In today's video I'm announcing the secret 200k special opening and we're opening an insane Yu-Gi-Oh! collection What's up guys we're back with another epic video as you can see we've got a new camera today It's in 4k right now So I don't know how long we're gonna do that because large file sizes issues with OBS freezing I'm trying to troubleshoot all that stuff, but for now it looks great I'm excited about it, but I'm also announcing a big 200k special opening if you are a special footage member of the channel You actually already know what this is because I did a little sneak preview for you guys as a special footage member If you guys want to become special footage members as well You can check that little join button down below and then you can get little updates like that and discounts on the Brock sprays and everything like that The 200k special is sponsored by Sasiado and he sent us this item in this box I'm about to show you guys what he sent us But make sure to go check out the link down below if you want to pre-order some legacy boxes like from the legacy openings that I did in legacy week just recently go check out those from the past week and You guys can get your own boxes coming in July and it supports me it supports Sasiado You get 5% off to use my code which is down below in the description and in the pin comment Sasi also sent us a giveaway We have two rucks and mystery packs which were apparently from a canceled order So somebody bought these and then canceled so who knows maybe there's something insane that they'll regret canceling and one of you Guys can win it all you have to do is like the video be subscribed turn on notifications Let me know how excited you are for this opening and let me know about the seal collection Which may or may not have a weird twist that I'm hoping is not gonna happen But I feel like it might I'll explain that later. Hey guys What you are not at my last what not stream Fear not there's another stream upcoming Thursday June 1st at 5 p.m. Central we have done some insane giveaways and sold some awesome stuff on what not I give it away over three thousand dollars in cards and we've opened some insane packs and sold some awesome singles Why should you join what not because what not is an awesome live streaming platform where you could buy Sell or just simply view live streams of people opening product selling things such as cards Shoes and other collectibles you can find my show just by clicking the link down below Which will give you $15 for free with your first purchase on what not then go to the search bar search rucks and 34 You'll see my profile click on the shows tab then save the show for the shows that I have coming soon We've done some amazing streams on what not so I hope to see you there June 1st at 5 p.m. It's gonna be pretty amazing. Thanks again to what not for sponsoring this video. All right. Here we go Any guesses yet? Oh, you got the outside a little bit of extra What will we be opening for a special 200k pre 200k opening actually just celebrating 200k We have that 200 pack opening as well a First edition invasion of chaos box. I've never actually owned or even held one of these This is the first time and by the way if you're wondering this is a chaos emperor dragon box So we could potentially pull chaos emperor dragon blacklist or soldier demock all inside of this box It will be insane first edition is right there It is gonna be an epic opening upcoming 24 packs of booster box So shout out to sassy outo for hooking me up with this box. Make sure to go check out his links down below It's gonna be an insane opening and this isn't all the cool silk product we have today I have some more unique old sealed stuff as well. All right, this next item is where it gets weird So I knew I was getting this item from a guy He said hey, I got these packs you want to buy him and I was like sure So there were blister packs in there It's like nine blister packs that we're gonna be involved in some of the collection I bought and here's the box. I don't know if you guys see the problem here. I'm gonna show you guys this This box is not long enough to hold a blister pack So this is about like probably six inches wide your normal packs about four or five inches Blister packs are probably like ten inches blister packs are one of the most annoying things to ship So I know this very well because I've shipped a lot of blister packs before I hate them because you need weirdly sized boxes to actually fit them in because they don't weigh a lot But they're like an awkward shape So you need a really long box, but then it's not it didn't weigh that much It's kind of like a waste of space So I don't know what's going on with this box There's no way you fit blisters in here without either bending them opening them I think best case scenario is that he forgot to put him in here But that was like half of the the packs I bought so I'm really scared to open this box I'm not gonna lie. So we're gonna experience this together normally I just open this stuff ahead of time and show you guys but when I saw this I was like this can't have blister packs in it. So I don't know what's about to happen Okay, let's get this thing open. Okay the moment of truth This is about to be where it gets really scary Oh, no, oh, no, let's just get straight to the pain. Oh, there's some they're not bent Wait, they looked a bit. Okay. They're it's a little bit. Wow. I'm surprised that he was able to do that That's pretty impressive. Okay, as you guys can see LOB blister will save that for later But I feel like this defies the laws of physics. This feels like this should not fit But they're only somewhat been which is a lot better than I thought was gonna happen So maybe this is best case scenario. That's sweet. All right Our first package has an original magic ruler pack So a lot of these I'm considering opening and the 200k special obviously because we need epic packs got a couple of metal raiders Original print which is really cool and limited couple of OCG. I think this one's called Yeah revival of black demons dragon pretty cool and then metal raiders as you guys could see back there I know a lot of you guys love how about posters situated, but this is one of the packs That's a metal raiders poster back there a lot of you guys didn't know that it's green back in the OCG So we get to open one of those in the 200k, which is gonna be fun. All right Then we have a few more loose packs before we get to the blisters We are gonna open a couple of packs in this video. So don't fret. We're gonna open some cool stuff. All right These are really cool. So oh what what is that? Oh you getting a little hint of what this might be So we've got a original Legend of Blue Eyes pack. That's unlimited So not first edition or anything but still really cool. Then we have something different Asian English first edition So we have three Six eight of those so we're talking a third of a booster box out of a first edition Asian English box You can pull like blue eyes and stuff. This has the Asian logo on the back, but it is English on the front They're pretty weird. I've never actually opened any of them before but they're pretty rare at this point So I'm excited to open some of those for the 200k. We'll probably open one of those today So first for our blisters these look like they're almost pristine. I don't think these even like got touched somehow These fit in that box. I do not understand. They're too long. It doesn't make sense I don't get it, but guess what? They were the perfect fit I guess first edition by the way labyrinth of nightmare. We got four of these Beautiful glad to see they're not damaged. These are really nice I don't know if I want to open those then we have the one we kind of saw before the legend of blue eyes original I think this one did get a little bit of Bindature to it. So this is looks like this was the casualty of the shipping, but honestly, it's really not bad And oh my gosh, I just love the look of these old blisters, especially L. O. B. and MRD and Ferris Okay, they're all good.  We have some original Fossil blister packs. So as you can see Pokemon, they didn't have the weird Super long top like the Yu-Gi-Oh does so these are a little bit shorter. So it makes sense why these fit in Well, these are really sick. So we've got okay, not all the different arts. I think there's four different ones We've got Lapras Zaptos and two erudactyl I've never opened the set in my life unless I open something back in the day, which is possible But it's been a very long time. So I don't remember if I did this will be something really cool But these are really nice blisters and I don't know if I want to open them But you know me guys, we're probably gonna end up opening them. These are really cool. Ah, yeah, these are super sick I'm going to card party early June. I'll probably bring at least one of these to open up That should be pretty fun. So some insane blisters I'm really glad that only one of them had slight damage to it and maybe have even been like that before So maybe just fit in but super excited about that collection I mean not a lot of packs about some really really quality stuff that you will see in the 200k opening So if you're excited for the 200k, you can see invasion of chaos first edition. That's a different video So we get to watch that video and we get to watch 200 packs of 200k They're gonna have stuff like that that I just showed you big-time old-school packs and because this is an opening channel We will be opening a pack here first edition Asian English blue eyes white dragon I mean, I've never opened this pack for so let's open one of these here Let's have a little fun in this. I mean, let's just put the invasion of chaos box right here Just for a little bit of love right here. Just throw that back. It doesn't reflect. Well, that's the problem I'll do it. I'll just set it back there like that invasion of chaos just to send us some luck I don't know what kind of pack trick this is. I mean these came out in like 2003. I think so they're very very old I'm guessing it's for I'm gonna do three just in case so we don't ruin it We have a power of kaishin. Well, he's got some like interesting feel to him first edition L.O.B These are the cards that used to get confused with all the time You thought they were in a first edition you'd see him You're like look it's in a there's no set symbol or anything and then you look at the back like oh It's Asian English So these were like originally kind of annoying to find but now they're kind of cool because you know back in the day They weren't worth anything but they're getting pretty rare at this point. So the the hollows are pretty valuable. Oh, what? Dragoness wait, do we get a foil? No No, we ruined it Check it out. That's a really cool the book of secret arts. So it looks like wait Let me let me redo that. So if I was like this, what was the package? We got to figure this out for the 200k special. So I did three from the back Which means I took three and put them to put them to the front So it was just gonna be in the back already. That's insane. So I guess this just all the foils are automatically in the back Asian English knew was up these put the right foil in the back. All right We have two metal raiders. So I'll open one of these and then we will be done with this epic announcement video Hopefully you guys have enjoyed the video. Hopefully the new camera looks great. I think it's doing well The problem is I'm a little worried about crashing but one two three four. This is an original print So this is old-school stuff. We can get a petite moth out of your pecanium moth epicness king of yummy Mackay We have a little good the ancient elf. This elf is rumored to have lived for thousands of years He leads an army of spirits against his enemies Neutrary, what does that mean again? I can't remember mystic lamb the genie cheerful coffin We have Lady Defei the blue winged crown and finally we have the Magician Defei Magician of faith one of the best rares in this set So not a hollow but still a really nice card so amazing collection I hope you guys are excited for this epic opening 200k. I cannot wait to record this So if you guys enjoyed the video and want to see 200k make sure to subscribe to the channel for more epic content I've showed you a lot of it coming up.  Shout out the tone foe show Dax or JT show Puffets of doom Ernesto Deanna dizzy my cycle America Deutzer Supreme Stage 21 and then a Thai show Ian Moosa junior barding mimic echo with Thomas plane. Thank you guys for supporting the channel. I'll see you guys in the next video Peace


So, the other day, I ran the Vanguard Captain on a World Tier 15 200 times and counted those loot results. It's rumoured now that there has been a stealth nerf lowering Legendary Drunk Race. Looking back at these results though and seeing how I only got 1 in 200 runs on a World Tier 15, it does seem a little if you're considering on a World Tier 5 when farming the demo, I'll get 5 times this many. But even so, this is the full game and things may have changed. Well, I wanted to test the loot rewards from a World Tier 1 versus a World Tier 15 to see the differences and see if they are a major. So back I went to it guys, 200 runs of the Vanguard Captain on a World Tier 1, the results are coming up. How's it going guys? My name's DPJ and if you enjoyed the video leaving a like really helps out and if you like what you see and want to see more outriders on a daily basis be sure to subscribe. So, looking back at the results from the World Tier 15 200 runs of the Vanguard Captain, we can see within 1 hour and 30 odd minutes I got 128 res which resulted in 9,360 iron and 10,176 leather. I also got 169 epics which resulted in 2,197 titanium. When added to the titanium I got from the boss I had a grand total of 3,719. And well guys from 200 runs of the Vanguard Captain on a World Tier 15 I got 1 legendary. Just 1 legendary. So yeah, craziness. So let's move on to the results of 200 runs of the same boss on a World Tier 1. And while I did this much quicker, landing it in just over an hour as obviously the boss is just an instant kill.  Craziness. So loot wise here from the 200 runs on a World Tier 1 of the Vanguard Captain I got 48 green gear pieces which resulted in 1,344 iron and 2,020 leather. I also got 177 rare gear pieces which resulted in 10,302 iron and 15,124 leather. In total from the 200 runs I also got 97 epics. Which for a Tier 1 was surprising. Thing is on a World Tier 1 epics dismantled into only 1 titanium. So yeah, I got 97 titanium for my troubles here. Combined that with the average of 2 per run on the Captain on a World Tier 1, I had a total of 244 titanium for this run. Now the question I know you want to know is, did I get a legendary? And the answer is, as you would expect, no. No I didn't. If I only got 1 on 200 runs on a World Tier 15, I didn't in reality expect 1 on a World Tier 1. But I will state, they do exist. Now for compared to loot it's clear that on a World Tier 15 you just get way more materials. Way more epics and I mean we got 1 legendary on a World Tier 15 against none here. But I feel on a World Tier 1 I could have gone for another 4 or 5 hours and still not got a single legendary. But people I know there's a question many of you may want to know and that is, do legendos even exist within the loot pool on a World Tier 1? I can confirm that they do. Even though they are crazy does indeed happen. So yes people, a World Tier 1 vs a World Tier 15. As you guessed, they stick to a World Tier 15 even though in terms of legendary loot they are crazy either way or for materials and other good shiz, World Tier 15 is just far far better. And on that note, the end of the video has arrived. If you enjoyed it, leaving a like really helps out. If you're new around here and want to see more outriders on a daily basis be sure to subscribe and if you never want to miss a video I upload you can turn notifications on by hitting that bell button. But guys thanks as always for stopping by and hopefully I will see you on that next one.


So I'm just about to make one of the coolest calls I've ever been able to make. I've been working with this organization called Giveability that raises money for individual people who are looking for adaptive sports equipment like running blades. I know how much running blade changed my life. It is just, oh my god, it's a game changer. It's so exciting.  Let's do this. Hey, is this Christian? So you are looking for a running blade, is that right?  Yeah, I was so excited when he told me that. Hands down on one of the coolest calls I've ever had the honor of being able to make.


The Virtual Broadcasting System presents The Mysterious Traveler, written, produced, and directed by Robert A. Arthur and David Colvin, and starring Lawson Zerbe, him, the most famous man in the world. I'm inviting you to join me on another journey into the realm of the strange and the terrifying. I hope you'll enjoy the trip, so settle back, get a good grip on your nerves, and be comfortable. As we meet two people who haven't even been born yet, it's a story I call the most famous man in the world. You don't know him yet, but you will, if things happen as predicted. His name is Frank Richards, and he has a very odd story. You may find it a little hard to believe at first, but so many things are hard to believe these days, aren't they? So please, keep an open mind while Frank gives you all the facts. And here he is. I wouldn't be telling you this if Mabel hadn't asked me to. Just before she went to the hospital, she said, Frank, you tell people exactly what's happened. Even if they don't believe you, you'll have done your duty. And I said, all right, I would. So I'm going to tell you about the deans. They rented our front room, John and Susie Dean. They spelled their names funny, John, J-O-N, and Susie, S-U-S-I. You see, we had an extra room in our apartment, and when we learned it was going to be in addition to the family, we decided we needed some extra money. So I went down to the paper and put in an advertisement, offering our front room for rent. Then I went to work. When I got home about six, and I'd hardly settle down with my paper when the door buzzer rang. All right, sweetheart. Yes? Mr. Frank Richards? Yes, that's my name. I'm John Dean, and this is my wife, Susie. Oh, pleased to meet you. How do you do, Mr. Richards? We have come desirous of renting the room which you posted in today's newsprint. You mean the room I advertised in the paper? Of course, the room you advertised in the paper. It has not been a lot of it yet, has it? What, you mean rent it? Yes. Well, no, as a matter of fact, the paper the ad is in isn't even out yet. You mean not printed yet? That's right. It's the morning paper. It doesn't come out until about 9 p.m. and it's only 6.15 now. Oh, but you are wrong. It is out. We have a copy of it. Here, Mr. Richards, you see, the city gazette for Wednesday, June 6th, 1951 Old Style. 1951 Old Style? I mean Ono Domini. And here is your posting. I mean your advertisement. Charming front room for rent, newly furnished, kitchen privilege. May I look at that paper? Of course. It's my ad, that's right. But this is the final edition of the paper. It shouldn't be out now. It's not supposed to be printed until about 4 o'clock tomorrow morning. John, we have made a mistake. Well, what is it? Someone come to see our front room, sweetheart. Mr. and Mrs. Dean, my wife. How do you do? How do you do? Well, frankly, mustn't keep them standing in that dark hallway. Won't you come in and see the room? Thank you. We will. It is very kind of you. The room is right this way. Oh. Yes? Oh, nothing. If you'll come this way? Of course. Come on, John, dear. Well, I knew what it was that had startled Mabel. The way the deans were dressed. I hadn't been able to see clearly in the dark hall, but once they were inside, I saw that Mrs. Dean was wearing a tight little hat and a fur neck piece and a short skirted dress, vintage of 1929. While Mr. Dean had on an old-fashioned frock coat, a boiled shirt and a stand-up collar, high-button shoes, striped formal trousers, and was carrying a silk top hat. A minute later, Mabel came out, leaving them to look the front room over and join me, looking puzzled. Did you see how they're dressed? They might have gotten those clothes out of the museum. Well, maybe they're going to a masquerade ball, but that's not the funniest thing about them. Mabel, that newspaper they had just can't be printed yet. It's about 10 hours ahead of time. Shh! Here they come. My wife and I have been talking about the room. And we want to take it. Why? That's fine. It is a lovely room. It has such a nice, clear view of the street. And we would like to stay here because we have read so much about you both. We feel that we know you. You have read so much about us? Why, yes, you are famous. Goodness, I cannot imagine how many words... Susie! Yes. Oh, my goodness. I mean, we have heard so much about you from people who know you. Well, anyway, we do like the room and want to rent it. Well, I don't know. We were thinking of just one person. We will not be any trouble at all. In your posting, I mean your advertisement. You will mention $10 a week. We will pay 12 and in advance. Here you are. One month rent in advance. Well, I still think... Oh, I'm sure the deans are perfectly all right, Frank. Go ahead, take the money. Well, if the wife says okay, Mr. Dean, then, uh, here you are. Thanks. Say something to money. You're looking at it as if it were not good. Well, no, I guess it's good all right. It's just that these are the old-style bills. The big kind haven't been in use for 20 years or more. That's Victor at the museum. A big part? Uh, nothing. I can explain the bills. You see, my wife and I have been living abroad. Recently, we received a legacy from a distant relative. She was, uh, an eccentric. Left us trunks of old clothes. I've noticed you staring at her clothes. And old money, too. Oh, well, that explains it. Well, in that case, folks, just make yourselves at home if you've got any luggage. We are having a couple of bags sent on later. But for now, we are going to buy all new things. And about how long do you think you'll be staying, Mrs. Dean? We can tell you exactly, Mrs. Richard, until five minutes past three in the afternoon, October 30th. You see what I mean about the deans being odd? Well, I've explained to you in all this detail, so you'll know just how the whole thing started. Well, the next day, the deans went shopping and came back with a brand-new up-to-date wardrobe. And a couple of days later, two small trunks of some funny new plastic arrived, but I never saw them open the trunk. They read a lot, mostly newspapers and history books, and stayed in their room a good deal. But they were awfully nice people.  Just a plain bridge, evenings and talking. Damon, Robert, do you want to play any more, Susie? No, thank you, Mabel. Let us just sit and listen to the radio and talk. It is so nice to be able to talk without worrying about a monitor listening in. A monitor? Susie means a spy. You see, abroad. Well, you have to watch everything you say these days. Oh, that must be terrible. Mabel, that is why it is so nice to talk and not worry about saying the wrong things. But surely in your own home you can talk. No monitors can overhear you then. Oh, but they can! There is two-way television in every home. They can see you and hear you. Everything you say and everything you do. Why, how awful! But where is this? I haven't heard of any place where such a thing has been developed. You two talk just like you'd stepped out of one of these imaginative books about the future. What? What did you say? Should you talk like a couple of people out of a book about the future? Yes, Frank, I suppose we do. But, John... We might as well let Frank and Mabel in on our little secret, darling. They are just about to guess it anyway. You see, folks, we are from the future. Sure, what? We come from the future, Mabel. John was born in the year 2,205. John was born in 2,198. Oh, no! Hey, wait a minute. Hey, a gag's a gag, but you're kidding. No, Frank.  You know we are not kidding. Back home now, the year is 2,228. So there you have it. Two people from the year 2,228 in our front room. People who wouldn't even be born for over 200 years. Two people from the future. Mabel, I see you are convinced now. Yes, I guess we are. It's the only answer that explains anything. Especially that newspaper you had when you first came here, printed 10 hours ahead of time. It came from the files of the Historical Museum, Frank. So did our clothes and our money. Our researchers were a few years out of date. You see, we do not know too much about the everyday details of the past. Back in 2,228. But goodness, I should think you could find out every detail about it in your library. Surely the old books and newspapers... I mean, unfortunately, we don't have many old books and newspapers. Why the devil not? For one thing, the war. The war? Oh, you need not look scared. It will not happen in your lifetime. Not the one I am speaking about. But when it does come, well, there will not be many books or newspapers left. That sounds as if there won't be many people left, either. Now we must not talk about the war. In fact, it may never happen if we are successful. If you're successful? Oh, look, you've told us this much. Now I think you've got to tell us a little more. How did you get here from 2,228? We came through a time gap. A distortion in the time field. I cannot explain it. It was developed at the Science Institute. And except for a few trial trips, we are the first people ever to use it. All right, well, that brings up my other question. Why? Why did you come? And especially here? Why were you so anxious to rent our front room that you showed up even before my advertisement was printed? Frank, we are photographers. And we have come here into the past to make a newsreel of a political parade. A parade? Yes, it will take place on October 30th. It will be an honor of a candidate for the Senate. A certain Sarrington Farnsworth. Farnsworth? Oh, yes, we've heard some of the speeches on the radio, Frank. Oh, sure, I remember. He'll red-hot down with everybody but us kind of politicians. In 1964, he was elected president. I mean, he will be elected president. Him? President? Yes, Frank.  Goodness, it is hard to remember the difference between past and future when you are traveling in time. A dictatorship? This country? Oh, you're joking. No, we are very much in earnest, Mabel. Farrington Farnsworth will become our first dictator. His son will become Farrington Farnsworth the second dictator of the Western Hemisphere.  I guess we set up most of that night talking, and what John and Susie told us kind of made our hair stand on end about the dictatorship of America and the wars that followed. Ending up with a big slam bang all out war of 2012, with only 400 million people left alive. And how the dictatorship spread over the world. So that by 2228, the world was ruled by a small group, living in luxury. Most of them, distant descendants of dictator Farnsworth, the first. Well, there was more. I guess that's enough to give you the rough idea. The glorious future? Not the way John and Susie Dean told it to us. It made me and Mabel mighty glad we were alive now So John explained they had come back to the past to get a special newsreel of dictator Farnsworth in his first big public appearance. Now that's all they would say, so we let it go at that. We didn't tell anybody about them. Who would have believed us? But now that we knew the truth, we weren't puzzled by John and Susie anymore. Well, the weeks went by and they saw as much of life today as they could. Went to ball games, the theater, all the different restaurants and had a wonderful time. Sometimes they just sat home with us and we listened to the radio.  So much fun. I wish it did not have to come to an end. Yes, we have stayed about as long as we can. Tomorrow is the big parade, you know. Oh, yes, the parade for Farrington Farnsworth.  We'll just go on with the old routine, I suppose, as if we'd never seen it. Well, not exactly the old routine, Frank. No, life will be considerably different for you in the days to come, Frank. You and Mabel. You said something like that the very first day you were here. You said you'd read a lot about us. But where? In the newspapers, Mabel. While John and I were studying up on this time period. In the newspapers? Me and Mabel? To put it bluntly, old man, you are both going to be famous. You're joking? Why should we be famous? You don't mean the book I'm writing. To make a little extra money so that when the baby gets here... No, not your book. Though it will be public. Well, at least that's nice to know. Well, go on, John. Tell us some more about what lies ahead of us. Look, look, I need to make some more money. Can't you give me a tip on the stock market? After all, you did read the newspapers. Back then in the future you said you read all the newspapers for a hundred years. You must know whether stocks are going up or down. Well, yes, we do. But we cannot tell you. Really, we cannot. And besides, you will not need any such information. But why not?  For a little while, Frank is going to be the most famous man in the world. It is true, Frank. Really it is. I do wish you wouldn't be so mysterious. Can't you give us even a little hint as to why he'll be famous? I could give you half a dozen reasons. But I will not. But when it happens, and you remember that we predicted it, then you will know that all this really took place. Even though later it will seem just like a strange dream. Then I suppose we'll just have to wait and see, huh? I am afraid so, Frank. And now I think we should all go to bed. Tomorrow is going to be a big day for all of us. We all went to bed. Mabel and I tried to figure out what John and Susie meant. How could two average people like us become famous? Didn't Adam? So we finally decided they were just kidding us and went to sleep. Well, the next day we didn't get to talk much. John and Susie were busy. Long before the parade came past, they got a funny looking camera out of their suitcases and started setting it up in the front room, looking out on Main Street. But when they finished, we could hear the bands playing in the distance as their parade in honor of Farrington Farms with came down our street. Well, here he comes, Susie. Your great, great, many times great-grandfather will be coming past any minute. Yes, I know. I suppose I will be the first person in history to see his great-grandfather eight times removed. Nervous? I am a little. What will happen? I do not know. But we will have to be prepared. I am. I am prepared. Hey, what are you two talking about? Is the parade inside, huh? It is just down the street. Where is Mabel? Oh, she's lying down. Doesn't feel like watching. I'll turn on the radio. We'll get a commentary from the car right behind Farrington Farms with. I think I can see his car now. Yes, I am sure of it. Well, folks, here we are halfway to City Auditorium. And so far, at least half a million people have greeted the Farrington Farms world from the crowded sidewalks. It's really a triumphal day for him. All public opinion polls predict he will be swept into the Senate by a landslide. And he was, too. Went on to become dictator. Now his descendants keep the world enslaved. As far ahead as the eye can see, dense, small, flat streets. Victory is in the air. Victory for Farrington Farms World and his foreign policy. Now we're going to let you listen to the band for a moment. There he is, John, waving to the crowd. I see him. I have the camera focused. Yes. Turn it on. Yes, John. Yes. Hey. What kind of camera is that? It's been me a blue light down on Farrington Farms world. Please, Frank, stand back. Cut power, Susie. Yes, John. What? Now the blue light is gone. So what are you two up to? You didn't take any picture of that. Hey, hey, hey. Something's happening down there. Yes, Frank. Farrington Farms World is suddenly down this seat. If something's happened, it's Farrington Farms World has just collapsed. The parade has stopped. The crowd seems stopped. He may have fainted. This position is hiring to his side. They're trying to rouse him. I'll let you know as soon as I can find out just what's wrong. Good Lord. John, did you... Did that blue light have anything to do with Farrington Farms World's collapse just now? Yes, Frank. It caused his collapse. Now close the window, Susie. Yes, John. Now the radio. Cut it off. We will not need it. Well, John, sorry, Frank. Hey, look here. What's going on? What are you two up to? We have just killed Farrington Farms World. Just killed? Yes. Now we haven't much time. Susie, better pack back. Of course. We will talk while we pack, Frank. Farms World has had a heart attack. In a minute, he will be dead. That blue light caused the heart attack. It is a weapon very popular in 2228. The secret police use it a lot. Good Lord. It's a favorite weapon of Farrington Farms World VIII. It helps him keep the slaves quiet. Then you lied to me. Yes, we lied to you. We came back to your time in order to assassinate the first Farrington Farms World before he could ever become powerful. We came back to prevent the future from happening. We came back to remove one man to keep the world free. I don't get it. Think about it and you will. We are leaders of an underground dedicated to freeing the world of 2228. Our scientists perfected a time machine. We cannot fight the Farrington Farms World dictatorship in our own time so we came back to eliminate it in advance. Then the future, all those things you told me, will never happen. We hope not. It is what we are trying to present. But Susie, you said you were a direct descendant of Farrington Farms World. Now, if he dies without any children, where will that leave you? I am afraid it will not leave me any place, Frank. I just will not ever have existed, that is all. And... John... John, darling. Yes, Susie? Hold me close. I feel so strange and... and far away. I think Farrington Farms World must be dying. I will hold you, Susie. Oh, Susie. Susie, if it could only have been different. John, I... Susie, she... She's gone. She vanished. She just went out. Like a light going out. Yes. Like a light going out. Susie has never been born, Frank. Never existed. Farnsworth is dead. Dead. I understand, but... But to vanish like that... It has to be. It is the price of freedom for the world. The whole future is different. I will go back to a world I may not even know. Now stand back, Frank. I am signaling for them to turn on the time transmitter and pull me back to 22, 28. Back in my own time, they hear that. They will be activating the apparatus. I'll be gone in a moment, Frank. But what will I tell people? Do not tell them anything. They may lock you up in a sanitarium if you do. Remember, the doctors will say Farnsworth died of a heart attack. There will be no proof. He has been murdered. Now goodbye, Frank. You're getting all misty. Transparent. I can see through you. John! John! Goodbye, Frank. Goodbye. Be happy with Mabel. Remember, I predicted you would be famous. Forget about us. Forget about... He's gone. And the trunks. Everything they brought with them. He's gone. Everything is just... gone. That's a story, folks. It happened just this afternoon. John and Suzy Dean from the year 22, 28 assassinated a man who would have become dictator. And I can't prove it. In fact, I wouldn't even have told you this. But Mabel, she felt we had to tell. Just before she went to the hospital, she promised the shock of what happened. Well, it hurried things up, and we sent for the doctor right away after John vanished.  I'm waiting now for word that everything's all right, and I decided I'd tell you the story while I waited. You see, here's... Excuse me. The telephone. It may be the hospital. Hello? Hello? Yeah. Yeah, yeah, speaking. What's that? A boy? It's fine. How's my wife? Good, good, good. Tell her I'll be right over. What? You said it was a boy. Yeah, but I don't understand. Oh, no. Oh, no, it can't be. They said everything's all right. And it's a boy, but... but not just one boy. Six boys! Well, I... Oh, so that's what John meant. That's what he meant when he said he could give me half a dozen reasons why we were going to be famous. This is the mysterious Chavre again. Did you enjoy our little visit from two people of the future? Oh, there are some questions you'd like to ask me. Well, I'd be glad to answer them just as soon as the program is over. We only have a minute left, you know. Oh, you'll have to get off here, I'm sorry. But I'm sure we'll meet again. I take this same train every week at this same time. You have just heard the Mysterious Traveller. Now you can enjoy other exciting tales of the Mysterious Traveller and the current issue of the Mysterious Traveller magazine. In our cast will Lawson Zerpe, Bryna Rayburn, Cliff Carpenter, and Miss Leslie Woods. Maurice Tarplin played the title role. Original music by Fred Mendelssohn. All characters in this story were fictional. Any resemblance to names of actual persons was purely coincidental. Bill Tarkin speaking. This program came to you from New York. The Shadow Knows. Yes, the Shadow Knows the weed of crime bears bitter fruit. And the ability of Lamont Cranston to become the invisible nemesis of evil strikes fear into the hearts of criminals across the world. The shadows fight against the enemies of society and you and eerie tales of suspense every Sunday. For adventure into the realm of the unknown where an oriental secret transforms a man about town into an unseen presence, listen when Mutual presents the Shadow every Sunday over most of these same stations. This is the Mutual Broadcasting System.


31 students from across the Region 5 area competed in the Lakes bee today at Sourcewell and Staples. The winner of the regional Spelling Bee will move on to the Scripps National Spelling Bee in Washington, D.C. A reporter Rachel Johnson has more. A good memory, lots of studying and being able to be calm under pressure are just a few things that make for a successful Spelling Bee contestant. The kids are, they're full of nerves, but there's so much in them. They've been studying so hard. Today, students from Region 5, Cass, Crowing, Morrison, Todd, and Wadena Counties gathered in Staples to compete in the Lakes Bee. All of the schools in Region 5 participate at the Spelling Bee at their local level, and then we host at the regional level, and then from here then they move on to Washington, the Washington competition. The Spelling Bee started off with 31 students and whittled down over 8 rounds to one final winner. The Spelling Bee began at 130 sharp, and as the competition went on, fewer and fewer students remained. After the eighth round, it was down to the final two. It was the word apothecary that sealed the deal, and Hannah Modus was named 2019 Lakes Bee Winner. Exhilarated and really surprised. Hannah will travel to the Washington, D.C. area to compete in the Scripps National Spelling Bee, all expenses paid by Sourcewell. I'm very, very proud, obviously. Proud for her. I'm very happy for her. Sourcewell has sponsored the event for years and has hosted it for the last three. We really stand behind just growth for kids and really being able to celebrate their accomplishments along the way, and this is just a beautiful way to do that and to have them be able to experience learning at much grander level. Hannah Modus is ready to get back to studying to gear up to face spellers from around the country at the National Spelling Bee. Reporting from Staples, Rachel Johnson, Lakeland News. And that Scripps National Spelling Bee will be held from May 27th through May 30th. If you enjoyed this segment of Lakeland News, please consider making a tax-deductible contribution to Lakeland PBS.


to our latest talk in the Russian and Eurasian Security Research series here from the Department of War Studies, King's College London, obviously coming to you virtually for now. I'm talking to you from the UK, and then I am delighted to have with me also Professor Elizabeth Wierschnick from the United States. She is Professor of Political Science, Montclair State University, and also a senior research scholar at the Weatherhead East Asian Institute part of Columbia University. And Professor Wierschnick has been working on Russia-China relations for quite some time, but has also expanded into other areas. But I can't think of anyone better really to talk about this. When I was writing my PhD on Russian relations with China and Japan, you know, she was one of the few people working on that area at the time. And I'm also delighted to have here today Dr. Martyn Kaszmaski from Glasgow University, Lecturer in Security Studies. And Martyn and I, I think met her some time ago at a conference and realized that we were to have a new handful of people still at that time working on the area. So it's a great pleasure to have Martyn and Elizabeth here today. And what we're going to do today is to look in the time allotted at actually a huge topic, but we're going to try and kind of focus in on a few areas of the Sino-Russian rapprochement. What are the drivers and limitations of this very important relationship? And there is, you know, this is the kind of topic that really invites a lot of speculation. And, you know, I'm sure you will have noticed that the media is often prone to rather hyping up this relationship, but also policymakers sometimes have a tendency to, you know, sort of blow up this relationship into, out of proportion, perhaps some might say, you know, so that question of course comes up time and again, you know, is this relationship an alliance or is it moving towards an alliance or is it something else? You know, how close is it and what is this relationship actually based on? And I think given, you know, the new administration that we now have in the United States, the question of the relationship of these two members of the P5 who also, you know, wield a certain amount of power in their own regions, if you like, is really quite a oppressing issue. So we will also touch a little bit on what we might expect in terms of the Russia-China relationship from the new Biden administration. So I'd like to invite Professor Wyschnick to begin the proceedings. She'll talk a little bit about what she thinks are the main challenges of this relationship. Thank you. Thank you, Natasha, for inviting me. And it's a pleasure to talk to all of you about this important topic. And so as Dr. Kurt mentioned, there has been a lot of speculation about this relationship, this important partnership. And there have been characterizations that discount the consequence of this relationship, calling it transactional and fundamentally not very durable. Others also have focused on the asymmetry involved with Russia being a dependent junior partner and seeing this relationship also is one that one or the other might abandon for this reason. And by contrast, there are a few more common in the United States during the Trump administration was to focus on the great power competition viewpoint and seeing the US factor as key in terms of serving or critics of the Trump policy would see this approach as motivating China and Russia to seek a closer partnership. And so I think these are approaches that you've all heard of if you're following this topic. But I would like to propose a different approach from what is driving them. I think to understand what's driving them, we need to look at when did this rapprochement really begin to come together. And I think I would date it from 2008 from the financial crisis when China and Russia look at the disarray in the global economy and the weakness of Western states and try to create some kind of alternatives of their own. And so this is not to discount the perceptions of Western pressure that they each feel and the problems and relations that each has with the United States. But I think that what has served as the anchor for this relationship is the agreement that they have on various values and norms of international behavior and the joint effort that they have to delegitimize Western values and to promote alternative ones that support their domestic narratives. This partnership, I think, contributes very much to the ability of Putin and Xi Jinping to maintain their political hold domestically. So for example, the principle of non-interference in the affairs of authoritarian states, the portrayal of democracies in the US in particular as unstable and ineffective, a use of disinformation campaigns in different ways, and repression of democratic movements at home. I think all of these are of a piece to counter these Western values. And also a second component of this is to create alternative approaches to various international problems. For example, to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula and to create an East Asian order that would be more conducive to their own domestic goals. And so I wouldn't say they have identical approaches, but they have parallel ones. And they don't act much in multilateral for, although they are members of many together, I think they act more on a bilateral basis within a multilateral context. And they are also neutral where they disagree, so they don't always agree. They don't have identical ways of going about these efforts to create alternative approaches. But I think that they do have this joint quest to develop some kind of alternative frameworks that are more conducive to their domestic goals. However, I would say that in the regions, they have different regional identities that will create some barriers. And I'm going to just briefly mention two different areas where I think this is the case. One is in the Arctic. That's a region I've been following closely lately. And China, as you may know, is advancing a near Arctic identity to justify its growing participation in this important region. And I think this runs across purposes with Russia's Arctic identity, which is rooted in its geographically and historically and economically in terms of the importance of the regions for the Russian resource-connected GDP. And so I think this is a region to watch in terms of how Russia and China will interact in the future, especially as Russia takes the leadership of the Arctic Council this coming spring. And then Central Asia. So Marge and I, I think, will disagree perhaps on this issue. I think that this is an area where Russia and China so far have managed not to compete very overtly. But there are some new challenges on the horizon. And also, I want to mention the case of COVID, which has showed a new arena for competition. So one issue is hard security. The division of labor has always been China provides the economic goods, and Russia provides the security. But recently, China is becoming more involved in security with using its own border forces in Tajikistan and private security companies in Afghanistan. And so what will this mean going forward for this unofficial division of labor? Is this going to cause some consternation in Russia? And what kind of reaction will there be in the region? And turning to the region, I found it interesting to look at the vaccine situation in Central Asia and who's buying whose vaccine. And so while on the surface, you see cooperation between China and Russia in terms of combating COVID-19, mutual support, where their positions on the issue, some efforts to joint development of vaccines. There's a Chinese vaccine being tested in Russia. Also, some joint disinformation about the US responsibility for this virus. However, in Central Asia, you see some competition in terms of which countries are using, which Russian or Chinese vaccines, both of promoting them. But so far, what I've found is only Uzbekistan has committed to a Chinese vaccine. Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, which claims it has no COVID, are all using the Sputnik 5 vaccine. And others are also hoping for the Kovacs, the WHO vaccine. So it's interesting that Russia has more vaccine dominance in Central Asia than China, despite China's effort to promote a Silk Road health diplomacy. And you would think that this would be a part of development aid that China would be proposing to Central Asia. But in fact, it hasn't worked out that way. And I think that's a curious. I wasn't expecting to find this result when I was looking into it. But I find that's an interesting indication that Russia still has some is trying to maintain its soft power in this region through nontraditional means. And I don't want to go on too long, but there are other areas where I think Russia and China are at odds in this region over nontraditional security issues like water rights and so on. So I'll stop there. Thank you very much. Great. Thank you. And that was a fascinating detail there on the vaccines because I guess vaccine nationalism has been a part of the pandemic, I mean, even here in the UK, I think. But clearly, as you say, there's sort of maybe slightly hidden soft power competition there in Central Asia. And as you say, I think the respective roles of Russia and China in Central Asia, particularly with the BRI, and then Russia promoting the idea of the Greater Eurasian Partnership, there is debate obviously among academics and others as to essentially what China's aims are in Central Asia during the extent to which Russia might accommodate those aims and what it is exactly that China wishes to achieve in the longer term. And as you said, Martian has a slightly different take to you. I tend also slightly to be a little more skeptical about Russia, China, and Central Asia. But I would be very interested now to hear Martian your take on this. Thank you. Thank you for the opportunity to be here. It's a real pleasure. And what I find a bit problematic is that I agree with almost anything what Professor Wiesing has just said. So I will try to address some other aspects and return to Central Asia a bit later. If I were to sum up the Sino-Russian relationship today in one sentence, I would say that it's an ever closer relationship, but the obstacles to what we could term a full of list alliance continue to persist. And if we are to start with external factors or external pressures that to what extent they are drivers of the relationship, it has been a constant thread in the IOR literature that it is the US policy that pushes Russia and China closer together. And we can trace it back to the year 2000 into Kenneth Waltz's article, where already at that time he indicated that it is the US that pushes both states closer together. So from this perspective, and according to this logic, what we should have expected is another stage of cooperation after late 2017, early 2018, when the US puts Russia and China on the same level as strategic competitors. But despite these dual pressures or despite this conducive in quotation mark environment, we have not seen such development. So I would argue that the picture of Sino-Russian relations for the last three years has been quite mixed. Because on the one hand, what we have seen has been the flourishing of cooperation in a number of areas, security and defense, energy cooperation, normative proposition towards the West. But at the same time, we have seen Russia having more and more difficulties walking this fine line between China and India and trying to stay neutral during their conflict. Russia has limited means to support China in the rivalry with the US, even if it's genuinely wanted in such areas as technology, investment, or trade and financial markets. It is also a similar case with the South China Sea, with Russia trying to walk this fine line between China and its traditional partners like Vietnam. Discussing drivers of the relationship, we should also pay attention to at least three other elements. So firstly, the domestic politics, which Elzabeth mentioned some aspects of this, it certainly facilitates Sino-Russian cooperation. I would argue that it mitigates the effects of power symmetry. The fact that China is not a threat to Russia in terms of regime security and regime survival makes the Kremlin more willing to accept the fact that China's all the distribution of material capabilities is very biased towards China. And China's influence has been growing, for instance, in Central Asia. At the same time, there is a growing number of domestic players in Russia who benefit from China's rise and from whom the perspective of closer relations is very promising with the energy industry, both state-owned enterprises like Rosnift or private companies like Novatec, which have clearly benefited from cooperation with China. Secondly, I would throw our attention to the kind of learning process in the part of the Russian elite. Just as in the case of relations with the West, we continue to argue that Russian bad experiences with the West, the bad experiences of the Russian elite with the Western policy pushed Russia into a more assertive approach. I would say that in the case of China, positive experiences make Russia make the Russian elite less to perceive China as less threatening. For me, still the case is here, the reaction of Beijing towards the Ukrainian crisis. Finally, I would argue that we should remember about unintended consequences of the Russian policy and should not see the relationship as driven only by rational, strategic, intentional actions. For the last decades, Russian leaders have been repeating about the turn to the East and the turn to Asia. Ultimately, they have ended up with the turn to China with limited room for maneuver vis-à-vis other partners. If we look at such recent developments in the Russian security cooperation as joint bomber patrols, which were conducted both in late 2019 and towards the variant of 2020, they do not help Russia to establish good relations or cordial relations with Japan or South Korea. They are specifically serving Chinese rather than Russian purposes. And I would not like to exaggerate the Russia's dependence on China, but still I would see it as problematic for Russia in terms of growing asymmetry in its relationship with China and inability to balance it even for the last couple of years when China faced such numerous pressures from the US. So perhaps I will stop here. Thank you, Martyn. Yeah, that was a great summary, I think, really, of a kind of warning, if you like, of not assuming that Russia and China are being pushed together by what's happening elsewhere, if you like, that the relationship has a kind of momentum of its own. And I think we do need to remember that that momentum has been building since at least 1989 and Gorbachev had the window on the Asia Pacific and so on. But as you say, also unintended consequences and unintended developments. I mean, when the Soviet Union collapsed, Russian Federation foreign policy, policy towards Asia, the idea of a very close relationship with China, I think, was seen as actually not really on the cards, particularly at all. And for the first couple of years, it was very much Japan that was going to be the key partner. Obviously, things have changed very much since then for all sorts of reasons. And unfortunately, the Japanese-Russia-Japan relationship is still very much hobbled, if you like, by the territorial issue amongst others. But Japan obviously keeps a very close eye on what's happening with Russia and China. And I think what you said about the asymmetry in relations, I mean, really, although trade has, of course, increased year on year and is now probably about $100 billion turnover, which has obviously come on in leaks and bounds. But as before, obviously, we see that huge proportion of raw materials, hydrocarbons, and so on, making up the trade turnover. And that hasn't changed. If anything, I think it's got actually worse. I mean, as in the raw material, hydrocarbon component of bilateral trade, Russian exports to China, essentially, are raw materials. But the Russian government hasn't really done anything to try to change that for all sorts of reasons. As you said, there are domestic players who benefit from that cooperation. So positive experiences are different. Perhaps that's one of the positive experiences rent-seeking. But I guess what's maybe interesting to think about as well is there's this economic dependence quite clearly. At what point does that translate into some kind of dependence politically? Because is there a relationship between the two or not really? Because obviously, especially in the 1990s, the whole idea of Russia being a raw materials appendage, a resource appendage of China was very much in the air. I mean, these days, it's become much less of a trope. But I think that was really very much utilised in order to denigrate the idea of closer relations with China. So I just wondered if Liz and then Marcin, what do you think about this asymmetry? Does it really matter? Maybe it doesn't matter. Does it, in the longer term, what kinds of repercussions might it have, do you think? I'd like to say, I think the issue of asymmetry is often over-emphasised. And I think that that's because we don't take into account what China gets from this partnership. This China without Russia would really have very few friends. David Chambow once described China as a lonely power. And I think that's right. I mean, who are China's other closest friends? And Pakistan, and at least on paper, North Korea. So these are problematic friends. And so without Russia, I think China would find itself very isolated, especially in the UN. And also China benefits from these resources that Russia is sending, and the number two source or number one, depending on the year of oil for China, increasing gas cooperation, and now this Arctic route, which is very important for China's ability to be a participant in the region. Without Russia, I think it would be hard for China to be able to implement many of its goals in the Arctic. And similarly with Central Asia, even though China has expanded its influence, I think this is because China and Russia have come to this partnership that enables China to do that. And some China scholars are very aware that Russia can try to limit China's role in the region and does to some extent. So I think that partly the view of the asymmetry is because the Russian side talks a lot about it. They securitize this problem. And China does the opposite. They desecuritize. They say, oh, we may have different strengths, but this doesn't mean we're an unequal partnership. So I think that we need to keep in mind that China also benefits and needs Russia in certain ways. And it's not just Russia being dependent on the Chinese market. I think you're right to emphasize the fact that China does need Russia. So I suppose the question is why does Russia highlight this dependence and the asymmetry? Who is the audience, if you like, that they're talking to with that narrative? Is it the West, or is it domestic factions and players within Russia? I don't know if there's an answer to that, but marching. I would say that when we speak about the asymmetry, we need to go beyond just seeing it as a pure asymmetry in terms of material power and in terms of just GDP and military budgets, but also look at how much China's influence comes at Russia's expense. And what we have discussed before about Central Asia, the process of China encroaching into the security realm is one of these elements of growing asymmetry, which Russia cannot balance by increasing its presence in East Asia, because in East Asia, there's rather Russia that is following in China's footsteps. When we speak about the export of energy resources to the Asian markets, Russia made itself dependent on the Chinese market in terms of both the oil pipeline to China, for which the part of the Siberia Pacific Ocean pipeline, which goes to China, but also the power of Siberia gas pipeline, which cannot go anywhere else. And all the ideas of building a pipeline to Korea or building an LNG terminal, the Vostok LNG, they came to nothing because of focus or forced by the Kremlin to strike a deal with China. So I would argue that from this perspective, Russia has made itself dependent on China. But certainly, there is what we can term as both self-restraint and strategic patients on the part of China. Because if we discuss the Belt and Road Initiative, Russia's brinkmanship and Russia's aggressive policy, for instance, towards Ukraine, generated a lot of difficulties for the Chinese project that completely turned off or shut down the route via Ukraine since 2014 and that's only since late 2019 when Russia agreed that cargo transports from China and to Europe and the other way around can go via Ukraine. And we don't know whether it was the pressure from the Russian participants in the Belt and Road, so mostly from the Russian rivalries, or was it the case of China pushing Russia to change its policy? And I would see the implications, the long-term implications of the asymmetry as a situation in which Russia will be forced with uneasy choices, especially if China's foreign policy becomes more aggressive and if China pushes its neighbors like India or Vietnam further than Russia has been able to to resist this pressure so far. But the question I would say is how long is it is possible for Russia to keep this as well as? Thank you, Marcin. Yes, I mean, obviously East Asia, or should we call it the Indo-Pacific now, which is what the US has been calling it for a while. And of course, Russia, I mean, Lavrov has made quite a big fuss about it being called the Indo-Pacific, you know, and has really sort of expressed Russia's displeasure at this kind of branding or rebranding, if you like, of the region. And obviously that's, I think, a point where we kind of remind ourselves that Russia also has a so-called strategic partnership with India, you know, which is, you know, a long-standing relationship. Liz, I don't know if you'd like to come in on that. And maybe here we could link to a little bit to maybe the new administration in the White House. I wanted to go back to a point that Marcin made about how China limits Russia's Asia policy. I think that what limits Russia's Asia policy is the Russian economy, that the weakness of the Russian economy has really prevented Russia from being a big player in the Asia-Pacific. I think I don't see the partnership with China really constraining Russia too much, except perhaps in multilateral fora. But on its own, I think Russia has been expanding its network in the regions in Southeast Asia, beyond Vietnam, and maintaining its partnerships with Vietnam and India. And I think that gives Russia some leverage, because Russia can increase arms sales to India, can speed up as 400 sales, can create new energy exploration agreements with Vietnam. So I think Russia has some disruptive power if it feels that China is overstepping in other ways. And I think the energy projects, I mean, the gas pipeline, admittedly, can only go to China. But other projects also go to Asia, like the oil pipeline has sales to Asia. The Arctic projects that China is invested in also will supply other Asian countries. And there are other Asian investors in the Arctic, including Vietnam and India. And so I know about the Indo-Pacific, I think Russia is concerned that the US is trying to pry India away from Russia as a partner. And India is a longstanding partner, and it's not a partnership that's directed at China. It's a parallel partnership that, or even predating the China partnership in many ways, that Russia wants to maintain. And so it's looking at how the US is creating or trying to reaffirm its partnerships in the region, especially with the Biden approach, which is likely to improve relations with South Korea and Japan and to reprioritize engaging with Asian allies while maintaining the Trump administration's earlier focus on India. So I think that creates a challenge for Russia. But so does the China-India border clashes. And so I'm sure Russia is not very happy about this outcome, because on many levels, Russia would agree with India about the importance of observing borders and not with the Chinese's more flexible understanding of border zones, which has been an impediment to Russia-China relations in the Russian Far East. So I think this is a very tricky issue for Russia. They've been trying to stay neutral, but Chinese actions may test them. So I think this is an issue to watch going forward. And when I think about the US. So in terms of the US policy, we don't really have too many clues about whether the Biden administration is going to continue with this focus on great power competition or not. And there are some indications that from an article that our national security advisor, Jake Sullivan, wrote about how we should reframe the China challenge as not being a quest for regional hegemony in Asia, but being a broader geoeconomic challenge in terms of China seeking to play a more leading role in global governance. And I think that is the argument I was trying to make for why China and Russia are cooperating, because they can do this together in terms of internet governance or using ruble yuan payments for things or trying to create alternatives to the US or Western led order. So I think that there's some attention to this issue. And we'll have to see going forward how the Biden team navigates between Russia and China. Yeah, thank you, Liz, because I think Biden has called Russia an opponent and China a serious competitor, which suggests there's a little bit of a hierarchy there. Martin, would you like to say anything about perhaps US, potential US policy going forward and the implications for the rapprochement or perhaps policy recommendations that you might have? How should they, what would be the ideal approach if you were yourself the US National Security Advisor? Secretary? Right after the elections, we've seen signals from the Biden administration that it wants to establish a serious dialogue with Europe on the issue of China and the issue of sign of Russian relationship, entered the agenda of NATO. It was supposed, it found its place in the report. They prepared by advisors NATO Secretary General. What I am very surprised by is the policy of Europe actually. So the fact that the European Union without waiting for the transition in Washington has decided to opt for a investment agreement with China, which actually makes all the idea, the whole idea of a transatlantic dialogue on China and possibly on the sign of Russian relationship much more difficult. I would, prior to this, I would see a much more robust transatlantic approach to China and Russia and to the sign of Russian relationship. But at this stage, I don't think that the China has much to be afraid of in terms of a strong shared position of Western states. And of course, it depends on the developments within Europe. And to what extent those who oppose the agreement are able to either prevent its stratification or are able to force this type of transatlantic dialogue on China. But I think that now, I would say that now the Biden administration faces a serious test when it comes to agreeing its policies with its allies in Europe. Yeah, I mean, obviously, as you say, that trade deal does kind of raise a certain number of questions. Elizabeth. Yes, I think probably from a European perspective, watching all the chaos in the US political system of late, probably they felt that who knows what's going to happen in four years or two years or two days in Washington. And so perhaps they were moving forward. And I'm sure the Chinese side was certainly pressuring them to do this. But we'll see if it's ratified. Many agreements have not been ratified in Europe, EU constitutions, and so forth. So we'll see what happens and how the Biden administration engages with the EU, because that was not a priority for the Trump administration and perhaps a serious effort on the part of the Biden team to have a dialogue about China or about China-Russia issues might change some minds. But of course, there are reasons to have an EU-China investment agreement that relate to the issues of business and how European businesses can compete in China. So there are some rationale for this. The timing was perhaps unfortunate in terms of the message it might send, as Martin was saying, about the likelihood of some kind of unified response. Yeah, thank you. Martin, any comeback on that? I guess that we, as Liz mentioned, it's the early days of the administration and probably the dynamics of China-American relations in the coming weeks and months can push the policy or can change the course of policy in unexpected ways as well. I would not exclude some difficulties between Washington and Beijing. And the question is, to what extent Russia benefits from it and to what extent Russia would like to strengthen its position vis-à-vis China capitalizing on the fact that China faces growing pressures from the US. But so far, I understand that the current administration intends to keep sanctions which target both Russian and Chinese companies, especially the recent set of sanctions which target companies with ties to the military. It seems that the current administration intends to keep these sanctions in place, which will, to some extent, push Russia and China a bit closer together. Yeah, I mean, the idea of joint financial agreements and strengthening going forward, perhaps as well, some people have speculated for Russia to essentially be able to bypass using Swift and so on. I mean, I don't know whether that might be something that would, that kind of cooperation might increase if there are new sanctions. I mean, obviously, the EU has discussed a set of new sanctions, but I think they decided against it. So we'll have to see. OK, so just finally, Putin described the Russia-China relationship recently as an allied relationship in the full sense of a multi-faceted strategic partnership. Is that just kind of obfuscating language or playing with words? Does it actually mean anything at all? Putin says one thing to one audience and another thing to another audience about alliance, the alliance issue. And both countries have said that they would not seek an alliance for different reasons. And I think we have to look at on the ground, are they acting like allies? Do they have interoperability of military forces? Do they come to each other's aid in the case of a security conflict? In terms of the values, I would say that's where they come closest. They share certain values. But I think in the operational sense, I don't see them acting as allies yet. I think that they float this idea of a possibility because that in itself is a deterrent, because it makes other countries think that there is an alliance or there could be an alliance. But I think we should be careful about taking too much or reading too much into individual statements because there are a lot of different statements by various different actors on saying that it is or it is not an alliance. And even Putin himself has said two opposite things about this. So I'm not convinced by that statement alone. I mean, he did in a way he just really said it was an allied relationship in the full sense of a multifaceted strategic partnership. So even with that phrase, he's really suggesting that it's more like a multifaceted partnership than an alliance. But yeah, I think probably holding out that prospect is quite convenient in terms of suggesting to others that it might develop into that kind of relationship. As you say, it acts as a kind of deterrent. Marcin, final words? Certainly the obstacles that we have observed for the last decades is the unwillingness to support each other's most aggressive moves and the realization that entering into an alliance means that each side limits its own room for maneuver is probably the biggest obstacle. But at the same time, what we have seen, at least in terms of how they view international politics, is that Chinese rhetoric becomes more anti-American, has become more anti-American, more anti-US in there for the last couple of months. And it starts resembling what he is saying, starts resembling what Putin has been saying, what Putin said in Munich in 2007. So in the long term, it might prepare the ground, especially that it comes from the very top in the case of China. Well, thank you both very much. We have time for Q&A. There are a couple of questions in the chat, but I'd like to invite our patient audience to pose further questions. If you can put your questions in the Q&A, in the Q&A function, I think that's the easiest way to tackle them. We can go to the Q&A now and have a look. So there's a question from Kavorka Skanyan. Hello, Kavork. And he asks if a long-term fixation with this relationship with the US and the West more broadly has, to a much greater extent, been a driver for Russia's attitude towards China rather than the other way around. And then there's a question about the Biden administration, which I think you've probably really addressed. Much has been made of the possibility of peeling Russia away from China as a way of balancing Beijing, especially by those in the West of a more realist perspective. What are the prospects for this? Now, Martin, I think you addressed that actually in your article recently in survival, but I think Liz might also have something to say about that. Martin, would you like to take that one? Thank you, Natasha. I would see these ideas as impossible to implement. I mean, one reason is that it's this kind of very simplistic kind of quasi-geopolitical thinking of the part of a number of Western politicians who see that Russia can be easily thrown away from China. And I would say that there are two main problems with it from the Western perspective. First, what actually the West could offer to Russia without risking a major rift inside the West itself? And secondly, such an approach assumes that the Russian-Chinese relationship is exclusively about this rational, objective pursuit of power and personal interest, which and it ignores the whole complex of questions like the role of domestic politics, the role of domestic actors and to which I like to return to this impact of unintended consequences and of the fact that the relationship is much more complex than assuming that it just can be changed with the help of several openings towards Russia. And I think that what the signing of the extension of the new start has shown is that the US can find some room for cooperation with Russia on very specific issues, but we should not expect that they translate into a broader rapprochement between Russia and the US against China, which would be much more harmful for Russia than beneficial. Thank you. And Liz, would you like to add anything? I would agree to that. I think that there's too much focus on the possibility of US maneuvering somehow more successfully in the triangle. And I think that there are real problems in both US-Russia relations and US-China relations that are going to be difficult for the new administration to resolve. And I don't think that these are issues that can be used as bargaining chips with one or the other. So I think that's a pipe dream to be focusing on somehow peeling Russia off. Because I think they do have, as Martin said, they are domestic factors. I would say they're ideational factors that anchor them together for better or worse. And I don't think that they're going to be inclined to overlook the benefits that they get from the partnership when they have so many problems of their own with the United States. So I think what's more likely to happen is that, as Martin said, they'll be efforts to engage with each one on issues that can be discussed, like arms control or climate change or Arctic search and rescue, scientific collaboration. I mean, there are more areas that can be discussed. And I think the tone might be different on certain issues than during the Trump administration. But I don't see the US having more leverage at this moment. Yeah. And I mean, I think we should bear in mind that I think sometimes one could be forgiven for thinking that this relationship only got started and got going in 2012, 2014 from what some people suggest. But actually, this has been developing for 30 years now, really. So it's not something you're going to just toss out into the garbage. There's a lot at stake now, I think, as well. So there are a few more. There's a question here on the Indo-Pacific. And so is there any difference? Are there any different approaches? Do China and Russia have different approaches? Some European countries are coming to the Indo-Pacific. I know Global Britain is heading there. So I wonder about the views of Russia and China. Does the due developments in the Indo-Pacific make them unsafe? Russia may feel sandwiched between Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Are Russia and China challenging the initiative or view in a unified way? I think we kind of partially addressed some of that. But if you'd like to come in on that, either of you on the Indo-Pacific. I'd just say that for China, it's a much more of a security threat, because that's China's neighborhood. And India is one of its opponents. And to the extent that it links up with other challengers in the region that makes the security environment much more precarious for China. For Russia, the issue is more the Russia-India relationship and how it's connected to US alliances. And Russia has a different perception of the Asian security environment. And in previous decades, managed to cooperate with the United States to some extent in that region in the 1990s, for example. And Russia also has good relations with South Korea and would like to improve relations with Japan. And so Russia, I think, has a different set of relationships and might be more concerned about the Indo part than the Pacific part. For China, it's more about encirclement. Thank you. Marchion, do you want to say anything on that one or we can move on? I would just very briefly add that what I think from the Russian perspective is a bit of a non-starter in terms of Indo-Pacific is that it is the US, the American idea, and it makes it suspicious by default. Yeah, I think you're right. Although I would say that I think Liz is right to say the fact that it's been rebranded as Indo-Pacific. I think Russia does really take Umbridge, the idea of India being the beacon of democracy in that region when Russia has quite a close relationship with India. I think it sort of has raised Russia's hackles somewhat. But it can't really do very much about it, I think. And there I would probably say I don't see that Russia and China are going to challenge the initiative in a unified way, which was the other part of the question. I don't really see that happening because I think it's fairly compartmentalized. Although I know there have been exercises and so on, I think that's not really something very serious in terms of challenging the US on Russia's part. But let's move on to a question from Ivan. Ulysses, hello. Hope you're well. Thank you for the fascinating talk. I have a question to the maneuvering and balancing by the smaller states located between China and Russia, presumably Central Asian states, derailed the Beijing-Moscow rapprochement. Could a decision by, for example, Tashkent turn the rapprochement into competition? Or is the relationship robust enough to negotiate such unexpected exogenous changes? I don't know if either of you would like to take that, or both of you. I'll say something about Mongolia. I've been looking at the Mongolia, Russia, China corridor. And I think that it introduces new complications because smaller states, Mongolia, well, it's not small geographically, but in terms of economic power and I think similarly in Central Asia, are sandwiched between Russia and China and they seek some maneuvering space. And it gives them an opportunity to look to each one and see which one provides the most benefits, which one is the most concerning and a given issue. And in the case of Mongolia and some water issues, I found that Russia was siding with Mongolia against China and so it gave Russia an opportunity to push back on certain plans that China had for border river development that were causing unease in Russia as well as in Mongolia. So sometimes it provides a little bit of space for Russia as well, not just pressure. So it's an interesting dynamic. It is, yeah, we should probably think about Mongolia more often. I mean. Yeah, and I think probably in the terms of Central Asian states, I think China tries to prevent this kind of multilateral dialogue like on water issues with Kazakhstan, there are no trilateral discussions with Russia. And I think because China prefers to be the bigger party and control the negotiations. So China is well aware of this potential threat by smaller countries to engage with others. Thank you, Marcin, do you want to add anything or shall we move on? I would say the situation is certainly worth following in particular when we talk about Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, it's still not clear why the fourth branch of the Central Asia China gas pipeline has not been completed. The revolution in Kyrgyzstan also threatened Chinese investments in this state. So I think we should follow the developments closer and see it as a possible incentive for China to become more assertive in the region if its interests are threatened. But at the same time, I would argue that from the perspective of smaller states, it's being able to play Russia and China against each other, it provides them with much more room for maneuver than just subordinating their interests to one of these two powers. Okay, thank you. We have a question about relating to Vietnam. Won't Russia be forced over time to reduce its ties with Vietnam because of its economic dependence on China? And because of presumably Vietnam's hostility to China and maybe over time have to side with China over India, especially if India gravitates more towards the U.S. Also, is Iran an important partner for Russia? Well, I think maybe we'll leave that to one side for this discussion because we're kind of trying to focus a bit more on Asia, but if we have time. I don't see Russia backing down on its ties to Vietnam. I think Russia argues that these are traditional partners. They have nothing to do with anti-China policies and that just like China has other partners, Russia is going to have its own friendships in the region. And so far, Russia has only marginally made adjustments on Vietnam in terms of slightly moving one energy investment that was falling into the so-called nine line. But I think that's Russia's leverage. They're not going to give that up. And it's more than that. It's their independent foreign policy.  So I think China, some Chinese scholars are frustrated by that because they see the negative impact for Chinese foreign policy. And I'm sure that there are discussions that happen about it among the leadership level. But I don't think that this is likely to change. I think that's probably right. Marchion. I can only agree with this.  So, you know, it doesn't really seem that they were particularly taking Chinese feelings, let's say, into account. I think they accelerated the transfer. Yeah, in fact. Yeah, they did. Right. And then a question from Zach Pakin. Hi, Zach. What will the Russia-China partnership look like in 10 years or 20 years? Nice easy question for you there. If Russia-West relations remain hostile, is there anything that China can do that would cause Moscow to want to pivot back towards Europe? If I can start on this question, it's pondering possible scenarios for sign Russian relations for the UISS in Paris last year. I would say that the biggest question when trying to imagine Sino-Russian relations in 10 or 20 years is the answer to the question, what is Russia going to look like in 10 or 20 years? While this partnership with China is certainly multileveled and that this embedded in a number of segments of society, I think we should not forget that there is quite a strong backlash both in Navalny-type opposition which perceives the relationship with China as driven by corruption and China as supporting the corrupt Russian elite. And on the other hand, the strong nationalist opposition towards China. So while in the current political climate the Russian government managed to suppress most of the anti-Chinese voices, I would see the possibility of shifts in the relationship in case of domestic, deep domestic changes in Russia. That's great. And also partly answers the next question in the Q&A. Liz? I'll answer from the China point of view. I think what happens with China will also be of great importance. For example, is China going to become involved in some regional conflicts as it becomes more assertive? For example, what if Xi Jinping decides to try to retake Taiwan? Then what does Russia do? Right, I think that would be a real strain on the kind of partnership. Could Russia actually be neutral in that kind of situation? And that's one of the factors that led to the collapse of the previous of the Sino-Soviet alliance in the 1950s when the Soviet Union refused to support China's efforts towards Taiwan. Or what if the conflict between China and India deepens and becomes more militarized? I think that these kinds of conflicts would really test the ability of Russia to maintain its neutrality and you would see how Russia would act in these kinds of situations. Another factor would be domestically in China. China faces many pressures with its ethnic minorities effort to repress ethnic expression. So what kind of trajectory domestically will China have? Will it become more authoritarian? Will it become more fractious? Fracture is there also. Great. There was a question which is related about opposition to China domestically from ordinary people, anti-Chinese sentiment that is held by ordinary people sort of differently to the Russian government, let's say. So, you know, they're basically saying will domestic opinion in Russia have any bearing on future relations? I think, Marcin, you kind of answered that question, probably. I mean, I think one thing one can say is that in the 1990s, there was a lot more anti-China feeling, which was also often played up and used by particular political forces in the regions in particular. And we don't really see that to the same extent now, partly because there was a kind of bit of a clamp down in general, and it became a bit of a taboo topic, if you like. But I guess also because perhaps, you know, people can see greater benefits to some extent. I mean, it's difficult. I think in the Russian Far East, I think I'm not sure that there is anti-China sentiment to the extent that one might think there would be, but I don't know if you want to comment, Liz. Well, I was there in the fall of 2018. There were a few surprising features that I noticed. One is that there's a lot more back and forth among people in the region. So that seniors from Russia will retire to China. They're not English people, they're talking to Spain. Right. We'll go to the dentist in China and so on. So there's a lot of near actual real Chinese tourists that you do see in Vladivostok and other places. And the public opinion polls in the regions show more positive views of China. But I think that also reflects the anti-American mood in the Russian media. So Russian views of the US and the region have declined considerably compared to what they were in the 90s. However, what you don't see is a lot of regional cooperation. So the regional agreement between Russia and China recently expired and was only marginally completed. And the new agreement totally scrapped the old projects and created new ones, much more targeted ones. And the parties that are involved are mostly state-owned companies, not regional companies. And when you have regional projects, they tend to cause a lot of trouble, like the Baikal water bottle project that was scrapped, small-scale Chinese sawmen created a lot of opposition. Oh, yeah, the timber trade, yeah. Right, and then on a popular level, people are still skeptical of buying Chinese produce. And there are certain stereotypes that persist. So I think that there's still concern about border security and the different approaches that the two countries have with Russia really being concerned about maintaining the sanctity of its border regions and China being more open to border zones, which might potentially disregard sovereignty. So I think that that's a stumbling block for regional cooperation that they have yet to overcome. If I can very briefly follow up on this. One of the problems with the relationship is that we haven't seen any major, let's put it non-geopolitical projects between Russia and China that could convince the both populations that this cooperation goes beyond kind of high politics. What is going to be interesting is to follow whether the joint project of a wide-body jet, which is to be co-produced by China and Russia, is going to be completed. This would be one of the first examples of genuine civilian cooperation and not going beyond also the type of trade between the two that we have seen so far. I think we've only got a couple of minutes left. So unfortunately, we're not going to be able to get to all of the questions, but there's one on the likely nuclearization of North Korea, which may well be accepted by China, went to that alarm Russia and strained China-Russia relations. So I didn't understand that, the nuclearization or? You know, they're talking about the nuclearization of North Korea, which might be accepted by China. I mean, I don't really see China accepting nuclearization of Korea personally. No, I think that both countries are concerned about. Yes, I think I don't think anyone really wants the nuclearization of North Korea, apart from maybe North Korea, probably. I think where they differ perhaps is what happens to a united Korea. Yeah, a united Korea would be something different. Yeah, China is more concerned about that outcome than Russia, because for Russia having another, assuming it was not a state with a U.S. force or tightly involved with the U.S., I think it might allay some security fears for Russia having another medium-sized power. Yeah, I don't know if we're going to have the plug pulled in us or not. There's another question from Pete Duncan. Hi, Pete. Asking about Africa, have Russia and China divided Africa into spheres of influence, e.g. Russia and Central Africa and Republic China and Zambia, blah, blah, blah, thus avoiding conflict there? I would speculate, because I have not been following the Russian police towards Africa, but I would speculate here that we observe a similar process to the one in the Balkans or the Middle East, where Russia and China, because they are using, they use such different instruments, they are able to reconcile their interests. They operate in different segments, different sectors of those states and are still able to coexist, but not necessarily coordinate their efforts. Yeah, I mean, I have been following it a bit and I think I would agree with that, Liz. I would just say, look at the vaccine situation, because I was just looking at that yesterday and there's, like in Central Asia, you see different countries choosing Sputnik or Chinese vaccines and I think that's an interesting development to see. Is that, because that's an area where presumably you would think China might have the edge, but Russia is, I think, trying to make its brand better known in that respect as well. I mean, I think it is an interesting development, but I think talking about spheres of influence, maybe it's a little bit too, you know, too much. And we have to remember that, you know, for example, Central African Republic is a kind of francophone country. You know, there are other players, if you like, as well. And I think that's been a factor for Russia. You know, it's been kind of engaging in certain kind of anti-French sort of rhetoric in some parts of Africa. And there was a question about the Balkans, the dynamic between China's growing economic interests in the Balkans and Russia's more traditional, historic political and cultural interests. And I think Martin kind of touched on that already. So again, in the Balkans, you see there's a kind of division. Well, division of labor, if you like, but not in a formal way. I mean, they haven't kind of agreed on a kind of program or a plan of how to do things. It's just the way that it's working out. Is that what you would say? On the Balkans, yeah. We've got one final question. I think we've actually managed to answer them all. Basically, I think this person's saying there are 370,000 Chinese students in the US, 20,000 Chinese students in Russia. So can you comment on the educational rapprochement between Russia and China? That's always been a sore spot in terms of the soft power issue. And it's just a fact that Chinese elementary school students learn English. And so they're better placed to go study in American universities than to study in Russian ones. But that's a problem going forward in terms of preparing experts for the future. And that goes back to that question of the future of the relationship because Russian isn't seen as a career builder in China for the most part, except perhaps in northern China or maybe in western China. And so there's not a lot of Russia experts anymore. There's an older generation that was trained in the 50s that's retired. And you have younger people coming up, but not that many. And so if this relationship is going to move forward, you do need personnel on both sides. I think this is an issue in Russia as well. Gabyev has written about the problem of China expertise in Russia. So you do need people who are motivated to work in this partnership. And so that's part of that puzzle. What will the relationship be in the next decade or two? Thank you, Liz. Any final words, Marcin? I guess also the problem of, to what extent, China is able to attract Russians as a place to live and as opposed to Europe. So apart from these border regions, we haven't seen Russian companies going to the Shanghai Stock Exchange and investing that much in China. So I think if we discuss the future of the relationship, the lack of this type of crisis is certainly a long-term obstacle. And just one, if we're not going to have the plug pulled in us, there's just one more question, maybe final question. Will Russia and China continue with the BRICS in a quest for multi-polarity? Or are they dead? I think they'll continue. Will they succeed in their quest? That is another matter. I think these multilateral fora are a part of a presentation or an aspiration rather than a confirmation of an existent multi-polarity. But Emily, going back to my vaccine fixation today, if you look at where China is testing its vaccines, you see it doing so in some BRICS countries. And so it is a vehicle for a certain economic outreach. And we've seen also some naval exercises among some of the countries. And so you do see some outcomes, though I don't know that we've seen a systemic change in the global balance of power. Marcin? I would return to the beginning of our discussion with the question of asymmetry. And from this perspective, I wonder to what extent we should speak about multi-polarity and to what extent we see the A system in which there is the US, China, and only on the later other players. Right, yeah. OK, well, I think we've covered quite a lot here. And thank you to the audience for your questions, which were thought provoking and forced us to arrange across a huge number of topics. I'm sorry if we didn't answer all of them, but I think we probably answered nearly all of them. There was just one really quick one about Mongolia. Will China force Mongolians to learn Mandarin and stop them learning Mongolian? But I don't know if you really know the answer to that question. Mongolia? Sorry? Mongolians in Mongolia? Or Mongolians in Inner Mongolia? Well, that's the thing that isn't clear from the question, actually. Well, in Mongolia, definitely not. In Mongolia, they're doing the best to promote Mandarin instruction at the expense of Mongolian, causing protests in a region that has not been known for it. So probably a productive move. Yes, so maybe they did mean Inner Mongolia then. It wasn't clear. OK, well, all that remains is for me to thank both of you, Dr. Martian Kashmarski and Dr. Elizabeth Wyshnick for coming along and really engaging so well with the topic, which obviously is quite a complex topic. I think you did really well to range over so many different areas. And you had answers for pretty much everything, which is always nice. And I shall now go and read up on all these vaccines. You've kind of opened up a new area of research there. Thank you, Elizabeth, for that. I really enjoyed the discussion. Thank you both again for coming.  And thank you very much to the School of Security Studies, to Danny McDavit for moderating and setting us up with the discussion. Thank you, everybody. Good night. Thank you very much. Thank you for having us here. Thank you. Goodbye.