Hello, I'm AJ Crystal. I am a member of the Naval War College Foundation. I'm a graduate of the senior reserve officer's course here, and I spent ten summers here at the Naval Justice School as an acting professor. I have a warm spot in my heart for Newport that I'm honored and pleased to be here. As you were just told, I spent 38 years in the Navy as an aviator and an international lawyer. 60 years ago, this is what I was doing. That's me. I hope so. I'm here to talk to you about an event that occurred almost five decades ago. Why would an incident that is almost ancient history be of interest today? I had the same question about 28, 29 years ago when I got involved in this research project. On June 8, 1967, the fourth day of the Six-Day War, the USS Liberty, a Navy overt electronic intelligence gatherer, failed to receive five military communications orders telling her to stay 100 miles away from the combat zone and sailed into the middle of a hot war. Only two days before, the United States had announced to the United Nations Security Council that the United States had no ships or planes within 100 miles of the war zone. As a result of a series of blunders by both the U.S. and Israel, the Liberty was mistakenly identified as hostile and attacked, resulting in the loss of 34 lives and 171 wounded. The incident has been investigated multiple times by both the United States and Israel, and every official investigation has concluded the incident was a tragic case of mistaken identity. Then why is there to this day any interest in the incident? When I had the honor of being appointed a federal judge, I thought my very busy lifestyle would calm down and I would have time to study, read, and write. I enrolled as an audit student at the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Miami. I began researching and I published on terrorism. The faculty suggested that as a naval aviator for 18 years, a Navy lawyer who had been sent by the Department of Defense to teach law of naval warfare to senior foreign military officers at the International Institute of Humanitarian Law at San Remo, Italy, a civilian lawyer and a federal judge, that I was qualified to research and write on this subject. My initial response was, who would be interested? That was 20 years ago. A year earlier, I was on reserve active duty in the Pentagon working for the Chief of Naval Operations when an Iraqi fighter jet fired two exoset missiles into the USS Stark in the Arabian or Persian Gulf, killing 37 US servicemen. A year later, that incident was forgotten. However, I soon learned that the Liberty incident was not forgotten and was brought up almost daily to by conspiracy purveyors on talk shows, letters to the editor and elsewhere. Since the 1967 Six Day War, the United States-Israel relationship has continued to develop and become stronger and stronger to the mutual benefit of both nations. There are very few points on which to attack that relationship. The Liberty incident is a primary focus point for the anti-Israel interests. There are apparently more different conspiracy stories about the Liberty incident than about the JFK assassination. If we have time, I'll discuss a number of them later. For now, let us start at the beginning. The story began in 1956 when President Nasser of Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal. England, France and Israel went to war in Operation Musketeer and took control of the canal. Three significant things occurred. First, the Israel Navy captured an Egyptian hunt class destroyer, the Ibrahim Alawal. When signaled AA, International Code for Identify Yourself, the Egyptian signaled back AA. The Egyptian destroyer was swiftly disabled and captured by the Israel Navy. Second, the Israel Air Force concluded that having their high command headquarters in Ramla was not effective. They moved it to the IDF High Command Headquarters in Tel Aviv at the Keryah. Unfortunately, the Navy kept its high command headquarters in Haifa, atop Mount Carmel at Stella Maris, where the communication with the high command in Tel Aviv was by closed television. Finally, and most important, President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles forced Israel to withdraw from the Suez Canal and the Sinai. In exchange, they promised that the Sinai would be demilitarized, occupied by UN peacekeeping forces, and most important, the Straits of Tehran would remain open to Israel ships. Eisenhower specifically promised that the closing of the Straits would be a Kossus Belli. So now we fast forward to 1967. Tensions were mounting. There were 14 terrorist attacks into Israel from Syria. Syrians were shelling farmers in Israel from the Golan. Syria and Egypt were making bell echo statements. Here's an Arab cartoon showing Nasser kicking Israel into the sea and his quote on May 30th 1967, our basic objective will be the destruction of Israel. The Arab people want to fight. Meanwhile, back in the United States, the USS Liberty was ready to sail. In fact, on May 2nd 1967, she sailed from her home port of Norfolk, Virginia, scheduled for a routine four-month deployment on the coast of Africa. Bless you. Where she would listen to the electromagnetic spectrum. Incidentally, I hear that they're trying to talk about eight-month deployments now instead of six, but hopefully that may not happen. May 14 1967, Egyptian Field Marshal Amir ordered Egyptian troops into the Sinai and put the Egyptian army on alert. Next, Egypt ordered the UN peacekeeping force commanded by Indian General Reiki out of the Sinai. The UN complied. A week later, on May 21 1967, President Nasser announced that he was closing the Straits of Tehran. Now, we had excellent communication with Israel and we knew what was going on in Israel and on Israel's side of this event, but in Egypt, the U.S. Ambassador, Lucius Battle, had left his post and returned to Washington. I interviewed him later in Washington and he had not yet been replaced by Ambassador Nolte, who had not presented his credentials to President Nasser. And Nasser wouldn't speak to a deputy chief of mission, so the U.S. had no knowledge or no specific knowledge of what was going on on the Sinai, whether what Amir announced was true, and they were concerned. I had the honor of interviewing Secretary of State Dean Rusk at Athens, Georgia, and he confirmed to me the excellent wide-open communication between the U.S. and Israel and the lack of communication between the U.S. and Egypt. On May 23, the National Security Agency ordered liberty, which at that time was in Port in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, to proceed at best speed to a point off Egypt near Port Said. Liberty sailed the next day on the 3,000-mile journey where she went to Rotas, Spain and picked up some Arabic linguists and completed some repairs. On June 2, the liberty sailed from Rotas, Spain into the Mediterranean for the coast of Sinai. On the morning of June 5, while liberty was in the middle of the Mediterranean, the Israel Air Force struck all Egyptian air bases, destroying most of the Egyptian Air Force. The liberty's mission had now been overcome by events, but liberty's captain had not been briefed on why he was going to the coast of Sinai. The folks at the National Security Agency did not wake up to the problem until June 7 at 6.30 p.m. Washington time, which is about 30 minutes after midnight on June 8, Sinai time. They sent a total of five naval messages to the liberty, tell your standoff, but as a result of mistakes, faulty protocols, and other problems with the U.S. military worldwide communication system, none of those messages were received by liberty priority to the attack. What was happening in the Sinai? Israel armor had swept across the Sinai to the Suez Canal, but pockets of resistance remained and Israel and Egyptian forces were engaged at El-Arish. On June 7, the day before, an Egyptian destroyer shelled the Israel forces from a point off El-Arish. On the faithful day June 8 at 5.58 in the morning, the Israeli morning reconnaissance flight spotted the liberty. She was 70 miles west of Gaza, steaming southeast at 120 degrees 10 knots. She was specifically identified by her hull numbers as the USS Liberty, and the information was sent to Israel Naval Intelligence at Stella Maris, where Admiral Arell, the chief of the Navy, ordered a wedge, denoting liberty marked neutral, be placed on the war situation board in the war room. The liberty arrived at Point Alpha, its initial starting point off the Sinai, at 8.49 a.m. and turned to a westerly heading with its bow pointed towards Egypt and slowed to about five knots. The Liberty's logbook confirms that her crew observed the explosions occurring on shore at El-Arish. Now back in Haifa, Naval Command Headquarters at 11 o'clock, the shifts changed, and in the war room, Rami Lutz took over as command duty officer. Admiral Arell, the chief of the Navy, who knew about the wedge representing liberty, had gone down to the port, and his number two, Issy Rahav, assumed overall command at about 11 a.m. Lutz looked at the wedge representing liberty and concluded, ships do not remain still. Five hours later, the ship was no longer at the point of sighting, so he directed the wedge be removed from the board. I learned in my research that today the Israeli Naval Commander sits at a computer and nothing that was put into that computer may be removed. I believe this is a direct result of this mistake that was made in 67. The original identification information remained down the hall in Naval Intelligence and with Admiral Arell, who was not in the war room, but down at the port, the stage was now set for disaster. The Israel Army reported us explosions to headquarters and said they were being shelled from the sea as on the day before. This was a mistake. The explosions were being generated on shore, but the Army passed the information to Navy headquarters in Haifa and the Navy ordered Motor Torpedo Boat Division 914 from the port of Ashdod to investigate. The torpedo boats raced towards Anarish at their top speed. They picked up a radar target on the extreme edge of their World War II U.S. Army surplus Kelvin Hughes radar, which they had installed in their Motor Torpedo Boats. When I began my research, I found one of the actual sets and the junkie behind the Israel Naval Museum and took that picture. On the up, the 20-year-old combat information officer miscalculated Liberty's speed at 28 or 30 knots. Of course, he was under the impression that the Liberty was a destroyer, which is a normal speed that a destroyer might make. The MTB Division Commander concluded they could not catch the target and called for air assistance. Now, anyone who knows of the rivalry between the Israel Navy and the Israel Air Force would be certain that if the Navy thought it could catch the target, they would have never have asked for assistance from the Air Force. The Navy in Haifa called its Air Force Liaison Officer Lieutenant Commander Pinkus Pinkazi in Air Force Headquarters in Tel Aviv and told them to request air support. Air Force Headquarters in the Keria was a large room with a World War II-type plotting table and a two-story structure overlooking the table. On the upper level sat Air Force Commander General Mati Had. To his right was Rafi Harlev, his deputy. Further right was the Chief Air Controller Shmuel Kislev and his deputy. To Had's left behind the sliding glass window sat Shaiki Bereket, the Air Force Chief of Intelligence. Under them on the floor below sat the Air Defense Officers and the Naval Liaison to the Air Force Lieutenant Commander Pinkazi. Pinkazi picked up the phone and called Mati Had and was told the Air Force was too busy to provide air for the Navy. Pinkazi reported back to Haifa and was told by Naval Headquarters to be more aggressive. He got up and went upstairs to ask General Had face-to-face for air support. Now for a moment we must aggress to the night before. June 7, 1967 Israel Radar reported three images of ships proceeding along the coast of Israel towards Tel Aviv. The Navy dispatched its three destroyers to engage them. The weather was broken clouds. The Air Force sent a flight of Mirage 3C aircraft to the scene. The pilots reported seeing three wakes on the surface and asked permission to attack. Admiral Arell, the commander of the Navy, said hold and General Had, the Air Force Commander, got testy and said my planes are getting low on fuel. If we cannot attack I'll have to send them back to their base. Admiral Arell said give me illumination. One plane dove below the clouds and dropped the flare and there were the three Israel destroyers. The radar targets had been false images. There were no enemy ships. So the next morning when Pinkazi asked Had for air support face to face, Had said what is this? Another Navy wild goose chase? Do you have a target? Pinkazi was on the spot. He replied yes. So Had told his chief air controller, Shmuel Kislev, to give the Navy air support. Here is where the Liberty had its first bit of luck on that sad day. The deputy air controller said we have menorah flight, four Mirage 3C aircraft armed with iron bombs and route to the Suez canal to bomb SAM sites. Kislev said no. That mission is too important. Let menorah go.  So they searched and found a flight of two Mirage 3Cs doing combat air patrol over the canal. Now why was this lucky for Liberty? In World War II at Midway US Navy dive bombers armed with iron bombs attacked the Japanese fleet and sank three aircraft carriers in 10 minutes and mortally wounded a fourth which sank the next day. The deputy identified Cursa flight, two Mirage 3C aircraft flying combat air patrol over the canal armed with air-to-air combat 30 millimeter cannons. He told Cursa, fly to Anarish with the order if you can find a warship there you may attack it but be careful we have some of our Navy ships in the area. Cursa flew to Anarish and not with standing authorization if you can find a warship there you may attack it. Cursa first established communication with the torpedo boats and further confirmed that the Liberty was some kind of military ship before attacking. Cursa and his wing attacked flying head on at the Liberty. This picture is from the US Navy court of inquiry record. It was taken aboard the Liberty during the attack. I can't tell you if it was taken by Captain McGonigal or the ship's photographer because they both indicated they took pictures and the record doesn't indicate who was the photographer but the Mirage 3C there it is and what do you think could they see a fly on the ship at that distance and there in the water are the splashes from the 30 millimeter cannon shells the show the attacking aircraft is already firing at the Liberty at that distance. Now an American flag was hoisted on the Liberty. Some conspiracy purveyors argue that the aircraft should have seen Liberty's American flag which they say was flying but a five by eight foot flag would not have been visible beyond the distance of 1,323 feet and the attacking aircraft would have broken off their attack at no closer than 2,500 feet. Look at this attacking aircraft and think do you think that they could see a flag? The visual acuity formula which you can verify with any physicist or ophthalmologist tells you that you can't see a flag a five by eight flag any any further away than 1,323 feet but let us assume that the attacking aircraft flew inside the 1,323 feet viewing distance. What would a pilot see of a flying flag on a head-on run? Well here's a flag and if you're flying head-on at it what do you see? The leading edge of the flag. There is no question the flag was hoisted but was it flying?  Imprudently they had left cans of gasoline on the deck to fuel their motor whale boat and the 30 millimeter cannon shells had struck those cans and started the fire and the smoke as you can see is rising but how is it rising? It's rising straight up so if the smoke was rising straight up it confirms there is no relative wind across the deck and a flag would not have been flying but would have been drooped at the mast and therefore very difficult if not impossible to see. Cursa Flight 2 aircraft each made three strafing runs over a period of five minutes. When Cursa Flight exhausted their 30 millimeter ammunition Cursa left for base. Air control had located Royal Flight 2 Super Mysterio aircraft interjecting armor over the Sinai. They were also armed with 30 millimeter cannon and napalm canisters. Royal Flight was sent in as Cursa left. Royal Flight attacked from stern to bow and here's another picture taken from Liberty and you can see the Super Mysterio coming over the stern of the ship. Now on their first run each of the aircraft dropped both of their napalm canisters. I don't believe that any of them hit the ship but it is possible that one of them did hit the ship however in the court of inquiry record the ship's doctor testified that he did not treat anyone for napalm burns so even if one of the canisters did hit the ship apparently it was of little or no effect. Royal Flight leader after his initial pass made a 270 degree turn to the left to attack the ship broadside. As he came across he observed Roman letters on Liberty's bow. He was aware that Arab ships are marked with Arabic script and therefore Liberty was not Arab. He reported this to headquarters and at 212 Kislev ordered quote leave her. At this point nine Liberty true members had been killed or mortally wounded. The air force halted the attack and left the scene then came Liberty's second tiny little bit of luck. The air controller had just located and launched Nixon flight armed with iron bombs from Telnauf air base only minutes away. Nixon flight was diverted to the north and Liberty was not attacked with anti-ship weapons which most likely would have sunk her which even more catastrophic results. Shortly thereafter the motor torpedo boats arrived. They stopped a mile away and began signaling AA identify yourself. The torpedo boat division commander Moishi Oren had been the gunnery officer on the Israel destroyer Jaffa in 1956 when they signaled AA and the Egyptian destroyer replied AA. Whether or not Liberty actually responded AA is in dispute but this became immaterial because at this point Liberty opened fire on the torpedo boats. This is confirmed by Liberty's commanding officer in his testimony before the Navy court of inquiry. In fact he was once so far as to say that he was certain that there was no question that the people on the motor torpedo boats could see and know that they were under fire. Oren's response was to ask permission from Navy headquarters for a torpedo attack. Oren radioed Navy headquarters in Haifa with the request. Captain Issy Rahab the second in command of the Navy had just received a phone call from the Air Force in Tel Aviv advising of the concern about the identification of the ship. Rahab said hold up we have doubt about the ship's identification. It is not recorded but I can imagine what Oren said to Rahab you SOB you're sitting there warm and dry and safe in Haifa that ship is shooting at me I have no doubt about its identification it's hostile. The argument was persuasive and overwhelming Rahab gave the okay for the torpedo attack and tragically 25 more Americans died from a torpedo which struck the middle of the Liberty. Now following the attack Israel rescue helicopters arrived at 312 44 minutes after the attack was over. A helicopter saw and reported an American flag on the ship. Conspiracy purveyors love to tell that an Israeli pilot was recorded reporting an American flag on the ship but they neglect to tell that the pilot was not an attacking pilot and that the sighting was 44 minutes after the attack was over. Four interesting things happened when the Israeli high command learned they had attacked an American ship they immediately advised U.S. Naval Attache commander Ernest Castle and he sent a flash message at 414 to the White House to the commander of the Sixth Fleet and others advising of the event and conveying Israel's apology. The castle message had this curious effect of generating waves of relief while the Israel high command when the Israel high command received Royal Flight Leader's message now pay attention this ship is marked CTR 5 the message terrorized the high command headquarters in the carrier. Royal misread the G for a C. Hearing the ship's markings began with a C suggested the ship was Soviet there were at least five Soviet intelligence gathering ships in the Eastern Mediterranean and all of their markings began with C. If Israel had attacked the Soviet ship it would be an excuse for the Russians to enter the war on the side of the Arabs and take away all of Israel's gains when it was determined that the ship was attacked by Israel and not not not so vets a wave of relief swept through the career now President Johnson was in his bedroom on the morning of June 8th when he got the first message by telephone from Walt Rostow that one of our ships had been torpedoed in the Mediterranean. With him was George Christian his press secretary and George Christian told me the president looked at him and said George if this is an attack by the Russians it looks like we have to go to war but when the initial word of the castle message reached the White House it was still uh they were still wondering who had attacked Johnson had ordered his national security team to meet in the situation room and they sat there fearful the attackers were Soviet and wondering what would be or should be the U.S. response should it be a strike back at Russia is at the beginning of world war three are we on the edge of a nuclear exchange and then castle's message arrived and here's the team in the situation room you can see Dean Rusk and George Bundy and Clark Clifford and the president is standing under a clock and if you look at it close you'll see it's right around 11 o'clock and that was a about the time that the message arrived advising the United States that the attack had been by Israel and not by the Soviets and as a result a wave of relief swept through the White House situation room the situation that the attacker was our friend Israel not the Soviet Union World War three was off the table but out in the Mediterranean with the sixth fleet Admiral Martin was aboard his flagship the Little Rock and his staff had the same concern as Washington except it was more immediate the USS Saratoga one of two carriers Saratoga in America that were steaming with the sixth fleet was steaming alongside a Soviet destroyer they had their guns pointed at each other should the United States open fire first where the Soviets about to open fire when the castle message reached the bridge the flag bridge of the Little Rock a wave of relief swept through the flag bridge it was not time to start fighting with the Russians finally at the US embassy in Cairo where the initial report of the attack had been received there was deep concern that the Egyptians or the Soviets had attacked the liberty and that would bring the US into the war on the side of Israel now the US embassy this is the old one was in the heart of Cairo I'd been there and in my opinion it's since been rebuilt but in my opinion it was the least secure and most unprotected US embassy in the world the embassy was under siege by street mobs and it was uncertain if the Egyptian army or police would continue to protect the embassy when the castle message was received confirming that Israel and not Egypt or the Soviets had attacked liberty uh ambassador Richard Parker much uh ambassador Parker was a wonderful gentleman he served as ambassador to three arab states and uh he was very helpful in my research sadly he passed away in January but at the time he was a political counselor in the embassy and confirmed that a wave of relief swept through the US embassy in Cairo well back in Israel Israel provided castle with a super freon helicopter and he flew out to the liberty and was the first US person to reach her the aircraft of the sixth fleet were hours away and the ships almost a day away castle was initially mad as hell he assisted in the US investigations and as the investigations were completed he became convinced that the attack was a tragic case of mistaken identity here's what captain castle told tem's television in 1983 man we'd better not do that or let that happen so let's think what it came to stand let us presume it was a pre-meditated plan for whatever reason you get rid of a united state ship that was a threat to Israel the nation that had just in 22 minutes destroyed an entire Egyptian airport had captured all of the Egyptian armor in the Sinai but later decided they had to take the United States ship I believe that it would have done 25 years later to the day almost to the minute I piloted a plane from Stadov airport north of Tel Aviv where Castle had taken off in 1967 I flew castle and Israel Lieutenant Colonel Danny Grossman to the GPS spot where Castle had flown over the Liberty on June 8 1967 we circled the spot and I dropped 34 flowers in memory of the lost castle recited a blessing on the lost and their families and the US Navy hymn Lieutenant Colonel Grossman intoned the cottage the Jewish prayer for the dead in memory of the American Jewish sailor who died in the attack on the Liberty when I published the Liberty incident in 2002 I had been fortunate enough to obtain transcripts of the Israel Air Force audio tapes and they were included in the book how they clearly show the attack was a case of mistaken identity however conspiracy purveyors claimed the tapes were fabricated by Israel after the attack there were rumors that the United States national security agency had audio tapes that proved the attack was deliberate the US had an EC 121 flying in the Mediterranean that made some recordings and in a letter dated March 3 2000 chief petty officer Marvin Nowicki the NSA Hebrew linguist who was with NSA Hebrew linguist petty officer Michael Prostiniak recorded the NSA tapes and these are the tapes that Nowicki told about to James Bamford and he said they showed the attack was a mistake Bamford nevertheless wrote in a book that the tapes proved the attack was deliberate now here's a picture of what Nowicki and Prostiniak receiving awards for their work they were two of the Navy's Hebrew linguists the Navy did or the NSA's Hebrew linguists they didn't have very many at the time and when the book came out Nowicki responded with a letter to the Wall Street Journal and in his letter which was published May 16 2001 he concluded my position is the opposite of Mr. Bamford's it is that the attack though terrible and tragic especially to the crew members and their families was a gross error how can i prove it i can't unless the transcripts tapes are found and released to the public following the publication of the 2002 volume on the liberty incident i sued the national security agency for release of their tapes i prevailed i commend them they're not sore losers they were very cooperative and the release of the tapes made the new york times and the associated press you can see the new york times headline recordings back is real claim on spy ship as a result of this release uh i had my 15 minutes of fame on cnn with will putzer a 30-year-old mystery what really happened in the Israeli attack on the uss liberty will sort through some newly released classified information welcome back to pass with u.s. government declassified secrets about a long-time naval controversy a 1967 attack by Israeli forces on the uss liberty of Israeli pilots and ground control and english transcripts now being made public by the u.s. national security agency shed new light on one of the most controversial mysteries in u.s. navy history why did the israelis attack an american surveillance ship that was monitoring communications in the six-day war on the tape recorded by a nearby american surveillance aircraft you hear the israeli ground controller talking to rescue helicopter pilots set in after the initial israeli attack for your info it is apparently an arab ship roger it is an egyptian supply ship roger the nsa tapes are included as an appendix in the new book the liberty incident revealed and they dovetail exactly with the israeli air force tapes so they validate each other and confirm that the israeli tapes were not fabricated but were in essence recordings of the same information that was recorded by the national security agency if you'd like to listen to the tapes you can listen to them in hebrew on the national security agency website they're posted there under www.nsa.gov and you can read there also the nsa translations of the tapes that were made there by another nsa hebrew linguist less than a year after the release of the nsa tapes the united states state department released volume 19 of foreign relations of the united states which contains many additional state department defense department white house cia and other documents all further confirming the attack was a mistake since then some conspiracy purveyors have claimed that the state department the national security agency and i are engaged in a conspiracy to fool the american people i'm honored to be included with such distinguished organizations i will admit that i was invited by the state department to appear and speak on january 12 2004 together with the historian for the state department the historian for the cia the historian for the national security agency at a symposium in the uh loy auditorium at the state department at that event i presented a paper on the incident co-written by me together with captain earnest castle who you saw a few moments ago and by the cia chief of station in televieve in 1967 in the earlier book that's how he's identified however since then he's come out and his name john haddon is on the uh article that ernie castan and i wrote together i was also there after invited to speak at the national security agency symposium on october 12 2009 perhaps it was best stated by richard hickman he was a national security agency he grew linguist who translated the nsa tapes at fort mead for the nsa hickman was in the navy in 1967 and uh one is one of the few he grew linguists at nsa uh he had sailed with uh the lopez on a uh a cruise together with an nsa civilian named al blue and uh here's what he had to say al blue the nsa arabic linguist was a friend of mine as early al died in the attack we were both on the valdez during february april of 67 having picked up the ship in messua ethiopia and rode it up the canal into the mediterranean and out to barcelona when we returned they told us we had to go right back out and get on the liberty i told them i was due to be discharged from the navy in june of 67 and it was unlikely the navy would let me go with so little time left so they agreed that i couldn't go which resulted in no he grew linguist aboard the liberty but they said al blue had to go so because of the fact that i'd lost a good friend in al and of course naval security group shipmates and other wounded civilians i was ready to blame the israelis along with everyone else who was angry but based on what i heard both from eyewitnesses and the tapes my conclusion has always been that it was a case of mistaken identity now of the several conspiracy stories that we talked about i'll mention just two in 1967 Yuri premikov who at that time was an editor for pravda and uh ultimately became the prime through the kgb became the prime minister of the soviet union he wrote some articles in pravda and a book about the six-day war which he titled the dove has been released he claimed the liberty was there fighting with israel against the arabs and the attack was coordinated between the cia and israel to cover up the us participation this story is most beloved by the arabs as they found it easier to accept their defeat at the hands of superpower usa rather than little israel another writer john loft is has a story that the liberty was there fighting with the arabs against israel both stories are pure nonsense everyone is entitled to their own opinion but no one is entitled to their own facts in this case the facts are clear that the tragedy was a result of mistaken identity caused by a series of blunders by both u.s and israel while we'd like to go on for several hours i believe now is the time to stop for questions yes sir the liberty after the attack uh well they they were sailing up parallel to the coast they turned north out to sea and they sailed a while with the fires burning and uh they they had a lot of mechanical problems and ultimately the ship became dead in the water the ship was uh reached by the davis and the massie sent by the sixth fleet but almost not quite 20 about 23 or 21 hours later and at that time the uh davis put on board a gentleman named paul tobin who many of you may have known he ultimately became the oceanographer of the navy and then he was the director of the naval historical center in washington and he and their ship's uh damage control officer worked on the problem they got the boilers up they got the ship underway and they were originally ordered to go to crete and while in route they got a message no go to malta instead so they sailed under their own power the navy uh tugboat papagaia was also sent to the scene to tow them but it wasn't necessary liberty could proceed under its own power and the papagaia uh trailed a quarter of a mile behind watching for anything that might wash out the home and the side of the ship so that no secret documents were lost yes sir i recall what they were the ceremony later about passing out decorations who got them and what were they for well there were several ceremonies one ceremony uh was well i mean there were many purple hearts many bronze stars many silver stars one silver star went to uh commander marise benet marise benet got a silver star and the purple heart for saving the lives on the ship that day when my first book came out benet read it and sent a message to his friends on the liberty uh i've read the book and it seems to explain everything he got returned messages you traitor in any event uh there are a number of i mean there's quite a number of photos which you can see of the people getting their awards i can't tell you the number but a large number and then there was a separate award given to the captain of the liberty bill megonical and bill was awarded to the men of honor and it was awarded at the native washington navy yard and some people said that this was a slight by the president and uh i did some research on that and i discovered that both the state department and the defense department wanted to keep this low key because of these arguments that the liberty was there fighting against the arabs and they set it up at the washington navy yard i've been there for retirement services of many of my friends and there were many other metal honors given there but uh in any event uh there was a story that president johnson gave 13 medals of honor at the white house the same day that megonical got his medal of honor at the navy yard check that out that's false i have a letter from bill megonical with whom i became friendly over the course of my research and in which i said to him look if he didn't want to i mean honor you he could have just not signed the citation and the bill said yeah that makes a lot of sense and so uh i can't tell you uh the total number but there were numerous awards yes sir given that liberty was not engaged in espionage i would assume that the subtitle of your book identifying it's a spy ship you're right it's not of your doing you're right that's the publisher's idea as i started out as i started out i i said a navy over intelligence gatherer and now liberty was sailing normally on the high seas and listening to what was broadcast that's not spying that's intelligence gathering which is 95 percent of what the cia does but uh nevertheless uh if you'll pardon my saying so uh a spy ship sounds more sexy than an overt intelligence gatherer and that's why the publisher i guess it does yes sir you don't need to see an american flag to recognize whether a ship is a combatant or not a combatant particularly whether it's capable of bombarding the shoreline i mean you know you know i know all of us ameters you know you know from over a mile away what kind of ship that is how was that explained in all of this well i mean there were a number of first of all remember there were numerous mistakes and uh this was in the middle of a situation where shooting was going on uh there had been the shooting that the day before by a destroyer and now uh here's a ship 14 miles offshore not a mile but 14 miles offshore it's battleship gray and as you know the definition of a warship under international law is that it's uh painted the normal color of warships that is commanded by uh an officer of the navy that the crew is subject to the law of war and there's one other criteria so i mean uh it was a as i say it was it was a mistake uh perhaps they it's easy to for us to sit here like uh you see Rahab warm and dry with no one shooting at us and say oh you should have recognized that but but nevertheless it was battleship gray it was a uh in essence it looked like a warship and uh the israeli navy like our navy has had a very limited experience in naval aviation uh in 1948 they sent out a uh beach bonanza with two guys in it to fly over an egyptian ship and throw a hand grenade they opened the door and the plane spun in and it was lost in 1956 uh dany shapira the chief test pilot of israel air force was leading a flight a mirage three seas down near the red sea and they saw what looked like a destroyer well of course you remember the egyptians had scurry class destroyers and zed class destroyers this was a zed class destroyer and they attacked it and dany told me that they's very they felt terrible about it when they learned that it was a british ship the crane and not an egyptian ship and i and my research got to london i went to white hall i got the british navy's records and they pulled them out and here was the report and the good news was they didn't kill anybody one soldier suffered a broken tibia and so when i was able to go back to israel and tell daddy that he could take that off his conscience he felt very good about it so uh they're the very i i can't think of any other incidents where israel's involved in naval aviation the israel navy has no air dedicated to it though their air is uh assigned by the air force and in 67 they have a nord 2501 twice a day dawn and the sun said it went out and flew an ark and reported what it saw but uh they're not the great naval power that perhaps the united states or england is uh okay yes the lettering on the bow of that show looked like a seed yes sir maybe they need some new sign papers that's the thought yes sir i'm just thinking did you say this was a day or so or when they wiped out the egyptian armored horse well that's uh that's what castle said uh because i mean the confusion and they're so but i just wanted to know who anybody was well i mean that there was there was stuff going on and of course there's another explanation that comes from uh some of the folks in israel the cic officer who made the mistake on the speed 22 year old guy he was so upset about this that he left the navy and switched to the air force and came in f-16 pilot but the story that he likes to tell is that on the first day of the six day war the navy launched six seal missions into six arab ports down in alexandra it was a total disaster they lost some people of north and syria at latakia they sent people in accomplished nothing and 914 was supposed to take them out they got them all on board and while milling around one boat bumped into the other so they had a hole about this big in one of their boats they went back to ashtad and within 10 hours it was fully repaired so uh if rock likes to say that uh on the fourth day of the war the paratroopers had captured jerusalem and the west bank the armor had gotten to the sewage canal and was dipping their feet in it and the navy we had made a hole in one of our own boats we were anxious to get some action uh let's let's say yes sir sir lieutenant commander geybarat from the israeli navy uh behavior servant of the navy war college at the international program i heard your lecture before in the israeli naval academy and it's a pleasure to hear you again uh first of all i would like to say that until today we're not uh we're not coming on our black pilots to recognize chiefs at sea we will leave it to the navy people not to our aviators um but my question is actually of course there are many uh tactical and strategical lessons learned from this incident and and i'm still thinking if if uh according to the u.s public opinion many years ago if it happened and new evidence came out during the years and and as many things in the u.s that it lay on the public opinion how do you drain the public opinion today on this this incident regard to all the all the uh you know stories that people tell and not seeing the facts as you as you perform well to tell you the truth what started out as a one-year project and is now in its 29th year is uh a bit of a disappointment because when i started the project i thought okay i'll research it i'll gather the facts i'll publish them and that'll be the end of this no there are people who uh for example american educational trust uh founded by two former state department the arabist leaning people uh publish a slick magazine out of washington there's a fellow named uh paul finley who was a congressman from chicago who founded the liberty veterans association and these people basically are anti-israel and are not interested in facts or truth they're interested in attacking israel and so uh what i thought was going to be a simple matter of laying this to rest in a year 29 years later there are still um people out there every day telling conspiracy stories and of course uh when they're told and there's nothing in opposition to them uh many people believe them so yes sir that wasn't the only attack on american intelligence scholarship some years later uh another lonely ship was the attack captured by the north korean that was uh nine months later the Pueblo and as a matter of fact there's a very excellent writer phil gulding who was under secretary of state for public affairs who wrote a very excellent book called confirm or deny one of the things that i have taken from his book and never forgotten as he says whenever something happens at a distance the first message that you get is either incorrect or incomplete but uh he told in his book how he argued with state and defense that the uh they should tell the truth what the ship was doing there and the argument that overcame that and resulted in a phony press release was that oh these ships are going around the world and they're welcome everywhere and if we tell what they're really doing they won't be welcome so they made up the phony press release but it it didn't work and as you pointed out the Pueblo was captured nine months later their captain was as i recall was court-martialed uh and uh in case you're interested the ship is still on the registry of naval ships although it's docked in north korea and if you can get to north korea you can visit it as a tourist attraction do we still conduct these surveillance no about this time these ships became obsolete because we got into satellites satellite can go at an altitude where there's no human life involved listen as well or better than these ships could do and so within the next few years they were all phased out in the shut down yes sir administrative matter the judge will be here as long as you can keep him here and being two bells plus a little bit considered by eight bells itself over and release those of you who have other tasks to go to thank you