How does the narcissist react to your success? How do they react to your attainment of fame, wealth, or social status? Or your accomplishment of an aim or purpose? They will most often give up whatever they're doing, whatever they're trying to accomplish, and they will then take on the supportive role in your success. They will act as though they are trying to support you. They will even portray this image that they were the reason for your success. They will then use this as an excuse to take control of what you're doing. Now they're the ones making the decisions. They're the ones who are deciding what happens next because they're envious of your success. They want it for themselves. They want the fruits of your labor without doing any of the work. They portray this image of being the reason for your success as though you couldn't have done it without them. They will lie about it to people, to the point where they begin to believe it themselves, and then they will even expect a share of your success. They will feel as though you owe them something, even though they never did anything to support you. They have a strong sense of entitlement. If you do not hand over a share of your success, they will find a way to take it from you because deep down, they don't even believe that you deserve it. They believe that they are more deserving than you are, even if they did nothing to earn it. They have an exaggerated sense of their abilities and importance. They believe that they brought more to the table than they actually did. So now they expect an exaggerated return on their exaggerated investment. If you don't give in and just hand over whatever they're looking for, they will then resort to sabotaging your success. They will try to find ways to sabotage whatever you're doing. They might steal your money or property. They might start a smear campaign and turn everyone against you or your work. If they cannot be in control of it, they might as well run it to the ground. That's just how they see it. They don't want a piece of the pie. They want the entire thing. They expect you to hand it over to them. And if you don't give it to them willingly, they will find an underhanded way to take it from you. When you don't hand over the reins to them, they see it as though you're attacking them. You're not letting them benefit from your hard work, your success. And this is something they feel that they're entitled to. They believe that you owe them the world.  You're trying to hurt them. And that is when they will do whatever it takes to rob you of your power. Even though it is rightfully yours, they believe that they are inherently deserving of it just because they want it.  They develop this sense of being arrogantly superior, proud and vain. They show an excessively high opinion of their appearance, abilities or worth.   If this is something that you're all capable of doing or something that you just don't want to do, they will then try to take your success and remove you from the equation. So now it's just them and your success, but they're telling everyone that they earned it and it's feeding their ego, making them feel really nice, but it isn't real. It's all a lie and deep down they know this. In some cases, they might not go as far as to actually take your success from you. But they will be leaching off of your time, energy and money, to the point where your work ethic begins to fail. You're no longer able to work as hard as you once did. You're no longer getting the same results. People see the image of the narcissist supporting you, but what they don't see is how they're actually taking up all of your time and draining the energy out of you. There's really nothing you can say to the narcissist. They're not flexible to your needs. They cannot adapt to your situation and what you require from them because they're only focused on themselves. They're only focused on their own needs. And over time, this begins to affect your results. This begins to take up your time. Now you have no more time for yourself, no more time for your work, no energy to do the work. Now there's more money going out than there's coming in.  You're supporting someone who is not supporting you. You're supporting someone who is taken from you and given back the bare minimum or nothing in return. But if you were to ask them, they would say that they are supporting you. They would say that they're the ones keeping it all together. And that is why everything stays the same. That is why nothing ever changes because they cannot acknowledge what they're even doing. They have to protect their false self. So now you're stuck with no time for yourself, no time to do what you need to do to maintain your success, no energy or motivation to do anything. And gradually, the money is depleting until you're left with nothing. But just because you don't have anything now, it doesn't mean the narcissist is suddenly going to acknowledge everything they did wrong. They're going to blame you. They're going to see it as though you failed them, as though you're not good enough. They will then use that as an excuse to discard you. And they will then usually find someone else to do the same thing to all over again. If you try to rebuild and over a period of time you are successful in doing this, the narcissist may come back. They might re-idealize you, but that is only so they can do the same thing again. They will use up all of your resources and then blame you for being unable to provide to them. Nothing ever changes because they never self-reflect. They don't look at their own behavior and how it affects the people around them because they're too preoccupied with their own interests or needs. Thank you for watching. I hope this video resonate with you. Please like, comment, share and subscribe. Click the bell icon to receive notifications for my future videos. If you would like to donate, my PayPal link is in the video description. Culture inquiries, you can email me at nagsforevercouching at gmail.com. Thank you for watching and I'll talk to you soon.


Definitely worried about whether I'd even have enough time to sleep about balancing work and uni and Having friends and a life on top of that as well But I found that because the university timetable is so flexible that everything was able to kind of slot in together nicely Everyone is so supportive and everyone wants to see you succeed So there's so many ways to get help through like academic support And if you're having personal life troubles the well-being team is absolutely excellent. So I definitely felt supported Through those teams as well, but also through my teachers and lecturers


Fee determinations really hard. What we've done is we do a classical increase on a lot of the non-shopped items So the things that that people don't ring around and ask for we'll do a CPI increase So two to three percent increase on on sort of the sale price of those things Then we have our shopped items So they're the things that the practice gets called about and asked how much is this and classically that's Consultations and de-sexing simple six-month old de-sexing and we don't give out prices for anything else over the phone because it's too complicated We have a budget set for the whole year So we look at we know how much and we always start off with staff because staff is our biggest expense So we know how much our staff is going to be for the whole year or we estimate how much it is and then on top of that We have to pay for uniforms and continuing education and superannuation and sick leave and long service leave So we estimate all of those costs for the staff that we think we're going to need for the next year We have rental and we have interest and other things like that and then we have variable costs Which are cost of goods sold so drugs and consumables and and all of the things we use in surgery And we know that they're those ones in particular the variable costs are normally a percentage of our total income And then we look at how much the the practice needs to make to reinvest and to compensate everyone fairly and things So that and that gives us a budget for how much we need to make and then we look back and we go Well look we saw this many clients this year And we know that we charge the clients on average this much over over a 12-month period And so if we could see the same number of clients Do we need to increase that or is it the same and it's always an increase because wages go up every year The bills from the the drug suppliers go up every year Zoetas who makes out most of our antibiotics and our vaccinations just had another 7% price rise And they did one six months before of 4% so that nobody else is stopping the escalation of their prices yet The vets are expected to be the same price year after year And so that's what we have to look at how much are we going to need to spend just to have the doors open It gives us a bit of a base figure as to how we charge for thing on a five minute period And then we use that number to work out what most of our fees should be and we don't work it out a new every year We work it out and then we monitor it and we check it back against that number But that's how we try to work out what things are what things cost us


Chapter 8 of The Life of Washington, Volume 2 by John Marshall. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Chapter 8. General Washington commences his march to the Delaware, takes measures for checking Burgoyne. British Army lands at Elk River. General Washington advances to Brandy Wine. Retreat of Maxwell. Defeat at Brandy Wine. Slight skirmish near the White Horse. And retreat to French Creek. General Wayne Surprise. General Howe takes possession of Philadelphia. Removal of Congress to Lancaster. 1777, July. General Washington commences his march to the Delaware. On receiving intelligence that the British fleet had sailed from New York, the American Army commenced its march to the Delaware. About the time of its departure, a letter from Sir William Howe, directed to General Burgoyne at Quebec was delivered to General Putnam by the person who had received it, as was said for the purpose of carrying it to Quebec and was transmitted by Putnam to the Commander-in-Chief. In this letter, General Howe said that he was exhibiting the appearance of moving to the southward while his real intent was against Boston, from whence he would cooperate with the Army of Canada. This stratagem entirely failed. General Washington at once perceived that the letter was written without design, that it should fall into his hands and mislead him with respect to the views of the writer. He takes measures for checking Burgoyne. While the utmost vigilance and judgment were required to conduct the operations of the Army under the immediate command of General Washington, the transactions in the North were too vitally interesting not to engage a large share of his attention. He not only hastened the march of those generals who were designed to act in that department and press the governors of the eastern states to reinforce the retreating Army with Albert Militia but made large detachments of choice troops from his own, thus weakening himself in order to strengthen other generals whose strength would be more useful. The fame of being himself the leader of the victorious Army did not, with false glare, dazzle his judgment or conceal the superior public advantage to be derived from defeating the plans of Burgoyne. On the 30th of July, all doubts respecting the destination of the British fleet were supposed to be removed by its appearance off the capes of Delaware and orders were immediately given for assembling the detached parts of the Army in the neighborhood of Philadelphia. Scarcely were these orders given when the aspect of affairs was changed and they were countermanded. An express from Cape May brought the information that the fleet had sailed out of the Bay of Delaware and was proceeding eastward. From this time, no intelligence respecting it was received until about the 7th of August when it appeared a few leagues south of the capes of Delaware after Richard disappeared and was not again seen until late in that month. The fact was that on entering the capes of Delaware, the difficulties attending and attempt to carry his fleet up that bay and river determined General Howe to relinquish his original design and to transport his Army to the Chesapeake. Contrary winds prevented his gaining from the mouth of that bay until the 16th of August. The several divisions of the Army were immediately ordered to unite in the neighborhood of Philadelphia and the militia of Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware, and the northern counties of Virginia were directed to take the field. British fleet comes up the Chesapeake and lands an Army under Sir William Howe at Elk River. The British fleet, after entering the Chesapeake, sailed up it with favorable winds and entered Elk River, up which the Admiral proceeded as high as it was safely navigable. And on the 25th of August, the troops were landed at the ferry. The British Army, at its disembarkation, has been generally computed at 18,000 men. They were in good health and spirits, admirably supplied with all the implements of war and led by an experienced general of unquestionable military talents. General Washington advances to Brandywine. The day before, Sir William Howe landed, the American Army marched through Philadelphia and proceeded to the Brandywine. The divisions of Green and Stephen were advanced nearer to the head of Elk and encamped behind White Clay Creek. Congress had directed General Smallwood and Colonel Gert to take command of the militia of Maryland, who had been ordered by General Washington to assemble near the head of the bay. The militia of the Lower Counties of Delaware, commanded by General Rodney, were directed also to assemble in the British rear and to cooperate with those of Maryland. Colonel Richardson's Continental Regiment, which had been stationed on the eastern shore, was ordered to join this corps. The militia of Pennsylvania, commanded by Major General Armstrong, were united with the main body of the Army. Great exertions were used to bring them promptly into the field, and they came forward generally with some degree of alacrity. Although the numbers required by Congress did not assemble, more appeared than could be armed. The real strength of the American Army cannot be accurately stated. It was estimated by Sir William Howe at 15,000, including militia. And this estimate did not far exceed their real total as exhibited by the returns. But it is a fact attributable in some degree to the badness of their clothing and scarcity of tents, and in some degree to the neglect of the commissary department to provide those articles of food which contribute to the preservation of health, that the effective force was always far below the total number. The effectives, including militia, did not exceed 11,000. Morgan's Regiment of Riflemen, having been detached to the Northern Army, a corps of light infantry, was formed for the occasion, the command of which was given to General Maxwell. This corps was advanced to Iron Hill about three miles in front of White Clay Creek. The cavalry consisting of four regiments amounting to about 900 men, including persons of every description, were employed principally on the lines. Lord Cornwallis attacks Maxwell's corps and compels them to retreat. One division of the British Army, commanded by Sir William Howe in person, had taken post at Elkton with its van advanced to Grays Hill. General Niphausen, with a second division, had crossed the ferry and encamped at Cecil Courthouse. He was directed to march up on the eastern side of the river and to join Sir William Howe, seven or eight miles south of Cristiana. The intention to make this movement being disclosed by the preparatory arrangements, General Washington advised Maxwell to post a choice body of men in the night on an advantageous part of the road in order to annoy him on his march. In the morning of the 3rd of September, the two divisions under Lord Cornwallis and General Niphausen moved forward and formed a junction at Penn Cater or Atkins Tavern, where they encamped. In their way, the column led by Lord Cornwallis fell in with and attacked Maxwell, who retreated over White Clay Creek with the loss of about 40 killed and wounded. September 5, the whole American Army, except the light infantry, took a position behind Red Clay Creek on the road leading from the camp of Sir William Howe to Philadelphia. On this ground, the general thought it probable that the fate of Philadelphia and of that campaign might be decided, and he resorted to all the means in his power to encourage his troops and stimulate them to the greatest exertions. September 8, on the 8th of September, the British Army was again put in motion. The main body advanced by Newark upon the right of the Americans and encamped within four miles of that place, extending its left still farther up the country. Meanwhile, a strong column made a show of attacking in front, and after maneuvering sometime halted at Milton within two miles of the center. September 9, General Washington was soon convinced that the column in front was designed only to amuse, while the left should affect the principal and real object. Believing that object to be to turn his right and cut off his communication with Philadelphia, he changed his ground and crossing the brandy wine early in the night, took post behind that river at Chad's Ford. General Maxwell was advanced in front and placed advantageously on the hill south of the river on the road leading over the Ford. The militia under General Armstrong were posted at Ford, two miles below Chad's, and the right extended some miles above with a view to other passes deemed less practicable. In this position, General Washington attended the movements of the adverse army. In the evening, Howe marched forward in two columns, which united early the next morning at Kennet Square, after which advanced parties on the roads leading to Lancaster to Chad's Ford and to Wilmington. The armies were now within seven miles of each other with only the brandy wine between them, which opposed no obstacle to a general engagement. This was sought by Howe and not avoided by Washington. It was impossible to protect Philadelphia without a victory and this object was deemed throughout America and especially by Congress of such magnitude as to require that an action should be hazarded for its attainment. In the morning of the 11th, soon after day, information was received that the whole British army was in motion, advancing on the direct road leading over Chad's Ford. The Americans were immediately under arms and placed in order of battle for the purpose of contesting the passage of the river. Skirmishing soon commenced between the advanced parties and by 10 Maxwell's Corps, with little loss on either side was driven over the brandy wine below the Ford. Nick Pauson, who commanded this column, paraded on the heights, reconordered the American army, and appeared to be making dispositions to enforce the passage of the river. A skirt of woods with the river divided him from Maxwell's Corps, small parties of whom occasionally crossed over and kept up a scattering fire by which not much execution was done. It linked one of these parties, led by Captains Wagner and Porter Field, engaged the British flank guard very closely, killed a captain with 10 or 15 privates, drove them out of the wood and were on the point of taking a field piece. The sharpness of the skirmish soon drew a large body of the British to that quarter, and the Americans were again driven over the brandy wine. About 11 in the morning information reached General Washington that a large column with many field pieces had taken a road leading from Kenneth Square directly up the country and had entered the Great Valley Road down which they were marching to the upper fords of the brandy wine. This information was given by Colonel Ross of Pennsylvania who was in their rear and estimated their numbers at 5,000 men. On receiving this information, Washington is said to have determined to detach Sullivan and Lord Sterling to engage the left division of the British army and with the residue of his troops to cross Chad's fort in person and attack Niphausen. Before this plan could be executed, counterintelligence was received inducing an opinion that the movement of the British on their left was a faint and that the column under Lord Cornwallis after making demonstrations of crossing the brandy wine above its forks had marched down the southern side of that river to reunite itself with Niphausen. Not long after the first communication was made by Colonel Ross, information was received from Colonel Blant of the Cavalry which produced some doubt respecting the strength of this column. He saw only two brigades but the dust appeared to rise in their rear for a considerable distance. A major of the militia came in who alleged that he left the forks of the brandy wine so late in the day that it was supposed Lord Cornwallis must have passed them by that time had he continued his march in that direction and who asserted that no enemy had appeared in that quarter. Some light horsemen who had been sent to reconquer the road returned with the same information. The uncertainty produced by this contradictory intelligence was at length removed and about two in the afternoon it was ascertained that the column led by Lord Cornwallis after making a circuit of about 70 miles had crossed the river above its forks and was advancing in great force. A change of disposition was immediately made. The divisions commanded by Sullivan, Sterling and Stephen took new ground advanced farther up the brandy wine and front of the British column marching down that river. The division commanded by Wayne remained at Chad's Ford to keep Kniphousen in check in which service Maxwell was to cooperate. Green's division accompanied by General Washington in person formed a reserve and took a central position between the right and left wings. The divisions detached against Lord Cornwallis formed hastily on an advantageous piece of ground above Birmingham Meeting House with their left near the brandy wine and having both blanks covered by a thick wood. The artillery was judiciously posted and the disposition of the whole was well made. Unfortunately, Sullivan's division in taking its ground made to larger circuit and was scarcely formed when the attack commenced. The American army defeated at brandy wine and retreat to Chester. On perceiving the Americans, the British army was formed in order of battle and about half past four the action began. He was kept up warmly for some time. The American right first gave way and by its flight exposed the flank of the remaining divisions to a gall in fire. The line continued to break from the right and in a short time was completely routed. The right wing made some attempts to rally but being briskly charged again broke and the flight became general. On the commencement of the action on the right, General Washington pressed forward with green to the support of that wing but before his arrival its route was complete and he could only check the pursuit. For this purpose the 10th Virginia regiment commanded by Colonel Stevens and a regiment of Pennsylvania commanded by Colonel Stewart neither of which had been in action were posted advantageously on the road taken by the defeated army. The impression made by the fire of these regiments and the approach of night induced Sir William Howe after dispersing them to give over the pursuit. When the American right was found to be fully engaged with Lord Cornwallis Nephausen made real dispositions for crossing the river. Chad's fort was defended by an entrenchment and battery with three field pieces and a howitzer. After some resistance the work was forced and the defeat of the right being known. The left wing also withdrew from its ground. The whole army retreated that night to Chester and the next day to Philadelphia. The loss sustained by the Americans in this action has been estimated at 300 killed and 600 wounded. Between three and 400 principally the wounded were made prisoners. As must ever be the case in new raised armies unused to danger and from which undeserving officers have not been expelled their conduct was not uniform. Some regiments especially those which had served the preceding campaign maintained their ground with the firmness and intrepidity of veterans while others gave way as soon as they were pressed. The authors of a very correct history of the war speaking of this action say a part of their troops among whom were particularly numbered some Virginia regiments and the whole core of artillery behaved exceedingly well in some of the actions of this day exhibiting a degree of order, firmness and resolution and preserving such accountants an extremely sharp service as would not have discredited veterans. Some other bodies of their troops behaved very badly. The official letter of Sir William Howe stated his loss at rather less than 100 killed and 400 wounded as the Americans sustained very little injury in the retreat this inequality of loss can be ascribed only to the inferiority of their arms. Many of their muskets were scarcely fit for service and being of unequal caliber their cartridges could not be so well fitted and consequently their fire could not do as much execution as that of the enemy. This radical defect was felt in all the operations of the army. From the order with which the commander-in-chief had inspired his troops before this action it is probable that the conflict would have been more severe had the intelligence respecting the movement on the left of the British Army been less contradictory. Raw troops changing their ground in the moment of action and attacked in the agitation of moving are easily thrown into confusion. This was the critical situation of a part of Sullivan's division and was the cause of the rights breaking before Green could be brought up to support it after which it was impossible to retrieve the fortune of the day but had the best disposition of the troops been made at the time which subsequent intelligence would suggest the action could not have terminated in favor of the Americans. Their inferiority in numbers and discipline and in arms was too great to leave them a probable prospect of victory. A battle however was not to be avoided the opinion of the public and of Congress demanded it. The loss of Philadelphia without an attempt to preserve it would have excited discontents which in the United States might be productive of serious mischief. An action though attended with defeat provided the loss being not too great must improve an army in which not only the military talents but even the courage of officers some of them of high rank remain to be ascertained. Among the wounded was the Marquis de la Fiat and Brigadier-General Woodford. The battle of Brandywine was not considered as decisive by Congress the general or the army. The opinion was carefully cherished that the British had gained only the ground and that their loss was still more considerable than had been sustained by the Americans. Congress appeared determined to risk another battle for the metropolis of America far from discovering any intention to change their place of session. They passed vigorous resolutions for reinforcing the army and directed General Washington to give the necessary orders for completing the defenses of the Delaware. September 12th from Chester the army marched through Darby over the Scuttle Bridge to its former ground near the falls of that river General Green's division which having been less in action was more entire than any other covered the rear and the core of Maxwell remained at Chester until the next day as a rallying point for the small parties and straggling soldiers who might yet be in the neighborhood. Having allowed his army one day for repose and refreshment General Washington recrossed the Scuttle and proceeded on the Lancaster Road with the intention of risking another engagement. So William Howe passed the night of the 11th on the field of battle on the succeeding day he detached Major General Grant with two Barrett brigades, two Concord meeting house and on the 13th Lord Cornwallis joined General Grant in March towards Chester. Another detachment took possession of Wilmington to which place the sick and wounded were conveyed. To prevent a sudden movement to Philadelphia by the lower road the bridge over the Scuttle was loosened from its moorings and General Armstrong was directed with the Pennsylvania Militia to guard the passes over that river. On the 15th the American army intending to gain the left of the British reached the Warren Tavern on the Lancaster Road 23 miles from Philadelphia. Intelligence was received early next morning that Howe was approaching in two columns. He being too late to reach the ground he had intended to occupy Washington was all to meet and engage him in front. September 16th both armies prepared with great alacrity for battle. The advanced parties have met and were beginning to skirmish when they were separated by a heavy rain which becoming more and more violent rendered the retreat of the Americans a measure of absolute necessity. The inferiority of their arms never brought them into such imminent peril as on this occasion their gun locks not being well secured their muskets soon became unfit for use. Their cartridge boxes had been so artificially constructed as not to protect their ammunition from the tempest. Their cartridges were seen damaged and this mischief was the more serious because very many of the soldiers were without bayonets. After a slight skirmish compelled again to retire crossed the scoochle and proceed to French Creek. The army being thus rendered unfit for action the design of giving battle was reluctantly abandoned and the retreat commenced. It was continued all the day and great part of the night through a cold and most distressing rain and very deep roads. A few hours before day the troops halted at the yellow springs where their arms and ammunition were examined and the alarming fact was disclosed that scarcely a musket in a regiment could be discharged and scarcely one cartridge in a box was fit for use. This state of things suggested the precaution of moving to a still greater distance in order to refit their arms obtain a fresh supply of ammunition and revive the spirits of the army. The general therefore retired to warwick furnace on the south branch of French Creek where ammunition and a few muskets might be obtained in time to dispute the passage of the scoochle and make yet another effort to save Philadelphia. The extreme severity of the weather had entirely stopped the British army during two days General Howe may know of the movement than to unite his columns. From French Creek General Wayne was detached with his division into the rear of the British with orders to join General Smallwood and carefully concealing himself and his movements to seize every occasion which this march was a great offer of engaging them to advantage. Meanwhile General Washington crossed the scoochle at Parkersbury and encamped on both sides of Perky Amie Creek. September 19th General Wayne surprised and after a sharp action compelled to retreat. General Wayne lay in the woods near the entrance of the road from Darby into that leading to Lancaster about three miles in the rear of the left wing of the British troops encamped at Tid Ruffin where he believed himself to be perfectly secure but the country was so extensively disaffected that Sir William Howe received accurate accounts of his position and of his force. Major General Gray was detached to surprise him and effectively accomplished his purpose. About 11 in the night of the 20th his pickets driven in with charged bayonets gave the first intimation of Gray's approach. Wayne instantly formed his division and his right sustained a fierce assault directed a retreat by the left under cover of a few regiments who for a short time were stood the violence of the shock. In his letter to the Commander-in-Chief he says that they gave the assailants some well-directed fires which must have done considerable execution and that after retreating from the ground on which the engagement commenced they formed again at a small distance from that scene of action but that both parties drew off renewing the conflict. He states his loss at about 150 kilg and wounded the British accounts admit on their part a loss of only seven. When the attack commenced General Smallwood who was on his march to join Wayne a circumstance entirely unexpected by General Gray was within less than a mile of him and had he commanded regulars might have given a very different term to the night but his militia thought only of their own safety and having fallen in with a party returning from the pursuit of Wayne fled in confusion with the loss of only one man. Some severe and mad versions on this unfortunate affair having been made in the army General Wayne demanded a court martial which after investigating his conduct was unanimously of opinion that he had done everything to be expected from an active brave and vigilant officer and acquitted him with honor. September 21 having secured his rear by compelling Wayne to take a greater distance Sir William Howe marched along the valley road to the scoochle and encamped on the bank of that river from that land forward up to French Creek along the front of the American army to secure his right from being turned General Washington again changed his position and encamped with his left near but above the British right. Washington marches through Potts Grove September 22 General Howe now relinquished his plan of bringing Washington to another battle and thinking it advisable perhaps to transfer the seat of war to the neighborhood of his ships determined to cross the scoochle and take possession of Philadelphia in the afternoon he ordered one detachment to cross at that land forward which was on his right and another to cross at Gordon's Ford to take possession of the heights commanding them. These orders were executed without much difficulty and the American troops placed to defend these fords were easily dispersed. This service being effected the whole army marched by its right about midnight and crossing at that land without opposition proceeded a considerable distance towards Philadelphia and encamped with his left near Swedes Ford and his right on the Nani Road having Stoney run in its front. It was now apparent that only immediate victory could save Philadelphia from the grasp of the British general whose situation gave him the option of either taking possession of that place or endeavoring to bring on another engagement. If therefore a battle must certainly be risked to save the capital it would be necessary to attack the enemy. Public opinion which military chief finds too much difficulty in resisting and the opinion of Congress required a battle. But on a temperate consideration of circumstances Washington came to the wise decision of avoiding one for the present. His reasons for this decision were conclusive. Wayne and Smallwood had not yet joined the army the continental troops ordered from Peake skill who had been detained for a time by an incursion from New York were approaching under reinforcement of Jersey militia under General Dickinson was also expected. To these powerful motives against risking an engagement other considerations of great weight were added founded on the condition of his soldiers an army maneuvering in an open country in the face of a very superior enemy is unavoidably exposed to excessive fatigue and extreme hardship the effect of these hardships was much increased by the privations under which the American troops suffered while in almost continual motion waiting deep rivers and encountering every vicissitude of the seasons they were without tents nearly without shoes or winter clothes and often without food a council of war concurred in the opinion the commander-in-chief had formed not to march against the enemy but to allow his harass troops a few days for repose and remain on his present ground until the expected reinforcements should arrive immediately after the battle of Brandywine the distressed situation of the army had been represented to Congress who had recommended it to the executive of Pennsylvania to seize the costs and other military stores in the warehouses of Philadelphia and after granting certificates expressing the value to convey them to a place of safety the executive being unwilling to encounter the odium of this strong measure advised that the extraordinary powers of the commander-in-chief should be used on the occasion. Lieutenant Colonel Hamilton one of the general's aides a young gentleman already in high estimation for his talents and zeal was employed on this delicate business your own prudence said the general in a letter to him while in Philadelphia will point out the least exceptional means to be pursued but remember delicacy and a strict adherence to the ordinary mode of application must give place to our necessities we must if possible accommodate the soldiers with such articles as they stand in need of or we shall have just reason to apprehend the most injurious and alarming consequences from the approaching season all the efforts however of this very active officer could not obtain a supply in any degree adequate to the pressing and increasing wants of the army general howe takes possession of Philadelphia congress removes to Lancaster. Colonel Hamilton was also directed to cause the military stores which had been previously collected to a large amount in Philadelphia and the vessels which were lying at the wars to be removed at the Delaware this duty was executed with so much vigilance that very little public property fell with the city into the hands of the British general who entered it on the 26th of September the members of congress separated on the 18th in the evening and reassembled at Lancaster on the 27th of the same month from the 25th of August when the British army landed at the head of Elk until the 26th of September when it entered Philadelphia the campaign had been active and the duties of the American general uncommonly arduous the best English writers bestow high encomiums on Sir William Howe for his military skill and masterly movements during this period at Brandywine especially Washington is supposed to have been out general more out general than in any action during the war if all the operations of this trying to be examined and the means and possession of both be considered the American chief will appear in no respect inferior to his adversary or unworthy of the high place assigned to him in the opinions of his countrymen with an army decidedly inferior not only in numbers but in every military requisite except courage in an open country he employed his enemy near 30 days in advancing about 60 miles in this army fought one general action and though defeated was able to reassemble the same undisciplined unclothed and almost unfet army and the fifth day afterwards again to offer battle when the armies were separated by a storm which involved him in the most distressing circumstances he extricated himself from them and still maintained a respectable and imposing countenance the only advantage he is supposed to have given was at the battle of Brandywine and that was produced by the contrarity and uncertainty of the intelligence received a general must be governed by his intelligence and must regulate his measures by his information it is his duty to obtain correct information and among the most valuable traits of a military character is the skill to select those means which will obtain it yet the best selected means are not always successful and in a new army where military talent has not been well tried by the standard of experience the general is peculiarly exposed to the chance of employing not the best instruments in a country too which is covered with wood precise information of the numbers composing different columns is to be gained with difficulty it has been said that the Americans do not appear to have made all the use that might be expected of the advantages which the country afforded for harassing and impeding the British army in estimating this objection it ought to be recollected that general was directed with the militia of Maryland and Delaware supported by a regiment of continental troops to hang on and harass the rear of the enemy that general Maxwell with a select corps consisting of a thousand men was ordered to seize every occasion to annoy him on his march that general Wayne with his division was afterwards detached unite with Smallwood and command the whole force collected in the rear which would have been very respectable if the militia did not assemble in the numbers expected or effect the service allotted to them their failure is not attributable to general Washington his calls on them had been very early and energetic and the state of his army did not admit of his making larger detachments from it to supply the place they had been designed to fill loud complaints have been made against general Maxwell by the officers of his corps and a corps was ordered to inquire into his conduct by whom he was acquitted whether that officer omitted to seize the proper occasions to annoy the enemy for the cautious and compact movements of Sir William Howe afforded none cannot be easily ascertained general Washington felt the loss of Morgan and wrote pressingly to gates after his success against Burgoyne to restore him that officer with his regiment as soon as possible End of Chapter 8 Chapter 9 of the life of Washington volume 2 by John Marshall this Libra Rocks recording is in the public domain Chapter 9 measures to cut off the communication between the British army and fleet battle of Germantown measures to intercept supplies to Philadelphia attack on Fort Mifflin on Red Bank the Augusta blows up Fort Mifflin evacuated Fort Mercer evacuated the British opened the communication with their fleet Washington urged to attack Philadelphia General Howe marches out to Chestnut Hill returns to Philadelphia General Washington goes into winter quarters 1777 September measures taken to prevent the communication between the British army in Philadelphia and their fleet Philadelphia being lost General Washington sought to make its occupation inconvenient and insecure by rendering it inaccessible to the British fleet with this design works have been erected on a low marshy island in the Delaware near the junction of the Scoochel which from the nature of its soil was called Mud Island on the opposite shore of Jersey at a place called Red Bank a fort had also been constructed which was defended with heavy artillery which was used to protect the channel between or under cover of these batteries several ranges of frames had been sunk to which from their resemblance to that machine the name of Chevaux de Fries had been given these frames were so strong and heavy as to be destructive of any ship which might strike against them and were sunk in such a depth of water as rendered it equally difficult to ray them or cut them through no attempt to raise them nor to open the channel in any manner could be successful until the command of the shores on both sides should be obtained other ranges of these machines had been sunk about three miles lower down the river and some considerable works were in progress at Billingsport on the Jersey side which were in such forwardness as to be provided with artillery these works and machines were farther supported by several galleys mounting heavy cannon together with two floating batteries a number of armed vessels and some fire ships their present relative situation of the armies gave a decisive importance to these works cutting off the communication of General Howe with his fleet they prevented his receiving supplies by water by the American vessels in the river above Fort Mifflin the name given to the fort on Mount Island rendered it difficult to forage in Jersey and hoped to render his supplies on the side of Pennsylvania as to compel him to evacuate Philadelphia the advantages of this situation were considerably diminished by the capture of the Delaware frigate September 27 the day after Lord Cornwallis entered Philadelphia three batteries were commenced for the purpose of acting against any American ships which might appear before the town while yet incomplete assisted by several galleys and gondolas the Delaware being left by the tide while engaged with the battery grounded and was captured soon after which the smaller frigate and the other vessels retired under the guns of the fort this circumstance was the more interesting as it gave the British general the command of the ferry and consequently free access to Jersey and enabled him to intercept the communication and Trenton from which place the garrisons were to have drawn their military stores September 28 all the expected reinforcements except the state regiment and militia from Virginia being arrived and the detached parties being called in the effective strength of the army amounted to 8,000 continental troops and 3,000 militia with his force general Washington determined to approach the enemy and seize the first favorable moment September 30 in pursuance of this determination the army took a position on the skip pack road about 20 miles from Philadelphia and 16 from Germantown a long village stretching on both sides the great road leading northward from Philadelphia which forms one continued street nearly two miles in length the British line of encampment crossed this village at right angles near the center and Lord Cornrolis with four regiments of Grenadiers used occupied Philadelphia September 29 the immediate object of General Howe being the removal of the obstructions in the river Colonel Sterling with two regiments had been detached to take possession of the fort at Billingsport which he accomplished without opposition this service being effective and the workspacing the water destroyed Colonel Sterling was directed to escort a convoy of provisions from Chester to Philadelphia October 3 some apprehensions being entertained for the safety of this convoy another regiment was detached from Germantown with directions to join Colonel Sterling this division of the British force appeared to Washington to furnish a fair opportunity to engage Sir William Howe with advantage determining to avail himself of it he formed a plan for surprising the camp at Germantown and attacking both wings in front and rear at the same instant the divisions of Sullivan and Wayne flanked by Conway's brigade were to march down the main road and entering the town by the way of Chestnut Hill to attack the left wing while General Armstrong with the Pennsylvania militia was to move down the Mount Taney road by Van Derings Mill and turn the left flank to attack in the rear the commander in chief accompanied this column the divisions of Green and Stephen flanked by McDougall's brigade were to take a circuit by the Lyme kiln road and entering the town at the market house to attack the right wing the militia of Maryland and Jersey under General Small Wood and Foreman were to march down the old York road and turning the right to fall upon its rear the division of Lord Sterling and the brigades of Nash and Maxwell were to form a core dirt reserve parties of Cavalry were silently to scour the roads to prevent observation and to keep up the communication between the heads of the several columns October 4th Royal Army attacked at Germantown the necessary arrangements being made the army moved from its ground at 7 in the afternoon before sunrise the next morning the advance of the column led by Sullivan encountered and drove in a picket placed at Mount Airy the house of Mr. Allen the main body followed close in the rear and engaging the light infantry in the 40th Regiment posted at the head of the village soon forced them to give way leaving their baggage behind them though closely pursued Lieutenant Colonel Musgrave threw himself with five companies of the 40th Regiment into a large stone house belonging to Mr. Chew which stood directly in the way of Wayne's division and poured on the Americans an incessant and galling fire infantry from its doors and windows after making some unsuccessful and bloody attempts to carry this house by storm and then battering it for a few minutes with field artillery which was found too light to make any impression on its walls a regiment was left to observe the party within it while the troops who had been checked by Colonel Musgrave again moved forward passing to the left of the house and rather more than half an hour after Sullivan had been engaged the fire in the building formed the line came also into action and attacking the light infantry posted in front of the British right wing soon drove it from its ground while rapidly pursuing the flying enemy Woodford's brigade which was on the right of this wing was arrested by a heavy fire from Chew's house directed against its right flank the inefficiency of Musgrave against troops thus sheltered being instantly perceived to the left by its commanding officer and the field pieces attached to it were ordered up to play on the house but were too light to be of service sometime was consumed in this operation and the advance of the brigade was of course retarded this part of the line was consequently broken and the two brigades composing the division of Stephen were not only separated from each other but from the other division which was led by General Green in person consisting of the brigades of Muhlenburg and Scott pressing forward with eagerness encountered and broke apart of the British right wing entered the village and made a considerable number of prisoners thus far the prospect was flattering the attack had been made with great spirit several brigades had entered the town and such an impression had been made on the British army as to justify the expectation that its wings might be separated from each other and a complete victory would be obtained had the American troops possessed the advantages given by experience at every division of the army performed with precision the part allotted to it there is yet reason to believe that the hopes inspired by this favorable commencement would not have been disappointed at the face of the country and the darkness of the morning produced by a fog of uncommon density cooperating with the want of discipline in the army and the derangements from the incidents at Jews house blasted their flattering appearances and defeated the enterprise the grounds over which the British were pursued abounded with small and strong enclosures which frequently broke the line of the advancing army the two divisions of the right wing had been separated at Jews house and immediately after their passing yet the right of the left wing was stopped at the same place so as to cause a division of that wing also the darkness of the morning rendered it difficult to distinguish objects even at an inconsiderable distance and it was impossible for the commander in chief to learn the situation of the whole or to correct the confusion which was commencing the divisions and brigades separated at Jews house could not be reunited and even among those parts which remained entire a considerable degree of disorder was soon introduced by the impediments to their advance some regiments pursuing with more vivacity than others they were separated from each other their weight lessened and their effect impaired the darkness which obstructed the reunion of the broken parts of the American army also prevented their discerning for real situation of the enemy so as to improve the first impression and in some instances some corps being in advance of others produced uncertainty whether the troops seen indistinctly were friends or foes the attacks on the flanks in rear which formed a part of the original plan do not appear ever to have been made the Pennsylvania militia came in view of the Chaussers who flanked the left of the British line they did not engage them closely their Maryland and Jersey militia just showed themselves on the right flank about the time Green was commencing a retreat the Americans repulsed these embarrassments gave the British time to recover from the consternation into which they had been thrown General Knipphausen who commanded their left detached two brigades to meet the right of Sullivan which had penetrated far into the village before his left which had been detained at Chew's house could rejoin him and the action became warm in this quarter the British right also recovered from its surprise and advanced on that of Green's division which had entered the town after a sharp engagement these two brigades began to retreat and those which were most in advance were surrounded and compelled to surrender about the same time the right wing also began to retreat it is understood that they had expended their ammunition every effort to stop this retrograde movement proved ineffectual the division of Wayne fell back on that of Stephen mistaken for the enemy general confusion prevailed and the confidence felt in the beginning of the action was lost with infinite chagrin general Washington was compelled to relinquish his hopes of victory and turn his attention to the security of his army the enemy not being sufficiently recovered to endanger his rear the retreat was made without loss undercover of the division of Stephen which has scarcely been in the engagement in this battle about Americans were killed near three times that number wounded and about 400 were made prisoners among the killed was general Nash of North Carolina and among the prisoners was Colonel Matthews of Virginia whose regiment had penetrated into the center of the town the loss of the British as stated in the official return of general how did not much exceed 500 and killed and wounded of whom less than 100 were killed among the latter were Brigadier and Colonel Byrd the American Army retreated the same day about 20 miles to Perky Army Creek where a small reinforcement consisting of 1500 militia and the state regiment was received from Virginia after Richard again advanced towards Philadelphia and encamped once more on skip back creek the plan of the battle of Germantown must be admitted to have been judiciously formed and in its commencement to have been happily but a strict adherence to it by those who were entrusted with the execution of it several parts was indispensable to its success Major General Stephen who commanded the right division of the left wing was cashiered for misconduct on the retreat and for intoxication Congress expressed and decided terms their approbation both of the plan of this enterprise and of the courage with which it was executed for which their thanks were given to the general and the Army the intention of both armies was most principally directed to the forts below Philadelphia the loss of the Delaware frigate and of Billingsport greatly discouraged the semen by whom the galleys and floating batteries were manned believing the fate of America to be decided an opinion strengthened by the intelligence received from their connections in Philadelphia they manifested the most alarming defection and several officers as well as sailors deserted to the enemy this desponding temperate was by the battle of Germantown and by throwing a garrison of continental troops into the fort that red bank called Fort Mercer the defense of which had been entrusted to militia this fort commanded the channel between the Jersey shore and mud island and the American vessels were secure under its guns the militia of Jersey were relied on to reinforce its garrison and also to form a core of observation which might harass the rear of any detachment investing the place measures taken by general Washington for cutting off supplies from Philadelphia to increase the inconvenience of general Howe's situation by intercepting his supplies 600 militia commanded by general Potter crossed the Scoochle with orders to scour the country between that river and Chester and the militia on the Delaware above Philadelphia were directed to watch the roads in that vicinity the more effectively to stop those who were seduced by a group of gold and silver to supply the enemy at this critical time congress passed a resolution subjecting to martial law and to death all who should furnish them with provisions or certain other enumerated articles who should be taken within 30 miles of any city town or place in Jersey Pennsylvania or Delaware occupied by British troops these arrangements being made to cut off supplies from the country general Washington reoccupied in March to fight the battle of Germantown attack upon Fort Mifflin meanwhile general Howe was actively preparing to attack Fort Mifflin from the Pennsylvania shore he erected some batteries at the mouth of the Scoochle in order to command Rebs Ferry which were attacked by Commodore Hazelwood and silenced but the following night a detachment crossed over Rebs Ferry into Province Island and constructed a slight work opposite Fort to musket shots of the block house from which they were enabled to throw shot and shells into the barracks when daylight discovered this work free galleys and up floating batteries were ordered to attack it and the garrison surrendered while the boats were bringing off the prisoners a large column of British troops were seen marching into the fortress upon which the attack on it was renewed but without success and two attempts made by Lieutenant Colonel Smith to storm it failed and the next works were completed on the high ground of Province Island which infillated the principal battery Fort Mifflin and rendered it necessary to throw up some cover on the platform to protect the men who worked the guns the aides expected from the Jersey militia were not received assure yourself so Lieutenant Colonel Smith in a letter pressing earnestly for a reinforcement of continental troops that no dependencies to be put on the militia whatever men see determines on sending no time is to be lost the garrison of Fort Mifflin was now reduced to 156 effectives and that of Red Bank did not much exceed 200 in consequence of these representations Colonel Angel of Rhode Island with his regiment was ordered to Red Bank and Lieutenant Colonel John Green of Virginia with about 200 men to Fort Mifflin immediately after the battle of Brandi Wine Admiral Howell sailed for the Delaware where he expected to survive in time to meet and co-operate with the army in and about Philadelphia but the winds were so unfavorable and the navigation bay of Delaware so difficult that his van did not get into the river until the 4th of October the ships of war and transports which followed came up from the 6th to the 8th and anchored from Newcastle to Rhode Island the frigates in advance of the fleet had not yet succeeded in their endeavors to affect the passage through the lower of Chavaux de Fries they were no longer protected by the fort at Billingsport they were defended by the water force above and the work was found more difficult than had been expected it was not until the middle of October that the impediments were so far removed as to afford a narrow and intricate passage through them in the meantime the fire from that Pennsylvania shore had not produced all the effect expected from it and it was perceived that greater exertions would be necessary for the reduction of the works then could safely be made in the present relative situation of the armies under this impression general how soon after the return of the American army to its former camp on the skip pack withdrew his troops from Germantown into Philadelphia as preparatory to a combined attack by land and water on forts Mercer and Mifflin after affecting a passage through the works sunk in the river at Billingsport other difficulties still remain to be protected by the ships of war several rows of chiveau de frieze had been sunk about half a mile below mud island which were protected by the guns of the forts as well as by the movable water force to silence these works therefore was that necessary preliminary to the removal of these obstructions in the channel October attack upon red bank on the 21st of October a detachment of Hessians amounting to 1200 men commanded by Colonel Count de Knapp crossed the river at Philadelphia with orders to storm the fort at red bank the fortifications consisted of extensive outer works within which was an entrenchment eight or nine feet high boarded and frieze late in the evening of the 22nd Count de Knapp appeared before the fort and attacked it with great intrepidity it was defended with equal resolution the outer works being too extensive to be manned by the troops in the fort were used only to gall to silence while advancing on their near approach the garrison retired within the inner entrenchment whence they poured upon the Hessians a heavy and destructive fire Colonel de Knapp killed and his party repulsed with considerable loss Colonel de Knapp received a mortal wound and Lieutenant Colonel Men Garode the second in command fell about the same time Lieutenant Colonel Mencing the oldest remaining officer drew off his troops and returned next day to Philadelphia the assault of the assailants was estimated by the Americans at 400 men the garrison was reinforced from Fort Miffin and aided by the galleys which flanked the Hessians in the advance and retreat the American loss and Kilburn wounded amounted to only 32 men the Augusta frigate blows up the ships having been ordered to cooperate with Count de Knapp the Augusta with four smaller vessels passed the lower line of Chavaux de Fries opposite to Billingsport and lay above it until the assault should be made on the fort the flood tide setting in about the time the attack commenced they moved with it up the river the obstructions sunk in the Delaware had in some degree changed its channel in consequence of which the Augusta and Merlin grounded a considerable distance below the second line of Chavaux de Fries and a strong wind from the north so checked the rising of the tide that these vessels could not be floated by the flood their situation however in the evening as the frigates which were able to approach the fort and the battles from the Pennsylvania sure kept up an incessant fire on the garrison till night put an end to the cannonade early next morning it was recommenced in the hope that under its cover the Augusta and the Merlin might be got off the Americans on discovering their situation sent four fire ships against them but without effect meanwhile a warm cannonade took place on both sides in the course of which the fire and it was found impracticable to extinguish the flames most of the men were taken out the frigates were gone and the Merlin set on fire after which the Augusta blew up and a few of the crew were lost and hurried this repulse inspired Congress with flattering hopes for the permanent defense of the post on the Delaware that body expressed its high sense of the merits of Colonel Green of Rhode Island who had commanded in Fort Mercer Lieutenant Colonel Smith of Maryland who had commanded in Fort Miffin the commander of Commodore Hazelwood who commanded the galleys and presented a sword to each of these officers as a mark of estimation in which their services were held the situation of these forts was far from justifying this confidence of their being defensible that on Rhode Island had been unskillfully constructed and required at least 800 men fully to man the lines the island is about half a mile long Fort Miffin was placed at the lower end having its principal fortifications for the purpose of repelling ships coming up the river the defenses in the rear consisted only of a ditch and palisade protected by two block houses the upro story of one of which had been destroyed in the late Catamide above the fort were two batteries opposing those constructed by the British on Province and Carpenters Islands which were separated from Mud Island only by a narrow passage between four and five hundred yards wide the vessels of war engaged in the defense were partly in the service of the continent and partly in that of the state of Pennsylvania under a Commodore who received his commission from the state a misunderstanding took place between him and Lieutenant Colonel Smith and also between him and the officers of the Continental Navy and it required all the authority of the commander in chief to prevent these differences from a century injuring the service the garrison at Fort Miffin consisted of only 300 Continental troops who were worn down with fatigue from constant watching under the constant apprehension of being attacked from Province Island from Philadelphia and from the ships below October 29 having failed in every attempt to draw the militia of Jersey to the Delaware General Washington determined to strengthen the garrison by farther drafts from his army 300 Pennsylvania militia were detached to be divided between the two forts and a few days afterwards General Barnum was ordered with his brigade to take a position about near Red Bank and to relieve and reinforce the garrisons of both forts as far as his strength would permit the hope was entertained that the appearance of so respectable a Continental force might encourage the militia to assemble in greater numbers aware of the advantage to result from a victory over the British Army while separated from the fleet General Washington had been uniformly determined to risk much to gain one he had therefore after the battle of Germantown continued to watch assiduously for an opportunity to attack his enemy once more to advantage the circumspect caution of General Howe afforded none after the repulse at Red Bank his measures were slow but certain and were calculated to ensure the possession of the forts without exposing his troops to the hazard of an assault in this state of things intelligence was received as a successful termination of the Northern Campaign in consequence of which great part of the troops who have been employed against Burgoyne might be drawn to the aid of the army in Pennsylvania but it was feared that before these reinforcements could arrive so William Howe would gain possession of the forts and remove the obstructions to the navigation of the Delaware this apprehension furnished a strong motive for vigorous attempts to relieve Fort Miffin but the relative force of the armies the difficulty of acting offensively against Philadelphia and above all the direction that a defeat might disable him from meeting his enemy in the field even after the arrival of the troops expected from the North determined General Washington not to hazard a second attack under existing circumstances to expedite the reinforcements for which he raided Colonel Hamilton was dispatched to General Gates with directions to represent to him the condition of the armies in Pennsylvania and to urge him if he contemplated no other service of more importance to send the regiments of Massachusetts and New Hampshire to aid the army of the middle department these orders were not preemptory because it was possible that some other object as the capture of New York still more interesting than the expulsion of General Howe from Philadelphia might be contemplated by Gates in Washington meant not to interfere with the accomplishment of such object on reaching General Putnam Colonel Hamilton found that a considerable part of that Northern Army had joined that but that Gates had detained four brigades at the Albany for an expedition intended to be made in the winter against Ticonderoga. Having made such arrangements with Putnam as he supposed to secure the immediate march of a large body of Continental troops from that station Colonel Hamilton proceeded to Albany for the purpose of remonstrating to General Gates against retaining so large and valuable a part of the army unemployed at a time when the most imminent danger threatened the vitals of the country. Gates was by no means disposed to part with his troops. He could not believe that an expedition then preparing at New York was designed to reinforce General Howe and insisted that should the troops then embarked at that place instead of proceeding to the Delaware make a sudden movement up the huts and it would be in their power should Albany be left defenseless to destroy the valuable arsenal which had been there erected which had been chiefly deposited in that town. Having after repeated remonstrances obtained an order directing three brigades to the Delaware Hamilton hastened back to Putnam and found the troops which had been ordered to join General Washington still at peak skill. The detachment from New York had suggested to Putnam the possibility of taking that place and he does not appear to have made very great exertions to divest himself of a force he deemed necessary for an object of accomplishment of which would give so much thunder to his military character. In addition to this circumstance an opinion had gained ground among the soldiers that their share of service for the campaign had been performed and that it was time for them to go into winter quarters. Great discontents to prevail concerning their pay which the government had permitted to be more than six months in a rear and in poor's brigade a mutiny broke out in the course of which a soldier who was run through by his captain before he expired shot the captain dead or gave the wound. Colonel Hamilton came in time to borrow money from the governor of New York to put the troops in motion and they proceeded by brigades to the Delaware but the several delays retarded their arrival until the contest for the forts on that river was terminated. November the preparations of Suri Abhaal being completed a large battery on province island of 24 and 32 pounders and two howitzers of eight inches each opened early in the morning of the 10th of November upon Fort Mifflin at the distance of 500 yards and kept up in incessant fire for several successive days. The block houses were reduced to a heap of ruins. The palaces were beaten down and most of the guns dismounted and otherwise disabled. The barracks were battered in every part so that the troops could not remain in them they were under the necessity of working and watching the whole night to repair the damages of the day in regard against the storm of which they were in perpetual apprehension. If in the day a few moments were allowed for repose it was taken on the wet earth which in consequence of heavy rains had become a soft mud the garrison was relieved by General Varnam every 48 hours but his brigade was so weak that half the men were constantly on duty. Colonel Smith was decidedly of opinion and General Varnam concurred with him that the garrison could not repel and assault and ought to be withdrawn but General Washington still cherished the hope that the place might be maintained until it should be reinforced from that northern army believing that an assault would not be attempted until it worked for better down he recommended that the whole night should be employed in making repairs his orders were that the place should be defended to the last extremity and never were orders more faithfully executed. November 11 several of the garrison were killed and among them Captain Treat a gallant artillery Colonel Smith received a contusion on his hip and an arm which compelled him to give up the command and retired to red bank major Fleury a French officer of distinguished merit who served as engineer reported to the commander-in-chief that although the block houses were beaten down all the guns in them except two disabled and several breeches made in the walls the place was still defensible but the garrison was so unequal to the numbers required by the extent of the lines and was so dispirited by fatigue and constant exposure to the cold rains which were almost incessant that he dreaded the event of an attempt to carry the place by storm 14th fresh troops were ordered to their relief from Barnum's brigade and the command was taken first by Colonel Russell and afterwards by Major Bayer the artillery commanded by Captain Lee continued to be well served the procedures were several times thrown into confusion and a floating battery which opened on the morning of the 14th was silenced by the day 15th the defense being unexpectedly obstinate the assailants brought up their ships as far as the obstructions in the river permitted and added their fire to that of the batteries which was the more fatal as the cover for the troops had been greatly impaired the brave garrison however still maintained their ground with unshaken firmness in the midst of this stubborn conflict the vigilant and a sleep of war were brought up the inner channel between mud and province islands which had unobserved by the besieged been deepened by the current in consequence of the obstructions in the main channel and taking a station within 100 yards of the works not only kept up a destructive cannonade but through hand grenades into them while the musketeers from the round top of the vigilant killed every man that appeared on the platform Major Thayer applied to the Commodore to remove these vessels and he ordered six galleys on that service but after reconordering their situation the galleys returned without attempting anything their report was that these ships were so covered by the batteries on province island has to be unassailable Fort Nifflin evacuated and possession taken by the British November 16 it was now apparent to all that the fort could be no longer defended the works were in ruins the position of the vigilant rendered any further continuance on the island a protocol and useless waste of human life and on the 16th about 11 at night the garrison was withdrawn a second attempt was made to drive the vessels from their stations with a determination should it succeed to repossess the island but the galleys affected nothing and a detachment from province island soon occupied the ground which had been abandoned November 17 the day after receiving intelligence of the evacuation of Fort Nifflin General Washington deputed General DeKalb and Knox to confer with General Varnum and the officers at Fort Mercer on the practicability of continuing to defend the obstructions in the channel to report their on and to state the force which would be necessary for that purpose their report was in favor of continuing the defense a council of the Navy officers have already been called by the Commodore in pursuance of a request of the commander in chief made before the evacuation had taken place who were unanimously of opinion that it would be impracticable for the fleet after the loss of the island to maintain its station or to assist in preventing the chavaux de-frise from being weighed by the ships of the enemy General Howe had now completed a line of defense from the Scuttle to the Delaware and a reinforcement from New York had arrived at Chester these two circumstances enabled him to form an army in the Jersey sufficient for the reduction of Fort Mercer without weakening himself so much in Philadelphia as to put his lines in hazard still deeming it of the utmost obligation of the Delaware completely he detached Lord Cornwallis about one in the morning of the 17th with a strong body of troops to Chester from that place his lordship crossed over to Billingsport where he was joined by the reinforcement from New York November 17th General Washington received immediate intelligence of the march of this detachment which he communicated to General Varnum with orders that Fort Mercer should be defended to the last extremity with a view of the operations in that quarter he ordered one division of the army to cross the river at Burlington and dispatched expresses to the northern troops who were marching on by brigades directing them to move down the Delaware on its northern side until they should receive further orders Fort Mercer evacuated Major General Green an officer who had been distinguished early in the war by the commander in chief for the solidity of his judgment and his military talents was selected for this expedition. A hope was entertained that he would be able not only to protect Fort Mercer but to obtain some decisive advantage over Lord Cornwallis as the situation of the fort which his lordship could not invest without placing himself between timber and manto creeks would expose the assailants to great peril from a respectable force in their rear that before Green could cross the Delaware Lord Cornwallis approached with an army rendered more powerful than had been expected by the injunction of the reinforcement from New York and Fort Mercer was evacuated. A few of the smaller galleys escaped up the river and the others were burnt by their crews. Washington still hoped to recover much of what had been lost a victory would restore the Jersey shore and this object was deemed so important that General Green's instructions indicated the expectation that he would be in a condition to fight Lord Cornwallis. That judicious officer feared the reproach of avoiding an action less than the just center of sacrificing the real interests of his country by engaging the enemy on disadvantageous terms. The numbers of the British exceeded his even counting his militias regulars and he determined to wait for Glover's brigade which was marching from the north. Before its arrival Lord Cornwallis took post on Gloucester Point a point of land making deep into the entire undercover of the guns of the ships from which place he was embarking his baggage and the provisions he had collected for Philadelphia. Believing that Lord Cornwallis would immediately follow the magazines he had collected and that the purpose of Sir William Howe was with his united forces to attack the American army while divided General Washington ordered Green to recross the Delaware and join the army. The enemy succeeds in opening a free communication with his fleet. The one continued struggle of more than six weeks in which the continental troops displayed great military virtues the army in Philadelphia secured itself in the possession of that city by opening a free communication with the fleet. While Lord Cornwallis was in Jersey in General Green on the Delaware above him the reinforcements from the north being received Washington urged to attack Philadelphia an attack on Philadelphia was strongly pressed by several officers high in rank and was in some measure urged by that torrent of public opinion which if not resisted by a very firm mind overwhelms the judgment and by controlling measures not well comprehended may frequently produce especially in military transactions the most disastrous effects. It was stated to the Commander-in-Chief that his army was now in greater force than he could expect it to be at any future time that being joined by the troops who had conquered Burgoyne his own reputation the reputation and opinion of Congress and of the nation required some decisive blow on his part that the rapid depreciation of the paper currency by which the resources for carrying on the war were dried up rendered indispensable some grand effort to bring it to a speedy termination the plan proposed was that General Green should embark 2000 men at Dunksbury and descending the Delaware in the night land in the town just before day attack the enemy in the rear and take possession of the bridge over the strong core should march down on the west side of that river occupy the heights infallating the works of the enemy and open the brisk animate upon them while a detachment from it should march down to the bridge and attack in front at the same instant that the party descending the river should commence its assault on the rear not only the Commander-in-Chief but some of his best officers those who could not be impelled by the climbers of the ill informed to ruin the public interest were opposed to this mad enterprise armies they said were now nearly equal in point of numbers and the detachment under Lord Cornwallis could not be supposed to have so weakened Sir William Howe as to compensate for the advantages of his position his right was covered by the Delaware is left by the Scooch or his rear by the junction of those two rivers as well as by the city of Philadelphia and his front by a line of redoubts extending from river to river and connected by an abadus and by circular works it would be necessary to carry all these redoubts since to leave a part of them to play on the rear of the columns while engaged in front with the enemy in Philadelphia would be extremely hazardous supposing the redoubts carried in the British army driven into the town yet all military men were agreed on the great peril of storming a town the streets would be defended by an artillery greatly superior to that of the Americans which would attack in front while the brick houses would be lined with musketeers whose first must thin the ranks of the assailants a part of the plan on the successful execution of which the whole depended was that the British rear should be surprised by the court descending the Delaware this would require the concurrence of too many favorable circumstances to be calculated on with any confidence as the position of General Green was known it could not be supposed that Sir William Howe would be inattentive to him it was probable that not even his embarkation would be made unnoticed but it was presuming a degree of negligence which ought not to be assumed to suppose that he could descend the river to Philadelphia undiscovered so soon as his movements should be observed the whole plan would be comprehended since it would never be conjectured that General Green was to attack singly if the attack in front should fail which was not even improbable the total loss of the 2000 men in the rear must follow and General Howe would maintain his superiority through the winter the situation of America did not require these desperate measures the British general would be compelled to risk a battle on equal terms or to manifest a conscious inferiority to the American army the depreciation of paper money was the inevitable consequence of immense emissions without corresponding taxes it was by removing the cause not by sacrificing the army that this evil was to be corrected Washington possessed too much discernment to be dazzled by the false brilliant presented by those who urged the necessity of storming Philadelphia in true lust around his own fame and that of his army and too much firmness of temper too much virtue and real patriotism to be diverted from our purpose believed to be right by the clamors of faction or the discontent of ignorance disregarding the importunities of mistaken friends the malignant insinuations of enemies and the expectations of the ill-informed he persevered in his resolution to make no attempt on Philadelphia he saved his army and was able to keep the field in the face of his enemy while the clamor of the moment wasted in the air and is forgotten the opinion that Sir William Howe meditated and attacked on the American campus not ill founded scarcely had Lord Cornwallis return to Philadelphia in green to the American army when unquestionable intelligence was received that the British general was preparing to march out in full strength and with the about object of forcing Washington from his position and driving him beyond the mountains General Howe marches out to West Nothill on the 4th of December Captain McLean a vigilant officer on the lines discovered that an attempt to surprise the American Camp at White Marsh was about to be made and communicated the information to the commandant chief in the evening of the same day General Howe marched out of Philadelphia with this whole force and about 11 at night McLean who had been detached with 100 chosen men attacked the British van at the three mile run on the Germantown Road and compelled their army to change its line of march. He hovered on the front and flank of the advancing army galling them severely until three next morning when the British encamped on Chestnut Hill in front of the American right and distant from it about three miles a slight skirmish had also taken place between the Pennsylvania militia under General Irvine and the advanced light parties of the enemy in which the general was wounded and the militia without much of the loss were dispersed the range of hills in which the approach nearer to those occupied by the Americans as they stretched northward having passed the day in reconordering the right so we how changed his ground in the course of the night and moving along the hills to his right took an advantageous position about a mile in front of the American left the next day he inclined still farther to his right and doing so approach still nearer to the left wing of the American army supposing a general engagement to be approaching Washington detached just with some Maryland militia and Morgan with his rifle corps to attack the flanking and advanced parties of the enemy a sharp action ensued in which Major Morse of Jersey a brave officer Morgan's regiment was mortally wounded and 27 of his men were killed and wounded a small loss was also sustained in the militia the party's first attack were driven in but the enemy reinforcing the numbers and Washington unwilling to move from the heights and engage on the ground which was the scene of the skirmish declined to reinforce just in Morgan they in turn were compelled to retreat returns to Philadelphia so we have how continued to maneuver towards the flank and in front of the left wing of the American army expecting to be attacked in that quarter in full force Washington made such changes and the disposition of his troops as the occasion required and the day was consumed in these movements in the course of it the American chief rode through every brigade of his army delivering in person his orders expecting a manner of receiving the enemy exhorting his troops to rear lie principally on the bayonet and encouraging them by the steady firmness of his countenance as well as by his words to a vigorous performance of their duty the dispositions of the evening indicated an intention to attack him the ensuing morning but in the afternoon of the 8th the British suddenly filed off from their right which extended beyond the American left and retreated to Philadelphia the parties detached to harass their rear could not overtake the loss of the British in this expedition as stated in the official letter of General Howe rather exceeded 100 in killed wounded and missing and were sustained principally in the skirmish of the 7th in which Major Morris fell on no former occasion had the two armies met uncovered by works with superior numbers on the side of the Americans the effective force of the British was then stated at 12,000 men it has been since declared by an author who then belonged to it who though a candid writer appears to have been by prejudices against Sir William Howe to have amounted to 14,000 the American army consisted precisely 12,161 continental troops and 3,241 militia this equality and point of numbers rendered it a prudent precaution to maintain a superiority of position as the two armies occupied heights fronting each other neither could attack without giving to its adversary some advantage in the ground and this was an advantage which neither seemed willing to relinquish the return of Sir William Howe to Philadelphia without bringing on an action after marching out with the of out intention of fighting is the best testimony of the respect which he felt for the talents of his adversary and the courage of the troops he was to encounter the cold was now becoming so intense that it was impossible for an army neither well-clothed nor sufficiently supplied with blankets longer to keep the field intense it had become necessary to place the troops in winter quarters but in the existing state of things the choice of winter quarters was a subject for serious reflection it was impossible to place them in villages without uncovering the country or exposing them to the hazard of being beaten in detachment to avoid these calamities it was determined to take a strong position in the neighborhood of Philadelphia equally distant from the Delaware above and below that city and there to construct huts in the form of a regular encampment which might cover during the winter a strong piece of ground at Valley Forge on the west side of the Scoochew between 20 and 30 miles from Philadelphia was selected for that purpose and sometime before day on the morning of the 11th of December the army marched to take possession of it by an accidental concurrence of circumstances Lord Cornwallis had been detached the same morning at the head of a strong corps on a forging party on the west side of the Scoochew he had fallen in with a brigade of Pennsylvania Militia commanded by General Washington which he soon disposed and pursuing the fugitives to gain the heights opposite may transform over which the Americans have thrown a bridge for the purpose of crossing the river and had posted troops to command the D file call the Gulf just as the front division of the American Army reached the bank of the river this movement had been made without any knowledge of the intention of General Washington to change his position or any design of contesting the passage of the Scoochew but for the sole purpose of covering for the forging party. Washington apprehended from his first intelligence that General Howe had taken the field in full force he therefore recall the troops already on the west side and moved rather higher up the river for the purpose of understanding the real situation for us and designs of the enemy the next day Lord Cornwallis returned to Philadelphia and in the course of the night the American Army crossed the river. General Washington goes into winter quarters and the chief communicated to his army in general orders the manner in which he intended to dispose of them during the winter he expressed in strong terms his approbation of their conduct presented them with an encouraging state of the future prospects of their country exhorted them to bear with continuing fortitude the hardships inseparable from the position they were about to take an endeavor to convince their judgments that those hardships were not imposed on them by unfeeling compete but were the winter had set in with great severity and the sufferings of the army were extreme in a few days however these sufferings were considerably diminished by the erection of logged huts filled up with mortar rich after being dragged from comfortable habitations and gave contempt to men long and used to their conveniences of life the order of our regular encampment was observed and the only appearance of winter quarters was the substitution of huts for tents End of Chapter 9