Thank you for joining us for today's event on the Brazilian election and Brazil's foreign policy under the next administration. This event is part of a CSIS America's Brazil initiative. The initiative engages a series of issue areas in which bilateral cooperation and private sector collaboration can improve understanding about Brazil. So as you know, today's event has a dual purpose. On the one hand, this wonderful group that we have here on stage will be talking about Brazil's presidential election and what it'll mean for the country's foreign policy. On the other hand, I'm thrilled to launch our latest report, co-authored with my good friend and colleague Hussein Calhout from Harvard's Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, the papers entitled Brazil's Presidential Elections, Expectations for Foreign Policy. The report is available on our website, csis.org forward slash americas, and it's a really informative piece. It was really great to partner up with Hussein, so I recommend it to all of you. I think you should check it out. Anyway, this is a very exciting time for Brazil. The first round elections take place this Sunday, and arguably they are the most contested in recent memory. Dilma Rousseff, the current president, has recently pulled ahead in polls relative to her chief rivals Marina Silva and Ayesha Neves. I'm sure many of you know Marina's candidacy has itself been something of an upset. Initially, the vice presidential running mate for Eduardo Campos Marina took over the top of the ticket when Eduardo Campos tragically died in a plane crash late summer, and she represents a change, I'd say, in tone for many Brazilians, a reality which caused an early surge of support for her candidacy. But according to many, this election is up for grabs. Even with Dilma's current lead, it's unlikely that we will see her win in the first round. And the second round is a completely different game. But a huge part of what makes all of this so interesting are the implications for Brazil's foreign policy, which is the main issue of our event today. Relative to her predecessors, Dilma has arguably dialed back the government's focus on foreign policy. So some feel that the prospect of change in the administration or the prospect of a change in the election could mean change from Brazil's approach to foreign policy. So what can we really expect then? I personally think, as is highlighted in our paper, that any change will be a narrative but not in content of Brazil's foreign policy. Brazil's foreign policy is based on a set of firmly held tenants that aren't likely to change quickly. It's much more likely, though, that each candidate, if elected, would rebalance the country's foreign policy priorities based on their own interests. Perhaps, for example, a Marina presidency could see renewed cooperation with the U.S. on the basis of shared environmental concerns because of her background. Or with Mr. Neves expanded commercial relations. Or with Dilma, a deepening of her focus on Brazil's existing multilateral commitments. But what about Brazil's relationship with the United States? As I was walking in, a good friend of mine at the embassy mentioned to me, U.S. and Brazil reached an agreement yesterday on the WTO cotton dispute. So there are some positive things that are happening in this relationship. But I think more is to be seen after the election. The U.S. and Brazil are natural partners despite the recent tensions that belie that reality. The two countries share a tendency toward prescriptive foreign policy and unease with dispassionate geopolitical dealings and a commitment to the most fundamental democratic values. In this regard, I think we're on a set course for our paths to converge. There are a lot of areas of potential shared interest for the U.S. and Brazil, energy, competitiveness, innovation, technology. Ultimately, what matters is that the two countries look to where their interests overlap as a guide for working together. And through that kind of mutual understanding, the U.S. and Brazil can build trust, make bilateral relations and progress real without letting the perfect be the enemy of the good. But for now, I'll leave it there. We're going to dive into the answers to all of these questions during this afternoon's event. And I'd like to get started. So I'm going to quickly introduce our panelists. And then Hussein's going to give a little bit of the content of our report. And then we're going to move on to some good conversation here with the folks that we have. So first, I want to introduce Paulo Sotero, who is the director of the Brazilian Institute at the Woodrow Wilson Center. He's an award-winning journalist, a native of Sao Paulo and lecturer at some of Washington's most esteemed universities. And I would say he's probably the senior Brazilianist that we have here in Washington. And one of the oldest. And the oldest. We have Clalia Trevisian, who is the Washington correspondent of Mostado de Sao Paulo. She's worked in journalism for the past 25 years all around the world. She's an accomplished author and she's a senior associate of the America's Program here at CSIS. And I'm really happy that she's my friend. And Sergio Lemucci, who's a new friend. And Washington correspondent for Valor Economico, where he's been since 2003. Like Paulo, he's an award-winning journalist and a specialist on Brazil's foreign policy, especially toward the United States. Welcome. And last, but not least, my good friend, Hussain Kalupe, the co-author of this report. He's a political scientist, professor of international relations, Brazilian foreign policy expert, and research scholar at Harvard's Weatherhead Center for International Affairs. Welcome. I think this is the beginning of a very close partnership. It's been a true pleasure to work with you on this report. I've learned a lot and I hope our partnership endures. So thanks to all of you for joining us here at CSIS. I'm sure it's going to be a great discussion. Just a few reminders. We're on the record today. We're webcasting live, so greetings to the folks that are watching us. After the discussion, we will engage in a Q&A session. We want to try to get as many people to participate. So we are going to hopefully benefit from your knowledge as well and have a very vibrant conversation about such an interesting issue. So without further ado, Hussain, I'll allow for you to start and then we'll get to our panels. Thank you, Carl. I would like to express the honor and the privilege to be here at the CSIS. And I would like to thank you for this remarkable experience to work in partnership with you and with your staff. And also, I'm very glad to be here between friends on familiar faces from the Brazilian Embassy and also from other places in the bureaucracy of Washington. Well, we worked hard in this piece of paper trying to understand and trying to imagine how it could be the foreign policy, especially of ASU and especially of Marina, because already we knew it, we tested the foreign policy of Dilma in the last four years. Finally, our conclusion or brief conclusion, it is no matter whom are going to win the elections, Brazil is a very solid country and has very solid principles in foreign policy. And I think it is, we can see a great consensus between the three main candidates and the broader lines of the Brazilian principles, let me say that, such as the enhancement of the multilateral institutions, the reform of the Security Council of the United Nations, and the Brazilian inspiration for a permanent seat, the respect of the international law, the protection of the human rights and the enhancement of the democracy and the enhancement also of the sustainable development. So basically those are the main lines and the norm of the three candidates will be able to change essentially those principles. Basically what I can say is the Labour Party, as we call it in Brazil, again want to introduce a foreign policy labeled by Brazil leader of the south, global south, Brazil is leader of the countries and development, Brazil want to rebalance the geoeconomical order and want to be a very important influential actor in the international political scene. ICOs in the other hand, his foreign policy label is based on Brazil should emphasize its diplomacy as a trader state, he want to be more closer to the orbit of the western powers, he want to restart or renew the relation with the United States, with the European Union and probably he could have a little harder politics toward South America or toward Argentina particularly. Well Marina Silva, I guess she's kind of between the both foreign policy, so she has some aspects from DPT and she has other aspects from the PSDB, the Social Democrat Party, but I think what Marina aspires it is to be recognized as the humanitarian environmentalist leader and probably she want to push a agenda based on that, projecting Brazil as the leader of this subject. Well, and Marina, a platform or a foreign policy paper, she emphasized that Brazil should take more steps, strong actions related to humanitarian field, human rights, but there is a very gray area, diplomacy is not the white and black, and that probably will result in some costs for Brazil, so there's some incongruencies in her and out in her paper, for example, to condemn Russia and what related to Crimea and the other day to take some coffee with the Russian in the bricks, that's not something factible, especially at least for the Russian perspective. Well what I also can appoint here, that we can see certain disengagement from some areas, likewise the Middle East, I think ISU foreign policy will be, will still link economically because Brazil in the last 10 years increases straight to the Middle East from 3 billions dollars to 25 billions of dollars, so I think I will keep it, but we will draw a little bit in some political aspects. I think for the Labour Party, Brazil will keep the same strategy without any innovation, and Marina is a great incognito in this subject because she doesn't have any mention to her foreign policy towards the Middle East except Syria and the civil war at Syria, Brazil will be a little bit critical about what's going on there, but definitely what I can say, she is quite susceptible to some pressures, especially from the evangelical side, which they are quite closely with the Jewish lobby, so yes indeed, what possibly she can do in like Gaza war, it's different actions rather than Dilma governments, like I do not believe that you will withdraw an ambassador or condemn one side without the other, possibly she could be more pushed more toward more balanced, not balanced, could be a list for Israeli policy, but the main challenge of all the candidates, it's how to combine moralistic and idealistic aspect with pragmatism and realism in the next four years, so and how they want, how they are going to make from their promises as a coherent guidelines of the Brazilian foreign policy. Great, great, so thank you Hussain, with this we're going to open it up to our panelists and Paolo, I'm sure you have many views and opinions on these issues, you've seen administrations come and go and people make promises sometimes, they keep them, sometimes they don't, so it would be very interesting to hear your views and opinions on these issues. Well, first the idea that there's not going to be much change, followed by our description, I think I believe that with President Dilma Hussain's wins re-election, which is likely, maybe even probable at this point, there won't be much change, she may have made an effort, she may make an effort to get better relations with countries that are more meaningful for the Brazilian economy, the Brazilian economy will be the main driver of foreign policy, domestic policy or any other policy in Brazil, Brazil is basically in a recession right now, it's not common in Brazil for Brazil to be in a recession, Brazilian foreign policy has one of its tenets, has always had its development and development depends on economic growth and Brazil does not have it now and probably will not have much of it in the next couple of years, it makes very difficult to do foreign policy in that context, it conditions foreign policy. In the case right now it's unlikely that either Marina or I assume that this will prevail, I think that there would be a significant change. First of all, it's not, you know, there will be a going away from the Bolivarian aspects of politics in South America, I think there will be an effort to try to recast Mercosur to its original purpose which was to promote trade integration and trade liberalization, right now Mercosur is an obstacle to that. There would be, I believe, an effort to really a better, a more engaging relationship with the United States along the lines President Fernando Henrique Garduas was engaged in with Bill Clinton and even with George W. Bush at the beginning. For one particular reason, unlike the party in power, Aécio Navas comes from an area of Brazilian politicians that do not have a cheap on the shoulder regarding the United States, they don't have a predisposition against the United States. The traditional left in Brazil has. Marina Silva is a person that comes from the traditional left but she brings a new element to the left, to the democratic left in Brazil which is the idea of sustainability. After she lost her first, the first time she ran for president in 2010, after she came to the United States, she spent time here, she was a fellow at MIT. She is a very well-versed on topics like energy, etc., that are central to a effort to try to put Brazil back on the growth pattern but an economy with higher quality. So I think that's a fundamental difference. It's not a small difference, etc. The other things are, you know, there is now a day in Brazil, an enormous first of those that follow foreign policy. Foreign policy has been barely mentioned in the presidential election. President Dilma came to the United States to give a speech but it was basically to use the platform to create some, you know, try to get some dividends at home. It didn't work very well. She was heavily criticized in some quarters, including by some very senior former diplomats for her speech. I believe that Marina gave one or two, she gave one basic interview to Associated Press that dealt a bit with foreign policy. The region, not much of a surprise there, but I think that as I describe, I think she would go into a different direction. I assume that it's the same, I assume that it's focusing on trade, but the problem is, frankly, that the most likely scenario is that President Dilma will continue to have, you know, will continue to be at the Palácio Guplan Alto. We all know that President Dilma is not particularly interested in the subject of diplomacy. She doesn't have a temperament for diplomacy. And this is, I'm not saying that I'm going to read to you something that junior diplomats, and apparently 340 of them, we have 1,400 diplomats. So a good proportion of Brazilian diplomats sent recently a letter according to Foda de São Paulo, and this has not been denied by anybody, saying that the government of Dilma deconstructed everything that the administration of Lula and Celso Mourinho, the former foreign minister, did for Itamara Ti and foreign policy. Those are diplomats talking. People that are hired are there working to promote diplomacy. And so I would not argue with them on that. They have that position. I talk a lot with diplomats, and you can sense an enormous frustration, a disappointment to the point that sometimes you have to contain people to be calm and not say things that they could harm themselves if said in the wrong places. I have many friends that are diplomats, many. Actually, I think, well, it's one of the few advantages of age. I know a lot of former Brazilian ambassadors now that remain friends and remain active. And I disagree with their thesis. I think they are under an illusion that under President Lula and Mourinho, we had this very active foreign policy. We had a kind of a celebrity foreign policy. We wanted to be, because of President Lula, which is such a magnificent, has such a wonderful history, I think his election was very affirming of Brazilian democracy, his personal biography allowed us to, and the success at home of poverty reduction gave a lot of legitimacy to an agenda that would put Brazil in a position here. We are not preaching to you. We are doing it. We want to do diplomacy by example. So for a while there was really a vision, but that vision did not materialize. That vision produced one thing, which was the increase of the staff of it, from 1,000 to 1,400, because there was an idea that that vision would correspond to actions here and there. There would be initiatives, et cetera. Give me one example. In 2005 there were 12 diplomats at the Brazilian embassy in Washington, DC. In 2009 there were 28. So one would assume that this would correspond to the expansion and a deepening of the relationship. Actually it ended up corresponding to the creation of, I think, I stopped at 22 working groups. And that went then later was created the working groups of the working groups. I stopped there. Because frankly I do not agree that there was, it was none of the strategic objectives stated by President Lula, with probably the best of intentions were achieved. The integration in South America, there were some successes in terms of and some positive interventions in terms of UNASU, especially in diffusing a couple of crisis. But the vision was not because you ended up actually complicating things. Brazil ended up complicating things when it incorporated Venezuela to Mercosur in a way that according to a former foreign minister and I cite, Celso Lafer, who wrote it for the São Paulo, that was done illegally. That was done in, did not respect the terms of the treaty. And I remember receiving calls from dear friends, Brazilian diplomats saying, we don't do that. We follow treaties. We follow agreements. So this is the, you know, in the other two things where obviously we wanted to, the idea of reform of the National Security Council of the United Nations with Brazil. This is a very old demand for Brazil, unsupported by President Roosevelt, that Brazil becomes a permanent member. If one day the Security Council is reformed, well, again, if one day it's reformed, I don't see it being reformed in the next maybe what, 10, 20 years. I don't think that Brazil will get much support from the countries that would normally support Brazil, the democracies. I don't see it happening. And the third one that was, would have been the coronation of a foreign policy strategy based on trade, the trade expansion, trade liberalization, which was first you work South America. You organize that space and in a open regionalism and then you bring that to the WTO. At the WTO we do the liberalization where every subject is discussed, which was I think a reasonable way of thinking. Problem is, didn't work. The WTO, as you know, the round has collapsed. It's not going to be revived. So if you judge things by measuring the results of what was intended, it's pretty frustrating. I don't see much changing, obviously, if President Dilma Rousseff gets reelected. I assume she will make efforts to try to get some traction. Brazil needs to, in order to revive its economy, Brazil needs to open its economy. In order to become more competitive, Brazil needs to open its economy. This in itself would be a fundamental change in Brazilian foreign policy. I am always hopeful, I think, that the pressures that were in the streets in June of 2013 will come back, will be for surface if their demands that were heard then are not, don't get a response. And to do that I think you have, Brazil has to integrate itself in the world economy and in the global politics in a different way. Finally, one point regarding the speech that President Dilma, at the UN the other day, generated a lot of controversy because Brazil didn't do a combination of the horrible terrorist acts of people decapitating people in front of the religion. There was not initially a mention of that, but there was a denunciation and a criticism of the, which was, you know, the tradition was in a position, you know, things are better solved through dialogue, et cetera, then there was an explanation by the foreign minister saying, no, no, she was not, President was not referring, obviously, to dialogue with the guys who, with the executioners, right? One very senior former diplomat in Brazil thought that it was, actually he wrote a piece, I'm referring to Rubens Recupero, a man known, was ambassador here, said that dialoguing with the executioner, this was the title of his column the other day, but then the foreign minister came out and said, no, the dialogue was not that, your misunderstanding, is the dialogue with the international community about this issue of, yes, there is a dialog in the international community, the only problem is that Brazil is not part of it. Claudia. Well, hi, thank you for your invitation. Let me just be following this a little bit, no, no. So do you think that there would be a difference depending on who wins, one, and two, how do you make out it, because this has been an issue that has been coming up more and more, the speech of President Dilma at the UN and the effectiveness of it, the purpose of it, the reaction? How do you see these things? Well, we see a difference based on what the outcome of the election would be and what, I guess, what's the status of foreign policy with Brazil right now. Yeah, well, regarding to the elections itself, I think there has been a very volatile election. If you look at 20 days ago, there was a great expectation that Marina would go to the second round with Dilma that she could win the election. I think the Dilma campaign was very successful in deconstructing the Marina image. Marina had an image of a very authentic politician, someone that was out of the traditional space, and with methods not always, that's not a very thinking, it's ethical, they managed to associate Marina with the most conservative sectors of the Brazilian society. Like the Dilma campaign managed to associate Marina with the bankers, managed to present the proposal of Marina for the independence of the Central Bank as something that would benefit the region, threaten the social conquerors that the poor people had in the last 12 years, and also in social issues. Marina was associated with very conservative positions, especially in the question of gay rights, to the point that Mark Ruflo, the American actor, he recorded the video supporting Marina, because he worked with Fernando Mereles, which is a director that worked with him, and he received a lot of criticism on the social media, people saying that Marina was against gay rights and then he withdrew his support to Marina. And I think Marina was not able, like she was not very able to contest it, and she committed errors herself, like releasing her program, and then reviewing it in less than 24 hours exactly on this issue of gay rights, and it gave the impression that she was bowing to the pressure of the evangelical community. So I think she arrived in the eve of the first turn in a very fragile situation, like she is losing support while Dilma is increasing support. In a situation in which they are not able to contest it, the economy is barely growing, like the economy will grow less than 1% this year, probably 0.5%, but there is one thing, unemployment is still historically low. The unemployment in August was 5%, which was the lowest for in August in 13 years or 15 years. Yes. And you have also something that Dilma was very, did in a very, her campaign was very effective in presenting the social benefits as one of the main conquerors of Brazilian population, and if any of the other candidates win, these social benefits could be at risk. And regarding to foreign policy, I think, first of all, I think the relations with the United States, I think no matter who wins, even if Dilma wins, I think the question of rebuild the relations with the United States will be one of the priorities. And I think to use an expression of one very good diplomat and very well connected, that the current situation is unsustainable. Brazil and the United States have a lot of economic relations, trade relations that cannot, you cannot have a high level relationship that does not match this relation. The United States is the largest foreign investor in Brazil by far. Brazil is increasing its investment in the United States. There are a lot of big companies in Brazil that are increasing its investments here. The United States is the main destination of Brazilian tourists, is the main destination of the students that the government is sending abroad to study the science without borders. So I think there will, and I think one expression that you use in the report that somehow the United States need to throw a ladder for Dilma to get out of the hole that she put herself. And I think like yesterday Marina gave an interview to Cristiana Mampur, and I think the ladder needs to be thrown to Marina as well, because on the interview she criticized, she mentioned the question of the NSA, and she was very strong, and she said the United States needs to recognize its mistakes. So I think there need to be, I think with IESO, in the unlikely scenario that IESO is, I think it would be much easier to rebuild this relationship as I was talking with who was saying before, like he does not have, he was not a target of the NSA, he does not have this personal difficulties that Dilma has. And I think another area that there will be a change no matter who wins, I think is Mercosul. I think even if Dilma wins, I think the current situation is also unsustainable. I think there is a growing sense in Brazil that Mercosul is becoming a more, a more, a more, a more of a problem than a solution. And also one thing that probably would be, would see the largest or the biggest change I think would be the question of Venezuela. I think there will, for sure if IESO wins or Marina wins, I think there will be some kind of a more less ideological relation with Venezuela. And I think what I, and I think if Dilma wins probably things will not change. And one thing that I'm hearing, there was a lot of reference, the principles that guide the Brazilian relations and the reference to democracy. And it's on the charter of the OAS. And I'm hearing more and more from Brazilian officials reinterpretation of the meaning of democracy. And the expression that, oh, we need to contemplate different kinds of democracy. And Venezuela has its own kind of democracy, has its popular kind of democracy. And it needs to be respected by the OAS charter. I think with Marina and IESO, I think there will be a lower degree of tolerance to human rights abuses and suppression of dissent inside Venezuela. But I think also there is, but there, the space to do, I don't see a rupture or, because we have economic relations, important economic relations with Venezuela. Last year Venezuela was number seven in the ranking of the main destination of Brazilian exports. And we mainly exports industrial products to Venezuela. And the same with Argentina is our third main trading partner. So I think I agree with the paper like there, you're not going to see dramatic ruptures or changes. But I think in the question of Venezuela probably would be where, or the Bolivaria, where it would be. The issue that's come up with both Paulo and Claudia has been the issue of the economy. And the economy of Brazil right now faces some serious challenges. And I think Paulo talked about the economy as being the driver of a lot of the foreign policy. Who do you think would be more likely to make reforms that are consistent with strengthening Brazilian's foreign policy if it's rooted, as Paulo said, in having a strong economy? First, thank you for the invitation. I think Marina or I ask you, they have tried to push an agenda of reforms that is clear. Dilma is saying at her programs, at her speeches that there's nothing fundamentally wrong with their policies. So I think I asked Marina would pursue an agenda of reforms. But there's something that Paulo mentioned and the situation of the economy is very delicate now. The commodity boom is over. So maybe there will be a push in the direction of pragmatism or whoever will be the next president. There's something interesting that I think that the private sector now wants free trade agreement with the U.S. This was a major change. Brazilian industrial leaders are usually very protectionists. And I talked to one of the directors of Confederação Nacional de Indústria in the Industrial National Confederation. And they want a free trade agreement to the U.S., a free trade agreement to the European Union. And they'll press the government in this direction. I think in a word that Brazilian economy, we won't have the revenue from commodities. The productivity is so low. And what people are saying that Brazil is true does not participate in many of the supply chains, global supply chains, is a way of from innovation. So it's fundamental that you have this kind of approach to deal with free trade agreements. But I think any of the candidates, if president, they will try to reset the relations with the U.S. It would be more difficult to deal with them, because yesterday, for example, Minister Figueiredo was here. They signed the end of the cotton controversy. And I was there, Clara was there. We insisted, wow, is this a sign of improvement of the overall bilateral relations. And he was very clear that it was only a step of progress in the trade relations. He was very careful. He said that it's a solution for a specific problem in a specific area, which is the trade area. So there's maybe the ladder that you said in your report that they should give to Dilma. It's important. And something that we need to be done. But I asked you and Marina, I think you would be much more pragmatic. Even I didn't see this interview with Marina. But Mauricio Hans, one of Marina's economic advisers, he was here last week at the U.S. Chamber event. And he said that he wanted to, Marina's government would develop ties with the U.S. And he said that the Mercosur is stagnated. I think they are ready to try to negotiate something more pragmatic with the U.S. Armino Fraga, a month ago, in an interview to Valor from my colleague, Sergio Lell, he said that, well, about Mercosur, we should say we'll go this way. Or the Mercosur comes with us, or we'll go without Mercosur. It was a blunt statement. So I think if I ask you when there will be a change, but it's unlikely that he will be even in the second round. But I think Marina and Mauricio Hans also pointed that Mercosur is stagnated. And I think they are, even in Dilma's government, they are running out of patience with Arminina, for example. They are an obstacle for negotiations with the U, for example. And now they are delaying some payments for exporters, for Brazilian exporters, because they have a shortage of dollars. Let me stay with you for a little bit. And I know I want to open it up. And there's wonderful points being made everywhere. And this session should really have been an afternoon session. No? Okay. Anyway. So on that point, a lot of the thinking is that so the United States is engaged in free trade agreements with the Europeans, with TPP. You're seeing a lot of activity in the region, specifically with the Pacific Alliance, trying to be more attractive to find markets in other places. And it truly is a global sort of reach that the Pacific Alliance is trying to have with over 30 observing members from all over the world.  It's not even the Pacific Alliance. This EU issue sort of comes back more and more. What is the likelihood that this fervor or this desire, and this is for all of you, this fervor desire to sort of break away and do something different away from Mercosur or reform Mercosur, what's the likelihood that this actually would come into being? And that's the first question. And the second issue is you talk about a lot of will or interest in Brazil and having closer relations with the U.S. I worked with Congress for many years and we were really trying to push the issue of a tax treaty for a long time and felt that that was a way of doing this. How likely is the Mercosur reform or change or movement away from it a possibility? And how likely is that something like a tax treaty would be more possible on the Brazilian side? Because the U.S. is a completely different discussion with the two years that we're going to have presidential politicking, et cetera. But from the Brazilian side, how do you see that evolving? How real is this interest in doing something different from Mercosur and how real is this interest in doing something with the United States? I think any candidates would like a tax treatment with the U.S. It doesn't matter if it's Dilma or Marino. I think this is not a problem. And people, I think they will detach from Mercosur and they'll try to develop something, some strategies to do that. For example, in the negotiations with the EU, they talked about the two-speed integration and the tariffs would be lowered in different velocities depending on the country. I think there would be people desire to do something different. I'd like to say a few things about this. When I thought that the idea that Claudia mentioned that the improvement in U.S.-Brazil relations is inevitable, I actually wrote that a couple of times. Probably it was public and it was proved wrong. So I'm not saying that anymore. I also believe that, but I'm not writing it anymore. If you go to the Humphries Post, there is a piece of mine two years ago that is inevitable. Obviously, rationally it has to happen. And actually the relationship between Brazil and the United States continues to be very intense, except at the level of the two federal governments. All the other relationships are quite intense. They're good. The fact that they finally removed this thing, the cotton case after 12 years, obviously it's positive. We have here and there competent negotiators and they compromise. Wow, what an idea. And to resolve this thing because it's needed. It's necessary. The problem is, and if you see, for instance, I am involved in something called a scientific cooperation between Brazil and the United States. For instance, you are all invited, October 28th, a one-day symposium at the Wilson Center about something that's fundamental to the Brazilian economy, to the future to climate change. It's a study done cooperatively by American scientists, Brazilian scientists ongoing on the hydrological equilibrium of the Amazon region. If that goes, the Brazilian agriculture goes with it. Energy production in Brazil, mostly hydro, goes with it. It's a matter, it's a very important matter. Brazilian and American scientists and with the São Paulo Science Federation and the Department of Energy have been working. This is a subject that had been studied for 10 years. And they are. They were in four places in the Amazon taking measurements about the size of a rain drop at different altitudes. This cooperation exists. The cooperation between industries, especially the ones that are global, exists all the time. The transit of people, the only problem is the two governments cannot, they have to catch up with reality. The reality is much better than the relationship would. And this is, this business of friends, the tax, I frankly, if Dilma, imagine a re-elected Dilma, I don't know what is the conclusion she will take from the re-election. She may decided that everything she was doing was absolutely right and therefore she will continue to do the same thing. She may also, she has all the power and she's a very energetic person and say, so let's do a tax treatment treaty with the United States. A tax treaty with the United, Brazilian United States would probably be worth two alcas for Brazil because it would make businesses that already exist between, some American companies have been in Brazil forever and there are some major Brazilian companies here now. If you facilitate that, that would create some momentum for a tax treaty. There's a matter of political will and conviction. If a president, a re-elected president, Dilma or an elected, they have to put together their people, negotiate and move. That's, it's very simple. You have to have the will and the capacity to do this. I would like to see that. On the NSA thing again, there are certain, it's Milor Fernandes, a great satirist that once said that when ideas get old, they move to Brazil. And once we get stuff and this is the NSA, now we're not going to get away with the NSA stuff. The Indians, India, was the main target of the NSA spine. No country, no prime minister, no, it was more spied on by the NSA, this operation, than India. The prime minister of India, the Modi, who was actually, had a visa, what, canceled, right? I don't know. He could, no, he wasn't the least of people. No, no, I think he was denied. The visa was revoked and then was reinstated. So it was much more serious situation. He was here the other day at the White House because pragmatism, because the interest, the national interest of India are informing a policy in this world and India participates in very complicated negotiations regarding international peace. And so this is, you know, I think it's very difficult to talk about those issues right now because we have to see what is the outcome of the, like, maybe if we have a second round, maybe the candidates will use the second round to debate some of those questions related, for instance, to the economy that are related to foreign policy, but they have not so far, so we don't know what they really think. And I think also the question of NSA and, like, I don't think, during the election moment, during the campaign, like, I don't think Dilma can in any way reach a position that she would appear not being tough with the U.S., but even though when she gave an interview to Christiana for last month in which she said, well, the problem of NSA is not a problem of Obama, it was something that was a consequence of the war on terror. That seemed to be a kind of opening for a less confrontational position. Let me allow me to make some brief remarks on the Brazil-U.S. relations. I think Dilma, she threw the ball in the court of the United States, and she needed some important and strategic signs from Obama's administration. No matter who I'm going to win, I don't think even ISU or Marina, they will be capable to improve the relation without any important signs from the United States. This is a very crucial point. What Brazil want, and no matter whom will be the president, it's a recognition on the Brazilian condition as a strategic partner of the United States. And ultimately, what we should ask, what do the United States want from Brazil? They want a partner, they want a strategic partner, or they want to maintain Brazil and the ghettos of the American foreign policy. So this is a very crucial question. I don't believe ISU will restart the relation just because he wanted to do without any counter-offer from the United States. You know, when people talk about that in this country, strategic partnership for the United States means something very different than what it does for Brazil. So when we put that on the sheet, I think it's helpful and necessary to define the terms. So institutional relationships, legally binding relationships is usually what strategic means to the U.S. And up until now it's been difficult to develop that kind of relationship with Brazil. So when you talk about, when Secure talks a little bit about a willingness to embark on a different kind of policy with a tax treaty or an evolved or a different kind of version of Mercosur for obvious reasons. That kind of talk is a little more sort of consistent with what the United States sees as sort of the pillars to create a strategic relationship. When people talk about the Security Council, I mean I don't know when Security Council reform is going to happen, maybe you're right, maybe it's 10 years from now, I don't know. But one of the things that you hear from folks here is that sure we'd support Brazil, but Brazil would have to be supporting a lot of the things that we support because we don't want to put another member on the Security Council that doesn't work so much with the United States. And that's just sort of the United States response. So it's very helpful to get a sense of what strategic relationship means. I know because of our previous conversations that they're competing orbits now that didn't exist before like the BRICS. And that is something that I think we sort of need to unpack and I'd like to unpack a little bit of this. I'm sure there's people that have questions. So I don't want to sort of just monopolize. I think we will go over a little bit, but I'd like to give back to that. But first of all let me open it up and get some questions from the audience. There's tweeted questions as well so I wanted to try to get everything to be 20. If you could just go to these gentlemen over here and we'll just take how many questions are there? We'll take one, two, three questions and then you guys pick which ones you want to answer. If you could just identify yourself first and your question. Hello, my name is Jose Miguel Pulido. I work at Mitsui. Thank you very much for a great presentations. I was wondering about the issue of governability. If Marina or ASIO or DOMA wins, DOMA will probably have a weekend PT. Marina said that she doesn't want to construct alliances which would be very new for Brazil. So even if they want to start economic reforms, what's the likelihood that they can accomplish them? Thank you. Next question. I won't ask a question, but I just note that China wasn't discussed very much. Identify yourself. Oh, I'm sorry. I'm Tom O'Donnell. I work in Energy and International Affairs. I'm currently in Berlin teaching. Two things. One, the NSA issue. It's always dealt with and referred to as though, well, it's kind of silly that people go on about this because it's things that happen between governments and it's political. It's for public consumption. And I've heard a number of American ambassadors and other diplomats both in Europe and Latin America more or less say things like that and it really shouldn't be taken. I think there's just a disconnect by the United States in understanding. One thing that everybody that they always say I noticed is that, and of course there was no economic side to this. But Brazil is precisely a country where there may have been significant economic effects of the spying. One is, you know, the negotiations over the airplane sales. If those negotiations in fact were being spied on, it raises the question, were the American commercial negotiators given information? Of course the other side, when you find out that, doesn't want to sign the contract because who knows what they knew. It raises legal issues in the United States if other competitors didn't get the information. And the same thing with Petrobras. What are the effects? So I think it's a pragmatically has to be, it's not just a matter of an apology, there has to be a certain trust involved. If you could address that. The other thing is with Venezuela, again here it's often, this is often addressed as a question of because of the political proclivities of the workers party, there's a sort of closeness. But I think what's left out is that the business, there's a significant section of the business class that might not be PT, but they agree with keeping relations in this way with Venezuela because Venezuela is rather a basket case and what it's really going to need over time is infrastructure, not only exports. And Brazil of course, probably I would predict that more so than China, it'll be Brazil that supplies this sort of thing. And so it's, I think if you could address this, it's not just a political question, but there's a business interest. And the gentleman in the back there, and I think then we'll let you guys pick. Vitoria? Straight to the right. Hi, my name is Marcia Coimbra for the Huffington Post, Brazil, Brazil Post. Brazil is going to go through the next year through very dramatic economic adjustments, even with Dilma or more with Marina or ISU. And some economists say that Brazil may hit the bottom next year economically. So I would like to hear from you what does this impact with the relation with the United States? Okay, great. Who would like to go first? About the governability. Well, if Dilma wins, she will keep the majority in the Congress. I guess no Brazilian president has such a big majority in the recent democratic era in Brazil. This is very easy to talk about. Secondly, if ISU wins, well, probably the PMDB will move toward ISU and they will rebuild the association during the 90s, PMDB, PSDB and PSD and whatever. If Marina wins, then I guess she will be in trouble what we should look at if she will be capable to make some concession and what she now, during campaign, what she's saying, I'm not going to do concession, I'm not going to make the old way of politics, whatever, but you cannot govern without PMDB in the Congress. So effectively it will depend ultimately on one, what kind of concession that she will be able to make to have a majority to govern. Let me say something. The only certainty about Brazilian politics next year, in the first of January, is that the PMDB will move towards whoever wins the election. That's what the PMDB does. But depends how many ministers they will have. Yes, now, it's a matter of price. Okay? That's all. And that there are presidents like Fernando Henrique Cardoso that managed to protect certain key areas of the government where there was no negotiation about governability and then dealt with PMDB and all the... We have 32 parties. It's a pluralistic country. We deal with all those. It's a nightmare, it's fragmented, it doesn't work. About governability, there was one president in Brazil that governed under very dire circumstances, a very decent man, a very valiant opponent to the dictatorship. It was a senator from Ina Gerais that eventually became our president, had no political party, had no basis in Congress and was able to select a group of people in a difficult situation that resolved the two most negative legacies of the military dictatorship, the foreign debt crisis and the danger of near hyperinflation, pay-all plan. This was done by a president that covered... All of this was done in a year and a half. So it's perfectly possible, I think, that the problem of governability that I would see is once there is probable re-election of President Dilma Rousseff that the economy will not allow her to respond to the demands that were in the streets last year, remain there, which is, we want more, we want better, we want faster. And all of this will cost money. And President Dilma will not have the space to respond to that. So my difficulty with this, the problem of governability is the possibility that the streets could erupt again. The campaign has been, in a sense, in certain senses, it's very good, actually the campaign, the organization, there is a debate, but because of what the candidates chose to focus on, there has not been really so far a debate about the tough choices the country has to make. So therefore it's very difficult to see. And finally on NSA, I just think, you know, I think it's important to deal, I think Germany is one of the countries that is dealing with this seriously. German has an absolutely strategic relationship with the United States based on values and is able to deal with that. I hope that Brazil will, and the United States, will get an understanding, trust is absolutely fundamental. And if countries have to do clandestine work, and most countries do it, they should at least hire professionals to do it. Sef, do you want to answer the question on the economy? Well, I believe the economy will be in a very difficult situation. There will be, there is a need to be a fiscal adjustment because now we are running almost no surplus. We will have to adjust the managed prices like gasoline, so it will be very difficult. And it's better if it's done in the beginning. And part of it's a problem of credibility. If you look at the business confidence, consumer confidence, it's in 2009 levels that was in the middle of the crisis. So if the expectations are well managed, it's possible to do that to overcome. A finance minister with a good speech, with a good team would do part of the job, I think. Then it would not be necessary to raise much more interest rates. So I think the economic agenda is more or less of everybody, but President Dilma during her campaign and her economic aides, they said repeatedly that there is no fundamental problem and they should keep the course. There will be some changes. She will change the finance minister, she announced it. But if she insists in this approach, maybe there will be some problems, especially on the credibility side. And I find it difficult to relate it with your question about what would mean to the U.S. Maybe Brazil will be too worried about its economic problems that the foreign policy would be in the second plan. Yeah, and I think there is one question that is also very difficult for the economy next year is the external sector. That will suffer the impact of the likely raise of interest rates in the U.S., which is already affecting, which in the long run could have a positive impact with the devaluation of the real. And regarding the NSA, I always, I don't like this speech of that. Everybody does. Because this speech that everybody does, it's one that only benefits the ones that can do. And the ones that, the country that could do the espionage, the scale that the U.S. does is only the U.S. So I think it cannot be used as a justification. I think the concerns of the Brazilian government, I think they are justified. And I think we should also kind of rewind, if you look at the relationship before the NSA scandal, what we were seeing in last year. It was a very positive scenario. There was this engagement. The engagement was growing. There was the expectation toward the state visit. There was a visit that human insisted in doing. It was something important for her. So I think if we take the NSA thing from the picture, it was a positive scenario. So I think the question now is how the two countries take the NSA out of the picture and go back to where they were. And yes, the agreement was important. Yeah, I think the agreement, the cultural agreement that you should have underestimated. Yeah, I think it's a signal that the things are going on. They're moving on. And there was, from the U.S. side, there was concessions. I think if they were elected, she would have less pressure also to improve this relation. And this year will be very hard for her, like running, campaigning, and accepting to dialogue with Obama administration without any gesture, positive gesture, she will be easily targeted by the other candidates. So I think also she's waiting for the second term to try to build a strategy for that. But also what she also, what also that requires is the, I coordinate strategy to rebuild the confidence, the level of the confidence between both countries. This is very important. And what she is expecting, it's any minimum action from Obama to take her out of the box. But without that, you cannot leave it. Yeah, just one thing, having been kind of a veteran here. Obama, President Obama will face now an election where his party may not fare very well. And that is another information that will be relevant for the future. How much engaged he will be able to be. Sometimes I find it unbelievable that Obama has now to worry about his own safety in the White House, frankly. It's pretty complicated. I think that yes, they can make just, but what I wanted to tell you, there's a very unfortunate episode of the NSA and I totally agree that President Dilma was absolutely dedicated to improving this relationship. I have no doubt about it. And what happened, and then after what happened, other things happened that left lots of resentment on both sides. And those are things that you cannot ignore. And those will be factors. And we know, because we talk to people here, we talk to people in Brazil, it's very, very unfortunate that the two largest democracies in this hemisphere had to go through that. If there is, you know, Brazil has all, and the United States, all the means to face their problems. And we have been proving this, you know, Brazil is the country.  You least expect. We surprise people. We have a capacity to. But, you know, it's a matter of, and not only in Brazil, it's also here. Those things depend fundamentally, the willing to engage and to resolve and to move forward, depending on vision and leadership. If there is leadership, those things happen. Take all the, in the history of recent agreements, things that were absolutely impossible. Leaders are the people that make things move forward. I think it's perfectly possible because the two societies want to get closer. I have no doubt about it. But the message apparently has not reached the governments yet. This has been a very fruitful and useful session. I want to thank you for agreeing to come. I want to thank you, Hussein, for working on the paper. I think it's a great piece that contributes to the discussion on these issues and expands and deepens understanding on this relationship. I want to finish with something positive. Since you said that Brazil was the country that surprises. Always does. So Churchill said about the United States and you probably know this quote, that the U.S. always does the right thing after it's tried everything else. I think that's what's going to end up happening. I think we're going to have a couple of challenging years. Obviously we have a presidential election and we call it the silly season here in the U.S. and you never know what's going to happen. That's just the reality of our democracy. But I think that eventually the two rivers will come together, and we'll be going in the same direction because it's in our benefit. It's in both of our countries' benefit to do this. So anything that we can do to expedite that process, and I think these events actually do help that because they maximize understanding, is something that you will always find me game to doing. So thank you, Paulo. Thank you. Claudia, Sergio, and Hussein. Thank you everybody for coming.


The Prime Minister had the other part of the country, and President Trump had the other part of the country to see. Good morning. Good morning. I hope you've got some rest. Yes, Mr. President. Thank you very much. At the same time, in this country of ours that we've had, we've had some assistance for floods. I'll put it so. Welcome your visit. Continue. The tradition of necessities will have become a tradition between our two countries. We certainly support your independence in the territory of integrity. And I'm pleased with the economic progress that you've made in 1984. And no, of course, that your stabilization program has been difficult. The most supportive of your continued efforts there. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. I would like to say to you that you have always been a welcome guest in the U.S. and that you have a standing invitation to come visit us. Thank you very much. In the United States, we've been in the United States, in all of its extended talks. With the end of the assessment that we knew each other well, the United States of America is a strategic orientation of both one country and the other. The great need to have a continuity of dialogue on all matters which are interested and conducted with a great deal of thought. What was the travel of the damn thing? Somebody locked it. You mean with a key? Yeah. Oh, not the sliding? No. Ah, I only could do is stick something in the keyhole and break it off. Hello. Hello. Susan King. We said hello. We did. We will again. How are you? I'm doing pretty well. Doing very well. All right. The other day. Well, this President, I'm going to sit there. George is going to sit there. No, I'm not. I want to hear, hear, hear. I want to hear. President Pittsburgh. All that stuff. That was a great idea the last few years. There was a lot of people sitting there. I don't know why so many people are objectively going to Pittsburgh. But all I see on television, all I see is Jim Pooch. I don't see the President. Jim ran around all over the place. I had a nice meeting with Hussein yesterday, Mr. President. And I was telling him about it. We talked for about 30 minutes. He spoke to himself. That's not why I'm here, obviously, but I would like to add that. I think we're headed for a big problem. If we get the Soviets back involved in that conference, I think it's going to be an irresistible stage for them to demo God. To repoliticize the problems in the Middle East, at least to repolarize it. And that I think it's a mistake. And he thinks he has to do that in order to, quote, have international cover and all that sort of thing. But for whatever it's worth, my political instincts tell me that that is a tough, bad deal. And I don't want to lose Hussein or jeopardize Hussein, but I want to say that. I just, even though he says that it would be an umbrella with the negotiations only taking place between the Israelis and the Arabs and the Palestinians.


This is the story of the Pacific and its people, of the peaceful sea and the lands and lives it touches, and their meaning to us and to the generations to come. The Pacific Story, presented by the National Broadcasting Company and dedicated to a fuller understanding of the vast Pacific Basin. This Broadcast Series comes to you as another public server, with drama of the past and present and commentary by Dr. Clarence Henderson for some years resident of Burma and now associate professor of history at Redlands University. Burma, keystone to the far east. The monsoon rains are coming to an end, and soon the green fields of Burma will turn to a golden brown. The great Irrawaddy Valley will turn golden, and will match the gleaming gold on the pagodas and the monasteries throughout the land, and then over the land and through the skies will move great engines of destruction and death. For even now the United Nations and the Japanese are girding for the bloody struggle which must be fought for this doorway to China. This keystone to the far east. For centuries, Burma has been a battleground, tribe fought against tribe, people against people. More than 140 years ago, Colonel Michael Syme, envoy of the British Crown, returned with fabulous accounts of the wealth and power of Burma. The population, I should judge, is 17 million. What of its army, Colonel Syme? It has twice invaded Xi'an. It repelled the recent Chinese invasions. Strong, then. Matter of fact, they've conquered Arakhan and raided Manapur, and set up a control over parts of Essen. Then we have a powerful and ambitious neighbor next to India. I should not be surprised that the Burmans think they are invincible. This means, then, that we are ripe for trouble with Burma over the frontier between Arakhan and Bengal. It may come at any time. Burma's greatest era of expansion was taking place in the early 1800s, at the same time British power was growing next door in India. The Burmans demanded payment of toll on all British boats passing up the North Estuary, the frontier between Bengal and Burma, the British Refuge. We have parked with Bengal native infantry, General Mandela. What of the British traffic on the estuary? We have stopped it. We have halted the driven back to British at every point on the frontier. Then we'll bring up the flies and prepare to advance. Yes, General Mandela. Yes, Major. We have just received a dispatch overland. British transports are anchored off Rangoon. Off Rangoon? Yes, sir. They dropped anchor in the harbor during the night. That means they're probably in Rangoon by now. Yes, sir. The British have attacked it up back. We withdraw to the new view and they're set up a line of... The British landed and the Burmans suffered defeat after defeat. General Mahabandula was killed by a British rocket, and the Burmans sued for peace. Burma seated the coastal provinces of Erekan in Tannasarim, and Britain gained its first hold on Burma. But 25 years later, relations between the British and the Burmans again were on edge. It is with the greatest respect that we make this request of our majesty. This is Lord Dalhousie, India's Governor-General. You recall that we protested at the time Captain Shepard, a British subject, was accused by Burmese officials of embezzlement and the murder of his river pilot, who also was a British subject. We protested when Captain Lewis of the Barkantine Monarch complained of indignities in pines. Accordingly, we ask better treatment of British merchant ships. We have sent six British men of war to Rangoon to await communication with the Burmese government and to seek... No answer was forthcoming from the king, and a month later, a British boat under a flag of truce went up the Rangoon River to receive an answer from the Burmese court. This makes me nervous. You don't know who's in those jungles along the river. They know we're British. Look, there's a fort back there on the hill. Yes, so it is. And we're passing right under it's nose. We've got a flag of truce here. They can see that. They're shooting at us. They're shooting at us. They've opened fire. Lay on those oars. Over to the side of the river. Role! Role! The second Anglo-Burmese war was on, and Burma's only remaining maritime province, Pugue, was annexed by Britain in 1852. Only Upper Burma now remained under the rule of the Burmese kings. Relations between Britain and Burma were strained, and with the passing years worsened. In British political circles, it was said... What King Sibor is actually trying to do is use the French to checkmate us in Burma. In American political circles, it was said... Britain is not concerned with the heavy spy that King Sibor has levied on the Bombay-Burma trading company. What Britain is concerned about is the rumour that Sibor is encouraging France to move into Stockbridge. In Burma, King Sibor said... Britain wants full control of our cheap forests and our oil, and we should use Burma as a backdoor to China. This is why the British have sent us this ultimatum, and this is why we have replied to them unfavorably. British General Prendergast's command advanced on Mandalay, and the third Anglo-Burmese war broke out. Before nightfall, King Sibor was a prisoner of the British. He was exiled to the Bombay coast of India, and Lord Dufferin announced in a classic one-sentence proclamation... By command of the Queen Empress, it is hereby notified that the territories governed by King Sibor will no longer be under his rule, but have become part of her Majesty's dominions and will during her Majesty's pleasure be administered by such officers as the viceroy and Governor-General of India may from time to time up point. Thus, on January 1st, 1886, Upper Burma, the last independent territory of Burma, was annexed by the British. Britain now held all of Burma. Burma was incorporated into British India, although the people of Burma are racially different from the people of India. The people of Burma are basically Mondullian. The people of India are basically Aryan. There are many races and many languages in Burma, yet the Burmans are the dominant race. Observers in Burma note the outstanding characteristics of the Burmans. You should be able to pick out the Burmans from the other easily here in the market place. There are so many different types, but many are mixture of race here, of course. That fellow there is a shan from the northern hills. He looks something like a Thailander. Yes, the shans are more slender than the Burmans. They are good businessmen too. Aren't the Burmans? Not so much as a shan. You see, there is a Chinese. I should say a man of Chinese blood. There seem to be many Chinese here in Burma. Yes, and the Koreans, Chinese, Thalaians and Malay. Many of them are intermixed with Portuguese, Dutch, British and French. What a great mixture. That is because for centuries Burma has been a sort of crossroads of many people. Yes, I see. Oh, there is a Burma now. Yes, he is much darker than the Chinese. Yes, and like most Burmans, he is more vigorous than many of his neighbors in this part of Asia. That's as though he knows his own mind. Oh, that's a characteristic of Burma. He is independent and he is strong. But notice how good nature he is. Yes, it just seems to glow. They say that Burmans are never pessimistic. They are spontaneous in nearly everything they do. And most of them have very good manners. They are called the Irishman of the Easter. Then what of this notion that the Burmans are cruel and vindicated? Well, that's true in war. And they are capable of great violence and peacetime too. So, but that's true of most of them, isn't it? Yes, yes, I guess so. The Burmans is a pretty solid citizen, actually. Some people mistake their light-heartedness for lack of purpose. But the Burmans will work and work hard if he knows he's hoping himself right. You know, the strange thing is that these Burmans with all the other races around them are not absorbed. The greater likelihood is that the Burmans will Burmenize the smaller racial groups. Is that to mean then that a sort of unification of the people of Burma is slowly taking place? That's about what's happening. Many Burmans are rising to post of importance in the government. And politically, the Burmans are thinking of... Burma had been made part of British India and this rankled in her soul. In 1919 when Britain adopted the Government of India Act, providing for reforms for India, but specifically excluding these reforms for Burma, the Burmans rose in protest. Why has Burma been excluded from the benefits of these reforms? Burma is not India. Burma is prosperous, law-abiding. And since 1886 has been considered a part of India, the people of Burma belong to another race and its problems are altogether different. Burma is entitled to the same treatment as the other provinces of India. The agitation on this point continued for years. Burma was granted a measure of home rule in 1921, equal to that of the provinces of India. But politics sieved within Burma. Some shouting for separation from India, some arguing that separation would mean that if India were given dominion status, Burma might be regarded as inferior and kept a colony. In 1935, a new constitution for Burma was set forth. A document six times longer than the document under which the American government is set forth. The Burmans had gained a voice in their future. And in 1937, Burma was separated from India. Out of the political turmoil in Burma, rose Usaw, leader of the nationalist patriotic party. In 1938, Usaw was jailed as head of a civil disobedience campaign. In 1940, he became Prime Minister of Burma. We must mermanize the government services, education, and the defense forces. This is Prime Minister Usaw. Burma neither needs nor can afford a Rolls Royce administration on afford income. We shall seek national honor and home rule by evolution rather than revolution. World War II in Europe had been underway for a year when Usaw became Prime Minister. On the occasion of his taking office, newspaper men waited on him for an interview. Chances are Usaw will give Burma its best government until it was separated from India. Usaw is pretty extreme. Well, he's a nationalist. He's more than that. He's a radical extremist. The program he's announced sounds pretty good to me. But what of Britain? Is Usaw pro-British or pro-Japanese? He's pro-Burma, just as I say of all Burma. It's 20% pro-Japanese, 20% pro-British, and 60% pro-Burma. Usaw may be just pro-Burma, but I've got an idea. Usaw was interviewed on this point and his answer was, I cannot desire the defeat of Britain a little more than a year past and the crisis in the Pacific was nearing the breaking point. In November 1941, Usaw flew to London. On Usaw's mind was the third clause of the Atlantic Charter providing for the self-determination of nations which Prime Minister Churchill had announced did not apply to regions and people that spoke allegiance to the British Crown. Who's that? Looks like somebody from the Colony. What is the Indian? Doesn't look like an Indian to me. Never seen anything like it on the streets of London walking round here in the wind and cold, dressed in silk talc, a pallet skirt and an anchor ship on his head. Why doesn't he dress like a human being, I ask you. I know who he is, I know. I saw his picture in the paper last night. That's that Prime Minister from Burma. No, I mean the Inc. Usaw. Isn't it? That's it, Usaw. Come here to talk with Churchill, he did and the Piper said he brought a box of show notes for Churchill. I wonder if Churchill likes him as well as those togies of me. Days later, the discussions with Prime Minister Churchill passed. Usaw and his party prepared to fly away home by way of the United States. Before they took off from England. Have you satisfied with your discussion with the Prime Minister, Usaw? The discussions have not fulfilled the high hopes of my countrymen but I leave your shores with no bitterness. Would you say your mission to London was fruitless? The results achieved were hardly commensurate with the risks we have taken to visit London in wartime. I see. Well, Mr. Usaw, in the light of what's happened here in London, what is your attitude toward Japan? The Bermans are not vigorous, we have the Nazis. Since as Buddhists, they are not given to amateurs. I must go now. Goodbye, sir. Thank you. All aboard, please. Goodbye. Goodbye, sir. Goodbye, sir. Goodbye, sir. Usaw spent a month in the United States within this country when Pearl Harbor was attacked. He had planned to fly across the Pacific, had actually started, and his plane returned to San Francisco. He then made plans to circle the globe in the other direction to reach Burma. And with the statement that he was still hopeful, took off for home. Some reports received about Usaw's movements after his Goodwill mission to Britain. It has come to the knowledge of his Majesty's government that he has been in contact with the Japanese authorities since the outbreak of the Japanese war. This fact is being confirmed by his own admission. On January 18, 1942, a month after Pearl Harbor, Usaw was intercepted somewhere in the Middle East and returned home to Burma. And a communique announced, Usaw has been placed under surveillance. His Majesty's government has been compelled to detain him, and it will not be possible to permit him to return to Burma. Whether or without Usaw's influence, the Japanese had come to Burma. And Burma, the backdoor to China, had become a battleground. The keystone to the struggle in the Far East. Today, Japan is pouring men and money and material into Burma. North Baton is in India to direct United Nations operations in this theater of the world conflict. The strategic value of Burma to both the United Nations and Japan is enormous. This map here tells the story. The geographer points to the north of Burma. You see here on the north, Burma is bounded by Tibet and China. Over here on the east is China and Thailand. On the south, here, is the Bay of Bengal. And on the west, here, are the Bay of Bengal and British India. You notice that there are mountains on the Burma-India frontier. These are the Arakhan Yomas. Yomas meaning mountains in Burma. The Arakhan Yomas are the barrier between Burma and India. Are those mountains fairly high? Oh yes, and very rough. Covered with jungle and almost impossible. Thousands of men, women and children have made their way over these Arakhan Yomas from Burma to India. But moving a mechanized army over them would be another thing. Well, are there any roads at all over them? The roads are hardly more than trails. They cross bogs, swift rivers. They curve up into almost perpendicular, mule routes. Well, if it's difficult to send men and material from India overland into Burma, it's also difficult to send men and material from Burma into India. That's one of the military problems for both sides, isn't it Colonel? Yes, it is. But the Japanese in Burma can do the same thing to the Allies in India as the Allies in Britain are doing to the continent. You mean pinning down great enemy forces by their very presence? Exactly. Just as the Germans are pinned down to the invasion coast of the English Channel, so the Allies are pinned down to the Burma frontier in India. Of course you could say that the Japanese are also pinned down in Burma. Well, yes, except that the Japanese have the advantage of having air bases in Burma. There are only 500 miles from India's Ruhr. They are in cold and steel industrial region of India. 500 miles. That's only about two hours flying time for bombers. That's right. But it works both ways, doesn't it Colonel? No, because Burma has no heavy industries or any coal or iron on which to build it. So the advantage, as far as nearness is concerned, is the same. Burma has no heavy industries, but Burma is rich in supplies for men and the machines that are necessary for the war effort. Burma is rich in rights and oil. Before the war in the Pacific broke out, did this entire ship was raised? Yes, Burma has an excess of about 3 billion tons of rice every year. Where does this ship load going? This ship is going to India. India imports nearly 2 million tons of rice from Burma each year. And Ceylon imports some 370,000 tons from Burma each year. That's an enormous amount. Oh, there's always plenty of rice in Burma. The Burmans supply rice for a good part of the country. In addition to the rice, there are substantial amounts of fish, and vegetables in Burma. By controlling these, the Japanese forces in Burma have plenty food without having to bring it in. But more serious to the United Nations, India is denied that 2 million tons of rice imported from Burma each year. Parts of India today are suffering famine, and Japan's occupation of Burma creates another problem. You'll set your maps and you know your targets. Is there any questions before you take off? All right. Just one last thing then. In bombing these oil fields, we're doing more than blowing up a few oil wells. The oil fields of Burma are the biggest fields between Persia and the Dutch Indies. And although these fields were destroyed before the Japs got there, we know now that they've repaired them and have them in operation. Now, this means that they have oil here where they need it. Or we have to bring nearly every drop we use from the Persian Gulf. Any questions? All right. That's all. Report your planes and take off at once. By the occupation of Burma, the Japanese have barred the back door to China. By this occupation, they have severed the Burma Road, vital supply route to China. By its location, Burma has become a keystone in the strategy of the Far East. We look at the map again. What are the United Nations on the map up there? China and India have a long common frontier. The Japanese control the northeast frontier and in the northwest up there. Here, you see? There is the greatest barrier to human travel on Earth. Those mountains? Those of the Himalayas, the highest range on Earth. And no conqueror in all history has crossed those mountains in either direction to invade the country on the opposite side. The Japanese can clap a pincer's operation on China using Burma as the bottom jaw. But to clap a pincer's on the Japanese in Burma from the outside is quite another matter. Its strategic location, the character of its people, its resources and its geography, Burma has become a focal point of a world at war. And here to tell the meaning behind these factors is Dr. Clarence Henderson for some years resident of Burma and now associate professor of history at Redlands University. Dr. Henderson. Months before Pearl Harbor the Japanese were secretly training Burmans to assist them in driving the British out of Burma. 32 men were smuggled to Japan, trained and then returned to Thailand where they trained a thousand guns. These men were the nucleus of the Burma independence army. The map shows clearly the strategic value of Burma to the Japanese. Through it passed the Burma road which must be closed to complete the strangulation of China. By taking Burma the Japanese could shorten their land fronts with the west to the 500 mile bottleneck between the Himalaya mountains all of Indochina Thailand, Malaya and Burma could be defended by a front that was not only short but made virtually impenetrable for a mechanized army by a range upon range of jungle covered mountains devoid of roads. Behind this barrier were vast doors of vital raw materials for rice eating Japanese army practically all the world's exportable surplus of rice for their trucks and airplanes and ample supply of oil. For shipbuilding almost all of the world's supply of peace. In addition there were quantities of rubber, tin, tungsten nickel and other strategic materials. But as important as Burma is to our enemy it is no less so for us. Only when Burma is again in our hands can we provide the Chinese with supplies they must have to place their veteran armies on the offensive and in turn make possible for us air bases within bombing distance of Japan and of Japanese shipping lanes. Burma's rights could relieve starvation in India. Its oil could save us the long haul from the Persian Gulf but there are other important strategic factors. In the flank of Singapore it's lost by the Japanese will leave the whole of Southeast Asia open to an offensive by land. The ending this month of the southwest monsoon which had delused the country since May removed one obstacle to the invasion of Burma by Lord Mountbatten's forces but the formidable natural barriers remain. Roads are being hacked out of the jungles and carved through the mountains obviously they cannot be extended into Japanese occupied territory. Moreover, mountain roads are extremely vulnerable to bombing. The mountainous terrain between Calcutta and the Burma Frontier presents scarcely less difficulty. It is as though troops and supplies were landed at Los Angeles or San Francisco and then transported by narrow gauge mountain railway, river boats and hastily constructed roads in Utah. The Japanese, on the other hand have the advantage of convenient bases in Burma which they have had to hear and a half to establish. We hear of preparations for an amphibious invasion of Burma. If we are thinking in terms of a large scale expedition to southern Burma the logical place for such an attack. The nearest base now in a wide hand will be 600 miles distance. Moreover, throughout most of the voyage, the invasion fleet would be within easy bombing range of land based Japanese planes. That is not a pleasant prospect. The Japanese are doing everything in their power to hold Burma. A railway from Thailand is being constructed to facilitate troop transport and supplies. The Burmans are being ruled. The country has been declared independent. The Japanese are capitalizing on religion by saying we too are Buddhists. Of more practical significance, the hated land taxes it is reported are being remitted. The measure of their success in winning over the people of Burma is mooted. But some who are formally friendly to the British are cooperating with the Japanese. Fortunately for us the 16 million inhabitants of Burma are not all of one race. Two thirds of them are Burmans but the remaining third is split into numerous tribes. Some of these bear a traditional hatred toward the Burmans born of the cruelty with which they were treated in the days of the Burmese king. Among these tribesmen especially the Karens, Chins and Kachins, the British have found their most loyal friends and the bulk of the recruits for their native armies. Hundreds of these native troops accompanied Brigadier Wingate on his notable expedition into northern Burma last February. Fortunately too, these same tribes and many Burmans as well have a warm friendship for the United States. They arrive from contacts with American missionaries such as a well known doctor, Gordon S. Seagrave and agriculturalist, Brayton Case. It is our good fortune also that these friendly tribes inhabit the territory bordering India. Friendly natives may prove of invaluable assistance to our invasion forces. If meanwhile our political leaders can convince the Burmans many of whom are already working against the Japanese that their best interests lie with the democracies the reconquest of Burma will certainly be facilitated. To convince them however to acquire assurance of something more alluring than a return to the pre-war status. To complete the conquest of Burma in five or six months, that is before the next monsoon breaks may be too much to hope for but conquer it we must to open the gateway to China to secure an invaluable road to Tokyo and to acquire a base from which to drive the Japanese from Malaya, Thailand and Indochina. Thank you Dr. Henderson. Next week at the same time over most of these stations the National Broadcasting Company will present another program on the Pacific with drama of the past and present and dedicated to a fuller understanding of the vast Pacific Basin. A reprint of tonight's Pacific Story program is available at the cost of ten cents. Send ten cents in stamps or coin to the University of California Press Berkeley, California The address again University of California Press Berkeley, California Written and directed by Arnold Marquess The musical score is composed and conducted by Thomas Paluso, your narrator, Gain Whitman. This program has been presented as a public service by the National Broadcasting Company and the independent radio stations associated with the NBC network. This is the National Broadcasting Company.