Book 5, Chapter 7 of History of Florence by Machiavelli, Volume 2. Book 5, Chapter 7. Rescue relieved by Sforza, his other victories, Piccinino is recalled into Lombardy. He endeavours to bring the Florentines to an engagement. He is routed before Anghiari, serious disorders in the camp of the Florentines after the victory. Death of Rinaldo Dele Albitzi, his character, Neri Caponi goes to recover the Cacentino. The Count de Poppi surrenders, his discourse upon quitting his possessions. While these events were taking place in Tuscany, so little to the advantage of the Duke, his affairs in Lombardy were in a still worse condition. The Count Francesco, as soon as the season would permit, took the field with his army, and the Venetians having again covered the lake with their galleys, he determined first of all to drive the Duke from the water, judging, that this once affected, his remaining task would be easy. He therefore, with the Venetian fleet, attacked that of the Duke and destroyed it. His land-forces took the castle's help of Pilipo, and the Ducal troops who were besieging Brestia being informed of these transactions withdrew, and thus the city, after standing a three-year siege, was at length relieved. The Count then went in quest of the enemy, whose forces were encamped before Cincino, a fortress situated upon the river Olio. These he dislodged and compelled to retreat to Cremona, where the Duke again collected his forces, and prepared for his defense. But the Count constantly pressing him more closely, he became apprehensive of losing either the whole or the greater part of his territories, and perceiving the unfortunate step he had taken in sending Nicola into Tuscany in order to correct his error, he wrote to acquaint him with what had happened, desiring him with all possible dispatch, to leave Tuscany and return to Lombardy. In the meantime the Florentines, under their commissaries, had drawn together their forces, and being joined by those of the Pope, halted at Angari, a castle placed at the foot of the mountains that divide the Valdita Veri from the Valditiani, distant four miles from the Borgos San Sepulco on a level road, and in a country suitable for the devolutions of cavalry or a battlefield. As the Senori had heard of the Count's victory and the recall of Nicolo, they imagined that without again drawing the sword, or disturbing the dust under their horse's feet, the victory was their own, and the war at an end. They wrote to the commissaries, desiring them to avoid an engagement, as Nicolo could not remain much longer in Tuscany. These instructions, coming to the knowledge of Piccinino, and perceiving the necessity of his speedy return to leave nothing unattempted, he determined to engage the enemy, expecting to find them unprepared and not disposed for battle. In this determination he was confirmed by Ronaldo, the Count of Depoppe, and other Florentine exiles, who saw their inevitable ruin in the departure of Nicolo, and hoped that if he engaged the enemy, they would either be victorious or vanquished without dishonour. This resolution being adopted, Nicolo led his army, unperceived by the enemy, from the Cittadicastello to the Borgo, where he enlisted two thousand men, who, trusting the general's talents and promises, followed him in hope of plunder. Nicolo then led his forces in battle array towards Anghiari, and had arrived within two miles of the place, when Michirotto at Tendulo observed great clouds of dust, and conjecturing at once that it must be occasioned by the enemy's approach, immediately called the troops to arms. Great confusion prevailed in the Florentine camp, for the ordinary negligence and want of discipline were now increased by their presuming the enemy to be at a distance, and they were more disposed to fight than to battle, so that every one was unarmed, and some, wandering from the camp, either led by their desire to avoid the excessive heat, or in pursuit of amusement. So great was the diligence of the commissaries and of the captain, that before the enemy's arrival the men were mounted and prepared to resist their attack, and as Michirotto was the first to observe their approach, he was also first armed and ready to meet them, and with his troops hastened to the bridge which crosses the river at a short distance from Anghiari. Pietro Giampa Golo, having previous to the surprise filled up the ditches on either side of the road, and levelled the ground between the bridge and Anghiari, and Michirotto having taken his position in front of the former, the Legate and Simonsino, who led the troops of the church, took post on the right, and the commissaries of the Florentines, with Pietro Giampa Golo, their captain, on the left. The infantry being drawn up along the banks of the river. Thus, the only course the enemy could take was the direct one over the bridge, nor had the Florentines any other field for their exertions, excepting that their infantry were ordered, in case their cavalry were attacked in flank by the hostile infantry, to assail them with their crossbows and prevent them from wounding the flanks of the horses crossing the bridge. Michirotto bravely withstood the enemy's charge upon the bridge, but Astore and Francesco Picinino, coming up, with the picked body of men, attacked him so vigorously that he was compelled to give way, and was pushed as far as the foot of the hill which rises towards the Borgo d'Anghiari, but they were in turn repulsed and driven over the bridge by the troops that took them in flank. The battle continued two hours, during which each side had frequent possession of the bridge, and their attempts upon it were attended with equal success, but on both sides of the river the disadvantage of Nicola was manifest, for when his people crossed the bridge they found the enemy unbroken and the ground being leveled. They could maneuver without difficulty, and the weary be relieved by such as were fresh. But when the Florentines crossed, Nicola could not leave those that were harassed on account of the hindrance interposed by the ditches and embankments on each side of the road. Thus, whenever his troops got possession of the bridge, they were soon repulsed by the fresh forces of the Florentines. But when the bridge was taken by the Florentines, and they passed over and proceeded upon the road, Nicola, having no opportunity to reinforce his troops, being prevented by the impetuosity of the enemy and the inconvenience of the ground, the rearguard became mingled with the van, and occasioned the utmost confusion and disorder. They were forced to flee and hastened at full speed toward the Borgo. The Florentine troops fell upon the plunder, which was very valuable in horses, prisoners and military stores, for not more than a thousand of the enemy's cavalry reached the town. The people of the Borgo, who had followed Nicola in the hope of plunder, became booty themselves, all of them being taken and obliged to pay a ransom. The colours and carriages were also captured. This victory was much more advantageous to the Florentines than injurious to the Duke. For, had they been conquered, Tuscany would have been his own, but he by his defeat only lost the horses and accoutments of his army, which could be replaced without any very serious expense. Nor was there ever an instance of wars being carried on in an enemy's country with less injury to the assailants than this, for in so great a defeat, and in a battle which continued for hours, only one man died, and he, not from wounds inflicted by hostile weapons or any honourable means, but having fallen from his horse, was trampled to death. Combatants then engaged with little danger, being nearly all mounted, covered with armour, and preserved from death whenever they chose to surrender. There was no necessity for risking their lives, while fighting their armour defended them, and when they could resist no longer, they yielded and were safe. This battle, from the circumstances which attended and followed it, presents a striking example of the wretched state of military discipline in those times. The enemy's forces being defeated and driven into the borgo, the commissaries desired to pursue them in order to make the victory complete, but not a single condottieri or soldier would obey, alleging, as a sufficient reason for their refusal, that they must take care of the booty and attend to their wounded, and what is still more surprising, the next day, without permission from the commissaries, or the least regard for their commanders, they went to Arezzo, and having secured their plunder, returned to Angari. A thing so contrary to military order and all subordination, that the merest shadow of a regular army would easily and most justly have rested from them the victory they had so undeservedly obtained. Added to this, the men-at-arms or heavy-armed horse who had been taken prisoners, whom the commissaries wished to be detained, that they might not rejoin the enemy, were set at liberty contrary to their orders. It is astonishing that an army so constructed should have sufficient energy to obtain the victory, or that any should be found so imbecile as to allow such a disorderly rabble to vanquish them. The time occupied by the Florentine forces in going and returning from Arezzo gave Nicolo opportunity of escaping from the borgo and proceeding toward Romagna. Along with him also fled the Florentine exiles, who, finding no hope of their return home, took up their abodes in various parts of Italy, each according to his own convenience. Rinaldo made choice of Ancona, and, to gain admission to the celestial country, having lost the terrestrial, he performed a pilgrimage to the Holy Sepulchre, whence, having returned, he died suddenly while at the table at the celebration of the marriage of one of his daughters, an instance of fortune's favour in removing him from the troubles of this world upon the least sorrowful day of his exile. Rinaldo Dalvizi appeared respectable under every change of condition, and would have been more so had he lived in a united city, for many qualities were injurious to him in a factious community, which in an armonious one would have done him honour. When the forces returned from Arezzo, Nicolo being then gone, the Commissaries presented themselves at the Borgo, the people of which were willing to submit to the Florentines, but their offer was declined, and while negotiations were pending, the post-Legate imagined the Commissaries' design to take it from the church. Hard words were exchanged, and hostilities might have ensued between the Florentine and ecclesiastical forces if the misunderstanding had continued much longer. But as it was brought to the conclusion desired by the Legate, peace was restored. While the affair of the Borgo Sansepolca was in progress, Nicolo Piccinino was supposed to have marched toward Rome, other accounts said La Marca, and hence the Legate and the Count's forces moved towards Perugia to relieve La Marca or Rome, as the case might be, and Bernardo de Medici accompanied them. Neri led the Florentine forces to recover this Castantino, and pitched his camp for a sinner, which he took, together with Bibiena, Prato Vecchio, and Romena. From thence he proceeded to Poppi, and invested it on two sides with his forces, in one direction toward the plain of Certo Mondo, and the other upon the hill extending to Fonzole. The Count finding himself abandoned to his fate had shut himself up in Poppi, not with any hope of assistance, but with a view to make the best terms he could. Neri pressing him, he offered to capitulate, and obtained reasonable conditions, namely, security for himself and family, with leave to take whatever he could carry away, on condition of ceding his territories and government to the Florentines. When he perceived the full extent of his misfortune, standing upon the bridge which crosses the Arno, close to Poppi, he turned to Neri in great distress, and said, Had I well considered my own opinion and the power of the Florentines, I should now have been a friend of the Republic, and congratulating you on your victory. Not an enemy compelled to supplicate some alleviation of my woe. The recent events which to you bring glory and joy to me are full of wretchedness and sorrow. Once I possessed horses, arms, subjects, grandeur, and wealth. Can it be surprising that I part with them reluctantly? But as you possessed both the power and the inclination to command the whole of Tuscany, we must of necessity obey you, and had I not committed this error my misfortune would not have occurred.  Therefore, let your pity pass by my fault, and allow me to retain this single house to leave to the descendants of those from whom your fathers have received innumerable benefits. To this Neri replied, that his having expected great results from men who were capable of doing only very little had led him to commit so great a fault against the Republic of Florence, that every circumstance considered he must surrender all those places to the Florentines as an enemy which he was unwilling to hold as a friend, that he had set such an example as it would be most highly impolitic to encourage, for upon a change of fortune it might injure the Republic, and it was not himself they feared, but his power while lord of the Cassantino. If however he could live as a prince in Germany, the citizens would be very much grudified, and out of love to those ancestors of whom he had spoken they would be glad to assist him. To this the Count in greater anger replied, he wished the Florentines at a much greater distance. Attempting no longer to preserve the least urbanity of demeanor, he ceded the place and all its dependencies to the Florentines, and with his treasure, wife and children, took his departure, mourning the loss of a territory which his forefathers had held during four hundred years. When all these victories were known at Florence, the government and people were transported with joy. Benedetto de Medici, finding the report of Nicola having proceeded either to Rome or to La Marca, incorrect, returned with his forces to Neri, and they proceeded together to Florence, where the highest honours were decreed to them which it was customary with the city to bestow upon her victorious citizens, and they were received by the scenery, the Capitani de Parti, and the whole city in triumphal pomp. Chapter 1 of History of Florence by Machiavelli Volume 2. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Nicholas Clifford. History of Florence and of the affairs of Italy by Nicolò Machiavelli Volume 2, translated by an unknown translator. Book 6, Chapter 1. Reflections on the Object of War and the Use of Victory. Nicolò reinforces his army. The Duke of Milan endeavors to recover the services of Count Francesco Sforza. Suspicions of the Venetians. They acquire Ravenna. The Florentines purchase the Borgo Sansepolcro of the Pope. Piccinino makes an excursion during the winter. The Count besieged in his camp before Martinango. The insolence of Nicolò Piccinino. The Duke in revenge makes peace with the League. Sforza assisted by the Florentines. Those who make war have always and very naturally designed to enrich themselves and impoverish the enemy. Neither is victory sought or conquest desirable, except to strengthen themselves and weaken the enemy. Hence it follows that those who are impoverished by victory or debilitated by conquest must either have gone beyond or fallen short of the end for which wars are made. A republic or a prince is enriched by the victories he obtains when the enemy is crushed and possession is retained of the plunder and ransom. Victory is injurious when the foe escapes or when the soldiers appropriate the booty and ransom. In such a case losses are unfortunate and conquests still more so, for the vanquished suffers the injuries inflicted by the enemy and the victor, those occasioned by his friends, which being less justifiable, must cause the greater pain, particularly from a consideration of his being thus compelled to oppress his people by an increased burden of taxation. A ruler possessing any degree of humanity cannot rejoice in a victory that afflicts his subjects. The victories of the ancient and well-organized republics enable them to fill their treasuries with gold and silver, one from their enemies, to distribute gratuities to the people, reduce taxation, and by games and solemn festivals disseminate universal joy. But the victories obtained at the times of which we speak first emptied the treasury and then impoverished the people without giving the victorious party security from the enemy. This arose entirely from the disorders inherent in their mode of warfare, for the vanquished soldiery divesting themselves of their accoutrements and being neither slain nor detained prisoners, only deferred a renewed attack on the conqueror, till their leader had furnished them with arms and horses. Besides this, both ransom and booty being appropriated by the troops, the victorious princes could not make use of them for raising fresh forces, but were compelled to draw the necessary means from their subjects' purses. And this was the only result of victory experienced by the people, except that it diminished the rulers' reluctance to such a course, and made him less particular about his mode of oppressing them. The such estate had the practice of war been brought by the sort of soldiery then on foot, that the victor and the vanquished, when desirous of their services, alike needed fresh supplies of money, for the one had to re-equip them and the other to bribe them. The vanquished could not fight without being remounted, and the conquerors would not take the field without a new gratuity. Hence it followed that the one derived little advantage from the victory, and the other was the less injured by defeat, for the routed party had to be re-equipped, and the victorious could not pursue his advantage. From this disorderly and perverse method of procedure, it arose that before Nicolò's defeat became known throughout Italy, he had again reorganized his forces and harassed the enemy with greater vigor than before. Hence also it happened that after his disaster at Tenna, he so soon occupied Verona, that being deprived of his army at Verona, he was shortly able to appear with a large force in Tuscany, that being completely defeated at Anghiari before he reached Tuscany, he was more powerful in the field than ever. He was thus enabled to give the Duke of Milan hopes of defending Lombardy, which by his absence appeared to be lost. For while Nicolò spread consternation throughout Tuscany, disasters in the former province so alarmed the Duke that he was afraid his utter ruin would ensue before Nicolò, whom he had recalled, could come to his relief and check the impetuous progress of the Count. Under these impressions, the Duke, to ensure by policy that success which he could not command by arms, had recourse to remedies, which on similar occasions had frequently served his turn. He sent Nicolò da Esti, Prince of Ferrara, to the Count, who was then at Peschiera, to persuade him that this war was not to his advantage, for if the Duke became so ruined as to be unable to maintain his position among the states of Italy, the Count would be the first to suffer, for he would cease to be of importance either with the Venetians or the Florentines, and to prove the sincerity of his wish for peace he offered to fulfill the engagement he had entered into with regard to his daughter and send her to Ferrara so that as soon as peace was established the union might take place. The Count replied that if the Duke really wished for peace he might easily be gratified, as the Florentines and the Venetians were equally anxious for it. True it was, he could with difficulty credit him knowing that he had never made peace but from necessity, and when this no longer pressed him again desired war. Neither could he give credence to what he had said concerning the marriage, having been so repeatedly deceived, yet when peace was concluded he would take the advice of his friends on that subject. The Venetians, who were sometimes needlessly jealous of their soldiery, became greatly alarmed at these proceedings, and not without reason. The Count was aware of this, and wishing to remove their apprehensions, pursued the war with unusual vigor, but his mind had become so unsettled by ambition and the Venetians by jealousy that little further progress was made during the remainder of the summer. And upon the return of Nicolae into Lombardy, winter having already commenced, the armies withdrew into quarters, the Count of Verona, the Florentine forces to Tuscany, the Dukes to Cremona, and those of the Pope to Romagna. The latter, after having been victorious at Anghiari, made an unsuccessful attack upon Fugli and Bologna, with a view to rest them from Nicolò Piccinino, but they were gallantly defended by his son Francesco. However, the arrival of the papal forces so alarmed the people of Ravenna with the fear of becoming subject to the church, that by consent of Ostasio de Polenta, their Lord, they placed themselves under the power of the Venetians, who, in return for the territory, and that Ostasio might never retake by force what he had imprudently given them, sent him and his son to Candia, where they died. In the course of these affairs, the Pope, notwithstanding the victory at Anghiari, became so in want of money that he sold the fortress of Borgo Sansepolcro to the Florentines for 25,000 ducats. Affairs being thus situated, each party supposed winter would protect them from the evils of war and thought no more of peace. This was particularly the case with the Duke, who, being rendered doubly secure by the season and by the presence of Nicolò, broke off all attempts to affect reconciliation with the Count. Reorganized Nicolò's forces and made every requisite preparation for the future struggle. The Count, being informed of this, went to Venice to consult with the Senate on the course to be pursued during the next year. Nicolò, on the other hand, being quite prepared and seeing the enemy unprovided, did not await the return of spring, but crossed the Adda during severe weather, occupied the whole Brescian territory, except Odula and Acre, and made prisoners 2,000 horse belonging to Francesco's forces, who had no apprehension of an attack. But the greatest source of anxiety to the Count, and alarmed at the Venetians, was the desertion of his service by Giarpelone, one of his principal officers. Francesco, on learning these matters, immediately left Venice and, arriving at Brescia, found that Nicolò, after doing all the mischief he could, had retired to his quarters. And therefore, finding the war concluded for the present, was not disposed to rekindle it, but rather to use the opportunity afforded by the season and his enemies of reorganizing his forces, so as to be able, when spring arrived, to avenge himself for his former injuries. To this end, he induced the Venetians to recall the forces they had in Tuscany in the Florentine service, and to order that to succeed Garemelata, who was dead, Nicolotto at Endulo should take command. On the approach of spring, Nicolò Piccinino was the first to take the field, and, encamped before Cignano, a fortress 12 miles from Brescia, the Count marched to its relief, and the war between them was conducted in the usual manner. The Count, apprehensive for the city of Bergamo, besieged Martinengo, a castle so situated that the possession of it would enable him to relieve the former, which was closely pressed by Nicolò, who, having foreseen that the enemy could impede him only from the direction of Martinengo, had put the castle into a complete state of defense so that the Count was obliged to lend his whole force to the siege. Upon this, Nicolò placed his troops in a situation calculated to intercept the Count's provisions, and fortified himself with trenches and bastions in such a manner that he could not be attacked without the most manifest hazard to his assailant. Hence the besiegers were more distressed than the people of Martinengo whom they besieged. The Count could not hold his position for want of food, nor quit it without imminent danger, so that the Duke's victory appeared certain and defeat equally inevitable to the Count and the Venetians. But fortune never destitute of means to assist her favorites or to injure others, caused the hope of victory to operate so powerfully upon Nicolò Piccinino and made him assume such a tone of unbounded insolence that, losing all respect for himself and the Duke, he sent him word that having served under his ensign for so long without obtaining sufficient land to serve him for a grave, he wished to know from himself what was to be the reward of his labors, for it was in his power to make him master of Lombardy and place all his enemies in his power. And, as a certain victory ought to be attended by a sure remuneration, he desired the Duke to concede to him the city of Piacenza, that when weary with his lengthened services he might at last but take himself to repose. Nor did he hesitate, in conclusion, to threaten if his requests were not granted to abandon the enterprise. This injurious and most insolent mode of proceeding highly offended the Duke, and on further consideration he determined rather to let the expedition altogether fail than consent to his general's demand. Thus, what all the dangers he had incurred and the threats of his enemies could not draw from him, the insolent behavior of his friends made him willing to propose. He resolved to come to terms with the Count and sent Antonio Guido Buono of Tortona to offer his daughter in conditions of peace which were accepted with great pleasure by the Count and also by the colleagues as far as themselves were concerned. The terms being secretly arranged, the Duke sent to command Nicolò to make a truce with the Count for one year, intimating that being exhausted with the expense he could not forego a certain peace for a doubtful victory. Nicolò was utterly astonished at this resolution and could not imagine what had induced the Duke to lose such a glorious opportunity. Nor could he surmise that to avoid rewarding his friends he would save his enemies and therefore to the utmost of his power he opposed this resolution and the Duke was obliged in order to induce his compliance to threaten that if he did not obey he would give him up to his soldiers and his enemies. Nicolò submitted and with the feelings of one compelled to leave the country and friends, complaining of his hard fate that fortune and the Duke were robbing him of the victory over his enemies. The truce being arranged, the marriage of the Duke's daughter Bianca to the Count was solemnized, the Duke giving Cremona for her portion. This being over peace was concluded in November 1441 at which Francesco Barbadico and Pagolo Trono were present for the Venetians and for the Florentines Agnolo Acaioli. Peschiera Asola Adlonato, castles in the Manchuan territory were assigned to the Venetians. The war in Lombardy was concluded but the dissensions in the Kingdom of Naples continued and the inability to compose them occasioned the resumptions of those arms which had been so recently laid aside. Alfonso of Aragon had during these wars taken from Rene the whole Kingdom except Naples, so that thinking he had victory in his power he resolved during the siege of Naples to take Benevento and his other possessions in that neighborhood from the Count and thought he might easily accomplish this while the latter was engaged in the wars of Lombardy. Having heard of the conclusion of peace, Alfonso feared the Count would not only come for the purpose of recovering his territories but also to favor Rene and Rene himself had hope of his assistance for the same reason. The latter therefore sent to the Count begging he would come to the relief of a friend and avenge himself of an enemy. On the other hand Alfonso entreated Filippo for the sake of the friendship which subsisted between them to find the Count some other occupation that being engaged in greater affairs he might not have an opportunity of interfering between them. Filippo complied with this request without seeming to be aware that he violated the peace recently made so greatly to his disadvantage. He therefore signified to Pope Eugenius that the present was a favorable opportunity for recovering the territories which the Count had taken from the Church and that he might be in a condition to use it offered him the services of Nicolò Piccinino and engaged to pay him during the war who since the peace of Lombardy had remained with his forces in Romania. Eugenius eagerly took the advice induced by his hatred of the Count and his desire to recover his lost possessions. Feeling assured that although on a former occasion he had been duped by Nicolò it would be improper now that the Duke had feared to suspect any deceit and joining his forces to those of Nicolò he assailed La Marca. The Count astonished at such an unexpected attack, assembled his troops and went to meet the enemy. In the meantime King Alfonso took possession of Naples so that the whole kingdom except Castel Nuova was in his power. Leaving a strong guard at Castel Nuova, Rene set out and came to Florence where he was most honorably received and having remained a few days finding he could not continue the war he withdrew to Marseille. In the meantime Alfonso took Castel Nuova and the Count found himself assailed in the Marca Inferiore, both by the Pope and Nicolò. He applied to the Venetians and the Florentines for assistance in men and money, assuring them that if they did not determine to restrain the Pope and King during his life they would soon afterward find their very existence endangered for both would join Filippo and divide Italy among them. The Florentines and Venetians hesitated for a time, both to consider the propriety of drawing upon themselves the enmity of the Pope and the King and because they were then engaged in the affairs of the Bolognese. Anibale Bentivoglio had driven Francesco Piccinino from Bologna and for defense against the Duke who favored Francesco he demanded and received assistance of the Venetians and Florentines so that being occupied with these matters they could not resolve to assist the Count. But Anibale having routed Francesco Piccinino and those affairs seeming to be settled they resolved to support him. Designing however to make sure of the Duke they offered to renew the league with him to which he was not a verse for although he consented that war should be made against the Count while King René was in arms. Yet finding him now conquered and deprived of the whole kingdom he was not willing that the Count should be despoiled of his territories. And therefore not only consented that assistance should be given him but wrote to Alfonso to be good enough to retire to his kingdom and discontinue hostilities against the Count. And although reluctantly yet in acknowledgement of his obligations to the Duke Alfonso determined to satisfy him and withdrew his forces beyond the Tronto. End of book six chapter one. Book six chapter two of History of Florence by Machiavelli volume two. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Nicholas Clifford. History of Florence and of the affairs of Italy by Niccolò Machiavelli volume two. Translated by an unknown translator. Book six chapter two. Discords of Florence. Jealousy excited against Neri di Gino Caponi. Baldaccio D'Anghiari murdered. Reform of government in favor of the Medici. Enterprises of Sforza and Piccinino. Death of Niccolò Piccinino. End of the war. Disturbances in Bologna. Alibali Bentivoglio slain by Batista Caneschi and the latter by the people. Santi supposed to be the son of Ercole Bentivoglio is called to govern the city of Bologna. Discourse of Cosimo di Medici to him. Perfidious designs of the Duke of Milan against Sforza. General war in Italy. Losses of the Duke of Milan. The Duke has recourse to the Count who makes peace with him. Offers of the Duke and the Venetians to the Count. The Venetians furtively deprive the Count of Cremona. While the affairs of Romagna proceeded thus, the city of Florence was not tranquil. Among the citizens of highest reputation in the government was Neri di Gino Caponi of whose influence Cosimo di Medici had more apprehension than any other. For to the great authority which he possessed in the city was added his influence with the soldiery. Having been often leader of the Florentine forces, he had won their affection by his courage and talents. And the remembrance of his own and his father's victory, the latter having taken Pisa and he himself having overcome Nicolò Piccinino at Anghiari, caused him to be beloved by many and feared by those who were averse to having associates in the government. Among the leaders of the Florentine army was Baldaccio D'Anghiari, an excellent soldier, for in those times there was not one in Italy who surpassed him in vigor either of body or mind. And possessing so much influence with the infantry, whose leader he had always been, many thought they would follow him wherever he chose to lead them. Baldaccio was the intimate friend of Neri who loved him for his talents, of which he had been a constant witness. This excited great suspicion in the other citizens who thinking it alike dangerous either to discharge or retain him in their service, determined to destroy him, and fortune seemed to favor their design. Bartolomeo Orlandini was gonfalonier of justice, the same person who was sent to the defense of Baradi, where Nicolò Piccinino came into Tuscany, as we have related above, and so basely abandoned the past, which by its nature was almost impregnable. So flagrant an instance of cowardice was very offensive to Baldaccio, who on all occasions, both by word and letters, had contributed to make the disgraceful fact known to all. The shame and vexation of Bartolomeo were extreme, so that of all things he wished to avenge himself, thinking with the death of his accuser, to efface the stain upon his character. This feeling of Bartolomeo Orlandini was known to the other citizens, so that they easily persuaded him to put Baldaccio to death, and at one avenge himself, and deliver his country from a man whom they must either retain at great peril or discharge to their greater confusion. Bartolomeo, having therefore resolved to murder him, concealed in his own apartment at the palace several young men all armed. And Baldaccio, entering the piazza, whether it was his daily custom to come, to confer with the magistrates concerning his command, the gonfelinier sent for him, and he, without any suspicion, obeyed. Meeting him in the corridor, which leads to the chambers of the scenery, they took a few turns together, discoursing of his office. When being close to the door of the apartments in which the assassins were concealed, Bartolomeo gave them the signal, upon which they rushed out and, finding Baldaccio alone and unarmed, they slew him and threw the body out of the window, which looks from the palace towards the dogano or custom house. It was then carried into the piazza, where the head being severed, it remained the whole day exposed to the gaze of the people. Baldaccio was married and had only one child, a boy, who survived him but a short time, and his wife, Annalena, thus deprived of both husband and offspring, rejected every proposal for a second union. She converted her house into a monastery, to which she withdrew, and, being joined by many noble ladies, lived in holy seclusion to the end of her days. The convent she founded, in which is named from her, preserves her story in perpetual remembrance. This circumstance served to weaken Nellie's power and made him lose both influence and friends. Nor did this satisfy the citizens who held the reins of government, for it being 10 years since their acquisition of power, and the authority of the Balea expired, many began to exhibit more boldness, both in words and deeds, than seemed consistent with their safety. And the leaders of the party judged that if they wished to preserve their influence, some means must be adopted to increase it. To this end, in 1444, the councils created a new Balea, which reformed the government, gave authority to a limited number to create the scenery, reestablished the chancery of reformations, depriving Filippo Peruzzi of his office of president in it, and appointing another, wholly under their influence. They prolonged the term of exile to those who were banished, put Giovanni di Simone Vespucci in prison, deprive the acopiatore of their enemies of the honors of government, and with them the sons of Piero Baroncelli, the whole of the Seraili, Bartolomeo Fortini, Francesco Castellani, and many others. By these means, they strengthened their authority and influence and humbled their enemies or those whom they suspected of being so. Having thus recovered and confirmed their government, they then turned their attention to external affairs. As observed above, Niccolò Piccinino was abandoned by King Alfonso, and the Count, having been aggrandized by the assistance of the Florentines, attacked and routed him near Fermeau, where after losing nearly the whole of his troops, Niccolò fled to Montecchio, which he fortified in such a manner that in a short time he had again assembled so large an army as enabled him to make head against the Count. Particularly as the season was now come for them to withdraw into quarters. His principal endeavor during the winter was to collect troops, and in this he was assisted both by the Pope and Alfonso, so that upon the approach of spring, both leaders took the field, and Niccolò, being the strongest, reduced the Count to extreme necessity and would have conquered him if the Duke could not contrive to frustrate his designs. Filippo sent to beg he would come to him with all speed, for he wished to have a personal interview that he might communicate matters of the highest importance. Niccolò, anxious to hear them, abandoned a certain victory for a very doubtful advantage, and leaving his son Francesco to command the army, hastened to Milan. The Count being informed of the circumstance would not let slip the opportunity of fighting in the absence of Niccolò, and coming to an engagement near the castle of Monteloro routed the father's forces and took his son prisoner. Niccolò, having arrived at Milan, saw that the Duke had duped him and learning the defeat of his army and the capture of his son. He died of grief in 1445 at the age of 64, having been a brave, rather than a fortunate leader. He left two sons, Francesco and Jacopo, who, possessing less talent than their father, were still more unfortunate, so that the arms of the family became almost annihilated while those of Sforza, being favored by Fortune, attained augmented glory. The Pope, seeing Niccolò's army defeated and himself dead, having little hope of assistance from Aragon, sought peace with the Count and by the intervention of the Florentines, succeeded. Of La Marca, the Pope only retained Osimo, Fabriano and Recanati. All the rest remained in the Count's possession. Peace being restored to La Marca, the whole of Italy would have obtained repose had it not been disturbed by the Bolognese. They were in Bologna, two very powerful families, La Caneschi and the Bentivogli. Of the latter, Anibale was the head of the former Battista, who, as a means of confirming their mutual confidence, had contracted family alliances. But among men who have the same objects of ambition and view, it is easy to form connections but difficult to establish friendship. The Bolognese were in a league with the Venetians and Florentines, which had been affected by the influence of Anibale after they had driven out Francesco Piccinino. And Battista, knowing how earnestly the Duke desired to have the city favorable to him, proposed to assassinate Anibale and put Bologna into his power. This being agreed upon, on the 25th of June, 1445, he attacked Anibale with his men and slew him. And then with shouts of, the Duke, the Duke, rode through the city. The Venetian and Florentine commissaries were in Bologna at the time and at first kept themselves within doors, but finding that the people, instead of favoring the murderers, assembled in the piazza, armed in great numbers, mourning the death of Anibale, they joined them and assembling what forces they could, attacked the Canesci, soon overpowered them, slew part and drove the remainder out of the city. Battista, unable to affect his escape, or his enemies his capture, took refuge in a vault of his house used for storing grain. The friends of the Bentivolhi, having sought him all day and knowing he had not left the city, so terrified his servants that one of them, a groom, disclosed the place of his concealment and being drawn forth in complete armor, he was slain, his body dragged about the streets and afterward burned. Thus the Duke's authority was sufficient to prompt the enterprise, but his force was not at hand to support it. The tumults being settled by the death of Battista and the flight of the Canesci, Bologna still remained in the greatest confusion. There not being one of the house of Bentivolhi of age to govern, Annibale having left her at one son whose name was Giovanni, only six years old, it was apprehended that this union would ensue among the Bentivolhi and cause the return of the Canesci and the ruin both of their own country and party. While in this state of apprehension, Francesco, sometime Count Di Poppi, being at Bologna, informed the rulers of the city that if they wished to be governed by one of the blood of Annibale, he could tell them of one and related that about 20 years ago, Ercole, cousin of Annibale, being at Poppi, became acquainted with the girl of the castle of whom was born a son named Santi, whom Ercole on many occasions acknowledged to be his own, nor could he deny it for whoever knew him and saw the boy could not fail to observe the strongest resemblance. The citizens gave credit to the tale and immediately sent to Florence to see the young man and procure of Cosimo and Neri permission to return with him to Bologna. The reputed father of Santi was dead and he lived under the protection of his uncle whose name was Antonio da Cachese. Antonio was rich, childless, and a friend of Neri to whom the matter, becoming known, he thought it ought neither to be despised nor to hastily accepted and that it would be best for Santi and those who had been sent from Bologna to confer in the presence of Cosimo. They were accordingly introduced and Santi was not merely honored but adored by them. So greatly were they influenced by the spirit of party. However, nothing was done at the time except that Cosimo, taking Santi apart, spoke to him thus, no one can better advise you in this matter than yourself for you have to take that course to which your own mind prompts you. If you be the son of Ercole Bentevolio, you will naturally aspire to those pursuits which are proper to your family and worthy of your father. But if you be the son of Agnolo da Cachese, you will remain in Florence and basely spend the remainder of your days in some branch of the woolen trade. These words greatly influenced the youth who though he had at first almost refused to adopt such a course, said he would submit himself wholly to what Cosimo and Neri should determine. They, ascending to the request of the Bolognese, provided suitable apparel, horses and servants. And in a few days he was escorted by a numerous cavalcade to Bologna where the guardianship of Anibale's son and of the city were placed in his hands. He conducted himself so prudently that although all his ancestors had been slain by their enemies, he lived in peace and died respected by everyone. After the deaths of Nicolò Piccinino and the peace of La Marca, Filippo, wishing to procure a leader of his forces, secretly negotiated with Ciarpelone, one of the principal captains of Count Francesco and arrangements having been made, Ciarpelone asked permission to go to Milan to take possession of certain castles which had been given him by Filippo during the late wars. The Count, suspecting what was in progress in order to prevent the Duke from accommodating himself at his expense, caused Ciarpelone to be arrested and soon afterward put to death, alleging that he had been detected plotting against him. Filippo was highly annoyed and indignant which the Venetians and Florentines were glad to observe for their greatest fear was that the Duke and the Count should become friends. The Duke's anger caused the renewal of war in La Marca. Gismondo Malatesti, Lord of Rimino, being son-in-law of the Count, expected to obtain Pesaro, but the Count, having obtained possession, gave it to his brother, Alessandro. Gismondo, offended at this, was still further exasperated in finding that Federico di Montefeltro, his enemy, by the Count's assistance, gained possession of Urbino. He therefore joined the Duke and solicited the Pope and the King to make war against the Count, who, to give Gismondo a taste of the war he so much desired, resolved to take the initiative and attacked him immediately. Thus, Romagna and La Marca were again in complete confusion for Filippo, the King and the Pope sent powerful assistance to Gismondo while the Florentines and Venetians supplied the Count with money, though not with men. Nor was Filippo satisfied with the war in Romagna, but also desired to take Cremona and Pontremoli from the Count, but Pontremoli was defended by the Florentines and Cremona by the Venetians. Thus, the war was renewed in Lombardy and after several engagements in the Cremonese, Francesco Piccinino, the leader of the Duke's forces, was routed at Casale by Michelotto and the Venetian troops. This victory gave the Venetians hope of obtaining the Duke's dominions. They sent a commissary to Cremona, attacked the Giard d'Adda, and took the whole of it except Crema. Then crossing the Adda, they overran the country as far as Milan. Upon this, the Duke had recourse to Alfonso and had treated his assistance, pointing out the danger his kingdom would incur if Lombardy were to fall into the hands of the Venetians. Alfonso promised to send him troops, but apprised him of the difficulties which would attend their passage without the permission of the Count. Filippo, driven to extremity, then had recourse to Francesco and begged he would not abandon his father-in-law now that he had become old and blind. The Count was offended with the Duke for making war against him, but he was jealous of the increasing greatness of the Venetians and he himself began to be in want of money for the league supplied him sparingly. The Florentines, being no longer in fear of the Duke, ceased to stand in need of the Count and the Venetians desired his ruin for they thought Lombardy could not be taken from him except by this means. Yet while Filippo sought to gain him over and offered him the entire command of his forces on condition that he should restore La Marca to the Pope and quit the Venetian alliance, ambassadors were sent to him by that Republic promising Milan if they took it and the perpetual command of their forces if he would push the war in La Marca and prevent Alfonso from sending troops into Lombardy. The offers of the Venetians were great as also were their claims upon him having begun the war in order to save him from losing Cremona. While the injuries received from the Duke were fresh in his memory and his promises had lost all influence still the Count hesitated for on the one hand were to be considered his obligations to the League, his pledged faith, their recent services and his hopes of the future all which had their influence on him on the other were the entreaties of his father-in-law and above all the bane which he feared would be concealed under the specious offers of the Venetians for he doubted not that both with regard to Milan and their other promises if they were victorious he would be at their mercy to which no prudent men would ever submit if he could avoid it. These difficulties in the way of his forming a determination were obviated by the ambition of the Venetians who seeing a chance of occupying Cremona from secret intelligence with that city under a different pretext sent troops into its neighborhood but the affair was discovered by those who commanded Cremona for the Count and measures were adopted which prevented its success thus without obtaining Cremona they lost the Count's friendship who now being free from all other considerations joined the Duke. End of book six, chapter two. Book six, chapter three of the history of Florence by Machiavelli, volume two. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Nicholas Clifford. History of Florence and of the affairs of Italy by Niccolò Machiavelli, volume two translated by an unknown translator. Book six, chapter three. Death of Filippo Visconti, Duke of Milan. The Milanese appoints Sforza their captain. Milan becomes a republic. The Pope endeavors to restore peace to Italy. The Venetians oppose this design. Alfonso attacks the Florentines. The neighborhood of Piambino becomes the principal theater of war. Scarcity in the Florentine camp. Disorders occur in the Neapolitan and Florentine armies. Alfonso sews for peace and is compelled to retreat. Pavia surrenders to the Count. Displeasure of the Milanese. The Count besieges Caravaggio. The Venetians endeavor to relieve the place. They are routed by the Count before Caravaggio. Pope Eugenius being dead was succeeded by Nicholas V. The Count had his whole army at Cotignola ready to pass into Lombardy when intelligence was brought him of the death of Filippo which happened on the last day of August, 1447. This event greatly afflicted him for he doubted whether his troops were in readiness on account of their arrears of pay. He feared the Venetians who were his armed enemies, he having recently forsaken them and taken part with the Duke. He was in apprehension from Alfonso, his inveterate foe. He had no hope from the Pontiff or the Florentines for the latter were allies of the Venetians and he had seized the territories of the former. However, he resolved to face his fortune and be guided by circumstances. For it often happens that when engaged in business valuable ideas are suggested which in a state of an action would never have occurred. He had great hopes that if the Milanese were disposed to defend themselves against the ambition of the Venetians they could make use of no other power but his. Therefore he proceeded confidently into the Bolognese territory thence to Modena and Reggio halted with his forces upon the Lenza and sent to offer his services at Milan. On the death of the Duke part of the Milanese were inclined to establish a republic. Others wished to choose a prince and of these one part favored the count and another Alfonso. However the majority being in favor of freedom they prevailed over the rest and organized a republic to which many cities of the Duchy refused obedience for they too desired to live in the enjoyment of their liberty and even those who did not embrace such views refused to submit to the sovereignty of the Milanese. Lodi and Piacenza surrendered themselves to the Venetians Pavia and Parma became free. This confused state of things being known to the count he proceeded to Cremona where his ambassadors and those of the Milanese arranged for him to command the forces of the new republic with the same remuneration he had received from the Duke at the time of his decease. To this they added the possession of Brescia until Verona was recovered when he should have that city and restore Brescia to the Milanese. Before the Duke's death Pope Nicholas after his assumption of the pontificate sought to restore peace among the princes of Italy and with this object endeavored in conjunction with the ambassadors sent by the Florentines to congratulate him on his accession to appoint a diet at Ferrara to attempt either the arrangement of a long truce or the establishment of peace. A congress was accordingly held in that city of the Pope's legate and the Venetian, Ducal and Florentine representatives. King Alfonso had no envoy there. He was at Tivoli with a great body of horse and foot and favorable to the Duke both having resolved that having gained the count over to their side they would openly attack the Florentines and Venetians until the arrival of the count in Lombardy take part in the Treaty for Peace at Ferrara at which though the king did not appear he engaged to concur in whatever course the Duke should adopt. The conference lasted several days and after many debates resolved on either a truce for five years or a permanent peace which so ever the Duke should approve and the Ducal ambassadors having returned to Milan to learn his decision found him dead. Notwithstanding this the Milanese were disposed to adopt the resolutions of the assembly but the Venetians refused indulging great hopes of becoming masters of Lombardy particularly as Lodi and Piacenza immediately after the Duke's death had submitted to them. They trusted that either by force or by treaty they could strip Milan of her power and so press her as to compel her also to surrender before any assistance could arrive and they were the more confident of this from seeing the Florentines involved in war with King Alfonso. The king being at Tivoli and designing to pursue his enterprise against Tuscany as had been arranged between himself and Filippo judging that the war now commenced in Lombardy would give him both time and opportunity and wishing to have a footing in the Florentine state before he openly commenced hostilities opened a secret understanding with the fortress of Cennina in the Valdarno Superiore and took possession of it. The Florentines surprised with this unexpected event receiving the king already in action and resolved to do them all the injury and his power hired forces, created a council of 10 for management of the war and prepared for the conflict in their usual manner. The king was already in the Cienese and used his utmost endeavors to reduce the city but the inhabitants of Ciena were firm in their attachment to the Florentines and refused to receive him within their walls or into any of their territories. They furnished him with provisions alleging an excuse, the enemy's power and their inability to resist. The king finding he could not enter by the Valdarno as he had first intended both because Cennina had been already retaken and because the Florentines were now in some measure prepared for their defense turned towards Volterra and occupied many fortresses in that territory. Then she proceeded towards Pisa and with the assistance of Fazio and Arigode Conti of the Geradesca took some castles and issuing from them a sailed Campelia but could not take it the place being defended by the Florentines and it being now in the depth of winter. Upon this the king leaving garrisons and the places he had taken to harass the surrounding country withdrew with the remainder of his army to quarters in the Cienaese. The Florentines aided by the season used the most active exertions to provide themselves troops whose captains were Federigo, Lord of Urbino and Gismondo Malatesti da Rimino who though mutual foes were kept so united by the prudence of the commissaries Neri de Gino and Bernaletto de Medici that they broke up their quarters while the weather was still very severe and recovered not only the places that had been taken in the territory of Pisa but also the Pomerancie in the neighborhood of Volterra and so checked the king's troops which at first had overrun the Marema that they could scarcely retain the places they had been left to garrison. Upon the return of the spring the commissaries halted with their whole force consisting of 5,000 horse and 2,000 foot at the Spedaletto. The king approached with his army amounting to 15,000 men within three miles of Campiglia but when it was expected he would attack the place he fell upon Piumbino hoping as it was insufficiently provided to take it with very little trouble and thus acquire a very important position the loss of which would be severely felt by the Florentines for from it he would be able to exhaust them with a long war, obtain his own provision by sea and harass the whole territory of Pisa. They were greatly alarmed at this attack and considering that if they could remain with their army among the woods of Campiglia the king would be compelled to retire either in defeat or disgrace. With this view they equipped four galleys of Livorno and having succeeded in throwing 300 infantry into Piumbino took up their own position at the Caldani a place where it would be difficult to attack them and they thought it would be dangerous to encamp among the thickets of the plain. The Florentine army depended for provisions on the surrounding places which being poor and thinly inhabited had difficulty in supplying them. Consequently the troops suffered particularly from watered wine before, none being produced in that vicinity and unable to procure it for more distant places it was impossible to obtain a sufficient quantity. But the king, though closely pressed by the Florentines was well provided except in forage for he obtained everything else by sea. The Florentines, desirous to supply themselves in the same manner, loaded four vessels with provisions but upon their approach they were attacked by seven of the king's galleys which took two of them and put the rest to flight. This disaster made them despair of procuring provisions so that 200 men of a foraging party principally for watered wine deserted to the king and the rest complained that they could not live without it in a situation where the heat was so excessive and the water bad. The commissaries therefore determined to quit the place and endeavor to recover those castles which still remained at the enemy's power who on his part, though not suffering from water provisions and greatly superior in numbers found his enterprise of failure from the ravages made in his army by those diseases which the hot season produces in marshy localities and which prevailed to such an extent that many died daily and nearly all were affected. These circumstances occasioned overtures of peace. The king demanded 50,000 Florence and the possession of Piumbino. When the terms were under consideration, many citizens' desires of peace would have accepted them declaring there was no hope of bringing to a favorable conclusion a war which required so much money to carry it on. But nearly Caponi, going to Florence placed the matter in a more correct light and it was then unanimously determined to reject the proposal and take the lord of Piumbino under their protection with an alliance offensive and defensive provided he did not abandon them but assist in their defense as hitherto. The king being informed of this resolution saw that with his reduced army he could not gain the place and withdrew in the same condition as if completely routed leaving behind him 2,000 dead. With the remainder of his sick troops he retired to the Sienese territory and then to his kingdom incensed against the Florentines and threatening them with new wars upon the return of spring. While these events were proceeding in Tuscany the Counts Forza, having become leader of the Milanese forces strenuously endeavored to secure the friendship of Francesco Piccinino who was also in their service that he might support him in his enterprises or be less disposed to do him injury. He then took the field with his army upon which the people of Pavia conscious of their inability to resist him and unwilling to obey the Milanese offered to submit themselves to his authority on condition that he should not subject them to the power of Milan. The Count desired the possession of Pavia and considered the circumstance a happy omen as it would enable him to give a color to his designs. He was not restrained from treachery either by fear or shame for great men consider failure disgraceful. A fraudulent success the contrary. But he was apprehensive that his possession of the city would excite the animosity of the Milanese and perhaps induce them to throw themselves under the power of the Venetians. If he refused to accept the offer he would have occasion to fear the Duke of Savoy to whom many citizens were inclined to submit themselves and either alternative would deprive him of the sovereignty of Lumberdy concluding that there was less danger in taking possession of the city than in allowing another to have it. He determined to accept the proposal of the people of Pavia trusting he would be able to satisfy the Milanese to whom he pointed out the danger they must have incurred had he not complied with it. For her citizens would have surrendered themselves to the Venetians or to the Duke of Savoy so that in either case they would have been deprived of the government and therefore they ought to be more willing to have himself as their neighbor and friend than a hostile power such as either of the others and their enemy. The Milanese were on this occasion greatly perplexed imagining they had discovered the Count's ambition and the end he had in view. But they thought it desirable to conceal their fears for they did not know if the Count were to desert them to whom they could have recourse except the Venetians whose pride and tyranny they naturally dreaded. They therefore resolved not to break with the Count but by his assistance remedy the evils with which they were threatened hoping that when freed from them they might rescue themselves from him also. For at that time they were assailed not only by the Venetians but by the Genoese and the Duke of Savoy in the name of Charles of Orléans the son of a sister of Filippo but whom the Count easily vanquished. Thus their only remaining enemies were the Venetians who with a powerful army determined to occupy their territories and had already taken possession of Lodi and Piacenza before which latter place the Count encamped and after a long siege took and pillaged the city. Winter being set in he led his forces into quarters and then withdrew to Cremona where during the cold season he remained in repose with his wife. In the spring the Venetian and Milanese armies again took the field. It was the design of the Milanese first to recover Lodi and then to come to terms with the Venetians for the expenses of the war had become very great and they were doubtful of their general sincerity so that they were anxious alike for the repose of peace and for security against the Count. They therefore resolved that the army should march to the siege of Caravaggio hoping that Lodi would surrender on that fortress being rested from the enemy's hands. The Count obeyed though he would have preferred crossing the Adda and attacking the Breschen territory. Having encamped before Caravaggio he so strongly entrenched himself that if the enemy attempted to relieve the place they would have to attack him at a great disadvantage. The Venetian army led by Michelotto approached within two bow shots of the enemy's camp and many skirmishes ensued. The Count continued to press the fortress and reduced it to the very last extremity which greatly distressed the Venetians since they knew the loss of it would involve the total failure of their expedition. Very different views were entertained by their military officers respecting the best mode of relieving the place but they saw no course open except to attack the enemy in his trenches in spite of all obstacles. The castle was, however, considered of such paramount importance that the Venetian senate, though naturally timid and averse to all hazardous undertakings chose rather to risk everything than allow it to fall into the hands of the enemy. They therefore resolved to attack the Count at all events and early the next morning commenced their assault upon a point which was the least defended. At the first charge, as commonly happens in a surprise, Francesco's whole army was thrown into dismay. Order, however, was soon so completely restored by the Count that the enemy, after various efforts to gain the outworks, were repulsed and put to flight and so entirely routed that of 12,000 horse, only 1,000 escaped the hands of the Milanese who took possession of all the carriages and military stores nor had the Venetians ever before suffered such a sour route and overthrow. Among the plunder and prisoners crouching down as if to escape observation was found a Venetian commissary who, in the course of the war and before the fight, had spoken contemptuously of the Count calling him bastard and base-born. Being made prisoner, he remembered his faults and fearing punishment being taken before the Count was agonized with terror and, as is usual with mean minds in prosperity, insolent, in adversity, abject and cringing, prostrated himself, weeping and begging pardon for the offenses he had committed. The Count, taking him by the arm, raised him up and encouraged him to hope for the best. He then said he wondered how a man so prudent and respectable as himself could so far err as to speak disparagingly of those who did not merit it. And as regarded the insinuations which he had made against him, he really did not know how Swarza, his father, and Madonna Lucia, his mother, had proceeded together not having been there and having no opportunity of interfering in the matter so that he was not liable either to blame or praise. However, he knew very well that in regard to his own actions he had conducted himself so that no one could blame him and in proof of this he would refer both the Venetian Senate and himself to what had happened that day. He then advised him in future to be more respectful in speaking of others and more cautious in regard to his own proceedings. End of book six, chapter three, recording by Nicholas Clifford, New Haven, Vermont. Book six, chapter four of history of Florence by Machiavelli, volume two. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Nishele von Lodder. History of Florence and of the affairs of Italy by Niccolò Machiavelli, volume two. Translated by an unknown translator. Book six, chapter four. The Count's successes. The Venetians come to terms with him. Fuse of the Venetians. Indignation of the Milanese against the Count. Their ambassadors address to him. The Count's moderation and reply. The Count and the Milanese prepare for war. Milanese ambassadors at Venice. League of the Venetians and Milanese. The Count dupes the Venetians and Milanese. He applies for assistance to the Florentines. Diversity of opinions and Florence on the subject. Neritigino Caponi averse to assisting the Count. Cosmo de' Medici disposed to do so. The Florentines sent ambassadors to the Count. After this victory, the Count marched into the Bressian territory, occupied the whole country, and then pitched his camp within two miles of the city. The Venetians, having well-grounded fears that Bressia would be next attacked, provided the best defense in their power. They then collected the relics of their army and, by virtue of the treaty, demanded assistance of the Florentines, who, being relieved from the war with Alfonso, sent them 1,000 foot and 2,000 horse, by whose aid the Venetians weren't a condition to treat for peace. At one time it seemed the fate of the Republic to lose by war and win by negotiation, for what was taken from them in battle was frequently restored to full on the restoration of peace. They knew the Milanese were jealous of the Count, and that he wished not to be their captain merely, but their sovereign, and as it was in their power to make peace with either of the two, the one desiring it from ambition, the other from fear, they determined to make choice of the Count and offer him assistance to effect his design, persuading themselves that, as the Milanese would perceive that they had been duped by him, they would in revenge place themselves in the power of anyone rather than his, and that, becoming unable either to defend themselves or trust the Count, they would be compelled, having no other resource, to fall into their hands. Having taken this resolution, they sounded the Count, and found him quite disposed for peace, evidently desirous that the honour and advantage of the victory at Caravaggio should be his own, and not accrued to the Milanese. The parties therefore entered into an agreement, in which the Venetians undertook to pay the Count 13,000 florins per month, till he should obtain a Milan, and to furnish him, during the continuous of the war, 4,000 horse and 2,000 foot. The Count engaged to restore to the Venetians the towns, prisoners, and whatever else had been taken by him during the late campaigns, and contempt himself with those territories which the Duke possessed at the time of his death. When this treaty became known at Milan, it grieved the citizens more than the victory at Caravaggio had exhilarated them. The rulers of the city mourned, the people complained, women and children wept, and all exclaimed against the Count as false and perfidious. Although they could not hope that either prayers or promises would divert him from his ungrateful design, they sent ambassadors to see with what kind of colour he would invest his unprincipled proceedings, and being admitted to his presence, one of them spoke to the following effect. It is customary with those who wish to obtain a favour to make use either of prayers, presents or threats, that pity, convenience or fear may induce compliance with their requests. But as with cruel, avaricious, or in their own conceit, powerful men, these arguments have no weight. It is vain to hope either to soften them by prayers, win them by presents, or alarm them by menaces. We therefore, being now, though late, aware of thy pride, cruelty and ambition, come hither, not to ask God, nor the hope, even if we were so disposed, of obtaining it, but to remind thee of the benefits thou hast received from the people of Milan, and to prove with what heartless ingratitude thou hast repaid them, that at least, under the many evils oppressing us, we may derive some gratification from telling thee how and by whom they have been produced. Thou canst not have forgotten thy wretched condition at the death of Duke Filippo. The king and the pope were both thine enemies. Thou hast abandoned the Florentines and the Venetians, who, on account of their just indignation, and because they stood in no further need of thee, were almost become thy declared enemies, that were too exhausted by thy wars against the church, with few followers, no friends, or any money, hopeless of being able to preserve either thy territories or thy reputation. From these circumstances thy ruin must have ensued, but for our simplicity. We receive thee to our home, actuated by reverence for the happy memory of our Duke, with whom, being connected by marriage and renewed alliance, we believe thy affection would descend to those who had inherited his authority, and that, if to the benefit he had conferred on thee, our own were added, the friendship we sought to establish would not only be firm, but inseparable. With this impression, we added Verona or Bressia to thy previous appointments. What more could we either give or promise thee? What else couldst thou, not from us merely, but from any others, have either had or expected? Thou receivest from us an unhoped for benefit, and we in return an unmerited wrong. Neither hast thou deferred until now the manifestation of thy base designs. For no sooner were thou appointed to command our armies than contrary to every dictate of propriety, but thou didst accept Pavia, which plainly showed what was to be the result of thy friendship. But we bore with the injury, in hope that the greatness of the advantage would satisfy thy ambition. Alas! those who grasp it all cannot be satisfied with a part. Thou didst promise that we should possess the conquest which thou might afterward make, for thou art well aware that what was given at many times might be withdrawn at once, and was the case after the victory at Caravaggio, established by our money and blood, and followed by our ruin. O unhappy states which have to guard against their oppressor, but much more wretched those who have to trust to mercenary and faithless arms like thine. May our example instruct posterity, since that of Thebes and Philip of Macedon, who, after victory over her enemies, from being her captain became her foe, and her prince could not avail us. The only fault of which we are conscious is our overweening confidence in one whom we ought not to have trusted.  Neither ought we to have confided in one who betrayed the Lord of Luca, set to find upon the Florentines and the Venetians, defied the duke, despised the king, and besides all this persecuted the Church of God and the Divinity himself with innumerable atrocities. We ought not to have fancied that so many potent tastes possess less influence over the mind of Francesco Sforza than the Milanese, or that he would preserve unblemish that faith towards us which he had on so many occasions broken with them. Still this want of caution in us does not excuse the perfidy in thee, nor can it obliterate the infamy with which our just complaints will blacken thy character throughout the world or prevent the remorse of thy conscious when our arms are used for our own destruction. For thou wilt see that the sufferings due to parasites are fully deserved by thee, and though ambition should blind thine eyes, the whole world, witness to thine inequity, will compel thee to open them. God himself will enclose them if perjuries, if violated faith, if treacheries displease him, and if as ever he is still the enemy of the wicked. Do not therefore promise thyself any certainty of victory, for the just wrath of the Almighty will weigh heavily upon thee, and we are resolved to lose our liberty only with our lives. But if we found we could not ultimately defend it, we would submit ourselves to anyone rather than to thee. And if our sins be so great that in spite of our utmost resolution, we should still fall into thy hands, be quite assured that the sovereignty which is commenced in deceit and villainy will terminate either in thyself or thy children with ignominy and blood. The Count, though not insensible to the just reproaches of the Milanese, did not exhibit either by words or gestures any unusual excitement, and replied that he willingly attributed to their angry feelings all the serious charges of their indiscreet harangue, and he would reply to them in detail, were he in the presence of anyone who could decide their differences, for it would be evident that he had not injured the Milanese, but only taken care that they should not injure him. They well knew how they had pursued after the victory of Caravaggio. For instead of rewarding him with either Verona or Bressia, they sought peace with the Venetians, that all the blame of the quarrel might rest on him, themselves obtaining the fruit of victory, the credit of peace, and all the advantages that could be derived from the war. It would thus be manifest they had no right to complain, when he had affected the arrangements which they first attempted to make, and that if he had deferred to do so a little longer, he would have had reason to accuse them of the ingratitude with which they were now charging him, or that the charge were true or false, that God whom they had invoked to avenge their injuries, which showeth the conclusion of the war, and would demonstrate which was most his friend, and who had most justice on their side. From the departure of the ambassadors, the Count determined to attack the Milanese, who prepared for their defence, and appointed Francesco and Jacopo Piccinino, attached to their cause on account of the ancient feud of the families of Boraccio and Sforza, to conduct their forces in support of liberty, at least till they could deprive the Count of the aid of the Venetians, who they did not think would long be either friendly or faithful to him. On the other hand, the Count, perfectly aware of this, thought it not impotent, supposing the obligation of the treaty insufficient, to bind them by the ties of interest, and, therefore, in assigning to each their portion of the enterprise, he consented that the Venetian should attack Crema, and himself, with the other forces, assail the remainder of the territory. The advantage of this arrangement kept the Venetians so long in alliance with the Count, that he was unable to conquer the whole of the Milanese territory, and to press the city so closely, that the inhabitants could not provide themselves with necessaries. Despairing of success, they sent envoys to the Venetians to beg they would compassionate their distress, and, as ought to be the case between republics, assist them in defense of their liberty against the tyrant, whom, if once master of their city, they would be unable to restrain. Neither did they think that he would be content with the boundaries assigned him by the treaty, but who expected the dependencies of all Milan. The Venetians had not yet taken Crema, and, wishing before they changed sides to effect this point, they publicly answered the envoys that their engagements with the Count prevented them from defending the Milanese, but secretly gave them every assurance of their wish to do so. The Count had approached so near Milan with his forces that he was disputing the suburbs with the inhabitants, and the Venetians, having taken Crema, thought they need no longer hesitate to declare in favor of the Milanese, with whom they had made peace, and entered into alliance, among the terms of which was the defense of their liberty unimpaired. Having come to this agreement, they ordered their forces to withdraw from the Count's camp, and to return to the Venetian territory. They informed him of the peace made with the Milanese, and gave him twenty days to consider what course he would adopt. He was not surprised at the step taken by the Venetians, before he had long foreseen it, and expected its occurrence daily. When it actually took place, he could not avoid feeling regrets and displeasure similar to what the Milanese had experienced when he abandoned them. He took two days to consider the reply he would make to the ambassadors, whom the Venetians had sent to inform him of the treaty, and during this time he determined to dupe the Venetians, and not abandon his enterprise. Therefore, appearing openly to accept the proposal for peace, he sent his ambassadors to Venice with full credentials to effect ratification, but gave them secret orders not to do so, and with pretexts or cavaline to put it off. To give the Venetians greater assurance of his sincerity, he made a truce with the Milanese for a month, withdrew from Milan, and divided his forces amongst the places he had taken. This course was the occasion of his victory and the ruin of the Milanese, for the Venetians, confident of peace, were slow in preparing for war, and the Milanese finding the truce concluded the enemy withdrawn and the Venetians their friends felt assured that the Count had determined to abandon his design. This idea injured them in two ways. One, by neglecting to provide for their defence, the next, that being sea time, they had sowed a large quantity of grain in the country which the enemy had evacuated and thus brought famine upon themselves. On the other hand, all that was injurious to his enemies favoured the Count, and the time gave him opportunity to take breath and provide himself with assistance. The Florentines, during the War of Lombardi, had not declared in favour of either party, or assisted the Count either in defence of the Milanese or a sense, for he never having been in need had not presently requested it, and they only sent assistance to the Venetians after the Rata Caravaggio in pursuance of the treaty. Count Francesco, standing now alone and not knowing to whom else he could apply, was compelled to request immediate aid from the Florentines, publicly from the state and privately from friends, particularly from Cosmo de' Medici, with whom he had always maintained a steady friendship and by whom he had constantly been faithfully advised and liberally supported. Nor did Cosmo abandon him in his extreme necessity but supplied him generously from his own resources and encouraged him to prosecute his design. He also wished the city publicly to assist him, but there were difficulties in this way. Nere di Gino Caponi, one of the most powerful citizens in Florence, thought it not to the advantage of the city that the Count should obtain Milan, and was of the opinion that it was more to the safety of Italy for him to ratify the peace than pursue the war. In the first place he apprehended that the Milanese, through their anger against the Count, would surrender themselves entirely to the Venetians, which would occasion the ruin of all. Supposing he should occupy Milan, it appeared to him that so great military superiority, combined with such an extent of territory, would be dangerous to themselves, and that if the Count was intolerable, he would become doubly so as Duke. He therefore considered it better for the Republic of Florence and for Italy that the Count should be content with his military reputation, and that Lombardi should be divided into two republics, which could never be united to injure others, and separately are unable to do so. To attain this he saw no better means than to refrain from aiding the Count, and continuing in the former League with the Venetians. These reasonings were not satisfactory to Cosmo's friends, for they imagined that Nere had argued thus not from a conviction of its advantage to the Republic, but to prevent the Count, as a friend of Cosmo, from becoming Duke. Seeing that Cosmo would, in consequence of this, become too powerful, Cosmo, in reply, pointed out that to lend assistance to the Count would be highly beneficial both to Italy and the Republic, for it was unwise to imagine the Milanese could preserve their own liberty, for the nature of their community, their mode of life, and their hereditary feuds were opposed to every kind of civil government, so that it was necessary, either that the Count should become Duke of Milan or the Venetians her lords, and surely under such circumstances no one could doubt which would be most of their advantage to have for their neighbor a powerful friend or far more powerful foe. Neither need it be apprehended that the Milanese, while it wore the Count, would submit to the Venetians, for the Count had a stronger party in the city, and the Venetians had not, so that whenever they were unable to defend themselves as free men they would be more inclined to obey the Count than the Venetians. These diverse views kept the city long in suspense, but at length it was resolved to send ambassadors to the Count to settle the terms of agreement, with instructions that if they found him in such a condition as to give hopes of his ultimate success they were to close with him, but if otherwise they were to draw out the time in diplomacy. CHAPTER IV BOOKS 6 CHAPTER V OF HISTORY OF FLOWANCE by Machiavelli, volume 2 This is a Librivox recording. All Librivox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit Librivox.org. Recording by Morgan Scorpion. History of Florence and of the affairs of Italy by Nicola Machiavelli, volume 2, translated by an unknown translator. BOOKS 6 CHAPTER V PROSECUTION OF THE WAR BETWEEN THE COUNT AND THE MILANESE THE MILANESE REDUCEED TO EXTREMITY THE PEOPLE RISE AGAINST THE MAGISTRATES MILAN SURRENDERS TO THE COUNT LEAGUE BETWEEN THE NEW DUKE OF MILAN AND THE FLOWENTINES AND BETWEEN THE KING OF NAPALS AND THE VENETIANS VENETIAN AND NEAPOLITAN EMBASSADORS AT FLOWANCE ANSWER OF COULDLY MOVED IN MEDICI TO THE VENETIAN AMBASSADOR PREFERATIONS OF THE VENETIANS AND THE KING OF NAPALS FOR THE WAR THE VENETIANS EXCITE DISTURBANCES IN BULONNIA FLOWANCE PREPARES FOR WAR THE EMPEROR FREDRIK III AT FLOWANCE WAR IN LOMBODY BETWEEN THE DUKE OF MILAN AND THE VENETIANS FERRANDO, SON OF THE KING OF NAPALS, MARCHES IN TITUSCANY AGAINST THE FLOWENTINES THE AMBASSADORS WERE AT REGIO WHEN THEY HEARD THAT THE COUNT HAD BECOME LORD OF MILAN, FOR AS SOON AS THE TRUTH HAD EXPIRED, HE APPROACHED THE CITY WITH HIS FORCES, HOPEING QUICKLY TO GET FOSSESSION OF IT IN SPITE OF THE VENETIANS, WHO COULD BRING NO RELIEF EXCEPT FROM THE SIDE OF THE ADDA, WHICH ROOT HE COULD EASILY ABSTRACT, AND THEREFORE HAD NO APROHENCION, BEING THEN WINTER, OF THEIR ARRIVAL, AND HE TRUSTED THAT BEFORE THE RETURN OF SPRING HE WOULD BE VICTORIUS, PARTICULARLY AS BY THE DEATH OF FRANCHESCO PICCININO, THERE REMAINED ONLY JACKAPO, HIS BROTHER, TO COMMAND THE MILANESE. THE VENETIANS HAD SENT AN AMBASSADOR TO MILAN TO CONFIRM THE CITIZANS IN THE RESOLUTION OF DEFENCE, PROMISING THEM POWERFUL AND AMEDIATE ADE. During the winter a few slight skirmishes had taken place between the Count and the Venetians, but on the approach of Milderweather, the latter, under Pandolfo Malatesti, halted with their army upon the Adda, and considering whether in order to circuit the Milanese they ought to risk a battle. Pardolfo, their general, aware of the Count's abilities, and the courage of his army, said it would be unadvisable to do so, and that, under the circumstances, it was needless for the Count, being in great want of forage, could not keep the field and must soon retire. He therefore advised them to remain encamped, to keep the Milanese in hope, and prevent them from surrendering. This advice was approved by the Venetians, both as being safe, and because, by keeping the Milanese in this necessity, they might be the sooner compelled to submit their dominion, for they felt quite sure that the injuries they had received would always prevent their submission to the Count. In the meantime the Milanese were reduced to the utmost misery, and as the city usually abounded with poor, many died of hunger in the streets. Hence arose complaints and disturbances in several parts, which alarmed the magistrates, and compelled them to use their utmost exertions to prevent popular meetings. The multitude are always slow to resolve on commotion, but the resolution once formed any trivial circumstance excites it to action. Two men in humble life, talking together near the Porta Nuova of the calamities of the city, their own misery, and the means that might be adopted for their relief, others beginning to congregate, there was soon collected a large crowd. In consequence of it, a report was spread that the neighbourhood of Porta Nuova had risen against the government. Upon this, all the lower orders, who only waited for an example, assembled in arms, and chose Gaspar da Vecoma Carto to be their leader. They then proceeded to the place where the magistrates were assembled, and attacked them so impetuously that all who did not escape by flight were slain. Among the number, as being considered a principal cause of the famine, and gratified out their distress, fell Leonardo Veniero, the Venetian ambassador. Having thus almost become masters of the city, they considered what course was next to be adopted to escape from the horrors surrounding them, and to procure peace. A feeling universally prevailed, that as they could not preserve their own liberty, they ought to submit to a prince who could defend them. Some proposed King Alfonso, some the Duke of Savoy, and others the King of France, but none mentioned the count, so great was the general indignation against him. However, disagreeing with the rest, Gaspar da Vecoma Carto proposed him, and explained in detail that if they desired relief from war, no other plan was open, since the people of Milan required a certain and immediate peace, and not a distant hope of succor. He apologised for the count's proceedings, accused the Venetians, and all the powers of Italy, of which some from ambition and others from avarice were averse to their possessing freedom. Having to dispose of their liberty, it would be preferable, he said, to obey one who knew and could defend them, so that by their servitude they might obtain peace, and not bring upon themselves greater evils and more dangerous wars. He was listened to with the utmost profound attention, and, having concluded his harangue, it was unanimously resolved by the assembly that the count should be called in, and Gaspar was appointed to wait upon him and signify their desire. By the people's command he conveyed the pleasing and happy intelligence to the count, who heard it with the utmost satisfaction, and entered Milan as prince on the 26th of February, 1450, where he was received with the greatest possible joy by those who, only a short time previously, had heaped on him all the slanders that hatred could inspire. The news of this event reaching Florence, orders were immediately sent to the envoys who were upon the way to Milan, that instead of treating for his alliance with the count, they should congratulate the Duke upon his victory. They, arranging accordingly, had a most honourable reception, and were treated with all possible respect, for the Duke well knew that in all Italy he could not find the braver or more faithful friends to defend him against the power of the Venetians than the Florentines, who, being no longer in fear of the House of Visconti, found themselves opposed by the Aragonese and the Venetians. For the Aragonese princes of Naples were jealous of the friendship which the Florentines had always evinced for the family of France, and the Venetians, seeing the ancient enemy of the Florentines against the Visconti transferred to themselves, resolved to injure them as much as possible, for they knew how pertinaciously and invariably they had persecuted Lombard princes. These considerations caused the new Duke willingly to join the Florentines, and united the Venetians and King Alfonso against their common enemies, impelling them at the same time to hostilities. The King against the Florentines, and the Venetians against the Duke, who, being fresh in the government, would, they imagined, be unable to resist them, even with all the aid he could obtain. But as the league between the Florentines and the Venetians still continued, and as the King, after the War of Pionbino, had made peace with the former, it seemed indecent to commence an open rupture until some plausible reason could be assigned in justification of offensive measures. On this account each sent ambassadors to Florence, who on the part of their sovereigns signified that the league formed between them was made not for injury to any, but solely for the mutual defence of their states. The Venetian ambassador then complained that the Florentines had allowed Alessandro, the Duke's brother, to pass into Lombardy with his forces, and, besides this, had assisted and advised in the treaty made between the Duke and the Marcus of Mantua, matters which he declared to be injurious to the Venetians, and inconsistent with the friendship hitherto subsisting between the two governments, amicably reminding them that one who inflicts unmerited injury gives others just ground of hostility, and that those who break a peace may expect war. The scenery appointed Cosimo de Medici, to reply to what had been said by the Venetian ambassador, and in a long and excellent speech he recounted the numerous advantages conferred by the city on the Venetian republic, showed what an extent of dominion they had acquired by the money, forces and council of the Florentines, and reminded him that, although the friendship had originated with the Florentines, they had never been given occasion of enmity, and, as they desired peace, they greatly rejoiced when the treaty was made, if it had been entered into for the sake of peace and not of war. True it was, he wanted much, at the remarks which had been made, seeing that such light and trivial matters should give offence to so great a republic, but if they were worthy of notice he must have it universally understood, that the Florentines wished their country to be free and open to all, and that the Duke's character was such, that if he desired the friendship of the Marcus of Mantua he had no need of any one's favour or advice. He therefore feared that these cavals were produced by some latent motive, which was not thought proper to disclose. Vethis as it might, they would freely declare to all that in the same proportion as the friendship of the Florentines was beneficial their enmity could be destructive. The matter was hushed up, and the ambassadors on their departure appeared perfectly satisfied, that the lead between the King and the Venetians made the Florentines and the Duke rather apt to hand war than hope for a long continuance of peace. They therefore entered into an alliance, and at the same time the enmity of the Venetians transpired by a treaty with the C&E's, and the expulsion of all Florentine subjects from their cities and territories. Shortly after this Alfonso did the same, without any consideration of the peace made the year previous, and not having even the shadow of an excuse. The Venetians attempted to take Bologna, and having armed the emigrants and united to them a considerable force, introduced them into the city by night through one of the common sewers. No sooner had they entered than they raised a cry, by which Santi Bento Vogli, being awakened, was told that the whole city was in possession of the rebels. But though many advised him to escape, saying that he could not save the city by his stay, he determined to confront the danger, and, taking arms, encouraged his followers, assembled a few friends, attacked and routed part of the rebels, slew many more, and drove the remainder out of the city. By this act of bravery all agreed he had fully proved himself a genuine siren of the house of the Bento Vogli. These events and demonstrations gave the Florentines an earnest of approaching war. They consequently followed their usual practice on similar occasions, and created the Council of Ten. They engaged new Condottieri, sent ambassadors to Rome, Naples, Venice, Milan and Siena to demand assistance from their friends, gain information about those they suspected, decide such as were wavering, and discover the designs of the foe. From the Pope they obtained only general expressions of an amicable disposition and admonitions to peace. From the King empty excuses for having expelled the Florentines, and offers of safe conduct for whoever should demand it. And although he endeavored, as much as possible, to conceal every indication of his hostile designs, the ambassadors felt convinced of his unfriendly disposition, and observed many preparations tending to the injury of the Republic. The League with the Duke was strengthened by mutual obligations, and through his means they became friends with the Generees, the older differences with them respecting reprisals and other small matters of dispute, being composed, although the Venetians used every possible means to prevent it, and entreated the Emperor of Constantinople to expel all Florentines from his dominions. So fierce was the animosity with which they entered on this war, and so powerful their lust of dominion, that without the least hesitation they sought the destruction of those who had been the occasion of their own power. The Emperor, however, refused to listen to them. The Venetian Senate forbade the Florentine ambassadors to enter their territories, alleging that being in league with the King, they could not entertain them without his concurrence. The Sionis received their ambassadors with fair words, fearing their own ruin before the League could assist them, and therefore endeavored to appease the powers whose attack they were unable to resist. The Venetians and the King, as was then conjectured, were disposed to send ambassadors to Florence to justify the war. But the Venetian envoy was not allowed to enter the Florentine dominions, and the King's ambassador, being unwilling to perform his office alone, the embassy was not completed, and thus the Venetians learned that however little they might esteem the Florentines, the latter had still less respect for them. In the midst of these fears, the Emperor Frederick III came into Italy to be crowned. On the 30th of January, 1451, he entered Florence with 1,500 horse, and was most honouredly received by the Sinyuri. He remained in the city till the 6th of February, and then proceeded to Rome for his coronation, where, having been solemnly consecrated, and his marriage celebrated with the Empress, who had come to Rome by sea, he returned to Germany, and again passed through Florence in May, with the same honours as upon his arrival. On his return, having derived some benefits from the markers of Mantua, he conceded to him Rodina and Reggio. In the meantime the Florentines did not fail to prepare themselves for immediate war, and to augment their influence, and strike the enemy with terror. They, in conjunction with the Duke, entered into alliance with the King of France for the mutual defence of their states. This treaty was published with great pomp throughout all Italy. The month of May, 1452, having arrived, the Venetians thought it not desirable to defer any longer their attack upon the Duke, and with 16,000 horse and 6,000 foot assailed his territories in the direction of Lodri, while the markers of Montferrat, instigated either by his own ambition or the entreaties of the Venetians, did the same on the side of Alexandria. The Duke assembled a force of 18,000 cavalry and 3,000 infantry, garrisoned Alexandria and Lodri, and all the other places where the enemy might annoy them. He then attacked the Brescian territory and greatly harassed the Venetians, while both parties alike plundered the country and ravaged the smaller towns. Having defeated the markers of Montferrat at Alexandria, the Duke was able to unite his whole force against the Venetians and invade their territory. While the war in Lombardy proceeded thus, giving rise to various tripping incidents unworthy of recital, King Alfonso and the Florentines carried on hostilities in Tuscany, but in a similarly inefficient manner, evincing no greater talent and incurring no greater danger. Ferrando, the illegitimate son of Alfonso, entered the country with 12,000 troops under the command of Federigo Lorda Verbino. Their first attempt was to attack Pugano in the Val di Gianni, for, having the Sienesa in their favour, they entered the Florentine territory in that direction. The walls of the castle were weak, and it was small and consequently poorly manned, but the gallows and whirl among the soldiers of that period considered brave and faithful. Two hundred infantry were also sent by the scenery for its defence. Before this castle, thus provided, Ferrando sat down, and either from the valour of its defenders, or his own deficiencies, thirty-six days elapsed before he took it. This interval enabled the city to make better provision for places of greater importance, to collect forces and include more effective arrangements than had hitherto been made. The enemy next proceeded into the district of Gianni, where they attacked two small towns, the property of private citizens, but could not capture them. They then encamped before the Castellina, a fortress upon the borders of the Gianni, within ten miles of Siena, weak from its defective construction, and still more so by its situation, but, notwithstanding these defects, the assailants were compelled to retire in disgrace, after having lain before it forty-four days. So formidable were those armies, and so perilous those wars, that places now abandoned as untenable were then defended as impregnable. While Ferrando was encamped in the Gianni, he made many incursions, and took considerable booty from the Florentine territories, extending his depredations within six miles of the city, to the great alarm and injury of the people, who at this time, having sent their forces to the number of eight thousand soldiers under Astoria de Faenza and Gismondo Malatesti, towards Castell de Colli, kept them at a distance from the enemy, lest they should be compelled to an engagement. So they considered that so long as they were not beaten in a pitched battle, they could not be vanquished in the war generally, or small castles, when lost, were recovered at the peace, and larger places were in no danger because the enemy would not venture to attack them. The king had also a fleet of about twenty vessels, comprising galleys and similar craft, which lay off Pisa, and during the siege of Castellina were moored near the Rocca di Varda, which, from the negligence of the governor, he took, and then harassed a surrounding country. However, this annoyance was easily removed by a few soldiers sent by the Florentines to Cambiglia, and who confined the enemy to the coast. End of Book Six, Chapter Five