Question 43 of Summa Theologica, Pars Prima, Trinity and Creation. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. This recording is by Jim Ruddy. Summa Theologica, Pars Prima, Trinity and Creation by St. Thomas Aquinas, translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province. Question 43, The Mission of the Divine Persons. We next consider the mission of the Divine Persons concerning which there are eight points of inquiry. Whether it is suitable for a Divine person to be sent, whether mission is eternal or only temporal, in what sense a Divine person is invisibly sent, whether it is fitting that each person be sent, whether both the Son and the Holy Ghost are invisibly sent, to whom the invisible mission is directed, of the visible mission, and whether any person sends himself visibly or invisibly. First article, whether a Divine person can be properly sent. Objection 1. It would seem that a Divine person cannot be properly sent, for one who is sent is less than the sender, but one Divine person is not less than another, therefore one person is not sent by another. Objection 2. Further, what is sent is separated from the sender. Hence Jerome says, commenting on Ezekiel, what is joined and tied in one body cannot be sent. But in the Divine Persons there is nothing that is separable, as Hilary says. Therefore one person is not sent by another. Objection 3. Further, whoever is sent departs from one place and comes anew into another, but this does not apply to a Divine person who is everywhere. Therefore it is not suitable for a Divine person to be sent. On the contrary, it is said, I am not alone, but I am the Father that sent me. I answer that the notion of mission includes two things, the habit of the one sent to the sender, and that of the one sent to the end where to he is sent. Anyone being sent implies a certain kind of procession of the one sent from the sender, either according to command as the master sends the servant, or according to counsel as an advisor may be said to send the king to battle, or according to origin as a tree sends forth its flowers. The habit to the term to which he is sent is also shown, so that in some way he begins to be present there, either because in no way was he present before in the place where to he is sent, or because he begins to be there in some way in which he was not there hitherto. Thus the mission of a Divine person is a fitting thing, as meaning in one way the procession of origin from the sender, and as meaning a new way of existing in another. Thus the Son is said to be sent by the Father into the world inasmuch as he began to exist visibly in the world by taking our nature, whereas he was previously in the world. Reply to Objection 1. Mission implies inferiority in the one sent when it means procession from the sender as principle by command or counsel, for as much as the one commanding is the greater and the counselor is the wiser. In God, however, it means only procession of origin, which is according to equality as explained above. Reply to Objection 2. What is so sent as to begin to exist where previously it did not exist is locally moved by being sent, hence it is necessarily separated locally from the sender. This, however, has no place in the mission of a Divine person, for the Divine person sent neither begins to exist where he did not previously exist, nor ceases to exist where he was, and such a mission takes place without a separation, having only distinction of origin. Reply to Objection 3. This objection rests on the idea of mission according to local motion, which is not in God. Second article, whether mission is eternal or only temporal. Objection 1. It would seem that mission can be eternal, for Gregory says the Son is sent as he is begotten, but the Son's generation is eternal, therefore mission is eternal. Objection 2. Further, a thing is changed if it becomes something temporally, but a Divine person is not changed, therefore the mission of a Divine person is not temporal but eternal. Objection 3. Further mission implies procession, but the procession of the Divine persons is eternal, therefore mission is also eternal. On the contrary, it is said, when the fullness of the time was come, God sent his Son. I answer that a certain difference is to be observed in all the words that express the origin of the Divine persons, for some express only relation to the principle as procession and going forth. Others express the term of procession together with the relation to the principle. Of these, some express the eternal term as generation and spiration, for generation is the procession of the Divine person into the Divine nature, and passive spiration is the procession of the subsisting love. Others express the temporal term with the relation to the principle as mission and giving, for a thing is sent that it may be in something else and is given that it may be possessed, but that a Divine person be possessed by any creature or exist in it in a new mode is temporal. Hence mission and giving have only a temporal significance in God, but generation and spiration are exclusively eternal, whereas procession and giving in God have both an eternal and a temporal signification, for the Son may proceed eternally as God, but temporarily by becoming man, according to his visible mission, or likewise by dwelling in man according to his invisible mission. Reply to Objection 1. Gregory speaks of the temporal generation of the Son, not from the Father, but from his mother, or it may be taken to mean that he could be sent because eternally begotten. Reply to Objection 2. That a Divine person may newly exist in any one or be possessed by any one in time does not come from change of the Divine person, but from change in the creature, as God himself is called Lord temporarily by change of the creature. Reply to Objection 3. Mission signifies not only procession from the principle, but also determines the temporal term of the procession. Hence mission is only temporal, or we may say that it includes the eternal procession with the addition of a temporal effect. For the relation of a Divine person to his principle must be eternal. Hence the procession may be called a twin procession, eternal and temporal, not that there is a double relation to the principle, but a double term, temporal and eternal. Third article, whether the invisible mission of the Divine person is only according to the gift of sanctifying grace. Objection 1. It would seem that the invisible mission of the Divine person is not only according to the gift of sanctifying grace. For the sending of a Divine person means that he is given. Hence if the Divine person is sent only according to the gift of sanctifying grace, the Divine person himself will not be given, but only his gifts. And this is the error of those who say that the Holy Ghost is not given, but that his gifts are given. Objection 2. The position according to denotes the habit of some cause. But the Divine person is the cause why the gift of sanctifying grace is possessed and not conversely according to Romans. The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost who is given to us. Therefore it is improperly said that the Divine person is sent according to the gift of sanctifying grace. Objection 3. Further Augustine says that the Son, when temporarily perceived by the mind, is sent. But the Son is known not only by sanctifying grace, but also by gratuitous grace as by faith and knowledge. Therefore the Divine person is not sent according only to the gift of sanctifying grace. Objection 4. Further Rabbanas says that the Holy Ghost was given to the Apostles for the working of miracles. However it is not a gift of sanctifying grace, but a gratuitous grace. Therefore the Divine person is not given only according to the gift of sanctifying grace. On the contrary, Augustine says that the Holy Ghost proceeds temporarily for the creature's sanctification. But mission is a temporal procession. Since then the creature's sanctification is by sanctifying grace. The Divine person is only by sanctifying grace. I answer that the Divine person is fittingly sent in the sense that he exists newly in anyone and he is given as possessed by anyone and neither of these is otherwise than by sanctifying grace. For God is in all things by his essence, power and presence according to his one common mode as the cause existing in the effects which participate in his goodness. Above and beyond this common mode however there is one special mode belonging to the rational nature wherein God is said to be present as the object known is in the knower and the beloved in the lover and since the rational creature by its operation of knowledge and love according to this special mode God is said not only to exist in the rational creature but also to dwell therein as in his own temple. So no other effect can be put down as the reason why the Divine person is in the rational creature in a new mode except sanctifying grace. Hence the Divine person is sent and proceeds temporarily only according to sanctifying grace. Again we are said to possess only what we can freely use or enjoy and to have the power of enjoying the Divine person can only be according to sanctifying grace and yet the Holy Ghost is possessed by man and dwells within him in the very gift itself of sanctifying grace hence the Holy Ghost himself is given and sent. Reply to Objection 1 sanctifying grace the rational creature is perfected so that it can freely use not only the created gift itself but enjoy also the Divine person himself and so the invisible mission takes place according to the gift of sanctifying grace and yet the Divine person himself is given. Reply to Objection 2 sanctifying grace disposes the soul to possess the Divine person and this is signified when it is said that the Holy Ghost is given according to the gift of grace. Nevertheless, the gift itself of grace is from the Holy Ghost which is meant by the words the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost. Reply to Objection 3 Reply to Objection 4 Reply to Objection 4 Reply to Objection 4 Reply to Objection 4 Reply to Objection 4 Reply to Objection 4 Reply to Objection 4 Reply to Objection 4 Reply to Objection 4 Reply to Objection 4 given to the Apostles for the working of miracles because sanctifying grace was given to them with the outward sign. Were the sign only of sanctifying grace given to them without the grace itself, it would not be simply said that the Holy Ghost was given except with some qualifying term just as we read of certain ones receiving the gift of the spirit of prophecy or of miracles as having from the Holy Ghost the power of prophesying or of working miracles. Fourth article, whether the Father can be fittingly sent. Objection one, it would seem that it is fitting also that the Father should be sent. For being sent means that the divine person is given but the Father gives himself since he can only be possessed by his giving himself. Therefore it can be said that the Father sends himself. Objection two, further the divine person is sent according to the indwelling of grace. But by grace the whole trinity dwells in us according to John. We will come to him and make our abode with him. Therefore each one of the divine persons is sent. Objection three, further whatever belongs to one person belongs to them all except the notions and persons. But mission does not signify any person nor even a notion since there are only five notions as stated above. Therefore every divine person can be sent. On the contrary, Augustine says, the Father alone is never described as being sent. I answer that the very idea of mission means procession from another and in God it means procession according to origin as above expounded. Hence as the Father is not from another in no way is it fitting for him to be sent. But this can only belong to the Son and to the Holy Ghost to whom it belongs to be from another. Reply to Objection one, in the sense of giving as a free bestowal of something the Father gives himself as freely bestowing himself to be enjoyed by the preacher. But as implying the authority of the giver as regards what is given to be given only implies in God to the person who is from another and the same as regards being sent. Reply to Objection two, although the effect of grace is also from the Father who dwells in us by grace just as the Son and the Holy Ghost. Still he is not described as being sent for he is not from another. Thus Augustine says that the Father when known by anyone in time is not said to be sent for there is no one whence he is or from whom he proceeds. Reply to Objection three, mission meaning procession from the sender includes the signification of a notion not of a special notion but in general thus to be from another is common to two of the notions. Fifth article whether it is fitting for the Son to be sent invisibly. Objection one it would seem that it is not fitting for the Son to be sent invisibly for invisible mission of the divine person is according to the gift of grace but all gifts of grace belong to the Holy Ghost according to Corinthians one and the same spirit worketh all things therefore only the Holy Ghost is sent invisibly. Objection two further the mission of the divine person is according to sanctifying grace but the gifts belonging to the perfection of the intellect are not gifts of sanctifying grace since they can be held without the gift of charity according to Corinthians if I should have prophecy and should know all mysteries and all knowledge and if I should have all faith so that I could move mountains and have not charity I am nothing therefore since the Son proceeds as the word of the intellect it seems unfitting for him to be sent invisibly. Objection three further the mission of the divine person is a procession as expounded above but the procession of the Son and of the Holy Ghost differ from each other therefore they are distinct missions if both are sent and then one of them would be superfluous since one would suffice for the creature's sanctification on the contrary it is said of divine wisdom send her from heaven to thy saints and from the seat of thy greatness I answer that the whole trinity dwells in the mind by sanctifying grace according to John we will come to him and will make our abode with him but that a divine person be sent to anyone by invisible grace signifies both that this person dwells in a new way within him and that he has his origin from another hence since both to the Son and to the Holy Ghost it belongs to dwell in the soul by grace and to be from another it therefore belongs to both of them to be invisibly sent as to the Father though he dwells in us by grace still it does not belong to him to be from another and consequently he is not sent reply to Objection one although all the gifts considered as such are attributed to the Holy Ghost for as much as he is by his nature the first gift since he is love as stated above some gifts nevertheless by reason of their own particular nature are appropriated in a certain way to the Son those namely which belong to the intellect and respect of which we speak of the mission of the Son hence Augustine says that the Son is sent to anyone invisibly whenever he is known and perceived by anyone replied to Objection two the soul is made like to God by grace hence for a divine person to be sent to anyone by grace there must needs be a likening of the soul to the divine person who is sent by some gift of grace because the Holy Ghost is love the soul is assimilated to the Holy Ghost by the gift of charity hence the mission of the Holy Ghost is according to the mode of charity whereas the Son is the word not any sort of word but one who breathes forth love hence Augustine says the word we speak is of knowledge with love thus the Son is sent not in accordance with every and any kind of intellectual perfection but according to the intellectual illumination which breaks forth into the affection of love as is said everyone that hath heard from the Father and hath learned cometh to me and in my meditation of fire shall flame forth thus Augustine plainly says the Son is sent whenever he is known and perceived by anyone now perception implies a certain experimental knowledge and this is properly called wisdom as it were a sweet knowledge according to ecclesiasticus the wisdom of doctrine is according to her name replied to objection three since mission implies the origin of the person who is sent and his indwelling by grace as explained above if we speak of mission according to origin in this sense the Son's mission is distinguished from the mission of the Holy Ghost as generation is distinguished from procession if we consider mission as regards the effect of grace in this sense the two missions are united in the root which is grace but are distinguished in the effects of grace which consists in the illumination of the intellect and the kindling of the affection thus it is manifest that one mission cannot be without the other because neither takes place without sanctifying grace nor is one person separated from the other sixth article whether the invisible mission is to all who participate grace objection one it would seem that the invisible mission is not to all who participate grace for the fathers of the Old Testament had their share of grace yet to them was made no invisible mission for it is said the spirit was not yet given because Jesus was not yet glorified therefore the invisible mission is not to all partakers in grace objection to further progress in virtue is only by grace but the invisible mission is not according to progress in virtue because progress in virtue is continuous since charity ever increases or decreases and thus the mission would be continuous therefore the invisible mission is not to all who share in grace objection three further christ and the blessed have fullness of grace but mission is not to them for mission implies distance whereas christ as man and all the blessed are perfectly united to god therefore the invisible mission is not to all sharers in grace and objection four further the sacraments of the new law contain grace and it is not said that the invisible mission is sent to them therefore the invisible mission is not to all that have grace on the contrary according to augustin the invisible mission is for the creatures sanctification now every creature that has grace is sanctified therefore the invisible mission is to every such creature i answer that is stated above mission in its very meaning implies that he who is sent either begins to exist where he was not before as occurs to creatures or begins to exist where he was before but in a new way in which sense mission is ascribed to the divine person thus mission as regards the one to whom it is sent implies two things the indwelling of grace and a certain renewal by grace thus the invisible mission is sent to all in whom are to be found these two conditions reply to objection one the invisible mission was directed to the old testament fathers as appears from what augustin says that the invisible mission of the sun is in man and with men this was done in former times with the fathers and the prophets thus the words the spirit was not yet given are to be applied to that giving accompanied with a visible sign which took place on the day of pentecost reply to objection two the invisible mission takes place also as regards progress and virtue or increase of grace hence augustin says that the sun is sent to each one when he is known and perceived by anyone so far as he can be known and perceived according to the capacity of the soul whether journeying toward god or united perfectly to him such invisible mission however chiefly occurs as regards anyone's proficiency in the performance of a new act or in the acquisition of a new state of grace as for example the proficiency in reference to the gift of miracles or a prophecy or in the fervor of charity leading a man to expose himself to the danger of martyrdom or to renounce his possessions or to undertake any arduous work reply to objection three the invisible mission is directed to the blessed at the very beginning of their beatitude the invisible mission is made to them subsequently not by intensity of grace but by the further revelation of mysteries which goes on till the day of judgment such an increase is by the extension of grace because it extends to a greater number of objects to christ the invisible mission was sent at the first moment of his conception but not afterwards since from the beginning of his conception he was filled with all wisdom and grace reply to objection four grace resides instrumentally in the sacraments of the new law as the form of a thing designed resides in the instruments of the art designing according to a process flowing from the agent to the passive object but mission is only spoken of as directed to its term hence the mission of the divine person is not sent to the sacraments but to those who receive grace through the sacraments seventh article whether it is fitting for the holy ghost to be sent visibly objection one it would seem that the holy ghost is not fittingly sent in a visible manner for the sun as visibly sent to the world is said to be less than the father but the holy ghost is never said to be less than the father therefore the holy ghost is not fittingly sent in the visible manner objection two further the visible mission takes place by way of union to a visible creature as the sun's mission according to the flesh but the holy ghost did not assume any visible creature and hence it cannot be said that he exists otherwise in some creatures than in others unless perhaps as in a sign as he is also present in the sacraments and in all the figures of the law thus the holy ghost is either not sent visibly at all or his visible mission takes place in all these things objection three further every visible creature is an effect showing forth the whole trinity therefore the holy ghost is not sent by reason of those visible creatures more than any other person objection four further the sun was visibly sent by reason of the noblest kind of creature namely the human nature therefore if the holy ghost is sent visibly he ought to be sent by reason of rational creatures objection five further whatever is done visibly by god is dispensed by the ministry of the angels as augustin says so visible appearances if there have been any came by means of the angels thus the angels are sent and not the holy ghost and objection six further the holy ghost being sent in a visible manner is only for the purpose of manifesting the invisible mission as invisible things are made known by the visible so those to whom the invisible mission was not sent ought not to receive the visible mission and to all who received the invisible mission whether in the new or in the old testament the visible mission ought likewise to be sent and this is clearly false therefore the holy ghost is not sent visibly on the contrary it is said that when our lord was baptized the holy ghost descended upon him in the shape of a dove i answer that god provides for all things according to the nature of each thing now the nature of man requires that he be led to the invisible by visible things as explained above where for the invisible things of god must be made manifest to man by the things that are visible as god therefore in a certain way has demonstrated himself and his eternal processions to men by visible creatures according to certain signs so was it fitting that the invisible missions also of the divine persons should be made manifest by some visible creatures this mode manifestation applies in different ways to the sun and to the holy ghost for it belongs to the holy ghost who proceeds as love to be the gift of sanctification to the sun as the principle of the holy ghost it belongs to the author of this sanctification thus the sun has been sent visibly as the author of sanctification the holy ghost as the sign of sanctification replied to objection one the sun assumed the visible creature wherein he appeared into the unity of his person so that whatever can be said of that creature can be said of the sun of god and so by reason of the nature assumed the sun is called less than the father but the holy ghost did not assume the visible creature in which he appeared into the unity of his person so that what is said of it cannot be predicated of him hence he cannot be called less than the father by reason of any visible creature replied to objection two the visible mission of the holy ghost does not apply to the imaginary vision which is that of prophecy because as Augustine says the prophetic vision is not displayed to corporeal eyes by corporeal shapes but is shown in the spirit by the spiritual images of bodies but whoever saw the dove and the fire saw them by their eyes nor again has the holy ghost the same relation to these images that the sun has to the rock because it is said the rock was christ for that rock was already created and after the manner of an action was named christ whom it typified were asked the dove and the fire suddenly appeared to signify only what was happening they seem however to be like to the flame of the burning bush seen by moses and to the column which the people followed in the desert and to the lightning and thunder issuing forth when the law was given on the mountain where the purpose of the bodily appearances of those things was that they might signify and then pass away thus the visible mission is neither displayed by prophetic vision which belongs to the imagination and not to the body nor by the sacramental signs of the old and new testament were in certain pre-existing things are employed to signify something but the holy ghost is said to be sent visibly in as much as he showed himself in certain creatures as in signs especially made for that purpose replied to objection three although the whole trinity makes those creatures still they are made in order to show forth in some special way this or that person for as the father son and holy ghost are signified by diverse names so also can they each one be signified by different things although neither separation nor diversity exists amongst them reply to objection four it was necessary for the sun to be declared as the author of sanctification as explained above thus the visible mission of the sun was necessarily made according to the rational nature to which it belongs to act and which is capable of sanctification whereas any other creature could be the sign of sanctification nor was such a visible creature formed for such a purpose necessarily assumed by the holy ghost into the unity of his person since it was not assumed or used for the purpose of action but only for the purpose of a sign and so likewise it was not required to last beyond what its use required reply to objection five those visible creatures were formed by the ministry of the angels not to signify the person of an angel but to signify the person of the holy ghost thus as the holy ghost resided in those visible creatures as the one signified in the sign on that account the holy ghost is said to be sent visibly and not as an angel reply to objection six it is not necessary that the invisible mission should always be made manifest by some visible external sign but as is said the manifestation of the spirit is given to every man unto profit that is of the church this utility consists in the confirmation and propagation of the fate by such visible signs this has been done chiefly by christ and by the apostles according to he bruise which having begun to be declared by the lord was confirmed unto us by them that heard thus in a special sense a mission of the holy ghost was directed to christ to the apostles and to some of the early saints on whom the church was in a way founded in such a manner however that the visible mission made to christ should show forth the invisible mission made to him not at that particular time but at the first moment of his conception the visible mission was directed to christ at the time of his baptism by the figure of a dove a fruitful animal to show forth in christ the authority of the giver of grace by spiritual regeneration hence the father's voice spoke this is my beloved son that others might be regenerated to the likeness of the only begotten the transfiguration showed it forth in the appearance of a bright cloud to show the exuberance of doctrine and hence it was said here ye him to the apostles the mission was directed in the form of breathing to show forth the power of their ministry in the dispensation of the sacraments and hence it was said whose sins you shall forgive they are forgiven and again under the sign of fiery tongues to show forth the office of teaching once it is said that they began to speak with diver's tongues the visible mission of the holy ghost was fittingly not sent to the fathers of the old testament because the visible mission of the son was to be accomplished before that of the holy ghost since the holy ghost manifests the son as a son manifests the father visible apparitions of the divine persons were however given to the fathers of the old testament which indeed cannot be called visible missions because according to augustin they were not sent to designate the indwelling of the divine person by grace but for the manifestation of something else eighth article whether a divine person is sent only by the person whence he proceeds eternally objection one it would seem that a divine person is sent only by the one whence he proceeds eternally for as augustin says the father is sent by no one because he is from no one therefore if a divine person is sent by another he must be from that other objection to further the sender has authority over the one sent but there can be no authority as regards a divine person except from origin therefore the divine person sent must proceed from the one sending objection three further if a divine person can be sent by one once he does not proceed then the holy ghost may be given by a man although he proceeds not from him which is contrary to what augustin says therefore the divine person is sent only by the one whence he proceeds on the contrary the son is sent by the holy ghost according to isaac now the lord god hath sent me and his spirit but the son is not from the holy ghost therefore a divine person is sent by one from whom he does not proceed i answer that there are different opinions on this point some say that the divine person is sent only by the one whence he proceeds eternally and so when it is said that the son of god is sent by the holy ghost this is to be explained as regards his human nature by reason of which he was sent to preach by the holy ghost augustin however says that the son is sent by himself and by the holy ghost and the holy ghost is sent by himself and by the son so that to be sent in god does not apply to each person but only to the person proceeding from another whereas to send belongs to each person there is some truth in both of these opinions because when a person is described as being sent the person himself existing from another is designated with a visible or invisible effect applicable to the mission of the divine person thus if the sender be designated as the principle of the person sent in this sense not each person sends but that person only who is the principle of that person who is sent and thus the son is sent only by the father and the holy ghost by the father and the son if however the person sending is understood as the principle of the effect implied in the mission in that sense the whole trinity sends the person sent this reason does not prove that a man can send the holy ghost for as much as man cannot cause the effect of grace the answers to the objections appear from the above the end of question 43 question 44 of summa theologica pars prima trinity and creation this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org this recording is by Jim Ruddy summa theologica pars prima trinity and creation by st. Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the english dominican province question 44 the procession of creatures from god and of the first cause of all things after treating of the procession of the divine persons we must consider the procession of creatures from god this consideration will be threefold of the production of creatures of the distinction between them of their preservation and government concerning the first point there are three things to be considered the first cause of beings the mode of procession of creatures from the first cause and the principle of the duration of things under the first head there are four points of inquiry whether god is the efficient cause of all beings whether primary matter is created by god or is an independent coordinate principle with him whether god is the exemplar cause of beings or whether there are other exemplar causes and whether he is the final cause of things first article whether it is necessary that every being be created by god objection one it would seem that it is not necessary that every being be created by god for there is nothing to prevent a thing from being without that which does not belong to its essence as a man can be found without whiteness but the relation of the thing caused to its cause does not appear to be essential to beings for some beings can be understood without it therefore they can exist without it and therefore it is possible that some beings should not be created by god objection two further a thing requires an efficient cause in order to exist therefore whatever cannot but exist does not require an efficient cause but no necessary thing cannot exist because whatever necessarily exists cannot but exist therefore as there are many necessary things in existence it appears that not all beings are from god and objection three further whatever things have a cause can be demonstrated by that cause but in mathematics demonstration is not made by the efficient cause as appears from the philosopher therefore not all beings are from god as from their efficient cause on the contrary it is said of him and by him and in him are all things I answer that it must be said that every being in any way existing is from god for whatever is found in anything by participation must be caused in it by that to which it belongs essentially as iron becomes ignited by fire now it has been shown above when treating of the divine simplicity that god is the essentially self-subsisting being and also it was shown that subsisting being must be one as if whiteness were self-subsisting it would be one since whiteness is multiplied by its recipients therefore all beings apart from god are not their own being but are beings by participation therefore it must be that all things which are diversified by the diverse participation of being so as to be more or less perfect are caused by one first being who possesses being most perfectly hence Plato said that unity must come before multitude and Aristotle said that whatever is greatest in being and greatest in truth is the cause of every being and of every truth just as whatever is the greatest in heat is the cause of all heat I reply to objection one though the relation to its cause is not part of the definition of a thing caused still it follows as a consequence on what belongs to its essence because from the fact that the thing has being by participation it follows that it is caused hence such a being cannot be without being caused just as man cannot be without having the faculty of laughing but since to be caused does not enter into the essence of being as such therefore it is possible for us to find a being uncaused reply to objection two this objection has led some to say that what is necessary has no cause but this is manifestly false in the demonstrative sciences where necessary principles are the causes of necessary conclusions and therefore Aristotle says that there are some necessary things which have a cause of their necessity but the reason why an efficient cause is required is not merely because the effect is not necessary but because the effect might not be if the cause were not for this conditional proposition is true whether the antecedent and consequently possible or impossible reply to objection three the science of mathematics treats its object as though it were something abstracted mentally whereas it is not abstract in reality now it is becoming that everything should have an efficient cause in proportion to its being and so although the object of mathematics has an efficient cause still its relation to that cause is not the reason why it is brought under the consideration of the mathematician who therefore does not demonstrate that object from its efficient cause second article whether primary matter is created by God objection one it would seem that primary matter is not created by God for whatever is made is composed of a subject and of something else but primary matter has no subject therefore primary matter cannot have been made by God objection to further action and passion are opposite members of a division but as the first active principle is God so the first passive principle is matter therefore God and primary matter are two principles divided against each other neither of which is from the other objection three further every agent produces its like and thus since every agent acts in proportion to its actuality it follows that everything made is in some degree actual but primary matter is only in potentiality formally considered in itself therefore it is against the nature of primary matter to be a thing made on the contrary Augustine says two things hast thou made old lord one lie unto thyself namely angels the other nigh unto nothing namely primary matter I answer that the ancient philosophers gradually and as it were step by step advanced to the knowledge of truth at first being of grosser mind they failed to realize that any beings existed except sensible bodies and those among them who admitted movement did not consider it except as regards certain accidents for instance in relation to rarefaction and condensation by union and separation and supposing as they did that corporeal substance itself was uncreated they assigned certain causes for these accidental changes as for instance affinity discord intellect or something of that kind an advance was made when they understood that there was a distinction between the substantial form and matter which latter they imagined to be uncreated and when they perceive transmutation to take place in bodies in regard to essential forms such transmutations they attributed to certain universal causes such as the oblique circle or ideas according to Plato but we must take into consideration that matter is contracted by its form to a determinant species as a substance belonging to a certain species is contracted by a supervening accident to a determinant mode of being for instance man by whiteness each of these opinions therefore considered being under some particular aspect either as this or as such and so they assigned particular efficient causes to things then others that were who arose to the consideration of being as being and to assigned a cause to things not as these or as such but as beings therefore whatever is the cause of things considered as beings must be the cause of things not only according as they are such by accidental forms nor recording as they are these by substantial forms but also according to all that belongs to their being at all in any way and thus it is necessary to say that also prime matter is created by the universal cause of things reply to objection one the philosopher is speaking of becoming in particular that is from form to form either accidental or substantial but here we are speaking of things according to their emanation from the universal principle of being from which emanation matter itself is not excluded although it is excluded from the former mode of being made reply to objection to passion is an effective action hence it is reasonable that the first passive principle should be the effect of the first active principle since every imperfect thing is caused by one perfect for the first principle must be most perfect as Aristotle says reply to objection three the reason adduced does not show that matter is not created but that it is not created without form for though everything created is actual still it is not pure act hence it is necessary that even what is potential in it should be created if all that belongs to its being is created third article whether the exemplar cause is anything besides god objection one it would seem that the exemplar cause is something besides god for the effect is like its exemplar cause but creatures are far from being like god therefore god is not their exemplar cause objection to further whatever is by participation is reduced to something self-existing as a thing ignited is reduced to fire as stated above but whatever exists in sensible things exists only by participation of some species this appears from the fact that in all sensible species is found not only what belongs to the species but also individuating principles added to the principles of the species therefore it is necessary to admit self-existing species as for instance a per se man and a per se horse and the like which are called the exemplars therefore exemplar causes exist besides god objection three further sciences and definitions are concerned with species themselves but not as these are in particular things because there is no science of or definition of particular things therefore there are some beings which are beings or species not existing in singular things and these are called exemplars therefore the same conclusion follows as above and objection four further this likeness appears from Dionysius who says that self subsisting being is before self subsisting life and before self subsisting wisdom on the contrary the exemplar is the same as the idea but ideas according to august and are the master forms which are contained in the divine intelligence therefore the exemplars of things are not outside god i answer that god is the first exemplar cause of all things improve whereof we must consider that if for the production of anything an exemplar is necessary it is in order that the effect may receive a determinant form for an artificer produces a determinant form in matter by reason of the exemplar before him whether it is the exemplar be held externally or the exemplar interiorly conceived in the mind now it is manifest that things made by nature receive determinant forms this determination of forms must be reduced to the divine wisdom as its first principle for divine wisdom devised the order of the universe which order consists of the variety of things and therefore we must say that in the divine wisdom are the types of all things which types we have called ideas that is exemplar forms existing in the divine mind and these ideas though multiplied by their relation to things in reality are not apart from the divine essence according as the likeness to that essence can be shared diversely by different things in this manner therefore god himself is the first exemplar of all things moreover in things created one may be called the exemplar of another by the reason of its likeness there to either in species or by the analogy of some kind of imitation replied to objection one although creatures do not attain to a natural likeness to god according to similitude of species as a man begotten is like to the man begetting still they do attain to likeness to him for as much as they represent the divine idea as a material house is like to the house in the architect's mind replied to objection two it is of a man's nature to be in matter and so a man without matter is impossible therefore although this particular man is a man by participation of the species he cannot be reduced to anything self existing in the same species but to a superior species such as separate substances the same applies to other sensible things replied to objection three although every science and definition is concerned only with beings still it is not necessary that a thing should have the same mode in reality as the thought of it has in our understanding for we abstract universal ideas by force of the active intellect from the particular conditions but it is not necessary that the universal should exist outside the particulars in order to be their exemplars replied to objection four as Dionysia says by self existing life and self existing wisdom he sometimes denotes god himself sometimes the powers given to things themselves but not any self-subsisting things as the ancients asserted fourth article whether god is the final cause of all things objection one it would seem that god is not the final cause of all things for to act for an end seems to imply need of the end but god needs nothing therefore it does not become him to act for an end objection two further the end of generation and the form of the thing generated and the agent cannot be identical because the end of generation is the form of the thing generated but god is the first agent producing all things therefore he is not the final cause of all things objection three further all things desire their end but all things do not desire god for all do not even know him therefore god is not the end of all things and objection four further the final cause is the first of causes if therefore god is the efficient cause and the final cause it follows that before and after exist in him which is impossible on the contrary it is said the lord has made all things for himself i answer that every agent acts for an end otherwise one thing would not follow more than another from the action of the agent unless it were by chance now the end of the agent and of the patient considered as such is the same but in a different way respectively for the impression which the agent intends to produce and which the patient intends to receive are one and the same some things however are both agent and patient at the same time these are imperfect agents and to these it belongs to intend even while acting the acquisition of something but it does not belong to the first agent who is agent only to act for the acquisition of some end he intends only to communicate his perfection which is his goodness while every creature intends to acquire its own perfection which is the likeness of the divine perfection and goodness therefore the divine goodness is the end of all things reply to objection one to act from need belongs only to an imperfect agent which by its nature is both agent and patient but this does not belong to god and therefore he alone is the most perfectly liberal giver because he does not act for his own profit but only for his own goodness reply to objection two the form of the thing generated is not the end of generation except in as much as it is the likeness of the form of the generator which intends to communicate its own likeness otherwise the form of the thing generated would be more noble than the generator since the end is more noble than the means to the end reply to objection three all things desire god as their end when they desire some good thing whether this desire be intellectual or sensible or natural that is without knowledge because nothing is good and desirable except for as much as it participates in the likeness to god and reply to objection four since god is the efficient the exemplar and the final cause of all things and since primary matter is from him it follows that the first principle of all things is one in reality but this does not prevent us from mentally considering many things in him some of which come into our mind before others the end of question 44 question 45 of summa theologica pars prima trinity and creation this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org this recording is by Jim Ruddy summa theologica pars prima trinity and creation by st. Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province question 45 the mode of emanation of things from the first principle the next question concerns the mode of the emanation of things from the first principle and this is called creation and includes eight points of inquiry what is creation whether god can create anything whether creation is anything in the very nature of things to what things that belongs to be created whether it belongs to god alone to create whether creation is common to the whole trinity or proper to any one person whether any trace of the trinity is to be found and created things and whether the work of creation is mingled with the works of nature and of the will first article whether to create is to make something from nothing objection one it would seem that to create is not to make anything from nothing for augustin says to make concerns what did not exist at all but to create is to make something by bringing forth something from what was already objection to further the nobility of action and of motion is considered from their terms action is therefore nobler from good to good and from being to being than from nothing to something but creation appears to be the most noble action and first among all actions therefore it is not from nothing to something but rather from being to being and objection three further the preposition from imports relation of some cause and especially of the material cause as when we say that a statue is made from brass but nothing cannot be the matter of being nor in any way its cause therefore to create is not to make something from nothing on the contrary on the text of genesis in the beginning god created and so forth the gloss has to create is to make something from nothing i answer that as said above we must consider not only the emanation of a particular being from a particular agent but also the emanation of all being from the universal cause which is god and this emanation we designate by the name of creation now what proceeds by particular emanation is not presupposed to that emanation as when a man is generated he was not before but man is made from not man and white from not white hence if the emanation of the whole universal being from the first principle be considered it is impossible that any being should be presupposed before this emanation for nothing is the same as no being therefore as the generation of a man is from the not being which is not man so creation which is the emanation of all being is from the not being which is nothing reply to objection one augustin uses the word creation in an equivocal sense according as to be created signifies improvement in things as when we say that a bishop is created we do not however speak of creation in that way here but as it is described above reply to objection two changes receive species and dignity not from the term where from but from the term where to therefore a change is more perfect and excellent when the term where to of the change is more noble and excellent although the term where from corresponding to the term where to may be more imperfect thus generation is simply nobler and more excellent in alteration because the substantial form is nobler than the accidental form and yet the privation of the substantial form which is the term where from in generation is more imperfect than the contrary which is the term where from in alteration similarly creation is more perfect and excellent than generation and alteration because the term where to is the whole substance of the thing whereas what is understood as the term where from is simply not being reply to objection three when anything is said to be made from nothing this preposition from does not signify the material cause but only order as when we say from morning comes midday after morning is midday but we must understand that this preposition from can comprise the negation implied when I say the word nothing or can be included in it if taken in the first sense then we affirm the order by stating the relation between what is now and its previous non-existence but if the negation includes the preposition then the order is denied and the sense is it is made from nothing that is it is not made from anything as if we were to say he speaks of nothing because he does not speak of anything and this is verified in both ways when it is said that anything is made from nothing but in the first way this preposition from implies order as has been said in this reply in the second sense it imports the material cause which is denied second article whether God can create anything objection one it would seem that God cannot create anything because according to the philosopher the ancient philosophers considered it as a commonly received axiom that nothing is made from nothing but the power of God does not extend to the contrary of first principles as for instance that God could make the whole to be less than its part or that affirmation and negation are both true at the same time therefore God cannot make anything from nothing or create objection to further if to create is to make something from nothing to be created is to be made but to be made is to be changed therefore creation is changed but every change occurs in some subject as appears by the definition of movement for movement is the act of what is in potentiality therefore it is impossible for anything to be made out of nothing by God objection three further what has been made must have at some time been becoming but it cannot be said that what is created at the same time is becoming and has been made because in permanent things what is becoming is not and what has been made already is and so it would follow that something would be and not be at the same time therefore when anything is made it's becoming precedes having been made but this is impossible unless there is a subject in which the becoming is sustained therefore it is impossible that anything should be made from nothing and objection for further infinite distance cannot be crossed but infinite distance exists between being and nothing therefore it does not happen that something is made from nothing on the contrary it is said in the beginning God created heaven and earth i answer that not only is it not impossible that anything should be created by God but it is necessary to say that all things were created by God as appears from what has been said for when anyone makes one thing from another this latter thing from which he makes is presupposed to his action and is not produced by his action thus the craftsman works from natural things as wood or brass which are caused not by the action of art but by the action of nature so also nature itself causes natural things as regards their form but presupposes matter if therefore God did only act from something presupposed it would follow that the thing presupposed would not be caused by him now it has been shown above that nothing can be unless it is from God who is the universal cause of all being hence it is necessary to say that God brings things into being from nothing reply to objection one ancient philosophers as is said above considered only the emanation of particular effects from particular causes which necessarily presuppose something in their action whence came their common opinion that nothing is made from nothing but this has no place in the first emanation from the universal principle of things reply to objection two creation is not change except according to a mode of understanding for change means that the same something should be different now from what it was previously sometimes indeed the same actual thing is different now from what it was before as in motion according to quantity quality in place but sometimes it is the same being only in potentiality as in substantial change the subject of which is matter but in creation by which the whole substance of a thing is produced the same thing can be taken as different now and before only according to our way of understanding so that a thing is understood as first not existing at all and afterwards as existing but as action and passion coincide as to the substance of motion and differ only according to diverse relations it must follow that when motion is withdrawn only diverse relations remain in the creator and in the creature but because the mode of signification follows the mode of understanding as was said above creation is signified by mode of change and on this account it is said that to create is to make something from nothing and yet to make and to be made are more suitable expressions here than to change and to be changed because to make and to be made importablation of cause to the effect and of effect to the cause and imply change only as a consequence reply to objection three in things which are made without movement to become and to be already made are simultaneous whether such making is the term of movement as illumination for a thing is being illuminated and is illuminated at the same time or whether it is not the term of movement as the word is being made in the mind and is made at the same time in these things what is being made is but when we speak of its being made we mean that it is from another and was not previously hence since creation is without movement a thing is being created and is already created at the same time reply to objection four this objection proceeds from a false imagination as if there were an infinite medium between nothing and being which is plainly false this false imagination comes from creation being taken to signify a change existing between two forms third article whether creation is anything in the creature objection one it would seem that creation is not anything in the creature for as creation taken in a passive sense is attributed to the creature so creation taken in an active sense is attributed to the creator but creation taken actively is not anything in the creator because otherwise it would follow that in god there would be something temporal therefore creation taken passively is not anything in the creature objection two further there is no medium between the creator and the creature but creation is signified as the medium between them both since it is not the creator as it is not eternal nor is it the creature because in that case it would be necessary for the same reason to suppose another creation to create it and so on to infinity therefore creation is not anything in the creature objection three further if creation is anything besides the created substance it must be an accident belonging to it but every accident is in a subject therefore a thing created would be the subject of creation and so the same thing would be the subject and also the term of creation this is impossible because the subject is before the accident and preserves the accident while the term is after the action and passion whose term it is and as soon as it exists action and passion cease therefore creation itself is not anything on the contrary it is greater for a thing to be made according to its entire substance than to be made according to its substantial or accidental form but generation taken simply or relatively whereby anything is made according to the substantial or the accidental form is something in the thing generated therefore much more is creation whereby a thing is made according to its whole substance something in the thing created i answer that creation places something in the thing created according to relation only because what is created is not made by movement or by change for what is made by movement or by change is made from something pre-existing and this happens indeed in the particular productions of some beings but cannot happen in the production of all being by the universal cause of all beings which is God hence God by creation produces things without movement now when movement is removed from action and passion only relation remains as was said above hence creation in the creature is only a certain relation to the creator as to the principle of its being even as in passion which implies movement is implied a relation to the principle of motion replied to objection one creation signified actively means the divine action which is God's essence with a relation to the creature but in God relation to the creature is not a real relation but only relation of reason whereas the relation of the creature to God is a real relation as was said above in treating of the divine names replied to objection two because creation is signified as a change as was said above and change is the kind of medium between the mover and the moved therefore also creation is signified as a medium between the creator and the creature nevertheless passive creation is in the creature and is a creature nor is there need of a further creation in its creation because relations or their entire nature being referred to something are not referred by any other relations but by themselves as was also shown above in treating of the equality of the persons replied to objection three the creature is the term of creation as signifying a change but is the subject of creation taken as a real relation and is prior to it in being as the subject is to the accident nevertheless creation has a certain aspect of priority on the part of the object to which it is directed which is the beginning of the creature nor is it necessary that as long as the creature is it should be created because creation imports a relation of the creature to the creator with a certain newness or beginning fourth article whether to be created belongs to composite and subsisting things objection one it would seem that to be created does not belong to composite and subsisting things for in the book they causes it is said the first of creatures is being but the being of a thing created is not subsisting therefore creation properly speaking does not belong to subsisting and composite things objection to further whatever is created is from nothing but composite things are not from nothing but are the result of their own component parts therefore composite things are not created objection three further what is presupposed in the second emanation is properly produced by the first as natural generation produces the natural thing which is presupposed in the operation of art but the thing supposed in natural generation is matter therefore matter and not the composite is properly speaking that which is created on the contrary it is said in the beginning God created heaven and earth but heaven and earth are subsisting composite things therefore creation belongs to them I answer to be created is in a manner to be made as was shown above now to be made is directed to the being of the thing hence to be made and to be created properly belong to whatever being belongs which indeed belongs properly to subsisting things whether they are simple things as in the case of separate substances or composite as in the case of material substances for being belongs to that which has being that is to what subsists in its own being but forms and accidents and the like are called beings not as if they themselves were but because something is by them as whiteness is called a being in as much as its subject is white by it hence according to the philosopher accident is more properly said to be of a being than a being therefore as accidents and forms and the like non subsisting things are to be said to coexist rather than to exist so they ought to be called rather concreated than created things whereas properly speaking created things are subsisting beings replied to objection one in the proposition the first of created things is being the word being does not refer to the subject of creation but to the proper concept of the object of creation for a created thing is called created because it is a being not because it is this being since creation is the emanation of all being from the universal being as was said above we use a similar way of speaking when we say that the first visible thing is color although strictly speaking the thing colored is what is seen replied to objection to creation does not mean the building up of a composite thing from pre-existing principles but it means that the composite is created so that it is brought into being at the same time with all its principles and reply to objection three this reason does not prove that matter alone is created but that matter does not exist except by creation for creation is the production of the whole being and not only matter fifth article whether it belongs to god alone to create objection one it would seem that it does not belong to god alone to create because according to the philosopher what is perfect can make its own likeness but immaterial creatures are more perfect than material creatures which nevertheless can make their own likeness for fire generates fire and man begets man therefore an immaterial substance can make a substance like to itself but immaterial substance can be made only by creation since it has no matter from which to be made therefore a creature can create objection to further the greater the resistance is on the part of the thing made so much the greater power is required in the maker but it contrary resists more than nothing therefore it requires more power to make something from its contrary which nevertheless a creature can do than to make a thing from nothing much more therefore can a creature do this and objection three further the power of the maker is considered according to the measure of what is made but created being as finite as we proved above when treating of the infinity of god therefore only a finite power is needed to produce a creature by creation but to have a finite power is not contrary to the nature of a creature therefore it is not impossible for a creature to create on the contrary agustin says that neither good nor bad angels can create anything much less therefore can any other creatures i answer that it sufficiently appears at the first glance according to what precedes that to create can be the action of god alone for the more universal effects must be reduced to the more universal and prior causes now among all effects the most universal is being itself and hence it must be the proper effect of the first and most universal cause and that is god hence also it is said that neither intelligence nor the soul gives us being except in as much as it works by divine operation now to produce being absolutely not as this or that being belongs to creation hence it is manifest that creation is the proper act of god alone it happens however that something participates the proper action of another not by its own power but instrumentally in as much as it acts by the power of another as air can heat and ignite by the power of fire and so some have supposed that although creation is the proper act of the universal cause still some inferior cause acting by the power of the first cause can create and thus avicenna asserted that the first separate substance created by god created another after itself and the substance of the world and its soul and that the substance of the world creates the matter of inferior bodies and in the same manner the master says that god can communicate to a creature the power of creating so that the latter can create ministerially not by its own power but such a thing cannot be because the secondary instrumental cause does not participate the action of the superior cause except in as much as by something proper to itself it acts dispositively to the effect of the principal agent if therefore it affects nothing according to what is proper to itself it is used to no no purpose nor would there be any need of certain instruments for certain actions thus we see that a saw in cutting wood which it does by the property of its own form produces the form of a bench which is the proper effect of the principal agent now the proper effect of god creating is what is presupposed to all other effects and that is absolute being hence nothing else can act dispositively and instrumentally to this effect since creation is not from anything presupposed which can be disposed by the action of the instrumental agent so therefore it is impossible for any creature to create either by its own power or instrumentally that is ministerially and above all it is absurd to suppose that a body can create for no body acts except by touching or moving and thus it requires in its action some pre-existing thing which can be touched or moved which is contrary to the very idea of creation replied to objection one a perfect thing participating any nature makes a likeness to itself not by absolutely producing that nature but by applying it to something else for an individual man cannot be the cause of human nature absolutely because he would then be the cause of himself but he is the cause of human nature being in the man begotten and thus he presupposes in his action a determinant matter whereby he is an individual man but as an individual man participates human nature so every created being participates so to speak the nature of being for god alone is his own being as we have said above therefore no created being can produce a being absolutely except for as much as it causes being in this thing and so it is necessary to presuppose that whereby a thing is this thing before the action whereby it makes its own likeness but in an immaterial substance it is not possible to presuppose anything whereby it is this thing because it is what it is by its form whereby it has being since it is a subsisting form therefore an immaterial substance cannot produce another immaterial substance like to itself as regards its being but only as regards some added perfection as we may say that a superior angel illuminates an inferior as Dionysia says in this way even in heaven there is paternity as the apostle says from whom all paternity in heaven and on earth is named from which evidently appears that no created being can cause anything unless something is presupposed which is against the very idea of creation a thing is made from its contrary indirectly but directly from the subject which is put in potentiality and so the contrary resists the agent in as much as it impedes the potentiality from the act which the agent intends to induce as fire intends to reduce the matter of water to enact like to itself but is impeded by the form and contrary dispositions whereby the potentiality of the water is restrained from being reduced to act and the more the potentiality is restrained the more power is required in the agent to reduce the matter to act hence a much greater power is required in the agent when no potentiality pre-exists thus therefore it appears that it is an act of much greater power to make a thing from nothing than from its contrary reply to objection three the power of the maker is reckoned not only from the substance of the thing made but also from the mode of its being made for a greater heat heats not only more but quicker therefore although to create a finite effect does not show an infinite power yet to create it from nothing does show an infinite power which appears from what has been said for if a greater power is required in the agent in proportion to the distance of the potentiality from the act it follows that the power of that which produces something from no presupposed potentiality is infinite because there is no proportion between no potentiality and the potentiality presupposed by the power of a natural agent as there is no proportion between not being and being and because no creature has simply an infinite power anymore than it has an infinite being as was proved above it follows that no creature can create sixth article whether to create is proper to any person objection one it would seem that to create is proper to some person for what comes first is the cause of what is after and what is perfect is the cause of what is imperfect but the procession of the divine person is prior to the procession of the creature and is more perfect because the divine person proceeds in perfect similitude of its principle whereas the creature proceeds in imperfect similitude therefore the processions of the divine persons are the cause of the processions of things and so to create belongs to a person objection to further the divine persons are distinguished from each other only by their processions and relations therefore whatever difference is attributed to the divine persons belongs to them according to the processions and relations of the persons but the causation of creatures is diversely attributed to the divine persons for in the creed to the father is attributed that he is the creator of all things visible and invisible and to the son is attributed that by him all things were made and to the holy ghost is attributed that he is lord and life giver therefore the causation of creatures belongs to the persons according to processions and relations and objection three further if it be said that the causation of the creature flows from some essential attribute appropriated to some one person this does not appear to be sufficient because every divine effect is caused by every essential attribute namely by power goodness and wisdom and thus does not belong to one more than to another therefore any determinant mode of causation not not to be attributed to one person more than to another unless they are distinguished in creating according to relations and processions on the contrary Dionysius says that all things caused are the common work of the whole godhead I answer that to create is properly speaking to cause or produce the being of things and as every agent produces it's like the principle of action can be considered from the effect of the action for it must be fire that generates fire and therefore to create belongs to God according to his being that is his essence which is common to the three persons and to create is not proper to any one person but is common to the whole trinity nevertheless the divine persons according to the nature of their procession have a causality respecting the creation of things whereas was said above when treating of the knowledge and will of God is the cause of things by his intellect and will just as the craftsman is cause of the things made by his craft now the craftsman works through the word conceived in his mind and through the love of his will regarding some object hence also God the father made the creature through his word which is his son and through his love which is the holy ghost and so the procession of the persons are the type of the productions of creatures in as much as they include the essential attributes knowledge and will reply to objection one the processions of the divine persons are the cause of creation as above explained reply to objection two as the divine nature although common to the three persons still belongs to them in a kind of order in as much as the son receives the divine nature from the father and the holy ghost from both so also likewise the power of creation whilst common to the three persons belongs to them in a kind of order for the son receives it from the father and the holy ghost from both hence to be the creator is attributed to the father as to him who does not receive the power of creation from another and of the son it is said through him all things were made and as much as he has the same power but from another for this preposition through usually denotes immediate cause or a principle from a principle but to the holy ghost who has the same power from both is attributed that by his sway he governs and quickens what is created by the father through the son again the reason for this particular appropriation may be taken from the common notion of the appropriation of the essential attributes for as stated above to the father is appropriated power which is chiefly shown in creation and therefore it is attributed to him to be the creator to the son is appropriated wisdom through which the intellectual agent acts and therefore it is said through whom all things were made and to the holy ghost is appropriated goodness to which belongs both government which brings things to their proper end and the giving of life for life consists in a certain interior movement and the first mover is the end and goodness replied to objection three although every effect of God proceeds from each attribute each effect is reduced to that attribute with which it is naturally connected thus the order of things is reduced to wisdom and the justification of the sinner to mercy and goodness poured out super abundantly but creation which is the production of the very substance of a thing is reduced to power seventh article whether in creatures is necessarily found a trace of the trinity objection one it would seem that in creatures there is not necessarily found a trace of the trinity for anything can be traced through its traces but the trinity of persons cannot be traced from the creatures as was above stated therefore there is no trace of the trinity in creatures objection to further whatever is in creatures is created therefore if the trace of the trinity is found in creatures according to some of their properties and if everything created has a trace of the trinity it follows that we can find a trace of the trinity in each of these properties and so on to infinitude objection three further the effect represents only its own cause but the causality of creatures belongs to the common nature and not to the relations whereby the persons are distinguished and numbered therefore in the creatures is to be found a trace not of the trinity but of the unity of essence on the contrary augustin says that the trace of the trinity appears in creatures i answer that every effect in some degree represents its cause but diversely for some effects represent only the causality of the cause but not its form as smoke represents fire such a representation is called a trace for a trace shows that someone has passed by but not who it is other effects represent the cause as regards the similitude of its form as fire generated represents fire generating and a statue of mercury represents mercury and this is called the representation of image now the procession of the divine persons are referred to the acts of the intellect and will as was set above for the sun proceeds as the word of the intellect and the holy ghost proceeds as love of the will therefore in rational creatures possessing intellect and will there is found the representation of the trinity by way of image in as much as there is found in them the word conceived and the love proceeding but in all creatures there is found the trace of the trinity in as much as in every creature are found some things which are necessarily reduced to the divine persons as to their cause for every creature subsists in its own being and has a form whereby it is determined to a species and has a relation to something else therefore as it is a created substance it represents the cause and principle and so in that manner it shows the person of the father who is the principle from no principle according as it has a form and species it represents the word as the form of the thing made by art is from the conception of the craftsmen according as it has a relation of order it represents the holy ghost in as much as he is love because the order of the effect to something else is from the will of the creator and therefore Augustine says that the trace of the trinity is found in every creature according as it is one individual and according as it is formed by a species and according as it has a certain relation of order and to these also are reduced those three number weight and measure mentioned in the book of wisdom for measure refers to the substance of the thing limited by its principles number refers to the species weight refers to the order and to these three are reduced the other three mentioned by Augustine mode species and order and also those he mentions that which exists whereby it is distinguished whereby it agrees for a thing exists by a substance is distinct by its form and agrees by its order other similar expressions may be easily reduced to the above reply to objection one the representation of the trace is to be referred to the appropriations in which manner we are able to arrive at a knowledge of the trinity of the divine persons from creatures as we have said reply to objection to a creature property speaking is a thing self-subsisting and in such are the three above mentioned things to be found nor is it necessary that these three things should be found in all that exists in the creature but only to a subsisting being is the trace ascribed in regard to those three things reply to objection three the processions of the persons are also in some way the cause and type of creation as appears from the above eighth article whether creation is mingled with works of nature and art objection one it would seem that creation is mingled in works of nature and art for in every operation of nature and art some form is produced but it is not produced from anything since matter has no part in it therefore it is produced from nothing and thus in every operation of nature and art there is creation objection to further the effect is not more powerful than its cause but in natural things the only agent is the accidental form which is an active or passive form therefore the substantial form is not produced by the operation of nature and therefore it must be produced by creation objection three further in nature like begets like but some things are found generated in nature by a thing unlike to them as is evident in animals generated through petrification therefore the form of these is not from nature but by creation and the same reason applies to other things and objection four further what is not created is not a creature if therefore in nature's productions there were not creation it would follow that nature's productions are not creatures which is a reticle on the contrary auguston distinguishes the work of propagation which is a work of nature from the work of creation i answer that the doubt on this subject arises from the forms which some said do not come into existence by the action of nature but previously exist in matter for they asserted that forms are latent this arose from ignorance concerning matter and from not knowing how to distinguish between potentiality and act for because forms pre exist in matter in potentiality they asserted that they pre exist simply others however said that the forms were given or caused by a separate agent by way of creation and accordingly that to each operation of nature is joined to creation but this opinion arose from ignorance concerning form for they failed to consider that the form of the natural body is not subsisting but is that by which a thing is and therefore since to be made and to be created belong properly to a subsisting thing alone as shown above it does not belong to forms to be made or to be created but to be con created what indeed is properly made by the natural agent is the composite which is made from matter hence in the works of nature creation does not enter but is presupposed to the work of nature reply to objection one forms begin to be actual when the composite things are made not as though they were made directly but only indirectly reply to objection two the active qualities in nature act by virtue of substantial forms and therefore the natural agent not only produces it's like according to quality but according to species reply to objection three for the generation of imperfect animals a universal agent suffices and this is to be found in the celestial power to which they are assimilated not in species but according to a kind of analogy nor is it necessary to say that their forms are created by a separate agent however for the generation of perfect animals the universal agent does not suffice but a proper agent is required in the shape of a univical generator reply to objection four the operation of nature takes place only on the presupposition of created principles and thus the products of nature are called creatures the end of question 45


My name is Jeff Gotthelve and I work as a teacher, a trainer, a keynote speaker and an author these days, mostly on the topics of product management, OKRs, product discovery, and Lean UX as well as organizational agility. My background is user experience design. I was a UX designer for a decade or so, and then a product manager, and then a team leader, and then an entrepreneur, and then these days an author and a speaker and a trainer. What should people expect to take away from your keynote at Agile India this year? The keynote is focused on product planning with outcomes rather than features. So again, features being our best guess about what we should build, and how we should design, and how we should deploy it, and typically it's how we measure success, and it's how we plan the work. I'm going to challenge that and say, look, we should be planning our work by outcomes, by measurable changes in the behavior of the people that we serve, and so that becomes really interesting because then everybody wants to know, well, what are you building? What are you making if we're not managing the features? So that's what the conversation is about. It's about answering those questions, and showing an example of what that looks like, and talking about how we arrive at outcome-paced roadmaps. I'm excited to be speaking at this event. I think there's a lot of interesting talks coming up, and I hope that you'll join me, and I hope you'll take what I talk about to heart and give it a shot. And if you do try it, I hope that you'll reach out to me and let me know that you tried it, and that it worked, or that it did work, and we can talk about why some of those things were challenging.