relationship between foreign aid and democracy in sub-Saharan Africa. And so the project is basically designed with a global group of researchers. We had about 10 researchers from Europe, Africa, and North America working on the research. And these are typically scholars who have both a background on the countries that they worked on as well as on the issues of foreign aid. And the main aim of our research was to understand, well, generally how does aid impact democratic trajectories in sub-Saharan Africa? And then more specifically, in what way does aid, you know, in the absence of aid would we see worse democratic outcomes? So what aspects of aid are absolutely fundamental to some of the trajectories that we've seen? So on the other hand, what aspects of aid, including modalities of implementation, actually exacerbate certain weaknesses that we see in sub-Saharan Africa. So our reason for focusing on Africa was twofold. One reason is because even though Africa is a really dynamic region, it's attracting a lot of foreign direct investment, we're seeing a growth of a middle class, it's still the most aid-dependent region of the world. So it still receives four times as much foreign aid as a share of gross national income as the next most dependent region, which is the Middle East and North Africa. And then the second reason is because a lot of democracies in Africa are still very fragile. So if we're talking about electoral democracies in particular, we saw a number of countries in the 1990s in sub-Saharan Africa transition from one party to multi-party regimes and become what are considered electoral democracies. So these are countries that have regular, generally free and fair elections that the opposition has a relatively equal playing field. And unfortunately, since that transition in the 1990s, we've seen 13 countries actually backslide and go back to one party regimes. So we only have, you know, about 10 or 12 countries in Africa that are considered electoral democracies, at least by Freedom House. Some other weaknesses that we see throughout the region are incumbent dominance. So institutions like legislatures and judiciaries don't play a large check, don't have a large check on what the activities of the executive branch. We also see entrenched incumbent advantage. So in Africa, incumbents win reelection by 85 percent of the time. This is much higher than in other developing regions. So this means that opposition parties have a really difficult time getting onto the national political arena. So we're seeing this combination of both high-aid dependence and still very fragile democratization. And so we wanted to understand what is in a relationship between the two. The interest in democracy came from the fact, from a first and normative perspective, that we think that following Amartya Sen's view that exclusion from one's political sphere and from political participation is equivalent to a human deprivation in the economic realm. So being able to participate in the political sphere is very important from a normative perspective. Then from an instrumental perspective, democracy might actually be a means to greater development ends. So there's a large body of scholarship that shows that democracies are at least more interested in providing goods and services for their citizens than autocracies. So they at least spend more on things such as education, health, and social welfare, even if the outcomes are not as good as maybe in some autocratic regimes. Then thirdly, from a policy perspective, this is really an important issue on the donor agenda. So we're seeing a lot of donors now say that along with everything else, promoting human rights and democracy and good governance are really an important part of their efforts and most of these bilateral agencies have democracy and governance units. And so we wanted to know in what way have they actually done this in their efforts and what types of trade-offs or contradictions might have existed between their democracy and governance work and other type of development interventions that they have. And then fourthly, from more of a research perspective, many of the existing works on aid and democracy have had a lot of mixed findings. This is typically because a lot of the work is cross-country econometrics, so it provides a broad perspective and generalizable findings. But the problem is they often use very different time periods that are often data-driven and often a theoretical. So there's no real reason for why you look at 1971 to 1990 or 1980 to 2000. And they often incorporate very disparate countries into their country samples, so countries that are at very different levels of democratization. And so we wouldn't expect aid to have the same effect across these countries given that they are experiencing different trajectories. And they also tend to aggregate all foreign aid together. So increasingly there have been some studies just focusing on democracy assistance and the impact on democracy, but a lot of them have tended to just look at foreign aid overall. When we know that the foreign aid community is very diverse, that practitioners within the community have very different objectives and modalities for delivering aid. So in terms of being useful for policy makers, aggregating all foreign aid together is not particularly useful. And finally, when they're looking at the impact on democracy, they never really clear on what they mean by that. So some studies do say they're looking at the transition from autocratic to democratic regimes, but a lot of them are just looking at the impact on aggregate outcome indicators like a freedom house indicator or a polity for index on political regimes. So democracy is not very well conceptualized and operationalized. And then on the other hand, away from the cross-country studies you have really interesting in-depth case studies, but they're sometimes very selectively chosen. And so people will talk about Ethiopia and then the negative impacts aid has had on Ethiopia, which gives very good kind of causal process tracing mechanisms. But the downside is that we can't really draw general conclusions given some of the unique factors of the Ethiopian regime, for example. So this project was very much aimed at trying to reconcile some of those existing research gaps. And we did that by using mixed methods, so combining the strengths of these two approaches. So we had first a cross-country analysis across all Sub-Saharan countries, looking at important indicators of democratic transitions and consolidation. So looking at, you know, did aid increase the propensity to transition from a one-party to a multi-party regime? What is the relationship with incumbent turnovers? Relationship with a number of times incumbents have tried to change the constitution. Relationship between whether elections are deemed free and fair. So a number of different, more disaggregated outcome variables besides just democracy. And then we combined that with a number of country case studies. So we had seven country case studies. These are all countries that are considered electoral democracies. But there is still some variation amongst them. So we were looking at Benin, Ghana, Mali, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Malawi. But as I mentioned, there is variation amongst them. So Ghana, Zambia, and Benin are seen as being more robust electoral democracies, particularly in Zambia and Ghana, we've seen the ousting of the incumbent a number of times. So we've seen at least two turnovers of political parties, which some see as a major sign of consolidation. Then we have two very fragile democracies, at least at the time of doing the research. So certainly Mali, which has experienced a coup in the last year, as well as Malawi, which is in kind of a fragile transition period after the death of the president earlier this year. And then we have Mozambique and Tanzania, which are considered dominant party regimes. In both countries, the ruling party has been in office since those countries became democratic regimes. So we haven't seen the type of turnover that we've seen in our Ganas or Zambia. Dividing foreign assistance into both democracy aid and development aid. So trying to get at least one of these research gaps that I noted earlier from the other cross-country studies. So when we're talking about development aid, we're talking more about aid that's intended to promote growth, reduce poverty and inequality, promote broader social welfare. So aid that goes mostly for agriculture, education, health, transport, and other types of infrastructure. When we're talking about democracy assistance, we mean aid that's going more to support actors and institutions that are trying to promote greater political liberalization in their policies. So supporting elections, parliaments, civil society, things of that nature. And then the other innovation of this research is also trying to take a more sophisticated approach to what we mean by democracy, which is the second research gap I was noting earlier. And so here we've looked at both transitions to democracy, as well as democratic consolidation. And when we're talking about consolidation, we're seeing it as a spectrum with both what can be considered positive and negative polls or endpoints. So on the negative side, we see consolidation as you're trying to avoid something. At the most extreme, you're trying to avoid a transition back to authoritarian regimes or back to a cessation of elections. Just next to that in kind of a middle ground is you're avoiding erosion. So these are conditions where you have, you continue to have elections, but they're not necessarily free and fair. Potential civil liberties of certain minority groups are infringed upon. Potentially the government has tried to change the constitution or has imposed restrictions on other important institutions. And then on the positive side, you're trying to deepen democracy and promote certain elements that we think are important for greater consolidation. So in this regard, we look specifically at strengthening vertical accountability. And these are relationships of responsibility between elected officials and citizens. And there's various mechanisms that citizens can use to try to keep elected officials accountable, one of which is elections, another is using the media, another is working with civil society groups to put pressure and enhance transparency of elected officials. And then we also looked at strengthening horizontal accountability. So these are relationships of responsibility across various government institutions. So looking at the role of parliament, judiciaries, anti-corruption commissions, et cetera, and their ability to keep a check on each other and on the executive. So in designing the project, we were trying to do mixed methods, the cross-country and the in-depth case studies. We were trying to have a more disaggregated approach to foreign aid, the division between development and democracy assistance, which is, of course, could be much more nuanced and detailed, but for the sake of then having generalizable findings, we found it was really important to at least have that distinction. And then finally, having a more sophisticated approach to democracy, so looking at both transitions and then various aspects of the consolidation process. Did find some interesting differences between these two types of aid regarding transitions. And in particular, a lot of the differences for both transitions and consolidation is driven by the fact that these two types of aid very much see democracy in a different light and have different tools for influencing democracy. So development aid tends to see democratization as potentially being a long-term process that comes about through promoting greater social and economic well-being, perhaps the growth of an educated middle class that might have more cosmopolitan worldviews that enhance democratization, while democracy is more interested in short-term actors and institutions and their role in promoting liberalization. They also, importantly, have very different relationships with the government. So often the development aid community sees the government as being a critical partner in their interventions, and we hear this a lot in discourse about partnership and ownership. The democracy assistance community sometimes can see the government as being a hindrance to their activities, particularly if the government doesn't want them working with the opposition or civil society groups, for example. And then very importantly, they have different areas of leverage on governments. So development aid tends to have much greater leverage because it just tends to be a larger resource. So democracy aid tends to only be about, well, in Africa, as of 2011, it was 8% of total overseas development assistance. So it has been going up over time in Africa, and Africa is the biggest recipient of democracy assistance, but as a share of total ODA, it's still a very small share of total ODA. And so because of that, democracy assistance doesn't have much leverage over governments. They're not too upset if they lose support for civil society groups, for example. But development aid does tend to play a very big role in a lot of these countries' economies, and there is much more concern about losing those resources. The development aid community can also use two important mechanisms, one of which is coercion through conditionalities or threatening to withdraw aid. And then the other side is using incentives. So if governments meet certain targets, then they might get additional tranches of funding in the next year or the next funding cycle. And increasingly, as more donors are using general budget support, which is when foreign aid is typically not earmarked. Instead, it goes to support the Ministry of Finance and the activities that the government has delineated in its national development plan. And so many African governments prefer general budget support, gives them some freedom over how they're going to use the money. But the flip side of that is that it means that donors threaten to withhold budget support that has even greater influence than if they're just threatening to withhold project support to a specific sector of the economy. So because these two types of aid have different types of leverage, they then have different indirect impacts on the transition process and then by continuation on the consolidation process. So in terms of transitions, development aid plays a much more direct impact. What we've seen during the 1990s, but even what we're seeing more recently in regimes such as Uganda or Rwanda, is that development aid, because they're using that mechanism of coercion, in particular, has been able to influence governments to engage in some reforms. So they can do this directly by specifically saying, you know, unless you're going to allow multi-party elections or cease human rights abuses, we're going to stop aid. So a critical example of this was in Malawi in 1993, 1992, 1993, when there were a lot of human rights abuses under the dictator then, Hastings Banda, and they reached a culmination at least for the donors in 1992. And all the donors said they were going to cease all non-humanitarian aid until the government held a referendum on holding multi-party elections. And because there was a food crisis at the time, because there was a lot of protest and domestic discontent, Banda, Hastings Banda did hold the referendum and then subsequently held the first multi-party elections the following year in 1994. Kenya is often seen as another example where the donors were able to have that influence on Daniel Erepoit. The economic conditionality is that then provoke economic discontent that filters into demands for political reform. And so we've seen this in Benin or in Zambia in the early 1990s where structural adjustment and economic austerity provoked a lot of the trade unions and civil society groups out into the streets. And they often tied their economic demands to political demands as well for greater multi-party democracy. You know, once the government, for example, like Malawi, decides to hold elections, then the democracy aid community plays a really big role in funding those first elections and making sure that they happen successfully and that we don't have a democratic breakdown and go back to a one-party regime. And this is particularly important in post-conflict situations as well when you're trying to make that transition. Those first elections, such as in Mozambique as well as another good example after the end of the Civil War, holding those first elections is really important. So you need the donors to be able to fund, which is typically very expensive undertaking, to register everyone, create a voter's role in the first place, get an electoral commission up and running. So democracy plays a role in the transition, but it's kind of after the fact. It's after the government has decided to allow those to occur. We again see very different impacts as a result of these two types of aid. So democracy aid tends to play a much more direct role on the positive poll of consolidation that I was talking about. So on these issues of strengthening horizontal and vertical accountability. And it does this because it's specifically often targeting those mechanisms. So for example, as I was just alluding to, electoral assistance is a really important important aspect of democracy assistance. Many countries could not have held and still cannot hold relatively free and fair elections without the help of the donor community in some way. Donor community is really important, as I said, for helping to update voter registers, sometimes even doing an audit of the electoral register, which donors did in Senegal in 2011, seeing what problems exist, engaging in civic and voter education programs, and basically training electoral commissions on how to roll out an election, how to monitor the elections. So we found in a number of our case study countries that democracy assistance has been really key for elections, which are an important mechanism of vertical accountability. The downside is that they tend to be very much focused on the electoral period, seeing donors come in maybe a year or 18 months before the election. And so elections are seen as an event, not really as a process. And this can often inhibit long-term sustainable capacity training, particularly for electoral commissions. So often, not all countries, but many often just have an electoral register that's open right before the election. They don't have a continuous registration process because maybe the electoral commission doesn't have the capacity to do that. And so there's a high level of administrative burden right before the elections, which could have been more smoothed over the time period between elections and ensuring that people know about the electoral process that no one's excluded because of logistical or administrative constraints. In terms of other aspects of vertical accountability, democracy assistance has been really critical for a number of civil society groups and for media organizations that couldn't find resources elsewhere for their activities. The media in particular being able to, you know, just have, being able to afford newspaper, ink, or radio transmitters, just kind of basic expenses that otherwise there wouldn't be the resources for. The downside, again, has been sometimes civil society groups, strictly NGOs or sometimes competing with each other for donor assistance. So instead of maybe coming together and speaking with one voice on particular issues that they're all interested in, can be more of a combative atmosphere for that. And also democracy assistance can't really target the broader legal environment in which some of these groups are operating. And so if there are infringements on media freedom as particularly the independent press, media organizations might not know how to react to that or how to fight against that because they've been getting more assistance in terms of financial assistance from the donor community, not really kind of legal training. Another mechanism of vertical accountability is political parties. Political parties are really critical for aggregating citizen interest and communicating them into the political sphere. And as I mentioned earlier, particularly opposition parties in Africa have been relatively weak because of both financial and strategic limitations. And so party aid does certainly fall under the democracy assistance area. But the problem is that it's a very small area for most democracy aid donors. Civil society tends to dominate most of the assistance that democracy aid community gives, even though political parties could really benefit from having more support from the democracy aid community. And one of the key reasons given for why it's not a very popular area for donors is because it is seen as being more political. It might be seen by the government as supporting opposition parties or giving them an unfair advantage. But from our research, we found that there's some really important critical but technical areas of intervention that the democracy aid donors could be focusing more on. I mean, one is just helping political parties, both opposition and incumbent, better understand what a manifesto actually is, what it entails. Secondly is helping them considering mechanisms for internal democracy, so promotion of the rank and file within political parties so that they're not consistently revolving around just one particular leader or person who leads the party. Because often we see in many countries if there's a debate within the party, members leave and create a new party and creates this party proliferation, which isn't so good for creating party voter affinities over time. And often this is because there aren't very clear mechanisms for advancement within political parties. And donors can also help with just teaching about campaign finance, how to broaden political parties, ability to gain finances so that they're not, again, just dependent on the party leader or particular private sector interest to support the party. So what ways in relatively poor countries can political parties try to start getting membership fees and campaign finance fees that creates more of an affinity between party members and voters. We did find in our research that development aid also has an impact on vertical accountability, but it's much more indirect and not often intended by the donors. So I'll just give one example with regards to political parties. And this is the fact that in a number of our countries we find that the development aid community inadvertently reinforces incumbent advantage because they allow presidents to take credit for development projects, for example. So for example in Malawi again, the donors were partially involved in directly funding the fertilizer input subsidy program from not during the first year of the program but subsequently. And then they were continuing to fund the program through general budget support as well. And right before the 2009 elections in Malawi saw a huge spike in spending for this program, about $228 million just under the government spending on that. And the minister of finance has clearly said that at least two-thirds of that $228 million came from general budget support. And as a result of those elections, the president at the time, Bingu Matarica, he won overwhelmingly, got about 66 percent of the votes. It was the first time in Malawi you didn't see ethno-regional voting patterns because his fertilizer subsidy program was popular across the country, particularly it's a very rural country. And so it was highly popular and the increase in spending right before elections certainly helped his chances in winning those elections. And so it's just a small example of, of course, the donors were just supporting a program in the country's national development plan, but it very much reinforced the incumbents' advantage in office. We've seen other issues like this such as malaria medicines being dispersed right before elections in Vietnam. And you can often see many other examples going into our country case studies, but in other African democracies where a president might be pictured on a billboard showcasing a new road or a new well that the donors most likely finance. Again, here we see democracy aid has more of a direct impact, development aid having a more inadvertent impact. So democracy aid has been really important for a number of parliamentary strengthening activities, has been involved in anti-corruption commissions and judiciaries, also police and military training, but mostly on parliaments, that's where a lot of assistance has been focused in the area of horizontal accountability. So these might be training workshops for parliamentarians, it might be helping to finance a library or for them to have resources to go to at the time of budget discussions. The problem is that a lot of these interventions are not very well coordinated, so you can have different donors coming in at different times, you know, each having a five-year cycle program where they're going to work with different MPs. They might choose different approaches, so USAID and Malawi, for example, likes to work with individual committees, DFID might instead have three-week training courses for all MPs. So they're using different techniques, of course they're also hindered by turnover within parliament as well, but it's symbolic of a larger problem within the democracy aid community, which is not so problematic in the development aid community, which is that there tends to be more fragmentation and less coordination than the democracy aid community. The development aid community has some indirect effects, as I mentioned, on horizontal accountability, particularly with regards to parliament. And this is particularly through general budget support, was found across all of our country case studies to actually further sideline parliaments. So even as you have a democracy aid community trying to strengthen parliaments and get them involved in budget discussions, general budget support, because it's focused more on executive decisions in particular the Ministry of Finance, doesn't allow that same type of engagement with parliamentarians. A lot of them learn what donors are doing at the time of budget approval, and at that time they're often not given enough time to actually scrutinize the budget and see exactly what donors are doing. General budget support is also seen as a grant rather than a loan, so typically parliaments don't need to approve grants. This varies across countries, but a number of the cases we looked at, the parliaments were only required to approve loans, so they're often not aware of actually what the donors are doing in their countries. And that's a broader issue of potentially lack of communication between the donors and MPs, not having maybe dissemination activities that informs MPs about what they're doing. Here knows where we see the development aid community having more direct impact, and this is again because of this coercive mechanism. So if we're thinking about human rights abuses or changing constitutions, this is where donors can come in and either threaten or actually withdraw budget support in particular to get governments to change their reactions. We've seen this a lot recently with Diffred and USA talking about potentially withholding aid to countries that don't support, at least withholding aid to countries that are in prison or criminalized homosexuality. It's a very controversial mechanism, but it's been something that these two donors have at least considered recently. That's a big step forward because when we're looking in our case studies, most of the time, despite having this rhetoric about promoting good governance and human rights, has actually been issues around corruption or macroeconomic stability where the development aid community will be most influenced to act and to act in a concerted manner. So in Malawi in 2011, we're starting to see a large deterioration in civil liberties, further criminalization of homosexuality, repression of the independent consideration of greater repression of the independent press, an injunctions bill was tabled whereby people were not allowed to sue the government. And at the time, we were only seeing Germany, it was one of the first to react, saying it was going to withhold half of its budget support and we didn't really see the government reacting in any way. And it wasn't really until late 2011 where the government was still very intransigent about devaluing them allowing quacha, which had been a real big concern of the IMF, where we saw large-scale reaction by the donor community. The IMF halted its support and as a result, all the budget support donors had to follow suit and halt their support. And one of the reasons for this is when you look at countries performance assessment indicators or the indicators in their performance assessment frameworks, which details their disbursement criteria for budget support, they rarely have specific criteria on human rights and democracy. So it might be part of their memorandum of understanding with the government and their partnership principles, but when you look at the actual disbursement criteria, they'll be very erratic on human rights. In Malawi, for example, they focus on domestic violence towards women, that's their human rights criteria. And that's just by a few of the donors, that's not by all of them. And often when you look across the budget support donors, the one thing that they will agree on these macroeconomic and corruption indicators. So that gives them a platform for more concerted action in that domain. There are some really important complementarities between development and democracy aid, but that there are also some key tradeoffs. So I alluded to some where democracy aid is trying to strengthen, a little bit trying to strengthen political parties and elections where development aid might actually be reinforcing incumbent advantages, where democracy aid is trying to strengthen parliaments, development aid might actually be sidelining parliaments. So there's important tradeoffs between these two types of aid. That I think the research really highlights better than other research on aid and democracy, because by looking at these two together and their interaction, it's more useful for practitioners, specifically since democracy and aid units can't work in isolation of their colleagues in health and education and agriculture units. They should be working together and thinking about ways in which they're at least not undermining each other's initiatives. And you really, even if you're just looking at the impact of democracy aid alone, you're really not getting to see some of these interactive effects that come across in our research. And I think, secondly, the research really highlights that foreign aid is political, does have political consequences, even if it's not always intended to. So I mean, there have been some scholars, including Paul Huyer, who said that donors should not get involved in governance issues and in politics. But based on our research, it's pretty clear that it's really hard to divorce foreign aid from what's going on in the domestic political sphere. And so even though domestic actors will always be much more important in the democratization process, we do show that external actors play a really important role, both directly and indirectly, particularly in such an independent region of the world.


What's up guys Michael here with Jaspies and in this video. We're gonna be doing 2022 23 hip-rate basketball sapphire PSA 10 edition series 3 10 box case break number one. It is a random team Each box will contain one PSA 10 car autos non-auto But I do have all the names people in the fillers and Main spots or straight-up spots and all the teams in a list So we're just gonna roll the dice see who gets which teams three and the one four times one two three and four Four times there. Let's just check that. Yep Okay, so we got Eugene Down Trying time, I don't know I'm gonna try but again four times for the teams one two three four We've got the calves down to the sixers Stop All right, so we got Eugene with the calves will with the Hawks Kim with the pistons out with the Blazers CJ with the Pacers and magic and next Adam with the Grizzlies Alan with the Rockets Steven with the Clippers Peter with the Jazz Steve with the Bulls CJ with the Warriors Michael with the Pelicans Adam with the Timberwolves Hans with the Hornets Eugene with the Wizards will with the Mavericks CJ with the Suns Michael with the Celtics Alan with the Bucks and Kings CJ with last spot mojo has the Thunder Stephen with the Heat Alan with the Nets Time with the Raptors Hans with the Lakers Oliver with the Spurs CJ with the Nuggets and Hyme with the Sixers so We've got see bring me get a little That should be perfect. All right. We've got all Names teams randomized the trade window is open I'm gonna pause the video and when I come back. We'll see if there's any trades if not Just get into ripping cool trade window open All right, so there was no trade chatter just alphabetized it right now and it's printing Should be at least maybe it's not printing The printer needs your attention. I oh, there's no paper. I do not need my attention any longer. So this side of the way Switch the view here. Okay Here is the official list And if you got mosaic 64 that just means you got your spot in that filler Let's just rip the case. So it's my first time doing a case break of hip braid So that's fun It's a pretty good one to To get to do I think I'm getting good at this so I'm actually I'm gonna pull up just a little Kind of sell sheet whatever the picture is on our website just to see What uh What some of the sell sheet hits are anyway, this is it first box Good luck everybody should be one PSA 10 first hit 2019-2020 panini select Nicola Jokic. That's a gold wave. That's from a team all those are shorter printed PSA 10 going to Denver CJ with one of his filler spots there Nice start 19 Not bad 2019 2020 panini Donner's optic Jordan pulls signature series. That's a rookie auto PSA 10 Not numbered but Might be a good time to buy Jordan pool. He's down a little bit Might have a bigger role in Washington. You never know That's going to golden state though That is CJ again with a straight-up spot that's number three 2014 Wow, that's pretty sweet 2014 15 panini select Kobe Bryant silver prism PSA 10 These actually sell for more than you might think That's a nice it going to the Lakers Pons Nice hit there Very beautiful card box number four 2019 panini Don Russ optic demulered my house orange out of first on print out of 39 Nice little card there PSA 10 always helps that's going to Portland Which is Allen with his filler spot box number five and halfway point of this case 2020 panini oh nice quite Leonard on the horizon PSA 10 these are out of case hits Or from from some whatever pecs He's come out of I know these are not easy to hit that's going to the Clippers Steven with his filler spot. These are actually pretty sweet. They're kind of like the downtown's It's dope right now we are Past the halfway point now on to box six trash cans being a little full here 2021 Don Russ elite Kyrie Irving Clarity one-of-one It's a Kyrie one-of-one Insert from Don Russ elite PSA 10 Can't go wrong with the one-of-one. That's going to Brooklyn Allen nice one there Number seven 2006 FLIRT EX Michael Jordan PSA 10 That's sweet Going to Chicago Steve Getting himself a PSA 10 MJ. We got box 99 out of 100 Box number eight in the case. Let's see Has to offer 2019 panini prism Tyler hero rookie penmanship silver prism. That's a PSA 10 And that's from Miami That is a rookie auto Miami is Steven with his filler spot and I said there two boxes left See if we can get one of those Cell sheet hits pretty awesome Destroyed the hip There you go 2021 22 panini prism Kate Cunningham sensational signatures. That's just the base But dual graded PSA 10 10 Auto got a 10 as well Detroit hopefully he has a Nice comeback this season that is going to Kim With the mosaic 64 filler spot and the last box of the case Thank you once again to everybody who got in bought a straight-up spot got into the fillers Of course these breaks don't happen without any Of those whether it was straight up or filler. We appreciate all of you the last card of The break here 2016 panini studio Devon Booker that's a cell sheet and that is How you end a break right there Devon Booker downtown PSA 10 from Panini studio. This is either First year or second year downtown But that is a Massive card that is one of the cell sheets. See you right there on the list It's going to Phoenix CJ CJ Little recap because that was Probably one of the most fun Case breaks. I've had I was sick. Of course the D book Cade rookie auto 10 10 Tyler hero silver rookie auto 10 Got a Jordan 10 Kyrie Irving one-of-one 10 Kauai Leonard on the horizon 10 Day my house orange 10 Koby silver from select 10 Jordan pool optic rookie auto 10 and a Yelkic gold wave from select PSA 10 awesome That was a fun break. Thank you once again To everybody who got into this break That was a lot of fun All right, guys Joe will be taking over here in a few minutes. I'm gonna clean up pack up Well, not really just organize for him But thank you guys for a fun Monday morning and afternoon, but I'll see you guys soon. Bye guys


Gunmen, suspected to be bandits, have again kidnapped no fewer than 13 persons in Nguyen Gimbiya community of Sabo in Chikun Loko government area of Kaduna state. The incident happened late Wednesday night at about 11pm. Sources have it that about 6 persons, including a landlord and his tenants, were kidnapped from one house. This attack comes barely 48 hours after the abduction of the Bethel Baptist High School students in Maraban Ridu in Chikun Loko government area on Monday morning. Youths in their large numbers have taken to the major towns of Sabon Tashak chair area of the state in protest over the attacks on Thursday morning. We will also bring you further details in subsequent bulletins.


okay so substituting into the equation for xb we get and we find c equals gamma three quarters of the way there the next one's a little bit trickier so if we make the substitution we get this and dividing all sides by delta ta we get or rather e is minus one over v one on gamma minus gamma and then this is where the hint's coming so for one on gamma minus gamma we just write the second term as a fraction for one minus gamma squared we have we recognize that this is equal to okay so substituting these values into our expression for e we find e is equal to v on c squared gamma so now we have our Lorentz transformations


Breaking bad. Oh Yeah, Hank Hank and Marie. I would have been much more like Hank and Marie saying the kids are coming with us Yeah, you know, sorry you guys are dysfunctional the kids are staying with us.  Skyler Skyler.  Don't watch Breaking Bad. You follow us on Instagram, Twitter, and Instagram It's juicy content. It's so juicy. Twitter account. Breaking Bad is a juicy content. That's true. It's a great show. Ah, yes it is. Except for one episode. Ah, today a new trailer dropped. I'm gonna love it. A new trailer. Mmm. I'm expecting it to be a quiet test. It's called Trance. Cool. Yes, but it is starring, um, say the same. Oh, you said Trance. Oh, Fahad Fasil. Yes. Yes, the crazy guy from Gumball AG Knights. Yes, and also from Super Deluxe, right? Yes. That's a shapeshifter. Yes. And apparently, I don't know if he's the biggest, but I know he's a huge Malolium actor. Yes. Uh, you don't have to let us know like a, like, what, is he the biggest? Is he like the SRK of Malolium? Uh, or the big B, even though he's not nearly the right age. Uh, but hold on. I need to turn on my soundbar here. Oh, why don't you flirt with it? Oh, that'll turn it on. Get it? Knee slapping funny. Here we go. I like it. Oh, I really like it. That was, and what we've been told is that Malolium trailers, they do that.  Yeah, they just say, this is going to be good. Come see it. Yeah. And so one, if he's playing two characters, either he is or the other guy looked just like him in that moment. Yeah, I'm going to look it up real quick. But the trailer was cut very well. Really cool. The whole clap, clap, clap, clap, top, top, top, top, knock, knock, knock, knock. Also, it comes out like next this weekend. Did I get to 20? Yeah. The trailer just came out. It comes out to 2020. Okay, am I crazy? Or is he playing? There he is. Yeah. And what are the characters in? No, no, just saying actor. Well, it just says actor. Everybody's an actor in it. So I'm not giving you the character names. Okay, I thought he was going to be playing. Let me see if there's a little design. Man. Okay. That was him, right? Well, that was him. At the very, toward the beginning, I thought I saw him. Obviously, there's shots. Okay. No, that's one of the guys from Combiology Nights, though. That's the brother, isn't it? Yeah. Who's also another brilliant actor. And that's him. Correct. But then who was this other guy? Or does he just have a beard at different times? Because that's him. He just must have a different look at different times. Okay. Because certain times he has a full, full beard. And other times he kind of is clean shaven. Okay, so it's one. Those two actors. I didn't realize that other guy was in there as well. He's great. He's great. Also, the score behind this entire thing, I think was really, really good. As was the lighting and the cinematography. Great. The one line says a lot. There's only two kinds of people in this world, masters and slaves. What a worldview. Good grief. That's my worldview. Me, master, you, slave. Then you must feel that way about everybody. Because they're just you. Just me? Okay. That's my worldview with you. But yeah. So it comes out. It's at the 20th of February, right? Yeah. So it did. So. That's this weekend. Yeah. That's 2020-2020. Do you think we're going to get it though? No. No? No. No? Hold on. Let me look it up. I hope so. But I doubt it. You know we're going to get it. Because I will run theater 50 miles away. I will 100% support this actor. And that other actor. And Malolium. Absolutely. Film. I don't know if I've only seen one. But I was that impressed. Yes. We have seen one but we've seen enough trailers as well. I don't think there's a single trailer that's Malolium that we haven't liked. The one that just came out a few days ago we were impartial to. Which one was that?  Remember? Just two days. We reacted to a lot. I don't remember. My mind is melting. Anyways. That one we said we didn't know yet so we'd have to wait for word of mouth. That was Malolium? Yeah, that was Malolium. Okay. Sorry, I'm trying to look it up. He's looking to see if it's going to be playing in a theater near us. Why can't I search? Because you're not looking in the right place. Would you see this film? Like nothing else? Yes. I would absolutely see that. Especially right now when this is the dead in the water time of season where it's post Oscars and the films that are coming out are really not worth seeing. This is the best time of the year to see other films that you wouldn't see ordinarily because it's not as busy. Those two actors alone piqued my interest and the trailer was intriguing. Sorry, there's a trance from... I'm not going to be able to look it up. If somebody knows if it's playing near us, please let me know. I don't know how often we've never gone to see Malolium film when it came out. I don't know how readily available they are because it's a much smaller industry than Bollywood. We barely get Bollywood. Exactly. There's two theaters that play near us and they're not really near. Well, we can get to the one in Burbank, that one which is a little farther away. There's one in Burbank, there's one in Simi Valley, and there's one in Encino. We tend to go to the one in Simi Valley the most. There's been some films that we've wanted to see that were a big Hindi film that didn't get distributed out here. What did you think of this film? Let us know what we missed out. And also, besides this, what should be the next of his that we watch? Because I want to get more into him, like when we get into Nawaz and stuff like that. Yep, I want to get more into this gentleman. Bangalore? Bangalore? Say that word? Bangalore? Bangalore Days is one I've actually heard a lot of people recommend. Rave about? Let us know!


Part 11 of Work of the Sisters during the Epidemic of Influenza, October 1918, by Francis Edward Tersher. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Part 11. Deceased Sisters. Franciscans. Sister Mary Clarina died October 9, 1918, at St. Elizabeth's School, Philadelphia, where she had taught since her profession in 1915. She was formerly Miss Rose Kelly of Wilmington, Delaware. Sister Mary Saturnia died October 10, 1918, at the Provincial House, 1810, Spring Garden Street, Philadelphia. She was stricken with the influenza while teaching at the Catholic Girls High School, Philadelphia, where she had been stationed since 1913. She was known in the world as Miss Margaret Macau of Wilmington, Delaware. She made her profession in October 1912 and was sent to teach a class of boys in St. Peter Claver's School, Colored, Baltimore, Maryland. Sister Mary Euphrasia was known in the world as Miss Mary Pollux of Philadelphia. She received the Franciscan Habit in 1909, made her profession two years later, and was sent to Holy Family School, Shenandoah, Pennsylvania, to take charge of the domestic department there. In 1917 she was transferred to St. Mauritius School, Ashland, Pennsylvania. During the epidemic she contracted the influenza while doing relief work in the parish and died October 26, 1918. Sister Mary Carina, formerly Miss Mary Mott of New Haven, Connecticut, did splendid work among influenza sufferers in St. Joseph's Parish, Lancaster, Pennsylvania, in which school she had been teaching since 1910. She contracted the disease and died November 6, 1918. Sister Carina made her profession in August 1909, and her first mission was St. Elizabeth School, Philadelphia. From St. Elizabeth she was transferred to Lancaster. Sister Mary Philip was stationed at Glen Riddle, where she assisted in caring for the aged in St. Elizabeth home. During the epidemic she took an active part in nursing the influenza victims in the surrounding villages, especially in the homes of the poor. She was known in the world as Miss Cecilia McGinley of Philadelphia. She entered the religious life in 1915 and died January 2, 1919. Sisters of the Holy Child Mother Maria Aloysia, Eva St. John Annette, daughter of James Annette and Isabel McGee, born June 24, 1881. She entered the novitiate January 1900, made her first vows September 1902, and taught at the Academy of the Holy Child Sharon Hill, Pennsylvania, St. Michael's Chester, Pennsylvania, St. Leonard's St. James Assumption, Philadelphia, Academy of the Holy Child Cheyenne, Wyoming, St. Edward's School, Philadelphia, again at St. James, where she was at the time of her death, October 15, 1918. Sister Mary Verena, she was Agnes McGuckin, daughter of Michael McGuckin, and Catherine Murray, and was born in Chester, Pennsylvania, March 17, 1885. She entered the novitiate at Villa Maria, West Chester, Pennsylvania, March 25, 1905. Received the Holy Habit August 2, 1905, made her profession August 15, 1907. Sister labored at the missions at St. Veronica's, Philadelphia, St. John Baptist, Manimek, St. Gabriel's, Philadelphia. She died at St. Gabriel's, a victim of influenza, October 17, 1918. Sister Mary Enviolata, she was Mary Campbell, daughter of Patrick Campbell, and Catherine Henry of Philadelphia, and was born in Philadelphia, September 1, 1889. She entered the novitiate at Villa Maria, West Chester, Pennsylvania, February 2, 1907. Received the Holy Habit August 15, 1907, made her profession August 2, 1909. Sister labored zealously at the missions at Our Lady's, Mount Garmo, Pennsylvania, St. Cecilia's, Coatesville, Pennsylvania, St. Agatha's, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. When the call came for volunteers to nurse the epidemic victims at the Philadelphia Hospital, Sister offered her services generously. She contracted the influenza, which at first assumed a very light form. Later pneumonia developed, and with the greatest resignation to the Divine Will, Sister Enviolata gave her soul to God, October 26, 1918, at our convent at St. Agatha's, Philadelphia. Sister Mary Clarice, she was Ellen O'Connor, daughter of James N. O'Connor and Ellen Brogan, and was born at Dusher, Pennsylvania, July 27, 1885. She entered the novitiate at Villa Maria, West Chester, Pennsylvania, August 15, 1907. Received the Holy Habit December 31, 1907, made her profession December 28, 1909. Sister labored at the missions at Lancaster, Pennsylvania, and at Germantown, Pennsylvania. She was the first beloved member of the community to be taken by the Dread Disease. With beautiful resignation she breathed forth her pure soul to her Divine Master, October 2, 1918, at Germantown, Pennsylvania. Sister Mary Florentinez, she was Mary Hillie, daughter of James Hillie, and Anna M. Burke, and was born in Philadelphia, August 20, 1889. She entered the novitiate at Villa Maria, West Chester, Pennsylvania, September 8, 1910. Received the Holy Habit December 29, 1910, made her profession December 30, 1912. Sister labored faithfully at the missions at St. Francis Xavier's, Philadelphia, and St. Agatha's, Philadelphia, again at St. Francis Xavier's, Philadelphia, where she died in peace October 9, 1918. Sister Mary Wendeland, she was Alice Becker, daughter of Wendeland Becker, and Mary Ackerman, and was born May 14, 1888. She entered the novitiate at Villa Maria, West Chester, Pennsylvania, September 8, 1910. Received the Holy Habit December 29, 1910, made her profession December 30, 1912. Sister labored at the missions at St. Anthony's, Philadelphia, St. Francis De Sales, Philadelphia, St. Thomas Aquinas, Philadelphia. She died most peacefully at our mission of St. Thomas Aquinas, October 8, 1918. Sister Rita Maria, she was Mary E. Ratto, daughter of Joseph Ratto, and Margaret Donovan, and was born in Philadelphia, August 9, 1892. She entered the novitiate at Villa Maria, West Chester, Pennsylvania, September 8, 1912. Received the Holy Habit December 30, 1912, made her first vows December 30, 1914. She labored on the missions at St. Agnas, West Chester, Pennsylvania, St. Agatha's, Philadelphia, St. Ignatius, St. Tralea, Pennsylvania, St. Joseph's, Frackville, Pennsylvania, Most Blessed Sacrament, Philadelphia, St. John Baptist, High School, and Manioc. She contracted the influenza in school, probably from some of her pupils, who were afflicted with the disease, and on the 12th of October 1918 she died most peacefully at the convent of St. John Baptist, Manioc. Sister Louise Marie, she was Mary Gertrude Zipp, daughter of Carl Zipp and Carolyn Kiefer, and was born at Norristown, Pennsylvania, December 27, 1893. She entered our convent at Villa Maria, West Chester, Pennsylvania, September 8, 1913. Received the Holy Habit December 30, 1913, made her first vows December 29, 1915. She labored faithfully on the missions at St. Anthony's, Philadelphia, St. Francis De Sales, Philadelphia, Jaisu, Philadelphia. Sister was one of the first victims of the epidemic, and though all available medical skill was called into requisition, she died peacefully at the convent of the Jaisu, October 8, 1918. Sister Mary Yolokum, she was Mary Duffy, and was born at Philadelphia, February 15, 1897. She entered the novitiate March 25, 1917, received the Holy Habit August 16, 1917. Though sister was stationed on our mission at St. Joseph's Frackville, Pennsylvania, for only one month, her eager generosity and deep religious spirit endeared her to the hearts of all with whom she came in contact. These virtues, too, have left an indelible impress upon the members of the novitiate, who sincerely mourned the loss of one of their most beloved and revered members. Sister died most peacefully at the convent of St. Joseph's Frackville, Pennsylvania, October 10, 1918. Sister Nora Cogger, she was born in Ireland, September 3, 1895. She entered the convent at Villa Maria, Westchester, Pennsylvania, July 2, 1918. She died October 17, 1918. Sisters of St. Joseph Sister Irma Aloysia, formerly Ella G. Vessels, she was born in St. Michael's Parish in June, 1899. At the time of her death she was engaged in teaching in the School of Our Mother of Sorrows. She did not attend any sick in person, but it was thought she contracted the disease from some of the children, as no sister in the convent had it. Sister was taken to the Mesa-Recordia Hospital, where she was visited by the right Reverend Bishop McCourt. After making her holy vows, she went to God on September 29, St. Michael's Day, 1918, aged 19. Sister Mary Rose Catherine, she was formerly Catherine Kelly, and was born in 1893. She entered the novitiate in 1913, made her vows in 1915, and taught in St. Columbus Barocchio School for four years. When the hospital at St. Columbus was opened, she took her share in the work, and contracted the disease while nursing. She died October 18, 1918. Sister Frances Xavier, formerly Catherine McGarvey, was born in Philadelphia in 1888. She entered the novitiate in 1910, and was later sent to teach at the Visitation BVM School, Philadelphia, where she died October 21, 1918, aged 30 years. Sister Mary Florentine, formerly Mary Craven, she entered the novitiate August 16, 1883, made her vows August 17, 1885. Her first mission was at St. Philip's Philadelphia. From St. Philip's she was sent to St. Mary's convent, Lana Conning, Maryland, then to St. Anne's widows asylum, Philadelphia, where she had charged at the sick. For the last fifteen years of her life she was infomerium at St. Charles Seminary Overbrook, where she died a victim of influenza, October 22, 1918. She was a servant, kind, and a faithful religious, beloved by all who knew her. Sister Mary Cyprian, formerly Catherine A. C. Marley, aged 25 years, she entered the novitiate in 1916, taught at the School of the Most Precious Blood, and died of the influenza October 23, 1918. She made her vows on her deathbed at Mount St. Joseph, Chestnut Hill, Pennsylvania. Sister Mary Frances Bernard, formerly Marie Kavanaugh, aged 25 years, she entered the novitiate January 1914, died October 29, 1918, at St. Clair, Pennsylvania. Sister Mary Catherine, formerly Margaret McBride, aged 29 years, entered the novitiate September 1909, taught in the Schools of Our Lady of the Rosary, St. Francis of Assisi, Holy Soul's Most Precious Blood, and for the last five years of her life in the English Department of the Catholic Girls High School Philadelphia. She died October 25, 1918, at Mount St. Joseph's Convent, Chestnut Hill, Pennsylvania. Sister Mary Charles Borromeo, formerly Marie F. Doyle, aged 26 years, graduate of Business College, entered the novitiate, taught in St. Michael's, St. Leo's, Daconee, Ardemore and Chester, and died in Chester, Pennsylvania, of influenza October 25, 1918. Letter of the Archbishop, authorizing the opening of parish buildings, halls, and schools for the use of the sick, also the nursing and relief work of uncoistered sisters. Archbishop's residence, 1723 Race Street, Philadelphia, October 10, 1918. During the influenza epidemic, permission is given to utilize church edifices, particularly halls and parochial schools, as hospitals. Permission is also granted for uncoistered sisters to serve as nurses. If need be, the aid of the St. Vincent de Paul societies should be utilized in each parish. The members of these societies can help to nurse the patients and also open kitchens to provide soup and other foods for the sick. These foods could be brought to the doors of the suffering by messengers, particularly by the schoolboys. It is left to each pastor to devise the best means to combat the epidemic in his own parish. Priests and nuns are advised to obtain and use masks while attending those attacked by influenza. The affectionately yours, DJ Doherty, Archbishop of Philadelphia. Letters of acknowledgement to the sisters, a grateful community, tenders its thanks to Sister Herman, for the noble unselfish and faithful services rendered to the helpless victims of the dire epidemic which visited South Philadelphia during the month of October in the year 1918, in attestation of which the officers of the Emergency Relief Committee of South Philadelphia have attached their signatures here too. Samuel J. Buck, Alfred Hyman, Abraham Berkowitz, John J. Rome, Samuel E. Kratzik. The Board of Officers of the Jewish Hospital Association of Philadelphia wishes to express its sincere appreciation and thanks to Sister Alonso for devoted unselfish service and valuable assistance given in various departments of the hospital during the influenza epidemic of October 1918. Author A. Fleischer, President, Alfred Meyer, Secretary. Appendix. In connection with the closing of churches during the epidemic, the following points seem to deserve notice and record. First, the action of pastors and rectors of churches was in accordance with the orders of civil authorities, the State Board of Health, City and Local Departments of Health and Public Safety, as directed by the letter of His Grace, the most reverent Archbishop, which follows. Archbishop's House, 1723 Rays Street, Philadelphia, October 4, 1918, Reverend Dear Sir. We hereby direct your attention to the order of the Board of Health issued on Thursday, October 3, which prohibits the assemblage of all persons in the churches and schools of Philadelphia until further notice. Second, in many, probably all, the city churches, this order was given during the afternoon and evening of Thursday, October 3, when usually there are many confessions in our churches in view of communions for the first Friday. The notice to close was generally brought to the church or the rectory by the police, then and there on duty. Some of the churches were closed, and some of the churches were closed and some of the churches were closed. Then and there on duty. Some of the churches were closed, as reported to the compiler at six o'clock p.m. others at eight o'clock. Permission was granted in some, at least of the churches, to allow the people to come to the church on Friday morning, October 4 for Holy Communion. This permission was granted when requested by phone from Departments of Health or Public Safety. Third, while formally and legally closed, the doors of churches were were not locked, and attendance at private masses during the week and on Sundays was not forbidden. Devout and prayerful visits in acknowledgement of the real presence in the churches of the business section of the city were apparently quite as regular and frequent as in normal times. Fourth, some of the city churches tried to meet the difficulty by mass in the open air on Sunday, October 6 and 13. There was no prohibition or public protest against this so far as the compiler has been able to find, but the practice did not meet with general approval and after the second Sunday was discontinued. Fifth, city churches were closed October 6, 1320. The permission to open churches for Sunday, October 27, was followed by unusually large crowds for confessions on Saturday evening, October 26. The list of the dead and the announcement at masses on October 27 seemed almost interminable in some churches more than 100 names. Outside the city the date for reopening the churches varied according to different views taken by local boards and different interpretations given to the action of the State Board of Health in lifting the ban. Some country churches followed the order of city churches and assumed the right to open October 27. Others in the same townships and under the same local boards did not reopen until November 3. It would be very desirable indeed to have for our records as a supplement to the work of the sisters a brief but authentic notice of the priests of the city and diocese who died victims of the influenza during the epidemic, but full and accurate information is now, August 1919, practically beyond our reach. Out of a list of 16 names submitted to the present compiler, he has found several points on which other printed accounts do not agree. He is unwilling therefore to stand sponsor for the accuracy of the list appended. Reverend Daniel Kennedy died at Ashland, Pennsylvania October 10, 1918, aged 29. Reverend Peter Catori of Don Bosco Institute died in St. Joseph's Hospital Reading October 10, 1918. Reverend Henry J. Hebrick died at St. Ludwig's Philadelphia October 13, 1918, aged 36. Reverend Joseph A. Carter, C. M. D. D., died at St. Vincent Seminary, Germantown, Pennsylvania October 6, 1918, aged 26. Reverend Joseph C. Tierney, C. M., died in St. Joseph's Hospital Philadelphia, September 27, 1918. Reverend Joseph J. Murphy, D. D., died at St. Charles Seminary, overbrook, Pennsylvania October 15, 1918, aged 38. Reverend Edward L. Gallagher died at Lost Creek, Pennsylvania October 17, 1918. Reverend E. A. Hughes, O. P., died in St. Mary's Hospital, Philadelphia October 18, 1918. Reverend John J. Dugan, D. D., died at Gerardville, Pennsylvania St. Joseph's Rectory October 27, 1918. Reverend John J. Paternackie, D. D., died at McAdoo, Pennsylvania October 25, 1918. Reverend James A. Campbell, D., died at South Bethlehem, Pennsylvania November 26, 1918, aged 28. Reverend Jeremiah Mahon, died at Rectory of St. Mary's of the Assumption, October 19, 1918, aged 32. Reverend Emile Deuzer, C. S. S. R., died in St. Mary's Hospital, Philadelphia October 11, 1918. Reverend John H. Carmen, C. M., died October 14, 1918. Reverend Joseph C. Dorothy, C. M., D. D., died October 15, 1918. Add to these the names of five student clerics, Reverend William O'Driscoll, D. C. M., who died at Germantown St. Vincent's Seminary, October 8, 1918, Leo Naylor, a seminarian and third-year theologian at Overbrook, and the three cleric students who died in St. Mary's Hall, Villanova, Albert Starr, October 15, John Dorgan, October 11, Gilbert Clunk, October 10, and we have the toll of death among the clergy in probably about the same proportion with the losses and sacrifices and the spiritual gain of the sisters. Francis E. Tersher, Villanova, Pennsylvania, September 1919, end of Part 11. End of Work of the Sisters During the Epidemic of Influenza, October 1918 by Francis Edward Tersher.


What is up everyone, my name is Zesty Mike and today we're going to be talking about the new YouTube platform that they release that they hope will compete with Twitch. And apparently today we're going to have a husky guest appearing in our video. Everybody loves you, cute dogs don't they? Hopefully. Otherwise I'm going to get a lot of thumbs down. Anyways, if you visit gaming.youtube.com you'll find a new platform that YouTube silently released the other day. It integrates with YouTube's new stream now function and makes live streaming super simple and clean. Which is very nice for any of us who have streamed before because we all know how difficult that can be. One of the reasons gamers prefer to use Twitch is because Twitch promotes the little guy. It's not a matter of who you are it's a matter of what game you're playing. People search what game they want to see it and it shows who's currently playing the game. The new platform does just that. I clicked a game at random and found a talented YouTuber who I've never seen before who only has 300 subscribers. If it weren't for this I probably never would have found this person. So this looks like it might be a really good tool for any YouTube gamers arsenal. If you're looking to grow your channel and you do the occasional live stream to promote yourself I think this might be something good and a nice way to promote yourself to the masses. I personally think that this would be a great addition and I prefer to use this over Twitch. The only reason I use Twitch is to help promote my YouTube channel and if I can do that right on YouTube itself it would do a lot better. Not only that but you can manage to get extra ad rev from your streams on YouTube. So if you're someone who has to pay the bills this could be some extra help. My question to you guys is what do you think of this new feature? Is this something you're going to use over Twitch or are you someone who's going to stay with Twitch? And if you're going to stay with Twitch please tell me why I'd love to know. But anyways guys it's it for me today I know this was kind of a short video but I saw this new update and I decided to look into it. I've actually found it quite useful so I decided to share it with you guys. I believe next Friday we're going to come back with another tip video and this time we're going to talk about sponsorship so we're going to get back into the YouTube creating process and growing your channel and marketing with new companies and stuff. Anyways guys that's it if you want to see more of my tips and tricks you can click the link in the sidebar or if you want to see more of me click the links down in the description below or click my name up in the cards. Anyways guys that's it and we'll see you next Friday. See ya. Impulse is produced by the Freedom Network. Ever wanted to earn revenue from your videos? Freedom offers a great partnership program which includes access to hundreds of thousands of audio tracks, sponsorships with great partners and most importantly a no lock-in contract. You can leave at any time for any reason. We accept everyone both big and small. For more information click here or visit the link in the video description.