Before we get into the video, first off I'd like to tell you about my monthly controller giveaway. Each month one person will win a fully customisable controller sent anywhere in the world, Xbox or Playstation. To enter the giveaway, simply hit the like button on this video and leave a comment down below and enter the giveaway via the Gleam link linked within the video description. Good luck, you sexy bastards! So I thought I'd show you a few of my own recordings and well, judge for yourself, some of these are beyond crazy. First up, this is why you don't drive headfirst into a herald public event bus. Sure, here my teammate, being my brother, fell off his barrel causing mine to explode.  He used the case of one place long time. I'm playing against the worst kind of laggy players and the best kind of laggy players at the same time. I actually have no idea what happened here. Next one, yes I should have killed him, but if I did you wouldn't have witnessed this craziness. Dude is literally riding a shotgun. What the heck. I love them Destiny PvP spores, they are the best. We all have that one oversized Fat Titan teammate. It's a while back, I'd never heard the dialogue and to be honest I haven't since. From me being a noob I found this crazy glitch at a map spot. First Destiny 2 recordings and I believe my very first WTF moment of many. This is how you send a wall up flying. C is one of my strong points, guardian down. Many people say the lasers in the primitive strike are OP. When you see this you'll be saying I'm the OP one. Impossible. Impossible. Impossible. Such an impossible discrepancy. A true ninja, simple. I love it. This is me forgetting to jump, something I always do. Confirmed, DPJ is a noob. If it's helpful, I suggest you deal with the drills when the shooting stops. Another demo of how brilliant PvP spawns are indeed too. This is wonderful. This Titan's mad. The best timing ever. Zone advantage is yours. Zone B lost. But unlock his timing and the best timing all in one clip. Okay so that is it. I thought I'd share these recordings with you as they'll only be pinned. If you enjoyed them hitting that like button truly helps me out. Also guys, if you have any amazing clips you want featured in my top 5 plays, they can be like anything you've witnessed in this video or anything else for that matter. Send them into my top 5 email address linked within the top of the video description. But guys, thanks as always for stopping by and that continued support and hopefully I will see you on the next one.


Okay, welcome everybody, sitting, I feel the time. We have three speakers also after the break. The starters, the doctor will do. Dr. Kupu Mireya, sorry if I mispronounce. No, you try actually. I have an idea of words. I can see in my hand, there's always... Sorry about that. So the floor is yours for the talk, 20 minutes, and then I'll find the controls like signalling and then half an hour, three times. That's the time. Do you want to sit? To be clear. My presentation is quite simple, straightforward, so hopefully I'm not even using all of my time, which I think is good for conversation. What I want to do is to share with you the results of a project that I did with some colleagues at the Brno University last year, where we tried to understand the incentive acting on... Manage us in the extractive industry in Nigeria, the incentive acting on these managers to undertake proactive environmental behaviour. Specifically, we wanted to weigh the relative impact of economic, institutional and ethical factors in shaping managerial perception towards responsive environmental behaviour. Researchers for a long time have always investigated the factors that are shaping managerial perception and companies environmental disposition or behaviour. They've looked at the role of competitive dynamics, the role of organizational capability, the role of leadership, the role of pressure from NGOs, et cetera, et cetera. And what we have as a framework for organising this range of motives or incentives is a framework that categorizes them into three key factors. The first is the economic factors, the second is the institutional factors and the fourth is the ethical factors. And although there are a range of different research that seeks to explore the impact of these various factors, we did not find any research that examines the relative weight of these three factors in a multivariate analysis. So we tried to fill that gap. But also there is a second motivation, which is that in literature there is a debate about what is going on between some people who suggest that CSR, this Corporate Social Responsibility, is nationally contingent, Martina Moon, for example, questions that we shouldn't be searching for these, if you like, universal forces that make managers to act in the way they do, that these CSR companies are local and nationally contingent. But also you have other research, I think, leading that part with the Bonyas package, saying, no, actually, the universalizing force of global capitalism means that managers all over the world are far more likely to behave in the same way because they get acted upon by the same kind of global capitalist forces and pressure. While these researchers have explored the source of dynamics in the West, we didn't find any response to do that from the African context. So we thought there was a gap there again, and particularly the gap was important as Africa begins to take a bit more active role in global economic dynamics. 6% GDP grows over the past five years, and it's much more than Japan's percent in the past 10 years. But also there's a top multibersion, the increasing formulation of Voluntary Reporting Initiative, Global GRI, Global Compact, the United Commission on Human Rights of the Companies. These sorts of initiatives are crafted at a global level. And we're worried that they may have been crafted at a deep understanding of the cultural context in which they are supposed to function. And that actually leaves me to my title because when we began to survey the literature, we found that once a number, I mean a number of researchers in the West suggest that the most important factor are to learn managers and companies to behave in an environment that's not aware or economically related, economy factors. The male writers from an African context are Meshia and Alou, Vista and Co. They suggest that the key motive that is making managers to act in their responsible, social responsible way is actually cultural. It has to do with this Ubuntu philosophy. Ubuntu is a term from East Africa that has to do with humaneness or humaneness. Literally.  We are because... So there is this connectivity like this communitarian ethic that outlines its social relationship in Africa. And they argue that this is the engine for both company managers to act in a corporate social responsive way. But we are actually quite right with all that point. It's not in dubious because if African managers have been prepared to act on the basis of their ethical convictions grounded in this Ubuntu philosophy then you would expect that companies in Africa are a lot more environmentally responsible because actually when you look at the... Let's see if I can find it. If you look at these pyramid by Carol it suggests that philanthropic or ethical motives actually come well after economic and legal responsibilities. So you stop ready by trying to do all you can to get away with as much as you can then you keep the low but then you begin to be motivated by some more sublime ethical responsibilities. If African managers are mainly influenced by the Ubuntu philosophy by this communitarian ethic then why is it that African managed companies are not a lot more environmentally responsible than they are? We know from practice that there is a lot of pollution environmental irritation and a lot of shell and some marble So we went up to go and find out what exactly is happening. And our research I'm proud to say actually as far as I can see is the research that involved the largest number of company managers in Africa. A lot of the previous research have been small end samples. They have their place but we're worried that the men of the capturing what is the practice. Let me kind of unpack these a little bit before I show you the result. And so I've already indicated there are a wide range of factors that act on company managers to dig in particular way towards the environment. I've suggested that they can be categorized around the straight key sets of factors. The theory of the FEM says very simply that the main objective of business is business. And the champion is fired in 1907 to war. Businesses would only engage in corporate social responsible action if it brings about profit. Simple. Now, don't understand that in a very narrow way because the understanding of what makes for profit is quite broad in this theory. So it can be direct profit in terms of increasing resource efficiency and therefore bringing up our terms. But it can also be profit in an indirect way. So we get on where we come into where we are operating and therefore our businesses are not destructed and therefore we maintain our profit margins. Now, that was for a long time the dominant theory of CSR the motif in CSR. Then Carol came and said that's not actually the case. We should see companies as a multi agent FEM, not only interested in profit but also being ethically driven and it is not only about profit, it is also about the role of institution. So institutional theory seeks to understand the way in which the social, cultural, environment in which companies are acting or operating have to share the deception and the action of companies and managers. By the way, notice that I use those to interchangeably because after all companies are neutral entity but the managers have, of course, moral values and the moral values managers for transfers in the moral disposition of the life of the companies. And so Carol suggested that institutional pressures are of extreme importance. We all pose the marginal who unpack this institutional pressure in three dimensions. The coercive, the mimetic and the nominative. The coercive mainly have to do with the rules of the game the policies of the state. The mimetic has to do with the associations that these company managers belong to for example the industrial association and the nominative has to do with kind of pressure from NGOs. The manual argues that the coalition of these three forces creates what is called an organizational field and that companies that are operating in a particular organizational field will be most likely to act in a particular way into what they call isomorphism. A particular that has to do with doing right or wrong operating on the basis that theory of the fair which is profit oriented or the institution do not capture the wiring of motive that may companies to act and that some companies can be driven by purely the desire to do right and I show that, I mean this is not very specific because you have companies here that are purely ethical I bought a shop but you know they are not for profit but they are not also for loss. We need to put that in the palace but surely there are companies that are not driven purely by pressure from NGOs all by a company of a dynamic but they really aren't here to to add value to society and are driven by particular ethical convictions. Now this theory has been unpacked again to say that there are at least three key motives or pressures that can be gathered around ethics. One is the so-called stakeholder theory that says companies are owned not only by the shareholders but actually by the stakeholders and every decision that a company makes will have to accommodate the shareholders which have or are bound to have various impetus and convictions. There is also the sustainable development dimension of the ethical theory which says that companies have to attune where that leave resources not just for this present generation but also for future generations. But in particular and of course there is also the right based theory which again casts the ethics of companies in terms of human rights and that's actually what underpins this new human body of human rights of companies. But the one that relates very closely to whom to philosophy is the ethical theory about common good that companies are not just fictitious entities they are also citizens the way that a human being or those of us as citizens would then to act not just about what is in the best interests of our individual self-accusing collective interests that is also the way that companies should act or those act. And so that's what links to this who will do philosophy of humanness of common materialism of these bound areas that we are together. So we went and tested these as I said, 377 managers but don't ask me too many questions because it was done by my colleague from Bruneo but we constructed this relationship that the responsible environmental behavior of companies can be explained by a combination of the economic institutional and ethical factors. And then there are also a number of other factors but we try to separate them to control for them because of gender, age and managerial position and experience, education and income. In this as we're presenting, we kind of control for this because they know we are coming too close to the institutional economic and ethical forces. So based on that connecting equation, we tested that this is a result and we found very simply what this result shows is that by far the most important factor acting on companies, managers in Africa, in Nigeria are economic factors. We found that Bruneo philosophially the ethical factors have very, very little purchase in explaining why managers act the way they do. So hopefully I will read all of those. So that really leads us to why. Again, back to the theory we argue of the way we try to explain this is that it is not to say that there aren't cultural impetus or forces where the managers are holding on sensitive to this. But when managers find themselves managing a multinational company they will have to follow the rules and regulations set by the company. And so managers are being influenced more by pressures from the home companies. And we actually notice that there is a difference between the way that companies that are owned for example by the Netherlands versus the UK versus the United States showing a variety of capitalism play a role here. But I don't have time to unpack that. So we notice that actually globalization or global capitalism has spawned a transnational cadre of managers or managerial elites. The value of which is moved away from this boom to humanitarian philosophy that is African in nature more to these individualistic profit maximization ethics. And that is really the, if you like me, the key result. And therefore we are able to question the Moon and Matan kind of literature that is saying how is this national economy that is culturally contingent. And the next step will actually be to do a lot more work to really tease out the relative weight of these in different contexts. But yes, we are going to appear to have been killed and economic hegemony appear to reign. Thank you. That was interesting. The floor is open. Thank you very much for that contribution to the afternoon. Let's open the floor to the I will give presents to those who have not spoken to this yet. Thank you very much. I'm Jen Baca from LSE. I wonder if we could talk a little bit more about who the managers are that you interviewed and were they Nigerians themselves or were they from other cultural contexts where they maybe would not be familiar with the boom to philosophy. What actually happened? So, managers from coal, oil and gas and mining minerals and metals. There are 52 companies in total out of which we have 307. These are all Nigerian managers but in managing mega multi-national companies. And that's actually very important for at least three reasons, maybe four. First of all the extractive industry in Nigeria contribute up to 40% of the GDP. Although this is not like we haven't taken a tour through all the MNCs in Nigeria but we feel that by focusing on the extractive industry you get a powerful snapshot of what's going on here. Now this is a common point. A lot of these MNCs are actually enjoying ventures with the government. So if you want to know exactly the commitment of government in pushing through environmental reforms and promoting sustainable energy these joint venture companies are the players to look. And totally these MNCs have usually social influence because apart from the government they're employed by far the largest number of people. By the way, we also said that they have the ability for good and for bad being global multi-national companies they can easily transport the best technologies if they're so wanted to Africa but that also gives them the enormous opportunity to transport very bad technologies and appear just to be the way of them. You and then you have I wouldn't ask this question but you have to make a preference. Sorry and then we will come to the I would have you please say your name. I have two questions. One is to deal with what you just hinted on the CSR policy or the environmental policies that companies follow within CSR is much dependent on national regulations of environment and which is the case in developing countries and that is why most of the industries were multi-national in nature they might have very different environmental practice in home countries but they have low levels of environmental practice in other countries where the environment regulation is not strong enough. So if you could reflect on that and how does it influence the practice in Nigeria with visible regulation and the second question is that also environmental ethics to a great extent depends on the extended arm of the consumer and as far as I understand the instructive industry is not located within Nigeria because most of the resources are being transported outside so could that be one of the reasons why CSR is less ethical or much far from the African practice of Ubuntu and shifting more towards capitalist exploitation of resources because the consumers don't have a hand in how the resources can be used or even controlled. I don't know how to do a paper with you. I would like to do a paper with you because you present this thing so nice. That was a bit of Kubu too. But Pete here, Freina, Michael Blofield a major show every research on CSR in developing makes this point that the weak institution with policy framework is a major factor and without that strong policy framework that companies are not actually going to do what they are supposed to do. An interesting research compares about 150 managers from South Africa and 150 managers from the US to check their position towards the environment and they found interestingly that managers from the US are more positively disposed to doing the right thing environmentally, product and behavior and this report says that the major difference is the institutional factor that managers in the US felt that the institutional context in which they operate meant that they had to go up on the agenda to do the right thing. Whereas the managers from South Africa didn't feel that they had that kind of constraint and pressure to act. So institutional factor is really really important and that really ties into this idea of green consumerism the idea that we don't have that sort of green consumers in Africa that will bring pressure to be our own companies to behave in an ethical way. The new research that I have been doing actually looks at the acrobin rating project in Ghana to see the extent to which this voluntary reporting initiative in Ghana could act as an impetus to make companies to do the right thing. I found that the prospects of a voluntary rating program in Africa is very, very low insofar as we do not have that critical mass of green consumers that would be saying I will not back from you if you do not claim your rights. Okay, we have one more question here and then we have three questions for you. Yeah, I was wondering if you controlled Can you say anything? Oh, sorry I'm comparison unknown, I don't see it. I was wondering if you controlled for where these managers are trained because there is of course this idea if you're trained in the West then you take Western values so I was wondering your research. I warned you clearly not to ask me questions on that. No, but I think that the right, the next step. What we found was some relationship between the headquarters of these companies and the environment to this position of the company and the managers. I suspect that that is a saying that there are reasons that where the managers train is a factor. If you assume that they've got your training, that they've been there for a long time and therefore got your training from the headquarters, you know, there's a connection between them. That does not necessarily hope. It could be actually that the managers are schooled in the UK but they're now walking in a US company on the Netherlands, an owned company teasing out if that can be done mathematically, teasing out the relative influence of the education where education was acquired and where there is any tension between them and the whole company of those managers would be very interesting and I suspect it would be difficult to really do to unpack that box. But yes, it would be an interesting thing to do. Then you'll have Phil O'Keefe, Peter Newell and Jessica with three short interventions because we have exactly three minutes left. So I haven't been at you frequently transposed to talk from examples on the ground of African managers in general because we're too much sophisticated but when you look at Africa anyone knows of the Sahel and certainly all the way down the southern African coast, it's largely Islamic. In your sample or in your personal experience is there a difference in senior management brought up in Islamic tradition and both brought up in Christian tradition particularly with reference to the use of insurance for environmental management? Be a question. You'll collect the three and then you'll have the last word. Yes, just quite to the previous conversation a little bit about where the norms about CSR come from and how you track that within the firm in using it to do it mathematically. One thing is to look at who's doing the training because I've done some training with companies before on CSR issues and it often comes from the home country basically the owner of the company has a CSR package or idea about things they think the whole company should know about and enroll particular consultants or people to come and give this sort of training and therefore you would expect the diffusion effect to be very much steered towards the priorities of that country and I guess that's what I was going to ask about a little bit is did you find differences across those sectors in terms of where the company is based back also to the audience question about who are they trying to use CSR tools for which audiences are they trying to persuade because presumably depending on how globalised they are each of those sectors and companies within them would be organised very differently. Let's go last. I'd just like to ask if you could elaborate a little bit on how you actually did the study and in particular how you practice teased out whether the managers might have been likely to be influenced by Ubuntu or and the economic sort of decision making. Okay. I'll go in the reverse direction. So we distributed questionnaires. The questionnaires have about four different sections. The first section general questions about disposition. The second section we then begin to ask questions some in direct function some in reverse coding about you know to tease out economic factors for example would you invest in this technology if it's going to cost your company money? Okay. Would you invest in this technology if you think it's going to clean the air but it's going to reduce the profit margin. So questions both directly and indirectly. In the second section to just gauge the economic the importance of economic factor. In the third section we then ask questions about institutional factors. Actually we adapted now a little bit of a scale that has already been used to publish a work. And this question you asked about the influence of NGOs, the influence of regulation, the influence of organizations industrial organizations. And then in the last we asked questions about ethics. So do you believe in oneness? Do you believe in community or still standing so far of this humanness of a boom too. Would you still do something if would you prefer to make profit when it impacts on the environment. So we ask a lot of questions like that's the ethics. And that's how we then record those and then we are analyzing based on the question. It's a good question about training. The problem with this is that these are more international companies. If they are getting their training from local sources then that's because they chose to do so it's not because they cannot afford the best training in any part of the world. Shell, Scom, BEP mobile they should be cascading the best practices from the west to wherever their operations are. I find a point that no other country in the world plays more gas than Nigeria. Whereas here and in the Netherlands gas learning is bad. What makes a difference? This is the same management at the top level. So why don't you say that we're going to hold these same practices wherever we operate. So if we choose a very watered down, local specific not up-to-date or scratch training from the local people, that's because they choose it's not because they cannot afford the very best. But you're right, we need to kind of explore where they're getting their training moves advancing there. So I would actually see, even from this question there's another different direction that we can take this research to. And that actually I think answers the question. No we did not answer any questions about religion. But the managers from my understanding, the managers that we Peter, the manager that we serve, comprises both Christian managers and Muslim managers. I would however say that trying to understand the extent if any, the religion have any impact would be an interesting next step. Okay, thank you very much indeed. And a hand for thank you for looking to the drivers of manager behavior. We often wonder in our department about the drivers of our managers behavior. So we should do something in life. Where would that train would be a good question. Where do you learn new public management? Okay. Okay, maybe we should be too cynical. The next speaker is Prof. Katie Humble. Yes, hello. So nothing else to talk about my research. That's what I'm going to do. Environmental society futures in East African range lands. And what I want to do is look at five things. First of all just very briefly an overview of East African range lands and community based conservation in those areas. I want to look quickly at the livelihoods of Marseille pastoralists who inhabit one area of those range lands. And I want to look a little bit more detail at one research project that we have looking at Tanzanian wildlife management areas, which are Tanzanian form of CDNRM. And a second project that we have looking at Kenner Conservancies. And think about the implications for environmentally sustainable futures in those range lands. So a very brief overview of East African range lands. Everybody's familiar with the fact that these areas have a tremendously spectacular Savannah large mammal wildlife. That population of wildlife has been in drastic decline over the last 30 to 40 years. Kenya has lost between 50 and 80% of each of something like 45 different large mammal Savannah species. Just during the three decades, 75 to 2005, that decline has continued up. The present day it's very well documented. Tanzania data less well documented, but it looks like there are similar declines happening. At the same time, these range lands are the home of iconic pastoralist peoples like Marseille, like the Turkana, like the Samburu. And those peoples are if you like the subject of numerous environmental degradation debates where governments and sometimes conservation organisations tend to see pastoralism as driving environmental degradation. Many independent researchers working in those areas don't see the evidence for that suggestion at all. What nobody debates though is the fact that these populations are subject to persistent poverty. So working in this area in four out of five sites, well over a thousand household surveys, four out of five sites, the average mean annual household income showed that it was for living on less than a dollar a day. Khajado district in Kenya 50% of the population living below the rural poverty line of 50 cents per day. Nobody disputes that poverty is both wide and deep in these areas. And the third thing about these range lands with respect to what we're talking about today, they are tremendous earners of revenue. So both Kenya and Tanzania currently get well over a billion dollars a year from tourism and much of which is focused on these range areas, on the Savannah wildlife, on the pastures peoples there. Tourism's top contributor to GDP in both of those countries. Tanzania is expected to have around 3 billion US dollars in the next three years, so building up to 3 billion dollars a year. And so many people, states, conservation organizations, business entrepreneurs, see this as a wonderful case for win-win community-based conservation. And I just want to very briefly show some results from research that goes back 10 years looking at livelihoods of Maasai communities adjacent to a series of large protected areas or other conservation interventions in these East African range lands. So just to show you we're talking about Kenya and Tanzania, the area I'm talking about as Maasai lands straddles that border, it's so echolometers. And we looked at several hundred households in each of the series of communities around protected areas. So around the Maasai Mara, around Narebi National Park, around Andeseli National Park, those three are in Kenya and in Tanzania around Edomet Wildlife Management Area and around Tarangiri National Park. And what these pie charts show is just basically the composition of mean annual household income. So if you start to take quickly through this, if you start at 12 o'clock and go around clockwise, that big area of black represents the proportion of household income that comes from livestock, from pastoralist enterprise. Moving on around clockwise, the pale grey area proportion of household income, cash and income that comes from cultivation. Moving on, the mid grey area, proportion of household income that comes from activity, people going to town working as night watchmen, working as sex workers, whatever it may be. And then you'll see there's a little sliver in mid grey, which may not even show up terribly well, sorry about that pictures and colours. That's the proportion of household income coming from wildlife conservation and tourism in these communities. And just to hammer home the point that you'll see that in all of these areas, on average people are getting at least half, in some cases nearly three quarters of the income in livestock. Okay, so moving on to ten years further down the line, we're now looking at these community-based conservation interventions that have been rolled out both in Tanzania and in Kenya. Tanzania is a country with strong socialist history, still very strong central state control despite liberalisation. And in Tanzania community-based conservation is a national project. It's a national project with a national model of wildlife management areas which are rolled out according to a particular very structured, very bureaucratic quite complex pattern across the country. What this map shows you in pale green are the protected areas of Tanzania so you've got more than 40% of land surface area dedicated to protected areas not allowing consumptive use by the local population. The mid-green areas are the sites of wildlife management areas. Several of them already established and then these little ones once during the process of being established. And we have a project funded by ESPA on the poverty impacts and also the ecosystem services impacts of those wildlife management areas. And I just want to, I'm sure everyone knows this, but just to take you through the idea of CBNRO. So this is from a WWF USAGE report a couple of months ago on the centers of wildlife management areas. The central idea of CBNRO is that when local communities have ownership of natural resources and derive significant benefits from the use of those resources, then the resources will be sustained and managed. This involves shifting control from the state to the community and developing opportunities for local residents to earn income from the resources newly under their control. I have to tell you this is all one in stuff you will see why. WNA objectives. To increase participation of local communities in management of wildlife resources to enable local communities to derive benefits from wildlife resources and third and last to enhance the conservation of wildlife resources. Now how well this shows up. I just want to because this project only started a few months ago, I don't know much about the results but I want to tell you a little bit about one wildlife management area called MDOMET. First of all, where is it? It's right up against the Tanzania Kenya order so this is MDOMET outlined in black. It's between Ameseli National Park, Kilimanjaro National Park and Arisho Montmery National Park and one of the reasons there's such intense pressure to establish this wildlife management area are these public lines which are migratory routes for wildlife, particularly elephant. So you can see it enhances the connectivity from a conservation point of view. Now apologies for this lower frame. This was a snapshot taken by Fred Nelson in the local government office of the kind of management plan if you like and what's important here, two things. First of all you'll see there are something like nine villages, I won't go through them all but nine villages all included in this wildlife management area. Secondly, I'm not sure if you can read here but proposed wildlife management area 110,000 hectares residents and agriculture 11,000 hectares. So the idea is that you take a population for whom three quarters or at least half but probably three quarters of their livelihood or more comes from livestock and cultivation and for whom less than 5% of their income comes from wildlife and you get them to set aside 90% of their land. This is called giving control and opportunities to the local population. Opportunities could be there if they get access to that tourist month, if tourists come. So let's look at that. Tanzania has a very complex bureaucratic procedure which I'm not going to go into and broadly speaking it's encapsulated in the fact that all of the revenues to wildlife management areas go first of all centrally to the state. Then they trickle down from the state to the district then from the district to the wildlife management area which is a group of several villages then from the WMA to the villages themselves and ultimately for the benefit of the households. At each of those stages inefficiencies, at each of those stages perfectly legitimate overhead and at each of those stages there are multiple different revenue streams which are extremely complicated given limited local accounting capacity and indeed literacy extremely complicated for people to manage. I'm not going to go into all of those different revenues but just they are kind of summarised in these two coloured frames. Revenues come either from game viewing or they come from hunting okay and anything that is in blue goes to the central government. Anything that's in green is the share that goes to the WMA okay so the central government retains 85 percent of the permit fee which is the big earner. The WMA gets 75 percent of the block fee which is around $5,000 a year in this particular place. So although I'm not giving you the results because I don't want to go through all the figures that we are trying to accumulate for all these different revenue streams what you can see is that the WMA just on a structural basis of how the revenues are meant to be dispersed is getting far less than 50 percent of tourism revenues. Now when that money arrives at the WMA they again give about 50 percent of it to the village governments. The governments of each of the individual villages. That's a real problem because some villages have put a huge amount of land in being coerced to do so in many cases. Other villages have put only a small amount of land in but all of them get equal shares. No matter what that does for social relations and community feeling. When the village government gets that money it goes into 20 level initiatives. Any significant proportion of which are to do with the enforcement of the WMA. So it's kind of all well in. Opportunity costs that's what we're interested in looking at is what people giving up, what they're getting in return. It is just possible that some people or even majority are benefiting but we think it's unlikely. So our research questions in this particular project are one of the ecological outcomes of WMAs and we have natural scientist colleagues looking at land cover change with remote sensing, looking at aerial sensors counting wildlife and livestock, looking at are you getting the conservation benefits that are assumed to follow all this change and together with colleagues at Copenhagen I'm looking at the social outcomes of WMA so we're looking at institutional governance change at the level of the village and at the level of the WMA itself and carrying out a very, very large number of household interviews with men and with women, looking at resource use histories and looking at perceptions of change of individual world view. I'm not going to go into research design except to say we are trying really hard to make it qualitatively really rigorous and quantitatively and statistically really rigorous so that we can get very good causal attribution so that we can really tie any differences that we find to WMAs or to other possible external factors. Talking quickly about Kenya, Kenya, capitalist country, completely different political and economic history since independence even before independence and the big difference in Kenya has been that rate lines rather than really remaining under central control of the state have in Mars Island largely been divided up into private areas and let me just take you through that history so that you'll see the background of how this plays out as community based conservation. In this upper frame you've got the Kenya Tanzania border there, that diamond line and you've got the Masai Mara game reserve here which is Kenya's top earning tourist destination and around that you have a set of rangelands and basically in the decades, in a couple of decades following independence, those rangelands were divided up under well with a great deal of support and facilitation one in say from the World Bank, they're divided up into group ranches so the idea is these are still kind of co-operative organisations and basically anybody who managed to get their name on the register of the group ranch had security attendant unfortunately as we know these land programs are very open to manipulation and so a lot of people who should have got their names on group ranch registers didn't and quite a lot of outsiders who had absolutely nothing to do with these group ranchers did manage to get their names on them so that's one thing, membership registration was very problematic. Now what then happened over the next couple of decades is that it became apparent that the chairman the treasurer and the secretary of many group branches who were meant to be subject to elections every couple of years actually stayed in the post for 25 to 30 years and during that period of time they profited personally from the resources that belonged to the collective so they were selling bits off or they were annexing bits for their own personal use and this drove a movement to privatise further and to divide this land up divide this common range land up into individual plots so if you just look at that's Masai Mara and this is the Arki and Olpignier group ranchers this shows the individual allocations which people then fence and move to now when you fence this land you undermine the possibility of mobility which is vital to both livestock and wild life, driving the defines in both and so over the last couple of decades there has been pressure to form conservancies to reverse fragmentation and those conservancies pay a market rate to title holders, people who own the land get a market rate that sounds good so how does this work we are interested in a project called best bio diversity existing services tipping points we're modelling the environmental and social implications of these conservancies, looking at the same sorts of things as for Tanzania except here you have this pest income however it creates some interesting effects and I hope you have to answer questions on in terms of gender well of land ownership as to who actually gets this, who doesn't, who wins and who loses so I'm going to skip that, I want to just move to one of the aspects of that work to my colleague Aidan Keane who designed for a neat set of economic games and choice experiments and just to give you an illustration of the way that these things work and of the sorts of results that we're getting from that, I'm just going to talk you through this picture so here you have a Maasai Khardona playing one of Aidan's economic games and you see he has in front of him a board that's divided up into different coloured areas so this green area represents what's left of his private land but he hasn't set aside, he hasn't put it into the conservancy you can't really see it, this blue area, the blue area represents that part of his wealth which he has actually set aside into the conservancy but he's getting cash into it so that's his cash reserve and this red represents the Maasai Mara National Reserve which is a protected area and the blue counters represent what he's doing with his wealth which can be either his money or his livestock so you see he put some of his livestock on his own land and he's getting some of his wealth from the conservation but the majority of his livestock is grazing illegally in the national protected area and that's the only thing he can do Conservancies in Kenya are proliferating 10% of land area and grazing in Tanzania currently only 3% but rising to 18% over the next couple of years that's on top of the 40% already dedicated people are rarely being squeezed so to conclude CBNRM and CPC are rarely dominant narratives about land grazing they are seen by states by conservation organisations by tourism operators as the environmentally sustainable future probably the alternative view but see it as a form of green grab and bear in mind that that's taking place alongside land work because these African and semi-arid lands and the water that in some cases runs through them or lives under them and they have become resources of tremendous value for the production of food and fuel and fibre for global markets and states and foreign investors are moving in on that and there's a great deal of expropriation so the positive message would be maybe the sorts of results that we're getting from this research gives some scope for nudging policy raising awareness of the implications of these sorts of changes but I suppose the stronger message comes out just of the political ecology in these African range builds on degradation discourses which are highly questionable which I haven't gone into but that's a whole lot of debate that they are driving processes which purport to be decentralisation but in fact they're either re-centralisation and that people respond by using the weapons of the week to subvert the process that's my colleagues for that one project, my colleagues for another project and ah, it's not letting me say that ah, ah, ah nice picture of myself critical teaching on community based and resource management definitely haven't leached the main play area that makes me a bit sad it is a very interesting even if we're really in a case study I'm sure there are many comments and questions to be asked please say your name I am Amrita from SOAS thanks for your presentation I'm really curious to know how this revenue from I think coming to this entire sphere of conservation area that's a really good question how does it come in because I don't think any of this is about conservation it's about money and tourist hunting is a phenomenal revenue for the Tanzanian government there's an interesting contrast in that Kenya builds its presence its international presence Tanzania builds its international presence as come here and hunt elephants so really, how does that fit in well, if you read for example Hassan Sashedina's work on Tarigiri National Park he shows how the allocation of hunting permits is an extraordinary corrupt process and the wildlife division in Tanzania is renowned for corruption and they sell at every level multiple versions of the same permit so any quota system is a joke there are some species of wildlife that can very well support that sort of pressure but there are some species particularly the carnivores particularly the elephants I guess that can't I don't know if that answers your question Fiona Noonan University of Birmingham it was a bit depressing really in case for a single person that is depressing how much CBNRM and CBC have been critiqued to be largely because of interpretation because obviously what we were showing how could he possibly think that was community based but what do you think is there any hope to change the interpretation and misuse of this is there any opening in government so I think there is hope I think that let me talk about the north side because these are people with whom or in these areas I've worked for a long time maybe I know them better than other groups they're extremely sophisticated to negotiators in a country like Tanzania there's a direct confrontation with the government over the precipitated really horrible consequences and as a result they've become politically very sophisticated in showing that they want to work with the government but also in making their case in those circumstances the more information we can give people and the more information that governments have to accept of being scientifically rigorous they like numbers I'm afraid the more that you can give that to the grassroots users and the more you can give it to donors at the international community level then hopefully the more you can squeeze corrupt organizations like the Division of Wildlife so that would be a very positive message and they would be a very positive response we're all trying to help them evidence-based advocacy yes move next be soon be yes I thought the I agree with your answers but from my work in Tanzania I just wonder if there's a missing element here because I think that government planners would say that the community-based management model could work or would work but they base it on a resumption of modern pastoralism so they're assuming that pastoralists are also going to turn into modern pastoralists only keeping one or two capital and in this kind of model so they're allocating land and so on on that basis so it's a different model of pastoralism that they're allocating the land to certainly for the assignment basis on that was the basis on which the land use planning was made so I just think it's still probably unviable but it goes with the whole capitalist production sort of model of things these are modern pastoralists if you look at this you'll find that for almost all these areas after livestock production the next most important thing is off-farm work incredibly tightly integrated by violated night watchmen and sex workers so so this is a very diversified economy but what works in modern pastoralism but you see that you can do modern pastoralism if you have the resources but in terms of the livestock the livestock officials are doing that and the land use planning notice because the land use planning they did for the Usangriry settlement was done on the basis of non-mobile pastoralism the model they were planning for making the land use planning for was from a form of pastoralism that was non-mobile where families would have essentially there wouldn't be a pastoralist there would be farms or diversified rural households with a few cattle and that's what their community management was I'm just raising a query about it is are there those assumptions underlying that allocation of land can we talk about the same thing where we talk about pastoralism and they talk about pastoralism the system that you're describing is in some ways emerging in Kenya where many must have been moving and we've got the data not just from our own studies but from area accounts and all sorts of different sources that support each other people moving away from cattle and into small stock is the first thing 70 people are to some extent reducing their numbers and moving to as you say send the improved rates but you can only do that where the system allows you to access the vaccines that you need and the fodder that you need and the water development that you need which I have to say is absolutely not the case but that is the model that the town is here that is the model it's there not here not here so I should have said this is a positive change is that in Endome just over the last couple of years they have moved to say well maybe you can use this area for grazing so they're opening up the set aside for grazing how are the conditions under which that happens are more clear and the kind of pastoralism that they're trying are complex I just raised it because I just think that sorry I just think it's just part of the wider anti-pastoralist kind of attitude of government so it's not all just about let's pass through this managed in a nice community way partly it will be upward and next next I agree there's an official with the two I don't know if it was a little bit it's not farm income largely by labour migration sorry it's the off farm income largely by labour migration well actually I'm afraid for this purpose as we rolled in together migration in the town local trade not livestock trade which is wrapped up with livestock but other forms of local trades a huge amount of local trade petipending and cross-border trade and we also put remittances in there so it's bit for capital because it does not have implications for the collapse of labour in the early on farm activity there are issues about that which people seem to resolve through moving from well basically it's a wealth thing so wealthier families children get educated and they get jobs less wealthy families people become hard-hearted and live very very best of cheap lives last question thank you for the presentation my question was largely to do with the migratory communities because Tanzania is also known for a lot of migration from south to the north and I was wondering how does that play out especially with the privatisation of land that we explained that happened where people were creating their own boundaries on the basis of allocations that happened has there been a sense of conflict between the migratory communities who have moved into certain indigenous areas and how does that play out okay so I think the short answer is yes but not so much in this area here you're really still talking about a very strongly Marseille population but as you go further south and further east you get into situations where there are major clashes between Marseilles and other agricultural groups and particularly where quite significant numbers of faster risk have been displaced from land that's been given to external investors and I think that the estimates are there are hundreds of thousands of people displaced by that process and there is nowhere for them to go and so inevitably you get conflict where they end up so refugee would be a good example and I think where Francis has been working in December would be another example okay thank you very much for this expert okay thank you everybody my job is to try and talk about the politics of science and expertise and of course that's a huge topic and what I try to do is to try and wrap that up into a general statement about science and expertise but also in as far as it speaks to political ecology I'm going to be kind of general but I'm also hoping to cover various themes about what political ecology is and possibly what it should be doing or possibly that's the suggestion and my main argument are these two things which is first of all if we're going to democratize or politicize expertise and science then we have to look at the normative values within it in other words the public norm social norms which are out there shape the knowledge which becomes authoritative and then takes on the position of science and expertise or indeed experts if we're going to talk about the power of knowledge as something which directs the rest of political ecology so in other words we have to look at the normative value behind what makes expertise now this is somewhat different from how some people talk about expertise at the moment which is essentially what how do experts act they're normally talking about people who have already been defined as experts and how they act in organizations like UNEP for example rather than understanding the more social basis of what is authoritative knowledge so that's the first point the second point I want to make is that political ecology as I understand it as I experience the terms is that most people who talk about political ecology usually from the US don't yet get this and therefore the challenge for political ecology in my view is whether political ecology as a sort of phrase is sufficiently nuanced to understand the relationships of science and political science and norms rather than actually being a sort of a collective of basically greenies who want to argue against various things in today's society and recline for example so the issue there is partly a critique of how we do science and politics but also a critique of how political ecology does political ecology and this is my main point which is that the usual challenge which I try to write about is the expense of which too much environmental policy or environmental debate is based upon essentialized naturalized facts which reflect a whole bunch of norms and the facts are then reproduced in ways to justify further norms without people realizing that the normative basis of these so called facts now of course lots of people like Latour and others have said this sort of thing for years and part of my critique is also to understand how political ecology has as honest people like Latour because I think that's part of the problem as well so let's move on now what I think the beginning point is is the realization that ecology as is often used within political ecology has a normative history which people don't yet fully appreciate which is that if you go back to the history of ecology now if you go back to the really early days of ecology people like Townsley or people like that it's all based upon the idea of connectivity but in the 1960s coinciding with the interest in critical theory cavernas in the life there's always ecologists like Eugene Odom Paul B. Sears talking about ecology as a subversive subject in other words the very science is by definition subversive now why is it basically because they saw it as an antidote to individualism so this is a statement here and by individualism I mean a metaphor for economic behavior a bit like Latour talking about Ubuntu versus capitalism I think this is this which is basically the idea that individualism economic rationality not thinking about the common is the root of problems in society now that's what people have about some Herbert Markoos wrote about from the critical theory of the 1960s the people in the ecology well cottoned on to this and transferred this to the model of ecology so essentially what you get is an emerging of two broad areas of debate which is first of all the relationships of ecology in general plus the relationship of ecological processes in the sense of environmental resource of animals relating to ecosystems and its systems became essentially a metaphor for community but I don't think this sort of thing has been made transparent enough so when you look back at the history you can see the overlimes there but it's not just the dark ages of the 1960s but it's also people like Adel Gore who created some awful book it's full of these sorts of statements which reproduced the sort of ideas of the 1960s now of course by me saying that Al Gore's book in 1992 is awful doesn't suddenly put me in the camp of George Bush or all the climate change deniers but I'm just trying to say that there's a history in context of the way in which people use ecology as a justification for politics which is essentially normative but in ways in which people generally don't understand but if we're going to do ecology and if politics better we need to understand those things better now what I'm going to do is review some of the ways in which political ecology has tried to deal with this now the first I would say the first main big theory of dealing with this is something that Tony Allen holds very dear, cultural theory which I think I'm putting up here because it's like the chapter one of how political ecology has dealt with this so a lot of the work done in the 1980s and 1990s was influenced by this also dare I say Mike Kuhn who's a big name in climate change politics is essentially a cultural theorist I think where it's essentially as I guess you know this diagram I'm not going to waste time describing it but it's a very simplistic model clunky model based upon the idea that there are two key criteria grid and group, grid is a willingness to follow rules, group is a willingness to act with other people so if you think about this as a diagram, down here are people who don't like grids or groups so these are equivalent to individualists these are the Idaho gun lobby people who would be like they don't want the state telling them not to own a gun, that sort of thing whereas up here you get the rule makers they want to have rules for everybody so in a sense if you want to run the list a bit more this isn't Idaho anymore this is like the Netherlands perhaps and then you get other groups the point is now out of this sort of clunky cultural theory comes a rather attractive classification so this is Leicester Brown okay he's obviously there this is Young Lomborg if you read Young Lomborg it's all about individualism and optimism if you read Leicester Brown it's all about limits and pessimism up here you've got the state to making rules for people and in the top corner this is my symbol for a fatalist woman, African farmer it's very difficult but the point is it's meant to be a powerless person a powerless person who can't act commonly because they're disempowered and they just have to follow rules because they don't have any choice now out of this comes this attractive sort of end result because I still see this happening today I mean you still get this sort of debate going on we've heard it today so these are the growth people these are the degrowth people or what Peter was talking about I think about the coal I thought was interesting that lots of people when you read the green literature about climate change and energy so many people slam coal they want to see the end of coal but the obvious point is that that's a very serious undertaking when so much of the world uses coal there's also ways in which you can look at these different voices fighting each other now the point I'm trying to say here is that this is very much an attractive way of looking at expertise because out of all of these groups they generate knowledge which they then give authority to using their own social techniques so all alliances of people quote Nester Brown as an authority to the voice similar to what you're doing normal is often trotted off as a voice what I'm trying to say here is that the point of connecting norms to science is to look more at the basis of doing this now cultural theory I think is not sufficient because it tends to be so simplistic about these four voices it doesn't do enough about what to do if you follow these voices the sort of people who push this like Michael Thompson basically say that if you acknowledge every voices there then it helps you understand why these voices emerge which is great but it doesn't exactly tell you what to do about a specific problem like renewal and energy for example but it is also useful for it does have some things which is that it is also a model for understanding how not just how knowledge is shaped by how society shapes knowledge and it struck me a couple of years ago when I saw a movie which I'm sure some of you have seen that there are so many ways in which society especially society in the US tends to reproduce knowledge in this way so I'll give you that example it's a little bit sad because there I was watching the Simpsons movie thinking about cultural theory but obviously Homer is an individualist and the film writers put Lisa as a legalitarian she wants to protect the environment so she creates a common property regime this is Eleanor Ostrom to the rescue the common property regime doesn't work because the individualist breaks the rules so the worst thing in the world happens which is that the state intervenes and the big state comes to the rescue which proves it up for all the fatalists who have to live with this so as a result the solution to all this is regulate the individualists now the point is I'm trying to say here is apart from the fact that I'm brought sad in thinking this is that this is a morality play in North America today it's not so much that the environment expertise is either individualism or fragility but society itself is working through these different options in this case I think it's a story about the state especially it says that if we can work together as communities then we don't need a big state now that I think is a morality play which works in the United States in today's environment now the problem with cultural theory from the sort of science and politics view is that it doesn't necessarily address or correct any of these views but these views continue to have authority which I'm now shifting to which is a more narrative based more sort of storyline based approach I'm going to use Jarrod Diamond as an example because I never wasted an opportunity just to show people quotations like this what's so interesting about Jarrod Diamond's book collapsed since it's so widely quoted so many people with authority cite it as something that's very useful I'm just reading Dryzek's Schlossberg's and Norgaard's book about climate challenge society and within the first chapter they're citing Jarrod Diamond as a source of authority and what I find interesting is that probably most people read the first chapter but they don't get to page 500 because when it hits page 500 you get all these juicy quotations which look pretty ugly when you look at it in context now what I'm trying to say here is first of all the authority of Diamond as a spokesperson which is expertise here secondly the way in which makes these chains of cause and effect which he says up here is transparent connections I would say quite the opposite actually but nonetheless he's actually making these sort of hard cause and effect statements within his stories about the world and if that's not enough then if you read on then he comes up with these sorts of statements which I find quite astounding that people don't call them to account more for this sort of stuff but what I'm trying to say here is that all of these are examples of narratives but also it's an example of how cause and effect statements are put into nice black boxes and presented as authority in order to justify a political statement or if you like the political viewpoint justifies putting the facts together in this way so just to be precise this is blaming developing countries for AIDS and terrorism and this is saying horror of horrors the only way we can deal with this is through military intervention there's nothing here by the way you'll notice which is to do with edit or humanitarians it's all the idea that if we don't control these populations then the only option is military assistance now what I'm saying here is that maybe it's because he's a bit out there but also I think probably it's more to do with this kind of position in the same way as the Simpsons movie marries together the various political mainstream views in the states which is basically that it makes a lot more sense to speak to the egalitarians in this sort of crisis driven way rather than to talk in terms of interventionism which I think is something that Jared Diamond or Paul Ellicott's friend and other people, unless they're Brownlee's other friend don't necessarily want to do so what I'm trying to do here I'll be, how do we deal with this now in political ecology there's been a great deal of deconstruction of narratives stuff that I think I've done a little bit of myself that other people have had this and other people where we looked at all this sort of stuff now my point is that it hasn't really worked it hasn't had much influence now also the deconstruction of narratives is for example looking at these cause and effect statements and saying it's not really true look at the evidence but still the narratives keep on coming out so I think one of the key things is the way in which the literature driving this sort of analysis hasn't transferred or hasn't really applied to the if you like the practical world of policy so this is Brimelatorre Catech to the Brimelatorre thing where he basically makes a key point which is that we talk about nature and non-nature in nice convenient ways like deforestation, arrows, genocide versus actually what really happened is this now what we need to ask is therefore how do we get to that situation and lots of people have done this sort of historical genealogy narrative sort of stuff but the trouble is that when you actually read the literature people at the tour write in this sort of style which he's a very brilliant man but God, is he unusable you know it's not honestly like, dare I say I'm going to be wrong with assertive but the ANT crowd, the active network theory people seem to write for themselves in very self-referential ways using these theories in ways which almost seem like to back off from actually engaging with people at the World Bank or engaging with people like Kevin Anderson who is the climate scientist at UEA who travels the world talking about imminent collapse and the need for deep growth and I think there's this mismatch between there's this mismatch between you know the academic theories and then the world of development and I think that's one of the key things and I'm just going to put that up as an example a very particular type of narrative of desertification where this has been tried to be applied but the question is how do you do this how do you actually make it work how do you move from the world of ANT and deconstruction so what I'm asking here is how do we do this more successfully and this is what I'm trying to end on which is the discussion of how to do this now this is where I'm trying to use more debates now within science and technology studies I'm now going down the road of those Frenchy type statements about actually never trying to deal with any question which is actually trying to deal with how do you implement this in policy now I'm not going to say there's an easy answer to this but what I'm trying to do generally is work within this sort of framework so over here we've got the institutions approach which is basically the idea of trying to implement a solution to a problem now on this side very nice people in all these groups by the way but Eleanor Ostrom has been the industry standard of applying so you get this sort of I used to call it the Russian Dole Model of the global system connects to the national connects to the village where it's all based upon ideas of regulating individualistic behaviour but the attraction here is that this will meant to be transferable and everybody follows the rules so it's very pluralist for UCB NRM which is what CAF homework was telling us about and there's a great deal of stuff here and then this is the middle ground where I think it's trying to connect to more I think maybe Francis Cleave's work but also CAF homework the idea of trying to connect the scales through a system or institutional for it to be larger or some kind of situation now what I'm trying to talk about more generally is if expertise is normatively based the way to get better expertise which doesn't create the problems that we've been talking about is to try and localise it a bit more trying to feed in more development norms at the local level or to feed it up higher I mean that's my question about CAF's work which is that you seem to be explaining in your talk at least all sorts of local dynamics about what's good and bad about these macro planning and local livelihoods but the bigger question is how do we reform the planning process to incorporate those values now I'm going to end on a an example of how to do adaptation because essentially that's what I think it's all about the idea of how do you live with scarcity and I recently came across a publication by the World Bank on ecosystem based adaptation to climate change which came up with this astounding statement that agriculture is one of the greatest threats to the natural ecosystem to all of why which seems to be well putting the cart before the force I mean the point is that it's all about regulating the environment so that people can live or regulating people so that they can live within the environment rather than actually understanding that in places like Idaho or Iowa there's plenty of agriculture and plenty of prosperity the question is how now I'm talking about community based adaptations as an example of how this may or may not work so as community based adaptation to climate change this is from Bangalore there's so much work done now on very physical and obvious approaches to what people think is climate risk which I think is useful and we shouldn't dismiss that we shouldn't say it's not useful but it is kind of limited which is things like this these are called moctics it's basically a device to make sure a household has got fresh water in the event of a flood kind of fundamental but also very important in raising the level of the house but this is what I'm trying to suggest is kind of obviously simplistic because you're essentializing the risk and you're essentializing the response which is to say that the risk is rising sea level therefore the response is protecting against the rising sea level a similar example is this I took this photograph and people all of a sudden wanted to publish this photograph because it speaks to the narrative of sea level rise here we have a dry road to the ocean and we have people raising the level of the road and people are saying oh brilliant this is community based adaptation because they're all raising the level of the road now unfortunately for that story this is what happens every year they do it in the dry seas and because that's what they do it's a dry road they've got to replace it the real problem apparently with sea level rise is not so much that the water is rising at least yet but this sort of water is turning salty but there's nothing in the magazines in the USA you want to the publishers that wanted to talk about salinization rather than actually people getting their feet wet and I think that's what we're trying to say is this sort of co-construction of risk and agency which is going on which I think is what needs to be challenged within these institutions but one of the problems we have is that the model of additionality from the climate change convention the idea that risk is reduced to just additional greenhouse gases rather than risk as a result of social vulnerability means that generally speaking the mechanisms and the expertise doesn't focus on the local value this is possibly one example which is that in this particular place people use this rice field during the dry season they grow rice because the water is fresh they eat that rice during the wet season it turns salty so they put in baby crabs and the crabs get big in the fat they're not chained now in a sense that is a very interesting livelihood adaptation but it's not technically considered adaptation under the climate change convention because it's not immediately linked to what the IPCC says will happen in terms of additional storms now I've already diminished the need to protect against those storms because after all storms kill people but I'm also saying that I think the challenge is to try and to increase the space for influencing these expert organizations to hear more about what's happening so one possible way which is this is happening is through this organization CCAPS which is relatively new because it's part of the CGIIAR which is focusing on how to mitigate an adaptation simultaneously with food security and ecosystem based adaptation now this is so far I knew an interesting but not very powerful bit of the climate change but I think it's a good example of what I think some of us have been talking about already today so if Jessica's talking about water as not just water I think this is an interesting thing because it's talking about climate change risk not just as what happens as a result of additional greenhouse gases but essentially a locally informed way to increase resilience against those risks by focusing on livelihoods and food rather than simply within the framework of iobrids, mitigation or adaptation to those gases this was something I think we talked about earlier which I think I touched on in a paper that's just come out previous in that same edition with a rather cheesy title climate justice is not just ice the idea is that it's not just all about what's happening to the atmosphere but it's about what our people experience that so my final point is that political ecology generally speaking seems to be full of people the field called political ecology to get to the dimensions of political ecology conference in the US it's full of people who basically locate themselves as egalitarians who want to fight against individualists I think the basis of political ecology as a discipline is framed as an antidote to individualism what people don't realise is that out of that framework comes a vision of what the risk is that we're facing also a vision of agency to fight that risk which I think is exclusionary it doesn't take into account in cultural theory terms it doesn't take into account the fakers we're speaking on behalf of the fakers by saying things like oh you poor people you've got so many more greenhouse gases to deal with let's let us build you a sea wall rather than actually understanding things like well let's get rid of your vulnerability to those gases now a way ahead is to try and politicise those connections to make them more transparent that's my view now the question I'm wondering is is political ecology as it is currently discussed the way to do that or is it a broader discussion of science and politics within environmental policy more generally or within public policy that's part of what I'm dealing with anyway I'll shut up thank you a very appropriate ending of the series of talks questioning the whole concept idea of political ecology so here we are starting the master's program in the political ecology but of course a very personal question we have a few minutes left five minutes for some feedback and questioning on this if you still understand now I'm sure this was invigorating we actually had a debate in there just to give you one half minute more to think we had a debate and then we started discussing this initiative for a new master some of my colleagues suggested that perhaps political ecology was over its peak and I feel that was disappearing I think you've seen this not that serious questions have to be asked about its focus and orientation there were already two hands but I've probably reached one Peter thanks Tim just on that final point do you see do you see spaces for reflection and engagement on the parts of elites expert communities is there an openness to hearing alternative narratives or accounts about how people understand risk resilience, think about climate change or is there an element of them being locked into a particular way of presenting a narrative or an attachment to it that they can't move away from right I feel a bit I feel rather strange saying this to you because you know so much more about it than I do but my understanding of the climate change convention is that it's already on the road to the waters and what we're getting is a sort of hybrid situation of different modes of government so like the 1997 Kyoto mode was all about fast mitigation using you know flexible finance to do that we you know since about the Bali road map I think 2007 I think we're in a situation where there are multiple routes to doing this so red for example I think is dead in the sense that it was proposed in 2005 2005 was spectable mechanism investors get cash in return for mitigating carbon now it's like red has become an aid project it's all about building capacity I mean you were saying earlier about the association of red projects with dodgy government strategies I think the point is that it's already down that road but this is not shared by everyone I think you get multiple people so UNDP is down this road but World Resources Institute is not and I think probably probably to be fair there's room for both approaches you know I think that we should probably move down the road of having national targets which people try and follow but at the same time we certainly need to diversify carbon objectives away from just simply carbon we need to diversify into a broader definition of risk so yeah I think already people are moving down that road I'm Tony Allen formerly of SOAS currently at Keynes I'd like to ask you a question why is it I like the idea of political ecology as a simple way of looking at the way we handle the environment being determined by power and political and political relations but and then also the nice idea that the political economy which is very powerful if you've had giants projecting for 200 years they were the one that's a political economy as an approach the political the political economy is a wholly owned subsidiary of the political ecology I don't know what do you think that sort of idea is helpful in trying to give some primacy to political ecology I'm not at this point in my life what would be a giant figure of political ecology but why is it that we haven't got any giants in political ecology we've had 200 years of giants in political ecology but why have we not got any giants that are automatically talking about in terms of political ecology this is meant to be I'm just one of the people that provide these ideas, this leadership that I can't complicate in this I've got lots of other things to do in order to answer that question you've got to have a theory of what are giants and how they emerge when did Adam Smith when did Adam Smith become a giant I know literally when he did but at what point did his books suddenly become considerably classic I think it also partly depends on the boundaries around the concept in other words, too soon possibly what about Esther Bozrop I think Esther Bozrop as a Danish woman who wrote about adaptation who also wrote women's role in economic development in 1970 possibly she's a candidate for centred within environmental development but we're not there yet it's a theory of how you get there I don't know, I would have thought that maybe she's up there as a potentially important person who could be then co-opted I remember a million years ago when I was doing geography, there was this mini campaign to co-opt Darwin as a geographer Darwin actually wrote a paper with words physical geography it was about words people were saying he's already de facto a geographer Darwin, who is a giant so I think it's partly a bit of the boundary politics around how you define political ecology and I think probably over time people will either redefine who are political ecologists or they'll redefine political ecology to include giants but if I may that feels quite about what we really need is the political ecology of the environment can we get that going because this sounds like a way in for us to get to a point where I think there's loads of work on political ecology of the environment but he's saying it's more important than political ecology well I would agree with that but I think it begs the point that your discussion seems to be based upon putting words within fixed meanings and I don't think that people attribute these meanings very clearly I mean I don't think everybody agrees on what political ecology is I think there are loads of people talking about the politics of the environment but I don't think Al Gore talks about political ecology I think this part needs to do with you know the potency of certain words that they want to use Exactly I once lived in a university where political ecology was basically equivalent to the notion of interdisciplinarity right so words are everywhere I wanted to ask a little bit about the cultural theory so I wanted to I didn't get exactly where you said this division of narratives or you think it's limited because my take would be that political ecology precisely I mean the way I understand it so we share our own experiences here but the way I understand it precisely tries to break with this type of division like exactly the argument I was trying to make with the growth is that it's not the standard packaging of it's Leicester Brown versus Leomburg it's the limits to growth versus the neoclassical economist I've been trying to say that I don't feel very much common with Leicester Brown maybe I have 30% common with him but not so I think political ecology is exactly producing new political in the sense of different imaginaries of the world narratives that they break this packaging of this 2x2 so I wondered what's your take on this by 2 do you think it captures more narratives or are you criticising it that it's oversimplifying the morality of narratives that exist Tony you can say more than I will but I'll take the liberty I spend a lot of time talking to my good friend Michael Thompson about this he's a really good guy but the key point he would say is that this is constrained low to this the idea is that if you imagine a diagram here with an X and a Y and you get like a million dots representing people in society each of these dots will be a different viewpoint somebody here is kind of similar to somebody here but the way to make the point is just to simplify it to get some distance so they end up with these rather stereotypical views in order to represent these key positions the idea is that not everybody in this position is going to be exactly like this and therefore exactly different to this but you get these real transitions happening but also so therefore it is trying to demonstrate the importance of narratives but by so doing it makes a simplistic approach to narratives to do so a deliberately simplistic approach to say this is what it's all about so their idea of environmental democratisation is not simply watching these guys fight it out but to appreciate that there are a number of views some of which are more visible than others like these people are not visible unless they are seen through the lens of the alliances with these people so all these investors who say things like the people of Tanzania want energy we're bringing them energy we're helping them develop it's basically them talking about them so in the sense there's a positive thing because it's trying to show that truth claims are conditional but at the same time what is simplistic about this is its theory of how we get there I think as an observation of society this is generally accurate but as an explanation of how society works it's awful one last I suppose we have to start with diamond the reintroduction of the environment and determinism in the early 20th century it was very much based on the individual social black man was black therefore he couldn't work she was feedback of course she had done good for the middle class man it just goes on and it seems to me when I think back through the 20th century in the history of fights it was one of the fight against environment and determinism that helped to allow other social struggles to take place some 50, 60, 70 years later somebody said I was grumpy a peter I'm not grumpy I'm just sick of fighting the same fights again and diamond raises one of the environment and determinism which is very very serious because I can see a scenario in which any game made by feminism or any game made by the background is simply not very serious and I think it's so essential to talk about the norms of discourse between society and science one of the things about ecology is its prime objective is conservation that do we conserve at the level of the gene at the level of the species or at the level of the ecotone come on these have got entirely different meaning in other cue gardens but it's not very useful to many people we can keep the quality as alive but that's not even for the hemispheres ecotone is what matters one of the things we've got to keep very much alive because political ecology is very rarely done in developed countries it's like we've invented the science that developed and that is really serious because sometimes we have said oh yes and it's too difficult to talk about pre-capitalism on the production what? let me tell you one little good story entirely by 70 I was involved in planning a series of 200 stone projects in East Africa each stone project was to do 200 stones each stone project did precisely 200 stones in 2017 it was not diffused each stone used the same physical principles of radiation convection that had to be addressed to improve the open fire so the first thing each stone make it did was to enclose the fire space to come on story short cooking takes place at dusk at dusk and close to 10 o'clock she's there she's got no light what's the single most expensive form of energy to buy? light why didn't they spread? because they were unable to identify that results she used in pre-capitalism on the production is multi-purpose and simultaneous and that makes it extremely different from a commodity undercapitalism technologies are quite wide some of them are so simplified not even worth addressing but trying to deal with this idea that we've got a multi-purpose simultaneous use of energy has been very difficult so I would have the greatest problem with developing fuel trees because fuel would have something like that when the trees got no further use and it ceases to do for the tree nobody will take on the results base of what pre-capitalist production is including how they use water and it's absolutely fascinating we've got the science for development which is important in the third world which will not seek to address the reuse of resources and that's what makes me frustrated okay thank you for that