We officially begin as I mentioned this keynote session will continue up to 10 a.m so please please do not move until that time thank you. Good morning everyone welcome and thank you so much for attending Norwich University's 2022 Peace and World Summit in person or virtually. My name is Yang Mokoo associate professor of political science and associate director of Peace and World Center at Norwich University. I am extremely honored to serve as executive director of this year's summit which addresses such a pressing issue Russia. As we have witnessed on top of global pandemic our global community is currently facing one of the most dangerous moment at the end of World 2. Russian invasion of Ukraine has inflicted serious human and material casualties and we have to be even concerned about the possibility of nuclear war among great powers. Even though I have not directly experienced any war condition as a Korean-American I have often listened to my parent generations about how devastating the Korean war was. As all of us desire I honestly hope that Russia's unprovoked invasion against Ukraine stops as soon as possible and stable peace and justice are fully restored. At this summit two keynote speakers 11 scholars and three students will address many different demands of Russian and international issues. I believe that these summit sessions will deepen our understanding the current world order significantly disrupted by Russia's aggressive act. Also this summit will help current leaders and future leaders here just to be educated and to find peaceful and effective solutions to such challenging global issues. Thank you again for participating in the summit. Please keep in mind that this keynote session will continue up to 10 a.m. so until then please do not move in your seat. Now I would like to introduce Dr. Mark Anarumo, 24th president of Norwich University. For time limit just I cannot share his full bio but briefly speaking Dr. Anarumo assumed the presidency in June 2020 amid the global pandemic and civil unrest. Despite tough challenges he has been successfully leading this historic institution. He retired as a U.S. Air Force Colonel after serving in many different nations including Turkey, Iraq, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan and South Korea. Before assuming his presidency Dr. Anarumo worked as a director and permanent professor for the Center for Character and Leadership Development at U.S. Air Force Academy. Now I turn it over to 24th president of Norwich University Dr. Mark Anarumo. Thank you. Let's give a round of applause. Can somebody that Yanmoku? We have a few folks getting settled. I'll let them sit before I start the formal comments to kick off the ceremony. Welcome all. So good morning everyone and welcome to the peace and war summit at Norwich University here in the great state of Vermont. I am Dr. Mark Anarumo the 24th president of Norwich University. We are of course the nation's oldest private military college and the birthplace of the Reserve Officer Training Corps or ROTC. We are so pleased to host you here in person in the Mack Hall Auditorium and I also want to offer a very sincere welcome to our virtual audience who is attending from around the world today. So welcome to all. I do want to recognize our keynote speakers for this two-day peace and war summit. First, and you can join me in welcoming each, the governor of the great state of Vermont Phil Scott. Sir, thank you. The next title is fairly long. I will cue applause once I get through the gentleman's complete formal title. The acting ambassador, Mr. Giorgi Siculia, the Charges Affairs Embassy of Georgia to the United States. Sir, welcome. Also in the front row is Brigadier General John Weidner of U.S. Strategic Command. Sir, welcome. And also a special welcome to all of our distinguished panelists and presenters. They are some of the great thinkers in the world on this critical topic. We're honored to have you here. Welcome and thank you to you all as well. So this is our third peace and war summit. It's presented by the John and Mary Frances Patton Peace and War Center, which is one of our centers of excellence here at Norwich University. This year's summit theme is called Deciphering the Russian Riddle National Interest and Geopolitical Competitions. Our keynote presentations, the panel discussions and our workshops will scrutinize the very timely and relevant questions that face the United States and the global community related to Russia. The topics will range from territorial intrusions into Ukraine and to Georgia, intervention in Syria, growing military partnership with China, and of course areas that Norwich has unique expertise, cyber attacks and disinformation. The summit provides an excellent opportunity to dive deeply into these issues that are fueling a reignited rivalry between the United States and Russia. A simple summary list of the issues is extraordinary. It's going to inform our understandings of the events that are literally unfolding today as we stand here. Military security, economic sanctions, cybersecurity threats, disinformation campaigns and Russia's perceptions of and roles in the intensifying great power struggle between the United States and China. I encourage our entire Norwich University community of learning, our wonderful students, faculty, staff, alumni, parents and friends to participate fully in these sessions, whether in person or virtually. We need to discuss and debate these important global topics that are so clearly impacting our world, yes, in the future, but quite literally right in this current moment. The summit is critically important and we believe it is necessary. We are very proud of our ability to host events like this that support the development of a deeper understanding of our shared global community. Our world is increasingly defined by uncertainty and complexity.  We hope to develop these skills over the next few days together. The summit especially will explore what the future may hold. We will learn how the nations and the world's colleges and universities are developing critical thinking required of students and scholars to prepare for what lies ahead. The relationship between the United States and Russia is currently significantly strained and for the first time in decades it could very reasonably result in kinetic conflict. This would of course be disastrous for both nations and NATO and other countries in terms of human casualties and additional crises to the world economic system. We are currently experiencing the effects of the conflict in Ukraine. The results of economic and trade sanctions, the witnessing of violence and war, the effects of information warfare, fear and of course all these pale in comparison to the loss of life of combatants and innocent civilians that are caught in the violence. The past several weeks of conflict are affecting the international order in ways that have not been witnessed for two generations. As president of this very fine university I must also share that our student population has been affected very directly. We have today students on our campus from Ukraine and also from Russia in addition to many students from all across the world. We also have many current students and alumni in uniform services in the intelligence community and in other fields related to conflict management and crisis response. These individuals are very literally standing today in harm's way and they deserve our best time and our greatest effort. The current conflict has affected us all in some way. The ways that they will affect us in additional ways in the coming months and years will be another item that we will explore together during the course of this critical event. We will talk how as superpowers the United States, China and Russia all share responsibility for dealing with the countless challenges facing our global community. Our shared fate will be shaped by how the great powers and allies will address current crises, myriad other issues that will persist and new issues that will inevitably emerge. It is our hope that this summit will help deepen our understanding of current US and Russia relations and provide practical policy recommendations to leaders of all nations. These recommendations will be more refined and more effective if our entire community participates fully. I implore all of us take advantage and help make a difference in our present and in our future. All of us here at Norton University thank you for your attendance and for the contributions that all of you will make during this critical summit. It is our privilege and our honor to host you. It is now my distinct honor and privilege to introduce a truly gifted leader and staunch supporter of Norton University, the 82nd governor of the state of Vermont, Governor Phil Scott. Good morning, everyone. And thanks for having me. It's an honor for me to be here today to say a few words, but I'm especially interested in learning from the distinguished speakers who will be speaking in a few minutes. Their insight and expertise are incredibly important right now as we all watch what's going on in Eastern Europe with a great deal of concern. Now, unlike them, I have no background in World Affairs or expertise in foreign policy. I'm here as the governor of a state full of people who like me are looking at this situation in disbelief. For more than three weeks, we've all watched in horror as Putin's Russia was has brutally attacked a neighbor who wanted peace, not war. Ukraine has worked hard to become a democracy and is now working harder than they ever imagined for the future of their people. Because of this unprovoked attack, thousands of Ukrainian and patriots and civilians, including women and children, have already lost their lives. In fact, as we all saw last week, the Russians targeted both a hospital and a theater where hundreds of people, including many children, were sheltering. Millions have had to leave their homes, their belongings and their way of life to protect their families. These are parents and grandparents, college students and schoolchildren who just 30 days ago were going about their daily lives the same way many of us would. Going to work, seeing their friends at school shopping at the grocery store and walking their dogs are riding a bike through the park. And now their world has been turned upside down. Many have been torn from their homes, taking shelter in subway stations fearful for their lives and their future. It's a reminder of how easy it is to take what we have for granted from our democracy as a whole down to our everyday routines. And that's why it's so important for us to continue to keep up with what's going on. Listen to the experts like those we'll hear from today and learn from the courage and resiliency we're seeing in the people of Ukraine. Because while they're going through what is deemed horrific and is horrific, their response has been so inspiring. Acts of courage, selflessness and resolve from average citizens all the way up to the country's leaders. It's truly a David versus Goliath moment with soldiers defending their country against an army five times the size with only a tenth the number of aircraft. Civilians taking up arms for the first time in their lives to slow and hopefully fend off this unprovoked invasion, knowing the life and death consequences. We've all seen the heartbreaking footage of parents leaving their children to fight for freedom. As just one example, I read the story of one dad who left his seven month old daughter behind saying it was a difficult choice, but better than she be without a father and without a future. Think about that for a moment and let it sink in. What all this tells me is that while Putin may have a larger army is clear Ukraine and its people have the courage, heart and will to persevere. And they have the power of the truth and the moral high ground on their side. And that's why the rest of us in the free world need to have their back. As I said earlier, I'm no expert in world affairs. But I feel a responsibility like many of you to be a part of this now. I think about my dad, Howard Scott, a tanker in patents Third Army, who was severely wounded in France shortly after the war in D-Day. When the tank hit a landmine on their way to free St. Low, both of his legs were amputated above the knee and he spent two years in Walter Reed Hospital recovering before returning home to start a family. And unfortunately, he passed away due to those injuries when I was 11. He was no expert either. But he stepped up when it was the right thing to do. Many are doing the same for Ukraine. And while it pales in comparison as governor, I thought it was important for Vermont to do its part as well. That's why I called for and signed a bill last week to contribute $1 for every Vermonner, totally more than $640,000. The appropriation went to save the children for humanitarian efforts in Ukraine. We've also worked to make sure the state of Vermont is not purchasing Russian-sourced goods and services. And through our National Guard and State Police, we're collecting body armor for those on the front lines in Ukraine.  But it's what we can do right now. And we have a moral obligation to do whatever we can. The fact is, Ukraine's fight to protect its people, their rights, and their land. And what that means for democracies across the globe is too important for us to sit out.  Unfortunately, we're seeing democracy threatened far too often right now, including examples right here in the US. These are powerful reminders why we must always guard against authoritarianism and the ilk that comes with it. And why defeating Putin and putting an end to this invasion is so important. Today in this hall, as we're speaking freely, without fear of oppression, the people of Ukraine are fighting for their independence and their fundamental right to decide their own future. It's important they know they're not alone in this fight. The people of Vermont and all around the globe stand united with Ukraine for its freedom and with its people. I thank you and I look forward to learning more from this important and very timely summit. Thank you again. Governor Scott, thank you so much for your attendance in the summit and then your powerful speech. Now, I'm very pleased to introduce two keynote speakers, Georgian Acting Ambassador Gorgi Cicolia and Brigadier General John Weidner at US Strategic Command. In terms of the natural flow of their speech content, General Weidner will deliver his address first. Let me introduce him briefly. US Army Brigadier General John Weidner assumed the duties as deputy director, plans and policy US Strategic Command in May 2020. Weidner most recently served as the director of the US Army nuclear and countering WMD agency at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, where he led the Army's capability to integrate nuclear weapon effects into conventional operations and supported Army service component command with a nuclear and countering WMD expertise. Now, I turn it over to General Weidner. Let us give a round of applause. Governor Scott, Mr. Cicolia, President Anna Rumo and Dr. Koo. Thank you so very much for the kind introduction and for the warm reception here. On behalf of the United States Strategic Command, I'd like to thank Norwich University and the Peace and War Center for the opportunity to speak at this timely and prestigious event. As a product of the Army's ROTC program, I'm particularly excited to be here at the birthplace of the ROTC system that prepared me so well for a military career. And by the way, it's a great honor and pleasure to be in a room of America's future military leaders. Keep that in mind. I'm here today representing U.S. Strategic Command and a team of 150,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen's, Marines, guardians, civilians, and contractors dedicated to the DOD's highest priority, strategic deterrence, a subset of which is nuclear deterrence. That is, all nuclear is strategic, but not all strategic is nuclear. U.S. Radcom is a global combatant command responsible for, among other things, strategic deterrence and nuclear operations, and we take it very seriously. We execute strategic deterrence activities every day and stand ready to deliver a decisive response should strategic deterrence fail. Over the next several minutes, I want to discuss some of the characteristics and challenges for strategic deterrence in the 21st century, highlight some of the concerning aspects of Russia's capability and behavior, and offer some thoughts on the way forward. Before describing how the character of strategic deterrence is changing in the 21st century, however, let me first review some fundamental tenets of deterrence that have not changed. Deterrence is focused on influencing an adversary's perception such that they decide not to take a certain action. The basic pillars of strategic deterrence are focused on imposing costs that exceed any benefit of action, denying the benefit of an action, and encouraging restraint. Another enduring element of strategic deterrence is that it's an active sport. One does not merely deter by possessing a capability. We must train, sustain, maintain, and exercise our strategic capabilities to be proficient on using them on a moment's notice, and an adversary's leaders must see that we expertly train and maintain these capabilities and can bring them to bear whenever needed. This is one reason why U.S. Strategic Command does so many deployments around the globe with our strategic bombers, the most visible leg of our triad of strategic delivery capabilities. In addition to strategic deterrence, in addition strategic deterrence must begin day to day in the gray zone, in the gray zone conflict, because we are in diplomatic, economic, and informational conflict. These gray zone activities are what will lead to crisis, and if crisis is not resolved will lead potentially to conventional conflict, and conventional conflict with a near peer nuclear armed adversary will be overshadowed by the potential for adversary non-nuclear strategic attack in space and cyber domains or nuclear attack. In other words the adversary could view nuclear attack as their least bad option. The nation cannot wait to conduct strategic deterrence activities at the brink of strategic or nuclear deterrence failure. U.S. Stratcom can't be called in at the last minute to do strategic deterrence like a pinch hitter, pinch hitter brought in at the bottom of the ninth inning to win the baseball game. Moreover, should should strategic deterrence fail and we find ourselves in conflict with a near peer nation, strategic deterrent activities must continue in conflict, and in addition they must increase in intensity. We can take more aggressive deterrent actions in conflict because they wouldn't be as destabilizing in conflict as they would be day to day or in crisis. The challenge with this seemingly obvious statement is that these activities will compete for the very limited resources that will be in high demand to prosecute the conventional fight. An example of this is the demand for our heavy bombers, our B-52s and even B-2 bombers and their associated tanker aircraft. Those nuclear weapon delivery platforms and associated tanking aircraft that refuel the bombers in air also have important roles in the theater conventional nuclear war plan. We need to frame those important resource allocation decisions now in our policy documents and supporting strategies and operationalize that understanding through large globally integrated exercises. So let me transition now to how strategic deterrence is changing in the 21st century. Starting with the global view, we must be aware that for the first time in our history the United States faces two near-peer nuclear armed adversaries in Russia and China and they must be deterred differently because they have different national security objectives and different levels of relative national power. So I'll focus my comments on Russia of course today but would caution us not to lose sight of China or North Korea or Iran or any other country that has or is seeking strategic capabilities. US STRATCOM, the United States and our network of allies and partners must deter all of these actors all of the time. We can't forget that. China's explosive growth of nuclear capabilities is absolutely breathtaking and they're voicing similar regional security concerns as Russia and seeking to exert sovereignty over international waters and territories based on historic claims in a manner similar to Russia. These claims threaten the rules-based international order and should be deeply concerning to all nations that seek to uphold that order. China and other actors are watching our approach and response to Russia. How much risk we are willing to take and how much stake we demonstrate and will be influenced by our commitment to uphold the international rules-based order. Adding to the challenge of strategic deterrence in the 21st century is the increased number of domains through which strategic effects can be delivered as opposed to just 30 or 40 years ago. During the Cold War strategic deterrence was synonymous with nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. We now have strategic reliance upon the space and cyber domains as you appreciate and our adversaries are developing asymmetric capabilities to threaten our dependence upon them. Now a challenge to these relatively new domains is how to incorporate them into our traditional deterrent and military activities. You have likely heard of the term integrated deterrence used by leaders in the Department of Defense. That is a vision for optimizing the combination of effects across all domains to deter or if necessary defeat an adversary. It's the best way to deter in combining all of our capability and it affords us the best approach to defeat an adversary at the lowest level of damage achievable. The key to success will be reaching the goal of integrated deterrence before our adversaries and they are striving to do just that. And it's not just the increase in a number of domains and determining how to integrate those with our existing other domains. The lack of widely accepted norms in these new domains in the increased risk of miscalculation and escalation that accompanies that lack of norm makes strategic deterrence in the 21st century that much more complex. Now we at Stratcom are working through a logic that underpins all of this as I'll explain in a moment because after all we are US strategic command not US nuclear command and we look forward to enhancing strategic deterrence and planning and theory. Now primary implication of all of this is that we must be very humble about our ability to control escalation. That term gets thrown around a lot control escalation. Well let me be very pointed we cannot control an adversary's escalation. We must recognize that a near peer nuclear armed adversary can escalate to any level of violence anywhere on the globe through any instrument of national power at any time. That's a factor that the United States has not had to consider since the fall of the Soviet Union and it has enormous implications for how we react to the conflict in Ukraine today. This also profound because nearly all strategic deterrence theory was developed as a result of our experience in the Cold War when there were two superpowers a bipolar world each relying very heavily on their nuclear arsenals for deterrence. We must evolve our fundamental understanding of strategic deterrence theory to align with today's strategic environment. In other words we need to enhance and our approach to an all-domain conflict with one near peer adversary while deterring a second near peer adversary and others with strategic capabilities or at worst be prepared to confront two near peer nuclear armed adversaries simultaneously. Now Yostrakham is making a concerted effort to reinvigorate research and strategic deterrence primarily by leveraging our academic alliance of more than 70 academic institutions including Norwich University that are focused on building the next generation of national security professionals but US STRATCOM can't and should not do this alone. We need your help. We need continued debate and discussion on strategic deterrence to evolve our approach and prepare the next generation and national security professionals. So with that let me how let me describe how this applies to Russia today and in the near term. Russia has the largest and most diverse nuclear weapons stockpile on the planet. Its strategic forces are defined by the New Star Treaty as are ours as intercontinental ballistic missiles, ballistic submarines that carry submarine launch ballistic missiles and heavy bombers that's what a strategic nuclear force is and the New Star Treaty limits both sides to 1,550 units. Russia has fielded a tremendous number of nuclear weapons that are not accountable under the New Star Treaty. Open source reporting suggests that that stockpile number somewhere between 1,500 and 2,000 more than the warheads in their strategic forces. These weapons are often referred to as non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons but I would discourage you from using that term for we at United States strategic command and we in the United States view any use of a nuclear weapon as a strategic act rather I suggest you describe them as non-accountable weapons because that's what they are. Many of Russian's non-accountable weapons are delivered by platforms that can carry conventional warheads such as fighter aircraft, close and short-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. Russia is using many if not all of those dual capable delivery platforms with their fight to Ukraine right now. We must be keenly aware that Russia has the choice to use those same delivery platforms to employ nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction if they feel the need to to achieve their objectives. Further, Russia has been modernizing both their nuclear weapons and their delivery platforms for two decades and they're more than 80 percent complete. So let me kind of foot-stomp that. For 20 years Russia has been increasing the role of nuclear weapons in their security strategies and has spent a significant fraction of their very limited military funding on not just replacing their nuclear warheads and delivery platforms but modernizing them to offer new and improved capabilities. Clearly the decision to embark on this three decade long nuclear weapon modernization project was not motivated by geopolitical developments over the last 10 years. It was a purposeful strategy to enhance Russia's position to counter NATO's defensive posture in order to achieve its objectives and as we are seeing today by force if necessary. In contrast the United States has completed one nuclear warhead modernization program and zero delivery nuclear weapon delivery platform programs. More on that in a little bit. Now if that's not concerning enough Russia is developing several exotic nuclear weapons such as a nuclear powered nuclear armed cruise missile known as Skyfall or as we at US Stratom like to call it the flying chair noble. Because of the accident that cruise missile had in August of 2019 that released a significant amount of radiation across north and central Europe when they tried to recover it. It's also developing an autonomous nuclear powered nuclear armed underwater torpedo known as Poseidon likely armed with a very large I think megaton class weapon designed to create extensive zones of radioactive contamination in coastal areas making them unsuitable unsuitable for military economic or other activity for a very long time. These exotic weapons are non-accountable and they are weapons of coercion and revenge by their very nature and reflect a very different value that Russia has on war and its use of nuclear weapons. Let me also comment on Russia's activities in just the past two months which also illuminate their view on nuclear weapon use and violence. In February Russia conducted one of the largest if not the largest nuclear exercise involving its nuclear forces since the end of the Cold War. Conducting such a large exercise of nuclear forces just prior to initiating the largest invasion of a European country since World War II was clearly coordinated till coerced NATO into inaction regarded as an invasion of Ukraine nuclear coercion that is reckless and highly irresponsible. Russia also announced to the world on February 27th that it put its nuclear forces in a heightened state of combat readiness a special regime of combat duty Putin said an overt nuclear threat only days after Russia invaded Ukraine. Such provocative actions in rhetoric regarding nuclear weapons is dangerous adds to the risk of miscalculation and should be avoided. We will not indulge in it. I must emphasize however that U.S. strategic command does not have the luxury of minimizing or dismissing these nuclear threats. We must and are taking Putin at his word and are prepared to provide a range of decisive options to the president and secretary of defense if and when needed. So what do we do about all of this? Well let me close with four things that I think the United States needs to do. These are not particularly original ideas but for the most that I've taken away from many conversations in the global strategic environment. First we have to have a rigorous but succinct national debate on the various nuclear capabilities required to deter both Russia and China simultaneously. The average American cannot articulate an informed argument on that subject and for that matter neither can most leaders in the federal government, the Department of Defense or members of Congress. That's because our existing nuclear forces, the triad of the strategic delivery capabilities that we've operated for many decades, has done such a superb job of deterring strategic attack on our homeland and our allies that we have become absolutely dismissive of any thought on of nuclear attack on the United States. That is all changing. Nothing makes you more concerned about your nuclear capabilities than being threatened by somebody else's and that's exactly what Putin just did. We need the public to not only be involved but committed because our nuclear warhead life extension programs and nuclear weapon delivery platform modernization programs won't be complete for 25 or more years and since all power eventually comes from us the people we need society to prioritize this work to ensure full and consistent funding. Second the DOD nation must again be able to develop and field new cutting edge strategic capabilities at the speed of relevance and let me just give you one example in the course of just eight years in the late 1950s and early 1960s Air Force General Benny Schriever led the conception, design, engineering, production and fielding of four ICBM missile systems in just eight years. The program to replace our current minute man three intercontinental ballistic missile has been under underway for many years and won't be complete for more than a decade just to replace the missile not the silos not the secure communication not the security just the missile if we want our capabilities to provide Russia and China with strategic dilemmas we need to go much much faster. Third our nation needs to form a process for integrating and guiding all instruments of national power as well as private industry and non governmental organizations towards a common purpose. We currently have no national way to do this. Some might point to the national security council but having work there I would offer that the national security council is neither resourced nor intended to lead national operational activities. We're getting a glimpse of the power of integrating economic diplomatic and informational along with military capabilities for a common purpose through the security force assistance and sanctions we've imposed on Russia and the assistance we're providing Ukraine. But can we honestly say that our efforts to get ahead of potential Russian false flag operations were intricately synchronized with Coca-Cola, Facebook and Boeing cutting ties with Russia or with the security force assistance that we provided to Ukraine. From my view it seems we've enjoyed equal benefit from good fortune and good judgment. Lastly we need to restructure the Department of Defense to effectively confront global challenges. The office of the Secretary of Defense and the joint staff and what have up until recently been known as geographic combatant commanders and commands are built on regionally focused organizations by design. But Russia and China are not regional challenges they provide they pose a worldwide threat to the international rules based order. Moreover we must dispel the traditional view of a single supported combatant commander of operations and develop truly integrated not just coordinated war plans that incorporate space and cyber from the outset just like ground air and sea operations are considered from the very beginning. To reiterate a major conflict with Russia and China will be global in nature. To solve that global problem we need a global top-down strategy that prioritizes homeland defense and strategic deterrence ensures multiple simultaneous supported supporting command relationships and enables all domain awareness to achieve decision superiority. With that ladies and gentlemen I'll thank you so much for allowing me to speak with you and take a little bit of your time today and turn the podium back over to Dr. Koo. Thank you. General Weidner thank you so much for your insightful speech. At this time I will briefly introduce Acting Ambassador Golgi Chikolia at the Georgian Embassy to the United States. Previously Mr. Chikolia was appointed Deputy Chief of Mission at the Embassy of Georgia to the U.S. As Deputy Chief of Mission he was responsible for the daily operation of the embassy the largest Georgian diplomatic mission in the world. Prior to his posting he was the CEO of Enterprise Georgia the Georgian Entrepreneurship Development Agency. In this role he was responsible for the establishment of the first major governmental institution mandated to facilitate private sector development through a variety of financial and technical support mechanism. Here is Georgian Acting Ambassador Golgi Chikolia. Let us give a round of applause. Good morning everyone. It's an honor and the pleasure of being here. It's an honor to speak at the America's oldest private military college. I want to thank the leadership of the Peace and Work Center President Anna Muro of course and my compatriot Lasha Jumbuidze who is in this audience as well. It's an honor to share this podium with the Distribution Waste Guest General Brigadier Weiner U.S. Strategy Command and Honorable Government of the State of Vermont Phil Scott. Thank you for being here and thank you for extending this honor to me. I have been fortunate to tour United States and Canada in my academic years but I have never been to Vermont. In fact I went to school not too far from here but somehow never made it to this beautiful state and I know how serious you guys are about your beer and maple syrup. I learned about beer last night and I knew about the maple syrup so I'm glad most people here know about Georgia, the country on Georgia and the confusion of my country with the state of Georgia is less frequent. For those of you who are still confused I'll give you a pass. Today's peace and war summit could not be more timely as we witness a full-scale war the first full-scale war of the 21st century in Europe. I represent the country that has witnessed invasions and occupations by foreign powers for centuries and one that knows too well the destruction of war. Especially today when Russian forces attack Ukraine our hearts ache for the Ukrainian people. Georgia and Ukraine share the same transatlantic valleys and the western democratic goals most notably entry to the European Union and NATO and we have faced tragically the same threats for the past 30 years. The past of Western integration has not been easy to us. In the early 90s as we regained independence from the Soviet Union we witnessed Russian aggression. Conflicts in Georgia's two breakaway regions Abkhazia and Skandalo region where Russia supported separatist movements and continues to do so today. In August 2008 Russia illegally seized those two sovereign parts of Georgia through an act of war and now controls 20 percent of Georgian territory. Just for sheer geographic compression there would be a whole of settlement of United States including Texas. Russia has turned these occupied regions into military bases by deploying modern offensive weapons and stationing troops on the ground. Russian troops stationed in the occupied Skandalo region of Georgia stand 25 miles away from the Georgian capital of Tbilisi. We have lived in this reality since 2008. Russia quickly arranged for a few ideological allies to recognize so-called independence of two occupied regions Abkhazia and Skandalo. Nicaragua, Venezuela and Syria complied. As did the tiny island nation of Nauru. Georgia has worked diligently to find the solution to this infringement on its sovereign territory and has assisted has been assisted by the United States, the European Union and other partners and international institutions. The conflicts in Georgia took a significant toll on the livelihoods of Georgians. Russia's occupation has expelled 10 percent of the Georgian population nearly half a million people internally displaced and refugees from these territories through ethnic cleansing. The population of Abkhazia has been reduced from nearly 450,000 to a mere 100,000 and the other region the Skandalo region from 150,000 to close to 30,000 with grave human rights violations happening in these regions on a daily basis. My family is one of them. As we witness the war in the early 90s we were forced to flee Sakhumi to the capital of Abkhazia. The city wants a prosperous and lovely metropolis now stands as a testament to Russian destruction and stagnation. When I watch scenes of innocent Ukrainians fleeing from Russian terror it reminds me the story of my family. We too, along with thousands of others had to flee from the only place when you're at home. Thirty years have passed and we're still waiting for the moment to reach into the land we call home where ancestors lie. Past tragedies have inspired Georgians to remain firm and vigilant in our choice to integrate into the western institutions and what thankful to our western partners especially the United States for their support. In a few days on March 24th we mark 30 years of diplomatic relations with the United States. I am proud to be the part of this relations for the past six years. I have personally witnessed our strategic partnership and friendship grow over the years. Since day one of regaining independence America's role in shaping Georgian statehood has been vital. US support in fields including security, economy, education, democracy and the rule of law cannot be overstated. In numbers the United States has allocated almost six billion dollars in assistance to Georgia in addition to other forms of support. The Biden administration has elevated support for Georgia to meet today's challenges. Last Tuesday President Biden signed a massive 1.5 trillion omnibus spending bill with 132 million dollars available for assistance for Georgia. The government of Georgia is extremely grateful for the continued assistance of the US as the Russian aggression continues. We are also fortunate to have champions from both sides of the island and congress most notably Senator Gene Shaheen from a neighboring state of New Hampshire and just yesterday learned that there was a time when New Hampshire was considered being a hostile territory right in the history of Vermont so lots to learn. As security partners we have developed a deep, durable and mutually beneficial security and defense relations now codified in multiple agreements. In addition to a commitment to NATO Georgia is an integral part of the American planning from maintaining regional stability in a face of multiple security challenges. These include anti-terrorism strategies related to the Middle East and Northern Caucasus defending US and allies interest in the Black Sea frontier safeguarding Eurasian energy and transport networks and lending strength to support key US allies like Israel. The United States has supported our efforts to modernize and strengthen the military. The American people have invested over 1.5 billion dollars in helping Georgia strengthen its resiliency, defend our borders and support our territorial integrity. Most recently during US during the visit of the US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin to Georgia he and our defense minister signed the US-Georgia Defense and Deterrence Enhancement Initiative or as we call it the Jedi. Highlighting the US commitment to bilateral security cooperation and the food integration of Washington and Tbilisi. And we are paying back. Georgia is not only a receiver but also a provider of security in the region and beyond. In the South Caucasus region we act as a beacon of Western ideals and an exporter of stability. This was on full display when our Prime Minister together with the US State Department mediated an exchange of 15 Armenian prisoners for a land mine map between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Once again highlighting the pivotal role that Georgia plays in the region. Whenever possible Georgia proactively seeks to boost the regional peace and security through innovating problem-solving and facilitating unique opportunities for the cooperation leading the way in regional dialogue and joint peace building. The Prime Minister has been actively promoting the Peaceful Neighborhood Initiative with regional actors and providing an alternative to the Russian Iranian platforms. Our deep commitment to bilateral security cooperation grows grows out of shared values and experiences. As we have faced common foes in Iraq and Afghanistan fighting against terrorism and promoting democratic values. When partners need us we send 8,000 soldiers for Operation Iraqi Freedom. In Afghanistan Georgia provided the largest number of soldiers per capita of any non-NATO allied nation including all European states in both ISF and ISM missions. Just as we entered battle together we also played out our park until the very end. During the last weeks of conflict we were crucial to to the evacuation efforts from Afghanistan. In total approximately 35,000 individuals were evacuated through Georgia. And we aid in international NGOs like National Endowment for Democracy, International Republican Institute and an Asian Development Bank and others in the safe transport and temporary accommodation of their staff. While we aspire to become members of NATO we owe the act as a member of the alliance spending more than 2% of our GDP on defense organizing multinational exercises on our soul and committing to every mission that NATO undertakes. And our partnership with the U.S. goes beyond security. U.S. assistance has helped Georgia handle the transition to a market economy with development and economic assistance that helped Georgia establish democratic and free market institutions that are essential to a fully integrated democratic state in the European and Euro-Atlantic family. Transforming and reforming Georgia into a European democracy is the choice of the Georgian society. Georgian people have requested to follow this path. Support for the European Union and NATO membership has been soaring 75 to 80% for the past decade. Same numbers could be attributed when Georgians being asked of the views of the United States. More than 80% of Georgians look favorably to the U.S. throughout the decades. This is why the government of Georgia institutionalized the European and Euro-Atlantic choice of Georgia by making a clear declaration in Georgia's highest law the Constitution. Today we stand as an associated partner of the European Union. We have a free trade agreement so-called deep and comprehensive agreement and a visa-free regime with the European Union. We're in a process of implementing EU association agenda which is the cornerstone of our future to reach European Union membership. We have successfully implemented the vast majority of the obligated reforms and we're on a track to submit our bid to the membership. But the current events expedited their decision and last week the Prime Minister of Georgia announced Georgia's decision to apply for the membership in the European Union in parallel with Ukraine and Moldova. Our vision for the next 30 years and beyond is an optimistic one but the current reality is not promising. While Georgia's economy reached double digit growth last year which along with the island was the highest in Europe we are still in a phase of post pandemic recovery and the war in Ukraine endangers the livelihoods of many. As a brotherly nation we have provided our assistance and support. We have opened our doors to every Ukrainian in need and sent 140 tons of humanitarian aid to Ukraine. In this endeavor Georgian government and people are united. While no one really knows what Putin's ultimate objective is one fact is certain he wants to prevent countries Russia dominated for centuries from developing in the prosperous democracies and keep them trapped in an imposed purgatory where development ends and democracy fades. Accepting Georgia's Ukrainians and Moldova's application for European Union membership will be a strong and unequivocal signal that these countries are part of the West and the all term of the post-Soviet countries will transform into the new Eastern European Union countries. While military support and NATO membership are ultimate tools to help nations at risk from Russian aggression economic tools are also available and should be utilized. As the majority of Georgians support deep integration with the West the U.S. can take a specific concrete action that will help Georgia build a stronger economy established by lateral free trade agreement. This will strengthen Georgia's regional leadership increase competitiveness of our economy and have collateral benefits for all Americans. In closing I would like to quote the famous son of New England Daniel Webster who once said God grants liberty only to those who love it and are always ready to guard and defend it. Thank you for the opportunity to be here with you today it has truly been an honor. And Mr. Chikulia thank you so much for your informative speech. Once again thank you very much for all speakers for the Kino session. Also in person and virtual audience many thanks for your attendant attendance in this Kino session. As seen on the program we will have a series of summit panel discussions and sessions today and tomorrow. So see you at the next session at 11 o'clock. Thank you so much again. Okay good morning everybody we're going to begin in two minutes please make sure your cell phones are off or on vibrate please. And also just a reminder the session goes until 12 15. So if you do have class and you need to leave make sure that you plan accordingly in terms of seating. Just a quick reminder so we're going to begin in a few minutes. So good morning everyone welcome to the first workshop session of the 2022 peace and war summit which focuses on deciphering the Russian riddle national interest and geo-political competitions. My name is Dr. Travis Morris and I have the privilege in honor of being the director for North University's peace and war center. I would like to welcome our distinguished guests both that are on the stage and also in in the audience would like to thank you in advance for your contributions to the summit this year. This event is as you all know incredibly timely. We could not be more fortunate to have a summit at this time and to be able to have our distinguished guests to add to the conversation to enlighten our understanding of what's going on with Russia and the Ukraine. The current war has eclipsed the media it eclipsed government conversations and hearts and minds all over the world. It's important to note that this venue is significant as Norch has produced leaders that have fought and engaged in America's security conflicts for over the past 200 years. Distinguished guests the information from this summit is not static. Many in the room may find themselves using this information strategically and tactically in the near future and in their future careers. I would also like to welcome all of you that are joining us virtually. Thank you so much for attending and also a special welcome to our Canadian colleagues and officer cadets who are visiting from the Canadian Royal Military College St. Jean. Welcome. So before you on stage and we have a author that's joining us online we have a distinguished panel for you and it is my pleasure to introduce them. Thomas Graham Dr. Thomas Graham to the far left is a distinguished fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations. He's currently a senior advisor at Kissinger Associates. He's also a research fellow at the MacMillion Center at Yale where he teaches the course on U.S.-Russian relations. He was a special assistant to the president and senior director for Russia on the National Security Council staff from 2004 to 2007 during which he managed a White House Kremlin strategic dialogue. Welcome Dr. Graham. Dr. Peter Rutland is a professor of government at Wesleyan University and vice president of the Association for the Study of Nationalities. He works on nationalism and political economy in the post Soviet space. His recent articles include understanding Putin's Russia and perspectives on politics in 2021 and nation building in the Baltic States. 30 years of independence in the Journal of Baltic Studies in 2021. Dr. Jessica Pisano who will be joining us online. She's an associate professor of politics at the New School for Social Research in New York City and is associate of the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Harvard University. Her research focuses on how economic change affects people's lives and how those affect translate into changes in local, national and global politics. Dr. Michael Andrew will be our discussant for today's session. He joined the faculty at Norwich University in the Department of History and Political Science in 1993. He was named an associate professor in 2002 and he serves as program chair since 2015. He earned a BA and MA at Desales University and his PhD at State University of New York Binghamton. Just a quick overview of how the session is going to run. Each scholar will give a 15 minute presentation which will be followed by Dr. Andrew's discussant comments. After his comments the floor will be open for a Q&A session and you see we have mics to your left and to the right and we would encourage you to think of questions and we'd love to have you engage our distinguished panel while we're here. Let's give them all a round of applause. And to start us off Dr. Graham the floor is your sir. Thank you very much for that kind introduction and it is indeed a real pleasure to be here today. I want to thank the University for this for the invitation for hosting this very important summit at this time. It is indeed a real pleasure to speak before an audience of future leaders. There are a lot of challenges coming down the road and I think it's a great time to be young. The world is changing in dramatic ways. I think we're at an inflection point in history and yours is a generation that has the opportunity to shape the world in ways that will work to our security and our prosperity for decades into the future. Now at a conference like this I always feel like an interloper of some sort because I'm not an academic. I'm not an academic by training. I'm not an academic by inclination. I've spent most of my professional life in the policy world. And in the policy world more often than not you find yourself acting under time pressure on the basis of incomplete information and you have to live with the consequences and you have to hope that you guess right because the guesses that you make are based on the intellectual capital you've built over the years. Sometimes you're right sometimes you're wrong. You hope that you're right more often than not. But a policy maker and a wise policy maker also reaches out to the academic community because these are the people the individuals that had the chance to study issues in depth to provide a different type of perspective that could help a policy maker think through the challenges that he or she is going to face in the future and helps them make that right hunch when the time to act comes. Now we're all appalled by the recent events by the unprovoked Russian aggression against Ukraine we have seen the wrenching pictures of human death physical destruction and I think we all have a sense of moral outrage at this point but everybody who's worked in the policy community understands that moral outrage is not sufficient for developing a good policy and an effective policy. One of the key challenges for a policy maker is to understand the other side be able to see the world through the eyes of the rival and in this case to be able to see the world through the eyes of Russia more specifically the Kremlin and to the extent possible Putin himself. Now none of this is meant to be a justification for what Russia is doing is an act of strategic empathy and what the goal is is develop a deeper understanding that allows you to develop the types of effective policies that will counter Russia when it acts in ways that are hostile to American interest. So that's what I want to try to do in the next few minutes and I want to start by laying out what I think Russia sees and has historically seen as this great strategic challenge and to put it in a sentence that is how do you defend a multi-ethnic country located on a vast territory with very few formidable physical barriers and a territory that abuts unsettled territory unsettled lands or powerful neighbors. And throughout history for the past three, four, or five centuries the answer that Russia has come up with is strategic depth or building buffer zones pushing the boundaries the borders as far away from the strategic heartland as possible second, strict internal control over the population and three, disruption of hostile alliances along your borders. And it's these three tasks that have guided Russia as it's developed its policies towards Europe towards the West. From the moment Russia entered the European balance of power system in the early early 18th century the great czars of the 18th century Peter and Catherine put a great deal of time and effort into expanding Russia's borders westward into Europe. Catherine was the leader that brought much of the territory of current day Ukraine including Crimea into the Russian Empire at the end of the 18th century. We've also seen that throughout history and certainly after Russia entered Europe that there was an effort to limit the flow of Western ideas into into Russia as a way of controlling the population. The challenge that they faced was to introduce those Western ideas that were critical to developing the type of industrial commercial power that they needed to generate the resources to fuel their grand great power ambitions. But they wanted to limit the political values that came from the West because those are ones that challenge the fundamental structure of the Russian state. And finally, certainly after the humiliating defeat in the middle of the 19th century in the Crimean War when Britain and France floated excuse me fleets through the Turkish straits into the Black Sea and defeated Russia on its own territory. The Russians had a firm principle of trying to disrupt that Crimean coalition and preventing anything like that from re-emerging in a way that would threaten Russia's future. Now, we see that these principles guided Soviet policy probably taken too extreme. The Soviet Union developed probably the Russia's largest buffer zone in Europe, extending it all the way to Eastern Germany during the Cold War. The Soviet Union certainly cracked down on domestic opposition limited to the extent possible any influx of Western values and Western ideas. And it certainly spent a great deal of time trying to disrupt alliances, particularly trying to disrupt the United States, NATO and America's position throughout the world. This only changed for a brief moment in the very late Soviet period and the first decade of the post-Soviet Europe. Gorbachev was a unusual Soviet leader, an unusual Russian leader. He in fact gave up the Soviet buffer zone in Eastern Europe in a space of a couple of years. He welcomed the influx of Western ideas as he sought to reform the Soviet political system. And instead of trying to disrupt the creation of hospital alliances against Russia, he reached out and tried to form a partnership with the United States. President Yeltsin followed that path in the first decade after the breakup of the Soviet Union. And he came upon Putin to restore this traditional approach to Russian security, particularly vis-à-vis the West. And what we've seen over the past 20 years is a concerted effort by Putin to rebuild Russia as a great power to assert its prerogatives on the global stage. And in a sense to transform those three principles that I talked of in the concrete tasks that Russia needs to achieve if it's going to maintain its position well into the future. Now, I would put these tasks the following way. Five that I see that is translating those three principles that I talked into to five for the current period. The first is to prevent the West from undermining Russia from within. And that means putting very strict controls on the flow of Western information. We've seen Putin over the past 15 to 20 years crack down on any way that foreign influence could impact on Russia's domestic politics. Cracking down on non-governmental organizations that received foreign funding. Eventually passing what he calls a foreign agent law a way of labeling those who have contacts with the outside world, particularly the Western world, propagate those types of views as foreign agents which in Russian translates into spies, espionage, traders of some sort. And we've seen certainly over the past three or four weeks in the wake of the conflict in Ukraine a very concerted effort to block out the last independent media in Russia to control the narrative of the war in Ukraine. Second is that Putin has tried to create a buffer zone in the former Soviet space. He has put in place certain institutional practices that he thought would bring these countries together. He launched the so-called European Economic Community Union as a way of bringing Kazakhstan, Belarus, Russia, and hopefully other former Soviet states into some type of economic union that would also have a political dimension and would be dominated by Russia. Now it's quite clear that all of Putin's efforts to rebuild his buffer zone hinge on Ukraine. Ukraine is the crux of the problem. You don't have a buffer zone unless you have Ukraine. Ukraine is that former Soviet state that after Russia itself has the greatest potential both economically and militarily. And we've seen some of that unfold over the past couple of weeks and months. Third task is to impede the consolidation of Europe so that Europe doesn't dwarf Russia in economic, in wealth, in population, and power potential much the way the United States does today. A consolidated European Union would be an entity of over 400 million people an economy of some 15 trillion dollars and technologically advanced economy. That would dwarf Russia which has a population of 140 million, a GDP of about $1.8 trillion and also a country that devotes precious little of its of its economic wealth to the research and development you need to succeed in developing the cutting-edge technologies that are going to dominate the 21st century. So Russia, we've seen, has spent most of the past 15 to 20 years trying to drive wedges between European States, between the United States and Europe. It has funded populist movements on both the left and the right as a way of fostering unrest, discontent within these States. It has used its energy power to try to isolate countries from one another. The fourth task is to compel the United States to act like a normal great power. And what that means in the Russian sense is that the United States would give up what Russia sees as its ambitions to develop a unipolar world, to stop being a hegemonic power but to be a country of a great power that understands that it needs to take into account the interest of other great powers, principally Russia, if it's going to advance its own. And Putin has tried to do this in several ways over the past 20 years. He actually started by trying to build something like a partnership with the United States, trying to create a special relationship akin to the relationship that Great Britain has with the United States on the assumption that if you had that type of relationship you would have some influence over how the United States operated on the global stage. He quickly came to the conclusion that the United States was not interested in that type of arrangement and moved to a posture that was much more controversial and confrontational, trying to build organizations that would challenge the United States in both the security realm, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, for example, with China and a number of Central Asian states and in the economic realm, the BRICS, this union of Brazil, Russia, India, China and later South Africa that would act as a counterweight to the international financial institutions that are dominated by the United States on the global stage. And you've also seen Russia insist that big issues in global politics be discussed in forum in fora where Russia has a veto, the UN Security Council, the primary place where that is done, but also the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the OSCE, also an organization that operates by consensus. And the final element of this policy, of this posture towards the West has been to build a strategic alignment with China, to build a strategic alignment with China because China is that one country that can act as something of an economic counterweight to Europe, reduce Russia's over reliance on Europe as a trading partner as a source of foreign direct investment and also a country and probably the only other country in the world that can act as something of a strategic counterbalance to the United States, a peer competitor, a country that Russia would want to have very close relationship with. So we have these five tasks that Putin has set out, and he's pursued them, I think, with interlocking policies over the past 15 to 20 years. I think the question that we need to ask at this point is how successful has Putin been and how successful can he be over the next several years if he remains in power that long. And I would argue that this success has been far from complete. We start with the former Soviet space. Ukraine is probably the best example now of how Putin has failed to create a genuine buffer zone. There's tremendous resistance to this in Ukraine and we see Ukrainians prepared to fight to lay down their lives to preserve their independence and their freedoms. But it's not the only place where Russia's influence, I think, has waned or has been challenged in the past couple of years. Think of Belarus, a dictator that survives only at the grace of Putin at this point. Doesn't enjoy much popular support. Think about the recent events in Kazakhstan that suggested elite and some popular resistance to a closer relationship with Russia. Think about the war in the caucuses between Armenia and Azerbaijan a year and a half ago. Also challenging Russian influence in the former Soviet space. Europe, to be sure, had many different difficulties over the past decade. Burying many issues that challenge the unity of Europe in the future. But almost all of those were due to domestic issues, domestic origin. They were not the result of Russian activities and Russian activities and to try to exacerbate those actually didn't have much influence. And what we've seen over the past month is how Putin by launching this aggression against Ukraine has unified the European Union in a way that very few people expected just three or four months ago. I think something similar can be said about the United States. Putin certainly thought that the United States would not be able to rally the West would not be able to lead this very serious sanctions campaign against Russia that we've seen unfold over the past three or four weeks. And finally China. He has built a closer strategic alignment with China. But the problem is that Putin doesn't have an answer for how this relationship is going to develop over the next 10 to 15 years. The asymmetry and growth rates is dramatically in favor of China. To remain historical grievances that will reappear as China goes stronger. And already China is beginning to challenge Russia in a strategic backyard in Central Asia in Ukraine in Central Europe. And finally there's a fundamental in hearing contradiction between what China wants to do on the global stage and what Russia wants to do. China wants to expand its economy and wants to expand into Europe economically and technologically. That requires stability. Capital as we all know is a coward. The Russians to advance their goals at this point need instability and that is going to come to play. I would argue in the next in the not so distant future. So we have a Russia that has an historic challenge. It has had a set of principles that have guided it in trying to secure its country in its future. But as you can see there are real problems with how you're going to implement that in today's world given the values, given the leadership of the United States and Russia still hasn't figured out how it is in fact going to reassert itself and maintain itself as a great power well into the 21st century. So let me end there. Dr. Graham, thank you for your illuminating remarks. So we're going to transition now to Dr. Rutland. Let me just get this power point ready. The floor is yours, sir. Well, it's great honor to be here at Norwich University. It's a great institution and without further ado I will plunge into my power point. Now I agree with most of what Dr. Graham said. I think there are some differences in my approach and so it will be interesting to see the audience questions and comments about our views. But I would take anything that Dr. Graham says very seriously. First came across his name in 1995 when you wrote an article in the Russian press about the clans that were running the Kremlin and that was the first time people talked about clans in the Kremlin what later became known as the oligarchs and it was a wake-up call because we were being told don't take the political institutions seriously the formal elections and formal institutions of power look for the informal networks and that's really been the pattern in Russian politics and domestic politics ever since. So these are two disturbing quotations showing just how bad things are I think in Vladimir Putin's perception of the world his place in it and Russia's place in it and his threats explicit threats to destroy that world if he doesn't get his way. So why did Putin start this war in Ukraine which started of course in 2014 not three weeks ago. I see it my main argument is these two trends heading in opposite directions. Putin's Russia was getting stronger and stronger as Dr Graham has explained over the past 20 years on the international stage and Putin thought that the US was finished as a global power and needed taking down a peg or two. However at the same time at the regional level specifically in the case of Ukraine the trends were going against the Kremlin's interests that the consolidation of national identity in Ukraine and its deepening ties with Europe were pulling Ukraine further away from Russia. So we have these two trends heading in opposite directions. At the macro global scale Russia is getting stronger but locally regionally on its borders it seems to be getting weaker. So Putin decided up to various other strategies it failed to use military intervention to use war to close the gap between the power of Russia as he saw it and the local outcome within Ukraine. And why that effort to close the gap isn't working is because the Ukrainians are fighting back and are not cooperating and have agency of their own and the fatal mistake in Putin's approach was not understanding the character of Ukrainian identity. I give him the benefit of the doubt he probably understands Russian identity pretty well but he does not understand Ukrainian identity and Sun Tzu and other military scholars have always told us know the enemy as well as knowing yourself. Why did Putin think he was in a strong position very quickly? Economics Russia's earning $150 billion a year exporting oil and gas even after the sanctions they're continuing to go to earn that amount of money per year. So they have a flow of income which enables them to do whatever they want on the international stage that's at least Putin's Putin's view of this and Europe in particular with 40% of his natural gas and 25% of his oil coming from Russia Putin assumed Europe can't do anything to stop us from doing what I want to do. On a global scale President Biden was seen as weak I'm not sure what the Russians made of President Trump by the end of his administration but it was clear that the US was pivoting back to domestic politics and if it was going to do anything internationally it would be with China at least that was what Putin thought. Militarily the Russian army was on a roll they won three wars in a row in their view and so they thought that it's a no-brainer that any future military conflict will be in their favor. Finally and this is the kind of joker in the pack is the identity politics Putin complains a lot under Kremlin political analysts talk about identity politics in the West very dismissively but the real driver in Russia is also identity politics and Putin's sense of humiliation and trying to recreate some kind of great Russian identity from the past and part of that narrative we shockingly learned in his July 2021 article is to deny the existence of Ukraine to say the Ukrainian so just Russians who don't realize that they're Russians kind of thing and so if Ukraine doesn't exist as a nation well then there's no problem invading it because you're not invading a nation it's just like motoring from from you know Connecticut to Vermont it's just the same kind of operation except in tanks putting my academic hat on for a while three floors I think and this is obviously premature it's only three weeks into the war but my own interpretations of how the world works and how Russia works have changed radically on February the 24th and I realized a lot of what I thought about Russia was just wrong or inadequate so here are three points for discussion with my fellow academics first of all I think there's been over emphasis on NATO expansion that's dominated a lot of the debate about the strategy and looking at General Wiedner here I would ask why do you need a buffer zone if you got nuclear deterrence I mean we're not living in the 1850s here we're not even living in the 1940s so why does Russia see NATO as a threat under what kind of science fiction scenario would NATO be a military threat to Russia so but academics love to explain why World War One happened the security dilemma we don't spend that much time explaining why World War Two happened it's like that's not a problem because everybody realizes Hitler was insane and he had to be stopped point number two a lot of political scientists study elections in Russia talks about a hybrid regime electoral autocracy and but it wasn't a hybrid regime it was an authoritarian regime under Putin it's now becoming potentially a totalitarian regime and elections and public opinion just don't matter it's very hard to understand what does public opinion mean what kind of telephone polls can you do and you just invaded another country and you're asking people do you approve of this or not what kind of response rate are you getting and what kind of people are responding to those polls so we just don't know what the public opinion really is and it doesn't matter at least in the short run in this kind of regime so I don't buy the diversionary theory argument that Putin went to war because he wanted to boost his opinion rating or to make sure he'd win the next election that was never in doubt the sanctions issue is more complicated and I probably won't have time to go into all of the arguments around the sanctions but briefly the previous smart sanctions were kind of based on a hypothesis that oligarchs run Russia and the rich will go and complain to Putin and get him to change his behavior but in fact Russia is a personalistic dictatorship and not ruled by oligarchs and so the sanctions this time around or hitting the entirety of Russian society and the state not just the oligarchs this is a Chinese cartoon unfortunately this narrative of the wars are caused by native expansion is very widely believed in the global south in China and even in India which is a democracy but it's kind of backing Russia in this one which I think is very unfortunate I'll skip through this material this I've already talked about nuclear powers don't really need physical buffer zones Ukraine was not a member of NATO anyway we can run counter history and think if NATO had pledged never to invite Ukraine to join maybe this war could have been avoided but we'll never know the answer to that question I think the real issue is not NATO expansion it's the resentment of the US as a global power and the economic collapse of the 1990s was blamed on the west although it was a result of the collapse of the Soviet central planning system also pushback against cultural imperialism also resentment at America's military role in Afghanistan Iraq Kosovo and Libya in the 1990s those were all reasons for Russia to become resentful and angry with the US and NATO is just a kind of label for all of that resentment what it is really about I think is more about Europe than about NATO recall that the Maidan revolution began because of the association agreement with the European Union not NATO back in 2013 and why would why on earth would Ukraine want to join the EU well it's all in this table which shows the relative economic performance 1990 to 2020 and you can see that the country's on the left that joined the EU experienced like a doubling of GDP per capita measured relative to the EU average so Poland is now 75 80 percent of the EU up from 35 percent and the country's on the right the country is that did not join the EU and you can see that Ukraine has performed very poorly economically since independence and Russia has kept going by its oil and gas revenues so Ukraine looking at Poland thinks if only we could get close economic ties to the EU we would become more prosperous these these relationships that we have with Russia are just not developing our economy why did Putin oppose Ukraine joining the west Russia had economic interests in Ukraine it feared at the example of a Ukrainian democracy and other color revolutions in Georgia and elsewhere that could spread to Belarus Kazakhstan and Russia itself there's also a change in the political calculation that Putin thought in the 1990s and 2000s that Ukraine was serving as a kind of buffer state because Russia could control a lot of the Ukraine's politics through bribery and favoritism and oligarchs but after the Maidan revolution that calculation shifted and especially under President Zelensky Putin felt that he'd lost those internal levers to control Ukraine and finally this question of identity politics that it's not just about security it's about how people interpret their place in the world and world history I'm running out of time I think I'm not sure how much time I have left one or two minutes so I'll skip through important point about the Crimean precursor or start of the war is that the Nazi narrative was already there in 2014 this was on the day of the referendum and this billboard in Crimea said choose do you want a Nazi Crimea or a Russian Crimea but was also there already in 2014 was this notorious TV statement on the night of the referendum on Russia's state TV Dmitry Kisselov saying America should remember we can reduce you to radioactive dust that's what those words say and a mushroom cloud in the background so a lot of these themes that we're seeing now the denazification narrative the threats of nuclear war they were already there in 2014 I'll skip through to the end these are trends in Russia post the world favoring Russia since 2014 weakening of the US during the Trump presidency weakening of the EU with the transition from Angela Merkel and also the experience of sanctions after Crimea those sanctions were relatively ineffective then we had a series of build-up in 2021 looking back we can see that Putin was preparing for this war for some time with the military exercises and then also with cutting back on natural gas deliveries to Europe so that the storage facilities were only 25% capacity by August so he was going to use the natural gas as a blackmail to get the Germans to approve Nord Stream 2 and this dialing down of the spot deliveries of spot sales of gas led to a price spike in December of 500% higher natural gas prices in the EU than a year earlier so Putin clearly thought that this economic lever is going to force the Europeans to just basically accept whatever plans he had in mind for Ukraine this is discussion of the diversionary politics argument I summarized all this at the beginning because I knew I had run out of time so I got the main points out there first the final slide is what next Putin is trying to roll back history probably to around 1860 or so I don't think this is going to work on he's not able to win the war but it's not clear that he's willing to admit defeat so we may be looking at a continuing stalemate the sanctions are amazingly powerful and effective but the fact that Europe continues to need to buy Russian oil and gas means that Putin will continue to have a cash flow from Europe he'll also be ramping up trade with China and India so economically he will have the resources to continue this stalemated war for as long as he likes or as long as he's in power and this is terrible for Ukraine it's also terrible for Russia and it's it's not great for anybody in fact and so it's amazing how much damage this war has done so I'll finish that thank you so welcome Dr. Bassano you're on the screen and we're ready for your presentation the floor is is yours and welcome to Norwich University this is an imaginary home world accessible in the Russian language and compatible with long-standing philosophical traditions of China that democratic imaginary is appealing from many Russians which is why Vladimir Putin who locates the source of his war not in his own choices but in a new bloody vital accusing Zelensky of Nazism who actually precedes the contemporary Ukraine even under Senator Alexander poses an existential threat to Putin's rule so for two decades before his global fame as a workhand president his bravado enemy for quote Amon that arrived accompanied by actual courage while Zelensky was widely known in the Russian speaking world for his artistry, humor and moral leadership if the Soviet period had been distinguished for some above all by its regalism its ruthlessness, its palesness and in the 1990s by a mercilessness of a different sort as a showman of Vladimir Zelensky Vladimir Zelensky at the time had consistently embodied and articulated humanistic values telling the truth about politics and everyday life even on the states of doing so were quite high so Zelensky will compare it with contemporary so-called populists but although his empathy for people struggles me to sound that way he does not appeal to ethnic constituencies within the Demas instead his imaginary is inclusive civic and defined for by care for and life within the sovereign boundary of the national state it emphasizes not only freedoms but also responsibility so this conceptual foundation of unity and diversity and this agreement distinguishes Zelensky's work from that of his neighbors to the west and north and it's a reason he is a following not cults now in the decades preceding is more on the entirety of Ukraine in 2022 Kremlin and Kremlin adjacent actors rigorously had intervened in Ukrainian elections and Ukrainian public discourse promoting the idea that Ukraine was polarized society Americans may recognize this so on television newspapers and street demonstrations Russian politicians journalists and other public figures repeated this to be talking point that Ukraine was divided between east and west the west like Europe and the east was oriented toward Russia journalists and social scientists in North American Europe also absorbed this idea and regularly published articles that portrayed Ukraine as two societies now over time many Ukrainians internalized this narrative of two Ukrainians and some people saw evidence of division in their daily lives especially in 2004 following the massive demonstrations in response to documented electoral fraud in Ukraine's foreign revolution sometimes even members of the same film couldn't agree about whether protest was the right path to political change so at that time Ukraine seemed to lack a central national idea a shared set of ideas beyond a belief in the constitution politicians initially looked to ethnic identity as a salvo under Viktor Yushchenko but the country's diversity meant that not all Ukrainians could embrace this approach as others have noted the Russian invasion of Crimea support of armed proxies in the Donbas and unsuccessful attempts to foment secession in Kharkiv and Mariupol in 2014 did much to unify Ukrainians turning Russian speakers in Ukraine into Russian-speaking Ukrainian patriots but there remained fracture lines as some people remained in epistemological silos whose boundaries were determined by media consumption or by their beliefs about the legitimacy of street demonstrations as a vehicle of redress amidst documented electoral manipulation so at this point Zelensky's intervention in Ukrainian popular culture as a showman played a key role in Ukrainian public discourse the televised stage performances of Zelensky and his troop of Foptal 95 can be understood as the sort of quote unquote pre-political work that Czech playwright and president Václav Havel called quote the living hummus from which genuine political change usually springs unquote so Zelensky and his troop responded to Kremlin-led societal polarization with a multi-stage artistic operation rather than contributing to polarization by vilifying and pushing back against part of Ukrainian society he and his troop executed two discursive moves that helped shift popular framings of Ukrainian politics so first as a performer and then in the first year of his presidential administration Zelensky worked to disaggregate the dual elements of the seemingly bipolar world of Ukrainian domestic politics so through their lyrics and other elements of performance his troop articulated ideas of Ukrainian identity that focused on a diversity of possible personal and group identities these identities co-heared not around language or region east west Russian speaking Ukrainian speaking but around everyday practices and individual beliefs so I'll give you an example from Zelensky's New Year's Eve presidential ingredient in 2020 which I think sums up this approach so asking who am I Zelensky gave examples of who Ukrainians are which co-heared around things other than ethnicity and language so he says quote I am someone who learned Ukrainian because it's normal to know the state language someone who doesn't want to someone who pays for taxes someone who breaks the traffic laws someone who has a dog a redhead a Muslim someone who is hearing impaired someone who hates olives a liberal an excellent student someone who didn't watch Game of Thrones a vegan a Capricorn Capricorn someone who doesn't offer his seat in the subway a blood donor someone who refuses to use plastic he went on to add this is each of us Ukrainians as we are not ideal not saints because we're just people living people with our flaws and eccentricities so second having broken down the idea of two Ukrainians and too many Ukrainians through individualization and recognition Zelensky and his troop made a second discursive move that used two key focal points to gather individual Ukrainian identities into a coherent home these focal points were interlocking foils the action of Ukraine's own oligarchic political class and Putin's political regime and its war in Ukraine's Donbas so focusing on issues about which all Ukrainians of all political, linguistic and other stripes could agree Zelensky's troop used each theme to create the idea of a united popular front in artistic work that laid the ground for his presidential campaign Zelensky and Kvartal 95 rallied Ukrainians behind Frank's speech about and criticism of the regional kleptocrats whose assets and activities straddle the Ukraine-Russia border this critics suffused their musical numbers and song lyrics describe Ukrainian oligarchs as divided between quote a body in Ukraine and a soul offshore unquote their musical numbers focusing on the war in the Donbas linked Ukraine Ukrainians in a common frame telling of the country's struggle to choose its own way despite Putin's wishes so Zelensky and Kvartal 95 offered an imaginary that broke through long-standing societal politicization and interference from Russia to create a space in which individual Ukrainians could find an idea of community a mirror image to the robust civil society that had developed in Ukraine during the same period parallel with Zelensky's move to institutional politics and a unified opposition to Putinism so eight years before Zelensky's leadership through Putin's current catastrophe in Ukraine his troop had drawn Ukrainians together having quote from one of their songs lit all of the candles in the church save one for the one who made Ukraine go to war for the one about whom they sang in hark of football fan songs for the one who so generously handed out lead to our boys unquote so Zelensky's political imaginary offers a model for reframing politics not only in Ukraine but also elsewhere including in Putin's Russia his work abandoned the analytical categories that social science uses to sort people's identities instead recognizing the possibility of unity by validating a great diversity of possible taxonomies all of which could be used for thinking about belonging is it in Zelensky's imaginary that recognition of diversity also included an embrace of agonism a radical acceptance of messiness and disagreement in democratic society and a willingness to look with humor and understanding upon human frailty notwithstanding the intensification of authoritarian politics within Putin's Russia Russian society has generated just such a cacophony with activists holding diverse points of view on a variety of issues for a parallel think of American society under the previous presidential administration what many Russians may want now in the face of Kremlin attempts to impose a homogeneous unicity in support of a criminal war it's not only dissent but also a competing story a narrative frame that can bring together and validate multiple voices and overlapping identities Zelensky recognized that a social fabric woven of many different visible threads can be more flexible and resilient more resistant to damage than an undifferentiated weft now the forced genicity Russian society nonetheless seems poised to accept may create an impression of homogeneity homogeneity and Russian political viewpoints for a time but in a connected world even one segmented by new limits on free speech online and saturated with deliberate lies about the nature of the Kremlin's quote unquote special operation observations about people's real lives move like water and state constructed dams only temporarily redirect the flow a Russian national idea resilient enough to withstand the centrifugal forces produced by Putin's war on Ukraine and global responses to it needs to be capacious and flexible accommodating of the multiplicity of identities practices and dissenting voices that had developed within Russian society during and despite Putin's rule this is where Zelensky offers a model an alternative a genuine antipode of the fascism with which Zelensky's government has been ligled so decades of decolonization and repression under Putin have made of much much of Russia a desert of political indifference and fear but as the Russian expression goes a desirable place isn't empty for long there is room for a new story in this context the work of Vladimir Zelensky the artist whom Russians have known almost as long as they have known Putin may offer Russians an attractive local ideological alternative if they can break through the society-wide wall of denial about the facts of their country's work against Ukraine without such an approach create a positive narrative that better reflects the diversity of Russian's experiences than the Kremlin version Russians describing their own country may soon find need to resurrect the second half of the saying that a desirable place does not remain empty for long for long long fallen into disuse in contemporary language a pustan yes that never was yet but no one wants an empty place I'll stop there thank you have some time for a question and answer thank you Dr. Morris I'm going to radically edit some of my comments so we have enough time for question and answer especially from from our students I didn't want to say that the value of this kind of exercise is the opportunity to engage with scholars and practitioners and it's also a great opportunity for our students to feel it's happening in the real world take their classroom experiences because I just came from two sections of introduction to international relations and I hope students can see how the ideas that they learned in class are being applied and finally this just reaffirms my faith in the significance and the importance of the social sciences and the humanities now with respect to the different presentations I'm going to start with Professor Graham Russia's grand strategy towards the west and when I when I read this it reminded me of George Cannon's sources of Soviet conduct because essentially what Cannon was arguing in the late 1940s if you want to understand Soviet conduct after the Second World War you need to understand Russian foreign policy Russian attitudes towards security and so what you find are ideas rooted in basic traditional realism for the most part for instance the idea of spheres of influence or a security buffer fragmenting hostile alliances sort of keeping your your adversaries off balance frustrating hegemony preventing one state from dominating a particular region war the world and of course a partnership with with China which is a balancer to US power so the creation of a a multi-polar world one thing that falls outside of traditional realism is the role of identities and in particular a western identity and the desire of Russian leaders and Putin in particular today to limit Western influence in in Russia so in terms of questions that I'm opposed to Professor Graham do you think that John Muir Sharma was right in arguing that NATO Eastward expansion was an unnecessary provocation he's argued this recently in past weeks and then just over the weekend in a commentary in the the economists he reiterated this this idea and where do identities fit into that because I think we can understand why Russia might see Eastward expansion of NATO and the European Union as a provocation but how does the West and how does the United States see Eastward expansion of NATO and and the European Union why is it that another question why is it that the the West is and has been perceived as a threat I think this is why it's important why Professor Graham brought up the Napoleonic experience in the 19th century and how Russia fit into a traditional balance of power before the Napoleonic period and how those attitudes and security concerns changed after the Napoleonic wars and finally in terms of recommendations how should the United States and the West respond to Russian security concerns respect to Professor Rutland I see or I see Professor Graham as putting Russia's security concerns in a context I see Professor Rutland's papers explaining why invade Ukraine now and I think as Professor Rutland laid out there's an opportunity on the one hand from the Russian perspective the Crimean invasion didn't spark the pro-Russian response that it was supposed to have was that was anticipated there was concern that pro-Russian elites in Ukraine have been losing influence the post Crimean invasion encourage Ukraine to begin an arms build up and there was concern that Ukraine might use these weapons and this new military power against Russia or against Russian minorities the Trump administration weakened ties between the United States and its allies and Vladimir Zelinsky even though he's portrayed as a hero now had been losing popularity was considered a relatively unpopular leader in Ukraine and so I think Putin and Professor Rutland laid out Putin saw this as an opportunity now I know that Professor Rutland has rejected the realist explanations in favor of constructivist interpretation and constructivism is an approach which would explain and this sort of fits into Dr. Vizano's work also how do Russians imagine themselves what do they understand to be right and wrong behavior but also how does the United States imagine itself and how does the United States imagine Russia because that helps us understand why or how we would predict the behavior of of another state of other other actors constructivism also here I'm borrowing from Donald Kagan military historian Donald Kagan author of on the origins of war the role of things like honor and prestige and reputation sort of old-fashioned ideas but they still influence behavior beyond just a sort of rational cost-benefit calculation so that would expect to explain why what seems to be irrational behavior is in fact rational understanding behaviors from the perspective of adversaries I also thought about um Stephen Waltz distinction between balance of power and balance of threat and what decision makers do is they respond to what they perceive to be a threat not just changes in balance so why is it that the united states for instance is concerned with students in my IR classes are probably sick of hearing this why is it that the United States is concerned with nuclear weapons in Iran and North Korea but we're not concerned about France and Britain having nuclear weapons so how how is it that Russia perceives its world and and threats not just from a pure power perspective Professor Pizano two most important ideas concepts I took away from this the idea of political imaginaries and agonism because political imaginaries fits into this idea of how we imagine ourselves to be and how we imagine others so how has Vladimir Putin for instance imagined Russia how has he imagined Ukraine and what are the right and wrong behaviors based on those those imaginations and so what Putin has done is he's created an antagonistic imaginary where an antagonistic imaginary is one where you you accept conflict as natural but you treat your opponents as your enemies and so this contributes to a bipolarity and a reluctance to cooperate or make concessions with those who you see as your mortal enemies an agonistic approach which is what Zelinsky has developed is one that treats opponents not as enemies but as adversaries as actors who have legitimate complaints actors who have legitimate interests that you may not agree with but you should tolerate and understand their their perspectives and that is why I think it's important that President Pozzano points out that what Zelinsky did is he used satire as a way of appealing to the Ukrainian public he used satire as a way of pointing out what was ridiculous and absurd in everyday life something that has a very broad appeal something that most people could could identify with and that is why Zelinsky using that that approach is a threat to Putin's regime because he offers a different different narrative and the question that I had was does this explain Putin's hostility to all of Ukraine because I think you make the case that maybe what Putin should have done is hive off the eastern provinces of Ukraine declared victory and go home instead he's launched his full scale invasion of Ukraine and do the business I did different narratives perhaps explain that has Putin perhaps personalized the conflict so it's not just one between Russia and Ukraine but it's between Putin and Vladimir Zelinsky Zelinsky is the is the threat I was also wondering of respect to this approach how would you change the narrative in Russia how's it possible to change narrative in Russia because of course Zelinsky was dealing with a much more permissive environment than currently exists in in Russia so what is the potential for an outsider it's as if Zelinsky was to make inroads into Russian politics and then change that that narrative thank you Dr. Andrew thank you for your insightful remarks and and solid questions and if you just look at the time left we have 10 minutes and the time is going to evaporate quickly I would like to give students the opportunity to ask a couple of questions so if you have a question please go ahead and move to to the microphone and we'd like to fuel questions for you first but certainly the questions that Dr. Andrew posed could fulfill another summit for another week in response very deliberate questions but very timely very tactical very strategic and also very applied questions and from multiple different angles to understand currently what's going on so if you could just state your name and then your question please and who you're directing your question to or the entire panel good afternoon my name is K.F. Barnes and Professor Graham you began your talk Fights to Hangman and I'm paraphrasing here the decisions that we make are built upon our intellectual capital so my question is how do you recommend that we the young can navigate this increasingly complex situation and this miasma of misinformation that we find ourselves in at the deficit of intellectual capital that comes with not having been around for very long absolutely yes please look I mean the way you deal with it the way you deal with it is through your studies you know your studies at this university are a part of develop your intellectual capital if you're thinking about a career in foreign policy you know the recommendation first is history history is critical to understanding where we are but it's also critical because you develop your ability to see situations you go back to the second world war the Napoleonic wars certain revolutions see the types of challenges that statesman based at that time how they thought through the problem how they made the decisions and then what the consequences of those decisions were now anyone will tell you that analogies are in perfect you can't take one situation and apply it word for word today but they help develop a critical process that helps you think through the issues what the what the possibilities are and what the possible consequences are and you develop political capital that way the other thing you study is political philosophy the great ideas that have that have shaped the way the modern world functions the way we think about the relationship between the individual and the state the state and society the way we think about how countries interact and on the basis of what and so forth so your four years here this is where you begin to develop the intellectual capital then you'll have your your own experiences and hopefully during a career whether it's in the military the foreign service you'll have time to spend a year or two to reflect on what you've learned and then apply that when you return to a position of power one of the things that I have done and I've been out of government now since 2007 is try to reflect on what happened during the 20 years I was in government what I got right what I got wrong how I would have dealt with these issues if I knew what I do now back then when I was in the decision making process so again education now and the constant process of education and reflecting on your own experience builds that political capital and intellectual capital that you're going to spend down when you're actually in the heat of battle and have to make decisions press very much for time thank you Dr. Graham let's go to the site please four chairs I was just about to get ready from Seymar Stasia Dr. Rudman I had a question about your safety flaws in the way that we think about Russia so since 2014 you've seen a very expanded NATO involvement in Eastern Europe from China, juncture airborne operations in Ukraine and perhaps four present thousands I was wondering how if you could expand perhaps on how the perceived threat of NATO expansion and operations in Eastern Europe is not particularly a real threat or that that perceived threat is a flaw in the way that we think about it well as I said in my talk I don't understand why Russia sees those NATO presence in Poland or the Baltics as a threat to Russia because even though as you say it's being stepped up it's not like NATO is going to attack Russia from Poland so I think the answer is is in the realm of identity politics rather than military calculation and on the question of NATO expansion I didn't get into it in detail but I think the expansion to Poland and then later to the Baltics was I think legitimate and that did provide security to those countries and got them out of the grip of the Russians permanently but it was kind of too late for Georgia and Ukraine that they were in my position thank you sir thank you very much over to you please so my question is for Professor Paisana so how would you say we should observe social media's influence on the on the way on the way that affects the Russian propaganda machine in relation to the comparison between President Zelensky and can you hear me we can hear you absolutely we can hear you perfect all right thank you for that question about social media I think that that's this is an incredibly important topic and thank you for raising it I think that one way there's a great deal to observe one of the things that is worth remarking upon with respect to Ukrainian's response to the invasion of their country is that there has been really a proliferation of documentation of the facts on the ground but also continuing satire by Ukrainian people about what is happening right now and so it's possible to observe those comments as it's also possible to be exposed to criminal propaganda now how is it possible to distinguish between the two I think that may have been part of the question the first is to come back to come back to the first question to Dr. Graham is that informing yourself about what the Kremlin's stories are can help you be a smart consumer of online social media information the second part is that interestingly and I think this also speaks to the fact that there is still a great deal of heterogeneity in Russian society the Kremlin's sponsored Misesen Sen the dramatizations that are being promulgated by the Kremlin of soldiers going to liberate Ukrainians from there from supposedly Ukrainian oppression these videos are very poorly produced the acting is not in the best traditions of Russian stage practice and they're actually quite easy to identify because frankly they're so bad so that also tells us something about the enthusiasm of those who are participating in them so those are the two elements I would highlight as we sort of try to make our way through this incredibly complex sea of differing narratives and stories about this work thank you very much so we're about out of time but we would certainly just like to hear your questions so if you could just one at a time just repeat your concise question and then we'll end the session and perhaps you can approach the panel and discuss your question with them so go ahead just reach your question and then we'll just go left and right if Ukraine becomes a NATO power will US send military support to this country to promote democratic influence? Next question please My question was mainly on the renewed sense of Ukrainian identity that has come about because of this award and if that is more of a heated moment kind of agreement or some of the divides that we have kind of perceived in the past that were propagated from kind of like an east-west split are going to research as along as this conflict might drag out in two months or years thank you please My question was just in regards to the policies Putin has instituted in order to make Russia more resistant to sanctions and whether or not you believe these policies namely I believe Fortress Russia if you believe they've been effective and if you expect them to be effective going forward Great thank you My question was about how with Russia's aggression expansion how the US and NATO should should go about dealing with the Arctic Thank you Our final two questions One thing that definitely should not be overlooked is the fact that Russia is a petro state gas and oil make up a large part of it of its exports and the invasion of Crimea in 2014 happened just two years after offshore oil was discovered right off the coast of Crimea and in eastern and western Ukraine Do you think that the discovery of these oil resources and the and the refinery treaties that the Ukrainian government signed with the Shell Corporation contributed to the annexation of Crimea Thank you In our final question for the session please Hello This is a question for the entire panel Why do you think western public opinion and media overemphasized the threat of NATO and the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO to explain why the war began Thank you very much Let's give our panel and our students a round of applause Thank all of you so very much for just advancing our understanding on the conflict and if you could grab a program if you have it the next session is at one o'clock and we look forward to seeing you then thank you for being such a great audience and thank you panelist Dr. Pisano, thank you very much Thank you so much We'll give you some more and some more I know, I'll take it It's for dinner Yeah, it's for lunch For lunch I guess it's provided to us here I'm not used to them Hey, Jesse Jesse It's there Jesse This is my big problem Hey Hey, yeah, you're here to go, okay? Well Yeah, I, yeah, I feel like I thought you made a new between Ukraine and Ukraine So you're really not a sort of narrative in the end of all of this in this day and age You're like No, no, no, we're not affected Yeah Maybe even in 1992 Yeah, not now Not now, no And it hasn't for a long time And I think in 1991 when the whole country were moving Yeah, it was Soviet Union You know when the Soviet Union was going down That's some sort of I'm not sure Please, please, first No, no, no, no, wait Water Well, water No, no, no, I just I just didn't see the zero sugar in the complex That's right I eat them first Did you do the campus tour or No, because I've been here before and I've been to like I know Yeah, no, I just I didn't know if they would have a laptop Maybe I don't read my email enough I'm just like I'm no idea what the set up is going to be tomorrow So I went through my paper and like highlighted Your PowerPoint is ready up there I knew it was going to be Am I going to I don't know I don't know I was going to introduce you guys I don't want people to go down the line So, but was the Central Asia and some presentations I'm going to Okay That's fine Good afternoon It's good to see you all There's nowhere else that I'd rather be right now than listening to this panel of experts talk about a problem that is on all of our minds and it's a great honor and privilege to be here listening to their remarks on Russia and Ukraine My name is Dr. Daniel A. Morris and I'll be the moderator for today It's my job right now and my pleasure to introduce our panel and then after the panel we'll have remarks from our respondent and a time for questions and comments from the audience So I will just begin by introducing the individuals that you see on the stage before you starting here to my immediate left with Dr. Nicholas K. Gvostev Dr. Gvostev is Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval War College and a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute He holds non-residential fellowships with the Carnegie Council for Ethics and International Affairs and he's a member of the Loisach Group which is a collaboration between the Munich Security Conference and the Marshall Center to enhance his security partnership He's a contributing editor for the National Interest and he has taught at Baylor, Georgetown, George Washington Harvard Extension and Brown Universities Next We have Dr. Angela Kaczyewski who is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Arcadia University in suburban Philadelphia Her research falls in the fields of conflict resolution and critical security studies and she focuses on divided societies identity boundaries and Russian speaking minorities in Ukraine the Baltic States and Moldova Next we have Dr. Lasha Chanterise who is a Professor and Director of the Graduate Programs in Diplomacy and International Relations He earned his PhD in International Relations from Queens University of Kingston, Ontario and his research interests are at the University of Tennessee Enforced International Politics and his academic publications are in the areas of Geopolitics, Russian Foreign Policy, Canadian Foreign Policy the Arctic, the Black Sea Basin and International Politics in the Caucasus And finally to introduce our respondent for the afternoon we have Dr. Lisa Chaldeze who has dedicated her work as a lawyer, educator and author and activist to the development of the School of Law as well as the defense of human rights and I'm very eager to hear from all of our presenters and also from our respondent and from you after their presentations have ended so thank you all for coming and I will now turn it over to our first speaker Hello everybody I'm really happy to be here I'm happy to be back at Norwich and delighted to speak with you today My speaker is going to consider this concept of Ukraine as a borderland it's often been considered between East and West and I'm going to present some of my ideas about that I'm going to focus given what's going on with this war and I think most of us are sort of shocked by the scale and the brutality of this conflict that is going on right now a lot has been written about NATO expansion European Union enlargement Ukrainian neutrality I'm not denying at all that these things are important although I don't think that this war is about Ukrainian neutrality or NATO expansion at all and that's something maybe we can discuss later I'm instead going to not deny that those things are important but rather really focus on some of the important identity issues that I think give additional context and perspective as to what's going on I'm going to focus on three main areas very quickly given the constraints of time I'm going to talk a little bit about two core concepts that are within the current Russian national identity building project and that is the concept of the near abroad which is a way to characterize neighboring states and the more recent concept of the Russian world I'm then going to look a little bit at the Eurasian Economic Union project that is led by Russia and the European Union project which obviously is happening in the same space and then finally I'm going to look a little bit at some of the identity dynamics that we have seen particularly since 2014 with the annexation occupation particularly among Russian speaking Ukrainians and I want to say also I think it's a very very important point to underscore when we talk about Russian speaking Ukrainians we're not talking about Russians who happen to be living in Ukraine we're talking about Ukrainians who for various reasons of history have over time Russian has become their native language but they're not Russian and I think that's an important point so let's talk a little bit about how we got from the Soviet Union to the so called Russian world the Soviet Union as Putin has sort of described as this enormous geopolitical catastrophe and tragedy for Russia was actually led by Russia and some of the other states so Boris Yeltsin as president of the Russian Federation together with the presidents of Belarus and Ukraine met together and dissolved the Soviet Union as a way to try to free up their republics to pursue the kinds of reforms that they wanted to pursue and that they felt that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was holding them back for however the CIS, the Commonwealth of Independent States which they created to sort of replace the Soviet Union was really under specified, very vague when it was agreed to as to how actually all of these things would operate in principle but really in detail practice and so pretty close after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 it became pretty clear that there would be really serious consequences for Russia for a number of reasons, strategic reasons, you've got bases that are now located in different states and you've got different borders you have all kinds of things that are happening and so for this reason I think it's not really surprising that Russia has defined the former Soviet republics as part of their special sphere of influence and there's a good amount of evidence sort of assumed or had a vision that the Commonwealth of Independent States would operate pretty much the same as the Soviet Union, they would just get rid of Communism but that the Commonwealth would be strong, there would be a common market, a common currency, sort of unified military structure but none of the other republics of the Soviet Union were interested in that and so the CIS being under specified just never fulfilled that role so Russia in response has tried to create sort of this sphere of influence within the neighboring states and initially this wasn't such a big problem because Boris Yeltsin did respect the independence of neighboring states and followed a fairly liberal sort of rules based foreign policy but for a number of reasons including perceived discrimination of Russian speakers abroad particularly in the Baltic states perceived sort of dismissal of Russia's national insecurity interest by the west, concerns about Russia being shut out of some kind of a European integration project, put a lot of pressure on Russia to turn to a more kind of nationalist oriented foreign policy and as the economic situation grew worse and the influence of the sort of liberal western oriented economist diminished this pressure to kind of have a more strong focus on Russia's national interest emerged. Therein we get this term called the near abroad which emerged in mainstream discourse in 1993 when then foreign minister Andrey Kozarev laid out the tenets for a new Russian foreign policy concept and the term in Russian has at least to my ear has a sort of a connotation where the word for near kind of connotates a feeling of closeness that in turn gives this sort of distinction between territory that is abroad out there that's a really truly sovereign state and these states that are kind of near us and they aren't therefore fully sovereign. So to be kind of the close abroad means well you're technically kind of a sovereign state but not really right. This is how at least it appears to my ear. So Russian policy has been to sort of assert a special role in this area has sort of asserted the right and the responsibility to exert special influence in these territories and in fact Russian policy has articulated the concept of compatriots as a category of noncitizens living outside of Russia who nonetheless go do under a certain extent fall under Russian responsibility and this is written into Russian law where they assert a special responsibility for these compatriots who are not living in Russian or not Russian citizens. So even though this compatriot status may not be recognized and frankly isn't recognized by other states and is therefore pretty symbolic it's pretty clear that this gives Russia a formal and systematic way to assert and potentially as we see now exert influence beyond its geographic boundaries. The compatriot policy also exists within this context of the Russian world. The Russian world concept which posits Russia as a distinct civilization that transcends Russia's territorial borders. This Russian world asserts that Russian civilization is a naturally existing civilizational community. So Russia is not just Russian culture Russian national identity is not part of European culture it is a naturally separately existing civilizational identity. And it emphasizes the cultural basis of identity which is rooted in Russian language and a shared Orthodox Christian faith. The civilization shares a common past and is currently according to Putin who's been quite explicit about this wrongfully and even perversely divided into separate states which he says has resulted in the greatest divided nation on earth. So in this context Ukraine and Belarus are seen not only as members of Russia's natural zone of special influence but actually as integral pieces and integral parts of the Russian world based upon eastern Slavic civilization and they are not separate nations so let's talk about that in a bit. So this kind of view at this natural special role for Russia is obviously not shared by all states and certainly not by Ukraine who has very consistently been very steadfast regardless of which political party is in power about Ukrainian sovereignty and independence. So let's talk a little bit about the European and Russian projects within this kind of what you might think of as the shared neighborhood. Russia and EU and again I'm focusing on identity issues today this isn't to ignore or discount the other material interest in economic integration I'm going to focus on the identity issues. Russia and the EU have each asserted and defined a special role for themselves in this region that goes beyond their boundaries that is based upon both economic interests and shared cultural values okay so they're both doing sort of the same thing I'm not equating between the two projects obviously but they're motivated by some of the same narratives. Each of these imagines a sort of normative cultural space that unifies populations beyond geographic borders and an economic zone that benefits from deeper economic integration. We have the European neighborhood policy which was brought into place in 2004 because of an expansion of the European Union that required the European Union to start to think about making a formal relationship with states that now became on actual EU borders and the idea behind the European or the European neighborhood policy was to include states from the former Soviet Union and also countries along the Mediterranean basis in a regional engagement and cooperation policy. In 2009 an actual specific policy called the Eastern partnership was brought into place that had even more formal relations with the Eastern European states and were based upon three different objectives. First was to accelerate political association to create more formal and strong political relations. Second was to further economic integration through association memberships and other economic agreements. And third for providing for citizen mobility. This would be in visa free regimes and work permits. And again an idea of creating greater contact between those areas. And I'm sorry I went ahead too fast but that's okay we'll come back to this. The goal of this project was to build greater prosperity through interdependence and the creation of a free trade zone that requires Eastern European participating states to meet EU standards for business, finance, banking and trade. And the idea was that strengthening governance and increasing prosperity in the neighborhood and deepening regional integration would lead to greater stability and prosperity in the region. The problem that we have however is that this comes into conflict with Putin's plans for economic integration in the same exact neighborhood. Given that signing an association agreement with the European Union would preclude membership in the Eurasian Economic Union. And even if this was not the intention of the European Union this was indeed seen by Moscow as a direct effort to try to isolate Russia from its neighbors. Okay, gotta go fast. So we're gonna go beyond European Union and I'll just jump in to talk a little bit about some of the identity issues. We have a lot of discussion about a so-called two Ukraine's narrative where the eastern part of Ukraine is Russian speaking and sort of geopolitically oriented towards Russia. The western part of Ukraine is Ukrainian speaking and sort of geopolitically oriented towards the west. And there are a lot of reasons why this narrative may or may not have been a fruitful or valid way of thinking about Ukraine in the past. But certainly since independence we've seen a very clear movement towards a civic model of national identity and not an ethnic model of national identity. We do have a little bit of a challenge because on the one hand Ukraine has very clearly articulated a national polity that is multi-lingual and multi-ethnic and cultural. It's civic in nature, right? It's inclusive. But on the other hand the nation building project has been based upon promoting the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian culture. So we've got these two things happening at the same time. So we have seen some divisions since independence. But what we have seen since 2014 with the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbass is an increasing identity that is civic in nature based upon understanding Ukraine as a native language and identifying Ukraine as the homeland and accepting Ukrainian language as the mother tongue even if you don't speak the language. And this is a really important point. People will say Ukraine is my native language whether or not they can speak Ukrainian.  So I'm just going to make three quick observations because it's a bit too early within this war. I'd like to think that the war will be over tomorrow and we can start to draw conclusions. But for now I'd like to make three observations to toss out and maybe there might be an interest in some discussion. The first is that I think that what we see with the incredible resistance that is happening in Ukraine today where Russian speaking cities are being targeted ruthlessly. Kharkiv is a Russian speaking city. Mariupol is a Russian speaking city. Hevson is a Russian speaking city. And they are resisting and they are saying we are Ukrainian. So I think what we can see is that this whole Russian world concept is a complete and abject failure first in soft power and now in hard power because they are not winning the war. And I also observed that the two Ukraine's concept if it ever had any validity is completely dead because obviously we are all one Ukraine. And I suppose that I think we can stop thinking about Ukraine as a borderland. If it ever was one it certainly is not one any longer. So with that I will finish. Thank you. So I'm speaking to you on the lessons that can be learned from Russia's intervention in Syria. No, no PowerPoint. So I can go ahead and blank that one. There we are. Let me first offer the observation that this would be a different presentation or the presentation would be received differently if this was being presented to you prior to February 24th. And so I would echo the caution of Center for Naval Analysis expert Michael Kaufman who says prior to February 24th we had a tendency to really overrate and over exaggerate the Russian military to say that they were 12 feet tall. And now because of the first three weeks of the campaign in Ukraine he says we have a tendency now to go into an opposite direction which is equally unhelpful, which is to think of the Russians as two feet tall. And one of the questions that may come out in our discussion is why some of the lessons that the Russians demonstrated in Syria they did not apply in Ukraine. And is that a policy failure, an intelligence failure? Is this just simply the bureaucratic reaction of most of the Russian military establishment that kind of pushed back against some of the innovative techniques that were being used in Syria and said we don't want to apply them anywhere else I think is something that we're still waiting to get more information on. I'd like to offer what I would call a triple disclaimer in making my remarks. And the first of course since my day job is to work for the U.S. Naval War College I am presenting here in a personal capacity. I'm not speaking in any way on behalf of the U.S. Navy representing a U.S. government position or even for that matter relying on any U.S. government resources for my conclusions. Everything is based upon my own open source analysis. The second disclaimer is when you present on a topic like this and you say the lessons of Syria I'm doing this as an analyst. We have a tendency now in the academic and scholarly worlds to confuse analysis and advocacy or to confuse analysis with approval. That is to say if there are lessons to be learned from Syria then therefore you must be saying well what the Russians did is good or we should be you're advocating for it and instead I simply want to look back, look at what the Russians have been doing since they intervened in Syria in 2015 as a basis for us to understand both is there a new paradigm for Russian intervention are there lessons that the U.S. and allied militaries can learn in some cases we cannot apply those lessons because of our own rules of engagement and traditions of war fighting but there may be lessons that may be applicable to us and the final disclaimer is in presenting this kind of 30 or 60,000 foot view we can lose sight of the fact that in the end we're talking about human beings whether in Syria or in Ukraine particularly who are on the receiving end of violence and so again when we speak very analytically about it we don't want to lose sight of the fact that at the end of the day this affe