Part 1. Elcibiades 1. By Plato. Translated by Benjamin Joit. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Kevin Johnson. Appendix 1. It seems impossible to separate by any exact line the genuine writings of Plato from the Spurious. The only external evidence to them, which is of much value, is that of Aristotle. For the Alexandrian catalogues of a century later include manifest forgeries. Even the value of the Aristotelian authority is a good deal impaired by the uncertainty concerning the date and authorship of the writings which are ascribed to him. And several of the citations of Aristotle omit the name of Plato, and some of them omit the name of the dialogue from which they are taken. Prior, however, to the enquiry about the writings of a particular author, general considerations which equally affect all evidence to the genuineness of ancient writings are the following. Shorter works are more likely to have been forged, or to have received an erroneous designation than longer ones. And some kinds of composition, such as epistles or panigerical orations, are more liable to suspicion than others. Those again which have a taste of sophistry in them, or the ring of a later age, or the sleighter character of a rhetorical exercise, or in which a motive or some affinity to spurious writings can be detected, or which seem to have originated in a name or statement really occurring in some classical author, are also of doubtful credit. While there is no instance of any ancient writing proved to be a forgery which combines excellence with length, a really great and original writer would have no object in fathering his works on Plato. And to the forger or imitator, the literary hack of Alexandria and Athens, the gods did not grant originality or genius. Further, in attempting to balance the evidence fore and against the Platonic dialogue, we must not forget that the form of the Platonic writing was common to several of his contemporaries. Iscanese, Euclid, Phido, Antisthenes, and in the next generation Aristotle are all said to have composed dialogues, and mistakes of names are very likely to have occurred. Greek literature in the third century before Christ was almost as voluminous as our own, and without the safeguards of regular publication, or printing, or binding, or even of distinct titles. An unknown writing was naturally attributed to a known writer whose works bore the same character, and the name once appended easily obtained authority. A tendency may also be observed to blend the works and opinions of the master with those of his scholars. To a later Platonist, the difference between Plato and his imitators was not so perceptible as to ourselves. The memorabilia of Xenophon and the dialogues of Plato are but a part of a considerable Socratic literature which has passed away, and we must consider how we should regard the question of the genuineness of a particular writing, if this lost literature had been preserved to us. These considerations lead us to adopt the following criteria of genuineness. 1. That is most certainly Plato's which Aristotle attributes to him by name, which 2. Is of considerable length, of three, great excellence, and also four, in harmony with the general spirit of the Platonic writings. But the testimony of Aristotle cannot always be distinguished from that of a latter age, parentheses, seafobs, and apprentices, and has various degrees of importance, those writings which he cites without mentioning Plato, under their own names, e.g. the Hippias, the Funeral Oration, the Fido, etc. have an inferior degree of evidence in their favor. They may have been supposed by him to be the writings of another, although in the case of really great works, e.g. the Fido, this is not credible. Those again which are quoted by non-named are still more defective in their external credentials. There may be also a possibility that Aristotle was mistaken, or may have confused the master and his scholars in the case of a short writing. But this is inconceivable about a more important work, e.g. the Laws, especially when we remember that he was living at Athens and a frequenter of the groves of the Academy during the last twenty years of Plato's life. Nor must we forget that in all his numerous citations from the Platonic writings, he never attributes any passage found in the extant dialogues to anyone but Plato. And lastly, we may remark that one or two great writings, such as the Parmenides and the Politicus, which are wholly devoid of Aristotelian I credentials, may be fairly attributed to Plato on the ground of II, L, III, excellence, and IV, accordance with the general spirit of his writings. Indeed, the greater part of the evidence for the genuineness of ancient Greek authors may be summed up under two heads only, I, excellence, and II, uniformity of tradition. A kind of evidence, which though in many cases sufficient, is of inferior value. Proceeding upon these principles, we appear to arrive at the conclusion that 1920s of all the writings, which have ever been ascribed to Plato, are undoubtedly genuine. There is another portion of them, including the Epistles, the Eponomous, the dialogues rejected by the ancients themselves, namely the Axiocus, Dejusto, De Brutute, Demoticus, Sisyphus, Erixias, which on grounds both of internal and external evidence, we are able with equal certainty to reject. But there still remains a small portion of which we are unable to affirm either that they are genuine or spurious. They may have been written in youth, or possibly, like the works of some painters, may be partly or wholly the compositions of pupils, or they may have been the writings of some contemporary transferred by accident to the more celebrated name of Plato, or of some Platonist in the next generation who aspired to imitate his master. Not that on grounds either of language or philosophy, we should lightly reject them. Some difference of style or inferiority of execution or inconsistency of thought can hardly be considered decisive of their spurious character, for who always does justice to himself, or who writes with equal care at all times? Certainly not Plato who exhibits the greatest differences in dramatic power in the formation of sentences, and in the use of words. If his earlier writings are compared with his later ones, say the Protagoras or Phaedras with the Laws, or who can be expected to think in the same manner during a period of authorship extending over above 50 years in an age of great intellectual activity, as well as a political and literary transition? Certainly not Plato whose earlier writings are separated from his later ones by his wide and interval of philosophical speculation as that which separates his later writings from Aristotle. The dialogues which have been translated in the first appendix and which appear to have the next claim to genuineness among the Platonic writings are the Lesser Hippias, the Menexinus or Funeral Oration, the First Elcibiades. Of these the Lesser Hippias and the Funeral Oration are cited by Aristotle. The first in the metaphysics, the latter in the rhetoric. Neither of them are expressly attributed to Plato, but in his citation of both of them he seems to be referring to passages in the extant dialogues. From the mention of Hippias in the singular by Aristotle we may perhaps infer that he was unacquainted with the second dialogue bearing the same name. Moreover, the mere existence of a greater and lesser Hippias and of a first and second Elcibiades does to a certain extent through a doubt upon both of them. Though a very clever and ingenious work, the Lesser Hippias does not appear to contain anything beyond the power of an imitator, who was also a careful student of the earlier Platonic writings, to invent. The motive or leading thought of the dialogue may be detected in Xenophon memorabilia, and there is no similar instance of a motive which is taken from Xenophon in an undoubted dialogue of Plato. On the other hand, the upholders of the genuineness of the dialogue will find in the Hippias a true Socratic spirit. They will compare the Ion as being a kin both in subject and treatment. They will urge the authority of Aristotle, and they will detect in the treatment of the Sophist in the satirical reasoning upon Homer, in the reductio ad absurdum of the doctrine that vice is ignorance, traces of a Platonic authorship. In reference to the last point we are doubtful, as in some of the other dialogues, whether the author is asserting or overthrowing the paradox of Socrates, or merely following the argument whether the wind blows, that no conclusion is arrived at is also in accordance with the character of the earlier dialogues. The resemblances or imitations of the Gorgias, Protagaris, and Euthydomus, which have been observed in the Hippias, cannot with certainty be adduced on either side of the argument. On the whole, more may be said in favor of the genuineness of the Hippias than against it. The Menexonus, or Funeral Oration, is cited by Aristotle, and is interesting as supplying an example of the manner in which the Orators praised the Athenians among the Athenians, falsifying persons and dates, and casting a veil over the gloomier events of Athenian history. It exhibits an acquaintance with the Funeral Oration of Thucydides, and was perhaps intended to rival that great work. If genuine, the proper place of the Menexonus would be at the end of the Phaedrus. The satirical opening and the concluding words bear a great resemblance to the earlier dialogues. The Oration itself is professively a memetic work, like the speeches in the Phaedrus, and cannot therefore be tested by a comparison of the other writings of Plato. The Funeral Oration of Pericles is expressly mentioned in the Phaedrus, and this may have suggested the subject in the same manner that the Clytophon appears to be suggested by the slight mention of Clytophon and his attachment to Thrasymachus in the Republic, and the Theoges by the mention of Theoges in the Apology and Republic. Or as the second Elcibiades seems to be founded upon the text of Xenophon Memorabilia, a similar taste for parody appears not only in the Phaedrus, but in the Protagoras, in the Symposium, and to a certain extent in the Parmenides. To these two doubtful writings of Plato, I have added the first Elcibiades, which, of all the disputed dialogues of Plato, has the greatest merit, and is somewhat longer than any of them, though not verified by the testimony of Aristotle and in many respects at variance with the Symposium in the description of the relations of Socrates and Elcibiades. Like the Lesser Hippias and the Menexanus, it is to be compared to the earlier writings of Plato. The motive of the piece may perhaps be found in that passage of the Symposium in which Elcibiades describes himself as self-convicted by the words of Socrates for the disparaging manner in which Schleiermacher has spoken of this dialogue, there seems to be no sufficient foundation. At the same time, the lesson imparted is simple and the irony more transparent than in the undoubted dialogues of Plato. We know too that Elcibiades was a favorite thesis and that at least five or six dialogues bearing this name passed current in antiquity and are attributed to contemporaries of Socrates and Plato. One, in the entire absence of real external evidence for the catalogues of Alexandrian librarians cannot be regarded as trustworthy. And two, in the absence of the highest marks either of poetical or philosophical excellence. And three, considering that we have expressed testimony to the existence of contemporary writings, bearing the name of Elcibiades, we are compelled to suspend our judgment on the genuineness of the extent dialogue. Neither at this point nor at any other do we propose to draw an absolute line of demarcation between genuine and spurious writings of Plato. They fade off imperceptibly from one class to another. There may have been degrees of genuineness in the dialogues themselves, as there are certainly degrees of evidence by which they are supported. The traditions of the oral discourses both of Socrates and Plato may have formed the basis of semi-plotonic writings. Some of them may be of the same mixed character which is apparent in Aristotle and Hippocrates, although the form of them is different. But the writings of Plato, unlike the writings of Aristotle seem never to have been confused with the writings of his disciples. This was probably due to their definite form and to their inimitable excellence. The three dialogues which we have offered in the appendix to the criticism of the reader may be partly spurious and partly genuine. They may be altogether spurious. That is an alternative which must be frankly admitted. Nor can we maintain of some other dialogues such as the Sophist and Politicus that no considerable objection can be urged against them, though greatly overbalanced by the weight chiefly of internal evidence in their favor. Nor, on the other hand, can we exclude a bare possibility that some dialogues which are usually rejected, such as the Greater Hippias and the Clytophon, may be genuine. The nature and object of these semi-plotonic writings require more careful study and more comparison of them with one another and with forged writings in general than they have yet received before we can finally decide on their character. We do not consider them all as genuine until they can be proved to be spurious, as is often maintained and still more often implied in this and similar discussions, but should say of some of them their genuineness is neither proven nor disproven until further evidence about them can be adduced, and we are as confident that the epistles are spurious as that the Republic, the Tamias, and the laws are genuine. On the whole, not a 20th part of the writings which pass under the name of Plato, if we exclude the works rejected by the ancients themselves and two or three writings, can be fairly doubted by those who are willing to allow that a considerable change and growth may have taken place in his philosophy. That 20th debatable portion scarcely in any degree affects our judgment of Plato, either as a thinker or a writer, and those suggesting some interesting questions to the scholar and critic is of little importance to the reader. Elcibiades 1 Introduction The first Elcibiades is a conversation between Socrates and Elcibiades. Socrates is represented in the character which he attributes to himself in the Apology of a no-nothing who detects the conceit of knowledge in others. The two have met already in the Protagoras and in the Symposium. In the latter dialogue as in relation between them is that of a lover and his beloved, but the narrative of their loves is told differently in different places. For in the Symposium, Elcibiades is depicted as the impassioned but rejected lover, here as coldly receiving the advances of Socrates who, for the best of purposes, lies in wait for the aspiring and ambitious youth. Elcibiades, who is described as a very young man, is about to enter on public life, having an inordinate opinion of himself and an extravagant ambition.  But has he the knowledge which is necessary for carrying them out? He is going to persuade the Athenians about what? Not about any particular art but about politics, when to fight and when to make peace. Now men should fight and make peace on just grounds and therefore the question of justice and injustice must enter into peace and war and he who advises the Athenians must know the difference between them. Does Elcibiades know? If he does he must either have been taught by some master or he must have discovered the nature of them himself. If he has had a master Socrates would like to be informed who he is, that he may go and learn of him also. Elcibiades admits that he has never learned, then has he inquired for himself? He may have, if he was ever aware of a time when he was ignorant.  According to his own explanation he had learned of the multitude. Why he asks should he not learn of them the nature of justice as he has learned the Greek language of them. To this Socrates answers that they can teach Greek but they cannot teach justice for they are agreed above the one but they are not agreed about the other and therefore Elcibiades who has admitted that if he knows he must either have learned from a master or have discovered for himself the nature of justice is convicted out of his own mouth. Elcibiades rejoins that the Athenians debate not about what is just but about what is expedient and he asserts that the two principles of justice and expediency are opposed. Socrates by a series of questions compels him to admit that the just and the expedient coincide. Elcibiades is thus reduced to the humiliating conclusion that he knows nothing of politics even if as he says they are concerned with the expedient.  He is reminded that he has to contend not only with his own countrymen but with their enemies with the Spartan kings and with the great king of Persia and he can only attain his higher aim of ambition by the assistance of Socrates. Not that Socrates himself professes to have attained the truth but the questions which he asks bring others to a knowledge of themselves and this is the first step in the practice of virtue. The dialogue continues we wish to become as good as possible but to be good in what? Elcibiades replies good in transacting business but what business? The business of the most intelligent men at Athens. The cobbler is intelligent in shoemaking and is therefore good in that he is not intelligent and therefore not good in weaving. Is he good in the sense which Elcibiades means who is also bad? I mean replies Elcibiades the man who is able to command in the city but to command what? Horses or men and if men under what circumstances? I mean to say that he is able to command men living in social and political relations and what is their aim? The better preservation of the city but when is a city better when there is unanimity such as exists between husband and wife? Then when husbands and wives perform their own special duties there can be no unanimity between them nor can a city be well ordered when each citizen does his own work only? Elcibiades having stated first that goodness consists in the unanimity of the citizens and then in each of them doing his own separate work is brought to the required point of self-contradiction leading him to confess his own ignorance. But he is not too old to learn and may still arrive at the truth if he is willing to be cross-examined by Socrates. He must know himself that is to say not his body or the things of the body but his mind or truer self. The physician knows the body and the tradesman knows his own business but they do not necessarily know themselves. Self-knowledge can be obtained only by looking into the mind and virtue of the soul which is the diviner part of a man as we see our own image in another's eye. And if we do not know ourselves we cannot know what belongs to ourselves or belongs to others and our unfit take apart in political affairs both for the sake of the individual and of the state. We ought to aim at justice and temperance not at wealth or power. The evil and unjust should have no power. They should be the slaves of better men than themselves. None but the virtuous are deserving of freedom. And are you, Elcibiades, a free man? I feel that I am not but I hope Socrates that by your aid I may become free and from this day forward I will never leave you. The Elcibiades has several points of resemblance to the undoubted dialogues of Plato. The process of interrogation is of the same kind with that which Socrates practices upon the youthful Clanius in the Euthydomus and he characteristically attributes to Elcibiades the answers which he has elicited from him. The definition of good is narrowed by successive questions and virtue is shown to be identical with knowledge. Here as elsewhere Socrates awakens the consciousness not of sin but of ignorance. Self-humiliation is the first step to knowledge even of the commonest things. No man knows how ignorant he is and no man can arrive at virtue and wisdom who has not once in his life at least being convicted of error. The process by which the soul is elevated is not unlike that which religious writers describe under the name of conversion if we substitute the sense of ignorance for the consciousness of sin. In some respects the dialogue differs from any other platonic composition. The aim is more directly ethical and hortatory. The process by which the paganist is undermined is simpler than in other platonic writings and the conclusion more decided. There is a good deal of humor in a manner in which the pride of Elcibiades and of the Greeks generally is supposed to be taken down by the Spartan and Persian queens and the dialogue has considerable dialectical merit but we have a difficulty in supposing that the same writer who has given so profound and complex a notion of the characters both of Elcibiades and Socrates in the symposium should have treated them in so thin and superficial a manner in the Elcibiades or that he would have described to the ironical Socrates the rather unmeaning boast that Elcibiades could not attain the objects of his ambition without his help or that he should have imagined that a mighty nature like his could have been reformed by a few not very conclusive words of Socrates for the arguments by which Elcibiades is reformed are not convincing. The writer of the dialogue whoever he was arrives at his idealism by crooked and tortuous paths in which many pitfalls are concealed. The anachronism of making Elcibiades about twenty years old during the life of his uncle Pericles may be noted and the repetition of the favorite observation which occurs also in the Laches and Protagoras the great Athenian statesman like Pericles failed in the education of their sons. There is none of the undoubted dialogues of Plato in which there is so little dramatic verisimilitude end of part one recording by Kevin Johnson. Section two of Elcibiades one by Plato translated by Benjamin Joe it this LibriVox recording is in the public domain recording by Kevin Johnson persons of the dialogue Elcibiades Socrates Socrates I dare say that you may be surprised to find oh son of Clanius that I whom your first lover not having spoken to you for many years when the rest of the world were worrying you with their attentions and the last of your lovers who still speaks to you the cause of my silence has been that I was hindered by a power more than human of which I will someday explain to you the nature this impediment has now been removed I therefore here present myself before you and I greatly hope that no similar hindrance will again occur meanwhile I have observed that your pride has been too much for the pride of your admirers they were numerous and high spirited but they have all run away overpowered by your superior force of character not one of them remains and I want you to understand the reason why you have been too much for them you think that you have no need of them or of any other man for you have great possessions and lack nothing beginning with the body and ending with the soul in the first place you say to yourself that you are the fairest and tallest of the citizens and this everyone who has eyes may see to be true in the second place that you are among the noblest of them highly connected both on the father's and the mother's side and sprung from one of the most distinguished families in your own state which is the greatest in Hellas and having many friends and kinsmen of the best sort who can assist you when in need and there is one potent relative who is more to you than all the rest Heracles the son of Santhippus whom your father left guardian of you and of your brother and who can do as he pleases not only in the city but in all Hellas and among many and mighty barbarous nations moreover you are rich but I must say that you value yourself least of all upon your possessions and all these things have lifted you up you have overcome your lovers and they have acknowledged that you were too much for them have you not remarked their absence and now I know that you wonder why I unlike the rest of them have not gone away and what can be my motive in remaining Elcibiades perhaps Socrates you are not aware that I was just going to ask you the very same question what do you want and what is your motive in annoying me and always wherever I am making a point of coming parentheses comparison posion and of parentheses I do really wonder what you mean and should greatly like to know Socrates then if as you say you desire to know I suppose that you will be willing to hear and I may consider myself to be speaking to an auditor who will remain and will not run away Elcibiades certainly let me hear Socrates you had better be careful for I may very likely be as unwilling to end as I have hitherto been to begin Elcibiades proceed my good man and I will listen Socrates I will proceed and although no lover likes to speak with one who has no feeling of love in him parentheses compare symposium end of parentheses I will make an effort and tell you what I meant my love Elcibiades which I hardly like to confess would long ago have passed away as I flatter myself if I saw you loving your good things or thinking that you ought to pass life in the enjoyment of them but I shall reveal other thoughts of yours which you keep to yourself whereby you will know that I have always had my eye on you suppose that at this moment some God came to you and said Elcibiades will you live as you are or die in an instant if you are forbidden to make any further acquisition I verily believe that you would choose death and I will tell you the hope in which you are at present living before many days have elapsed you think that you will come before the Athenian assembly and will prove to them that you are more worthy of honor than Pericles or any other man that ever lived and having proved this you will have the greatest power in this state when you have gained the greatest power among us you will go on to the other Hellenic states and not only to Hellenes but to all the barbarians who inhabit the same continent with us and if the God were then to say to you again here in Europe is to be your seat of empire and you must not cross over into Asia or metal with asiatic affairs I do not believe that you would choose to live upon these terms but the world as I may say must be filled with your power and name no man less than Cyrus and Xerxes is of any account with you such I know to be your hopes I am not guessing only and very likely you who know that I am speaking the truth will reply well Socrates but what have my hopes to do with the explanation which you promised of your unwillingness to leave me and that is what I am now going to tell you sweet son of Clanius and Dino Macae the explanation is that all these designs of yours cannot be accomplished by you without my help so great is the power which I believe myself to have over you and your concerns and this I conceive to be the reason why the God has hitherto forbidden me to converse with you and I have been long expecting his permission for as you hope to prove your own great value to the state and having proved it to attain at once to absolute power so do I indulge a hope that I shall be the supreme power over you if I am able to prove my own great value to you and to show you that neither guardian nor kinsman nor anyone is able to deliver into your hands the power which you desire but I only God being my helper when you were young parentheses compare symposium and of parentheses and your hopes were not yet matured I should have wasted my time and therefore as I conceive the God forbade me to converse with you but now having his permission I will speak for now you will listen to me alcibiades your silent socrates was always a surprise to me I never could understand why you followed me about and now that you have begun to speak again I am still more amazed whether I think all this or not is a matter about which you seem to have already made up your mind and therefore my denial will have no effect upon you but granting if I must that you have perfectly defined my purposes why is your assistance necessary to the attainment of them can you tell me why socrates you want to know whether I can make a long speech such as you are in the habit of hearing but that is not my way I think however that I can prove to you the truth of what I am saying if you will grant me one little favor alcibiades yes if the favor which you mean be not a troublesome one socrates will you be troubled at having questions to answer alcibiades not at all socrates then please to answer alcibiades ask me socrates have you not the intention which I attribute to you alcibiades I will grant anything you like in the hope of hearing what more you have to say socrates you do then mean as I was saying to come forward in a little while in the character of an advisor of the Athenians and suppose that when you are ascending the Bhima I pull you by the sleeve and say alcibiades you are getting up to advise the Athenians do you know the matter about which they are going to deliberate better than they how would you answer alcibiades I should reply that I was going to advise them about a matter which I do know better than they socrates then you are a good advisor about the things which you know alcibiades certainly socrates and do you know anything but what you have learned of others or found out yourself alcibiades that is all socrates and would you have ever learned or discovered anything if you had not been willing either to learn of others or to examine yourself alcibiades I should not socrates and would you have been willing to learn or to examine what you supposed that you knew alcibiades certainly not socrates then there was a time when you thought that you did not know what you are now supposed to know alcibiades certainly socrates I think that I know tolerably well the extent of your requirements and you must tell me if I forget any of them according to my recollection you learn the arts of writing of playing on the lyre and of wrestling the flute you never would learn this is the sum of your accomplishments unless there were some which you acquired in secret and I think that secrecy was hardly possible as you could not have come out of your door either by day or night without my seeing you alcibiades yes that was the whole of my schooling socrates and are you going to get up in the Athenian assembly and give them advice about writing alcibiades no indeed socrates or about the touch of the lyre alcibiades certainly not socrates and they are not in the habit of deliberating about wrestling in the assembly alcibiades hardly socrates then what are the deliberations in which you propose to advise them surely not about building alcibiades no socrates for the builder will advise better than you will about that alcibiades he will socrates nor about divination alcibiades alcibiades no socrates about that again the diviner will advise better than you will alcibiades true socrates whether he be little or great good or ill-looking noble or ignoble makes no difference alcibiades certainly not socrates a man is a good advisor about anything not because he has riches but because he has knowledge alcibiades assuredly socrates whether their counselor is rich or poor is not a matter which will make any difference to the Athenians when they are deliberating about the health of the citizens they only require that he should be a physician alcibiades of course socrates then what will be the subject of deliberation about which you will be justified in getting up and advising them alcibiades about their own concerns socrates socrates you mean about shipbuilding for example when the question is what sort of ships they ought to build alcibiades no I should not advise them about that socrates I suppose because you do not understand shipbuilding is that the reason alcibiades it is socrates then about what concerns of theirs will you advise them alcibiades about war socrates or about peace or about any other concerns of the state socrates you mean when they deliberate with whom they ought to make peace and with whom they ought to go to war and in what manner alcibiades yes socrates and they ought to go to war with those against whom it is better to go to war alcibiades yes socrates and when it is better alcibiades certainly socrates and for as long a time as is better alcibiades yes socrates but suppose the Athenians to deliberate with whom they ought to close in wrestling and whom they should grasp by the hand would you or the master of gymnastics be a better advisor of them alcibiades clearly the master of gymnastics socrates and can you tell me on what grounds the master of gymnastics would decide with whom they ought or ought not to close and when and how to take an instance would he not say that they should wrestle with those against whom it is best to wrestle alcibiades yes socrates and as much as is best alcibiades certainly socrates and at such times as our best alcibiades yes socrates again you sometimes accompany the liar with the song and dance alcibiades yes socrates when it is well to do so alcibiades yes socrates and as much as is well alcibiades just so socrates and as you speak of an excellence or art of the best in wrestling and of an excellence in playing the liar I wish you would tell me what this latter is the excellence of wrestling I call gymnastics and I want to know what you call the other alcibiades I do not understand you socrates then try to do as I do for the answer which I gave is universally right and when I say right I mean according to rule alcibiades yes socrates and was not the art of which I spoke gymnastic alcibiades certainly socrates and I called the excellence in wrestling gymnastic alcibiades you did socrates and I was right alcibiades I think that you were socrates well now for you should learn to argue prettily let me ask you in return to tell me first what is that art of which playing and singing and stepping properly in the dance are parts what is the name of the whole I think that by this time you must be able to tell alcibiades indeed I cannot socrates then let me put the matter in another way what do you call the goddesses who are the patronesses of art alcibiades the muses do you mean socrates socrates yes I do and what is the name of the art which is called after them alcibiades I suppose that you mean music socrates yes that is my meaning and what is the excellence of the art of music as I told you truly that the excellence of wrestling was gymnastic what is the excellence of music to be what alcibiades to be musical I suppose socrates very good and now pleased to tell me what is the excellence of war and peace as the more musical was the more excellent or the more gymnastical was the more excellent tell me what name do you give to the more excellent in war and peace alcibiades but I really cannot tell you socrates but if you were offering advice to another and said to him this food is better than that at this time and in this quantity and he said to you what do you mean alcibiades by the word better you would have no difficulty in replying that you meant more wholesome although you do not profess to be a physician and when the subject is one of which you profess to have knowledge and about which you are ready to get up and advise as if you knew are you not ashamed when you are asked not to be able to answer the question is it not disgraceful alcibiades very socrates well then consider and try to explain what is the meaning of better in the matter of making peace and going to war with those against whom you ought to go to war to what does the word refer alcibiades I am thinking and I cannot tell socrates but you surely know what are the charges which we bring against one another when we arrive at the point of making war and what name we give them alcibiades yes certainly we say that deceit or violence has been employed or that we have been defrauded socrates and how does this happen will you tell me how for there may be a difference in the manner alcibiades do you mean by how socrates whether we suffered these things justly or unjustly socrates exactly alcibiades there can be no greater difference than between just and unjust socrates and would you advise the Athenians to go to war with the just or with the unjust alcibiades that is an awkward question for certainly even if a person did intend to go to war with the just he would not admit that they were just socrates he would not go to war because it would be unlawful alcibiades not their lawful nor honorable socrates then you too would address them on principles of justice alcibiades certainly socrates what then is justice but that better of which I spoke in going to war or not going to war with those against whom we ought or ought not and when we ought or ought not to go to war alcibiades clearly socrates but how is this friend alcibiades have you forgotten that you do not know this or have you been to the school master without my knowledge and has he taught you to discern the just from the unjust who is he I wish you would tell me that I may go and learn of him you shall introduce me alcibiades you are mocking socrates socrates no indeed I most solemnly declare to you by Zeus who is the god of our common friendship and whom I never will foreswear that I am not tell me then who this instructor is if he exists alcibiades but perhaps he does not exist may I not have acquired the knowledge of just and unjust in some other way socrates yes if you have discovered them alcibiades but do you not think that I could discover them socrates I am sure that you might if you inquired about them alcibiades and do you not think that I would inquire socrates yes if you thought that you did not know them alcibiades and was there not a time when I did so think socrates very good and can you tell me how long it is since you thought that you did not know the nature of the just and the unjust what do you say to a year ago were you then in the state of conscious ignorance and inquiry or did you think that you knew and pleased to answer truly that our discussion may not be in vain alcibiades well I thought that I knew socrates and two years ago and three years ago and four years ago you knew all the same alcibiades I did socrates and more than four years ago you were a child were you not alcibiades yes socrates and then I am quite sure that you thought you knew alcibiades why are you so sure socrates because I often heard you when a child in your teacher's house or elsewhere playing at dice or some other game with the boys not hesitating at all about the nature of the just and unjust but very confident crying and shouting that one of the boys was a rogue and a cheat and had been cheating is it not true alcibiades but what was I to do socrates when anybody cheated me socrates and how can you say what was I to do if at the time you did not know whether you were wronged or not alcibiades to be sure I knew I was quite aware that I was being cheated socrates then you suppose yourself even when a child to have known the nature of just and unjust alcibiades certainly and I did know then socrates and when did you discover them not surely at the time when you thought that you knew them alcibiades certainly not socrates and when did you think that you were ignorant if you consider you will find that there never was such a time alcibiades really socrates I cannot say socrates then you did not learn them by discovering them alcibiades clearly not socrates but just before you said that you did not know them by learning now if you have neither discovered nor learned them how and whence do you come to know them alcibiades I suppose that I was mistaken in saying that I knew them through my own discovery of them whereas in truth I learned them in the same way that other people learn socrates so you said before and I must again ask of whom do tell me alcibiades of the many socrates do you take refuge in them I cannot say much for your teachers alcibiades why are they not able to teach socrates they could not teach you how to play at draughts which you would acknowledge would you not to be a much smaller matter than justice alcibiades yes socrates and can they teach the better who are unable to teach the worse alcibiades I think that they can at any rate they can teach many far better things than to play at draughts socrates what things alcibiades why for example I learned to speak Greek of them and I cannot say who was my teacher or to whom I am to attribute my knowledge of Greek if not to those good for nothing teachers as you call them socrates why yes my friend and the many are good enough teachers of Greek and some of their instructions in that line may be justly praised alcibiades why is that socrates why because they have the qualities which good teachers ought to have alcibiades what qualities socrates why you know that knowledge is the first qualification of any teacher alcibiades certainly socrates and if they know they must agree together and not differ alcibiades yes socrates and would you say that they knew the things about which they differ alcibiades no socrates and how can they teach them alcibiades they cannot socrates well but do you imagine that the many would differ about the nature of wood and stone are they not agreed if you ask them what they are and do they not run to fetch the same thing when they want a piece of wood or a stone and so in similar cases which I suspect to be pretty nearly all that you mean by speaking Greek alcibiades true socrates these as we were saying are matters about which they are agreed with one another and with themselves both individuals and states use the same words about them they do not use some one word and some another alcibiades they do not socrates then they may be expected to be good teachers of these things alcibiades yes socrates and if we want to instruct anyone in them we shall be right in sending him to be taught by our friends the many alcibiades very true socrates but if we wanted further to know not only which are men and which are horses but which men or horses have powers of running with the many still be able to inform us alcibiades certainly not socrates and you have a sufficient proof that they do not know these things and are not the best teachers of them in as much as they are never agreed about them alcibiades yes socrates and suppose that we wanted to know not only what men are like but what healthy or diseased men are like with the many be able to teach us alcibiades they would not socrates and you would have a proof that they were bad teachers of these matters if you saw them at variants alcibiades I should socrates well but are the many agreed with themselves or with one another about the justice or injustice of men and things alcibiades assuredly not socrates socrates there is no subject about which they are more at variants alcibiades none socrates I do not suppose that you ever saw or heard of men quarreling over the principles of health and disease to such an extent as to go to war and kill one another for the sake of them alcibiades no indeed socrates but of the quarrels about justice and injustice even if you have never seen them you have certainly heard from many people including Homer for you have heard of the Iliad and Odyssey alcibiades to be sure socrates socrates a difference of just and unjust is the argument of those poems alcibiades true socrates which difference caused all the wars and deaths of Trojans and Achaeans and the deaths of the suitors of Penelope in their quarrel with Odysseus alcibiades very true socrates and when the Athenians and Lacedaemonians and Boetians fell at Tanagra and afterwards in the battle of Coronea at which your father Planias met his end the question was one of justice this was the sole cause of the battles and of their deaths alcibiades very true socrates but can they be said to understand that about which they are quarreling to the death alcibiades clearly not socrates and yet those whom you thus allow to be ignorant are the teachers to whom you are appealing alcibiades very true socrates but how are you ever likely to know the nature of justice and injustice about which you are so perplexed if you have neither learned them of others nor discovered them yourself alcibiades from what you say I suppose not socrates see again how inaccurately you speak alcibiades alcibiades in what respect socrates in saying that I say so alcibiades why did you not say that I know nothing of the just and unjust socrates no I did not alcibiades did I then socrates yes alcibiades how was that socrates let me explain suppose I were to ask you which is the greater number two or one you would reply to alcibiades I should socrates and by how much greater alcibiades by one socrates which of us now says that two is more than one alcibiades I do socrates did not I ask and you answer the question alcibiades yes socrates then who is speaking I who put the question or you who answer me alcibiades I am socrates or suppose that I ask and you tell me the letters which make up the name socrates which of us is the speaker alcibiades I am socrates now let us put the case generally whenever there is a question and answer who is the speaker the questioner or the answerer alcibiades I should say socrates that the answerer was the speaker socrates and have I not been the questioner all through alcibiades yes socrates and you the answerer alcibiades just so socrates which of us then was the speaker alcibiades the inference is socrates that I was the speaker socrates did not someone say that alcibiades the fair son of Planias not understanding about just and unjust but thinking that he did understand was going to the assembly to advise the Athenians about what he did not know was not that said alcibiades very true socrates then alcibiades the result may be expressed in the language of Euripides I think that you have heard all this from yourself and not from me nor did I say this which you erroneously attribute to me but you yourself and what you said was very true for indeed my dear fellow the design which you meditate of teaching what you do not know and have not taken any pains to learn is downright insanity alcibiades but socrates I think that the Athenians and the rest of the Hellenes do not often advise as to the more just or unjust for they see no difficulty in them and therefore they leave them and consider which course of action will be most expedient for there is a difference between justice and expediency many persons have done great wrong and profited by their injustice others have done rightly and come to no good socrates well but granting that the just and the expedient are ever so much opposed you surely do not imagine that you know what is expedient for mankind or why a thing is expedient alcibiades why not socrates but I am not going to be asked to gain from whom I learned or when I made the discovery socrates what a way you have when you make a mistake which might be refuted by a previous argument you insist on having a new and different refutation the old argument is a worn out garment which you will no longer put on but someone must produce another which is clean and new now I shall disregard this move of yours and shall ask over again where did you learn and how do you know the nature of the expedient and who is your teacher all this I comprehend in a single question and now you will manifestly be in the old difficulty and will not be able to show that you know the expedient either because you learn or because you discovered it yourself but as I perceive that you are dainty and dislike the taste of a stale argument I will inquire no further into your knowledge of what is expedient or what is not expedient for the Athenian people and simply request you to say why you do not explain whether justice and expediency are the same or different and if you like you may examine me as I have examined you or if you would rather you may carry on the discussion by yourself alcibiades but I am not certain socrates whether I shall be able to discuss the matter with you socrates then imagine my dear fellow that I am the Demis and the Ecclesia for in the Ecclesia too you will have to persuade men individually alcibiades yes socrates and is not the same person able to persuade one individual singly and many individuals of the things which he knows the chimerion for example can persuade one and he can persuade many about letters alcibiades true socrates and about number will not the same person persuade one and persuade many alcibiades yes socrates and this will be he who knows number or the arithmetician alcibiades quite true socrates and cannot you persuade one man about that of which you can persuade many alcibiades I suppose so socrates and that of which you can persuade either is clearly what you know alcibiades yes socrates and the only difference between one who argues as we are doing and the orator who is addressing an assembly is that the one seeks to persuade a number and the other an individual of the same things alcibiades I suppose so socrates well then since the same person who can persuade a multitude can persuade individuals try conclusions upon me and prove to me that the just is not always expedient alcibiades you take liberties socrates socrates I shall take the liberty of proving to you the opposite of that which you will not prove to me alcibiades proceed socrates answer my questions that is all alcibiades nay I should like you to be the speaker socrates what do you not wish to be persuaded alcibiades certainly I do socrates and can you be persuaded better than out of your own mouth alcibiades I think not end of part two recording by Kevin Johnson section three of alcibiades one by Plato translated by Benjamin Joett this LibriVox recording is in the public domain recording by Kevin Johnson Socrates then you shall answer and if you do not hear the words that the just is the expedient coming from your own lips never believe another man again alcibiades I won't but answer I will for I do not see how I can come to any harm socrates a true prophecy let me begin then by inquiring of you whether you allow that the just is sometimes expedient and sometimes not alcibiades yes socrates and sometimes honorable and sometimes not alcibiades what do you mean socrates I'm asking if you ever knew anyone who did what was dishonorable and yet just alcibiades never socrates all just things are honorable alcibiades yes socrates and are honorable things sometimes good and sometimes not good or are they always good alcibiades I rather think socrates that some honorable things are evil socrates and are some dishonorable things good alcibiades yes socrates you mean in such a case as the following in time of war men have been wounded or have died in rescuing a companion or kinsmen when others who have neglected the duty of rescuing them have escaped in safety alcibiades true socrates and to rescue another under such circumstances is honorable in respect of the attempt to save those whom we ought to save and this is courage alcibiades true socrates but evil in respect of death and wounds alcibiades yes socrates and the courage which is shown in the rescue is one thing and the death another alcibiades certainly socrates then the rescue of one's friends is honorable in one point of view but evil in another alcibiades true socrates and if honorable then also good will you consider now whether I may not be right for you were acknowledging that the courage which is shown in the rescue is honorable now is this courage good or evil look at the matter thus which would you rather choose good or evil alcibiades good socrates and the greatest goods you would be most ready to choose and would least like to be deprived of them alcibiades certainly socrates what would you say of courage at what price would you be willing to be deprived of courage alcibiades I would rather die than be a coward socrates then you think that cowardice is the worst of evils alcibiades I do socrates as bad as death I suppose alcibiades yes socrates and life and courage are the extreme opposites of death and cowardice alcibiades yes socrates and they are what you would most desire to have and their opposites you would least desire alcibiades yes socrates is this because you think life and courage the best and death and cowardice the worst alcibiades yes socrates and you would term the rescue of a friend in battle honorable in as much as courage does a good work alcibiades I should socrates but evil because of the death which ensues alcibiades yes socrates might we not describe their different effects as follows you may call either of them evil in respect of the evil which is the result and good in respect of the good which is the result of either of them alcibiades yes socrates and they are honorable in so far as they are good and dishonorable in so far as they are evil alcibiades true socrates then when you say that the rescue of a friend in battle is honorable and yet evil that is equivalent to saying that the rescue is good and yet evil alcibiades I believe that you are right socrates socrates nothing honorable regarded as honorable is evil nor anything base regarded as base good alcibiades clearly not socrates look at the matter yet once more in a further light he who acts honorably acts well alcibiades yes socrates and he who acts well is happy alcibiades of course socrates and the happy are those who obtain good alcibiades true socrates and they obtain good by acting well and honorably alcibiades yes socrates then acting well is a good alcibiades certainly socrates and happiness is a good alcibiades yes socrates then the good and the honorable are again identified alcibiades manifestly socrates then if the argument holds what we find to be honorable we shall also find to be good alcibiades certainly socrates and is the good expedient or not alcibiades expedient socrates do you remember our admission about the just alcibiades yes if I am not mistaken we said that those who acted justly must also act honorably socrates and the honorable is the good alcibiades yes socrates and the good is expedient alcibiades yes socrates then alcibiades the just is expedient alcibiades I should infer socrates and all this I prove out of your own mouth for I ask and you answer alcibiades I must acknowledge it to be true socrates and having acknowledged that the just is the same as the expedient are you not let me ask prepare to ridicule anyone who pretending to understand the principles of justice and injustice gets up to advise the noble Athenians or the ignoble pepper ethians that the just may be the evil alcibiades I solemnly declare socrates that I do not know what I am saying verily I am in a strange state for when you put questions to me I am of different minds in successive instance socrates and are you not aware of the nature of this perplexity my friend alcibiades indeed I am not socrates do you suppose that if someone were to ask you whether you have two eyes or three or two hands or four or anything of that sort you would then be of different minds in successive instance alcibiades I begin to distrust myself but still I do not suppose that I should socrates you would feel no doubt and for this reason because you would know alcibiades I suppose socrates and the reason why you involuntarily contradict yourself is clearly that you are ignorant alcibiades very likely socrates and if you are perplexed in answering about just and unjust honorable and dishonorable good and evil expedient and inexpedient the reason is that you are ignorant of them and therefore in perplexity is not that clear alcibiades I agree socrates but is this always the case and is a man necessarily perplexed about that of which he has no knowledge alcibiades certainly he is socrates and do you know how to ascend into heaven alcibiades certainly not socrates and in this case too is your judgment perplexed alcibiades no socrates do you see the reason why or shall I tell you alcibiades tell me socrates the reason is that you not only do not know my friend but you do not think that you know alcibiades there again what do you mean socrates ask yourself are you in any perplexity about things of which you are ignorant you know for example that you know nothing about the preparation of food alcibiades very true socrates and do you think and perplex yourself about the preparation of food or do you leave that to someone who understands the art alcibiades the latter socrates or if you were on a voyage would you be will do yourself by considering whether the rudder is to be drawn inwards or outwards or do you leave that to the pilot and do nothing alcibiades it would be the concern of the pilot socrates then you are not perplexed about what you do not know if you know that you do not know it alcibiades alcibiades I imagine not socrates do you not see then that mistakes in life and practice are likewise to be attributed to the ignorance which has conceit of knowledge alcibiades once more what do you mean socrates I suppose that we begin to act when we think that we know what we are doing alcibiades yes socrates but when people think that they do not know they entrust their business to others alcibiades yes socrates and so there is a class of ignorant persons who do not make mistakes in life because they trust others about things of which they are ignorant alcibiades true socrates who then are the persons who make mistakes they cannot of course be those who know alcibiades certainly not socrates but if neither those who know nor those who know that they do not know make mistakes they remain those only who do not know and think that they know alcibiades yes only those socrates then this is ignorance of the disgraceful sort which is mischievous alcibiades yes socrates and most mischievous and most disgraceful when having to do with the greatest matters alcibiades by far socrates and can there be any matters greater than the just the honorable the good and the expedient alcibiades there cannot be socrates and these as you were saying are what perplex you alcibiades yes socrates but if you are perplexed then as the previous argument has shown you are not only ignorant of the greatest matters but being ignorant you fancy that you know them alcibiades I fear that you are right socrates and now see what has happened to you alcibiades I hardly like to speak of your evil case but as we are alone I will my good friend you are wedded to ignorance of the most disgraceful kind and of this you are convicted not by me but out of your own mouth and by your own argument where for also you rush into politics before you are educated neither is your case to be deemed singular for I might say the same of almost all our statesmen with the exception perhaps of your guardian pericles alcibiades yes socrates and pericles is said not to have got his wisdom by the light of nature but to have associated with several of the philosophers with pithocliades for example and with an exagerus and now in advanced life with damon in the hope of gaining wisdom socrates very good but did you ever know a man wise in anything who was unable to impart his particular wisdom for example he who taught you letters was not only wise but he made you and any others whom he liked wise alcibiades yes socrates and you whom he taught can do the same alcibiades true socrates and in like manner the Harper and gymnastic master alcibiades certainly socrates when a person is enabled to impart knowledge to another he thereby gives an excellent proof of his own understanding of any matter alcibiades I agree socrates well and did pericles make anyone wise did he begin by making his sons wise alcibiades but socrates if the two sons of pericles were simpletons what has that to do with the matter socrates well but did he make your brother clanias wise alcibiades clanias is a madman there is no use in talking of him socrates but if clanias is a madman and the two sons of pericles were simpletons what reason can be given why he neglects you and lets you be as you are alcibiades I believe that I am to blame for not listening to him socrates but did you ever hear of any other Athenian or foreigner bond or free who was deemed to have grown wiser in the society of pericles as I might cite pithodorus the son of isolocus and calius the son of caliades who have grown wiser in the society of xeno for which privilege they have each of them paid him the sum of a hundred minni footnote about 406 pounds sterling and a footnote to the increase of their wisdom and fame alcibiades I certainly never did hear of anyone socrates well and in reference to your own case do you mean to remain as you are or will you take some pains about yourself alcibiades with your aid socrates I will and indeed when I hear you speak the truth of what you are saying strikes home to me and I agree with you for our statesmen all but a few do appear to be quite uneducated socrates what is the inference alcibiades why that if they were educated they would be trained athletes and he who means to rival them ought to have knowledge and experience when he attacks them but now as they have become politicians without any special training why should I have the trouble of learning and practicing for I know well that by the light of nature I shall get the better of them socrates my dear friend what a sentiment and how unworthy of your noble form and your high estate alcibiades what do you mean socrates why do you say so socrates I am grieved when I think of our mutual love alcibiades at what socrates at your fancying that the contest on which you are entering is with people here alcibiades why what others are there socrates is that a question which a magnanimous soul should ask alcibiades do you mean to say that the contest is not with these socrates and suppose that you were going to steer a ship into action would you only aim at being the best pilot on board would you not well acknowledging that you must possess this degree of excellence rather look to your antagonists and not as you are now doing to your fellow combatants you ought to be so far above these latter that they will not even dare to be your rivals and being regarded by you as inferiors will do battle for you against the enemy this is the kind of superiority which you must establish over them if you mean to accomplish any noble action really worthy of yourself and of the state alcibiades that would certainly be my aim socrates verily then you have good reason to be satisfied if you are better than the soldiers and you need not when you are their superior and have your thoughts and actions fixed on them look away to the generals of the enemy alcibiades of whom are you speaking socrates socrates why you surely know that our city goes to war now and then with the lack of demonians and with the great king alcibiades true enough socrates and if you meant to be the ruler of this city would you not be right in considering that the lack of demonium and persian king were your true rivals alcibiades i believe that you are right socrates oh no my friend i am quite wrong and i think that you ought rather to turn your attention to medias the quail breeder and others like him who manage our politics in whom as the woman would remark you may still see the slaves cut of hair cropping out in their minds as well as on their pates and they come with their barbarous lingo to flatter us and not to rule us to these i say you should look and then you need not trouble yourself about your own fitness to contend in such a noble arena there is no reason why you should either learn what has to be learned or practice what has to be practiced and only when thoroughly prepared enter on a political career alcibiades there i think socrates that you are right i do not suppose however that the spartan generals or the great king are really different from anybody else socrates but my dear friend do consider what you are saying alcibiades what am i to consider socrates in the first place will you be more likely to take care of yourself if you are in a wholesome fear and dread of them or if you are not alcibiades clearly if i have such a fear of them socrates and do you think that you will sustain any injury if you take care of yourself alcibiades no i shall be greatly benefited socrates and this is one very important respect in which that notion of yours is bad alcibiades true socrates in the next place consider that what you say is probably false alcibiades how so socrates let me ask you whether better natures are likely to be found in noble races or not in noble races alcibiades clearly in noble races socrates are not those who are well born and well bred most likely to be perfect in virtue alcibiades certainly socrates then let us compare our antecedents with those of the Lacodemonian and Persian kings are they inferior to us in descent have we not heard that the former are sprung from Heracles and the latter from Achaemenes and that the race of Heracles and the race of Achaemenes go back to Perseus son of Zeus alcibiades why so does mine go back to Euryceses and he to Zeus Socrates and mine noble alcibiades to Deedalus and he to Hephaestus son of Zeus but for all that we are far inferior to them for they are descended from Zeus through a line of kings either kings of Argos and Lacodemon or kings of Persia a country which the descendants of Achaemenes have always possessed besides being at various times sovereigns of Asia as they now are whereas we and our fathers were but private persons how ridiculous would you be thought if you were to make a display of your ancestors and of Salamis the island of Euryceses or Vigina the habitation of the still more ancient Iacus before Arta Xerxeses son of Xerxeses you should consider how inferior we are to them both in the derivation of our birth and in other particulars did you never observe how great is the property of the Spartan kings and their wives are under the guardianship of the Ephory who are public officers and watch over them in order to preserve as far as possible the purity of the Heracliad blood still greater is the difference among the Persians for no one entertains a suspicion that the father of a prince of Persia can be anyone but the king such as the awe which invests the person of the queen that any other guard is needless and when the heir of the kingdom is born all the subjects of the king feast and the day of his birth is forever afterwards kept as a holiday and time of sacrifice by all Asia whereas when you and I were born Elcibiades as the comic poet says the neighbors hardly knew of the important event after the birth of the royal child he is tended not by a good for nothing woman nurse but by the best of the royal Unix who are charged with the care of him and especially with the fashioning and right formation of his limbs in order that he may be as shapely as possible which being their calling they are held in great honor and when the young prince is seven years old he is put upon a horse and taken to the writing masters and begins to go out hunting and at 14 years of age he is handed over to the warriors as they are termed these are four chosen men reputed to be the best among the Persians of a certain age and one of them is the wisest another the justice a third the most temperate and a fourth the most valiant the first instructs him in the Magianism of Zoroaster the son of Oromasis which is the worship of the gods and teaches him also the duties of his royal office the second who is the justice teaches him always to speak the truth the third or most temperate forbids him to allow any pleasure to be lowered over him that he may be accustomed to be a free man and king indeed lord of himself first and not a slave the most valiant trains him to be bold and fearless telling him that if he fears he is to deem himself a slave whereas Pericles give you Elcibiades for a tutor Zopyrus the Thracian a slave of his who was past all other work I might enlarge on the nurture and education of your rivals but that would be tedious and what I have said is a sufficient sample of what remains to be said I have only to remark by way of contrast that no one cares about your birth or nurture or education or I may say about that of any other Athenian unless he has a lover who looks after him and if you cast an eye on the wealth the luxury the garments with their flowing trains the anointings with myrrh the multitudes of attendance and all the other bravery of the Persians you will be ashamed when you discern your own inferiority or if you look at the temperance and orderliness and ease and grace and magnanimity and courage and endurance and love of toil and desire of glory and ambition of the Lachydemonians in all these respects you will see that you are but a child in comparison of them even in the matter of wealth if you value yourself upon that I must reveal to you how you stand for if you form an estimate of the wealth of the Lachydemonians you will see that our possessions are all far short of theirs for no one here can compete with them either in the extent and fertility of their own and the Messenian territory or in the number of their slaves and especially of the Haloths or of their horses or of the animals which feed on the Messenian pastures but I have said enough of this and as to gold and silver there is more of them in Lachydemon than in all the rest of Halas generations gold has been always flowing into them from the whole Hellenic world and often from the barbarian also and never going out as in the fable of Asop the fox said to the lion the prince of the feet of those going in are distinct enough but who ever saw the trace of money going out of Lachydemon and therefore you may safely infer that the inhabitants are the richest of the Hellenes gold and silver and that their kings are the richest of them for they have a larger share of these things and they have also a tribute paid to them which is very considerable yet the Spartan wealth though great in comparison of the wealth of the other Hellenes is as nothing in comparison of that of the Persians and their kings why I have been informed by a credible person who went up to the king that he passed through a large tract of excellent land extending for nearly a day's journey which the people of the country called the queens girdle and another which they called her veil and several other fair and fertile districts which were reserved for the adornment of the queen and are named after her several habiliments now I cannot help thinking to myself what if someone were to go to Amestris the wife of Xerxes and mother of Artaxerxes and say to her there is a certain Dynomache whose whole wardrobe is not worth 50 minai and that will be more than the value and she has a son who is possessed of a 300 acre patch at Percae and he has a mind to go to war with your son would she not wonder to what this Elcibiades trusts in his success in the conflict he must rely, she would say to herself upon his training and wisdom these are the things which Helene's value and if she heard that this Elcibiades who is making the attempt is not as yet 20 years old and is wholly uneducated and when his lover tells him that he ought to get education and training first and then go and fight the king he refuses and says that he is well enough to know what it is would she not be amazed and ask on what then does the youth rely and if we replied he relies on his beauty and stature and birth and mental endowments she would think that we were mad Elcibiades when she compared the advantages which she possess with those of her own people and I believe that even Lampito the daughter of Leotichides and mother of Agis all of whom were kings would have the same feeling if in your present uneducated state you were to turn your thoughts against her son she too would be equally astonished but how disgraceful that we should not have as high a notion of what is required in us as our enemies wives and mothers have of the qualities which are required in their assailants oh my friend you are persuaded by me and hear the Delphian inscription know thyself not the man whom you think but these kings are our rivals and we can only overcome them by pains and skill and if you fail in the required qualities you will fail also in becoming renowned among Hellenes and Barbarians which you seem to desire more than any other man ever desired anything I certainly believe you but what are the sort of pains which are required Socrates can you tell me? Socrates, yes I can but we must take counsel together concerning the manner in which both of us may be most improved for what I am telling you of the necessity of education applies to myself as well as to you and there is only one point in which I have an advantage over you Socrates, I have a guardian who is better and wiser than your guardian, Pericles Elcibiades, who is he Socrates? Socrates, God Elcibiades who up to this day has not allowed me to converse with you and he inspires in me the faith that I am especially designed to bring you to honour Elcibiades you are jesting Socrates Socrates, perhaps at any rate I am right in saying that all men greatly need pains and care and you and I above all men Elcibiades you are not far wrong above me Socrates and certainly not above myself Elcibiades, but what can we do? Socrates there must be no hesitation or cowardice my friend Elcibiades, that would not become us Socrates no indeed and we ought to take counsel together for do we not wish to be as good as possible Elcibiades, we do Socrates in what sort of virtue Elcibiades, plainly in the virtue of good men Socrates, who are good in what? Elcibiades those clearly who are good in the management of affairs Socrates, what sort of affairs equestrian affairs Elcibiades, certainly not Socrates you mean that about them we should have recourse to horsemen Elcibiades, yes Socrates, well, naval affairs Elcibiades, no Socrates you mean that we should have recourse to sailors about them Elcibiades, yes Socrates, then what affairs and who do them Elcibiades, the affairs which occupy Athenian gentlemen Socrates and when you speak of gentlemen do you mean the wise or the unwise Elcibiades, the wise Socrates and a man is good in respect of that in which he is wise Elcibiades, yes Socrates and evil in respect of that in which he is unwise Elcibiades, certainly Socrates, the shoemaker for example, is wise in respect of the making of shoes Elcibiades, yes Socrates, then he is good in that Elcibiades, he is Socrates, but in respect of the making of garments he is unwise Elcibiades, yes Socrates, then in that he is bad Elcibiades, yes Socrates, then upon this true of the matter, the same man is good and also bad Elcibiades, true Socrates, but would you say that the good are the same as the bad? Elcibiades, certainly not Socrates, then whom do you call the good? Elcibiades, I mean by the good those who are able to rule in the city Socrates, not surely over horses Elcibiades, certainly not Socrates, but over men Elcibiades, yes Socrates, when they are sick Elcibiades, no Socrates, or on a voyage Elcibiades, no Socrates, or reaping the harvest Elcibiades, no Socrates, when they are doing something or nothing Elcibiades, when they are doing something, I should say Socrates, I wish that you would know what this something is Elcibiades, when they are having dealings with one another and using one another's services as we citizens do in our daily life Socrates, those of whom you speak are ruling over men who are using the services of other men Elcibiades, yes Socrates, are they ruling over the signal men who give the time to the roars? Elcibiades, no they are not Elcibiades, that would be the office of the pilot Elcibiades, yes Socrates, but perhaps you mean that they rule over flute players who lead the singers and use the services of the dancers Elcibiades, certainly not Socrates, that would be the business of the teacher of the chorus Elcibiades, yes Socrates, then what is the meaning of being able to rule over other men? Elcibiades, I mean that they rule over men who have common rights of citizenship and dealings with one another Socrates, and what sort of an art is this? Suppose that I ask you again as I did just now What art makes men know how to rule over their fellow sailors? How would you answer Elcibiades, the art of the pilot? Socrates, and if I may refer to another old instance what art enables them to rule over their fellow singers? Elcibiades, the art of the teacher of the chorus which you were just now mentioning Socrates, and what do you call the art of fellow citizens? Elcibiades, I should say Good Council, Socrates Socrates, and is the art of the pilot evil council? Elcibiades, no Socrates, but Good Council Elcibiades, yes That is what I should say Good Council, of which the aim is the preservation of the voyagers Socrates, true And what is the aim of that other Good Council of which you speak? Elcibiades, the aim is the better order and preservation of the city Socrates, and what is that of which the absence or presence improves and preserves the order of the city? Suppose you were to ask me, what is that of which the presence or absence improves or preserves the order of the body? I should reply, the presence of health and the absence of disease, you would say the same? Elcibiades, yes Socrates, and if you were to ask me the same question about the eyes, I should reply in the same way, the presence of sight and the absence of blindness or about the ears I should reply that they were improved and better case, when deafness was absent and hearing was present in them. Elcibiades, true Socrates, and what would you say of a state? What is that by the presence or absence of which the state is improved and better managed and ordered? Elcibiades, I should say Socrates, the presence of friendship and the absence of hatred and division. Socrates and do you mean by friendship, agreement or disagreement? Elcibiades, agreement Socrates, what art makes cities agree about numbers? Elcibiades, arithmetic. Socrates and private individuals? Elcibiades, the same. Socrates and what art makes each individual agree with himself? Elcibiades, the same. Socrates and what art makes each of us agree with himself about the comparative length of the plan and of the qubit? Does not the art of measure? Elcibiades, yes. Socrates, individuals are agreed with one another about this and states equally. Elcibiades, yes. Socrates and the same holds of the balance. Elcibiades, true. Socrates, but what is the other agreement of which you speak and about what? What art can give that agreement and does that which gives it to the state give it also to the individual, so as to make him consistent with himself and with another? Elcibiades, I should suppose so. Socrates, but what is the nature of the agreement? Answer and faint not. Elcibiades, I mean to say that there should be such friendship and agreement as exists between and affectionate father and mother and their son. Or between brothers, or between husband and wife. Socrates, but can a man, Elcibiades agree with a woman about the spinning of wool which she understands and he does not? Elcibiades, no, truly. Socrates, nor has he any need for spinning is a female accomplishment. Elcibiades, yes. Socrates, and would a woman agree with a man about the science of arms which she has never explained? Elcibiades, certainly not. Socrates, I suppose that the use of arms would be regarded by you as a male accomplishment. Elcibiades, it would. Socrates, then upon your view, woman and men have two sorts of knowledge. Elcibiades, certainly. Socrates, then in their knowledge there is no agreement of woman and men. Elcibiades, there is not. Socrates, nor can there be friendship if friendship is agreement. Elcibiades, plainly not. Socrates, then woman are not loved by men when they do their own work. Elcibiades, I suppose not. Socrates, nor men by woman when they do their own work. Elcibiades, no. Socrates, nor are states well administered when individuals do their own work. Elcibiades, I should rather think Socrates that the reverse is the truth. Parentheses, compare Republic, end of parentheses. Socrates, what? Do you mean to say that states are well administered when friendship is absent, the presence of which, as we were saying, alone secures their good order? Elcibiades, but I should say that there is friendship among them, for this very reason that the two parties respectively do their own work. Socrates, that was not what you were saying before. And what do you mean now by affirming that friendship exists when there is no agreement? How can there be agreement about matters which the one party knows and of which the other is in ignorance? Elcibiades, impossible. Socrates, and when individuals are doing their own work, are they doing what is just or unjust? Elcibiades, what is just? Certainly. Socrates, and when individuals do what is just in the state, is there no friendship among them? Elcibiades, I suppose that there must be Socrates. Socrates, then what do you mean by this friendship or agreement about which we must be wise and discreet in order that we may be good men? I cannot make out where it exists or among whom. According to you, the same persons may sometimes have it and sometimes not. Elcibiades, but indeed Socrates, I do not know what I am saying and I have long been unconsciously to myself in a most disgraceful state. Socrates, nevertheless, cheer up. At 50 if you had discovered your deficiency you would have been too old and the time for taking care of yourself would have passed away, but yours is just the age at which the discovery should be made. Elcibiades, and what should he do, Socrates, who would make the discovery? Socrates, answer questions, Elcibiades, and that is a process which, by the grace of God, if I may put any faith in my Oracle will be very improving to both of us. End of Part 3 Recording by Kevin Johnson Section 4 of Elcibiades I by Plato Translated by Benjamin Joett This LibriVox recording is in the public domain Recording by Kevin Johnson Elcibiades If I can be improved by answering I will answer. Socrates, and first of all, that we may not for adventure be deceived by appearances fancying perhaps that we are taking care of ourselves when we are not. What is the meaning of a man taking care of himself? And when does he take care? Does he take care of himself when he takes care of what belongs to him? Elcibiades, I should think so. Socrates, when does a man take care of his feet? Does he not take care of them when he takes care of that which belongs to his feet? Elcibiades, I do not understand. Socrates, let me take the hand as an illustration. Does not a ring belong to the finger and to the finger only? Elcibiades, yes. Socrates, and the shoe in like manner to the foot. Elcibiades, yes. Socrates, and when we take care of our shoes do we not take care of our feet? Elcibiades, I do not comprehend. Socrates, But you would admit Elcibiades, that to take proper care of a thing is a correct expression. Elcibiades, yes. Socrates, and taking proper care means improving. Elcibiades, yes. Socrates, and what is the art which improves our shoes? Elcibiades, shoemaking. Socrates, then by shoemaking we take care of our shoes. Elcibiades, yes. Socrates, and do we by shoemaking take care of our feet? Or by some other art which improves the feet? Elcibiades, by some other art. Socrates, and the same art improves the feet which improves the rest of the body. Elcibiades, very true. Socrates, which is gymnastic. Elcibiades, certainly. Socrates, then by gymnastic we take care of our feet, and by shoemaking of that which belongs to our feet. Elcibiades, very true. Socrates, and by gymnastic we take care of our hands. And by the art of graving rings of that which belongs to our hands. Elcibiades, yes. Socrates, and by gymnastic we take care of the body and by the art of weaving and the other arts we take care of things of the body. Elcibiades, clearly. Socrates, then the art which takes care of each thing is different from that which takes care of the belongings of each thing. Elcibiades, true. Socrates, then in taking care of what belongs to you, you do not take care of yourself. Elcibiades, certainly not. Socrates, for the art which takes care of our belongings appears not to be the same as that which takes care of ourselves. Elcibiades, clearly not. Socrates, and now let me ask you what is the art with which we take care of ourselves. Elcibiades, I cannot say. Socrates, at any rate, thus much has been admitted that the art is not one which makes any of our possessions but which makes ourselves better. Elcibiades, true. Socrates, but should we ever have known what art makes a shoe better if we did not know a shoe? Elcibiades, impossible. Socrates, nor should we know what art makes a ring better if we did not know a ring. Elcibiades, that is true. Socrates, and can we ever know what art makes a man better if we do not know what we are ourselves? Elcibiades, impossible. Socrates. And is self-knowledge such an easy thing, and was he to be lightly esteemed to inscribe the text on the temple at Delphi? Or is self-knowledge a difficult thing which few are able to attain? Elcibiades, at times I fancy Socrates that anybody can know himself. At other times the task appears to be very difficult. Socrates, but whether easy or difficult, Elcibiades, still there is no other way. Knowing what we are we shall know how to take care of ourselves, and if we are ignorant we shall not know. Elcibiades, that is true. Socrates, well, then let us see in what way the self-existent can be discovered by us. That will give us a chance of discovering our own existence, which otherwise we can never know. Elcibiades, you say Socrates, come now I beseech you. Tell me with whom you are conversing, with whom but with me. Elcibiades, yes. Socrates, as I am with you? Elcibiades, yes. Socrates, that is to say I, Socrates, am talking. Elcibiades, yes. Socrates and Elcibiades is my hearer. Elcibiades, yes. Socrates I, in talking, use words. Elcibiades, certainly. Socrates and talking and using words have, I suppose, the same meaning. Elcibiades, to be sure. Socrates and the user is not the same as the thing which he uses. Elcibiades, what do you mean? Socrates, I will explain. The shoemaker, for example, uses a square tool and a circular tool and other tools for cutting. Elcibiades, yes. Socrates but the tool is not the same as the cutter and user of the tool. Elcibiades, of course not. Socrates and in the same way the instrument of the harper is to be distinguished from the harper himself. Elcibiades, it is. Socrates Now the question which I asked was whether you conceive the user to be always different from that which he uses. Elcibiades, I do. Socrates Then what shall we say of the shoemaker? Does he cut with his tools only or with his hands? Elcibiades, with his hands as well. Socrates He uses his hands too? Elcibiades, yes. Socrates and does he use his eyes in cutting leather? Elcibiades, he does. Socrates and we admit that the user is not the one who uses. Elcibiades, yes. Socrates Then the shoemaker and the harper are to be distinguished from the hands and feet which they use. Elcibiades, clearly. Socrates and does not a man use the whole body? Elcibiades, certainly. Socrates and that which uses is different from that which is used. Elcibiades, true. Elcibiades, that is the inference. Socrates, what is he then? Elcibiades, I cannot say. Socrates, nay. You can say that he is the user of the body. Elcibiades, yes. Socrates and the user of the body is the soul? Elcibiades, yes, the soul. Socrates and the soul rules. Elcibiades, yes. Socrates universally admitted. Elcibiades, what is it? Socrates, that man is one of three things. Elcibiades, what are they? Socrates, soul, body or both together forming a whole. Elcibiades, certainly. Socrates but did we not say that the actual ruling principle of the body is man? Elcibiades, yes, we did. Socrates and does the body rule over itself? Elcibiades, certainly not. Socrates, it is subject as we were saying. Elcibiades, yes. Socrates, then that is not the principle which we are seeking. Elcibiades, it would seem not. Socrates but may we say that the union of the two rules over the body and consequently that this is man? Elcibiades, very likely. Socrates the most unlikely of all things for if one of the members is subject the two united cannot possibly rule. Elcibiades, true. Socrates but since neither the body nor the union of the two is man either man has no real existence or the soul is man. Elcibiades, just so. Socrates is anything more required to prove that the soul is man? Elcibiades, certainly not. The proof is, I think, quite sufficient. Socrates and if the proof although not perfect be sufficient we shall be satisfied. More precise proof will be supplied when we have discovered that which we were led to omit from a fear that the inquiry would be too much protracted. Elcibiades, what was that? Socrates what I meant when I said that absolute but now instead of absolute existence we have been considering the nature of individual existence and this may perhaps be sufficient for surely there is nothing which may be called more properly ourselves than the soul. Elcibiades, there is nothing. Socrates then we may truly conceive that you and I are conversing with one another soul to soul. Elcibiades, very true. Socrates and that is just what I was saying before that I, Socrates, am not arguing or talking with the face of Elcibiades but with the real Elcibiades or in other words with his soul. Elcibiades, true. Socrates then he who bids a man know himself would have him know his soul. Elcibiades that appears to be true. Socrates, he whose knowledge only extends to the body, knows the things of a man and not the man himself. Elcibiades, that is true. Socrates, then neither the physician regarded as a physician nor the trainer regarded as a trainer knows himself. Elcibiades, he does not. Socrates, the husband men and the other craftsmen are very far from knowing themselves for they would seem not even to know their own belongings when regarded in relation to the arts which they practice they are even further removed from self-knowledge for they only know the belongings of the body which minister to the body. Elcibiades, that is true. Socrates, then if temperance is the knowledge of self in respect of his art none of them is temperate. Elcibiades, I agree. Socrates and this is the reason why their arts are accounted vulgar and are not such as a good man would practice. Elcibiades, quite true. Socrates, again he who cherishes his body cherishes not himself but what belongs to him. Elcibiades, that is true. Socrates, but he who cherishes his money cherishes neither himself nor his belongings but is in a stage yet further removed from himself. Elcibiades, I agree. Socrates, then the money maker has really ceased to be occupied with his own concerns. Elcibiades, true. Socrates, and if anyone has fallen in love with the person of Elcibiades, he loves not Elcibiades but the belongings of Elcibiades. Elcibiades, true. Socrates, but he who loves your soul is the true lover. Elcibiades, that is the necessary evidence. Socrates, the lover of the body goes away when the flower of youth fades. Elcibiades, true. Socrates, but he who loves the soul goes not away as long as the soul follows after virtue. Elcibiades, yes. Socrates, and I am the lover who goes not away but remains with you when you are no longer young and the rest are gone. Elcibiades, yes Socrates, and when you do well, and I hope that you will remain. Socrates, then you must try to look your best. Elcibiades, I will. Socrates, the fact is that there is only one lover of Elcibiades, the son of Clanius. There neither is nor ever has been seemingly any other, and he is, is darling. Socrates, the son of Sofraniscus and Fianerite. Elcibiades, true. Socrates, and did you not say that if I had not spoken first you were on the point of coming to me and inquiring why I only remained? Elcibiades, that is true. Socrates, the reason was that I loved you for your own sake, whereas other men love what belongs to you and your beauty, which is not you, is fading away just as your true self is beginning and I will never desert you if you are not spoiled and deformed by the Athenian people. For the danger which I most fear is that you will become a lover of the people and will be spoiled by them. Many a noble Athenian has been ruined in this way. For the demis of the great hearted Erectaeus is of a fair countenance, but you should see him naked, wherefore observe the caution which I give you. Elcibiades, what caution? Socrates, practice yourself sweet friend in learning what you ought to know, before you enter on politics, and then you will have an antidote which will keep you out of harm's way. Elcibiades, good advice Socrates, but I wish that you would explain to me in what way I am to take care of myself. Socrates, have we not made an advance? For we are at any rate well agreed as to what we are and there is no longer any danger as we once feared that we might be taking care not of ourselves but of something which is not ourselves. Elcibiades that is true. Socrates and the next step will be to take care of the soul and look to that. Elcibiades certainly. Socrates leaving the care of our bodies and of our properties to others. Elcibiades very good. Socrates but how can we have a perfect knowledge of the things of the soul for if we know them, then I suppose we shall know ourselves. Can we really be ignorant of the excellent meaning of the Delphian inscription, of which we were just now speaking? Elcibiades, what have you in your thoughts, Socrates? Socrates, I will tell you what I suspect to be the meaning and lesson of that inscription. Let me take an illustration from sight which I imagine to be the only one suitable to my purpose. Elcibiades what do you mean? Socrates consider if someone were to say to the eye, see thyself as you might say to a man, know thyself what is the nature and meaning of this precept? Would not his meaning be that the eye should look at that in which it would see itself? Elcibiades clearly, Socrates and what are the objects in looking at which we see ourselves? Elcibiades, clearly Socrates in looking at mirrors and the like. Socrates very true and is there not something of the nature of a mirror in our own eyes? Elcibiades, certainly. Socrates, did you ever observe that the face of a person looking into the eye of another is reflected as in a mirror and in the visual organ which is over against him and which is called the pupil? There is a sort of image of the person looking. Elcibiades, that is quite true. Socrates then the eye looking at another eye and at that in the eye which is most perfect and which is the instrument of vision will there see itself? Elcibiades, that is evident. Socrates but looking at anything else whether in man or in the world and not to what resembles this it will not see itself. Elcibiades, very true Socrates then if the eye is to see itself it must look at the eye and at that part of the eye where sight which is the virtue of the eye resides Elcibiades, true Socrates and if the soul, my dear Elcibiades, is ever to know herself, must she not look at the soul and especially at that part of the soul in which her virtue resides and to any other which is like this Elcibiades, I agree Socrates and do we know of any part of our souls more divine than that which has to do with wisdom and knowledge? Elcibiades, there is none Socrates then this is that part of the soul which resembles the divine and he who looks at this and at the whole class of things divine will be most likely to know himself Elcibiades, clearly Socrates and self knowledge we agree to be wisdom Elcibiades, true Socrates, but if we have no self knowledge and no wisdom can we ever know our own good and evil? Elcibiades, how can we Socrates? Socrates you mean that if you did not know Elcibiades, there would be no possibility of your knowing that what belonged to Elcibiades was really his? Elcibiades, it would be quite impossible, Socrates nor should we know that we were the persons to whom anything belonged if we did not know ourselves Elcibiades, how could we? Socrates and if we did not know our own belongings, neither should we know the belongings of our belongings. Elcibiades, clearly not Socrates then we were not altogether right in acknowledging just now that a man may know what belongs to him and yet not know himself nay, rather he cannot even know the belongings of his belongings. For the discernment of the things of self and of the things which belong to the things of self appear all to be the business of the same man and of the same part. Elcibiades so much may be supposed Socrates and he who knows not the things which belong to himself will in like manner be ignorant of the things which belong to others. Elcibiades very true. Socrates and if he knows not the affairs of others he will not know the affairs of states. Elcibiades, certainly not Socrates then such a man can never be a statesman Elcibiades he cannot Socrates nor an economist. Elcibiades he cannot. Socrates he will not know what he is doing. Elcibiades he will not Socrates and will not he who is ignorant fall into error. Elcibiades assuredly. Socrates and if he falls into error will he not fail both in his public and private capacity. Elcibiades yes indeed. Socrates and failing. Will he not be miserable? Elcibiades very. Socrates and what will become of those for whom he is acting. Elcibiades they will be miserable also Socrates then he who is not wise and good cannot be happy. Elcibiades he cannot Socrates the bad then are miserable. Elcibiades yes very. Socrates and if so not he who has riches but he who has wisdom is delivered from his misery. Elcibiades clearly Socrates cities then if they are to be happy do not want walls or try reams or docks or numbers or size. Elcibiades without virtue. Parentheses compare Aristotle Politica and the parentheses Elcibiades indeed they do not. Socrates and you must give the citizens virtue if you mean to administer their affairs rightly or nobly Elcibiades certainly Socrates but can a man give that which he has not Elcibiades and possible Socrates then you or anyone who means to govern and super intend not only himself and the things of himself but the state and the things of the state must in the first place acquire virtue. Elcibiades that is true. Socrates you have not therefore to obtain power or authority in order to enable you to do what you wish for yourself and the state but justice and wisdom Elcibiades clearly Socrates you and the state if you act wisely and justly will act according to the will of God Elcibiades certainly Socrates as I was saying before you will look only at what is bright and divine and act with a view to them Elcibiades yes Socrates in that mirror you will see and know yourselves and your own good Elcibiades yes Socrates and so you will act rightly and well Elcibiades yes Socrates in which case I will be security for your happiness Elcibiades I accept the security Socrates but if you act unrighteously your eye will turn to the dark and godless and being in darkness and ignorance of yourselves you will probably do deeds of darkness Elcibiades very possibly Socrates for if a man my dear Elcibiades has the power to do what he likes but has no understanding what is likely to be the result either to him individual or to the state for example if he be sick and is able to do what he likes not having the mind of a physician having more over tyrannical power and no one daring to reprove him what will happen to him will he not be likely to have his constitution ruined Elcibiades that is true Socrates or again in a ship if a man having the power to do what he likes has no intelligence or skill do you see what will happen to him and to his fellow sailors Elcibiades yes I see that they will all perish Socrates and in like manner in a state and where there is any power and authority which is wanting in virtue will not misfortune in like manner ensue Elcibiades certainly Socrates not tyrannical power then my good Elcibiades should be the aim either of individuals or states they would be happy but virtue Elcibiades that is true Socrates and before they have virtue to be commanded by a superior is better for men as well as for children parentheses compare Aristotle politica end of parentheses Elcibiades that is evident Socrates and that which is better is also nobler Elcibiades true Socrates and what is nobler is more becoming Elcibiades certainly Socrates then to the bad man slavery is more becoming because better Elcibiades true Socrates then vice is only suited to a slave Elcibiades yes Socrates and virtue to a free man Elcibiades yes Socrates and oh my friend is not the condition of a slave to be avoided Elcibiades certainly Socrates Socrates and are you now conscious of your own state and do you know whether you are a free man or not Elcibiades I think that I am very conscious indeed of my own state Socrates and do you know how to escape out of the state which I do not even like to name to my beauty Elcibiades yes I do Socrates how Elcibiades by your help Socrates that is not well said Elcibiades Elcibiades what ought I to have said Socrates by the help of God Elcibiades I agree and I further say that our relations are likely to be reversed from this day forward I must and will follow you as you have followed me I will be the disciple and you shall be my master Socrates oh that is rare my love breeds another love and so like the stork I shall be cherished by the bird whom I have hatched Elcibiades strange but true and hence forward I shall begin to think about justice Socrates and I hope that you will persist although I have fears not because I doubt you but I see the power of the state which may be too much for both of us End of part 4 Recording by Kevin Johnson End of Elcibiades 1 by Plato Translated by Benjamin Joatt