hina has a little bit of DNA in the North Korean nuclear program. But what he really meant was China's not gonna get involved. It's your problem, give the North Koreans what they want. And you know, China, US pushed hard for this, but China hosted the six-party talks in the Security Council now. China's usually on our side, not usually less than we want, but usually agreeing to sanctions. China's implementing sanctions much less than we want, but implementing them on balance. I think that US-China cooperation on North Korea has been positive. It has not been enough to stop North Korea, but that doesn't mean that it wasn't worth doing. The strategic mistrust is growing between US and China. I think that's structural to a large extent, almost inevitable. It will probably make North Korea cooperation harder. You heard that from all of us, but I still think that more can be done. I think the US and China can do a lot more in the tactical area. I think how we deal with W and D, how we deal with North Korean terrorist acts, frankly, attacks like the one on Kim Jong-un and so forth, there are areas in tactics and management of the North Korea problem and the consequences of North Korea's programs, where the US and China could probably do more at a tactical level. I think at a strategic level, we could have a much more effective dialogue with China if the US could be more predictable. I know that's not easy now. Some people think the way to get more strategic trust with China is to have a grand bargain when we agree on certain things on the Korean Peninsula. No US troops north of the DMZ, independent unification, yada, yada, yada. I think that's a useless endeavor, frankly, that these big principles are gonna be counterproductive. There's a very strong chance that if we do this, Japan, our ally will be deeply anxious, but Korea would be anxious too about the US and China determined in the future of the Korean Peninsula. I think the best way to have a productive strategic dialogue with China is to have more predictability in our alliances, frankly. And when the administration beats Japan up on aluminum steel and Korea on everything from dishwashers to chorus, unpredictability can be off-putting for an adversary. However, one of our great strengths as a nation is our alliances and unpredictability is really off-putting for your allies and weakens our hand in dealing with China. It makes it harder for us to have the kind of strategic dialogue. If we were steady on things like trade and alliances, and if we had senior people with that background, they could sit down with the Chinese side and have a much more productive dialogue about how to make sure that the Korean Peninsula is an area where we don't turn towards conflict and where we manage the threats that we both face. We're not in that environment right now, but I do think there's a prospect for more cooperation, actually. And the way to get there is not some G2. The way to get there is for us to mind our overall Asia strategy and align with our allies and then go to China and talk about the Korean Peninsula knowing full well the equities of Korea and Japan in the process, but not representing them. Before we thank the panelists, I wanna invite everyone to stick around for lunch in the Great Hall, where Ambassador Mark Lippert will be giving a keynote speech. You can get to the Great Hall either through this door down here or the door up top and then we'll have volunteers take you down the stairs back to the Great Hall. Thank you so much. Please join me in thanking our panelists. Check, check, check, check, two, two. Good afternoon, everyone. We're gonna go ahead and get started with our keynote, our luncheon keynote today. My name is Oriana Schuyler, Master, I'm an assistant professor of security studies at Georgetown University, one of the co-organizers of this conference. It's my great pleasure to introduce Ambassador Mark Lippert as our luncheon keynote today. Ambassador Lippert is currently the Vice President of International Government Affairs at Boeing. Prior to that, as most of you know, he was the US Ambassador to the Republic of Korea. He has also served in a number of senior positions in the Department of Defense, including as Chief of Staff to Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel and as an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs. It was in that position that I actually first met Ambassador Lippert. He was kind enough to meet with me at the Pentagon when I was there, I think, as a second lieutenant, which I always think says a lot about people in important positions who make time to meet, mentor, and counsel those below them. Ambassador Lippert also served in the White House as Chief of Staff to the National Security Council and in other senior staff positions in the United States Senate. Ambassador Lippert is also a veteran. He's been mobilized to active duty with the United States Navy from 2009 to 2011 as an intelligence officer, and this included a deployment to Afghanistan. From 2007 to 2008, he deployed as an intelligence officer with SEAL Team 1 in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. For all of his service, both as a civilian and as in the military, he's received a number of awards and decorations for example, he received the Bronze Star Medal for his service in Iraq, the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, and the Basic Parachute Dispatch. He's also the recipient of the Department of Defense's Distinguished Public Service Award and the Department of the Navy's Distinguished Public Service Award. Most importantly, as a fellow Stanford graduate myself, he graduated from Stanford with a BA in political science and holds an MA in international policy studies from Stanford as well. He has studied Mandarin Chinese at Beijing University and obviously since I just heard him when we were having lunch speaks Korean as well. So please join me in inviting Ambassador Lippert to the stage for his keynote remarks. I will thank you captain now, I guess. Been promoted and professor and holder of many titles and real honor to be here today and thanks again to Georgetown and USIP for putting on a great conference. I got to hear a little bit of the panel before and I understand there was a really interesting discussion about Chinese views on unification and really, again, I think speaks to the work that USIP and Georgetown are doing on this issue. Let me also say I'm a little down this morning. Dusan, my favorite Korean baseball team was beaten soundly by the Hanwha Eagles so I'm a little down but Dusan was on an eight game winning streak literally every day, my excuse is it helps me with my Korean language but I do wake up virtually every morning and watch Dusan on the neighbor app. I highly recommend it, it keeps me close to South Korea. I think the challenge of giving a talk like this is the wide variety and deep expertise of folks in this room. I think there are some people who know just a heck of a lot more about this subject in me. There are folks who like General Pio, like Jaws over there, experts on military issues that they've forgotten more about military strategy and tactics than I will ever know. So what I thought I would do here is just do about a 20 minute kind of primer overview to just level set and then really get into a Q and A because I think that's where the value is in these is really the audience experience and really inviting comments, not just questions because I think this is an environment, especially with I'm looking out at the folks here, you just can learn a lot and that's what this really, this forum's all about. So let me dig in, try to do about 20 minutes like I said and why don't I start with something that I think is often overlooked but incredibly important in all of this. It's the neighborhood, the neighborhood in which this is all operating and people often wanna go right to the US and North Korea and sort of don't necessarily take into account the context in which, the regional context in which this is happening. Let's just go through the neighborhood and I know some of this is self-evident and obvious but it's always I think important to remind us why this issue is so important. One of the reasons it's so important is the neighborhood in which it is unfolding. First, if you're around foreign policy circles long enough people know one of, if not the most important foreign policy issue that you deal with is nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons policy. It is in many respects, there's a reason people who are expert in this are called theologians. That is the status in which this part of foreign policy is held. And in this issue are three of the world, nuclear weapons states, three of the five declared nuclear weapons states. You also have North Korea obviously with its nuclear weapons program. That's why we're here and then you have a lot of countries, Korea, Japan, Taiwan, nearby that could break out as necessary. On the economy this really is the flight deck of the world's economy. The United States, China, Japan, Korea, four out of the top 15 economies right there so if you have a disruption in this neighborhood it's not gonna just be regional, it's not gonna just be in Asia, it's gonna be global. Third point people often overlook is look at the treaty alliances in the neighborhood of the five treaty allies we have in Asia. Two are right there obviously within close proximity. The Philippines not far away. 80,000 U.S. troops in proximity. The world's only U.S. forward deployed aircraft carrier. We also have our obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act as well. And so that is also, there's a lot of commitment there by the United States. It's obviously it's the other thing too that people often forget. It's a hub and spoke alliance system. It's not a NATO, it's not a collective security architecture so that complicates things in a way in terms of the way the U.S. has to maneuver through these different alliances. There are also critical bilateral relationships. Look at Beijing, look at Moscow. These are important, often complex, sometimes difficult issues for the United States and then locally you have really deep, often unresolved or under-resolved territorial and regional issues that I think add to the difficulty, the degree of difficulty or so just, I just wanted to set that up at the outset. The second thing I wanted to do quickly is just go through my own personal assessment of where the DPRK is just in terms of its leadership and we can get into their motivations later I think in the Q and A but just a little bit of a sort of a scene setter at first. I do think Kim Jong-un is in control. I do think he has control of the regime through a number of different instruments, the family name, the elite's fear of the regime collapsing and the whole hang together, hang separately, colloquialism you hear. I do think that he is a rational actor on the scene. I think there's an open question that's always interesting dealing with any country of how he perceives the world, how he perceives the United States and I think we're gonna get a lot more clarity on that in the coming days with the Inter-Korean Summit and then by the end of June. That's an interesting question. Thus far up until this point, really the last month or so, what has been interesting is he has looked very different from his father. He has been much more black and white. He has shown much less faith in diplomacy and negotiations and I think if you talk to folks you'd often get into a pretty interesting conversation. You would get into this conversation of, well, is he really smart and perceptive? In other words, is he essentially accumulating as much fissile material, nuclear missile technology to set himself up for a bargain or a negotiation or is he missing opportunities in terms of diplomatic outreach? One could argue the 2015 aborted trip to Russia, the lack of conversation with Beijing, the failure to follow through on inter-Korean talks in 2015 with the Pakenet regime. Is he missing opportunities to otherwise divide the coalition that is against him that has proven pretty robust in terms of sanctions? So I think the jury was still out and it still is out but that's often the debate you'd get into. Is he just avoiding smaller, what you would say smaller negotiations to save up for a big one or is he in the regime missing opportunities, not seeing those opportunities or just doesn't believe in diplomacy? And I think that's an interesting question as well. I've always said the last point I'd say is what I think is interesting here is, last two points is one, I felt he's in control, rational. My own belief though, the model he has built is hard to sustain over time, if not impossible. It's hard not to have no relationship with Beijing. It's hard to have your hard currency come way down dramatically. There are a whole host of other things but it always made me feel about a year ago that he was going to have to, the regime was probably gonna have to make some sort of diplomatic move relatively soon to address some of these shortcomings and I think one of the most interesting issues that they probably have to address are markets and information flow. We've seen that in terms of the book North Korea Confidential, it's review in the Chosunobo and the North Korean regime reaction to that which I think is a pretty interesting data point. So I have always felt that the model isn't necessarily sustainable. There probably needs to be some sort of diplomatic move. I think there's an open question as to whether or not this current round is that diplomatic move or not or if it's more of a stalling tactic, more on that later. Last, I think just again self-evident but what's interesting here in terms of the negotiations is the Kim Jong-un regime, the North Korean regime, especially over the last five years has made obviously nuclear weapons, the nuclear power status a key component of the regime and its legitimacy and I think that makes it a little less incompatible with some of the negotiating aims of the United States and the international community and we've seen recent comments in the press that the North Koreans are committed to denuclearization and I think that is a very interesting question which needs to be looked at in the coming days and weeks. Let me maybe just take a quick run through kind of the recent history and talk a little bit about I would say almost dramatic turn of events we've had over the last couple of months. You know, first there's the Olympics, right? Everybody followed that pretty closely. I think there's a question about the DPRK motivations here. I think, you know, first of all, I think they did wanna participate in the Olympics. I think there's some of that. Second, I think the field in terms of a liberal South Korean regime, a conservative United States presidency look very familiar. I think they also felt that there was very little cost to participating and in fact, it allowed them to test if the South-South split is alive and well, it allowed them to try to increase their popularity in the short term so there was a lot of benefit to participating in the Olympics and I think by most analysts' measures, they not only ran the play, they ran it pretty well in terms of the Olympics. It did give the South Koreans, I think, an important opening, an opportunity to I think express a certain degree of warmth, I think to test where the North Koreans are and to follow up and so then we have, we're quickly into the follow up meeting in Pyongyang between the South Koreans and the North and I think if you read the press carefully and you talk to South Korean friends during the meeting, the North Koreans committed to denuclearization, they agreed to let the US ROK exercises go forward and the South Koreans did make a strong point of emphasis on the need to remain firm on sanctions. I think there was also a recognition between the two Koreans, the two Korean sides that as important as inter-Korean talks are and as important and as sacrosanct is the peninsula is to the Korean people, that the United States had to be part of this equation and I think that's precisely what Moon Jae-in, President Moon was trying to do which was trying to bring the United States back to the table. What's interesting here is that there has not been a lot of direct statements or conversations by the North after this summit. You have a little bit, the language looks fairly familiar but you have on the other hand, you have the exercises did go forward and there seems to be some interesting private messaging that is unfolded here as well. So squaring that circle is important down the line as well. The only other thing I would say in terms of what I think the South Koreans are after here is obviously they want denuclearization talks, they are interested in de-escalation of tensions and possibly more engagement going forward. I think within the confines though that the South Korean side has been very clear about no preemptive reduction in sanctions and has taken I think a very pragmatic centrist line here. I think one of their also their overriding goals is to try to set up the US and the DPRK for a successful summit and I think what is really key in the inter Korean summit coming up is to find out where the DPRK is on some of their positions, what is their definition of denuclearization and how does the South Korean government then vector in and out of this conversation in the run up during and after the summit. Let me just come to a pretty interesting thing in terms of South Korea. You know, the president will be maneuvering in a very interesting political environment. I would say the Korean population is broadly supportive of Moon Jae-in's agenda and you look at his popularity, 60 to 70%. You know, from a guy who when he ran for president was at about 40, 45%. That's where he kind of moved. He's 30 points, 25 to 30 points above where he has been during the campaign. You have midterm elections in June which everybody is watching closely in South Korea. You have an opposition that does not seem to be unified and you know, the history of Korean politics in a grossly oversimplified way is the unified and organized side seems to win. And you look back at the last midterm elections, the conservatives look like they were headed for a super majority only to have public infighting break out, fall out and they were punished at the polls for it. The role of youth is interesting. I mean, I think it's widely reported here about the young Korean populations, I think skepticism about North Korea and you saw it in a little bit on the backlash of the hockey team decision. So I think it's a very interesting time in South Korean domestic politics and I think that's an important factor that a lot of people don't follow closely. Let me just quickly make a couple comments about the roles of the regional actor. I know we've had panel discussions on that here so I won't spend a lot of time on it but you know, I think the Chinese seemed in the short term, I think very pleased with the outcome in terms of getting folks back to the negotiating table. It seems like they're trying to figure out where they go from here in terms of the medium term and then longer term, I think I'm hoping that the panel solved the unification question in Beijing's mind but that's an interesting, tricky issue for them. You know, the Japanese I think were surprised. They felt a little isolated but I think now that you've got a summit coming between the president and the prime minister, I think that will be resolved pretty quickly and then, you know, the Russians are out there as well and that's an interesting question, their role in all of this. What does this mean, I think, for the US DPRK summit? I'm not here, I don't have answers, solutions. I think if I predicted it accurately I would be doing something else working in the financial markets because I would be a wealthy man but why don't I sort of go through and sort of say what I think's old, what I think's new and what are some of the key questions and outcomes. First, you know, what seems old is that, you know, first we're back in kind of talks with the North Koreans. Second, the language out of the North Korean, as I mentioned, does not seem all that new, a little bit new but mostly old. We are talking about denuclearization, the things that are out in the ether, our peace treaty, that's all old. That feels very, very familiar. And again, we will now be on the third iteration of the inter-Korean summit talks. That all seems kind of standard and has been out there. What's new, there's some interesting new things. First, obviously, you have the President at the United States meeting with the leader of North Korea for the first time. The size of the North Korean program is different. Sanctions pressure more severe than it's ever been. The exercises continuing, I think it's an interesting variable as well. The other thing too, and I think, you know, this was well laid out in the New York Times today, is that this is early in the President of the Republic of Korea's tenure. You think of when Kim Dae-jung, No Mi-hyun met. No Mi-hyun was almost out of office. Kim Jae-jung was latter in his term. So you have a possibility of repeat summits as well. And the South Koreans have already talked about that. You have public opinion in the Republic of Korea, as I mentioned, which is dramatically different from when the last time you had really inter-Korean summits in the No Mi-hyun or Kim Dae-jung administrations, you have, and then also you have, I would say, China's place in the world is very different than it was 10, 15, 20 years ago when this kind of a similar swirl happened. You have some interesting possible outcomes. You could have a good meeting that is largely symbolic. You could have a meeting that is symbolic with some substance, kind of in your punt, or you could have a framework that comes out. And you read, again, the South Korean statements today. I think they are hoping very much for the latter. Some sort of framework that puts together a grand bargain. Interestingly, of course, the U.S. and the North Koreans have been quite quiet on this. And I think that is really interesting is where are we headed with that? The risks are pretty self-evident. Obviously, if you have a bad meeting, a bad summit, it's hard to see where you go on diplomacy next. I think, you know, the good news is you do have a president of the Republic of Korea that's early in his tenure, but I think is resilient and committed to diplomacy. So that's less of a risk than it might otherwise be, but I think that is still out there. You have obviously the North Koreans making a meal of that internally, that in terms of their own propaganda. You have the fact that these opportunities don't come along very often, so you need to make the most of them. And then I think the question to me is what do you do out of this on sanctions? That's a really important variable going forward. So let me wrap up and just say, in the interest of getting to questions, couple of quick things. First, I think what, and I kind of touched on this earlier, but I just kind of wanted to, in conclusion, kind of give you some of the things that I am gonna be looking for as now someone, an analyst on the outside who's incredibly committed and interested in this, but obviously has no formal role. What I would say is first, how do we, even though we have seemingly incompatible long-term goals between the US and the North Koreans, can we find some sort of short and medium term agreement? And I think that's obviously an open question, but a very interesting one as well is how do you square the circle on different long-term goals in the short and medium term? And that's probably something that comes down to a lot of the definition of denuclearization and how that's interpreted. Second, what are the various negotiating strategies? Are we playing for time? Is this a real change? What is the timeline here? And I think that's obviously key. What is the appetite coming out of the summit for reduction of sanctions? I just view the sanctions as critical. I think they've been really important in getting the North to the table. They're really, I think, the most important piece of leverage. And so what's the appetite going forward? This comes to the next question is, can we get a better read on how much pressure Kim Jong-un and the North Korean regime is under at this point? That's a hard question, but will the two summits shed any light on that? And can we then vector and or change our negotiating strategy? Comes to the next question, which is, can Kim Jong-un's regime continue to sustain itself? This is not the 1990s with famine and collapse of the Soviet Union and post-Cold War, but it is an environment in which they are under really unprecedented sanctions pressure, which I've said before, and how much longer can they go on this? I've always felt personally that they've had to make a move, and the question is, is it shorter term, is it medium term, is it longer term? And related to that, is this, therefore, is this latest round in treaties by the North, is this a stall? Is this a play for time? Is it a play for hard capital? Or is this a real sea change in response to an international community that has really, I think, put a lot of unified around this question? And then last but not least, what I would say is, and this is the big black box that's going on right now, what are the outcomes of this flurry of diplomatic activity? And I think the more insight we get on that, what's gonna come out of the President-Prime Minister Summit? What's gonna come out of all of the talks that we've seen various and sundry reports about? Where is that going to lead us going forward? So those are kind of my universe of questions that I'm watching. It will be, nonetheless, something that will be interesting for all of us Korea Watchers to really, I think, dig into, analyze, really try to discern. But I think longer term, just coming back to the very first point I made about the region, this is incredibly important. It's an incredibly important moment in history. It's an incredibly important time. And I think that it's not just about Korea. It's not just about Northeast Asia. This is about the world. And the entire world was watching. And so let me end by saying, the stakes really are high here and really important for everybody. So with that, let me open it up to the questions. I prepare, I stand ready to be peppered, corrected, amended, told how wrong I am. But I just did want to level set everybody before we got into questions from this very, very esteemed and distinguished audience. Thanks. Well, thank you for those remarks. Before we open up to questions, I have a few of my own to get a little bit more out of you on some of the topics that you raised to potentially inspire more questions from the audience, which we'll do in probably the last half an hour or so of this session. So my first question is you began with the regional dynamics. And you ended with the regional dynamics about how important those are. And I was wondering from your point of view, what would really be game changers with respect to, for example, relationships, bilateral relationships between countries like South Korea and China or Russia and South Korea. And the basic premise of this question is to ask, what would be the ideal strategic environment for us to be able to resolve this North Korean nuclear issue? Yeah, it's a great question. And I guess this question takes me back to really the gambit that Pakenna made with Xi Jinping early in her tenure. I mean, you had this interesting dynamic where Xi Jinping for the first time in really modern Chinese North Korean relations came to Seoul before he visited Pyongyang. And that was a really interesting time because I think some thought, well, are we actually witnessing a fundamental realignment here? So I think what would be ideal going forward is obviously I think more alignment between Chinese, South Korean, and US, I would say short and medium term interests. I'm gonna be a realist here and say, look, our long term interests are something that are really big, really important. We've gotta hammer those out. Those are big, huge issues. We've got summits coming up in weeks and months. So I would say over time and the short and medium term issues, if we could see those three countries, obviously with our good friends, the Japanese involved, more of an alignment in those short and medium term goals. And I would hope that that would be a real outcome of some of this important diplomatic flurry that's going on right now. So this conference is about primarily the relationship between China and North Korea. And as someone who speaks a lot about that issue, I can never go through a conference or panel or something without someone asking me about Russia. And I never have really a good answer because as a China specialist, I don't really see Russia playing a big role. It seems like they're relatively uninvolved right now, at least. So do you think the United States should be promoting greater Russian involvement? Do you think they're gonna stay on the sidelines? And just in your experience as ambassador, is that assessment of Russian influence or involvement declining over time an accurate one? It's a great question. Well, where the Russians have really shown up in force is at the UN. Using their vote veto on the permanent five to I think influence and shape sanctions questions. And moreover, remind people that they are in the region, that they are in a voice that needs to be accounted for. So what I would say is, I think it's important to your point not to forget about the Russians, to make sure that they are accounted for, engaged with early. Often it's the Koreans and the Japanese who have better success these days in terms of engaging with the Russians. So perhaps that's an important role that those two countries can take on. More broadly, I think the trick here is going to be, for the first time you have a US DPRK kind of bilateral dynamic at the leader level going. And then how does that coming out of that translate into more multilateral diplomacy, which I think will be ultimately required to solve this. That's I think point one. The second point is then to add to that is how does that square with, as I mentioned in the speech, really an early in his or her tenure president of the Republic of Korea having these meetings and going forward if you have repeat inter-Korean talks. So how do you square the circle between the US DPRK bilat? How do you square the circle between the inter-Korean talks and then make sure the neighbors and other regional players that will be important in this conversation are accounted for and engaged with. So we have the inter-Korean talks coming up. So it's a very exciting time that every week something exciting happens that then we have to rethink all of our assessments. So we won't hold you to your answer to the next question that I have, but I'm curious on what you think through this at least a diplomatic process, hypothetically what you think South Korea can live with in terms of an agreement. What is non-negotiable for South Korea? What do you think maybe the United States is willing to put on the table that the South Koreans aren't? And do you see any divergence in the views of the moon government versus elites versus the domestic public on this particular issue of what can be obtained through negotiations? Well, each of those questions is an all-day seminar run by Frank Aum that will be coming later. I guess what I would say, those are huge questions. I think what's, as I mentioned a little bit and I wanted to make sure it got in there because I know this is primarily about DPRK, China, but I mentioned in my speech and you touched on it in your last question is public opinion in the Republic of Korea which I just find incredibly interesting and I was having a conversation with Scott Snyder before and we were both kind of nerding out on it. Because it is a factor I think in a way that is again new on the scene and I think you look at the generational cleavages in their approach to North Korea and I think that is an interesting variable that is gonna be I think over time something that the Blue House will obviously have to account for. Like I said, I think right now they're in great shape, they're at 60 to 70% but what you've seen in South Korean politics if you study it is, the public opinion changes pretty quickly and two months is a long time in South Korean politics so I think that is gonna be something that is gonna have to be managed through just like any democracy but I think it's newish in terms of its complexity on the North Korean question that was a little more manageable I think in 20 years ago. I think you've gotten just more public opinion has sort of gotten more you know you almost look crystallized and almost bifurcated into different quadrants that is more complicated so that's point one. You know in terms of what I'm gonna come back to this again but I'm more having worked in the government the way I would be thinking on this is obviously you've got your long-term goals and you wanna have an idea of where you're going but right now given that you had this almost these summits come at you in such rapid succession I think my short-term and medium term objectives is to figure out what we can do in that time period to both advance our key interests, keep momentum going and then make real progress on the denuclearization and missile questions and I think that's where the trade space is on all this. What can they live with? I would say you know look I think the most important thing I think to the South Koreans is having a good summit holding firm on sanctions questions, deescalating tensions but then I think trying to set up the US and the North Koreans for a successful summit and as a footnote here I would just say I do think the South Korean government has really held the line. I think surprising some commentators on exercises on sanctions on certain areas so that I think will be kind of their minimum which is like holding the line continuing to make clear to the North Koreans where the red lines of the international community are but also then getting into a real negotiation over denuclearization and what that looks like. So in terms of holding the line I've heard that too that the South Koreans have done a really good job of you know stating what their position is and sticking to what we heard today. I think on the second panel about in the face of Chinese pressure even to sign something saying that they were against alliances they were unwilling to sign that and there's another new factor in this whole dynamic and that's the current US administration. And when people discuss the coming summits and talks there's also concern and it seems to be exaggerated one way or the other that either these talks are kind of a pretext for some sort of limited military conflict or President Trump is gonna give away the store and sign away some agreement with Kim Jong-un that includes withdrawal of all US troops from the Korean Peninsula because that fits with his narrative of not being so involved overseas. Outside of the United States so are these things that the South Koreans are worried about either the sort of use of talks as a pretext for military options or that the United States is gonna make some sort of agreement that's not much of their benefit? I mean it feels so I was in South Korea a couple weeks ago and you know just on vacation actually and you know opinion was all over the map you know I mean this in a way you know the fact that there was I think such a surprise about the summit it really befits a favorite saying of mine or a friend of mine that told me that I like to repeat and you know that way everybody says South Korea is the land of mourning calm and my friends had know that it was just like my first month as ambassador goes they say it's the land of mourning calm and what you gotta remember it's the land of mourning surprise and so it was kind of befitting that at about seven o'clock Eastern time right in the mourning period of in South Korea you know there you have the national security advisor and the Republic of Korea ambassador United States making what was largely a surprise announcement about the summit so what I would say is I think people are still kind of sifting through this issue in terms of what it means but I do think that by and large South Korean public opinion has turned more skeptical to the North I think it does augur well for holding the line on sanctions and for I think a pretty clear eyed view of the North Koreans and what their objectives are so I think if you're asking me where the South Korean population is I think it's generally supportive of talks I think generally it's but generally you look over especially over the last seven, eight years it's generally a more clear eyed view of the North than its objective so that will be I think an interesting dynamic which the Blue House and to a lesser extent the United States and others are gonna have to navigate through giving away the store preemptive sure like there are always voices on every side of the spectrum who like to make news but I think most people are kind of in a meaty middle of let's wait and see let's see what happens let's get on the other side of this and then we'll make a judgment as to where to go from here. So one of the big factors about where this is gonna go is North Korea's own objectives and one of the big aspects of the debate is whether Kim can give up his nuclear weapons and stay in power I guess more importantly does Kim believe he can give up his nuclear weapons and still stay in power? Yeah and I think that's really it comes back to your first question or your question that you just asked which is part of why there's so much speculation or why there is a little bit of uncertainty or I would say unformed opinion that seems more fluid is nobody really knows exactly what the North Koreans want the language as I said looks a little old in some of their statements that leads one to the classic conversation about what the definition of denuclearization is or is not and may include on the other hand you have sort of interesting new elements right and you talk to people in this town a couple of months ago and they said well this is all just a big setup and this was a way to force a split in the alliance and to have basically the North walk out during the exercises and resume test that has not happened yet so I think it's a pretty interesting sort of conversation and to your point I again I think that's an incredibly important long-term question I'm sort of figuring out okay that question is something we have to address but if we got there that would be a really good thing if we were talking about single digits of possible nuclear weapons material and how do we manage the short and medium term I think is really what folks are focused on and that's where I would be sort of focused on with an idea of where I wanted to head long term but so my answer to your question is I do think that if you get there the environment is gonna look so differently it's really hard to make a judgment upfront on that but that's what would lead me back to the short and more medium term questions so in the short term right now we have the summits coming up, the diplomatic options the Trump administration is continuing at least for now the maximum pressure campaign in addition to introducing this new diplomatic element in discussing how this diplomatic element is gonna go down we've talked about the idea maybe Trump will give away the store or it'll fail or it can succeed we could get some sort of agreement for a timeline for longer term denuclearization maybe something short of it that's more of a freeze to the program but what do you think if you had to sort of predict or if you had to advise this administration about how to get the best outcome what can the United States do in this lead up to this summit maybe even during the summit following the summit to ensure that we get the best possible outcome? Yeah I'd say three things I mean this is all about leverage right at the end of the day so to me in the run up you're trying to maximize your leverage and so that includes three things first you know unify your allies, friends and partners right I think that's incredibly important make sure at its core that you and the South Koreans are aligned and then more than reach out to the Japanese you're obviously your treaty ally and then figure out your China play right and that's and then obviously not forget about the Russians but getting that is incredibly important I think in the short term I think the second thing that I would be doing and it related to one is making sure that you are as solid as possible on sanctions because I do think that that is your leverage that's what you're gonna have to trade away over time and sort of figure out what the game plan is there and then third obviously I think you're trying to sess out where the North Koreans are right and that's you know if these reports are true sessing them out through the direct G to G talks that are going on, sessing them out through the North South talks sessing them out through the inner Korean summit and I think that's incredibly important because again what's a big unknown here if you're the US coming into this is where exactly the North Koreans are what are their definitions and how is their continuity between the Kim Jong-un and his father's regime in terms of some of these policies or does this represent a sea change and a real opportunity to make rapid progress on some of these goals like denuclearization? Well thank you for answering all of my questions I think we have put forth a lot of interesting ideas and topics that will sparks of discussion so I'm gonna go ahead, we have a little bit over a half an hour to get to questions. When I call on you please wait for the microphone I know you, some of you will forget and I will remind you to introduce yourself and please make it a question versus commentary and I'll start over here. Hi my name is Jenna Gibson I'm with the Korea Economic Institute here in DC. I think the Trump and Moon administrations have made it clear that their primary goal is talking about the nuclear program to the exclusion of some other issues that might come up such as cyber, chemical, biological, even human rights so I'm wondering your thoughts on is that the right approach should be focused on nuclear first before digging into any of those at some point or what would be your advice on how to possibly integrate some of those other issues as well? Yeah it's a great question you think about it a lot and it's one of those that doesn't have a great answer other than I would say if it were me I would be on the denuclearization track it's the most, I think dangerous it's the most, I think imminent in terms of just how big the program is I think that's sort of how I define that I think that's where I would be I do think that the good news is on some of these other issues especially human rights now the conversation has been multilateralized a bit especially after the Kirby report all the UN action so you could on that issue you could put a lot of emphasis up front on the nuclear question while making sure your multilateral diplomacy was engaged on something like that the other thing that I think we haven't had a real serious conversation about in almost two decades is missile technology and that probably has to be brought in sooner rather than later as well so it's a really hard I think unenviable task to figure out how to prioritize those but I would probably put denuclearization at the top of the pile I'd focus directly on that that's where I think the international communities sanctions efforts are concerned is I think making progress on that is critical and I do tend to believe the theory that if you can make progress there it will unlock some of these other at least security questions in terms of bringing them in the human rights question I think is harder but incredibly important to have the conversation on and so that's why this sort of back of the envelope thinking would be how do you kind of structure your bilateral, your regional and then your UN more formal multilateral diplomacy to come in together simultaneously this gentleman over here I'm here for the analyst and a former diplomat closely related the most lethal weapon is not the nuclear weapons it is the prison camps which account for about four or five nuclear weapons worth of death so far we have zero chance of getting rid of those zero chance of getting rid of the entire biological infrastructure zero chance of getting rid of the entire chemical infrastructure zero chance of getting rid of all the missiles and zero chance of having IAEA inspectors run all over the country at will, uninhibited so what's the point I don't I don't believe in magical thinking what is the point why even go to this summit if there's zero chance of getting what you what you absolutely must have it's even more pessimistic for me you said your former diplomat yeah I mean I guess what you know we could have a discussion about you know that's I think it would it's an interesting conversation about whether you should you know should we have agreed to the summit or not right that's that's a whole nother but I guess what I would say we are we are where we are and going forward what what is the the probability of success but I you know it's an interesting question uh... that you know uh... that worth a discussion on right so uh... what is the point I think you know first I'll let me play devil's advocate I'll give you the positive side of the story right and I I guess I would say first you know look you just you get leaders in a room you never know you never know what's gonna happen uh... and maybe there is some sort of breakthrough uh... that's probably not a great chance but it's an interesting dynamic uh... second you know I think that the point is in the run-up to this uh... is I think some will argue that you will get a flurry of diplomacy and maybe some some issue will break free uh... and that's kind of why I got to the the different outcomes in the summit right you could have kind of just a meeting nothing comes out of it you could have kind of a meeting that you get a little substance or you could get a real framework out of this and I guess it's the smaller chance of getting a big framework out of this that I think excites a lot of people you know I'm less you know I'm less enthusiastic about just a summit for a summit's sake uh... but I do think that if you do feel that you if you're in the government you feel you can make some progress on some critical issues freeze maybe start a rollback and have a real conversation or real effort towards denuclearization that it's probably worth it um... hard question though I think your your your other points are really spot on right the the hard thing about this is the denuclearization issue is incredibly difficult but it's not the only issue out there right I mean there are so many tough issues with the North Koreans um... on this and how to how to figure out a way forward on any of those issues is really hard final point I'd say you know I had this conversation with you know I when I was ambassador and and it was um the north just wasn't interested in talking and you know the Obama administration was trying to figure out where to go and I had a former very senior diplomat the U.S. side come and just said you know we've got to we've got to start somewhere and that's there is some of that thinking that I think still permeates you know the state department and others is in terms of making an argument at least for a conversation and dialogue going forward so uh... I don't have a great answer for you on your question uh... but I all I can say is that I think there are real pros and cons with the summit um... but the fact of the matter is we're likely gonna have a summit and I think that the challenge for the U.S. government obviously I don't work for the government anymore is how to maximize your chances for success and minimize uh... the downside risks and that's probably what they're doing now the woman in the back hi my name is So-young Kim from Radio Free Asia so it could be a follow-up question regarding the upcoming summit between the U.S. and North Korea so a lot of experts I've talked to told me that like we don't see any specific conversation about the digital collage legislation and because they're probably just, you know, gonna talk they might bring up about it but like they're not really gonna talk about anything specific so in your opinion um... what kind of rear picture you can imagine when Trump and Kim Jong-un are actually sitting on the same table what do you think they are gonna actually talk about um... I know need you know if you would ask me this question about President Obama at least I would know new President Obama so I could give you some sort of answer I just don't know you know I just I just don't have a good uh... you know I've never met either one of them so it's impossible for me to answer that question I'll have the gentleman in the back and then we'll work our way around Good afternoon my name is Lee Jong-un, P.A. Student at American University my question is in your view how important is the location of the summit and as an outsider what location would you recommend for the summit? Yeah good question I mean you know I've run through this in my own mind and you know there's the obvious you know candidates are Sweden and Switzerland in terms of being the neutral nation states that still are extant up at the uh... you know the demilitarized and still have a formal role you know those are technically the UN side you know the North Korean sides I think it was the checks in the polls and they have since departed in that role so those two seem to be the most logical in terms of you know within this institutional framework that still exists coming out of the armistice and the Security Council resolutions that date back to the Korean War on the other hand you know I've seen the one that makes sense in the region in terms of you know proximity in terms of having a relationship with the North Koreans that is unique is Mongolia uh... that that I saw that makes a lot of sense in the Mongolians have always had that that kind of interesting relationship with the North Koreans and you know they're they're a country that has you know in terms of the US relationship has really grown exponentially over the last five to ten years as well so that that's intriguing as well uh... how much importance do I put to the locality I you know hard for me to say I I tends to be if you're not gonna have it in North Korea the United States the significance of it diminishes uh... in terms of the the importance of the location as an operative variable I think you know much more important is the negotiating positions the willingness to talk the definition so on and so forth it's something that's interesting that people like to talk about you know I think once the talks start the the more much more important things are just where the two sides are in terms of their alignment willingness to talk Junho Kim visiting scholar at the George Washington University uh... I guess you understand how dynamic uh... the South Korean politics is and there are many age cohorts that have a different understanding of America what measures can or should be taken to improve a mutual understanding between South Koreans yeah great question I mean this is you know I know everybody asked me about North Korea and it's it's obviously you know the topic that every you know folks are rightly uh... concerned about it are you ask me what my my real passion is it's really I'm interested in South Korean domestic politics in sociology right I mean it's just it's a really interesting thing that doesn't get I think enough attention everybody I'd be sitting there as ambassador I'll just tell you I mean again it's it's it's right the the the problem is a global problem it's a critically important problem historically uh... interesting moment so it's right to talk about the north but I would always be sitting in my office as ambassador and I get you know journalists or people visiting and they just they've asked me ten questions about North Korea and maybe a half a question about South Korea and I you know I always felt that you know South Korea is a huge important big country in and of its own self it just happens to be in a really a dynamic and interesting neighborhood surrounded by really really big countries uh... and I always said if you lop off South Korea and dropped it somewhere else in the world you would pay much more attention to it as a bilateral relationship so it comes to your question you know I you're exactly right in terms of you know you see these real cleavages in generations in South Korea and some people will attribute that to to the rapid uh... development and and rise in industrialization over a very short period arguably the most spectacular and quickest democratic development story in the history of the world right so so I think to get to your point here is that you do have very different views of the alliance of North Korea uh... of the world in the embedded in these generations you know and so I think your question is how do we make this better I think you know especially for the younger generation it's figuring out you know that the younger generation South Korea communicates in a very different way it's a lot more online just like the United States and how do you have that conversation through a completely different medium that you're used to with you know that probably the two older generations that they come before them and then I think on on the other two generations obviously you have very different experiences the older generations South Korea still you have the Korean War memories that's one that you still have to work on through a very I'd say more traditional lens and then I think that the 386th generation is interesting because it's it's changing right it's the 386th generation is in power now it's the probably the most dynamic in terms of where it was to where it is and so I think that's that's the one in terms of of how to communicate I think there I'm a big believer of kind of the the people to people diplomacy I'm a big believer of track two conversations I think my point here with especially with 386 is you got to get it out of the government to government channel that's an important you have to have a good government to government relationship but the relationship is so much bigger than just a g to g relationship that those other components have to be emphasized in order to I think make progress in understanding our our two peoples the young man up here front hi my name is Justin Lewis I'm a student in Georgetown security studies program what lessons would you take from the failure of the 1994 agreed framework that could be applied towards strengthening any future diplomatic agreement on denuclearization yeah it's a great question you know and you talk to those folks who have been around it and it's a really you know the history there is so important and something that you know we do have to learn from I guess you know a couple lessons first you know I think obviously and the world is very different from where it is where it was then where it is but I think you know if you looked at had you had to do it over again probably more consultation up front right I mean the whole it's well well publicized right but you know not having the South Koreans in the negotiations and then essentially handing them a bill for fuel oil that always created angst and problems that probably you know slowed down I think that's sort of I so I think the point comes to a little bit what we were talking about before using this time to make sure you are really aligned in your interest I think that's point one point two I think what what is interesting is it does show that the North Koreans you know if given the right set of circumstances can go down the road of negotiations but I think you know you can and I think this is the third big lesson that I always sort of take from it you know it's one thing to negotiate it's another thing to implement and it's another thing to adhere to the agreement and is there in that process of adherence and implementation attempts at renegotiation and I think that's something you just have to account for in your negotiating strategy up front is that you know it's one thing to negotiate with the North Koreans but their history especially now over the last 25 years has so clearly shown a proclivity to cheat and undertake a range of other problematic behavior that you almost have to figure out how to build that into your calculus as you're coming into the negotiating table final point I would say look there's a whole history here in terms of you know where South Korea and the United States were transition between two different administrations in the United States that's like an all day seminar that's really important history but you know if you're asking me the big lessons to try to boil all this down in a really short answer it's pre-consultation alignment up front it's factoring in you know it's the North Koreans at times will negotiate they have shown a proclivity to negotiate 2015 as well like on the demilitarized they were they negotiated very very rapidly but then again negotiation renegotiation implementation and adherence verification are critically important questions as well Stella Xu from Ronald College and one of the panelists for the morning session and I hope you don't mind sharing some of your personal journey in your official career so one is that you were in Korea still in a very pivotal like a moment and would you mind sharing like one positive side what is the what is the most like a accomplished moment that you have and also very inspiring to to you and the other side is that so what you have wished that you could do a little more or a little differently so being away from your office for a little bit so good question well first I you know I guess the thing I survived was Jaws General General Jaws is a retirement ceremony which I think was freezing cold I'm joking I'm joking no what I would say it's a point that I was just going to make in a joking way is like you're asking me you're asking me about sort of my experience I think what I came away with is like you're only as good as the team around you in Korea and being in the ambassador in the US in being the US ambassador in the Republic is unique because the only place you have you know unified four-star sub unified commander sorry they're with you and two three stars and how that team works together you know most ambassadors show up he or she is by far the senior person you show up in Korea and you have an embassy two to three hundred people really committed interagency a lot of diplomats but then you go to USFK and you have essentially 30,000 people there and a four-star and two three stars and oh by the way all the military assets and a training command that runs through there so I think just a lead-in point is that you've got to work together as a team and you're only as good as the colleagues you had and we had just I just want to point out the jaws he was an excellent colleague why it was why he was there and you know that's that's point one most you know interesting moment was obviously the knife attack I mean it was a you know crazy interest you know you're I'm just you know somebody told me it's like that's going to be on your tombstone when you when you die and I said yeah I guess that's probably true and you know that that's where you just see where you saw in a matter of three days a range of different emotions aspects of of South Korea and you know almost all of it was positive you know with the exception of the one to two minutes when you're being physically attacked the response was amazing by the South Korean people and that's what I always say that they'll the last point I'll say on this is you know the true test of a principle the true test of an alliance the true test of a friendship is not when things are good it's when things are bad and how you respond in that adversity and the response was just amazing I still you know I think about it you know once you know every couple of days I think about it and I still kind of get half choked up you know just remembering like some of the great things and I'll just you know you think about like thousands of people outside your hospital room you know I mean it's it was amazing and then you know like you're you're you're out of the hospital and the South Korean government shut down all the traffic and soul to get back to the residents and you're like that that's just amazing and the you know people for who you haven't heard from in years you know showing up in your hospital room or emailing you I just in a way I just will stop here it's it just you saw it there are moments where you see the very best in people brought out and that was one of those moments and it's great I get to live with that memory for the rest of my life what what I wish I would have done more of on the on the other side of the ledger I guess more time you know you I two and a half years it was great but you know it's endless in South Korea and it was just a fantastic fantastic experience you know I guess you'd sort of say do you you know I had I had a little more time I would have you know like to have done a little bit more on what I called sort of the new frontiers issues like everybody comes to South Korea they want to talk about the north south issues or secondarily they want to talk about the economic issues and there's a whole emerging set of issues in the US ROK relationship cyber space energy environment public health you know AI all of that that's an incredibly important basket of bilateral issues that will define this relationship going forward it also gets to the younger generation draws in different segments of society so I've had I had more time I would have put more focus on that and that and agreeing to swim across the Han River and sort of September are my two biggest regrets anyway so I'll stop the gentleman here all the way to the left great answer thank you Joel excuse me Joel star from usip mark good to see you I was working for a senator in Hoffman he was over on the senate form relations committee and you're in the reserves as well as I'm as a lieutenant colonel in the us army I wanted to ask you about conventional forces you just talked about the through three star commands the joint commands the UN command us army how is that reflected in the move from Yongsan to Camp Humphries and how is it perceived by the North Koreans from a conventional forces standpoint great great point Josh chime in here please you know I mean I just you know my incorrect me if I'm wrong here I my sense is you know first the North Koreans have largely fallen back on asymmetrical asymmetric capabilities in in the face of what I would say not quite overwhelming but I would say significant conventional superiority between the US and ROK and our combined forces are very I think in terms of the gap it's big and it's getting bigger so I think to to your question I think that makes the North fall back on cyber undersea warfare nuclear and missile programs things that and special operations forces I think you know I want to say you know they had a big parade in Pyongyang I want to say about a year and a half ago I'm my date but first time special operations forces were featured in that parade so I think that is where you're seeing the trend move and I think it's in a way it's in now it makes it a very difficult problem because you have to maintain your conventional superiority and account for these other factors which the North Koreans in some of them are quite good and capable so how you it I think it is a test of the agility of the alliance moving forward on on the move I don't I don't see the move as something that necessarily has a big impact on the North Koreans you know I I think you know to me a symbol of the world's I think it's our biggest military base outside the United States maybe even in the United States at a cost of ten billion dollars that the South Koreans are paying 96 percent of that's a huge symbol that we're there to stay so I think that that to me are the are the big takeaways and I think just going forward the challenge will be how do you stay it's always in this alliance you've had success in the deterrence mission how do you how do you keep that success and broaden that success into these other areas how do you deal with the reality of having most of your force presence down south and keep that connectivity that I think has worked so well between usfk cfc and the ROK military and then finally how do you deal with just a dramatically changing security environment northeast asia and that's why they pay you know general brooks a tiny government salary to keep to keep watch over all that but in all seriousness it's why we generally send our very best to to south to south korea and you've seen it I think reflected in you know promotions recently of general scaperati to uh to to you calm others they're promoting people out of Korea because I think now the people realize just how important the mission is and it's not there johns please follow a man correct we have general pio there too so you know if you want to uh please chime in as well hi i'm john mark juas i'm a former deputy commander for us forces korea and you in command korea and uh ambassador one it's great to see you here and I just want to say thanks to your great service to our country it is appreciated one of the team members that I think would be critical going forward here would be the US ambassador to korea um position hasn't been filled I like your thoughts on that on what the impact of that has been over the past year based on your past knowledge and also your discussions with your south korean friends and what you think that impact may have going forward a good question um you know first let me just say you know I do think you know there is a very capable uh sarge in south korea mark napper uh you know there's a guy who I always feel bad because you know you always get the question and it makes it sounds like the embassy's empty right and it's full of very competent um uh career officials there and you know you look at you know mark napper ed sagart and the political counselor the economic counselor joy gamma moda I mean there these are top flight uh US career diplomats that have served elsewhere mark you know speaks three languages I mean just an amazing guy who will be an ambassador one day I'm sure um you know what what I would say is you know korea is kind of the sweet spot in terms of it's a incredibly important relationship but it's one that I think is hard for the two sides to manage through capitals um you know some relationships having worked in the white house you do a lot of management through capitals right uh the uk is like that you know the time zones you know the language that that that sort of and now communications you can kind of do that right um it's harder to do that um through from the us ro k relationship and I think that's why you end up with a premium on the us ambassador and the us fk commanders and their deputies so I think it is a place where the ambassador really does have an impact I think that the the mitigating factor here in this case besides a competent charge is two things one the fact there is a four star commander out there there is that full compliment that does help cover down you obviously want the job filled it always all things being equal um you know and assuming you get the right person obviously you know it's always you're always better off and I think it does it is important in terms of the day to day momentum on the other hand like I said there are some mitigating factors one is um the uh uh the the the the us fk command structure does help a bit uh and the second it's pretty interesting I think you know all of the high level attention uh that it's getting does kind of force more management from capitals but you know where it really shows up as I always say like the the top tier issues tend to get taken care of right it's that kind of one a one b one c two third tier issues that that tend to where the ambassador can kind of go in and elevate those issues I think that's where there's a really critical need um you know and finally you know I'm a little biased I would just say you know I I um you know I I'd like to think the job was consequential right when you did it but I would say I think the other thing it really it where it where you where where it shows up is a lot in the public diplomacy a lot of the people to people diplomacy and a lot of who is the public face of that relationship obviously the president's the public face day to day uh on the macro sense but in terms of who the Korean people engage who the Korean people see in the media who the Korean people um you know kind of interact with I think that is where the ambassador really shows up and let me just end on this point you know in a country with you know depending on how you count it five to eleven national newspapers an unbelievably interactive social media scene um you know and one of the world's most vibrant democracies the public diplomacy pieces really really important that it otherwise might be I think we have time for one last question here in the back um thank you very much Ambassador I'm a reporter from Hong Kong Phoenix TV of China my question to you would be you just mentioned that China's role has changed dramatically in the past years decades my question would be how has China's role changed also what does the U.S. expect China to do specifically in addressing this peninsula issue thank you well um this is you know there many more China experts here than I uh but you know what I would say is look at the time period between you know I guess if you want to use a benchmark you kind of have to pick an arbitrary place but maybe the time of the first inter-Korean summit with Kim Dae-jung right and look where China has come economically politically militarily um you know it's it's influence on the world stage it's very different country in terms of just its prominence um you know at least in modern time so I think that's really really important and is a key driver in terms of uh security economic political machinations in northeast Asia so I think that's sort of the short answer to your question um you know what does it expect uh out of the Chinese uh you know I think it's you really have to ask the administration on that you know I'll just say from you know when when I when when we were in office with the Obama administration what we were trying to do is obviously um in you know put up the denuclearization uh issue is the most pressing concern with with Chinese leadership and the second thing in terms is just was uh was that look if the North Koreans which they didn't want to do after the leap day deal fell apart if they didn't want to negotiate we were left with a pretty binary choice in terms of sanctions and it was working with the Chinese to craft and implement uh robust sanctions because the Chinese we knew could move the needle on the sanctions unlike any other country so that's what we were after in the Obama administration and and to its credit the Chinese moved uh and moved dramatically during President Obama's time in office and his conversations with Xi Jinping they moved off of long-standing red lines and you ended up with you know two I would say pretty robust security council resolutions in 15 and 16 um you know I think the question is going forward what is enough how fast uh how rigorous the the sanctions will be implemented that's all a conversation between I think the China between Beijing and Washington that is critically important both in the run-up and the aftermath of these summits well thank you very much for your comments here today um we have one more panel we're going to get 15 minute break and then we have a final panel at two o'clock in which we're going to talk um about you know to end on a very positive note uh the possibilities and nature of military contingencies on the Korean Peninsula so I hope you will join us for that but first please join me in thanking Ambassador Lippert for his comments today all right we'll go ahead and get started for our third and uh final panel of the day thank you all for coming back this afternoon especially those of us those of you who have been with us all day um for those of you who haven't this is the last panel in our day long conference on China and North Korea examining their relationship in the past present and future we had two terrific panels this morning one looking at the history of their relationship between China and North Korea and a second thinking about what China's view of the ultimate end state on the Korea Peninsula might be and for our third panel today we are going to talk about um the possibilities of a military contingency on the Korean Peninsula um what would war look like what kind of issues might have to be addressed and what role do we think China would play um these are very tough questions and hard ones to think about but fortunately we have an excellent panel with us this morning to help think through these issues um first we will hear from Abe Denmark who will talk about some of the geopolitical and geostrategic implications and considerations of a potential war on the peninsula then we will hear from General Juaas who will talk about the U.S. ROK alliance and how it might fight a war on the Korean Peninsula and finally we'll hear from Dr. Mastro who will talk about how the PLA is thinking about a potential conflict um so uh we'll hear from each of them for about 10 to 12 minutes and their prepared remarks and then we'll open it up for questions from the audience so um to start things off we will hear first from Abraham Denmark um he is the director of the Asia program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars um he also holds a joint appointment as a senior fellow at the Wilson Center's Kissinger Institute on China and the United States and before joining the Wilson Center Abe served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for east Asia thank you Jennifer thank you too the USIP uh for hosting this terrific conference on a very important issue um before I begin I just wanted to offer a caveat a caveat I expect you've already heard a few times and we'll probably hear a few more times um that um what I'm about to say are my own views and not representative those of the Wilson Center or of the U.S. government um so when considering a conflict on the Korean Peninsula and how the United States and China may approach it um everything flows out of one critical question um to my mind uh and that question is if the objectives of either side are limited or if they are total um and and this is a critical question uh from both sides really uh from the from the American perspective um we've seen this debate play out in recent months where um people have been writing people have been debating this possibility of what some have referred to as a bloody nose option um to refer to as limited strike options but basically an idea that the United States would uh as it has recently done with Syria or previously with Afghanistan previously before that in Libya all sorts of other places conducted limited strikes on North Korea on a very limited set of targets not with the intention of solving a problem but with rather of sending a message and trying to establish some uh degree of a red liner or punitive action um or if the United States would seek to use a conflict uh to solve the problem which is certainly one of the objectives that the Trump Administration has been suggesting that um when President Trump says that the United States would not accept in North Korea that can strike the the United States with nuclear weapons um this in that um that such a capability is not going to happen under his watch um that uh suggests fairly expansive uh objectives from an American perspective especially considering the military realities that I expect my colleagues will get into on the difficulty of uh forcibly denuclearizing and reliably denuclearizing North Korea by force um through air power alone through uh strikes alone that many have have suggested what I believe is that um such a uh such a capability would not be possible without um a fairly significant military commitment on the part of the United States um and from China's perspective I think that question is also critical in thinking about how they would address this um in in previous years um it has been suggested um looking at various media reports coming out of China that China's uh approach to a conflict on the Korean Peninsula would be rather limited focusing on establishing a buffer zone along the border trying to contain refugees but basically trying to limit as much the crisis as much as possible um trying to fulfill what Xi Jinping has described as China's of objectives for the Korean Peninsula that being uh no war no chaos and no nuclear weapons usually in that order um and so that has been the US understanding for quite a long time and um in some sectors continues to believe to be how many Americans see China's objectives um but I think that view is starting to change and I think in part because of some of the tremendous work done by people uh by some people in this room that China's objectives on the Korean Peninsula might be much broader and more ambitious um than um than than what was uh believed to be earlier that uh China may see other interests at play beyond what exactly happens on the Korean Peninsula um and and we'll get into the specifics of what that may look like in a military scenario but um I wanted to describe sort of once we get beyond that first question of um whether this is limited or broad objectives for two sides um what would be the the key interests the key issues that both sides would be looking at um when a conflict were to occur uh again in my in in my estimation um from an American perspective once a conflict begins um my expectation is that the objective will be to rapidly degrade North Korea's ability to attack the United States and its allies especially with weapons of mass destruction um at the same time and perhaps a bit counterintuitively one of the objectives especially if America's broader strategic objective is limited and not seeking to replace the regime and reunify the peninsula um the United States will also be attempting I expect to manage escalation and maintain uh inter inter conflict deterrence so that we're able to send the message to the North Koreans that yes we're in a conflict yes we're trying to degrade your capabilities but you don't need to use your nuclear weapons you don't need to strike the United States or our allies because we're not going to try to replace your regime and try to try to maintain that uh intra conflict deterrent maintain that escalation control I think would be a key and challenging objective for the United States especially given some of the countervailing interests that we would have um to deny North Korea the ability to strike the United States uh and our allies and you can see how that those two objectives would be a bit in conflict with one another um and the the other objective that I would want to to mention from an American perspective would be to avoid war with China as the the history of this conflict is incredibly difficult from that perspective I expect that a high priority for the United States would be to try to avoid history from repeating itself and that goes to the final point that I'm going to mention about opportunities for cooperation between the two sides but first I wanted to speak what my expectation of what China's objectives would be in a conflict and I expect them to be actually quite numerous and of course it would depend on the specifics of the scenario the specifics of their ambition and the specifics of their assessment of American objectives but we I think we understand sort of um some of the more um some of the more operational concerns that the Chinese would have uh in terms of managing refugee flows uh into northeast China uh managing any uh spread of radiation or other weapons of mass destruction that may emanate from the Korean Peninsula as the result of a conflict or a test or a leakage or whatever it may be um mitigating their effects on Chinese civilian populations um also seeking to secure nuclear weapons secure weapons of mass destruction especially considering that many public assessments suggest that a lot of North Korean WMDs are close to the Chinese border um that the Chinese may see it as necessary for them to try to secure those things um there's a key question here um that I'll get back to in a bit about how the Chinese expect the United States and South Koreans to handle secure nuclear weapons and there's a very interesting question on that um but finally um I think the two pieces that I think are most important in terms of China's objectives on a conflict one would be re-establishing stability and that speaks to a key question of Chinese uh calculations what scenario what scenario do they see as most conducive to re-establishing stability in northeast Asia is it continuing uh uh divided Korean Peninsula as they've calculated for the past several decades that they see a divided Korean Peninsula as as a conducive to stability and conducive to Chinese interests or will they change their calculation that a unified Korean Peninsula under the control of South Korea would actually be more conducive to stability um that would require a major change in Chinese interests and Chinese calculations but I think it's something that once um once Pandora's box is open with the conflict it's a question that I think might be open to reinterpretation and it would be influenced the answer to that I think in China's minds would be influenced but I think is the most important question for for Chinese uh strategists when looking at a conflict on the Korean Peninsula what outcome would best uh advantage China in terms of geopolitical interest uh influence in the Korean Peninsula that um when I think this is present this is an issue that was present during previous administrations but I think has increased during the Trump administration uh during the more explicit embrace uh geopolitical competition between the United States and China that many uh Chinese strategists are increasingly seeing the Korean Peninsula through the lens of broader geopolitical competition between Washington and Beijing and one of the I think one of the key questions um about Beijing's views on these issues is how they see a conflict playing in terms of that broader competition and how they would seek to position themselves and forces and forces supportive of China's interests um in the in the uncertainties of a conflict and how they try to support those interests uh in the um in the negotiation in the conflict as it gets closer to resolution um so opportunities for cooperation this is sort of the last point that you mentioned this is the last area that I wanted to focus on um I think there's a lot of opportunities for cooperation between the United States and China um and I'm sure my colleagues would have other ideas but um to me there's there's two mechanisms that I would encourage being established um in between the United States and Chinese military apparatuses between our top military leaders between the secretary of defense and the vice chairman of the of the central military commission um establishing a regular communication between those two but I'd say the most important communication to establish between the United States military and the PLA would be between the commander of US forces Korea and the commander of the northeast theater um those are the two operational leaders that would be in in charge of a military conflict on the Korean Peninsula and it's those two leaders not the people back in Washington Beijing but those two people on the ground who know what's going on who have operational control of those forces that I think need to be most in close connection with each other at minimum to deconflict to make sure that operations are not accidentally influence impacting on the other but also um to um go beyond that to look at broader potential operational coordination and cooperation if the if the broader geopolitical environment supports it um so I'll finish up on one question that I alluded to earlier which is Chinese conceptions of American interests and South Korean interests um it comes as a surprise to many Americans that I that I speak to that um many of the Chinese scholars that I've had an opportunity to talk with are actually very skeptical that if in the event of a conflict if the United States or South Korea were to come into possession of North Korea nuclear weapons many Chinese scholars that I've spoken to are skeptical that we would actually remove those nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula and some Chinese scholars uh fear that that South Korea would actually take those weapons and use them to nuclearize themselves and establish a Korean either unified or South Korean nuclear capability which I think is a very problematic assumption and I think it comes as a surprise to most Americans most Americans assume that we would handle this responsibly in accordance with international law in accordance with our policy of seeking to denuclearize North Korea but being able to talk about how we would handle North Korean nuclear weapons in the event of a collapse or in the event of a conflict both in terms of military deconfliction but also in terms of removing them from the Korean Peninsula and handling them in accordance with international law I think would be an essential aspect of US China cooperation that could I think potentially happen before a conflict actually turns out and considering the tremendous technical and logistical challenges of that mission I think it's an issue that must be discussed before a conflict or a collapse happens if we wait until we need it then it'll be too late and then things will be left to chance and chaos which as we've learned in recent years has not always been favorable uh to our interests or as I expect to China's interests um so I'll I'll stop there and turn things over to my colleagues wonderful thank you very much Abe um our next speaker is Lieutenant General Jean-Marc Jouas who's now retired from the United States Air Force but recently served as the Deputy Commander for US Forces Korea and the United Nations Command Korea as well as Commander of the Air Component Command Republic of Korea US Combined Forces Command and the Commander of the Seventh Air Force and again he's going to talk to us a little bit about the US ROK Alliance and how it is thinking about a possible war on the peninsula thanks thanks Jennifer and thank you all for being here with us today and my thanks also to USIP and George Tom and Oriana for inviting me to uh be part of this panel um I'm glad to see everyone here today because I'm I'm sure that we all share a great concern with potential war on the Korean Peninsula and during my time as Deputy Commander of US Forces Korea and United Nations Command Korea we believe that if war came to Korea it would have started as a deliberate act of aggression by the north or been the result of a smaller provocative incident that spiraled into a much larger configuration uh the two major command and control exercises that are held each year key resolve and ultra-freedom guardian were always based on the premise that the alliance would initially be on the defensive now I don't know the scenario for the key resolve exercise that is currently on the way and it may still follow that same script the first half consisting of the prelude to war and initial hostilities and the second half where our forces would take the offensive what I do know is that of the six major exercises in which I participated between 2012 and 2014 none included intervention by China it simply wasn't addressed now that our mission extended into the second half of each exercise following a halftime reset if you will that moved the timeline of the exercise several weeks or more into the future but even in these scenarios in which the alliance would be on the offensive China's potential role in the conflict was never addressed it was clear that the Korean and US perspectives differed on this issue in many of my discussions with my counterparts and I think it's complexity may have been one reason for excluding this line of play in the exercise it's certainly my hope that that is no longer the case today there is a very real possibility that if North Korea develops a credible ability to made a nuclear warhead to an ICBM and launch it against the United States a scenario not previously envisioned or exercised may be facing the alliance a preventive attack by the US initiating hostilities on a peninsula this real world scenario in which the US abrogates the armistice agreement could also include the use of nuclear weapons a level of conflict that in my experience was not part of any major exercise and one that is sure to draw in China now the contours of such action could follow any number of paths some believe that a strong message by the US in a manner of a powerful conventional strike on North Korea's nuclear weapons facilities would not elicit a comparable response and deter the regime from continuing its program I am not among those who believe that having put together the operational plan for an air campaign against North Korea I am certain that we cannot completely eliminate their nuclear capability though we can cause a great damage I'm equally certain that North Korea would retaliate with artillery fire on Seoul conventional and chemical missile attacks on US and Korean bases our logistics hubs our command and control centers and other facilities initiate submarine warfare initiate special forces infiltrations and potentially launch missile attacks on Japan and the United States or its territories now how quickly this war would become nuclear is unknown but Kim Jong-un's resort to his ultimate weapon should not be discounted either to strike punishing first blows or stave off a regime collapse now while North Korea and China may no longer be as close as teeth and lips I'm equally certain that China will come to the North's support rapidly if the United States initiates hostilities I can't predict the extent of China's actions but I do know that PLA forces are far closer to the peninsula than US forces in Japan or in Alaska or in the continental United States and while North Korea may receive quick support from China I also question whether an author participating states of United Nations Command Korea will support the United States if it is viewed as the aggressor this war would have devastating consequences for South Korea and be unlike any conflict United States has seen since the last Korean war the 28,500 US armed forces personnel in South Korea are vastly outnumbered by North Korean forces under the US leadership of the combined forces command it is the Korean forces the South Korean forces that will conduct the overwhelming majority of the fighting and unlike our recent conflicts the United States will not be able to build an overwhelming force prior to the start of hostilities reinforcements will take days to months to arrive in theater as will supplies and equipment and when they do arrive they may well find their basis subject to attack by conventional or chemical weapons which will further delay their entry into the war North Korean artillery rockets and missiles that threaten the capital will take days to eliminate even under ideal conditions during that time an enormous casualty and evacuee crisis will develop and include over a hundred thousand non-combatant Americans many of whom will turn to US forces to try to get them off the peninsula the defense of South Korea and the evacuation of US citizens will be significantly complicated by the expected North Korean use of chemical munitions and the ambassador mentioned the asymmetric use of force that the North Koreans have developed and they their capabilities will also pose a severe challenge including cyber attacks against the US and Korean command and control nodes North Korean special forces which are among the largest special forces in the world will create a second front in the rear the North Korean submarine force also among the largest submarine forces in the world although it's a brownwater submarine force although technically inferior is is capable of sinking allied vessels sowing mines and inserting special forces units the United States intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities that are critical to finding targets will be limited by hardened and concealed North Korean underground facilities the lack of under present overhead imagery satellites the terrain of North Korea and mobile North Korean weapons systems that can rapidly relocate and these include the four ICBMs that can reach the United States the KN 08 the KN 14 the KN 20 and the KN 22 a non permissive air environment will drastically curtail the use of unmanned aerial vehicles that that are ubiquitous in other theaters these ISR limitations coupled with the North's abilities to move hide or deeply shelter their assets will significantly degrade our ability to find fix and finish many high priority targets at the onset of the conflict I do believe that in the end we would be victorious but it would be a very very difficult fight it is far more likely that a US attack on North Korea no matter how limited would result in a dissolution of the 1953 armistice and a resumption of war between North Korea and the US rock alliance an attack by the US on North Korea strategic nuclear capabilities which they deem essential to the regime's survival would most likely be viewed as an existential threat and generate a corresponding response in my opinion under these circumstances it's inconceivable that China would not intervene and so I'll turn the turn time back over to you Oriana well I will briefly introduce Oriana although I know you've heard from her already today we're very happy to have Oriana Schuyler master with us I'm not only as a co or leading organizer of this conference but also a panelist today on our last panel she is an assistant professor of security studies at the Edmond a Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown and also as I mentioned primary organizer of today's conference she's also the Jean Kirkpatrick Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and an officer in the United States Air Force Reserve Oriana thank you and thank you all for being here I'm happy to serve as the last panelist and General Juas gave me a nice segue to talk about Chinese planning for Korea contingencies before I do so I just want to specify like Abe did that my views are my own and don't represent those of the US government US Department of Defense with the United States Air Force when I first started looking at this issue I had seen a pattern that General Juas very clearly articulated for you today which was at least in the defense community in the military community in the United States in my experience there hadn't been serious consideration or thinking on what the Chinese role would be in a contingency now one of the reasons for this I think is that when it comes to China as a China specialist I know that things change very rapidly for example I wrote an article that was published in the January February issue of foreign affairs in which I made a series of arguments which I'll lay out today and between January and today many things have occurred and happened on the Korean issue we had the Olympics the inter-Korean summit we had Kim visit Beijing we had the national security advisor be swapped out now we have John Bolton in that role and so only in the course of two months I was asked by foreign affairs to write a post script which was posted last weekend how my views have changed and how they've stayed the same when you study the Chinese military more broadly because of how quickly they've been making progress it's the same thing you have to constantly be reassessed in your views and so when I spent time talking to individuals who were focused on the military aspects but not China experts it seemed to me that their view of China was correct if it were 25 years ago but China had come a long way since the 1990s where they couldn't fly or land unless they could see the ground and their Navy didn't have any air defense systems on it so they're basically a glorified Coast Guard that had to hug their shores and so I was inspired to look more deeply into given especially the increase in capabilities of the Chinese military had their thinking about Korea changed and the bottom line argument I made in that foreign affairs article that General Jua also hinted to was that our de facto planning assumption needs to be that if there is a major conflict on the peninsula the Chinese military is going to intervene extensively militarily and this is a bit of a nuance but not in support of North Korea but in support of their own interests in the months that I spent in Beijing talking to military officers I was told that they don't expect an invitation from Kim and that they plan on fighting the North Koreans to intervene so this is not an intervention in support of their allies you heard this morning Dr. Wang pointed out very clearly there is no alliance China is looking out for its own interests and in some scenarios that would be to intervene some scenarios that would be to prop up a pro-China government afterwards and other scenarios would be to get rid of that regime and support South Korea but the bottom line is that China is looking out for its own interests and if it did intervene militarily what would that look like so I'm going to talk a bit about the forces that they have available the exercises that they have done and some of the writings that they put forth on why they would intervene to this degree so if China intervened the newly formed northern theater command would be in charge of this contingency in charge of the large ground forces that would be required for any type of operation from something more limited to more extensive combat operations force posture and exercises suggests that China is planning on infiltrating North Korea by air by sea and by land for example in September of 2017 a few days after the North Korean fifth nuclear test land and air force personnel Chinese personnel conducted exercises while China strategic rocket force practiced shooting down incoming missiles over the waters close to North Korea and this scenario one of the thing that comes up a lot is the discussion of the border and one of the things that have changed in the past couple of years is that the Chinese military no longer is really in charge of that refugee border mission the people's armed police which I'll talk a little bit more about later they would be primarily in charge of securing the border in this contingency and what this does is it frees up the Chinese military to engage in more extensive combat operations within the northern theater command there are three group armies the 78th 79th and 80th and each of these group armies has about 30,000 to 50,000 troops and very interestingly a little less than two years ago they did a reform of these group armies in which they put a army aviation brigade into each and the special operations forces brigade into each and so what this tells us is you know these forces could be used for a ground invasion of North Korea but also China seems to be preparing to drop in special special ops forces and secure some critical sites within North Korea such as those nuclear sites this is something that the brigade seemed to be training for the aviation brigades also if you take a look at the equipment that they have available to them they have a full mix of both transport and attack helicopters they would be needed for any sort of close air support or lift capabilities into North Korea if this conflict actually extended and was prolonged the the northern theater command could also pull the same types of assets from the central theater command if they needed those types of extra forces another thing that was interesting in the reorganization the Chinese military used to be organized according to military regions the country was broken up into different military regions and each military region was in charge not only of sort of the internal defense border defense insert when it was relevant of the country but then they also had these kind of external missions one of the reasons that Xi Jinping got rid of that system was it was too internally focused it made it difficult for China to move forward with joint operations and to project power so when there was a reestablishment or an establishment of these theater commands which uh China now has one of the interesting things about the northern theater command that's in charge of Korea contingencies is it's the only one that has territory that's non-contiguous specifically in addition to putting together two military regions that were next to each other they decided to take a piece of territory the Shandong Peninsula which has not touched those other territories but add it to the northern theater command why would you do this primarily because by adding that you give the northern theater command also access to the sea and this coupled with some exercises that China has done in the Bohai and Yellow Sea off the coast of North Korea and Japan suggests that China is also thinking of intervening amphibiously by sea now if they if they did intervene a few points and whether this is good or bad for the United States the first thing is on the refugee issue China is and we heard this morning very concerned about a flow of refugees and I don't mean to understate their concern about this however they're given their increased capabilities there is a degree of confidence I've seen in interviews and in writings that they could handle this China plans to seal the border and conduct border control operations and they have the people's armed police to do so they also have security forces along the border and 24-hour surveillance there now one of the things that is often discussed is is it possible to cooperate with China when it comes to dealing for example with North Korean nuclear weapons as they pointed out China's right now has a number of interests one of which is they're primarily concerned about nuclear security there's a view in China that China has to be in control of North Korean nuclear facilities for a number of reasons one he already laid out ironically to ensure the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula if the United States is in control of these weapons there are a lot of people in China that are convinced that the United States would hand those off to the South Koreans and allow a reunified South Korea to be nuclear now again this seems counterintuitive for Americans when I first heard this argument I used to ask well if the United States wanted South Korea to have nuclear weapons we could just give them some we could you know support their development it's primarily because the United States does not support the development that South Korea doesn't have nuclear weapons so where did this argument come from and what I heard was that the United States cares about international norms and international pressure so allowing South Korea to have nuclear weapons under those circumstances would be unacceptable but a contingency provides this loophole in which the United States could say yes we want denuclearization dismantlement but according to some long timeline that then over time South Korea becomes a de facto nuclear state China is also concerned about North Korea using nuclear weapons and so they think if they're in control of the facilities and I agree with this Chinese control of North Korean nuclear weapons are better than North Korean control of those weapons and lastly they think if Chinese troops are at these facilities the United States is less likely to conduct standoff strikes that could lead to contamination because they wouldn't want to risk war with China and so nuclear security is a primary issue for China and if you just look at the force posture I laid out before and geography based on information from the nuclear threat initiative if China moved 50 kilometers across the border into North Korea the PLA would control territory containing approximately 44 percent of North Korea's priority nuclear sites and 22 percent of their priority missile sites if Chinese forces move 100 kilometers in they would control basically all of the priority nuclear missile of the nuclear sites and two-thirds of the missile sites now China is going if China decides to intervene as I am arguing they are going to get there long before the United States does you heard a few words of that from general jews about why that is the case but let me just point out a few things the first one being as was already mentioned you know the United States has 30 000 forces within South Korea now it's true that the South Korean counterparts or allies would play a major role in those ground operations but they have limitations in terms of what they can do with the nuclear sites because South Korea is a non-nuclear state and according to NPT rules they have limitations on what they can handle now my understanding is in the State Department right now they're trying to push forward some ideas that would allow the South Korean troops to identify identify those facilities and hand them over to the United States but it's primarily the US troops that would have to do this and according to some Rand studies based on how permissive the environment are we're talking about 188 000 to a quarter million US troops that would be dedicated just to securing and dealing with these nuclear facilities now the United States doesn't have this kind of manpower readily available China does as I mentioned before China already has 150 000 PLA ready to go along the border also if even though the Chinese are planning on having to fight the North Koreans to intervene what they would say is they have a great advantage because the North Koreans are very much focused on fighting South Korea and the United States so the best troops and the majority of their conventional assets are oriented south and are not along the border to counter China so China has an advantage there the third advantage that they have and we can talk a bit more about intelligence maybe in the Q&A but at least when it comes to early warning the Chinese do have 24 hour surveillance of that border and they also have ties people to people ties across that border so in certain contingencies for example if a war was going to occur because of a collapsed type of scenario China is confident that they would get some sort of indicator that something is happening before the United States would which will allow them to be better prepared so in this scenario if China is ready to move more quickly and can move more quickly by air by sea and by ground this discussion of what the United States is going to do with this these nuclear facilities is kind of a moot point because what I would argue is that Chinese are already going to be there and is this good or bad if the United States depends on a few things my last minute I'll just talk a bit about capabilities China has that I did a broader analysis on China's ability to safely secure these facilities do the accounting waste disposal render safe weapons dismantle them destroy them because leaving aside intentions if China can't actually do the mission this would be very problematic for the United States my bottom line assessment is that in many of these areas China is very capable there's two areas where China is the weakest one is the dismantlement of nuclear weapons now I talk to Chinese scientists who tell me they're very capable of doing this and they say so because North Korean weapons are configured ironically very similar to Chinese nuclear weapons I'm told and because North Korean nuclear weapons are very simple in their design now I'm not a nuclear scientist so I did what any good researcher would do I went and talked to some nuclear scientists and I asked them I said guess what you know good news the Chinese say they can do this for these two reasons I was told by those individuals there's no way China can do this for two reasons the first is close in configuration is not good enough when it comes to dealing with nuclear weapons and the second thing is the simpler the weapon the less the safeguards are on those weapons it actually makes them more dangerous to render safe and in the history of you know conflict we've never had a situation not even the United States in which a country has dismantled another country's nuclear weapons without the cooperation of that state so this is a very complex mission the second thing that China is weaker on is a nonproliferation it's my understanding that Chinese definition of nonproliferation is very limited compared to the US definition specifically they're focused on preventing dangerous materials from entering into China that's not good enough for the United States that wants to make sure they don't leave North Korea the good news is in these two areas the Chinese seem to be very open international cooperation for example once these sites are secured inviting in IAEA to help them with that dismantlement or when it comes to nonproliferation maybe cooperating with the United States who could be in charge of sealing the ports for example as they secure those facilities so my bottom line assessment is I think that the I wouldn't make this argument for many other contingencies if if you have read anything else that I have read I would say that Chinese military involvement anywhere else in the world is not to the benefit of the United States but this one contingency I think it would be beneficial to have the Chinese military there because they can get there quicker and that would prevent nuclear use on the Korean Peninsula and given the level of capabilities they have and the areas where they're willing to cooperate I think at least operationally it would be very beneficial for the United States now as was said on previous panels China doesn't cooperate she's anything Dr. Wong said specifically you also have to think about don't just ask China to do something but what you're going to give them in return this type of help does not come without costs it comes with strategic trade-offs names as Yoon Sun pointed out the future of the peninsula as China sees it as one without US forces and without a US alliance and so if China has control over large parts of North Korean territory and North Korean nuclear weapons you better believe they're going to leverage that type of control for the sake of achieving some of those angles that might not be to the benefit of the United States so with that I will conclude well thank you very much to all three of you for three wonderful presentations and you really uncovered a lot of really fascinating issues from a number of different angles so we've got a lot to talk about over the next half hour so in our Q&A session I will start first I want to go back to some comments that Abe had made where I think you said one of if there is a war in the peninsula one of our main goals will be trying to find ways to avoid war with China in that contingency and I could see that but obviously happen if the Chinese don't get involved which doesn't sound likely or that they fight with us which also seems unlikely but then perhaps this third scenario that Oriana has described would be most likely where they're not necessarily aligned with the North and therefore fighting against us but they're really in defense of their own interests and sort of operating it in perhaps a third actor in the conflict and so I'm wondering if that's accurate or if you see another way that we would be involved in a conflict but not in war with China and related to that this conversation about ways that the United States can work with China to identify areas for cooperation and talk through some of these issues in advance and you know you suggested having the commander of USFK and the commander of the Northern Theater Command together to work through some of these issues it sounds like that's not happening and I wonder if you could talk a little bit about why that might be and what it might take for those conversations to actually take place so my expectation going into pretty much any conceivable scenario of a conflict on the Korean Peninsula is that neither Beijing nor Washington will enter into this conflict with the intention of going to war with the other. I expect that their military objectives would be focused on primarily on Korean Peninsula issues. The challenge for me therefore is avoiding unintentional conflict between the two and I see that most happening in scenarios in which the United States is trying to go after North Korean targets that have already been overrun or controlled by Chinese military forces and you know one version of that if you think about a North Korean WMD facility that American military planners believe is a threat to the United States and to our allies and therefore high on the list of targets in the early hours and days of a conflict but unbeknownst to the United States to American planners is also high on the list for Chinese planners and forces and you see and which leads to the potential for the United States bombing a target that's being occupied by the PLA and not as we believe by the KPA and you can see how that could lead to an out of control escalation between the two sides. The only other way I see a conflict happening between the United States and China is if China comes at the conflict in very cold real politic calculations. In the belief as Oriana mentioned as I mentioned that this conflict is while it's nominally about Korea what it's really about is competition between the two sides and they need to secure an advantageous position potentially using this conflict as a way to press their geopolitical advantage and press their geographical advantage further into Northeast Asia in a way that disadvantages the United States and going into this conflict from a Chinese perspective going to this conflict potentially on purpose if not not to go to a general war with the United States but rather to send a message to the United States this isn't your area you need to back off we will take it from here basically. In terms of challenges for cooperation I think the primary hurdle has been Chinese reluctance and this has been a story that we've been dealing with for quite a long time that there's a they don't have the same historical background as the United States they don't have the same belief in military to military communications as a tool of de-escalation they don't share the same belief that transparency breeds stability they come at things from a completely different perspective that transparency is the tool of the strong against the weak that countries need to maintain ambiguity in order to maximize their strategic advantages and so while we have had success in military and military communications over over the years I've participated in several of those they're usually fairly technical and take a tremendous amount of work and especially time to actually get there so I expect that if situation if the situation comes down to it if things get bad on the Korean Peninsula I expect to see a flurry of activity from China reaching out to the United States and we need to talk we need to figure this out the things that we've been wanting to do for years I expect that they'd pick up the phone and start and start talking about but ultimately the key to military and military communications in my experience is not the agreement we have a lot of agreements with China in the military to military sphere we have for quite a long time the cutting to the agreement of this is how we're going to talk to each other that's actually the easy part the hard part is when something happens both sides need to be able to pick up the phone and actually be able to communicate with each other authoritatively there's stories from several senior military commanders US military commanders when there's an incident with the Chinese we pick up the phone and it rings for 45 minutes because nobody answers and until we actually get to the point where the two military leaders I think we're getting closer to this where two military leaders on the two sides are able to talk to each other in the middle of a crisis and speak to each other in a constructive and helpful and detailed way we're always going to have that challenge and I expect that's going to be a major problem for this contingency especially but even outside of the Korea context looking at issues related to the South China Sea related to Taiwan a wide variety of issues I think this is going to be a continual challenge in our military relationship thank you very much um general gs two short questions for you one is um you talked about the US ROK exercises and how they don't really take the role of China into consideration I'm wondering um what those exercises assume about the role of Japan and perhaps Russia um or what you're thinking might be in the role that those countries might play in a potential conflict um and also just a broader question about the US ROK alliance it's obviously been in existence for decades and hasn't by any means been static during that time but I'm wondering um if you could make some recommendations for changes or revisions or growth that might be necessary in that alliance to prepare it for the future what you might recommend well thanks Jennifer uh with regard to Russia and Japan one of my criticisms of our exercise program was that they were too focused on Korea and that is um and I'm sure my panel members here would agree that any conflict on the Korean Peninsula is going to extend beyond the Korean Peninsula uh North Korea has the ability and I don't doubt the desire to attack US bases in Japan from which we would be launching sorties or or or supporting the effort on on the peninsula um and yet PAKOM was only marginally involved and PAKOM for those that don't have specific command and it's uh responsible for the entire Pacific theater from the Arctic to the Antarctic and from the West Coast California to the Indian Ocean uh US forces Korea is a subunified command to Pacific command um but PAKOM was only superficially engaged with any of our major exercises there when in fact this would not be a localized war it would be a regional conflict and so you know what Russia would do what Japan how that would play into it and what in in a larger view uh the rest of Pacific would be doing including our allies was just not part of the exercise so uh that was one of my criticisms and and I think they may around us probably more at speed on this than than me because I left three years ago hopefully they've made some steps in that direction to make it a more realistic exercise that involves all the levels of command control and all the larger organizations that would be involved like US Army Pacific and Pacific Air Forces and for one very important was its fifth Air Force which is in Japan it would be doing much to support the the fight on the Korean Peninsula uh in terms of what our alliance can do you're right the the uh the alliance was formed in 1953 and it's gone through many changes over that time uh our presence on the peninsula has has gotten smaller over the years particularly in the Carter years when it was almost eliminated um and I think one of uh one of the transitions that we we see in play right now is op-con transition which after more than 60 years the United States still remains in command of a combined forces command the US forces Korea command of the force star is also in charge of all us and uh Korean forces that has the command of combined forces command um this transition was supposed to have taken place initially I think in 2012 and then again I think in 2015 I remember right uh it's now been um conditionally based and so it will happen at some time in the future but uh I would I would say that uh a gradual assumption of greater responsibility by the rock forces I think is is one of those uh uh items that needs to to take place in in our alliance that and um I I think more jointness uh as the United States has has become more joint in in a way it approaches conflict I would hope to see the same develop and you see it in the Korean forces where they are becoming more joint but uh in some ways they're still very much as we were before the Goldwater Nichols Act and and that is you know kind of stovepipe within you know navy lanes and air force and army and marine lanes so I would say enhanced jointness and uh accepting more responsibility for uh the big fight on the part of Korean forces thank you um Oriana two last questions for you one is I want to make sure we don't miss part of the title of this panel which is war and it's aftermath um so I wonder if we could talk a little bit more about how China is thinking about um what happens after the fighting stops you talked a little bit about the People's Armed Police taking control of the refugee issue in China so I had a couple questions one on how China might be thinking about the humanitarian issues involved in terms of making people sure people are fed and addressing uh communicable diseases but also the inevitable economic development that's going to be required um and related to that your your um uh notion that you know what would be included in a 50 kilometer zone of control or 100 kilometer zone of control um I think I've heard some China experts say that China would not be interested in that because then they would therefore own all of the humanitarian related issues uh that would need to be addressed within that zone of control and I wonder if that's something you have seen much discussion about um and finally uh your point at the very end about um the fact that China can play a very positive uh role in in a conflict but it would require some strategic trade-offs to get their help um I'm curious so much of what you described seemed to be very much in line with China's own interests um and again part of the driving reason for them getting involved in doing these things in the first place so what what do you think was sort of the extra that they would do in exchange for strategic trade-off that wouldn't be included in what they would do just simply because it's in their own interest to do so so I'll start with um the strategic trade-off question and this goes to the aftermath of what are the possible scenarios the bottom line is that China is not interested in paying any costs you know whether it's through diplomacy which you know is a different panel or through conflict that then leads to an outcome in which the United States is more powerful and more influential in the peninsula from the Chinese perspective that doesn't really make any sense that's why I think for a great degree they're supporting the status quo because the United States hasn't really presented a vision uh at all let alone a credible vision of one in which China would be better off in the future than they are today um and so what China is really looking for is that reduction of US influence um and now with the summits uh if you look at what Xi Jinping has said about uh how he thinks we can get the nuclearization it's very clearly based on reciprocity in which the United States military also reduces its presence operations and things like that so that's a different strategic route but in terms of conflict I think the timeline is important when it comes also to thinking about the costs of reunification the humanitarian issue my sense is that China is hoping that its occupation of North Korea is actually very short lived right that it right after you know the conflict is going to come to some sort of close China can use this occupation to negotiate reunification terms that are favorable to Beijing now I have this um uh back and forth with Michael Green my colleague at Georgetown about this issue I don't see any indications in Chinese writings or I'm talking to them that they're in any way threatened by democratic South Korea the fact that South Korea is a democracy I don't think is really problematic I've seen many statements even by Xi Jinping himself in which he supports a reunified Korean Peninsula under South Korean control but that reunified peninsula is not one of which the United States is there so very shortly in these types of negotiations China would want to ensure okay we're leaving and the United States is leaving now if that doesn't look possible if the United States says no we're not going to do that China might put in prop up another regime in North Korea not allow for that reunification to happen so that's a possibility um and if the unification does happen if the United States does agree to some sort of reductionist relationship with South Korea or at least the elimination of troops on the Korean Peninsula um if that reunification happens I think the Chinese believe they're basically they don't as far as I can tell they're not really thinking about the humanitarian issue or the economic costs because those are things that come in the next stage that the international community in South Korea primarily will be dealing with um that they don't really have to be the ones to deal with it because they won't be present there anymore and when it comes to refugee camps and things like that they too can open those situations up to the international community so they're not primarily responsible I've heard as much discussion about the economic benefits of reunified peninsula for China in terms of you know maintaining preferential rights to certain natural resources there access to ports and roads while Chinese ports are themselves congested and the idea that if that North Korea to China is like how China was with the reform and opening up that a lot of overseas Chinese invested in China when it was so low on the economic totem pole made all this money off of that that China could be that to North Korea so I think to a large degree um they're thinking about these broader geostrategic issues about how to position themselves in a beneficial place with respect to the United States and all the kind of