Hwn. Mae'r cymdeithas ynghyd yn gyflawniaeth yma. Nid yw'r cyflwytu cyflwytaeth a'r cyflwytaeth yn beth. Mae'n gofio'n gwybod. Felly, ddiw i'ch rhaid o Llywodraeth Llywodraeth i'w ddiddordebeth i'r defnyddio ym Llywodraeth. Mae'r cyflwytaeth i'r reall ac ar y cyflwytaeth ar y cyflwytaeth. Mae'n ddiddordebeth o'r cyflwytaeth a'r reall a'r cyflwytaeth i'r sefydlu o'r ddiddordebeth o'r ddiddordebeth ..y'r cysylltu'r bwysig o'r swyddi i'r defnyddio a'i dweud. Yn ymddech chi'n dweud, mae'n ffyrdd o'r cyd-dwyllg... ..y'r cyfeilio'r cyd-dwylliant o'r defnyddio... ..y'r cyd-dwylliant a'r cyd-dwylliant o'r Ffèbryd yma... ..cyrydyfodol rhesweddol, ac mae'n ffyrdd o'r cyd-dwylliant... ..y'r cyd-dwylliant. Mae'n gweithio, ymdyn ni'n i'n gwybod yn cyd-dwylliant... …di'r myfyrdd i ddweud exercodau i rhodoedd ysgrifennu i Moscow… …yna'n meddwl i'r ysgol. Elisgynnau. Y rôl oedd y West yn supportedr i Ychryn… …azwod yn ymbylchedd ar y cyfrifyddeithas… …yna'r cyfrifyddiad o'r cyfrifyddiad… …ath yn ymddefnydd ymddefnyddio. Y cyfrifyddiad yn wider a'r argynnu… …y ddau ffyrdd i Moscow i'r ddweud… …y ddau'r cyfrifyddiad o'r cyfrifyddiad… …y'r ysgrifennu. But along with all this, we've also become increasingly aware of the risks associated with escalation in the war. Whether in the part on the part of NATO and its assistance to Ukraine, or in the part of Russia and what it might be prepared to do to impose its will. Russia's veiled and not-so-veiled nuclear signalling has also been an important part of the war to date. Mostly focused on deterring NATO's direct intervention but also potentially signalling that Russia could resort to low yield nuclear use. wrth ymlaen i chi'n cael ei gynnwys i'r cynghwyl yn ymddangos iawn. Byddwn ni wedi cael eu bod ni'n ffobl ymlaen dda i'r unrhyw gwaith yw, ond bydd ni yn gweithio'n bwylltio, ond byddwn ni'n gwaith yn ymlaen gweithio'n gweithio'n gweithio'n gweithio'n gweithio'n gweithio. Rwy'n creu'n meddwl â'r admin. Rhyw bifrwyr arfer yw'r tymp yn gyfanyddol ar y dyfodol. Felly, y ffair alarm yn yw'r gweithio, mae'n gweithio, ond mae'n gwneud y byddai a llunio'n dwylo'n gweithio'n gweithio. Mae'n gwneud yw'r gweithio'n gweithio'n gweithio'n gweithio'n gweithio. Ddod, rydyn ni'n gweithio'n gweithio'n gweithio'n gweithio. Welcaf i'r Ffwrdd y Ddefnyddio Yngrif Weinidog. Yngrif Weinidog yn cyffredig, wrth gwrs, byddai'n gweithio'n gweithio a'r amser o Gweithio Llywodraeth. Rwy'n lle pethau, y dwi'n gallu ei ddefnyddio'n gwneud gyda fydd ei gynfennydd yn Llywodraeth, i'i ddifyn nhw i'r dysgu ei gynfoddol pan rydych yn dod i ddod, fel bod eich gweithio'n gweithio, a ddiddordeb yn eu ffordd, i ddelw i'r llwygoedd Gymdeithasys Llywodraeth. Dîm y gallwn cyd-Mackai, mewn gweithio, ymgyrch yn cael ei ddechrau, gan rhaid fathogwad, oerdog, ac i ddim yn gwneud. Fy'r gweithio i fynd i fynd i'w ymgyrch, dweud, fel Y Llywydd. Mae'r cwmffrin sy'n ymgyrch gyda'i ffosibl oherwydd y gweithio gyda'r gweithio cyhoedd, eu cyfnod y ddweud, oherwydd yma'r gweithio'r gweithio. Efallai'r ddweud i fynd i'r hyd yn y ddwylliant. Ond mae'n ffosibl yw Cran, mae yna'n i'r ddweud. Mae'r rhaid i, mae'n gweithio mor cyfnoddau i'r cyfnoddau i'r cyllidion ffraeg yw'r rhai wladau hynny ond ond y wneud i'r ffraeg a'r prysbyrdiadau. Ond o'r rhaid i'r wneud, mae'n gweithio'r cyffredin o'r Eurchran yn ynwyr i'r cyflwyffaeth yw ei ddweud. Mae'r cyflwyffaeth ei ddefnyddio. Mae'n gweithio'r dreflu'r cyfnoddau i'r ei wneud i'r Eurchran, mae'n gweithio'r cyffredinol. Yn ddweud â'r sefyllfa yma yw Adam Bolton? Yn ddweud â'r sefyllfa yma yw Mark Urban? Gweithio Mark Urban i gyntaf gyda'r cyffredinol. Ddweud. Yn caes i gydag. Rydyn ni'n fyddeithas i ni. Rydyn ni'n Mark Urban. Rydyn ni'n gwybod gyda'r cyffredinol. Rydyn ni'n gwybod ei gilydd. Rydyn ni'n gwybod ei gwybod eich lŵr. Rydyn ni'n gwybod ei gwybod ei gwybod ei gwybod. Mae'r llwyddiad i'r Llyfrgellllion Llyfrgellion. Felly mae'r llwyddiad yw'r llwyddiad, wrth gwrs. Mae'n amlwg ar y cwestiynau yma, mae'n gweithio'r cyffredinol yn y cyffredinol ar y gweithio a'r effektol ar y gweithio eu defnydd. Mae'r gweithio'r llwyddiad yma a'n amlwg ar y cwestiynau. Mae'n gweithio ar y cyffredinol yma. Mae'n gweithio'r cyffredinol, mae'n gweithio'r cyffredinol, ac mae'n gweithio'r cyffredinol ar y gweithio? Mae'n gweithio'r cyffredinol yn y cyffredinol. Mae'n amlwg ar y cyffredinol i'r 30 minuteau o'r cyffredinol, felly mae'n gweithio i'n gweithio i'r panallus o'r 30. Dyma'n gweithio i'r gweithio i'r cwestiynau, oedd eich cwestiynau gweithio. Mae'n gweithio i'r cwestiynau, yna, gallwch chi'n gweithio'r panell i'r unig. Cymru. Felly, mae'n rai'r cerddoriaeth. First on my left is Will Jessett, who was in MOD for many many years involved in drafting defence reviews, military planning at the highest level. Then General Sir James Everard, Armored Corps, cavalry officer, I think, by formation and instinct, then involved in commanding brigade in Iraq, and later on, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, which, for those of you unfamiliar with the shape system, there's a lot of alliance management in that job, so fantastic to have you here as well, James. Professor Helen Thompson, Professor of Political Economy at Cambridge, author of a fantastic book, Disorder Hard Times in the 21st Century, who will, I think, give us a lot of insights on geopolitics and the way that will play out in the coming months and years. And then, finally, Tim Marshall, formerly a colleague of mine in the Diplomatic Corps of Correspondents or whatever you would call us, author of all sorts of fantastic books on geography and interstate relations in general, and somebody who's been trying to make sense of these developments as they've been going on. I'm going to go left to right here, so let's start with you, Will. I mean, I guess looking at what we've seen in the past two and a half months, is it, to an extent, sort of good news and bad news for Western Defence? Good news in the sense that are approached things like combined operations or the fusion of intelligence and those sorts of things looks to be much better than that of the Russians. Bad news in the sense we'd run out of ammunition in two or three days. Well, I suppose I'll start off by saying, you've got to put this crisis into context and put defence planning into context. So you go all the way back to the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review, where we were saying confidently no major state threat at present, no state currently has the combination of capability and intent needed to pose a conventional threat to the territorial order of the table of the UK. So 12 years ago. We then stepped through a series of events, Russia invading Crimea in 2014.  All the way through to the 2021 integrated review, where we're saying Russia continues to pose the greatest nuclear, conventional, military and sub-freshhold threat to European security. So quite a journey, I think, over 10 years. And that manifests itself in what we're planning for. So in 2010, we're planning to be able to rule and want to brigade of forces through Afghanistan because that was what was on our minds, and international terrorism was the thing. By 2015, we were back to war fighting at scale being the kind of thing we needed to challenge. And then as you say, Mark, we're now into complex multi-domain operations against aggressive state-based actors. And that manifests itself, doesn't it, in the way that budgets, capabilities, plans come together. So from taking 8% out of the defence budget in 2010, we then start to increase the budget from 2015 onwards, and then there's the huge influx in 2020, the 16th or 24th. And I put it that way just to kind of put this thing into historic context and to say that over the last 10 years, 12 years, we've been building, we've been rebuilding our defence planning, we've been rebuilding our defence capabilities. So the three sort of headmark joint forces that we were asserting we would build in 2020, 2025, 2030, I would contend have most of the right characteristics associated with them. But your point I think is well made. It's something James and I were just talking about to say this needed, this needs and needed to happen more quickly than it currently has. So the reasonably well documented shortage of munitions has been a thing for several years and it's not just munitions, it's fighting vehicles, et cetera, et cetera. So there are clear capability shortfalls, but if you put this into the historic context, I would say that we have built the capabilities that we would require by and large if this crisis continues to unfold. Thank you very much, Will. General, I mean I look at this, what we've seen and in a sense a reminder of the First and Second World War artillery, the big killer, shocking in a way. I mean I reckon at least 20,000 military dead, probably double that civilians, level towns. But I wonder for you what are the stand out impressions of this sort of re-emergence of state to state warfare in Europe and how do you interpret what's happened? Well it is really my New York Times this morning that was a Ukrainian major describing it as a war of position and a war of artillery and I think the big lesson you take is while you're drawn to new ways of warfare, that the Germans don't disappear and that is a challenge and I could talk to NATO and we NATO don't have a formal approach to Ukraine because Ukraine is not a NATO member. Indeed NATO would say that Ukraine is not a crisis because that allows them to use peacetime plans and measures they have to cohere alliance activity. I think they've got some very good plans for the future that we could talk about if you like. But when it comes to Ukraine we're currently I think observers giving them enough not to lose, not enough to do much more with and we'll see where it goes but I think the big point is that the pattern of war hasn't changed and when you look at things like the integrated review which was I think pretty widely applauded in the alliance for its intellectual rigour. They didn't always like the punchlines but you would think that we now had to go back and visit this, not just in the light of Ukraine but the lessons learnt from Afghanistan and indeed NATO's future plans for the deterrence and defence of the European economy. Alan, I mean a lot of people put the emphasis on economic action both to avoid this, to threat of sanctions and now to sort of end it on terms that would be to Russia's disadvantage. I mean to what extent do you think that's viable and to what extent do you think the underlying geopolitical realities energy and all the rest of it will dictate the outcome? Well I think we have to distinguish between two different things here where energy sanctions are concerned or perhaps even three different things. The first of them is that I think that Putin has been taken aback that there have been any energy sanctions at all so the fact that the US and the UK made a relatively quick commitment to cut out Russian oil and the fact that the fifth round of the EU sanctions included an outright coal ban. But on the other hand he might have been shocked by that but I don't see any evidence that this has actually changed any calculation that he's made during the course of the war. So then the question would become if the EU really can put in place an oil sanctions agreement and there's not such an agreement yet the discussions have been going on a long time and if you listen to the language of the Hungarian government over the weekend you wouldn't be particularly optimistic that the agreement is coming soon. But if that were to happen would that make a difference? And I think the difficulty here is that even at best we'd be talking about trying to phase out all Russian petroleum products and that crucially involves diesel only by the end of the year. So how does that sort of change anything in the immediate term? That allows Russia the possibility of improving its capacity to export more petroleum products to Asian countries. The shipping costs of that are quite considerable. Extra shipping costs are quite considerable from the Russian point of view. It seems to me that the only thing that could really deliver would be something that was done quickly would be an immense shock not just to Western economies but to the entire world economy citizen we'd all have to be prepared for that and that I think has the possibility of changing or at least making Putin reconsider. On the other hand the counterpart to that would be well if he's going to do that they would also have to come off quite quickly and I don't think that they would have to come off quite quickly as well because I don't think the world economy can withstand it and the sacrifices that would be required for very long. I think there is a medium term to long term issue though the way in which the sanctions and the atmosphere around the sanctions has made it much more difficult for Western oil companies total energies accepted to stay in Russia and that that will have an impact because Russia's future as an energy well at least as an oil producing power depends on developing alternatives to the Western Siberian oil fields which are probably peaked in terms of their output and they need Western capital and technology to do that particularly where the possibility of developing shales concerned and it's not so clear to me that the Chinese and Japanese companies could provide that and they're more willing to stay. So if we think of it as do these sanctions make Russia's energy choices much more difficult in the medium term I think very much so. Do they thus far change the course of the war I think no. Thank you very much Tim. I mean I guess one factor in that is that Western Europe is plumbed in to Russian energy with your geographical hat on to what extent do you think geography will define how this current round of fighting ends and basically it will be inevitable that a certain level of both commerce and other types of interstate relations with Russia and other Putin states or goes will have to be part of what comes out of this. Thank you very much morning. Geography underpins this and I think it's the best example and it will partially determine how it ends. The background being I mean I start by looking at the geography of a situation layering on the history and then laying on the politics and then I think it comes together and the real experts drill down. The geography of Russia no warm water port Crimea flatland in front of it Ukraine and Belarus and Poland it has been invaded through that direction for so many times over so many centuries and genuinely does fear I think wrongly there's no justification but it genuinely fears it and that's the deep background to it it under someone like Putin cannot allow a vibrant democracy which is looking westwards in Ukraine. That's the geography of it and then there's this history of them being invaded and the low water mark for Putin was probably 1999 Kosovo which we were both there and it was Putin who whispered into Yeltsin's ear in 1999 said get yourself to Pristina and they came down from Bosnia and made themselves a player. I think that was the point where the tide stopped coming into Russia and they started pushing back out and when you look at everything that is done on foreign policy it is about pushing back out from Moscow not just in front of them but also further round to well actually 360 degrees they've been trying to push back out and in 2014 they could only give themselves a small buffer zone and guarantee their warm water port which the lease was up in 2042 and they've spent the last few years preparing to push that tide further out and then to everybody's surprise they've come a cropper. Now as for the geography of it now again the military experts will know more but they struggled because through the pre-apet marshes it was boggy it was only frozen for a short period of time General Frost was back in fashion and had a vote now with the tank battles in the south it's flatter, harder ground it's going to be some very tough fighting and overall the Americans I think when they went to cube three weeks ago Lloyd Austin went and at that point I thought I saw a shift the Americans have gone from containing the situation and managing the situation giving the Ukrainians enough to just to manage I think they've made a strategic decision to now inflict a serious defeat upon Russia and I think that Liz Tross' speech last week to the mansion house put Britain on that same page and this is again part of geography at the biggest picture the Americans have always intervened when they see one big dominant power trying to dominate the continent of Europe if it looks like it's going to do it they step in they've done it again Absolutely well I mean I just wondered picking up from Tim's point they're almost about sort of warrains I mean it's still relevant to those questions how does it end and the West and to what extent the West is willing to just carry on fuelling Ukraine in its desire to retake all of its lost territory even if that includes Crimea I mean is that a realistic and wise thing for western countries to commit themselves to Well it seems to me that we've got a there is still a need to try to reconcile that Ukraine is looking to get out of this what British politicians and other western politicians are saying what's being said in the EU what's being said in NATO doesn't seem to me to be quite reconciled at the moment and it's important it's important that there is the best possible alignment on that because it is the the Ukrainians' Excellentski who's going to have to go to the table and do a deal and there's an issue associated with this isn't that Mark which is the growing risk of some sort of escalation of the crisis as Ukraine does begin to push back at that order we've all been reading haven't we the nuclear doctrine the nuclear policy that's been coming out the increasingly assertive statements that Putin and others have been making and measure that against the kind of the language on what is existential for Russia exactly Tim's point and you've got quite an unhealthy mix of issues there which do require a bit that seems to me greater clarity than we have currently got about the reconciliation of western and Ukrainian ends in order to see some sort of ends to this When do you think that gets untangled or sharpened because an attack on Crimea is if that's what the Ukrainians want to eventually press on to do is a real red line for Russia it is now as far as their concern part of Russia so I don't see how and when this does begin untangled particular we were all weren't we listening with interest to the speech this morning that doesn't seem to have gone anywhere particularly new so that doesn't add very much to this we've heard Zelensky being increasingly been boldened I think by what is happening but I don't think we've yet really heard at least recently what his goals are some weeks ago they seem to be potentially more limited than perhaps they have begun General you said in your first answer the old ways of war have shown us that they're still very much part of the way that states when they collide will try and resolve huge questions like this I just wonder just picking up on what we were discussing with Will about the possible Ukrainian reconquest of lost territory firstly whether you think they can are they capable of doing it and whether if they're not some kind of stalemate does inexorably lead towards a negotiated outcome well it comes to that when does this get untangled I don't think it gets untangled until the current phase of the war stops I think Putin's generals will still think that they can win in the east and establish a new front line along the river Niper secure the south and that would be their start point I think for that but I look at the evidence and I don't think that they can achieve that without escalating significantly conventionally or potentially some form of nuclear escalation tactical nuke, not massive nuke but again I think for Putin that would represent for me a failure at a grand strategic level I think the consequences would be hugely negative no he doesn't go there but I think that we're at the start of a long war for Ukraine and a new Cold War for NATO I don't think that Russia would allow crime here to be retaken I think that's just I know people talk about it, it just seems very very difficult to me and when it comes to end states we're probably going to vote in the west because we're supporting them so much but in the end I think it has to be Ukraine that decides whether the end state is the status quo ante or something more or less than that but I don't think that can be decided until we have a sort of pause in the battle at the end of this phase Helen if that does happen say at some point later in the summer or something like that you were talking about the facts of life as far as energy are concerned the fact that there isn't any easy answer to this there's been a lot of emphasis in the EU on looking for alternative sources of supply to what extent have those things delivered by the end of summer or the end of the year and to what extent does the energy dependence still define the outcome from a western point of view I don't think that there's any way of changing the energy situation and the energy choices by the end of the year and if you want to look at the one factor that tells us this most clearly at the moment it's diesel prices diesel prices and gasoline prices are pretty much completely separated on each other diesel prices are now at their highest ever level and that is true despite the fact that the price of crude oil is about $70 a barrel cheaper than it was at the previous height of crude oil in the middle of 2008 then when you throw in that diesel is the fuel that basically keeps the supply chains of the world economy going through shipping and trucking that this is a massive issue I think in terms of alternative supplies in the situation for European countries particularly where gas is concerned is what we need to understand is that once Germany next year or I'm at a point of view hopefully next year is able to import liquid natural gas so it's able to import seaborn gas and move away from pipeline gas from Russia which is a very significant proportion obviously if it's gas imports that is going to be a pretty massive shock to world gas markets because there has not been a world gas markets in which Germany does this and in 2021 I've already seen a huge shock to natural gas markets because China's demand for gas imports went up 20% in 2021 causing huge price shock both for Europe and for Asian countries Europe for those countries that were importing liquid natural gas so I just don't think we can underestimate how difficult this energy situation is now that doesn't mean that we should just say ok we can't have objectives we in the West can't have objectives put in support of Ukraine but we must do so with open eyes about what the energy consequences of what we're doing are and then have strategies for dealing with that and that's probably going to me looking at significantly reduced energy consumption Thank you Tim, I mean we've been talking a bit about does this stutter to a halt later in the summer or later this year and I suppose what I sense is in the West a lot of people yearling for signs that either Putin will be finished by it's an overthrown or in some ways so weakened I suppose it's the Lloyd Austin line that he never thinks of doing anything like this again but I wondered to what extent regardless of what happens to Putin personally the geopolitics and the underlying attitudes in Russia will mean that the threat will not disappear or even that a leader worse than Putin in the sense of being more nationalistic and doing what the army thinks is necessary to subjugate Ukraine might emerge Yeah, just as Trump did not come out of nowhere the conditions of it produced him and just as when Xi and Modi have disappeared the Himalayas will still be there these underlying things that we discussed at the beginning are still in place whether it's Putin or not Putin now if there was a genuine Czechoslovakia situation after the fall of the wall where you get someone like Vaclav Havel emerging and leading Czechoslovakia in now two countries into democracy liberal democracy then Russia could take a different turn but there's been no period in Russian history when they've really had civil society especially once you've moved outside of the two main cities they've never really had democracy so I don't see what would produce a Havel in Russia so consequently take Putin out of the picture you might get a temporary solution but there is a solution to this as long as Russia is the type of country that it is and that is manufactured by its geography and its history and I personally think this will go on all year I think the economics of it are very just as equally as important if not more important than the military and it never finished after 2014 there's actually been fighting constantly for the past eight years more than that now so basically it doesn't finish until Russia changes and Russia isn't changing I'm going to open this up at about eight miles to fulfil my commitment to giving you guys half the session in terms of questions so what I want to do in the last portion of this is be in a sense more detailed or literal about lessons for western defence and maybe start off well with the idea of kind of revisiting defence reviews I mean I was in Kiev until a couple of days before the war started there was a day when the ATMs weren't working one or two other things happened and people said oh yeah this is the cyber attack and then they were back on in three hours and I thought to myself is this it? Is this what all these experts in various departments and think tanks have been telling us about for years is this, have we not seen it? and those other types of warfare that have been very much emphasised in the latest review should we be just pausing a little bit and thinking about numbers of missiles we've got or numbers of F-35s I suppose is the crude term before we're investigating quite so fully in those I guess non-kinetic or other domains Well I think cyber hasn't featured as widely in this crisis as many of us expected to of course we won't necessarily be seeing some of the behind the scenes things that are happening inside and of course it's a relatively new domain it's still developing as an art so I don't think we have yet seen enough to conclude that cyber hasn't had a role won't have an increasing role as we go forward but I think your wider point about the need to run a rule again over where we got to in the latest review feels to me to be right I heard Tony Radican, David Williams from the MOD doing a thing at the IFG a couple of weeks ago where I thought that they were actually quite measured and were saying it's too soon to rush into this but it's all very well to run through the series of reviews that I described using a set of planning assumptions that we might be in a big scrap this is now changing we're not yet in a big scrap but the situation is a lot worse in terms of stability and security in Europe we were expecting so I think it does require and James will speak to this looking again at some of the choices that were made on platforms numbers of platforms as you say this has been very largely missile war hasn't it we've known for a long time that munitions and stockpiles are low we're scrambling now to make some more but as you say it's also about whether the platforms that we're developing bring into service are the right ones this debate about mass I think is really interesting and really important a lot of people I know are moving very quickly to say huge mistake to reduce the size of the army to where it is and we must begin to recruit a bigger army from now on to which I sort of say well maybe not yet proven picking up a world's description of this as a missile war does investing a huge amount in a carrier that has to be really quite close to the enemy coastline because of the range of its aircraft makes sense to you now general or equally tanks or equally manned aircraft the things that in a way define the culture of our armed forces those prestige platforms do they look vulnerable now? I was done in Portugal last week at striking force NATO looking at the lessons they learnt from the Truman into the NATO order of battle these are aircraft based in the Adriatic which are striking targets in Estonia they make a huge difference so you definitely need aircraft carriers as I made the point these new ways of walking of warfare are right you can't forget the old ones you need troops to season hold ground you need troops for urban fighting and you need huge quantities of artillery and rocket ammunition and I mentioned it earlier I think the integrated view was people liked its intellectual rig that didn't like the punchlines configuring to operate below the threshold of warfare and returning to war fighting at graduated winners a modern division in 10 years and a course of reduction of combat power to NATO which doesn't make sense given the fact that our leaders have signed up to a new concept for the deterrence and defence and I'll just it's based on a very simple idea that in order to deter you have to unambiguously demonstrate the ability to defend the defence requires you to control geographic areas and the domains of warfare simultaneously so it's a very simple idea but it needs combat power to make it work and hugely expensive of course Helen you've been very direct about the dependencies diesel fuel the gas infrastructure the other things that mean with one bound Europe cannot be free in this sense to what extent can you be prescriptive and say what would help what should Europe as a collective be doing in the coming months to try and change the calculus I think that the energy transition is obviously part of this but at the same time we need to understand the ways in which the present tense situation with fossil fuel energy is itself a constraint on the energy transition because very high fossil fuel energy prices mean that the inputs for the energy transition for green energy are more expensive than they would otherwise be and nothing that's happening with the war changes in some sense the physical difficulties of the energy transition it doesn't in itself provide the technological breakthroughs that are necessary for storage of concern the thing that I think in some sense is positive or encouraging about where we now are on the energy side is that I think all illusions that people have had about energy and its importance in every respect has shattered geopolitically because nobody is any longer going to say that dependence on Russian energies of geopolitical consequence you didn't need too much paying attention to this to understand the ways in which Putin was deliberately creating reinforcing European energy dependency through the last couple of decades and the way in which he was using the pipelines for that I think that nobody can any longer have any illusions about the fact that there are some structural reasons why the prices of oil and gas and perhaps surprisingly coal were actually as high as they are and that was true in the autumn before the war came and I also don't think anybody can any longer think that you can separate out those energy issues from the energy transition that what everybody has to do all governments have got to do to hear an energy strategy that deals with all aspects of the energy situation as a whole and I think that the space for doing that is greater than it was before the war because mines have been focused Tim, I'm going to ask you one last question and then we'll throw it open but you don't just do geography you do all sorts of aspects of human interaction I'm thinking about lessons and do we change things and at times in this it's occurred to me that Putin going for professional armed forces was in a way a massive self-own because he now faces this dilemma do I have to mobilize the country which he's politically very reluctant to do and our western countries I mean we see now Ukraine able to mobilize literally hundreds of thousands of people we look at Finland and say well the great thing about Finland is they have a system where from a standing army of 22,000 they can go up to hundreds of thousands and indeed Poland has tried to have a sort of hybrid system is there a lesson there even for a country like this one which traditionally doesn't engage in prolonged continental wars and think it needs lots of military man and woman power no you think it's not it doesn't really expand no because and this takes us back to cyber the snake by Putin is not that he doesn't have a conscript army it's just that they have used the army that they have incredibly badly talks about it I saw some footage of a day of some tyres on one of the armoured vehicles had USSR on it they're using tyres of 40 years old to fight a war in 2022 that's one of the reasons they're losing not because they don't have a conscript army it makes sense for Finland and the Baltics I think Lithuania has conscription now reintroduced it a few years ago it doesn't make sense for us and going back to cyber because that's part of this answer I think they haven't used it because it's held in reserve they are very good at it but so is Ukraine but also so is the United States and increasingly the UK I don't know of the degree of plausible deniability we could have but there is a price to pay for fighting cyber war in the longer term we are in this movement where mass is still important I suspect mass will always be important but mass is increasingly controlled by cyber and anyone who doesn't put money into that is going to lose great thank you do we have roving microphones? yes we do on each flame the gentleman at the back on this side was the first person I saw raising so let's open it up I'm David Lloyne, former colleague from the BBC now visiting senior fellow here at Kings and I want to go back to a comment that Will Jessett made right at the beginning about the pivot from Afghanistan to state on state warfare in this last decade and of course the attack on Crimea in 2014 came coincidentally with the end of NATO combat operations in Afghanistan and I wonder if we are in danger in moving towards tanks and big mobile armies which armies feel very comfortable in training for in losing the lessons of Afghanistan and losing the lessons of counterinsurgency and these complex interventions which we fought over the last 20 years and may well have to fight again is that directed? it's principally at Will but I'd like to hear the general's comments as well well so we we spent a lot of time thinking about what happened in Afghanistan and what went well and what went badly and let's bear in mind how it ended and let's be realistic about what sort of conflict it was but James will recall just how much effort went into thinking through the lessons that we picked out of the successful parts of the counterinsurgency operations so kind of you know very strongly I think embedded into British military doctrine and certainly informed all the work that has happened since so the big policies that get most focus out of the most recent reviews are the white papers themselves but it was an integrated operating concept that was published as a preview to the integrated review and the command paper that are in many ways the most interesting and they do, as you've said Mark take us a long way into sub-threshold and grey zone and cyber and space and all of that but that's not all they do I think those documents are actually quite sober about the sorts of conflicts that we'll need to get into and they don't they certainly don't expect that we're not going to get into further difficult counterinsurgency style operations into the future I don't think that they're immediately foreseeable but I don't think they're ruled out either so I think the picture is rather better than us simply forgetting the hard one hard learned lessons about Afghanistan it does feel to me like the essence of those has been incorporated into that update on doctrine but Joan So start with the return to collective defence and big armies I mean I think these armies won't fight the way that armies have been fighting even as we're seeing at the moment I mean this is the era of multi-domain operations I mean it's not yet working as we want it to but we will get there and what you might call distributed mission command in the old days as a tank command if you penny package your forces people would condemn you but now you penny package to survive when you're given huge autonomy and you don't concentrate force to kill the enemy you concentrate fires to kill the enemy and I think it's interesting that how do we judge progress in this war we judge it by the land that is seized and is held you need large numbers of troops and to manoeuvre troops around the battlefield in a way that they can win the fight and survive still requires combined arms groupings just cleverly used so we will screen with drones and clear with artillery your distributed mission command much smaller packets of forces all these ideas are in the process of being delivered the third division last year was an America experimenting on many of these things and cyber of course will be a big part and there's a very good if you haven't seen it Microsoft open source report on the use of cyber in this campaign and there has been significant use of destructive cyber by the Russians against the Ukrainians and chatting to a Ukrainian the other day he described that you needed a can do attitude and I think that is quite interesting because the can do attitude has made it seem to us as though there hasn't been any but there has been a lot it's a very good report but it just tells me it's not quite the decisive arm that some of us hope it is going to be lessons learned Afghanistan I think there is lots to learn there I think in capacity building in particular and there's a very good NATO report that's just about to get in production which sort of says that capacity building in support of fragile you know sovereign states doesn't work very well I would have thought David that all that investment in hunting terrorists fusion of intelligence i-style all those other things is one of the pay backs isn't it for the war on terror if you look at the number of Russian generals but that's the point those skill sets get built into your model for your defense and war fighting it was a 20 year campaign and we didn't know in 2001 any of the lessons that we knew in 15 years later and I just fear that we might be losing some of those more complex lessons that aren't as technical but they're about troops on the ground and counterinsurgency and how you fight wars among the people my fear Thanks David Suzanne Raine is sitting in the midst of a centre in the most hard to reach position for any microphone wielder Thank you Mark Suzanne Raine I'm a visiting professor at King's and also with Mark on the board of the Imperial War Museum I have a question about capability we talk particularly at the moment about material as a capability and about building material capacity and obviously in the middle of the war that's the thing that you see the bit that sits behind that and arguably before that is the decision making capability and decision making capacity and part of that is actually built into the integrated review in a way but also you could argue that it's at the heart of some of the things that Will was talking about about do we have the best alignment in Europe in terms of what we think we should be doing next and if you're talking about deterrents deterring Russia you have to be thinking how do we alter Putin's risk calculus so all of that is essentially about how we think and how we project our thoughts in a credible way so I'd be really interested in your views on what more could be done to improve decision making capability and capacity in the UK but also very much in NATO and in Europe so that we can really affect as Helen was saying really anything that we've done on the economic side yet changed how Putin's thinking how could we improve that thank you I'd like to I'll have a jump in on this I'll have a quick cut and say I don't know as a matter of fact where the decision making is being done in the UK on this I assume very largely through the NSC or some sort of small group of the NSC where you would need to bring everybody together including very importantly the energy component of this and in the national debate that doesn't yet seem I think to have featured as widely as maybe we should expect for reasons hadn't spoken about but it's how you then sort of the point I was getting to on war aims I suppose is how do you then align that better across western nations because again James and I were talking on the way in and saying we've been reasonable I think American leadership on this but you know you've had American positioning you've had something different in the EU you've had something quite different in NATO and something different here so there doesn't really seem to be a multinational multilateral forum in which you're already bringing together you know key decision makers to talk about those big issues that kind of you know the war aims and all of that you know you're still doing G7 you're still doing all these kind of groupings but they're at this stage in something that's important as this one would have thought by now there would be a kind of a bespoke piece of international machinery and maybe a bespoke piece of national machinery maybe there is maybe there are both but I can't see what they are sort of contact group Helen did you want to come in on the deterrence point I mean clearly Putin was not deterred because he didn't believe the threat all I would say is this is I think where the energy sanctions are concerned the only possibility to change the character list is something that's very drastic and very quick because anything that allows Russia a longer period of adjustment which means essentially replacing European market share with a higher Asian market share I think at least allows him to think that the risks of continuing are worth it what we have to understand though is is that anything that would change his character list in terms of the size of the energy sanctions and immediacy of that would be a seismic shock to the world economy and you have a number of developing countries in the world that are already on the precipice where a set of issues around fuel and food are concerned so to take that as the option and I'm not saying it should be ruled out but there has to be a strategy for what that means too now I have no idea how these things are thought about in the people who are making the decisions in the UK but I slightly worry that it can be seen that the decision making can be what's the way of putting this not sufficiently focused on the worldwide consequences economic sort of contact group but with an element is what's needed to sort of but with an economic element as well as a strategic and political element next question yes the woman there we've just about put the microphone in time there to Hi my name is Christine Chang I'm a lecturer here in the study in the department of war studies and I have a simple question for you do you think military escalation is basically inevitable and I ask that just with a bit of background framing so the way that I see this playing out is basically that Putin is backed into a corner he this has become essentially an existential fight for him and then on the NATO side it has also become we have turned it into an existential fight both for ourselves and also for Putin and it's obviously an existential fight for Ukraine there is now no incentive for anybody to back down that whole structure of peaceful negotiation has fallen away now it feels like we're in for a very long insurgency as some of you have already indicated but is there a different way out is there a different way out I know that's a really hard question but I'm hoping to some of you can imagine a different way out because I personally can't and I'm looking for a little bit of hope here Tim do you want to give hope the moment you said it was a very simple question I thought now it isn't there is a way out sure and it's compromised but that's in short supply and Benet and Macron and others were trying to put together some sort of compromise deal about three weeks in the vague outlines of what could be achieved and that would be something along the lines of February 24th which is a bit of a problem for Putin but if you can manufacture it if you can lie convincingly enough that he got something out of it you could go back more or less to February 24th he definitely keeps Crimea various beautifully crafted worded statements that allow him to sell something but that's the only way and no I'm not hopeful I think Putin is in trouble as we said as you said I think when Finland and Sweden joined NATO he's even more trouble because he's trying to stop NATO expansion and partly has failed and Ukraine his any way out is to escalate I don't think NATO are yet caught in that trap I think NATO haven't needed to make a decision yet you know it's not a crisis for NATO at the moment and building up to the summit in June I think they will form an opinion and give it and NATO spent a lot of time working on the decision making come back to your earlier question decision making at the speed of relevance is a big subject we all tick about it when you look at the evidence every time they are presented with an immediate challenge they make a decision I think our challenge though is the fact that many people have never been through this before understanding the theory of deterrence people are terrified to provoke Putin but if you're not prepared to escalate when you deter you can't so I think it's education of our leaders is one of the challenges but I think NATO haven't had to make a decision yet I think when the current phase that the war runs its course I think NATO can then decide what its strategy is going to be I suppose the other potentially difficult conversation in NATO in terms of the sort of compromise that you were talking about Tim is at what point does pressure get put on Ukraine not to accept the permanent loss of I beg your pardon either way there will be pressure on Ukraine at some point either way certainly in the days running up to the war in Kiev I had a lot of resentment that Schultz and Macron had tried to put pressure on Zelensky to concede something in Donbass or somewhere else even the idea of it was really violently opposed I think in Kiev at that time and of course since then they've achieved extraordinary things this gentleman here had a question I think he's raised his hands so you can probably say I can be held guilty of favouring this side of the room and the other microphone wielder has had no actual battle experience yet there's someone there but let's this one first and then all that Neil Collins I'm a financial journalist I have a question for Professor Thompson I think that attacks on Russian oil and gas where the proceeds are paid to the IMF would mean that there's never going to be a shortage of it but it would start to produce a various substantial sum which could be used for rebuilding Ukraine it would demonstrate how much of the world is prepared to pay up for Russian gas and also gives a huge incentive to find alternative supplies and it wouldn't matter if the whole world didn't join in if the major Western countries did that would be sufficient I think at the moment you can buy Russian oil at about a $35 a barrel discount from the world price which gives you some idea of the amount of money that could be available and best of all it would make Putin absolutely furious well I definitely think there's got to be creative thinking because we both have agreed that the supply side particularly in the short term is really, really difficult I think though you've still got to be really clear about what your objectives are with this I mean it would be one thing to say okay we're doing this because it will when peace whenever it comes or relative peace Ukraine's recovery but do you think that that makes any difference to Putin's calculus right now I mean it can infuriate him without changing anything in his strategic judgment about what he's doing and I think the question still has to be are Western countries really serious about energy sanctions actually as something that changes Putin's calculus so that needs to be like thought through in terms of what the implications are for the for the world economy now I'm not saying that finding some extra money for Ukraine financing it for the future is insignificant I'm just saying I think it's a secondary question to whether any of us think that energy sanctions can actually change the outcome of this war Paul at the back there another ex-calling Mark what are we learning what a straight question what is the optimum size of a deterrent force that we're going to have to deploy if we presume that the conflict gets frozen in place the Russian army remains something like what it is Russian armed forces what size do people think a NATO force is going to have to be but in the context of that what are we learning about the way the Ukrainian system works so you've got reserves paramilitary national guard national army interoperating what are any lessons emerging from that early though it is it's a very good question I think as NATO now move to implement this new concept that I've talked about it's accompanied by another bit of work called the new force structure work which tries to much more cleverly integrate the forces of all the allies you know at the moment people contribute forces to NATO and they keep perhaps a bit fat themselves the idea here is that in large parts your forces are part of the NATO response so I don't think we know the answer to that question yet particularly because of course we now recognise in the future that you can have significant effects in individual domains be they maritime strike air strike you know space targeting all these sort of things so it's a very good question I would have thought there would be an answer in June if it's requested but probably not until then and what you learn about about Ukraine well for this sort of war you learn that the combined arms grouping is still important and it's very interesting to see some of their tank brigades have three tank regiments and three artillery regiments the weight of the weight of artillery that they can bring to bear now of course queued shooter descensor very quickly by drones has been the battle winner as someone said I mean end laws javelins yes having an effect but what's really killing people is our tournament so we need more of it need more of it yeah thanks paul another gentleman here Andrew Adamson ex armed forces now work in defence industry what the panel or the extent to which they think that this is an opportunity to recalibrate the relationship between the armed forces and governments and industry I'm thinking particularly in terms of partnerships between the customer and industry on setting requirements weapon stocks and dynamic stock piling that sort of thing and also the sovereignty of defence r&t and how much of that we ought to be outsourcing and how much of it should be sovereign thanks it seems to me that the answer to all of that is there in the fairly recently published defence and security industrial strategy I think the need is simply now to get on and deliver that because the questions you're asking kind of you know are as old as the hills aren't they I've been doing this which is 30 plus years we've been talking about the need for stronger more strategic more trustful relationships between government between the department the armed forces and defence industry and I think you know realistically one has seen quite a lot of progress against that but the fact that we're still publishing things like the industrial strategy and saying there is need to more needs to do more on this demonstrates just that point there's big machinery being built in government to do this now I think that this crisis will accelerate the pressure to do this much more quickly as you were saying earlier Mark and this is kind of you know in munitions in particular you know we're now having to kind of go very very quick on this and very much like urgent operational requirements in previous campaigns we're rather good at doing this when we really need to do this we're much less good at doing it when there's not pressure on it so surely a big part of the answer is to you know capitalise on what we're learning out of what's being done in the context of this current crisis and applying that logic straight away to doing exactly what you're describing time is almost run away from us but we're going to take two last question two final questions we'll take them both at the same time and then we'll feel those two questions so please Hi, I'm Ian Matheson a retired former British Foreign Service Officer My question really is about the future of Russia I was struck by Tim Marshall's gloom about this which I think most of us will probably share to some extent but it does make me think the title is really a title that asks the defensive view of against Putin or against any likely successor to Putin and I wonder really if that's a realistic end I'm sorry the Ukrainian ambassador's not here but I'd like to know what the Ukrainians think the future of Russia is I wonder if there are Ukrainians in the audience who could tell us that but there might be scope for a little bit more optimism and a little bit more sort of creative policy making about how to deal with Russia in order to will the ends that would be better than most of us are now expecting the Cold War as I remember Cold War I ended much much more suddenly than people at the time expected and I don't think we should rule out that changes could happen very quickly I just wonder if anyone on the panel know what the Ukrainian view of the future of Russia is OK Great questions Robert Tyler from New Direction the Foundation for European Reform I just want to ask the panel very quickly about resilience obviously we see in the defence concepts of countries like Poland and the Baltic states a huge emphasis on this by example in Latvia's 2020 defence concept they even outlined the role of the church, the government universities and primary schools why in the west do we not have a sort of similar concept Shall we do Russia with Tim and then we'll see because we've got about three minutes I live in hope but not expectation of things getting better I was with the Ukrainian ambassador last week because he was kind enough to ask me to host the charity event where Zelensky's fleece was sold for auction for £90,000 a quick aside on that one Boris Johnson was there as well and I was supposed to be introducing him and this was election night and he swapped in was supposed to come on the stage within two minutes and go but Zelensky we couldn't get him up for 20 minutes so Boris Johnson is standing there now you know his life it's lived in 10 minute chunks I think it says an awful lot that he stood there ruffling his hair for 20 minutes was patient enough and I know it's a sort of anecdote but it does show you the resolve and the relationship sorry briefly well I'll try to be brief on Russia again you just look back at the geography in the history look back at what happened after the Cold War why are they going to change I hope they do as the resilience I think NATO is now again back in fashion found its raison d'etre I think that Schultz will look at Macron's strategic resilience and think it's not going to be very resilient so I think Germany if it's going to spend this 100 billion which it says it is mostly within the NATO framework and that is aimed sadly it's not aimed eastwards it's defensive shield is against is eastwards just so I think on Russia I mean I deal with the Ukrainian military so I mean at the moment they're very in the moment so the only good Russian the dead Russian and perhaps more refined views will come over time but I don't know and on resilience of course again it's lined up to some pretty hard nose resilience objectives and enhanced resilience objectives in recent summits actually the UK resilience doctrine is very good but how far down that line we are I don't know but I think it is interesting to alluded to this UK don't tend to educate their populations on the true nation of the threat unlike perhaps Finland and Sweden and Estonia which makes I think delivery of some of these things much more difficult Thank you all very much indeed so we are out of time for this session there is a 20 minute break now we hope that we may have the Ukrainian ambassador with us but we certainly have another great session to follow after 11 so I look forward to seeing you all back and please join me in thanking our fantastic panel I'm just slightly chipping you all along because I don't want the time to run away with us on this session so session number two is more focused on the European dimension how Europe responds to this crisis and what could be done to respond better to this crisis and what kind of new security order might emerge in the European context from this so we've got a fantastic panel and I hope you'll join me in welcoming them on stage now on the ground yes please yes Anna go to the the file seat Anna and then Beatrice and Elizabeth yes Fabian I guess if you come in and then we'll leave so General Adrian Bradshaw is not here yet he's been decorated apparently not with an icing sugar or something like that but a Belgian medal so we'll get to Adrian in a bit if he appears General Bradshaw I should say probably so first on stage Anna Fottiga who was a foreign minister of Poland and senior European politician who unsurprisingly given her background has been keeping a close eye on the Russian threat for many a year then we've got Professor Beatrice Hauser historian political scientist and somebody who's worked in NATO looking at these and at Kings so you've got the benefit of the home audience Elizabeth Braugh journalist scholar specialising in deterrents you were at Russie weren't you and now at the American Enterprise Institute and has just flown in so thank you very much Elizabeth for coming in and I should say by origin Swedish in case the question turns to the Nordic flank of NATO or whatever we can get some expert exactly expert opinion on that and then finally Dr Fabian Zuleg chief executive and chief economist of the European Policy Centre in Brussels specialist on EU and EU accession but also of course from Germany and able to look at that country and it's obviously key importance in defining what goes ahead well let's kick off with Anna Fottiga because Anna I guess that if you're Polish a lot of people will have been saying particularly since 2008 in Georgia or 2014 in Crimea and Donbass look this is a thing that needs to be urgently addressed and with varying results among European countries some I think probably preferred to ignore it so do you think now there can be no further argument about this or do you think there are still some European countries who don't understand the magnitude of this and the type of change that needs to happen me to start with thanking UK for distance for actually for many years already and in particular in recent times I think it is over political divisions in the country over political opinions in this country I think that in terms of perceiving the threat the imminent threat from Russian Federation since beginning of previous year and mounting of arms around Ukraine five eyes so the old alliance were right and actually it was the most accurate assessment of the situation in saying this I would wow I wonder because listening to previous panel I put the question how to deal with the country that is that develops like current Russian Federation nurturing ages old ideas and it is not only Putin because now this war in Ukraine is online actually and we see all effects of this war so the near imperialism that is legacy of older ideas because for ages being a tsarist Russia the Soviet Union or the Russian Federation modern Russian Federation there is anormous expansion accompanied by unbelievable atrocities when we see what happens in Ukraine and try to remember Chechnya I was reminded about this you know how they used to get grosny and now to do same atrocities exactly same atrocities so extermination of those who are not willing to assimilate is part of policy and the question is when we deliberate how to deal how to build strong security environment in such circumstances the question is how to deal with country nurturing older ideas not reforming structures because KGB guy runs this country and he is not alone Russia is like mafia type country the economy of Russia is fully fully regulated by colleagues of Putin and these are links with the west collective west and this mafia has nuclear arms are we able to stop this once and for eternity it's a very good moment to bring in Beatrice then in terms of does Europe share that perception those things we've been hearing from Anna I mean because in the past obviously there were differing responses based on geography, economy, energy all the different interests variable geometry can that survive and is it inevitable that some countries will not feel that strongly or do you think this is a true paradigm shift remember Saint Malo or Brussels Treaty or Modified Brussels Treaty we were able to to say or the west collective west was able to say at that time that military cooperation close between France and UK possible possible not only transatlantic links should be accompanied by economic links and I believe it, I'm economist in my background it should be innovation cooperation so links are not sanctions again you've put your views over very clearly let's get a perspective from Beatrice on that one of the things that really surprises me is that we are no longer in an east west ideological contest and nevertheless we find that there are people in the west and throughout the west that seems to be influenced by the Russian story or seem to buy into the Russian story and I find that absolutely extraordinary also there seems to be no proper line up with particular ideology so you find in France for example both on the far right and on the far left people who are very much in sympathy with Putin how is that possible that's something that really really astonishes me and the other thing we have centres of excellent for strategic communication all this sort of thing we seem to have absolutely no way of affecting public opinion within Russia and the Russian hinterland we have some access to academics and a very small elite in the Moscow and St Petersburg cities but the vast majority of the Russian population seems to have absolutely no exposure to an alternative story on this whereas throughout the west there seem to be people who've got the exposure to the Russian story and buy into it and I find that absolutely flabbergasting Elizabeth I know you were looking a lot the open society in its enemies that's what we experienced absolutely and in terms of Greyser I know previously when we appeared on a platform you were talking a lot about that this is whatever you want to call it red this is not about shades of grey in terms of the scale of the aggression and the scale of the shock but does it shift relationships on meaningfully does it provide the necessary impetus to come out with a more coherent European response to threats from the east it does and I'm going to be rude Mark because I've been talking to talk into the microphone no no please it's very important no no Mark I think that the challenge is that we are so well set up militarily but the weak part is our civil society it was a fantastic quote in I think last weeks in New York the report had gone gone to Ukraine or was based in Ukraine was based in Ukraine and nice to see you ambassador and he was happened to be at the gas station or petrol station that was manned by volunteers who made sure that people didn't get more petrol than they were supposed to and a car pulled up with Lithuania license plates and apparently that's something that happens quite a bit in Ukraine I'm not an expert on Ukrainian license plates but apparently people do this people register their cars elsewhere to save money and so this volunteer at the gas at the petrol station said no petrol for people who don't support our state and I thought that was brilliant and it told the people in this car support our army support our people then you get your petrol and that's what it's about our responsibility as citizens to support our country and if we don't have that then what's the point of having strong armed forces if behind them in our civil society we have this mush of people who may not have feel any allegiance to our government to our society more generally and so extremely receptive of what you for example just mentioned Beatrice and for other forms of aggression and everybody admires Finland well Finland has spent decades educating the population about national security threats and as a result they have 77% of the population willing to defend the country with weapons then personally defending the country with weapons should they be asked to but how do we get to that I think it starts with feeling commitment to society and maybe this is an investigation for you Mark I would love to see an investigation into the connection between tax evasion and willingness to defend one's country I promise you anything in Finland they have low rates of tax evasion but that's for you investigative journalists Thank you Fabian Germany always so central to European debates and hearing Elizabeth talk about attitudes there to defending the country things like that we know and education indeed about national security threats that is not the case in Germany and the numbers are much lower of people who say they take a gun in their hand as it were to defend the country how big a transformation do you think is necessary in terms of German attitudes because the Chancellor in announcing changes more defence spending changing energy priorities suggested that he was going to lead the country to a different place is that doable in the foreseeable future do you think I think firstly I would say that Germany has already changed a lot in the last weeks there have been many taboos which have been broken we shouldn't forget that for a long time Germany was told not to do these things it was told that it could never engage again in any kind of military adventure yes there was a change already over the last years but it is still a major change not only to policy but also to the psyche of people there was a belief that Russia could be controlled through trade, through interdependence clearly we now know that didn't work but this is a big change which has to come now there are some people in Germany who traditionally have believed in non-military means so there is that peace movement which is saying that whatever has happened the best way of addressing this is through peaceful means but I think they are in the minority now so we are seeing much more willingness to address this we are seeing that German weapons are going to Ukraine which is a major change that's not to say more doesn't need to happen clearly there is more which has to happen but I think overall actually Germany is going in the right direction and a big recapitalisation of the Bundeswehr absolutely things we've known for quite a long time which have to happen but not only that I think we have to look at the whole package the sanctions, the energy sector which is much more difficult for Germany and some Eastern European countries than for others we have to look at also the response to the migration question so it's the whole package and in all of those areas a lot has changed not only in Germany but across the European Union we have now been joined by General Adrian Bradshaw who, like General James Everard in the first panel is a former Deputy Supreme Allied Commander and therefore very much steeped in the alliance management issues and questions of collective security and so it's great to bring you in General perhaps on this question one or two of the panellists more or less say well we're kind of there on the military in terms of European I guess spending or full structure but do you feel that there is an effective European military capability do you feel that NATO essentially can serve all the requirements of people in the European space how do you see things developing in terms of concerning and improved collective response to what's happened in Ukraine Thanks for that there's quite a lot in that question Firstly I think we all need our sight and vendor and one is delighted to see the realisation in Germany which is not at all surprising but I think collectively in Europe and in the transatlantic domain we need that realisation but I was reflecting this morning that Mr Putin has committed two heinous crimes with respect to Ukraine on the macro scale one of course is embarking on this terrible war and unleashing this unacceptable aggression in the heart of Europe but the other is in managing to lie to his own nation to quite such an extent and to get a nation to believe so many things fundamentally completely untrue and listening to the Radio 4 this morning the interviews in Russia on the eve of their parade one reflected with horror the degree to which Russian people have drunk the Kool-Aid have got the message and so coming back to the point that has been made actually already on this panel we need to remind ourselves that warfare is hybrid by nature we all started talking about hybrid after 2014 it's hybrid by nature it's an all of nation collectively all of capability affair it's not just about armed forces it's about winning the information battle it's about winning the economic battle it's about winning the war of ideas and it was easy enough in the cold war to have a great idea which was opposed to a grim ideology we need to generate the great idea about the importance of democracy and freedom and the rule of law and of truth and how important it is that that wins in the struggle with these autocracies criminal autocracies and so what I would wish to see in our defence structures firstly is a an acknowledgement across NATO particularly from the nations who aspire to be in the lead of European defence that the transatlantic nature of NATO is absolutely vital that our link with the Americans is incredibly important and that NATO is the organisation for transatlantic military strategy making and for executing the military collective requirements of Europe and the North Atlantic area the talk of European strategic autonomy in defence should be quietly reduced and more talk should be made of the nature of the relationship with the United States and the EU and NATO need to start working together properly we have the Berlin Plus arrangements which have so far managed to command three operations since 2003 which is a lamentable state of affairs they were very successful the counter-piracy operation down in the south of the Balkans and most importantly the U4 operation in Bosnia in Bosnia Herzegovina which is incredibly important for the stability of that part of the world but it demonstrates that using NATO command structures NATO facilities Europe can execute military operations without duplicating military structures within the EU what actually needs to happen is that NATO and the EU need to be able to formulate strategy together which I might say is impossible you would be amazed that during my time as deputy SACUR it was impossible to have strategists from the EU and NATO in the same room developing joint strategy despite the hybrid nature of warfare today we could not coordinate military strategy a NATO economic strategy NATO political strategy NATO financial strategy because it was not allowed because a couple of nations one of which is a member of NATO but not of the EU and another member of the EU but not of NATO and it so 29, 30 nations can't do the business the vital business of today which is coordinate grand strategy so that's my observation for this morning sorry there was a moment when I thought we were going to disagree and I actually then found that we have lost lots of common ground there because one of the things that I've been preaching all my life time in academia is that what we need is a European pillar of NATO along the Berlin plus that you've discussed and then basically we had that we had that in the WEU and the WEU as you recall was not only closed down but its vital defence clause was absorbed into the Spent Treaty with Brexit, the United Kingdom was no longer part of it my question is always, my challenge is always can we not somehow revive something or reinvent something like this European pillar of NATO the WEU, the Western European Union that existed and basically it cannot possibly anybody's disadvantage if the Europeans can act more autonomously if need be because one of the things that I think is absolutely clear that's been said over generations of American presidencies is that the Americans would like us to shoulder more of our own defence burden that they'd like us to be able to do more together and the other thing that is clear taking a much, much larger perspective now than the Ukraine war or even the US departure from Afghanistan is that simply over the decade since the beginning of the North Atlantic Treaty and before that the Western European Union the United States has gradually declined in its commitment to Europe in the total the sum total of its commitment to Europe I'm not saying it'll withdraw I'm not saying it's going to the end is in sight I'm not saying the Americans will not come to our rescue if they can and if the situation is urgent but what I'm saying is that it is absolutely clear that for a long time the tilt towards the Indo-Besific has been a very important factor which means that it is everybody's interest including the United States that the Europeans can do much more for themselves is described the political will of actually saying why can't we then in that case get together those member states of both organizations that are in both organizations and sorry the others have to stay outside why can't we do things together is absolutely would be in the sense of that thing and that the Western European Union was actually embedded in NATO it left to NATO everything that it was doing its organization that would be a very important answer there goes I've said it before in the context of what you said general that the sort of emphatic lesson to be drawn I suppose from Sweden and Finland being members of the EU is that they don't feel safe within solely that structure that they want NATO membership and that is the effective response in this crisis from their national perspective but we're going to take two more views on this and then I'm going to try and open things up to the audience Anna you wanted to come in quickly to agree to enlarge this extent with general Bradshaw it was a very important statement when we speak about European pillar of NATO it should be well understood of course the Barden sharing so taking much more responsibility for defending Europe is important but in terms of decision making it is slightly different and when we speak about transatlantic alliance well we have a proof a war on Ukraine actually it is US in lead and many countries simply following US or aligning with US and then step by step Europe I think that the EU I think there is much more consolidation and observing things in the EU I see that this actually perception of threat from Russia is much more common within the EU and we are able to better communicate but it's still much to do and US, Canada, UK also Turkey in many ways remember Montreux Convention that was quite important on this so NATO transatlantic link is of vital importance here strategic autonomy a quick follow up from Fabian and then Elizabeth and then we'll open it up to one of the questions no problem I just wanted to follow up on your comments and disagree with you slightly on one of the points I think it's very clear at the moment that the transatlantic relationship is the most important relationship not only for defence and security but including that but I would disagree a bit on the strategic autonomy question because I think that's misrepresented and maybe the term isn't very helpful in that but really what we're talking about here is addressing the vulnerabilities of Europe and addressing the vulnerabilities of course also means taking into account where the resources come from the kind of relationships are behind it that there is a big difference between a relationship with an ally and with a potential rival or with a potential enemy as we have seen now and then addressing those vulnerabilities but this is exactly what we should have done years ago when we look for example at the energy field we should have looked at where our energy is coming from and how that makes us vulnerable and clearly that should have led to action in the area of dependence on Russian gas and oil so I think this is a useful concept to look at it is also a useful concept because we do have to think in the long term what is the situation going to be what are the contingencies we have to take for example in relation to a different president in the White House for example in relation to a possible security guarantee which has to be given by the EU rather than NATO dependent on what happens between Ukraine and Russia so I think there are many issues there which should be addressed but I think none of that really questions the transatlantic alliance Quick response from maybe then to Elizabeth The points you make are entirely fair and I didn't mean to be too hard on strategic defence autonomy for Europe but I'm hitting at the use of the term in a political context particularly from one of the member nations when they seek to create more defence autonomy within the EU as opposed to reaching out to NATO and making use of shared structures and I think that is potentially damaging if it suffers to damage the relationship with the United States that was the context I think we should we owe Ukraine a big huge deal of gratitude for having demonstrated in a very unfortunate situation that everybody can play a role in keeping that country safe so let's learn from Ukraine not by waiting for a war Ukraine didn't wait for a war they didn't have the luxury of the sort of preparation that we can do but what we should learn from them is that everybody can play a role in keeping that country safe in organising themselves and if I may hope I'm not too polliannish but isn't the problem in our societies that most of us don't feel any sort of allegiance loyalty to our societies or to civil society to societal structures we are seeing very dramatically in the U.S. but also in other countries and I think it started with what Robert Patnam documented 20 years ago the bowling alone phenomenon and as I said I'm not trying to be polliannish about it but if we look at the challenges facing our societies especially national security it stands to reason that we can all get involved in some way and by getting involved we create that sort of buffer that tells our adversaries that if you try well you can try but we will have the entirety of our society or large parts of our society will be organised and will deny you the advantage of taking whatever it is you want in our countries that's what Finland did in 1939 and kept the Russians, the Soviets at bay for 105 days and what the Ukrainians are doing today great we do have the Ukrainian ambassador here now so the last part of the session is going to be remarks from him so we've got time for a couple of questions certainly let's see how we go so let's start with one or two questions I think you were just fractionally faster in getting your hand up there so let's start there and then second question here yes thank you Merrick Chapman I'm a macro strategist I'd like to ask about the commitment of this is directly at Germany in particular where we've heard that there's been big changes in their orientation but it's striking that the 100 billion fund that they've committed to their military is actually extra budgetary so they're going to continue with the debt break and they're going to pretend that they've not got this fiscal commitment so it sounds like they're not being entirely honest with themselves I wonder if you could comment I think Fabian and General probably should talk to German I think many countries play around with budgets and putting things across different years and in different ways but personally I don't think it really matters what matters is that the money is spent and that it's also spent well and I think this is one of the great concerns for me the number sounds great but really it isn't only about spending that money it is about spending that money effectively so that increases European capability European capacity that it contributes better to NATO and that also means we have to look at all defence industrial sector because in the end we are already spending a lot of money on defence and security the question is whether we are doing it effectively and I would think that if this hundred billion really does have the effect we want to see then we need to also make changes to how we procure defence and security how we organise that whole sector Well only to say that it really has a special contribution to make for the future in that it lies in a particularly significant area of Europe from the point of view of getting stuff from A to B and it's noteworthy that the means of doing so have been reduced hugely since the days of the Cold War so for example where there were dozens of trains that could carry main battle tanks that are now rather few and tend to be dedicated to commercial interests so the amount of spending that is required on infrastructural support to the means of responding to a threat are enormous and it's quite possible that defence spending in Germany would not be in the shop window if it were going to be very very effective I would just make that observation Major Alan Broughton Royal Marines my question is to Fusion we've spoken a lot about how the UK can cohere its social, political, economic and military levers we've seen in the in response to the Ukraine crisis an unprecedented response from our civil institutions or civil institutions around the world such as McDonald's, Visa, IOC but those institutions have made those decisions unilaterally whereas in comparison Russia has a national defence management centre which is able to cohere its political, social, economic levers now it has that luxury because clearly it's an autocracy and we're a democracy in the UK we're able to do that with say counter terrorism where we have the counter terrorism extremist network is it feasible with us talking about Fusion for us to actually cohere our foreign policy in a way where we could have security lines of effort and direction to say something like the BBC or is that inherently undemocratic Elizabeth first and then Beatrice I leave the BBC to Mark well maybe not but the UK government is actually doing I hope I'm not revealing anything untoward but is doing really pioneering work on working with the private sector because obviously in as you say in a democracy, in a liberal democracy the government can't tell privately owned companies what to do but it can engage with them to help them better understand their role in furthering the national interest and by the way this is a lot harder than it was during the cold war when companies did that because CEOs are often from a different country than the company and the company may be ultimately owned in yet another country but the UK government is doing some fantastic pioneering work there Can I address your question in a slightly different way it's not what you extended into here and it should be Professor Helen Thompson who comments on this but one of the things that is happening is that what we're doing the sanctions are affecting the entire society and if we're talking about how we're educating the population to come along with us it's actually a small people who are paying the price of our sanctions now Professor Thompson would be able to liken us to the effect that the sanctions have had on the gas and oil prices and to what extent they were going up even before the war but I keep getting letters from former friends or old friends who are saying I can't pay my gas bills in this country my electricity bills in this country so one of the things that is clearly happening also is that throughout European societies the fact that these prices are going up are something that is seen as challenging the prosperity they've had and very briefly therefore also on Germany for example one of the things the Financial Times quoted Chancellor Schultz this morning saying that they had to weigh the disadvantages of this impeachment or this impounding on the prosperity of our societies against the help for Ukraine this is one thing that particularly western societies are really not used to any longer that people have to make sacrifices in that way and to some extent one could even say you turning down the radiator is your tiny contribution to our sanctions on Ukraine this is not happening so from that point of view this all of society approach isn't taking place although the fact though it's an all of society effort that is being made to a large extent it is not perception of threat because we learned something in Poland recently over 3 million people coming through our borders and a lot of them actually it is the biggest wave of refugees real refugees after I think that after a second world war not that is true and without governmental lectures with full support of government of course of all levels of government but each and individual family each person took this on his her own and they host people at home it is not very easy I know it from my family experience as well but they do this that's understanding threats and solidarity who I'm sure will reflect on that but Fabian and then General Bradshaw I think this question of the cost of living crisis is really important because it plays much bigger in politics than the war itself maybe that's because it's not communicated in the right way but it does have an influence on how politicians act and I think there's also a question of solidarity how can we actually manage to distribute the costs which are undoubtedly there so that the most vulnerable aren't suffering the most because then we're not going to maintain the public support for any kind of action in Ukraine and that also means doing this across countries there will have to be some form of solidarity between countries because countries are affected very differently now just on Germany I think what we have seen there is frankly it's the wrong way of making the argument there has been far too much discussion around the economics of it the argument in Germany is about historic responsibility it's about moral responsibility it is about learning from what happened in the Second World War that's an argument where Germans can also be convinced that sacrifices are necessary and that there is something here which is more important than the immediate effect but talking about the economics of it is not going to convince people in Germany right thank you thanks I think your question was about our ability to be able to fuse strategy and the Ukraine war has served to force us to think about the relationship between economic and defence and security and information strategies but as yet our mechanisms for fusing them are not that great which is my point about the EU and NATO working together in the face of somebody like Putin who has his hands on most of the levers you need a very quick response between the military and the diplomatic and the political and the economic if you're going to be effective in response to his latest move which implies in the context of NATO and the EU that they need to be able to work very closely but within our nations sadly we've lost the ability to do that during the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns they were largely subcontracted out to defence and security so for example in the United States the strategy for the invasion of Iraq whether you think it was a good thing or a bad thing to do it the strategy went very rapidly to SENTCOM who did an immaculate job of developing military strategy but what one needed in Iraq was a holistic strategy so when we arrived in Iraq the only people on the ground by and large were from defence and the intelligence services one needed people for reconstruction for education for rebuilding political structures for information and all of that was missing Ukraine has forced us to confront the reality all of that needs to be combined and I think it starts at the top in the cabinet office here in UK in the NSC in the United States which needs to have much more power to bring ministries and departments together and co-ordinate stuff before it's pushed out I did want to sort of come back and come back to the question in the sense of saying well isn't our NSC system supposed to give us this capability but I think we are quite limited on time and I think all of us would very much like to hear from the Ukrainian ambassador so if I can call on that impristika to come up on stage and I think his remarks on this topic will obviously be particularly important and interesting to the conference Good morning I hope you can hear me Can you hear? Thank you I'm sorry to get in the way of such an interesting discussion I would love also to be a part of the discussion and mostly what I appreciate when talking to the audience like yours is being able to react because that's the way how we built up our messaging as well I understand how many different things here around and I'm sorry that I came a bit late I was in another meeting with this audience like yours in our museum where the secretary Ben Wallace was also giving his address and we'll be happy to see him again just a couple of words to tell you actually I came with the prepared speech but I understand the appetite here is understand what actually Ukraine was one of the question earlier today was actually Ukraine once this work can be ended it was actually end of the work for Ukrainians I don't want to tell you how the situation on the ground I have total respect in your media and the people around the government which are making all decisions knowing what's actually the situation all about in Ukraine I just wanted to tell you how Ukrainians see and how we can bring this to the end First of all we had six rounds of negotiations with Russians sometimes very difficult to believe but we are sitting around the table and negotiating with them I have to tell you that in usual Russian manner they came with such a high expectation such a high sort of demand that I'm not even going to tell you because you will see how unrealistic they are how unjustified they are and everybody understood that that's the negotiation position so what we came at the end of days to how we managed to bring together us and Russians around what the items there are just a couple of them please bear with me so the Ukrainians are asking now not how we finish up the work but how we will be living afterwards and what is the afterwards security picture this is something very close to what we are discussing right now and I will be more than happy if you engage in this trying to understand what future of our order if you wish will be so the idea came that at the end of the war we will sign the treaty and ratified by the parliaments which is very important I have to remind you that Minsk agreements so called were not apart never been signed by anybody by Ukrainian presidents no Russian and never been ratified by Ukrainian parliaments so there are major guarantors as we call them guarantors which we offer to become Ukrainians guarantors after the war is ended in the Kingdom in Canada, Italy Poland, Israel was mentioned and in the initial stage even Russia was mentioned and Belarus as a guarantors that was two inputs from Russian side you can imagine that so we hope that all the guarantors will be able to support our way towards EU you can see that NATO is not mentioned here in the next 15 years we agreed with Russians that the fate of Crimea will be decided this is very interesting diplomatic way of telling that we don't know what to do with Crimea right now the fate of Lugansk and Donetsk so called Lugansk and Donetsk people republics is also set aside and given to the presidents President Putin and President Zelensky to decide when they meet it's again very purely diplomatic trick how to allow the negotiations progress knowing that the re-stumbling block is here the sanctions and legal actions again Russia should be discussed only when we finish the peace treaty with Russians not before as some of our colleagues in Europe now are doing telling the Russians you know what to do something we will start lifting the sanctions and the last one that everything we discussed with Russia will go on referendum with Ukrainians if Ukrainians decide that we still have to go find the place under the umbrella of NATO security security guarantees so the Russian Ukrainian negotiations will be restarted that's more or less I understand it's complex that that's more or less what we did last official negotiations were on the 29th of March obviously Russians are not happy with the result of negotiations and they believe that they don't have to go along them they will fight and will achieve something on the ground on our side the same we started to receive more support sometimes militarily support sometimes political stand financially and the both negotiation teams and their positions departed each other so just to finish that if we will have one minute and somebody will have questions on this structure I will be happy to respond but just a couple of things to tell what Ukrainians feel what is our biggest pain right now this is the lack of security structures which would allow us as a nation to survive we are not talking about everybody knows the faith of we are not talking about the partnership for peace with NATO didn't work with us the NATO in our water didn't help us either the European sorry the future is not is not helping so the Helsinki final act we have to admit that Russians just threw this paper away OAC didn't work it was biggest and most expensive mission OAC over the whole existence of organization didn't work either I don't want to start with UN and UN Security Council so what Ukrainians maybe we are to hasty in our observations and our assessment of the existing structures in the world but that's what nations have when it is at war against the very big powerful nation with the nuclear weapon and the part of the security council so what Ukrainians believe can be done right now we offer it maybe it's half baked I understand but we offer it an idea to the world and we call it united 24 meaning that we offering an idea that will become basic for the new security arrangement I'm not talking about organization which arrangement if anything happens to the sovereign state in the world the nations guarantors of this security will come together in three days will finish up all the consultation just three days then the next move is nations guarantee that sky over the particular nation will be closed against any enemy on this planet third the nation in need will be provided all the assistance they require financial and everything I know that it sounds like a fiction but that's the best we could come at the moment right now let me stop it here if we have a second I would be more than happy to reply if not thank you very much do you just have time for one or two questions so let's the first hand I saw there obviously we have got the ambassador so questions to the ambassador all the panel but let's see how you were talking about the terms of a settlement there are three issues I think were very very important for many Ukrainians which ought to be or perhaps I like your views whether they are a condition of a settlement or a condition of sanctions being lifted war crimes in other words the pursuit of war criminals at the height of the Russian leadership down to the troop level of Russian forces that's point number one the issue of reparations for war damage inflicted by the Russian aggression on Ukraine and certainly the very humanitarian issue of the deportees not the refugees who have fled to western Europe but the compulsory deportees from the occupied territories who have been deported into Russian territory and are being currently reeducated as it were those three issues are they part of your conditions for sanctions being lifted in other words that has to be resolved before some sort of semblance of normality returns to relations with Russia thank you what I gave you this is official party line if I may if you talk to a hardliner like myself I will tell you that for example I can't see why we have to look into pockets of western taxpayers money for the after-war reconstruction that we built I believe Russia has to pay for everything so everything you mentioned is not even a question that's the way I would describe I can't see how can we get out with reparations not to be paid by Russians or all those committed the crimes won't be prosecuted and there are so many other things I guess the best way out of it if Ukraine wins militarily so if you allow yourself it's very difficult to believe I understand but if you allow itself the idea that actually Russia can be defeated on the field of war you would allow yourself to think and find the way how to do it what to do maybe it will be even better for Russians themselves a quick question from Fabian I just wanted to ask because you mentioned EU membership and I wanted to ask what is the expectation of Ukraine in terms of EU membership and also time scales it's very easy we believe that that's actually what initiated the war what was the last drop when Russians lost their patience remembering 2013 that was the case why they went against us and why they went to take over the Crimea so it's not even NATO that's that much because in this audience I don't have to explain that NATO is already all over Russian western borders just another piece is not changing the strategic strategic concept of Russia being able to defend itself so this is EU we are just departing Ukraine showing that they are not ideal but we are departing somewhere thus creating the conflict within Russian society creating this threat to Russian society that somebody like Ukrainians can live differently they don't need Russia to follow the case we can build up our Slavic finally Slavic Orthodox nation can live western way this will be blow not to Russia not to Russian population not to huge Russian territory but the way they run themselves Russian dictatorship whatever the way system of power we will be in thanking very much a UK Defence Secretary Ben Wallace on stage shortly there will be a little bit of hiatus so I will ask the panel to join me in leaving the stage but please also let's thank our panel for today where I'm also Professor of National Security Studies I'm delighted to welcome the Secretary of State for Defence Ben Wallace to join me in a conversation as part of our conference today Mr Wallace has given a big speech this morning at the Army National Army Museum and has raised some of the issues that we've been talking about this morning I've been thinking about how one might start with this as many people have said it's the 9th of May Russian Victory Day Vladimir Putin has spoken he's accused the west of preparing an invasion of of Russian land NATO being a threat and you selected this day to make a keynote speech on the Ukrainian conflict you're a former soldier as you've watched this conflict unfold what are your thoughts about the course of the conflict and where we may go next well I think I mean the reason I did the speech was despite how it appeared in some newspapers it wasn't about necessarily Putin it was really about the failure of the general staff of the Russian army to both I suppose speak truth to power but also to prepare their forces properly now I had to be slightly careful because I didn't want to show any sympathy I mean I don't you know what the Russian are engaged in is an illegal invasion and every soldier whether they're junior or senior has a responsibility in that but from a professional point of view as a soldier you have to marvel at the sort of you know betrayal really of many of those people and many of those people who are not all in support of the war will get no voice and it's quite important if you're ever going to try and penetrate the Russian system to make the point that suffering does not excuse culpability today will be a whole excise in the Russian I mean remember it is the Soviet effectively union who fought the Second World War not the Russians alone you know I think Ukraine marked the day before but nevertheless it was a collective endeavour but you won't hear any culpability in any of it no one ever asks whether suffering is actually a sign of failure at high levels and so the purpose of the speech was to make sure that President Putin doesn't wrap it all up put the cloak of this great defeat of Nazism around himself and use it for his own imperial ambitions which is exactly what he has been doing and I think that is very important to challenge that assertion and you know if you read his essay he wrote 2020 it's another piece of amazing fiction that he positioned himself as the saver at World Russia or the Soviet Union as the saver of the world and actually we all know it was much more complicated he plays down the Ribbentrop pack which effectively allowed the Russians to dismember Poland transport people from the Baltics and that's all forgotten he never registers that Britain really stood alone for 2 years before they turned up I think it's just important to register that today there are lots of people dying suffering unnecessarily strategically because of the illegal invasion and then tactically because of utter incompetence in the Russian general staff now I don't want them to be successful so don't please make that mistake but that's why the army museum is important to remind people that the people who pay the price of imperialist ambitions or rewriting history or indeed general staff who like to have lovely parades but don't actually deliver the effect on the ground is the young soldier and that's where we get to now and even worse than that it's the people that are their targets which is Ukraine obviously we're holding this conference and we're going to hear from our student panel at the end of the day who are providing the conclusions and hopefully a summary of the day so I asked the students if they would give me some questions for you as well and they've been quite forthright and on this question they were saying were you intending to wind up the Russians with the speech and are you hoping to achieve something specific they've read it and they thought that it was a challenging speech but I think if you ignore the sort of sub-ed written headlines in the newspapers and read the actual speech in full I wasn't trying to wind up I think I was trying to make the point that there is culpability in this, the culpability within the Russian system I remember going to St Petersburg years ago and being told you don't understand more people died defending the city than the whole of you lost in the Second World War I remember saying slightly sheepishly from the back of a minibus at the time I think to the guide as a soldier I'm not sure a casualty rate is a sign of success and when I went to Moscow about a week before the invasion and Shoigu said to me no one suffers like us as a sort of boast and I said in the meeting I don't want anyone to suffer I remember saying I've seen too many of my own soldiers buried when we were trying to persuade Russia to stop it and they were slightly thrown when I said I don't want Russians to suffer I mean it's not a and the problem it's been used to avoid culpability and I think there are now body bags coming home in their tens of thousands potentially into Russia if they haven't been cremated or hidden there are therefore tens of thousands of injured Russians coming home they can hide that, they can bully it shame the widows into not speaking which we saw when the curse went down I don't remember the lady was in fact injected by an agent in the middle of an audience you can see on live on YouTube when one of the wives of the curse actually says well where is it and they inject her as she's complaining so they can do all that but I think it's important that we point it out and make it very very clear that huge amounts of what is going on is unnecessary and the generals the truth to Putin by now So you were security minister and long serving security minister at the time of the Salisbury attack has that shaped your approach to Russia I mean you were one of the people who spoke out quite early about the challenge of Russia Yeah I mean I think you know to deploy nerve agent on a country soil is a really big step they won't have been taken freelance that would have been, I think I remember I said at the time authorised at the highest levels of the Russian government this is nerve agent right this is not running somewhere over the car it's a proper deployment of a military capable chemical weapon when it was deployed on our streets and there was a bit of debate inside government about why were they so bad in doing it and so far as you know they all got caught they appeared on Russia today talking about cathedrals and actually started to look a bit comical dangerous let's carry out that and were they ten foot tall or did they not care and you know I think at the time and I've been to visit Ukraine I've been to Ukraine five times both the security minister and defence secretary and you know what goes on I know what they do in many parts of the world you've seen what Wagner's done in Libya you've seen what they've done in Syria and the world has not been paying attention to the nature of the regime and I think we forget too much because we either look in our own backyard and nobody cares about that or we remove the person and in a sort of effectfully a totalitarian regime the person's more important than anything else and you can have all your analysis you like but if there's someone who takes that view of the world and as you can see in his own writings he's convinced himself all sorts of things you have to take that seriously and you have to prepare for that because you know he is he's got a view he doesn't seem to want to change it doesn't seem to listen to anything alternative and it's a dangerous view so we're going to have to live with Russia for the moment we have to live with with President Putin there have been references today already in this conference about whether or not we've returned to a new cold war I'll be interested to know whether you find the analogy even the term useful but no one can deny that there have been repeated references to nuclear weapons and to questions of escalation little talk about the management of it to be frank how far do we have any off-ramps in this crisis when the rhetoric at times seems to be going in an extraordinary warring direction for the public there's one thing that's difficult to read which is some of the tools we usually relate to being less escalatory like sanctions, economic tools actually in the Kremlin have the opposite effect they're more escalatory in some of their minds because it's harder to hide from your public economic punishment it's much easier potentially to hide military casualties they have a track record in being able to do that in 2014 in the Donbas there were lots of unmarked graves actually fun enough even the great patriotic war one of the characteristics of the Soviet side at the time was they didn't ever really seek to find out what happened to many of those people there were many many families in the Soviet system who never knew what happened to their father and grandfather whereas we had a sense of trying to account for it let's not forget the effort the world took to try and persuade Putin not to do this this was not like we didn't all try we didn't all bend over backwards my ministers people went to the Kremlin people still do as we see President Macron is often trying to engage with President Putin asking him not to do it it wasn't like he wasn't asked and I said to Shoigu that I said look you don't understand that if you didn't do this the world would relieve a really big sigh of relief and we had no plans to invade Ukraine it was only about 10 days before I was born yesterday I think we are dealing with a difficult issue cold war analogies I'm sure someone out there is desperate trying to look for another phrase a modern iron curtain phrase I think the key thing here is to ask NATO which we did at my last defence minister's conference they need to set a long term plan whatever happens in Ukraine I think Putin will still be there I mean Putin certainly in the short and middle time 70 years of age plenty of time in a sense so the question is how do we contain Russia how do we reassure our allies and how do we provide resilience to other allies to make sure they are not victim or subject to sub thresholds lashings out or manipulation at the end of this conflict a war and I think that's the challenge we have to do so we have to get the international NATO membership to think long term now whether that manifests itself in a cold war an iron curtain or nothing like that for anyone right section of defence is calling for a new iron curtain I'm not we need a plan, we need to see a plan across the whole of the international community through NATO I'm going to come on to NATO in a minute but you mentioned sanctions there needs to be done with the sanctions tool to make it a more effective coercive part of your armory in effect it doesn't seem to be achieving the ends we want yet I know Americans have talked about like a 12 week, 4 to 16 week time frame or whatever but can we make the sanctions more effective Britain's been quite vocal and wanting to be harsher on the gas sanctions I wouldn't underplay however that when eventually that does happen in a broader sense that won't have an effect Russia is fighting the war in Ukraine with 65 to 75% of its land forces they will have to be refurbished they will have to be re-equipped that won't be able to be done the time they get around to trying to do that I suspect the sanctions will be much harsher anyhow they'll already I think there are a number of consequences of sanctions that haven't yet been felt but will be photographs of people at cafes in Moscow is not actually a benchmark of whether sanctions are working look at the ruble, look at its long term challenges when it has to both get knowledge, people services and technologies huge amounts of what's been exposed here as a large part of their military capability is based on western technologies or components or that's not going to happen so I think we've been more vocal that gas and we have to effectively be tougher on that Britain has tried to move that further I think we'll get there is oil I think is the latest one they're talking about but in many other areas they're already finding it difficult but we knew they built up reserves and he's got lots of reserves which he will try but he cannot miss the fact that the western international community plus Australia and others are actually quite unified in a converse way if things moved towards negotiations of some sort which might involve parties other than the Ukrainians and the Russians do you think there would be a withdrawal this comes from the students by the way do you think there would be a withdrawal of sanctions relatively quickly potentially or are we essentially looking at a posture that has done something I accept well certainly the characteristic most of these sanctions are punitive rather than deterrent and I think to be fair the Ukrainians were often asking for sanctions earlier as a deterrent rather than punitive you'd hear a number of the international community saying well he hasn't done it yet so being punitive they have to be punitive let's be honest for what he has done or what the regime has done look I think it is and we have to be very careful here it is for Ukraine to choose its future and where it wants to settle or not settle or go with this conflict and I think it would be quite wrong for me to sit here and either put conditions on Ukraine or tell Ukraine what piece it has to make that is for Ukraine the thing worth fighting for for all of us is the freedom to choose of a sovereign nation that chooses with that choice with that freedom is entirely up to that it's the same as Finland and Sweden President Putin would love it because it would fit with his narrative that NATO is there trying to seduce Finland or Sweden or is encouraging them to join we're not actually we would absolutely understand and recognise the importance of the freedom to choose but Sweden and Finland will be very close allies of the United Kingdom whether they choose NATO or not we have a squadron of British tanks and Finland right now I think the first time ever but my God I would stand up and defend their right to choose and if you listen to the president of Finland's speech of the new year it was a very good speech about that so I think I'm not going to start putting stipulations on Ukraine that is for Ukraine I do of course want to help them negotiate from a position of strength not weakness that's why we're standing by and will continue as long as they wish us to do so you're teasing me with NATO so NATO summits coming up next month the Sherpas will be out there they'll be already drafting the communiques which will say solid things how resilient do you feel at the stage the NATO alliance is as we face potentially a summer continuation of this conflict well into the autumn so I think NATO has worked incredibly well contrary to the allegation that was brain-dared it's actually the opposite look it's harsh but it's true Ukraine is not in NATO and I've been open about that for months and weeks for years a number of nations wanted to move at different speeds but it isn't but within NATO's borders NATO has very quickly stepped up in military support around those borders for example we've got a company we've got six Typhoon aircraft in Romania we've got two battle groups at the moment in Estonia we've got a good few hundred troops Royal engineers and infantry in Anlite cavalry in Poland we've got ships deployments etc and we're not alone and there's a huge amount I think there's a hundred thousand United States troops in Europe at the moment so NATO has responded it's remain consistent we didn't cancel cold response up in the high north 35,000 troops including actually troops attached from Finland and Sweden and actually we have come together very well and we yes some countries move at different places but there are 30 members but we've all got there so I think it's worked well I think the next challenge for it is long term what are we going to do with this Russia as it is we've got resilience and containment and reinforcement but fundamentally I think it has worked very well on that looking forward what does success look like for NATO forgive me putting Ukraine to one side here because the challenges that this invasion crisis has thrown up some people talk about it being existential for a number of entities in Europe what does NATO need to come out of this stronger rather than weaker well I think it needs to have shown that deterrents it can deliver deterrents that's why we come together it's a defensive organisation contrary to allegations by President Putin it is and that you you provide defence through deterrents and if this conflict doesn't over spill Putin for all the words doesn't escalate and if anything does happen we are in a position where we can provide that resilience and reassurance to our fellow members and that's absolutely what works for NATO but you know I mean that's ultimately more there for we are a self defence organisation and anyone who claims otherwise is wrong so there's lots of talk about expansion you sort of semi-referenced it in an earlier answer how could NATO expand at the moment without giving President Putin an excuse to take action somewhere else or to demonstrate to his support whatever it is I told you so all along it seems that NATO is likely to expand very soon isn't it to expand into Russia so you know I mean I mean it is it's quite interesting I think I've lost count of the number of international statements signed up by Minister Lavrov or indeed Putin on the right to respect a nation's freedom to join an alliance I mean I funnily enough when I went to Moscow having seen how Lavrov played games with the Liz Trust I had in detail their so-called draft treaty I then looked at compiled all the times Lavrov or Putin had declared that we respect a nation's right to choose an alliance and that goes back to I think 1991-1989 we've got declaration we've got declaration of declaration where the Russians put their name to it I remember George Robertson telling me that you know at one stage and Putin put his name to it so just because a country is small doesn't mean to say Putin gets to pick and choose when his declarations and Lavrovs come into force so I think the reality is that if President Putin wants to make an excuse to do things he's already proven he'll make it up I mean he's already made up that apparently the Nazi hordes of the Ukrainians are about to come and invade Russia he's made it up he's just talked about it again today and I do I think if Sweden and Finland join NATO it'll be provocative I don't think so, I mean he was told I mean 2014 he was warned you do this the consequence of invading Crimea is more spending on defence and more NATO and that's exactly what he got no one hid that very very clear that's why the EFPs are in Estonia, Poland they were very clear we warned it publicly everyone talked about it, I said it in Moscow that if you do these things you'll get more NATO so he can't be surprised and the reality of he makes his strategic blunders more than he makes his strategic successes it still doesn't sound like many of France though out of this crisis this seems to be and this was mentioned this morning by our first panel we seem to be in a position where it's almost doubling down by every party to this terrible conflict at the moment except for the four civilians who are there NATO's doing it to reinforce its deterrent posture but the question is how will we get out of this crisis you must find it a bit dizzying I'll ask you, is it dizzying the latest thing at the weekend was that there was some speculation that there might even be a referendum in Switzerland about NATO membership it's quite extraordinary in a matter of months there's a referendum about everything in Switzerland I genuinely hold very true to the tenant that effectively people choose NATO and NATO doesn't NATO is not some country that goes around the world trying to absorb things it is an organisation that people with the same values who believe in self defence not offence choosing off ramps there may be lots of off ramps we've already seen President Putin shaping today potentially a sense of about the Donbass I'm here to defend the Donbass defend our people in the Donbass and he may he's certainly capable of writing a story that fits his narrative if he wishes to do so but the world can't stand by and watch him invade sovereign nations commit war crimes well his forces are committing war crimes and go around bullying the world and not expect us to stand by our values freedom isn't free that's the motto above the South Korean War Memorial and let's put it another way at the moment there are a number of components that you would expect a successful army to have technology, leadership intelligence support of the population well he's wrong on all those four so turns out that the Ukrainians don't want to welcome him with flowers and banners turns out that his superior technical forces the way they're deployed don't work they're not as necessarily superior in some areas as they would lead to the belief his intelligence was clearly wrong in many areas and the his judgment of international community was wrong there is one component he still has in his back pocket which we should really worry about which is brutality which is if you win your war by killing, murdering raping, bombing civilian territories breaching all human rights all Geneva conventions corruption and that becomes the battle winning component the message that sends around the world to other adversaries is incredibly dangerous that you don't actually need to have all the best kit or the best training or appropriate rule of law you just need to be able to be more brutal than the other person and more prepared to destroy everything in your path that's been said in generals and philosophers have said those for decades that is still the untested component they're not interested in occupying Maripole they will use it they will use the port but they're hardly invested in something to save there and where we see it it's destruction so I think that is a really important thing it's why it matters to the international community it should matter that if Putin is successful in Ukraine then watch out I don't want to fall into the narrative of Putin about this being Russia versus NATO but just before I move on implications for Britain NATO as an organisation it's leading nation what very long ago had a president who was questioning it's relevance and it's future that person those views could easily be part of the next election in America European allies continue to question the role of NATO in European defence to other security and defence structures as you know and as you will discuss I just go back to this question of how far this and we're trying to look at the future as well how far the defence of Europe and ultimately NATO's role in it will be affected by this crisis are we already seeing that some of those difficult questions about the relevance of NATO are now essentially being put to bed well I mean I I remember when President Trump was the president I remember the December NATO leaders summit and having lunch with him and a few others of us had lunch and you know actually my reading of President Trump's questions on NATO was more about a view of are we in the United States taken for granted by other members of NATO who aren't paying their way as opposed to anything else President Trump was always about money he was about money right so he'd be saying I'm putting in x% 3 billion billions and billions into NATO and these countries are getting a free ride as he would view it and I think the 2% club wanting to get people to pay more for their security I don't think that's unreasonable and I think actually I'm off to Washington after this that's heard across the aisle there is a sense of how much is Europe going to put in the pot to help contribute to its collective defence I think that's perfectly reasonable that many countries including the UK have all taken peace dividends over the last 30 years and been very quick to bank in the end of the Cold War but not necessarily step up when the security got going so I don't think that was him actually fundamentally saying he doesn't believe in the collective self-defence or anything else I think it was a sense of I did an interview saying taking for granted what I meant was I think America we in Europe must not take America's support for granted we must recognise that they spend a lot of money to do it and what I would say is this incident has jolted a lots of countries to come forward with the planning spending increases to actually spend their way back into it and also the point about other European nations it's Sweden and Finland that seem to be big European not in scale but very respected European members of the EU who first point of call is actually I think maybe will explore NATO it's not European Union thingy which is always developing it's been developing into some form of strategic compass or whatever it's calling so and I think what's been interesting in this position is when it comes to security people do trust that Britain does what it says it does come and stand by you we might not have everything to do it with we don't have past divisions to do it with and I know a lot of my colleagues and everyone would like us to have more but we do turn up we are there on day one in fact in Ukraine we were there on day whatever many years ago 2015 we did orbital we were there on the ground and we've got a squadron of tanks in Finland right now so we do and I think that's something to be proud of so let's turn to Britain then the papers are full of a cost of living crisis you're talking about increased spending by some members of NATO is the UK going to spend some more on defence it's going to be a difficult ask isn't it the public don't actually link even though we may intellectually link it do the public link the cost of living crisis with the crisis in Ukraine not entirely how are you going to get the resources that you need to encourage your colleagues in NATO and other fours to support you I think at the time we got the 24 billion extra we were the first to have a big jump and the Prime Minister was very supportive it was the biggest single jump since the Cold War and it was very important at the time when the threat was what it was to make sure that we modernise the army and when the army's land fleet is woefully behind its peers and you can lay the blame on all sorts of reasons but fundamentally it needs definitely to modernise we needed to take some strategic decisions on type of complex weapon systems and all sorts of things were incredibly important and we did get that funding for it and as I see here now we've got the extra funding for operations to support Ukraine and our lethal aid that we've been doing that was in the media over the weekend the 1.3 billion and we will continue to be able to meet the current commitments of course and I said it all the way through the process as a threat change we should also be prepared to change I don't think it's impossible to persuade the public of the importance of stability the one thing I bring from being the sec