Question 10 of Summa Theologica, Paras Prima, Initial Questions. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. This recording is by Jim Ruddy. Summa Theologica, Paras Prima, Initial Questions by St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 10, The Eternity of God. We must now consider the eternity of God concerning which arise six points of inquiry. What is eternity? Whether God is eternal? Whether to be eternal belongs to God alone? Whether eternity differs from time? The difference of av eternity and of time? And whether there is only one av eternity as there is one time and one eternity? First article. Whether this is a good definition of eternity, the simultaneously whole and perfect possession of interminable life? Objection one. It seems that the definition of eternity given by Boethius is not a good one. Eternity is the simultaneously whole and perfect possession of interminable life. For the word interminable is a negative one. But negation only belongs to what is defective, and this does not belong to eternity. Therefore, in the definition of eternity, the word interminable ought not to be found. Objection two. Further, eternity signifies a kind of duration. But duration regards existence rather than life. Therefore, the word life ought not to come into the definition of eternity, rather the word existence. Objection three. Further, a whole is what has parts. But this is alien to eternity, which is simple. Therefore, it is improperly said to be whole. Objection four. Many days cannot occur together, nor can many times exist all at once. But in eternity days and times are in the plural, it is said, his going forth is from the beginning from the days of eternity. And also it is said, according to the revelation of the mystery hidden from eternity. Therefore, eternity is not only simultaneous. Objection five. Further, the whole and the perfect are the same thing. Supposing therefore that it is whole, it is superfluously described as perfect. And Objection six. Further, duration does not imply possession, but eternity is a kind of duration. Therefore, eternity is not possession. I answer that as we attain to the knowledge of simple things by way of compound things, so we must reach to the knowledge of eternity by means of time, which is nothing but the numbering of movement by before and after. For since succession occurs in every movement and one part comes after another, the fact that we reckon before and after in movement makes us apprehend time, which is nothing else but the measure of before and after in movement. Now, in a thing bereft of movement, which is always the same, there is no before or after, as therefore the idea of time consists in the numbering of before and after in movement, so likewise in the apprehension of the uniformity of what is outside of movement consists the idea of eternity. Further, those things are said to be measured by time, which have a beginning and an end in time, because in everything which is moved there is a beginning and there is an end. But as whatever is wholly immutable can have no succession, so it has no beginning and no end. Thus eternity is known from two sources. First, because what is eternal is interminable, that is, has no beginning nor end, that is, no term either way. Secondly, because eternity has no succession being simultaneously whole. Reply to Objection 1. Simple things are usually defined by way of negation, as a point is that which has no parts. Yet this is not to be taken as if the negation belonged to their existence, but because our intellect, which first apprehends compound things, cannot attain to the knowledge of simple things except by removing the opposite. Reply to Objection 2. What is truly eternal is not only being, but also living, and life extends to operation which is not true of being. Now the protraction of duration seems to belong to operation rather than to being. Hence time is the numbering of movement. Reply to Objection 3. Eternity is called whole not because it has parts, but because it is wanting and nothing. Reply to Objection 4. As God, although incorporeal, is named in Scripture metaphorically by corporeal names, so eternity, though simultaneously whole, is called by names implying time and succession. Reply to Objection 5. Two things are to be considered in time, time itself which is successive, and the now of time which is imperfect. Hence the expression simultaneously whole is used to remove the idea of time, and the word perfect is used to exclude the now of time. Reply to Objection 6. Whatever is possessed is held firmly and quietly, therefore to designate the immutability and permanence of eternity we use the word possession. Second article, whether God is eternal. Objection 1. It seems that God is not eternal, for nothing made can be predicated of God, for Boethius says that the now that flows away makes time, the now that stands still makes eternity, and Augustine says that God is the author of eternity, therefore God is not eternal. Objection 2. What is before eternity and after eternity is not measured by eternity, but as Aristotle says God is before eternity and he is after eternity, for it is written that the Lord shall reign for eternity and beyond, therefore to be eternal does not belong to God. Objection 3. Further eternity is a kind of measure, but to be measured belongs not to God, therefore does not belong to him to be eternal. Objection 4. Further in eternity there is no present, past, or future, since it is simultaneously whole, as was said in the preceding article, but words denoting present, past, and future time are applied to God in Scripture, therefore God is not eternal. On the contrary, Athanasius says in his creed, the Father is eternal, the Son is eternal, and the Holy Ghost is eternal. I answer that the idea of eternity follows immutability as the idea of time follows movement, as appears from the preceding article, hence as God is supremely immutable, it supremely belongs to him to be eternal, as he is eternal only, but he is his own eternity, whereas no other being is its own duration, as no other is its own being.  Reply to Objection 1. The now that stands still is said to make eternity according to our apprehension, whereas the apprehension of time is caused in us by the fact that we apprehend the flow of the now, so the apprehension of eternity is caused in us by our apprehending the now standing still. When Augustine says that God is the author of eternity, this is to be understood a participated eternity, for God communicates his eternity to some in the same way as he communicates his immutability. Reply to Objection 2. From this appears the answer to the second objection, for God is said to be before eternity, according as it is shared by immaterial substances, hence also in the same book it is said that intelligence is equal to eternity. In the words of Exodus, the Lord shall reign for eternity and beyond, eternity stands for age as another rendering has it. Thus it is said that the Lord will reign beyond eternity and as much as he endures beyond every age, that is, beyond every kind of duration, for age is nothing more than the period of each thing, as is said in the book de Celo. Or to reign beyond eternity can be taken to mean that if any other thing were conceived to exist forever as the movement of the heavens according to some philosophers, then God would still reign beyond and as much as his reign is simultaneously whole. Reply to Objection 3. Eternity is nothing else but God Himself. Hence God is not called eternal as if he were in any way measured, but the idea of measurement is there taken according to the apprehension of our mind alone. Reply to Objection 4. Words denoting different times are applied to God because his eternity includes all times, as if he himself were altered through present, past and future. Third article, whether to be eternal, belongs to God alone. Objection 1. It seems that it does not belong to God alone to be eternal, for it is written that those who instruct many to justice shall be as stars unto perpetual eternities. Now, if God alone were eternal, there could not be many eternities. Therefore God alone is not the only eternal. Objection 2. Further it is written, depart ye cursed into eternal fire. Therefore God is not the only eternal. Objection 3. Further every necessary thing is eternal, but there are many necessary things as for instance all principles of demonstration and all demonstrative propositions. Therefore God is not the only eternal. Contrary Jerome says that God is the only one who has no beginning. Now whatever has a beginning is not eternal. Therefore God is the only one eternal. I answered that eternity, truly and properly, so-called, is in God alone because eternity follows on immutability as appears from the first article. Accordingly, however, as some receive immutability from God in the way of never ceasing to exist, in that sense it is said of the earth, it's standeth forever. Again, some things are called eternal in Scripture because of the length of their duration, although they are in nature corruptible. Thus the hills are called eternal and we read of the fruits of the eternal hills. Some again share more fully than others in the nature of eternity and as much as they possess unchangeableness either in being or further still in operation like the angels and the blessed who enjoy the word because as regards that vision of the word no changing thoughts exist in the saints as Augustine says. Hence those who see God are said to have eternal life according to that text this is eternal life that they may know thee the only true God. Reply to Objection 1 there are said to be many eternities accordingly as many share in eternity by the contemplation of God.  Still there is change in the pains of the lost according to the words to extreme heat they will pass from snowy waters. Hence in hell true eternity does not exist but rather time according to the text of the psalm there time will be forever. Reply to Objection 3 necessary means a certain mode of truth and truth according to the philosopher is in the mind. Therefore in this sense the true and necessary are eternal because they are in the eternal mind which is the divine intellect alone hence it does not follow that anything besides God is eternal. Fourth article whether eternity differs from time Objection 1 it seems that eternity does not differ from time for two measures of duration cannot exist together unless one is part of the other for instance two days or two hours cannot be together nevertheless we may say that a day or an hour are together considering hour as part of a day but eternity and time occur together each of which imports a certain measure of duration since therefore eternity is not a part of time for as much as eternity exceeds time and includes it it seems that time is part of eternity and is not a different thing from eternity. Objection 2 further according to the philosopher the now of time remains the same in the whole of time but the nature of eternity seems to be that it is the same indivisible thing in the whole space of time therefore eternity is the now of time but the now of time is not substantially different from time therefore eternity is not substantially different from time Objection 3 further as the measure of the first movement is the measure of every movement as said in the physics it thus appears that the measure of the first being is that of every being but eternity is the measure of the first being divine being. Therefore eternity is the measure of every being, but the being of things corruptible is measured by time. Time, therefore, is either eternity or as a part of eternity. On the contrary, eternity is simultaneously whole, but time has a before and an after. Therefore time and eternity are not the same thing. I answer that. It is manifest that time and eternity are not the same. Some have founded this difference on the fact that eternity has neither beginning nor an end, whereas time has a beginning and an end. This, however, makes a merely accidental and not an absolute difference, because granted that time always was and always will be, according to the idea of those who think the movement of the heavens goes on forever, there would yet remain a difference between eternity and time, as Boethius says, arising from the fact that eternity is simultaneously whole, which cannot be applied to time. For eternity is the measure of a permanent being, while time is a measure of movement. Supposing, however, that the aforesaid difference be considered on the part of the things measured and not as regards the measures, then there is some reason for it, and as much as that alone is measured by time which has a beginning and end in time. Hence, if the movement of the heavens lasted always, time would not be of its measure as regards the whole of its duration, since the infinite is not measurable. But it would be the measure of that part of its revolution which has beginning and end in time. Another reason for the same can be taken from these measures in themselves, if we consider the end and the beginning as potentialities, because granted also that time always goes on, yet it is possible to note in time both the beginning and the end by considering its parts, thus we speak of the beginning and the end of a day or of a year which cannot be applied to eternity. Still, these differences follow upon the essential and primary differences that eternity is simultaneously whole, but that time is not so. Reply to Objection 1. Such a reason would be valid one if time and eternity were the same kind of measure, but this is seen not to be the case when we consider those things of which the respective measures are time and eternity. Reply to Objection 2. The now of time is the same as regards its subject in the whole course of time, but it differs in aspect. Question 11 of Summa Theologica, Pars Prima, Initial Questions. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. This recording is by Jim Ruddy. Summa Theologica, Pars Prima, Initial Questions by St. Thomas Aquinas, translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province. Question 11, The Unity of God. After the foregoing, we consider the divine unity concerning which there are four points of inquiry, whether one adds anything to being, whether one and many are opposed to each other, whether God is one, and whether he is in the highest degree one. First article, whether one adds anything to being. Objection 1. It seems that one adds something to being, for everything is in a determinate genus by addition to being, which penetrates all genera, but one is a determinate genus, for it is the principle of number, which is a species of quantity, therefore one adds something to being. Further what divides a thing, common to all, is an addition to it, but being is divided by one and by many, therefore one is an addition to being. Objection 3. Further if one is not an addition to being, one and being must have the same meaning, but it would be nougatory to call being by the name of being, therefore it would be equally so to call being one. Now this is false, therefore one is an addition to being. On the contrary Dionysius says, nothing which exists is not in some way one, which would be false if one were an addition to being, in the sense of limiting it, therefore one is not an addition to being. I answer that one does not add any reality to being, but is only a negation of division, for one means undivided being. This is the very reason why one is the same as being. Now every being is either simple or compound, but what is simple is undivided both actually and potentially, whereas what is compound has not being whilst its parts are divided, but after they make up and compose it. Hence it is manifest that the being of anything consists an undivision, and hence it is that everything guards its unity as it guards its being. Reply to Objection 1. Some thinking that the one convertible with being is the same as the one which is the principle of number, were divided into contrary opinions. Pythagoras and Plato, seeing that the one convertible with being did not add any reality to being, but signified the substance of being as undivided, thought that the same applied to the one which is the principle of number, and because number is composed of unities, they thought that numbers were the substances of all things. Avicenna, however, on the contrary, considering that one, which is the principle of number, added a reality to the substance of being, otherwise number made of unities would not be a species of quantity, thought that the one convertible with being added a reality to the substance of beings, as white to man. This, however, is manifestly false in as much as each thing is one by its substance, for if a thing were one by anything else but by its substance, since this again would be one, supposing it were again one by another thing, we should be driven on to infinity. Hence we must adhere to the former statement, therefore we must say that the one which is convertible with being does not add a reality to being, but that the one which is the principle of number does add a reality to being, belonging to the genus of quantity. Reply to Objection 2. There is nothing to prevent a thing which in one way is divided from being another way undivided, as what is divided in number may be undivided in species, and thus it may be that a thing is in one way one and in another way many. Still, if it is absolutely undivided, either because it is so according to what belongs to its essence, though it may be divided as regards what is outside its essence as what is one in subject may have many accidents, or because it is undivided actually and divided potentially as what is one in the whole and as many in its parts, then in such a case thing will be one absolutely and many accidentally. On the other hand, if it be undivided accidentally and divided absolutely as if it were divided in essence and undivided in idea or in principle or cause, it will be many absolutely and one accidentally as what are many in number and one in species or one in principle. Hence in that way being is divided by one and by many as it were by one absolutely and by many accidentally. For multitude itself would not be contained under being unless it were in some way contained under one. Thus Dionysius says that there is no kind of multitude that is not in a way one. But what are many in their parts are one in their whole and what are many in accidents are one in subject and what are many in number are one in species and what are many in species are one in genus and what are many in processions are one in principle. Reply to Objection 3. It does not follow that it is nougatary to say being is one for as much as one adds an idea to being. Second article whether one and many are opposed to each other. Objection 1. It seems that one and many are not mutually opposed for no opposite thing is predicated of its opposite. But every multitude is in a certain way one as appears from the preceding article. Therefore one is not opposed to multitude. Objection 2. Further no opposite thing is constituted by its opposite. But multitude is constituted by one. Therefore it is not opposed to multitude. Objection 3. Further one is opposed to one. The idea of few is opposed to many. Therefore one is not opposed to many. Objection 4. Further if one is opposed to multitude it is opposed as the undivided is to the divided and is thus opposed to it as privation is to habit. But this appears to be incongruous because it would follow that one comes after multitude and is defined by it. Where on the contrary multitude is defined by one. Hence there would be a vicious circle in the definition which is inadmissible. Therefore one and many are not opposed. On the contrary things which are opposed in idea are themselves opposed to each other. But the idea of one consists in indivisibility and the idea of multitude contains division. Therefore one and many are opposed to each other. I answer that one is opposed to many but in various ways. The one which is the principle of number is opposed to multitude which is number as the measure is to the thing measured. For one implies the idea of a primary measure and number is multitude measured by one as is clear from the metaphysics. But the one which is convertible with being is opposed to multitude by way of privation as the undivided is to the thing divided. Reply to Objection One. No privation entirely takes away the being of the thing and as much as privation means negation in the subject according to the philosopher. Nevertheless every privation takes away some being and so in being by reason of its universality the privation of being has its foundation in being which is not the case in privations of special forms as of sight or of whiteness and the like. And what applies to being applies also to one and to good which are convertible with being for the privation of good is founded on some good. Likewise the removal of unity is founded in some one thing. Hence it happens that multitude is some one thing and evil is some good thing and non-being is some kind of being. Nevertheless opposite is not predicated of opposite for as much as one is absolute and the other is relative for what is relative being as a potentiality is non-being absolutely that is actually or what is absolute being in the genus of substance is non-being relatively as regard some accidental being. In the same way what is relatively good is absolutely bad or vice versa. Likewise what is absolutely one is relatively many and vice versa. Reply to objection two. A whole is twofold. In one sense it is homogeneous composed of like parts. In another sense it is heterogeneous composed of dissimilar parts. Now in every homogeneous whole the whole is made up of parts having the form of the whole as for instance every part of water is water and such is the constitution of a continuous thing made up of its parts. In every heterogeneous whole however every part is wanting in the form belonging to the whole as for instance no part of a house is a house nor is any part of a man a man. Now multitude is such a kind of whole therefore in as much as its part has not the form of multitude the latter is composed of unities as a house is composed of not houses not indeed as if unities constituted multitude so far as they are undivided in which way they are opposed to multitude but so far as they have being as also the parts of a house make up the house by the fact that they are beings not by the fact that they are not houses. Reply to objection three. Many is taken up in two ways absolutely and in that sense it is opposed to one. In another way as importing some kind of excess in which sense it is opposed to few. Hence in the first sense two are many but not in the second sense. Reply to objection four. One is opposed to many privatively in as much as the idea of many involves division. Hence division must be prior to unity not absolutely in itself but according to our way of apprehension for we apprehend simple things by compound things and hence we define a point to be what has no part or the beginning of a line. Multitude also an idea follows on one because we do not understand divided things to convey the idea of multitude except by the fact that we attribute unity to every part. Hence one is placed in the definition of multitude but multitude is not placed in the definition of one. But division comes to be understood from the very negation of being. So what first comes to mind is being secondly that this being is not that being and thus we apprehend division as a consequence. Thirdly comes the notion of one. Fourthly the notion of multitude. Third article whether God is one. Objection one it seems that God is not one for it is written for there be many gods and many lords. Objection two further one is as the principle of number cannot be predicated of God since quantity is not predicated of God likewise neither can one which is convertible with being be predicated of God because it imports privation and every privation is an imperfection which cannot apply to God therefore God is not one. On the contrary it is written here oh Israel the Lord our God is one Lord. I answer that it can be shown from these three sources that God is one first from his simplicity for it is manifest that the reason why any singular thing is this particular thing is because it cannot be communicated to many since that whereby Socrates is a man can be communicated to many whereas what makes him this particular man is only communicable to one. Therefore if Socrates were a man by what makes him to be this particular man as there cannot be many Socrates so there could not in that way be many men. Now this belongs to God alone for God himself is his own nature as was shown above therefore in the very same way God is God as and he is this God impossible it is therefore that many gods should exist. Secondly this is proved from the infinity of his perfection for it was shown above that God comprehends in himself the whole perfection of being if then many gods existed they would necessarily differ from each other something therefore would belong to one which did not belong to another and if this were a privation one of them would not be absolutely perfect but if a perfection one of them would be without it so it is impossible for many gods to exist hence also the ancient philosophers constrained as it were by truth when they asserted an infinite principle asserted likewise that there was only one such principle. Thirdly this is shown from the unity of the world for all things that exist are seen to be ordered to each other since some serve others but things that are diverse do not harmonize in the same order unless they are ordered there too by one for many are reduced into one order by one better than by many because one is the paris a cause of one and many are only the accidental cause of one in as much as they are in some way one since therefore what is first is most perfect and is so paris a and not accidentally it must be that the first which reduces all into one order should be only one and this one is God. Reply to objection one. Gods are called many by the error of some who worship many deities thinking as they did that the planets and the other stars were gods and also the separate parts of the world hence the possible adds our god is one. Reply to objection two. One which is the principle of number is not predicated of god but only of material things for one the principle of number belongs to the genus of mathematics which are material and being and abstracted from matter only an idea but one which is convertible with being is a metaphysical entity and does not depend on matter in its being and although in God there is no privation still according to the mode of our apprehension he is known to us by way only of privation and remotion thus there is no reason why a certain kind of privation should not be predicated of God for instance that he is incorporeal and infinite and in the same way it is said of God that he is one. Fourth article whether God is supremely one. Objection one it seems that God is not supremely one for one is so called from the privation of division but privation cannot be greater or less therefore God is not more one than other things which are called one. Objection two further nothing seems to be more indivisible than what is actually and potentially indivisible such as a point and unity but a thing is said to be more one according as it is indivisible therefore God is not more one than unity is one and a point is one. Objection three further what is essentially good is supremely good therefore what is essentially one is supremely one but every being is essentially one as the philosopher says therefore every being is supremely one and therefore God is not one more than any other being is one. On the contrary Bernard says among all things called one the unity of the divine trinity holds the first place. I answer that since one is an undivided being if anything is supremely one it must be supremely being and supremely undivided. Now both of these belong to God for he is supremely being in as much as his being is not determined by any nature to which it is adjoined since he is being itself subsistent absolutely undetermined but he is supremely undivided as he is divided neither actually nor potentially by any mode of division since he is altogether simple as was shown above and it is manifest that God is one in the supreme degree. Reply to objection one although privation considered in itself is not susceptible of more or less still according as its opposite is subject to more or less privation also can be considered itself in the light of more or less therefore according as a thing is more divided or is divisible either less or not at all in the degree it is called more or less or supremely one. Reply to objection two a point and unity which is the principle of number are not supremely being in as much as they have being only in some subject hence neither of them can be supremely one whereas a subject cannot be supremely one because of the difference within it of accident and subject so neither can an accident. Reply to objection three although every being is one by its substance still every such substance is not equally the cause of unity for the substance of some things is compound and of others simple. End of question 11 question 12 of Summa Theologica Parse Prima initial questions this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org this recording is by Jim Ruddy Summa Theologica Parse Prima initial questions by St. Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province. Question 12 how God is known by us as hitherto we have considered God as he is in himself we now go on to consider in what manner he is in the knowledge of creatures concerning which there are 13 points of inquiry first whether any created intellect can see the essence of God second whether the essence of God is seen by the intellect through any created image third whether the essence of God can be seen by the corporeal eye fourth whether any created intellectual substance is sufficient by its own natural powers to see the essence of God fifth whether the created intellect needs any created light in order to see the essence of God sixth whether of those who see God one sees him more perfectly than another seventh whether any created intellect can comprehend the essence of God eighth whether the created intellect seeing the essence of God knows all things in it ninth whether what is there known is known by any similitudes tenth whether the created intellect knows at once what it sees in God eleventh whether in the state of this life any man can see the essence of God twelfth whether by natural reason we could know God in this life and thirteen whether there is in this life any knowledge of God through grace above the knowledge of natural reason first article whether any created intellect can see the essence of God objection one it seems that no created intellect can see the essence of God for christen commenting on john no man has seen God at any time says not prophets only but neither angels nor archangels have seen God for how can a creature see what is increatable Dionysius also says speaking of God neither is there sense nor image nor opinion nor reason nor knowledge of him objection two further everything infinite as such is unknown but God is infinite therefore in himself he is unknown objection three further the created intellect knows only existing things for what falls first under the apprehension of the intellect is being now God is not something existing but he is rather super existence as Dionysius says therefore God is not intelligible but is above all intellect objection four further there must be some proportion between the knower and the known since the known is the perfection of the knower but no proportion exists between the created intellect and God for there is an infinite distance between them therefore the created intellect cannot see the essence of God on the contrary it is written we shall see him as he is i answer that since everything is knowable according as it is actual God who is pure act without any at mixture of potentiality is in himself supremely knowable but what is supremely knowable in itself may not be knowable to a particular intellect on account of the excess of the intelligible object above the intellect as for example the sun which is supremely visible cannot be seen by the bat by reason of its excess of light therefore some who consider this held that no created intellect can see the essence of God this opinion however is not tenable for as the ultimate beatitude of man consists in the use of his highest function which is the operation of his intellect if we suppose that the created intellect could never see God it would either never attain to beatitude or its beatitude would consist in something else besides God which is opposed to faith for the ultimate perfection of the rational creature is to be found in that which is the principle of its being since the thing is perfect so far as it attains to its principle further the same opinion is also against reason for there resides in every man a natural desire to know the cause of any effect which he sees and then surrises wonder in men but if the intellect of the rational creature could not reach so far as to the first cause of things the natural desire would remain void hence it must be absolutely granted that the blessed see the essence of God replied to objection one both of these authorities speak of the vision of comprehension hence Dionysius premises immediately before the word cited he is universally to all incomprehensible and so forth chrysostom likewise after the words quoted says he says this of the most certain vision of the father which is in such a perfect consideration and comprehension as the father has of the son reply to objection to the infinity of matter not made perfect by form is unknown in itself because all knowledge comes by the form whereas the infinity of the form not limited by matter is it in itself supremely known God is infinite in this way and not in the first way as appears from what was said above reply to objection three God is not said to be not existing as if he did not exist at all but because he exists above all that exists and as much as he is in his own existence hence it does not follow that he cannot be known at all but that he exceeds every kind of knowledge which means that he is not comprehended reply to objection four proportion is twofold in one sense it means a certain relation of one quantity to another according as double treble and equal our species of proportion in another sense every relation of one thing to another is called proportion and in this sense there can be a proportion of the creature to God in as much as it is related to him as the effect of its cause and as potentiality to its act and in this way the created intellect can be proportioned to know God second article whether the essence of God is seen by the created intellect through an image objection one it seems that the essence of God is seen through an image by the created intellect for it is written we know that when he shall appear we shall be like to him and we shall see him as he is objection two further augustin says when we know God some likeness of God is made in us objection three further the intellect in act is the actual intelligible as sense in act is the actual sensible but this comes about in as much as sense is informed with the likeness of the sensible object and the intellect with a likeness of the thing understood therefore if God is seen by the created intellect in act it must be that he is seen by some similitude on the contrary augustin says that when the apostle says we see through a glass and in an enigma by the terms glass and enigma certain similitudes are signified by him which are accommodated to the vision of God but to see the essence of God is not an enigmatic nor a speculative vision but is on the contrary of an opposite kind therefore the divine essence is not seen through a similitude i answer that two things are required both for sensible and for intellectual vision namely power of sight and union of the thing seen with the sight for vision is made actual only when the thing seen is in a certain way in the seer now in corporeal things it is clear that the thing seen cannot be by its essence in the seer but only by its likeness as the similitude of a stone is in the eye whereby the vision is made actual whereas the substance of the stone is not there but if the principle of visual power and the thing seen were one and the same it would necessarily follow that the seer would receive both the visual power and the form whereby it sees from that one same thing now it is manifest both that God is the author of the intellectual power and that he can be seen by the intellect and since the intellectual power of the creature is not the essence of God it follows that is some kind of participated likeness of him who is the first intellect and it's also the intellectual power of this creature is called an intelligible light as it were derived from the first light whether this be understood of the natural power or of some perfection super-added of grace or of glory therefore in order to see God there must be some similitude of God on the part of the visual faculty whereby the intellect is made capable of seeing God but on the part of the object seen which must necessarily be united to the seer the essence of God cannot be seen by any created similitude first because as Dennis says by the similitude of the inferior order of things the superior can in no way be known as by the likeness of a body the essence of an incorporeal thing cannot be known must much less therefore can the essence of God be seen by any created likeness whatever secondly because the essence of God is his own very existence as was shown above which cannot be said of any created form and so no created form can be the similitude representing the essence of God to the seer thirdly because the divine essence is uncircumscribed and contains in itself supereminently whatever can be signified or understood by the created intellect now this cannot in any way be represented by any created likeness for every created form is determined according to some aspect of wisdom or of power or a being itself or of some like thing hence to say that God is seen by some similitude is to say that the divine essence is not seen at all which is false therefore it must be said that to see the essence of God there is required some similitude in the visual faculty namely the light of glory strengthening the intellect to see God which is spoken of in the psalm in thy light we shall see light the essence of God however cannot be seen by any created similitude representing the divine essence itself as it really is replied to objection one that authority speaks of the similitude which is caused by participation of the light of glory reply to objection two augustin speaks of the knowledge of God here on earth reply to objection three the divine essence is existence itself hence as other intelligible forms which are not their own existence are united to the intellect by means of some entity whereby the intellect itself is informed and made in act so the divine essence is united to the created intellect as the object actually understood making the intellect in act by and of itself third article whether the essence of God can be seen with the bodily eye objection one it seems that the essence of God can be seen by the corporeal eye for it is written in my flesh I shall see God and with the hearing of the ear I have heard thee but now my eye seeeth thee objection two further augustin says those eyes namely the glorified will therefore have a greater power of sight not so much to see more keenly as some report of the sight of serpents or of eagles for whatever acuteness of vision is possessed by these creatures they can see only corporeal things but to see even incorporeal things now whoever can see incorporeal things can be raised up to see God therefore the glorified eye can see God objection three further God can be seen by man through a vision of the imagination for it is written I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne but an imaginary vision originates from sense for the imagination is moved by sense to act therefore God can be seen by a vision of sense on the contrary augustin says no one has ever seen God either in this life as he is nor in the angelic life as visible things are seen by corporeal vision I answer that it is impossible for God to be seen by the sense of sight or by any other sense or faculty of the sensitive power for every such kind of power is the act of a corporeal organ as will be shown later now act is proportional to the nature which possesses it hence no power of that kind can go beyond corporeal things for God is incorporeal as was shown above hence he cannot be seen by the sense or the imagination but only by the intellect reply to objection one the words in my flesh I shall see God my savior do not mean that God will be seen with the eye of the flesh but that man existing in the flesh after the resurrection will see God likewise the words now my eye see if the are to be understood of the mind's eye as the apostle says may give unto you the spirit of wisdom and the knowledge of him that the eyes of your heart may be enlightened reply to objection to augustin speaks as one inquiring and conditionally this appears from what he says previously therefore they will have an altogether different power namely the glorified eyes if they shall see that incorporeal nature and afterwards he explains this saying it is very credible that we shall so see the mundane bodies of the new heaven and the new earth as to see most clearly God everywhere present governing all corporeal things not as we now see the invisible things of God as understood by what is made but as when we see men among whom we live living and exercising the functions of human life we do not believe they live but see it hence it is evident how the glorified eyes will see God as now our eyes see the life of another but life is not seen with the corporeal eye as a thing in itself visible but as the indirect object of the sense which indeed is not known by sense but at once together with sense by some other cognitive power but that the divine presence is known by the intellect immediately on the site of and through corporeal things happens from two causes namely from the perspicuity of the intellect and from the refulgence of the divine glory infused into the body after its renovation replied to objection three the essence of God is not seen in a vision of the imagination but the imagination receives some form representing God according to some mode of similitude as in the divine scripture divine things are metaphorically described by means of sensible things fourth article whether any created intellect by its natural powers can see the divine essence objection one it seems that a created intellect can see the divine essence by its own natural power for Dionysia says an angel is a pure mirror most clear receiving if it is right to say so the whole beauty of God but if a reflection is seen the original thing is seen therefore since an angel by his natural power understands himself it seems that by his own natural power he understands the divine essence objection two further what is supremely visible is made less visible to us by reason of our defective corporeal or intellectual site but the angelic intellect has no such defect therefore since God is supremely so supremely intelligible in himself it seems that in like manner he is supremely so to an angel therefore if he can understand other intelligible things by his own natural power much more can he understand God objection three further corporeal sense cannot be raised up to understand incorporeal substance which is above its nature therefore if to see the essence of God is above the nature of every created intellect it follows that no created intellect can reach up to see the essence of God at all but this is false as appears from what has been said above therefore it seems that it is natural for a created intellect to see the divine essence on the contrary it is written the grace of God is life everlasting but life everlasting consists of the vision of the divine essence according to the words this is eternal life that they may know thee the only true God therefore to see the essence of God is possible to the created intellect by grace and not by nature i answer that it is impossible for any created intellect to see the essence of God by its own natural power for knowledge is regulated according as the thing known as in the knower but the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower hence the knowledge of every knower is ruled according to its own nature if therefore the mode of anything's being exceeds the mode of the knower it must result that the knowledge of the object is above the nature of the knower now the mode of being of things is manifold for some things have being only in this one individual matter as all bodies but others are subsisting natures not residing in matter at all which however are not their own existence but receive it and these are the incorporeal beings called angels but to god alone does it belong to be his own subsisted being therefore what exists only in individual matter we know naturally for as much as our soul whereby we know is the form of certain matter now our soul possesses two cognitive powers one is the act of a corporeal organ which naturally knows things existing in individual matter and sense knows only the singular but there is another kind of cognitive power in the soul called the intellect and this is not the act of any corporeal organ where for the intellect naturally knows natures which exist only in individual matter not as they are in such individual matter but according as they are abstracted there from by the considering act of the intellect hence it follows that through the intellect we can understand these objects as universal and this is beyond the power of sense now the angelic intellect naturally knows natures that are not in matter but this is beyond the power of the intellect of our soul in the state of its present life united as it is to the body it follows therefore that to know self-subsistent being is natural to the divine intellect alone and this is beyond the natural power of any created intellect for no creature is its own existence for as much as its existence is participated therefore the created intellect cannot see the essence of god unless god by his grace unites himself to the created intellect as an object made intelligible to it reply to objection one this mode of knowing god is natural to an angel namely to know him by his own likeness refueled in the angel himself but to know god by any created similitude is not to know the essence of god as we're shown above and so does not follow that an angel can know the essence of god by his own power reply to objection two the angelic intellect is not defective if defect be taken to mean privation as if it were without anything which it ought to have but if the defect be taken negatively in that sense every creature is defective when compared with god for as much as it does not possess the excellence which is in god reply to objection three the sense of sight as being altogether material cannot be raised up to immateriality but our intellect or the angelic intellect in as much as it is elevated above matter in its own nature can be raised up above its own nature to a higher level by grace the proof is that sight cannot in any way know abstractedly what it knows concretely for a no way can it perceive a nature except as this one particular nature whereas our intellect is able to consider abstractedly what it knows concretely now although it knows things which have a form residing in matter still it resolves the composite into both of these elements and it considers the form separately by itself likewise also the intellect of an angel although it naturally knows the concrete in any nature still it is able to separate that existence by its intellect since it knows that the thing itself is one thing and its existence is another since therefore the created intellect is naturally capable of apprehending the concrete form and the concrete being abstractedly by way of a kind of resolution of parts it can by grace be raised up to know separate subsisting substance and separate subsisting existence fifth article whether the created intellect needs any created light in order to see the essence of God objection one it seems that the created intellect does not need any created light in order to see the essence of God for what is of itself lucid insensible things does not require any other light in order to be seen therefore the same applies to intelligible things now God is intelligible light therefore he is not seen by means of any created life objection two further if God is seen through a medium he is not seen in his essence but if seen by any created light he is seen through a medium therefore he is not seen in his essence objection three further what is created can be natural to some creature therefore if the essence of God is seen through any created light such a light can be made natural to some other creature and thus that creature would not need any other light to see God which is impossible therefore it is not necessary that every creature should require a super added light in order to see the essence of God on the contrary it is written in thy light we shall see light i answer that everything which is raised up to what exceeds its nature must be prepared by some disposition above its nature as for example if air is to receive the form of fire it must be prepared by some disposition for such a form but when any created intellect sees the essence of God the essence of God itself becomes the intelligible form of the intellect hence it is necessary that some supernatural disposition should be added to the intellect in order that it may be raised up to such a great and sublime height now since the natural power of the created intellect does not avail to enable it to see the essence of God as was shown in the preceding article it is necessary that the power of understanding should be added by divine grace now this increase of the intellectual powers is called the illumination of the intellect as we also call the intelligible object itself by the name of light of illumination and this is the light spoken of in the apocalypse the glory of God hath enlightened it namely the society of the blessed who see God by this light the blessed are made de-afform that is like to God according to the saying when he shall appear we shall be like to him and we shall see him as he is reply to objection one the created light is necessary to see the essence of God not in order to make the essence of God intelligible which is of itself intelligible but in order to enable the intellect to understand in the same way as a habit makes a power abler to act so even so corporeal light is necessary as regards external sight in as much as it makes the medium actually transparent and susceptible of color reply to objection two this light is required to see the divine essence not as a similitude in which God is seen but as a perfection of the intellect strengthening it to see God therefore it may be said that this light is to be described not as a medium in which God is seen but as one by which he is seen and such a medium does not take away the immediate vision of God reply to objection three the disposition to the form of fire can be natural only to the subject of that form hence the light of glory cannot be natural to a creature unless the creature has a divine nature which is impossible but by this light the rational creature is made de-afform as is said in this article sixth article whether of those who see the essence of God one sees more perfectly than another objection one it seems that of those who see the essence of God one does not see more perfectly than another for it is written we shall see him as he is but he is only in one way therefore he will be seen by all in one way only and therefore he will not be seen more perfectly by one and less perfectly by another objection two further augustin says one person cannot see one in the same thing more perfectly than another but all who see the essence of God understand the divine essence for God is seen by the intellect and not by sense as was shown above therefore of those who see the divine essence one does not see more clearly than another objection three further that anything be seen more perfectly than another can happen in two ways either on the part of the visible object or on the part of the visible power of the seer on the part of the object it may so happen because the object is received more perfectly in the seer that is according to the greater perfection of the similitude but this does not apply to the present question for God is present to the intellect seeing him not by way of similitude but by his essence it follows then that if one sees him more perfectly than another this happens according to the difference of the intellectual power thus it follows too that the one whose intellectual power is higher will see him more clearly and this is incongruous since equality with angels is promised to men as their beatitude on the contrary eternal life consists in the vision of God according to John this is eternal life that they may know the the only true God therefore if all saw the essence of God equally in eternal life all would be equal the contrary to which is declared by the apostle star differs from star in glory i answer that of those who see the essence of God one sees him more perfectly than another this indeed does not take place as if one had a more perfect similitude of God than another since that vision will not spring from any similitude but it will take place because one intellect will have a greater power or faculty to see God than another the faculty is seeing God however does not belong to the created intellect naturally but is given to it by the light of glory which establishes the intellect in a kind of deiformity as appears from what is said above in the preceding article hence the intellect which has more of the light of glory will see God the more perfectly and he will have a fuller participation of the light of glory who has more charity because where there is the greater charity there is the more desire and desire in a certain degree makes the one desiring apt and prepared to receive the object desired hence he who possesses the more charity will see God the more perfectly and will be the more beatified replied to objection one in the words we shall see him as he is the conjunction as determines the mode of vision on the part of the object seen so that the meaning is we shall see him to be as he is because we shall see his existence which is his essence but it does not determine the mode of vision on the part of the one seeing as if the meaning was that the mode of seeing God will be as perfect as is the perfect mode of God existence thus appears the answer to the second objection for when it is said that one intellect does not understand one and the same thing better than another this would be true if referred to the mode of the thing understood for whoever understands it otherwise than it really is does not truly understand it but not if referred to the mode of understanding for the understanding of one is more perfect than the understanding of another replied to objection three the diversity of seeing will not arise on the part of the object seen for the same object will be presented to all namely the essence of God nor will it arise from the diverse participation of the object seen by different similitudes but it will arise on the part of the diverse faculty of the intellect not indeed the natural faculty but the glorified faculty seventh article whether those who see the essence of God comprehend him objection one it seems that those who see the divine essence comprehend God for the apostle says but I follow after if I may by any means comprehend but the apostle did not follow in vain for he said I so run not as at an uncertainty therefore he comprehended and in the same way others also whom he invites to do the same saying so run that you may comprehend objection two further augustin says that is comprehended which is so seen as a whole that nothing of it is hidden from the seer but if God is seen in his essence he has seen whole and nothing of him is hidden from the seer since God is simple therefore whoever sees his essence comprehends him objection three further if we say that he is seen as a whole but not wholly it may be contrarially urged that the holy refers either to the mode of the seer or to the mode of the thing seen but he who sees the essence of God sees him wholly if the mode of the thing seen is considered for as much as he sees him as he is also likewise he sees him wholly if the mode of the seer is meant for as much as the intellect will with its full power see the divine essence therefore all who see the essence of God see him wholly therefore they comprehend him on the contrary it is written oh most mighty great and powerful the lord of hosts is thy name great in counsel and incomprehensible in thought therefore he cannot be comprehended i answer that it is impossible for any created intellect to comprehend God yet for the mind to attain to God in some degree is great beatitude as augustin says in proof of this we must consider that what is comprehended is perfectly known and that is perfectly known which is known so far as it can be known thus if anything which is capable of scientific demonstration is held only by an opinion resting on a probable proof it is not comprehended as for instance if anyone knows by scientific demonstration that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles he comprehends that truth whereas if anyone accepts it as a probable opinion because wise men or most men teach it he cannot be said to comprehend the thing itself because he does not attain to that perfect mode of knowledge of which it is intrinsically capable but no created intellect can attain to that perfect mode of the knowledge of the divine intellect were of it is intrinsically capable which thus appears everything is noble according to its actuality but God whose being is infinite as was shown above is infinitely knowable now no created intellect can know God infinitely for the created intellect knows the divine essence more or less perfectly in proportion as it receives a greater or lesser light of glory since therefore the created light of glory received into any created intellect cannot be infinite it is clearly impossible for any created intellect to know God in an infinite degree hence it is impossible that it should comprehend God replied to objection one comprehension is twofold in one sense it is taken strictly and properly according as something is included in the one comprehending and thus in no way is God comprehended either by the intellect or in any other way for as much as he is infinite and cannot be included in any finite being so that no finite being can contain him infinitely in the degree of his own infinity in this sense we now take comprehension but in another sense comprehension is taken more largely as opposed to non-attainment for he is who attains to anyone is said to comprehend him when he attains to him and in this sense God is comprehended by the blessed according to the words I held him and I will not let him go in this sense also are to be understood the words quoted from the apostle concerning comprehension and in this way comprehension is one of the three prerogatives of the soul responding to hope as vision responds to faith and fruition responds to charity for even among ourselves not everything seen is held or possessed for as much as things either appear sometimes a far off or they are not in our power of attainment neither again do we always enjoy what we possess either because we find no pleasure in them or because such things are not the ultimate end of our desire so as to satisfy and quell it but the blessed possess these three things in God because they see him and in seeing him possess him as present having the power to see him always and possessing him they enjoy him as the ultimate fulfillment of desire replied to objection to God is called incomprehensible not because anything of him is not seen but because he is not seen as perfectly as he is capable of being seen thus when any demonstrable proposition is known by probable reason only it does not follow that any part of it is unknown either the subject or the predicate or the composition but that it is not as perfectly known at his as it is capable of being known it's augustin in his definition of comprehension says the whole is comprehended when it is seen in such a way that nothing of it is hidden from the seer or when its boundaries can be completely viewed or traced for the boundaries of the thing are said to be completely surveyed when the end of the knowledge of it is attained replied to objection three the word holy denotes a mode of the object not that the whole object does not come under knowledge but that the mode of the object is not the mode of the one who knows therefore he who sees God's essence sees in him that he exists infinitely and is infinitely knowable nevertheless this infinite mode does not extend to enable the knower to know infinitely thus for instance a person can have a probable opinion that a proposition is demonstrable although he himself does not know it as demonstrated eighth article whether those who see the essence of God see all in God objection one it seems that those who see the essence of God see all things for Gregory says what do they not see who see him who sees all things but God sees all things therefore those who see God see all things objection two further whoever sees a mirror sees what is reflected in the mirror but all actual or possible things shine forth and God is in a mirror for he knows all things in himself therefore whoever sees God sees all actual things in him and also all possible things objection three further whoever understands the greater can understand the least as is said in De Anima but all that God does or can do are less than his essence therefore whoever understands God can understand all that God does or can do objection four further the rational creature naturally desires to know all things therefore if in seeing God it does not know all things its natural desire will not rest satisfied thus in seeing God it will not be fully happy which is incongruous therefore he who sees God knows all things on the contrary the angels see the essence of God yet do not know all things whereas Dionysius says the inferior angels are cleansed from ignorance by the superior angels also they are ignorant of future contingent things and of secret thoughts for this knowledge belongs to God alone therefore whosoever sees the essence of God does not know all things I answer that the created intellect in seeing the divine essence does not see in it all that God does or can do for it is manifest that things are seen in God as they are in him but all other things are in God as effects are in the power of their cause therefore all things are seen in God as an effect is seen in its cause now it is clear that the more perfectly a cause is seen the more perfect of its effects can be seen in it for whoever has a lofty understanding as soon as one demonstrated principle is put before him can gather the knowledge of many conclusions but this is beyond one of a weaker intellect for he needs things to be explained to him separately and so an intellect can know all the effects of a cause and the reasons for those effects in the cause itself if it comprehends the cause wholly now no created intellect can comprehend God wholly as shown above therefore no created intellect in seeing God can know all that God does or can do for this would be to comprehend his power but of what God does or can do any intellect can know the more the more perfectly it sees God reply to objection one Gregory speaks as regards the object being sufficient namely God who in himself sufficiently contains and shows forth all things but it does not follow that whoever sees God knows all things for he does not perfectly comprehend him reply to objection two it is not necessary that whoever sees a mirror should see all that is in the mirror unless his glance comprehends the mirror itself reply to objection three although it is more to see God than to see all things else still it is a greater thing to see him so that all things are known in him than to see him in such a way that not all things but the fewer or the more are known in him for it has been shown in this article that the more things are known in God according as he is seen more or less perfectly reply to objection four the natural desire of the rational creature is to know everything that belongs to the perfection of the intellect namely the species and the genera of things and their types and these everyone who sees the divine essence will see in God but to know other singulars their thoughts and their deeds does not belong to the perfection of the created intellect nor does its natural desire go out to these things neither again does it desire to know things that exist not as yet but which God can call into being yet if God alone were seen who is the font and principle of all being and of all truth he would so fill the natural desire of knowledge that nothing else would be desired and the seer would be completely beatified hence augustin says unhappy the man who knoweth all these and knoweth not thee but happy who so knoweth thee although he knows not these and who so knoweth both thee and them is not the happier for them but for thee alone ninth article whether what is seen in God by those who see the divine essence is seen through any similitude objection one it seems that what is seen in God by those who see the divine essence is seen by means of some similitude for every kind of knowledge comes about by the knower being assimilated to the object known for thus the intellect in act becomes the actual intelligible and the sense in act becomes the actual sensible in as much as it is informed by a similitude of the object as the eye by the similitude of color therefore if the intellect upon who sees the divine essence understands any creatures in God it must be informed by their similitudes objection to further what we have seen we keep in memory but paul seeing the essence of god welston ecstasy when he had ceased to see the divine essence as augustin says remembered many of the things he had seen in the rapture hence he said i have heard secret words which it is not granted for men to utter therefore it must be said that certain similitudes of what he remembered remained in his mind and in the same way when he actually saw the essence of god he had certain similitudes or ideas of what he actually saw in it on the contrary a mirror and what is seen in it are seen by means of one likeness but all things are seen in god as in an intelligible mirror therefore if god himself is not seen by any similitude but by his own essence neither are the things seen in him seen by any similitude or ideas i answer that those who see the divine essence see what they see in god not by any likeness but by the divine essence itself united to their intellect for each thing is known insofar as its likeness is in the one who knows now this takes place in two ways for as things which are like one and the same thing are like to each other the cognitive faculty can be assimilated to any noble object in two ways in one way it is assimilated by the object itself when it is directly informed by a similitude and then the object is known in itself in another way when informed by a similitude which resembles the object and in this way the knowledge is not of the thing in itself but of the thing in its likeness for the knowledge of a man in himself differs from the knowledge of him in his image and to know things thus by their likeness in the one who knows is to know them in themselves or in their own nature whereas to know them by their similitudes pre-existing in god is to see them in god now there is a difference between these two kinds of knowledge hence according to the knowledge whereby things are known by those who see the essence of god they are seen in god himself not by any other similitudes but by the divine essence alone present to the intellect by which also god himself is seen replied to objection to the created intellect of one who sees god is assimilated to what is seen in god in as much as it is united to the divine essence in which the similitude of all things pre-exist replied to objection to some of the cognitive faculties form other images from those first conceived and thus the imagination from the preconceived images of a mountain and of gold can form the likeness of a gold and mountain and the intellect from the preconceived ideas of genus and difference forms the idea of species in like manner from the similitude of an image we can form in our minds the similitude of the original of the image thus paul or any other person who sees god by the very vision of the divine essence can form in himself the similitudes of what is seen in the divine essence which remained in paul even when he had ceased to see the essence of god still this kind of vision whereby things are seen by this likeness thus conceived is not the same as that whereby things are seen in god tenth article whether those who see the essence of god see all they see in it at the same time objection one it seems that those who see the essence of god do not see all they see in him at one in the same time for according to the philosopher it may happen that many things are known but only one is understood but what is seen in god is understood for god is seen by the intellect therefore those who see god do not see all in him at the same time objection two further augustin says god moves the spiritual creature according to time by intelligence and affection but the spiritual creature is the angel who sees god therefore those who see god understand and are affected successively for time mean succession on the contrary augustin says our thoughts will not be unstable going to and fro from one thing to another but we shall see all we know at one glance i answer that what is seen in the word is seen not successively but at the same time improve whereof we ourselves cannot know many things all at once for as much understand many things by means of many ideas but our intellect cannot be actually informed by many diverse ideas at the same time so as to understand by them as one body cannot bear different shapes simultaneously hence when many things can be understood by one idea they are understood at the same time as the parts of a whole are understood successfully and not all at the same time if each one is understood by its own idea whereas if all are understood under the one idea of the whole they are understood simultaneously now it was shown above that things seen in god are not seen singly by their own similitude but are all seen by the one essence of god hence they are seen simultaneously and not successively replied to objection one we understand one thing only when we understand by one idea but many things understood by one idea are understood simultaneously as in the idea of a man we understand animal and rational and in the idea of a house we understand the wall and the roof replied to objection two as regards their natural knowledge whereby they know things by diverse ideas given them the angels do not know all things simultaneously and thus they are moved in the act of understanding according to time but as regards what they see in god they all see at the same time 11th article whether anyone in this life can see the essence of god objection one it seems that one can in this life see the divine essence for jacob said i have seen god face to face but to see him face to face just to see his essence as appears from the words we see now in a glass and in a dark manner but then face to face objection to further the lord said to moses i speak to him mouth to mouth and plainly and not by riddles and figures that he see the lord but this is to see god in his essence therefore it is possible to see the essence of god in this life objection three further that we're in we know all other things and whereby we judge of other things is known in itself to us but even now we know all things in god for augustin says if we both see that what you say is true and we both see that what i say is true where i asked do we see this neither i in thee nor thou in me but both of us in the very incommunicable truth itself above our minds he also said we judge of all things according to the divine truth and it is the duty of reason to judge of these corporeal things according to the incorporeal and eternal ideas which unless they were above the mind could not be incommunicable therefore even in this life we see god himself objection four further according to augustin those things that are in the soul by their essence are seen by intellectual vision but intellectual vision is of intelligible things not by similitudes but by their very essences as he also says therefore since god is in our soul by his essence it follows that he is seen by us in his essence on the contrary it is written man shall not see me and live and a gloss upon this says in this mortal life god can be seen by certain images but not by the likeness itself of his own nature i answer that god cannot be seen in his essence by a mere human being except he be separated from this mortal life the reason is because as was said above the mode of knowledge follows the mode of the nature of the knower but our soul as long as we live in this life has its being incorporeal matter it's naturally it knows only what has a form in matter or what can be known by such a form now it is evident that the divine essence cannot be known through the nature of material things for it was shown above that the knowledge of god by means of any created similitude is not the vision of his essence hence it is impossible for the soul of man in this life to see the essence of god this can be seen in the fact that the more our soul is abstracted from corporeal things the more it is capable of receiving abstract intelligible things hence in dreams and alienations of the bodily senses divine revelations and foresight of future events are perceived the more clearly it is not possible therefore that the soul in this mortal life should be raised up to the supreme of intelligible objects that is to the divine essence reply to objection one according to Dionysius a man is said in the scripture to see god in the sense that certain figures are formed in the senses or imagination according to some similitude representing in part the divinity so when jacob says i have seen god face to face this does not mean the divine essence but some figure representing god and this is to be referred to some high mode of prophecy so that god seems to speak though in an imaginary vision as will later be explained in treating of the degrees of prophecy we may also say that jacob spoke thus to designate some exalted intellectual contemplation above the ordinary state reply to objection two as god works miracles in corporeal things so also he does supernatural wonders above the common order raising the minds of some living in the flesh beyond the use of sense even up to the vision of his own essence as augustin says of moses the teacher of the jews and appall the teacher of the gentiles this will be treated more fully in the question of rapture reply to objection three all things are said to be seen in god and all things are judged in him because by the participation of his light we know and judge all things for the light of natural reason itself is a participation of the divine light as likewise we are said to see and judge of sensible things in the sun that is by the sun's light and so gustin says the lessons of instruction can only be seen as it were by their own son namely god as therefore in order to see a sensible object it is necessary to see the substance of the sun so in like manner to see any intelligible object it is necessary to see the essence of god reply to objection four intellectual vision is of the things which are in the soul by their essence as intelligible things are in the intellect and thus god is in the souls of the blessed not thus he is in our soul but by presence essence and power twelfth article whether god can be known in this life by natural reason objection one it seems that by natural reason we cannot know god in this life where boethius says that reason does not grasp simple form but god is a supremely simple form as was shown above therefore natural reason cannot attain to know him objection two further the soul understands nothing by natural reason without the use of the imagination but we cannot have an imagination of god who is incorporeal therefore we cannot know god by natural knowledge objection three further the knowledge of natural reason belongs to both good and evil in as much as they have a common nature but the knowledge of god belongs only to the good for augustin says the weak eye of the human mind is not fixed on that excellent light unless purified by the justice of faith therefore god cannot be known by natural reason on the contrary it is written that which is known of god namely what can be known of god by natural reason is manifest in them i answer that our natural knowledge begins from sense hence our natural knowledge can go as far as it can be led by sensible things but our mind cannot be led by sense so far as to see the essence of god because the sensible effects of god do not equal the power of god as their cause hence from the knowledge of sensible things the whole power of god cannot be known nor therefore can his essence be seen but because they are his effects and depend on their cause we can be led from them so far as to know god know of god whether he exists and to know of him what must necessarily belong to him as the first cause of all things exceeding all things caused by him hence we know that his relationship with creatures so far as to be the cause of them all also that creatures differ from him in as much as he is not in any way part of what is caused by him and that creatures are not removed from him by reason of any defect on his part but because he super exceeds them all replied to objection one reason cannot reach up to the simple form so as to know what it is but it can know whether it is replied to objection two god is known by natural knowledge through the images of his effects reply to objection three as the knowledge of god's essence is by grace it belongs only to the good but the knowledge of him by natural reason can belong to both good and bad and it's august and says retracting what he had said before i do not approve what i said in prayer god who will us that only the pure should know truth for it can be answered that many who are not pure can know many truths that is by natural reason 13th article whether by grace a higher knowledge of god can be obtained than by natural reason objection one it seems that by grace a higher knowledge of god is not obtained than by natural reason for Dionysia says that whoever is the more united to god in this life is united to him as to one entirely unknown he says the same of moses who nevertheless obtained a certain excellence by the knowledge conferred by grace but to be united to god while ignoring of him what he is comes about also by natural reason therefore god is not more known to us by grace than by natural reason objection two further we can acquire the knowledge of divine things by natural reason only through the imagination and the same applies to the knowledge given by grace for Dionysia says that it is impossible for the divine ray to shine upon us except as screened round about by the many colored sacred veils therefore we cannot know god more fully by grace than by natural reason objection three further our intellect adheres to god by grace of faith but faith does not seem to be knowledge for gregory says that things not seen are the objects of faith and not of knowledge therefore there is not given to us a more excellent knowledge of god by grace on the contrary the apostle says that god hath revealed to us his spirit what none of the princes of this world knew namely the philosophers as the gloss expounds i answer that we have a more perfect knowledge of god by grace than by natural reason which has proved thus the knowledge which we have by natural reason contains two things images derived from the sensible objects and the natural intelligible light enabling us to abstract from them intelligible conceptions now in both of these human knowledge is assisted by the revelation of grace for the intellect's natural light is strengthened by the infusion of gratuitous light and sometimes also the images in human imagination are divinely formed so as to express divine things better than those do which we receive from sensible objects as appears in prophetic visions while sometimes sensible things or even voices are divinely formed to express some divine meaning as in the baptism the holy ghost was seen in the shape of a dove and the voice of the father was heard this is my beloved son reply to objection one although by the revelation of grace in this life we cannot know of god what he is and thus are united to him as to one unknown still we know him more fully according as many and more excellent of his effects are demonstrated to us and according as we attribute to him some things known by divine revelation to which natural reason cannot reach as for instance that god is three and one reply to objection two from the images either received from sense in the natural order or divinely formed in the imagination we have so much the more excellent intellectual knowledge the stronger the intelligible light is in man and thus through the revelation given by the images of fuller knowledge is received by the infusion of the divine light reply to objection three faith is a kind of knowledge and as much as the intellect is determined by faith to some noble object but this determination to one object does not proceed from the vision of the believer but from the vision of him who is believed thus as far as faith falls short of vision it falls short of the knowledge which belongs to science for science determines the intellect to one object by the vision and understanding of first principles the end of question 12