Good afternoon everyone. Thank you for joining us. My name is Mohit Yusuf. I am the Associate Vice President here looking after the Asia portfolio at USIP. Most of you know that we have a very frequent, regular, and vibrant, convening part of our portfolio where we bring experts from around the world to talk about issues that are closest and most important US foreign policy interests in the region and specifically South Asia. And I couldn't be more delighted to have the topic and the panel that we have here today. So I can promise you you're in for a treat. The India-Pakistan conundrum doesn't need any introduction except that perhaps we don't talk about it enough in this town. We've done three or four events on this over the past couple of years. But today's is interesting even more so because of the timing. For those of you who follow the region you know that India-Pakistan have been in a crisis situation without declaring it a crisis since last fall. The line of control that divides the Kashmir part of Pakistan and India has been hot as they say. Regular casualties being reported both military and civilian. A blame game between the two sides. There's also been what's being called spy gate in Pakistan. One alleged Indian spy who has recently been headed a execution sentence, etc. So it's a very, as you would say in South Asia, interesting time but a very worrying time quite frankly between the two nuclear powers. The panel we have here today I honestly say we could not have four better people to talk about this. We have Brigadier Gurmeet Kaval, a long, long old-time friend and mentor in a lot of ways. Former Indian Army officer also commanded in the north if I'm not wrong in Kashmir. That's right on the line of control so he's part of the problem. And now a distinguished fellow with the Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis which is one of India's leading think tanks and looks at security issues. A very well-known name, well-published and somebody who's also known to this town and has had a number of stints here at think tanks. To my left is Dr. Yaku Bhangash who's the director of the Center for Governance and Policy at Information Technology University in Lahore. Coming fresh from Pakistan I think so if you fall asleep we'll forgive you. But was also at the Forman Christian College before there's somebody who looks at the discipline of history very carefully but today we'll also talk about what is happening in terms of the India-Pakistan situation. We have Dr. Dinshaw Mistri from the University of Cincinnati. Again somebody who's looked at the region for a long time, does work on nuclear nonproliferation issues, has a couple of very famous books, one on India's, the US-India nuclear deal and before that again a book on nonproliferation and the technical aspects of that. And Dinshaw would be speaking to US grand strategy and sort of US interest in the region and where that fits given where things are going. And Ambassador Teresita Shefer, last but certainly not least, former US ambassador, was ambassador in Sri Lanka, had a number of stints in Pakistan I believe or a couple at least, has done a very interesting book on India recently. Before that a book with her husband also former US diplomat Ambassador Howard Shefer on Pakistan's negotiating style with the US which is actually a must read for anybody who wants to understand how Pakistan conducts diplomacy. What we'll do here is rather than have the panelists speak for the usual 10-15 minutes and then open it up, I requested them to only give us five minute opening statements. And then we'll try and spark a conversation among them before we come to the audience and make it more conversational rather than just lectures. So with that let me turn to Yacoub to give us your opening statement. We'll come to Brigadier Koval after that. He has a few slides to show I believe. We'll go to Ambassador Shefer and then to Dr. Mistry. Yacoub. Okay, great. Thank you very much, Mohit. I usually scream at my class so I hope you can hear me still. I should say the only one not wearing a tie. So you must forgive me for that. So as Mohit said, I'm from the discipline of history and I sort of look at, you know, sort of speak, take the long view. So I'm going to comment on just a couple of things because we only have about three to five minutes. In trying to sort of understand the Pakistan-India relationship from a historical perspective because I think that has a lot to say about what's happening now also as it always has been and also point out, as some other scholars have also, but I think perhaps in greater depth, the real sort of problems that actually exist in the asymmetry that exists between India and Pakistan. So that's the first thing I'll speak about. And secondly, just because I'm interested in law and everything, so I've been very keenly following the ICJ case and I've just been speaking to a person very intricately involved in it. So I'll give you an update on that perhaps. And I'll explain the whole thing. Yeah, I'll explain the whole thing. So the main thing that I kind of want to sort of focus on in terms of India-Pakistan relations is the fact that where there's the beginning of the asymmetry lies sort of right at the beginning of the country. So on the 15th of August, both countries are actually born. But Pakistan very quickly creates this siege mentality as some would put it, which of course leads to which other scholars have called the Garson state. But let me just explain what the siege mentality is. It is this self-perpetuating view that no matter what Pakistan does, Pakistan is under attack. So I'll give you one very simple example. So if you read any book on Pakistan, everyone will actually mention each and every single book written by Pakistani will mention that in the initial couple of years, the government didn't even have tables and desks and they were using thorns to tie paper and it was very, very, very complicated to actually put things together. Well, fine. I accepted that argument for a long time and thought that, okay, Pakistan had been dealt a bad hand because, of course, Delhi was all laid out, New Delhi had all the secretarial staff in the buildings and everything, and Pakistan had to begin from scratch in Karachi. Till I read a very interesting minute of a deputy secretary in the government of Pakistan and that noted, and this is late 1947, and that actually noted and said, wouldn't it have been sensible to actually have the temporary capital at Lahore, which has had the secretariat since the early 1800s and where there is no problem of accommodation and where there's no problem of offices and, you know, pencils and pens and, you know, all those kinds of basic things. And that suggestion is accepted to a certain extent because some ministries do actually move to Lahore and even Lakhid Ali Khan and do spend a lot of time in Lahore. But it's very interesting that the idea was, no, no, we have been dealt a bad hand by India and that is their fault, not the fault of Pakistan making perhaps not the right choice. Yes, of course, Lahore would have been on the border, but, you know, assuming that Pakistan and India would be at logheads on the 15th of August was, I think, slightly far fetched because we didn't really know where Kashmir would have ended. But, you know, that image of Pakistan sort of being developed in this very hostile environment where everyone is kind of against it. I think that has informed the way Pakistan thinks of itself and also thinks of the areas and the countries surrounding it. Allied to that concept is also this concept that we are kind of, you know, and in Pakistan the term is used and I'll translate that the God-given Kingdom of Pakistan, Mulk Khudadad Pakistan, as it's called, that we're there for this very special purpose. So on the one hand, Pakistan is there for this very special purpose and on the other hand, it is under siege, which of course should make you think that it's very much like Israel because, you know, that's the exact same conception there. And that is why it has to react in a particular way. And that leads us very much to the present. Whenever you actually talk about the India-Pakshan, you know, relationship, every single time you will hear a lot from the civilian bureaucracy, from parts of the military and the think tanks and everyone, that, no, this is the way it has to be, this is the way it has been. And I'll give you an example again. When Modi was elected, it was very interesting. I was on the TV of a couple of channels and interestingly enough, everywhere the conversation was, oh, Modi's election validates the partition. And I was the history person there and saying, are you still talking about it? Pakistan has been in existence for 60 odd years. Are you still trying to validate the partition? And throughout, you know, there were articles, there were newspaper articles, there were TV shows, discussions, and saying, see, Hindutva has come up and that is why we actually created Pakistan. So it kind of goes to the original moment where this kind of a conception has been nurtured. And therefore, at some level, I would argue that, you know, and we're just coming up with the 70th anniversary that Pakistan hasn't left that partition moment. And that is why when Pakistan looks at India, it actually looks at that partition moment. Now, just a couple of very quick comments on the India side. At some level, India also does the same thing. When it talks to Pakistan, a lot of the time, the partition comes up and that puts Pakistan on a back foot and creates greater insecurity. But I won't go on the Indian side because I'm sure there'll be interesting questions about that, too. But I think on the Indian side, also, there is this very old mold that has its view towards Pakistan. Now coming to the recent thing. So I hope some of you know about the International Court of Justice case. Pakistan caught this person who they claim was an Indian spy in Pakistani Balochistan. The military courts tried the case and gave him the death penalty. And India has now taken it to the International Court of Justice. And just today, the case was heard at the Hague. And the court has reserved its judgment. But from what I hear, that Pakistan, you know, of course, I'll say that perhaps, that actually Pakistan made a very good case in terms of jurisdiction, but also in terms that the Consular Access Agreement between India and Pakistan of 2008 actually does say that at certain moments when national security is under threat, consular access can be denied to citizens of the other country. So let's see what happens on that side. But there also, I think there is this, and that's the point I really would like to make. Pakistan, because of its historical movement, at some level is very consistent about India. India, to a large extent, is very inconsistent about Pakistan. And that, to a certain extent, I think baffles people. So let's just look at the ICJ case. India, like the US, has long been against multilateral interventions, has long sort of kind of ignored the ICJ. And all of a sudden, it's actually went to the ICJ, asking them to intervene in this matter. The chances are nothing will really happen. But the idea that when India can pick and choose, and if you look at any Pakistan TV programs, a lot of them have been discussing that, that when it comes to issues where Pakistan wants multilateral intervention, India says, oh no, but where India has an interest, it kind of picks and chooses. And that, I think, understanding sort of gives Pakistan this way, puts Pakistan in this very bizarre position because of the very set nature of the civil military equation and how they approach India. They cannot deal with an unpredictable India. They cannot deal with an India that doesn't behave in the way they kind of expected to behave. And the last comment on the Indian side, I think it's very interesting, and I think this ICJ thing sort of brings it to the fore, that India really has no clear policy towards Pakistan. There was once the idea of isolating Pakistan, that really hasn't worked. Then, of course, we just heard a couple of days ago that India would not go to China for the One Belt, One Road initiative, but that's still going ahead with India there or not there. And it's unable to actually see that if it is going to emerge as a world power, how is it going to deal with Pakistan, make an agreement or not, that's another question. But how to even deal with Pakistan? And I think this recent ICJ thing and the way they've actually dealt with the whole case of this spy being caught illustrates the point. So I think the unclarity on the Indian side of how to actually deal with Pakistan muddles waters even further. Thank you. Thanks. Thank you. Yes, sir. The screen is there, which is going to be complicated. Hear me? Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. It's a privilege to be invited to speak here and on an important subject, very important for us. I have a short presentation. The bottom line is that there is ugly stability and anything could happen. It reminds me of a very famous phrase, Houston, we have a problem. Giving you an Indian perspective of Pakistan today. Pakistan is in a state of slow-motion implosion. This term has been coined by a senior U.S. policy analyst. I'll not name him. I know implosions don't happen in slow-motion physics, but he says, you know, you get the picture. Perhaps it can be arrested at some point. Look at that list of what's happening inside Pakistan. And yet, Pakistan sponsors Transporter Terrorism. It's an instrument of state policy, staging a war with India, asymmetric war, rest Kashmir from India, providing support to the Hakanee network to destabilize the Afghan government. By the way, killing Americans in the bargain. Ashraf Ghani said at the last Heart of Asia conference, President of Afghanistan, if Pakistan wants the insurgency in Afghanistan can be wound up in a month, one month. Incidentally, his chief of general staff had said so here and a half or two years before. Same thing, one month. So we call the state between Pakistan and India ugly stability. The term was coined by Ashley Tillerson and monograph he wrote in the mid-90s. Not much has changed. They have provocations from Pakistan. Punjab, the 80s, Germany and Kashmir asymmetric war. It used to be called a proxy war. Many people still call it a proxy war, but I don't use the term because that's letting off Pakistan. As if you know, somebody else is doing it. It's a state-on-state war that's being waged against India. Parliament attacked 2001, Mumbai terror strikes 2008, and the recent ones are as shown. Strikes at Uri in September 2016 led to the attack on Uri military camp in September 2016 led to surgical strikes. And since then provocation, India has maintained strategic restraint. On the Uri war, the military camp was the last straw. The policy is tactical aggressiveness under the umbrella of strategic restraint. You will see more action on the line of control and beyond it. So miscalculation is possible when there is ugly stability. I have a few slides on the U.S. role. I'll skip it for the time being. Maybe we can come back to it. Before the rapprochement process can resume, Pakistan must stop cross-border terrorism. That's a bottom line. It will not change. We have talked to Pakistan enough. The present government has stated this as a policy. Terrorism from across the border must end. There is, of course, need for military-to-military CBMs, need for risk reduction measures in the nuclear field, confidence building in the nuclear field. And both sides need to tone down the rhetoric of their media, the frenzy of the media. Both sides, the media does a lot of harm. India, as I said, has exercised strategic restraint. It still continues to do so. But we have to formulate a military strategy to achieve limited military aims, limited political aims and objectives, if a war happens, where the cold-start doctrine comes in. It gives India a window of opportunity below the nuclear threshold. I'll leave it at that, and we can discuss this to whatever extent you want. Thank you. Thank you. Let me go to Ambassador Sheffa. Thank you for taking to the time and being more prepared than I was for your slides. I apologize. Thank you very much. Thank you very much, Moeid and fellow panelists and audience, for coming out to hear us. I was more or less asked to do was to look at the U.S. perspective. So that is what I'm going to do. I'm tempted to say that we have just been treated to presentations that suggest the sentiment of perpetually being under attack is fairly widely distributed in the subcontinent. But that's not news. Moeid also expressed the hope that we could focus on strategic issues. In my experience, policymakers sometimes think strategy and occasionally write it. What they do is tactics. And the bigger the power, the harder it is to stick to strategy, because big powers have diverse interests. And so policy and tactics go off in different directions and usually focus on something quite concrete. In today's Washington, I would argue that the thinking is not so much strategy as what are our big things? ISIS, showcasing American strength, and trade policy, which in the view of this administration means preventing excessive imports. These don't necessarily fit together into a neat strategy. And people in other countries perceive a drawing in by the United States. I think they're correct in the intentions of the administration. I'm not sure whether that's what will be achieved. Made that disclaimer for strategy, I would argue that the strategic outline from Washington, such as it is, continues to look at the Indo-Pacific region as one big security space influenced heavily by the rise of China and India. One consequence of this is that the security agenda is likely to be the primary driver of India-U.S. relations. That has been the case sort of for the past couple of years. It was certainly never the case before that. China is rising faster than India. And so that creates interesting issues. India is important for the U.S. primarily because of the good things, the hopeful things that can report, that can result if the U.S. can work together with not just India, but Japan, Australia, South Korea, a network of large or large-ish friendly powers in a region that's tremendously important. Pakistan is important for India, for the United States. I would say primarily in the view of American policymakers, both now and in past administrations, because of their worry about the bad things that can happen if things go wrong. U.S. interests align quite well with India on a lot of security issues with a significant reserve for Pakistan. They don't align as well with Pakistan. And this has been a problem. We have built relationships with Pakistan which were constructed on the assumption that we had a strategic alignment, and they have come apart when that turned out not to be true. What's new in this administration is a much more transactional side. I don't actually like the word transactional, because I think in a lot of ways there's nothing wrong with it. But what I'm talking about in this case is what I would describe as an us-versus-them approach to economic issues and primarily to trade. With India, the United States has a $25 billion trade deficit, or that was last year's figure. India is the number nine trade partner for goods. The U.S. has claimed that it wants to make trade policy by addressing bilateral trade imbalances. As someone who studied economics, I don't think this makes sense, but it is a handle that policymakers can grab if what they want to do is go after countries that are, in our view, exporting too much. Both this and the visa issue will be contentious. It's not clear how much appetite there is in Washington for give and take. Give and take on trade is essential, but it also turns out to be difficult, because there are domestic constituencies involved for everybody, and that's just as true of India, Pakistan, and everybody else as it is of the United States. With Pakistan, there's a different problem, I would say, in the sort of transactional category. The economy is too small to be of much interest to the administration, though I would argue that addressing the economic relationship would be a great way to avoid having it be all about Afghanistan. But the administration, I'm sure, would like to see huge changes in Pakistan's policy towards Afghanistan and towards the Taliban. These subjects, I would say, are less amenable to give and take than trade problems are, and I don't detect any appetite in Washington for a policy of backing Pakistan against India, which is probably the only give that would really make a difference in Pakistan's policy, and I'm not even sure about that. Or Pakistan and India reacting. India, so far so good, I get from people who are or recently were in senior government positions a sense that they are excited about the potential in the personal relationship between Modi and Trump, and note that Modi managed to strike up a good relationship with Barack Obama, with whom there was no reason to assume they would be soul brothers. India is uneasy about the economic dimension for all the reasons I've just mentioned. Indian strategic thinkers and senior officials are looking for opportunities, but India is a cautious power. Its focus through the years has been on strategic autonomy and regional primacy in the Indian Ocean region, to which I would now add using India's economic strengths as an asset. Modi is comfortable with risk, so for that matter is Trump. The Indian system is not, so I'm not sure how that's going to play out. It's probably too early to tell. Pakistan, I would say, and thank you Moid, both thanks to the USIP for publishing how he's in my book on Pakistan, and thanks for mentioning it. I would say that Pakistan is trying to use its historically successful approach to the United States. A charm offensive while holding fast to its own priorities. Mind you, holding fast to your own priorities is what countries do. That's a description, not a criticism. There is an underlying view that the United States needs Pakistan more than Pakistan needs the United States, which has served Pakistan well for long periods until all of a sudden it absolutely wasn't working. So for that and other reasons, I predict volatility in both of those relationships, but volatility against a more positive background for India than for Pakistan. Throughout the region, the big imponderable is Afghanistan in the short term, but in the long term, and especially China, which has a growing economic profile in the region. Pakistan continues to hope that China's role will enable it not to worry about the United States. That hasn't happened yet, but these things can change. And India is wondering how to navigate China's growing power and clearly interests that are clearly opposed to India's. And one senior Indian official told me with some passion that the big imponderable about the strategic approach of the current U.S. administration was what would happen in the U.S.-China relationship. Thank you. Thanks. Okay, so what I'll do is very quickly look at the approximately last 16 years, the last two administrations, and some of my points will also overlap with what the other speakers have said. Basically, in approximately a 16-year perspective, you know, if we go back 16 years, U.S. policy towards the region was more or less hyphenated. India and Pakistan were taken together. A lot of that was forced by two major crises between nuclear arms states right after they conducted nuclear tests. So the immediate focus was preventing military crises from escalating and preventing the use of a nuclear weapon in the subcontinent. Moving on from there, we kind of got a dehyphenation. India and Pakistan were looked at separately with, you know, broadly speaking, separate sets of foreign policy objectives for both Pakistan and India. So what were some of these objectives and, you know, where are we now in terms of have we achieved those objectives? Let me go through them one country at a time. So broadly speaking, for Pakistan, you know, it was mentioned the state in slow motion implosion. We did not want to stay with nuclear weapons to implode. That kind of was part of the objective. And over time, this brought in into basically what I would say democracy and development is one objective. Security was another objective. One way to measure these is to look at the budgets, the foreign aid budget. So again, over the last 16 years or so, there's been approximately 11 to 12 billion in economic and governance assistance to Pakistan, and approximately eight billion in security assistance to Pakistan. This is over the last two administrations, approximately. You know, where do we stand in terms of achieving objectives in democracy, development, and security when it comes to Pakistan? You know, in one sense, we've got a transition to an elect, to a democratic government. The Freedom House scores for Pakistan on the scale of one to seven is 4.5. It's been at that level for the past few years. That's slightly better than the Southeast Asian average. But, you know, India and Sri Lanka are much better on democracy scores there. In terms of development, you know, you've, the US USAID on its website, it says the focus of USAID in Pakistan is in a number of sectors, economic growth, energy, education, health, and resilience. You know, we do see there is economic growth, the energy, education, and health sectors are lagging. Of course, the caveat here is that, you know, democracy and development are the dependent variables. Nobody expected that USAID is the sole contributor to those factors. There are many other variables that contribute to those objectives in Pakistan. Most of them are internal variables. But this is just a snapshot of, you know, where we were in terms of what we thought our objectives were and how far have we gone towards them. On the security front, you know, we put in eight billion security assistance to Pakistan. Some of the big-ticket items there are maritime patrol aircraft, upgrade kits for 70 F-16s in Pakistan, about 30 attack helicopters and 300 armored personnel carriers and a bunch of other security assistance. If we measure security indicators in Pakistan, you know, it's hard to say security has improved either internally or externally, okay?  So groups inside Pakistan attacking Pakistani targets, you know, there have been 5,000 to 10,000 casualties annually for much of the late 2000s and early 2010s. It's about 2,000 to 3,000 fatalities and internal violence in Pakistan the last two years. And then, of course, there's the groups inside Pakistan attacking outwards, Afghanistan and India. So it's hard to say that, you know, we've had a positive security impact in terms of turning security indicators around. Has Pakistan's security policy really aligned with the U.S.? Again, this, you know, it's a mixed bag. You can say in U.N. peacekeeping and anti-piracy in strengthening its nonproliferation controls after the AQ Khan incident. You know, on those issues, it has aligned with the U.S., broadly speaking, geostrategically, while nobody expected Pakistan to turn away from China, it has not actually gotten closer to the U.S. compared to where it was with China. So China supplies a lot of Pakistan's conventional military hardware even today. Okay, so again, broadly speaking, it's good to ask the hard question, you know, what have we got if we take a transactional perspective? We've got something, but it's a glass half full and a glass half empty, both. Very quickly turning to India, a lot of the points were also covered. You know, what were our grand objectives towards India? Some of this was inflated, broadly speaking, strategic and economic. We did want India to balance against China, and to some extent it has. It's built up its military forces on the border with China. Its navy conducts frequent patrols with other American allies in Asia, Japan more significantly. So yes, implicitly, you know, it's tilting towards the U.S. in terms of implicitly helping balance China, but don't underestimate, you know, there's a huge 2.5 is to one approximate disparity between Chinese military and Indian military in terms of budgets and gross economy. So, you know, one has to kind of put that caveat to that. And again, economics, the figures were mentioned, you know, about 10% of India's trade is with the U.S., but the deficit, there's $40 billion, if you count goods and services together. It's about $30 to $40 billion deficit, goods and service trade deficit. So, you know, since I've run out of time, that's essentially where we stand. And of course, the India-Pakistan rivalry was not a grand strategic objective since those crises, but maybe it's time to re-evaluate what are our objectives and, you know, what sort of, what strategy can the Trump administration come up with towards the region and shoot it while still continuing to de-iphonate the two countries, at least partly hyphenate them as one of its objectives. Okay. Okay. Thank you. And thank you to all the panelists. And as I mentioned, what we'll do is have a conversation here and then open it up and I'll make sure we leave enough time for Q&A. Before I raise any questions, are there any comments on what you've heard here? Okay. So, in that case, let me begin with what you've left us with, Dinsha, and your argument that the India-Pakistan competition wasn't sort of the strategic, you know, hook there. And Ambassador, you've also talked about India and then US-Pakistan. This town is increasingly allergic to India-Pakistan. We talk about US-India, we talk about US-Pakistan, but the conversation about India-Pakistan starts and ends at saying it's too difficult. We don't want to get involved because there is a competition between India-Pakistan and thus the US can get caught up in the middle and it's not like we can solve their problems. That I think is fair. The question is, if you're talking about strategic priorities, and this is my view, I see three for the US in the region in the long run, short and long run, but really in the long run strategically. Number one is no nuclear war for obvious reasons. Number two is India as an ally. You could argue as a counterweight to China, although, you know, that is not sort of the formally used term, but in any case, this idea that India is going to be the ally in the region against China's rights. And the third one is, of course, Afghanistan, and peace in Afghanistan and the war that continues. None of these three can be achieved without some movement on the India-Pakistan front. Nuclear war, of course, for obvious reasons. China, till the India-Pakistan thing continues, India has diverted attention and that's, you know, we've heard this argument. And then Afghanistan, to my mind, is as much an India-Pakistan proxy situation as it is, or at least Pakistan's behavior in Afghanistan is driven as much by its view on India, whether right or wrong. So I want to open this to the panelists to say, is it not anything but strategic for the US not to think about this region and realize that each and everything that the US wants to achieve is actually tied to India-Pakistan more than even AFPAC or US-India or US-Pakistan? I would question your premise. I think that if you look at the past couple of years, the connection between the problems in Afghanistan and India-Pakistan relations has actually worked quite differently from what you described. There have been periods when it certainly appeared that the Pakistan military were having enough trouble over the border with India and didn't want to heat things up in Afghanistan. So I don't buy the argument that you have to solve India-Pakistan in order to have a decent outcome in Afghanistan. I think that you have correctly said that the first priority is no nuclear war. The question is, what does it take to improve the security of that concept? I think Colonel Kanwal said something very important, which is that miscalculation is the big danger. The big reason why the United States has shown, this town shows an allergy towards India-Pakistan, as you put it, is not just that it's too hard, but the reason that it's too hard is, I would say threefold. First of all, you don't have one of the prime prerequisites for an India-Pakistan breakthrough, which is strong governments in both countries that are willing to take some kind of agreement into the public domain. Secondly, one of the parties definitely does not want any kind of outside involvement, and that therefore creates a most unpromising setting for waiting in there. And third, I question how much Pakistan actually wants the United States to get involved. I think they're very suspicious of what the United States might do. So if you're looking for a way to improve the odds, I think you're basically looking at much lower-profile diplomatic skills whose objective would be to bring about a situation in which India and Pakistan could talk productively, and productively gets to a lot of the points you made. I just wanted to chime in and sort of say, I think I do agree with your three points, and I think what's really essential is, and I think the last decade or so has clearly shown, that dehyphenating India and Pakistan and making it AFPAC hasn't really worked to that extent, because even AFPAC has an India involvement right next to it. So whatever you actually do in South Asia does involve both the countries. And when you were talking about it again, as a history person reminded me, it's of Pakistan-U.S. relation in the historical perspective. And as the master Hakanee has actually shown in his book on magnificent delusions, how Pakistan had certain expectations of the U.S. But one thing which he didn't really emphasize to that extent was the U.S. was always aware of it. So it wasn't that the U.S. did not know that it's arming Pakistan and Pakistan's main opposition is India. The U.S. kind of chose to ignore it to a large extent. And I think that led to the asymmetry that then emerged in the late 60s, and then Pakistan began to sort of distrust the U.S. So I think any policy of the U.S. towards South Asia has to involve some kind of an India, Pakistan hyphenated or non-hyphenated, some kind of an approach that actually looks at it together. And I think just on the comment of the ambassador on whether there's Pakistan trust the U.S. or not, I actually think that Pakistan would like anyone to intervene that would lead to any kind of a solution. I think one of the real frustrations in Pakistan is this consistent refusal of India to achieve some kind of a solution regarding Kashmir or regarding all the other kinds of conflicts. And again, you actually see this in the historical perspective that if you look at beginning from 1947, Pakistan did try consistently to talk to India and the roadblocks were from the Indian side. So I think Pakistan is still quite open. Pakistan tried to involve the Commonwealth. Pakistan tried to involve the British government directly. So anyone who would listen practically. And I think it's still basically open to it as long as it leads somewhere. Not any kind of solution, though. Did you really mean that? Some kind of solution. It just depends what's accepted. A particular kind of solution. Yeah. It just depends what's accepted. Let's have a conversation if we have time at the end, if we could come to that. Sure. Let me let me let's just have a conversation and come back. I want to ask you one thing and then go to Brigadier Caval, which is I take your point about the solution and Pakistan at least, you know, in my view, okay, Pakistan wants this. The question I have for you is, and I'm not suggesting that you speak for the Pakistani perspective, but put yourself in that position. And I want to know what ultimately do Pakistani policymakers think they are getting out of the continuation of whatever kind of terrorism or militancy from Pakistani soil, whether they're involved, not involved, unable to prevent or not, because the entire argument that the world should come and try and figure out a solution falls flat on its head. As soon as the picture is that there are people coming out of Pakistan doing things that nobody wants done. So what's the logic behind continuing to argue that well, actually, it is not the priority. X is not the priority. Y is not the priority, where that to my mind is the number one reason the world looks at Pakistan the way it does. You're very, very right. And putting myself in the shoes. So not what I what I actually think, but also this relates to a couple of conversations I've had people who are sort of involved in this. I really think that their main objective is it keeps India busy and it keeps India as a small regional power, because that is what frustrates I think India the most, that it's not able to actually emerge where it's supposed to be. And this goes back right to Nehru when he wanted to be the leader of the world in a number of ways. And these kind of things kind of keep it limited. India can never get a permanent seat on the UN Security Council as long as Kashmir is there. India cannot really become a rival to China because it has to keep looking at its other border. So all these kinds of things kind of keep India limited. And I think if they even sort of get that idea that India is limited and not moving ahead, they also think that keeping India limited will eventually make India understand that you need to talk to Pakistan. That of course has not happened, which I'm also, and that's where my perspective is, I'm at a loss to understand why that has not happened. Because ultimately, the greater incentive is for India, because let's say for example, tomorrow by a miracle, Pakistan, India problems are actually solved. The one country that's going to come out of it much stronger is India, not Pakistan. So it's their incentive, they're not doing it. Forget it, Kamal. If I could get a response to this, but also want to ask you a separate question if you allow me after you're done with what you're going to do. May I have my slides, please? Can't prevent the South Asian Army men from doing what they want to do. Go for it. After all, I'm just a civilian. Our Army men are just as much in love. Presentation. Please. Are you sure you do that with the uniform? May I have the presentation, please? As that's coming up, can I ask you the other question I had in mind? There's a conversation in this town about India as the US partner in the region ally fully understood, but then the China linked to it. India as the potential counterweight to China, if I were to put it bluntly. We are seeing on the one hand India, the one belt, one road and India's reaction to that. On the other hand, there is 70, 75 billion dollars of trade. Talk about investment over 150 billion. Where does India stand on playing counterweight to China as a US ally? I think the Indo-US strategic partnership is a hedging strategy for both. And the dragon in the room is China. It's as simple as that. There are two eventualities that I look at. One China could implode. There are plenty of people in this town who think so. Gordon Chang, the leader, and even David Shambog has jumped on to the China may implode bandwagon lately. So it's a low probability, but a high impact event if it ever comes about. The second is that China could behave irresponsibly militarily, somewhere on its periphery. Maybe India, Vietnam, Japan, South Korea, who knows? Somebody else. In either case, both the US and India will need strong partners to manage the fallout to deal with the consequences. And therefore, the Indo-US strategic partnership makes eminent sense as a hedging strategy for both. May I say one or two more sentences in this particular regard? Can we do the slides and then we'll come back? I just want to say that there is a need for a cooperative security framework in the Indo-Pacific. And the US can take the lead. India would willingly join in. And some of the other nations that Ambassador Sheffer had mentioned, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore, several others. Okay. I'm glad you didn't do the whole presentation. Okay. The US role in South Asia. Because it's a comparative chart of what the US interests are and what the alignments are. Pakistan is an MNNA, major non-nato ally. India is a strategic partner, recently designated as a major defense partner for the purposes of transfer of technology. US is the largest supplier of defense equipment to India. The largest supplier. India is incidentally the largest buyer of defense equipment, weapons and equipment. And the US is the largest supplier. So that says something. Growing bilateral trade, Moid mentioned it, $115 billion last year. Pakistan receives a lot of coalition support funds, surplus military equipment, etc. Now here's the bottom line. All around the Beltway, one hears this thought in policy circles, think tanks, government, everywhere. Pakistan is going down the tube. We know the reasons why I showed you a slide about Pakistan's internal instability. And if Pakistan goes down the tube, nuclear weapons will fall into jihadi hands. It's been mentioned in this panel as well by Dinsha and others. And that is not acceptable. It's a vital national interest for the United States that Pakistani nuclear weapons must not fall into jihadi hands. So far no quarrel, absolutely no quarrel with the assessment. But the policy prescription, therefore, to prevent this, it is necessary to support and strengthen the Pakistan Army. This finds no resonance in New Delhi. India-Pakistan tensions could lead to conflict. It's also been mentioned by Moid again with risk of escalation to nuclear exchanges. Therefore, Council India to continue to show restraint and solve the Kashmir dispute and call on Pakistan's deep state to stop cross-border terrorism. There is no real pressure on Pakistan to actually stop cross-border terrorism. Look at how many Russians have been designated as put on the banned list or sanctioned list, and how many Pakistanis. Whereas coalition support funds, arms transfers continue despite American deaths in Afghanistan at the hands of the Hakanis. Efforts to promote a new normal nuclear Pakistan are underway in Washington, D.C. A new normal nuclear Pakistan, as if something has changed. All that has changed is that Pakistan is going in for a full spectrum nuclear deterrence, whatever that means. Last one. The policy prescription to support and strengthen the Pakistan Army finds no resonance in New Delhi for the reasons shown. Helping to destabilize Pakistan's neighbors, helping the Army to maintain its aliens in Pakistan's polity, undermining democracy and civilian authority. What is the impact? Support for the Pakistan Army slowing down further growth of the strategic partnership with India. Why? Because we have doubts about what is the American thinking? What are the U.S. intentions? This is very important, ladies and gentlemen. If the United States continues to support Pakistan the way it has been doing, don't you think Indians will have doubts about the intentions? And finally, since the key requirement is to safeguard nuclear warheads, help should be limited to that aim, to achieving that aim. So let's, if I finished, if the Pakistan, if the support continues, the relationship with India could become a transactional one. Ambassador Schaeffer used this term. That's what will happen. Thank you.  So thank you. Thank you. That was very helpful. The only word I would object to and all of that was the Russia part, because that gets our heads to spin these days. So we'll stay away from that. Dinshok, if I could ask you, following up from Brigadier Caval, this whole idea of the nuclear weapons being loose, et cetera, but also nuclear war, where is the risk? Because, or where, what is, on the spectrum of one to 10, what is the level of risk and threat? And I say this because I just, as you know, finished a book on looking at India-Pakistan crises. The two conclusions I draw, one, the idea that India and Pakistan don't want to engage, the U.S. is actually not true. There's enough evidence to show during crises it happens. But the more important part there is, the whole nuclear business is about signaling. And so it's very difficult to reach the objective reality on what the risk levels are, because it suits Pakistan to say, oh, well, actually, we have nothing to do with this cross-border business. If you do something to us, we are actually the victims of terrorism, don't touch us. It suits India to say, next time you do this, we will take you down, and then use one excuse or another not to do it, because everybody is signaling. Where do we stand on this? Are we exaggerating the threat? Are we not? And if we are not, then what are we doing about it? Okay. So the risks are basically a repeat of the 99-2001 crisis. I put forth a hypothesis that's not testable because we don't have data when India-Pakistan relations, if at all they are normal, the risk of a mass terrorist attack escalating quickly are much less. If India-Pakistan temperature is hot, which it is today and which it was in 2001, the risks of escalation are much greater. Right now, we are in a hot temperature zone. During the peace process, arguably, we were in a lower temperature zone, 2004 to 2007, approximately. So the process tracing or the chain of events is essentially a lot of game theorists and analysts and policymakers have processed this. Very basically is that a single Indian blow may not provoke a retaliation, but an exchange of two, three rounds of either a prolonged multi-week exchange, both the duration and intensity of the exchanges, will very quickly cross a red line that's ambiguous and blurred. That will escalate to a more deeper conventional military action, which would bring a tactical nuclear weapon from the Pakistani side, most likely, into the conflict very quickly. What it can do is bring its playbook back into the National Security Council, the same playbook that was used in 1999 but fine-tuned in 2001 and 2002, which is a diplomatic crisis management strategy of having diplomats on the ground day by day, week by week, until temperatures cool. So, yes, the U.S. cannot solve the broader India-Pakistan conflict, cannot propose a peace solution that hasn't happened either between Israel and its Arab and the Palestinians or between India-Pakistan. But it can, or at least it has in the past, cool an immediate crisis. Could I just say that what Dinshah said does not in any way contradict what I said, because what I was thinking was off-limits or at least in all likelihood very unproductive would be a mediating effort that was looking primarily at the longer term and the big breakthrough. Crisis management is something the United States has done effectively. The caution, though, is that the next crisis won't necessarily be like the last one, so you may want to bring your old playbook, but you have to assume that you're going to need to rewrite it. Let me open it up and get some questions and we'll come back to the conversation if there is time. Yes, there are mics on the side, so let me see if somebody is going to get them. We're also webcasting this. We want to make sure that people can hear right here. If you could please introduce yourself and keep the questions short. Thank you. Yeah, sure. My name is Ramana. I'm a student of international law at GW. So currently my question is to Mr. Singh. He said that Pakistan is transporting cross-border terrorism and everything, so my question goes back to 2001 when bond negotiations started for peace in Afghanistan. I hope everybody knows that Afghanistan has a longest border with Pakistan and then Iran and India is nowhere in the picture, but still India jumped in. It said, okay, we would provide 100 million dollar of infrastructure, but give us a role in Afghanistan. Why would India want a role in Afghanistan? I mean, and then India had like 76 consulate in Afghanistan, and then there is a tag on Pakistan APS students, just school students, and then my enemy is found in your safe haven in your consulate. I mean, could you please explain role of India in Afghanistan in this perspective? Okay, thank you. Any other at this point or yes, please? Raju Kotzreker. I have a question. So far I have heard a lot about the security and stability perspective, and I understand that is the issue, but it has been the issue for quite a while. I've sort of drawn analogy with Europe and, you know, the Germany and France fought wars, three wars, devastating last one, and then they came up with the trade. So my question is, and I understand that, you know, you can't have trade unless you stabilize the region, but at least that is your long-term solution, and that can, you know, solve these issues in the long term. So do we have to wait for a nuclear war or disaster? So second world war? Very nice. Thank you. Any others? Yes, take one more and then come back. Yeah, my name is Peter Kovach, and I'm not sure how welcome this question will be. I want to explore a little bit more the religion-driven ideological aspects. I mean, Hinduism is rebound in response to British colonialism, and it's really skillful definition, frankly, of the higher-minded aspects of the religion. Jinnah's recognizing in part that Satya Graha was essentially a hinduist movement and feeling that this sort of more modern secular Islam needed to be represented in a separate state. But then in insecurity, the broad-minded goals of Hinduism become insecure, and Hindutva becomes an ideological driver of the right, and in Pakistan, especially after the Afghan war and the way we, frankly, drew them into that, Wahhabism and other more extreme aspects of Islam come in. I want to say that I've talked to Sharia intellectuals in Pakistan, and one of the interesting, I would almost say, cliched statements that you get from them is that their scholarship is increasingly separated into civilization from Gangetic civilization, and that what Pakistan needs is a kind of a reconciliation with an Asian Islam that looks at the non-Abrahamic prophets, Buddha, Mahavira, even the Chinese Lao Tzu and Confucius. How does that all fit in, in your view? That's surely for Yaku.  Afghanistan. India has historically had a great relationship with Afghanistan. Recent stability in Afghanistan are vital national interests, in my view, vital national interests, and the definition of a vital interest is it should be defended by force, military force, if necessary. But India doesn't have any soldiers in Afghanistan. India was involved in the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan, spent over two billion dollars, two billion U.S. dollars, precious foreign exchange for us, which we can ill afford, for peace and stability in Afghanistan. When Rabindranath Tagore wrote that famous poem about Kabuliwala, there was no Pakistan. There was only India. So India's relationship goes back that far. As far as your number of 76 consulates is concerned, I don't know where you got that number from. On Pakistan, what are there at Jalalabad and Ghazni and Kandahar? That is all, three of them.  People have gone there and seen it for themselves. In the army, we have an expression, a man and a dog. And that's what they are. They are worried about their own security, those poor guys. Where are they going to destabilize Pakistan from? That's a chief on trade. I'm so glad the gentleman asked the question about trade. You know, one of the most promising things that happened on the India-Pakistan front a few years ago was the initiative to open trade between the two countries, which was worked out and discussed between the normal trade officials in both countries, obviously with consultations at the top. The way Pakistan played it was particularly interesting because it was barely covered in the press, but it was covered extensively in the India press for about two weeks, which I read as giving the army time to object if it was going to object, and it didn't. And it looked like it was going forward. Unfortunately, things fell apart after the change in government. And the reasons for this are somewhat confused. What one hears from Pakistani sources is that they were all set to sign on the dotted line, but were asked by Modi's people to hold off so that he could take credit for it. And India's then decision to stop the talks that had been planned between the foreign secretaries pushed the trade initiative off the cliff. It is certain, though, that at some point in the proceedings, the Pakistan army also got cold feet. So I think there's enough blame to go around for the fact that that initiative didn't go anywhere. It would be a great one to revive. And one of its biggest champions, interestingly enough, was Shahbaz Sharif, Chief Minister of Punjab, who bent my ear for about an hour one fine afternoon, talking about how this was going to be the salvation of the Punjabi economy, about which he cares deeply, due trade without having everything else stabilized. But what you have to do, and it sounds like what I said before is ultimately, you're going to have to have political leaders who are willing to own this initiative, take it public. If they may have a parliamentary process to go through, they may simply want to go through some kind of consensus building process outside of that. But you have to have leaders on both sides who are willing to say, this is good for us. It doesn't solve all our problems, but it is good for us. And I would love to see that happen at some point, whether this is the next step or not goes beyond what we can settle this afternoon. Well, first, I could just make a quick petition to what a master said. Completely agreed trade is the way to go. And I think the current government in Pakistan, both Shahbaz Sharif and Nawaz Sharif, were very committed to it. And I think are still very much committed to it. And if you go to the Vaga border, there is a special trade door that actually Pakistan initiated and said that it should be created. And they were all going for it. Of course, as the ambassador mentioned, that there were some hiccups. So I think from the Pakistan site, it is kind of an opening. And I think from the Pakistan site also, it was a lot. So Pakistan moved ahead much further than what it usually does, because usually Pakistan says, well, let's talk about Kashmir. And only then we will do anything else. Here, Pakistan had actually, in fact, kept Kashmir on a side and said that we will move ahead with trade. And at least to a great extent, you had the establishment for it. So I think it showed a huge shift in Pakistan's approach towards India. Sadly, it just didn't work out. But I think it's a very important thing to revive. Now, your question about sort of the whole religious dimension of it, I think, of course, both sides feed on each other. And there is a reaction on both sides. And I think what's happened with sort of the rise of the Hindutva is that I think now, because, you know, I used to argue about five, six years ago, that Pakistan's self-understanding of itself was that we are not India. So Pakistan defined itself as not India. But that's what's happening in India now. India wants to define itself as not Pakistan. And once it tries to define itself as not Pakistan, the only differentiating factor is majority religion. And that's what fuels the whole Hindutva thing. The other thing is, and as you very rightly mentioned, that Jinnah's vision was, you know, what this late 19th century scholar, Saeed immediately spoke about in the spirit of Islam and Saeed Ahmad Khan, a very modernist, rational Islam. And therefore, this Islam could actually engage with the world. And I think that is what Saeed the Saeed immediately and Saeed Ahmad Khan will actually talk about what then Jinnah picked. But where you had in the Sarvarkar thing was this very inward-looking Hindutva understanding that is trying to enforce and reinforce what Hinduism, as they understood it, stood for. And that, I think, factor, you know, and I hate to predict things as a historian, but that I think is more destructive and more dangerous than even, you know, the kinds of things that I bring in Pakistan. And just the last point, I just wanted to respond to what Brigadier Saab earlier mentioned in his presentation. You know, on the Pakistan side, I always get demused when, so there are some some organizations in Pakistan who always come up with some report and say India is imploding. So I was quite interested to hear that Indians have the same view. And I ridiculed the Pakistan side saying, you have been saying this for the last 20 years, but it hasn't imploded. But I'll say the same thing to the Indian side. You've been saying this for a long time. It hasn't. Because if you look at the figures, you know, even if you look at, like, like practical things, even now in India, so with all the problems of Pakistan that Brigadier Saab showed, India has an indigenous insurgency in Kashmir, which has imploded. India has, in the centre, in the heart of India, 32 districts that are controlled by the next lights, and they kill policemen and paramilitary force every other day. The whole of the Northeast has been burning for, you know, God's knows when. So there are huge parts of India that are actually imploding. So I think if we talk about the implosion debate, then I think perhaps India, at least on that count, wins. It has a lot more reasons to implode than Pakistan. I would remind you, we're sitting at the U.S. Institute of Peace. And thus, we are not going to have any implosions here. I promise you. I'm not going to let you get away with the impression that Hindutva is something violent and virulent and, you know, something is going to happen. It's a fringe, it's only fringe elements who are involved. A very, very small minority. Nobody cares a damn for them. There must be something we are doing right as a nation. We have the second largest Muslim population in the world after Indonesia, and our Muslims are good Indians and good Muslims. So we must be doing something right. Thank you. Others, please. Good afternoon. Thank you all for coming. You're all very intelligent. My name is Julian Kyle Lewis. I represent the American University here in DC. I study international education policy. I wrote the rules and regulations manual for the department in the Office of Presidential Correspondence in 2011 at the White House. And my question for you is, in light of our newly elected president here in the United States, you know, it seems like the whole world shares the same views on who's president right now, but I would encourage you to look forward to the next four years and eight years. And what we determined was that when President Obama got elected, a lot of the folks that voted for him, they decided to sit on the couch after he got elected and didn't really want to help him much, get much of his agenda passed in Congress. We'd have some type of leverage here at home and abroad. So right now, Senator Elizabeth Warren, do you have any advice for that lady? Because she's a very, very, very good lady who cares a lot about the things that you all care about on this stage, and we're trying to help her move forward and help the world be a better place. So any advice for Senator Elizabeth Warren? Thank you very much. Let me rephrase that. As USIP doesn't sort of take political positions on these things, but let me ask this question rather than the world applied to South Asia and go back to the conversation that we had. And then show me if I can come to you and then I have a couple of questions for the others, which is, is there a way for the US to make South Asia a better place? I know that's not your question, but let's ask this. Well, let's get a policy-focused group. Let's see what the core objectives are. Is it, again, what were the original objectives? Democracy, development, security, what sort of tangible benchmarks can one put towards those objectives? So basically develop a strategy. Haven't we been doing this for years and years? Well, it's time to re-evaluate it. So I think this is actually a good time to re-evaluate it. Let me come to you, the government, then one question each to everyone. But I wanted to follow up on what Jacob had said. In how he has presented this, holding India down, if that's sort of one of Pakistan's strategies, right or wrong, are they not succeeding? Because the more India sort of talks about Pakistan, then it's a cash-22. And you mentioned that talks only after terrorism is resolved. But then if you take Jacob's argument at face value, that plays into Pakistan's hands. The fault, dear Brutus, lies in the stars. Actually, the fault lies in the China-Pakistan nexus. It's a deep nexus, a collusive nexus. It's a grand strategy formulated by both. They have a friendship that is higher than the mountains, deeper than the oceans, stronger than steel, and sweeter than honey. I hope both of them don't get diabetes. And it is part of that grand strategy of China that Pakistan is acting as a proxy in pulling India down. Whether it has succeeded, I think it has, to a large extent. India is forced to face a two-front situation, prepare militarily for a two-front war. Of course, it's a drain on resources. And to a large extent, it has succeeded. Therefore, India is now getting back with a strategic partnership with the United States and other partners in South Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia and East Asia. I'll leave it at that. I would suggest, Brigadier, that the breakthrough India achieved in the early 90s, when it changed its economic policy and roughly tripled growth, a change which has continued, I mean, you don't keep that same percentage, but India has continued basically to be a high growth country. That opened up far more possibilities for India than its military difficulties with either Pakistan or China. I'm not for an instant suggesting that India can ignore those, but India has in its hands the tool for increasing its power regionally and globally, and for lining up international support. Now, the flip side of that coin is that it would be within Pakistan's power to take a leaf out of India's book and focus a bit more on its economy. They've got a very talented finance minister at the moment who's trying to do that, and it is harder for Pakistan than India to attract investment because the security situation has been difficult and still has a horrible reputation. But I think this is one of the ways that one can change the shape of the problem, and it would make both South Asia and the world a better place if that continued to happen. The fundamental basis of the strategic restraint policy was that there is a conflict in Jammu and Kashmir. Okay, we can handle it. We should keep it confined locally so that the economy can grow at 10%. It never did reach 10%, but India is the fastest growing economy among the large economies of the world. So that was the basis of strategic restraint. And ma'am, we spent 1.6% of our GDP on defense. That's for the threats and challenges we face that's extremely small. Yaku, could I come to you and flip this? You said essentially Pakistan holding India down, Brigadier Kamal seems to suggest it's worked, but let me turn this around. If you're Pakistan, and if your view is that India is talking about isolating Pakistan and essentially holding Pakistan down in another way, which is to tell the world that this is a farayah state and you've got to deal with it that way, and Brigadier Kamal also touched upon that, then aren't you playing into India's hands? If you close the system of regional integration, if you essentially keep doing what you've been doing for the past 20, 30 years, and if India keeps doing what it's doing for the past 30 years, the differential keeps growing. I mean, that data is indisputable. So if you're Pakistan, isn't it engumbered upon you to change something even if you feel that the other is at fault? Because otherwise, in this game, there's only one winner, and it's pretty clear where that's going. I think that's a very important point, and I think that's the result we have seep in. Because Pakistan has realized that it needs to get out of this equation, but it's stuck with the reality of the situation. And I think one must see, like even going back to the Mushara Farah and the proposed solution of the Kashmir dispute, that can show that Pakistan had moved dramatically from its official stated position. So Pakistan, again, I would reiterate from day one, has been open to some kind of negotiation. It has to be agreed upon by all sides, whatever that might be. And I think, of course, Pakistan has certain red lines perhaps, but I think that red line is very, very sort of low down and very sort of thin. So I think Pakistan would accept any broad base solution. But until that is done, relations with India cannot improve. But I think just we were actually talking about the economy. The economist had came out with the calculation a couple of months ago, which actually showed that by 2030, Pakistan will be one of the world's 20 largest economies. And I think over the last couple of years, we have actually seen the incidence of terrorism go down dramatically in Pakistan. And I think that has sort of changed the economic situation in Pakistan. And that's where I think CPEC comes in, because I think what the Sharif governments, both at the provincial level and at the federal level, they know the answer is actually trade. They know the answer is the economy. And therefore, they actually wanted to open it up with India. But that didn't work out. So now they are using China for that benefit. So it will eventually happen. And just to underline, I actually just got to know a couple of days, well, a couple of weeks ago and actually saw it firsthand, the documentation. Pakistan was so open to good relations with India under the Musharraf era that four kilometers from the border between India and Pakistan lies this area called Kartarpur, where the founder of Sikhism, Guru Nanak, died and is actually buried. And there's a Sikh shrine and there's a Muslim shrine to Guru Nanak there. Pakistan said that it would create a road to India, and Sikhs can actually come there and, you know, worship there visa-free and without any restrictions and controls. And it's very interesting. And I looked at the documentation that Pakistan wrote about three to four letters to India, and there was no response to it. So even the idea of religious tourism, you know, and this was the sole attempt under Musharraf to promote religious tourism, even that was actually really, really tried. And that also hit a roadblock. So I think Pakistan has tried. And I think the whole CPEC thing, and I think we also need to remember if CPEC actually takes off as it is poised to take off, it will again hard line Pakistan's view of India, because then it doesn't need that trade with India to that extent, because it'll be dependent more on the Chinese connection. And if that happens, I think the openness of Pakistan with greater sort of, you know, greater cooperation with India will diminish. It doesn't really get that bad press. Well, it's sort of complicated because the details of CPEC haven't been announced. But just yesterday, there was a news item that actually detailed a lot of what's happening in CPEC. So it's coming out. And I think slowly, of course, they are internal internal quarrels about it. But I think it's actually much larger than a lot of people also even imagine. So I think it's a work in progress. The only thing I'll say, Yaku, is I don't think you can look at CPEC and the India opening as substitutes, because at the end of the day, the East-West has to connect with North-South. Pinchot, if I may ask you to talk about grand strategy, you think a lot about that. The one word that hasn't been mentioned on this panel, and I'm a bit surprised, is Russia. Because there's a lot of conversation about now in South Asia, Russia, you know, much closer to India than Pakistan throughout the Cold War and throughout history really. Now, the Pakistanis also talk about an opening to Russia and a change in that. Russia and Iran are also seen as supporting one way or another the Taliban in Afghanistan against U.S. interests, et cetera. Where does this Russian attitude towards South Asia fit in the India-Pakistan equation? So where does it fit? Well, first in the India-Pakistan competition in Afghanistan, yes, for tactical reasons, Russia is, you know, trying to tilt that conflict towards a solution that may be good for Russia, and it may be good for Pakistan. Who knows? That's kind of open-ended. Russia is still one of the traditional arms suppliers. And if there is nuclear energy, then one of the nuclear energy suppliers for India. So while India has diversified its arms imports to include the United States, Israel, France, Russia is still one of those top four in the mix.  It's going to reassert itself in South Asia. Do you see Russia as a potential mediator in India-Pakistan issues? So the ultimate mediator is India and Pakistan themselves. But that hasn't happened for seven years. It hasn't happened. The ultimate model, the realistic model, is the peace process that was in place in the mid-2000s. You know, the details of that peace process were worked internally. The notch came from outside, including the Bush administration. So, I mean, that's where that's my comment. Okay. Let me, any last, one last question right here. Short. Hello. So my name is Luis. I'm a student here at Nova Community College. So my question is, from what I see and from what I heard, why is it so hard for the leaders from both countries to just come together? Why does it always have to be, and I'm pretty young. So, you know, why is it so hard for them just to come together without having like, if you do this first, then we'll talk. Just sit down. If you're the leader of your country, sit down with the other leader of your country and figure things out like gentlemen or gentlemen and lady or whatever. Because I think that we have bigger issues that will come up in the next 30, 40 years concerning global climate change.  So I wonder, with your intellectual capability here, congregated here, what are some potential solutions or what can we do to actually bring peace? Or what can they do, like concrete steps? Why they don't do it is welcome to South Asia. That's the answer. Any one line responses? No more than that. I'm reminded of a quote that was attributed, I believe, to Warren Austin, who at the time was the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, asking why, and I think he was talking about India and Pakistan, but it could just as easily have been Israel and the Arabs or other discordant couples, why they couldn't sit down and work it out like good Christian gentlemen. One should perhaps add Gandhi's reported answer when asked what he thought about, I believe it was Christian philosophy, and he said, I think it would be a good idea. All right. You had a good idea. On that note, let me just say to do my duty as USIP, but this is an analytical comment that I always make in these discussions on India, Pakistan. I do want to remind myself, but everybody else, that as difficult as this seems and has to be one of the most difficult ones to resolve, nuclear weapons, we know all of that. It's a very odd rivalry in which both antagonists know exactly what the solution to each of their problems is. Each one, whether it's trade, which we know will open and what they would need to do, whether it's Kashmir, which both of them worked out a formula during the peace process, and everybody at least I've talked to in India and Pakistan who matter will privately tell you, yes, whenever we get around to it, it's going to be somewhere there. That's the framework. Siachen, others, every single issue, they have a box, and they just have to figure out how to piece the puzzle together. And so I do want to keep hope. Otherwise, I would say that's idealistic, but I do think nobody believed when India and Pakistan were in the midst of a crisis in 2002 that they would four or five years from then be within touching distance of inking a deal on every issue, including Kashmir, but they were, and it fell apart. And I think there is no reason why we can't believe that it'll come back. We just have to, you know, find the right time and the moment to do it. And at least to my mind, whether Pakistan, India like it, or X likes it, or Y likes it, whatever the world can do to get them to figure this out, I don't see how that could be a problem. With that, thank you very much, and please join me in thanking the panelists.