So, you know, you were the first to say anything about it. I don't get it at all. So, I'm going to have to wrap this up. I just want to go ahead. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. You're welcome. Thank you. Thank you. And I'm going to go ahead and do that. So I'll go ahead and do it. I would like some more questions. I have a question. I'm not sure if I can answer this. I'm sorry. I'm not sure if you can answer this. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. Okay, you'll point out that these are out. Okay, you'll point out that these are out. Okay, you'll point out that these are out. Okay, you'll point out that these are out. Okay, you'll point out that these are out. Okay, you'll point out that these are out. So, ladies and gentlemen, can I ask the panelists to take seats here so we can actually get started. Everybody else is already here, panelists. And so we're now set to go. Welcome. My name is Bill Taylor. I'm the Executive Vice President here at the United States Institute of Peace, and I am very pleased to welcome you here to this event. Another in our short series of Balkan events that we are sponsoring here, cosponsoring, as you will hear. So Time for Action in the Western Balkans is the title of a publication that is not only over here, but I think probably outside. Most of you probably got it on your way in. We are very pleased to be cosponsoring this with the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, and you'll hear a little bit more about the National Committee in a moment. But the Institute of Peace focuses on conflict. So we were established in 1984 to try to look for nonviolent ways of solving conflict. As we were saying in the room next door, there are other agencies in the U.S. government that look for violent ways of solving conflict. But we are, and we've got some representatives in the room that know about that as well. But we look for nonviolent dispute resolution mechanisms, and we do this all over the world. We have offices in Afghanistan, and in Iraq, and in Burma, and in Tunis. So those kinds of operations that feed into what we do back here. And we are able to convene people like you, and we appreciate all of the attendance and interest in this particular area. So as I say, we are cosponsoring this event with the National Committee on American Foreign Policy and the East-West Institute, Cameron. Yes, Cameron, you will hear from Cameron as well. And this will be a lively interaction. We'll have the presentation of the report, opportunity to explore further with the authors. So, and speaking of the authors, first among them is Ambassador Frank Wissner, right here. I was telling Frank that I just spent about two hours in the Frank Wissner meeting room, right upstairs on the fifth floor. We think of you every day, Ambassador, and it's great to have you here, International Affairs Advisor, Squire Patent, and Boggs, former U.S. Ambassador to Zambia, Egypt, the Philippines, and India. Ambassador Cameron Munter, you'll see in a minute, CEO and President of the East-West Institute. Former Ambassador to Serbia of relevance here, and Pakistan, even greater challenge, that was Cameron. Jonathan Levitsky, partner, voice from Plimpton, and former Counselor to Ambassador Richard Holbrook. There we are. And Tom Graham. We're very pleased to have Tom in this context. He's been working with us on some of our Ukraine-Russia work. Tom is the Senior Fellow and Managing Director at Kissinger Associates. Ambassador Sarah Mendelssohn has also been working with us on Ukraine and Russia and other kind of things. She is the Distinguished Service Professor of Public Policy and Head of Carnegie Mellon's Heinz College in Washington, D.C. Like that, right? Very good. Also a former U.S. Representative to Economic and Social Counsel at the United Nations, so Ambassador Mendelssohn, we are very pleased that you can be here to moderate this panel. Before we get to the panel, let me ask Grace Kennan-Warnacky, who is the Board Chair of the National Committee of American Foreign Policy to come forward. Grace reminded me that her father, whom we all know, George Kennan, was longer in the Balkans than he was in Moscow. So this makes this particularly relevant here, and we are very pleased to be able to have this opportunity to welcome you, Grace, up here. Do you want to say a little bit about the National Committee? And then Sarah will welcome all the panelists up to the mic. So please welcome Grace. Hello. Can you hear me? Well, thank you all for being with us this afternoon for the launch of such a timely and important book on U.S. policy in the Western Balkans. I'd like to begin by extending great thanks to Stephen Heintz and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, whose guidance and generous support made this Center possible. I will just say a few words about the National Committee. The National Committee was founded 43 years ago by Hans Morgenthau with the aim of promoting a more realistic American foreign policy. As you know, we have not quite arrived, so we still have a lot of work to do. It's been a small and niche organization that is amazingly effective. We played a big role in the Irish peace process, and we currently, for the last 20 years, have been doing a lot of track-to-work in Southeast Asia, which you will never read about, because it's under the screen, under the radar, but it's really interesting. We are also privileged to be invited to work alongside with its esteemed colleagues and partners throughout the writing process of this project. And I would like to commend Ambassador Wissner, Cameron Munter, Tom Graham, and John Levitsky for all their hard work and dedication. I'd also like to recognize Stephen Whitaker and Mark Standick for all the hard work in forming this report and making today's event possible. The Western Balkans has been a challenging region for U.S. policymakers for decades, and you have all done an amazing job of presenting clear and succinct set of recommendations. We are very excited to be going to hear about them. And I would especially like to thank this afternoon, our hosts, the U.S. Institute of Peace, for their support in helping to pull together today's event in such a seamless fashion. Now I'm pleased to turn the program over to our moderator, Ambassador, and she will invite the panelists to go. Thank you for being with us on this warm, close, as I would say, my grandmother would say, Friday afternoon. If you haven't had a chance to read the report, I urge you to do so. There are a lot of our words in the report, and it's really about re-engaging, re-imagining, re-energizing, and refocusing our attention on the Western Balkans. So please keep that in mind as we go through the panel and we turn to you for a question and answer. We're going to travel in different directions in this discussion. We're going to start with transatlantic integration, which has played a big role. We're going to talk a little bit about Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Serbia, and Montenegro, and then we're going to talk a little bit about external power and the role that exogenous forces are playing in the Western Balkans. So we'll then turn to you all for questions. So please be thinking about what those questions are. But for now, let's go right to the panel. So in terms of transatlantic integration, we have to ask how reliable do you think, and what is your metric exactly of what we might think of as the pull factor of possible membership in the European Union at a time when member states, such as Hungary, are challenging EU standards, when key member states such as Germany and France are facing mounting political pressures to pause or even stop the enlargement process. So if we're thinking about enlargement as a pull, how do we balance that with the realities of today? Who wants to go first? Why don't I lead off, Sarah, and let me do so by thanking you for being willing to take on this panel and my colleagues for joining me. We've been hard at work for the better part of a year in coming to the conclusions. All of us are veterans one way or another of American diplomacy in the Balkans, and what we are trying to present to you today is the distillation of not only our experience, but intensive consultations inside the region and with diplomatic representatives of the region of Europe, of our own government, in coming to the conclusions that we've reached today. So that, in a way, to say, we come to you because we were and came together to do this report because we were deeply concerned. Concerned that the situation in the region called for action, called for engagement by the United States, called for re-engagement. And why? Because for a long-standing set of reasons, the United States has core interests. In the Balkans, Western Balkans, we've been heavily involved diplomatically, militarily, and all through the 90s and then through much of this, the first decade of this century. We are compelled as well by the, not only our interests as a country, but by the situation which has changed as we see it in a manner that is profoundly unhelpful on several grounds inside of Balkan nations, governance is deteriorated between communities in the Western Balkans, between ethnicities and religious groups, and even between nationalities. We've seen intensifying trouble while not reaching the level that it reached in the past that brought us into literally warfare in the former Yugoslavia, the trend lines have all moved in the wrong direction. Aged on in part by new factors, three in particular, the entry in a very spoilers role by Russia, by the Chinese who, while they've not yet set a clear political course, have decided to make the Balkans one of the endpoints in one belt, one road, and are positioned to be serious players without paying any heed at all to the standards of European and Western Alliance principles, principles of transparency, principles of how you do business, principles of how you conduct contracts. So all of these factors are new and harken our attention. As we looked at it furthermore, we faced the fact that this year is a year of particular significance. It is a year this month when the EU is going to meet in Sofia, and the Balkans is on the agenda of how the EU confronts and deals with the questions. So this year is important to the EU as a whole. It's important in several other regards. There will be a NATO summit this fall and again the Balkans is a matter of interest. Third, the three C's gathering that President Trump attended in Poland will again meet this year in Bucharest and here again the Balkans is a key player. So timing, there is a moment in history when people pay renewed attention to a situation and the Western Balkans invites that attention. The report that we've put before you and harken to your attention is a report that's based on a key assumption. And that assumption is that the way to deal with the situation in the Western Balkans is known to all of us. It is the gradual integration of the region, accelerated integration of the region into the EU on the one hand and into NATO on the other. That if those safe harbors can be energized and brought to the region in a more rapid and consequential manner, then there is an outcome that can stabilize the region and stop the downward spiral that gives us every reason to be concerned. We're not talking nor arguing that the region is ready for full membership in any of some of the countries are, some are already there, but what we are trying to argue for is a credible, achievable path that is clear to the people of the Balkans across the board that they are on their way to membership in the transatlantic institutions and that path we argue is not yet visible and the report calls for attention to making it be just so. Let me end with a note about the United States. It is our view that the situation is ripe for American re-engagement, but re-engagement of a special sort. The United States always was a secondary, though interested player in the Balkans. This matter continues to be primarily Europe's, Europe's concern. The Balkans is part of Europe. It's indivisible from it. A Europe free and whole is a Europe that must include the Balkans. Europe has the resources and the institutions to cope in the long run with the multiple questions the Balkans faces. But the United States has the unique privilege of being able to serve once again as a catalyst, not at the front of the line, but part of achieving a solution. And that means a political decision on our part that the Balkans is important and that we need to be engaged with the Europeans to reach the objectives that we need to reach. And I'd like to think, and I believe I reflect the opinions of my colleagues, that this role, catalytic role for American foreign policy has lessons well beyond the Balkans to a much broader base of engagements the United States is part of in today's world. Having said that, Sarah, you posed a couple of very tough questions. They're more coming. And they're more coming, I know. I think it's only a reasonable question to say it's all good and well it's a dramatic picture of what's needed, what the institutions are, what's going on in the Balkans. But are we all ready for this? Is the United States prepared to shift its attention beyond a single trip by Vice President Pence and pay attention? Is Europe, with its multiple distractions from Catalonia to Brexit to Eastern Europe to quarrels between Poland and Hungary and the rest of the European Union, is Europe ready? And the answer to that is yes and no. Yes, we have now ample evidence before all of us that the European Union has given specific instructions to its staff functions to accelerate a study of how Europe can engage the Balkans. The summits that are coming up all engage Europe. But is Europe still ambivalent? That is ambivalent. And so we tried very carefully in the course of our report to think about issues that could engage Europe and yet not push Europeans beyond a comfort zone that they can work inside of. We've proposed interim steps. NATO we know. PFP is an interim step on the way to NATO. But in terms of the European Union a credible achievable path means there are many ways the Balkan nations who are not part of European institutions today and who aspire at some point to be there can begin to dial into the European system. And you will see those ideas. They run quite a wide range. I won't choose to bore you with them at the moment. But I think we tried to take into account the distractions of Europe and put our fingers instead on ways this job can be done, tough as it is given the fact that the year is a good one in which to engage. Sarah. Perfect. If others have pressing issues they want to bring up otherwise I'm going to turn to Bosnia. Let me just emphasize what... Push. The point that Frank made is that let's not forget we are not an analytical group that is trying to dissect the internal workings of the region. We count on the experts with whom we spoke and with the discussions to set that as a backdrop. It is mainly intended to be a means by which American policymakers across the board can see where they can engage to support their European fellows. But I hope that we can steer the tenor of what we're trying to do is not to relitigate those elements that many of us have lived through in recent decades, but to find out where, in a policy sense, we can move ahead. So I hope that you will also work in that spirit that we're not going to argue about what happened in 1993. We're not going to rehash those things but to look forward. So thank you for that. Sure. I'm happy to, although I think Sarah was about to turn to Bosnia, which I was going to talk about, but it's fine. So just to maybe jump ahead a little bit and also focus on the question that you started with, Ambassador, concerning the pull factor in Europe. If you sort of take a step back and you look at the region and you sort of say why are we concerned about it? Why have things become challenging there? It's really two factors. The first is one that we haven't, that Ambassador Wisner spoke about briefly, and that is simply that to some significant extent American diplomatic attention has drifted away from the region. That's appropriate. It started, I think, sort of after 9-11 and rolled forward pretty consistently from that time. And there's no way that we could reasonably expect or that it would be appropriate for the United States to engage at the level that it was engaging in the region in the late 90s. At least we hope it never is necessary again. But part of our goal here is to suggest that a relatively small incremental engagement above and beyond where we are now really could have a very significant impact in avoiding a more grave problem down the line that requires a more significant engagement by American policymakers. But the second factor, and it's the one that you opened with, Ambassador, is the pull. The whole framework that the United States and Europe built around the Balkans starting in the late 90s and rolling forward in order to maintain peace and stability of the region once we got through the Dayton Peace Accords in Bosnia, the sort of Rambouille 1244 saga in Kosovo, it was all built around the attraction of Europe. The notion was that the endpoint for Kosovo, for Bosnia, and for the other states in the region was fundamentally to be a part of Europe. And as Ambassador Wisner correctly pointed out and as your question suggests, people in the region, I think, have come to question whether that carrot is real or whether they'll ever get to eat it even if they think it's real. And so as Ambassador Wisner said, one of the most important things that we are recommending is that our colleagues in the European Union think awfully hard about ways they can both make that carrot real and also motivate interim steps, motivate the parties through interim steps that go beyond just the sense that there's this immense bureaucratic slog of files that have to be closed before you get anything at all. Yeah, let me just add one other point here. I mean, the focus for this group has been on sort of re-engagement at this point and re-engagement because of the understanding that the United States and Europe are not properly engaged. They don't have a high level presence that that vacuum is filled by other powers. And what we've seen over the past decade is other actors moving in a significant way. The Russians in particular will talk a little bit more about that, the Chinese, some of our allies get involved in ways that are not conducive to what we like to see as the better governance a turn towards more democratic governance in the Balkans-Turkey I'm thinking of. And of course we have the problem of violent extremists moving into the region from time to time. A much higher profile engagement by the West in general is an important element in pushing back against this, giving the people the region the understanding and a hope that there is an alternative, that the West cares, that there's another way to move forward that is going to bring greater security, greater stability, and greater prosperity to the region over the long run. So now the questions are going to get really tough. So the report does two things particularly well, I think. Number one, it points to three factors generally in the Western Balkans that are driving problems. Number one, this issue of governance, and we're going to return to that. Ethnic tensions and external forces, outside forces. In the case of Bosnia Herzegovina, which it places primary importance on, and I agree with that as well, it has very specific immediate important recommendations having to do with the election law and this is appropriate because they're approaching elections in the fall. But I want to ask the panelists a tougher issue, which is there are other internal issues that are driving problems inside Bosnia, including massive unemployment, high levels of corruption, and yes, what we might think of as the unresolved present past, historical legacy. Until those things are really addressed, it's difficult to think of a way forward, and I want to press the panelists on specific things that the U.S. as well as the European Union might do to address these very tough issues. Election laws, we have a lot of experience in advocating around the world on these issues, but if we might do a little bit on this, maybe starting in the middle. Sure. And going around. My affiliation with the late Ambassador Holbrook means that I seem to be the go-to person for all things Bosnia. So a couple of thoughts. First, just to say a couple of words about the election law, recognizing that it is to some extent the crisis du jour, and it's very easy in the Balkans to get yourself swept up in those and not focus in the longer term so your question, Ambassador, is perfectly appropriate, but just to sort of fill out for the group that issue, it's sort of a question that in some ways might sound very esoteric. It's almost like a dispute about electoral redistricting, but fundamentally, it is a dispute between the Bosnians and the Croats and one of the two entities, constituent entities, of Bosnia Herzegovina, the Federation, as to how representatives ought to be elected to the House of Peoples, which is the upper house of their Federation, and it turns out, and there was a court decision sort of holding last year that the current electoral law is improper, and it turns out that if you don't have that electoral law, then you can't elect the House of Peoples, and if you can't elect the House of Peoples, then you can't have a government in the Federation. If you can't have a government in the Federation and you don't have a House of Peoples, then you probably can't put people in the House of Peoples at the national level in Bosnia, and so it's this sort of tiering effect. And furthermore, as Ambassador Wisner was pointing out, if you don't have a government in the Federation then come March, you won't have a budget and you won't be able to pay anybody. And so it's a real sort of serious crisis point. We suggest in the report that this is an issue of sufficiently grave importance that if the parties really cannot come to agreement, ultimately, it's one of those rare circumstances under which we think it would be appropriate for the higher-rep to exercise this bond power and impose a solution on the parties of one variety or another, but we're hopeful it doesn't come to that. And we know that folks both in the United States and in Europe are actively working with the parties in an effort to resolve that situation in a timely way. But to take a step back and talk about the sort of the situation on the ground more generally. It's a little bit complicated because it's a chicken and an egg. There's a technical word that we lawyers use for this. It's a big mess. So how do you undo that mess? There's no simple answer. But there are a bunch of small-bore steps that can and we think must be taken to help. On the economic side, it's really fundamentally, you know, my sort of current life is in the private sector. I've done that for quite some time now. And, you know, looking as a sort of person who represents private equity investors and strategics who might invest in various markets in the world, you wouldn't look at Bosnia and sort of say that's an easy place to go invest. And why is that? It's very high on the Transparency International Corruption Index. There's serious difficulties with regard to the rule of law and the enforceability of court judgments. It's just a tough place to invest. And so, you know, fixing the problems of governance in Bosnia are the way you fix the economic problems. Because otherwise, although their economy has been growing at about 2.5% a year for the last five years, it's really driven by remittances. That's not indigenous economic activity. So, you know, one of the things we propose in the report is that within the Dayton framework, we urge, we push the parties, both in the United States and Europe, as a part of the EU accession process to streamline their governmental institutions and to work very hard on these issues that are limiting foreign direct investment. So that's a complicated answer to a complicated problem. And it's not one that will deliver a near-term solution, but it's the, I think it's the path forward. Sarah, let me just add a quick thought on what John has just said and wrestle with you for a moment. We thought long and hard about the challenge you laid before us. Bosnia is a mess. But is it a mess that American policy can address directly? What are the pieces we can address that would make a difference? And I think we reached a conclusion that you have to create a framework of stability before there can be reasonable economics. Bosnia will then, and thereafter and for years, have worked to do to sort out its economic system, its complex political structures, many things. But it needs to get started. And the election law is really important. There are other ways that NATO can be involved. We've recommended one in terms of dealing with NATO property. We've also recommended modest ways the United States can be directly involved in Enterprise Fund, which two senators have launched on Capitol Hill. But the core point I want to leave is if you don't get a framework of stability in place, nothing else will happen. And we believe in the long run the issues of governance, of rule of law, of economics are going to end up being issues that will play out over the years and will end up being primarily European issues with an American supporting role. I think in part my question is an excuse to elevate the work that AID and colleagues have been doing on the ground for a long time. As taxpayers, we support a mission there. I think I see, is that Gretchen, we're joined by the Deputy Assistant Administrator from USAID for Europe and Eurasia who oversees this area. So just to know that there is good work that is going on tackling corruption and historical memory and unemployment. Let's turn to Kosovo for a moment. This is a very, the report frames the grand bargain proposal that's been floated by Serbia's President Vucic that may include territorial exchange as a quote, an idea whose time has not yet come. It feels like a Pandora's box that's being opened anytime you talk about territorial exchange as a possibility in the Balkans. I wanted to hear a little bit more about what the report, the writers of the report were thinking about when they were discussing this issue of territorial exchange. The issue is not one we raised. The issue was put on the table by the facts on the ground and even more importantly by the Serbian President. So we had no choice but to address it. In addressing it, we looked at it very carefully and it was immediately obvious to us that this idea of territorial exchanges is an idea whose time has not come and I don't suspect it's going to come anytime soon. There are all the issues we know only too well of precedent for the rest of the region, opposition inside of Kosovo, unclear objectives on the part of those who mention it. You can make a long laundry list but I think we addressed it in order to say move on and deal with what you can deal with and that is the framework of direct dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade sponsored and supported by the European Union, nudged forward by the United States and there there are real issues that need to be addressed. Issues between Kosovo and Serbia that have to come to a head. For example, the Association of Serbian Communities remains mired in a dispute on the Kosovo side but really the Serbs as well have no particular interest in seeing it resolved except in a manner that would be divisive for Kosovo. That needs to be settled. There are many other issues that have to be drawn between the two countries to keep them on the road to some modus favendi in which they will take the poison of this dispute out of it and make both of them members in time of the European Union and I think we come down very hard that on the issue that you should not allow any member of the European Union any new member to have veto power over the future membership and that Kosovo, Serbia will not be able to block Kosovo's entry. I know that's the German Chancellor's view and most Europeans, it's one I think all of us agree to wholeheartedly. And if I can add, I'm struck by what you said about USAID and other people. We don't mean to imply that many of these kinds of discussions are not going on. That is to say we're inventing these things or coming up with these ideas. The idea that there is a dialogue about the Association of Serbian Communities, that's going on. And that's something that we like to think that in good faith, Mr. Vuchis, Mr. Tachi, other interlocutors have actually addressed. There are a number of economic issues which the new Prime Minister in Serbia, Bernabece, has put forward that don't get a lot of attention but that set the stage for healthier economic relations across the border between Serbia and Kosovo. It's a long process of confidence-building that I think we're talking about. What we're calling about is not to say let's invent this. What we're saying is let's make sure that those on the outside who care about peace in the region of the United States work closely with our European friends to foster that kind of dialogue. And when the time comes that the trust has been built, not only between leaders but social trust, people studying at each other's universities, people engaged in cross-border trade, people who have various cultural events that take place across the border, that's when we're going to come to a time when we hope both sides come to an agreement that we not only can support but that over the time, up till that time, that we've been able to shape. So staying with the Serbian theme and returning a little bit more to the pull factor of the EU and moving us into a conversation about the role that certain powers play on others. What is your sense about the EU requesting or putting pressure on Serbia to play a more constructive role in Bosnia? And what does that look like? What is an inducement? It's very vague. So far what we have seen is that the EU is calling for personal links, that is personal efforts as far as I see them, that Mr. Vutic and Mr. Dodic could take almost as an assumption that one person could make another person act a certain way. I think that's the right way to look at this rather is to look at the institutions, those questions, those issues that Jonathan raised earlier within Bosnia that will allow for a constructive role for the leadership of all the communities in Bosnia, rather than looking for something that you would say an outside party should somehow control or steer. Obviously we're looking for a positive role by Serbia in Bosnia and certainly to the Republic of Srpska a positive impact. But I think it's much more important to focus that question on the internal development in Bosnia and I would think that when the European Union looks at these questions, it's looking at governance and domestic issues that's most important. So the report has a very intriguing recommendation for the US, the EU and Russia. To essentially enter a dialogue to reassure Russia that NATO membership should have come about does not affect Russian interests. So I wanted to know, curious minds want to know who might be involved in that dialogue. How receptive do we think the Kremlin actually is to that dialogue? What tools does the EU and the US have to reduce Russian disruption in the Western Balkans? And here I want to tag on the question of Montenegro what do you do to completely prevent Russia from playing an even more disruptive role in Montenegro? To my mind, even raising awareness or shining a light on the disruption is one tactic perhaps to be more methodically explored but it's a tactic, it's not actually a strategy. I think people at this moment are thinking a lot about Russian interference in various elections but they're not necessarily paying that much attention to the Western Balkans. So I'm going to turn first to Tom for this. Can I say a great question? The question de jour I think in Washington. Let me take a step back. You mentioned the Montenegro events of October 2016 which I think is an extreme example and a very clumsy example of what the Russians have been doing in the Balkans over the past several years but as I said, emblematic of a broader approach. The fundamental problem that we have with the Russians is not so much that they're proposing a different set of solutions to the problems of the Balkans is that they don't really want solutions. They're uncomfortable with the types of proposals we're making and the policy has been focused on creating problems and obstacles are moving forward so we see it with Kosovo. You nurture a close relationship with the Serbs but you back them, make sure that you will support them on their non-recognition of Kosovo. You see it in the support that they give to Dodic and Bosnia-Herzegovina as an effort to undermine resolution of these very difficult issues. We've been talking about it. You see it in the way they play both sides on the same issue in Macedonia because they don't want a resolution of that issue. But the second point that I would make in this regard is that the Western Balkans is really not a priority for the Russians.  What the Russians are concerned about is their situation, in Ukraine, the Middle East. If they can engage us in a broader negotiation about those issues, then the Balkans become something that we can talk about. Now, how does the United States deal with this? I think we deal with both aspects of the problem. One is that we move forward on what we think are the appropriate solutions to the region, things that we've been talking about, the way Ambassador Wissner laid it out in the beginning, that achievable, credible path towards EU membership, NATO membership is a way of pushing back against what the Russians are doing. And as we've seen in Montenegro, you can make that happen despite Russian resistance. So we envision that for a broader process in the region. Second, the Russians, in part of this effort of creating friction, spend a lot of time on disinformation, the various sort of media efforts that we've seen elsewhere in Europe and in the United States. So we need to respond to that. We need to help build up the independent media in the Western Balkans. We need to be able to provide credible news, in a sense, to push back and undermine the false narratives that are being presented. We need to work with the various countries of the region and cyber security. That's obviously easier to do with countries like Montenegro that are now part of NATO, where you can have a more intensive discussion where you can do the types of intelligence sharing you need. But there are ways that you can do this with the other countries of the region as well. But the second part of this is that larger negotiation. One of the reasons we talked about having a dialogue, the EU obviously has to be part of this. It doesn't have to be the EU out of Brussels necessarily. It can be, in a sense, the way we've approached the Ukraine crisis to take some of the big powers that are really interested in the region, Germany first of all, to be engaged in a dialogue with the Russians and the United States about the future of the Balkans, trying to understand what Russian concerns are. But you're going to have to deal with that, as I said, in the broader context of the overall relationship. You can't sit down and have a fruitful discussion with the Russians simply about the Western Balkans. It's got to be in the context of how we're going to manage the overall relationship. And if we move towards some semblance of a framework for that, then I think you can resolve the localized problems of the Balkans. I think placing it in the context of the larger Russian foreign policy around disruption I think is really important. And understanding it against the backdrop of Ukraine and the MENA region. I would very much hope that US policymakers understand, though, the security implications of this disinformation and how dangerous this is. I think a lot of times people think, oh yes, and we'll work on independent media if it's some kind of add-on. When the world that we live in, the kind of the use of social media, regular media to stir up a lot of ethnic divide in this particular part of the world is extremely dangerous and needs to be understood as a larger security issue. Just make one point on this because this always comes up and I think we have to stress it. And the Russians don't make life easier, but they haven't created the problems. And the resolution of this is not simply pushing back against what the Russians are doing. This is why we're talking about the broader issues, the indigenous problems that have to be addressed. If you can address those, you give less room for the type of mischief that the Russians want to do. I agree. I mean, this is why the present past is an issue that needs to be addressed. Staying with the external power. So China is moving assertively in this region as we see in many other parts of the world where it can lend money more quickly with fewer conditions to support large and important infrastructure projects that people on the ground want to see happen. Its labor laws, as I think you were noting, and environmental standards are not in accordance with the EU rules and regulations. So how do we handle this discrepancy? And should or could, this is a provocative question, should the Chinese model cause the EU and the United States to change how it supports development? And specifically, are we going to face pressure to be more, let's say, flexible in our assistance as a response? How does this square in this region with reducing corruption? I'll make an initial stab at that and then maybe I think Frank has some things to add. I think there are two ways to think of the Belt and Road Initiative and let's not forget the Belt and Road Initiative and the impact that it's going to have in the western Balkans is just a small part of an extraordinary process that's going to be going on throughout Central Asia throughout the maritime area of Southeast Asia. In other words, the Belt and Road Initiative is going to come and the question is only what are we going to do about it with it, right? So to say that we are resisting it's kind of a parallel to what Tom is saying. You don't just counter, say, Russian ideas in the region. You deal with what's at stake there. What's at stake is the kind of infrastructure that the Belt and Road Initiative offers is welcome. There's no doubt they need it there. There are two ways to deal with this in my mind. One is to come up with alternatives whether they are enterprise funds, whether they are projects in the private sector, whether there are consortia of people working in different areas, public-private partnerships, that come up with an alternative that emphasizes not only the quality of the infrastructure that's being built but the rules by which that infrastructure is being built, fair labor, sanctity of contract, rule of law. And to make that compete with what we might see as the Belt and Road Initiative. Secondly, the other part is we need to think hard whether we can participate. It's not going to happen anyway. Is there a way in which westerners can take part in the kind of investment the Chinese are putting forth and perhaps shape the conditions under which that kind of infrastructure is going to be built because it's going to be built. It's not a question that you can replace the Belt and Road Initiative. You can compete with it and perhaps you can shape it. So those are the two ways of thinking. Are we able, are we interested, we and our European allies and other friends, and not only Europeans, what about the Japanese, what about other investors? Is there a way that we can compete and again, is there a way we can participate that would at least make sure that the kinds of governance issues that would emanate from the Belt and Road work would have an impact? I think you've covered the main points and just let me add a couple of quick reflections because Sarah, I think it's a problem that is now just beginning to emerge and it is going to be more and more important in the years ahead. I must say it grew in importance in our own deliberations the more we thought about it. And why? Because I think this country is finally coming to a belated recognition that the Chinese do have some grand national strategies involved. They are in the process of developing an economic system that is matched with political interests that begin in Beijing and will end in Western Europe. They will link China and Chinese markets to Western markets and the Balkans is really the first landfall in Europe. So when the Chinese put together a billion euro fund for the Balkans it's real money. It's real money particularly because the Balkans has a crying need for infrastructure. It is a desperately short commodity in the Balkans. Any of you who've ridden on roads in the Balkans recognize how desperate it is and are the Chinese there? Of course they are. Look at what we're looking at right now. Look at the Piraeus port, roads in Macedonia, roads in Serbia, deals that are currently being made. So that's the problem. And with it comes not yet but tomorrow another model, another political set of interests in the Balkans and the only way we can really get on top of this is to be certain that the Balkans are part of Europe. Now, here comes the challenge and Cameron put his finger on it. One, you have to be able to mobilize some alternative resources and I'd like to think European infrastructure funds don't have to wait until the EU has developed a full membership quota before those infrastructure funds can be mobilized. But I also don't believe that it is only Europe's job or that it's only a job for the public sector. Public-private partnerships in mobilizing capital and it's more capital than just Europe in the United States is Japan with interests in this region. The question is a challenge to American leadership and European leadership to put together serious infrastructure development funds and at the same time make it clear to our friends in the Balkans that if you want to be part of an integrated European economy in which your people are able to circulate and work your products will be bought, Europe will help you manage your financial systems all of these come with a price you have to play by the rules and the rules are not corrupt project development lack of transparency lack of environmental standards there's a cost to being part of a richer reward and here Balkans have a few lessons to learn that there isn't just a free Chinese contract to sign if their ambitions in the long run are to be part of Europe. I haven't passed this by my colleagues they'll totally disagree with this just a footnote on this the Chinese are also interested in security and stability that's how you're going to develop markets over the long run that is not exactly what the Russians are doing at this point so one of the reasons that you engage the Chinese in this one it is going to happen two it would be a positive development for the region if it's done properly three it gives a bit of leverage in managing the Russian problem so we're now coming to you do we have microphones? yes please if you could when you ask your question state your name where you're from and go at it and if you want to identify a particular participant please do we're going to start there and then we're going to go over here let's collect a couple and then we'll do another round thank you very much Ambassador Edward Joseph Johns Hopkins Seiss I worked for about a dozen years in the region including as deputy head of the OSC mission Kosovo and I want to salute the authors of this report I think this is an excellent report I think it's remarkable in a short report how many of the key issues you touched upon and I was particularly pleased to see the emphasis on NATO and just to mention Hans Benedik Hans Benedik and I had a piece urging a new NATO initiative for the Balkans at the summit so I was very pleased to see that to see you all emphasize that in this excellent report my question has to do with Serbia and Kosovo and the way I read the report and hear the discussion here today you put a lot of emphasis on Europe you talk about the need to continue the EU-led dialogue when it's clearly at an impasse you talk about the need for the condition absolutely that Serbia must recognize Kosovo as a condition for it to enter the EU and not obstruct when of course as we all know five EU states themselves do not recognize Kosovo and then third you make the point again quite correctly insisting that Serbia has to commit decisively to the EU again well said but in all of these cases we see very clear obstacles so my question is here as we're all gathered at the US Institute of Peace with the State Department across the street you really want to put so much of this on Europe what about Washington's role let me give you an opportunity here to amplify maybe precise a little bit more giving some of these inherent contradictions and complications for Europe to resolve this critical question so thank you so much okay we're going to take one or two more right here in the front sure my name is Marci Ries I've been ambassador of Bulgaria and Albania and head of mission in Kosovo I have a complimentary question to yours which is you've got a pretty heavy menu here for the Europeans I gather you talk to a lot of people how much of an appetite is there for taking this on we've already had this big discussion about enlargement no enlargement so where does this fit into all that actually it's such a great pairing let's go back to the panel and then we'll take some more well let me put a couple of thoughts out and then turn to my colleagues and have them pick up it's quite interesting the two questions what really could the United States do and should it do and how to look at that question on the one hand and on the other what are the Europeans what's the real European attitude if I could put the two of them together the heart of this report is that there is a role for the United States because it's important we get involved re-involved refocused re-energized on the question of the Vulcans because we have real interest at stake and we try to define those interests as clearly as we can now what does that actually mean practically it means number one and the most important is right at the top of the United States government the president of the United States his senior cabinet have to say the Vulcans matters and that's on our agenda with Europe and we need to form a common cause to take advantage of this promising year and put our respective collective shoulders to the wheel it starts there it's a political decision it's not just needling Europeans at second echelons of the United States government it's a genuine political commitment the burden of the two however will fall obviously more on Europe after all these nations will end up being one way or the other part of a European Union but they'll also be part of NATO so the burden falls on us particularly to focus on the security aspect how do you expand NATO and I'm pleased to hear that you're considering fresh ways to think about accelerating NATO's involvement PFP has made its contribution in the past we have troops on the ground in Kosovo we believe that NATO can do more to entice, bring along our Balkan colleagues NATO can for example also take on a more determined responsibility for the creation of a small self-defense force in Kosovo as unhappy as that news may fall in Belgrade it only makes sense that we put ourselves firmly behind that objective now that's what the United States can, should, must and our judgment do but it is a catalytic role finally to look at all foreign policy issues the United States faces around the world is where is the American leadership position is not where I believe this country ought to be headed and I don't think any of the members of this panel believe that here's a really good case where the careful deployment of American influence some resources can make a big difference if we start with a political commitment at the top so let me pause there I don't underestimate the difficulties of moving this country nor do I underestimate Marcy the problems on the European front but I can tell you it is fascinating talking with Europeans today they are completely ambivalent they will list the difficulties and they will acknowledge the demand and we are seeing it not only in the commission but in the statements of individuals in governments the question is how do you bring those two together and here I think sparking a discussion across the Atlantic is one way that you try to bridge the gap between what is the recognition of reality and a reluctance to actually have to deal with it Cameron you wanted to add behind that fundamental goal of what we're doing is the recognition that we don't go into in depth here that just because we're saying America needs to talk to Europe doesn't mean that the only place we talk is in multilateral fora that is yes it's important to go to the EU summit yes it's important to go to the NATO summit but we also should be thinking realistically about which countries really care or have the capacity to do things of course America should deal when it's talking to Germany to talk about what they have in common in which how does leadership of America and Germany play a role if for example the Brits have something else on their mind these days it may be that what we remember in the past about a leading role for the British might be less that is it's not just an amorphous America and an amorphous Europe there's going to be specific decisions but those won't happen unless the leadership that Frank talks about takes place similarly I think that there can be a leadership role for business we talked about the role in the development of the infrastructure it doesn't stop there I think that business even nonprofits even the US Institute of Peace or the East West Institute God knows there's a role to be played in the dialogue but that role is not likely to go anywhere unless there is that kind of political commitment that then gets the leadership of those countries to look for solutions and to actually just get the blood circulating a little more Sure, happy to say a few words so just in response to Ambassador Reese's good question about the European Union's appetite for addressing these kinds of issues this is a tricky one I think part of what we're trying to do in this report and I think we're not alone in this is to make an observation that European colleagues are beginning to make as well which is that there's this tendency to mistake stasis for stability and particularly in Bosnia Tom Miller and I, who's in the audience is our ambassador in Sarajevo for a number of years when I was in the government as well and in some ways the situation is static it doesn't actually look that different from when Tom and I were serving in government and dealing with the Bosnia issue but the fact that it's been static for all those years doesn't mean it's stable and in fact in some ways it's getting a lot less stable and that's quite rightly focusing the mind and this report is a part of an effort to encourage people to do that to catalyze that, to encourage our European colleagues who've come off a tough road in terms of their internal dynamics to think hard about what more they can do as well as encourage our own government at a senior leadership level to participate actively in re-energizing that engagement We're going to go back to the audience but I'd like to hear if possible whether or not there's a road show for this in Europe whether there's a conversation in London or Brussels or Berlin Answers, yes Good, yeah Barry Wood, economics columnist I've just come back from the Balkans I wanted to ask what do you think the implications of a settlement in Macedonia will be in terms of moving forward that country and perhaps Serbia towards EU membership Let's take one on the other side of the room No one over there Okay, the gentleman far back Thank you, my name is Har Savasvar which I'm currently independent I'm former representative of Bosnia-Herzegovina at the Vorban Group I would like to ask the question related to election law So I think that in Bosnia-Herzegovina last four election cycles we have a very, very similar pattern We are discussing big political changes in the front of the elections Cycle before we discussed the Shvinci ruling then we had discussions putting a discussion on constitutional changes and then April package all those discussions failed so far So I think there's something that has to be changed this regard So what do you think about the idea to open discussion about the political reforms in the country just after the elections? Where the capacity of the political parties to make a compromise is much bigger than in the front of the election years And second thing, I think that focusing on only one issue, very important issue is always very difficult to reach an agreement especially in such circumstances I'll remind you that two years ago we had a 94th decision of the constitutional court of Bosnia-Herzegovina not being implemented So can we open the broader discussion about all those other decisions that are supposed to be implemented and then to initiate the whole broader and comprehensive discussion about the rule of law in the country and that will help reach some political solutions as well That's one question and second question or more comment if you don't mind Very brief I was really surprised to hear and I have to comment on that that EU has requested Serbia to get more engaged in Bosnia-Herzegovina and play a more constructive role I think that Bosnia-Herzegovina had over the last 25 years a lot of engagement of the neighbours and I think that the message is supposed to be completely on the opposite side Thank you very much To the panelists Macedonia, Bosnia Let me say a few words about Macedonia and it's the trajectory that we're looking at I'm pleased to bring some good news and some less promising news The good news is that our that quite literally today the number of issues between the Greek government and the Macedo and the Skopje government have been narrowed considerably Second, the atmosphere appears to be unprecedented in the warmth of the dialogue the exchanges the practicality that the two sides are bringing to the table The personal chemistry between the two prime ministers the two foreign ministers is apparently just really outstanding Now on top of it the United States is giving a good nudge the Europeans are pushing So there is a serious possibility that the two sides could find We're not there yet but it is highly promising That said What is this all about? It's about a name and it's about two countries and it's about the future of the Balkans It's about Macedonia's future inside the EU and inside of NATO A fact that Tom I'm sure would agree is one of the reasons Russia plays such a disruptive role in the region is to make certain they're not more people in NATO and more problems more people with sanctions imposed on Russia So what's the path forward? I think we have to be a bit cautious Any agreement that's reached has got to go through the Greek Parliament That's a challenge Second, if my understanding is correct in terms of the Macedonians you need three things You need a parliamentary decision a change in the constitution and a national popular referendum So frankly if the two sides reach an agreement tomorrow morning I think we're weeks if not months away before you could even begin to see that actually politically accepted by the two sides then you begin the processes for NATO and for the EU So there is no immediate promise out there there's a lot of very hard work that lies ahead And just what's really important of course everything Frank says is usually pretty important but what I think is very important about this is the atmosphere we're not used to the kind of atmospherics that we're seeing there and I think the question had something to do with whether this had an impact on Serbia it has already had an impact in Serbia on the way in which Serbian leadership is talking with its neighbors in Macedonia and trying to figure out how if the good friends of Serbia, that is the Greeks are able to make an agreement how that can just play into a kind of atmospheric change that could be very beneficial in talks on beyond substance Jonathan do you want to speak to the issue of delaying on the Bosnian? I didn't catch the gentleman's name from Bosnia who spoke but his question was certainly well taken one it's the Setic Finci ruling from the European Court of Human Rights for those not deeply into the Talmud of the Balkans is a ruling that the Bosnian that the European Court of Human Rights handed down some years ago that the feature of the Dayton Constitution requiring people to qualify for positions in the tripartite presidency at the national level assigned themselves to one of the three principal ethnic groups was inconsistent with the European Convention on Human Rights that figuring out sort of how to square that with the fundamental deal of Dayton is a puzzle that I'm not sure any of us have ever sort of figured our way through and similarly the sort of the full April package obviously unfortunately didn't succeed in terms of sort of moving Dayton forward to the next level and that also has been the kind of fundamental reform that people have kicked down the road for the time being I think our instinct as a group is that the first thing we need to do in Bosnia is stop the bleeding we need to get through the electoral law we need to get a stable government and we need to get the parties working together motivated by concrete carrots offered by partners in Europe partners in the United States beyond the the more distant character of ultimately membership in the European Union in engaging in the kind of smaller board confidence building measures that will get that country working again as a more normal country and at some point yes Dayton was never meant to be final in the form that it was signed it was meant to be a framework and the framework and principles of the Dayton piece of cords certainly need to be maintained to maintain peace on the ground but as Ambassador Hobrick always said there was a Dayton plus around the corner and that time I think will eventually come but we are not there right now we're in a much different and somewhat more dangerous place Dayton plus plus the north side of the room we have one here and then we'll go back to the we're the western side hi my name is Arsim I am from Baltimore I originally am from Kosovo I lived in Croatia even you never mentioned Croatia today my question when I hear about Serbia and follow Serbia news like I don't know which world you are living but to illustrate like what's happening in Serbia now in Serbia and Parliament we have association of Serbian Syrian friendship Serbian Russian friendship Serbian North Korean friendship now historically looking politically Serbia never behaved the last 100 years what are indications the next 100 years going to be better okay question on Serbia and this gentleman I was Ambassador in Greece in Bosnia just a comment and then a question Frank remember that on the Macedonia issue it's got to go through all kinds of hoops in Macedonia but it's also going to probably be the subject of the next Greek election and unfortunately Mitsutakis the son of is going to make a big deal of this so it's not a done deal in Greece by any means now the question I've got and this goes back to Bosnia Jonathan is I just glance through your report a lot of it is the what what you need you need a new electoral law you need this you need that if you don't get it you go to the high rep Jonathan you and I both know the high rep went to sleep about 15 17 years ago and so you're not going to get the bond powers being used you'll know this and so my question is broader than that and that is your report deals with the what and I would ask you to focus a little bit on the how in Bosnia and focus not so much on what we should do or the Europeans should do but I still get back to Bosnia periodically and I find that the leadership many of whom were in office when I was there and that's a long time ago these guys are very comfortable they you know they're not changing for a reason we might want all the things you've got in your report but they don't so can you talk a little bit about the how and focus on them rather than us can I just piggyback and say the question of personality and chemistry is so important here with the possibilities of having somebody who would wake up in that office also to remind us that we've got about seven minutes to address these very important questions and any other thoughts that you that you have I'll take a quick stab at the Serbia question you know I just I have the unfortunate American optimism I'm from the West Coast I'm just a man without history you know I think I think that come to the Balkans there's plenty to go around but I just have to say you know the remarkable changes that have taken place at certain levels in Serbia society those if you look at the way that the Serbian economy is slowly changing slowly there is you know the same kind of problem Serbia is suffering from that many countries are suffering from you know Shumadia is in terrible trouble Belgrade is in many ways booming is it booming in a way we'd like it to boom not exactly but in other words it is not even your brothers let alone your father's Serbia it is changing now within Serbia changing I don't believe in the immutable evil of any country you know that these people have been bad for 100 years and they're never going to get good to me that's not useful what we have to look for is the ways that are their constituencies within Serbia who are committed to the kind of ideas that we have and I believe there are and we've met them we've gone out and we've met them now we're being selective there's plenty of people who are angry about the way things are moving but you know there's plenty of people in the Netherlands who are angry about the way things are going this is not just something that is unique to these countries in the region so I would only say A we're focusing on trying to identify those people who if the Americans and the Europeans in tandem are able to show leadership would be willing to be supportive of the kind of efforts that we make there's no guarantee it's going to work but I tend to be a little bit less dismissive of the role of Serbian society if I understood your question correctly now that was the easy one I'm going to pass but yes yes I mean if we're going to talk this way then we may as well close up shop then in your case over to the easy one and now I got to deal with Tom Miller okay this is the way it's been for me for a long time it's all about chemistry so so Bosnian how do we do it first of all on the high rev I mean obviously you're right Tom we're not going to go back to the days of Patty Ash down throwing the lightning bolts out and telling everybody how it's going to be that's not going to happen I do think however that with respect to the election law if this doesn't get sorted that probably is a prospect that the high rep will step in if it really has to happen but I don't think that's going to happen without things really coming to the wall but I would not discount the possibility that tool is there and I think it needs to be there and preserved in order for the parties to get to a decision so that's that but let me answer the harder question which is or at least try which is how do we get parties who have I think you're absolutely right develop a certain level of comfort with the wiggle room with which they've been able to operate the opportunities for personal enrichment and enrichment of friends and political cronies that the situation provides and how do you unseat that I think the only way to unseat it is to play upon the fundamental fact that the people Bosnia are themselves not happy the political class may be happy people Bosnia are not happy and that means that if there's a real opportunity for things to get better in a meaningful way that's concrete and demonstrable that the needle can move that's what we have to believe and that's what we're going to try and that's what we're trying to encourage policy makers to steer toward Sarah if you'd forgive me if I had just a thought on what John has just said I think Tom when you have a chance take a look at what we put in the report as well we tried to come up in Bosnia with a set of carrots and sticks inducements so young Bosnians really Bosniaks see some hope for themselves and don't have to leave the country that there are ways of beginning to offer serious European inducements and even measured steps towards NATO and they're articulated but we also said there are sticks now the bond powers is one that we perhaps undervalue because it hasn't been used despite not without effort on the part of the United States but I don't know and I think I reflect what John's saying what will happen next year if the budget if there's no budget and no parliament to pass a budget there's a real crisis then there's no money in the system to pay all of those who are waiting do bond powers become more likely under those circumstances may take a crisis but what we wanted to do with the report is to remind all of us readers thinkers about this bond powers exist they may not be there may not be a finger on the trigger today but there are other there are other negatives as well that I think we can use we've begun tentatively the United States is singularly finger do-ditch and put him in the dock there are plenty of ways to block accounts, sanction recalcitrant leaders and we recommend a vigorous look at deploying those powers because there has to be a cost for inaction or blocking behavior finally in a hundred years from now in Serbia I'm enough of a lover of Balkan history to think that things really don't change in a secular fashion but yes I think Cameron's right Europe is changing the world is changing the Balkans will not be stuck you can't constantly roll your dice against the force of history I'd like to be an optimist as Cameron is and not feel in a hundred years that Serbia will be as recalcitrant on some of the issues we're talking about today after all in the final analysis and we try to make the point in the report Serbia is a great nation with a terrific history magnificent culture strong industrial base it has something to contribute and so being a responsible party ought to be part of way Serbia's look about their own future we ought to look at Serbs in that way too and they need to know that we think of them I want to just thank you for mentioning youth because I think the younger generation is particularly critical and as we go forward we should be thinking about ways to engage young people and thinking about their future I want to let you know that on May 31 at 2pm at the east west office in New York this report will also be officially launched this is the real rollout you're present at the creation this is the real rollout but we are going to talk to the community in New York especially the community in the UN community but also people in media finance etc and as I think one of the questions came we will also be going to the region as well as to European capitals to make sure that we get both the input and try to make the points that we've made at this session and thank you to our hosts USIP for their continued focus on the Balkans and particularly focus on the western Balkans and to the panelists for great participation and to you thank you