to recognize the presence of Mr. Mark Anthony D'Acella, one of our professors in the senior high school department of San Carlos, and some of his team guests. All right, welcome again to our second academic symposium. And this is the very first online academic symposium ever held in the department, traditionally, we usually held this symposium or the symposha in our auditorium. And because of the situation where we are in right now, we cannot hold it yet, hopefully in the coming months or in the next year, we can now join our speaker in sharing wisdom and do these courses monthly. So this month's theme is entitled of sheep, goats, and eschatological fatalism. Since this topic is quite interesting to us, seminarians, as it focuses on the discourse on philosophical theology, we should be attentive to what our esteemed speaker for today will give us. As I have heard, our speaker is one of the well-known philosophers in our country, the Gaten, the Gaten Dao if you like. So without further ado, may I now call on Mr. Jose Luis Fabio of the class of St. Teresa Calcutta to introduce our speaker. Good morning, everyone. Allow me to introduce our speaker for this morning. He finished his Bachelor of Philosophical Studies in Collegio, the San Juan de Le Letran, and his MA philosophy studies in the University of the Philippines, Deliman. He is a research fellow of the Southeast Asian, research center and hub, and a research affiliate of the Center for Language, Technologies, and a visiting researcher of several institutions. He is an academic author and a contributor to a number of published journals and books. He holds a PhD in philosophy from the De La Salle University, Manila, and is currently one of its associate professors. He is also currently the president of the Philosophical Association of the Philippines. Brothers, let us all welcome Dr. Jeremiah Joven Joaquin. Virtual clap, supposedly. Hello, thanks, thanks very much. Thanks very much for organizing this, Joshua, and the rest of the gang. May I just share my screen, please? Yeah, peace, allow me to share my screen. Yeah, so it's wonderful to be here. Some of my friends are here, like Dr. Mark Anthony Tasella, and some of my students as well from De La Salle University are also here. Now, what I want to do, so here's my presentation. Now, what I want to do today is just introduce you to some of the exciting stuff going on in philosophical theology. So my work basically is on logic and metaphysics, so I'm doing work on formal logic, a lot of stuff in the formal machinery of logic, and a lot of metaphysics as well. So my interests in metaphysics are broad, so I'm interested in modality, I'm interested in personal identity, and so on. But recently I was enamored by issues in philosophical theology. Specifically this brewing discipline, which is known as analytic theology. Now, analytic theology is just about 10 years old, so it's an upcoming, up-and-coming discussion of theological matters using the lens of analytic philosophy. So the pioneers of this kind of philosophy are Oliver Crisp and Michael Ray. So Oliver Crisp is from, I think, St. Andrews. Michael Ray is from Notre Dame University in the US. Now, the general idea of analytic theology is to apply the tools of analytic philosophy to understand certain theological, mostly Christian doctrines via natural research alone. So what are the tools of analytic philosophy? So these are the tools of logical and conceptual analysis. Perhaps one way of thinking about what's going on in analytic theology right now is that it's like medieval philosophy. So medieval philosophers like Aquinas and so on are using the tools of philosophy to understand theological doctrines. That's why they are doctors of the church. So what's happening now is that there's an advancement in the tools of analytic philosophy. So what these theologians are trying to do is to understand those doctrines in terms of the new tools, conceptual tools offered by analytic philosophy. Now, so what Christian doctrines are being analyzed using this tool? Well, some works have been devoted on the doctrine of Christianity, others on the doctrine of Christology, others on Atonement or Soteriology and Eschatology. Now, I'll focus on Eschatology in a bit on Atonement or its salvation history, the doctrine of salvation here in this talk. Now, this one is an offshoot of recent work that I've published elsewhere. So I have this paper on Hell, Heaven, Neither, or Both. So it's a paper on eschatology. So what happens in the afterlife? There's also a more poppish paper I created with Dr. Hazel Biana from Delos on University. We're looking at the Good Place, and we're trying to understand, if you know the Netflix series, The Good Place, we're trying to understand the philosophical underpinnings of that series. So the outline of the talk will be as follows. So I'm told that tomorrow is, what's that, Christ-Dakingba, tomorrow. Anyba, Christ-Daking, right? So the Gospel, apparently, supposedly tomorrow is the Gospel of sheep and goats. I'm not sure if Joshua knows this, that's why he scheduled the talk today. But that's a provident, so to speak. So we'll talk about the positive parable of sheep and goats. So I'll focus on that. Then I'll give you the philosophical puzzle that I think will be something interesting for you. I'll also motivate the puzzle and tell you why you should hear about this particular eschatological puzzle. I'll outline some possible responses, and I'll conclude by summarizing the whole thing. That's the outline of the talk. So let's start with the puzzling parable of sheep and goats. All right, so you know this story, so your seminarians or most of our audience will be Christians or Catholics, right? So this parable is found in Matthew 25, 31 to 46. You know the story, so let's go to the story. When the Son of Man comes in his glory and all the angels with him, then he will sit on his glorious throne. Before him will be gathered all the nations and he will separate people one from another as a shepherd separates the sheep from the goats. And he will place the sheep on his right, but the goats on the left.  So the sheep will go to heaven. What will happen to the goat? So I'll quote this one. He will say to those on his left, so the goat. Depart from me, you are cursed in the eternal fire prepared for the devil and his agents. Okay, so I'll stop there. I'll stop there because now that's a question in the doctrine of salvation, right? Who will be saved? Who are the sheep? Who are the goats? So that's an interesting philosophical issue in this particular doctrine. Now, in your, another way of thinking about this is in terms of eschatology, what will happen in the end of days? Then God will be back, right? He must, and he will separate the sheep from the goats. Now, what do biblical exigents say about this? Thaipoia and exigents. So the parable implies the thought that salvation is attained by, here are some options. So, sola fide, or sola grafnia, or sola caritas, or fides caritade formata. So for Catholics like us, this is our option, right? It's fides, good works through faith, right? For non-Catholics, I think Protestants, Lutherans and Mormons, I think they'll go for sola fide, so by faith alone, or by the grace of God. I'm not sure if this is an option by good works, sola caritas, right? So those are the options, and, but I'm not concerned with these things, okay? I'll get another moral, I'll draw a different moral from the parable. I'll say that given the analogy of sheep and goats, the parable seems to imply a puzzle, premise on eschatological fatalism. So what's the idea of eschatological fatalism? So the idea is that you are created to be in heaven, or hell, right? So the parable of sheep and goat seems to imply that right now you are already a sheep or a goat, and you will either be in heaven or in hell. I'm not sure if you're aware of this implication of the parable, but it's an interesting way to think about this particular parable. So I'll try to motivate the puzzle. The puzzle looks like this. So I've set it up as an argument so that it's easy to follow. So the first premise is that you are either essentially a sheep or essentially a goat, but not goat. Now this one is the crucial caveat in the premise. So it tells you that you're either one exclusively, but you can't be goat. Now premise two tells you that if you are essentially a sheep, then you are bound to be with God in heaven.  And finally, the conclusion will be you are either bound to be with God in heaven or be damned in hell, but not both. All right, again, this one will be the crucial caveat and the conclusion, but at least you'll see how the argument flows. That's why I'm calling it a scatological fatalism because right now you're fated to be either one, but not both. I'll try to motivate the puzzle as follows. So let's try to think about premise one, you are essentially a sheep or essentially a goat, but not both. Now here's a way of understanding that. So in the parable, the analogy is sheep and goat, but if you think about it, no sheep can be a goat, right? And no goat can be a sheep.   So if God, in the end of days, until we deem us all, if he comes back, when he comes back, if you're a Catholic, when he comes back, he'll separate the sheep from the goats.  And that's, here's a picture. So you're either this guy or you're that guy. Decide to motivate premises two and three. So if you are essentially a sheep, then you are bound to be with God in heaven. That's premise two.  Well, the motivation will be biblical, right? So as the passage goes, you will place the sheep on his right, the goats on his left, and those on the right will be with God in heaven, and those on the left will be damned in hell. So I think those two premises follow if you just take in the parable of prima facie.  You'll be in heaven.   See you guys there. So let's try to motivate the conclusion. So we have motivated the premises, so premise one, you're either a sheep or a goat, but not both. You're essentially one or the other.  Let's not talk about purgatory first. I will talk about that later. Then the conclusion will be, therefore you're either bound to be with God in heaven or be damned in hell, but not both. So what's the motivation? Well, it just follows by a logic. So the argument is valid. If I could show that if the premises are true, then the conclusion must be true. So I'll just show it. So the argument structure looks like this. If you know your logic, if you have gone through elementary logic, you know that the structure looks like a constructive dilemma argument.  So we're treating this as a mutually exclusive premise. So we're not using the inclusive or.  Premise three, again, is the fatalist premise.  Then the conclusion will be, again, a mutually exclusive conclusion that either you'll be in heaven or will be in hell. So just a bit of formalization. So this might look Greek to you. It's not, it's symbolic logic. So I'm just using this symbol to just demonstrate the exclusive or. So it's not your usual V symbol for either or, inclusive or. So that's a more stronger relationship. So it's either P or Q, but not both. This one is just your conditional, if P then R. Same with premise three. And your conclusion will be like that. So that's the structure. It's a valid argument in logic. Now, there's a simpler way of thinking about this argument. Let's call it a simple dilemma argument. So the first premise will be either your sheep or a goat exclusive. Again, the two premises here will tell you if you're a sheep, then it's fated. You're fated to be in heaven or whatever.  So there you go. It's fate. So that's the argument in simpler formulation. All right, so the formalization looks like this if you like your logic stuff. Oh, so this argument is valid, all right? So if the premises are through, if you grant that the premises are through, then the conclusion of the argument must be true. It necessarily follows that if, all right, the first three premises are true, then you are either bound to be with God in heaven or be damned in hell, but not both. Okay, now that's the puzzle. I hope you're motivated. I hope you're thinking about this. I hope you're bothered.  I don't want to be just a sheep or a goat and I can't do anything about it. All right, so why should you care about the puzzle? So that's the question. Well, I'll try to rephrase the question. Perhaps most of you are not, some of the audience here might not be Christians, right? I'm sorry, we're not Catholics, so they might just be Christians, so why should a Christian care about this puzzle?  Well, I'll say one important reason to care about this puzzle is that the puzzle raises an issue regarding the nature of God. Let's call it a Christian God or whatnot, but if you believe that this God is an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent being, then the puzzle will raise certain issues concerning this. So let's just define omnipotence in terms of being all powerful, omniscience as being all knowing, and omnibenevolence as being all loving. Now, I'm arguing that if we take the puzzle seriously, then you have to question these properties of God, the omniproprieties or omniatributes of God. So why is it a puzzle for omnipotence? Again, omnipotence is just the idea that God is all powerful. It's a problem because if the puzzle is right, then God can't change the fact that either you will be in hell, exclusive or in heaven.  Now, he can't change that because to change that would be to change the fact that you are essentially a sheep or essentially a goat. So if that's the case, if he can't change that, there's at least one thing that he can change the last questioning omnipotence. Why is it a problem for omniscience? Again, if the puzzle is right, then since God already knows being omniscient or knowing that you will be in heaven or hell, if all is that if you could change that fact, that you'll be in heaven or in hell, then God does not know everything. Sorry, does not know everything. So there's a thing missing there.  Now, finally, why is this a problem for omnipinevolence? Well, if God, if the puzzle is right, then if God permits some people, perhaps you, sorry, not in there, but if yes, we'll see each other there, perhaps you to be in hell, then God does not really love everyone.  Why would he permit that? If he is loving, perhaps he does not really care or it does not really, or she, whatever God is. So this question's on the benevolence. So again, if the puzzle is right, you have to let go of either omnipotence, omniscience or omnipinevolence, but if you let go of either of those, then what's your idea of God? All right? Now, I'll outline some of the possible responses to the puzzle, and this one will take us to heavy-duty philosophy. All right? So here's the challenge. Here's the puzzle, all right? So again, it's a eschatological fatalist argument. You are essentially a sheep or essentially a goat, but not both. If you are essentially a sheep, then you'll be with God. If you're a goat, sorry. So either, so on. So I have listed down four possible responses that a theist might take. So first, we'll be to reject the whole puzzle, all right? Eh, sabihe nongteistni. Another one is to accept that the argument is valid and sound, thus accepting the conclusion. So you're a fatalist about your salvation, or accept that the argument leading to the puzzle is valid, but show that at least one of the premises is false, since the argument is unsound, so you could have reasons to reject the whole solution. Or did they deny that the argument is valid, all right? So I hope these responses are, do you understand these responses? Again, the first one, sabihe nongteistni. It's not really a puzzle. I don't care. The second one will be it's valid, so accept the whole solution because it's also sound. The third one, there's a faulty premise. So I have reasons to reject the whole solution, and finally that the argument is invalid or denied the argument is valid. Again, you have reasons to reject the whole solution. All right, so let's try to think about response one. So if you say that you reject the whole puzzle, perhaps your reason is, well, God only knows who goes where. So it is not, it is just a matter of faith. We should not question God. That's what he said in the Bible. Sabihe nongteistni. Temptation, thou shalt not question God. So perhaps that's your motivation here. That's your response to the puzzle. Well, here's an objection to that response. So if you're going for that kind of thinking, okay, well, I'm good. So, but I think we need to have our reasonable, not just blind faith. So this being, I'm going to answer me. Fetus quadrants in Telenjom. So we need faith seeking understanding. And we need to think about this. Can you still hear me? Yes, Dr. Ramon. Yes, yes, yes. Okay, I'll only freeze you because you're not moving anymore. Okay, I'll see you going back. So that's response one. I don't think it works. So if you're a theist, a believer in God, we need to have a reasonable faith. So here's another response. Accept that the argument is valid in sound. Now, the problem with this response is since the argument leading to the puzzle is theologically and philosophically motivated, we just need to accept the conclusion. So it's a fatalist take on our salvation. Now, the problem with response two of just accepting your faith is that, well, if we do that, then God might not have those omni properties in the first place. So if you accept the puzzle, if you accept the conclusion of the puzzle, then you might as well reject some of the omni properties of God. So if we believe in God, then we must not go for this option. I don't think that this is a good response if you are a theist or a believer in God. So if we have reasonable faith in God, then we must either show that the argument has a false premise, hence it's unsound, or show that the argument is invalid. So if the argument leading to the puzzle is invalid, so we have reasons to reject the omni function. So let's go there. Let's try to think about some responses using these two possibilities of rejecting one of the premise or denying the validity of the argument. So let's try the first possible response. So let's show that the argument is unsound. So how do we do that? We reject premise one, right? You are either essentially a sheep or essentially a goat, but not both. You just reject that. So what's the motivation? Well, you could deny essentialism, so you're not really essentially a sheep or essentially a goat. You could turn into an existentialist about premise one. Here's a way of motivating that response. You can think about life as a project. So here's a quotable quote from Jean Coleshorre, as being a man or human being, so a major gender insensitive, so for those who are, you must be gender sensitive. So human beings are nothing else, but what we make of ourselves. So that's a low way of thinking about life as a project idea. Or here's another existentialist, Simone de Vervo. She'll say, life is a becoming. So one is not born, but rather becomes a woman. So you're not essentially a man or essentially a woman. You become those things. So it's an open field for you. I think here's the, well, quotable quote, the quotable quote from Jean Coleshorre, Jung Existence precedes essence. So what do we mean by that? We mean that man, first of all, exists, encounters himself. So he's just up in the world and defines himself afterwards. So you don't have any essential nature. You're not essentially a sheep or a goat.  He paraphrasing de Vervo, you might say, one is not born, but rather becomes a sheep or a goat. So if you go back to the Biblical exigence of how they think about that parable, they'll say, perhaps it's a kind of sola caritas or fetus, yeah, fetus caritas thing. So you do good works in order to have or become a sheep or become a goat. So if that's the case, if we accept that kind of motivation, you have the solve the puzzle in a way. Because you're accepting that the argument is valid. Yes, but premise one is false. Premises two and three are really true since essentialism is false. Again, premise two and premise three, if you deny the essential insensitivity of being a sheep or being a goat, then this antecedent part will be false, making the second premise true. You also deny that this one is true, so it's false. So making this premise also true, it's really true. So the argument is still valid, but it's unsound because we have reasons to reject premise one. Oh, hi. Now here's a problem for response three. I've used Sartre and de Verbois, the existentialists, but their version of existentialism is atheistic. Right? So hence, we can't use it to solve our atheistic puzzle unless you accept the atheist existentialist theory, so to speak. So you can't go for this option if you are atheist. Here's a rejoinder. Oh yeah, wait, we can go to a more theistic existentialist, like Cisarin, Cisarin Kierkegaard. He tells us that our very existence is a paradox and each of us singularly yearns to be with God. So I think that's an option for those going for existentialist solution to the puzzle. However, again, there's a problem with theistic existentialism. Why? Because the parable implies a strong essentialist reading.  So that's the idea of this objection.  So existentialism might not be a good response. So let's turn to another response. I'm calling it the Wiggins' response. I'm not sure if you're familiar. There's this philosopher, David Wiggins.  So we could use that distinction to deny a premise one. So how do we do this? Well, for Wiggins, his book, Sameness and Substance Renewed, this is the second edition of his original work. So he distinguishes between sortle concepts which are substance, substance sortles, right? So how does he define substance sortles? Well, concepts that present, tends to be applied to an individual ex at every moment throughout ex's existence, for example, being human and those that do not, example, being a boy or being a cabinet minister, right? So the former here will be substance concepts. These are the concepts that we apply to an individual at every moment of its existence.   But you are only temporarily a boy or a student. So those categories or those concepts are only face sortles. Okay. So here's the motivation that David Wiggins, so that's him presented for that distinction. So Sabina, you may refuse to say, Sir John Doe is the same boy as John Doe, since it is false that Sir John Doe is now a boy, but it is true and perfectly unproblematic that Sir John Doe was the same boy as John Doe was. Why? Because again, John Doe is that thing that we track throughout its existence. So this is a kind of personal identity. You're the same thing you are throughout your life because you are the same human being. But of course, you're not the same boy you were yesterday or the same thing you will be tomorrow because those are face sortles. You could be categorized in terms of different face sortles as well. So what's the punchline here? Substance concepts tell us what something ultimately is. So the very nature of that thing. Well, face sortles only tell us what that thing temporality is. So in medieval terms, I think you can use, these are essential categories as opposed to temporary or accidental categories. Essential properties or accidental properties, if you want to think in terms of essence, accidents, distinction. So the implication would be something like, regarding the puzzle, we are substantially human beings. We are only temporarily, but not substantially sheep or goats. So you need to look at sheep or you need to look at goat but you are human being, you might become a sheep or you might become a goat later depending on what you do. So if that's the case, again, the same thing happens to the puzzle. So you have reasons to reject premise one that makes premises two and three, trivially true. Because we are not essentially, it's not our substance to be a sheep or goat or just human beings and we will become sheep or we will become goats. The future, so the argument is still valid but it's still unsound. Because again, the premise one is false. Now here again, we could have a problem, we could raise a problem that the parable's exegesis implies a strong, essentialist reading.   So in this case, sheep and goat are not just face sortals in Wiggins's terms but as substance sortals. So far so good. So we have encountered many responses now. Let's go to response five. So here's another response that you'll do. So you're still targeting premise one. Now you could ask the question, take a look, it seems like there's a problem with the ore that this junction will question that. One way of motivating the idea of questioning the ore will be or the sore in this case, exclusive ore will be because the future is still an open one. Right now, we're still not sure whether we will become sheep or goats but it does not discount that you are essentially a sheep or essentially a goat. You will become those things but because you will become those things because you have done good things or bad things or whatnot. Here's another way of thinking about this using Buddhist philosophy. The future is completely open and we are writing it moment to moment. Looks like it's essential, looks like Wiggins's reply but it's really not because it's targeting the ore where we will be heading, not our nature. Now there's an analogue in Aristotle. So Aristotle has this weird argument because it's a sea battle argument. It's in his own interpretation or the interpretation if you're using the Latin. So here's the argument to show that, well, we could have an open future thinking about whatever. So here is Aristotle's argument. Either there will be a sea battle tomorrow or there will not be. If there will be a sea battle tomorrow then it is inevitable that there will be. If there will not be a sea battle tomorrow then it's inevitable that there will not be. So therefore, since there's nothing special about sea battles, the future is inevitable. So again, this is your fatalist argument. So Aristotle shows you a kind of fatalist argument using the analogue of sea battles tomorrow. So if you look at it vis-a-vis the puzzle, you'll notice that there's something similar going on in these two arguments. What's the similarity? Well, they share the same structure. They share the same structure. So you could say that if the first one is valid, the other one is valid as well. Now, a response that Aristotle makes, actually attributed to Aristotle, but I'm not sure whether Aristotle upholds that view, shabismo, but a response is that sentences about the future are only contingently true. They are at present neither true nor false. So what's the motivation? So the motivation is that when you talk about future contingent things, what will happen in the future? Whether you'll go to heaven or hell, it's in the gap between it's true that you'll be in heaven or it's true that you'll be in hell. And that's a gap. So between the truths and falsities, you have the gap thing. Speaking of gaps, so here's a logic detour. This is heavy duty philosophy, so I'm introducing you to stuff in metaphysics and logic. All right, so here's this guy, Polish logistical Jan Lohestewicz. And he thinks of Aristotle's sea battle argument as promoting a kind of three-valued logic. Now, right now it's called as L3 or Lohestewicz's three-valued logic. So aside from your true and false truth values, you also have a gap, a middle value between true and false. Now, if you want to think about it in terms of logic, so if true is one and false is zero and there's something in between true and one and zero, call it a half, all right? Now, the offshoot of this kind of logic is that it denies the law of excluded middle. So if you're familiar with the principles of logic, so you have your principle of identity, if p then p or p if and only if p, you have non-contradiction, it's not the case that p and not p. Now, there's an exclusive middle principle or the law of excluded middle, either p or not p. But if you have a gap between truths and falsities, then you need to deny the law of excluded middle. That is in L3, if at least one premise of an argument is in the gap, then the argument is three-valued but oneself. All right, that's the implication. If we deny the law of excluded middle, then the puzzle will dissolve. How? Well, first, let's look at Aristotle's argument. Since future contingents are in the gap, it's neither true nor false that there will be a sea battle tomorrow. So premise one will be false or at least it's neither true nor false. So it's not true that there will be a sea battle tomorrow or there will not be sea battle tomorrow. Now, it follows again that the argument is three-valued. Again, basing just from the structure, you'll grant that the argument is valid if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true. But it's unsound because the first premise is neither true nor false. It's not true. Again, this one is an instance of the excluded middle, either p or p is the case or not p is the case. And so that's exclusive though. So if you go for lucasovic's logic, you could deny this premise. Now, as a consequence, we could deny the first premise of the puzzle. Since this one is also relying on the law of excluded middle, since there's a gap between truths and falsities, then there's a reason to deny that you are either essentially a sheep or essentially a goat at the wrong time. So this argument will be trivially true, or sorry, trivially valid, but it's unsound because again, the first premise is not true. Now, here's the problem. So what Aristotle's key battle is phrased in the future tense or eschatological puzzle is not. That's the disanalogy between the two cases. All right, how do we do this? If we look at the arguments side by side again, this is the one another, you'll notice that the phrasing of our puzzle is in the present tense. Well, the second, the Aristotle argument is in the future tense. Fine, in this way, there's a disanalogy between the two. So here, our puzzle is really a fatalist puzzle because right now you are essentially a goat or essentially a sheep. Right now you are bound to be in heaven or bound to be in hell. So it's not a future thing.  So we could grant that while the L3 analysis works for Aristotle's key battle argument, it does not necessarily work for our puzzle. So we're still left with thinking about, okay, so I'm still fated to be in heaven or in hell. All right, so here's another response. So we had a logic detour, we have a metaphysics detour, now we'll have another metaphysics detour. All right, now even if we grant that L3 works, that logic works. Oh, sorry, I forgot. Another response for five is to deny essentiality. We're not denying this one. I need to deny that in this response. What we will deny will be premises two and three. We will question the inevitability of if you're a sheep, then you'll be with God in heaven. Okay, I think we'll question it and have premises two and three, not premise one. So we'll deny those two premises. How do we do that? We question inevitability. Now here's a fatalist analog. Now, if you look at this argument, this one came from Michael Domet, 20th century English philosopher from Oxford University. So yeah, a fatalist will have this kind of thinking.   If you're not, then it's inevitable that you're not going to be killed. So it is inevitable that you are going to be killed or not by a bomb. I think a better way of thinking about this argument If you're bound to be the pope, either you're going to be a pope or not. If you're going to be the head of the Catholic Church or not, you're not going to be the head of the Catholic Church.   Either way, it's inevitable that either you're going to be a pope or not. So that's one way of generating this kind of fatalist attitude, this fatalist argument. And if you look at that kind of fatalism vis-a-vis our puzzle, it looks like, yes, that's right. That's the fatalist attitude that we are in. When you think about being cheap and goat, and then you're thinking about it in terms of what's inevitable for you in the future in the afterlife. Again, these are argument analogs, especially the tenses. Notice that now we're using present tense in both instances. So no fancy footwork, then feature tense, distinction with present tense, or still using present tenses here. So the fatalist attitude is generated using the same language, same tense. So they are perfect analogs, so to speak. Now, here's the thing about inevitability. So our sense of fatalism, as we have seen here, that events are inevitable seems to stem from the idea that if something happened, then it must happen. That is, if I ate eggs this morning, then necessarily I ate eggs this morning.  Our sense of inevitability that we have in this kind of fatalist argument that we're playing around with. Now, the response, why are you denying the inevitability here, would be something like, if something did happen, was it inevitably happened? Think about it. If something happened, or if something happened, is it inevitable to happen? Think about that kind of attitude. And you'll see that we could distinguish between two types of necessity at work here, or inevitability at work. So we could compare something like necessarily if P is the case, then P is the case, and if P is the case, then necessarily P is the case. When we think about the fatalist premise, the sense of necessity is in the second one. But the second one is false, plainly false. Because P might actually be true, but it is not necessary that it's true. Now, compare this one with the first one. Not necessarily if P is the case, then P is the case. Now, one is just terribly true. This thing here, if P is the case, then P is... If I am doing a lecture now, I'm doing a lecture now, that's trivial, that's a tautology, it's necessarily true. Yes, that's right. But it doesn't mean that if I'm doing a lecture now, it's necessary that I'm doing a lecture now. I could have been somewhere else. Right? Can I not sing? Right? And so on and so forth. So the necessity here does not work for premise two. It works for, sorry, for the second instance, it works for the first instance. So what's the lesson that we could learn here? Well, when we go back to the fatalist argument, you see that there's something wrong with premises two and three here. Right?  Nope, it's not inevitable that you'll be killed by a bomb. Or you'll be a pope. And so on. Okay? So it's just false. If something did happen, it must inevitably have happened. Now, could we use this kind of technique, this kind of argument? Or this kind of reason to deny the premises in our puzzle? Okay? Well, if we do that, then even if you are essentially a sheep or a goat, it is not necessary that you're bound to be in heaven. No. Sorry. Because the philosophers love you. Here, you have a question. No, the battle is not over yet. I have a woman with you. Those are the philosophers. So let's try to question the responses. So let's try to revive the notion of inevitability. Let's be fatalists. So the theological underpinning of the puzzle implies that if you are a sheep, then you are bound to be in heaven. Otherwise, you are bound to be in heaven. However, this boundedness is a different form from the inevitability from what we have discussed earlier. Is it possible to be bound to be inevitable? Sorry, it is possible to be bound, but it is not inevitable. If it is inevitable, it is bounded, but if it is bounded, it is not necessarily inevitable. To think about boundedness, it seems like you have the two premises here. Looks like, in the fatalist argument earlier, it is not the form of our premises 2 and 3. Rather, it is of this form. Some other thing will be the highest. So yes, that's right. Yes, we could deny the inevitability idea here, but our two premises, if you are essentially a sheep, then you are bound to be with God in heaven. It does not look like this. It is not this. It is something else. So we can't use that technique to undermine the argument. So far, from responses 2 to 6, all of them accepted that the argument is valid. All of them accepted that it is valid because they are denying one of the premises. But let's look at a response that denies the validity of the argument. How can you deny the validity of the argument? The structure is solid.  Well, we could do this if we deny the exhaustiveness nature of your order. Because again, premise 1 assumes that you're either one or two, but not both. But why accept this? Can't you be both? This is my third time to present this paper. I am finalizing it for publication somewhere in the future. But I can't help but think about this particular response. This is my favorite response so far. I'm for this response. Why? Well, you could think about it in terms of a Venn diagram. So you have a sheep, you have a goat, but you could be this. You are essentially a sheep, and you are essentially a goat. We are always thinking about goats and sheep in terms of a mutually exclusive set of categories that you can't be both. But there is a possibility that you are a geep. Now, when I was searching the internet for a picture, it turns out that there is such a thing as a geep. I'm not sure if this is a hoax. You tell me. But yes, there's a geep. It's a thing which is both a sheep and a goat. So I think that they are mutually exclusive. So what's the punch line here? There's an analogy. So we could think about sheep and goats because it's just binary. But you can think about that some things are both true and false. If you want an analogy using true and false, truths and falsities, sheeps and goats, right and wrong. You could think of gluts. Right now, there's an exciting field in logic known as glutty logic. So there's a gaffy logic that we have discussed a while ago. You have the binary logic of true and falsity. And there's a glutty logic. That's why it's glutty. It accepts truths and falsities. So this is a fat conception of truth. So we could have sentences which are both true and false. Consider three such sentences. So you could have the liar sentence as a really interesting example. Or you could have mundane sentences like a sentence about motion and a sentence about choice. I'll show you these examples. So here's the liar sentence. So consider the sentence. This sentence in red highlight is false. Question, is that sentence true? This is your classic, I am lying to you right now. I kissed you wrong.  So this sentence in red highlight is false. Now, is it true? If you're thinking in terms of binaries of truths and falsities, you'll have a problem because if it is true, then what it says holds. So since it says that it's false, if it is true, it's false. On the other hand, if it is false, then what it says does not hold. So since it says it's false, then it's true. So the liar sentence here is false. Have you seen that? That's the argument. Hello, can you hear me? Are you still here? Yes, sir. Can you still see me? Can you still hear me? Did you hear the argument? Can you hear me? Am I flaky? Yes, sir. Alright, we can hear you now. So I was unstable. Going back, so the argument for some sentences are poetry and false. So the liar sentence is an example of that one. And there's another example about motion. If I say I am moving, I'll ask you, is it true? Well, if I'm moving, then I'm moving from one point to another. If I'm moving from one point to another, then I'm not in one particular point. I'm in a constant flux. Thus, if I'm moving, I am, and I'm not at a particular point. That's just the definition of motion. It's a displacement from one place to another, one point to another. So if you're moving, you're not at, you are at the same point at the same time. So that's another sentence that's true and false. Another one is a sentence about choice. So if you're saying that I'm choosing between this or that, if you ask the question, is that true? Well, if you're choosing this or that, then you are yet to make a choice between those two things. So if you're yet to make a choice, then you are in a state where you are both making and not making the choice. So when you are choosing, you are, and you are near those sentences. If you think about this, these are weird things. Gluts are really weird things, and they behave weirdly as well, logically speaking. So two philosophers have tried to discern the logical behavior of this kind of glut. So one is my friend's grand priest. Right now, he's the graduate, sorry, Cooney Center City University of New York. He's doing still alive and well. The other guy is from Dr. D'Cella just emailed, just messaged me. Shrondiger, yeah, in a way, yes. Shrondiger's cat, it's dead and not dead at the same time. It's a glut, yeah. So to think about the logic of that, so this guy, grand priest, developed a logic. Independently, it was also developed by the Brazilian, I think, C. Asenho. Their logic looks like this one. So here's Grimm, good friend of mine, learned a lot from him. So what we call the logic is the logic of paradox. So we'll call it LP for our case, or it's the glotty logic. So like the L3, Rukasavich's logic, it's a three-valued logic. So you have true, false, and the glut. So instead of thinking about gaps, you think about gluts. One thing about the glotty logic is that it denies the law of non-contradiction. D'Basavich or Hanina, may law of excluded middle, and may law of non-contradiction. So the law of non-contradiction looks like this in logical form. So it's not the case that PS2 and not PS2. So the logic, if you accept gluts, you need to dispense of this because some things will be both true and false. Both the case and not the case. Also, one curious thing about the logic is that it's not an explosive logic. It's a bit technical. So the explosive nature of logic is your logic is explosive if you accept that from a contradiction anything follows. So the logic that you have learned in school, your elementary logic, symbolic logic, even I think a bit of the traditional Aristotelian logic, if you look at what's going on there, it's also an explosive logic because from a contradiction, if you have a proposition in its contradictory thing, you could generate any other proposition. Now if you use this kind of thinking, of gluts, then we could have a way to respond to the argument. Here's one way. So instead of denying any of the premises here, you don't need the premises. You accept the premises. But the conclusion won't follow. Why? Because you have a case where in all of these things will be either true or both true or false and false, right? But you could have a false conclusion. I won't get into the technical details of the logic itself, but I'll just assure you that if you have this kind of logic, you could show that the argument is invalid. So you have a case where in this one will be both true and false. You are essentially a sheet and you're essentially a goat because you could have that glut in your thinking. This one will be both true and false as well, right? This part here. So this makes this thing both true and false. But again, you have reasons to deny the conclusion, even if you grant that the argument is valid in this logic. Now, some problems about the LP solution now of treating people like us as both sheep and goats. First, its rationality. Is it even rational to believe in guts? So a recent work that I've done thinks about this. Is it reasonable to believe in guts? That there are sentences which are true and false? Or another way is that this means that we have a sheep and a goat nature. So we are essentially a geep. So here are some tentative rejoinders against those things. The question is, is it even rational to believe in guts? Yep, by an inference of the best explanation. So there's an argument that if you take in sentences like the sentence from motion, sentence about choice as both true and false, then you need the logic to handle those things. So yeah, it's reasonable to believe in guts. Does this mean that we have a sheep and a goat nature? Yes, we have a good side and a bad side. That's just being human. But are we essentially geeps? Nope, because it's possible that we have an entirely sheep nature or an entirely goat nature. So I think we have gone through a lot of things already. So some conclusions. Can you still hear me? Yes. So yeah, last part. So I'm wrapping up now. So what I presented you here is the puzzle of sheep and goats. So this is just an exploration of how we could use the tools of analytic philosophy to think about theological doctrines, theological things. How to use the available resources of logic, metaphysics. How to think about whether we are sheep or we are goats. Now I also outlined seven possible responses to the puzzle. I am for the last option, but I'm still weighing my options here because I think you can still make possible criticisms. So I'm still working on that. So if we could have a good discussion later about this one, it would be helpful. But I think the main thing that I want to instill is that, of course, if you are a theologian, if you are a seminarian, you're going for the priesthood or whatnot, you need to have at least this kind of attitude of faith-seeking understanding. And you can use the tools of analytic philosophy to help you out in your theological endeavors. Salamat. Thank you very much. That ends my presentation. Thank you so much, J.J. Joaquin, for such an interesting and knowledge-failing discourse. Our logic notes in our heads are being refreshed. And in just quite a brief manner, not usually a lengthy one, you were able to share in full the topic we have at hand. So the ideology being looked at in the lens of logic, even past the metaphysical talks, and other sorts of philosophical concerns and almost never-ending argumentations, expounding and bridging out all of the underlying questions and concerns from this seemingly quite simple argumentation or the puzzle of sheep and goats, so to speak. Because of our view of salvation and our faith in God and even our own selves as followers of Christ are being talked about here. All right, at this juncture, we should now move on to the panel discussion and joining Dr. Joaquin, our some lucky representative of each class, starting with Mark Vincent Thomas of the Class of St. Mary of the Archangel, currently Brett Gattapia from the Class of St. Therese of Calcutta, Josh Iron, Ethan Chavez of the Class of St. Paul the Apostle, and Mark Caesar Adarlo of the Class of St. Luke the Evangelist. Okay, I guess we should start with Ayan. Good morning, sir. Sir Jay, I'm a very informative talk, your presentation. I don't know if this is a big question, but it's a bit different in theology or philosophy. But I prepared two questions. First question, why does eschatology matter today, especially now this time of the pandemic, at the same time, these times that the cold, the typhoons that we experienced, why does eschatology matter today? Second question, after hearing your talk, you also presented the verse to Matthew. I remember the verse in Jeremiah, before I form you in the dome, I know you, before you were born, I set you apart, and so on and so forth. At the same time, I don't remember what the verse was, but the one that was repeated, he determined the time set for them. So my question is, is it possible, sir, that we are also being determined, like the sheep and the goat, because we believe God is omniscient, because he already knows how and where we could live. So is it more of a determination rather than fatalism or more fatalism? So that's my question, sir. Okay, so that's lovely. Lovely question. Smart. I like the question. I'm really interested. This is the second one before the first one. So this one is really a fatalist argument. It's not a determinist argument. So determinism is just to distinguish the two things here. So determinism is the thesis that given the loss of nature, given the history of the universe, we could predict in a way what will happen in the future. Or there's a cause in everything that we do. So that's only our thinking about determinism. So the thesis that we are playing around with, it's not of that sort. So it's not a contingent premise. It's not a contingent proposition. We're thinking about if necessarily you are a goat, then you'll be in. It's inevitable that you'll be in. What's this in hell? So your fatalist argument is more of an a priori or logical premise. It's true. If it is true, it's necessarily true. So determinism is more of, if it is true, it's contingently true. It's a fact about the world. The world is either determined or it's not determined. So that's the answer there. So the argument that we're playing around with is more fatalistic rather than deterministic. The first question is about the point that we're talking about in the eschatological fatalism. If, you know, given the pandemic, you can really think about it now. If God permits this kind of thing, that's for sure. That's how it is. That's how you think about fatalistic. But I think the challenge will be, do we want to be fatalists? That's why we were questioning the whole endeavor there of this kind of fatalistic edge. I'm not a fatalist, by the way. Although I believe that there are sufficient reasons for things, but I don't believe that we're fated to be whatever. We still have a certain handle of what's going on with our lives. So the attitude of people is that if, you know, the argument that started the pandemic, my own argument, if I'm going through COVID, I'm going through COVID. I'm not going through COVID. That's the attitude. But I don't think that works in that kind of argumentation. That's why it's safe. That's why it's at home. Because I'm not COVID. So it's not inevitable that I'm going through COVID. It's up to you. It's still up to you if you want to be safe or not safe. Going back to Jem, I think it's in the, before I, whatever, I already know you. Classic, like fatalist argument. Then I don't think that we could attribute fatalism to that idea. It's more of omniscience perhaps. So that's a different idea of God is omniscient because he knows everything. That gives you a different puzzle altogether. There's an interesting work on the problems of omniscience. It's a different class of philosophy. But if you're interested, if I could share my slide, can you share my slide? If you're still interested here, because I have a series of lectures on philosophy of religion, I'm writing a book on philosophy of religion. One argument that I'm playing around with is argument against omniscience. I wrote it down. That's why I wrote it down. Because I also hosted Jeremiah here in this passage. So, there's an interesting epistemic problem. Dr.  Can you generate a Get Your Problem case on omniscience to God? Yes, there could be within the vicinity of omniscience literature. You can generate. One guy who's doing a lot of work there is Patrick Grimm. He has worked on the problems of omniscience. If you're interested there, you can watch it. But it's more omniscience rather than fatalism per se. I think. Thank you. It's very much for the questions. Thank you, sir. Next is a question or some words? Good morning. I just thought it's possible to accept the arguments. If we accept it, we will deny God's omniscience and repotence and everything. It's possible to accept and then we accept the denial of God's omniscience. Then, be a negative. We will say that he's not omniscient because he's more than omniscient. I don't know. Because he has a medieval philosopher who said I like the attempt here, Kirk. I think you're on to something. But let me just clarify some things about the via-negative thing. The medieval technique of arguing for a positive thesis via-negative about God. It means that God is not omniscient. Rather, it's the idea that God is not limited in knowledge. Because the style of via-negative let's have some properties that we attribute, for example to ourselves or to any finite being, or created being, and we deny those things and arrive at some attributes to God. That's a kind of physiological technique philosophical technique. One guy who did that is the Jewish philosopher actually, Maimonides. He's a guy to the perplexed. He was thinking about God, but you can't really fatum the enormity of God. He's not us. He's not finite. He's not limited. He's not changing and so on and so forth. I'm not sure if you could use that here in this puzzle. Let's deny that God is omniscient or let's deny that God is omnipotent.  Because God is omnipotent. God is omnibenevolent. God is omniscient. If you extend this argument if you like not to extend it as an argument against the existence of God, you can do it. Thank you, Mr. Gatapia. Let us now move on to Mr. Thomas. Good morning, sir. Good morning, brothers. One of the questions that popped up in my mind during this symposium is that if I could be a sheep or a sheep and also a goat what would happen then? Is there an assurance if ever that a person will show according to the argument or to the person? Okay. Okay, okay. So I'll take your question as suppose that we are sheeps or sheeps as Dr. Dacela is also saying that there is another person who is not a sheep but a sheep. Okay.  Your question is what's going on there in this kind of picture? So how does it relate to the puzzle? In the following way. There's a third possibility. So you're not just a sheep. There's a goat but they're not usually exclusive because there's a third possibility that you're both a sheep and a goat.   Now how does it work? Now this is the pain in the head to think. So at the end of the days, you're just a goat.   So just be steady. What's the question? That's the topic of the other paper that I was working on. So how do you think about hell and heaven if there's a third possibility in your purgatory idea? Perhaps to go to purgatory not to heaven or hell. Now I know you're I don't know if you know the doctrine of purgatory but the doctrine of purgatory is safe zone. You're close to heaven but the problem is you need to be a little bit wet, right? You need to be wet so you can swim in the sky. You can't do anything when you're in purgatory but the people you left can go to heaven for you. That's an interesting prospect but again it generates another sort of puzzle. So how do you distinguish someone from heaven and someone from purgatory or someone from hell if there's a little difference that God's criterion for accepting you to heaven is C. That's the criterion. Go to heaven if there's a C. Question What if Kirk Hi Kirk. What are you doing? Hello So Kirk he has a C but he almost got it he barely got the C. Then Thomas but not quite he got the C.  That's the question so if that's the case it would God be just you could question God's justice it's okay so that's a different puzzle altogether but the answer to your to your question about geeps, we are geeps we could be sheep sorry sheep we could be gods at the end of days but if you remain a geep all throughout your life then so be it That's all Thanks Thank you Thomas Good morning Mr. Chavez let us hear from Mr. Aaron Joshua Calderon from the third year class Good morning sir good morning brothers so my question is going back to the first premise I would want to clarify it father can you define again the difference between the essentiality and the necessity not all father sorry what does it imply when one says one is essentially a sheep or one is necessarily a sheep we need a clarification Dr. Jay I don't need one father sorry I'm already on the hill sorry I'm back okay were you able to grasp the question of Mr. Calderon Dr. Jay actually I don't have one I'm already on the hill I'm already on the hill okay the question is going back to the first premise I would want to clarify sir can you define what is the difference between the essentiality and necessity and what does it imply when one says one is essentially a sheep or when one is necessarily a sheep actually that's an interesting question and right now father max and I are in a debate is father max here are you here no you need to know father max so we are thinking about necessities and essential natures I like the question very much and I'm right now I'm grappling with how do you distinguish between necessities and essentialities here's one stab at the problem necessities you can think about necessities in terms of you have better way of putting it for you think about sentences when do we say that a sentence is necessarily true one way of cashing that out is in terms of possible worlds so this is the logic of the content when we say that something is necessarily true it means that that sentence is through in all possible worlds so what's an example of a necessary through sentence perhaps mathematical sentences will be necessarily true because it's true in all possible worlds now how do you think about essential things obviously it's not essential for you to be a human being sorry it's not necessary for you to be a human being because you could have been an alligator for all we know uha being alligator possibility for you but because you are a human being you have some essential features of being a human being uha ba so you might here's the take the take is you could have a different set of properties but once you have them you have them essential so you could distinguish them in necessities and essentialities now one guy who's doing a lot of work regarding this if you're interested but in heavy duty metaphysics or heavy duty yeah heavy duty metaphysics I'll just show you this guy he's a friendly friend so here's one guy who's doing really excellent works he kept fine so he has a work as essence where he distinguishes between necessities on the one hand and essences on the other hand okay so if I tell you you are essentially a sheep you are essentially a human being well it's not necessary that you are a human being could have been some other thing okay if reincarnation is true then you might have been something else or you might be something else in the future I hope you don't know that but it could have been but that's necessity but essentiality is a different breed all together it's a property that you have without which you're not the same thing you get it you get it without that property you are not that thing Aeron Joshua Calderon if he's not a human being he's not Aeron Joshua Calderon okay so that's the property which is essential to you but does it mean that your existence is a necessary existence that being a human being is a necessary thing for you no you could have been some other thing or but it won't exist so those are possibilities so it's not true Aeron Calderon is necessarily a human being but since you are a human being you are essentially a human being because you have some natures which are essential to you I like the question because it's making me think right now I'm doing another work share ko narin eto yung pinag tatalu na namin if Father Maxel the other day because I'm writing a piece on this one so I have a friend and he just published this paper so he just thought he's Jerdal just last month so he offered a way to think about Christology the two natures of Christ he's fully divine and fully human so he's offering a way of thinking about that in terms of modalities or necessary properties across possible worlds I'm thinking that there's something wrong with this paper I'm writing a piece on this one so if you could help out that would be great what I'm saying is there's a distinction between necessary property and Christ might be Jesus Christ might be essentially human and divine but it's not necessary it's human and divine you can't attribute necessity and possibilities as attributes of God of Christ so in Christology it's more of a Christology of essences rather than necessities or possibilities so it's a direct reply to this interesting article actually thanks I like that thank you thank you at this point the platform is now open for other questions clarifications and comments in response to today's topic kindly make yourself recognized if you have one or you may use the chat feature and either I or one of the representatives of IFC will read your words let me begin with a question coming from Dr. Darcella he asks that the GLEAP solution inconsistent with God's omniscience I don't know if this is a legit one Dr. Darcella yeah it's still consistent because God knows that you are a GLEAP so he doesn't have the omniscience in that case does it generate the fatalist conclusion? nope it's not generated does it go against omniscience nope it does not at least as we look at it because the free will defense or whatever so you could have that well card if you are going for that did he just question the legitimacy of yes he did no Dr. Darcella okay any other questions please Dr. Darcella okay I guess Mr. Hoson Mr. Biel Hoson has a question good morning sir Joaquin I really like the symposium today it's really thought provoking and mind-boggling I just want to go back to your slide what translation you used I just want to clarify the translation you used okay we have a bible expert here it's not that's good actually I'm already here in the translation can you see my slide yes so I'm using the new version I think it's the NSV new standard version of the bible okay it has an obstacle and an imprimatur so I think it's accepted by the catholic church I like it yeah if I'm not mistaken it's using the new standard version NSV it's called the King James version it's not a protestant version I mean using the catholic version NSRV that's right NSRV I just noticed verse 32 before he will be gathered all the nations and he will separate people one from another as a shepherd separates the sheep from the goat so what I'm currently thinking regarding this verse is we should not literally take we are fated we are fated or determined that we are a sheep or goats but the point of this is that we will be divided or we will be gathered or separated but not necessarily that we are not a we are sheep or goats yeah I like that actually that's one comment when I presented this one somewhere because this is what he was reading look at the next part of the gospel so what he said look at the I was hungry and you gave me something to eat and so on and so forth so it's an action so it's a good work that generated that's why he became a sheep but here's the problem with that interpretation if you're thinking about God came and he will just separate the things the good people from the bad people will be in the good place and the bad people will be in the bad place my problem is why did he use the sheep and goats it's like a substantial distinction so if you're a sheep you can't be a goat or if you're a goat you can't be a sheep now there's a long history why sheep and goats were used in the bible but I'm not really interested in the biblical interpretation or biblical I'm more concerned about let's suppose that this is the interpretation that you have a strong idea about the sheep is and the goat is since if you're a goat you can't be a sheep if you're a sheep you can't be a goat so if that's the highest what will happen that's the motivation why I thought about the puzzle it seems like the parable implies a kind of faith you might reject that interpretation well and good because it's not consistent with some other gospel version I think John has a different formulation of this one but again I'm open if you go for that kind of exegesis but the point of the presentation is not exegesis it's more of the thing about the philosophy underlying the parable how does it relate to some doctrines like soteriology, salvation how is it related to eschatology and stuff but I like that, thanks thank you thank you Mr. Hausan any other questions good morning doctor I just want to can you hear me? yes yes I just want to ask for seek for some classification I don't know if a soteriology still applies to this because it is hero we know that it is hero proposed non-contradiction principle thank you for introducing to many of us this contemporary logic because we are used to eschatology and logic that is what we practice here this is something very complicated for me it is very complicated analytic logic but the question is what role does the principle of non-contradiction play in this synthesis between goat or goat or goat or goat or goat does it have something to do with the the goat thanks Joshua, thanks for inviting me by the way Dr. Darcella told me that I am alive I will tell you if it is true yes if it is true thank you Mark Darcella for advertising me to this bunch that is good we are promoting our brand of doing philosophy going back the law of non-contradiction is an integral idea Aristotle's whole logic actually whole philosophy just to get it out there so integral in principle of non-contradiction I think it is an action for it is a self-evident truth in Aristotle system now what is the problem with the non-contradiction as I said if the non-contradiction the principle of the law of non-contradiction is right then what do we say about the liar paradox about sentences about motion sentences about change and sentences about choice because it seems like you have reasons to reject the law of non-contradiction as I have shown it a while ago now how does it relate how does the non-contradiction relate to the parable and the puzzle that I have gave well I have motivated the puzzle in terms of the first premise that either you are essentially a goat or essentially a sheep but not both the qualification of not both you cannot be both because if you are both there is a contradiction that is why you need to have the principle of non-contradiction now how does my solution the logic of paradox address this kind of puzzle well if you are going for the logical paradox that I have shown you need to define the principle or the law of non-contradiction that means the argument is valid but the conclusion is the premise is already true the conclusion is false so the argument is that that is the work that I do at least here in the solution of the plot okay did I answer your question it's not that thank you for clarifying so there yeah there's another guy probably a citation but that's really what I feel I've already shown you so if you're interested there's another guy I'll just show his face again so this guy is Game Priest he wrote what's his book so that's the that's a book about truth to be a liar so John I think the first chapter questions Aristotle's principle of non-contradiction so he saw actually Aristotle does not hold the principle of non-contradiction that's the claim because I'm not sure if his history of logic is right but according to him Aristotle's logistic logic the original one not the thing that you're studying here in the seminary there's an AEO universal affirmative etc. etc. but Aristotle has only three universal affirmative the original Aristotle if you look at posterior analytics and I thought Aristotle's logic not Aristotle's logic so you have universal affirmative universal negative then particular positive then you define the O in terms of E and I that's why you have the syllogism of Phereo so the Phereo the E I O syllogism then you define the O in terms of E and I but you don't define the O as part of Aristotle's thing now going back to Aristotle so Aristotle if you have A an E preposition and an I preposition in the square of square of opposition so A E A E I O wait don't square of so you can see if you don't visualize in your brain there we go look at this one so what Aristotle said I have an E preposition and an I preposition I have a contradictory preposition but he said you can't generate any conclusion so no valid syllogism could be attained from E I A especially if it's about the same thing if you say no ASB no ASAM ASB that's an interesting result because if that's the case and Aristotle's logic is not an explosive logic as Graham would say so it means maybe Aristotle himself does not abide by the principle of non contradiction that's interesting it's an interesting thing if you want to get into that the argument of the priest it's a metaphysical thesis but it's not a logical principle it's a metaphysics that you could deny because you could have a different metaphysics altogether but it's not a logical principle it's not a principle of reason that's interesting thank you Mr. Aufhorn I would like to read this question from an anonymous brother if being a goat or a sheep is your faith then isn't it unfair for those who are destined to be a goat like are they considered as victim of destiny for making them goat and not a sheep instead that's what we talked about Omni benevolence if you have a God who's really all loving why are you a goat who has a sheep and a goat why would God separate a sheep from a goat if he truly loves us then we will actually I don't know if this is our right interpretation of Luther but that's what they say about Protestant ethics they say that we are destined to be a predestination idea it's a fatalist idea as well that's why he sells ideas that we are all saved we are all going to the land don't worry be happy that's it but on the other hand I'm not sure if you want to go that way as well because it seems like if you're fated to be in heaven or fated to be if you're fated to be whatever it seems like even if you don't have anything to do right? if you're fated to be a pope then even if you're a bull or a seminary even if you're a fool you will still be a pope but that's the right way of thinking thank you here's another one from anonymous brother also while I was listening to the talk regarding fatalism Saint Augustine's predestination also came up in my mind my question is it could be possible that Augustine's predestination be a response to the puzzle yes it is actually you just accept your fate just clarify so Augustine as far as I know it's a systemic take on predestination it's not really a metaphysical take that you are fated to be rather yes you are fated to be but you don't know you're going to twist Augustine's dialogue with his son it's in the freedom of the willy at that work so what's going on there it's also an outcome solution because they are it's not really an open future it's still contingently true or false that some proposition or some fact will obtain or some proposition will be true however we just don't know that's the twist it's an epistemic twist you're fated to be with God in heaven actually for Augustine our good but there are only levels of good that's why evil is generated but we're all going to save that's the idea of the Augustine solution but since you went to divine supposedly so yeah you could go for that solution but do you want to go back so you won't do the right thing that you did in your life just keep going I don't know thank you are there any questions or words going once alright I guess there's no more questions Doc J thank you so much brothers for active participation in this this course please take some words of gratitude from us to be given by Mr. Kenji Aragon our revised community good morning on behalf of the philosophy department with our director father and our dean of studies father I would like to thank you doctor sorry first and foremost for making your presence available for this symposium this symposium of ours won't be feasible without such passionate speaker like you also thank you for imparting your knowledge about the given topic by providing both affirmation and negation lenses to answer the puzzle of the sheep and goats and the astrological fatalism truly we are blessed to have you as our speaker for this morning giving such substantial informative talk once again thank you doctor Jeremiah thank you thank you once again we thank you so much doc JJ let us once again give him a virtual yet warm round of applause I hope you learn something do doc J the topic is really interesting for us here and before this I I challenge you father max I challenge you if you're interested in this kind of heavy duty theology share your last so you can see the developments I said earlier that there is a school of thought that is going out and I hope that some of you will join this one and I think there are some scholarships offered at St. Andrews the Logos Institute for Analytics theology so I have some friends working on this kind of logic sorry it's a big thing that's happening and I think there are some scholarships sorry this kind of thing so if you're interested please do join this okay thank you Dr. Jeremiah stay safe always and we hope to see you here in San Carlos soon at this juncture we now move on to the next part of the program which is the sharing of Mr. Calidiens philosophy entry but before that we will now go for a 5 minute break in order for Mr. Devin to prepare his presentation be back at 11 11-11


injury-wise thinking in particular Garner Gay obviously? Yeah he's still settling down and Armadou's got a groin thing similar to Garner's actually which are just settling down so we'll make a more decision on them tomorrow. Arnie's doing well with his ankle but it's obviously a longer term situation and he's doing really well I just smoked him actually just before I came in and he's in a good place and with that side of things and going well. Andre's been back on the grass with us he's going well and Deli's focus is just getting fit you know nothing other than that obviously he's got a period yet but I mean he's just focusing on that.