Thank you. All right. Welcome. The basic structure of this talk is sort of twofold. The first thing is to provide an overview of the different mechanisms that exist in this space of secure communication and try to tease apart a bunch of the individual choices and tradeoffs that have to be made and the implications of them. There's a lot of times we talk about security or privacy as very broad terms that cover a bunch of individual things, and breaking that down gives us a better way to understand what it is we're giving up or why these decisions actually get made for the systems that we end up using. And the way that it's going to sort of the arc that I'll cover is first trying to provide a sort of taxonomy or classification of a bunch of the different systems that we see around us, and from there identify the threats that we often are trying to protect against and the mechanisms that we have to mitigate those threats, and then go into some of these mechanisms and look at what's happening right now on different systems, and by the end we'll sort of be closer to the research frontier of what is still happening, where are places where we have new ideas, but there's still quite a high tradeoff to usability or for other reasons where these haven't gained mass adoption. So I'll introduce our actors, Alice and Bob. The basic structure for pretty much all of this is one-to-one messaging. So this is primarily systems that are enabling us to have a conversation that looks a lot like what we would have in person. That's sort of the thing that we're modeling is I want to have a somewhat synchronous real-time communication over a span of weeks, months, years, resume it, and in the same way that in real life I know someone and I recognize them when I come and talk to them again, I expect the system to give me similar sorts of properties. So the way we're going to then think about systems is initially we have systems that look very much the same as how we would have a real-life communication, where I can, on a local network, use AirDrop or use a bunch of things that just work directly between my device and a friend's device to communicate. So on a computer this might look like using Netcat or a command line tool to just push data directly to the other person. And this actually results in a form of communication that looks very similar. It's ephemeral, it goes away afterwards unless the other person saves it. But there's already a set of adversaries or threats that we can think about, how do we secure this sort of communication? One of those would be the network. So can someone else see this communication and how do we hide from that? And we have mechanisms against that, namely encryption. I can disguise my communication and encrypt it so that someone who is not my intended recipient cannot see what's happening. And then the other one would be the other, these end devices themselves. So there's a couple of things that we need to think about when we think about what is it that we're trying to protect against on an end device. One is there might be other bad software that either, you know, later gets installed and tries to steal or learn about what was said, either at the same time or afterwards. And so we have mechanisms there. One of them would be message expiry, so we can make the messages go away, make sure we delete them from disk at some point. And the other would be making sure that we've sort of isolated our chat so that it doesn't overlap and other applications can't see what's happening there. So we have these direct communication patterns, but that's a small minority of most of what we think of when we chat. Instead, most of the systems that we're using online use a centralized server. There's some logically centralized thing in the cloud, and I send my messages there, and it then forwards them to my intended recipient. And so whether it's Facebook or WhatsApp or Signal or, sorry, Slack or IRC or Signal or Wire or Threema or whatever, you know, cloud chat app we're using today, this same model applies. So we can identify additional threats here, and then we can think about why we do this. So one threat is the network, and I'll tear that apart a little bit. You've got the local network that we had before, so someone who's on the network near the person who's sending messages or receiving messages.  So the ISPs or the countries that you're in may want to look at or prevent you from sending messages. You've also got an adversary in the network sort of local or near the server that can see most of the messages going in and out of the server, because these services have to exist somewhere, be that in a data center that they physically have computers in or in AWS or Google or one of these other clouds. And now you've got a set of actors that you need to think about that are near the server that can see most of the traffic going in and out of that server. We also have to think about the server itself as a potential adversary. There's a few different threats that we need to think about. The server could get hacked or otherwise compromised, so parts of the communication or bugs in the software can potentially be a problem. You've got a legal entity typically that is running this server. And so the jurisdiction that it's in can send requests to get data from users or to compel it to provide information. So there's this whole threat of what is the server required to turn over. And then you've got sort of how is the server actually or this company making money and sustaining itself? Is it going to get acquired by someone that you don't trust even if you trust it now? So there's this future view of how do we ensure that the messages I have now don't get misused in the future. And we have a set of techniques that mitigate these problems as well. So one of them would be we can use traffic obfuscation or circumvention techniques to make our traffic look less obvious to the network. And that prevents a large amount of these. And then I'm calling this server hardening, but it's really a sort of a broad set of techniques around how do we trust the server less and how do we make those potential compromises of the server either code-based or it having to reveal information less damaging. It's worth saying that there are a bunch of reasons why we have primarily used centralized messaging. You've got availability. It's very easy to go to a single place and it also makes a bunch of problems like handling multiple devices and mobile push in particular because both Google and Apple expect or allocate sort of a single authorized provider who can send notifications to the app users, mobile devices. And so that sort of requires you to have a centralized place that knows when to send those messages if you want to provide real-time alerts to your application users. The cons is that it is both cost, right? There's some entity now that is responsible for all of this cost and has to have a business model. And also that there's a single entity that people can come to and that now faces the legal and regulatory issues. So this is not the only type of system we have, right? The next most common is probably federated. Email is a great example of this. And email is nice that now as a user I can choose an email provider that I trust out of many or if I don't trust any of the ones that I see, I can even spin up my own with a small group so we can decentralize cost. We can make this more approachable. And so while I can gain more confidence in my individual provider, I don't have as much trust in, you know, is the recipient, is Bob in this case? I don't know how secure his connection is to his provider, because we've separated and decentralized that. There's also a bunch of problems both in figuring out identity and discovery securely and mobile push. But we have a number of successful examples of this. So beyond email, the Fediverse and Mastodon, RiotChat and even SMS are examples of federated systems where there's a bunch of providers and it's not a single central place. As you continue this sort of metaphor of splitting apart and decentralizing and reducing the trust in a single party, you end up with a set of decentralized messaging systems as well. And so it's worth mentioning that as we sort of get onto this fringe. There's sort of two types. One is using Gossip protocol, so things like secure Scuttlebutt. And in those, you connect to either the people around you or people that you know. And when you get messages, you gossip, you send them on to all of the people around you. And so messages spread through the network. That is still an area where we are learning the tradeoff of how much metadata gets leaked and things, but is nice in its level of decentralization. The others basically try to make all of the users have some relatively low trusted participation in the serving infrastructure. And so you can think of this as evolving out of things like distributed hash tables that are used in BitTorrent. You see something very similar in things like Ricochet or TalksChat, which will use either Tor-like relays for sending messages or have an explicit DHT for routing, where all of the members provide some amount of lookup to help with discovery and finding other participants. OK, so let's now turn to some of these mechanisms that we've uncovered. And we can start with encryption. So when you're sending messages to a server, by default, there's no encryption. This is things like IRC. Email used to be primarily unencrypted. And you can think of that like a postcard. So you've got a letter or a postcard in this case that you're sending. It has where that message is coming from, where it's going to, and the contents. In contrast, when you use transport encryption, and so this is now a standard for most of the centralized things, what that means is you're taking that postcard and you're putting it in an envelope that the network can't open. And that's what TLS and other forms of transport encryption are going to give you, is the network link just sees the source and destination. It sees there's a message coming between Alice and Facebook or whatever cloud provider, but can't look into that and see that that's really a message for Bob or what's being said. It just sees individuals communicating with that cloud provider. And so, SMTPS, there are secured versions of IRC and email and most other protocols are using transport security at this point. The thing that we have now is called end-to-end encryption or E to E. And so now the difference here is the message that Alice is sending is addressed to Bob. And it's encrypted so that the provider, Facebook, can't open that either and can't look at the contents. Okay. So the network just sees a message going between Alice and Facebook still, but Facebook can't open that and actually see the contents of the message. And so end-to-end encryption has gained pretty widespread adoption. We have this in Signal for the most part in iMessage. We have tools like PGP and GPG that are implementing forms of this. For messaging, there's a few that are worth sort of covering in this space. The Signal protocol, which was initially called Axewaddle, is adopted in WhatsApp, in Facebook private messaging and sort of is, I guess, has generalized into something called the Noise Framework and is gaining a lot of adoption. OMEMO looks a lot like that specifically for XMPP. And so it is a specific implementation. The other one is called Off the Record or OTR. And Off the Record, sort of developed a little bit or independently from this, thinks a lot about deniability. I'm not going to go too deep into the specific knits of what these protocols are doing, but I guess the intuition is the hard parts here is not encrypting a message. But rather, the hard parts is how do you send that first message and establish a session, especially if the other person is offline? So I want to start a communication. I type in the first message I'm sending to someone. I need to somehow get a key and then send a message that only that person can read and also establish this sort of shared secret. And doing all of that in one message or with the other device, not online, ends up being tricky. Additionally, figuring out the mapping between a user and their devices, especially as that changes and making sure you've appropriately revoked devices, added new devices without keys falling over or getting too many warnings to the error, too many warnings to the user, ends up being a lot of the trick in these systems. There's two problems that sort of come into play when we start using end-to-end. One is we need to think about connection establishment. So this is the problem of saying who is Bob? So I find a contact and I know them in some way by an e-mail address, by a phone number. Signal uses phone numbers, you know, a lot of systems may be using e-mail address. There's things like Threema that use a unique identifier that they generate for you. But somehow I have to go from that identifier to some actual key or some knowledge of a cryptographic secret that identifies the other person. And I have to figure out who I trust to do that mapping of gaining this thing that I'm now using for encryption. And then also there's this, well, how do we match? So a lot of systems do this by uploading your address book or trying to match with existing contacts to solve the user interface problem of discovery, which is if they can already know the identifiers and have this mapping, then when someone new comes in they can suggest and have pre-found these keys. And you just sort of trust the server to hold this address book and to do this mapping between what they're using as their identifier and the keys themselves that you're getting out. Signal is nice here. It says it's not uploading your contacts, which is true. They're uploading hashes of your phone number rather than the actual phone numbers. But it's a similar thing. They've got a directory of known phone numbers. And then as people search, you'll search for a hash of the phone number and get back the key that you hope Signal has correctly given you. So there's sort of a couple of ways that you reduce your trust here.  The other way that you do this is you allow for people to use pseudonyms or anonymous identifiers. So wire you can just register an anonymous email address. And now the cost to you is potentially less if that gets compromised. And it's worth noting Moxie will be talking tomorrow at 4 p.m. about the evolution of the space around Signal. So there's probably a bunch more depth there that you can expect. So what if we don't want to trust the server to do matchmaking? One of the early things that has been around is the web of trust around GPG. And this is the notion that if I have in real life or otherwise associated an identifier with a key, I can publicly provide a signed statement saying that I trust that mapping. And then people who don't know someone but have a link socially maybe can find these proofs and use that to trust this mapping. So I know an identifier and I know that I trust someone who has said, well, this is the key associated with that identifier. And I can use that network to eventually find an identifier that I'm willing to trust or a key that I'm willing to encrypt to. There's some user interface trade off here. This is a manual process in general. And this year we've had a set of denial of service attacks on the web of trust infrastructure. And so the specific attack is that anyone can upload these attestations to trust and so if a bunch of random users or sipples start uploading trusts, when you go to try and download this, you end up overwhelmed by the amount of information. And so the system does not scale because it's very hard to filter to people you care about without telling the system who you care about and revealing your network, which you're trying to avoid. Keybase takes another approach. They made the observation that when I go to try and talk to someone, what I actually care about is the person that I believe owns a specific GitHub or Twitter or other social profile. And so I can provide an attestation where I say, well, this is a key that's associated with the account that controls this Twitter account or this Reddit account or this, you know, Facebook account. And so by having that trust of proofs, I can connect an individual and a cryptographic identity with the person behind who has the passwords to a set of other systems. Keybase also this year began to provide a monetary incentive for users and then struggled with the number of signups. And so there's a lot of work in figuring out, okay, do these identities actually correspond to real people? And how do you prevent a similar denial of service style attack that the web of trust faced in identifying things here? On our devices, we end up in general resorting to a concept called tofu or trust on first use. And what that means is when I first see a key that identifies someone, I'll save that. And if I ever get another need to communicate with that person again, I've already got a key and I can keep using that same key and expect that key to stay the same. And so that continuation and the ability to pin keys once you've seen them means that if when you first establish a connection with someone, it's the real person, then someone who compromises them later can't take over or change that. Finally, one of the sort of exciting things that came out, this is circa 2015 and is largely defunct now, was a system by Adam Langley called Pond that looked at hardening a modern version of email. And one of the things that Pond did was it had something called a password authenticated key exchange. And so this is a evolving cryptographic area where you're saying if two people can start with some weak shared secret, so I can perhaps publicly or in plain text ask the challenge, the other person, where were we at a specific day? And so now we both know something that maybe has a few bits of entropy at least if we can write the same textual answer. We can take that, run a key derivation function to end up with a larger amount of shared entropy and use that as a bootstrapping method to do a key exchange and end up finding a strong cryptographic identity for the other person. So Pond has a system that they call Panda for linking to individuals based on a challenge response. And this is also something that you'll find in off-the-record systems that you'll find in the future. The other thing that we need to be careful about in end-to-end encrypted systems is deniability. When I'm chatting one-on-one with someone, that conversation is eventually fairly deniable. Either person can have their recollection of what happened and there's no proof that the other person said something unless you've recorded it or otherwise brought some other technology into play. But with an encrypted thing where I've authenticated the other person, I end up with a transcript potentially that I can turn over later and say, look, this person said this. And we've seen recently that things like emails that come out are authenticated in this way. The DKIM system that authenticates email senders showed up in the WikiLeaks releases of Hillary Clinton's emails and was able to say, look, the text in these hasn't been changed and it was signed by the real server that we would expect. So the thing that we get from off-the-record and signal protocol is something called deniability or reputability. And this plays into a concept of forward secrecy, which is we're going to sort of throw away stuff afterwards in a way that our chat goes back to being more ephemeral. And so we can think about this in two ways. We have two properties that interlink in this. We have keys that we're using to form our shared session that we're expecting to use to have our secret message. And each time I send a message, I'm going to also provide some new keying material and begin changing that secret key that we're using. So I provide a next key and when Bob replies, he's going to now use my next key as part of that and give me his next key. So what I do is when I send a message, I can provide the secret bit of my previous key. So I can say my last private key that I used to send you that previous message was this. And now at the end of our conversation, we both know all of the private keys, such that we both could have created that whole conversation on our own computer. At any given time, it's only the most recent message that only could have been sent by the other person and the rest of the transcript that you have is something you could have generated yourself. There is a talk on day three about off-the-record v4, the fourth version of that that will go a bit deeper into that. That's at 9 p.m. in the About Freedom Assembly. So I encourage you to do that if you're interested in this. Okay. The next one to talk about is expiry. This is sort of a follow-on to this concept of the word secrecy. But there are sort of two attacks here to consider. One is something that we should maybe, I guess, give credit to Snapchat for popularizing, which is this concept of the message goes away after some amount of time. And really this is protecting against not fully trusting the other person from like sharing it later or sharing it away you didn't attend.  This is why some apps will blank the screen when they go to the task switcher. So if you're swapping between apps, you'll see that some of your applications will just show a blank screen or will not show contents. And that's because the mobile operating systems, APIs, don't tell them when you're in that mode if you take a screenshot. And so they want to be able to notify you if the other person does. And it's worth noting that this is all just raising sort of a social incentive not to. I can still use another camera to take a picture of my phone and get evidence of something that has been said, but it's discouraging it and setting social norms. The other reason for expiry is after the fact, compromise of a device, so whether that's, someone gets hold of the device and tries to do forensic analysis to pull off previous messages or the chat database or whether someone tries to install an application that then scans through your phone. So that's, FungTai is an application that's been installed as a surveillance app in China. And this also boils down to a user interface and user experience question, which is how long are you going to save logs? How much history are you going to save? And what norms are you going to have? And there's a trade-off here. It's useful sometimes to scroll back and especially for companies that believe that they have value-added services around being able to do data analytics on your chat history. They're wary of getting rid of that. The next thing that we have is isolation and OS sandboxing, right? So this is, a lot of this is up one layer, which is what is the operating system doing to secure your application, your chat system from the other things, the malware or the compromises to the broader device that it's running on. We have a bunch of projects around us at Congress that are innovating on this. There are chat systems that also attempt to do this sort of on their own. One sort of extreme example is called tinfoil chat, which makes use of three devices and a physical diode, which is designed to have one device that is sending messages and another device that is receiving messages. So what is if you receive a message that somehow compromises the device, the malware or the malicious file can never get any communication back out and so becomes much less valuable to have compromised. And they implement this with like a physical little hardware diode. The other side of this is recovery and backups, which is you've got a user experience trade-off between a lot of people losing their devices and wanting to get back their contact list or their chat history and the fact that now you're keeping this extra copy and have this additional place for things to get compromised. Apple has done a lot of work here that we don't look at so much. They gave a black cat talk a few years ago where they discuss how they use custom hardware security modules in their data centers, much like the T2 chip in the end devices that will hold the backup keys that get used for their iCloud backups and do similar amounts of rate limiting. And they consider a set, a pretty wide set of adversaries more than we might expect. So including things like what happens when the government comes and asks us to write new software to compromise this. And so they set up their HSM such that they cannot provide software updates to them, which is, you know, this cloud security side that we don't think about as much. So there's a set of slides that you can find from this and these slides will be online too as a pointer to look at their solution, which considers a large number of adversaries that you might not have thought about. So traffic obfuscation is primarily a network side adversary. The technique that is getting used and sort of what people are using if they feel they need to do this is something called domain fronting and domain fronting had its heyday maybe in 2014-ish and has become somewhat less effective but is still effective enough for most of the chat things. The basic idea behind domain fronting is that there's a separation of layers behind that envelope and the message inside of it that we get in HTTP in the web. So when I create a secure connection to a CDN, to a content provider like Amazon or Google or Microsoft, I can make that connection and perform the security layer and provide a fairly generic service that I'm connecting to. I just want to establish a secure connection to Cloudflare and then once I've done that the message that I can send inside can be a chat message to a specific customer of that CDN or that cloud provider which is a very effective way to prevent the network from knowing what specific service you're accessing. It got used for a bunch of circumvention things.  But it's still getting used. This is still what's sort of happening when you turn on a specific technique is getting another revival with DNS over HTTPS and encrypted SNI extensions to TLS which allow for a standardized approach to establish a connection to a service without providing any specific identifiers to the network for which service you want to connect to. It's worth sort of mentioning that the probably the most active chat service is telegram which has a bunch of users in countries that are not fans of having lots of users of telegram and so they have both systems where they can bounce between IPs very quickly and change where their servers appear to be and they've also used techniques like sending messages over DNS tunnels to mitigate some of these censorship things. Accessing their user population they're not really thinking about your local network or caring about that as much as as much as they are like oh there's millions of users that we should probably have still have access to us. So we can maybe hide the characteristics of traffic in terms of what specific service we're connecting. There's some other things about traffic though that also are revealing to the network and this is sort of this additional metadata that we need to think about. So one of these is padding or the size of messages can be revealing. So one sort of immediate thing is the size of a chat or a text message is going to be very different from the size of an image or voice or movies and you see this on airplanes or another bandwidth limited settings they might allow text messages to go through but images won't. There's been research that shows for instance on voice even if I encrypt my voice we've actually gotten really good at compressing audio of human speech so much so that different phenomes, different sounds that we make take up different sizes and so I can say something compress it, encrypt it and then recover what was said based on the relative sizes of different sounds. So there was a paper in 2011 at Oakland S&P that demonstrated this potential for attacks and so what this is telling us perhaps is that there's a trade-off between how efficiently I want to send things and how much metadata or revealing information for distinguishing them I'm giving up. So I can use a less efficient compression that's constant bit rate or that otherwise is not revealing this information but it has higher overhead and won't work as well in constrained network environments. The other place that this shows up is just when people are active so if I can look at when someone is tweeting or when messages are sent I can probably figure out pretty quickly what time zone they're in. And so this leads to a whole set of these metadata-based attacks and in particular there's confirmation attacks and intersection attacks and so intersection attacks is looking at the relative activity of multiple people and trying to figure out okay when Alice sent a message who else was online or active at the same time and over time can I narrow down or filter to specific people that were likely who Alice was talking to. Pond also is a service to look at or a system to look at in this regard their approach was that a client would hopefully be always online and would at a regular pattern check in with the server with the same amount of data regardless of whether there was a real message to send or not so that from the network's perspective every user looked the same the downside being that you've now got this message being sent by every client every minute or so and that creates a huge amount of overhead of just padded data that doesn't have any meaning so finally I'll take a look at server hardening and the things that we're doing to reduce trust in the server there's a few examples of why we would want to do this so one is that you've had messaging servers plenty of times that have not been as secure as they claim one example being that there was a period where the Skype subsidiary in China was using a blacklist of keywords on the server to either prevent or intercept some subset of their user's messages without telling anyone that they were doing that and then also just serve this uncertain future of okay I trust the data now but what can we do so that I don't worry about what the corporate future of this service entails for my data there one of the sort of elephants in the room is that the software development is probably pretty centralized so even if I don't trust the server there's some pretty small number of developers who are writing the code and how do I trust updates that they are making to this either the server or to my client that they pushed to my client isn't reducing my security open source is a great start to mitigating that but it's certainly not solving all of this so one thing one way we can think about how we reduce trust in the server is by looking at what the server knows after end to end encryption it knows things about the size it knows where the message is coming from it knows where the message is going to size we've talked about some of these things that we can use to mitigate so how do we reduce the amount of information about sources and destinations and this network graph that the server knows so this is a concept called linkability which is being able to link the source and destination of a message we start to see some mitigations or approaches to reducing linkability entering mainstream systems so Signal has a system called sealed sender that you can enable where the source of the message goes within the encrypted envelope so that Signal doesn't see that the downside being that Signal is still seeing your IP address but the thought is that they will throw those out relatively quickly and so they will have less logs about this source to destination theoretically though there is a bunch of work in this the first thing I'll point to is a set of systems that we classify as mix nets a mix net works by having a set of providers rather than a single entity that's running the servers a bunch of users will send messages to the first provider which will shuffle all of them and send them to the next provider which will shuffle them again and send them to a final provider that will shuffle them and then be able to send them to destinations and this delinks where none of the individual providers know both the source and destination of these messages so this looks maybe a bit like Tours Onion Routing but differs in sort of a couple of technicalities one is that typically you will wait for some number of messages rather than just going through with bandwidth and low latency and so by doing that you can get a theoretical guarantee that this batch had at least N messages that got shuffled or you can prevent there being some time where only one user was using the system and so you get a stronger theoretic guarantee there's an active project making a messaging system using MixNets called cats in post they gave a talk at camp this summer and I'd encourage you to look at their website or go back to that talk to learn more about MixNets the project that I was I guess tendentially helping with is in a space called private information retrieval it's another technique for doing this delinking and so private information retrieval frames the question a little bit differently and what it asks is if I have a server that has a database of messages and I want a client to be able to retrieve one of those messages without the server knowing which message the client got or asked for so this sounds maybe hard I can give you a strawman to convince yourself that this is do-able as the server for its entire database and then take the message that I want and the server hasn't learned anything about which message I cared about but I spent a lot of network bandwidth probably doing that so there's a couple constructions for this I'm going to focus on the information theoretic private information retrieval and so we're going to use a similar setup to what we had in our threat model for a MixNet which is and I'm going to assume that they're not all talking to each other or colluding so I just need at least one of them to be honest and one of the things that we'll use here is something called the exclusive or operation to refresh your memory here exclusive or is a binary bitwise operation and the nice property that we get is if I XOR something with itself it cancels out so if I have some piece of data and I XOR it so if I have my systems that have the database I can ask each one to give me a superposition of some random subset of its database so I can ask the first server give me items 4, 11, 14 and 20 XOR together I'm assuming all of the items are the same size so that you can do these XORs and then if I structure that it can appear that each server independently or as in the request that it sees that I just ask for some random subset but I can do that so that when I XOR the things I get back everything just cancels out except the item that I care about unless you saw all of the requests that I made you wouldn't be able to tell which item I cared about so by doing this I've reduced the network bandwidth I'm only getting one item of size back from every server now you might have a concern asking the server to do a whole lot of work here it has to look through its entire database and compute this super position thing and that seems potentially like a lot of work right the thing that I think is exciting about this space is it turns out this sort of operation of going out to a large database and like searching for all of the things and then coming back with a small amount of data looks a lot like the hardware like things and so this runs really quite well on a GPU where I can have all of those thousands of cores compute little small parts of the XOR and then pull back this relatively small amount of information and so with GPUs you can actually have databases of gigabytes tens of gigabytes of data and compute these XORs across all of it in order of a millisecond or less so a couple things in this space TALIC is the system that I helped with that demonstrates this working the converse problem is called private information storage and that one is how do I write an item into a database without the database knowing which item I wrote the mathematical construction there is not quite as simple to explain but there's there's pretty cool new work in the last month or two out of Dan Bonet and at Stanford called Express and Saba's first author that is showing how to fairly practically perform that operation cool I'll finish just with a couple minutes on multi-party chat or group chat so small groups you've sort of got a choice here in terms of how chat systems are implementing group chat one is you can not tell the server about the group and as someone who's part of the group I just send the same message to everyone in the group and maybe I tag it for them so that they know it's part of the group or you do something more efficient where you tell the server about group membership and I send the message once to the server and it sends it to everyone in the group even if you don't tell the server about it though you've got a bunch of things to worry about about leaked correlation which is if at a single time someone sends the same size message to five other people and then later someone else sends the same size message to five other people and those basically overlap someone in the network basically knows who the group membership is so it's actually quite difficult to conceal group membership the other thing that breaks down is our concept of deniability once again which is now if multiple people have this log even if both of them individually could have written it the fact that they have the same cryptographic keys from this message so there continues to be work here signal is working on providing again an SGX and centralized construction for group management to be able to scale better given I think the pretty realistic fact that the server in these cases is probably going to be able to figure out group membership in some case you might as well make it scale on the other side one of the systems that's being prototyped is called CUTCH out of open privacy and this is an extension to Ricochet that allows for offline messages and small group chats it works for order of 5 to 20 people and it works by having a server that obliviously forwards on messages to everyone connected to it so when I send a message to a group the server sends the message to everyone it knows about not just the people and therefore the server doesn't actually know the subgroups that exist it just knows who's connected to it and that's a neat way it doesn't necessarily scale to large groups but it allows for some concealing of group membership they've got an android prototype as well that's sort of a nice extension to make this usable wonderful I guess the final thought here is there's a lot of systems I'm sure I haven't mentioned all of them but this community is really closely tied to the innovations that are happening in the space of private chat and this is the infrastructure that supports communities and is some of the most meaningful stuff you can possibly work on and I encourage you to find new ones and look at a bunch of them and think about the tradeoffs and encourage friends to play with new systems how they gain adoption and how people figure out what mechanisms do and don't work so with that I will take questions wasn't necessary to encourage you to come with an applause there are microphones that are numbered in the room so if you start lining up behind the microphones then we can take your questions we already have a question from the internet popularity and independence are a contradiction how can I be sure that an messenger like signals stays independent I guess I would question whether independence is a goal in and of itself it's true that the value is increasing and so one of the things to think about is using systems that have open protocols or that are federated or otherwise not centralized and again this is reducing that need to have confidence in the future business model of a single legal entity but I don't know independence is of the company is the thing that you're trying to trade off with popularity cool and we have questions at the microphones we'll start a microphone number one thanks for the talk first of all we talked you talked a lot about content and encryption what about the initial problem history shows that if I'm an individual already a plurved in a sensitive area there might no need to encrypt decrypt the message I'm sending it's already identified I'm sending at a specific location at a specific time is there any chance to hide that or do something against it so it makes things hidden again after the fact that seems very hard I mean so there's there's a couple thoughts there maybe there's sort of a real world intersection attack which is if there's like a real world observable action of like who actually shows up at the protest that's a pretty good way to figure out who was chatting about the protest beforehand potentially and so I mean I think what we've seen in real world organizing is things like either really decentralizing that where it happens across a lot of platforms and happens very often so there's not enough time to respond in advance or using yeah or hiding your presence or otherwise trying to stagger your actual actions so that they are harder to correlate to a specific group it's not something the chat systems are talking about I don't think we have time for more questions so please line up in the microphones and if you're leaving then leave quietly we have a question from microphone so if network address translation is the origin sin to the end to end principle and due to that we now have to run servers someone has to pay for it do you know any solution to that economic problem I mean we had to pay for things even without network address translation but we could move more of that cost to end users and so we have another opportunity with IPv6 to potentially keep more of the cost with end users or develop protocols that are more decentralized where that cost stays more fairly distributed our phones have a huge amount of computation power and figuring out how we make our protocols so that work happens there is I think an ongoing balance I think some of the reasons why network address translation or centralization is so common is because distributed systems are pretty hard to build and pretty hard to gain confidence in so more tools around how we can test and feel like we understand and that a system actually is going to work 99.99% of the time for distributed systems is going to make people less wary of working with them so better tools on distributed systems is maybe the best answer we also have another question from the internet right now what do you think of technical novices acceptance and dealings with OTR keys for example matrix riot most people I know just click I verify this key and even if they didn't absolutely so this I think goes back to a lot of these problems are sort of a user experience tradeoff which is you know we saw initial versions of signal where you would actually try and regularly verify between each other and then that sort of has gotten pushed back to a harder to access part of the user interface because not many people wanted to deal with that and in early matrix riot you would get a lot of warnings about there's a new device do you want to verify this new device do you only want to send to the previous devices that you trusted and now you're getting the ability to sort of more automatically just sort of accept these changes and you're weakening some amount of the encryption security better smoother user interface because most users are just going to sort of click yes because they want to send the message right and so there's this tradeoff of when you have built the protocol such that you are standing in the way of the person doing what they want to do that's not really where you want to put that friction so figuring out other ways where you can have this on the side or supporting the communication rather than hindering what you should be thinking about that can be successful we have a couple of more questions we'll start at microphone number three yeah and thank you for your talk you talked about diniability by sending the private key with the last message and how do I get the private key for the last message in the whole conversation in the OTR XMPP Jabber systems there would be action to end the conversation that would then make it repudiatable that would send that final message to close it what you have in things like signal is it's actually happening every message as part of the confirmation of the message okay thank you we still probably have questions time for more questions so please line up if you have any don't hold back we have a question from microphone number seven so first of all brief comment the riot thing still doesn't even do tofu they haven't figured this out but I think there's a much more subtle conversation that needs to happen around the diniability because most of the time if you have people with a power imbalance the non repudiatable conversation actually benefits the weaker person so we actually don't want diniability in most of our chat applications or whatever but that's still more subtle than that because when you have people with equal power maybe you do it's kind of weird absolutely and I guess the other part of that is that something that should be shown to users and is that a concept is there a way that you express that notion in a way that users can understand it and make good choices or is it just something that we have one more question at microphone number 7 please line up if you have any more we still have a couple of more minutes microphone number 7 please thanks for the talk we talked about the private information retrieval and how that would stop the server from knowing who retrieves the message but for me the question is how do I find out in the first place which message is for me because if I had 14 then obviously over a conversation it would again be possible to de-anonymize the users in like okay they always accessing this one in like all those queries absolutely so I didn't explain that part the trick is that between the two people we will share some secret which is a conversation secret and what we will use that conversation secret for is to seed a pseudo random number generator and so we will be able to generate the same stream of random numbers and so each next message will go at the place determined by the next item in that random number generator and so now the person writing can just write at random places as far as the server tells and when it wants to write the next message in this random number generator for that conversation there's a paper that will describe a bunch more of that system but that's the basic sketch thank you we have a question from the internet it seems like identity is the weak point of the new breed of messaging apps how do we solve this part of SoCo's triangle the need for identifiers and to find people identity is hard and I think identity has always been hard and will continue to be hard having a variety of ways to be identified I think remains important and is why there isn't a single winner takes all system that we use for chat but rather you have a lot of different chat protocols that you use for different circles and different social circles that you find yourself in and part of that is our desire to not be confined to a single identity but to be able to have different facets to our personalities there are systems where you can identify yourself as a unique identifier to each person you talk to rather than having a single identity within the system so that's something else that pond would use was that the identifier that you gave out to each separate friend was different and so you would appear as a totally separate user to each of them it turns out that's at the same time very difficult because if I post an identifier publicly so you have to give these out privately in a one-on-one setting which limits your discoverability so that that concept of how we deal with identities I think is inherently messy and inherently something that there's not going to be something satisfying that solves and that was the final question concluding this talk please give a big round of applause for Will Scott thank you


Hello everyone. Are citizens with populist attitudes affected the most by radical right-wing disinformation? Can exposure to radical right-wing populist messages lead to support for radical right-wing positions? To answer these questions we have invited Michael Hamilliers from the Amsterdam School of Communication Research at the University of Amsterdam. He is sharing the findings of his research, published this year in our Open Access Journal, Media and Communication. I'm Ulrich Silve and today let's talk about media and communication. Hello Michael, welcome to our episode. Hi, thanks. The first question for you would be why is this topic so important? I think disinformation that revolves around sort of deliberate manipulation or fabrication of content with intention to deceive recipients is really important because there's really harmful intent behind the creation of such information. So I think it's really important that we as researchers and also for society more generally really try to understand how exposure to false information is affecting citizens. That's why I think it's important to study the effects of disinformation also in experimental settings. Of course, and when you started this research, so what were you hoping to find? What was the research gap? Yeah, so what I was manipulating in this experiment is not just false information in the sense that facts were completely fabricated and completely aligned with a deceptive political agenda. But also disinformation that relies on more subtle manipulations and stays closer to the truth, which has also been referred to as small information sort of the deliberate misuse of existing information that is placed in a different context. How that actually affects people and whether there's a difference in credibility between real information, completely fabricated information, but also less strong deviates from truthfulness, all aligning with a radical right wing populist perspective. I was hoping to find that there was no. There was a strong difference in credibility between the most manipulated and the most accurate or most authentic content, and if people are actually able to differentiate between different levels of truthfulness. Okay, so let us know about the findings. Yeah, so the most surprising finding for me at least is that people don't make very clear distinctions in terms of credibility between disinformation, the most fabricated type and authentic information. So real political speech or something that's based on actually accurate information to think really points to this debate that people have a hard time distinguishing between true information and false information. So the first surprise for me, but also an interesting finding was that sort of the disinformation stays closest to reality had the strongest effect on radical right wing issue positions. And how would you say these findings can impact in terms of public policies, individual choice. So how can these findings translate into real life situations. But I think it's important also if you look at how policy that aims to deal with misinformation but also how we fight or how the global fight against misinformation is focusing mostly on the strongest deviations from reality the most strongest types of conspiracy narratives and very strong lies. I think what is important is to take into account that also these more subtle manipulations and disinformation that stays closer to reality also can have a strong impact on people's belief. It's also important that policy and our global response to Mr disinformation also focuses on is more subtle manipulations. Of course, you mentioned before some surprising findings for you. Can you indicate to the researchers out there. So what comes next in this topic. So what's next to study. Yeah, what I think is important is that this this study only focuses on textual disinformation with a very strong anti immigration perspective. But I think future research also take you to kind of disinformation come in many different forms, such as deep fakes or cheap fakes that really relies on videos, but also more embeddings on social media or ordinary citizens communicating this information. Also in the forms of bots and trolls. So I think sort of the contextual factors that help to shape disinformation. I think it's important for future research to also take these differences in the context of false information into account. Can you provide some additional resources some additional materials about the topic discussed today of any format. Yeah, I think there are a lot of nice policy briefs out there if you look for them and I think it's also good for people to find how misinformation is different in different national settings. So my studies and also think from a lot of other literature out there is really focused on the US or Western Europe. I think it's good for for listeners to also take into account sort of the global perspective and try to find policy papers that have been written in different countries about the dynamics of misinformation which are very different across national settings. I always like to finish our episodes with a punchline of what we just discussed. So if there is anything you want our audience to remember about this talk, what would be Michael. Yeah, I think that's factual knowledge and truthfulness and reality have become very much contested debates and that's in this sort of fragmented setting that people no longer make a very strong distinction between levels of truthfulness on the whole and that deception can be credible. Whereas actually truthfully, if you can have a strong impact on attitudes, we really have to take into account that there are so many different degrees of deception and that's prooffulness has become also partially in the eye of the beholder in a time where there are so many competing narratives that all compete for being acknowledged as legitimate versions of reality. Thank you, Michael. This episode is available on the Let's Talk About Media and Communication website on Kojitatu's YouTube channel as well as in podcast directories such as Spotify, Google Podcasts, Apple Podcasts, etc. Michael, it was a pleasure. Thanks. It was a pleasure talking to you.


Hi, I'm Lylee Evangelista. I'm with the Leukemia and Lymphoma Society and I'm here at the UCLA Kaiser Permanente Health Equity Conference. I think this conference is just really great because obviously everyone who's here is really committed to health equity, but we're all working towards our own missions and specific silos that we sometimes forget what the work everybody else is doing and what part we play in helping build everyone up. So it's just really great to see how we fit in the context of everything and see how we can help in other respects.


you see the whole video? Apparently not. The mayor, because he condemned the kids. What do you think they did? Are you here for the protest? Would you mind if I ask you a couple questions? Where are you with? I have a YouTube channel, Drone Tech Politics. Free Nation, and this is Issa Gabona and what nation are you with? What they couldn't get, I had to try it for the last time. Okay, awesome. And we have a website, Indigenous in Facebook. So, we're trying to get the state of Kentucky, it's a bigger problem, to hire an enrolled Indigenous person, because right now there are Caucasians speaking for Indigenous people in Kentucky. With what's just happened, you're welcome to ask. Yeah, I'm just wondering, just in your guys' words, what you're here for, what you're protesting against? I think it's just important to stand up for what you believe in, and you know, I've got a lot of people here right now, and I feel like it's just, it's a good thing for us to be here and be supportive. Yeah, I agree. You definitely should be out and let your voice be heard. Did you guys, I mean, were you out here as a direct result of what happened in Washington?  The kids, like how they were shooting when they did how these, and just like, like how they came with like the hats on, and they're just very aggressive, and it was just really inappropriate. Okay, did you happen to see like the whole video, like the two-hour clip, or the two-hour video? I see possible. Okay, well thank you, I appreciate it.  I haven't heard or seen any of it. Where's the video of it? I've looked. The Facebook page that announced this didn't make that claim, but they didn't post any videos. I looked, I didn't see it. So where are, where can we find those videos? I mean, I searched for it, I couldn't find it. Video of them supposedly saying racial, the students saying racial things, but I have not seen it. But is it okay if it happens to a home person? Then that's hypocrisy. It's the definition of hypocrisy.  So when you're convinced your side is right. Do you think the media best up at all? I mean, those kids are getting death threats and stuff now. Yeah, that's true. Well, they, the event was just the pro-life event. They were just waiting for a bus to pick them up. That's why, that's why the numbers gathered over time. Well, they were waiting on a bus, and then the kids started to gather at the point what they were supposed to meet. No, no, no. He came up to them. Well, he walked into it. He walked into it. He could have just gone around and kept going, and he didn't. So, well, he's the adult though. Exactly. I had the same question. So why are you guys here, just in your own words? I have a YouTube channel, DroneTechPolitics. That's why we're here. And what, I mean, what was the incident? Like what, how do you perceive what happened there? Open their eyes of what's going on in America, what's going on in the country, and especially what's going on to our indigenous people. And so do you think the kids did something wrong that they were wrong and what they did? Evidence.  Yeah. Okay. Well, what's the end then? Like, what happened that you are objective? Mocked, humiliated, intimidated, and elder, and completely disrespected him. Well, how do they, how do they intimidate him? I mean, if our group surrounded you and chanted at you right now, it would be, it would be an intimidation time. Well, I mean, that's a pretty common thing in protests too, isn't it? I mean, no, I've, I've seen a ton of protests, a ton of videos, and like if, if I were to go to like, um, an anti-Trump protests and I wore like a MAGA hat or something, I'd probably be surrounded and screamed at. And not any, anything, it would be a lot worse than what happened the other day in Washington. I mean, don't you think? Do you think that, have you seen the video of the kid that was in the stair down, how he was trying to like, get people to calm down? Did you see that? Okay. Oh no, I'm just curious. I'm just wondering if you saw that. That's all. Because it just, it kind of brings context in it that he wasn't a hateful. Okay. Well, thank you. I do appreciate it. How do you feel about Nathan Phillips' group telling the kids to go back to Europe? It wasn't Nathan Phillips. It's on video. It's on video. It is. It's on the two hour video. No, I said it's a guy in Nathan Phillips' group. Oh, that's not what you said. It is. I was recording it too. So I could show you. So what did the kids do that you find so objectionable? I don't think anybody should harass Nathan Phillips. That's all. Well, how did they harass him? They danced around him. Having a hard time hearing? Okay.  Are you like an actual medic? What are you a medic for? Cool. Thank you. You guys interested in answering any questions? Just general what your opinion is about all this and you guys with Antifa by any chance? Oh, like that. Okay. That's cool. Yeah, just what you're... Yeah. If I'm leaving a message with this, no. All right. Thank you, sir. Appreciate it. And would you guys be interested in answering any questions? No. No? All right. Thank you. I'm sorry. He's here with a Native American organization and they're protesting what happened in Washington over the weekend. It's a complicated thing, but basically some kids were there for a pro-life demonstration and they were waiting on a bus when some Black Israeliites started yelling a bunch of racial stuff at them and they got kind of whipped into a frenzy. That's not what happened. Have you guys seen the video, the whole two-hour video?  And why is that? Aren't they just people like everybody else? Really, the media came down pretty hard on those kids. That's a lot of power. Five of them. Yeah. I already have. I interviewed a bunch of them already. They were real respectful. No, I'm American too. Absolutely. We all are. Are you guys with Antifa? Why the masks? I'm cold. Is it an intimidation tactic or you guys here to intimidate kids? So, they're saying the kids were racist, but because a Native American man named Nathan Phillips marched up in the middle of this and started banging his drum. And one of the kids stood there while he banged the drum in his face. He didn't do it or say anything, but everybody's really upset about it for some reason. And so, that's why we're here now. Basically, the media put out like a six-second snippet of video and then later put out the whole more context to it. But the damage had already been done and like a lot of people here still believe that something really bad happened when really it was not really anything. If I were to show up here with a MAGA hat, I'd probably get surrounded by Antifa people. It's me on the bad guy. I have a YouTube channel. What channel do you get? It's called DrunTech Politics. Yeah, that's what this is all about. So, the kids go to Covington. And so, that's why they're here. Yeah. So, basically the kids have been getting death threats and all this other stuff. And after the media put out the full story, which kind of doubted back, these folks are still kind of going with the original story.  They're going to continue. Right, exactly. Yeah. Have a good day, man. Telling kids to go back to Europe is not diffusing. I'm from here. Who is the first Native American tribe in America? She's spewing ignorance and hate. No, I'm not, though. I'm just trying to correct the ignorance and hate. Are you here to threaten me? Oh, here we go. Well, yeah, shouting into a crowd is not dialogue, though. Well, I have to get a word in. Someone just got to say it. Or else nobody, are we not going to acknowledge that at all? So many people are saying that. They weren't at first, though. The media was telling another story, weren't they? Yeah, I know. Drone Tech Politics, you can find me there. I must come back? Yeah. Why?    I'm not.   Sure you do. I do. You're doing just what that kid did. What? The kid stood there, silent. Yeah, you're trying to strut. You're doing worse. You're interrupting us. You're worse. Why don't you guys want to talk about inconvenient facts? Okay, I've got a crowd going now. I'm anti-fascist, anti-racist, pro-native. You want to, you want to talk a little bit on camera? Well... Is he a war hero? I know, I'm not, I'm not up on the facts on that, but I think that's in dispute. I don't really care about that. That's not here nor there. I don't think, but... So, I've heard that. I've heard that reported, but I've not seen a single shred of evidence of it. Have you? I have. I watched the whole two hour video. Right. Do you know what that was about? They have a school chant, like a sports chant, and when the black Israeli ice were yelling, spewing all that crap at them, they did that as a means of like not fighting, but they were trying to like... They're shouting at anybody they see. And what did they call that? What did they call that cheer? They call that a sumo cheer. I saw that video too. That's cultural appropriation in and of itself. You're not winning any... Well, everybody's culturally appropriating something, right? It's a melting pot that we live in here, right? Anyway, I'm not a scumbag, dude. I'm not. I'm just someone who sees it differently, I guess. Yeah, I'll say what doesn't de-escalate is banging...  Well, no, he walked up to them. Have you seen the two hour video, dude? Well, look, these kids were set upon from the very beginning. While they're... And you can say that he marched in there to de-escalate... Well, look, they're saying he went in there to de-escalate. Right. Unfortunately... Okay. Well, I thought it was a discussion. Okay. Well, they're screaming. You can easily hear them.  No, no, no, no. What I was gonna say is I want to introduce you and give you a chance to speak. I want... I know you're over here and you have a lot to say. And I think you should have the opportunity to say it as well. I'm not trying to set you up for anything. I mean, I know you have an opinion. I think you should be heard out. And then everyone else can be heard out as well. We can do this in a good way. Do you want to do that? I mean, I can if you want. That's cute. Do you want that platform? I mean, I'm more here just to record.  Yeah, I will. We're gonna have Mona speak first. Okay. Because we're in charge of this show. This is an indigenous format. I don't need to. And so he can speak in just a little bit. Mona, come on up, please. We always have to make room for you. No? So go away. You're very nice. It's okay.


This is stock number 10051B, we are here at Summit Automotive in Fond du Lac, Wisconsin. Your new and used car headquarters, today we are checking out the super clean 2007 Lexus LS460. This vehicle has the 4.6 liter dual overhead cam V8 motor, which pumps out 380 horsepower. The redigris mica is the color, a really nice green, and I'm going to go kind of fast on this video just because it's really hot out and my phone tends to get overheated if I'm in the sun too long here. But driver's side rim is really nice. It has brand new Sincera Falcon tires, these are 23550R18s, they are brand new, we put those on in our safety inspection. It has HID headlamps, it has the front bumper parking sensors, factory fog lights, bumpers in nice shape, headlight lenses are nice and clear, I didn't see any dents on that hood. Passenger side fender is in nice shape as well, and the passenger side rim, pretty nice, got a couple little scuffs, nothing too major, but that tire is brand new as well down this side of the car, very, very clean. We take these HD videos so if you are far away or even if you're close by and just can't make the trip down, you can still see the car, hear the car, and have confidence in the vehicle that you're looking at before you even get here, so that when you do get here there's no surprises. I will tell you there's one tiny little ding on that front door that I saw, back rims about the same as the driver's side front, and the back tires have all the tread left brand new as well, so we put all four brand new tires on in our safety inspection per the state of Wisconsin, we got to go through the vehicle, rear trunk is in very nice clean condition, and we'll have to take a look in there in just a second, dual rear exhaust, rear bumpers in nice shape, no dents or dings or cracks on that, rear quarters in nice shape, back rim about the same condition as the other ones, and down this side is very clean as well. Inside the LS460 package gives you the tan leather interior, there are no rips or tears on these seats, both of these seats are heated, both of these seats are cooled, we have weather tech floor mats, power windows, power locks, power mirrors, memory driver's seat, auto, the AFS system, I think that's like auto fog light system or auto light system, heated steering wheel, you can parking sensors, you can turn those off and on, you can see that this car has 103,985 miles, instrument cluster is very nice and clean, and for the age of miles on this car you know it's in really nice condition, we got Bluetooth and cruise controls on the right, audio controls on the left, wood grain trim, it's a heated steering wheel, you have your factory navigation system, dual climate control, CD player, you have your heated and cooled seat buttons right here, and you also have your rear shade, which it's a power shade kind of cool, so you can put that down, or you can put it up, a lot of luxury in this car, has a Lexus premium audio systems, the power sunroof, which is a nice shade, you have your home link buttons up there, and your volume controls and stuff for your phone, map lights, and we'll take a quick look at the back seats, we'll take a look at the trunk, then we'll also take a look under the hood, back seats are just as nice as the front seats, no rips or tears back here, it does have the latch child safety system, believe it has a pass through to the trunk, weather tech floor mats back here, carpeting in some pretty nice shape, that trunk lid opens up on its own, once you press the button we have a weather tech floor mat back here, you also have a normal floor mat, and then you have a factory rim back here as well, and spare tire, that shuts nice and solidly, and we'll take a quick look under the hood, I would personally like to thank you for checking out the video today, hopefully from this HD video, you'll have been able to tell just how clean this car is, all the way around, inside and out, not much to see under here, there's all sorts of covers and everything, but this is the 4.6 liter V8 motor, dual overhead cam, and 380 horsepower really gets up and goes, and what you can see of the engine bay, it's very clean, this car has been fully safe, and inspected by our service shop, has a fresh oil and filter change, all the fluids have been checked and topped off, four brand new tires, and its car is 100% ready to go to see more pictures of this car, one of our other 450 new and used cars, trucks, SUVs, minivans, wranglers, half tons, three quarter tons, one tons, you name it, we got it, go to our website www.summitauto.com, full pictures and descriptions of every single vehicle from two locations all at summitauto.com, and if you'd like to check out more HD videos, you can go to youtube.com slash summit auto remember to like, subscribe, and share on this video, and all the videos that you see there, in fact in a second you will see a link to subscribe to our YouTube channel on your left, a link to more used inventory videos like this one on your right, if you have not been to our website on the bottom link to this vehicle on our website, click those, check us out, we really look forward to helping you with this super clean 2007 Lexus LS 460, thanks again.


What is he saying? He's saying he's enjoying Spain. Yes, we're having a good time here. We've been here for two days. It's been quite complicated, but we're doing well. What has he just said? He just said, it's been tough. He's enjoyed it. What did you just say? What did you say? It's been nice. The people that work here, the receivers, the food, the installation. The pitch has been unbelievable. We've been here to work hard, so far it's been tough, but we're really good. We're happy, so it's good. You can teach him some Spanish. Come here. Teach him some Spanish. Thank you. Teach him some Spanish. What is your name? My name is Emmanuel. I'm from the centre. I'm from the centre. I'm from the centre. I'm from the centre. I'm from the centre. I'm from the island. Am I from the island? I'm from the island of Mago. The Mago? What did he say? He said, How's your Spain experience so far? Jan will then tell you how to say it in Spanish. My Spain... yeah it's been tough man. It's been good, it's been hot, you know. We've enjoyed it, low quality, on and off the board, you know. So yeah it's good to be out here man. How do you say that in Spanish? I have to say it again, half a go, what do you say? It's been tough, it's been tough. Very difficult, very difficult, very difficult. It's been hot, with a lot of heat. It's been enjoyable man, I'm enjoying it. We're having a lot of fun, having a lot of fun. Right, did I say it right? Creating out of ten. Oh nine, for his first time. That's a nine, yeah, nine out of ten, yeah. That's good. Enjoying being back on home side. You enjoying being back in Spain? Yeah, yeah definitely. For me it's always a blessing when I'm back home, for me it's my second home. So every time I've got a chance to be here for me it's a blessing. So yeah I'm really happy to be here. Is Jan showing you the ropes yet? What ropes? Yeah he's showing me about, yeah he's showing me about man. It's nice, it's nice, it's hot man. It's hotter than I thought. It's like Dubai. What's been your favourite part so far? In Spain. To get to know the new players, you know I think the quality is improving every day. You know we're getting fit and fit, it's just been nice to be around all the new players and get to know them and you know and learn obviously the new system that the manager wants to play and all these things. So it's just good to be out here and get the hard work done. Paddy who's done the best in the running? In the running? You have Gilly and Keen right out there, they're fit superstars man. They shouldn't be in the Olympics. That's what they should be in the Olympics. They shouldn't be here. Yeah man, it's good but keeping up, getting by you know. What's going on tomorrow? We're not sure yet but so far so well we know it's a golf day, some lad's going to play some golf. Spanish lessons. What one? Spanish lessons. Paddy, yeah we're doing go karting and you know he's going to be the winner then. Lewis Hamilton. Paddy. Yeah it's cold. Thank you.


These states have, in the aggregate, made considerable progress. The friendly exchanges between our two peoples have greatly increased, and their mutual understanding further deepened. Our exchanges and cooperation in the political, economic, cultural, scientific, technological, and other fields have markedly expanded, but it should be considered that the growth of the Sino-US relations is far below the level it should have attained. There have been ups and downs in the course of development, and there still exist difficulties and obstacles. China has always been loyal to the Sino-US relations, and I hope that the Sino-US relations will continue to develop. The U.S. government leader has always been loyal to the Sino-US relations, and I hope that this relationship can be stable and stable. I believe that such possibilities exist. We need to respect each other, and consider our own national interests. We need to respect each other's national interests. China and the U.S. have always been loyal to the Sino-US relations, and we need to respect each other's national interests. China has always attached importance to its relations with the United States, and hopes to see their growth. U.S. government leaders have also indicated on more than one occasion that they value Sino-US relations and wish to see their development on a durable and stable basis. I believe there is such a possibility. In order to turn the possibility into reality, it is necessary for both sides to show mutual respect and for each other to take into account the national interests of the other side, as well as its own country, in handling the problems before them. So long as both China and the United States strictly abide by the principles as confirmed by both sides in the joint communiques, perform the obligations each undertook, it is possible for Sino-US relations to leave behind jolts and uncertainties and embark on a smooth path. Five years ago, Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping said at this podium that great possibilities lie ahead for developing amicable cooperation between China and the United States. This remains our faith. Sino-US relations are now at an important juncture. As Americans would say, they are faced with big challenges and great opportunities as well. We should bravely accept the challenges and make full use of the opportunities. The world situation is at present more turbulent. The people of all countries are deeply worried about the future of the world. The United States and China, both being big countries, should be aware of their heavy responsibility for the maintenance of world peace. In the next few days, I shall hold talks with President Reagan and other leaders of our government and exchange views with them on ways to develop Sino-US relations and our international issues of common interest. We never construed the significance of Sino-US relations as being limited to ordinary bilateral relations, but regard them as an important affair affecting the overall world situation. We stand for peace not only because China needs peace, friendship and economic development, but also because people of all countries want peace, friendship and development. The amicable coexistence of China and the United States is a major factor for maintaining world peace and stability. As long as the peoples of the world take their destiny into their own hands, it will be possible to maintain world peace and prevent a new world war. I feel that the eyes of millions of people are always looking for us, looking forward to the development of Sino-US relations and the future of world peace and stability. We should not let them down. I just mentioned that today is the second anniversary of Sino-US signing. I think this is a very important and important moment for the people of the world. I believe that history will teach us a better lesson. I wish the people of the United States and the Sino-US relations a stable and sustainable development. Thank you. Mr. President, at this solemn podium, I feel that hundreds of millions of people are watching us. They expect us to make contributions to the development of Sino-US relations and to the cause of maintaining world peace. We should not disappoint them. As I said just now, this year is the bicentenary of the beginning of contacts between China and the United States. This is an occasion for reviewing the past and looking ahead to the future. I believe that with the study of history, we will learn to live together better in enmity. I wish happiness to the American people and steady and sustained development of the Sino-US relations. Thank you.


Welcome to Access a Trader, the number one community for those who are committed to taking control of their trading in order to achieve success, profitability, and longevity. Thank you for joining us. Here's Dan Shapiro to help you find your edge, master your process, and own your future. Hey guys, giving everybody welcome to another edition of the Axis of Trader.com nightly update show. Hope everybody is doing well. Crazy, crazy market, right? We started yesterday. I think before we even get started, I think the most important part, I see people dwelling what the Fed says. Number one, if you listen to any of the language that Powell was talking about, he doesn't even believe we're even in a recession. Right away, I kind of lost interest. I chuckled like everybody else and I lost interest. So whatever the Fed said today kind of went in one ear, one out the other. I'm sure there's a million websites you could go on and try to rationalize and make sense of it and discuss it with your neighbor or fight somebody on social media. Whatever you do in your time is up to you. I think the bigger picture is from the market point of view, from the trading aspect is what the market is telling us, right? So let's kind of back up. We'll get to meta in a second. Let's kind of back up. So last week, we reclaimed a really huge level, right? A really, really big level, 296.75 and reclaimed a 50-day moving average and we started a really big four or five-day run. And then the market rested, okay? And just when you thought yesterday, right? Yesterday before the close. Just when you thought that, okay, that's the last rest day we're going to rally, Walmart threw a big, right? Like a really, really big wrench into the plans of the bulls and not only that they, you know, more profit taken, the cues and the SPX came very, very close, maybe a day away, losing their 50-day moving average back, which would have been ridiculously bearish, would have been a punch-gut into the soul of the bulls. And we would have been having a completely different conversation. But that's not even the most important part, okay? It's what happens next. And we kind of talked about that last night in the video. Good news sometimes is good. Good news is sometimes bad. Good news sometimes is bad. The stock reacts good and vice versa. And the most ironic part of what we're seeing right now in this market is not only is bad news being discounted. Because again, if you remember two days ago when Walmart came out with that news, it took down every retailer. Whatever retailer you were in got absolutely destroyed. Target, Coles, anything to do. Shopify, Shopify came out with a 10% layoff reduction in its plans. Etsy got murdered. We'll talk about Shopify. We'll talk about Etsy in a second. Amazon, everything got absolutely killed.  I literally had all shorts. And when I went to pick up my son, okay, I even said this on the video. Oh my God, I got to redo my whole walks list because Microsoft missed their top and bottom and they exploded today. Google missed their top and bottom and they exploded to this. And there's nothing more bullish, right? Absolutely nothing more bullish that you could possibly have is getting bad economic data, negating it and going higher.  And obviously the other side of the spectrum as well. If a company comes out with good news and they sell it off, right? It doesn't make a difference how good the news was. Price action is the judge, jury and the executioner. So when last night, Microsoft misses, Google misses, and they both went up, you knew right away there was a very, very good chance. Bulls are going to put in a very good and aggressive footing into today's action. Did we think the NASDAQ was going to rally 500 points today? Probably not, right? Probably not. Again, we were prepared and we'll get to the pivots in a second. So it wasn't like we had 600 long setups because there wasn't any 600 long setups because the day before everything got destroyed to the bottom of the range. But since Microsoft and Google provided the really good ammunition for today's open, a lot of stocks started gapping right near the top of the range and they started confirming as well. And the most interesting part about this earnings quarter as well, it's very, very mixed up. And I'll give you an example, right? So like I said, Google, Mr. Earnings, Mr. The Revenue, Google exploded that, right? Absolutely exploded. It's probably one day away. I still like it above this range here. It's probably one day away from reclaiming the top of the range. Then it could go on a very, very big run. So it kind of cleared out a lot of the trees in the forest today and stopped right at the supply zone, which is fine, okay? But if you look at a stock in the same group and a grant, granted, it's not the same thing. I get it. Google and Meta not in the same world, right? But they group it in together. So Meta comes out with earnings and this is the first time, literally the first time revenues decline. Think about it, from the existence of the company, the revenues decline. And ironically, they brought down the stock and almost got it green in a day. They came in with like a dollar and change for going back in the green of the day. And again, it's one of those situations that, well, I don't get it. Google missed their numbers. Why did the stock explode? Well, I don't get it. Meta missed their numbers. Why did the stock go lower and now it's trying to recover, right? I don't get it. I don't get it. I don't get it. Look at a name, for example, like Lamb Research, right? Lamb Research today after the close, had a nice quarter, right? Has having a nice quarter. Well, what the hell happened to Qualcomm, right?  How come nobody's spending money at Walmart, right? How come nobody's spending money at Walmart, right? And how the hell is Etsy shining in this type of tape, right? Etsy's having a really, really nice move at all.  It really is. But when it's so random and they're negating the bad news, that's good for the, that's good for sentiment. That's really, really good for sentiment. Now again, anything changes at any given time, we get it, right? We're not naive. I've been doing this for 23 years. I'm going to my 24th year. So I get it. Everything is possible and on a drop in a dime sentiment changes. But when you get such a very, very aggressive statement, and especially last night with the Bulls, with Microsoft, with Google, right? Which Shopify this morning, you know, Shopify came out with earnings. They sold it off $2 at the, you know, $2 right away. They missed their earnings. Look what happened to Shopify, right? They missed their earnings. And all they did was literally, right, they bought the dip.  And that's what's really, really interesting about this, this market. Although yes, you're going to get some names that are being sold off on earnings. So far, TDOC is getting hit.  I get it. Something to do with online doctors. Okay. COVID zone. Right. COVID zone. Hopefully, hopefully it's over. Now we got monkeypox. Let's go. Right. So you got TDOC moving lower. You got a BBBY going lower. We got Qualcomm going lower. But the most important part is the stocks that had pretty decent numbers or didn't disappoint. They're starting to go higher. So when you look at tomorrow's earnings, for example, right? And today you had some pretty big moves. Again, we talked about Etsy, lamb research, even Ford, right? It shows you the strength of quote, unquote, the economy. Maybe this is why Powell doesn't think we're in a recession. Hey, people are buying cars, right? People have some reason to not spending money on Walmart or Target, but yeah, they're buying cars. Okay. That's cool. No recession. You heard it from Powell first. I didn't make it up. So don't shoot the messenger. So the most important part is tomorrow. Let's see if the bulls can get a gun, right? You got Apple tomorrow, right? You got Apple. You got Amazon tomorrow. You know, Amazon has not had great quarters of late. Now the question is, is it going to mirror what Walmart is saying? Or is it going to mirror what Etsy is saying, right? We don't know what Ford is saying. We don't know. We got Roku tomorrow, right? Again, one of those things that I don't have a Roku. Again, I think a lot of you guys who have smart TVs, you don't need a Roku. Let's see what this thing does. If this thing goes to zero tomorrow, is it going to affect anybody's life? Probably not. You got Intel tomorrow. You got MasterCard tomorrow. So you have a heavy dose of big mainstream companies combining with technology. And we'll give us a more clue. But when you look at the macro picture, and that's the most important part is, we are a stone throws away of the high that we put in last week. What a 500 point move. And the Nasdaq, super darn bullish. You got SPYs taking out last week's highs. And if everything continues, then we got to move, measured all the way to 407 on the SPYs. Even when you look at the Russell that's represented on the IWM. Again, even the Russell took out last week's highs. You're seeing some notable buying and a lot of speculation names. So everything on the surface looks very, very good. But again, as we know, things change very, very quickly. And I say all the time, I don't know, ish. I'm just trying to prepare for it, right? Just in case I guess right. And our research is saying the right thing that we could be prepared on both sides. And the most important part is have a rational approach and be adult-like every single day.  Because if we do have a follow-through day, and again, everything is possible, we could possibly rest tomorrow, right? We had a really, really big day. So we could have an inside day. We do follow-through tomorrow. Look at Tesla, right? We'll go to the pivots in a second. Look at Tesla. We're one day away from challenging earnings highs. Look at Amazon. Amazon is reporting tomorrow. If it could confirm the five-day tomorrow, maybe it runs, you know, runs into earnings, that looks really, really good, right? So keep an eye on that. Google, I think it's one day away, or maybe two days away, maybe needs a rest to getting above the top of the range here. If it could get above this top of the range here, you got 120 looking at you straight in the face. So, you know, we got some good stuff, man. You got NVIDIA that's probably going to benefit from the lamb research earnings. We want to watch the top of the range. A lot of really good aggressive call buying coming in. But again, it's very, very tough to get excited about NVIDIA option players because NVIDIA option players, if you guys remember, were going nuts last week into buying the 160 puts. So again, this is probably one of the only few names that it's hard to take at face value in the options market because they're just so damn wrong so much. But a name like a Tesla, if they're betting, and again, they're betting 840s, 850s for the weeklies, that's a pretty good sign. There's a high probability the stock has a punch of chance of getting there. So let's talk about it, right? So here was Tesla. You know, Tesla, again, finally woke up, right? Finally woke up here, 797, 803, next big spots to the upside, needs to confirm. Those are the levels, right? So Tesla woke up, right? Tesla woke up and after the Fed, it woke up more. So it took out the 797. Here's the 797. We talked about this little range here. But more important, it got above the range here, which was 802, 803, traded up to 811, and then finally got to the 825, 828 level. If Tesla confirms today's channel, you know, we should get a push, at least a close push into the earnings highs in the next couple of days. We'll see, you know, we'll see, but it definitely, definitely looks really, really good. Again, very, very aggressive call buyers coming into the name. Here with Shopify, we put in a two-sided move on Shopify, 32 to the upside, 30 and a half to the downside. Again, what's cool about Pivots, you don't need to guess. You don't need to have an opinion. Just wait for one of the channels to confirm. Shopify, although the first move was very, very small and it was a little cashflow move, the point is both ranges were in play. It took out the 32 level, close over 35, really, really strong move on Shopify. Nike never did anything. CRMX, I put in a couple of smaller cap names. They didn't confirm. Vizio didn't confirm. Again, Google, here it is. Google 10 and a half rejected twice, needs to build. Here is Google. Google went nuts towards the end of the day, just absolutely nuts. Here's, I apologize, an e-signal just doesn't, for some reason just refuses to update anything that stocks with. But here is the move. It got rejected here, 10, 50 several times, finally exploded up, went all the way to 14. Again, I like it. This thing starts building 14, 15. This thing could start its next leg up. A little scalp here.  Nice little pop, you know, pop to the 134 level. The volume came in, volume came out, and blah, blah, blah. It's a small cap stock. I mean, what do you expect from this thing? Nice little pop here. One of our guys, again, after 815, what does it go? 25, it went to 28. And that is about it. So we are set up, right? We set up. You don't have to be very creative today. Go through the NASDAQ 100. You'll see there's a lot of really good opportunities there. And again, like I said, is it possible we have an inside day tomorrow? Because again, after all, we had a really, really big move today, especially in the NASDAQ 100. The key is, don't give it back, right? Don't give it back. If you get a rest tomorrow, that's cool. You'll see other names kind of getting pulled up. We don't need the indexes for stocks to be stronger. It'd be nice, but we don't need it. The most important part is watching Tesla tomorrow. Definitely, definitely watching Tesla tomorrow, at least in the next two days. Watching, oh, by the way, Microsoft. We totally forgot about Microsoft. I love Microsoft. The next couple of days, if Microsoft wakes up, man, I mean, look at the move on Microsoft. The daily channel. Look at the daily channel on Microsoft. Again, miss, miss, miss, miss, miss, closes at the top of the channel. So we definitely have to watch that for continuation for the next couple of days. Tomorrow, guys, again, just as usual, it's my Thursday night off. There is no video on Thursday. So for all you guys who are joining us in the webinar tomorrow, we'll see you tomorrow. Obviously, we'll go through everything. And for all the rest of you guys, have a great trading day, and I will see you on the weekend update. It's all about Apple tomorrow. It's all about Amazon tomorrow. Kind of sort of Intel, but again, we'll get a bigger picture of where the bull market wants to go. Guys, God bless. Stay safe. Stay happy. Wish you the best. I'll see you tomorrow.