It's great to see so many people still here. One of our panelists was worried that as you were convening over coffee what you were really doing was heading for the exit. So it's a good thing that this individual won't be disappointed. I'm Cynthia Watson from the National War College and I'm delighted to be able to chair this panel this afternoon. You've heard about the history, you've heard about the raw facts, you've heard one extremely prominent and well respected analyst give you his views of where we're going and maybe a little hedging on where we might not be going. But on this panel we'll try to get a real range on what the individual speaker finds to be the most telling and pressing issue that he or she thinks we need to look into for the future. This is a concluding panel so I will ask everyone to try to leave some adequate time for questions and answers but I want to make sure that all of the perspectives represented on the panel have the opportunity to give us their views. I'm going to ask that we start with Dr. Chu who is, you have the biographies but coming to us from Tsinghua University. Then I will follow with Dr. Lai so that we move from the mainland over to Taiwan. Then Alexander Wong, Dr. Wong will be our third speaker and then concluding will be Bonnie Glazer. Dr. Chu. Thank you. I'm grateful for Bonnie Glazer and Richard Bruce giving me the opportunity to talk my will about the Taiwan election and the impact on the cross-strait relations for the next four years. First I see as we all know that the agreement of Douglas Paul's two terms to define mainland reaction to Taiwan election a few days ago that he was quite calm. And I read the so far two statements from Taiwan Affairs Office, a statement the Sunday about the election and the Tsinghua News Agency commentary about election and so far those are two only the official reaction I have seen from mainland China and basically two points first the welcome the election, second and believing and hope that the two cross-strait relations can continue to be stable peace and development. And yes, agree with the previous assessment that the mainland feel relaxed about election. The reason for the relaxed attitude is that the mainland also wants to see stability over the cross-strait relations. This is quite agreeable, same attitude with people inside Taiwan and here in this country that the stability, that is the central theme that President Hu Jintao produced before and at the 17 party congress in 2007 about the central theme of mainland on cross-strait relations and the peace and the development. Peace and stability are the same meaning, same words. And yes, mainland worry about the DPP position especially if PPP won because if DPP won that stability will become a question, peace and stability. And then mainland does not want to see that in stable position in next four years. And the reason for mainland to welcome and once the peace and stability cross-strait relations is because mainland in next four years has a full agenda in domestic issues. Like the Beijing leadership are fully occupied by the internal issues, economic continue growth, inflation, social inequality issues, corruption and public anger on something and social political stability. So it would like to see like the cross-strait relations will be no trouble now and in future. So I work on international affairs. My understanding of Beijing's attitude that is leadership fully occupying domestic issues does not care about others including United States. If you do not bring us trouble including from Taiwan. So I see that it's a general trend and this reason why the mainland like to see stability because the priority is internal. And so I see that this is basically reaction attitude that the mainland see from the towards the reelection. And the second talking about the impact, I see the election will outcome will bring about the not a positive impact on cross-strait relations in the future for years. That will continue to have the stability and the more progress in social economic issues. Like they call the social issues. Economic issues is basically a social economic issues. There have been 16 agreements in the past most of the four years. And then in future there will be some falling off and implement issues like investment protection agreement, law enforcement and education exchange in the future. So there are still some work to be done like the purist speakers are talking about. So I see that the result of the election Taiwan will give the opportunity for science to continue their efforts from the past four years to improve their social economic context times like this general trend. So that seems to be clear the impact. Another impact that we have talked a lot is not clear. That is the impact on political security relations between two sides across Taiwan Street in the future. And we have a lot of debate that's monitored, I've known about the political security talks. Here I should say that most mainland Chinese would want to see it like in future four years that two sides can start political talks and make agreements on the political issues can be peaceful or others. This is very much a general public opinion on the mainland side of China. We should pause yesterday's report like the Taiwan public opinion poll like 6% of the total needs are purified status quo, where small number like the purified reunification or something. Yes, this has been a long time that the poll, I think the mainland people understand, but is the public opinion there? But on the mainland China, we also have a public opinion and the public opinion is quite inconsensuous. 5% is 90% of people and it's quite strong for national reunification, for some movement towards national reunification. So I would like to be clear with myself that this is a strong opinion that the leadership in Beijing understand and I would like to stress it. That does not mean that it's the government position. She let the politicians government understand both public opinion demands and the difficulty in reality, politicians government. So in my study, I see government politicians everywhere in the world, their job is to work between something they want, something they are pure want and something they can do in the real world. I think it's the same truth to mind you, same truth to Hu Jintang and Xi Jinping and the same truth to President Obama here. So what does that mean in the future years? Depending on their judgment, their position, like the understand the public opinion and the reality. The general trend I see in the last four or couple of years, I see the leadership of the government has become very much realistic and practical in cross-Taiwan Street relations and peace and development is a reflection on that. So I see that we will continue to be the general trend in the future. By seeing that, I think that if we cannot have political talks in the future, and that means there will be a greater limitation for how to size can improve their relations. Because as we already said, like the social economic measures are mostly adjusted. So how many of those issues, how much work to size can do in the next four years on social economic issues? Yes, they can implement them, they can follow up on something. But basically they have reached the agreement that are possible or should to be reached on social economic issues. And then what we should do in the next four years. And if we don't have political talks and the price on it, I think there will be very much limitation for other specific issues like international space, CBMs, CBMs, security issues. Because then we do not have a framework or general principle. And the last point, if there is a political talks on myself, do not know what are those political talks will be. What is political talks, talk of what? I will not hear that my government, from my limited elimination, let my government give a clear talk. Because political talk, peace call, used to be first initiated, reached by Taiwan side in 1990s. It's not a millennial side in nature. And then later, millennial side talk about it. But now I don't know what does that mean, political talks? What is the contents of political talks, if to start it? Okay, I think my time is up. Thank you. Okay. Dr. Lai, I neglected to say is from Taiwan think tank. Thank you, Richard and Bonnie for inviting me here and among these very prominent speakers. My name is Sichuan, I have not been to the DC for about five years. So I'm very glad to be back here again. Although this is in a circumstances, I wish it could be in a better position. But well, the reality is like this. And so I thank you for this invitation. And of course, we all know from this morning about the election result. And the reality is that, yes, Mao win the election, but in comparison with what he got in year 2008, the difference between him and the opposition down from 2.2 million to 800,000. So it's about 1.4 million votes loss. And also his legislative majority, also down from 81 seats to 64 seats. So it's the decrease of 17 seats in legislative year. On the other hand, DPP, although did not win as it anticipated or it expected still was in a better position now than it was in four years ago. It has increased its vote share and also increased its legislative seats about 13 seats. So looking at this, if you believe or anybody, including President Ma and Joe, believe this. This is the mandate that the people, particularly on the 92 consensus, the Taiwanese people already given to him. I have to say that probably this will be a much reduced mandate if it is a mandate. Then otherwise, how could you explain about the losing support, rather than the increase of support or about the maintenance of support about his 92 consensus and other policies? And also in terms of the political operation upon view. Right now, we are looking at the mind Joe still commands the majority in the legislative year. However, not only the DPP has a 40 seats, but also a party that openly declared want to roll back the ECFA. And also the party at the same time, wanting to have a very open platform for Taiwanese independence, that the Taiwan Solidarity Union has three seats in the legislative year. And the three seats is sort of a magic number that they are able to form a party caucus and enter, just like Zhu Yihang said this morning, about the legislative piece of the policy legislation party-to-party inter-party negotiation. And if they wanted it, they can put on hold about a certain policy or certain piece of legislation for about a month or even three months. So that actually I think the president of mind Joe and his party is facing a stronger opposition and more constrained if he wanted to push forward a certain other thing that he wanted to do from now on. And also then that basically in terms of the cross-trade policy and many of the so-called cross-trade mechanism, that have the following impact. First of all, when we talk about 92 consensus, associated with it is the 92 mechanism. 92 mechanism, which means that the Taiwan established a straight exchange foundation in negotiation with another is counterpart from China, the rats. But the straight exchange foundation during that time was only authorized to talk about the functional issue, no political issues. But then if you look at the past 16 agreements, some of them actually has crossover to the political issues or the political content about an issue has a political implications. And they are able to go over and sort of pass through. It is precisely because the KMT at that time, with the overwhelming majority in legislative union, what they are able to do is to put those agreements, the agreements that the ARAT and SCF they have signed, then put into the legislative process, but then use the majority to prevent it from any discussion. And then it is because of the Italian legislative union, they have this bylaw that any piece of legislation put into the process. And if after like 45 days or three months without any discussion, that means that there is no disagreement and it will automatically pass. Or 16 of them, or 16 agreements of them have been passed in this way. So that basically was the exception of ECFA. What we have is a past 16 agreements between ARAT and SCF, what they have been signed, are not under or proper, in my view, the legislative union debates or discussions. And I think that situation will be changed from now on, with the DPP having 40 seats and particularly with the Taiwan Solidarity Union, and that three seats. I'm not saying that they are spoiler, but this is a stronger legislative opposition. And if they, if the mind your president wanted to push forward like it did in the past, then it will be facing a much, much stronger opposition. And I doubt if they're able to do that in this way. Another thing about the future development, probably something that is related with the US, Taiwan, China relation, is that the US and China, and also of course with Korea and Russia to a certain extent, you see that all are in the process of whether they have an election or leadership transition. And the transition process requires or demanded every government to want to have just a stable, a stability, not to have any other complexities in the future development. And for China, I think that will basically put into the issue whether they are in a choice that for Hu Jintao this. I look at this election as the relief. So I can safely step down since now will not be deteriorated when I step out of the office. Or this will increase the hawks within China. Demanded that the mind should pay back because all the good that we have been given to him in the previous four years. So it will be the debate between those two thinkings. And if that's something that's going to happen, I believe that window for this will be sometime before August. But after August, any major breakthrough in terms of political negotiation, dialogue and other things probably won't be able to happen due to the requirement for the sailing through safely in the future environment. And another thing is that that also has been related with what the Dr. Chu Sulong said in terms of the future negotiation. Because as Wang Yi, the Taiwan Affairs Director, once said that in the future negotiation will be Yizhong Younan and the Jingzhong Youzhen. That is there will be difficult issue within the easy issues. And there will be a political dimension within the economic negotiation. One other clear example is about the investment agreement treaty. That the environmental government that's been wanting to sign with China before this presidential election. But he did not. All right. And so I think that if issue like those will come in, it is not about the direct political negotiation. But the political contents have it issues within the economical, whatever other cultural and the social agreement they wanted to sign. That will study to occupy the agenda. And I think that will be a real test about how much of the so-called 92 consensus can carry through. So it is not about the 92 consensus with that we're able to negotiate without it. We won't be able to go forward. It is under this mind your government and with Hu Jintao facing those difficult issue. The already existing the 92 consensus would that be able to carry the very heavy burden for things meaningfully going forward. If it is not, for example, if there's a delayed or another very less than wanted the result in terms of investment protection agreement between Taiwan and China. How will that reflect to the people in Taiwan? How will that make the people in Taiwan feel about the cross-strait relationship will be going? So we actually we are going to enter the very uncharted water in the future. Now the finally about the global economic recession probably some people would like to say coming from the European debt crisis. Mass government during the election process during the campaign process once portrayed that it is because of European problem that we need China as a cushion for Taiwan's economic development. But we all know that the Chinese is relying on exploitation on the particular to the United States and Europe. So the Europe problem will become China's problem and when China faces problem, how will how it will react to Taiwan? Particularly the goodies that the mind your promise to Taiwan that in terms of equity in the future negotiations and that we're able to extract more goodies from China. Would China be able to deliver that? And if China won't be able to deliver that due to its domestic consideration. How would mind your be be able to say to the local Taiwanese community that the cross-strait negotiation or at least something that will be able to come forward? Because probably we are going to see is a complicated issues have political heavy contents and the progress. Whether that's with mind your or without mind your will be stalled or it be slow significantly due to a lot of other factors. And I think also with the already existing the so-called 92 mechanism where the SCF was not authorized to talk about political issues. And when we enter this political heavy negotiation, the already existing 92 mechanism that we have for the SCF would that be able to carry through? And that Taiwan at that time will be facing a very serious challenge that we probably need to reform the whole Liang An-Ren-Ming Guanxi Tiao-Li. That is the treaty article for the cross-strait people interchange. That is the article within Taiwan and how would that go with the today's reality? If that is the case, then with the stronger opposition in the later Yuan and with a discussion like those open. Probably we're going to face a very new and you can say prosperous but also fireworks about this because actually in the reality, 20 years past 1992. And we're still talking about 92 consensus to a certain extent this is we are in year 2012. So I think some improvement or at least some reform to reflect what is today that is needed. But with the mind shows, electoral victory and what he faced right now and also international situation, this moment, probably that will be complicated. If it is can be modeled through, that will be a very pleasant outcome. Thank you. Dr. Wang of Tom Kong University. Well, thank you. Thank you for the invitation, Richard and Bonnie. This is a little bit before Lunar New Year and I'm very happy to be back in Washington, DC. You know why? This is Richard you remember four years ago, three days after the election. I presented this slide four years ago and I say it won't be mama who who. Yeah, maintain a high altitude not to be disrupted by small events, pursue a peaceful environment. And I checked the list and I think pretty much, you know, excluding the economic, excluding the political and other sensitive security issues pretty much in the past four years. Those things have been carried out, not by Taiwan itself, but together between mainland China and Taiwan. And now let's go back to check, Ray, I promise that your picture is on. Let's look at the first term of Ma Yingzhou. Actually there was some misunderstanding of Taiwan's relations or Taiwan's rapprochement with China. Actually, Ma Yingzhou's guideline was Qingmei, He Zhongyuan Youru. And Qing does not equal to He. And I specifically put on the picture not only showing you how happy Ray was, but also to remind you that Ma Yingzhou when meeting with Ray had put a pin on the jacket. That's the flag of the my country and the United States. And that shows that sincerely that Taiwan when engaging dialogues, negotiations with Beijing did not put aside of the United States interest. And so was Ma too close to China? Who knows? You know, only Hu Jintao can answer that. And I'm sure his answer would be different from a lot of people. And Ma's second term China policy, we spent a lot of time debating and talk about 92 consensus. But we all agree that Taiwan voters in this election decided to maintain the stability to keep policy consistency in their mind. And if we look at the future agenda in the next four years, I would say that Xianjin, Hou Zhen or economy first and politics or political issues later will remain the dominating guideline in the next four years. Not only because that we have more than two dozens of potential agreements or proposed negotiations is already at the plate between Straits Exchange Foundation and the A-Rats on the other side. Connecting to the ECFA framework agreement. Our negotiation agenda is full and probably cannot be completed in the four years. But also as Professor Lai mentioned that Ma Yingzhou is now facing a stronger opposition in the parliament. So he needs to be more careful, more sensitive to the Taiwan public opinion. How about the political or military negotiations? It's unlikely because the political agenda is full. Not only Beijing as Professor Chu remind us that Beijing will be distracted by domestic issues. But also Taiwan is a small state. We need to manage our relationship with two nuclear powers. So before the agenda in Beijing and in the United States are settled that we need to be more cautious at least this year. So if I may use this timeline to make my point. Starting from yesterday that we will have a four month of transitional cabinet. We may have two full cabinet resignation between February and May. So in Taiwan itself as we all know we are all in capital city. When government in transition there are a lot of restrictions in terms of policy decisions. And then we have to wait until the agenda in Beijing and the US election to be settled. And looking into the future. The 2014 as many of my friends from DPP suggested that the rotation of government will be a normal practice in Taiwan. Because we are a democracy. And the major challenge to KMT rule is 2014 the mayoral elections. If DPP is not in the central government they will have full time. And they will have two full years to get themselves ready to challenge right now three to two very thin margin majority of KMT in the mayoral seats. And also after 2014 Ma Yingzhou has to be very sensitive to his possible successors and their possible campaign platform. And their probability of victory. So when engaging in China Ma cannot put full strength or his personal agenda or willingness ahead. But keep the KMT or the party interests or national interests in his mind. Beyond that also Ma needs to keep in mind is the strategic re-engagement of the United States. I characterize as a trident. It's a multiple multilateral diplomacy plus trade and a new concept of air sea battle. So it's political, diplomatic, economic and military. And so Ma Yingzhou's second term in terms of U.S. policy I would say it will focus more on bilateral relations. We talk about the beef vis-à-vis a program Tifa arm sales. They are all very very difficult issues. I think Ma Yingzhou and his cabinet will spend more energy and time in dealing with this bilateral relations with the United States. Not only that Ma Yingzhou has to position his U.S. policy with American Asian strategy in mind. So how to expand the functions and utilities of AQFA and working for bilateral or mutual commercial and economic interests between Taiwan and the United States is at stake. Earlier we also mentioned a little bit about Taiwan's defense transformation. Ma Yingzhou with his campaign pledge we will soon in state a all volunteer force program with almost no hope for increase of defense budget. With the United States re-engaging and redeployment of U.S. forces in the region. And keeping the problems in Northeast Asia, the Korean Peninsula and South China Sea in mind. So these are all very daunting challenges to the United States. Lastly I want to throw an idea. It's what I call mini-SNED. Don't be distracted by the term. I'm in no way to suggest that Taiwan will copy its strategic and economic dialogue with the United States. But I think the experience that we got, we accumulate in the past four years between Washington and Taipei was that we allowed us to be distracted or confused or conflicted. In different agencies on different issues. So it would be nice or wise that if we can have an interagency, you know, cabinet to cabinet at an appropriate level, a full cabinet dialogue in a quiet, sensible, substantial way. To increase and promote the bilateral relations between Washington and Taipei. So conclude my remarks I would say that in the next four years Taiwan's relations with China will go slow. And Taiwan's relations with the United States will get better. Thank you. Our concluding speaker is Ms. Glazer. Thank you, Cynthia, and thanks to all of you for coming to Richard for collaboration in this conference today. And especially to the staffs at both the CNAPS and the Freeman chair without whom this event would not be possible today. So first, what are the implications of this election for the United States? This was Taiwan's fifth direct presidential election. The campaigns and Election Day itself were well normal. Some observers said that there was less excitement than in prior elections and that the process was fairly ordinary in mundane. After all, there were no bullets and there was no firing of PRC missiles. The normalcy of this election marks a maturing of Taiwan's democracy and that is most important, not who was the winner. It was an orderly process in which the presidential candidates presented their views to Taiwan voters who made up their minds about whom to support. Taiwan has demonstrated the strength and vitality of its democracy. A healthy democracy requires a strong opposition and keen electoral competition. And Dr. Tsai Ing-wen brought her party from its nadir after Chen Shui-bian's presidency, won 46% of the vote and 40 seats in the legislative UN. She raised important issues such as the widening gap between rich and poor, and she conceded defeat gracefully. Opposition parties play a critically important role in democratic societies. They keep the ruling party honest and help to bring better governance. The DPP will continue to play that critically important role in Ma's second term. When Ma won in 2008, President Bush called Taiwan a beacon of democracy to Asia and the world. Although that language was not repeated by the Obama administration in its congratulatory message, it nevertheless remains true today. Taiwan especially represents a model for the people of mainland China to aspire to. Mainland Chinese tourists and students in Taiwan witnessed the campaign firsthand. Even larger numbers watched the presidential debates and the election results live via satellite TV. The election was the subject of postings in internet forums and on Chinese blogs. In years past, many mainlanders described Taiwan's election as chaotic and violent and viewed Taiwan's democracy as false or a negative model for China. This election has altered those views fundamentally. Many PRC citizens observe this election with respect and envy. One blogger wrote, and I quote, this is a first step in civil rights. This is a way we can learn how national leadership should be elected. Only when state leaders are elected via a democratic process can China become a democracy. Leaders produced via other methods are only dictators under a fake skin of democracy, end quote. Ma's reelection for a second term will ensure continued stability and predictability in cross-strait relations, which is critical for American interests. Ma has pledged to continue his three-nose policy, no unification, no independence, no use of force, and therefore the United States will not have to worry about the reemergence of cross-strait tensions or the implications of reunification. The U.S. will continue to support Ma's pragmatic approach to dealing with Beijing. There will not likely be pressure on Ma to move more slowly or more quickly into promoting better cross-strait relations. The U.S. will leave it up to Taiwan to decide. Washington will expect to be consulted as a friend and quasi ally with important interests at stake. U.S. policy toward Taiwan will likely continue to be guided by the view that only a secure and confident Taiwan will negotiate with Beijing. U.S. ties with Taiwan must therefore remain strong. In Ma's second term, whether President Obama remains in office or is replaced by a Republican, it is likely that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan will continue. The question is, what will be sold? The Obama administration has approved $13 billion in weapons sales so far, but has yet to sell new weapons systems that were not previously approved by the Bush administration. President Ma's request to purchase F-16 CDs remains a front burner issue. Hopefully, Tifa talks will resume and the U.S.-Taiwan economic relationship will be strengthened. The U.S. will be disadvantaged if it does not negotiate an FTA with Taiwan. Taipei is now in trade talks with Singapore, and New Zealand, India, Japan, Australia, and the European Union have all signaled a willingness to open bilateral trade negotiations. Let me turn to the implications of the election for U.S.-China relations and cross-strait relations. In the past few months, Beijing has not loudly opposed the many measures that the Obama administration took to bolster ties with Taiwan, including visits to the island by several senior U.S. officials. Undoubtedly, China's reserved response was due to its belief that such steps would help Ma to get re-elected, which was Beijing's preferred outcome. Now that the elections are over and Ma has won, China is likely to resume pressure on the U.S. to curtail weapon sales to Taiwan. China's hopes of achieving this goal have been buoyed by discussions in the U.S. to rethink U.S. policy toward Taiwan. Taiwan will therefore remain an area of friction in U.S.-China relations, how much friction will depend on U.S. policy decisions, and China's reaction to them. Ma's re-election presents opportunities for further progress in cross-strait relations, but problems are inevitable and should be anticipated. The mainland may be satisfied with the current agenda until after the 18th Party Congress, but subsequently greater impatience can be expected. Some on the mainland say that Ma's first term was waited in favor of concessions by Beijing to Taipei and called for the second term to be payback time, in which more benefits are accrued by the mainland. Whether this sentiment is translated into the mainland's policy approach to Taiwan remains to be seen, but it is worth watching. Beijing will conclude from Ma's victory that its policy of peaceful development has been a success. Discussion of the potential negative impact on whose legacy of the DPP win and resulting pressure on Chinese leaders to adopt a tougher policy toward Taiwan will now cease. With Ma winning by a bigger margin than expected, Beijing will become more confident in its efforts to win hearts and minds in Taiwan by means of economic favors. At the same time, however, the strong comeback by the DPP will ensure that mainland China will not be overconfident. Beijing will wisely not rule out a DPP victory in 2016, and hopefully over the course of the next four years, dialogue between the DPP and the mainland will expand. In the economic sphere, the easy things have been done between Taiwan and the mainland, and the more difficult things are yet to be addressed. Further trade liberalization under ECFA will be hard. Negotiation of a bilateral investment protection treaty will also be challenging. In the political realm, there is a possibility that Beijing will pressure Ma to adopt a definition of one China that is closer to the one China principle that is espoused by the mainland. China may also seek to persuade Ma to open talks on a peace accord, and this could become a major source of disagreement. The negative response of Taiwan's citizens to Ma's raising this issue during the campaign has likely made the president more cautious. Ma will undoubtedly continue to press Beijing to enable Taiwan to expand its international space and sign FTA-type agreements with other countries. He will also continue to call for a reduction in the military threat to Taiwan. In recent years, there has been little, if any, discussion on the mainland about adjusting its military deployments. I'm personally doubtful that mainland China will make any moves to do so, in part because the Chinese remain wary of the return to power by the DPP, now possibly in 2016. Military CBMs could be negotiated between the two sides of the strait. CBMs that reduced the possibility of a surprise attack, increased predictability, and reduced the chance of accidents would serve Taiwan's interests. A potential meeting between Ma and China's next top leader, Xi Jinping, could take place if Beijing supports Ma's attendance at APEC. It is not likely, in my view, that Ma will visit the mainland because Beijing would not agree to host him as the ROC's president. In some, the US-China-Taiwan triangular relationship can be expected to remain basically stable. Problems will invariably arise in all three sets of relationships, but are likely to be manageable. Thank you very much. I'd like to thank each of the panelists for remaining true to the time, and I'd like to open up. We have 25 minutes, roughly, for questions. Please give your identification and be as succinct as possible. Wait for the microphone, Chris. Oh, there we go. Thanks. Chris Nelson, Nelson Report. Thank you so much, all of you, for talking about the economic opponent so much. It's the other thing I try to write about, especially on TPP. I'd like to ask all of the participants, and perhaps even Ray Berghardt, who's trying very carefully not to look at me. Is it realistic to talk about Taiwan and TPP from a number of vantage points? China, at the moment, at least, seems to see TPP as yet another element of what it sees as a US containment policy. Does that in itself make TPP sort of a hot thing to even talk about that they're going to see that as a problem? Or would it be unrealistic to say no? Actually, to get the US and Taiwan talking about how Taiwan might get into TPP could help show the Chinese, given ECFA, that TPP is not aimed at China or against China, but it's something that China could also look at. And then from either or possibility, again, and maybe this is where Ray can help us out, what does need to be done so that it would be realistic to talk about Taiwan joining into TPP? Or is that just one of those things that we'd all like to talk about, but no way? Thank you. I'll just comment very briefly. Chris, I think that perhaps we need to make a distinction in this case between how scholars on mainland China view TPP and how the Chinese government view this, particularly regarding the intentions of US policy. I think that US officials at the White House have made perfectly clear that TPP is not intended to exclude anybody, that it is open to all countries and I believe to all economies. I think that is a signal to Taiwan as well. I believe it was Michael Froman at the White House who made the statement that TPP is not something that you get invited to. It is something you aspire to join. And I believe that in private discussions, this is likely to be reinforced in messages to China. It would undoubtedly be beneficial to the United States, to Taiwan, to the rest of the region if China actually were to join TPP and conform to all of the high standards that are involved in this, that will be included in the FTA agreement eventually. Having China not be part of the TPP in the long run, I really don't think would be beneficial. So I agree with you that there might be some scholars who see it that way. But I don't think that that's the way the Chinese government sees it. Thank you. Quick response, Chris. I think from the standpoint of Taiwan. You know, Taiwan has long feared that it will be marginalized economically. And ACFA was one approach or one solution. But joining the TPP is a long-term goal, as President Ma enjoying his press statement said that in the next 10 years we will try to work hard to meet the high criteria that TPP requires. But all these efforts, point number one is to put Taiwan or help Taiwan to escape from this possible economic marginalization. Number two, I think the biggest obstacle, if we sit in Taipei, the biggest obstacle is not Beijing. It's our domestic support. You know, the leadership, or President Ma and Joe in the next several years, will have to engage in conversation and discussions, not only with the oppositions, but also with different sectors, the agricultural, the service industry, the manufacturer. It's a daunting obstacle for Taiwan to meet the criteria before we think of whether we wanted to join something that opposed China or antagonized China. I agree with Bonnie that there are different views in China about the TPP. Yes, if you read the global time of some scholars, they tend to interpret everything the U.S. does in Asia to contain China, including TPP. The official and the mainstream scholarship will, including my will, basically see TPP as a competition that the U.S. has with China, not a containment, a competition for interest, for influence, for ties in Asia-Pacific. I see that so far most Chinese do not worry too much about TPP. First, it's going to be a long-term process for Ngozi Asia. Second, as Dr. Huang said, the criteria is too high even for Japan to meet. Third, I think most Chinese tend to have confidence that nothing is going to likely to replace that we are the largest trade partner on the market for most Asian economics, whether there is a TPP or not in the future. Yes, it seems everybody is responding, so I have to do the work. Basically, from adding to what Alexander's point, I think Taiwan signed the ECFA with China. If China rejected Taiwan to participate in TPP negotiation, showing anything like this, that will be demonstrating to Taiwan that China only allowed Taiwan to be an economic part of China, but not to let Taiwan engage with the rest of the real economy. That would be not good, not only to the people in Taiwan, but also it would reduce the support for Ma Ying-jeou in terms of his popularity in Taiwan. Another point about the complexity or the difficulty in the TPP negotiation, you look at the Taiwan economic negotiation with New Zealand, with the Singapore oil, that probably will be a little bit easier, but with India, that's going to be a difficult one. Because India specifically raised that it is not just about the goods, but also the movement of people and other, it had to be comprehensive. So the TPP negotiation in Taiwan encounter difficulty will also be the one that Taiwan encounter difficulty in negotiation with India and other countries. And I think that is not whether Taiwan is ready or not, but it's a political will. And if Taiwan, we really like to push over. In particularly that the TPP already bringing its support for the TPP. So I do not think that in this issue, the difficulty is really that big, because that is the one that really has endured the so called Taiwan consensus. Thank you. Ray Burkart, would you like to comment? I don't want Chris to think I'm ducking him. People have said it all. TPP is a serious, broad, deep trade agreement, very unlike the kind of trade agreements that have been signed recently within Asia, particularly very unlike the China-Ocean agreement, also very unlike ECFA. It's not one of these sort of, in other words, it's not one of these half baked, early harvest kind of trade agreements. It's a serious agreement that gets into service areas, the whole board range. The Taiwan economy, Taiwan has been fairly protectionist. It remains very protectionist. It's not Taiwan officials that made public, made clear publicly and privately that Taiwan is not ready for a TPP kind of agreement. But for Taiwan to aspire to it, and to move in that direction, would be certainly very welcome by the United States. And the same thing can be said about China. One of the clear things about TPP was very much emphasized during the APEC meetings in November, is that one of the aims of TPP, at least from the United States point of view, is to have a trade agreement which does not give state-owned enterprises special rights, and which basically forces state-owned enterprises to compete on equal terms with private companies. That's going to be very tough for Vietnam in terms of TPP negotiations. It would be really tough for China. Almost unimaginable, frankly, at this point. Eric. I'm David in the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. Alex, I liked your strategic trident for all sorts of reasons. But you mentioned TPP. When you said the multilateral diplomacy, what countries were you primarily talking about in the multilateral there? And I missed the third prong of the trident, so remind me of that. Dr. Lai, the residual tension over the Chen Shui-Bian era for the DPP and the U.S. considered a significant factor in this election, and is the DPP going to continue to do things to try to build a better relationship with the U.S. government while it's not in power? Very shortly. When I make the case of strategic trident, basically I look at the three elements that in the past two or three years that the United States has been done. The multilateral diplomacy means the more proactive participation of the United States in Asia-Pacific regional fora, you know, from Secretary Clinton's efforts, from APEC, from ARF, and East Asia Summit, all the way to even initiative to the Pacific Islands.  And the third element was air-sea battle concept. So it's a combination of diplomatic, economic, and military re-engagement of the United States in the region. Actually, I don't quite understand this question. I think it is the tension between DPP and the U.S. government during the Central Vietnam era. How will DPP be able to re-address that in particular right now? And I think if you look at the time when her leadership during those four years, that she particularly does not want to put the so-called the identity issue and unification versus the independence issue upfront. And I think it is important to note that from the campaign, I mean, this is way before when she entered the primary within DPP all the way until today, I believe, that in the campaign process she refused to call China by name. She never made any best statements referring to China. It's always something that we can discuss, and she even offered that we are willing to talk about any things with no precondition, which means that Taiwan will not attach any condition China has to abide by.  China does not have to renounce its so-called one China principle. And China does not have to do anything. We are willing to talk anytime, anyplace, anywhere. So that is what your time when actually pledged. And if you look at the 10-year platform that is still in the DPP's part of Tsai Ing-wen's process, one of the 10-year platform in the so-called core idea in which that is the article about how to reach the social consensus within a democracy. And if you look at that, there are distinct, in terms of language differences, with what the Taiwan future resolution is. There's a resolution about Taiwan's future in 1999 which talks about Taiwan's current name. So the current name is Republic of China. But in Tsai Ing-wen's, that is Taiwan is Republic of China. So that's one of the first differences. And second difference is that the name changes in the Taiwan resolution or any other change of this status quo has to be confronted with referendum process. But in this 10-year platform, particularly in that part, that particularly set user language that democratic process. So it dropped the word about referendum and using democratic process instead. So all those are just signified, the kind of the changes and also sensitivity that she had in terms of lowering down the possible tension across the street. But unfortunately, that when Tsai mentioned those things and when Tsai made those gestures, she was met by the, particularly later on, the Chinese official calling her by name and taking her position that Taiwan's ROCS, that's a disguised Taiwan independence strategy. Or calling Tsai Ing-wen by name that she is actually trying to prevent the three links by adopting the so-called ministry links, which I think that's unfortunate. Because the transformation process within DP also that has been symbolized by Tsai during this time is that if you have positive gestures, whether by the United States or by China, then the kind of transformation within DP will be much easier. So that's, and then we are left with this, that when the Tsai is about to resign from leadership, how the tenure platform, will that just cease to exist because she resigned from the leadership or they will continue to stay there. So that's going to be another question. Thank you. The gentleman at the third table back on the left, from on my left. Hi, my name is Raymond and I'm from the Carnegie Endowment. It seems to me that the midterm prognosis seems to be cautiously optimistic, but a lot of that is obviously contingent on Ma having won the election. I was just wondering if we could explore a little more the possibility of not so much a DPP victory, but necessarily a DPP communication with the Communist Party or the Chinese government. Specifically, it seems that from the perspective of a lot of DPP folks, including the perspective we just heard, that DPP has gone through a very intense process of transformation and it's moderated itself, but still China is deeply suspicious from its perspective of what the DPP's actual goals are and what its agenda is. So in that light, do you see it necessary for the DPP to go through an even more significant and painful process of renewal to moderate its demands, to come closer to a different understanding of sovereignty? What is the likelihood of that actually happening? And if that process were to fail, what would the implications for Taiwan's democracy, for cross-strait rapprochement be? Thanks. The DPP-CCP dialogue, I think that has happened particularly last year, later have last year, that has gone to several degrees of intensity. That is, we know that the DPP New Frontier Foundation, one of the deputy director for the international affairs, he went over to Shanghai on November along with another person for some discussions. I'm not going to reveal why the content discussion, because I don't know. We have also engaged in several content with not just a scholar, but also with officials. But unfortunately, some of the report that we reported back and in the Chinese public statement are demonstrating two very different themes, that the possibility about the 92 consensus, in which when we look at it, the DPP's position has moderated to a certain degree that even the DPP position on 92 consensus that 92 really happened something. So we are willing to talk based on what the result of the 92 negotiation. But the second fact about the 92 consensus is that the Chinese position of one China principle is not probably endorsed by the KMT. But also KMT position about one China different interpretation is also not accepted by China. And the third point is that about the facts, the 92 consensus from 1993 all the way to 1998 that despite the Chinese repeated refusal and the denial about the one China different interpretation, in 1998 both sides are still able to get going for the second Gu Wang negotiation, the Gu Wang talk. And from year 2000 all the way to year 2008, with the pragmatism there, this under DPP's rule that both sides are still able to finalize the three links, first from the ministry links and then to the air transportation links on the festivity, charter flight and all those things. So the issue is that on DPP's position that is that the non-acceptance about the so-called 92 consensus is based on what is actually there. But the DPP was believing when DPP was looking at the Hu Jintao's three opinions regarding the 92 consensus, they found tremendous amount of similarity. They actually can engage upon. So those are the issue because I'm just taking this occasion to talk about the one part of the examples about how the difference between both sides in terms of 90 consensus. But I think DPP to a certain extent misjudged about how the 92 consensus and all those particularly signified to Hu Jintao himself because it seemed that Hu Jintao, he is the one that personally take these things and take the political risk within his body to really going forward in order to, in his management about the Taiwan issue. And rejecting this, sort of like put a public slap in his face that the Hu Jintao would never accept. And I think that kind of the underestimate about the how this personally mean to Hu Jintao is some of the lessons that DPP needs to learn. But how would that mean to Xi Jinping and others? I think that would be the open things. Thank you. Thank you. Dong Huiyu with the China Review News Agency. My question is for Mr. Chu Shulong. And I remember you wrote an article in Global Times a couple years ago arguing that China doesn't need to focus too much on U.S.-China relations or take the U.S.-China relations too seriously. And how would you view the U.S. federal in a further cross-trade negotiation regarding the political and security issue? And this question also for Mrs. Bonny. And you mentioned that the U.S. won't push the developments of cross relations faster or slower. Do you think the U.S. would be really happy to see a closer cross-trade tie? And also what the possibility of reaching the peace accords although the opportunity would be very small? What role the U.S. will play in this process? Thank you. My argument from then until today is basically you look at the national ground strategy upon real China or argue China become much more internal oriented. I think like the general trend in whole China and let China be continued. I think like China is good for Chinese from policy, from release. But that does not mean U.S. is no longer important to China including Taiwan's regional relations. I should say in the past 10, more than 10 years including Bush eight years, Obama near four years U.S. has played a very positive, stabilized role in cross-Taiwan regional relations. I think the relatively peace stability cross-Taiwan through recent years has a lot of contribution from the U.S. side. Will the United States be happy to see improved cross-trade relations? Absolutely. I think that has been quite clearly stated by this administration and also by George W. Bush administration. Many people in China seem to not want to believe this. I was listening to a CCTV interview with a Chinese scholar the other day after the elections and he predicted the United States is going to ensure that it slows down the progress in cross-trade relations. I really think this is nonsense. The United States has repeatedly said that what we care about is the process. We want differences solved peacefully and without any coercion or an undue pressure by the mainland on Taiwan. It is the people on Taiwan that should have a say in the outcome. I see absolutely no concerns that the U.S. has about improved cross-trade relations. I don't think privately or publicly that we have conveyed any concerns to Ma Ying-jeo about his policies. But if anybody here from the U.S. government, there are several of you, want to disagree with that, feel free. What is the U.S. role in a peace accord? I would say none. Unless Taiwan and mainland China want the United States to play some role. I don't believe that you will see any active effort by the administration to encourage or discourage such talks. If that's something that Taiwan and the mainland agree that they want to talk about, I think we will certainly be supportive. I think that Taiwan probably would like the United States to play some role, for example, in a I've talked with people in Taiwan about confidence-building measures in the military sphere. Many people have said they would like the U.S. to play a role of guarantor. Again, unless it's something that the mainland wants, I think that the United States would not do that, though it might be important for a third country or several countries to play that role. Thank you. We have reached the end of our appointed time. I'd like to ask you to join me in giving this panel a round of applause. And let us turn it over to our conveners for any final comments. Well, I just want to thank you all for coming. Very much appreciate the interest and your questions and your engagement on this issue. We will continue to hold events in the future and publish in the future. We will have this event on our respective websites, both Brookings and CSIS, and we will also be posting with the agreement of the speakers today either the text of their presentations or the PowerPoints. Thank you very much.


Well, good evening, good afternoon, good morning, wherever you are, and welcome back to the DEF CON Groups Village. I'm here from DC603, which if your phone code, phone area code memory is not great, is New Hampshire. And so 603 does as an NPA cover all of New Hampshire, but really we are located in the upper valley. And I'm going to ask that the speaker assistant here advance the slide for the next slide real quick. And so we're like halfway up New Hampshire, which makes it far enough away from Boston that we're not really part of the Boston commuter area, the Boston suburbs that kind of extend into the southern part of the state. And then there's an awful lot of security meetups down in that area and around Boston generally. So we are actually up in an area that has a lower population density and definitely a lower tech job density. And if you could advance the slide, that'd be great. There we go. And let's just go one more part of that, please. I mean, it's an interesting red that we got there on the state, but the one that's about space VR. So just as an aside, I will say that if we make it through this slide, this talk today, I don't know about Jim Frautman, my compatriot here, who I'll introduce in a second, but certainly from my point of view, I feel like this may be the most complicated setup we've done for a talk. So I'll feel like I can present on Mainline, I'll present anywhere if I can make it through this one. Thank you for bearing with us as we do this. And so what you should be seeing on Twitch is that we've got, there we go, that's weird. So I don't know where the slide is at right now, because I see something on Twitch that is, I've got it, you just came through on my Twitch. So yeah, so that meeting room that you see there, that was our last virtual meeting back in March, and our last physical meeting back in March. And of course, with the lockdown situation, which I think we'd originally figured would not maybe last quite as long as it has so far, and as it looks like it's going to, we didn't immediately dive into a virtual mode, although we're kind of spinning that up more now. But yeah, so we've been getting together in person every month, and having some talks that are accessible, if you're listening to this, and if you're in the area and you're new, and you're like, well, I'm not a super, super skilled hacker, doesn't matter, come along. I think as long as you've got the interest in the topic, and the passion in the topic, we're going to be delighted to contribute to you, and get your contribution and your experience back and just work as a group to share those experiences and expertise. So in the case of the talk that we're about to present, this is actually a talk that Jim Fratman has done before, and he gave the talk originally at Shmucon as part of the Shmucon Fire Talk series, and won the top prize for that this past year at Shmucon. But when we did it locally in DC 603, what happened there was it provoked an awful lot of conversation, and that's typically how it goes, right? We're looking to have not just talk sessions, but we're looking to have a meetup where it's small enough that we can really dive in and talk about some of the topics in some detail. The Twitter that we have is easily findable. It's DC underscore 603, because I think somebody else has spotted on DC 603. But yeah, if you follow our DC underscore 603, it's a low volume list. We're just sending out when there's particular things to be aware of. And then we also have a Slack, which if you want to join with us and come to meetings and so forth, we can get you on the Slack. And I think the expectation coming out of this DEFCON is I think there's going to be some evolution with how we're doing Discord. And I suspect we'll probably look to do more with Discord going forward. So rather than preempt that, we'll wait and see how that plays out through Khan and after closing and then any updates without that. So I don't think the way this is set up that I'm going to be able to hear anyone's questions. If there are questions that you want to try and yell out, go for it or throw it into the text in Discord. And I'll take a look at it and catch up on that and maybe get back to you at the end. But without further ado, we have Jim Frautman on the line with us. He is ventriloquizing through me. So you're seeing, I think, one disembodied body on stage. But there's actually two of us in the one body, which is kind of how I feel about Jim. He's an amazing guy. Some of you probably know he does Sky Talks with me while I do Sky Talks with him.  He's been playing around with Telcom and DNS and all that stuff forever. And when he first said to me many months ago he was going to do a talk on DNS, I was like, cool, that's a Meet 101 talk. And then he did the talk and I'm like, oh my goodness, there is so much about this that I've just been oblivious to and not keeping up on the tech. And there's some really interesting stuff here. So if you think you know DNS, maybe you do. More power to you, but I suspect there's a few folks out there that are going to learn something today. Jim, over to you, man. Hey, good afternoon. Can you guys hear me? They better. Just keep going. We hope so. All right. Well, if we can take the slide forward to the title slide, there might be a next one over here. Thank you. So thank you guys for the DC Groups team for setting this up and making all this work. And I know there's been a lot of technical challenges, but I think it's been a good learning experience for everybody involved. And thank you to Donald for inviting me to come and do this presentation today. OK. So DNS New World Order. Quadex.do.de. So I'm a guy on the internet. You can find me easily. I've been around, done a lot of things in ISP land, been on the internet since 87. I have to issue a disclaimer. I am a director and co-founder of a nonprofit internet exchange called Nenix. We happen to host some servers for one of the companies that I'm going to be discussing today, Quad9. So just a little disclaimer. All right. So here's what we're going to learn today, topics of presentation. We're going to talk about the DNS system in general and some of these new encrypted DNS methods like Doe and Dot. We're going to talk about operational reasons why you should monitor your DNS, about all these cloud services that are out there offering easy to remember DNS servers and why would they want to do such a thing? The privacy implications of some of the web browser product decisions. And then I'm going to end with some recommendations on how to mitigate the impact of all of these new encryption methods and those cloud-based DNS services. So this slide here, which talks about the new troubleshooting procedure, it is not DNS. There's no way it's DNS. It was DNS. I'm going to pause here until the slides catch up. We should be on the one that says new troubleshooting procedure. It's not DNS. There's no way it's DNS. It was DNS. We know it was always DNS. And if, Jim, if you can do it next every time from now on, hopefully we can keep it that same. So we're on the graphic, right? That is new troubleshooting procedure sitting on a cube wall. There is a little bit of a delay on the screen. I can see that. Who would have thought? There's a latency on the internet. Yeah, it's amazing. Are we going to share these slides afterwards, Jim? Yes, yeah. OK, so if there's anyone in the audience who's trying to throw bricks at us right now, we will make sure you get a copy of the slide deck. And you can just play through in your own mind afterwards again. Oh, I see it loading. I see a cube wall loading. It's rendering line by line on my Twitch. I don't know about yours. Yeah, I apologize. That's awesome. Apparently, my slides gave the systems. They're not even all that complicated. Hey, look, graphics. Last slide, PNGs, right? Yeah, I wonder if it's upscaling them into some sort of ludicrously detailed resolution that it doesn't need to. Anyway, I'm proceeding onward. So let's talk about DNS next slide. So what the heck is DNS? So it's the domain name system. And it is really about the most fundamental technology that makes the internet work other than packets and wires and fiber. And it works so well that most people never even think about it. We don't think about it until it breaks. Most end users really have no knowledge about it. So what DNS does is that it simply converts the names that humans can remember into numbers, which is what computers use, network addresses. Next slide, please. It's also used internally by almost every organization because almost everybody is running Microsoft Active Directory. And guess what? Active Directory depends entirely on DNS working correctly and reliably. Next slide, please. So really everything you do on the internet needs DNS to function. This is why a lot of people will say something like, and I'm sure those of you in the audience that have done any sort of tech support or help desk, you've heard this before, the internet is down. And usually that's not the case. The internet is just fine. But DNS resolution was broken for that user. So DNS requests are usually called queries. And next slide, please. These queries that you issue all the time with your browser and with your phone and pretty much every single app that you use, they reveal an awful lot about you and what you are doing online. The games you play, email, et cetera. So a little refresher about what DNS is. Next slide, please. Domain names are hierarchical. They start at the root or the dot. And then we have top level domains. And there's the original generic top level domains like .com and .gov and .net. There are various country codes like .uk, .jp. Originally, there was just a very few number of top level names. Now there's more than 1,000. You have such things as .bank, .coop, even .horse, which is kind of fascinating. All right, so this next slide, please. So we have some example DNS names. Google.com, www.bbc.co.uk, et cetera. If you get the idea, I'll just let you guys know how DNS is structured. So DNS is a service that converts names into numbers. So for example, next slide, please.  You'll get an IPv4 address that you can almost remember, 151.101.67. But with IPv6, you're going to get a big, long, hexadecimal address that nobody in the world should try to remember. This is why we have DNS. Next slide. So DNS was originally conceived in 1983, roughly. At least the RFC was published then, RFC 882. And that was superseded by RFC 1035 in 1987. And that is basically the more or less the DNS that we have today. Bind, the Berkeley internet name demon, was created in 1985. And this DNS is really the last major plain text protocol that's left on the internet. Although, as we're going to discuss, there's lots of people trying to make it go away. A little more background on the DNS. In order for DNS to work, you have to have the root servers. Next slide, please. The 13 root servers in the world, letter A through M. And they're operated by 12 different organizations. And it's important to understand that these 13 servers that are the root of the DNS, they are by no means individual servers. These are clusters of servers with load balancers and multiple instances all over the world. Some of these root servers have over 160 separate physical instances around the world in various data centers. Because they're so widely distributed, this allows scaling of traffic volumes and lots of increased resiliency and redundancy, particularly against direct-to-the-tax, like DDoS attacks, which root servers get all day long. Next slide, please. So all of the root servers in the letters A through M, they get a massive amount of traffic in terms of queries and transactions. We're talking double-digit billions of queries per day processed by these root servers. That's trillions of DNS queries per month. And the DNS has actually managed to scale over nine orders of magnitude in the last 35 years. And it will continue to do so. I think that's pretty impressive for a protocol designed in the mid-'80s. One of the ways that DNS scales, next slide, please, is a technique called IPN casting. This is where you take an IP address block and you advertise it in multiple locations on the internet at the same time, via DGP routing. The same address appears in multiple locations, and your ISP or your network makes decisions to steer the traffic to the best nearest instance of that IP address. So all the DNS servers, all the root DNS and all the cloud DNS in the world, use as anycast. Next slide, please. So we talked about traditional DNS, started in 85. It's what some people are now calling DO53, since we have DOH and DOT. DO53 is the original unencrypted DNS. Again, so it's UDP port 53 for queries, TCP port 53 for zone transfers. And again, it's been largely the same for the last 35 years. Next slide, please. The wonderful thing about DNS, from a network management point of view and a security point of view, is that it's plain text. So you can monitor it over the wire very easily. And I have to say, if you're in a corporate environment and your IT security staff isn't monitoring DNS, they're doing it wrong. If you are the IT security staff for your organization and you are not monitoring DNS, you really ought to. It is incredibly useful to monitor DNS, lets you know what your endpoints are up to, and makes it easier to find malware, and of course, good old AUP violations on your network. Next slide, please. So there was some other, again, DNS is unencrypted. And some people have thought, well, that's kind of a problem. I don't really want people to know what I'm doing and what my DNS queries are. So there was a group of folks that were not IETF and did not come up with a official standard, but they created a thing out of the free VSD community called DNS Crypt. And I skipped over DNS Sack. You may have heard of DNS Sack is a way to cryptographically authenticate DNS data, but it doesn't actually hide it. It just authenticates it. And DNS Sack is really not a topic of this presentation. That's like a whole other presentation to itself. OK, next slide. DNS Crypt, 2011, bunch of folks in the free VSD world were instrumental in that. They created an encryption protocol. It worked. It actually used port 443, but didn't use TLS. Used another encryption method. So it worked. It solved the problems, but it really didn't get much traction at the time with anybody. Because you know what? DNS is kind of boring. So fast forward a little bit. Next slide. DNS over TLS, or commonly known as DOT. This was an RFC process issued May 2016. And this is basically traditional DNS with TLS encryption running on a different port. This uses TCP port 853. And the nice thing about that is it keeps the network control traffic separate from your application data traffic. Now, you may not be aware, but next slide, please, support for TLS at DNS over TLS DOT has actually been around for a while. It started in Android 9 for the whole OS. So if you have recent Android, it's enabled by default. And it will just work if it's supported by the server that you're talking to. Microsoft says they may eventually support DOT in the operating system. And Apple is going to be supporting DOT in the new iOS 14 and in Mac OS 11. So this is fairly recent developments. And this is good to have encrypted DNS, I think, from an end user perspective in your operating system. Next slide, please. So there was a different group of folks that decided to create DNS over HTTPS or DOE. This is a different RFC, 8484, issued in December of 2018. So this is a protocol that uses TCP port 443 with TLS encryption. What does that remind you of? Yes, it is the same as HTTPS for websites. So it implements DNS queries using a special HTTP GET with JSON responses that get parsed. It can be a little bit slower than regular DNS by several milliseconds, but it's not really a big deal. Microsoft has actually just added support for DOE, starting in Windows 10 preview build, 19628. And Apple is going to support DOE in the OS, starting in iOS 14 and Mac OS 11, both of which are coming out this fall. So we'll talk about why DOE and DOT exist a little bit. I'm going to talk about DNS in the cloud. Next slide, please. So you may be aware that for many years, there's been public DNS servers, usually operated by ISPs, as a resource. If you've been around on the internet for a while, you may recognize some of these numbers on the slide, like <IP_ADDRESS>, operated by level 3, 75, 75, 75, 75, which I believe is Comcast, and there's others out there. And these were really just primarily for network engineers and network people who just needed to set up DNS to get something working real quick. And most end users didn't really know about them, until DNS in the cloud. Next slide. So Google, back in December 2009, and some of you are probably still in high school then, they launched a service called <IP_ADDRESS>.8. And why did they do that? Well, they said they wanted to improve the speeds and the user experience versus a lot of ISPs that had broken DNS, and still do. And I believe that it also gave them all sorts of data about what people were doing and where they were going. Now, using Google DNS 8.8 back then, it's useful to work around censorship issues at the time. Next slide. You may or may not remember this picture, which will probably take a minute and a half to load on the stream. It's a picture from the Arab Spring uprising where people were actually spray painting graffiti with the DNS numbers on buildings more than once all over the place. And this at the time was actually an effective way to avoid censorship by the government. Not so much anymore. Censorship and network control has gotten a lot more sophisticated. Next slide, please. So Google their Quad 9 for several years, and there wasn't really any others. And then now there's more. Cloudflare came up with <IP_ADDRESS> in cooperation with the APNIC that controlled that IP space. Then there's another organization called Quad 9 that is all 9s. And then there's been other cloud-based next slide, please, such as Open DNS, which is now Cisco Umbrella, because Cisco bought them, because that's what Cisco does, they buy things. And most recently, Sierra, the Canadian.ca registry authority, they created a new service called Canadian Shield with an IP address that is available to the public. So next slide, please. If you can control the DNS for what someone goes to, what they're resolving, what your end users see, if you control the DNS, you basically control everything. It's almost as good as controlling the entire network, which is the reason why so much malware that attacks home routers and things like that, they want to modify your DNS settings on your network router if your clients are pointed at your local router so that they can send you to illegitimate sites. So next slide, please. Again, read of rate. DNS, it's great for tracking. If you monitor DNS queries, you know where everyone goes online. Your shopping, your entertainment, what you do for work, most likely, any medical sites, the apps you run on your phone. And even right down to depending on the device, you can figure out what device it is in your house or your business, and particularly with IoT devices, based on those DNS queries. Next slide, please. So if you control the DNS, again, you control where users go or don't go. I believe strongly DNS monitoring is great for fighting malware and intrusions. And I, again, say it is essential for blue team network defense and monitoring. But DNS also is money because many ISPs, and this includes your cell phone company because they are, in fact, an ISP because you use data on your phone, many of these ISPs, including your cable TV companies, iLex, telcos, wireless carriers, et cetera, they are monitoring your DNS. And they are actually, many of them, selling that information to a variety of data brokers and advertising companies and other companies that want to track people. And in some cases, those ISPs and carriers, they actually own some of the advertising companies themselves, which is why, when they say things in their acceptable use policy, like, we will not sell your data, you're able to tie you directly via your cell phone ID numbers, your home IP address range, whatever IP address you had at the time, they can tie that data directly to you demographically. They know it's you and not somebody else. Next slide, please. So there are different estimates what this data is worth and how they can sell it for. I have seen everything from $3 a year per subscriber up to several hundred. I think it varies upon the demographics of the value of the person. So if you are not paying for a product on the internet, you are the product. So next slide. So why do we have DOE? Well, the reason we have DOE is up until just recently, the operating system vendors, really, they had not implemented any sort of encrypted DNS. They are now about to release dot support. But for years, they really weren't doing anything. So some of the browser makers, like Firefox, Mozilla, they decided that they needed to take matters into their own hands. And that's in part how DOE came about. So Firefox added DOE support in September of 2018. And then in January of this year, they made it an option that you could enable DOE if you wanted to in Firefox. But since February 25 of this year, DOE is now enabled by default for all Firefox users in the US. Next slide, please. So this is a picture of the opt-out in Firefox. And I think most end users are just going to see this thing and say, OK, yeah, that's great. It's more encryption and it's more privacy. And in fact, that is true to a point. So Mozilla picked Cloudflare as their first and default DOE provider. And they drew up a contract. And there's various requirements that they have to honor. And that's interesting. Firefox also includes a domain name canary, which is something that your ISP can set in their DNS servers, which will actually disable DOE in Firefox.  So the ISPs have been doing the monetization. And now there are other folks that would like to do that. And it's also the monitoring. Next slide, please. So there are other web browsers besides Firefox supporting DOE now. Chrome supports it, but it's not enabled by default yet. I understand there is some A-B testing going on. And I imagine Chrome will be enabling it soon. But Chrome says they will have a GPO. They'll enable you the disabled DOE entirely. Microsoft Chromium Edge supports it. It's not enabled by default. Opera supports it. Brave supports it, et cetera, not enabled by default. So DOE does encrypt things. And it makes it harder for people to see where you're going on the internet by encrypting your DNS traffic. But this is a double-edged sword. There's a lot of malware now using DOE. And because it's using DOE, you're not seeing that traffic anymore. There's been at least one piece of malware, I guess Godlula backdoor for Linux and Windows. And that came out in January of 2019. And it was using DOE for its CNC servers. And I expect there's going to be all sorts of additional malware developed that's going to use DOE because it makes it easier for them to hide. So I think you're going to need to start deploying man-in-the-middle TLS proxies in your corporate environments if you aren't already. Next slide, please. And again, I think the adversary's TTPs are changing to adapt to DOE. I suspect there's probably some malware out there in the wild using DOE that people don't even know about right now. I think that's going to be a big, big thing for the rest of this year and next year. So DNS in the cloud, going back to that. It's really surveillance. Next slide, please. Not all of the DNS cloud providers have a clear privacy policy. Some things they're retaining for a couple of years, in summary, maybe just 24 hours. OK, some of that doesn't bother me, some of it does. However, everybody is just assuming that DOE actually does give you privacy. And the answer is not as much as you think. It also is centralizing your DNS queries by using these sort of well-known cloud providers to provide DNS service for all sorts of people. You're really centralizing the places where that data can be monitored and collected. So DNS over HTTPS, it's not as secure. Next slide, please. We're up to 49. DOE doesn't actually encrypt the data that you can't get in other unencrypted forms. You see, because where you go with DOE, SNI information, the IP address you're actually talking to, OSCP checks for certificates, and all of that is still in clear text. So if they know the IP address of the website you're going to, there's been studies that can pretty much correlate that with the website, something like 85% of the time. So you think that you may be getting all sorts of privacy from using DOE, but you're not. Just because they can't see exactly what DNS queries you were issuing doesn't mean they can't figure out what you're actually doing. Next slide. Here's a tweet from DA667 pointing out some of the same things. It really consolidates trust of confidential data to organizations that may not deserve it. Next slide, please. And then we have TLS session resumption tickets. And this was an area that I did not know about and was unaware of until I started doing the research for this talk. These are basically unblockable cookies that can track you everywhere you go by resuming your previous TLS sessions. Now this was done and included in the standards to help reduce session setup time and increased performance. But by renewing these resumption tickets, which can be done over a long period of time, up to seven days with TLS 1.3, that provides a method to track you across the internet no matter what you're doing and where you're doing it.  Any Wi-Fi that you use, they're still able to track you.  The point is, is that across all of those sessions and all of those multiple ISPs and multiple wireless networks, your traffic is directly back to you because of these session resumption tickets. Another problem with DNS in the cloud, particularly for people outside the US, next slide, is all of these DNS cloud services, they're USA-based, USA companies. So that means they are subject to getting national security letters. They're subject to FISA 702 and other laws. So that means that the government can go to one of these providers and say, we would like a copy of all of your server locks. And yes, you may be deleting them, but we don't have to. And if it's a national security letter, they can't even talk about it or tell anyone. So by centralizing into these cloud services, it just makes it easier for governments and law enforcement to get your information. So what do we do about all of this? Next slide. So I have some recommendations. Number one, if you should be running your own internal recursive DNS server for your network, this will give you the absolute best performance for DNS because it's the lowest latency because it's on your network. Now the good news is, if you're in a corporate environment, you're probably running Microsoft Active Directory, you're already running a local recursive DNS server. But it's probably not set up well. You should have this internal recursive DNS server, and you should put all kinds of logging and monitoring on this server. This is where your logging and monitoring goes here. Because logging on the server level, of course, it's decrypted those packets. This allows you to monitor your internal endpoint traffic. Next slide.  So they can't use regular DNS. This will force your endpoints to use your internal DNS. You also want to block TCP port 853 to block dot on your corporate firewall.  So there are some vendors, depending on what kind of firewall that you have, and which vendor, and how much money you're giving them. They have some rule sets to help enable blocking of Doe. Some of them work just by blocking the IP addresses of well-known Doe servers. Others actually use man and middle proxy functionality built in their solutions, and they may have rule sets. This is an area where I think a lot of corporate defenders are going to need to invest time specifically to monitor Doe queries via some sort of man in the middle proxy that you're going to have to manage. And this is what you're going to have to do, ultimately. You're going to want to set your endpoint configuration standards to disabled Doe and any browsers on your endpoints. And you do have endpoint configuration standards, right? In your organization, that magical golden image, as they say. So you want to make sure that all of your endpoints are configured to talk to your internal recursive servers only. Yeah, whatever method you have to do that, whether it's DHCP options, group policy objects, static configs, registry keys, whatever, make it so. You can also set up Doe logging in Firefox if you have to use Firefox. So now that you have everybody talking, next slide, please, to your internal recursive servers, that's great. But now you want to protect your traffic from those servers out to the internet. Because if you don't do that, then it's still possible to watch the data stream coming out of your environment, whether that's home or at work. So you can set your internal servers to use an external resolver where it will just automatically forward, as some of the software calls this forwarding, all of those queries to a particular outside server rather than talking to the root servers directly. So if you do this, if you have an internal recursive server and you tell it to talk to some external server over an encrypted protocol, whether that's . or DNSCrypt, Doe still leaks information, and you use an external server, particularly an external server in a GDPR country that has some actual privacy protection. And if that server has enough other users, you're going to get a privacy mixer sort of herd protection for your DNS queries. If there's tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of people all using a particular server, it's going to be a lot easier, a lot harder rather than that to tie those queries back to you. The other option that you can do is you can set up your own DOH server in like a VPS. If you trust DOH, you can also set up your own DOT server. It's not very hard, and if you are at all handy with a Linux command line, it's the sort of thing that you can do in a couple of hours. Another recommendation particularly for your corporate networks, but I would also extend this to any power user geek home network, is you want to capture all of the IP addresses of those well-known public DNS resolvers in addition to doing a block at the edge. And this is because you will be surprised to find out how many devices are using some sort of hard-coded DNS. In particular, I know Google Chromecasts, they ignore whatever you set in DHCP. They will use Google DNS always, and there's others. So many, many ISPs and a lot of hotel hospitality networks already do this sort of network capturing, and you just haven't noticed. Many times, you think you may be talking to Google Quad-H or some other server, but you're not. It's just something they've done particularly in hospitality networks to give you that hotspot login. Next slide. Now, a recommendation if you're in a small business environment or home environment, you might want to use Quad-9 or Cisco umbrella or Canadian Shield if you're not as concerned with privacy issues, because all of those services include some malware blocking, where they get threat intelligence feeds about the latest command and control servers, the latest compromised servers that are feeding downloads of malware. And so they are specially set up to not return the correct DNS information for any of those DNS queries. So that provides a level of additional protection, particularly in an environment that just simply can't afford anything else. The other recommendation that I give everyone, typically the enthusiasts, is you want to look at running something like PyHole. Next slide. PyHole was originally meant to run on a Raspberry Pi. Doesn't have to. You can run it pretty much on any Linux or in a container. And it works by blocking advertising servers, known advertising servers. And it's pretty effective. It's not perfect, but it's pretty effective. And you can use PyHole to do your internal resolution and then chain it to external DOH servers or DOT. So that's my presentation. And remember, it's always DNS, always. I will be making this slide deck available for download. There is a whole bunch of bibliography, about five pages of interesting links if you are at all interested in this sort of topic. I recommend that you read much further. Also, there are various folks in the DNS community, the true legends, like Paul Vixie, who is one of the original authors of Bind. And he's been doing DNS for decades. And Bert Hebert of Power DNS, those guys have many wonderful talks available on YouTube. And they are the real experts. I'm just the guy doing some research and bringing it to you folks. Jim, thank you so much. That was amazing.


With more cell phones than Americans, it's logical emergency personnel view mobile devices as important communication tools to alert people as soon as possible that their lives or property are seriously at risk. That's why the FCC, FEMA, and the wireless industry developed the Wireless Emergency Alerts. WIA allows customers who own wireless phones and other enabled mobile devices to receive geographically targeted text-like messages alerting them of imminent threats to safety in their area. New technology ensures that emergency alerts will not get stuck in highly congested areas which can happen with standard mobile voice and texting services. There are three different kinds of alerts, presidential alerts issued by the precedent, imminent threat alerts that include severe man-made or natural disasters, and amber alerts that meet the U.S. Department of Justice's criteria to help law enforcement search for and locate an abducted child. So what are the benefits of WIA? Well, the service is automatic. No need to download an app or sign up. Neither mobile users nor the agency sending these alerts are charged for them. WIA uses a point-to-multipoint system which means alert messages will be sent to those within a targeted area. So even if you're away from home, as long as your cell phone is on and has a signal, you will get the alerts wherever you are, regardless of where the phone is registered. When the alert is sent out, the alert has a unique audible signal and vibration cadence so all consumers, including individuals with disabilities, are aware of the danger. These alerts are no more than 90 characters and include the following information. Who's sending the alert, what is happening, who is affected, and what action to take. 24 cities and counties across California have already signed up for this service. To double check and see if your phone is set up to receive these alerts on an iPhone 5, you need to go into settings, notification center, and scroll down all the way to the bottom to make sure the alerts are switched to the on position. Of course, this will vary by device manufacturers and carriers. You also have the power to turn these off, but emergency managers really don't recommend it. All of this program is to save lives and property as we build a disaster-ready nation. In Sacramento, Lily Wyatt for Cal OES.


Did you please sit down and have a picture opportunity? Oh, you hear so well. I usually bring microphones, too, so it's just a small talk. Well, two weeks of riding every morning. I'll have a brush and a fire, whatever, afternoon, and even build a stone patio. Can we congratulate you on your marriage with your daughter? Oh, thank you very much. You're very lovely tonight to our visit there. If you're ever any of the engaged in building a patio, you can bend that short cut there. You place the stones, and you don't cement them in. You place them, and you just dump the dry cement, the powder on the stones, and take a broom and sweep it until it's all in the cracks in between the stones. It works just fine. It doesn't really come up. Mr. President, I know some of these people here today, but I thought it would be helpful to run around and ask them to introduce themselves to Barbara Mandel, President of the National Council of Jewish Women. Mr. Lewis, President Madassa, and American Section World Jewish Congress. Israel Singer, Executive Director of the World Jewish Congress, President of the National Council of Jewish Women. My wife makes them for all Jewish leaders, and we're going to include you in that cafe. Thank you. Rebecca Goodmel, National President of the ship General Jacobson, President Jewish National Fund. Nick Fox, Chairman and Reagan Bush Committee for 1980 and Qiu F entirely. Renee's town of down chairman of the world's Organization, American Section.