CHAPTER X In the foregoing reasoning we have supposed that the testimony upon which a miracle is founded may possibly amount to an entire proof, and that the falsehood of that testimony would be a real prodigy. But it is easy to show that we have been a great deal too liberal in our concession, and that there never was a miraculous event established on so full an evidence. For first there is not to be found in all history any miracle attested by a sufficient number of men of such unquestioned good sense, education, and learning as to secure us against all delusion in themselves of such undoubted integrity as to place them beyond all suspicion of any design to deceive others of such credit and reputation in the eyes of mankind as to have a great deal to lose in case of their being detected in any falsehood, and at the same time a testing facts performed in such a public manner and in so celebrated a part of the world as to render the detection unavoidable, all which circumstances are requisite to give us a full assurance in the testimony of men. Secondly. We may observe in human nature a principle which, if strictly examined, will be found to diminish extremely the assurance which we might from human testimony have in any kind of prodigy. The maxim by which we commonly conduct ourselves in our reasonings is that the objects of which we have no experience resembles those of which we have, that what we have found to be most usual is always most probable, and that where there is an opposition of arguments we ought to give preference to such as are founded on the greatest number of past observations. But though in proceeding by this rule we readily reject any fact which is unusual and incredible in an ordinary degree, yet in advancing farther the mind observes not always the same rule. But when anything is affirmed utterly absurd and miraculous, it rather the more readily admits of such a fact upon account of that very circumstance which ought to destroy all its authority. The passion of surprise and wonder arising from miracles, being an agreeable emotion, gives a sensible tendency towards the belief of those events from which it is derived. And this goes so far that even those who cannot enjoy this pleasure immediately, nor can believe those miraculous events of which they are informed, yet love to partake of the satisfaction at second hand or by rebound, and place a pride in delight in exciting the admiration of others. With what greediness are the miraculous accounts of travelers received, their descriptions of sea and land monsters, their relations of wonderful adventures, strange men, and uncouth manners? But if the spirit of religion join itself to the love of wonder, there is an end of common sense, and human testimony in these circumstances loses all pretensions to authority. A religionist may be an enthusiast, and imagine he sees what has no reality. He may know his narrative to be false, and yet persevere in it, with the best intentions in the world, for the sake of promoting so wholly a cause. Or even where this delusion has not place, vanity, excited by so strong a temptation, operates on him more powerfully than on the rest of mankind in any other circumstances, and self-interest with equal force. These auditors may not have, and commonly have not, sufficient judgment to canvas his evidence. What judgment they have they renounce by principle, in these sublime and mysterious subjects. Or if they were ever so willing to employ it, passion and a heated imagination disturb the regularity of its operations. Their credulity increases his impudence, and his impudence overpowers their credulity. Patience, when at its highest pitch, leaves little room for reason or reflection, but addressing itself entirely to the fancy or the affections captivates the willing hearers, and subdues their understanding. Happily this pitch it seldom attains. But what a tully or dimostinese could scarcely affect over a Roman or Athenian audience, every Capuchin, every itinerant or stationery teacher, can perform over the generality of mankind, and in a higher degree, by touching such gross and vulgar passions. The many instances of forged miracles and prophecies and supernatural events, which in all ages have either been detected by contrary evidence, or which detect themselves by their absurdity, prove sufficiently the strong propensity of mankind to the extraordinary in the marvelous, and ought reasonably to beget a suspicion against all relations of this kind. This is our natural way of thinking, even with regard to the most common and the most credible events. For instance, there is no kind of report which rises so easily and spreads so quickly, especially in country places and provincial towns, as those concerning marriages, in so much that two young persons of equal condition never see each other twice but the whole neighborhood immediately join them together. The pleasure of telling a piece of news so interesting, of propagating it, and of being the first reporters of it, spreads the intelligence. And this is so well known, that no man of sense gives attention to these reports till he find them confirmed by some greater evidence. Do not the same passions, and others still stronger, incline the generality of mankind to believe and report with the greatest vehemence and assurance all religious miracles? Thirdly. It forms a strong presumption against all supernatural and miraculous relations, that they are observed chiefly to abound among ignorant and barbarous nations, or if a civilized people has ever given admission to any of them, that people will be found to have received them from ignorant and barbarous ancestors, who transmitted them with that inviolable sanction and authority which always attend received opinions. When we peruse the first histories of all nations, we are apt to imagine ourselves transported into some new world, where the whole frame of nature is disjointed, and every element performs its operations in a different manner from what it does at present. Battles, revolutions, pestilence, famine, and death are never the effect of those natural causes which we experience. Prodigies, omens, oracles, judgments, quite obscure the few natural events that are intermingled with them. But as the former grows thinner every page, in proportion as we advance near the enlightened ages, we soon learn that there is nothing mysterious or supernatural in the case, but that all proceeds from the usual propensity of mankind towards the marvelous, and that, though this inclination may at intervals receive a check from sense and learning, it can never be thoroughly extirpated from human nature. It is strange, a judicious reader is apt to say, upon the perusal of those wonderful historians, that such prodigious events never happen in our days. But it is nothing strange, I hope, that men should lie in all ages. You must surely have seen instances enough of that frailty. You have yourself heard many such marvelous relations started, which being treated with scorn by all the wise and judicious, have at last been abandoned even by the vulgar. We assured that those renowned lies, which have spread and flourished to such a monstrous height, arose from like beginnings, but being sown in a more proper soil, shot up at last into prodigies almost equal to those which they relate.  People at a distance, who are weak enough to think the matter at all worth inquiry, have no opportunity of receiving better information. The stories come magnified to them by a hundred circumstances. Fools are industrious in propagating the impostor, while the wise and learned are contented, in general, to deride its absurdity, without informing themselves of the particular facts by which it may be distinctly refuted. And thus the impostor above mentioned was enabled to proceed from his ignorant Paphlegonians to the enlisting of votaries, even among the Grecian philosophers, and men at the most imminent rank in distinction in Rome. Nay could engage the attention of that sage emperor Marcus Aurelius, so far as to make him trust the success of a military expedition to his delusive prophecies. The advantages are so great, of starting an impostor among an ignorant people, that even though the delusion should be too gross to impose on the generality of them, which, though seldom is sometimes the case, it has a much better chance for succeeding in remote countries than if the first scene had been laid in a city renowned for arts and knowledge. The most ignorant and barbarous of these barbarians carry their report abroad. None of their countrymen have a large correspondence or a sufficient credit and authority to contradict and beat down the delusion. Men's inclination to the marvelous has full opportunity to display itself. And thus a story, which is universally exploded in the place where it was first started, shall pass for certain at a thousand miles distance. But had Alexander fixed his residence at Athens, the powers of that renowned mart of learning would have immediately spread throughout the whole Roman Empire their sense of the matter, which, being supported by so great authority, and displayed by all the force of reason and eloquence, would have entirely opened the eyes of mankind. It is true, Lucian, passing by chance through Paphlegonia, had an opportunity performing this good office. But though much to be wished, it does not always happen that every Alexander meets with a Lucian, ready to expose and detect his imposters. I may add, as a fourth reason, which diminishes the authority of prodigies, that there is no testimony for any, even those which have not been expressly detect, that is not opposed by an infinite number of witnesses, so that not only the miracle destroys the credit of testimony, but the testimony destroys itself. To make this the better understood, let us consider that, in matters of religion, whatever is different is contrary, and that it is impossible the religions of ancient Rome, of Turkey, of Siam, and of China should all of them be established on any solid foundation. Every miracle, therefore, pretended to have been wrought in any of these religions, and all of them abound in miracles, as its direct scope is to establish the particular system to which it is attributed, so has it the same force, though more indirectly, to overthrow every other system. When destroying a rival system, it likewise destroys the credit of those miracles, on which that system was established, so that all the prodigies of different religions are to be regarded as contrary facts, and the evidences of these prodigies whether weak or strong as opposite to each other. According to this method of reasoning, when we believe any miracle of Muhammad or his successors, we have, for our warrant, the testimony of a few barbarous Arabians, and on the other hand, we are to regard the authority of Titus Livius, Plutarch, Tacitus, and, in short, of all the authors and witnesses, Grecian, Chinese, and Roman Catholic, who have related any miracle in their particular religion. I say we are to regard their testimony in the same line as if they had mentioned that Muhammad and miracle, and had in express terms contradicted it, with the same certainty as they have for the miracle they relate. This argument may appear over-subtle and refined, but is not in reality different from the reasoning of a judge who supposes that the credit of two witnesses, maintaining a crime against any one, is destroyed by the testimony of two others, who affirm him to have been two hundred leagues distant at the same instant when the crime is said to have been committed. One of the best detested miracles in all profane history is that which Tacitus reports of Aspecian, who cured a blind man in Alexandria by means of a spittle, and a lame man by the mere touch of his foot, in obedience to a vision of the god Serapis, who had enjoined them to have recourse to the emperor for these miraculous cures. The story may be seen in that fine historian, where every circumstance seems to add weight to the testimony, and might be displayed at large with all the force of argument and eloquence, if anyone were now concerned to enforce the evidence of that exploded in idolatrous superstition. The gravity, solidity, age, and probity of so great an emperor, who through the whole course of his life, conversed in a familiar manner with his friends and courtiers, and never affected those extraordinary heirs of divinity assumed by Alexander and Demetrius. The historian, a cotemporary writer, noted for candor and veracity, and with all the greatest and most penetrating genius, perhaps of all antiquity, and so free from any tendency to credulity, that he even lies under the contrary imputation of atheism and profaneness, the persons from whose authority he related the miracle, of established character for judgment and veracity, as we may well presume, eyewitnesses of the fact, and confirming their testimony after the Flavian family was despoiled of the empire, and could no longer give any reward as the price of a lie. Atromqua cui interfuera nunquaqua memorant postqua nulum mendacchio pretium, to which, if we add the public nature of the facts as related, it will appear that no evidence can well be supposed stronger for so gross and so palpable of falsehood. There is also a memorable story related by Cardinal de Ratz, which may well deserve our consideration. When that intriguing politician fled into Spain, to avoid the persecution of his enemies, he passed through Saragossa, the capital of Aragon, where he was shown in the cathedral a man who had served seven years as a doorkeeper, and was well known to everybody in town that had ever paid his devotions at that church. He had been seen, for so long a time, wanting a leg, but recovered that limb by the rubbing of holy oil upon the stump, and the Cardinal assures us that he saw him with two legs. This miracle was vouched by all the canons of the church, and the whole company in town were appealed to for a confirmation of the fact, whom the Cardinal found by their zealous devotion to be thorough believers of the miracle. Here the relator was also co-temporary to the supposed prodigy of an incredulous and libertine character, as well as of great genius, the miracle of so singular a nature as could scarcely admit of a counterfeit, and the witnesses very numerous and all of them in a manner spectators of the fact, to which they gave their testimony. And what adds mightily to the force of the evidence, and may double our surprise on this occasion, is that the Cardinal himself who relates this story seems not to give any credit to it, and consequently cannot be suspected of any concurrence in the holy fraud. He considered justly that it was not requisite in order to reject a fact of this nature, to be able accurately to disprove the testimony, and to trace its falsehood through all the circumstances of navery and credulity which produced it. He knew that, as this was commonly altogether impossible at any small distance of time and place, so was it extremely difficult even where one was immediately present, by reason of the bigotry, ignorance, cunning, and rogary of a great part of mankind. He therefore concluded, like a just reasoner, that such an evidence carried falsehood upon the very face of it, and that a miracle supported by any human testimony was more properly a subject of derision than of argument. There surely never was a greater number of miracles ascribed to one person than those which were lately said to have been wrought in France upon the tomb of Abbé Paris, the famous Jansenist, with whose sanctity the people were so long deluded. The curing of the sick, giving hearing to the deaf and sight to the blind, were everywhere talked of as the usual effects of that holy sepulcher. But what is more extraordinary, many of the miracles were immediately proved upon the spot, before judges of unquestioned integrity attested by witnesses of credit and distinction in a learned age and on the most eminent theater that is now in the world. Nor is this all. A relation of them was published and dispersed everywhere, nor were the Jesuits, though a learned body supported by the civil magistrate, and determined enemies to those opinions in whose favor the miracles were said to have been wrought, ever able distinctly to refute or detect them. But note. This book was written by Monsieur Montgéran, counselor or judge of the parliament of Paris, a man of figure and character who was also a martyr to the cause, and is now said to be somewhere in a dungeon on account of his book. There is another book in three volumes, called Ruccaillie des Mericlys de l'Abbé Paris, giving an account of many of these miracles and accompanied with preparatory discourses which are very well written. There runs, however, through the whole of these, a ridiculous comparison between the miracles of our Saviour and those of the Abbeys, wherein it is asserted that the evidence for the latter is equal to that for the former, as if the testimony of men could ever be put in the balance with that of God himself, who conducted the pin of the inspired writers. If these writers indeed were to be considered merely as human testimony, the French author is very moderate in his comparison, since he might with some appearance of reason pretend that the Janseness miracles much surpass the other in evidence and authority. The following circumstances are drawn from authentic papers inserted in the above-mentioned book. Many of the miracles of Abbe Paris were proved immediately by witnesses before the officiality or bishop's court at Paris, under the eye of Cardinal Noia, whose character for integrity and capacity was never contested even by his enemies. His successor in the Archbishopric was an enemy to the Jansenists, and for that reason promoted to the sea by the court. Yet twenty-two rectors or curae of Paris, with infinite earnestness, press him to examine those miracles which they assert to be known to the whole world, and undisputably certain, but he wisely forebore. The Molinist Party had tried to discredit these miracles in one instance, that of mademoiselle La France, but besides that their proceedings were in many respects the most irregular in the world, particularly inciting only a few of the Jansenist witnesses whom they tampered with, besides this I say they soon found themselves overwhelmed by a cloud of new witnesses, one hundred and twenty in number, most of them persons of credit and substance in Paris, who gave oath for the miracle. This was accompanied with a solemn and earnest appeal to the Parliament. But the Parliament were forbidden by authority to meddle in the affair. It was at last observed that where men are heated by zeal and enthusiasm there is no degree of human testimony so strong as may not be procured for the greatest absurdity. And those who will be so silly as to examine the affair by that medium, and seek particular flaws in the testimony, are almost sure to be confounded. There must be a miserable imposter, indeed, that does not prevail in that contest. All who have been in France about that time have heard of the reputation of Mansour E. Roe, the Lutinande police, whose vigilance, penetration, activity, and extensive intelligence have been much talked of. This magistrate, who by the nature of his office is almost absolute, was vested with full powers on purpose to suppress or discredit these miracles, and he frequently seized immediately and examined the witnesses and subjects of them, but never could reach anything satisfactory against them. In the case of Mademoiselle Thibault he sent the famous De Silva to examine her, whose evidence is very curious. The physician declares that it was impossible she could have been so ill, as was proved by her witnesses, because it was impossible she could, in so short a time, have recovered so perfectly as he found her. He reasoned, like a man of sins, from natural causes, but the opposite party told him that the whole was a miracle and that his evidence was the very best proof of it. The Molinists were in a sad dilemma. They durst not assert the absolute insufficiency of human evidence to prove a miracle. They were obliged to say that these miracles were wrought by witchcraft and the devil, but they were told that this was the recourse of the Jews of old. No Jansenist was ever embarrassed to account for the cessation of the miracles, when the churchyard was shut up by the king's edict. It was the touch of the tomb which produced these extraordinary effects, and when no one could approach the tomb, no effects could be expected. God indeed could have thrown down the walls in a moment, but he is master of his own graces and works, and it belongs not to us to account for them. He did not throw down the walls of every city, like those of Jericho, on the sounding of the rams' horns, nor break up the prison of every apostle like that of St. Paul. No less a man than the Duke de Châtillon, a Duke and peer of France, of the highest rank and family, gives evidence of a miraculous cure performed upon a servant of his, who had lived several years in his house with a visible and palpable infirmity. I shall conclude with observing that no clergy are more celebrated for strictness of life in manners than the secular clergy of France, particularly the rectors or curays of Paris, who bear testimony to these imposters. The learning, genius, and probity of the gentleman, and the austerity of the nuns of Port Royal, have been much celebrated all over Europe. Yet they all give evidence for a miracle wrought on the niece of the famous Pascal, whose sanctity of life as well as extraordinary capacity is well known. The famous Racine gives an account to this miracle in his famous history of Port Royal, and fortifies with it all the proofs which a multitude of nuns, priests, physicians, and men of the world, all of them of undoubted credit, could bestow upon it. Several men of letters, particularly the Bishop of Trunet, thought this miracle so certain as to employ it in the refutation of atheists and freethinkers. The Queen Regent of France, who was extremely prejudiced against the Port Royal, sent her own physician to examine the miracle, who returned in absolute convert. In short, the supernatural cure was so uncontestable that it saved, for a time, that famous monastery from the ruin with which it was threatened by the Jesuits. Had it been a cheat, it had certainly been detected by such sagacious and powerful antagonists, and must have hastened the ruin of the contrivers. Our divines, who can build up a formidable castle from such despicable materials, what a prodigious fabric could they have reared from these and many other circumstances which I have not mentioned. How often would the great names of Pascal, Racine, Arnaud, Nikole, have resounded in our ears? But if they be wise, they had better adopt the miracle, as being more worth a thousand times than all the rest of the collection. Besides, it may serve very much to their purpose. For that miracle was really performed by the touch of an authentic holy prickle of the holy thorn which composed the holy crown which, etc., etc., in footnote. Where shall we find such a number of circumstances agreeing to the corroboration of one fact? And what have we to oppose to such a cloud of witnesses but the absolute impossibility or miraculous nature of the events which they relate? And this surely, in the eyes of all reasonable people, will alone be regarded as a sufficient refutation. Is the consequence just because some human testimony has the utmost force and authority in some cases, when it relates to the battle Philippi of Farsalia, for instance, that therefore all kinds of testimony must in all cases have equal force and authority? Suppose that the Caesarean and Pompeian factions had each of them claim the victory in these battles, and that the historians of each party had uniformly ascribed the advantage to their own side. How could mankind, at this distance, have been able to determine between them? The contrariety is equally strong between the miracles related by Herodotus or Plutarch, and those delivered by Mariana, Bede, or any monkish historian. The wise lend a very academic faith to every report which favors the passion of the reporter, whether it magnifies his country, his family, or himself, or in any other way strikes in with his natural inclinations and propensities. But what greater temptation than to appear a missionary, a prophet, an ambassador from heaven? Who would not encounter many dangers and difficulties in order to attain so sublime a character? Or if, by the help of vanity and heated imagination, a man has first made a convert of himself, and entered seriously into the delusion, who ever scruples to make use of pious frauds in support of so holy and meritorious a cause? The smallest spark may hear kindle into the greatest flame, because the materials are always prepared for it. The evidem genus auricularum, the gazing populace, received greedily without examination whatever sues superstition and promotes wonder. How many stories of this nature have, in all ages, been detected and exploded in their infancy? How many more have been celebrated for a time, and have afterwards sunk into neglect and oblivion? Where such reports, therefore, fly about, the solution of the phenomenon is obvious, and we judge in conformity to regular experience and observation when we account for it by the known and natural principles of credulity and delusion. And shall we, rather than have a recourse to so natural a solution, allow of a miraculous violation of the most established laws of nature? I need not mention the difficulty of detecting a falsehood in any private or even public history at the place where it is said to happen, much more when the scene is removed to ever so small a distance. Even a court of judicature, with all the authority, accuracy, and judgment which they can employ, find themselves often at a loss to distinguish between truth and falsehood in the most recent actions. But the matter never comes to any issue if trusted to the common method of altercations and debates and flying rumors, especially when men's passions have taken part on either side. In the infancy of new religions, the wise and learned commonly esteem the matter too inconsiderable to deserve their attention or regard, and when afterwards they would willingly detect the cheat in order to un-deceive the deluded multitude, the season is now past, and the records and witnesses which might clear up the matter have perished beyond recovery. No means of detection remain, but those which must be drawn from the very testimony itself of the reporters, and these, though always sufficient with the judicious in knowing, are commonly too fine to fall under the comprehension of the vulgar. Upon the whole then, it appears that no testimony for any kind of miracle has ever amounted to a probability, much less to a proof, and that even supposing it amounted to a proof, it would be opposed by another proof, derived from the very nature of the fact which it would endeavor to establish. It is experience only which gives authority to human testimony, and it is the same experience which assures us of the laws of nature. When therefore these two kinds of experience are contrary, we have nothing to do but subtract the one from the other, and embrace an opinion either on one side or the other with that assurance which arises from the remainder. But according to the principle here explained, this subtraction with regard to all popular religions amounts to an entire annihilation, and therefore we may establish it as a maxim that no human testimony can have such force as to prove a miracle, and make it a just foundation for any such system of religion. I beg the limitations here made may be remarked when I say that a miracle can never be proved so as to be the foundation of a system of religion, for I own that otherwise there may possibly be miracles or violations of the usual course of nature of such a kind as to admit of proof from human testimony, though perhaps it will be impossible to find such in all the records of history. Thus suppose all authors in all languages agree that from the first of January 1600 there was a total darkness over the whole earth for eight days. Suppose that the tradition of this extraordinary event is still strong and lively among the people, that all travelers who return from foreign countries bring us accounts of the same tradition without the least variation or contradiction. It is evident that our present philosophers instead of doubting the fact ought to receive it a certain, and ought to search for the causes whence it might be derived. The decay, corruption, and dissolution of nature is an event rendered probable by so many analogies that any phenomenon which seems to have a tendency towards that catastrophe comes within the reach of human testimony, if that testimony be very extensive and uniform. But suppose that all the historians who treat of England should agree that on the first of January 1600 Queen Elizabeth died, that both before and after her death she was seen by her physicians in the whole court, as is usual with persons of her rank, that her successor was acknowledged and proclaimed by the Parliament, and that after being interred a month she again appeared, resumed the throne, and governed England for three years. I must confess that I should be surprised at the concurrence of so many odd circumstances, but should not have the least inclination to believe so miraculous an event. I should not doubt of her pretended death, and of those other public circumstances that followed it. I should only assert it to have been pretended, and that it neither was nor possibly could be real. You would, in vain, object to me the difficulty and almost impossibility of deceiving the world in an affair of such consequence. The wisdom and solid judgment of that renowned Queen, with the little or no advantage which she could reap from so poor an artifice. All this might astonish me, but I would still reply that the navery and folly of men are such common phenomena that I should rather believe the most extraordinary events to arise from their concurrence than admit of so signal a violation of the laws of nature. But should this miracle be ascribed to any new system of religion, men in all ages have been so much imposed on by ridiculous stories of that kind that this very circumstance would be a foolproof of a cheat, and sufficient with all men of sense not only to make them reject the fact, but even reject it without further examination. Though the being to whom the miracle is ascribed be, in this case, almighty, it is not upon that account become a wit more probable, since it is impossible for us to know the attributes or actions of such a being, otherwise than from the experience which we have of his productions, in the usual course of nature. This still reduces us to past observation, and obliges us to compare the instances of the violation of truth in the testimony of men with those of the violation of the laws of nature by miracles in order to judge which of them is most likely improbable. As the violations of truth are more common in the testimony concerning religious miracles than in that concerning any other matter of fact, this must diminish very much the authority of the former testimony, and make us form a general resolution never to lend any attention to it with whatever specious pretense it may be covered. Lord Bacon seems to have embraced the same principles of reasoning. We ought, says he, quote, to make a collection or particular history of all monsters and prodigious berths or productions, and in a word of everything new, rare, and extraordinary in nature. But this must be done with the most severe scrutiny lest we depart from truth. Above all, every relation must be considered as suspicious, which depends in any degree upon religion, as the prodigies of Livy. In no less so, everything that is to be found in the writers of natural magic or alchemy, or such authors who seem all of them to have an unconquerable appetite for falsehood and fable." I am the better pleased with the method of reasoning here delivered, as I think it may serve to confound those dangerous friends or disguised enemies to the Christian religion who have undertaken to defend it by the principles of human reason. Our most holy religion is founded on faith, not on reason, and it is a sure method of exposing it to put it to such a trial as it is by no means fitted to endure. To make this more evident, let us examine those miracles related in Scripture, and not to lose ourselves in too wide a field, let us confine ourselves to such as we find in the Pentateuch, which we shall examine, according to the principles of these pretended Christians, not as the word or testimony of God himself, but as the production of a mere human writer and historian. Here then we are first to consider a book presented to us by a barbarous and ignorant people, written in an age when they were still more barbarous, and in all probability long after the facts which it relates, corroborated by no concurring testimony, and resembling those fabulous accounts which every nation gives of its origin. Upon reading this book, we find it full of prodigies and miracles. It gives an account of a state of the world and of human nature entirely different from the present, of our fall from that state, of the age of man extended to near a thousand years, of the destruction of the world by a deluge, of the arbitrary choice of one people as the favorites of heaven, and that people the countrymen of the author, of their deliverance from bondage by prodigies the most astonishing imaginable. I desire any one to lay his hand upon his heart, and after a serious consideration declare whether he thinks that the falsehood of such a book supported by such a testimony would be more extraordinary and miraculous than all the miracles it relates, which is, however, necessary to make it be received, according to the measures of probability above established. What we have said of miracles may be applied without any variation to prophecies, and indeed all prophecies are real miracles, and as such only can be admitted as proofs of any revelation. If it did not exceed the capacity of human nature to foretell future events, it would be absurd to employ any prophecy as an argument for a divine mission or authority from heaven. So that upon the whole we may conclude that the Christian religion not only was at first attended with miracles, but even at this day cannot be believed by any reasonable person without one. Mere reason is insufficient to convince us of its veracity, and whoever is moved by faith to assent to it is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all the principles of his understanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience. End of Chapter 10, Part 2. Chapter 16 of An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer visit LibriVox.org. An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding by David Hume. Chapter 16 of a Particular Providence and of a Future State. I was lately engaged in conversation with a friend who loves skeptical paradoxes, where, though he advanced many principles of which I can by no means prove, yet as they seem to be curious and to bear some relation to the chain of reasoning carried on throughout this inquiry, I shall here copy them from memory as accurately as I can in order to submit them to the judgment of the reader. Our conversation began with my admiring the singular good fortune of philosophy, which, as it requires, entire liberty above all other privileges, and chiefly flourishes from the free opposition of sentiments and argumentation, received its first birth in an age and country of freedom and toleration, and was never cramped even in its most extravagant principles by any creeds, concessions, or penal statutes, for except the banishment of Protagoras and the death of Socrates, which last event proceeded partly from other motives, there is scarcely any instances to be met with in ancient history of this bigoted jealousy with which the present age is so much infested. Epicureus lived at Athens to an advanced age in peace and tranquility. Epicureans were even admitted to receive the sacerdotal character and to officiate at the altar in the most sacred rites of the established religion, and the public encouragement of pensions and salaries was afforded equally by the wisest of all the Roman emperors to the professors of every sect of philosophy. How requisite such kind of treatment was to philosophy in her early youth will easily be conceived if we reflect that even at present when she may be supposed to be hardy and robust, she bears with much difficulty the inclemency of the seasons and those harsh winds of calamity and persecution which blow upon her. You admire, says my friend, as the singular good fortune of philosophy what seems to result from the natural course of things and to be unavoidable in every age and nation, this pertenacious bigotry of which you complain as so fatal to philosophy is really her offspring who, after a lying with superstition, separates himself entirely from the interest of his parent and becomes her most inveterate enemy in persecutor. Speculative dogmas of religion, the present occasions of such furious dispute could not possibly be conceived or admitted in the early ages of the world. When mankind, being wholly illiterate, formed an idea of religion more suitable to their weak apprehension and composed their sacred tenets of such tales chiefly as were the objects of traditional belief, more than of argument or disputation. After the first alarm, therefore, was over, which arose from the new paradoxes and principles of the philosophers. These teachers seem ever after during the ages of antiquity to have lived in great harmony with the established superstition and have made a fair partition of mankind between them, the former claiming all the learned and wise, the latter possessing all the vulgar and illiterate. It seems then, say I, that you leave politics entirely out of the question and never suppose that a wise magistrate can be jealous of certain tenets of philosophy, such as those of Epicurus, which denying a divine existence and consequently a provenance and a future state seem to loosen in a great measure the ties of morality and may be supposed for that reason pernicious to the peace of civil society. I know, replied he, that in fact these persecutions never in any age proceeded from calm reason or from experience of the pernicious consequences of philosophy, but arose entirely from passion and prejudice. But what if I should advance farther and assert that if Epicurus had been accused before the people by any of the sycophants or informers of those days he could easily have defended his cause and proved his principles of philosophy to be as salutary as those of his adversaries who endeavored with such zeal to expose him to the public hatred and jealousy. I wish, said I, you would try your eloquence upon so extraordinary a topic and make a speech for Epicurus which might satisfy not the mob of Athens if you allow that ancient and polite city to have contained any mob, but the more philosophical part of his audience such as might be supposed capable of comprehending his arguments. The matter would not be difficult upon such conditions, replied he, and if you please I shall suppose myself Epicurus for a moment, and make you stand for the Athenian people and shall deliver you such a harangue as will fill all the urn with white beans and leave not a black one to gratify the malice of my adversaries. Very well then, pray proceed upon these suppositions. I come hither, O ye Athenians, to justify in your assembly what I maintained in my school, and I find myself impeached by furious antagonists. Instead of reasoning with calm and dispassionate inquirers, your deliberations, which of right should be directed to questions of public good and the interest of the common wealth, are diverted to the dispositions of speculative philosophy, and these magnificent, but perhaps fruitless inquiries, take place of your more familiar but useful occupations. But so far as in me lies, I will prevent this abuse. We shall not hear dispute concerning the origin and government of worlds. We shall only inquire how far such questions concern the public interest, and if I can persuade you that they are entirely indifferent to the peace of society and security of government, I hope that you will presently send us back to our schools there to examine, at leisure, the question, the most sublime, but at the same time the most speculative of all philosophy. The religious philosopher is not satisfied with the tradition of your forefathers and doctrine of your priests, in which I willingly acquiesce indulge a rash curiosity in trying how far they can establish religion upon the principles of reason, and they thereby excite instead of satisfying the doubts which naturally arise from a diligent and scrutinous inquiry. They paint in the most magnificent colors the order, beauty, and wise arrangement of the universe, and then ask if such a glorious display of intelligence could proceed from the fortuitous concourse of atoms, or if chance could produce what the greatest genius can never sufficiently admire. I shall not examine the justness of this argument, I shall allow it to be as solid as my antagonists, and accusers can desire, it is sufficient if I can prove from this very reasoning that the question is entirely speculative, and that when in my philosophical dispositions I deny a provenance and a future state, I undermine not the foundations of society, but advance principles which they themselves upon their own topics, if they argue consistently, must allow to be solid and satisfactory. You then, who are my accusers, have acknowledged that the chief or sole argument for divine existence, which I never questioned, is derived from the order of nature, where there appear such marks of intelligence and design that you think it extravagant to assign for its cause either chance or the blind and unguided force of matter. You allow that this is an argument drawn from effects to causes. From the order of the work you infer that there must have been project and forethought in the workmen. If you cannot make out this point, you allow that your conclusion fails, and you pretend not to establish the conclusion in a greater latitude than the phenomena of nature will justify, these are your concessions. I desire you to mark the consequences. When we infer any particular cause from an effect, we must proportion the one to the other, and can never be allowed to ascribe to the cause any qualities, but what are exactly sufficient to produce the effect. A body of 10 ounces raised in any scale may serve as a proof that the counterbalancing weight exceeds 10 ounces, but can never afford a reason that it exceeds 100. If the cause assigned for any effect be not sufficient to produce it, we must either reject that cause or add to it such qualities as will give it a just proportion to the effect. But if we ascribe to it farther qualities or affirm it capable of producing other effects, we can only indulge the license of conjecture and arbitrarily suppose the existence of qualities and energies without reason or authority. The same rule holds whether the cause assigned be brute, unconscious matter, or a rational intelligent being. If the cause be known by the effect, we never ought to ascribe to it any qualities beyond what are precisely requisite to produce the effect, nor can we by any rules of just reasoning return back from the cause and infer other effects from it, beyond those by which alone it is known to us. No one merely from the sight of one of Zeuxis's pictures could know that he was also a statuary or architect, and was an artist no less skillful in stone and marble than in colors. The talents and taste displayed in the particular work before us, these we may safely conclude the workmen to be possessed of. The cause must be proportion to the effect, and if we exactly and precisely proportion it, we shall never find in any qualities that point farther or afford an inference concerning any other design or performance. Such qualities must be somewhat beyond what is merely requisite for producing the effect which we examine. Allowing therefore the gods to be the authors of the existence or order of the universe, it follows that they possess that precise degree of power, intelligence, and benevolence which appears in their workmanship, but nothing farther can ever be proved, except we call in the assistance of exaggeration and flattery to supply the defects of argument and reasoning. So far as the traces of any attributes at present appear, so far may we conclude these attributes to exist. The supposition of farther attributes is mere hypothesis, much more the supposition that in the distant regions of space or periods of time there has been, or will be, a more magnificent display of these attributes and a scheme of administration more suitable to such imaginary virtues. We can never be allowed to mount up from the universe the effect to Jupiter, the cause, and then descend downwards to infer any new effect from that cause, as if the present effects alone were not entirely worthy of the glorious attributes which we ascribe to that deity. The knowledge of the cause being derived solely from the effects, they must be exactly adjusted to each other, and the one can never refer to anything farther or be the foundation of any new inference and conclusion.  You forget that this superlative intelligence and benevolence are entirely imaginary, or at least without any foundation and reason, and that you have no ground to ascribe to him any qualities, but what you see he has actually exerted and displayed in his productions. Let your gods therefore, philosophers, be suited to the present appearance of nature, and presume not to alter these appearances by arbitrary suppositions in order to suit them to the attributes which you so fondly ascribe to your deities. When priests and poets supported by your authority, O Athenians, talk of a golden or silver age which preceded the present state of vice and misery, I hear them with attention and with reverence, but when philosophers who pretend to neglect authority and to cultivate reason hold the same discourse, I pay them not, I own the same obsequious submission and pious deference. I ask who carried them into the celestial regions who admitted them into the councils of the gods, who opened to them the book of fate that they thus rashly affirm that their deities have executed or will execute any purpose beyond what has actually appeared. If they tell me that they have mounted on the steps or by the gradual ascent of reason, and by drawing inferences from effects to causes, I still insist that they have aided the ascent of reason by the wings of imagination. Otherwise they could not thus change their manner of inference and argue from causes to effects presuming that a more perfect production than the present world would be more suitable to such perfect beings as the gods, and forgetting that they have no reason to ascribe to these celestial beings any perfection or any attribute, but what can be found in the present world. Hence all the fruitless industry to account for the ill appearances of nature and save the honor of the gods while we must acknowledge the reality of that evil and disorder with which the world so much abounds. The obstinate and intractable qualities of matter we are told, or the observance of general laws, or some such reason, is the sole cause which controlled the power and benevolence of Jupiter and obliged him to create mankind and every sensible creature so imperfect and so unhappy. These attributes then are, it seems, beforehand taken for granted, in their greatest latitude, and upon that supposition I own that such conjecture may perhaps be admitted as plausible solutions of the ill phenomena. But still I ask why take these attributes for granted or why ascribe to the cause any qualities but what actually appear in the effect. Why torture your brain to justify the course of nature upon suppositions which, for ought you know, may be entirely imaginary and of which there are to be found no traces in the course of nature. The religious hypothesis therefore must be considered only as a particular method of accounting for the visible phenomena of the universe, but no just reasoner will ever presume to infer from it any single fact and alter or add to the phenomena in any single particular. If you think that the appearances of things prove such causes it is allowable for you to draw an inference concerning the existence of these causes. In such complicated and sublime subjects everyone should be indulged in the liberty of conjecture and argument, but here you ought to rest. If you come backward and arguing from your inferred causes conclude that any other fact has existed or will exist in the course of nature which may serve as a fuller display of particular attributes I must admonish you that you have departed from the method of reasoning attached to the present subject and have certainly added something to the attributes of the cause beyond what appears in the effect. Otherwise you could never with tolerable sense or propriety add anything to the effect in order to render it more worthy of the cause. Where then is the odiousness of that doctrine which I teach in my school or rather which I examine in my gardens or what do you find in this whole question wherein the security of good morals or in the peace and order of society is in the least concerned. I deny a provenance you say in supreme governor of the world who guides the course of events and punishes the vicious with infamy and disappointment and rewards the virtuous with honor and success in all their undertakings but surely I deny not the course itself of events which lies open to everyone's inquiry and examination. I acknowledge that in the present order of things virtue is attended with more peace of mind than vice and meets with a more favorable reception from the world. I am sensible that according to the past experience of mankind friendship is the chief joy of human life and moderation the only source of tranquility and happiness. I never balance between the virtuous and the vicious course of life but I'm sensible that to a well-disposed mind every advantage is on the side of the former and what can you say more allowing all your suppositions and reasonings. You tell me indeed that this disposition of things proceeds from intelligence and design but whatever it proceeds from the disposition itself on which depends our happiness or misery and consequently our conduct and deportment in life is still the same. Is it still open for me as well as you to regulate my behavior by my experience of past events and if you affirm that while a divine providence is allowed and a supreme distributive justice in the universe I ought to expect some more particular reward of the good and punishment of the bad beyond the ordinary course of events. I here find the same fallacy which I have before endeavor to detect. You persist in imagining that if we grant that divine existence for which you so earnestly contend you may safely infer consequences from it and add something to the experienced order of nature by arguing from the attributes which you ascribe to your gods you seem to remember that all your reasonings on this subject can only be drawn from effects to causes and that every argument deducted from causes to effects must of necessity be a gross sophism since it is impossible for you to know anything of the cause but what you have antecedently not inferred but discovered to full in the effect but what must a philosopher think of those vain reasoners who instead of regarding the present scene of things as the sole object of their contemplation so far reversed the whole course of nature as to render this life merely a passage to something farther a porch which leads to a greater and vastly different building a prologue which serves only to introduce the peace and give it more grace and propriety whence do you think can such philosophers derive their idea of the gods from their own conceit and imagination surely for if they derived it from the present phenomena it would never point to anything farther but must exactly adjust to them that the divinity may possibly be endowed with attributes which we have never seen exerted may be governed by principles of action which we cannot discover to be satisfied all this will freely be allowed but still this is mere possibility in hypothesis we never can have reason to infer any attributes or any principles of action in him but so far as we know them to have been exerted and satisfied are there any marks of a distributive justice in the world if you answer in the affirmative I conclude that since justice here exerts itself it is satisfied if you reply in the negative I conclude that you have then no reason to ascribe justice in our sense of it to the gods if you hold a medium between affirmation and negation by saying that the justice of the gods at present exerts itself in part but not in its full extent I answer that you have no reason to give it any particular extent but only so far as you see it at present exert itself thus I bring the disputo Athenians to a short issue with my antagonists the course of nature lies open to my contemplation as well as theirs the experienced train of events is the great standard by which we all regulate our conduct nothing else can be appealed to in the field or in the senate nothing else ought ever to be heard of in the school or in the closet in vain would our limited understanding break through those boundaries which are too narrow for our fond imagination while we argue from the course of nature and infer a particular intelligent cause which first bestowed and still preserves order in the universe we embrace a principle which is both uncertain and useless it is uncertain because the subject lies entirely beyond the reach of human experience it is useless because our knowledge of this cause being derived entirely from the course of nature we can never according to the rules of just reasoning return back from the cause with any new inference or making additions to the common and experience course of nature establish any new principles of conduct and behavior I observed said I finding he had finished his harang that you neglect not the artifice of the demagogues of old and as you were pleased to make me stand for the people you insinuate yourself into my favor by embracing those principles to which you know I have always expressed a particular attachment but allowing you to make experience as indeed I think you ought the only standard of our judgment concerning this and all other questions of fact I doubt not but from the very same experience to which you appeal it may be possible to refute this reasoning which you have put into the mouth of Epicurus if you saw for instance a half finished building surrounded with heaps of brick and stone and mortar and all the instruments of masonry could you not infer from the effect that it was a work of design and contrivance and could you not return again from this inferred cause to infer new additions to the effect and conclude that the building would soon be finished and receive all further improvements which art could bestow upon it if you saw upon the seashore the print of one human foot you would conclude that a man had passed that way and that he had also left the traces of the other foot though effaced by the rolling of the sands or inundation of the waters why then do you refuse to admit the same method of reasoning with regard to the order of nature consider the world and the present life only as an imperfect building from which you can infer a superior intelligence and arguing from that superior intelligence which can leave nothing imperfect why may you not infer a more finished scheme or plan which will receive its completion in some distant point of space and time are not these methods of reasoning exactly similar and under what pretense can you embrace the one while you reject the other the infinite difference of the subjects replied he is a sufficient foundation for this difference in my conclusions in works of human art and contrivance it is allowable to advance from the effect to the cause and returning back from the cause to form new inferences concerning the effect and examine the alterations which it has probably undergone or may still undergo but what is the foundation of this method of reasoning plainly this that man is a being whom we know by experience whose motives and designs we are acquainted with and whose projects and inclinations have a certain connection and coherence according to the laws which nature has established for the government of such a creature when therefore we find that any work is proceeded from the skill and industry of man as we are otherwise acquainted with the nature of the animal we can draw a hundred inferences concerning what may be expected from him and these inferences will all be founded in experience and observation but did we know man from the single work or production which we examine it were impossible for us to argue in this manner because our knowledge of all the qualities which we ascribe to him being in that case derived from the production it is impossible they could point to anything farther or be the foundation of any new inference the print of a foot in the sand can only prove when considered alone that there was some figure adapted to it by which it was produced but the print of a human foot proves likewise from our other experience that there was probably another foot which also left its impression though a face by time or other accidents here we mount from the effect to the cause and descending again from the cause infer alterations in the effect but this is not a continuation of the same simple chain of reasoning we comprehend in this case a hundred other experiences and observations concerning the usual figure and members of that species of animal without which this method of argument must be considered as fallacious and sophisticated the case is not the same with our reasonings from the works of nature the deity is known to us only by his productions and is a single being in the universe not comprehended under any species or genus from whose experienced attributes or qualities we can by analogy infer any attribute or quality in him as the universe shows wisdom and goodness we infer wisdom and goodness as it shows a particular degree of these perfections we infer a particular degree of them precisely adapted to the effect which we examine but farther attributes or farther degrees of the same attributes we can never be authorized to infer or suppose by any rules of just reasoning now without some such license of supposition it is impossible for us to argue from the cause or infer any alteration in the effect beyond what has immediately fallen under our observation greater good produced by this being must still prove a greater degree of goodness a more impartial distribution of rewards and punishment must proceed from a greater regard to justice and equity every supposed addition to the works of nature makes an addition to the attributes of the author of nature and consequently being entirely unsupported by any reason can never be admitted but as mere conjecture and hypothesis footnote 30 in general it may I think be established as a maxim that where any cause is known only by its particular effects it must be impossible to infer any new effects from that cause since the qualities which are requisite to produce these new effects along with the former must either be different or superior or of more extensive operation than those which simply produce the effect once alone the cause is supposed to be known to us we can never therefore have any reason to suppose the existence of these qualities to say that the new effects proceed only from a continuation of the same energy which is already known from the first effects will not remove the difficulty for even granting this to be the case which can seldom be supposed the very continuation and exertion of a like energy for it is impossible it can be absolutely the same I say this exertion of a like energy in a different period of space and time is a very arbitrary supposition and what there cannot possibly be any traces of in the effects from which all our knowledge of the cause is originally derived let the inferred cause be exactly proportioned as it should be to the known effect and it is impossible that it can possess any qualities from which new or different effects can be inferred end of footnote 30 the great source of our mistake in this subject and of the unbounded license of conjecture which we indulge is that we tacitly consider ourselves as in the place of supreme being and conclude that he will on every occasion observe the same conduct which we ourselves in his situation would have embraced as reasonable and eligible but besides that the ordinary course of nature may convince us that almost everything is regulated by principles and maxims very different from ours besides this I say it must evidently appear contrary to all rules of analogy to reason from the intentions and projects of men to those of a being so different and so much superior in human nature there is a certain experienced coherence of designs and inclinations so that when from any fact we have discovered one intention of any man it may often be reasonable from experience to infer another and draw a long chain of conclusions concerning his past or future conduct but this method of reasoning can never have place with regard to a being so remote and incomprehensible who bears much less analogy to any other being in the universe than the son to a wax and taper and who discovers himself only by some faint traces or outlines beyond which we have no authority to ascribe to him any attribute or perfection what we imagine to be a superior perfection may really be a defect or were it ever so much a perfection the ascribing of it to the supreme being where it appears not to have been really exerted to the full in his works savers more flattery and panigiric than of just reasoning and sound philosophy all the philosophy therefore in the world and all the religion which is nothing but a species of philosophy will never be able to carry us beyond the usual course of experience or give us measures of conduct and behavior different from those which are furnished by reflections on common life no new fact can ever be inferred from the religious hypothesis no event foreseen or foretold no reward or punishment expected or dreaded beyond what is already known by practice and observation so that my apology for Epicurus will still appear solid and satisfactory nor have the political interests of society any connection with the philosophical disputes concerning metaphysics and religion there is still one circumstance replied I which you seem to have overlooked though I should allow your premises you conclude that religious doctrines and reasonings can have no influence on life because they ought to have no influence never considering that men reason not in the same manner you do but draw many consequences from the belief of a divine existence and suppose that the deity will inflict punishments on vice and bestow rewards on virtue beyond what appear in the ordinary course of nature whether this reasoning of theirs be just or not is no matter its influence on their life and conduct must still be the same and those who attempt to disabuse them of such prejudices may for ought I know be good reasoners what I cannot allow them to be good citizens and politicians since they free men from one restraint upon their passions and make the infringement of the laws of society in one respect more easy and secure after all I may perhaps agree to your general conclusion in favor of liberty though upon different premises from those on which you endeavor to found it I think that the state ought to tolerate every principle of philosophy nor is there an instance that any government has suffered in its political interests by such indulgence there is no enthusiasm among philosophers their doctrines are not very alluring to the people and no restraint can be put upon their reasonings but what must be of dangerous consequence to the sciences and even to the state by paving the way for persecution and oppression in points where the generality of mankind are more deeply interested and concerned but there occurs to me continue to I with regard to your main topic a difficulty which I shall just propose to you without insisting on it lest it lead into reasonings of too nice and delicate a nature in a word I much doubt whether it be possible for a cause to be known only by its effect as you have all long supposed or to be of so singular in particular a nature as to have no parallel and no similarity with any other cause or object that has ever fallen under our observation it is only when two species of object are found to be constantly conjoined that we can infer the one from the other and were an effect presented which was entirely singular and could not be comprehended under any known species I do not see that we could form any conjecture or inference at all concerning its cause if experience and observation and analogy be indeed the only guides which we can reasonably follow in inferences of this nature both the effect and the cause must bear a similarity and resemblance to other effects and causes which we know and which we have found in many instances to be conjoined with each other I leave it to your own reflection to pursue the consequences of this principle I shall just observe that as the antagonists of Epicurus always suppose the universe an effect quite singular and unparalleled to be the proof of a deity a cause no less singular and unparalleled your reasoning upon that supposition seem at least to merit our attention there is I own some difficulty how we can ever return from the cause to the effect and reasoning from our ideas of the former infer any alteration on the latter or any addition to it End of Chapter 16 Section 12 Part 1 of An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Section 12 of the Academical or Skeptical Philosophy Part 1 There is not a greater number of philosophical reasonings displayed upon any subject than those which prove the existence of a deity and refute the fallacies of atheists and yet the most religious philosophers still dispute whether any man can be so blinded as to be a speculative atheist How shall we reconcile these contradictions? The knights errant who wandered about to clear the world of dragons and giants never entertained the least doubt with regard to the existence of these monsters The skeptic is another enemy of religion who naturally provokes the indignation of all divines and graver philosophers though it is certain that no man ever met with any such absurd creature or conversed with a man who had no opinion or principle concerning any subject either of action or speculation This begets a very natural question What is meant by a skeptic? And how far is it possible to push these philosophical principles of doubt and uncertainty? There is a species of skepticism antecedent to all study and philosophy which is much inculcated by Descartes and others as a sovereign preservative against error and precipitate judgment It recommends a universal doubt not only of all our former opinions and principles but also of our very faculties of whose veracity, say they, we must assure ourselves by a chain of reasoning deduce from some original principle which cannot possibly be fallacious or deceitful But neither is there any such original principle which has a prerogative above others that are self-evident and convincing or if there were could we advance a step beyond it but by the use of those very faculties of which we are supposed to be already dividend The Cartesian doubt, therefore, were it ever possible to be attained by any human creature as it plainly is not, would be entirely incurable and no reasoning could ever bring us to a state of assurance and conviction upon any subject It must however be confessed that this species of skepticism when more moderate may be understood in a very reasonable sense and is a necessary preparative to the study of philosophy by preserving a proper impartiality in our judgments and weaning our mind from all those prejudices which we may have imbibed from education or rash opinion To begin with clear and self-evident principles to advance by timorous and sure steps to review frequently our conclusions and examine accurately all their consequences though by these means we shall make both a slow and a short progress in our systems are the only methods by which we can ever hope to reach truth and attain a proper stability and certainty in our determinations There is another species of skepticism consequent to science and inquiry when men are supposed to have discovered either the absolute fallaciousness of their mental faculties or their unfitness to reach any fixed determination in all those curious subjects of speculation about which they are commonly employed Even our very senses are brought into dispute by a certain species of philosophers and the maxims of common life are subjected to the same doubt as the most profound principles or conclusions of metaphysics and theology As these paradoxical tenets, if they may be called tenets, are to be met with in some philosophers and the refutation of them in several they naturally excite acuriosity and make us inquire into the arguments on which they may be founded I need not insist upon the more trite topics employed by the skeptics in all ages against the evidence of sense such as those which are derived from the imperfection and fallaciousness of our organs on numberless occasions the crooked appearance of an ore in water the various aspects of objects according to their different distances the double images which arise from the pressing one eye and with many other appearances of a like nature These skeptical topics, indeed, are only sufficient to prove that the senses alone are not implicitly to be depended on but that we must correct their evidence by reason and by considerations derived from the nature of the medium the distance of the object and the disposition of the organ in order to render them within their sphere the proper criteria of truths and falsehood There are other more profound arguments against the senses which admit not of so easy a solution It seems evident that men are carried by a natural instinct or prepossession to repose faith in their senses and that without any reasoning or even almost before the use of reason we always suppose an external universe which depends not on our perception but would exist though we and every sensible creature were absent or annihilated Even the animal creation are governed by a like opinion and preserve this belief of external objects in all their thoughts, designs and actions It also seems evident that when men follow this blind and powerful instinct of nature they always suppose the very images presented by the senses to be the external objects and never entertain any suspicion that the one are nothing but representations of the other This very table which we see white and which we feel hard is believed to exist independent of our perception and to be something external to our mind which perceives it Our presence bestows not being on it Our absence does not annihilate it It preserves its existence uniform and entire independent of the situation of intelligent beings who perceive or contemplate it But this universal and primary opinion of all men is soon destroyed by the slightest philosophy which teaches us that nothing can ever be present to the mind but an image or perception and that the senses are only the inlets through which these images are conveyed without being able to produce any immediate intercourse between the mind and the object The table which we see seems to diminish as we remove further from it but the real table which exists independent of us suffers no alteration It was, therefore, nothing but its image which was present to the mind These are the obvious dictates of reason and no man who reflects ever doubted that the existences which we consider when we say this house and that tree are nothing but perceptions in the mind and fleeting copies or representations of other existences which remain uniform and independent So far, then, are we necessitated by reasoning to contradict or depart from the primary instincts of nature and to embrace a new system with regard to the evidence of our senses But here philosophy finds herself extremely embarrassed when she would justify this new system and obviate the cavils and objections of the skeptics She can no longer plead the infallible and irresistible instinct of nature for that led us to a quite different system which is acknowledged fallible and even erroneous and to justify this pretended philosophical system by a chain of clear and convincing arguments or even any appearance of argument exceeds the power of all human capacity By what argument can it be proved that the perceptions of the mind must be caused by external objects entirely different from them though resembling them, if that be possible and could not arise either from the energy of the mind itself or from the suggestion of some invisible and unknown spirit or from some other cause still more unknown to us It is acknowledged that, in fact, many of these perceptions arise not from anything external as in dreams, madness and other diseases and nothing can be more inexplicable than the manner in which the body should so operate upon mind as ever to convey an image of itself to a substance supposed of so different and even contrary a nature It is a question of fact By the perceptions of the senses be produced by external objects resembling them, how shall this question be determined? By experience surely as all other questions of a like nature but here experience is and must be entirely silent The mind has never anything present to it but the perceptions and cannot possibly reach any experience of their connection with objects The supposition of such connection is, therefore, without any foundation in reasoning To have recourse to the veracity of the supreme being in order to prove the veracity of our senses is surely making a very unexpected circuit If his veracity were at all concerned in this matter our senses would be entirely infallible because it is not possible that he can ever deceive Not to mention that if the external world be once called in question we shall be at a loss to find arguments by which we may prove the existence of that being or any of his attributes This is a topic, therefore, in which the profounder and more philosophical skeptics will always triumph when they endeavour to introduce a universal doubt into all subjects of human knowledge and enquiry Do you follow the instincts and propensities of nature, may they say, in assenting to the veracity of sense? But these lead you to believe that the very perception or sensible image is the external object Do you disclaim this principle in order to embrace a more rational opinion that the perceptions are only representations of something external? You hear depart from your natural propensities and more obvious sentiments and yet are not able to satisfy your reason which can never find any convincing argument from experience to prove that the perceptions are connected with any external objects There is another skeptical topic of alike nature derived from the most profound philosophy which has married our attention, where it requisite to dive so deep in order to discover arguments and reasonings which can so little serve to any serious purpose It is universally allowed by modern enquirers that all the sensible qualities of objects such as hard, soft, hot, cold, white, black, etc. are merely secondary and exist not in the objects themselves but in the perceptions of the mind without any external archetype or model which they represent If this be allowed with regard to secondary qualities it must also follow with regard to the supposed primary qualities of extension and solidity nor can the latter be any more entitled to that denomination than the former The idea of extension is entirely acquired from the senses of sight and feeling If the qualities perceived by the senses be in the mind not in the object the same conclusion must reach the idea of extension which is wholly dependent on the sensible ideas or the ideas of secondary qualities Nothing can save us from this conclusion but the asserting that the ideas of those primary qualities are attained by abstraction an opinion which, if we examine it accurately we shall find to be unintelligible and even absurd An extension that is neither tangible nor visible cannot possibly be conceived and a tangible or visible extension which is neither hard nor soft, black nor white is equally beyond the reach of human conception Let any man try to conceive a triangle in general which is neither isosceles nor scalenum nor has any particular length or proportion of sides and he will soon perceive the absurdity of all the scholastic notions with regard to abstraction and general ideas Footnote 31 This argument is drawn from Dr. Berkeley and indeed most of the writings of that very ingenious author form the best lessons of skepticism which are to be found either among the ancient or modern philosopher Bale not accepted He professes, however, in his title page and undoubtedly with great truth to have composed his book against the skeptics as well as against the atheists and free thinkers but that all his arguments, though otherwise intended are in reality merely skeptical, appears from this that they admit of no answer and produce no conviction Their only effect is to cause that momentary amazement and irresolution and confusion which is the result of skepticism Return to main text Thus the first philosophical objection to the evidence of sense or to the opinion of external existence consists in this that such an opinion if rested on natural instinct is contrary to reason and if referred to reason is contrary to natural instinct and at the same time carries no rational evidence with it to convince an impartial inquirer The second objection goes further and represents this opinion as contrary to reason at least if it be a principle of reason that all sensible qualities are in the mind not in the object bereave matter of all its intelligible qualities both primary and secondary you in a manner annihilate it and leave only a certain unknown inexplicable something as the cause of our perceptions a notion so imperfect that no skeptic will think it worthwhile to contend against it End of section 12 part 1 Section 12 part 2 of an enquiry concerning human understanding This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Section 12 of the Academical or Skeptical Philosophy Part 2 It may seem a very extravagant attempt of the skeptics to destroy reason by argument and ratiosination Yet is this the grand scope of all their inquiries and disputes They endeavour to find objections both to our abstract reasonings and to those which regard matter of fact and existence The chief objection against all abstract reasonings is derived from the ideas of space and time Ideas which in common life and to a careless view are very clear and intelligible But when they pass through the scrutiny of the profound sciences and they are the chief object of these sciences afford principles which seem full of absurdity and contradiction No priestly dogmas invented on purpose to tame and subdue the rebellious reason of mankind ever shocked common sense more than the doctrine of the infinitive divisibility of extension with its consequences, as they are pompously displayed by all geometricians and metaphysicians with a kind of triumph and exaltation A real quantity, infinitely less than any finite quantity containing quantities infinitely less than itself and so on in infinitum this is an edifice so bold and prodigious that it is too weighty for any pretended demonstration to support because it shocks the clearest and most natural principles of human reason Footnote 32 Whatever disputes there may be about mathematical points we must allow that there are physical points that is parts of extension which cannot be divided or lessened either by the eye or imagination These images then which are present to the fancy or senses are absolutely indivisible and consequently must be allowed by mathematicians to be infinitely less than any real part of extension and yet nothing appears more certain to reason than that an infinite number of them composes an infinite extension how much more an infinite number of those infinitely small parts of extension which are still supposed infinitely divisible Return to main text But what renders the matter more extraordinary is that these seemingly absurd opinions are supported by a chain of reasoning the clearest and most natural nor is it possible for us to allow the premises without admitting the consequences Nothing can be more convincing and satisfactory than all the conclusions concerning the properties of circles and triangles and yet when these are once received how can we deny that the angle of contact between a circle and its tangent is infinitely less than any retylenial angle that as you may increase the diameter of the circle in infinitum this angle of contact becomes still less even in infinitum and that the angle of contact between other curves and their tangents may be infinitely less than those between any circle and its tangent and so on in infinitum The demonstration of these principles seems as unexceptionable as that which proves the three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right ones though the latter opinion be natural and easy than the former big with contradiction and absurdity Reason here seems to be thrown into a kind of amazement and suspense which without the suggestions of any skeptic gives her a diffidence of herself and of the ground on which she treads She sees a full light which illuminates certain places but that light borders upon the most profound darkness and between these she is so dazzled and confounded that she scarcely can pronounce with certainty and assurance concerning any one object The absurdity of these bold determinations of the abstract sciences seems to become if possible still more palpable with regard to time than extension An infinite number of real parts of time passing in succession and exhausted one after another appears so evident a contradiction that no man one should think whose judgment is not corrupted instead of being improved by the sciences would ever be able to admit of it Yet still reason must remain restless and unquiet even with regard to that skepticism to which she is driven by the seeming absurdities and contradictions How any clear distinct idea can contain circumstances contradictory to itself or to any other clear distinct idea is absolutely incomprehensible and is perhaps as absurd as any proposition which can be formed so that nothing can be more skeptical or more full of doubt and hesitation than this skepticism itself which arises from some of the paradoxical conclusions of geometry or the science of quantity Footnote 33 It seems to me not impossible to avoid these absurdities and contradictions if it be admitted that there is no such thing as abstract or general ideas properly speaking but that all general ideas are in reality particular ones attached to a general term which recalls upon occasion other particular ones that resemble in certain circumstances the idea present to the mind Thus when the term horse is pronounced we immediately figure to ourselves the idea of a black or a white animal of particular size or figure but as that term is also usually applied to animals of other colours, figures and sizes these ideas though not actually present to the imagination are easily recalled and our reasoning and conclusion proceed in the same way as if they were actually present If this be admitted as seems reasonable it follows that all the ideas of quantity upon which mathematicians reason are nothing but particular and such as are suggested by the senses and imagination and consequently cannot be infinitely divisible It is sufficient to have dropped this hint present without prosecuting it any further It certainly concerns all lovers of science not to expose themselves to the ridicule and contempt of the ignorant by their conclusions and this seems the readiest solution of these difficulties Return to main text The sceptical objections to moral evidence or to the reasonings concerning matter of fact are either popular or philosophical The popular objections are derived from the natural weakness of human understanding the contradictory opinions which have been entertained in different ages and nations the variations of our judgement in sickness and health, youth and old age prosperity and adversity the perpetual contradiction of each particular man's opinions and sentiments with many other topics of that kind it is needless to insist farther on this head these objections are but weak for as in common life we reason every moment concerning fact and existence and cannot possibly subsist without continually employing this species of argument any popular objections derived from thence must be insufficient to destroy that evidence the great subverter of Pyranism or the excessive principles of skepticism is action and employment and the occupations of common life these principles may flourish and triumph in the schools where it is indeed difficult if not impossible to refute them but as soon as they leave the shade and by the presence of the real objects which actuate our passions and sentiments are put in opposition to the more powerful principles of our nature they vanish like smoke and leave the most determined skeptic in the same condition as other mortals the skeptic therefore had better keep within his proper sphere and display these philosophical objections which arise from more profound researches here he seems to have ample matter of triumph while he justly insists that all our evidence for any matter of fact which lies beyond the testimony of sense or memory is derived entirely from the relation of cause and effect that we have no other idea of this relation than that of two objects which have been frequently conjoined together that we have no argument to convince us that objects which have in our experience been frequently conjoined require in other instances be conjoined in the same manner and that nothing leads us to this inference but custom or a certain instinct of our nature which it is indeed difficult to resist but which like other instincts may be fallacious and deceitful while the skeptic insists upon these topics he shows his force or rather indeed his own and our weakness and seems for the time at least to destroy all assurance and conviction these arguments might be displayed at greater lengths if any durable good or benefit to society could ever be expected to result from them for here is the chief and most confounding objection to excessive skepticism that no durable good can ever result from it while it remains in its full force and vigor we need only ask such a skeptic what his meaning is and what he proposes by all these curious researches he is immediately at a loss and knows not what to answer a Copernican or Ptolemaic who supports each his different system of astronomy may hope to produce a conviction which will remain constant and durable with his audience a Stoic or Epicurean displays principles which may not be durable but which have an effect on conduct and behaviour but a Peronian cannot expect that his philosophy will have any constant influence on the mind or if it had that its influence would be beneficial to society on the contrary he must acknowledge if he will acknowledge anything that all human life must perish where his principles universally and steadily to prevail all discourse all action would immediately cease and men remain in a total lethargy till the necessities of nature unsatisfied put an end to their miserable existence it is true so fatal an event is very little to be dreaded nature is always too strong for principle and though a Peronian may throw himself or others into a momentary amazement and confusion by his profound reasonings the first and most trivial event in life will put to flight all his doubts and scruples and leave him the same in every point of action and speculation with the philosophers of every other sect or with those who never concerned themselves in any philosophical researches when he awakes from his dream he will be the first to join in the laugh against himself and to confess that all his objections are mere amusement and can have no tendency other than to show the whimsical condition of mankind who must act and reason and believe though they are not able by their most diligent enquiry to satisfy themselves concerning the foundation of these operations or to remove the objections which may be raised against them end of section 12 part 2 section 12 part 3 of an enquiry concerning human understanding this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org section 12 of the Academical or Skeptical Philosophy part 3 there is indeed a more mitigated skepticism or Academical Philosophy which may be both durable and useful and which may in part be the result of this Pyranism or excessive skepticism when its undistinguished doubts are in some measure corrected by common sense and reflection the greater part of mankind are naturally apt to be affirmative and dogmatical in their opinions and while they see objects only on one side and have no idea of any counter-poising argument they throw themselves precipitately into the principles to which they are inclined nor have they any indulgence for those who entertain opposite sentiments to hesitate or balance perplexes their understanding checks their passion and suspends their action they are therefore impatient till they escape from a state which to them is so uneasy and they think that they could never remove themselves far enough from it by the violence of their affirmations and obstinacy of their belief but could such dogmatical reasoners be responsible of the strange infirmities of human understanding even in its most perfect state and when most accurate and cautious in its determinations such a reflection would naturally inspire them with more modesty and reserve and diminish their fond opinion of themselves and their prejudice against antagonists the illiterate may reflect on the disposition of the learned who amidst all the advantages of study and reflection are commonly still diffident in their determinations and if any of the learned be inclined from their natural temper to haughtiness and obstinacy a small tincture of peronism might abate their pride by showing them that the few advantages which they may have attained over their fellows are but inconsiderable if compared with the universal perplexity and confusion which is inherent in human nature in general there is a degree of doubt and caution and modesty which in all kinds of scrutiny and decision ought forever to accompany a just reasoner another species of mitigated skepticism which may be of advantage to mankind and which may be the natural result of the peronian doubts and scruples is the limitation of our enquiries to such subjects as are best adapted to the narrow capacity of human understanding the imagination of man is naturally sublime delighted with whatever is remote and extraordinary and running without control into the most distant parts of space and time in order to avoid the objects which custom has rendered too familiar to it a correct judgement observes a contrary method and avoiding all distant and high enquiries confines itself to common life and to such subjects as fall under daily practice and experience leaving the more sublime topics to the embellishment of poets and orators or to the arts of priests and politicians to bring us to so salutary a determination nothing can be more serviceable than to be once thoroughly convinced of the force of the peronian doubt and of the impossibility that anything but the strong power of natural instinct could free us from it those who have a propensity to philosophy will still continue their researches because they reflect that besides the immediate pleasure attending such an occupation philosophical decisions are nothing but the reflections of common life methodised and corrected but they will never be tempted to go beyond common life so long as they consider the imperfection of those faculties which they employ their narrow reach and their inaccurate operations while we cannot give a satisfactory reason why we believe after a thousand experiments that a stone will fall or fire burn can we ever satisfy ourselves concerning any determination which we may form with regard to the origin of worlds and the situation of nature from and to eternity this narrow limitation indeed of our enquiries is in every respect so reasonable that it suffices to make the slightest examination into the natural powers of the human mind and to compare them with their objects in order to recommend it to us we shall then find what are the proper subjects of science and enquiry it seems to me that the only objects of the abstract science or of demonstration are quantity and number and that all attempts to extend this more perfect species of knowledge beyond these bounds are mere sophistry and illusion as the component parts of quantity and number are entirely similar their relations become intricate and involved and nothing can be more curious as well as useful than to trace by a variety of mediums their equality or inequality through their different appearances but as all other ideas are clearly distinct and different from each other we can never advance further by our utmost scrutiny than to observe this diversity and by an obvious reflection pronounce one thing not to be another or if there be any difficulty in these decisions it proceeds entirely from the undeterminate meaning of words which is corrected by juster definitions that the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the squares of the other two sides cannot be known let the terms be ever so exactly defined without a chain of reasoning and enquiry but to convince us of this proposition that where there is no property there can be no injustice it is only necessary to define the terms and explain injustice to be a violation of property this proposition is indeed nothing but a more imperfect definition it is the same case with all those pretended syllogistical reasonings which may be found in every other branch of learning except the sciences of quantity and number and these may safely, I think, be pronounced the only proper objects of knowledge and demonstration all other enquiries of men regard only matter of fact and existence and these are evidently incapable of demonstration whatever is may not be no negation of a fact can involve a contradiction the non-existence of any being without exception is as clear and distinct an idea as its existence the proposition which affirms it not to be however false is no less conceivable and intelligible than that which affirms it to be the case is different with the sciences properly so-called every proposition which is not true is there confused and unintelligible that the cube root of 64 is equal to the half of 10 is a false proposition and can never be distinctly conceived but that Caesar or the angel Gabriel or any being never existed may be a false proposition but is perfectly conceivable and implies no contradiction the existence therefore of any being can only be proved by arguments from its cause or its effect and these arguments are founded entirely on experience if we reason a priori anything may appear able to produce anything the falling of a pebble may, for ought we know, extinguish the sun or the wish of a man control the planets in their orbits it is only experience which teaches us the nature and bounds of cause and effect and enables us to infer the existence of one object from that of another footnote 34 that impious maxim of the ancient philosophy ex nihilo nihil fit by which the creation of matter was excluded ceases to be a maxim according to this philosophy not only the will of the supreme being may create matter but, for ought we know, a priori the will of any other being might create it or any other cause that the most whimsical imagination can assign return to main text such is the foundation of moral reasoning which forms the greater part of human knowledge and is the source of all human action and behavior moral reasonings are either concerning particular or general facts all deliberations in life regard the former as also all disquisitions in history, chronology, geography and astronomy the sciences which treat of general facts are politics, natural philosophy, physique, chemistry, etc. where the qualities, causes and effects of a whole species of objects are inquired into divinity or theology as it proves the existence of a deity and the immortality of souls is composed partly of reasonings concerning particular partly concerning general facts it has a foundation in reason so far as it is supported by experience but its best and most solid foundation is faith and divine revelation morals and criticism are not so properly objects of the understanding as of taste and sentiment beauty whether moral or natural is felt more properly than perceived or if we reason concerning it and endeavor to fix its standard we regard a new fact to it the general tastes of mankind or some such fact which may be the object of reasoning and inquiry when we run over libraries persuaded of these principles what havoc must we make if we take in our hand any volume of divinity or school metaphysics for instance let us ask does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number no does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence no commit it then to the flames for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion end of an inquiry concerning human understanding by David Hume