everybody. Good morning. Thank you for getting up and getting down here in time for our talk. I barely made it myself so I understand the struggle that was involved. My name is Tom Cross and this is Colin Anderson and we're going to talk about the new export controls that are proposed for intrusion software. I guess I was going to start with a quick background for both me and Colin. I used to work for internet security systems where I did a lot of export control work. I helped the company understand what it was that we were making and how the export control rules applied to the things that we made. And I helped the lawyers communicate with the government about that. In addition I did a lot of vulnerability research work and managed vulnerability researchers and so I know a lot about vulnerability disclosure and I can see some of the consequences that the regulations may have for researchers. Sure. I'm Colin Anderson. I'm a network researcher based in Washington, D.C. I've done a lot of work on looking at the structures of network controls, patterns of network performance and especially as they're applied to issues such as internet censorship. Being in D.C. which is a scarce place for people with a technology background that's also afforded some interaction with the policy landscape and so as a result for the past five years or so I've looked at issues that are sort of rolled up under the umbrella of internet freedom including things like circumvention tools and anonymity online and in addition to export controls and sanctions on the flow of basically surveillance and censorship goods. So I, you know, I knew that this stuff was coming down the pipe, you know, months ago when the DEF CON call for papers opened and it was something that concerned me. I knew that the United States government was going to implement it at some point. I didn't know when and you know I felt like it was something that the community needed to understand better and I ended up having a conversation with Colin about it. He's one of the few people who was writing about this before the United States decided to publish their implementation. He wrote a really good paper discussing the controls and what they were and were not intended to do and so, you know, discussing it with them, you know, we decided to propose a talk here because we, you know, we felt that these issues were relevant to this community and the community needed to understand them. And then subsequently the United States published their implementation I think it was in May and opened a public comment period and so everybody in the infosec industry like sort of suddenly got involved in this topic and a huge number of comments were filed to BIS and the window for filing the original window to file comments closed just before DEF CON. So, you know, a lot has happened. Colin may be one of the few people on the planet who's actually read every single comment that was filed. I don't know if BIS has read every single comment that was filed. You know, there is going to be a second round of this. There's going to be a revised regulation and another opportunity for us to comment and so what's important is that everybody in the community understand what's going on and be engaged and provide constructive input to BIS so that they don't screw this up and they're going to ask for our input again. So, you know, the question that we have kind of a sarcastic title here, the Waston Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual Use Goods and Technologies and You. One of the things we wanted to discuss with this talk is like is this or is this not a threat to vulnerability research? And you know, the truth is we don't know. Part of the reason for that is that neither of us is an attorney and so you can't take anything we say seriously. The other thing is that the government doesn't know and they've contradicted themselves on this topic and we'll show you where. And in fact, nobody knows. And in fact, Colin and I don't even agree about it. So, it's a messy topic. But you know, so, I mean, there's been a lot of, there's actually been two other talks at Defconn and Black Hat about this. And we've heard opinions from a lot of smart people about this topic. What's really important is your opinion. And so we want to use this hour to try to arm you to develop your own point of view about this as opposed to necessarily just hearing ours. I do want to show you a few of my favorite comments that were submitted to BIS. I didn't read them all but I went through them and I have a few that I think are hilarious. And so, on the topic of like, what is constructive input to BIS and what is not constructive input to BIS, we'll start with some counter examples. The first is this, brah, make that jailbreak legal. So, BIS does not care how many people file comments. And although I agree with the said, it's been expressed here. It's not terribly persuasive. And so it helps to have arguments along with your opinion. The second favorite comment is the one that we've submitted. And it's, it's, he talks about his recent ordeal with law enforcement. And you know, there are many people who submitted comments that are critical of what BIS is trying to do. We've's comment was one of the few that was absolutely supportive of everything that they want to implement.  And so he encouraged BIS to proceed in hopes that it would, you know, drive more recruits into his, you know, planned revolution. You know, I personally, I don't often plan violent overthrow of the United States government. But what I do, I usually keep it on the DL until we're ready to roll. The third favorite comment is from Raytheon.   The, Raytheon is a 60,000 employee federal government contractor with full-time attorneys that work for them. They filed a single page in which they explained that they want an extension on the time window to come it because their dudes are on summer vacation. So this is now a new life goal for me. I hope to, in my life, become so powerful that I can tell the Department of Commerce to hold off on a regulatory issue because I need to take the time to do the certification. So no, these, these comments are not particularly helpful, but perhaps at the end of the talk we can, we can show you the kinds of comments that will be helpful. You know, first we want to talk about, about, about the basics. Like what is the problem here? Why is this even happening? And for that I'm going to turn over Colin. So I probably can't go close to that. Yeah. So part of the reason, I'm sure that several of you have attended all three now of the presentations and the idea is to give a common core because we need to be able to start to speak to what the issues are, what the language has been. And there are a lot of complexities to this issue and in fact I think no one's really talked about the full lead up to it, what people are trying to control and what the language even says. There's been a lot of assumptions, a lot of hyperbole, some of it true, some of it untrue, all driven by the complexities of this regulation. But we should step, take a step back very briefly. The, the source of this is obvious. The reality is, is that surveillance is, is becoming a multi billion dollar industry. Provided to foreign, foreign governments used against questionable targets on a continual basis. Change sides. You know, no, there's no greater example of this than the hacking team incident. What you have is a company that was based in Italy that was selling both to the FBI but also despotic governments around the world without necessarily any sort of precondition on those sales. Anywhere from Bahrain which regularly arrests dissidents, legitimate dissidents to Ethiopia, to Sudan who's under an arms control treaty. While, while hacking team had made, made the assertion that they had sort of a human rights due diligence process. So did Finn Fisher, we later found out that the chair of Finn Fisher's ethical review committee was the CEO of, of, of, of Finn Fisher himself. And so not really necessarily an independent arbiter of what is a, a legitimate transaction or not. In the case of hacking team, while there was a Italian attorney who was, I think very effective at actually writing out some of these issues, by and large these, these, these recommendations were ignored. But I want to focus on one thing, which is, what happened in hacking team especially, was the hacking team's products were being used to compromise not only legitimate targets or rather, not only counter-terrorism, but also legitimate democratic activists, but not only domestic democratic activists, but actually international activists. And so there's nothing that's going to invite regulation from, from, from governments more than having their own citizens being targeted by these items. So this becomes a product, this becomes a product of this sort of drag of unregulated space being used in creating increasingly visible sort of breaches of, of, of privacy around the world.  So I, I mean, I think that this is an issue that lots of people in this community care about. We don't like to see surveillance technologies used by oppressive regimes. A lot of this community has to do with, with fighting that on different levels. Really, so that, I think that most of us agree that this is bad. The, the question is what is the best way to combat it? And also, are there ways to create a rule for export control that combat it that don't also have negative consequences for other important things that we want to do? You know, often creating a new regulation creates more problems than it solves, as people in this community are very familiar with. So, you know, what we, so we want to provide some background here. You know, what is the Wassenar arrangement? The Wassenar arrangement is an international agreement regarding the export of dual use items. The, the, the, the, so let, let me explain what dual use item is. We have agreements about the export of military goods. So, you know, guns, tanks, airplanes, you know, stuff like that. And, you know, there pretty much is only one use for an aircraft carrier and that is to have a military. I mean, you could throw a party on it. But generally speaking, people are not buying them for legitimate consumer usage. But there are a lot of things that, that have legitimate consumer use or business use that could be applied to a military application but are not necessarily being sold for that purpose. And that's what a dual use item is. Cryptography is regulated as a dual use item. Most of us are not using it in order to, you know, protect espionage. You know, we use it to protect our web browsing. But, you know, it could be used to protect espionage and so it's considered a dual use item. The Wassner arrangement is, is a bilateral agreement amongst a whole bunch of different countries, including Russia. They, they all agree that they're not going to, you know, allow certain kinds of commodities to be exported outside of their country except in certain circumstances. So, it's important to understand that there's two tiers here. So, the Wassner arrangement agreed to some controls on intrusion software back in 2013. And all of the countries that are members of the Wassner arrangement are thereby compelled to implement this agreement. And so, at the United States being a member is now compelled to implement an agreement. And then BIS, it's part of the Department of Commerce, is attempting to implement this in the United States. And so, there's a discussion that's happening where, where BIS has published their suggested implementation and asked for comments about that implementation. And, you know, they're open to discussion about that. But having a different discussion where we say, well, let's go back and change what Wassner agreed to is a much more difficult thing. It's easy for BIS to change. It's more difficult for Wassner to change. And that's an important dynamic in this discussion that people need to be cognizant of. There's also, to that effect, one of the things, one of the things that's important to, to start to talk about is actually because there's, there's these layers. Effectively, what happens is Wassner gives a particular set of language and then it's up to the member states in order to dictate the licensing policies in some, in some ways, the, the interpretations. And so they can license these things liberally or they can even decontrol as in like not require a, a, a license for certain set of uses. But that's up to the member states. And so what we're going to talk about across a lot of this and, and it's important to reflect back on if you were here yesterday or any of the previous days or, or if you've read into this, there's a difference between the Wassner language as it was written and BIS's proposed control. And so we have to dissect the two because you look at things like root kit and zero day. A lot of people have fixated on, on the use of these terms, the undefined use of these very nebulous terms. But those aren't originally in the Wassner language. And so what we're going to try to do is effectively say this is the Wassner language, this is what BIS has added onto it. And this is particularly if you have concerns based off of this, the room for negotiation for either having it increased or decreased, presumably decreased, or having requiring or requesting specific definitions to be added to what these mean. Like when they, when it comes up, there's a nebulous term carrier grade class, what is carrier grade class. If you are interested in that recommending to BIS, this is what carrier grade class is. You know, clarification such as that. So this is a picture of me at DEF CON 4, wearing a t-shirt that had RSA implemented in Pearl, which at the time was considered, was on the U.S. munitions list, and was, you couldn't export it outside the United States, but it wasn't considered a, it was considered an arm. And, you know, today, and so arms, export of arms are controlled by ITAR, which you've heard a lot about. And they are, ITAR is operated by the Department of State. And so if you want to export something which is considered an ITAR commodity, you have to work with the Department of State in order to be able to do that. Dual use items are not controlled by the Department of State, they're controlled by the Department of Commerce. The reason is that commerce tends to be more friendly to business interests than the Department of State. And, you know, encryption is currently controlled by the Department of Commerce and the EIR. So I just wanted to clarify that distinction, because we talk a lot about ITAR in this community, and it's important that people understand the distinction between the dual use items that are controlled by the EAR, the export administration regulations under the Department of Commerce and arms which are controlled under the Department of State. The new intrusion software controls would fit under BIS and not under the Department of State. So another thing that a lot of people think in this community is that there are no export controls on cryptography anymore. We won the crypto war. And, you know, that's there's, I guess it's a matter of opinion, we did win a lot in the crypto war, but there still are export controls on cryptography. And, you know, people do get prosecuted for violating export controls on cryptography. So this example is from 2014 and Intel subsidiary paid $750,000 for an unauthorized encryption export. So, you know, it used to be in the 90s that if you wanted to export cryptography unless you met certain characteristics, the answer was usually no. And so you could ask the government and they would say no. Today you still have to ask the government generally speaking, but the answer is usually yes. And so, you know, that's a huge distinction in terms of what we're able to do, but the bureaucratic load of having to talk to the government about it is still there.  And as a consequence, we have an exception for open source software called License Exception, TSU, which allows you to, when you put source code out on the internet, you know, it can be exported without a license. Now, you are supposed to notify BIS that you've done it. You're supposed to send them an email with a link to the place where you put the stuff online, but other than that, you're good to go. You also email the NSA. You have this very dense License Exception ENC slide. So to go back to that point, actually, when we hear people like Matt Blaise talk, when we hear cryptographers talk about sharing within their domain, actually they are still controlled, but they fall under a set of license exceptions such as what's called License Exception ENC. Actually, License Exception ENC is very dense and complicated and really no one understands it. And to refer back to the settlement that was initially talked about, the crypto rules are not generally enforced. The case in which there was a $750,000 fine was actually an Intel subsidiary, Wind River, exporting to the People's Liberation Army of China. And so when they're used, they're used in these very specific cases, but very, very infrequently. So actually, for those of you who, for example, work on network, any sort of network communications tool that employs cryptography, even if you are not shipping cryptography, if you are linking to, for example, open SSL, you actually fall under still the export control regulations. However, you generally are not aware of this because you either fall under License Exception TSU, which is technology, software unrestricted. It's also called the general software note for other people who have been into this. But you also fall under this dense category of controls. So the point of talking about this is that when we talk about regulation, I think that we think that regulation automatically leads to the kicking down of doors, but in fact, on a daily basis, there is a regulatory landscape that you interact with that you might not necessarily be even aware of. So a lot of the questions that I heard talking to people at DEF CON have to do with what is the point of having an export control on software because you can just download it. Why is there an export control in cryptography when you can just download PGP? And I want to address that. I think there are two ways in which these things function that are worth being aware of. The first is that when you're working in a company, there's a lot of pressure to do deals. So you get somebody who comes in and wants to buy your product and the sales guy is financially incentive to do the deal. And the channel partners financially incentive to do the deal. And the management team is financially incentive to do the deal. And the shareholders financially incentive to do the deal. And you're the guy who stands up and says, guys, I don't think we should do this deal because the customer is threatening the national security of the United States.  We have a business to run here. And so, you know, export controls work really well when people actually want to comply with them. And so you don't want to do that deal. You don't want to do business with that guy. And now you can say, look, my hands are tied. I can't sell you the software. I'm sorry. You know, you can tell the sales guy and the channel partner and the management team and shareholders. I'm sorry, but you can't do this business. And so it puts businesses in a place where they're not required to make moral decisions with respect to who they're doing business with. And you also don't necessarily want a lot of these people to be making them more. Well, right, because a lot of them are just going to do the deal.  And so, you know, that's, and so at a previous employer, so back in the late 80s, India tested a nuclear bomb. And as a consequence of that, the United States took a bunch of Indian government agencies and put them on what's called the denied party list. So that's a list of people you're not allowed to export things to.  And they wanted to buy it for the same reason anybody buys an IPS. They're trying to stop malware in their network. But this IPS had encryption in it because you do that. And so it was a controlled commodity and we couldn't sell it to them because they were on the party list. They tried over and over and over again to buy it and we couldn't sell it.  I'm sorry, dude, we can't do this deal. And then, you know, so in 2007, the Bush administration reached some sort of agreement with the Indian government where the Indian government provided unspecified assistance on the war on terror in exchange for removing some of these entities from the denied party list. And these guys, this particular government agency in India called us the very next day to buy the software.  But it was on the list somewhere. It was probably pretty far down on it, but it was on it somewhere. So these export controls, you know, are a mechanism that the government uses to negotiate things with other governments. It's a stick in the various different kinds of diplomatic things that the government can do to put pressure on other governments.  And so they just wanted to be able to do that. And that was enough to give the United States some leverage. So we're going a little slow here. We want to talk about the new rules and provide you some background because nobody in the past few talks has really just sat down and explained exactly what is being proposed here. So we're going to do that and we'll start with the IP network surveillance controls, which are not as controversial as the intrusion software controls. Yeah. So to fly through it because we don't have much time, if you'd heard yesterday actually there's two controls that were proposed for implementation by BIS. They come from two different sources. The first is the IP network surveillance systems. Actually the origin of this originates from the French delegation to Vassnar. And the reason why is that post-Qaddafi Libya, a number of documents were uncovered showing that their local business, AMSIS, had been providing sophisticated monitoring centers to the government in order to basically surveil the entirety of the communications infrastructure, which isn't hard when it's Libya. So they pushed a particular rule for essentially monitoring centers or rather sort of correlation based off of DPI. This is a very narrow rule. And so actually you have a lot of lines here and they're joined with ands. And so this is very important because part of the reason I'm talking about this is that in the first conversations a lot of people just didn't read the rules. They didn't understand it and they took these things like IP network surveillance systems, these labels and assumed that it meant DPI more broadly. It's not. It's actually performing all of the following on a carrier class IP network, i.e. a national grade IP backbone and analysis at the application layer, so layer 7 on OSI, and extraction of selected metadata and application content, and indexing of that extracted data, and being especially designed, that's a term of art, to carry out all of the following. Execution of searches based off of hard selectors, so this is personally identifiable information like e-mail addresses, and mapping out national, the relational networks, the social network mapping of individuals or groups of people. So this ends up being a very specialized piece of technology and across all of, if you look for example, WikiLeaks spy files, only a few products start to fall under this framework, and they are very specialized products. And I wanted to sort of direct one thing, Vassanar doesn't necessarily, Vassanar has this idea of mass market, and what mass market says is actually, essentially not only if you're open source, but if you're generally available for the public, we're not going to control you. And so this is something that comes into play, because effectively stuff that's off the shelf generally, unless it's encryption actually, isn't controlled by the Vassanar arrangement. One of the points of controversy though is BIS said this all uses crypto, so we're going to control it like cryptography. That's a lot of the push back and it's an important point that we can talk about later. But suffice it to say, the IP network surveillance systems is very narrow and probably only runs in incidentally to some, I think probably speculative network intrusion detection systems. So intrusion software however is the largest point of controversy and rightfully so. So firstly, the Vassanar arrangement puts together this definition of what it calls intrusion software. And it says, software specially designed, there's that keyword again, or modified to avoid detection by monitoring tools or defeat protective counter measures of a computer or network-capable device and performing all of the following. The extraction of data or information from a computer or network-capable device or the modification of user data, that's one possible route, or the modification of the standard execution path of a program or process in order to allow the execution of externally provided instructions. And they provide definitions on how to use these tools and protective counter measures. I think probably people have a good understanding of what those mean, but hey, at least you have things like DEP and ASLR showing up in export control, so that's kind of cool. So I mean the question is, is intrusion right? Sorry. So here's the important point about intrusion software. Intrusion software itself is not that's the next slide. There are no controls on intrusion software. We've defined what it is, but there's no export controls on them. And this is why this gets very confusing. So what is controlled? One of the reasons that this is super confusing is that they didn't come up with a name for the thing that is controlled. I don't know if you want me to do this slide, do you want to do it? Well, so just to continue. So intrusion software is this periphery of technologies that they use throughout the rest of the document. Intrusion software itself is not the thing that's controlled, but actually what they start to control is this periphery of technologies. And the reason they did this was actually pretty smart, which as they said, firstly, the biggest problem is if we control, this came out by the way out of the UK delegation to Vassanar and the reason why is because they had figured out how to control finfisher. And what they said firstly is if we control intrusion software, then that means that anyone who's been hit by anything that's controlled, anyone who's, for example, a target of intrusion software would be engaged in an export control violation if they took their infected malware outside of the country. And so what they started to say is actually, especially for things like hacking team, what you start to see is a periphery of technologies that are used to support this. Fin agent, for example, or RCS, is not necessarily DaVinci, is not necessarily a substantial thing. It's not the thing that makes the entirety of hacking teams equipment valuable. And so what they said is we're going to control the periphery of technologies around it. So the things that interact with it, the RCS console, the FinFly proxy, which is basically the middle box that's doing infection by tainting binaries, we're going to control the hardware and the software that creates the ecosystem around that technology that is necessary for the infection and the operation of the the Trojan itself. Here's where it gets more confusing. They also start to do what's called technology for the development of intrusion software. And by and large, when you run into controversy, this is probably the largest issue. Which is technology in terms of Vassnar is a specialized thing. It's basically information. It's basically technical data. It's technical assistance. It's blueprints. It's the structure that is necessary for the operation of that thing. Anyone who's done a computer science 101 course knows how easy it is to control intrusion software. This is one of the points of ambiguity that we start running into. Because it's not well defined. Technology is defined. Development is defined. Intrusion software is defined. But what all of these things together mean is one of the largest things that you'll see in conversations across the debate. Difficulty from all of the parties involved really starting to be able to scope this out in a limited way that doesn't necessarily create an onerous burden for researchers like a lot of the people in the room. So what are the potential implications of all of this? And I'm going to run pretty fast because we're getting low on time. But a big question that everyone asks is what about open source? And it's interesting because a lot of us work in the encryption world and we're used to license exception TSU which I explained before being the mechanism through which open source software is not controlled for export. And they specifically said that TSU does not apply to intrusion software. And so that created a lot of confusion initially because people thought that means that I can't put this stuff on the web. There's this separate part of the regulations 15 CFR 734.3 which creates an exception for things that are publicly disclosed. This exception does not apply to encryption software. And so those of us who work in encryption software like we're not necessarily familiar with it, but it would apply to intrusion software. It creates exemptions for anything that's published including on the internet things that arise from what's called fundamental research which is narrowly defined and things that are presented in a classroom environment in an academic institution. And so those are pretty broad exceptions that allow you to do things and it's important that it doesn't matter whether or not your source code is open when you're operating under this exception. If you don't have the internet without publishing the source code and be free of control whereas in the encryption context you have to publish your source code. So I figure any slide about encryption and open source software could benefit from a few pictures of Eric Raymond. So I want to explain the distinction clearly. On the one hand with encryption there's this thing called license exception TSU and if you wanted to apply to you code and you have to email BIS and tell them where it is. On the intrusion software side there's this thing 15 CFR 734.3 before it must be publicly available it does not have to be open source and BIS does not have to be notified so it's a totally different system but either way if you're here in a con and you're talking about stuff and you're releasing stuff you don't have to worry about export control. So the whole public sphere is it's really private transactions that end up getting controlled. The next question is what about vulnerability research? Is vulnerability research covered? When you disclose a vulnerability to a vendor is that covered? And unfortunately that's been very unclear and BIS has actually contradicted themselves on this topic. So in the federal register when they published their implementation they had some notes that went along with it and they said technology for technology control that Colin was just talking about includes proprietary research on the vulnerabilities and exploitation of computers. So that seems to be yes vulnerability research is controlled. Then BIS after getting a lot of feedback about this started publishing an FAQ on their website and one of the FAQ answers says the proposed rule would not control information about vulnerabilities. So the BIS doesn't even know what these rules mean. They also said in their FAQ neither the disclosure of the vulnerability nor the disclosure of exploit code would be controlled. However this is the big caveat. I think that the BIS has been operating under the assumption that when you disclose a vulnerability to a vendor that all of the information that you give the vendor ends up becoming public. So they decided that this public, the exception for things that are published applies here and so we don't have to worry about vulnerability disclosure. But as many of you know that's not entirely true. Often when you disclose a vulnerability to a vendor you include a whole bunch of technical information that they don't subsequently disclose to the public. They put out an advisory with a little bit of information where to get the patch and they credit you but they don't like publish your exploit, they don't publish your write up that explains how you got reliable code execution and those kinds of things because they're not published may still be technology for the development of intrusion software so that's a real issue here and so potentially coordinated vulnerability disclosure across borders could end up being controlled by this unless they carve out some pretty clear exceptions for it. This could also impact bug bounties. Not only are you coordinating this information across a border but you're getting paid for it and you're not talking to the vendor directly so that's important to point out because if they do craft an exception it needs to include bug bounty programs. So this is one of the points though is that this is struggling to interpret the Vostner language and this is a point in which a large number of the people in this room have the ability to start to clarify what the intended scope of these should be. How you get to the effective point where hacking team and others might incur controls if you're interested in that where you're not necessarily creating an undue burden on the types of people in the room. This is the translation process that is necessary for the participation of those of you around. So quickly one of the things they controlled is ways to reliably and predictably defeat protective countermeasures because they didn't think that was relevant to a vulnerability disclosure program that specifically have to do with mitigation bypasses. So that's potentially an issue. Sharing exploit tool kit samples is potentially controlled and their fact they said exploit tool kits would be covered under the proposed rule and there's no license exceptions for them. So those of us who work in the infosec industry they find these things and pass them around on private mailing lists so we can make sure our tools detect them potentially that activity could be controlled at least under their initial pass in interpreting this. What about training classes? So technology for the development of intrusion software includes sitting down and talking to somebody about it and so if you're having a training class there's an exception for classes that are offered in an academic environment but there's no exception for private training classes so we see like a black hat they've got really expensive training classes that are available to the public so potentially they could become controlled and black hat might have to ask what country you're from before they let you take the class. Traveling outside the United States so there's a specific exception that applies to encryption software if it's on your laptop for personal use and you're traveling outside the United States you don't have to worry about export control as long as you're going to bring it back and you're not going to disseminate it when you're over there but they didn't apply this exception to intrusion software so if you had metasploit states potentially you might have illegally exported the software and doing so even if you don't give it to anybody else. If you have foreign coworkers in your office telling them about exploiting a vulnerability or giving them access to tools like Core Impact may potentially violate these rules because they're foreign nationals and so it's considered an export. That's also an idiosyncrasy of the US regime. This notion of deemed exports is something that exists in the US and that's one of the things that I think people have run into that they didn't necessarily understand. So debuggers and exploit generators is a question that people have brought up. If it's specially designed for the generation of intrusion software it may be controlled. Most debuggers aren't but some are. Jailbreaking software could potentially be subject to export control. So they said they would have a policy of presumptive denial for items that support root-kidder zero-day exploit capabilities and that's way more aggressive than like the last in our text itself. That's not something last in our requires. That's something that the US government is potentially interpreting. I'm trying to blow through the rest of our slides here. I think it's important that we highlight a few comments that were submitted that we think are really good. So we've run out of time and in 45 minutes we couldn't even get through the entire scope of the rule. It's complex and we know it's complex. There's a lot of resources that are available and there are specific points that people are going to incidentally run into. A lot of these things are easily fixable. As long as the right people are saying the right things. The last call closed on the 20th and actually 260 comments were filed. The vast majority of those were not broad don't mess up. They were constructive involvement from people within the community. So for example Dino from square submitted their issue in a personal capacity with deemed exports and they said actually we work in an environment in which we have to exchange this information that's critical. We are not facilitating the intrusion of users we're trying to protect our service. We need access to deemed exports. We need to be able to provide it to foreign nationals within our office. So Dino's comment is good because he talks about what he's doing. He explains why it's legitimate. He explains how it interacts with the regulation and why the regulation might prevent him from doing it. And he provides example after example after example. That level of specificity is influential to BIS because they don't know what goes on in your world and they need to understand how they could potentially actually the New York Electrical Power Association. At some point they realize wow we have pen testing tools and we have foreign nationals and we have international companies that need to be able to export within other branches. And this is a great example because what they said is we need to know about bulk export licenses. We need to know about whether it's possible for you to exempt certain countries that are not necessarily going to engage in malicious hacking of dissidents or intelligence targets. We need to know about how we can better interact with foreign offices and subsidiaries. We need to make sure that we can facilitate legitimate research within our company. And they started to lay out these specific points yet again that spoke to their interest and also the interest of BIS and basically the federal government to protect the power grid. I thought actually one of my favorites was cobalt strikes. Cobalt strike wrote through paragraph by paragraph on saying we need to be able to do this. We are a legitimate business, this is our involvement and this is how we interact with the economy. And so they went through paragraph by paragraph they had recommendations, they had support, they articulated their argument in order to address the specific claims. They had specific things that they were interested in fixing or that they needed to be protected. They don't necessarily have to endorse the rules. You don't necessarily have to endorse the rules. You can think that export controls are the bane of their existence, their feudal that you have to erect a great firewall. I will disagree with you. But the likelihood, you know, you have to behave politically essentially and you have to say irrespective we disagree with these rules, we disagree with them on this basis and this is the basis in which we want to protect our assets, and so this is what you have to do. They want information. They did not have to open up this call. Based off of the process, Rapid7 did this again. Rapid7 said this is our involvement with the industry. And so this is the point in which biz came to DEF CON. They want your input. There's going to be a second proposed rule that will come out in the next couple of months. There's technical advisory committees. They have maintained an open door and then this is the opportunity for you to be able to protect your profession. There you go. All right, so I'm sorry we don't have time for questions. It's early. It took us a little bit of time to get up to speed here, but I really appreciate your interest this morning and Colin and I will be hanging out if you want to come up and talk to us. Thank you.


Chapter 19 of the autobiography of Benjamin Franklin. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. The autobiography of Benjamin Franklin by Benjamin Franklin. Chapter 19. Agent of Pennsylvania in London. Our new governor, Captain Denny, brought over for me the beforehand mentioned medal from the Royal Society, which he presented to me at an entertainment given him by the city. He accompanied it with very polite expressions of his esteem for me having, as he said, been long acquainted with my character after dinner when the company, as was customary at that time, were engaged in drinking. He took me aside into another room, and acquainted me that he had been advised by his friends in England to cultivate a friendship with me, as one who was capable of giving him the best advice, and of contributing most effectually to the making his administration easy, that he therefore desired of all things to have a good understanding with me, and he begged me to be assured of his readiness on all occasions to render me every service that might be in his power. He said much to me, also, of the proprietors' good disposition towards the province, and of the advantage it might be to us all, and to me in particular, if the opposition that had been so long continued to his measures was drop, and harmony restored between him and the people, in effecting which, it was thought no one could be more serviceable than myself, and I might depend on adequate acknowledgments and recompenses, etc., etc. The drinkers, finding we did not return immediately to the table, sent us a decanter of Madeira, which the Governor made liberal use of, and in proportion became more profuse of his solicitations and promises. My answers were to this purpose, that my circumstances, thanks to God, were such as to make proprietary favors unnecessary to me, and that, being a member of the assembly, I could not possibly accept of any. That, however, had no personal enmity to the proprietary, and that, whenever the public measures he proposed should appear to be for the good of the people, no one should espouse and forward them more zealously than myself. My past opposition, having been founded on this, that the measures which had been urged were evidently intended to serve the proprietary interest, with great prejudice to that of the people, that I was much obliged to him, the Governor, for his professions of regard to me, and that he might rely on everything in my power to make his administration as easy as possible, hoping at the same time that he had not brought with him the same unfortunate instruction his predecessor had been hampered with. On this he did not then explain himself, but when he afterwards came to do business with the assembly, they appeared again, the disputes were renewed, and I was as active as ever in the opposition, being the pen man, first, of the request to have a communication of the instructions, and then of the remarks upon them, which may be found in the votes of the time, and in the historical review I afterward published, but between us personally no enmity arose. We were often together. He was a man of letters, had seen much of the world, and was very entertaining and pleasing in conversation. He gave me the first information that my old friend, James Relf, was still alive, that he was esteemed one of the best political writers in England, had been employed in the dispute. Footnote. Coral between George II and his son, Frederick, Prince of Wales, who died before his father, and footnote, between Prince Frederick and the King, and had obtained a pension of three hundred a year, that his reputation was indeed small as a poet, Pope, having damned his poetry in the Dansead. Footnote. A satirical poem by Alexander Pope, directed against various contemporary writers. End. Footnote. But his prose was thought as good as any man's. The assembly, finally finding the proprietary obstinately persisted in manacling their deputies with instructions inconsistent, not only with the privileges of the people, but with the service of the crown, resolved to petition the king against the king against them, and appointed me their agent to go over to England to present and support the petition. The house had sent up a bill to the governor, granting a sum of sixty thousand pounds for the king's use, ten thousand pounds of which was subjected to the orders of the then-general, Lord Luton, which the governor absolutely refused to pass, in compliance with his instructions. I had agreed with Captain Morris of the packet at New York, for my passage and my stores were put on board, when Lord Luton arrived at Philadelphia, expressively, as he told me, to endeavor an accommodation between the governor and assembly, that his Majesty's service might not be obstructed by their dissensions. Accordingly, he desired, the governor, and myself, to meet him, that he might hear what was to be said on both sides. We met and discussed the business. In behalf of the assembly, I urged all the various arguments that may be found in the public papers of that time, which were of my writing, and are printed with the minutes of the assembly, and the governor pleaded his instructions, the bond he had given to observe them, and his ruin if he disobeyed, yet seemed not unwilling to hazard himself if Lord Luton would advise it. This his lordship did not choose to do, though I once thought I had nearly prevailed with him to do it. But finally he rather chose to urge the compliance of the assembly, and he entreated me to use my endeavors with them for that purpose, declaring that he would spare none of the king's troops for the defense of our frontiers, and that, if we did not continue to provide for that defense ourselves, they must remain exposed to the enemy. I acquainted the house with what had passed, and presenting them with a set of resolutions I had drawn up, declaring our rights, and that we did not relinquish our claim to those rights, but only suspended the exercise of them on this occasion through force against which we protested. They, at length, agreed to drop that bill, and frame another comfortable to the proprietary instructions. This, of course, the governor passed, and I was then at liberty to proceed on my voyage, but, in the meantime, the packet had sailed with my sea stores, which was some loss to me, and my only recompense was his lordship's thanks for my service, all the credit of obtaining the accommodation. Falling to his share, he set out for New York before me, and, as the time for dispatching the packet boats was at his disposition, and there were two then remaining there, one of which, he said, was to sail very soon, I requested to know the precise time, that I might not miss her by any delay of mine. His answer was, I have given out that she is to sail on Saturday, next. But I may let you know, on thray new, that if you are there by Monday morning, you will be in time, but do not delay longer. By some accidental hindrance at a ferry, it was Monday noon before I arrived, and I was much afraid she might have sailed, as the wind was fair, but I was soon made easy by the information that she was still in the harbour, and would not move till the next day. One would imagine, that I was now, on the very point of departing for Europe. I thought so, but I was not then, so well acquainted with his lordship's character, of which, in decision, was one of the strongest features. I shall give some instances. It was about the beginning of April, that I came to New York, and I think it was near the end of June, before we sailed. There were then two of the packet boats, which had been long in port, but were detained for the general's letters, which were always to be ready tomorrow. Another packet arrived. She too was detained. And, before we sailed, a fourth was expected, ours was the first to be dispatched, as having been their longest. Passengers were engaged in all, and some extremely impatient to be gone, and the merchants uneasy about their letters, and the orders they had given for insurance, it being wartime, for fall goods. But their anxiety availed nothing. His lordship's letters were not ready, and yet whoever waited on him found him always at his desk, pen in hand, and concluded he must needs right abundantly. Going myself one morning to pay my respects, I found in his antechamber one Innis, a messenger of Philadelphia, who had come from Danse Express, with a packet from Governor Denny for the general. He delivered to me some letters from my friends there, which occasioned my inquiring when he was to return, and where he lodged, that I might send some letters by him. He told me he was ordered to call to tomorrow at nine for the general's answer to the governor, and should set off immediately. I put my letters into his hands the same day, a fortnight after I met him again in the same place. So, you are soon returned, Innis? Returned? No, I am not. Gone yet. How so? I have called here by order every morning these two weeks past for his lordship's letter, and it is not yet ready. Is it possible, when he is so great a writer? For I see him constantly at his Esquitoire. Yes, says Innis, but he is like St. George on the signs, always on horseback, and never rides on. This observation of the messenger was, it seems, well founded. For, when in England, I understood that Mr. Pitt. Footnote. William Pitt, 1st Earl of Chatham, 1708 to 1778, a great English statesman in Orator. Under his able administration, England won Canada from France. He was a friend of America at the time of our revolution. End. Footnote. Gave it as one reason for removing this general, and sending generals Amherst and Wolfe, that the minister never heard from him, and could not know what he was doing. This daily expectation of sailing, and all the three packets going down to Sandy Hook, to join the fleet there, the passengers thought it best to be on board, lest, by a sudden order, the ships should sail. And they be left behind. There, if I remember right, we were about six weeks, consuming our sea stores, and obliged to procure more. At length, the fleet sailed, the general and all his army on board, bound to Lewisburg, with the intent to besiege and take that fortress, all the packet boats and company ordered to attend the general's ship, ready to receive his dispatches when they should be ready. We were out five days before we got a letter with leave to part. And then our ship quitted the fleet and steered for England. The other two packets he still detained, carried them with him to Halifax, where he stayed some time to exercise the men in sham attacks upon sham forts, then altered his mind as to besieging Lewisburg, and returned to New York with all his troops, together with the two packets above mentioned. And all their passengers. During his absence the French and Savages had taken for George, on the frontier of that province, and the Savages had massacred many of the garrison after capitulation. I saw afterwards in London Captain Bonnell, who commanded one of those packets, he told me that, when he had been detained a month, he acquainted his lordship that his ship was grown foul. To a degree that must necessarily hinder her fast sailing. A point of consequence for a packet boat, and requested an allowance of time to heave her down and clean her bottom. He was asked how long time that would require. He answered, three days, the general replied, if you can do it in one day, I give leave, otherwise not, for you must certainly sail the day after tomorrow, so he never obtained leave, though detained afterwards from day to day during full three months. I saw also in London one of Bonnell's passengers, who was so enraged against his lordship for deceiving and detaining him so long at New York, and then carrying him to Halifax and back again, that he swore he would sue him for damages, whether he did or not, I never heard, but as he represented the injury to his affairs it was very considerable. On the whole, I wondered much how such a man came to be entrusted. Footnote, this relation illustrates the corruption that characterized English public life in the 18th century. See page 308. It was gradually overcome in the early part of the next century. And footnote, with so important a business as the conduct of a great army. But having since seen more of the great world, and the means of obtaining and motives for giving places, my wonder is diminished. General Shirley, on whom the command of the army devolved from the death of Braddock, would, in my opinion, if continued in place, have made a much better campaign than that of Luton in 1757. Which was frivolous, expensive, and disgraceful to our nation beyond conception, for, though Shirley was not a bred soldier, he was sensible and sagacious in himself, and attentive to good advice from others, capable of forming judicious plans, and quick and active in carrying them into execution. Luton, instead of defending the colonies with his great army, left them totally exposed, while he paraded idly at Halifax, by which means, for, George was lost. Besides, he deranged all our mercantile operations, and distressed our trade, by a long embargo on the exportation of provisions, on pretense of keeping supplies from being obtained by the enemy. But in reality, for beating down their price in favor of the contractors, in whose profits, it was said, perhaps from suspicion only, he had a share, and, when at length, the embargo was taken off, by neglecting to send notice of it to Charles Town, the Carolina fleet was detained near three months longer, whereby their bottoms were so much damaged by the worm that a great part of them foundered in their passage home, Shirley was, I believe, sincerely glad of being relieved from so burdensome a charge as the conduct of an army must be to a man unacquainted with military business. I was at the entertainment given by the city of New York to Lord Luton, on his taking upon him the command. Shirley, though thereby superseded, was present also, there was a great company of officers, citizens, and strangers, and, some chairs having been borrowed in the neighborhood, there was one among them very low, which fell to the lot of Mr. Shirley. Perceiving it as I set by him, I said, they have given you, sir, too low a seat. No matter, says he, Mr. Franklin, I find a low seat the easiest. While I was, as aforementioned, detained at New York, I received all the accounts of the provisions, etc., that I had furnished to Braddock, some of which accounts could not sooner be obtained from the different persons I had employed to assist in the business. I presented them to Lord Luton, desiring to be paid the balance. He caused them to be, regularly examined by the proper officer, who, after comparing every article with its voucher, certified them to be right, and the balance due for which his lordship promised to give me an order on the Paymaster. This was, however, put off from time to time, and though I called often for it by appointment, I did not get it. At length, just before my departure, he told me he had, on better consideration, concluded not to mix his accounts with those of his predecessors, and you, says he, when in England, have only to exhibit your accounts at the Treasury, and you will be paid immediately. I mentioned, but without effect, the great and unexpected expense I had been put to by being detained so long at New York, as a reason for my desiring to be presently paid, and on my observing that it was not right I should be put to any further trouble or delay in obtaining the money I had advanced. As I charged no commission for my service. Oh, sir, says he, you must not think of persuading us that you are no gainer. We understand better those affairs, and know that everyone concerned in supplying the army finds means in the doing it. To fill his own pockets, I assured him that was not my case, and that I had not pocketed a farthing, but he appeared clearly not to believe me. And, indeed, I have since learned that immense fortunes are often made in such employments. As to my balance, I am not paid it to this day, of which more hereafter. Our captain of the packet had boasted much before we sailed of the swiftness of his ship. Unfortunately, when we came to see, she proved the dullest of ninety-six sail to his no small mortification. After many conjectures respecting the cause, when we were near another ship almost as dull as ours, which, however, gained upon us, the captain ordered all hands to come af, and stand as near the ensign staff as possible. We were, passengers included, about forty persons. While we stood there, the ship mended her pace and soon left her neighbor far behind, which proved clearly what our captain suspected, that she was loaded too much by the head. The casks of water, it seems, had been all placed forward. These he therefore ordered to be moved further af, on which the ship recovered her character, and proved the best sailor in the fleet. The captain said she had once gone at the rate of thirteen knots, which is accounted thirteen miles per hour. We had, on board, as a passenger, Captain Kennedy, of the Navy, who contended that it was impossible, and that no ship ever sailed so fast, and that there must have been some error in the division of the log line, or some mistake in heaving the log. Footnote. A piece of wood shaped and weighted, so as to keep it stable when in the water. To this is attached a line knotted at regular distances. By these devices it is possible to tell the speed of a ship. And footnote. A wager ensued between the two captains, to be decided when there should be sufficient wind. Kennedy, thereupon, examined rigorously the log line, and, being satisfied with that, he determined to throw the log himself. Accordingly, some days after, when the wind blew very fair and fresh, and the captain of the packet, Lutwidge, said he believed she then went at the rate of thirteen knots, Kennedy made the experiment, and owned his wager lost. The above fact, I give, for the sake of the following observation, it has been remarked, as an imperfection in the art of shipbuilding, that it can never be known till she has tried, whether a new ship will or will not be a good sailor. For that the model of a good sailing ship had been exactly followed in a new one, which has proved, on the contrary, remarkably dull. I apprehend that this partly be occasioned by the different opinions of seamen respecting the modes of lading, rigging, and sailing of a ship, each has his system, and the same vessel, laden by the judgment and orders of one captain, shall sail better or worse than when by the orders of another. Besides, its scarce ever happens that a ship is formed, fitted for the sea, and sailed by the same person. One man builds the hull, another rigs her, a third lades, and sails her. No one of these has the advantage of knowing all the ideas and experience of the others, and, therefore, cannot draw just conclusions from a combination of the whole. Even in the simple operation of sailing when at sea, I have often observed different judgments in the officers who commanded the success of watches, the when being the same. One would have the sails trimmed, sharper or flatter than another, so that they seemed to have no certain rule to govern by. Yet I think a set of experiments might be instituted, first, to determine the most proper form of the hull for swift sailing. Next, the best dimensions and properest place for the masts, then the form and quantity of sails, and their position, as the wind may be. And, lastly, the disposition of the lading. This is an age of experiments, and I think a set accurately made and combined would be of great use. I am persuaded, therefore, that ere long some ingenious philosopher will undertake it, to whom I wish success. We were several times chased in our passage, but out sailed everything, and in thirty days had soundings. We had a good observation, and the captain judged himself so near our port, Valmoth, that if we made a good run in the night, we might be off the mouth of that harbor in the morning. And by running in the night might escape the notice of the enemy's privateers, who often cruised near the entrance of the channel. Accordingly, all the sail was set that we could possibly make, and the wind being very fresh and fair. We went right before it, and made great way. The captain, after his observation, shaped his course as he thought, so to pass wide of the Sicily Isles. But it seems there is sometimes a strong endraft setting up St. George's channel, which deceives Seaman and caused the loss of Sir Cloudesley Shovel's squadron. This endraft was probably the cause of what happened to us. We had a watchman placed in the bow, to whom they often called, look well out before there, and he as often answered, I, I, but perhaps had his eyes shut, and was half asleep at the time, they sometimes answering, as is said, mechanically. For he did not see a light just before us, which had been hid by the studying sails from the man at the helm, and from the rest of the watch, but by an accidental yaw of the ship was discovered, and occasioned a great alarm. We being very near it, the light appearing to me as big as a cartwheel, it was midnight, and our captain fast asleep, but Captain Kennedy jumping upon deck, and seeing the danger ordered the ship to wear round, all sails standing, an operation dangerous to the masts. But it carried us clear, and we escaped shipwreck, for we were running right upon the rocks on which the lighthouse was erected. This deliverance impressed me strongly with the utility of lighthouses, and made me resolve to encourage the building more of them in America if I should live to return there. In the morning it was found by the soundings, etc., that we were near our port, but a thick fog hid the land from our sight. About nine o'clock the fog began to rise, and seemed to be lifted up from the water like the curtain at a playhouse, discovering underneath the town of Falmouth, the vessels in its harbor, and the fields that surrounded it. This was a most pleasing spectacle to those who had been so long without any other prospects than the uniform view of a vacant ocean, and it gave us the more pleasure as we were now free from the anxieties which the state of war occasioned. I set out immediately with my son for London, and we were only stopped a little by the way to view Stone Hinge. Footnote. A celebrated prehistoric ruin, probably of a temple built by the early Britons near Salisbury, England. It consists of inner and outer circles of enormous stones, some of which are connected by stone slabs. In Footnote. On Salisbury Plain and Lord Pymbrokes House and Gardens, and his very curious antiquities at Wilton, we arrived in London the 27th of July, 1757. Footnote. Here terminates the autobiography, as published by William Temple Franklin and his successors. What follows was written in the last year of Dr. Franklin's life, and was never before printed in English. Mr. Bigelow's note in his edition of 1868. In Footnote. As soon as I was settled in a lodging Mr. Charles had provided for me, I went to visit Dr. Father Gill, to whom I was strongly recommended, and whose counsel respecting my proceedings I was advised to obtain. He was against an immediate complaint to government, and thought the proprietaries should first be personally applied to, whom I possibly be induced by the interposition and persuasion of some private friends to accommodate matters amicably. I then waited on my old friend and correspondent, Mr. Peter Collison, who told me that John Hanbury, the great Virginian merchant, had requested to be informed when I should arrive, that he might carry me to Lord Granville's. Footnote. George Granville, or Grinville, 1712 to 1770, as English Premier from 1763 to 1765, he introduced the direct taxation of the American colonies, and has sometimes been called the immediate cause of the revolution. In Footnote. Who was then President of the Council and wished to see me as soon as possible? I agreed to go with him the next morning. Accordingly, Mr. Hanbury called for me and took me in his carriage to that noble man's, who received me with great civility, and after some questions respecting the present state of affairs in America and discourse thereupon, he said to me, You Americans have wrong ideas of the nature of your Constitution. You contend that the King's instructions to his governors are not laws, and think yourselves at liberty to regard or disregard them at your own discretion. But those instructions are not like the pocket instructions given to a minister going abroad for regulating his conduct in some trifling point of ceremony. They are first drawn up by judges learned in the laws. They are then considered, debated, and perhaps amended in counsel, after which they are signed by the King. They are then, so far as they relate to you, the law of the land for the King is the legislator of the colonies. Footnote. This whole passage shows how hopelessly divergent were the English and American views on the relations between the mother country and her colonies. Grinville here made clear that the Americans were to have no voice in making or amending their laws. Parliament and the King were to have absolute power over the colonies. No wonder Franklin was alarmed by this new doctrine. And footnote. I told his lordship this was new doctrine to me. I had always understood from our charters that our laws were to be made by our assemblies, to be presented indeed to the King for his royal assent. But that being once given the King could not repeal or alter them. And as the assemblies could not make permanent laws without his assent, so neither could he make a law for them without theirs. He assured me I was totally mistaken. I did not think so, however. And his lordship's conversation having a little alarmed me as to what might be the sentiments of the court concerning us. I wrote it down as soon as I returned to my lodgings. I recollected that about 20 years before a clause in a bill brought into Parliament by the Ministry had proposed to make the King's instructions laws in the colonies. But the clause was thrown out by the Commons for which we adored them as our friends and friends of liberty till by their conduct towards us in 1765. It seemed that they had refused that point of sovereignty to the King only that they might reserve it for themselves. With his keen insight into human nature and his consequent knowledge of American character, he foresaw the inevitable result of such an attitude on the part of England. This conversation with Grenville makes these last pages of the autobiography one of its most important parts. After some days, Dr. Father Gill, having spoken to the proprietaries, they agreed to a meeting with me at Mr. T. Penn's house in Spring Garden. The conversation at its first consisted of mutual declarations of disposition to reasonable accommodations. But I suppose each party had its own ideas of what should be meant by reasonable. We then went into consideration of our several points of complaint, which I enumerated. The proprietaries justified their conduct as well as they could, and I, the assemblies, we now appeared very wide and so far from each other in our opinions as to discourage all hope of agreement. However, it was concluded that I should give them the heads of our complaints in writing, and they promised then to consider them. I did so soon after, but they put the paper into the hands of their solicitor, Ferdinand John Paris, who managed for them all their law business in their great suit with the neighboring proprietary of Maryland, Lord Baltimore, which had subsisted 70 years, and wrote for them all their papers and messages in their dispute with the assembly. He was a proud, angry man, and as I had occasionally in the answers of the assembly, treated his papers with some severity, they being really weak in point of argument and haughty in expression, he had conceived a mortal enmity to me, which discovering itself whenever we met, I declined the proprietaries proposal that he and I should discuss the heads of complaint between our two selves, and refused, treating with anyone but them. They then, by his advice, put the paper into the hands of the attorney and solicitor general for their opinion and counsel upon it, where it lay unanswered a year wanting eight days, during which time I made frequent demands of an answer from the proprietaries. But without obtaining any other than that, they had not yet received the opinion of the attorney and solicitor general. What it was when they did receive it, I never learned, for they did not communicate it to me, but sent a long message to the assembly drawn and signed by Paris, reciting my paper, complaining of its want of formality, as a rudeness on my part, and giving a flimsy justification of their conduct, adding that they should be willing to accommodate matters if the assembly would send out some person of candor to treat with them for that purpose, intimating thereby that I was not such. The want of formality or rudeness was, probably, my not having addressed the paper to them with their assumed titles of true and absolute proprietaries of the province of Pennsylvania, which I omitted is not thinking it necessary in a paper, the intention of which was only to reduce to a certainty by writing what in conversation I had delivered Viva voice. But during this delay, the assembly having prevailed with cover any to pass an act taxing the proprietary estate in common with the estates of the people, which was the grand point in dispute, they omitted answering the message. When this act, however, came over, the proprietaries, counseled by Paris, determined to oppose its receiving the royal assent. Accordingly, they petitioned the king and counsel, and a hearing was appointed in which two lawyers were employed by them against the act. And two by me in support of it, they alleged that the act was intended to load the proprietary estate in order to spare those of the people. And that if it were suffered to continue in force, and the proprietaries, who were an odium with the people, left to their mercy in proportioning the taxes, they would inevitably be ruined. We replied that the act had no such intention, and would have no such effect, that the assessors were honest and discreet men under an oath to assess fairly and equitably, and that any advantage each of them might expect in lessening his own tax by augmenting that of the proprietaries was too trifling to induce them to perjure themselves. This is the purport of what I remember as urged by both sides, except that we insisted strongly on the mischievous consequences that must attend a repeal, for that the money, one hundred thousand pounds, be printed and given to the king's use, expended in his service, and now spread among the people. The repeal would strike a dead in their hands to the ruin of many, and the total discouragement of future grants, and the selfishness of the proprietors in soliciting such a general catastrophe, merely from a groundless fear of their estate being taxed too highly, was insisted on in the strongest terms. On this, Lord Mansfield, one of the council, rose and beckoning me, took me into the clerk's chamber, while the lawyers were pleading, and asked me if I was really of opinion that no injury would be done, the proprietary estate in the execution of the act. I said certainly, then, says he, you can have little objection to enter into an engagement to assure that point, I answered, none at all, he then called in Paris, and after some discourse, his lordship's proposition was accepted on both sides. A paper to the purpose was drawn up by the clerk of the council, which I signed with Mr. Charles, who was also an agent of the province for their ordinary affairs. When Lord Mansfield returned to the council chamber, where finally the law was allowed to pass, some changes were however recommended, and we also engaged, they should be made by a subsequent law. But the assembly did not think them necessary, for one year's tax having been levied by the act before the order of council arrived, they appointed a committee to examine the proceedings of the assessors, and on this committee they put several particular friends of the proprietaries. After a full inquiry, they unanimously signed a report that they found the tax had been assessed with perfect equity. The assembly looked into my entering into the first part of the engagement as an essential service to the province. Since it secured the credit of the paper money then spread over all the country, they gave me their thanks in form when I returned, but the proprietaries were enraged at Governor Denney for having passed the act, and turned him out with threats of suing him for breach of instructions, which he had given bond to observe, he, however, having done it at the instance of the general, and for his majesty's service, and having some powerful interest at court, despised the threats, and they were never put in execution, unfinished. End of Chapter 19 The Appendix of the Autobiography of Benjamin Franklin This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information, or to find out how you can volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org The Autobiography of Benjamin Franklin By Benjamin Franklin The Appendix Electrical Clite to Peter Collinson, Philadelphia, October 19, 1752 Sir, as frequent mention is made in public papers from Europe of the success of the Philadelphia experiment for drawing the electrical fire from clouds by means of pointed rods of iron erected on high buildings, and etc. It may be agreeable to the curious to be informed that the same experiment has succeeded in Philadelphia, though made in a different and more easy manner, which is as follows. Make a small cross of two light strips of cedar, the arm so long as to reach to the four corners of a large thin silk handkerchief. When extended, tie the corners of the handkerchief to the extremities of the cross, so you have the body of a kite, which, being properly accommodated with a tail loop and string, will rise in the air, like those made of paper. But this, being of silk, is fitted to bear the wet and wind of a thunder gust without tearing. To the top of the upright sick of the cross is to be fixed a very sharp pointed wire, rising a foot or more above the wood. To the end of the twine, next the hand is to be tied a silk ribbon, and where the silk and twine join, a keem must be fastened. This kite is to be raised when a thunder gust appears to be coming on, and the person who holds the string must stand within a door or window, or under some cover, so that the silk ribbon may not be wet, and care must be taken that the twine does not touch the frame of the door or window. As soon as any of the thunder clouds come over the kite, the pointed wire will draw the electrical fire from them, and the kite, with all of the twine, will be electrified, and those loose filaments of the twine will stand out every way and be attracted by the approaching finger. And when the rain has wet the kite and twine, so that it can conduct to the electrical fire freely, you'll find it stream out plentifully from the key on the approach of your knuckle. At this key the file may be charged, and from the electric fire thus obtained, my spirits may be kindled, and all the electric experiments be performed, which are usually done by the help of a rubbed glass globe or tube, and thereby the sameness of the electric matter without of lighting completely demonstrated. Benjamin Franklin End of the appendix Red by Elijah Fisher End of the autobiography of Benjamin Franklin by Benjamin Franklin


So now we are ready for the next talk, that is Improved Security in 2003 by Ritam Baumik and Murilo Nandi, and unfortunately, both could not be here due to, as I understand, visa problems or something like that, which is why Afra Deep Mandal will give the talk for them, and since no one asked questions in the first two talks, I'm guessing everyone is saving the questions for him. Which one is the full strength? The next one, the whole thing is. Left, left, left, left, left. Okay. Okay, hello everybody. So the story goes like this. So last Saturday, I was preparing to come over here, and suddenly Mridhu gave me a call that can I present this talk. So I said, why not? If we had no idea of the paper, it would be really fun. So here we are. Hopefully the contents of the slide are simple enough that all of us can follow what's going on. So this talk is about Improved Security of OCB-3. So OCB-3 is Authenticated Encryption, and any Authenticated Encryption is a length extending cycle. It combines privacy and integrity. The Caesar Competition aims for making a portfolio of Authenticated Encryptions. And right now we are in the third round. Among all the candidates that are still in the competition, OCB-3 is one of them. And OCB-3 has also been standardized by RFC 7253 in 2014. So OCB-3 is a non-best Authenticated Encryption. So in a non-best Authenticated Encryption, in addition to the message, header or associated data, there is also nonce. So the guarantee is nonce is some non-repeating additional input. The advantage is that non-repeating feature helps us to design efficient Authenticated Encryption schemes. However, the disadvantage will have to do some nonce management. So this is the formal definition of any nonce-best Authenticated Encryption scheme. So basically it takes four inputs. Key, nonce, associated data and the message. And it outputs a ciphertext and attack. So for any nonce-best Authenticated Encryption scheme, first of all we need to have an attack, correct this condition. Which is basically if you are encrypted in it truthfully, and then you will get back the same message when doing the verified encryption. And as we have said in the nonce-repeating scenarios, two encryption queries cannot be made with the same nonce. And now as this is an Authenticated Encryption scheme, we have a privacy code which says for randomly chosen key and any non-associated data or the message, the adversary should not be able to distinguish the c from the output of a random injective function from it. So basically the ciphertext should look random. And we also have the Unfortability code which says, which basically says it's hard to forge this Authenticated Encryption scheme. Unless you have made that corresponding query, you won't be able to produce a ciphertext and attack such that that will pass the verification stage. And these two security code can be combined and stated as a combined security code in the different states that the ciphertext and the attack as a pair it should look random. So now let's see what is OCB-3. So OCB-3 was originally proposed by Rogay, Belaynab, Brack and Rovind in 2001, or the original OCB was proposed in 2001. Then we have a simple variant called OCB-2. And the recent version, the client OCB-3 was submitted to CISAR and also it was also published in FSC 2000. So in OCB-3, the key space is 128 bits. The non-space is 128 bits with a constraint that fast-122 bits are not all 0. So this constraint is kind of important and that will get used in the proof. And we got the associated data, which is strings of arbitrary length, the message, which is of arbitrary length, ciphertext, which can of course, the minimum length is 128 bits. And finally the tag. For the tag, the maximum length is 128 bits but if you want you can have a smaller tag. So this is how the nonce gets handled in OCB-3. So we have a stretch-dense-shift hash function. So for any 128-bit key kappa, we have a 6-bit input x. And this stretch-dense-shift hash function kind of behaves as a x or uniform hash function for when x is on the 6-bit. So these are the two property guaranteed. When k is x is 6-bit and k is sampled uniformly from 128 bits. And once we have that stretch-dense-shift hash function, this is how we process the nonce. So tn is the top 122 bits and bn is the bottom 6 bits. And at first we get a hash key from tn. So basically we are applying the rock cipher with last 6-bit 0. And then on this kn, we use this kn as a key. And we apply that key to that, using that key as kn, we use that stretch-dense-shift hash function and input as bn. So this is 6 bits, the bottom 6 bits and this kn is kind of random because it's a block-side problem. So this property was not present in the previous version of OCB and OCB-2. So this actually makes it efficient for 64 constitutive nonces. We can reuse kn, saving one block-side problem because this kn is then fixed for 64. And also we need to process the associated data. So this is done as follows. We break the associated and various blocks. And so these are the lambda 1l, various constant where l is the block-side problem. So it is a block-side problem on 0. And this is l is for the masking. And finally, if you process it like this, we get a false tag. So this is an authentication tag that we use in OCB-3. So this is how the OCB-3 looks like. We have the message. We have these data ones which are q plus lambda i l. So l, if you remember, it was the output of 0 on the block-side problem. And lambda i is some constant. And q, this part comes from the nonce. So this looks kind of simple. So for each message, we get the ciphertext. And we go on like this. So here we have c1 to cl. Finally, we have something called sister bar. Here we are padding. And for this one, this kind of special. So this one goes right over here. It doesn't go to this input. And finally, if we explore all of them, we get m tag. And from the m tag, we get, so here this auth is coming from the associated data. And finally, we get this tag. And if we want to get a smaller tag, we can chop this. And in the sister bar, not all the bits are important because final few bits we know, they are fixed one zero star. So if you want, we can save written data by chopping these. So the description is just opposite of the previous procedure. We just run everything in reverse. For this verification, in the verification, we are checking whether that tag is same as this t tag. And this verification can also be done instead of bringing it over here. You can do it over here. Which is very fine m prime tag is as tk inverse of t prime plus auth prime plus this data. So this is all good. So now we come to the main slides of this talk, the results. So what we know about the security box? So this was the original security box. When the encryption queries consist of sigma blocks and only one verification query is allowed, the forging advantage is order of sigma square by 2 to the power n plus 1 over 2 to the power tau. So this is the length of the tag. And if you have more verification queries, the straightforward extension is if you have q prime verification queries, straightforward extension would be just multiplied by q prime. So we get these results. However, it's possible to get, so now here this bound becomes q prime sigma square. So we can actually improve this by a slightly different analysis. If we assume the sigma prime is the total number of blocks in the verification queries, which is sigma square which is better than the previous one which was q sigma square. So now if we notice that this is actually a boundary bound in sigma sigma prime, which is the total number of blocks in the verification queries. Now the known privacy attacks are boundary bound in sigma, so this part of the bound can be matched. So this part of the bound is tight, but there are no known attacks for the boundary bound in sigma prime. So now we have the main contribution of this paper which shows the sigma prime part that can actually be improved by a reduced to q prime l max. So now this is no longer boundary bound in sigma prime. This shows that OCD3 can withstand beyond boundary bound verification queries as long as sigma is boundary bound and l max is reasonable. So l max is the length of a single verification query, the maximum length of a single verification query. So this is useful when the number of verification queries is limited, but many forging items can be made. So this can be some scenario called as known dataset. So looks like now we have enough time to go over the proof idea. So let's see our reports. So overall proof idea is kind of simple. So it's application of Pether's coefficient H technique. So we have all internal blocks in real world and simulate internal blocks in ideal world. We will mark out the bad cases in the ideal world sampling and carefully bound the bad qualities. So this is kind of how almost all the proofs in this period of the year works. So the first step is encryption query queries can go back. So any accidental collisions in the blockchain or this boundary is straightforward because over here we are not hoping to get something new, we are only aiming for bird demand. But this step gets treated because here we are going to get improved bound. So accidental for this bounding is treated since we are allowing the internal collisions. So now let's take a closer look what's really happening. So this is the last step. This is the last step in the or the final step in the verification. So this is the 10. We have this authentication. This gets passed through the block cipher and it gets added to this Q plus some constant. So the Q depends on the norms. This L is the masking key to remember and so masking key is just the block cipher column 0. And this outputs the m tag and then we can compare whether this m tag is same as summation m i. So this is the checks and if we compare that means verification is going to succeed which is bad because then we are doing a forgery attack is being made. So the main for our goal would be to bound this bad probability as something like Q L byte of the part Q L. So which will be found but maybe it's not. Something else we will see. So now we will show that this bad almost always result from at least two simultaneous tenuous collisions. So these those bad events give the beyond part the bound or the division query. So this quantity sigma square Q prime byte of the part Q L. So if we have two simultaneous collisions that means the bottom part of the bad is 3 part Q L because that's 2 block cipher blocks. And the top part is of this form because we have all together Q prime verification query that's why we have Q prime and for sigma square bound comes from every bad event so we have two collisions for each one of them we have sigma choices so that's why sigma square. And if we assume sigma is less than 3 by n by 2 then this can be stated as Q prime. So now since we are going into a little bit more details so here we are trying to so so here the encryption query we have MI and the output is CI and we say this part the input to the block cipher is called XI and output is YI and in the other way also given the verification query we have the CI prime that goes to MI prime and input to the inverse for block cipher call is YI prime and output is SI. And using this now we will try to see what really bad event looks like. So this XI prime is a trivially determined when CI prime is CI for an encryption query with same loss. So in that case MI prime is MI because that means basically this block cipher call has been determined by the previous queries and when it is not trivially determined one choice is it is being freshly sampled so in that case this output block cipher is completely free and only with probability 1 by 25 and the bad event can happen because we need to match that check cell. Another option is it can be determined with accidental function and where it is YI prime equals YG for high end GJs are different and maybe we have different non-sales or different positions. So we actually have four cases so case 0 is at least one output is fresh in that case we have seen the probability is 1 over 25 and the case 1 is all outputs trivially determined and in that case it is not valid for generating because that means the attacker is repeating the query and that is not a valid attack scenario and case 2 is exactly one output is non-trivial with accidental collision and case 3 is two or more outputs so this is what the case 1 looks like this is in the case 1 we have only one equation C1 prime plus delta 1 prime equals Cp plus delta p where if Y1 prime is colliding with Yp and we always have a second equation because the checks come needs to match so this shows we have two equations and they involve Kn and L and these are the two block cipher calls we have so Kn the block cipher calls are generated during nonce so when processing nonce and L is the masking so this is the block cipher call and output with input 0 and they are actually independent because if you remember we said that in the nonce first bits cannot be 0 so that is why they are independent block cipher calls and so there are at least two distant calls to the block cipher and 2 and so this quality can be at most 1 over 2 to the power 2 in the second bad surface we have two equations straight away and most often they are ranked 2 but there are certain degenerate cases where they collapse into single equations and those cases can be bound by certain multi-colonial external inputs on the external outputs and they can be shown to help to be at most in mag like so there can be some other batches of cases as well so collisions with the eq outputs from nonce processing collisions with eq outputs from associated data processing collisions with eq outputs from tag generations but if you analyze all those cases exhaustively finally you will get nice clear thank you if you have any questions just contact me


Let me correct that question a bit. Yes, I've been in international forums, met many leaders, you added great leaders. So, many leaders, not always so great. Yes, there are a few great leaders, no question about that. Where is the world heading? There are many possibilities because we have capabilities and technologies which no other generation could ever dream of. Will our capabilities turn against us or will they work for us is the big question. If all the human capabilities which are so hugely enhanced because of technology, everything that an individual human being could do has expanded many fold. In this enhanced state, and our numbers have increased tremendously. In the beginning of twentieth century, we were just about 1.5 billion people. Today, we are 7.3 billion people. The United Nations making predictions that by 2050, we will be 9.7 billion people. If all these people get educated, get technologically empowered, 9.7 billion people or nearly 10 billion people on this planet is for sure going to be a disaster. Yes, we can make arrangements and arrangements. We can improve the arrangements, we can make more energy-saving machines.  Yes, we can do all this. But if we don't come to our senses with human populations, there's going to be... I want you to just imagine how the world will be if the population almost goes up by 50% tomorrow. Just imagine your town, how it will be if 50% population increases tomorrow morning. Or in other words, no matter what we create, no matter how much we strive, whether whatever we build, everything is going to be insufficient because the planet is going to be insufficient. Of course, we are looking at planets which could sustain life outside of this solar system. We found two, three very promising planets. It's just a little, you know, not in the walking distance, a few thousand or a million light years away. Great planets, I believe, but this is the thing. But nobody wants to address this issue. Everybody wants to talk about cosmetic solutions, not address the basic problem of expanding human population. I was in a conference and I said, see, unless you... unless you reduce the human footprint on the planet, there is no solution for anything. Then they asked me a brilliant question, how do you reduce the human footprint? I said, you have to reduce the number of feet, that's the only way. So, right now, it doesn't matter what others think. All of you who are here and those of you who are hanging out with me, we can take it upon ourselves that we will not push the human population. You can have a dog, a husband and wife who are having a debate. Whether to have a child or not, the husband wanted a child, the wife hesitating because she will lose the shape of her body and... her husband, having a baby is simple. But for the woman, it's too many things involved. So debate was going on and then they came and the debate moved into an area where should we have a baby or should we get a dog? Then they could not decide, they went to your counselor, they put their problem in front of him.  We as human beings, we are wonderful, but we are too many. We are so many that the insect population is going down. No, no, it's not a joke, it's very... it's very threatening. If the insect population disappears, the planet will be destroyed. Yes, the worms disappear, the planet will be destroyed. If you and me disappear, planet will flourish. So leave the leaders alone because in every conference that you meet, very cosmetic solutions are being talked about. How to adjust the marketplace, okay? How to do this, how to do that? On immediate scale, yes, those things are necessary, but you're talking about what is the future of this world. If that is so, if we want a future for this world, if we want our children and their children to live well on this planet, the only way is to bring down human population. Not by doing some horrible acts, but if we have... See, our life expectancy has improved. This means we have taken death into our hands. When we take death into our hands, it is our business to take birth also into our hands, isn't it? If we convince the population of this one thing, the future is very bright because tomorrow morning the sun will come up. What's the problem?