Hello everyone. So today we will go through LFVM and its space within the free basic ecosystem. So I'm David Carlier, a contribute to various open source projects but more or less related to the business world. It can be video games, it can be enterprise oriented software. More related to the topic of the day, and I have been committed since May 2018. Ok. So what is LLVM? LLVM is a compound of tool set and frontends. Frontends which are able to generate what we call LLVM IR. IR stands for intermediate representation. It's kind of high-level assembly but much more architecture independent. So if we take as an example clang or clang++ frontends from your source code, the lector regenerates symbols which will be sent to the CMA to generate the AST which is abstract syntax tree. And then to the code gen to generate the LLVM IR. So with LLVM, we have also tools. You can build nice just-item compilers. You can extend LLVM itself. For instance, you can make module, what we call module pass which is an extension on the compilation unit perspective. And then function pass, basic block pass and so on. When you can do some checking, you can add some instruction, remove some instruction if you like. It's in the compilation times pass. Right? You have in addition the possibility to do some static code analysis. We have what we call sanitizers. We go through later. All of this available in FreeBSD since 9, 10 ish. First, it was just an option parallel to the old GCC 4.2. It was first a need to replace the old 4.2 which was the last GPL2 version. So it was quite a blocker because from this you can do C++11 and so forth. You can do only C99. So it was time to replace this for the system. So then it became full part of the system since FreeBSD 10. I mean, it's used to build the kernel, the other land, most of the ports. So yes, FreeBSD code base needs a lot of changes to fit clang criteria. Yes, a lot of changes to fit more modern style and so on. So then, as the time goes, more and more architecture was supported. AMD64, ARM, and then maybe now maybe only Spark64 remains a bit behind the rest but that's already a nice progress. So, yes, here we go. So, sanitizers, what are these? It's not really to clean up things like the name I say. It's more to detect at runtime some type of bugs. So it's kind of, it completes pretty much well the statistical analysis part. So, Sanitizer gives many different runtime gallery to detect some type of bug for memory, for rest condition, for several kind of overflow. For instance, we have memory sanitizer. It's mainly about initial variables. Address sanitizer, it's more for double free, heap and stack overflow. Right, for only in NBSE also in addition the leak sanitizer, which is pretty effective and also have much less performance drop compared to tools like Valkorin, for example, which can be 20 times slower. Whereas with address sanitizer, it's 5 times slower sometimes. So, yeah, it's pretty much. We have undefend behavior sanitizer. It's kind of small switch knife sanitizer. I mean, there is no shadow memory mapping like address sanitizer or memory sanitizer. So, it was, for instance, possible to port it to OpenBSD. For this reason, it's kind of small sanitizer. It's only for intergovernable flow with aligned pointers. And the performance drop is pretty small compared to the right. You can combine it with other sanitizer. Whereas memory sanitizer and address sanitizer, you can't use them at the same time. They are mutually exclusive. We have a nice waste condition detection called thread sanitizer. So, all of them are supported by FreeBSD. In addition, we have components like deep further to do some fuzzing and X-ray instrumentation to do some performance benchmarking. Right. So, for example, the very basic code, address sanitizer, it's perfectly capable to catch the first error, the double free. It's perfectly capable to catch it. So, you use the extra free as well. As you can see, it detects the first heap overflow, as you can see. Displacer line. Memory sanitizer, as well, is capable to catch this initialized variable, which can go under the radar very well in production. It works in production of error, but it's not correct code, obviously. As well, thread sanitizer is perfectly capable to catch this obvious waste condition. Like this. Again, it shows you where the problem lies. Ah, sorry. So, here, memory sanitizer was able to catch the initialized variable very well. And if an behavior sanitizer is capable to catch those two obvious errors, the alignment issue, and then the entire overflow, just below, as you can see. So, here, to show you the flag to pass to the front end. So, memory sanitizer, this memory, address sanitizer, address, thread sanitizer, and behavior. So, we mentioned earlier the leap further component. But what is buzzing all about in the first place? It's a testing technique to catch certain types of bugs with software, mainly libraries, I might say, which relies on external inputs. It can be just reading a config file, it can be listed in a socket, whatever you like. If we take an example, an image, picture pressure, if you want to further the picture format detection, if you want to further how it detects the PNG, GPAY, and so on. So, the leap further will use inputs which we can call corpusses in the buzzing vocabulary. So, those corpusses don't have to be full picture, can be just the first bytes of the picture format. Then, the leap further we take those corpusses, we proceed to do some transformation which we call mutations. It will insert some random bytes to some random offset, remove some other bytes, eventually, in order to trigger segmentation fault, ducera, whatever. Those mutations will be then stored so they can be reused once you fix your bugs. So, buzzing is meant to be run long enough, I mean hours, at least, if not days, if not weeks, if necessary, in order to cover as much as possible. So, as you can see, that completes pretty well the unit test we all know. But, leap physics is, buzzing is nice, but there are some corporates. I mean, as I said, it fits better with library, because with monolithic applications, for instance, if you want to further NGNICs, that can become very difficult. It's software relying on events, and leap further runs the code several times. That can contradict pretty well, pretty much, the application work for this case. You might need to do a lot of conchages in order to fit leap further needs. So, here, to display how leap further works, you have your first binary, you have one or several conferences. We have also, as an option, it supports dictionary. Dictionary is a sort of way to guide the buzzing. Sometimes, you may want to avoid too much pointless randomness. Let's take as an example, you want to fuzz HTTP server, you may not want to fuzz keywords like get, put, let, et so on, just maybe some part of the client request. So, dictionary is a good way to guide a little bit, make more sense of the buzzing. And then, with the corporates, eventually the dictionary, the input undergoes some mutation. Those mutations will be then stored in the same place as the original input. So, oh, oh, in practice, work leap further. You need to at least implement LFVM for the test when input, which takes as an argument the mutated data. So, it's a C function, right? And then, you do what you have to do with this. So, for instance, there is an obvious overflow here. So, that's why I recommend to combine further with, at least, a sanitizer, like, a sanitizer, for instance. Once you compile your first binary, ah, sorry, you will see. So, I type this, and then it comes with several options. You can show how much one it will do. The memory usage limit. If you want to do some parallel jobs, ah, what you can do as well is the max length of inputs. The initial seed for randomness. It has plenty, well, again, on FreeBSD, the leak detection is not supported, but there's many... So, then, you have to create a meaningful purpose folder. Ah, sorry. For instance, I ask him to run 200 times with this input folder. And then, it was able to catch the overflow. So, it created a crash file. So, yet, normally, it should create some mutated data with an hash code, and then, the transform inputs. Here it is. So, we have now X-ray augmentation. It's, as I said earlier, it's for doing performance benchmarking. For example, you are doing, just release a new version of your software for your company, and then, a customer of yours calls you to tell you that this new release had a severe performance drops compared to the previous version. So, X-ray augmentation, at least, will help you to find out where the bottlenecks really lies. So, X-ray augmentation will, when you compile your binary with X-ray augmentation, will put some augmentation hook in each function and free, in each function excite for the instrumentation function, because you can choose which function you want to instrument and which function you don't want to. As for instance, the more function you instrument, the slower the binary will get. So, you have to choose carefully which part of the code you want to instrument. In order to do this, you need to add those attributes. So, you want to instrument always those two. You can also say, you don't want to write these attributes. To discard the function, you want to avoid to instrument. So, by default, once you run your updated binary, it will create a file, but you can change the file naming. By default, X-ray log is the name of the application and then HASH. And then, with LLVN X-ray, you can find out, you can do some accounting, that means showing where your application spends most of the time. You can order, because it will generate kind of CSV-like presentation. So, it says here, the first version of the Fibonacci function is the bottleneck in this case. So, that's nice adding some attributes. In practical, I might say, you might not want to touch your code too much to that degree, at least when it's your corporate work. So, fortunately, there is another solution. It's via an external configuration file. As for you. You can say, please always instrument those two. And you can say, like these two. Never... Assumons this one, please. And then, you can pass this config file as follow. Same thing, it generates the same binary. So, to summarize, summarize. Here, your binary compiles with X-ray assumotation. So, I mentioned assumotation hook, but they are empty until you run the binary. And then, it will fill with the timer. So, in the beginning of each function, the excite point of each function in order to generate the delta. So, with LIVM X-ray graph, you can generate the code graph. And then, from this, you can generate SVG. For example. So, X-ray assumotation works well with multi-thread case, but you have the possibility to aggregate data because it can become very verbose, obviously. So, you can aggregate, can tell to aggregate the data in one point. So, yes, that will be all, fortunately, my few BSD machines that crashed yesterday. So, I could not use it. If you have any concern question.


Yeah, the question, you know, is there a hierarchy between men and women in a more beautiful world or the men in charge? I would say in charge of what? It could be that men are in charge of some things and women are in charge of other things and that's how it was in traditional societies and That might be true in the future too with always some exceptions, you know, there were Men who Sometimes took on more feminine roles. There were women who took on more masculine roles like these do not have to be confining


And so that was you know that was in 2007 and yeah, and then yeah And so I just started working leads. I was you know back then it was like shooting fish in a barrel like every lead company was good and You know why do you think that was yeah, you know so People were going online and there wasn't There wasn't much competition. There wasn't many people advertising for life when I was selling life insurance those days I mean I even put up a website and within two months. I think I posted like 10 blog posts, you know not I know what I was doing and then I started getting leads people finding me and these were great leads And that's kind of how I kind of got my you know started getting my taste of marketing down. So You know as far as why it was so good I think around 2008 that's when ping posting technology came out and And you know where then those lead vendors instead of selling direct to agent and dealing with with all that They started sending them through Ping trees which sells the highest bidder and sells multiple times And then it just diluted the quality of a lead and so it's been refreshing the past couple years seeing like You know your your lead company and a bunch of others out there just really doing agents right and not going through Ping trees You know, thank you buddy. Yeah for sure that yeah I mean with those with those with the ping posts everything else Like they're selling to each other and it's like a frenzy in a bidding market and you can who knows how many times the leads actually resold I mean, it's insane. Yeah, exactly. So, you know after 2008 everything changed but before that man those that was the heyday


In this presentation, we will discuss audit procedures. We're keeping in mind our objective. Our objective is to audit the financial statements. As we audit the financial statements, our objective is to give an opinion on the fairness of those financial statements in relation to a set of standards, typically being generally accepted accounting standards. To do that, we're going to go through audit procedures. And as we go through the audit procedures, we're going to document that evidence in order to support our opinion. As we go through each of the audit components, when we start to test specific accounts, for example, it will be more clear as we think about specific accounts, what type of audit procedures would make sense, what type of assertions would make sense with regards to those specific accounts. However, we want to take a step back because we want to think about the audit process as a whole as we plan for the different types of audit procedures going through the audit process. That's going to give us a better understanding of the process as a whole. It will also help us to plan more efficient audit procedures.


Hi, welcome to the first annual vote hacking village here at Defcon. Yeah. Yeah, all right So my name is Jake Braun. I this ridiculous thing was my idea and so somehow that landed me as the emcee today so I'll be in here all day and introducing people welcome and I Was the White House liaison to the Department of Homeland Security. I run a small National security and cyber security strategy and policy consulting firm called Cambridge Global Advisors And I teach cyber policy at the University of Chicago So just to do some quick table setting on what we're actually trying to achieve here and kind of what we're not trying to achieve here As well before I introduce our first speakers Let me just start by saying anybody who Thinks that they are machines network or database can't be hacked is either a fool or a liar, right? I think that's actually a totally uncontroversal thing to say at a place like this. However, unfortunately It's it's a pretty controversial thing to say in the election space And by the way because of some of the great work that this conference has done over the last 20 years 25 years You've got people in some of the Top industries top countries are top companies in the world Apple Google Lockheed Martin JP Morgan even the NSA Would never say with the straight face. We can't be hacked. We're unhackable and by the way 20 years ago They were all saying the same thing that we hear today in the election issue Oh, our machines don't never touch the internet, you know Our databases are air gapped and backed up all the time all this stuff Well now not only again because of the great work Death kind has done not only would all these industries say that they're hackable They would say we're probably being hacked right now successfully by multiple different actors, right? And so the goal of what we're trying to do here is not to play gotcha and show we can hack into this machine Or that database or or this county clerks, whatever first of all a we already know that we can write the Russians have already done it and And many researchers have already done it. This is they haven't been able to make the research public That's not the point. The point of this is actually much greater The point is to erase the idea of unhackability from the election industry writ large Why is that important? Well, that's important because We are actually now under a direct existential threat to the United States from a foreign adversary who has essentially unlimited resources Russia and Until we can get this industry to to get the whole concept of unhackability out of their mind We won't be able to begin to start Securing our democracy and so What we what we seek to do As as this goes on year after year is help get this industry to come around and again realize that that they are hackable They will be hacked the Russians are going to be back other bad guys are going to be back And they're going to get in and so then what do they need to do as our friends from friends from verified voting are going to talk about They need to actually talk to each other and share threat information they need to take the help of of Hack of the hacker community and securing their networks and they need to work with with our national security apparatus in this country To help secure their networks and by the way, you know, Google Facebook Apple Lockheed Martin JP Morgan None of them wanted to work with the national security apparatus 20 years ago when they were first being hacked and so on but you know They're sitting duck when there's a nation state after them and they've all now realized this in the election industry needs needs to do the same and so On that note by the way one thing I do want to point out before we get started is that if it wasn't for some really amazing local election officials Like a Dean Logan in LA Ricky hatch in Utah Lance golf in Chicago and some other people in the Chicago area that prefer to be remain nameless Helping us with this and really taking Understanding this for what it is which is an opportunity again not for us to play gotcha, but for their staff To get access to some great training and to have some great research done on on their Systems and machines and so on None of this would have been possible. So I do want to give the election officials who helped us with this around of applause before we get started Okay, so without further ado our first speakers David Jefferson is the board chair of verified voting Verified voting has been working on this issue for well over a decade decade David is a visiting computer scientist at Lawrence Livermore National Lab where he works on supercomputing applications, but has also been active in research in this space since Well for for decades In 1994 while a digital equipment corporation He oversaw development of the California election server the first web server anywhere to provide online voting information on candidates and issues In 1995 he helped develop in cooperation with California voter foundation the first online database of campaign finance information ever for the San Francisco Elections that year and Barbara Simons is the president of verified voting same organization Barbara has been on the board of advisors of the US election assistant commission since 2008. She published a book called broken ballots that you should all read and On voting machines that she co-authored with guy named Douglas Jones She also co-authored a report that led to the cancellation of Department of Defense Internet voting service done Oh, and but I can't I have to say that she's also the former president the Association for Computing machinery the largest and oldest international educational scientific society for computing professionals. All right, so Barbara and David please come up All right, so I'm going to speak first and I'm what I'm going to try to talk to you about is the ecosystem of Hardware and software and procedures in a US election There's a lot of concentration in people's minds on the voting machines themselves Those are the gray ones that I have in this diagram But there's a lot more to it than that and I want to introduce you to what it is when you learn the architecture about the information flows in in an election You'll you'll be able to understand the vulnerabilities That are not obvious otherwise. I'm going to probably just get rid of this microphone and speak to the diagram No, I don't mind Okay all right so There are basically Three kinds of information flows in an election the red arrows here talk about the flow of software and firmware through the system The green arrows talk about the election definition Which is data that describes the election what the candidates are what the propositions are where they where you Where the boxes are that you touch or or check and then the blue arrows Are the flow of votes and ballot information and derived information from from them? And then I have dotted lines here for in the case of voter where Systems have what's called a voter verified paper trail now I'm gonna go over this quickly and then I'm gonna Retrace in some with some particular marks about the software So first of all in the top left corner you see the vendor the vendor is the Company that both builds or contracts for the building of the voting machines themselves and also writes all of the software for for the voting machines not just the terminal voting machines where voters Record their vote but also the back. Whoops. Pardon me The back-end canvas computers that aggregate all the votes from the voting machines and and Produce the the final results so Let's look follow the red arrows from the vendor the vendor. They're very few vendors in the country a handful five six Nationally there are thousands of jurisdictions so many vendors or each vendor sells to many jurisdictions The vendor writes the software for both the voting machines and for the canvas computers those are treated as a single product and And a given jurisdiction buys all of its software both front-end and back-end from the same vendor The vendor then sells its Systems and services to the various jurisdictions so the next line there is supposed to represent local election officials government officials Who are legally responsible for the conduct of the election? They get copies of the software from the vendors. They only get binaries. They never see the source That's one of the issues that I'll come back to later They load those binaries prior to an election. They load those binaries onto the voting machines that are going to be distributed out into the into the precincts in the jurisdiction The This diagram is talking about Electronic voting machines such that you have over there in the in the hackers Forum over there You could vary this diagram for jurisdictions that use Optical scan voting systems, but For purposes of today. I'm talking about electronic voting machines. All right So the vendors of sorry the the election officials install software and all of the voting machines and they distribute all of the voting machines to each precinct a Few days before the election the voting machines sit there for a while in the custody of Maybe a nobody's custody they may just be locked in a closet or they may just be sitting in a hall somewhere They may be in the custody of a pole worker, but they find their ways to the pole on the election day Also the election officials install the software in the canvas systems and the so-called election management systems and the Ideally the election officials are the ones who run the canvas and run the election management system however more and more it seems to be the case that Jurisdictions don't actually do that. They also outsource The the running of these applications the back-end applications to the very same vendors So That's the flow of software to the voting machines and to the election management and canvas systems The flow of election definition Data that describes the election also comes from the the vendors To the election officials the election officials load it Load it on to the voting machines and to the canvas systems Oftentimes they outsource the production of that election definition file also to the vendors So the vendors play an absolutely critical central role here oftentimes a much more a much stronger role than even the election officials do The flow of votes of course a voter walks into a precinct Authenticates himself as being allowed to vote in this election being registered in this precinct Walks over to a voting machine Casts his his vote At the end of the day at the end of election day all of the votes are recorded on Memory cards that were inserted somewhere in the in the back of the voting machine Ideally those memory cards are removed at the end of the day and hand transported by poll workers To the back to the county where they are read by the canvas machines and the canvas systems Aggregate all the all the results and determine Who has won the election? Of course they have to deal with absentee ballots as well And there are many other kinds of many kinds of ballots you have to deal with provisional ballots So it's much more complicated than I'm talking about but this is idealized Eventually the canvas report is published and that indicates to the world who's supposed to have won the election Now let me do a time check here Okay Some Electronic voting machines have a feature called the verified voter verified paper audit trail Some of the machines that you will see down the hall have them some do not The voter verified paper audit trail was a late addition to the concept of an electronic voting machine In attempt to deal with the security weaknesses of all electronic voting machines because with the all electronic voting machines You basically have to trust all the software We did not want to be in that position so we tried to shall we say backpatch by adding a a Voter verified paper trail and the way that works is this when the voter is standing at the voting machine and Presses that cast my ballot button of course his ballot is recorded electronically But it is also printed on paper At the side of the voting machine and the voter is supposed to look at that and the voter is supposed to verify What's printed on the paper is the way? I intended to vote and he's supposed to report it if there's any difference as a Matter of fact hardly anybody ever does that which is one of the profound weaknesses of the VVPAT concept But if we assume that voters actually did that Then that printed audit trail from every voting machine Which now the voters have verified contains their true? Intense in principle they could all be aggregated and looked at it's on paper now and the paper copies of the votes are Of course immune to any kind of software attack. That's the beauty of it No matter whether they're bugs or malicious code anywhere in the line the paper trail is immune to To that kind of attack or failure so ideally you could you could it? Okay, you could take a random sample Or or the entire corpus of Voter verified paper records and compare them to the canvas report and if there were differences You could know there's a problem somewhere in the software in the procedures used to to to aggregate or possibly malicious code and if the if the law so supported it you could actually Presumably prefer the results from the hand counted paper audit trail the law doesn't prefer this but I mean principle it could So that's the that's the general flow of software votes and Election data, and I just want to make a few quick comments about the software itself before I turn this over to my colleague Barbara Simons The software written by is written by anonymous programmers Who work for the vendors? We don't really know who they are. We don't know how they're vetted They do not have to have security clearances. We know they're anonymous The software itself is considered proprietary by the vendors it is They are very protective of that proprietary nature So there's a network of law and contract restrictions and NDA's that prevent you or me or anybody else from Really seeing the insides of that software a few of us have under certain Circumstances been able to see that sort the source code But most people are not and that includes election officials election officials all over the country are running software And they do not even have the the source a Lot of the software in both the voting machines and the canvas systems is Cots software commercial off-the-shelf stuff. It's about mostly operating system stuff You will note that when you go down there you will see that some of these systems are so old They're running Windows XP. They're running Windows CE Some of them run Windows 2000 Nothing nowhere in the country are they running act systems newer than these or hardly anywhere if I'm not aware of any I mean that these are old and the reason that they are so old is because once they are certified You can't change a voting system without going through a complete recertification process, which is long slow and expensive The security features of these systems from beginning to end are especially weak The weak points would include the software update and installation process the password and key management cryptography and randomization all generally very weak and even the physical security the ports and And seals on voting machines when they are When when they're in storage and when they're in use It's a mess I Already mentioned that the software has to be certified to meet certain federal standards These are drafted by NIST and the EAC you'll hear more about that in the next panel So I'm not going to go into that now Except to say that the current standards are over a decade old Quite weak in the subject of security and they're only voluntary on the states anyway And they're enforced only by testing protocols not by any kind of deep analysis of of the source code So this I think I'm going to stop there and turn this over to Barbara Simons my colleague Barbara Okay, I guess this this will work I'm not going to bother with having slides up because they're not very exciting I'm going to be exciting, but the slides aren't exciting. So First of all, I want to thank you guys for coming here and for working on this really really important issue I mean, we need to get many more people involved we need to be able to show that there are major problems with these machines and I'm hoping that some of you will actually be able to show that with the work you're doing here. So thank you very much Here before it's been very difficult for independent experts to Examine these machines for some of the reasons that David mentioned the software is proprietary and some of you guys probably know the digital Millennium Copyright Act which makes it very difficult to To examine software if you don't have permission to do so. So There's been an exception made which allows this to go forward this this hacking village to go forward Fortunately that will remain for more than like the next year or two, but we may they may take it away So that's another issue As David said early test the testing is totally inadequate the early testing was even worse a lot of these machines that are in use some of them the ones that you'll see there were certified to early testing Where there was no penetration testing. I mean, can you imagine they had a list of requirements? I mean, can you imagine a major software vendor doing testing by just checking off a list of requirements like single entry single exit Loop without doing penetration testing and yet that's what's what's been done for many of these voting machines The results are sometimes secret So even the testing results are secret and there's a case in California Where the then Secretary of State Kevin Shelley tried to get the test results from debold machines because he was concerned about the debolds That were being used in California and the testing agency said to him These results are owned by debold and you can't get them from us You have to get them from debold and of course debold wouldn't turn them over. So even a very Proactive Election official who wants to know what's happening who wants to know the test results couldn't get them and So I'm gonna talk a little bit about how we got here and and the story kind of begins back with Florida 2000 which of course I'm sure so those of you who aren't old enough to remember what happened have probably heard of it and Some of us are old enough to remember And that but what really happened was forwarded 2002 because they had more problems in the midterm in Florida also as Result to help America vote act was passed in 2002 and it allocated About three billion that's with the bee dollars to replace voting systems And one of the unfortunate conclusions that a number of people reached from Florida 2000 Was that paper is bad? Paper is bad paper list is good. And in fact, I would go further than that to say that there was also an effort made to I'm not sure if exploit is the right word but to manipulate voters with disabilities Because there was there were people going around saying Paper machines with paper discriminate against voters with disabilities as if all voters with disabilities Had vision problems and as if there weren't alternatives for people who do have vision problems So a lot of people felt that that to support paper was to be against voters with disabilities Which is a really bad place to be put. I mean as a policymaker. So that's something else that happened and of course all This money was suddenly made available election officials wanted to get it and they wanted to get the newest and greatest shiny object and And not only so the vendors would say completely secure Federally certified we already know what that meant and of course You did they could just touch a button at the end of the day and get the results And if you're a hard-working election official that sounds really good You can go home, you know It's some decent hour of the night and you don't have to worry no recount. It's perfect You're done. So it was very appealing plus. There was sort of a gold rush mentality Everybody wanted to get this newest thing and besides they wanted to get have to get the money What was still there? So there was a big rush to buy machines And of course computers had to be introduced if you're going to go paperless you need computers David's already talked a bit about direct recording electronic machines These are the machines where which directly record the vote so the typical one will show the vote on the screen You will touch the screen. They're not all they want to all touch screen but most of them were you would touch the screen for your candidate and Presumably that information would be stored in the memory of the computer and initially most of them were paperless There were of course issues even early on because if the machines were not properly calibrated You could have problems. You would have jumping votes and people, you know, and and we've seen this a lot in recent elections We're say what they said, you know, I voted for Obama and there's other candidates name, you know And then people would say these machines aren't secure because I touched the vote for the button for candidate a and candidate b's Name approach appeared, but in fact, we don't know if that was insecure or not because we don't know what happened inside these machines So it's quite possible. They touched the button for candidate a and a was recorded in the machine Or maybe b was recorded in the memory. We don't know because of course nobody knows So these machines on top of everything else were really badly engineered I mean the technology the touchscreen machine was bad because it had to be constantly recalibrated They were insecure the testing was lousy It was a bad deal all the way around and yet they were used almost throughout the country In response as David said when when the computer scientists and other people election activists started complaining about this These they were there were retrofits with these voter verified paper audit trails Which tended to be continuous roll thermal paper With small font that was hard to read bad human factors one of the major vendors recorded every single step that the Let that the voter did which made it very hard to figure out what your final results were People didn't look at them and then if you did want to recount them It was a continuous roll which is hard to recount the thermal printed like what you get at a gas station which can fade in the heat I mean again, so really badly engineered machines were retrofitted with really bad retrofits I mean they were at least consistent So there were also paper ballot systems Typically, these are what we call upscan systems where you have a paper ballot in California You connect the broken arrow to decide who you're going to you know to signify who your selection is some places There'll be you know You feel in an oval and then these machines are put through scanners, which of course have computers in them So there are again problems with the scanners if they're not calibrated properly They may if they're calibrated to be too sensitive They may pick up stray marks and think that you voted twice Which you're not supposed to do if they're not sensitive enough they may miss So there are calibration problems there too, but the good news is that there are paper ballots So with if there's malware or software bugs Or calibration problems you can find them if you look at the paper ballots another advantage of course is that With paper ballots if the scanner is down people can vote the paper ballots and deposit them in a ballot box for counting later So it's a way to avoid long lines Although ironically we've seen in the past couple of elections that sometimes poor workers don't even know you can do that And so the lines is still they still form because poor workers don't tell voters that they don't have to wait for the scanners There's another problem which is that a Lot of people don't understand that these things have computers in them I mean that might I'm sure this audience finds that hard to believe But in fact people don't understand that the way the scanner works is it's basically a computer So we saw in Wisconsin in the recount in 2016 in Wisconsin That some places did a recount by manually recounting the ballots, which is what a recount is Other parts re-scan them. They put the ballots back into the scanners, which does not check the computer I mean it's sort of a silly exercise, but that's an example of the lack of understanding So I think I'll talk a little bit about debold because debold is the poster child of all that's wrong with these machines And I have to say in debold's defense They I mean they did have really lousy security and they did post their software and open FTP website Just asking for people to download. I mean they weren't asking but you know They set it up so that it could be downloaded and checked So yeah, they deserve a lot of what they got but the fact is the vendors were all bad We know that at this point, but anyway debold in 2002 was used in Georgia in a Georgia major Georgia midterm where both the senator senator Max Cleveland and the governor Were head in the polls and they both lost So we don't know if they truly lost or if there was a problem What we do know is that there were last-minute changes being made to the software with no oversight Now anyone who's worked on a large software project knows That you're always making last-minute changes, you know until the company releases it because you're always finding problems So there could have been very legitimate reasons for these last-minute changes or somebody could have decided who they wanted to win We don't know and nobody examined the software and of course that software is long gone So and and it was paperless. So these machines were used in Georgia 2002 in 2003 as I said somebody actually a journalist found The bold software on an open FTP website and downloaded it handed it off to some security people at Johns Hopkins and Rice and They examined that software and that was the first case where we've had an independent Examination done by people by computer security experts. They found They found gaping holes for example There was a single key a single key to encrypt all the data on every storage device And it was in it was in the program text and that key was F2 654 HD 4 That's all you needed So that was one of the things they found in 2006. There was another study. Well, there have been a lot of studies I'm skipping over a lot of material in the book. I wrote this whole chapter on deep old If you know, it's kind of interesting but in 2006 the Princeton team Showed how to implant a virus on a deep old machine on deep on these deep old machines So that you could basically rig an election. In fact, they testified before Congress on that Ed Felton did They also noted that The slot which contains the memory card has a lock and you could open that lock using a standard hotel bar key and They're pretty standard. So it was also easy to pick but you didn't have to bother you just get this bar key These same machines are in use today in Georgia They were used for the Georgia CD 50 election. Some of you may recall that election $50 million were spent. This is for a house of representative seat. It was the most expensive election ever and actually There were some other problems found in Georgia, which I won't go into one of the people found them Logan Lamb is here And so when I finish he's going to come up and just talk a little bit about Georgia because it's that's also an interesting story But these machines are still there still use in use today and there's no justification whatsoever for their use So there have been some studies. So you guys are not the first ones to try to look at these machines There have been a couple of studies that were sponsored by Secretaries of State and David mentioned how he was able to look at something because he was involved with these studies so in California the secretary of state Bowen did what was called the top-to-bottom review and She required the vendors to produce the machines and the software and all the all the related Material for getting an election setup and she was only able to do that because of a court case that had happened a few Years earlier with an earlier with Kevin Shelley and earlier Secretaries say who actually went to court and won that's the only way she could get these machines I mean you wouldn't believe how hard it is for people to get their hands on them So they she basically went to the University of California And they put together a missive folks put together a team They examined the security the the documentation The accessibility is the only time that that these machines have ever been examined to see how easy they are for voters with disabilities to use They did badly on everything and I should mention a there's some people here like Candace Hocus here Who was one of the people involved with this and Matt blaze was also In fact Matt blaze had an interesting quote We found significant deep-rooted security weaknesses in all three vendors software It should now be clear that the red teams were successful not because they somehow cheated But rather because the built-in security mechanisms. They were up against simply don't work properly There was a pervasive lack of good security engineering across all three systems. So as I said, it's not just debold These were two other systems as well. I believe e s and s and what was the third one was a heart I don't know So the red teams were able to break into all of them That should be inspiration to you guys The California study was validated by a subsequent study done in Ohio called the Everest study Which also again brought together, you know, really good security people They found they they basically found that they validated everything that was discovered in California plus they found more problems this was back in 2006 2007 and Some of these machines are still in use today. They were still used for the 2016 election To my way of thinking this is nothing short of a national scandal in addition. Many of the old machines are falling apart David's already mentioned some of the ancient software that's on them and the fact that it's not even updated frequently But even where there are updates because of the whole certification issue because then they need to be recertified So there's a catch 22 on top of everything else if you want to be conscientious and Update your software then you've got to go through recertification in which can be expensive and time consuming So if you don't want to go through that you don't update The hardware is also failing I mean these machines are just literally falling apart in some cases and some election officials are having to cannibalize other Machines to keep some of the machines going so election officials actually do want to replace these machines I mean, this is not a case where we are fighting against election officials the problem is there isn't money and So that's another issue obviously not directly related to DEF CON but that's something we need to be concerned about Oh, I should just mention that you've all I'm sure heard about the long lines in 2012 and 2016 a Lot of these were caused by the DREs the direct recording electronic machines because unlike paper ballots You must vote on the machine if the machine if there are some machines that are down Or if there are long lines a lot of people want coming to the polls at the same time You have to wait or not vote and go to work because you can't afford to spend an hour waiting in line so The good news, I mean Jake talked about how we are under attack and I agree I lose sleep over this and I hope you will too Because we have to fix the problem but We know how to protect ourselves against hacking we have the solution and it's pretty straightforward We need paper ballots and we need manual post-election ballot audits To check that the computers that count the paper are working correctly If we can get that nationwide We'll be safe from hacking of our voting systems. I mean, I'm not I'm not talking about the voter registration databases That's a different issue. We need to do we need to take significant steps there too to protect those But if you look at the voting technology itself paper ballots manual post-election ballot audits By the way, you have to randomly select the ballots clearly because if you don't use randomness The bad guys will know what you're going to look at and they'll they won't touch They'll just touch the other stuff and incidentally a lot of people don't know what random means Sometimes election officials will announce beforehand what they're going to you know Which precincts or whatever they're going to look at that ain't random so One of the problems we've had historically is Convincing people that this is a problem Not people like you but the press policymakers election officials and I've talked to a lot of reporters where they say to me well give us an example of a of an election that was hacked and The problem is the beauty of these paperless systems both these Touchscreen voting machines and internet voting by the way, which is another which I know there's going to be a whole session on that That's another really dangerous. I mean that's the worst actually But the beauty of these systems that don't have paper ballots that were marked by the voters Is there's no evidence? It's the you know, I mean It's very very very hard to prove that election has been Stolen not only because of the lack of evidence, but because of the resistance to looking we saw that in the 2016 Recount where there was great resistance even to doing recounts of a small number of states And in fact the Michigan recount which Michigan is all paper was halted in by the courts And of course most of the country wasn't really adequately examined at all So in fact, we don't know Whether or not the 2016 machine election was hacked because nobody has done an adequate study to determine whether or not it was hacked So going forward. We just can't allow this to happen. We have to fix these systems And we have to get paper ballots everywhere. So I'll just end with a quote from former FBI director Comey, which I completely support they'll be back in 2020 they may be back in 2018 and one of the lessons they may draw from this is that they were successful because they introduced chaos and division and Discord and so doubt about the nature of this amazing country of ours and our democratic process I think they will be back in 2018. They're a major major midterm elections coming up they're even important elections coming up in 2017 the governors of New Jersey and pencil and I'm sure Virginia are going to be reelect or elected in 2017 and There are a lot of bad machines Pennsylvania 80% of Pennsylvania is paperless buddy machines that are incredibly insecure 80% and this is a major state We've got to fix that. So thank you for the work you're doing and thank you for your support And I would I would like to see if Logan them could come up Talk about Georgia. This is Georgia. I'm a pacer All right, cool. Hey friends. So I'm Logan lamb. I'm a cybersecurity researcher based out of Atlanta. I primarily do wireless cybersecurity research, but Since it was election season and we all like to break things. I really really wanted to get my hands on some voting systems so I ended up going down to the elections office in Fulton County and I was attempting to speak with the election supervisor Richard Baron I think and I was gonna say hey, I'm a you know local cybersecurity researcher I'd like to do some good work and help you guys Well, as you can imagine, I didn't get past the secretary so she ran my card back to Richard Baron and Then they came back to me and let me know that all of the election systems in Georgia are actually handled at Kenesaw State University by the Center for election systems So immediately I thought this was kind of wacky, right? It's like what what is this university doing with all these systems? so Prior to sending an email to the director there. I figured I'd try and get some you know background information on the group And just see like who are these people? What do they do? So I checked out their website and then you know just fired off like the simplest Google dork ever I was just like hey, I'd like to see all of your documents and PDFs you have on this website, okay? Lo and behold There were some really really interesting documents that were already cached by Google, okay? I clicked one of the links and what appeared to be in front of me Was a list of voter names Okay, so at this point I was like is this real life is this happening right now so Yeah, I mean this was just a web server. So I went up a couple of directories Because it had like a directory structure in the route And then I looked at their robots.txt wrote a quick like bash script a curl everything off recursively And then I went to lunch Yeah, so Then I went to lunch and when I came back and I checked to see how much data I had on my computer I had 15 gigs worth of data y'all It's crazy crazy stuff so Yeah amongst this 15 gigabytes worth of data I had all of the voter registration information for everyone in Georgia. Okay, so that includes Names, addresses, birthdays, last four digits of your social Also your full driver's license number which seems relatively innocuous But you can actually use all that information to change people's Registration with the DMV. So that's just a whole nother kind of worms Okay, what else was there? We had PDFs of election day passwords and This seemed to be the same across all counties. Okay, and there were also Some gyms databases and like to this day. I have no clue what those were doing on that server. It's just a web server and From what I could gather it looks like this server was being used to disseminate information to all of the counties and There was like a a bulk update file which had a bunch of voter registration information and a couple windows binaries The center for election systems They would actually tweet out every couple months and be like hey There's a new bulk update file that you all should go download and run on your systems Well, yeah, so it looks like this Hilariously insecure system was being used to disseminate information related to the election systems Well, I mean it keeps getting worse actually So this web server it was vulnerable to Drupal get in okay, and Drupal get in is like the easiest exploit. It's easy mode There are YouTube videos detailing how to pop boxes using Drupal get in and this has been around since 2014 I think and I'm pretty sure it's 2017 now. So that's that's no bueno so an attacker could Trivially get root on this box that is being used to disseminate information and Amongst that information that they are intending to disseminate are windows binaries. I mean come on so I mean an attacker could very trivially implant malware in that and I mean never mind actually getting root on that box and then more than likely being able to pivot in Deeper into the center for election systems networks Oh Okay, so just to reiterate the center for election systems. They handle provisioning Every single DRE in Georgia. Okay, so I mean it makes for a hell of a target and They say that they're testing networks or actually You know, they're partitioned Segregated from whatever network that I happen to get gain access to but given what we've seen so far. I Don't think they have the discipline to really do that All right, so Yeah, I found all this information Immediately questioned if this was real life and then figured out the best way to actually get this resolved because at the end of The day, this is always about building more secure systems so I spent a day or two trying to craft an email to make it sound like I'm not some Rando crazy guy who is getting into their networks. I sent that to the director for the center for election systems and Yeah, I had a weird conversation with him, which I'll get to so I sent him this email and I didn't hear a response I didn't wait 24 hours because I was really really concerned about this So I ended up getting his cell phone number and giving him a call, right?  You're actually fixing this, right? And he oh gotcha gotcha Yeah, so chat with Merle King. He He assured me they were gonna fix this so at that point I dropped it Fast forward to March in March. I was working on the talk I'm gonna be giving tomorrow, which you all should come to cable tap and Over beers working with my buddies I was talking to Chris Grayson and I hadn't told him about this work previously So he went and double-checked what I had accomplished and they had not remediated it correctly So then of course I proceeded to download everything again, right? To see if they had actually made any changes The system was they fixed the Drupalgetten issue But they were still using the server to disseminate information as recently as 2017 so He let an individual at KSU know who could actually get this issue resolved They ended up bringing the FBI into it and then I ended up having the feds come to my apartment unannounced which For the for those of you who haven't experienced that I don't recommend it. It's not fun Yeah, so chat with the feds a bit and Yeah, as far as I know I I'm told they've actually fixed this issue now I haven't really looked into it because the feds are unhappy with me So I don't know if anybody's moderating this but I guess I have the mic Yes Logan Yeah, so the gyms database is that's where all of the votes are actually tallied and I have no clue what those were doing on that server. I don't have a real explanation there Sorry, so the gyms databases are not where the votes are tallied the those votes are tallied on the gyms machine What we think this is if because we're looking at the dates of the files that were when they were uploaded They actually come after the elections, so it's possible that those gyms databases were Tally totals that the counties then sent up to the election center after the elections Any further questions? I can't see who asked the question. Oh a question about open source there There are two jurisdictions in the country Los Angeles and Austin, Texas Travis County in Los Angeles County who are building Open source voting systems and then the elections community is certainly aware of open source as a possibility but Right now there are none as far as I know in use in the United States so obviously open source is preferable to proprietary software These both of these systems are fairly far along but at this point they need money to do the development work So if you know somebody who wants to invest in these in these systems It would really help with replacing these machines if we had the open source systems because they'd be cheaper So this is a this is the last question. We're going to have to we're running over time here So we see this we see this a lot. We see VPNs we see network connections that are not supposed to be there by law or by practice we see VPNs we see all sorts of Terrible operation security practices in various jurisdictions all over the United States. I don't even think Wisconsin is the worst at all I wish we had more time to talk about this But we're gonna have to cut this off now because the next session is gonna have to start So thank you all very much for being here


If you've been watching conservative media lately, over the past couple of weeks in particular, and I hope you haven't been by the way, but if you have been, you can see in real time the construction of a brand new narrative that serves two purposes. Not only is it an attempt to demonize the left and brazenly so, but also it simultaneously validates their anti-vax position as it relates specifically to the COVID-19 vaccines.  And I mean, if we live in a society, obviously, you don't necessarily have a choice as to whether or not you participate in it or not. But I mean, this time the claim is that if you rely on modern medicine, if you support vaccinations to stop the spread of a highly contagious, deadly disease, congratulations.  That's literally the argument that anti-vax right-wing pundits are making against the left. Thankfully, Namiki Kahn's well on Fox News to push back against this narrative, and she was so effective that the Fox host felt compelled to cut the interview short because she was making too much sense, I'm assuming. But take a look and then I have quite a bit to say about this. $5.6 billion in revenue to big pharma so far through the COVID-19 vaccine. I've read your Twitter feed. I've seen a lot of your comments, Namiki. You've been pretty aggressive. You've said that conservatives or anyone else who has questions about the vaccine are anti-vaxxers. You pointed Joe Rogan, I believe, once and called him an anti-vaxxer. Is it wrong to have questions about the motivations of this vaccine? Is it wrong right now to remain skeptical of big pharma? Well, I love that you're skeptical of big pharma. Just like Katie Porter was skeptical of big pharma just yesterday, who's a representative from California, a Democrat. And just like Bernie Sanders has put forward three pieces of legislation to rein in on big pharma and the fact that they're focused on profits. Listen, ABV, this is a pharmaceutical company, made, spent $1.6 billion in five years on research and development, yet $50 billion went to shareholders, $13 billion went to stock buybacks in during that five-year period. Their priorities are absolutely in the right places. Namiki, that's absolutely, that backs up the point. I'm sorry, Namiki, but the question isn't why I have grown skepticism towards big pharma. The question is why those on the left, like yourself, have become such blind followers of big pharma. Why is it if you have questions? Well, Namiki, you've been calling anyone that would question big pharma when it comes to the COVID-19 vaccine, an anti-vaxxer. When did you place your trust so blindly in people that stand to make $5.6 billion from this vaccine? The definition of intelligence is being able to hold two thoughts in your head at the same time and be able to consider. Big pharma makes a lot of money and they're not spending enough money on research and development, which is where their priority should be. But they should be trusted blindly on this issue? That other pharmaceuticals are stronger. It's not blind. The science is out about the vaccines. The vaccines work. Should there be a booster? I'm no scientist, but neither is Joe Rogan. Joe Rogan should not act like a scientist. Joe Rogan should not be telling people not to wear masks. Namiki, here's the truth. Not to take the vaccine. This is what I'm concerned about. I'm concerned you are a big vaccine booster now, not because you believe the science backs it up, but because the vaccine has come to represent a political ideal, a political signifier, a political fight on which you think you can win and claim the banner of science. But the wild thing about it, Namiki, is it exposes hypocrisy so blatantly for anyone on the left right now. Do you realize that big pharma, when it comes to- I think that's absolutely- Hold on, hold on, hold on really quickly. Do you realize- That is a Bernie Sanders bill. Do you realize that the vaccine makers- You're supporting the left right now. Excuse me right now. I'm supporting honest Americans having independent free thought to make a choice about what they inject into their body. And I think when the pharmaceutical companies have complete liability protection on the COVID-19 vaccine, you on the left have chosen a unique time, a really interesting time, to all of a sudden call people who have questions anti-vaxxers. It was the Republicans who pushed the liability protection. It was not the Democrats. The Bernie Sanders and Katie Porter are the ones that are advocating to reign in on the pharmaceutical companies' profits so they can put more money into research and development. Do you not believe in science? Do you think that we shouldn't have pharmaceuticals? Namiki, which only begs the question, why now did you do- Which only begs the question, why now did you do an about face? And all of a sudden say that anyone that has questions is an anti-vaxxer. Why now? No, no, no, no, no, no. I think Joe Rogan is an anti-science person. There's a difference between it being an anti-vaxxer and believing that COVID doesn't exist. He did not believe COVID really existed until recently. I mean, that's the difference here. I don't think that's fair. We believe in science and reason, which is why pharmaceuticals should spend money on research and development and not their shareholders. That's the difference. The profit motive. The profit motive should be in science. I'm sorry. I think that's an unfair characterization of what Joe Rogan said or what he believes. I think that you on the left have found a very unique time on emergency use application vaccine that has complete liability protection to switch. To all of a sudden have an about face on your trust in Big Pharma. And I think you did it. I think you did it because you thought it was a win over Republicans. That's all. Nothing more, nothing deeper. No, no. The Republicans want to keep their base. See, what's happening right now is you guys want to prolong. The pandemic is ending. And you want to keep everybody angry at COVID and the assault on freedom because you have to wear masks. And God forbid, you have to keep your community safe and your grandmother safe. You want to keep that going because it's been working. I got to run to make you. I want to say two things. I thank you for coming on the program. I always enjoy a spirited exchange of ideas. And I think that what I'm standing up for tonight is independent Americans having the ability to make freedom of choice specifically on the very intimate decision of what they inject into their bodies. Thank you to Mickey. I support freedom of choice when it comes to intimate personal medical decisions. By the way, also, I think we should ban abortions and criminalized gender affirming care for trans youth.  Conservatives have absolutely no room to preach freedom in the realm of individual health decisions because for decades, they've been on the wrong side of an issue that society is desperately trying to move on from abortion. And they're currently on the wrong side of history when it comes to trans issues. But I just got to say here, Namiki Kahn's excellent job here. That is exactly what a leftist should do if they get invited onto Fox News. Second of all, by this guy's logic, the only people who can actually legitimately criticize Big Pharma without being hypocrites are faith healers who don't rely on any modern medicine at all.  So my nephew who takes insulin, apparently he is just a Sinoffi shill, right? He needs insulin to survive because he has diabetes. But little did he know he's actually just patting the pockets of the CEO of Sinoffi. What a shill. I mean, this is the logic. I'm being hyperbolic, but obviously if you extend that logic to its conclusion, that is the argument that this buffoon is making. He adds, you've been calling anyone that would question Big Pharma when it comes to the COVID-19 vaccine an anti-vaxxer. Because they're anti-vaxxers. When did you place your trust so blindly in people that stand to make $5.6 billion from the vaccine? Obviously, this is a very low IQ position to take and he's deliberately misrepresenting the left's position. The left isn't blindly placing their trust in Big Pharma. The left is saying scientific data indicates that these vaccines are highly effective and they're safe. So if you want the pandemic to end, this is the correct measure to take. Mass vaccination, so we reach herd immunity, so we can all move on. But you're just saying, oh well you know what, this is you shilling for Big Pharma. Because if you want people to take the COVID-19 vaccine, you actually have an ulterior motive. You don't really care about them getting vaccinated and being safe. You care about the profits that Big Pharma is making. Is that really the argument that you're making? I mean, talk about bad faith.  The crux of the left's argument is that pharmaceutical companies are prioritizing profits over people. They prey on people who rely on their drugs to survive and knowing that people have to take these drugs to survive. They then jack up the prices in order to increase profits. I mean, it's exploitative. That's the argument that we have against Big Pharma. And a lot of leftists argue that we should nationalize some of these Big Pharma firms. Of course, pharmaceutical giants like Pfizer should be nationalized. We shouldn't have privately manufactured COVID-19 vaccines. But this is what we get. We live in a late-stage capitalist society. So because a private option is the only solution, we shouldn't reject it just on principle.  This isn't hard, right? This isn't difficult.  But this Fox News host is grasping for straws because he is anti-vax himself and he desperately wants to find some way to validate his position and also simultaneously demonize the left. And what's shocking to me is that all of these capitalists on Fox News, they don't even understand their own system. What's more lucrative for a company like Moderna or Pfizer? Ask yourself this. Is it more lucrative to just create some sort of ineffective or even unsafe vaccine that you distribute and then people get sick and they immediately stop taking it? I mean, is that going to be better for long-term profits? Or is it more lucrative to actually make an effective and safe vaccine but be the sole manufacturer of the global supply of said vaccine? What's more profitable? What do you think is actually going to be the best thing that this pharmaceutical company should do? I mean, that's not to say that we shouldn't be concerned with the safety of these drugs. Of course, they'll cut corners to save a buck or two. But that's why we support regulations on the left. It's the right who is in favor of deregulation. Trump boasted about all of the deregulation that he did. So yet, you support a president that deregulates including the pharmaceutical industry but then have the nerve to claim that it's the left who's promoting these unsafe vaccines when they've been proven by scientific data to be effective and safe? I mean, I just, I can't take it. Like the disingenuity here is so over the top. He's so hyperbolic, so disingenuous. Nobody who watches this should take this guy seriously. But unfortunately, we live in a country of a lot of uninformed people with a lot of uninformed people rather and they actually think that this argument is persuasive. And if Namiki Const wasn't there to push back on his bad faith attacks on the left, then they would just gobble up the propaganda. Now, what I love is that after this inmissile implied that Namiki Const is a big pharma shill because she's pro COVID-19 vaccines, he then goes on to suggest that really she's only taking this position not because she wants to end the pandemic, not because of the scientific data that's available for everyone to see. It's because she's a partisan hack. It's not the Fox News host who's the partisan hack. It's the leftist who wants to end the pandemic that's killed more than 500,000 Americans. That's actually the partisan hack. Here's the thing. Facts don't care about your feelings and the scientific data that's widely available that you could be reporting on, that's not partisan. Choosing to believe it, that is partisan because Republicans made it partisan.  You're the ones who said early on that we should sacrifice grandma to the gods of the markets in order to make sure that we don't lose profits, we don't hurt the economy. Your network argued for herd immunity early on and just pretend as if the pandemic isn't a thing. And yet this buffoon is claiming that it's the left. They're the ones being partisan because they want to end a pandemic.   Why are you supporting chemotherapy? It treats cancer, but short also is really bad for people's health.  Why is the left so partisan in this here? Can't you denounce this poisoning of people? Chemotherapy? I mean, this is the level of disingenuity we are dealing with here. So this individual, I don't know who he is. I haven't seen him on Fox News before, I don't think, but I mean, this is a blame propagandist. And thankfully, he's not a very persuasive propagandist and it didn't take much effort of Numikikonst to completely dismantle the argument that he was making. Of course, you're not a big pharma shill if you support COVID-19 vaccinations. And contrary to what you want to believe, you are anti-vax if you're literally against a vaccine that is going to help us end the pandemic. I know that anti-vax has a lot of negative connotations and it makes you seem like a crazy person, but I mean, if the shoe fits, you're wearing it, right?   Jesus Christ, this is not hard.


It's a thing of beauty isn't it? Sure is. Sort of bring a tear to your eye. What are we going to do with them? Thoughts they were going to be heavier.  Hope not. Call of 2022. This is a little bit of a different episode for us. We usually of course do the reviews, but we could not pass up doing an episode on this massive VHS haul that Justin landed. Yeah, I couldn't pass it up too. I saw on Facebook Marketplace somebody was selling their entire collection. Most of it's horror. Horror and all these crazy kind of action movies and stuff like that and thrillers and everything. So how could you pass it up? Some of these tapes separate are going for a decent amount of money. I know one of them I saw at a flea market for like 40 bucks and this ended up working out to be what? It's 140 total. So how much per tape? It's like $2 or something at tape. Between $1.50 and $2 at tape are some gems that are in here. Some real good stuff. Some of them are cut boxes. Some of them are original sleeves. Jaguar lives. Like what the hell is that? And then you got sun in the law. So it's quite the assortment of things in here. I don't even know Don Johnson had a music VHS. He's all directing on the back too. When you showed this to me I thought this was like an action movie. Cinderella. The person obviously loved their hair metal, right? Deaf Leopard? I don't know. Bon Jovi I think I'll donate. Sun in Lodge definitely shouldn't be in the action. But there's some cool ones like this. Like evils of the night. Drive-In Massacre. Oh this is the horror film? So let me see here. It's Drive-In Massacre. See I saw a different... I saw a different version of this at a flea market for 40 bucks. And we got it for two. Yeah. Yeah the cover was different though. This is cool. I definitely want to watch that. Demented. I definitely want to watch Beverly Hills vamp. She's all smoking in the tub. That's what you did in the 80s. Night creature. I had this and I lost it. Is that the one with Donald Pleasant? Yep. Oh yeah. That's the one I used to have. I see this VHS around more often than the first one. I wanted to get the first one on VHS. Where have you seen that? Just kind of around. Not locally but like for sale online. But I never see the first one for sale. People have gone to the first one. Yeah because the second one's probably all garbage. This one sounds cool. Man outside. Look at the cover. He's all strung up.  Terminal entry. That sounds like some sort of porn. Yeah. American Ninja V. Oh yeah. This looks... I mean heard of a lot of these titles. There's another cool looking one. The Destructors. Like what? That looks super cool. Where's that? Oh there's one in here that looks awesome. Blown away. There's another one that sounds like a porn. Time Guardian. This one looks... That's awesome. That was cool. We split the cost. Which I still owe you money for. Yes yes. I'll pay you before you leave. And to make it fair what we're going to do is we're going to actually have a draw. Film a VHS horror draw. Where it's a random draw as to who gets what tape to make it even. Yes.   I don't think there's many tapes in this haul that I actually own. Like if someone wants to sell a lot and you look at the listing it's like oh man like I have most of those. Why buy the whole lot? Yeah yeah and then you have to super undercut them because you own half of them. They're just going to get rid of most of them.  Looking for a VHS.  No bike riding required. No getting down on the dirty floors and getting your pants all dusty at the flea market. I kind of like doing that every single time. Yeah me too. But it's nice to find a big haul. We're going to line up all the movies. And it's going to be a random raffle. We're going to draw all the names out of a hat. This edge of sanity movie remember when we watched that? We tried watching that. It's all garbage. Oh dead time stories. Satan's plane. That looks cool. This is cool.  Yeah graduation day man. Whoever gets this is a lucky man. That's like almost pristine too. I don't think it's ever been open. Murder in New Hampshire with the Ellen Hunt. Is this even horror? Oh scalpel.  I can't wait to review scalpel. Then madhouse too. It's a madhouse. Yeah scalpel is super cool. The ambulance. Eric Roberts. This is suspense. Should we put it in the horror plot? Yeah. Larry Drake. This looks cool. Mad Jake with John Saxon. Gary Busey, Mimi Rogers and Hyder in the House. That time Gary Busey showed up at the store I work at and tried stealing guitar picks. The gyms. Oh yeah I always remember that one. Blackout. I've always wanted blackout. Unmasked part 25. There she is. So we'll see you next week at the great horror VHS raffle.


I'm Ayesha Samren. I'm Kila's visual designer. For those of you who haven't heard of Kila before, Kila is a Vancouver based tech startup that offers nonprofits powerful, intelligent tools to manage their donors, mobilize their volunteers, market their nonprofit and raise more money. In this session, I'm going to be discussing some compelling points on why nonprofits need to embrace artificial intelligence. Nonprofits are just starting to dip their toes in the proverbial water. So it's completely normal if you're struggling to stay afloat in the sea of change that artificial intelligence can bring to your organization. Technology for nonprofits is more powerful and more accessible today than ever before. At Kila, we see a bright future where accessible cutting edge tools serve the nonprofit sector in multiple ways, from automating administrative tasks to advising on fundraising outreach. Artificial intelligence is changing the way nonprofits work for the better. But before we dive into the wonders that artificial intelligence can help you achieve, what is the first thing that comes to your mind when someone mentions AI? Sci-Fi movies with shiny robots taking over the world? Well, the truth is that the concept of AI has been around for decades, and it's all very real. It's just that AI is becoming more powerful today, and that's mainly for two reasons. First, there's more data to process and analyze than ever before, and second, the computing power has improved dramatically over the last two decades. At this point, you might be wondering if you really need AI for your nonprofit. For a lot of organizations, embracing artificial intelligence raises a lot of questions around how it will impact human jobs. Will AI replace humans in the workplace entirely? Probably not. Once you take the time to understand the benefits, you will see that artificial intelligence has positive implications in nearly every industry, and that includes nonprofits. Artificial intelligence can enhance your services, expand your social impact, and even save lives. So AI automates time-consuming work. So artificial intelligence-based tools can alleviate the burden of mundane repetitive tasks, such as monitoring financial transactions and detecting discrepancies in your data. AI can also predict donor behavior and forecast giving trends, allowing you to quickly tailor your fundraising campaigns to a specific audience without sifting through data for hours. With more time back in your day, you can focus on what matters, building relationships. By automating administrative tasks, AI is not killing jobs. Instead, it acts as a smart assistant to enhance your work, helping you prioritize human connections and do more good. Secondly, AI is becoming accessible. It's no longer a complicated tool built exclusively for large tech companies, data scientists, and engineers. Non-profits, CRM providers like Keela are not only embracing AI-powered technology, but they're making it accessible for every organization, small or large, novice, or experienced. And lastly, AI helps you make more sense of your data. You already have access to a vast wealth of data, whether you keep it spread across numerous Excel spreadsheets or organized within a CRM. But how often can you spend time combing through data that to extract useful information? Artificial intelligence empowers you to act on data in more meaningful ways. It combs through your database to find patterns and trends that will improve your programs and campaigns. It can help your non-profits strengthen your fundraising performance, identify your top donors, and create marketing campaigns that will get you the biggest bang for your buck. Artificial intelligence and machine learning technology are redefining the nonprofit landscape. Now let's look at four use cases that show how AI can help non-profits raise more money and understand their donors in new ways. Mission-based AI tools boost nonprofit impact by improving the way they solve societal and ecological challenges. One of the most impressive applications of mission-based AI is the algorithm used by Crisis Text Line to predict suicide risks by analyzing online conversations. By analyzing 65 million text messages, the AI model recognizes what words are most statistically associated with high risk of suicide. Thanks to this tool, the organization can prioritize high-risk messages and is now able to service 94% of high-risk textors in under five minutes. Considering that every minute of response time matters, this is a game changer for Crisis Text Line. AI-powered fundraising tools help you understand your supporters. In the nonprofit world, this means that you can use AI-powered tools to go through previous donation amounts, event attendance records, and volunteer shifts. For instance, Kela CRM offers an AI-based feature called donor readiness to help customers understand their donor pool. Donor readiness tells you how likely your donor is to donate within the next two weeks. We calculate donor readiness through a machine learning algorithm that analyzes contact interactions, giving history, and even variables like contact location and weather. Since good timing greatly maximizes the chances of giving, there's no doubt that this AI tool will help boost your fundraising results. AI helps you engage more efficiently with your audience. AI solutions can not only send meaningful content to the right audience, but also help you understand when it's the best time to reach out what communication channels you should use. For example, some nonprofits are using Prasado to automate their communication channels with personal and authentic content. Prasado uses artificial intelligence to understand language and make recommendations to tailor content to a specific audience. Such tools can be used for a wide range of content formats from email subject lines to Facebook ads. AI tools reduce your administrative burden.  Artificial intelligence can automate tedious tasks, freeing up your time to do what's at the heart of your work, achieving a mission. For example, many nonprofits are now using chatbots to automate conversations with supporters who have basic questions or want details about a particular campaign. In a world where users expect to get answers in seconds, being able to hold conversations 24-7 through an AI chatbot is a true asset for nonprofits. The rise of artificial intelligence has given nonprofits a serious competitive advantage when it comes to pursuing their mission and raising more money. At Keela, we believe that artificial intelligence can change the way nonprofits work for the better. That's why our new software includes a suite of nonprofit intelligence tools to help organizations make better decisions. And that concludes my presentation for today. So thank you all for attending. I hope this session was helpful in learning how artificial intelligence can help elevate a nonprofit.