Director of Chatham House, welcome to this session this afternoon on redefining Europe's security agenda. Delighted that you could join us, European security has been on the agenda of this Davos Forum this year on a number of occasions actually, which tells you a little bit, I think, about the context that the World Economic Forum would make this such an important and targeted topic of the year. Just to remind you in terms of format, this is a one-hour session and we are going to have a conversation amongst ourselves in this little round intimate space that as Erika Mogherini was saying is deceptively intimate, but you will all have the opportunity to come in. It's a trap. It's not a trap. You said it's a trap. My job is not to show the trap because I keep putting leaves on the ground. So what I will do is we will have this conversation. We then will open it up to bring you in, hopefully with the TV cameras I'll be able to look over my shoulder because we've got participants throughout the room. So I will look around a few times. If you have a question you want to ask, make sure that you reach out to me and catch my attention. And this is being live-streamed on the web sites, so welcome to those people who are watching us. And so obviously it is on the record just to remind this distinguished panel we have with us. And just to, I think everyone here is known to everyone, but just running around in this order of Erika Mogherini, who is the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, also a Vice President of the European Commission, formerly Foreign Minister of Italy. Welcome. Jens Stoltenberg, who is Secretary General of NATO, formerly Prime Minister of Norway, as you know, Rob Wainwright, heads up Europal since 2009, I believe, that has a long-standing experience and knowledge of policing, crime at the international level from the UK experience. Witold Waszkikowski, who is the Foreign Minister of Poland, but first joined the Foreign Ministry of Poland back, I want to say, in the 90s, and so you have a lot of experience, including of NATO, and including its ambassador to Iran, amongst other places. So somebody who is bringing some good hands-on experience to this experience. And Margaret McMillan, who is a professor of history and warden at St. Anthony's College, author of a number of books, especially those that have helped us understand that wonder into 1914, and helping the world understand some of the experience of that period and how it could apply to now. And it would be great to have her, as I said earlier, to keep us honest a little bit historically in terms of what we're doing. So this is about redefining European security, and if I can just set the scene very quickly, the list of threats from the European perspective have clearly expanded, or at least they've all come together, you could say, in the last two to three years, Russia testing Europe at multiple levels. The Middle East, in many cases, imploding, certainly a much more unstable and insecure environment than it was three to four years ago. A president soon to be, as of tomorrow, Trump, who has called the NATO Alliance obsolete. And he's tried to redefine what he means by that, and he said it's very important to him, but nonetheless, perhaps heralding a more transactional approach from America to what NATO does and doesn't bring. Brexit pulling apart certainly the security dimension of the European Union, and I need mention obviously the two really cataclysmic, I think is the right word to use, events of the last couple of years, the big refugee and immigration influx into Europe, and of course the dreadful terrorist attacks which have taken place in recent months across European countries. Now why redefining European security? You could just add all these things together. But I think we are in a context where, and what we want to explore here, is that the external and the internal are kind of mixing at the moment, and each of the institutions is having to adapt. NATO is having to think about the internal security in a way of Europe, much more than perhaps it did just about external defences, cyber security and so on. The EU is having to think about the whole spectrum of security, and is having to adapt quite fundamentally in that sense, right through to counter-terrorism. And Europol finds itself from being a sort of quiet policing organisation to really being at the front line of European security. So we need I think at least three things, and I hope we will come back to these themes in the discussion and in the questions, adaptation, interaction, the capacity to interact between institutions and investment, are we putting the money in the effort and the resources. So if you don't mind, Jens Stoltenberg, if I could start with you, NATO has certainly been on a reinvention mission, kicking off with the Wales Summit of 2014, pushing through the Warsaw Summit of last year. But just in a, we're going to have a conversation, just in two minutes, if you were to pick out for yourself, for this audience, the two or three adaptations that you think NATO is making, has made, is in the process of making, that will let it deal with this new list of blended security threats. What would you, what would you highlight? I will answer that in a moment, but let me first just tell you why it is so important that international institutions adapt. Because in terms of turmoil and certainty, we need strong international institutions. The UN, the EU, NATO, the World Bank, IMF, all these institutions they were created after the Second World War, they are children of a, of a turmoil, of a war. And we need to continue to use these international institutions to preserve peace and stability. For NATO, that means that we need to adapt to new security environment. And that's exactly what we are doing. One key element in that is to make sure that we have strong transatlantic partnership with NATO, also in this new security environment. And just to be clear about that, because everyone asks me about that, I'm absolutely confident that also with the new US administration, we will have a strong US commitment to a strong transatlantic partnership in, in NATO. You don't think it's any more conditional? No, I don't think so, but I, at the same time, believe strongly that the United States expect European NATO Allies to invest more in defence. And the good news is that the European Allies have started to do exactly that. So defence spending has actually started to increase. We have a long way to go, but for instance, Poland meets the guideline of 2%. The United Kingdom meets the guideline of 2% of GDP for defence. So we are moving in the right direction. When it comes to NATO, we are adapting in many different ways. We are implementing the biggest reinforcement of our collective defence in a generation since the end of the Cold War. With more forces in the east, with a higher readiness of forces, just now we are deploying forces in Poland, in the Baltic countries, with new battalions, and in more US presence. This is a big adaptation as a response to a more assertive Russia in the east. We are stepping up our efforts to fight terrorism. We are in Afghanistan to fight terrorism. We have to remember that the reason why we are in Afghanistan is to fight terrorism. We are doing more to support the US-led coalition countering ISIL. And then we have, during the last years, increased our focus, and we are doing more when it comes to cyber defences. Because we have to understand that cyber attacks can be as dangerous, as serious, as armed attacks. It can take out critical infrastructure. It can cause human injury, and it can undermine our own defence capabilities. So we have decided that a cyber attack can trigger Article 5, meaning that the cyber attack can trigger a response from the Holy Lines, as a more conventional armed attack can. And we have also decided, and we are in the process of establishing cyber as a military domain alongside air, sea and land. And we are doing much to help our allies to improve their cyber defences. So we are constantly adapting. NATO is the most successful military alliance in history because we have been able to adapt and have to continue to adapt. Thank you very much. Clear answer. Frederic and Morghini, let me come to you. The European Union, the external action service, have put out a European global strategy, a new document. I think I'm right in saying that one of the phrases in there is about the uniting strategic autonomy, which is, it sounds good. And it sounds good, I think, in the current context. But what does it mean in practice? First of all, it means that Europeans have started to take seriously their security. We've started to do this, and it was part of it since the beginning, well before the UK referendum, well before the US elections, because security is a priority for Europeans. We've realized that our internal and external threats go hand in hand, that more than an excess, there's a continuum. And we have the instruments as European Union to tackle these threats, both externally and internally and along this continuum, exactly because we have a variety of tools, from the soft to the hard ones, and that we cannot afford anymore not using the tools we have for seeing for the European Union. You know that the issue of the European defence has been going on and on for 60 years now, has known more difficulties than, let's say, moments of enthusiasm. And I think it is quite significant that today, in the last seven months, we've done more and more united on European defence and security than it was done in the previous, probably, decades. If you could give a couple of examples, just specifically there, because the EU, if I may say, has a history sometimes of thinking about the process in the institutions without necessarily always coming up with the meat. No, this is very concrete. This is very substantial, and I can give you a couple of examples. In December, we have agreed altogether, 28, including the UK, still, to have, for instance, with NATO, more than 40 very concrete projects of cooperation. You were mentioning adaptation cooperation or interaction, you said, and investment. We decided to move forward with, for instance, parallel exercises, cooperation on cyber or on hybrid threats. Issues on which or threats on which NATO has more the hard power, the European Union has more, let's say, diversified tools that are essential, because in combating terrorism, for instance, you need to use a different set of instruments rather than the traditional hard military instruments. You can also use... This is one concrete example. The other concrete example is that we launched, we proposed, and this is in the making in this month. I'll report back to the European Council in March on this. A new level of ambition for the European defence, this is where we refer to the strategic autonomy, but we also refer to strong coordination with NATO, because we believe in joint security across the Atlantic. A new level of ambition for the European Union, as such, and the new set of capabilities that the European Union needs to develop with the necessary investments to meet this ambition. And this means using the tools that the treaties already give us in terms of cooperation, for instance, in the field of research or industrial projects with the necessary financial and economic support with the creation of a defence fund, European defence fund, that will support the spending together, because Jens is right, we have a spending gap across the Atlantic, but we also have, and I refer to this very often, a gap in the output of our expenses on defence. Europeans spend 50% of Americans on defence, 5-0, but the output of our spending is 15%, 1-5%, which means that if we spend together, as Europeans, in research, in technology, in industrial projects, in capabilities, the output of our investments is going to grow exponentially, and this is exactly where the European Union can help member states to come together and do better together, because not because we need to do separately from the others, at the same time we are strengthening cooperation with NATO, but because we have the instruments and the interests to do more for ourselves. Just one very quick follow-up point, one of the frustrations amongst governments, I'm sure within both your institutions and in the US has been the difficulty of the EU and NATO cooperating, that again, the phrases have been there, but there have been certain political obstacles, which I think are well known, but do you feel this is changing? I mean, you've certainly given a lot of examples here. How much of that is intention? How much of this is happening now? It's happening, and I don't only feel this is changing, I feel this has changed. Jens and I have met, I think, more than any of our predecessors on concrete projects. Our teams have done the same, and probably even more so, which is even more important in two institutions like ours, that we know very well our complex structures. And at the Warsaw Summit, I think we saw the clearer picture of this, we signed an agreement between the European Union and NATO to strengthen cooperation, and we have, Jens says often, we've done more in the last six, seven months than what we've done in all the previous years, because I think we have finally realized, both in the European Union and in NATO, that we have to get rid of the ghosts of the past and concentrate on the risks of today. And our cooperation is vital, especially to cover the fields that are new in this dangerous scenario we're facing. Thank you very much. Rob, let me come to you now. Europol has always had an important role, but given the terrorist attacks, and some obviously significant and serious in terms of deaths, casualties, political impact, especially now Berlin, Paris, Brussels, beyond the other ones that have taken place earlier, to what extent do you think Europol is adapting to this new environment? What's holding it back and where do you see the areas of progress right now? Yes, I think the expansion of Europol's mandate and resources and impact in the support that it can give member states is one example of a newfound confidence of willingness, I think, by the European Union to do more in the security space. So we have the European Security Union alongside what the high representative was saying, which complements a more ambitious external agenda with something that we're doing internally. And I think, first thing to understand, I think, is a recognition by the EU and the political leaders, which includes, of course, the 28. First of all, about the magnitude and the scale of the task that's ahead of us. What we've seen in the last two years, 12 very serious terrorist incidents with a clear prospect for more to come. A migration crisis made aggravated and made a lot worse by a community of 50,000 people smugglers that Europol has identified. And cyber crime, which remains, amongst all of them, perhaps the most enduring long-term security threat that we face in Europe. And I share the Secretary General's remarks on that. So a recognition of this complexity, it's the impact of a darker side of globalization, how to manage that between the internal and external space. Also, you asked for challenges, Robin. I think also understanding that that's not the only set of competing interests that we have to manage as we respond to these threats. We have to manage freedom of movement, which we cherish in Europe at the same time as an expectation from our public that we don't allow terrorists to move freely within between our countries. We have to, of course, perennially manage the balance between privacy and security. And, indeed, a very important point, you know, the space between the shared responsibility between national governments and those operating at the EU level. Very clear in what the Lisbon Treaty says, of course, that national security of which terrorism is a form shall be the sole responsibility of member states. That's what the treaty says, very clear. However, the nature of the terrorist threat facing Europe today is by its very nature a transnational one and, of course, requires at least an element, perhaps a significant element, of transnational cooperation. And it's managing, therefore, that apparent paradox, policy paradox, that gap between what the politics allows and what the law says with the realities of doing it. And that's the real challenge for us, which is why institutions like Europe have been upgraded to respond to the data sharing challenge, especially, and by helping to identify more quickly and more proactively the terrorist actors involved. Am I right in saying the US also has a role in Europe? You mentioned data sharing and, obviously, counter-terrorism, especially in today's world, is heavily data dependent, if not almost overwhelmingly now data dependent. How confident are you that the kind of level of improved interaction that you've seen so far is going to be sustained? What progress has been made? Can you say something on the data side? And there is a feeling that Europe really wasn't ready for the terrorist threat, as it has emerged, that levels of integration, levels of cooperation, both within member states and between them, have tended to be quite siloed. There might be some bilateral elements, but it's not been comprehensive. And this leaves room for the terrorists to move around the weak spots. Could you just say something about that and where the US fits into this and how important that is? Well, you're right. Our overwhelming strategic priority to Europe over these years has been to use data and technology as the great interconnector of the law enforcement and security domain. And we have 750 agencies, therefore, on our platform, using that in an enterprising way to identify more quickly the groups involved and how they're crossing borders, for example, and using technology and data to aggregate a much more informed picture. I can say that the Americans have invested significantly in that enterprise. It's because of the Americans that we have a leading edge now, I think, in many of the cyber crime investigations that we're doing, and increasing engagement on terrorism as well. So I think, actually, Europe Hall is a modern success story of transatlantic security cooperation. And I'm pretty sure my American counterparts would be saying exactly the same thing. Mr. Vaschikovsky, you represent here a key member state of both, all three institutions that have spoken so far. You are on one of the front lines of European security. As you sit there and you hear the report card, if I can describe it that way, of these three institutions, how does it look from a member state's perspective? Are things going the direction you want? Where would you put the emphasis? Thank you very much for inviting at least one member state and one owner of the many owners of these institutions so I can present my opinion about that. And I'll be happy to quote you on the Polish TV against the Polish opposition, because you're a member, the Poland is a key member, or a key partner in Europe, or a key member in Europe, because we are constantly criticized, but we are marginalized recently in Europe. But coming back to this general main issue, yes, we are happier, happier. In case of NATO, when we joined NATO in 1999, so it's about 18 years ago. For many years, we had the feeling that we were secondary member of NATO because of some restrictions or some promises, but since the beginning of this year, we have a feeling that finally the status, security status of Poland and other Eastern NATO countries is more and more equal to the status of Western European countries. So that's for sure. Of course, nothing is perfect. We can always discuss adaptation in the probing of NATO. And of course, Jens mentioned about cyber problems, about the hybrid war, of course, and we still have to work on this issue, how to prepare ourselves for this kind of a threat. We are also happier that the frozen conflict in Europe between the European Union and NATO is over. Let me tell you that for years, it was a kind of a schizophrenic situation because the same ministers from the same countries were visiting Brussels and they were behaving totally different in different headquarters. For years, there was unthinkable to mention, for instance, in the European headquarters about NATO and vice versa in NATO, about the European Union. Although, as I said, exactly the same people, the same minister for NATO. Almost the same. Almost. But of course, the list of problems facing Europe is facing. It's much longer, as you mentioned, for instance. We have still a problem of growth, how to provide economic growth, how to provide economic growth which will be satisfactory for our people, especially for young people who are just joining the job market. We have a problem with Eurocurrency. We have a problem with future development of the European Union. For years, we were debating about enlargement. And this year, for the very first time, we'll start to debate exit. And not one of the countries which, for instance, for the last several years were stigmatized as bad Europeans. We are just going to lose the second economy of Europe and the fifth economy of the world, a member of the security council, the nuclear power. Is it because, was the decision, was it kind of a capricious decision, the moment of bad feelings or something? No, it was the decision, as we listen today, this morning, Theresa May, that one of the most important countries of Europe and the world is going to retake the self-decision-making mechanism to themselves, the self-determination again. So that means that something is wrong with the philosophy of the European Union right now. Something is wrong with the decision-making mechanism in the European Union. So the Brexit we can discuss and negotiate in the next few months and years, but it will not be only divorce. It will be also discussion about the future status of the United Kingdom, vis-à-vis Europe, but this has to be a reflection about the domestic status of the things and issues we have in the European Union. Thank you very much. There's points I want to come back to each of you on in a minute, but let me bring Margaret McMillan in now. Margaret, you've heard this conversation, you know the context, obviously, and I know it is a very dangerous thing to do, and you are, I'm sure, say this as well, to take historical periods and map them onto the present. But nonetheless, here we are at the moment of institutions that were designed for a particular era trying to adapt themselves to a new one. What lessons or insights do you draw from the past for today and for the next five to 10 years? Just broadly speaking first. I will have to speak broadly, because historians are not very good at solving day-to-day problems, which you are. But perhaps what we can do is help to raise questions and help to put things into context. And I think looking back does help in some cases. I think what makes international systems and international orders work are things like shared memories of why you need that order, shared assumptions about how that order should work and why it's valuable, shared understandings of practices and institutions and norms, possibly a hegemon that is prepared to act as a motor of that world order. We can talk about that. And then what happens when enough countries or players begin to react against that order and begin to break it? How much pressure can an international order take before it begins to fall to pieces? And I think a lot about the 19th century and the 20th century, because that's what I know best, but at the end of the Napoleonic Wars, I think enough European powers and enough Europeans thought we can't go on doing this. And there was a very interesting shift in thinking from the thinking of the 18th century, which was that international relations was a zero-sum game. I won, you lost. It was just simply like that. What people realized as a result of 20 or more years of war in the Napoleonic Wars, what they realized was that everyone lost if the wars went on. And everyone had an interest and a stake in maintaining a stable international order. And what you had for much of the 19th century was an understanding among the great powers of Europe that they would work together. It was dignified by the name of the concert of Europe. It didn't have formal institutions. It was a series of meetings. But they came together. And they were a conservative order. They came together to suppress revolution. But they also came together to keep stability. And that worked. It may have helped that they shared values. It may have helped that their elites often spoke the same language, literally spoke the same language. They tended to speak French. They tended to understand each other. They were often intermarried. We're going to go back to that, I think, and maybe in a new order, yeah? Maybe the order. I think it also helped possibly that the British were prepared at stages, and particularly once they became of world power by the end of the 19th century. They were prepared to intervene, to maintain a sort of balance in Europe. But what began to happen was that the concert of Europe began to run out of steam. I think people began to forget why they had wanted it in the first place. And I think we may be seeing that with some of the institutions that were built after 1945. Memory disappears, and new generations come along, and they don't necessarily realize why you wanted it. And I think what you also got before 1914 was a number of powers just beginning to break ranks. And they didn't get penalized for it. And you got, I think, a lack of communication, a lack of understanding of the other side. I think 1911 was very important. There had been an understanding that none of them would try and break up the Ottoman Empire, which had helped to keep the peace in Europe. And Italy broke ranks and paid no penalty for it, attacked the Ottoman Empire, seized those provinces in the north of Africa, which became Libya. And that encouraged other nations. And I think by 1914, the sense that we need to work together had disappeared. And there was no sense that we need to look out for ourselves. And you see that very clearly. And I think you see it very clearly in the 1930s as well. I think there are parallels. And I think we need to ask what makes international orders work? And what can we do to bolster them? How can we bolster them? And it seems to me we are perhaps at a moment now where there are pressures on the whole order which run the risk of breaking it down. And I think that's, of course, what you're trying to do is find ways of resisting those pressures. From your experience, do you think institutions or the members of them can learn? Or is it almost, this is a dangerous thing to say, historically predetermined that, as you said, those memories are loosened and the assumptions start to break apart. This is a kind of cyclical feature. And we're moving back to the next cycle. I mean, do you have any examples, even, of ways that institutions did work? And maybe they did for another 20 years when the end they broke down. Well, the 19th century, actually, in the terms of European history, was a very peaceful century. I mean, it doesn't mean there weren't wars. But I mean, in terms of Europe's history, it was a pretty good century. And the wars that there were, were usually between two powers and rapidly contained and very short wars. I think the period since 1945 has been another such period. You think of the Roman Empire, if you want to go back further, which was a much, much longer period of peace. I think we're capable of doing it. I think I'd hate to say that human nature means that every 30 or 40 years, we forget what war was like and we start doing it again. I don't think that's true. And we also think should be encouraged by the parts of the world like Latin America, which have had no serious wars for a very, very long time. And so it seems to be possible to move beyond what people assume and how you used to behave. Let me just bring in a couple more points because we've got about 10 parts, I think, before I bring people in. Yes, Donald, let me bring one specific issue to you about adaptation with the new president coming in. You gave the example of Afghanistan as an example of how NATO had actually been involved in fighting terrorism, al-Qaeda specifically at the time that that conflict began. There's a possibility that under a Trump administration, that kind of test of NATO's relevance will once again be, is NATO willing to be out of area? And that maybe there may be an American predilection to want to focus maybe a little less on the threat from the east and a bit more on the threat that affects America directly, which is the terrorist threat. I mean, do you think there's an appetite for that? Do you think the out of area debate is one, I would have thought most European governments are pretty skeptical. Afghanistan has been a mixed result. Iraq, not a good result. So can NATO think about counterterrorism not just in the sort of data sharing and the operational sense, but actually doing this appetite in NATO to be thinking globally? First of all, there's a will in NATO to also to take responsibility and to act out of area. But I think the thinking is different now than when we started to do that because we have to remember that for 40 years, NATO was only focused on collective defense in Europe and we had one task and that was to deter the Soviet Union and we didn't do anything out of the area. Then after the fall of the Berlin... That's a three test. Sorry? Three test. Keeps American since. German. Yeah. And then after the end of the Cold War, people start to ask questions whether we needed NATO anymore and then it was formulated that either we have to go out of business or we have to go out of area. And then NATO went out of the area. We helped stop ethnic conflicts in Bosnia and in Kosovo, in the Balkans. We fought terrorism in Afghanistan. We fought piracy of the Horn of Africa. And we are still present in Afghanistan. We are still present in Kosovo and we have maritime operations in the Mediterranean. We help the European Union with the Mayan crisis in the GNC and so on. But the kind of interventions that you were involved in, as you said, around that periphery in the East, it feels like a lot of North Africa, Syria, I mean, that has always been left to its own. The big difference now is that I think that we are much more focused on how can we project stability without deploying large number of NATO forces in combat operations, as we did in Bosnia or in Afghanistan. But how can then project stability by training local forces? Because I very much believe that in the long run, it's much more sustainable. It's much more effective to enable local forces, local governments, to stabilize their own country instead of we fighting their wars. Of course, NATO has to be ready to deploy forces out of air again. Something may happen that would require that. But as a long-term strategy, we are now much more focused on building local capacity. I believe that the best weapon we have in the fight against terrorism is to train local forces. And that would be a NATO responsibility? Or is that more about national governance? We can help national governments. End of the combat operation in Afghanistan. What we do in Afghanistan now with 13,000 NATO troops is to train, assist, and advise the Afghans. That's not easy. It's not, let's say, easy situation in Afghanistan. But at least the Afghans have been able to take over responsibility for security in their own country. We don't do the fighting. They do the fighting. We help them. And that makes a big difference for the Afghans. They feel that they are responsible for their own country. It makes a big difference for us because we are not sending young boys and girls into combat operations far away. And I think it's a much more sustainable way of fighting instability out of the NATO area. And sustainable domestically, politically, I would think as well. Frederica Mogherini, straight-up question. Easier to do EU security with the UK out of the EU? And do you think you might end up with a better relationship? I'd find out when the UK would be out. You know, I'm still chairing a council. The last one was last Monday when we are 28. We still take decisions at unanimity in foreign and security and defence policy at 28. And when I say we've done more on European defence in these last seven months, it has been with the UK at the table. Participating and helping to shape the decisions we've taken together. This to say that seven months after the referendum, UK is still a member of the European Union and that will continue to be the case for a certain number of years, at least two plus some months. And I'd like to add one thing. It has not been more difficult. It has not been easier. But it has been possible because you might have noticed Theresa May mentioned several times. The UK intends to cooperate with a strong European Union, not contributing to weakening the European Union as an institution, because it's an interest for our collective security in Europe. The UK, she said, is interested in cooperating even after she's gone, or it is gone, in the field especially of foreign and security policy. And this because we share the same space and because the threats are at the same time national and national securities, even within the European Union in the treaties, a competence of national governments, but all national governments in Europe, including the UK, I believe, have understood that you cannot effectively tackle national security if you do not cooperate across the border within the European Union and in our neighbourhood. One of the things we've done in the last year, very concrete, you were asking for concrete measures, we started to have counter-terrorist experts from the European Union in some key partner countries around us in the region, in the Middle East, in North Africa, in the Sahel, in Asia, because we understand that cooperating with our partners far away is a way to prevent attacks, to share information, but also to work on the prevention of radicalisation learned from our partners. So there is an added value that the European Union as such is bringing security also to the national level. And if I can enlarge a bit the picture or the scope of this thinking, in the world of today that is reshaping completely, I don't know if it's a cycle, but for sure we are in the moment when we see the geopolitics changing or the change is coming up. US, Russia, China, Africa, that is the big, big absence from our thinking, but is very much present in the demography of the world. The only way for the Europeans to be real global players is through the European Union. I hear a lot of talks about losing sovereignty. I see this actually as the only way of regaining sovereignty in a world that is so complex and reshaping and moving. The European Union is the first economy in the world after China, well before the United States, is the first market of the world, the first trade partner basically worldwide. It's also a security provider in a different manner than NATO, but also in a military manner we have 16 operations and missions around the world. In some cases we cooperate with NATO, in some other cases we do training, in places where maybe the European Union is easier to welcome than NATO. And we do a lot of prevention because Jens was perfectly right when he was basically saying, or at least I would say it with my own words, but sometimes in some situations of crisis, a military intervention, traditional-style military intervention is not necessarily the right thing to do, but you might require hard power anyway to do other things. So we are entering into a completely different way of doing security, and I think the European Union is perfectly equipped to do this if we decide as we are doing to do it. Thank you. Rob, one quick extra backup question to you again, being a bit more specific.  Do you see the front end of what might be a long period? Do you think Europe and European countries are adapting to this phenomenon of outside and internal threats being combined into one? Are you at the high level of alert, if you see what I'm saying, at the highest level? Or do you think this might be the end of Daesh, or at least certainly it falling onto the back foot? I had all my money on that being a Brexit question, by the way, so thanks for that. Don't worry, I'll come back before we finish. There's a clear connection, of course, and we are monitoring very carefully any signals that the squeezing of Daesh on the battlefield might lead to an increase in the rate of return of foreign fighters back to Europe, recognising there are some 5,000 or more European nationals that have gone out there. Many of them have died, many of them have since come back, but about a half still haven't. And I think the gradual or accelerated return of those foreign fighters to Europe will be a significant security challenge that we will have to manage for many years to come, recognising that not all of them will pose a terrorist threat, and some of them might make genuine attempts to rehabilitate themselves, of course. But managing that space is clearly a major part of our counter-terrorist effort. It is now, and perhaps it will be even more so in the future. Beyond that, I think Daesh will be defeated on the battlefield. I don't think that necessarily will be the end of jihadist terrorism. And as we've seen from the recent history of that, another reinvention of that may well appear on the horizon. Thank you. For a minister, you know, here we have a potential of Europe turning in on itself when it thinks about security. I know you described that it now feels like Poland is a core member of European security. The persistence presence, let's call it, of NATO troops there obviously makes a difference from your point of view. But you were involved closely in the missile shield negotiations during your time at the Foreign Ministry. We have Russia stationing nuclear-capable cruise missiles, if I've got my terminology right, in Kaliningrad. Some serious exercises taking place, I'm sure. There's a bit of an escalatory move here. The troops are being put in. How worried are you to put it bluntly? I was rather worried when we did not respond to action, to Russian action, because the decision of NATO last summer, taking Warsaw, was a response to the activity of Russia. Simultaneously, we decided to defense, to deter, but also to keep a dialogue. So we mandate Secretary General of NATO and Atlantic Council to reopen actually the dialogue with Russia. So it's up to them how they're going to use this opportunity, because we show them by, it's not a big deployment of troops. It's not a symbolic, but it's a significant token of determination of NATO to defend the territory of NATO member states. But nothing else. This is not the determination to show an aggressive posture. And this is a signal to Russia that, well, we will defend ourselves, but at the same time, we are ready to reopen the dialogue and find the possible solution how to bring you back to cooperation with NATO and the European Union also. The problem is that whatever we offer to the Putin right now, we'll be rejected, because he needs us, he needs enemy. This is a typical for the political science problem. He needs us as a kind of a scapegoat, as an excuse that he cannot deliver at home, having such a potentially rich country, because there are so many problems and hostile activities outside of Russia. So this is a dilemma. Whatever we offer, we'll be rejected, because this hostility or this picture of hostility, of picture of enemy, is needed for the domestic public. So we better prepare for the long haul then. And one last question to you, and then I'm going to come to you here, so please have your questions ready, and we'll take two or three or four at the same time. Margaret, Russia is an important element. It's been, it is a European power, as well as obviously looking to Asia, thinking with your historical hat on. Would you be looking to try to engage, accommodate? Is it impossible? Does it, in the end, are we returning, if we do return, to a near of national interest-based politics, which I would think is what Russia would be quite interested to see, is that incompatible with where Europe is going? Where would you put Russia in your mix? I think Russia is driven in part by a sense of wanting to overcome the deep sense of humiliation, and I think this is true of President Putin himself, at the end of the Cold War, the Soviet Union had been a world power, it suddenly no longer was. And I think these things matter, what people remember matter, and what they would like to try and recover matters. And Putin draws, of course, President Putin draws a lot on Russian history and talks about traditional Russian borders, talks about Ivan the Terrible, talks about Peter the Great, whether that's rhetoric, it's hard to tell, but it seems to me to be saying something that he uses those examples. I see Russia in two lights, I mean, on the one hand it is, as I think you had countries before 1914 and before 1939, which just disdissubated the rules. They threw the rules out, they didn't want to avail them. How you deal with that is an issue, we didn't deal with it very well in the 1930s. I think you have to have them, as we did with containment, a measure of firmness and willingness to talk, because one of the dangerous things that happens, I think, when international relations become difficult, and when you get, I think we are, I agree with Federica Mogherini, that we are in a time of transition, it's always difficult to see what that transition is, but I think clearly things are changing with the rise of China, with the United States, possibly withdrawing from a very active role in the world. But what is then, I think, particularly important is to try and understand the other and try and keep in contact, because the danger is when things begin to turn bad, is that we begin to think in terms of scenarios, and anything the other side does, we think, well, they would do that, wouldn't they? And they start doing that with us. And then it feeds itself. We expect them to be motivated by the things we fear, and they expect us to be wrapped in the ways they fear. So it is a combination of, I think, firmness, but also trying to build communication, which in fact worked with containment, because during the Cold War, superpowers and their allies, and it was painful and it was difficult, did develop ways of communicating, and did develop ways of understanding each other. It was helped by the fact that they had nuclear deterrents. It made it necessary for them to talk to each other, but it's just as necessary today. And so I think we have to keep on trying. Important points, right. Let's get some points in from round the room. As I see hands go up, I'll call on people. It's gentlemen here first, and then here. I'm looking at my shoulder as well. Okay, it's a question to Rob. Definitely go to. Introduce yourself as well. Is there any movement within the Schengen area to expedite extradition requests of terrorist suspects from country to country? Could you just say who you are? I'm Pinker Scorchamy, the President of Conference of European Rabbis. Okay, so Schengen expediting terrorist mix-up. Microphone here, please. Lauren Striegel, King's College London. To what extent, we'll talk a bit about Russian distance rule. We've had an alliance which has been led by the United States. We're worried at the moment that the person to elect has said that NATO is obsolete. Maybe it isn't obsolete, or maybe you can do something with it. But there's also this question of American leadership. To what extent do you think we may be in a period where Europeans find themselves pushing back? And let me give you a very specific question. The President-elect has said that he can imagine sanctions being removed from Russia in the event of a nuclear deal, nothing to do with Crimea. Would the EU follow the same path if the President did that? Or will the EU maintain its own distinctive line on how to deal with Russia, Crimea, and Ukraine? Thank you. Gentleman there. And then coming over to the side. Hi, my name is Alem. I'm a global shaper from Perth, Australia. My question is to Federica and Rob. I'm curious to know what institutions and organizations that you both work with are doing alongside technology companies to prevent the pervasive rise in violent extremist discourse on social media platforms. Okay, very good targeted question. And one more question here, and then let's come around and get some answers from our panel. Hi, I'm Will Marshall from Planet Labs, a satellite company. So, Federica, I just had a question for you. I wanted to pin you a little bit more on the question of European Common Security Defense Policy, if you like, post Britain. I was, in my mind, it was one of the few potential benefits of leaving the EU is that maybe the EU could be a little bit more, go a little bit further along that path of integrated security and defense policy and that that would be a positive thing. I just wanted to ask if you do think that is possible and in what particular ways, maybe? So, let's just take that group to start with and then we might see how we're doing on time. We might have time for another round. Federica Mogherini, can we start, actually, with that last question, about whether there is a more integrated security capacity that might be developed now? And if you want to see, put Brexit to one side, how would you like to see it be more integrated in any way we should be the question? I can tell you more. I can tell you what we're doing to make it more integrated because this is work that we've started just after the presentation of the global strategy in late June and we've moved very fast on this. I've put on the table of the European Council already last December, after a work that's defense and foreign ministers did, very well together, a set of proposals to have more structured cooperation among the European Union member states on security and defense and basically use all the tools that the treaty already give us. So, first element, I'm not going to see changes in the treaties. Also, because if you open the treaties now, you don't know where you end up. Second, we have tools we've never used. I'll give you a couple of examples. We have the possibility of having a permanent structure cooperation which would allow member states that are willing to do more in certain fields, up to them, for instance, in terms of investing in certain capabilities together or doing more on certain fields of defense together. The European Union framework, in some cases, the European Union supports or even some financial possibilities to invest in certain directions. I stress this because here we are in environments where the private sector is also present. I see the big potential of using these instruments also to invest in job creation on one side, technologies, investments of the defense industry and on the other side, to spend better together after such a long time of budget restraints in our European Union member states. So, it's a smart thing to do also economically. The other elements we've not used, for instance, we've never used an article of the treaty that foresees Article 44 for those that are really passionate about this, that foresees that, for instance, the Council of the European Union takes a decision together on, for instance, a military intervention. And then one or some member states are mandated by all to do it and report it to the Council. So, the burden of operating together goes away but the political steer and the political decision stays at 28. Or we have the battle groups that are rapid reaction forces that are there, are existing since 10 years, but we've never used them. So, why we've never used them? Because of sometimes some ideological, let's say, restraint, sometimes financial problems, the opportunity to use them, especially to bridge some UN operations that, as you know, are very long to be put in place, are many. And we simply don't leave any more in a word that allows us the luxury not to use the instruments we have. So, it's going in that direction. With the UK, without the UK, I am 100% sure that the field of defence and security is going to be one of the fields where the European cooperation and integration is going to move forward. There were two other questions which have applied to you as well. And we've got seven minutes left. So, maybe you could pick up the dice, cooperation and so on. But I would love to say on US and Crimea. Exactly, I thought you wanted to do that. And I was going to make sure I give everyone a chance there, but if you could, therefore, say it now. That's very easy and short. No, the European Union decisions are not taken in Washington or taken in Brussels, or, as well, we meet at 28, or at 27 in the future. So, our decisions on sanctions on Russia for the annexation of Crimea or for the aggression on Ukraine will be constantly and always merit-based, linked to the full representation of the missed agreements when it comes to the situation in the east of Ukraine and will not depend on decisions taken elsewhere. Although they have to be by unanimity, and therefore the political context may be different for that unanimity. For sure. It's the European Union taking its decisions, which is the 28 member states together. But Russia and others have always expected us to first not find the unity, then lose the unity. So far, it has worked. And I think we are united and we're going to stay united on this. Having said that, my aim is not to renew sanctions. My aim is to solve the conflict in Ukraine. And the sanctions are an instrument, and not a policy in itself. Could I turn to you, Vito, to say something on the sanctions issue and maybe on this deeper security cooperation within the EU? Is that something that a member state like Poland is looking for? You focus more on NATO. I think that we don't have to discuss the sanctions problem because the decision is taken. And we'll continue because so far I don't see the reason why we're supposed to lift the sanctions. Missed agreement is not implemented, so there is nothing to talk about sanctions, about cooperation. And yes, for the case right, we want to discuss and take decision at so far 2018 in Brussels. We want to keep the European Union united as possible. But also we want to avoid this schizophrenia. And as I mentioned, we want to keep the transatlantic bonds as strong as possible. So we have to keep convincing Americans to be together with us because being separate the World War I started, the World War II started, the Balkan War started, and all these times we couldn't, as Europe, solve the problem. Right now without Americans, we cannot solve the problem of a Russian-Ukrainian conflict. So all the formats which were created by European Union so far are not satisfactory and not implementing the decisions taken in Europe only. So I think that we need Americans. And we tried for years to prepare ourselves, to organize ourselves and to work with our Americans. I remember 20 years ago, we started with a concept of CJTF, Combined Joint Task Force with Pettersburg Missions, Berlin Plus, 1996. And we failed actually. 10 years ago, France decided to come back to the military structures of NATO. So I think that we can remind people these bad exercises, the bad experience, and convince new public administration, and it will be not just only Trump administration, it will be a public administration with people we know for years, for some of them even for century, like Henry Kissinger, I had a chance to talk two weeks ago in New York. So the very well-known people and rhetoric and policy of Republican mainstream is coming back to the United States. I know this is gonna be the last round, so I hope those of you ask questions, I'm sorry, we won't be able to go back to the floor again. In Stoltenberg, this will give you a chance, what's amazing, our last comment, because I know we're gonna hit the time at the end of this. Do you wanna pick up on any of these points, and could I ask you to just tack on, I know it's difficult to do this, a sentence on Turkey, and where you see that's going, and maybe a sentence on China, and whether Europe, why not? You can do this, you can do this. You're professional. Easy for dessert. Let's start by saying some words about Turkey, because I think it's extremely important to understand how important Turkey is for NATO and for Europe, because the strategic location of Turkey is important for all of us, close to Russia, the Black Sea, and then bordering Iraq and Syria. And Turkey is the NATO ally, most affected by the turmoil, the violence, the terrorist attacks we have seen, and they suffered a failed coup attempt. So I think, and also for the refugee crisis, to manage that, to handle that, I think Turkey is a key country in Europe. So for me, it is important to have as close dialogue, cooperation with Turkey as a NATO member as possible. At the same time, I'm aware of the concerns related to the consequences and the follow-up of the failed coup attempt. And therefore it is important that those who are behind the failed coup attempt, they are held responsible, but that is done in accordance to the law. That is a core value for NATO, and that's one of the values actually we are defending. But my main message is that it's important to keep Turkey together in the NATO family because they play such an important role. I think I have to wait with the China to next. We'll see about that next time. Hopefully Donald Trump will not put NATO in the position of having to make choices to show how, whether that part of the world is a security interest for Europe or not. Let's save that up. I'm sure we'll have more chance to come back to it. Rob, you had a specific question, which I think you're gonna take up here on cooperation. Just in one minute. And you can say with a Brexit. Just in one minute, a question by extradition, a question about tackling terrorism online. Actually two examples in which the mechanisms of the EU have worked in a flexible, responsive way to deal with a threat. Post-9.11 immediately, the European arrest warrant was ushered in fantastic, very, very practically, very practical, very successful operation, extradition within Europe. Similarly, a counter-radicalization project strategy to counter ISIS online. The establishment of a discreet internet referral unit at Europol, which is referring thousands of cases a year. And an example of the way in which the EU can leverage at scale the combined resources of 28 member states, in this case police forces, and also engage with the tech community. A success story, I think, of when it can work. And a reminder that the instruments of the EU, whether it's a common legal framework or a common police sharing framework, actually when we get our act together, we can make a big difference. Are you sanguine about Brexit then, or would it? You thought you'd get that question, so you just got it and you've got one line on it. What do you think, sanguine about Brexit? Well, similarly, you know, to the point that how representatives have said it, Theresa May was very clear today that she understands there's a shared security interest in Europe, as we heard earlier. And that, of course, includes the way in which Britain has to stay very closely engaged with the European partners in the fight against terrorism, for example. There are mechanisms and modalities available for that to continue post-Brexit. There are also some complications that have to be negotiated through that. Luckily, it will evolve commissioners and ministers and not somebody like me. Thank you. Margaret, you get, I think, quite appropriately the last word. As you reflect on the conversation, and we've gone into Turkey and discussed that aspect as well beyond Russia, are you confident that Europe can adapt to the new challenge or not? It's adapted before. I don't see why I shouldn't adapt again. And I think there has to be a willingness to adapt. There has to be a capacity to discuss, to adapt. I mean, Europe is adapted to the end of the Cold War. That was two decades ago, almost now. So it did so successfully. And I think Europe is actually an interesting example of a grouping that came together and that has worked without a hegemon. So it seems to me this is an encouraging example. If the United States no longer wants to play the role of hegemon, we have other examples of where nations of relatively equal stature, some more powerful, have come together and worked together. So I think history can be encouraging as well as immensely depressing. We wanted an optimistic note. There are very few of the sessions so far, especially on Europe, have ended optimistically. And it's great to get it from a historical perspective, because it sounds more structural. Let me close here by saying at the beginning that I asked the question, are we adapting? Is there more interaction? Is there more investment? I've certainly heard adaptation. I've heard interaction, which we've not heard before. I think we're going to have to wait to see on investment. That's going to be the difficult part, not least given the other challenges that Europe faces economically and in terms of the trust level between governments and their peoples. And will they allow governments to spend the money, even if you all here at this table have the plans for what to do with it? Could you please give a very strong hand to our panel? Great hand.