So, good morning, good afternoon, good evening, depending on where you are at this moment. Let me thank the ACV and in particular the organizing team for including our work in this Monetary Policy Conference. As Isabel mentioned, the topic of the paper of my presentation will be Monetary Policy with Opinionated Markets. And it's joint work without. But before getting into that paper, I'd like to describe very briefly our broad agenda. And it's an agenda that we like to describe as a recent macro, or recent macro policy. And the basic idea is very simple. In macroeconomics, we typically, actually in any economy, there is a productive capacity that productive capacity can produce certain amount of goods. That's what we call the supply of goods, a potential supply. And then most macro models and certainly a lot of macroeconomic policy is about an absorption problem, is how to find the right demand for that amount of supply. And now a productive capacity also produces risks, which is embedded in the assets in the economy. And so there is also supply of risk in the economy. And in that sense, it's a second absorption problem, which is to find the right demand for all the risk produced by the productive capacity. So macro is mostly about the top row. Finance, especially asset pricing, is mostly about the bottom row. But it turns out that these boxes are obviously connected. And the linkage between these rows is asset prices. Very broadly understood, asset stock markets, bond prices, the spreads, house prices, and so on. And now I think this distinction is very important for central banks in particular, because most of the objectives of certain banks are in terms defined in terms of the upper row. But it turns out that the place where they operate is really the bottom row. And so this linkage is very important for central bank policy in general. Now, once you start thinking about macro in terms of this bottom row, you have to think about things that are important for financial markets. And one of the key things that is important for financial markets is beliefs. A lot of speculation, trading, and so on is a result of beliefs, difference in beliefs, and so on. A huge role. And so with this perspective, those issues of beliefs and things that are specific, in principle specific to financial markets become issues that are important for macroeconomic policy as well. So in previous papers, what we have done is we have looked at belief heterogeneity within the private sector and have looked at what are the implications for that, for example, for macro-prudential policy, for prudential monetary policy, for large-scale asset purchases, and things of that kind. Now, in the paper that I'm going to present today, though, we don't look at differences of beliefs within the private sector, but a difference of beliefs between the private sector, which we want to call the market, and the central bank. And apologies for calling the central bank the Fed. Maybe I should have called it the ACB for this conference. But as we will see later on, I'm going to be talking about policy mistakes all the time. It may be better that I talk about the Fed. So one very clear source of disagreement is in the forecast of future interest rates. So what you have in this picture here is in the thin line is the federal funds rate, the path of the actual federal funds rate. And what you see in the thicker color lines are forwarders and dots. So the projections by the central banks are summarized by the average dot. So this is right after the FOMC meetings where the dots are released. You can also look at the forward curve and compare these two curves. And you can see that there are very clear differences and at times they are very similar, but at times there are very big differences. Now, you can adjust these pictures in many ways. You can add a reduced premium that actually compresses on average the difference, but it's very small relative to the size of the part that you see there. So there are a lot of dots. I mean, there's a lot of issues of what dots really represent, but you can look at the interest rates implicit in the green book, for example, compared with blue chips, and you see sort of similar big differences. I mean, you can see it also beyond the US and most central banks that we have access to data that do publish this forecast. You do see difference between the corresponding market curve and the forecast. So there is a literature in macro that thinks about information problems between the central bank and the private sector, and it's mostly about asymmetric information and the presumption there is typically that well, the Fed knows more about, obviously, its actions, but it also knows more about the economy. So it's a perspective in which the market is whether it's passive waiting for this great wisdom to come down to them from the central banks. But first of all, that cannot explain the picture that I just described, because those are disagreements just after the FOMC made its announcement. So the great truth has been revealed already to the market, and you still see these big differences. But second and more importantly, perhaps, is that I had a midlife crisis and I spent a couple of years in hedge funds outside of academia and I came back to academia precisely when this literature was developed in macro and it did not sort of match very well with the views I saw traders express. In fact, traders are very opinionated people. They are certainly observing very closely what the Fed and central banks are doing around the world, but mostly to confirm whether the banks have the right view or not in their perspective, the right view. A concrete example beyond my personal experiences December 2007, there was a hawkish interest cut by the Fed that led to asset price declines and so on. And you can see in the 100% of the article of the reactions of the market to what the Fed actions as expressed in the World Street Journalist here's a quote, from talking to clients and traders there is in their view no question the Fed has fallen behind the curve. That doesn't sound like it's receiving the great wisdom. They say, look, they're not getting it. Said David Greenlow, Economist at Morgan Stanley, there's a growing sense that the Fed doesn't get it. Okay? And not saying the market is right or wrong, but it's clear that it's not about having received information from the Fed it's about not agreeing So what do we do in this paper? We essentially it's a theory paper. We provide a model of a situation in which the Fed and the markets disagree. So we call this that's the reason we call it an opinionated paper. The paper is opinionated itself, but the markets are opinionated in our model and so is the Fed by the way. So we develop a model of opinionated markets and opinionated Fed. So the key features of this model is that first the Fed and the market are going to disagree about something. They can disagree about many things but the particular thing we would look at is this agreement about future aggregate the market. The second feature the model will have is that they both learn from the data. Okay? Now the players are going to agree to disagree and they know what is a disagreement so they know the beliefs of the player and they also know that each agent will learn as data comes along. So what are the main findings and the ones I'm going to explain mostly in this presentation. The first is that this environment provides a very natural explanation for these agreements about interest rate that I showed you before, the figure. And the second that perhaps more important for this conference is that these agreements matter for optimal monetary policy. Okay? For optimal monetary policy. Certainly it matters for the impact of monetary policy but it also matters for the design of monetary policy. Now the paper has several extensions and I doubt that I will get the time to discuss them in a certain and not in detail but let me tell you what these extensions are. The first one in the basic model prices are going to be completely sticky. But then we're going to add an Eukensian Phillips Curve and the main results of that section is that, yeah, you get more or less the same as the main conclusions survive that environment. But the most interesting aspect is you want to connect for example with Clarida Galli and Gertler, the classic paper on the science or art or science of monetary policy is that now you can think of this agreement as endogenous cost push shocks. Okay? Remember cost push shocks is what in that environment breaks the divine conscience. Well, having these agreements produces something very similar to that in a very formal sense. The second extension is, well, what if we bring into this frame also information as images of the kind that sort of have been developing the macro literature and the main results there is that, well, first the main results of our paper survive but more interesting than that now there's a second dimension of disagreement because the Fed may not know whether the market is willing to agree that that's the signal, the private signal is informative or not. And that can lead to sort of the perception of monetary shocks or information. It may vary depending on the particular market that the Fed faces and that in itself brings reluctance to act from the point of view of the Fed because it doesn't know whether the market will react positively or not to the information is about to be revealed. And the last extension is about heterogeneous data sensitivity. So the Fed and the markets need not be equally data dependent. They're both going to learn from data, but they need not be equally data dependent. Some of the market or the Fed may learn faster than the other. And the interesting implication of that extension is that now every single macro-economic shock has implicitly need a monetary policy shock. So there's a big literature that is intangible looking at the impact of monetary shocks that typically isolates high frequency events around FOMC announcements. Well, once you have this heterogeneous data sensitivity, then it turns out that any macro shock comes with an implicit or the market can focus at that moment that the Fed will react in certain way and the market may not agree with that certain way it expects the market to react. So every single macro shock becomes a compounded macro shock with a monetary policy shock. So that's what the paper does. So let me essentially describe the paper twice. Once, in words and diagrams, and then the second time, it's also going to be in words and diagrams, it's going to be a couple of equations more. But I'm going to sound repetitive, it's deliberate. So let me first tell you what the setup is and what are the main results and what features of the setup give this main result. So the first thing is we're going to have aggregate demand shocks. That's what markets and the Fed are going to disagree about. Now what is an aggregate demand shock for us is something that moves current expenditure given potential out. That's the definition of an aggregate demand shock. And there's many different sources for aggregate demand shock. In fact, the aggregate demand shock that we're going to model, the specific aggregate demand shock is going to be the most aggregate supplied looking aggregate demand model. You can imagine because it's going to be future productivity shocks. So today we're going to learn about future productivity. Well, that will have an effect on today's expenditure. And that's usually going to be an aggregate demand shock for today and it's an aggregate supply shock for the future. We're going to look at the current episode. So in the current period, we're going to have an aggregate demand shock. The Fed is going to have to take actions that set the interest rate, give speeches, whatever before it knows the current aggregate demand shock. So it's going to have to make a monetary policy decision. Now the Fed is going to set the interest rate targeting a zero output gap. Now it's a zero output gap under the Fed's beliefs. That's an important distinction now. Now the Fed has beliefs, that's a superscript F, that's what it denotes. And it's going to try to set an interest rate that gives on average, on average across all disaggregated demand shocks a zero output gap. Now after the Fed has set the interest rate for this period and the aggregate demand shock takes place the market sets the output gap. It's a equilibrium. It knows the interest rate and it knows what the aggregate demand shocks. So it determines equilibrium out. Now if the Fed doesn't think that the Fed has the right beliefs that this F is not the right belief, then this equilibrium output here will depend on what the market perceives to be a Fed mistake. So let me explain that and that will take us to the first result and perhaps the most important result for a central bank of this paper. So here is the period I just described, the current period. Remember what I said the Fed will target, will set an interest rate to try to set an average output under its beliefs equal to zero output gap equal to zero. Now the market is going to set output here but when it sets output it not only cares about the current aggregate demand shock, it not only cares about the current interest rate but it also cares about what it expects monetary policy to be in the future. Okay. See in particular suppose that the market believes that the Fed is being too hawkish. That is things of the future is a lot of market things. Then, well that of course is going to affect the current interest rate and that's going to affect the actual output gap but it would also affect the perception that the market has about future output gaps. It understands that the Fed will set the interest rate in the future in order to set an average output gap equal to zero under the Fed's beliefs which the market perceives to be a hawkish belief. So that means that will depress current output. It will depress current output for any given interest rate because now the market expects the future interest rate to be too high for what the market expects to be the actual economic environment, the actual level of aggregate demand. But the Fed understands that the market will believe that the Fed will make a mistake. So when the Fed sets the interest rate here for this period, it also has to internalize that the market will perceive a future mistake from the point of view of the Fed. So the future perception of mistakes by the market of the Fed believes also affect the current interest rate the interest rate that the Fed sets today. So and that's the main result for monetary policy because it says the Fed will have to partially accommodate the market and will have to do so to mitigate the impact that the perceived mistakes by the market, the perceived mistakes of the Fed by the market have on aggregate demand. Now very naturally if this believes are very entrenched and therefore the disagreements are very entrenched and they're likely to affect the future for a long time then the Fed needs to accommodate even more the market. In fact we have an extreme result in the paper in which if the two sides are completely stubborn and they're never willing to learn then the Fed should follow the market and ignore its own beliefs we're not going to look at that extreme in the paper so there's someone in between but you get the effect at least that the more entrenched these beliefs are, the more the Fed needs to accommodate the market. So that's going to be our first main result. The second main result is explaining figure one how can you have, even after the Fed has revealed all its wisdom how can you have different curves, future different forecasts about future interest rates. And that's when the learning block plays a very important role. So let me explain. So this is, remember this is the current period, that's what I just explained in the previous slide and we agreed in you the audience and me the presenter we agreed that the Fed will set an interest rate, take it into account its own beliefs at day one at the first period and also the market's belief. In particular I said, well the market the Fed will set the interest rate trying to set the average output gap to zero in these periods according to some belief but in order to do that successfully it has to take into account and accommodate its interest rate policy to the market's beliefs. Okay, okay. So there's no disagreement today about what the interest rate is today. The market the Fed will set an interest rate the market cannot disagree about the Fed the interest rate that was set by the market there's no disagreement about today's interest rate, it is what it is but there is disagreement about what the future interest rate will be and that's what I show you in the first figure and how does that happen? Well think what happens at day one at day one the Fed says, okay I know that the market has distorted beliefs I think the market is really dovish doesn't understand the market demand is it doesn't understand the market demand will be better on average than what they expect I cannot do much today about that I have to accommodate a lot but I know that in between this decision and the next decision there will be an aggregate demand shock and I am the Fed I think I'm right, I believe in my beliefs so I think this aggregate demand shock on average is not going to be a surprise to me in terms of realization but it's going to be a positive surprise for the market okay and the market is going to be surprised how good this aggregate demand shock will be and because of that I expect the market to update its beliefs so I expect for the next period so when I have to say I'm the Fed I have to set the interest rate in the next period I expect to have the same beliefs that are more or less the same beliefs I have today but I expect the market to have more optimistic beliefs than it has today because it's going to be surprised by a positive aggregate demand shock and therefore since I'm going to be dealing with a market that is more optimistic than the market I'm dealing with today I expect tomorrow to be able to set a higher interest rate one that is closer to the beliefs I have and that's the reason the top curve is up where it's sloping I have to accommodate a lot today I expect these guys to be positively surprised between today and tomorrow and therefore tomorrow I expect to be able to set a higher interest rate what about the market well the market also thinks the market is right I cannot disagree with the Fed today the interest rate is whatever it is but I know it's going to be an aggregate demand shock here I know the Fed is going to realize that it was way too optimistic when it was setting this interest rate on average I think they're going to get a negative surprise on aggregate demand so I expect to encounter in the next period a Fed that has an F2 lower sorry, than F1 a Fed that is less hawkish than I'm facing today so as a market I expect the interest rate to go down, why is that? again because I expect the Fed to learn that the war is a little worse than the Fed thinks at day one and so that's exactly what is playing so disagreement plus learning if there's no learning there's no way of there's nothing you can do it, we disagree completely we're going to convert to some interest rate but we're not going to disagree about the future either because there's no learning along the way it is the learning aspect that allows us to have this difference between the dot curve, the forward curve or the green spam book forecast and the blue chip forecast and so on so that's what the core of the paper is about now let me go over the paper again trying to tell you a little bit more about those results and a little bit more about the extensions extensions but before doing that the small section, this again is a theory paper but it's a small empirical section moderating our basic ingredients and I'm not going to present that but I'm going to show you one picture that captures what is in that section we there isn't a lot of data on disagreements between the Fed and the market but there's a lot more data about disagreements between different financial institutions big financial institutions there's blue chips data there's a much longer data set so we use this blue chips data to essentially demonstrate two points which are important for our model the first one is that interest rate forecast correlates with aggregate demand perceptions so if we want financial institutions that forecast a higher interest rate we'll also be forecasting higher aggregate demand so we're going to measure as inflation and the second feature we want is that these forecasts are confident in disagreements so even after you include all common information and so on they still disagree and not only they still disagree they continue to disagree over time okay so they're persistent disagreements and those two features you can capture in this picture here what you have is on the top figure you have the federal funds rate so the forecast of the federal funds rate works ahead for different financial institutions the green one is the consensus the blue one is Goldman and the red one is Bear Stearn and you can clearly see that before the global financial crisis Bear Stearns had a higher focus on interest rate and in the lower diamond you see the focus they have on inflation and you can see that Bear Stearns was far more optimistic than Goldman about future aggregate demand and as a result of that they did have a higher focus for interest rate now we all know the reason this line ends here is that clearly Goldman was a lot closer to reality than Bear Stearns but there are consequences of these big disagreements that's what you see here but you also see the second point which is that these disagreements are fairly persistent you can see sort of long periods where you see gaps in both focus of interest rate and disagreements about aggregate demand and then again in the paper there are some progressions and so on that prove this more formally with all sort of individual effects time effects and stuff like that so let me again get into the model and again you're not going to be able to fully understand the model because I'm going to skip almost the model but I want to give you a couple of equations so a few diagrams I'll show you later on make a little more sense the first slide is just to tell you that the basic macro model has nothing new so it's an official new Keynesian model with aggregate demand shocks so standard preferences more ballistic competition in the basic model we're going to assume fully sticky prices and all the firms have exactly the same prices there's no use in static shocks here all the firms have the same productivity AT the aggregate demand shock as I told you before it's going to be a more supply looking aggregate demand shock at any time T there's going to be a level of aggregate productivity AT but we're going to also learn about productivity in the next period so GT is going to be the aggregate demand shock we're going to call it the aggregate demand shock it's really the productivity growth shock but it cannot affect potential output today so we're going to call it the aggregate demand shock so you combine these and you get a pretty standard you log linearized standard new Keynesian model in the version of the paper that you may have seen we don't have linearization and everything is a little bit complicated there's risk premium floating around and so on in the version I'm presenting here and the one we're going to post next we may have just posted yesterday we log linearized so it's much more standard macro stuff in which the current output gap is a decreasing function of the interest rate set by the Fed it's an increasing function of the realization of the aggregate demand shock and it's an increasing function of the expectation of the market about future aggregate demand and in the previous version of the paper here you have a surprises stuff like that there is a one to one relationship between future aggregate demand and a surprises in this paper so that's the standard IS curve and again in which now I need to highlight this M here because it's the market's belief that matters for the actual output gap now monetary policy without commitment is going to be essentially the Fed trying to set this output gap equal to zero under its own beliefs so F okay so F and M will be different and so this interest so where do we see the Fed's beliefs here well in setting this interest when the Fed is going to the tool will have to set this interest at IT so it expects this the expectation of this to be equal to zero okay so what are the main equations we get out of this frame so let me remind you what I just showed you the yes is this so what is the equilibrium interest rate that is the interest rate set by the Fed okay but after it considers all the beliefs of the markets and so on it's own belief remember what it's trying to do is taking the expectation of this expression of the yes under its own beliefs and is setting it equal to zero so from that you solve for the interest rate set this equal to zero that gives you the interest rate then you have to put an expectation here and the Fed's belief and that gives you the interest rate so the equilibrium interest rate the interest rate set by the Fed is obviously going to be an increasing function of the Fed's belief about the aggregate demand shop for this period if the Fed believes the demand shop will be very high it's a very optimistic belief then you're going to set a higher interest rate naturally but and the term that comes from the beliefs of the markets is the second term well the Fed is also going to set a higher interest rate if it expects the market to have a very optimistic belief okay so if the Fed expects the market to expect an output gap given the interest rate policy of the Fed then the Fed is going to have to increase the interest rate to accommodate that conversely if the Fed expects the market to be more pessimistic then it's going to have to lower the interest rate to accommodate the pessimism that the market has okay so that's the optimal policy under the Fed's belief so the Fed is not betraying its belief the Fed is optimizing the Fed is trying to handle its beliefs but it turns out in order to do so it has to deal with the beliefs of the market and that's what we capture in this term here now replace this interest rate up here and you get the equilibrium output gap so the equilibrium output gap is what is a result of a surprise according to the Fed belief so if our demand turns out to be higher than what the Fed expected then the output gap will be positive and this will also be a function of the surprise for the Fed on the degree of optimism of the market so the Fed has an expectation about the degree of optimism or pessimism of the market but it turns out that the market may end up being more optimistic or more pessimistic than the Fed expected and that's also going to affect that really demand okay now in what I'm going to say today I'm not going to talk really very much about this term this is one of the extensions we're going to be mostly in this environment here so but let me move on I have I think six minutes more more or less that or seven minutes more so let me give you the last ingredient and then just pictures from here so the last ingredient is well where does the beliefs come from and what are they about so this is the way we model it so the growth rate and therefore the aggregate demand shocks is going to be is going to be equal to some parameter G plus an unknown component and plus noise so in every period there's going to be shocks IIT shocks and so on the disagreements and the beliefs are about this unknown component how much of the level of aggregate demand we're seeing is permanent or semi-permanent versus how much is noise that's what the market and the Fed are going to disagree about so they're going to have different beliefs different priors and then different posteriors that are going to start to convert over time but different priors about this permanent component of aggregate demand and so this prior again the Fed on the market will have different that J is the Fed on the market and there's also a certain amount of confidence C will capture the amount of confidence that each of these players have on their own beliefs if the players are very I'm not going to look at the heterogeneous and for most of the time so assuming that they have the same confidence if the players are very confident then the the priors are going to account therefore the difference are going to account for a very long time because they're not going to learn a lot of data if they're not very confident about their priors then they're going to learn fairly quickly and therefore the disagreements are also going to convert fairly quickly let me skip a few things so news are going to be here expectations about aggregate demand so this picture is important and then I'm going to get back to the results I already explained but using a different data so suppose that we start Fed that is more optimistic than the market so this is the expected aggregate demand by the Fed for this period and this is for the market so the Fed is more optimistic so what this figure shows is well what does the Fed expect to expect in the future about aggregate demand well the Fed expects to expect the same about aggregate demand in the future because the Fed thinks it has the right beliefs so today's expectation by the Fed of its own future expectations is a flat line, it expects to expect the same what about the market well the market expects to expect exactly the same aggregate demand in the future ok so the expectation for its own expectation of the market is also flat but the expectation of the market for the Fed is downward sloping because it expects the Fed to learn that the conditions are worse in the space over time so the expectations of the market for the Fed is downward sloping conversely the expectation of the Fed for the market expectations is upward sloping because it expects the market to figure out over time as it learns that it got the expectations wrong here. They had their own beliefs. So it expects the market to come to the Fed's beliefs. So here is disagreement. So imagine a situation where let me look at the left diagram here. So what I'm showing here is what happens when there is a shock to beliefs. So suppose that both the market and the Fed have these levels of belief. Let me give you first a benchmark. Suppose that both become more optimistic. And now both believes that the aggregate demand conditions is better, so that this permanent component of aggregate demand is better. Then what will happen is that the interest rate, the doctor and the Fed and the fore-workers are going to coincide at a much higher level. Both are going to go up. Suppose instead that all that happens is that the Fed becomes more optimistic. So suddenly the Fed sees the future better than the market sees it. Well, then what happens is, well, the Fed, we want to raise interest rates because it expects our aggregate amount of prices to be positive in the future. But it knows it cannot raise interest rate too much because if it does so, that's going to depress a lot the market. Because the market hasn't updated its belief. It does still remain pessimistic. So that will lead to a big crash in asset markets, collapse in aggregate demand, and so on. So the Fed cannot afford really to increase interest rate a lot, is in this sense that the Fed needs to accommodate the market's beliefs. The Fed became optimistic. It believes that we're on a full road to recovery. But it cannot fully increase interest rate because the market is still stuck there. And the Fed wants to prevent the effect of the market's perception of the Fed's mistakes on aggregate demand. Now, why is though the curve upward sloping and this one downward sloping? Well, because of what it just explained, the Fed says, OK, I cannot increase the interest rate a lot today because the market is very pessimistic. But I expect the market to become increasingly optimistic over time because they're going to learn from the depreciation of aggregate demand that the aggregate demand is better than what they expect. So that's the reason the Fed cannot have a upward sloping thought curve here. The market thinks the opposite. It says, no, no, no, this guy's made a mistake. They're going to realize after they see recessions and recessions that they made a mistake, they're going to have to retrace their steps. And therefore, we expect a lower interest rate. Now, the diagram on the right is essentially the same as the diagram on the left. The only big difference is that here the players have not very confidence on their beliefs. So they weigh the data a lot. Well, here they're very confident. So if you see the main difference, what I want to highlight of this picture is the main difference. The main difference is that here when the players are very confident, the Fed has to accommodate the markets a lot more than here. And why is that? It's because the Fed thinks, OK, I believe that the conditions are great, but I believe and I believe that the data will prove to be right. But the market will be very slow in learning. Worse than that, the market will think that I'm going to be very slow in learning. So the market expects me to make lots of mistakes in the future. And so it's going to be very depressed by an increasing interest rate, OK? Because, again, my problem as a Fed is that the market is going to be very stubborn. So it's going to continue to believe despite the data proving me right, it's going to continue to believe that I'm going to continue to make mistakes. And since the market believes I'm going to make mistakes for a long time, then that's going to depress us as prices a lot. It's going to depress our rate of demand a lot. And therefore, I cannot increase interest rate a lot. What happens here is the opposite. What happens here is, OK, I raise the interest rate. And I'm going to raise it more than I would have done here. Why is that? It's because I know that the market thinks I'm a fool, that I'm raising interest rate before I should have done that. But I know that I expect the data on average to come my way. Therefore, the market is going to learn very quickly that it's making a mistake. The market thinks the opposite. And that's the most important result for this. The market says, OK, the Fed made a mistake. The market raises interest rate. But I know these guys are not a great data dependent. They're going to get very unpleasant surprises in the next period. And therefore, they're going to retrace their steps very quickly. So you see, the forward curve here is very downward sloping, expecting a bigger version by the market. So there, again, that's really the summary of the core of the paper. And I think I'm beyond my time. And let me just tell you again what we do in the next part. The first station is to introduce a New York Ainsley and Phillips curve. And I think the most interesting result you get here, you get more or less the same result. But the most interesting result is that you can, this is like introducing in the basic benchmark model in the Claria Galli-Gertlum model, cost push shocks. And believe this agreement, act exactly as cost push shocks. And so that's interesting because it breaks the, then it introduce a trade-off between stabilization of inflation and output. The second extension, as I said before, is introduce signal. Suppose the Fed also gets applied a signal. Suppose first of the market agrees that the Fed has some private signal in addition to this agreement. And then when you get a weighted average of the result that you have in the standard signal in literature and our results, the more interesting result is that if the Fed doesn't know whether the market agrees or not on whether the Fed has a more informed signal, then it will tend to underweights its own signal because it's very scared of another reaction by the market to the perception to what the market will perceive as a mistake from the point of view of the Fed of assuming that it had better information than the market. And the last extension is assuming is what happens if you have different degrees of data accumulation, if what happens, for example, if the data is more responsive to data than the Fed, then the most interesting insight from that section is really that every single macro shocks, as I said before, has an optimism or pessimism in shock. If the Fed in particular is more data dependent than the market, then every time the market sees a positive shock in aggregate demands is, oh, well, the Fed is gonna get away with this and gonna hike interest rate faster than it should. And so you start getting sort of high volatility in interest rate as a result. Now that may be good or bad, that's a definition. Okay, good. So let me stop here. I just want to leave you with what we do in the paper. Sorry, I've rushed a few things, but there's an optimal amount of rush so you get to read the paper. Thank you very much, Ricardo, for this very clear presentation. We started already getting some questions on the paper and I'm encouraging the people in the session who are listening to, of course, submit more questions. The first question I have is from Anton Nakov and he's asking, why doesn't the Fed update its own beliefs eventually, rather than only updating its beliefs about the market's view? He's questioning if this learning only about other agents' learning is rational. No, no, that's not, sorry, I misspoke then. No, the Fed learns about updates. Both agents update their beliefs and they both converge to the truth eventually, okay? What I was showing there was not the update of beliefs. I mean, they're both patient, so they do standard patient updating. So they're both rational given the priors, okay? They disagree on priors, but they're both rational. The figure I show you there, and I was a little rushed, is what the Fed expects today about its expectations or beliefs being in the future. So it's purely rational not to expect to update your beliefs in any way. You expect to believe the same. You understand that you're not gonna believe the same because you're gonna get data along the way, but you should expect to be unbiased with respect to your beliefs. And so in that sense, it's rational condition on the prior. Thanks for the clarification. Second question that we came in is one titled More to Concrete Policy. What are really the policy implications from your paper? This is a question by Diego Rodriguez Palenzuela. He's asking, should we expect more transparency from the Fed or should the Fed be using the belief asymmetry? What is your view there? Well, this is not a communications paper, and it's a very interesting paper one could write about communication. But you already have a policy conclusion in the paper, which is look, the Fed needs to accumulate the beliefs of the market. And it needs to accommodate the beliefs of the market. Of course, it may try to influence the beliefs as well. And that's what the information part has. You may try to influence the beliefs and you can give speeches and so on to try to influence the beliefs. But at any point in time, you are gonna have some disagreements in belief. And this paper tells you you should give weight to those beliefs. And especially if you think that those are very entrenched beliefs. So that's what the paper tells you. And especially if you think that the market thinks that your beliefs are very entrenched. And so in that sense, for example, sometimes saying, look, I'm gonna be very data dependent. It's a way of communicating to the market. Look, my beliefs are not that entrenched. I'm gonna be very flexible. Well, that will help you here in the sense it will give you more space to move interest rate because you're saying, look, I'm gonna react to data very quickly. So don't be afraid that I may be making a mistake, but I'm not gonna make mistakes for a very long period of time. That's so this has obviously lots of implications for communication. This paper in particular is not about communication, but it has. And then in the final section, which I was in one of the sections, extension section, a point I made, obviously way to rush is one about what happens when you don't know how disagreeable the market is. So if you don't know, if you have a view on the market, but you don't have a very clear sense on whether the market is likely to believe your view or not, then that would naturally lead to underweighting your beliefs, for example. That's one conclusion. Now, the other conclusions that are not in this part of the paper, that you can begin to see, especially when I add sort of the Phillips curve there, is that you start getting some certain role for commitments and so on. Part of it is for the same reasons as you get it in Claria at all, because now you have a certain, it's a sort of cost push. And so you may want to, having believed this agreement is like introducing a cost, it's an endogenous cost push. And you may want to alter the variance of that endogenous cost push. And so that's another policy implication. We don't develop that in this paper, but you could imagine that. So I think it's just lots of policy implications and I'm sure that you're gonna get even more implications than I do. A lot of thought for follow-up work. Another question that we have received is from Carlo Altavilla, where he's asking, is there in your model a risk that the central bank ends up accommodating, let's say, market beliefs? And do you see that risk in actual policymaking? No, well, one of the main messages was that the Fed should accommodate the market's beliefs. And the question, something that the paper does, it tells you where you should accommodate more or less. And that's a bit what I was saying in the previous answer, which is look, if the market thinks that you're very stable and the market is in itself very stable, then you better accommodate a lot otherwise you're gonna leave a big mess. Now, there's this extra layer, which is the communication part. And remember, it's a weighted average. So if the market, for example, if the, I have two terms, I have a term that says, look, at the end of the day, the Fed or the ECB has to accommodate, it's used to interest rate together, zero would grab on average under its own beliefs. So it's not that it's giving up its beliefs, it's taking, but as parts of its beliefs, is it the beliefs about, it has about the beliefs of the market and about the stubbornness of the market with respect to those beliefs and about the beliefs of the markets, about the stubbornness of the Fed, about its own beliefs. But it's not that the Fed is giving up its beliefs, it's optimizing under its own beliefs, but it's acknowledging that there's a disagreement of beliefs. So it's not giving up beliefs. If the Fed gave up on its beliefs, then essentially what would happen is that it would set exactly what the market wants. And there is a particular case where that happens, which is if the two agents are infinitely stable, then the Fed accumulates the market, sets the interest rate with the market. Why is that? Because by doing so, it still hits the output gap at once on average. Why is that? Because what happens in that case is the following, is the market is very pessimistic. It gets surprised by a positive aggregate in the mind shot, but it's upset because the market said, oh, the Fed is gonna raise interest rate again tomorrow. This was an accident. Tomorrow is gonna be terrible and the Fed is gonna give us, we give this very high interest rate. And so, I'm gonna have a recession and that term completely overwhelms the other term. So the Fed does the right thing by setting the interest rate the market has, but it does the right thing under its own beliefs. And so that's the nice thing. It doesn't give up its beliefs, but it never know its things under its own beliefs. The question is, what does it have to do in order to get the right result under its own beliefs? I wanna stop here because I don't want to crowd out Giovanni, I think. Well, I won't find a question. You just saw that, but I can see Giovanni in the background, so it's a, I think about it. We have one final question also from Anton Nacov. If you have a question that you went, it's a super interesting discussion. I had one follow-up question, Anton, because it goes a bit in the other direction now. Could the Fed actually be trying to influence the market beliefs? So one question was, of course, to what extent the market should influence the Fed. The other question is whether the Fed should be influencing the market beliefs? For sure. As I said, this is not, well, both things are true, by the way. Again, this is not a communications paper, although it has some information in symmetry section at the end in which the Fed, in which everyone knows that the Fed knows a little bit more. So when the Fed starts something, it does affect the market's beliefs, okay? So we do have that. That's one in which, but it's obvious that it's an enormous play for communication here. And how do we inform beliefs? The novelty of the paper is the disagreement component. But obviously there is value in having converges in beliefs. And if there are other tools to do so, then of course you should use them. And in practice, they do use them. I mean, that's the reason Fed members give speeches and so on. And it's also, there is a two-way communication. There is no doubt that the market's also telling things to the Fed.


Welcome folks, we have the Dow Industries trading up $135, Nasdaq is up $60, S&P is up $16, Gold Contract down $2.30, trade at $18.40 an ounce, we have Silver up $0.39, $24.63 an ounce, Light Sweet Crude flat $86.90 a barrel, notes and bonds. The 10-year note right now trading up one tick, $127.23, 30-year down one at $154.17, and King Dollar, King Dollar is up 214 ticks, trading at $95.24, Euro is at $113, he ends at $114.16, and the British Pounds at $136 to $1 at U.S. Dollar. We get over here folks and take a look at this market and it's a weak market, you know, bottom line, we very well maybe set a very large ABC structure on the way down. The spy today, okay, so first off, yesterday you came down with 109 million shares, you were going into 107 million, so what happened at the close is that you actually went into the swing point with more volume, big problem. Today, we are making up the 458.74, guess what, market just gave up five S&P spy points, that very well could be the C point of an ABC structure on the way down, that's the way this baby is setting up. If we go take a look at the NASDAQ composite, what do you have with the composite? The composite is already into the October 4th bar. The October 4th bar starts at $14,499, we are at $14,406. That being said, we got to $14,642 today and the composite just gave up 240 points, like in a heartbeat, okay, that is a monster problem also. Gold, gold contract continues to want higher price, we take a look at gold, gold right now is down $2, you're trading $18.40, plenty of volume, nice volume in the gold market, $221,000 shares, I mean contracts, bottom line, gold wants higher price, as does silver, silver, nice lift on silver, man, silver is highly volatile, there's no doubt about that, but you're talking about some real nice follow through on silver. In three days silver just went from 2280 to 2463, next move on silver is going to bring you up to this 2558 area. We take a look at notes and bonds, notes and bonds folks are in a large ABC structure on the way down, you blew away the B point, you did it with volume, bottom line, now you're building cause. Stay right there folks, come right back.


A possible lead tonight into the disappearance of Jeremy Jordan of Cass Lake Jordan was 17 years old when he went missing last Halloween night and numerous Aaron ground searches have not let authorities to him. Now today the Shakopee police department announced on its Facebook site that they received a tip from someone claiming to have seen Jordan in Shakopee in the projects. It's not clear exactly where that person is referring to but Shakopee authorities are asking anyone with any information about Jordan to contact them or the Bemidji police department. Efforts to contact Bemidji police officials were unsuccessful tonight. Jordan is a Native American male six feet four inches tall and about 185 pounds. Again if you have any information contact the Bemidji police department at<PHONE_NUMBER>. If you've enjoyed this segment of Lakeland news please consider making a tax deductible contribution to Lakeland Public Television.


NASCAR took the Confederate flag out, Mississippi changed their state flag, so all these things go on in the world and the SBC at the time in 2020 became very, very clear to me that it's a, oh, if the destination is racial justice and solidarity, that destination is an island and the Southern Baptist Convention is a bus and I don't care if a bus is headed in the right direction, you cannot drive a bus to Puerto Rico yet. This is the wrong vehicle for the task that we have at hand. It was a decision that should have been made earlier, but when it was clear it was one of the easiest decisions that we ever made and slept like a baby for the, yeah, since we've


That's not, like, a rhetorical question. I really don't know. Good morning, Hank. It's Tuesday. So in wonderful news, the Anthropocene Reviewed book is here. It's so beautiful. I'm so grateful to the people who made this book. There are so many wonderful details. Like, these are the endpapers. They're based on my circle drawings. And then if you go to the endpaper opposite the signature page, there's a review of autographs. And yes, even my copy is signed because there are no unsigned copies. I've got just a regular green signature, by the way, but it's a good-looking signature. I mean, I'd say it's like a three-and-a-half-star signature. Okay, so writers are often told to distill their work into an elevator pitch. Like, if you had a short elevator ride with someone to tell them about your book, what would you say? And I think this is always pretty hard because books usually aren't about whatever they're about, right? Like, Turtles All The Way Down isn't really about the disappearance of a local billionaire.  An absolutely remarkable thing isn't really about its plot either. This is actually one of the things I wanted to write about in the Anthropocene Reviewed. We want to distill life down into single data points or elevator pitches, but the reality of human experience is so nuanced and multitudinous. So what do I say? Like, here's my actual elevator pitch. Being human in 2021 is very weird. It's weird because we are unprecedentedly powerful, but can still be brought to our knees by a strand of RNA. It's weird because we are, like, made out of Earth, and it's weird because human attention itself is weird. How we pay attention and what we pay attention to ends up shaping the world we share in ways we often don't pay attention to. So I tried to write a book about that. But if I say that, people don't know the premise of the book, so maybe instead I should say that the Anthropocene Reviewed is a book of essays that take the form of extremely in-depth Yelp reviews, except instead of reviewing, like, barbershops and restaurants, I'm reviewing Viral Menengitis and this photograph and the first five minutes of the movie Penguins of Madagascar. Or maybe I should just stick to explanatory facts, like it's my first book of nonfiction, and most of the reviews are adapted from a podcast I write, but some are new to the book. Or maybe I should just quote the blurbs, like, I can hardly do better than my podcast hero Anna Sayle of Death, Sex, and Money, who said, The Anthropocene Reviewed somehow satisfies all the contradictory demands I have for a book right now. It stimulates my brain while getting me out of my head, while taking me to faraway places, while grounding me in the wonders of my every day. That's lovely. But I wonder if I should also say that, like, the book is intended to be a memoir? It begins in my childhood when I saw Haley's Comet and smelled scratch-and-sniff stickers and moved through my adolescence, when I became fascinated by the internet, and then through my 20s when I worked at a children's hospital and survived a mental health crisis, and then into adulthood and becoming a parent. And so in that sense, it's a really personal book, but it's also about, like, Canada Geese and the Black Death and this particular kind of wintry precipitation called Garoppel. I don't know what the book is about.  It's about how it feels to live in what Mary Oliver called this the one world we all belong to, where everything sooner or later is part of everything else. It's about the terror of time passing and me with it. It's about the silliness and indispensability of the five-star scale, and it's about how this last year changed all the past ones and also all the future ones. But that all makes it sound quite serious when, hopefully, it's often funny. So yeah, I don't know. If you've listened to the podcast, maybe you know what the book is about and can tell me in comments because I cannot seem to figure out how to talk about it. I do know, however, that signed copies of The Anthropocene Reviewed are available for pre-order now and that Grace Hahn's cover is so, so lovely. All right, Hank, I'm off to figure out what The Anthropocene Reviewed is about and then pretend I knew all along. I will see you on Friday.


This is very needed to create a healthy situation. Girls need to be protected. Now boys also need to be protected. I visited some families. There were over 430 people. They would educate them about their biology without making it into sex education. Misuse is happening at various levels. Deception is happening. They're getting wild information all online. How to conduct it in a dignified way is something that has to be told. It said about you, Sadhguru can talk about anything under the sun.  I'm not talking. Somebody made a movie. That's right. So that was about OMG2. So tell me about that. How relevant, how important and what is… This was a culture where families means. I have… not my family but I have been to… I visited some families where when I went, there were over 430 people in one family, in one large house in Gokarna in Karnataka. I spent three days with them. It was an incredible experience to see how division of labour happens, how everything happens. And one man, what he says everybody follows. In today's world of nuclear family, you can't imagine living like that. But they all lived like that. Children till they are twelve, fifteen years away, they don't know who is their biological parents. They're just running all over the place. When they grew up like this, for boys there were many male members. For girls there were many women behind them. They would educate them about their biology without making it into sex education. Normally as process of life, because there are so many people in the family, girls need to be protected. Now boys also need to be protected unfortunately. But at that time girls need to be protected. So they would educate them what their body is, how they should behave, what they should do. They shouldn't let anybody do this, that, all these things. Naturally grandmothers and others would speak. If the mother is little embarrassed to talk to her own daughter, there were aunts and grandmothers and grandaunt and all kinds of people who would easily talk to them. So this naturally was happening. Anyway they were getting married by the time they were fourteen, fifteen or sixteen, max. So everything they have to know, they would know. So life just happened that way. But today we have come to a place where everybody has to educate themselves. That means minimum twenty-three, twenty-four. So their puberty might have happened twelve, thirteen, but there are ten, twelve years of space where lot of them may not figure things out by themselves. So somebody has to tell them. Who is to tell them? It's a nuclear family. Only father and mother are there, nobody else and they are busy with their stuff. And above all they may not be able to communicate these things properly. They may become very embarrassed and the child may become very embarrassed. They may not be able to face each other if they talk such things in the Indian culture, it is still like that. And above all marriages were happening because they were arranged marriages, parents would check out who they are, what they are and then fix it. And with the trust people, both boys and girls went with that. Without even seeing the girl, I know many of my uncles and all just married without seeing the girl. Because they trusted, they said, no, that girl is good looking means they said, okay, she's a good girl means good girl. That's all. Because they always thought their judgment is better than my own. But that is not the age in which we are living. Today by the time they're twelve, thirteen, they are online, they have social media friends, all kinds of things. Misuse is happening at various levels. Deception is happening. Just now they brought a law, any deception if you use, there will be ten years imprisonment. So this is for the times in which we are. Maybe in another fifty years we may not need such things, but right now our society needs it because this is just the first generation, gullible generation stepping out into a world that they're not familiar with. Stepping out into from an organized structure to a wide open structure, a lot of misuse is happening. So considering this, educating somebody about their own biology, what is the nature of your biology? Why are you feeling the way you're feeling? How to conduct it in a dignified way that is dignified for you and people around you is something that has to be told. Otherwise they'll do wild kind of things. Above all they'll hurt themselves, they'll feel guilty, they'll struggle, all these things. I feel any education is good education. Whatever is needed, you must educate, otherwise how will it happen? What form of education? That mode changes from time to time. Right now that onus has fallen upon the schools because the family structure is no more that organized as it used to be. It has just come down to two or three or four people. So it's very difficult to do these kind of things there unless they've built that kind of relationship. Many parents are doing that, but that's not possible for everybody. So I think the onus definitely goes into the education system. But at the same time, these are kind of things that must be told to the child from somebody that they trust. Someone else who you don't care for, if they come and say all these things, I don't think it'll work. So creating those people in school that children trust them, that they can talk about these things and the children will be open enough to ask the right questions. I think this is very needed to create a healthy situation, especially to create safety for a girl child in their adolescence and safety in terms of various other diseases and other things that spread. Otherwise they're getting wild information all online, they're researching everything and whoever guides them, that's how it goes. It is better at least a responsible person says this, even if you don't like him. At least a person, if you make some mistake, you can hold him responsible. You can't hold anybody online responsible. But it's needed in the society because we are a society at crossroads. This is the first generation of women who are stepping out of their homes to go to work. They need to be educated. They may be adults, but still a lot of them have no clue how the world works and they can be very easily misused. It's happening on a daily basis. And the younger girls probably are better educated than those little older ones because probably they have more access to information. I think it's very needed for women's safety, responsible behavior from the young males, all these things, not that everything can be fixed, but it is definitely better if they're educated about this rather than playing hide and seek and learning in the back street.


Everyone it's your girl can't see here from late and sports cards, and I'm ripping 21 22 Panini crown while basketball team all addition 10 box break number 10 random teams again Here's a look at the random results You can always find these elite and sports cards calm underneath the results tab and link is also in chat for you Alright, good luck Let's see what we can get again looking for the red team all exclusives out of this as well Joshua Westbrook, McCollum, KB got our first red exclusives the bonus for the Kings and snow globe gold five of ten LeBron Boom Did hear man back-to-back breaks with some big LeBron hits there you go one off of that jersey number two We'll mag this one up for you. Wow Kemba Walker Brogdon John wall. We've got a deer and sharp rookie Nets red jammer ant for the Grizzlies They have here We've got our Vita sub onus on the red exclusive to 31 blazers Nice again the red exclusives on these autos are to 31 and We have another one We do the 31 rookie Otto Christo Arte Pacers What a start Pacers Austin C seven up 31 That's cool Yeah, it's a bonus Middleton wise man. We've got a Franz Wagner rookie for the magic Jean-Té Murray red exclusive ant man on the second year for the T wolves and Snow globe red Dirk Nowicki maps Randall Colin Sexton Jalen Green rookie you go Rockets Kai Jones rookie for the Hornets red exclusive rookie Jaden Springer sixers and Rookie royalty red of Scotty Lewis for the Hornets AD Isaiah Isaiah livers rookie pistons Jamal Murray Joshua Primo rookie for the Spurs we've got red Trey young Hawks and Snow globe red of Davion Mitchell for the Kings righty rookie Luzma Garuba Rockets Yolk it's Steph Curry Jalen Brown red exclusive rookie Jeremiah Robinson Earl for the Thunder and Red rookie royalty of Santiago Dama Grizzlies about seven Chris Middleton wise man Franz Wagner rookie for the magic Jean-Té Murray red exclusive Paul George Clippers and Test of time Grant Hill for the pistons young hill there box eight Wish they had like red taboos in there. So it'd be pretty darn sweet, huh? Van Vleets Jalen Johnson rookie Hawks Chris Paul miles McBride rookie for the Knicks red exclusive rookie bones Highland Nuggets You got nugs and Grizzlies red exclusive rookie out of the 31 Zair Williams There you go, Memphis Grizzlies on that one Box nine get everyone the LSE Nationals promo will run tomorrow at 9 30 a.m. Force will be doing that before he gets into group breaks starting tomorrow He does have room left for some group breaks again new soccer release tomorrow. So you may put soccer see y'all come Josh giddy rookie for the Thunder Christo Arte Pacers look at Garza for the Pistons red exclusive Tyrese Halliburton Pacers and Test of time of Jimmy buckets for the heat Ten here, and then we'll do a quick recap God Scotty Barnes rookie Raptors Ant-Man Jama Rantz Cameron Thomas rookie Nets. We've got red exclusive Donovan Mitchell for the Jazz and and Red exclusive snow globe D Wade heat Nice. All right, very nice ten boxer there do a quick recap And we had a few autos. We had the red exclusives Zair Williams rookie Grizzlies a That's a 31. Oh, this is also the 31 a Christo Arte on the red exclusive Pacers a our Vita's subbonus to 31 Blazers nailed it and then snow globe gold five of ten Lebron James Beautiful Lebron. Congrats again on that one Lakers. Thank you everybody. We've got the ten box Tuesday basketball coming right up


Kelsey put a ring on it, as in Jason Kelsey putting his Super Bowl ring in a sock which was unfortunately lost during a New Heights podcast live show. What? But the Kelsey brothers always up for some fun, hid items in a pool of Skyline Chili during a live show in Cincinnati. One of those items was a Jason Kelsey Super Bowl ring hidden in a sock. It was never found, and Jason Kelsey is now thinking we can safely assume my Super Bowl ring is now in a landfill someplace in the Cincinnati area. And it's probably covered in chili, which is crazy. I just hope someone found it before it got in the landfill and can return it to him. But if it's never seen again, what a way to lose a Super Bowl ring.


What we've tried to do is focus resources and also partner with external agency who specialise in domestic violence with a grief support to try to enter the prevention space for domestic violence.  We will turn up every time and we will deal with the crisis, but we work best when we are working with our partners. What we've been able to do is bring the support services to the most vulnerable. By going with a police officer and a member from Centre for Women, they're actually attending those vulnerable or grieves at a time that's not in crisis so we're not going at a job, we're actually going the day after or a couple days later to check on their welfare and they're more susceptible to taking up that offer of support. So we saw a gap where if we could place somebody where they were going to be safe with police officers that could go out to these women and wrap support around them in a place where they're comfortable, that we were hoping we were going to see better outcomes for them long term. It's enabled police and our worker to build that rapport with that person which has resulted in a better relationship for that person with police long term. So it's really great that we're able to not only support the woman but also support the children and the whole family. We might be with them or doing different things with them to half an hour to an hour. It can vary and you don't know what you're going to go in for and what the result will be. We do care and we want to help and see what's going on with them. We're already seeing a reduction in our repeat calls for service. If they're not being subjected to domestic violence multiple times per week then we're winning.


Hey navigation traders welcome to today's update today's Monday December 16th Let's start off with the S&P 500. Where are we at? Well, we are strong again market just closed about 30 minutes ago on Monday and S&P's up 23 points hitting all-time new highs Impeachment we don't care trade war. We don't care. We're going higher. That's all we care about and so just another Explosive move to the upside Here's the expected move for the week and as you can see we've almost touched that already just out of the gate to the Upside implied volatility Continues to get annihilated We've got an IV percentile of one IV rank of one. I mean, there's just no juice in these options No fear whatsoever. So what are we doing today? Well, we didn't put on any new trades But we did close out a couple first being in our friend Amazon AMZN Booked a beak profit in the duck here. So this is one we just put on a few days ago right in here Got this rally quick rally got to a point where we had very little chance of getting back to the max profit area So we just took that money and run We'll redeploy that into other trades possibly Amazon again later this week Maybe Google I was also looking at Shopify and Roku today But I'd like to see a little bit of a reversion a little bit of downside a little bit of pop and implied volatility before we do So so we'll see if we get that later this week The other thing that we did today is we took off one of our pieces of our bond So we we just put this on a few days ago and implied volatility contracted Let's look at TLT to get an idea of the implied volatility here You can see it's really just contracted these last few days And so we took off over 30% of max profit on that trade within just a few days. So good deal there We've got another piece on still in ZB. So we'll we'll continue to manage that but we may jump back into bonds It's one of the only asset classes really now that still has decent high implied volatility along with natural gas and a couple others but Slim pickings for premium sellers right now, but we'll just we'll continue to stay mechanical we do have more cash on hand ready to be deployed than we usually do so definitely looking for some opportunities and We'll take advantage of those opportunities as they come But there's no reason to to push or rush anything. That's not there. The other thing this week is December Expiration week. So this is the last week of trading for those December options. We've got four days to expiration So Friday is the last day. So we've got three positions left in December in our portfolio So we will be rolling those the rest of this week. So look for that We just like to kind of spread out those rolls throughout the process So we don't do it all in one day or all at one price level and then Lastly we've got a few earnings this week. We've got FedEx on Tuesday after the market closes So we'll be looking at potential earnings plays on FedEx nice high implied volatility there on Wednesday, we've got micron MU is Reporting after the bell on Wednesday. So again some not great implied volatility But we'll see where that's at here in a couple days and then Thursday Nike the swoosh comes in for earnings So few that we're looking at kind of three of the last earnings before this earnings cycle is done So it's getting slim pickings on that. So obviously next year in January when earnings pick back up That'll create some activity if implied volatility is still low, but we've got a lot going on We do have the vote on the impeachment don't see that really move in the market too much unless there's a surprise, of course Uncertainty or surprises the market always reacts to but if everything kind of Plays out as everyone thinks it will with no actual impeachment then we shouldn't see much issues as far as volatility But would love to see something else create some volatility, but we'll see what happens. Hope that was helpful. We'll talk to you tomorrow


But for every Yankees are treated differently in the realm of Major League Baseball than those that have gone somewhere else, as he could ask Robinson Cano. Perspective is a big part of this, right? I mean Aaron Judge has played six years his entire Major League career for the New York Yankees. He knows what it feels like to jog out to right field and have that crowd rise up and elevate his game to another level, a level that we saw this year that we haven't seen before.  There is no place like it. And if he goes someplace else, he's going to realize for six years I had it made. You cannot replicate that energy that that stadium and that crowd brings every night. David Cohn, our colleague, said on my radio show a couple of weeks ago and he said it so well, he said, you don't realize what it is as John just said, until you go somewhere else. He said twice I went somewhere else. And each time all I wanted to do was get back here. This is different. There's a different vibe to it. And the Yankee uniform, I know it sounds corny and we're not sitting here selling it to Aaron Judge. He knows it better than anybody. It means something. You hear about players coming to Yankee Stadium and playing at Yankee Stadium for the first time. And they say that pinstripe uniform means something. And when you're a homegrown Yankee, I think it means a completely different thing, John.  When you put on that uniform, it does have a different feel. It feels different. I remember spring training going actually to the mirror and looking at myself in the pinstripes. And I had already played 10 years in the major leagues. But again, I go back to it. The Yankees are the big leagues, all 29 other clubs. It's just a little bit different. It doesn't feel the same. You wonder with the face-to-face between Aaron Judge and the Yankee front office, maybe Aaron says, hey, listen, it's really important to me. Let's get this thing done. I want to go back to something you mentioned, the Robinson-Cano deal. And when the Yankees were trying to sign him as a free agent, part of the conversation was your marketing opportunities will be so much better in New York. And I put that times a thousand with Aaron Judge. Because for him, he is the face not only of the Yankees, but major league baseball. Marketing in this day and age, in commercials, and super started that way, is so different from 10 years ago when Cano was leaving. And Judge has just a more marketable player in major league baseball, and the Yankees have proven that. And I think there's something to be said. Listen, I'm not a West Coast guy. You guys know me. But when you're on the West Coast, you're losing half the country to see you. Mike Trout's one of the greatest players who has ever lived. And I think if he walked down Fifth Avenue tomorrow, not that many people would recognize him. If Aaron Judge walks down Fifth Avenue, a lot of people would recognize him. If he walks down Rodeo Drive, I think people will recognize him. He's a very recognizable guy. And those six years of the Yankees and hitting 60-62 home runs, it's a big deal. So I think that when Aaron and his family sit down, and they decide, OK, this is what the Giants have offered me. This is what another team has offered me. This is what the Yankees have offered me. And if there's a difference in the years and the total value, he's going to have to say, let's just throw a number out. There's a difference of $27 million. Is that worth it for me to leave the New York Yankees? And again, that's a decision only he can make. And then you could flip it and say, well, for the Yankees, is it worth being outbid for $27 million and one year to keep such an iconic talent? It's a high-stakes game of chicken. When we go back to the A-Rod deal with Texas, they went out, Tom Hicks, and he spent $80 million more than any other team offered. Probably didn't know it at the time, but he ends up giving him $252 million. Is there an owner out there that's going to do that blowaway deal? It just feels like in this day and age, that owner doesn't exist. Will somebody go to that in nine years? Maybe, maybe even ten. But the number is, like Michael said, that N number is going to be one of those. Yeah, I don't think it's going to be like an A-Rod type of separation with the financial part of this. Again, it all goes back to, we don't know, and Aaron has done a very good job. Michael, you've talked about it, keeping it close to the vest. How important is the possibility of playing in California? We don't know. We haven't heard if it's really important. His wife is from out there. His family is from out there. I know everybody says, well, it doesn't matter. She can get on a charter and fly to New York. But there are some players that want to play closer to home. We haven't heard that, but that could be a possibility that the Giants are trying to play. I wonder, though, John, if that's a little bit overblown, because linden to San Francisco, that's a hike. Also, the judges, Aaron and his wife, they live full-time in Tampa, so they're not living in California. Maybe it's for mom and dad to be closer, but they're always around him anyway. Again, I think that if Aaron leaves the Yankees, this is my personal opinion, not on any information that I've gathered. It will be because of that one team that we have not realized yet that will completely blow him out of the water to the fact that the Yankees will go, well, we just can't. It just doesn't make fiscal sense. I'm not sure that team exists. That's the thing I think that will take him away. Everybody asks me wherever I go if I'm out to dinner, I always go 65-35. I think 65% he stays, but I don't think it's a slam dunk. There's still a 35% chance that there's, as you always used to say, one crazy owner. And those percentages could change on a dime over the course of the next day or two.