Good afternoon everyone. We are so delighted you joined us on this cold day although I understand we're having a heatwave at maybe 32 out there. Thank you for joining us. My name is Heather Conley. I'm Senior Fellow and Director of the Europe Program here at CSIS. I have been looking forward to this discussion for quite a while. We are very privileged to be a partner with the German Embassy and unveiling some survey results that they conducted a little while ago about American attitudes towards Germany and I would say largely towards Europe. I'm going to just give a bit of the run of the program this afternoon. I'm going to invite Karl Friedberg, Minister of Communications and Culture at the German Embassy just to give us a few introductory remarks and then we'll welcome to the podium Andrew Hare. Andrew is the Director of the Digital Research and Strategy at the Frank N. Maggett Associates. They're the colleagues that conducted the survey on behalf of the German Embassy. After Andrew's done with this presentation and you'll see the PowerPoint we're all going to watch down from the front row. I will then invite Bruce Stokes, who many of you know in this room, Director of the Global Economic Program as part of Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project. This is the guy I turned to and I need to understand transatlantic attitudes and vibes and Bruce is going to give some comments and reflections after the survey results are discussed and then after Bruce is finished we have Charles Lane with us, a Washington Post editorial writer that many of you I know read. Charles specializes in economic policy, financial and trade issues. We've unleashed Charles. He can talk about anything he'd like to talk about but to try from that journalistic perspective give us give us a point of reference and then we'll open up the floor for discussion and comment. I know we've got a lot of important questions to ask and I'll be delighted to moderate that part of the discussion. So with that let's begin and Conference please welcome. Dear Heather, dear Bruce and Charles, dear Andrew, ladies and gentlemen, it's a great pleasure to welcome you on behalf of the German Embassy to this presentation of the study perceptions of Germany and the Germans among the US population. Some of you might ask why this study, why this presentation, is it really necessary to do image studies of countries as if they were a commercial brand like a washing powder or whatever. The answer to that is a clear yes. Yes it is necessary and I will explain why. According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, diplomacy is the art of maintaining good relations between different countries. The important word here is relations and as we all know from our daily lives, relations are very much about perceptions. When we ask ourselves if and how we want to relate to someone, it is important how we perceive that other person. The same is true for nations. For the projection of our interests it matters very much how we are seen by others. While this is true in general for every nation, it is particularly true as far as a perception in the US is concerned. The US being the undisputed captain of the team if you will. We have an important year ahead of us with the visit of Secretary of State John Kerry in Berlin tomorrow and Chancellor Merkel in Washington later this year. The 25th anniversary of the fall of the wall which will celebrate this autumn reminds us of the importance of this relationship. It never would have happened without the help of our American friends. Now on a personal level it's usually fairly difficult to know where exactly we stand in the eyes of the others. We all remember the apprehension that we felt as teenagers when it came to trying out for a sport or asking someone out to the high school prom. With countries it's somewhat easier because so-called hard power in the form of factors like the GDP or military power is in play. But as far as perceptions is concerned it also gets difficult for states to find out if you go beyond the realm of stereotypes and anecdotal evidence that everyone who has lived abroad for some time has experienced. This is where this study and the work of professionals like Margit comes in. They provide us with reliable data that go beyond hunches and assumptions. And this is perhaps a good moment to thank Margit in particular Research Director Andrew Hare for their tireless work in preparing this study. I know of countless conversations in last autumn that we had with our team had with him on the fine tuning of the questionnaire and I'm grateful for your patience with us. It's also a good time to thank my colleagues at the German Information Center in particular Irina Speck and Rüdiger Born who have also put a lot of energy and resources into this valuable project. This leaves one question open why this event today. The answer is it is one thing to prepare a study. It is another to consider what conclusions we can draw from the material. Now we certainly will draw some conclusions for the public relations work of the Embassy but we felt that it would be interesting to see what conclusions other important players would draw from the facts that we soon will hear. What will opinion makers like journalists, think tankers or colleagues from other Embassy make of this data. So the idea developed to present this study publicly and not just keep it for ourselves or publish it just on our website. Now I'm very grateful that CSIS and Heather Conley were immediately prepared to host and organize this event with us. Thank you Heather. And I would also like to thank you Bruce and Charles for being part of the panel following the presentation. Thanks to both of you. Last not least and Heather mentioned the temperatures I would like to thank each and every one of you. Thanks for braving the cold and contributing to what will hopefully be an interesting and insightful discussion. Thank you very much. The floor is all yours Andrew. Thank you. Is that the right thing? Now Terry's gone. Oh my God. There we go. Hi. Thanks for being here today everyone. I want to thank the CSIS, the German Embassy, the Information Office as well as the other panelists. I'm going to make this short but sweet. This was a very large study we did. We have been doing with the German Embassy for the last 11 years really looking at the perception of Germany and Germans from the perspective of Americans. You know a lot of stuff that's really interesting. This is us. You don't need to worry about. But this is really important. So this is the sample and it's important not because of the sample today necessarily but how the sample is changing pretty radically. This is probably the most 2014 the most important demographic year in the US since about 1945. The youngest boomer is going to turn 50 years old this year. This is the first year where the Xers have the largest social, political, entertainment, cultural, whatever you call it value in the society. This is also the first year where the youngest millennial will be actually graduating high school, 18. So if you're born to 17, you're part of a new generation for the first time and you're what we're calling a pluralist. And the reason we're calling you a pluralist is actually because this is going to be the last generation where Caucasians are in the majority in the US. And they have a lot of different values, the pluralist, and they're much more multicultural segment. So why is this interesting? Why am I bringing this up? Really to underscore the fact that a lot of the perceptions we're seeing and the trends are changing and how people are viewing Germany, they're going to increasingly change. By 2040 in the US, it'll be the first time where Caucasians are actually in the modern era where Caucasians are in the minority in the US. By 2040, everyone. Live births are already getting that way. By 2019, live births are going to be in the minority for Caucasians. So just a little bit of the sample. This was a representative sample. We match it to the census. You screen it if you're in the study. So you don't have to have any prior knowledge of Germany or any understanding. In fact, you're going to see some questions that are, you know, in particularly a little difficult maybe for some people to answer. They just go, I don't know. It makes sense. But here's a really, really important part. So we did the study in November. This was shortly after the NSA announcement about Merkel, you know, cell phone being tapped essentially. So we did capture that bubbling into the surface. But the impression of Germany is actually the highest level we've seen since we've done this study. As you can see, you know, we look at the last decade, the perceptions of Germans, you know, the Middle Eastern conflicts, you know, a lot of tension to today. There is a bit of a paradox you're going to find in the data where Americans' impression of Germany is actually at a pretty good level, high in the last 10 years. However, we don't necessarily think Germans love us too much, which is probably a bit sobering but realistic. Germany considered a modern and forward thinking society, a major economic power in the EU, an important role in the United Nations, international politics, research technology piece in the world, free trade and fair competition. So, you know, these are sort of the images you would ask of a brand, but these are about, you know, the country as a whole and how people are viewing the Germans. What's really interesting here, too, is look at the disagrees. Very few people are disagreeing with a lot of these statements. Pretty universally known now among all Americans that Germany is a, you know, modern forward thinking society and leader. Here is the comparison, though, to 2011 in which we looked at, do they love us, sort of, is the question here. So, do you think Germans like the United States? Actually, minority really says that they do. A lot of people are unsure of German perception. But, again, that paradoxical inversion is going on in which, you know, we think Germany is doing great. We don't necessarily think they love us. The NSA thing probably has something to do with that. I would wager. And here's some perceptions also of the US and Germany relations which show that they're slightly declining. So, again, the impressions of Germany being high, but the relations between the countries maybe not so much. A lot of people in that neutral category, which would be interesting to comment on. And in fact, the pores, you know, about 10%, 42% saying that they're good relations between the countries. This next slide, I think, is particularly important in which also shows that, you know, again, they love Germany, but the US media from Americans perspective really doesn't provide enough news about Germany. There seems to be an appetite to know more about this, you know, increasingly powerful country in the EU. And they're not being informed currently by the media, so they say. The disagrees in particular high, they're 50% say I don't need to be informed about Germany. Well, they actually do need to be informed is what that means. And 51% saying the US media does not provide enough news about Germany. I want to show a little segment here about Germany as a US partner. Remember, with all these questions, these are perceptions, not necessarily reality. Which five countries do you consider the most important international partners of the US? So, we asked about five, well, you had to pick five, but we asked about 25 different countries that you could select. As you can see, Germany right in there, the top non English speaking country, and among European partners, a close second behind the UK. What's interesting to it's not on the slide, but we had asked about this, you know, last decade, essentially, and in 2005, that number was was about 35%. So increasingly, Germany is considered an important partner for the US. In terms of values, non English speaking, Germany is actually the highest shared value of all the countries here listed. So which five countries do you ask? Again, we asked about 25 different countries. 40% said that Germany was, you know, had shared common values with the United States. This next one, which three foreign countries do you think have the most influence on US politics? Pretty interesting here. Germany is right in there at 18 hide with Russia. Again, the increased importance of Germany here, we had asked this question in 2004, and Germany had 8%. So quite a staggering jump from eight to 18 to today in terms of, you know, having high influence on US politics. Great, Britain obviously real the strongest are 50. China close second. Talk a little bit about the economic relationship between the two countries in Germany and the economic world. No surprise here. We showed this German is a major economic power. This one's really interesting. The economic relationship between Germany and the US driving global economic stability and growth 45% agreeing with that statement. And 41% though saying that US and Germany are global economic partners sort of relates in a bit to some pure research that was done that also showed that. What's that? Oh, sorry, competitors. Yeah, sorry, it relates to some pure research that show that Germany Germans view the US largely as a partner and not necessarily a competitor. Here, you know, US is perception that they're sort of in between, you know, it's driving growth between both countries. But there is some level of global economic competition that goes on as well, naturally between the two. And this next question here, we're looking at, you know, how again, would you describe your general impressions of Germany here that some other questions we had asked about in terms of the importance of their partnership, I should say. So you can see China and Japan extremely important, according to Americans, Germany right in there though 60% the highest in the EU for non English speaking behind Great Britain. Again, there's a list of about 25. So pretty interesting, most again, thinking Germany is very important. Economically, we wanted to ask about the European Union when we get into some of these deeper issues with these participants. Like the EU, for instance, as you'll see that this is where the gaps sort of emerge in the perception of the country. Right here, for instance, we're asking about, you know, do you feel informed? How informed do you feel about the EU and the process of European integration? Here, you can see most Americans not really informed about the EU, almost, you know, 48% saying basically they're not informed, only 22% feeling informed about EU hasn't changed much over the last five years. Next, in terms of the Eurozone, this is this is really interesting. European debt crisis has repercussions for the US economy 60% agree that that's true. This is down pretty substantially though, since 2011, when it was at 68%. Most do believe that it's in the interest of the US that there's a strong European Union, the European Union is an important political partner. When we ask questions about the TTIP or the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, there is heavy don't know not sure what that is or what that will be, what form that will take. So a lot are unsure about that. But it does seem to be that the American perception of the Eurozone crisis is maybe, you know, while important and definitely has repercussions, maybe a little bit less important than we saw in 2011 and 2009. We also asked about Germany's role in the EU. So what role does Germany play currently in Europe? So you can see most believe stable, constructive, collaborative, only 20% actually said demanding. But as you can see, we're seeing not only strong impressions of Germany, but a stable force. Here, Americans feel Germany is a leading role in Europe that strengthened in the recent years. This is echoing a lot of the rest of the study. You know, Germany wants to assume a leading role in Europe. We perceive that to be true as Americans, expecting Germans to assume a leading role, demonstrating a deep commitment to the EU and a leadership role, as we've seen in the Eurozone crisis. And we see it especially here. And a lot of the data where in which the UK actually is one of the considered a more important partner, perhaps, or shared values or even a more important international player for the US in some ways, Germany is seen as the most important country to lead Europe out of the debt crisis at this point, trumping the UK, and then some international partners as well on that. So those are some of the top lines. I'll hand it over to the next portion.  Andrew, wow, thank you. My two takeaways. I have a lot more work to do in helping Americans understand Europe, the EU in Germany. And, cockpit, I hope you share these findings with the British Embassy. They should be pleased with some of the outcome there as well. Thank you so much, Andrew, for helping to really set the table for our conversation. And Bruce, I'll turn over to you and you can help us start the conversation. Thank you, Heather. And thanks, Andrew and Charles, for being here. And I appreciate all of you turning out. It's a real honor and a privilege to be here. This is clearly a very important topic. You wouldn't be here if on a cold day, unless you thought it was an important topic.  As Andrew's data show, Americans even perceive Germany to be the first among equals. I'm sure there'd be some European dissent about that. But I think that's clearly what Americans believe. And I think it's probably based in a certain amount of reality in current situation in Europe. Our data, we've been tracking kind of attitudes towards Germany for more than a decade now, is that the relationship got very, very rocky at the time of the Iraq war and the first Bush administration began to get better. And the second Bush administration got much better after the election of Barack Obama. And it began to tail off a bit since then. And of course, now we've had the Snowden incident and the tapping of Merkel's phones. And we don't know exactly what impact that's going to have. But everybody presumes it's going to have a negative impact. And it comes at a time, obviously, when it is crucial that Berlin and Washington agree on the future of the trade and economic relationship, the T-TIP. And clearly no one believes that without a meeting of the minds between Berlin and Washington on T-TIP, T-TIP will not happen. Now, the problem is that even if the chancellor's office and the White House agree on what should be in this agreement, it's not at all clear yet what the publics think about this. And that's still to be played out. And I think it'll be a very important thing to watch. The good news from our surveys over the years has been, let me start with the bad news. The bad news is that two years ago, at the height of the Euro crisis, when we would ask people what news items they were following in the news, people were three times as likely to be following the sex scandal at Penn State University than the Euro crisis, which, as you will recall, at the time, there were some concerns the Euro crisis would bring the entire world economy down with it. So this does show that we don't tend to pay attention to things in Europe. I think your data would suggest that hopefully has improved a bit. And some other data we have might suggest it as well. The good thing, I think, from a German and a European perspective is that we did in December ask the public which area is more important to the United States, Europe or Asia. And for the first time in years, people said Europe, not Asia. So even though there's a clear policy of the US government of a pivot towards Asia, the public, which had agreed with that recently, no longer agrees with that. Now, this may be just a quirk in the data. It may be a reflection of some things that have been in the news at the time the data was being taken. But what we do know is that it's not sustainable. Because if you look at the age breakdown of what people, the young people pick Asia or Europe, the older people pick Europe or Asia, it is people my generation who say Europe is more important. Young people say it's Asia. And we're all dying off. So Asia is the future. Whatever the current snapshot might show. On Germany in particular, I mean, Andrew's impression of German, of Germany data comport with our most recent findings. In December, we asked people they had a favorable attitude towards Germany and 67% said yes, only 16% said they had an unfavorable view of Germany, which is, you know, fairly strong. Bear in mind that in 2004, only 44% of the American public had a favorable view of Germany. This was at the height of the problems around the Iraq war. So that's a fairly significant improvement. We, as you found that men are more likely to have a favorable view of Germany than women. You found a 20 point difference. We found a nine point difference, but that's statistically significant. Men are more favorably disposed towards Germany. Interesting. Remember, overall, we found 67% of the public have a favorable view of Germany. There were some interesting, though, racial breakdowns here. 74% of whites had a favorable view of Germany. Only 49% of blacks and 51% of Hispanics. So to the extent that the embassy is thinking about their outreach, and given Andrew's point about the demographic change going on in the United States, there's some work to do in the minority communities in terms of Germany's image and so forth. We found no significant age differences, which I think is very, very interesting, because I think one of the concerns I know that I had, and it was some concerns actually sparked in me by some conversations with congressmen back in the 80s after the Wall fell, where congressmen were predicting that their constituents would have less of an interest in Europe once their sons and some daughters were not stationed in Europe. They didn't have that personal connection anymore. And, of course, the personal connection was really with Germany, not with other parts of Europe. That doesn't seem to have happened, where you kind of get this loss of connection. The college educated are more favorably disposed towards Germany than people with a high school education or less. Again, probably not surprising, also given the racial breakdowns and educational breakdowns on race in the U.S. We found that people in the northeast were about nine points more favorably disposed towards Germany than people in the west. But, again, that's probably not surprising. People in the northeast look east to Europe. People in the west look west to Asia. It's not surprising. We did not find any statistically significant difference among party allegiance and views of Germany. In other words, people across the board tended to, whether they were political views were to have a favorable view of Germany. There was one odd finding. The two most favorable groups in the population by ideology, most favorable towards Germany, were liberal Democrats at 80 percent and Tea Party members, 78 percent. Now, what, well, I mean, you know, if you had infinite amount of time and space with these people, which you don't, which is always the limitation in survey research, you would love to have dug into that and say, why do you like, and I will bet you any money, what you would find is that the liberal Democrats have great social welfare programs, you know, great labor relations. This is terrific. And the Tea Party guys would say, oh, you know, they're fiscally disciplined and, you know, rigorous and they, so they'd have totally different reasons why they both liked Germany. We did not ask the public, but we did ask members of the Council on Foreign Relations as kind of an elite surrogate group in December. Who did they think would be America's most important partner? So we didn't ask the public, and we did, we asked the elites. And what was interesting is Germany came in sixth behind India and China and Japan and Brazil and Mexico. Not quite sure why the elites let India was our most important partner, but that's a separate issue. But Germany came in sixth. What was interesting is it came in first among European countries. More importantly, in 2009, when we last asked that question, Germany was ninth. In 2005, when we asked that question, Germany was 11th. So it's jumped from 11th to sixth since 2005. So the estimation of Germany among foreign policy elites, at least that subsection of the foreign policy has gone up dramatically. Andrew asked Americans if they think Germans like the U.S. Every year we ask Germans their view of the U.S. We don't. And what we found was that in 2013, 53% of Germans had a favorable view of the U.S. I think Andrew found that we only thought that by a 43% plurality that we thought they liked us. So actually, we underestimate German appreciation for the United States. And in fact, Germans actually like Americans more than they like the United States, which I can tell you all over the world that's the case. I mean, there is a differentiation between Americans, except when George Bush was reelected and we asked people, do you think more or less of Americans were real? And then that went down dramatically. But we did ask, as I said, we have asked Germans' view of the United States over time. What is interesting, though, and I think bears watching, is that German's view of the U.S. is down 11 percentage points since 2009. And their view of Americans is down 9 percentage points since 2011. There is a wearing off here of the Obama bounce. These numbers aren't horrible for the U.S. or even Obama. We have asked questions about Obama, too. But it's beginning to fade. And what will be very interesting is when we do the survey, this spring again in Germany, if we can discern any impact of the Snowden incident. But thank you. Bruce, thank you. That was terrific and a nice balance of some of the statistical information. Charles, help us put this into some broader context. I thought I would start by giving a little bit more of a sense of why I may belong on a panel like this. In addition to the things that Heather said, I've been a foreign correspondent based in Germany in the past and continued to write about German and European issues since then. And that's one of the things I cover for the post-editorial page. So I've been watching I was very intrigued by this invitation to talk about perceptions of Germany. It's for me also somewhat of a personal matter because I'm married to a woman from Germany and my children are all dual citizens. So it's nice to know that if they go around introducing themselves as Germans in town, they'll be liked by 59 percent of the people. Although I have to say, I do wonder what the results would be if the sample were limited to people who have Americans who have German mother-in-laws because I think that could change the results. I'm just kidding. If my mother-in-law is out there, I'm just kidding. On a more serious note, I think these are fascinating results and I think it's also worth noting, and Bruce at different points alluded to this, that Germany isn't just kind of popular in the United States right now. It's popular everywhere, or so it would seem. From the most recent BBC survey of 25 countries, they did the middle of last year and Germany came out as the most favorably viewed country. 59 percent of the respondents ranked it as a country whose influence in the world is mainly positive. That was well ahead of the United States. It was even ahead of Canada, which is, I mean, everybody likes Canada. But I think it's worth really stepping back and focusing on this for a moment because this is an, for Germany, I think this is an historic moment. Maybe it's happened in the past, but I cannot remember a time when Germany was both powerful and liked since ever. Maybe it happened, but it's happening now. Because as you see, there are data here, and I think they appear in other surveys that suggest Germany is a world economic power, Germany is influential at the UN, Germany is strong, Germany leads the EU, and we like Germany. Germany is positive. And I think it's worth noting this is an extraordinary development in Germany's history and maybe even in the world's history. And since they asked, I'm going to tell you why I think this happened.  I think the first thing that's happened in recent history is that Germany unified, which made it possible for Germany to project an image of any kind at all as a unified nation. In the recent past, Germany's global image was completely muddled by the fact that it was divided. And who were we talking about here? Were we talking about those East German athletes with their steroids, or were we talking about, you know, those nice people in Sweden making clocks? It was completely indistinct. There was a kind of, I think, a kind of like a false dawn of Germany's image right at the moment of reunification, when there was this huge celebration of the fall of the wall, and there was a lot of boosterism about Germany. I remember at that time I was living in New York and I went to take German lessons because I was preparing to go over there. And the Goethe Institute classes were oversubscribed, packed with Americans, trying to learn German because they all wanted to go to Berlin and take advantage of this big boom that was coming in Germany. Germany was going to be this. And it kind of, I call it a false dawn because two things happened. First, there was a lot of negative publicity about xenophobic violence in the immediate aftermath of reunification. Some of you may remember that. It went well into 92 and 93. A lot of bad headlines about places burning that had asylum seekers in them and so forth. And that was followed by a lot of disappointment, stories about the disappointment that Easterners felt with reunification, the high economic cost and economic stagnation that was going on in Germany in the 90s. And as a result, the country could kind of couldn't capitalize on what seemed like an immediate opportunity to improve its global image. And with respect to the United States, I think these data that we just saw are quite stark as to sort of the moment this kind of bottomed out, which was April 2003. I mean, that date is very significant because that's the first month of the Iraq War, which is a time when the Germans were regarded, I think, by a lot of Americans as people who didn't help us in a war which at that time was popular. Notably, I think the highest moment there on the chart was September 2001, which is right after 9-11. And people forget, but the very first person foreign leader to visit Washington was Gerhard Schroeder, who later on would opt out of the Iraq War. But I wonder if that very high number of pro-German sentiment wasn't related to that gesture. And so that was sort of another blown opportunity there between 2001 and 2003. And then I think started what caused this to turn up were a couple of things. One was that Germany got its economic house in order and began to reform. It took some tough steps in the mid-2000s and restored its economy and became more dynamic, started to create jobs, started to produce a lot of exports that came to this country, started to invest, have a surplus to invest in factories in this country. And the bad times of Schroeder, in terms of bilateral relations, gave way to Angela Merkel, who was more interesting in a way, because she was the first woman to lead a European country of that size and significance. And I wouldn't underestimate the impact of the World Cup in 2006 in Germany, which was a happy event. It carried, well, not for the Germans, but for other countries anyway. And it was a great big festival. It showed the country in a very good light. The young people were there in front of the cameras. A lot of Americans went to visit. Admittedly, more would have gone if it were a baseball tournament, but still. And I think that was a good inflection point for Germany. And so in general, I think the sort of the trend has been up in terms of the overall dynamism and profile of Germany. You know, Angela Merkel, I would also not underestimate the degree to which she is responsible for this good image. As I said before, I think it impresses a lot of Americans that a woman could become Chancellor of a country like that. And she is now, I think she's probably the best known German Chancellor, you know, as an individual that I can remember my lifetime. In 1991, I was living in New York, learning German, and I was walking across the street, across Park Avenue, middle of Midtown Manhattan, one afternoon in the summer, and there, across the street, coming toward me, was Helmut Kohl. All by himself. I'm not making this up. Well, he was, I am making up, he wasn't all by himself. He had one bodyguard with him. That's it. Those two guys just crossing Park Avenue, nobody even noticed them. Apparently, he was in the country because his son was a student at Harvard, and he was visiting him or something like that. He was coming out of the Waldorf Historia. No one noticed him. I don't think that would happen to Angela Merkel, in part because now she's even on Saturday Night Live. I don't know if you've noticed this, but there's Kate McKinnon does an imitation of Angela Merkel, and everybody gets it. Think about that from it. All right. Now, for the future, and the gloomy part of this, I don't give advice. Well, let's put it this way.  Don't blow this. As I said, this is an extraordinary moment for Germany on the world stage. I repeat, to be both powerful and appreciated. It's especially significant with respect to the United States because people forget, well, maybe they don't forget, how many wars we fought with Germany to include, in a way, our own Revolutionary War, where the Hessians were paid by King George III to come over here and fight the Patriots. Okay, it's 50 percent. And the fact that all that history is behind us and that Germany has moved to the point where it has this great image in this country is really remarkable. It's really, really good news. And when I say don't blow it, I mean very specifically what's happening right now with Edward Snowden. Okay? I understand the irritation, the fury, the anger, indeed the righteous indignation of many Germans about this incident. But I really hope what I perceive to be an overreaction to this, in terms of demonization of the United States, which I see in the German press, is not going to define the view of German public opinion toward this country over time. Because that would lead, I think, down the same road we had with Schroeder and the Iraq War and early 2000s and that kind of conflict over security issues, foreign policy, and so forth, and would blow this whole wonderful dividend in relations between the two people that we have. There is a, perhaps I perceive a temptation in Germany to learn from history that the best thing to be in terms of getting sympathy is a victim. Be very blunt about it. And that would be one lesson history may have taught Germany. Better to be a victim. And the Snowden matter allows Germans, if they want to, to think of themselves as victims of the United States. And I think we'd be very short-sighted if Germans embraced that role, as opposed to a more confident role, a more broad-minded, long, far-sighted role, which is to keep this term of events in perspective and continue to think of themselves as people who are strong, who are not victims, who are not at odds in some fundamental way with the United States. And to go forward in that, because I repeat, the one thing I think that could cause Germany to blow this great thing would be any sort of uncontrolled or long-standing serious conflict with the U.S. So on that note, I'll stop giving advice. Thanks, Charles. We like you, Unleashed, and we are going to edit the video about the mother-in-law comments. You can go home. She's heard that joke. Okay, as long as she's heard that joke. Thank you. Thank you all so much. Wow, that terrific way to begin a conversation. I'd like to take the moderators prerogative and just throw a question out. And my brain is turning with all this information. Bruce, I thought the comment about the progressive, the liberal Democrats, the Tea Party, what they agree on because of the two things, both the generous social welfare programs or the perception and then that toughness on austerity, debt, living within your means effort, that in some ways I think that's probably the message that makes in some globally Germany more popular in its perception and maybe that's what the BBC was picking up on. But with both the economic power and then the bonus of popularity comes that loaded term of leadership. How does Germany lead? And Charles, your comment about, you know, I think as I've watched German, foreign and security policy evolve, it has always been so exclusively supportive of the European Union and NATO. Those were their interests. They supported those interests. And as we've seen, beginning with the Iraq war in some ways, but then during the European crisis, German national interests began to step forward and they were not always in balance with EU, NATO. It was not solidarity, but it was a different point of view. And I'm wondering if you could think through this question for both Bruce and Charles, how does Germany assume that leadership role in Europe and globally being very fearful though of how that leadership will be perceived both within Europe and the concern of, you know, anti-German sentiment that is certainly pops its head up in Greece and other Southern European countries and how that's assumed globally. That's question one. And number two, this is a big year. This is the 100th anniversary of the First World War, the Centenary. And so that's one historical point as well as the fall of the Berlin Wall. How does Germany navigate both the celebration of the fall of the Berlin Wall, but again it's also that historical recognition of Germany's role in Europe.  I mean, I think those are the key questions going forward. I mean, as Charles kind of alluded to them as well. I mean, to make a couple of fairly cynical responses about public opinion, I mean, I think basically publics like winners. And, you know, let's face it, Americans or anybody else that don't spend a lot of time thinking about Germans. So they have very superficial impressions and they're emotional impressions. They're not rational impressions. I mean, I think one of the things that is hardest for people like me as a recovering journalist or anybody who's interested in policy is to realize that we live in a rational world where we want hard answers to, you know, what do people rationally think about this, that or the other thing? The reality is most people have lives to live. They don't spend any time thinking about this. They have emotions. So what the best questions are ones that get at their emotions. And so one of the things that we're getting picking up, it seems to me in these favorable attitudes, is that Germany is seen as a winner and people want to be associated with a winner. Now, of course the irony of that is the German economy has not actually done that well lately. It's just done well relative to everybody else in Europe. But that's benefited Germany. The other problem is that nobody likes the biggest kid in the block. So the fact that Germany is the biggest kid in the block and will probably exert more and more authority in European discussions going forward is going to feed a certain amount of resentment. In our own surveys we've shown that two years ago Germany had a favorable view. People in most of Europe had a favorable view of Germany, except in Greece. Last year people had a favorable view of Germany, except in Spain, Italy, and Greece. So what happened over that one year? Well, Germany got tougher. And so I think there is that that dilemma. There are on the horns of a dilemma. My intuition tells me if the euro economy sticks together, and let's face it they've kind of tiptoed past the graveyard now for a number of years. So I think there's a good chance that will continue. That this gamble led by Merkel that we don't need to do a big intervention that we can get through. It seems to be paying off. If that continues, I think that Germany's favorability will continue to be strong or improve or whatever. And the resentment against Germans dictating to people will ebb over time. I mean who knows, but it just seems to me that would make it would make sense. Whether the Germans will have the good sense to pick up on Charles's point to not overplay this hand, and to be willing to change course, even 180 degrees, if the underlying economics require it, I think it's a test we just don't know. But I think the worst thing that could happen to Germany is that there is a crisis in Europe of some ilk, a banking crisis we'll say, and the Germans say well we really can't help here, you know. Well we'll protect the German banks, we won't protect them. Then I think the sentiment in Europe towards Germany might really shift dramatic, because people want to find somebody to blame. And who would be the likely candidate in this, you know, you guys had the money and you didn't help. And I think that's that's the challenge that Germany might face. I generally agree with that. I'm somebody who wrote a lot of, spilled a lot of ink, almost predicting that Europe would by now would have been collapsed. And so I'm obliged to concede that Angela Merkel's handling of the situation in terms of her ability to kind of muddle through without a disaster is is quite impressive. And and by the way I think is another reason Germany's image in the US is positive. I think that she or anyone who governs Germany in this circumstance has got a lot of different constituencies that they're trying to respond to. And the reluctance of Germans to lend the kind of support that these countries need, even though they I think at some level Germans understand they have to do it, is a genuine dilemma. And I think when the Obama administration kind of put a lot of pressure on the Germans to do more, that was not terribly welcome. And that was a sort of a bit of a sore point. But but basically even the US German issue wasn't that particular conflict wasn't fatal either. I'm going to sort of fall back on my don't be a victim argument on this point too, because I think the one thing the Germans could do to tip the rest of the continent's opinion against them in a dangerous way would be to overemphasize how much we're paying for you kind of thing and complain too much about it. There is a tendency in German public opinion, an understandable one, I don't deny to do that. But I guess I think with a test of leadership for the Germans is going to be to just do this and not complain about it. I mean I think that's one of the definitions of responsibility actually is that you do what you have to do and don't complain while you're doing it. And I think Merkel herself has has met that test and I think the problem is I think a lot of her people are complaining and so she has to steer around them. With respect to these anniversaries you know that's a very interesting one because the historical I mean the historical blame about world war two is just a no-win situation for Germany but 1914 is interesting because it's coming under a lot of historical revision right now and a lot of historical work is being done and some of the reaching popular audience is suggesting well you know this whole thing in 1914 was kind of everybody's fault and the Versailles was all unfair and so forth and so on and so that you know I don't expect that to be some kind of transformational debate but it will be an interesting little development to follow whether there's some revision in the U.S. and maybe even England about the first world war as well. If I could just add anecdote about this there's nothing to do with Germany but I was recently having lunch with the liberal democratic spokesman in the House of Lords who's a good friend and William Wallace who some of you may know and he said he was talking about the excitement in Europe and in Britain about the upcoming anniversary of the beginning of the first world war and he talked about all the things they were going to be doing and he said and oh what are the plans in the United States for commemorating the beginning of this and then he stopped himself got a big smile on his face and said oh I forgot it's not the hundred anniversary of you getting in the war.  Oh this is going to be a great year. Oh my goodness now it's time to bring you into the conversation. Oh great I see lots of hands we have microphones if you could please identify yourself your name your affiliation and this side of the room I'm going to challenge just looks like they're a bit more active so we have two hands in the back there and then one up here in the front hold on one second till that microphone gets to you. Thank you very much. My name is Victoria Rietig I'm an analyst at the Migration Policy Institute I'm a German born and raised but have been in the country more or less on and off for six or seven years. So thank you very much for these very insightful the insightful presentation and for doing this in the first place. I was wondering on the one hand I'm very happy to hear the things that you're saying because it gives me the feeling that we're being liked and that's wonderful. But my question is about potential limitations in the method and I was wondering about maybe some biases also in the results and maybe you could speak to that and here's why I was thinking of that when you presented about halfway through the presentation you presented name five countries that the US shares the most values with is most important and I was wondering did you have where people may be primed to think of Germany more than of others if they've already answered 20 questions in Germany. So could you speak a little bit about this danger of priming in there and about limitations of the study as a whole. Thank you. If it's okay I think we'll just take a couple of questions and then we can fire away Adam if that's okay. Sorry I'm Terry Murphy I'm a lifer sort of with CSIS. I was once upon a time complimented by a lady in Europe as unusually sophisticated for an American and I said well let's assume I'm in the top 10 percent because I went to a good college or what have you which means there's 300 million 30 million people just like me. So I think we it is useful for Europe to understand that the Americans are pretty well engaged and pretty knowledgeable. They'd be nice if we had more information but the fact is we are a fairly sophisticated group of people. Charles Lane had a good point when about the World Cup. A friend of mine who was a British ambassador was there as a guest and he was hugely impressed that the Germans were waving the flag for the first time since WW2. They were proud of being Germans. They were proud of being Germans. I've been around Germany for 30 years and I have been honored individually not courteously received individually without exception for 30 plus years not as a hugely important person but as simply an American. So I welcome comments to drive it down to the sort of coal face as the British would say the normal ordinary people who are represented by you folks here. Thank you Terry we'll take one more question sir did you have your hand up. Peter we're right down front here. Hi thank you I'm Andreas Ross with a Frankfurter Eigemeine Zeitung a correspondent here.  Does a German no sorry a US war wearing us that we've seen in Syria this past summer sort of correlate with liking the Germans that are champions in that in that domain. Does nobody dislike us for not having participated in Libya where the US government makes a strong point of needing the Europeans to tackle the problems in their own backyard. How do these two things relate. Thanks. Okay we have the sort of methodology question for Andrew and then we're commenting on Terry Murphy's question about the elite versus the normal folks and then I may have to comment on that last question about elite maybe versus public opinion on US perceptions of German military strength. Andrew. Yeah thank you. So the first question really good point yes there will be research by if you designed it in such a way where in which you would ask all of these questions about Germany and then ask well who are the biggest foreign powers and well no surprise Germany shows up. We actually designed it in such a way where we ask all of the questions about you know relation in term of international power shared values before we even get into Germany. So we sort of start the study broadly talking about global trends and then we get down into Germany. I was going to say on that point it was very German of you to look at this data and insist it can't possibly be true. Well that was my first crack but on this point about war which is a very interesting point actually because the Germans haven't gone along in Iraq and haven't gone along in Libya and I think the just take the Iraq one was the one I thought through more I think that one kind of ended up starting off bad for the Germans and ending up good because at the time that this happened as I was talking about earlier the data showing how unpopular Germany was in this country around 2003 when when Gerhard Schroeder was really quite actively campaigning against the war in Iraq in a way that a German Chancellor generally wouldn't have done but he was in a way vindicated right because the war didn't work out so well and American public opinion itself turned against the war so I think over the long term Germany's refusal to participate in that did not hurt and may even at some in some way have helped Germany's image in the US I don't know it'd be interesting question to ask and as far as the Libya thing goes I don't think Americans were too excited about plunging in there ourselves and I don't think faulted the Germans necessarily for staying out too much it had a happy ending with you know I guess not for Gaddafi but for us I guess you could say and didn't cost us a lot of time money and lives and so it was kind of a real blip on public opinion the Iraq thing was a much bigger deal and as I say it it worked out okay I think for the Germans on that I mean I know of no survey data that actually gets at how Americans view Germans lack of participation in Iraq or what they're doing in Syria compared to what we're doing in Syria I adventure to say that most Americans have never thought about it and have no idea that what the Germans are doing I think that and I totally agree with Charles I think the well we can't prove it I mean it's certainly the data show I mean there's this to collapse in support for Germany around the time of the fight over the Iraq war and then went back up and I think one of the explanations could be not that the Germans were suddenly doing things we liked but rather we came to not like the Iraq war so we weren't as upset with the Germans about their failure to support the Iraq war I think the bigger test is going forward is Iran and we don't know how the Iran thing is going to work out and at least the president thinks there's a 50-50 chance that it'll work out fine right and work together on this right now and that's great if it doesn't work out fine and the West has to decide what to do impose more sanctions go to war except Iran is a nuclear weapons state I think that's going to bear real watching in terms about how that affects U.S. German U.S. European relations but I think in particular Germany would be a key issue here because at least not among the public but among elites there was a perception in the old days that it was a lot of German companies who were doing a lot of trade with Iran and if that would spring back there might be some resentment I mean there's a lot of things to watch there but I do think that and look if we went to war I think it's inconceivable that there wouldn't be a dramatic increase in the price of oil and guess who whose economy that would hurt more than ours it would hurt the European economy so what would that do to relations so I do think it's a lot of moving parts here around Iran that really bear watching and we just don't know the outcome we won't know for months but I do think it really bears watching as a moderator I shouldn't do this but I can't help myself I just want to put a thought in on the German role of military security and again this is only elite opinion here this would not penetrate into the larger public opinion I think former German defense minister de Maizere's final comment sort of don't preach to us I'm paraphrasing badly about German military contributions and there is an under appreciation in some ways the fact that Germany is the third largest contributor to Afghanistan and has had significant force presence in Kosovo I think some of the unevenness about Afghanistan quite frankly has been German caveats and that is somehow and again in elite minds and this is the officials that deal with this that that is somehow less than that contribution because there were so many caveats about how and where and when and it could be used but I agree there is an under appreciation for me Libya disturbed me for a couple of reasons I as an analyst I sort of pride myself on trying to be able to think how I think a country would respond and I never thought I would see where on a U.N. Security Council resolution that Germany would not support the right to protect from historical standpoint and the fact that the abstention happened with Russia and China again just was a moment that I went ouch and I think 24 hours after the decision was made the German government went ouch maybe that wasn't quite where they wanted to be but then again the decision to remove naval assets from the Mediterranean to say we're going to make sure you understand we're not in this was again just another didn't feel and sound right and then you know the next comment was well we'll provide more assets to Afghanistan it's not a selection of which conflict to support it was about a specific issue we hope that in future cases when Germany is asked to respond that won't necessarily be the response but the chancellor was dealing with an incredibly difficult political position at that moment with regional elections and a very difficult issue surrounding the Fukushima decision so there were lots of domestic politics going on but that to me as an analyst that decision was striking to me and I don't know whether that was just a bizarre constellation or whether that is a new direction for for German foreign policy we'll have to see and you'll help us see that as well I saw some hands over here which means this side of the room is getting feisty so I saw two two hands here if we can have a microphone for questions hello thank you very much for putting on this wonderful panel my name is Britta Waldschmidt Nelson and I'm from the German Historical Institute and my question goes back to the advice that Charles Lane gives Angela Merkel or the German people to not complain about paying into the European Union but just do it and I was just wondering your take on the problem that I see is that the larger problem is that one is trying in Europe right now to have a financial union an economic union without having a political union and I can't help thinking I wonder how let's say the great state of California would feel if they would pay you know twice as much federal taxes everybody else for the fact that people in certain starts let's say Georgia or whatever Texas could retire seven years earlier because that is what Anna Merkel is dealing with the fact that in Germany due to economic austerity which is being praised everywhere the retirement age in Germany was recently raised from 65 to 67 and there's now talk to raising it to 70 years Germans don't like it but they swallowed the pill but what they don't like is that in Greece and France you have attempts by the political leadership to raise the retirement age from 58 or 60 to 62 and there are riots in the street and they take it back and so Anna Merkel is dealing with the problem that a lot of Germans feel we're happy to pay we can have a union we want to support everybody but it's simply not fair that we have to work 10 years longer than the others so how can she deal with that? What's your take on that? I'm Jerry Livingston from the German Historical Institute I want to disagree with Bruce Stokes on a point and answer Heather's question as to where can Germany lead? The disagreement if I understood you correctly you thought German-American relationship was more important sometime seems to me it's much less important and it's been for a long, long time and of course in the time of this cold war was the center of our relationship but after all the United States is pivoting to Asia and it's totally involved in the Middle East and Germany for its part on a daily basis is involved in building the EU and dealing with EU crises and dealing with political problems right next door like Ukraine an answer to your question where you didn't get an answer from the panel where can Germany lead? It seems to me there are a number of fields where Germany without being a hegemon and without being militaristic could easily lead one is arms control in the 1970s as an accompaniment to Austro-Politik Eastern policy Germany had a really rather strong arms control effort secondly it could lead much more than it does than issues of international trade which is for a German economy absolutely essential thirdly and this has been referred to several times Germany could play and should play a bigger role outside of your at least in the Middle East finally they could pull themselves together and said they would help with the disposal of Syrian chemical weapons but it took them a long time to do that there are all sorts of areas like that where they could and they are doing things sometimes not on the surface but they're they're helping they've been helping Israel for years in trying to deal with espionage and issues of that sort and lastly it seems to me Germany could be playing a bigger role in Ukraine in Ukraine crisis could be leading Europe this is a confrontation between Europe and Russia which is unusual and to some degree is a uniting factor for Europe and the unity of Europe of course is a German foreign policy priority so they should be seems to be playing a bigger role there too thanks Jerry I was going to add on to that sort of the historic German-Russian role and sort of the for Bruce and for Charles certainly Charles from your reporting when you were in Berlin how do you sort of factor the very special German-Russian relation but now as Mr. Putin becomes a much greater challenge to Europe to the United States how can you imagine Germany will lead that relationship I'll let you guys have the two questions well it is a panel about American perceptions of Germany we're starting to arrange a little far afield but to your point about paying for Europe don't take this the wrong way but this is exactly what I don't think you should be saying as the Germany should be saying the argument you just made because there's certain things that are true but not helpful to keep on saying and I think this is an example of it and and you yeah yeah I think she deals with it basically the way she has been dealing with it which is and this only became apparent to me over the course of several iterations of these European summits and crises and so forth which is to sort of drive the hardest possible bargain before paying right and to do it with rather impressive degree of calm you know and not giving a lot of speeches about how you know this is late you know this is really painful but since we're good we'll do it and things like that she has just kind of gone about it in a business-like way now privately I must say she's been there've been stories in the press about how very brutal some of this wrangling with the Greeks and the Italians has been and I will by Silvio Berlusconi would be a better panelist to discuss that than I am but it has been done it is it is he'd be a better panelist generally but we would survive this but she's done it you know I'm sounding like a groupie for Angela Merkel but she has she has done it in a kind of a business-like way and hasn't let the you know like the build Zeitung dictate how you know the optics of German German policy and I think that's been very good it takes a lot of discipline it's going to be very hard to sustain and honestly with the social democrats now in the government I don't know how that's gonna gonna play out we'll all have to see I don't I think that just to this leadership point where I think there's kind of like this phony sense that this all has been solved in Europe right I mean as you say the political union is not there which of course you need ultimately and so I think they're gonna be more rounds of more crises to come and it will just have to continue to be worked through in that way and I really mean it when I say like if they want to be thought of as leaders you know continue to be perceived that way I think it's just part of part of that is just not complaining too much and it's keeping it keeping it low key that's the only way that's the only way that can it could be handled look I I I'm not a politician right I don't have to speak to the German voters and explain what would appear to be a real contradiction um but I would echo Charles's point that I think that that to the extent that that discussion can be managed in Germany because it it could get out of hand very easily and it would you know cast the German as victims in ways that wouldn't be helpful even even if you could objectively argue on that issue they are victims right on Angela Merkel I our service continues to show that she's the most popular politician in Europe by far that she could get elected prime minister in every country in Europe now now we don't ask it that would you vote a German to be a prime minister to run that right but yeah but she is more popular than any of the leaders of any of the other countries despite the fact she's not popular in Greece or whatever but for the most part so she has managed this very very well and I I will do a public mea culpa here when I was a journalist I fretted in print about they were walking a tightrope and they couldn't keep this up and they couldn't muddle through and this was all going to go and badly and we're going to bring us all down on top of us and that hasn't happened and I think it's largely due to the Angela Merkel's political abilities and I think one has to acknowledge that whether they can continue to do that I think it's we're in less of a dangerous situation than we were a year ago or two years ago but I don't think we're totally out of the woods yet and we should remember that we have been told we were out of the woods several times already I'll need to go back fall back into the woods so we have to be very careful I'm sorry yeah on Jerry's point actually Jerry I think we agree I mean I I actually think that Germany is terribly important for the US for some of the very reasons you cited I think that we need Germany to help fix Europe because if Europe it is still the second largest economy in the world and if that went really south it would really cause a problem for us I think we need Germany to deal help deal with Russia and the Ukraine in particular and it would be great to have Germany involved in some other issues that are important to us and so I think that's why Germany is so so terribly important because I don't think that we are up I mean our other survey show that we are at a what at a very high level maybe the highest level since we started measuring this 20 30 years ago of Americans reluctance to bear burdens in the world you know our engagement dare don't call it isolationism because I think it's not quite classic isolationism because we're also very supportive of economic engagement in the world but we basically want our politicians to focus on things at home not abroad and I do think that in that context we need other people to help carry some more of the burden and only logical country to do that in Europe is Germany yeah I mean if I could just going back to the data remember which is kind of what what started all this you could interpret this data to suggest that beyond a general sense that Germany is economically strong Americans are kind of uncertain about what they're going to do with that and whether that will benefit us the Americans it is significant that a lot of people do seem to think that there are competitors which I mean is not an entirely good thing to be and the the numbers on the t-tip are interesting because I mean of course we wouldn't expect there to be a high degree of awareness about something that complex but the fact that it's such an open question means that if there suddenly becomes a perception that Europe is economically in crisis and is is unstable and and it you know then that will become what defines attitudes about the t-tip right so the United States without maybe even saying it openly is kind of dependent on Germany to kind of handle this over there in Europe for us while while we worry about other thing I've always worried about I mean there's all sorts of of individual issues about t-tip about GMOs or about data privacy or all sorts of issues the U.S. by America provisions all those technical issues but I've always thought the biggest danger to t-tip could be if the European economy went into crisis again that you'd have somebody stand up in Congress and say those people are sick and you want us to get in bed with them we'll catch their disease I mean you know this is this is one of the one of the things that that would I think be disastrous for for for the t-tip in the in the short run I have to say sort of true fessions of the panel I too said this muddling through strategy something's gotta give it can endure and the Chancellor has perfected it and we're actually seeing some results because of the structural reforms that she has demanded so I've always it well I'm in the groupie club with Charles I've always admired the Chancellor because she's always said this is going to be step by step there's no overnight solution for this while Commissioner President Barroso has been saying it's over we're done you know she's always been you know her expectations she's said it and so this is going to be hard we have to do this so I I admire that I wonder Jerry if U.S. German relations one thing we're going to have increasingly in common is we're going to understand there's a burden of responsibility and leadership and it costs a lot and it's not a lot of fun but that's and something in some ways an issue we can we can talk about whether that's regional responsibility or or global responsibility well we're going to have to get them to be a little more courageous one final question for the panel and I know I'm so sorry we're running out of time I have a demographic question so Andrew talked about the pluralist that's a new term for me so that the zero the 17 on the other side of then in Germany I'm worried about the demographic crisis that is that is hitting Germany what are the attitudes and the shifting changes again more from Germany towards America when their demographic crisis really hits how does that impact transatlantic attitudes or particularly on economic competition would there be any correlation there and Andrew I just love your comments more on the the west side on the pluralist but the flip side is the aging population in Germany and what that would mean in 2040-2050 yeah I mean I think from the you know I mean the way we traditionally seen generations in the U.S. is from a world view in a lot of ways and the real question is you know so much is in play right now and it's going to define how the pluralists see Germany and likewise it's going to define how younger Germans see Americans so you know I really think you know how you know this whole Snowden things taken care of you know Middle Eastern policy can they fix the Eurozone all of that right now is in play right now we want them as the other panelists have been saying to to to handle it basically because we're not going to intervene as much my sense in terms of you know it's funny a few years ago we were saying the millennials where this you know hope and change and you know this is why Obama resonated so much a lot of that has gone away so I think it's hard to say that you know people were thinking that are the plurals going to be more like the Xers a little bit more cynical about the world my sense is it's heading in that direction but that's not to say that you know we just they still don't believe that the U.S. and and Germany will basically be the leaders in the West right now and in the future your question reminds me of a conversation I have with the German Defense Minister at the time of the Iraq war and I remember him lecturing me I mean literally lecturing me as only a German can about how we Americans were at risk of alienating an entire generation of Germans just like we did with the Vietnam War and then you have to live with that alienation until they would die and the reality was it just didn't show up in the data that there wasn't a statistically significant difference I mean everybody in Germany was upset with the United States because of the Iraq war it wasn't just one and it didn't have any lingering effect now it'll be very interesting this year when we do the questioning in Germany about attitudes towards the U.S. if there's a real generational difference if young people are much more worried about this than older Germans or will older Germans be very worried because of the experience of the Germany and those memories and maybe even some memories of the Nazi period who knows I mean it'll be very interesting to see but at least the experience of the Iraq war would suggest it may not even even if there is a difference it may not have a lingering effect on the broader issue of the aging of the German population I don't know if that will have a whole lot of impact on the of the attitudes towards the U.S. in general unless there's something else going on that we don't understand between now and then I mean one thing we have looked at we just Pew just released today a survey of attitudes around the world towards aging which I would highly recommend to you which has some interesting questions about do people think it's a problem do people think they're going to have an adequate standard of living in their old age who do they think it's going to pay for their old age you know the government or their family or themselves or God knows who knows what and what was interesting was that obviously Germany's Americans were almost twice as confident that they would be able to pay for their old age that they would have an adequate standard of living in their old age then were Germans which I thought was a terribly significant difference even though the reality is probably the reverse and no it may well be right and and this was in very confident because I you know you can do very confident somewhat confident but you I think very confident is the is the is the right thing to look at now in part that reflects the reality that we're just younger right I mean we're we're we're going to be younger in 2040 or 2050 than the Germans are but and but you're right it belies this concern about about our systems and and the fiscal concern about our systems so I I would recommend that on that question well it's almost time to stop but just a quick point on the aging of Germany I mean perceptions are different from reality but they're not totally disconnected from reality I mean reality does affect perception and so it's interesting here that this survey says Germany is a modern and forward thinking society 60 percent if it turns out that Germany is like at one big nursing home one fine day will it still be regarded as a modern and forward thinking society will it actually be one I mean I think this is I mean because it also says here Germany is a global leader in research and technology 52 percent well elderly people don't invent things I mean well I take that back some do but by and large innovation comes from younger people and the reality that Germany is rapidly aging that that older people are cautious less willing to take risk they don't travel to the United States as readily and all those kinds of follow-on things could start to undercut this sort of perception that Americans have that Germany is kind of a cutting edge edge place because in fact it wouldn't be and so you know if you have honestly the last time I was in Berlin what really struck me just walking down the street was how old everyone is really there are large groups of elderly people everywhere you look and at a certain point with the risk of offending anyone in this room because I'm 52 now they even seemed old in my eyes at some point that could come to define American perception of Germany it's way too early to say that but it would be very interesting thing to have happen I think to some extent that has already occurred with Japan actually and that's because it's a reality but anyway think of all the geezer jokes about Florida yeah exactly I remember because they had so much retirement money that they they bought houses there I remember having a conversation with a senior Bundeswehr official and saying I was concerned with the demographic change that when security in a German context is only going to mean social security because that's going to be the priority at which they're going to focus their their attention but first let me thank the German embassy Karl Friedrich Irina you got a little bit more than you bargained for with this conversation I know that but this was an absolute delight thank you for sharing this survey data with us I had so much fun Charles, Bruce, Andrew you were great what a super conversation thank you for being with us and you guys made it really great thank you again please join us again for future events


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