is true in England where somebody is sentenced to a imprisonment say in federal prison often a date is set for them to turn up at the prison gates to begin their sentence occasionally people go AWOL and have to be tracked down and seized and dragged kicking and screaming to prison but the vast majority of convicted defendants simply turn up at the appropriate date and present themselves at the prison gates the law strains as far as possible to look for ways of enabling voluntary application of its general norms and voluntary application of its specific decrees all of this makes ruling by law forcing law quite different from say herding cows with a cattle prod or directing a fluff of sheep with a dog it's quite different too from eliciting a reflex recoil with a scream of command this pervasive emphasis on self application is in my view definitive of law differentiating it sharply from systems of government that work primarily by either manipulation or terrorism or galvanising behaviour in various ways and as fuller recognisers all of this represents a decisive commitment by law to the dignity of human individual and unposes a discipline in the way that law works because you can't work through self application unless the norms are properly communicated in a form that can be self applied there's something of this recognition too in my former mentor Joseph Ryers's famous article from 1977 on the rule of law where he connects the rule of law to law's action guiding character which is essentially the same notion and relates that in turn to the idea of dignity he says observance of the rule of law is necessary if the law is to respect human dignity respecting human dignity entails treating humans as persons capable of planning their future now I should add that Ryers now repudiates in the interest in dignity when I cited this in a paper that was circulated to you and recently he sent me an email and said hi Jeremy good to hear from you on page one of your circulated paper you imply that I said something about dignity without criticising the notion if I did I have to repent but I still hope that I did not and when I reminded him that indeed he had in fact he had said an awful lot about dignity without criticising the notion he replied terrible I repent so we can put Ryers in the category of those who think that talk of Ryers now rhetorical bombast but just as we refer to Hart's choice theory of rights even though he repudiated that in the 1980s so we can refer to Rass's theory about the connection between the rule of law and dignity even though he's now grumpy and impatient with the concept I'm going to omit what I have under 5a but I do want to mention the point under 5b it is tempting to say that law can guide conduct only if it is determinate that is only if it takes the form of rigid rules like speed limits or limits on tax deductions or things like that but it's remarkable of course that law doesn't always or even often present itself in terms of rules but it often presents itself in terms of standards using terms like reasonable you must take reasonable care in tort law or you must drive at a reasonable speed or pay reasonable attention to road conditions when you are driving and we communicate those standards to people their standards rather than rules because they use open ended evaluative terms that require not just perception but judgment on behalf of the person and it's tempting and a lot of my colleagues in the business foster this temptation to say that these norms phrased in that way are hopeless until some judge pins down the meaning of reasonableness for us in particular circumstances I don't believe that I believe what the law does is communicate these standards to us mindful of the fact that we have the ability to engage in complex evaluative thinking and we can put that ability to work in the self application of the law again there may be a problem if there are cultural reasons why for example my estimate of reasonable speed will be different from a police officer's estimate of reasonable speed cases like this have arisen in the American West but for the most part people seem to be able to cope with these standards and to administer them judiciously and again I think this is another aspect of human dignity the law credits us with the intelligence and the thoughtfulness to be able to apply these standards it doesn't just insist that the only forms of self application that we can participate in are the self application of mechanically phrased rules an important additional way in which law respects the indignity of those who are governed is in the provision that it makes for trials or hearings where an official determination is necessary and I want to talk a little bit now about procedure a legal system is not just a set of general norms officially recognised and applied to individual cases we call a mode of government law an account not only of the existence of rules but an account of the distinctive way in which official applications are conducted law is applied by courts not just by bureaucrats by which by courts I mean institutions certainly devoted to settling disputes about the applications of norms but I also mean institutions that do that through the medium of hearings formal events tightly structured procedurally in order to enable an impartial tribunal to determine the rights and responsibilities of particular people fairly and effectively after hearing evidence and argument from both sides it's a hearing it's not just a determination in which case the tribunal listens the tribunal doesn't just speak and that listening aspect is a huge tribute to the dignity of the people that law is dealing with it is remarkable this is another bit of jurisprudential gossip it is remarkable how little there is about courts in the conceptual accounts of law presented in modern positivist jurisprudence in his book famous book The Concept of Law HLA Hart tells us that a legal system is a union of primary and secondary rules primary rules of conduct secondary rules of change secondary rules of recognition and secondary rules of application and that's about as close as he gets to the idea of courts he says secondary rules of verification empower certain individuals to make authoritative determinations of the question of whether on a particular occasion a primary rule has been broken but his account defines the relevant institution simply in terms of their output function they take a dispute and they resolve it in the way that a king might resolve a dispute among two peasants the making of authoritative determinations of whether a primary rule has been broken there's nothing on the distinctive processes by which this function is performed for all that Hart says a star chamber proceeding ex party without any sort of hearing would satisfy the definition so with the tribunals that we call in the antipodes kangaroo courts so for that matter would a minister of police rubber stamping a secret decision to have somebody executed for violating a secret command all of these would satisfy Hart's definition of adjudication outside the hallowed halls of academic positivism I suspect most ordinary people and I suspect most people in this room would regard hearings and due process as essential rather than contingent elements of the institutional arrangements we call legal systems it's one of the most distinctive things not just that legal systems involve the presence and communication of general rules but legal systems involve hearings and processes rigidly controlled proceedings by which determinations are made maybe we don't want to be too essentialist about details in general jurisprudence which is a study of law as such our concept of a court and a hearing is necessarily rather abstract and there are many differences between proceedings that are used and I don't know British in the English legal system proceedings that are used in the French legal system and the proceedings that are used in the Chinese legal system and so on still the concept of a court is essential and it's not just the concept of a law enforcement agency it would be quite wrong even in general jurisprudence even in the most general jurisprudence to abstract away from the elements of process presentation formality, impartiality evidence and argument the basic idea as I said is procedural the operation of a court involves a way of proceeding which offers to those who are immediately concerned an opportunity to make submissions and present evidence in an orderly form the mode of presentation may vary the order of presentation may vary but the existence of such an opportunity does not and once presented the evidence is then made available to be examined and scrutinised and confronted by the other party and of course of all of this both sides are not only treated respectfully but above all are listened to by the tribunal which is bound in some manner to attend to the evidence presented and to respond to the submissions that are made in the reasons that it eventually gives for its decision these are abstract characteristics but they're not arbitrary abstractions they capture a very deep and important sense associated I believe foundationally with the idea of a legal system that law is a mode of governing people that acknowledges those people have a view of their own to present they people have a perspective of their own which they want to publicly put forward concerning their conduct and concerning the application of some norm to their conduct and situation in other words law proceeds on the basis that applying a norm to an individual is not like deciding what to do about a rabid animal or like deciding what to do about a dilapidated and deserted house which elicits an official determination but we don't as it were listen to the house's point of view or the rabid dog's point of view but when we deal with people we insist on recognising the dignity of a being that has a perspective of its own to present as such that embodies what I think of as a crucial dignitarian idea and it's back there in the definition of rejecting the dignity of those to whom norms are applied as beings capable of explaining themselves as beings capable of explaining themselves and whose explanations are not for purely private consumption indeed and this is another point along the same lines it's not just a matter of Audi, Outer Room, Parton I think it's part of our concept of law that legal positions are sustained or defeated as a matter of argument and by that I don't just mean an abstract series of propositions, I mean the activity of argumentation argument by council for each side and responsive argument rather than just parameterary decision at the level of the tribunal making its determination this I believe contributes yet another strand to law's respect to human dignity law presents itself to its subjects as something you can make sense of not just one damned thing after another it's the first command the second command is the millionth command and the millionth and first command but that you can make sense not just of each command as you might do with some doctrine of legislative purpose but you can make sense of the big picture and that people are capable along with their legal representatives of conceiving an account of how their relation to the particular norm that is at issue in the case can be presented if you screw your eyes up in a certain way and argue for 10 or 30 or 50 minutes can be presented in light of a particular conception maybe an idiosyncratic conception but again one for public consumption about how their the sense that they make of the law fits with the sense that they make of their position in this way too then law pays attention and pays respect to the people who live under it conceiving them as they bearers of reason and intelligence conceiving of them as the bearers of reason and intelligence the individuals whose lives law governs are treated by it as thinkers who can grasp and grapple with the rationale of their governance and related in complex but intelligible ways to their own view of a relation between their actions and the actions and purposes of the state so those are a couple of procedural ways in which it seems to me that that's essence law respects people as dignified beings capable of presenting and explaining themselves let's try a different tack in an article published in 2007 and in my 2009 Tanner lectures at Berkeley I argued that we should pay attention to the ancient connection between dignity and rank to indignity and rank in Roman usage dignitas embodied the idea of the honour, the privileges, the powers and the deference due to rank or office so somebody might have the dignity of pontifex maxims or the dignity of a general and the dignity might be a combination of the office and of their particular fflair in exercising it and in English this too was the original meaning of the word dignity as in the 1399 Statute that took the crown away from Richard II and said ye renounced and ceased of the state of king and of the lordship and of all the dignity and worship that belonged there too you are renouncing all the dignity of the crown some have suggested that this old connection between dignity and rank dignity and hierarchy was superseded by the Jewish Christian notion of the dignity of humanity of such human dignity I'm not convinced by that story as I argued in that article I think what happened was a generalisation of high rank I think we generalised high rank we decided to make every man a duke every woman a countess we didn't just replace the ranking idea with a egalitarian idea we leveled up rather than abandoning a hierarchical notion and replacing the egalitarian one the idea is that the modern notion of human dignity doesn't cut loose from the idea of rank instead it involves an upward equalisation so that we now accord to every human being something of the dignity rank and expectation that was formally accorded say to nobility or to professors or to judges or patriots or whatever I got this idea from Gregory Blast also as a distinguished classic scholar at Berkeley when I was there 1990s and James Whitman of the Yale Law School has also pursued this in his work in the idea of an extension of formally high status treatment to all sectors of the population you see you can imagine you don't have to imagine you can just do the history a system of government that involved radical discrimination at law among different sorts of rank high ranking persons will be regarded as capable of participating fully in something like legal system they would be trusted with a voluntary self-application of norms their word and testimony would be taken seriously they would be entitled to the benefit of elaborate processes and so on if they were coerced they would be dealt with under the auspices of quite respectful modes of coercion quite different from much less brutal than those applying to other the members of other strata in society at the other extreme there might be a caste or a class of persons who were dealt with purely coercibly by the authorities there would be no question of listening to or trusting anything they said they would be a pair in shackles if they appeared of the hearing at all their evidence, if they gave evidence would be taken under torture and they would not be entitled to make decisions or arguments relating to their own defence nor to have their statements heard or taken seriously they would not have the privilege of bringing suit in the courts or if they did it would have to be under somebody else's protection they would not be as we say the jurists ancient slave societies were like that modern slave societies are a little bit like that and many other societies in the past with which we are uncomfortably familiar evolved similar discriminating forms that distinguished between if you like the legal dignity of a noble the legal dignity of a common man the legal dignity of a woman and the legal dignity of a slave, a serf or a villain and the essential part of our modern notion of law that all such gross status differences have been abandoned not that the idea of status goes out the window we keep the idea of status for conditions that people might be in from time to time like bankruptcy or infancy of being a part of the military or something like that but gross status differences between different types of human beings we no longer work with in 1606 in London a carriage carrying Isabel the Countess of Rutland was attacked by sergeants at Mace pursuant to a writ alleging a debt of a thousand dollars the English reports tell us that the said sergeants and cheap side with many others came to the Countess and her coach showed her their Mace and touching her body with it said to her we arrest you madam at the suit of the creditor and there upon they compelled the coachman to carry the said Countess to the comter in Wood Street where she remained seven or eight days imprisoned until she paid the debt the Countess as you would imagine was terribly affronted by these proceedings and she sued successfully and the court held that the arrest of a Countess by sergeants at Mace is against all law and a severe sentence was given against the sergeants and others their confederates the court quoted an ancient maxim to the effect that law will have a difference between a lord or lady a lord or lady and a common person and it held that the person of someone who is a peer is not to be arrested in such cases for two reasons one because of her dignity and secondly because it's presumed that being a peer she has the ability to pay her debts anyway and that was 1606 and now we apply at least the first point to all debtors no debtors are seized in this way no debtors are imprisoned in this way no one's body is allowed to be seized by their creditors and we do that on account of an equalisation up of the dignity in this place and in a great number of other respects we have evolved a more or less universal status a more or less universal legal dignity that entitles everyone to something like the treatment at law that was previously confined to high status individuals now the sense in which we all have equal access to law is obviously a little bit fictitious that law continues to discriminate in various ways between the rich and the poor one thing to bear in mind when we talk about dignity in these matters is to remember that legal dignity at least whatever you think about moral dignity legal dignity is a construction it's a ramshackle human it's a construction like a building site it's incomplete it's a work in progress bits of it occasionally fall down and have to be built up again but it's a construction that we have made for ourselves perhaps in order to respond to what we think of as the inherent dignity of human beings but legal dignity at any rate in all these respects is something that we have tried to build and it is something that we have built in the first instance as a set of ideals not just moral ideals but ideals for our legal system that we respond to and I do want you to bear this in mind when I come to talk about my final topic which is something about dignified coercion law is an exercise of power and that power operates in the last resort coercively upon people and a number of thinkers including my hero long fella have sometimes said that we have to distinguish between law in its dignitarian capacity and law in its coercive capacity I think that's wrong I think that's wrong I think there are modes of coercion and modes of coercion and some of them are dignified and some of them are not dignified so I've listed there on the song treat four ways in which law operates coercively it presents its norms as categorical and non-negotiable demands, it's committed to doing whatever it takes to see what is obeyed, it imposes punishments and it exercises the power to get people to do things against their will and to tightly control people's behaviour I don't have time to go through all of these in detail but the way it works about self application it seems to me a tremendously important as far as possible when law coerces us it seeks to do so by communicating what it wants of us and asking us to do that ourselves people in the room will disagree as to whether for example the death penalty is an affront to human dignity many people in Europe believe it is many people in the United States believe it is not but the way it is administered is that as far as possible even though the death sentence will be carried out whatever the convict wishes as far as possible the convict will be treated as a human agent up until the last moment when he is extinct not exactly that we expect him to voluntarily administer the hemlock in the way that Socrates Socrates did but we expect people to walk to their execution we expect them to participate in the procedures of the last days of their execution and if that's true of the most extreme penalties that law can impose it's certainly true as I said of many of the others we strain and try to go as far as we can by indicating the demands that no doubt we have to use force to get them if we can if we have to but if possible we attempt to get voluntary maybe it's a wrong word but agents involved in the picture and there are some forms of force that we esdew or at least I always thought what happened in 2003 that we esdew there are some things if they can only be done by torture we don't do them because law has decided that whatever modes of coercion it uses it will not smash people's agency and break their agency and regress them to the status of infants now what happened in the United States between 2002 and 2008 shook a lot of people's faith in that I believe it undermined the legality of our legal system and argued extensively extensively on that but I think it's tremendously important to understand the ways in which law operates as far as possible non-brutally even when it operates coercion and you find the same thing in doctrines of punishment that punishments must not be inhuman what does that mean means partly that they must not be cruel but they must be punishments of the sort that humans are capable of bearing if their heads held high if necessary and these notions which are tremendously difficult to state of ways in which law seeks to treat us as responsible dignified agencies even when we are most at the mercy of its power and authority are I think hugely important in thinking about the law's commitment to dignity I don't deny and this is the last thing I would say I don't deny that this discipline of dignity in various aspects of the law is incomplete I don't deny that often we sell it short it's a normative discipline it is costly and demanding I think it is momentous that we are committed to it nevertheless but the commitment sometimes wavers and as with all commitments people sometimes don't do what they are committed to do and you might worry that the account I have been given has painted law a very nice light and a very flattering light so consider the United States it is burdened by a history of slavery and racism and that has affected the way in which it coerces and the way in which it rules people the 13th amendment for example didn't abolish slavery unconditionally abolish slavery except in prisons and critics have often observed that in regard to the dignitarian aspect of its treatment of prisoners America remains an outlier compared to say west european systems which have attempted to generalise formally high status notions of imprisonment or high status notions of incarceration and in regard to some of the other aspects of the argument I have been making we know from miserable reports from taxes and other states that American defendants are sometimes kept silent and passive in courtrooms by the use of belt technology which enables a judge to subject them to electric shocks if they misbehave by pressing a button on the bench I don't think you'd like that sort of appeal and reports of prisoners being herded with cattle plots occasionally emerge from time to time conditions in our prisons and in the United States I believe something similar is true in Britain are de facto terrorising well known to be terrorising and officials feel free to make use of those terroristic conditions imposing plea bargains to prisoners in a way that is thoroughly abusive and as I said in recent years we've seen the United States tempted away from dignitarian ideals in drastic regards in the attempt to establish forms of legally unreviewable detention and in its use of torture and other inhuman and degrading forms of treatment against terrorist detainees what do we say about all of that which is true because other examples could be multiplied from many other countries including this one here's what I say a legal system is a normative order both explicitly and implicitly the laws don't tell us what happens the laws tell us what is to happen the laws tell us what ought to happen explicitly the law commits itself to certain norms the rules and standards that it says publicly that it will uphold and enforce most of those it actually does uphold and enforce but occasionally for others in certain regards it fails to do so the law says the state should pay compensation to Smith but Smith does not receive it in those cases we can be very clear the law has fallen shorter of its own publicly enunciated standards and we hope that doesn't happen too often it's more difficult when the standards are implicit rather than explicit in the way that I have been talking about where they embodied implicitly in the practices, institutions and traditions of a system of governance and that's what I've been arguing about dignity that the idea of dignity is implicit in due process implicit in the mode of coercion implicit in equality before the law and so on but I believe nevertheless that some of the logic obtains the commitment to dignity that I think is even implicitly in our legal practices and institutions is present there and it is supposed to be controlling even though we sometimes fall short of it our practices convey a sort of promise but they do it implicitly and just as in moral life you don't always say I have a promise to do this but you give a commitment to your spouse that you'll do this in various implicit ways so the law gives us commitments in various implicit ways and just as it would be a very naive mistake to think that the only promises that ever existed were promises that were carried out so similarly would be a mistake to say that the only implicit commitments that the law has ever given us are the implicit commitments that the law has actually kept faith with dignity in the sense that I've been talking about is an implicit aspect of a legal system and as I said it's a ramshackle work in progress and it's often there is often a fall in short of course the interesting thing about law's commitment to dignity and our circle back to where I began is that the promise is actually embedded institutionally in both the ways that I've been talking about because there is this stuff in section one of this lecture in section two of this lecture about the reference to dignity and the explicit texts of certain documents that we have referred us of there to it is there internally or inherently a tissue of our practises and institutions but it's also present in rules, standards and preambles that we have explicitly committed ourselves to like the Geneva conventions or like the preamble to the international talent the two sorts of commitments reinforce each other and this is not unusual in regard to legal ideas article one nine of the US constitution prohibits ex post facto laws but many people would say quite reasonably that this is also a definitive feature of law as such so what we have here is an abundance of riches and just as it would be wrong to infer from the fact that article one nine might have been different in the US constitution that therefore law is only contingency contingently committed to prospectivity so it would be quite wrong to infer from the fact that the European convention might have been different but therefore law is only contingently committed to the protection of dignity it's an inherent in my view an essential commitment and it is worth working with that when we understand how legal systems operate thank you very much indeed we've had a really good lecture really interesting lecture and there may be a few points that people in the audience might want to make or questions to ask we've got about five minutes for comments or questions if anybody would like to make those Professor Cramer Professor Cramer I quite to ask quite a few questions of article no legal cause of this would deny that the features of attitude is distinctive of war in the world of government is to deny that that feature is a necessary condition for the treatment of people with dignity but what a legal cause of this might mean would deny is that that feature is anything like a sufficient condition and that that feature can in fact be used for the outright denial of dignity so let me offer an example without attempting to gloss over all the disinality the bank robber relies on the capacities of the bank clerk as a reflective agent to follow his instructions if the bank clerk doesn't open the safe the robber can't get what he wants so he relies indispensably on the agency of that person and that person's capacity to follow the bank robber's best likewise with the kidnapper there may be complicated instructions to be followed and if the if the address C of those instructions doesn't comply with them the kidnapper can't get what he wants Matt you're absolutely right so this is a distinctive feature of law by no means a feature of law that distinguishes it from other normative interactions families work through self-application ordinary economic transactions work through self-application and so does the bank robber example so law has that in common systems of law but the fact that it has it in common has it in common for a reason which is the respect for human dignity not just the respect for efficacy and we may want to debate that but also remember what bank robbers sometimes do so at a famous bullion robbery Heathrow and the guards would not self-apply the bank robbers norm they covered him with petrol and held a cigarette lighter very close to him and although it's tempting to say now consider the utility of being burned to death what's going to happen is in fact somebody's going to say I'm going to be burned to death and you go into a shivering situation of terror in which agency is largely short circled and what law and legal systems do on my account is that they pledge never to coerce like that they coerce forcefully but not terroristically or at least they do that at their best sorry to say thank you for my questions about the similar action because I was going to think about Foucault and his claim about self policing citizens I suppose Foucault would say it's a mistake to think that an overtly coercive forms of law are more repressive than the forms of law they get to indicate themselves but actually are more repressive more repressive so I mean and again it would be interesting to talk in detail about that one thing it might show us is that the insistence on dignified coercion is not the same as the insistence on less repressive coercion so there might be several dimensions in play here and it may well be that nothing is more repressive than say the inculcation of norms the internalisation of norms but nevertheless for all its repressiveness it is a way of respecting human agency and human presence and the ability to monitor and modulate your own behaviour compared to other modes of coercion which may be less Foucaultian in their character more brutal in their character but bypass or short circuit it may even mean that dignity needs to be unpacked with a certain sort of Foucaultian genealogy as well but that would be the first one How does your account of legal dignity involving agency, choice, self presentation apply to those who are unable to perform those functions due to infancy or through disability? Indeed and disability can range from simply not having forensic skills of an advocate to radical disability so again this is something that we have constructed, something that we build and one of the devices or practices that we build is the device of representation and when people make claims about the importance of representation this is part that I necessarily admit it because of time but one of the ideas is we want to work with two propositions the first is as a matter of dignity everybody's point of view has to be heard and listened to everybody's arguments have to be paid attention to as a second point since people are radically unequal in their ability to present arguments precisely the reasons that you mentioned we have developed notions of representation and of course representation varies from person to person but when we insist for example that even the lowliest and most impoverished criminal was entitled to a public defender and when we insist that infants in some contestation need guardians at litum and so on we are insisting on developing modes of conveying indirectly the dignified presence of those people in the proceedings so I think representation is one of the constructive aspects which we are building on this vast building site of law's commitment to dignity, very important one last question Professor Walden wondering whether you might have given the same to allow me to say so a fully excellent lecture but with the term autonomy substituted for dignity throughout and a number of people sceptical about the language of dignity have asked again what work does this do that the notion of autonomy doesn't do normally in the older notion of autonomy the notion of being a law to oneself being able to as a word behave in a law like manner not just behave with a degree of negative freedom that older notion of autonomy might be relatively easy to substitute in I'm not sure that it would convey exactly the same idea of presence presence that must be taken seriously or convey exactly the same idea of paying attention to a person's view of a matter or paying attention to an argument so I acknowledge immediately it's a perfectly good point that the two ideas are very close together but the idea of dignity is a status that must be paid attention to not just made room for I think it is an important one we'll have to finish there I'm sure there were plenty of questions that people will want to ask we've had the privilege of a very clear a very committed presentation of an idea of dignity that can work in law and that can set an ideal for law and it's an idea deal which treats individuals in society as some people who are capable of doing things on their own and being supported by law and sometimes confronted by law what we've had is something which we can take forward into a range of different activities of our own or research and work of our own whether as judges as students as academics and in different disciplines for that we're very grateful and it is a very fitting tribute that Sir David Williams committed his life to in ensuring both high standards of scholarship and great commitment to civil liberties can we thank Jeremy Waldron


Hvala, da se učili. Imam Mauro Kale, hrvam hrvam solizonarke, včaljim v Italii in PSI, tako imam pred evočnjeh bankov in zilensko. Imam hrvam hrvam vredanje, če povihlju in vse v perej. Počajte, da vse nasjevajte na Twittera in e-mail, včeč, da potrebojamo, da se objezdače, da vse koncerno pridemamo. In da isto bilo, da objezdače, da imaš 3 raptika, da bomo sem umeljali, da sem je pa dvori tako čiče. To je zač jaz, da sem je tudi tudi svoj. Jeste tudi tudi tudi tudi svoj. Svej za to, da sem sem. To je mi, da ne bomo sličaj, in da to je več, da sem je začel, da se se se vse dače, jaz so ta da je zbant, As you can see, one of my favorite sports is professionalism, of course. So, let's start with the thing that we probably used to here again and again. So, it's Java Dev. Short answer, of course, for everybody is no, but let's say that Java is mature enough. And this is what we see at our customer. But it's also true that it's probably not going anywhere. We will see some more points about that in a couple of slides. But basically, at least in our customers is still a standard 90% of the critical workload is on Java in G2 in Fibula. It does, of course, a very large skill base, we will have to articulate more on this in a couple of slides. And also the ecosystem is bigger and bigger because different players are coming. We will talk about Jakarta here, we will talk about a lot of stuff. So, it's basically not dying. Of course, it's mature. It's not a new thing. It's not, let's say, shiny and new, but it's still a lively kicking. This is what we usually bring to customers when it's about Java popularity. Maybe it's a bit blurred, but basically every rankings of languages, you can see. You obey, you can see. Redmon has a rank. Java is still there. There is some JavaScript coming because of Node.js and all the full spec things. There is some Python.  But at the end of the day, there is a lot of Java. Yeah, what we notice is that Java has got the main trend. Into our site customer. But the most important thing is that it's not only a mature language, but that is a language that is evolving in a cloud oriented way, for cloud ecosystem, for microservices and distributed ecosystem. The messages that we wanted to share with our customer and the community in general is not only that Java is a language that works well for enterprise ecosystem, but that continues to evolve like the emergence in language that are in the IT ecosystem. Now, of course, it was born a long time ago, 1996. I was growing up in Ajax in that time. So it's not, as I was saying, shiny and new. But yeah, it's a long travel. My customers are there for less. So mostly J2. Maybe not J2.6, but most of the applications are J2. Why are they stuck with J2, or at least they are satisfied with J2? Because of huge applications. They used to buy huge, off the shelf applications of customers once and to run critical services on top of that, like transactions, payments, online banking, whatever. So they are not so happy to move that critical and, you know, painful stuff to different things. They used to have, and they still have, Mootius Agreement with the traditional J2 software vendors, like Oracle, IBM, whatever. So it's basically not convenient for the sake of money. They have some technical debt and no one is willing to pay because it's very common to customer debt, the development teams, they pay for the projects and then they end over to the operation team. But if there is something to fix, like upgrade of the JVM version of the J2V specification and stuff like that, there is no budget for that, because operation is just for the running. They don't have that much amount of money to do huge redevelop forming or anymore of software. They often need specific features that are provided by J2V, like a common example is JCA adapter for connecting to mainframes or things of stuff, or they may need distributed transaction and say that kind of stuff. Of course they have widespread skills and by skills you may also think about the tooling. So as an example, JMX tooling or the kind of things they do for debugging, troubleshooting, Java application is well rooted into the skills and the infrastructure of the customer. And yeah, it just works. So very often there is no big needs for moving that stuff to something different. Something is starting to move from OpenShift because for some reason OpenShift is widespread. At least for lower customers I would say that more than half of the biggest Italian banks but talking also with colleagues all across Europe is true. OpenShift is getting better and better, it's present and people are starting to use it. They are using it in production a lot. And more and more critical apps are jumping in to OpenShift. They started to do simple stuff like lift and shift of Java boss applications but now we do have a lot of customers who build payment system, line banking all that kind of stuff on top of OpenShift so something is moving that and it's the opportunity to look into these applications and maybe make some choice. And when we started to talk about OpenShift I would say 3-4 years ago we used to talk to OpenShift about OpenShift as the new operating system but now it's transitioning into the new application server. This is because things like STO, like K-Native that are providing some features that are no more related to only an infrastructure level but are more closer to the application level so it's no more just the operating system of the cloud. And also give you functionality like for example the H&E that in application server environment are built on top of the cluster environment while in OpenShift is guaranteed by Kubernetes ecosystem functionalities. So most of the orangelist and people working with OpenShift is starting to see OpenShift as the new application server in the ecosystem. And there is also this challenger here which is Spring Boot. Why Spring Boot? Most of our customers run Spring Boot and does this thing like Spring Boot equals Microsoft. Why? This is quite spread. Because it used to be seen as the lightweight alternative to J2E. This used to be true before like EJB3 because it was one of the first frameworks in which you can match the kind of standards or technologies you want to use. But it's not true anymore. Not that true. Even from the point of view of the dimension of the application itself or the memory footprint is not true anymore. J2E is getting better and better and we will see that something is happening in that area. Even in that case the customer, especially in the development teams they have widespread skills because they used to use Spring application before Spring Boot. They used to embed Spring application into J2E application server like in Jbox. We have a lot of Jbox installation in the world that are wrapping Spring things. So people is used to have the skills about dependency in Jax strong using Spring. This creates a very difficult environment because you have a container inside a container that following two different rules. And so in order to try to adopt the new features that Spring guarantees to the customers because evolve faster than the previous version of JEE ecosystem. But the customer are usually forced into the rules of application server or standards that are not aligned to the new version of Spring or Spring Boot that customers would like to use. Another important topic is the supportability challenge because as we were saying most of the customers used to build Spring application and put it into a J2E application server thinking that this will help to have support to the application reality is not true anymore and in the container world is even worse because people are starting to just build fat jars and put it into a container and it doesn't mean that this kind of distribution should be supported by or anything of the commercial vendor. So this is particularly this is like a corner case but it's very important in production environment especially in ugly regulated one like banks. Another important point that Malo was in some ways starting to talk about is the tooling because with the traditional application server people used to have like consults, align things that are in some way standards to do the basic tooling of the application like the thread pools database connection in the Spring world there is no standard for this, it's just something custom so it's not that easy for operation teams to just operate things that are not sitting into a standard container. This is tricky in particular because if you use version like Java 8 that have some limitation on top of container because they are not fully ready to understand the CPU limit the resource limit that you can set into Kubernetes and Docker environments and application server environment can help you to mitigate this risk because the forcing that you can set about the connection pooling of the database connection or thread in particular the number of threads can help you to set a limit that the version of Java that most of the customer use are not able to set as this moment so can help you to fix the limit that you want that your users respect into pass environment. Last but not least, microservices because of course we are living all this microservices history since the beginning and the point is that at some point of time we started to identify one microservice container, which is something still true but the point is that it seems natural to fill these microservices with just a flatjar which we will see may not be the better choice because as an example it doesn't work well with layering of containers, you will not have a layer and then on top of that just things change but you will have this big binary and you push it around and yeah, it's not the best solution so yeah, you of course in the platform is our Jakarta E implementation which is pretty obvious What's Jakarta E in Mauro? Yeah In our opinion Oracle donates the Java EE ecosystem to the community and can help the community to remove the constraints that force the stop of evolution of Java Enterprise Edition that remain for two time too distant for the requirements that the new architecture needs and of the implementation of the use cases that the customer needs in order to reach the business targets The evolution is the Jakarta EE At the moment the version is the Jakarta EE 8 This is the major player players that commit to Jakarta EE but the community is open, we encourage you to participate to suggest the specification that you want to introduce the specification that you want to prove or removed, for example EJB, that most of the community would like to substitute with CDI and transactions API instead of EJB and consider that you can really influence evolution of Jakarta EE in cloud ecosystem environment and participate to this community So what my world was saying is basically that Jakarta EE is having a shorter feedback loop basically so you can have more releases releases more often this is because of course our problems are not the same as ten years ago, so we provide us a different paradigm in developing applications of course you will need a shorter release cycle What we are hearing from our customers is also a lot of confusion because of the transition from Jakarta EE to from Java EE to Jakarta EE the coming of micro profile we will see also quarkus is starting to build some confusion so one of the goals of this talk is trying to put some points about this and trying to clarify some of the relationships between those words Maybe the most important thing that you don't associate Jakarta EE to a vendor implementation but to a subset of specification this is the most important thing because many users confused Jakarta EE has a new renaming brand for Java EE but related to Oracle to Red Hat, to IBM to something vendor is not yet in this way so consider a subset of specification that you need to evolve and to create in the way that best fit your needs, your requirements There is a lot of material about that but basically also the JCR process is changing also the reference implementation that are shifting is changing now there is no and the most important thing is the timeline is changing J4CEP is still alive so it is not going any way and of course is evolving into open shift so those are the most interesting things that we see coming into wireflying Jboss CLI so the first is something directly related to some feedbacks that we got from our customers is the ability to run Jboss CLI things as part of same test of such image build so this is very important because it is better way to customize the image that you are running in production and it is something very, very common for our customers to start installing agents and different things using this procedure, this way Another very important thing is the release we don't understand any time frame about that but basically we are working on it of the open shift operator so we will have a CRD a custom resource definition for a wireflying server that will allow us to do things on QCPL like creating destroying new servers, changing simple things on the configuration ok, so let's switch about micro profile because we will see that there is a flow into these things into this topic because before the introduction of Jakarta EE and in order to respond to the really slow of the evolution of Java EE community create a micro profile that is a community that grouped a subset of specification that are define useful in microservices environment in distributed architecture and then reach this set of specification with a new set of specification that are very useful for microservices in order to make all of your distributed architecture available to run in a cloud native environment here you can see a snapshot of the evolution of the eclipse micro file as you can see we have 11 releases in 3 years so is a very active community as for the Jakarta EE the major players are working on the eclipse micro profile evolution on the right part of the slide you can see a reference implementation of the eclipse micro profile the latest version is the 3.2 as you can see you have the more common API that you can use when you create a micro services so for example JAXRS in order to expose your API your API or CVI for the injection but you can also have this new set of specifications, the metrics the health, the config API, open tracing a set of specification that we usually define as micro servitivities so the subset of the configuration that you need in order to make your infrastructure robust to run into cloud native environment so a lot of new things that are not easy to integrate with the traditional recycle like the J2E standard one that is starting to deal and work in Jakarta IE we will see that but that is basically an independent community working in a parallel way so JBOCAP is embracing micro profile, there are a lot of things we are just looking at the basic one like the health and metrics that is integrated into the Kubernetes and OpenShift infrastructures there is deep integration with all the tooling on the service mesh of OpenShift, Sotiali, Istio, Polygius Pogonizari in things like that and those versions of Welfly I don't know is a version that basically they are starting to embed micro profile specifics into JBOCAP actually we have Welfly 19 and at the moment is Jakarta IE8 fully compliant embrace a subset of specifications micro profile in particular the health in the demo at the end of the session we will show you how to integrate this specification into JBOCAP and traditional environment but the most important thing that you can see here is that what we define usually a brown field scenario so the existing application that you need to evolve but not to completely change are able to be update in a not disruptive way and in this session we will demonstrate how you can do it there is a starter for micro profile so basically a website that just does something similar to an archetype so it helps you build the scaffold of the application why Jakarta IE is different than micro file we are saying that basically they are looking at each other and starting to play together but the whole idea as Paolo was saying before is that micro file has its own evolution which is with shorter list cycles and then from time to time some of the capabilities of micro profile are snapshoted into Jakarta IE8 so this is the ideal governance model that they are putting in place for communities is starting to work right now and we will see how it will evolve if you want to briefly summarize the concept micro file is strictly related to new architecture so micro services and distributed architecture so need to evolve fast like Jakarta IE need to embrace all type of application so the brown field the green field scenario so before to evolve need to guarantee more compatibility but also the new features so now roughly we are talking about weeks Jakarta IE we are talking about months so probably twice a year for releases of course top tape most of you probably know about top tape it used to be our first implementation of micro profile is now shifting into communities in particulars small rye and corpus so it is not going to have its own logo and name anymore and this is in things of customer position of course so putting some more pieces into our picture Jakarta IE EAD is not only the Jakarta IE runtime but is also our micro profile that there is more to have of course everybody knows about this kind of shift so from monolith to micro service functions is not relevant anymore to go into details a bit and of course most of you that was a very interesting talk is wondering about this knows that traditionally well suited into container used to be not the best choice into containers basically because of application density and also of the startup over it so all the class load in teams, all the memory usage things we were talking about the peaks of memory and then the word map that JDM traditionally needs to have to perform at the best so corpus of course is our proposal to overcome all those limitations the first things that is most the most known everywhere is development performance even because the possibility to leverage the program but it's not in our opinion the idea is that it will start and stay into the standard based approach so it's good to have like an ecosystem around at least in micro provide ecosystem in this particular way and it should be to spring in for this reason because it's building a community and ecosystem around open standard so it's not something customized but just one vendor it has an extension mechanism and for this way most of those logos and communities and many more are already integrated into corpus and it's the most important things for our customers we come to the most important topics of our presentation it's providing an easy path from Java Enterprise Edition application into cloud native application because you can reuse skills, you can reuse most of the code in some cases and you can reuse also most of the code of the tooling if you are running one of a JDK as an example so if you have JMX monitoring or things like that you can just what we want to tell you is this Java for the standard edition platform is evolving because I try to fit best all the new features that container architecture give to us but these new features are incremental for example the parameters for intersect the limits the resource usage but not only the JMX and BEAN in order to expose new metrics but all of these things are not inside only one release you can find this from Java 9 to Java 13 but the major vendor support only the LTS version of Java the moments of Java 8 and Java 11 so the customer should choose a JDK version that give me the new feature or I stay to a JDK version that is supported the same thing for the enterprise edition version we showed before that Java EE is evolving that are micro profile but in terms of resource usage in order to control the scale of our application in order to decrease the time to market in order to control our application how can I group by all the new features of Java standard edition and Jakarta EE micro profile without completely change the way of build our application and in our opinion the answer is the use of the specification and works this line is pretty widespread basically nothing to add a lot of start-up and good time and usage of resource you can see some test about REST application and REST plus JD application is just way better than traditional JavaScript how this is possible is just the most essential part is that the workers just move some of the work required for the application to run into the compile time so the runtime is just thinking about runtime and the compilation time is thinking about heavyweight things like class start scanning annotation scanning reflection is not allowed more optimization that usually are in the runtime part in the runtime lifecycle are anticipated in the build time so the framework optimizes some set of features for you in order to give you your application more responsive and have a short usage of the resources into your run environment so split between build time and runtime this means that at its own core purpose consists of basically two parts deployment parts of the core of all the subsystems and the runtime part so it's just optimized for the two different phases this is more or less the anatomy of the core that is the core then there are some other things like index file generation and gizmo then if I'm not wrong it's used as a replacement for reflection things like that you can use it leveraging route so you can just generate a native image running on a system there is the arc as the dependency injection implementation which is not in reflection it's just a lightweight alternative well and there are all the extensions that basically as we were saying are all the third party frameworks that are integrated into varkus so I'm good it supports library load so it's very easy and fun to work in varkus because you can just edit most of the files and see in real time the changes when it's in the development mode you can build fat jars even if as we were saying maybe not a better choice and you can build native executable of course there are some downsides you can use imperative and reactive way of programming so it's just native reacting in some way using vertex and other reactive things it's optimized for very common class of application which are jugs.rs plus jpa and it's cheap subludes for building very easily this kind of create, read, update build applications it's well suited for server less because of the performance so it's very easy to spin up an image with varkus do something and pull it down so for microservices it's Kubernetes native there is a lot of tooling that comes into kubernetes varkus work well outside of container but was born to run into container environment so it's a framework thinking to work on top of Kubernetes and container environment it's a first class citizen this is what we were talking about before so incremental image building you can just add the layers that you need to if you do a fat jar with optimization things it's going away because you just have a very huge fat jar layer every time you change something you have to just spread everything so more pieces to our picture micro profile is going to be is going to be implemented actually it's already implemented but from varkus and enterprise application platform and the micro profile specification will so represent away a bridge in these two words so EAP of course is here to stay for ground building for things that just needs j2e specification in full they are not cloud native or whatever micro profile is representing the good bridge between the two words and of course if you need to server less or cloud native you can just opt to varkus still using something that is standard short summarize to answer a question that customers uses tell to us why I can use jbocep and when I can use varkus we can say that usually you can think about your business domain and the requirements of your application if you start to a completely new application when you can choose the best technologies that can fit the business requirement you can use varkus the recommendation is as you can able to do this follow the specification because in this way you can move from one implementation to another one but if you have an existing one application that you can have deployed on top of jbocep and you can want to move into a container environment for example on top of the open shift and then the couple in order to evolve a subset of this application in a microservices way you can change these pieces of your application and evolve in varkus using micro file specification and in this way you make the two part of your suite able to communicate each other and continue to evolve in a different way but continue to evolve we used to have in the in the old days we used to have customers just developing with pomcat and then deploying things on jbocep which is powerful from a testing perspective and a support perspective with varkus you may be able to do something like that in a better way because you may have your staff just deploying and testing things on varkus using the specification and then you can move to a containerized environment and using the same specification testing it into a g2e environment so you may have all the machine and all the varkus and then okay let's move to demo we realize a short demo we didn't create a doc application for this demo because what we want to demonstrate to you is this thing start from an existing one application built on top of specification and evolve these in the way that we described it before so we use the weather application that you can find in the catacoda website where we have the tutorial for OpenShift environment we start from these we use a code 3D container as local environment in order to have an OpenShift cluster on top of which deploy the different version of our application and we evolve this application with the later release of javai.ee so the 8 varkus and in the varkus version we introduce also the new feature of metaprofile in order to demonstrate also the different of the velocity of evolution because varkus evolve faster than javai.ee as you can see I started that code 3d container on my laptop I log to code 3d console I login as a developer and I don't need any special permission in order to implement what we will show you in this demo we created the DEVCON 2020 projects and we deployed three different two different version of our application the EAP version as you can see the varkus version works on top of PostgreSQL I know, I don't follow a microservices approach because I need to create two different database scheme but for commodity I use only one I login to CRC console in order to work on my project and I show you the code as you can see is a normal model project we create a word distributable file that is based on top of java in the API that will be provided by our application server jazm binding in order to map the answer of our JABSRS API and in this case I integrate the micro profile health specification in order to expose a way to verify the liveness of our application that you can integrate with the liveness and proveness check for example in OpenShift as you can see is a standard JABSRS application we have no proprietary import only standard we have CDI specification JBA specification JAXRS specification nothing of proprietary or related to redact or other vendors the result will be showed in a normal index html file I have a synchronous Ajax invocation of our API this demonstrate as you can have a traditional html file csf3 or client side frontend for your application and this is the health check implementation that verify that our service into OpenShift that post the Postgres SQL is up and running our application available to all the users here the log as you can see the JBO CLP start relatively fast so it's not a complex application but we have a subset of typically specification that you can find in our production application environment this is the final application and you can see the forecast weather for three different countries as I said before JBO CLP at the moment is not aligned to the latest version of micro profile for this reason in order to check the availability of our application so the health micro profile API you need to connect to the JBO CLP CLI so in the demo I connect the POP that host the AP version of the application I connect to the CLI and I will invoke the subsystem that give me the results of the health check configuration these can be easily connected to application monitoring using for example Ansible module in order to connect the health availability with our APM and as you can see our application is available to be reached by our the same application without touch any code will be migrated to Quarkus modify only the POMIXML so it's not a work but it's a jara executable file I set the build of material Quarkus in order to have dependency related to the latest version of the Quarkus yesterday was released the 1.2 so it's not related you need only to declare the specification that you need to use that if you make a parallel with JBO CLP you can consider this as the subsystem you declare it but as you can see from the code, the point on view you have changed your phone cbi, jpa jaseles, then I explain the new 2 annotations that you can see but I didn't change nothing from my application perspective but have all the features that Joseph described before about Quarkus, in fact if you connect to OpenShift here you can verify the install features that are available at the moment that are the equivalent of the JBO CLP subsystem the features that are available at runtime of your application and if you connect to the Quarkus version you have the same application at the running you saw jpa, cdi jaseles, micro profile health this is the concept and the specification give you the opportunity to reduce the impact of the effort needed to evolve your application in order to the couple and give different path of evolution of your business requirements the version of micro profile is different because Quarkus evolve faster so you can verify the micro profile health that with the API exposed so you can attach this on top of Prometheus into OpenShift or your traditional ADM that you use to monitor your production environment to do this we introduced two new features the open tracing in order to have the trace of the invocation of your application as you can see I introduced nothing at code point I only declared dependency at Pomex ML and without doing nothing more the only need that I need to do is to install a jager version into OpenShift in order to have an open tracing implementation my application attached to jager exposed the weather service that is the service that you are that you are seeing now you are able to have the list of invocation of the APIs of your application and that the snapshot of the API that was invoked the subsystem used in order to implement it the HTTP response code and then the total time of the execution of your API the last one will be the matrix it is another specification of a micro profile here the effort is very small because I declare dependency at Pomex ML I introduced these two invotations that you can see are micro file standards so not related to vendor and are the counted that give you the number the times of your API was invoked and the time that give you a snapshot of all the metrics related to your API invotations and the metrics will be exposed through API and you can have the total count of invocation of your API and that snapshot of mean time of execution time of execution and other metrics the same things you can attach this URL to your API subsystem in order to make this metrics stateful because at the moment are stateless so if you restart of the invocation so you need to attach this to an APM in order to make persistent and safe so as you can see the specification is the bridge to reduce the time to evolve so that's pretty much it there is a github repo and if you have any question but before the question a big round of applause to Mauro for being one of the last people on earth using net beans and yes here is the code you can use it as a scaffold to try to experiment any question do you remember have you looked at the amount of memory spending the VALFLA and CORCA's application that would be interesting to see like the difference of the question is about the difference in the user of memory between VALFLA and CORCA in terms of specification is the same because more write will be the reference implementation from the profile for the distribution but in term of execution executable at one time CORCA would be more performant for the reason that we asking about the memory usage the memory footprint from the java side so what the footprint of the java task not what your application is in term of hip CORCA is as a lower user of memory no, because at the moment the reference implementation of VALFLA is not comparable to CORCA because it is related to a JDK8 version or 11-bar traditional OpenJTK version and use a completely different approach of memory usage so it's all comparable the snapshot of comparison is what Juzette showed before in this slide because it's java different not the application server of the square Any other questions? Yeah, I've used or I've been using quite a lot so I'm thinking about what are the benefits of using Qarkus against some kind of Spring Boot application in terms of configuration and all that so the question is about the difference between using Spring Boot and Qarkus so the first part of the answer maybe as we were saying Qarkus may represent a smoother part of evolution like everything into cognitive ones with Spring Boot you may end up providing a big part of the board with Qarkus you may end up using most of your code or at least a big part of your code but Mauro is also looking into this kind of play between Qarkus and Spring Boot Yes, in terms of configuration there are no differences the drive the two frame of following are the same either thinking to work on top of Kubernetes and container environment the difference is and there will be also an evolution of Spring Boot in order to use Qarkus way of working in terms of runtime so some concepts of Qarkus runtime engine will be included into Spring Boot that at the moment are yet available so you can try to use it to experiment it to try in order to have the benefit but it's not a different way of working between Spring Boot or Qarkus it's only that the Qarkus at the moment as Giuseppe explained before give you a path through brown field and green field channel Another thing that I particularly like in the drive direction may end up having a community so you may end up writing code micro-r5.ly and using it on Qarkus or maybe using it on open library whatever you want with Spring Boot you are just What is on the top of the wish list of customers they speak with in terms of missing Qarkus extensions that's a good one I know that Mauro is looking to some implementation for Qarkus that is probably something that is coming the question is about what these customers are looking at like missing things on Qarkus Yeah the Saga pattern is one of the Mauro, very quickly the Saga pattern and the reactive programming because the reactive approach are set into Jakarta E in general API while the reactive as an evolution of a simple way of programming is one of the features that customers ask and that in Qarkus you can find we can continue discussion online Thank you so much