Cool. Well, thank you, everyone, for coming back. Great to see we're gaining people, not losing them. So I'm going to be introducing today, DARPA. Is this SSID or Scythe? Is it called Scythe? Okay, really? Okay, so I'm gonna be introducing Dr. Linton Salmon of the DARPA Scythe program. He joined the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency as a program manager in September 2014. Prior to joining DARPA, Dr. Salmon spent 15 years in executive roles directing development of CMOS technology at Global Foundries, Texas Instruments, and Advanced Micro Devices. Before joining Advanced Micro Devices, Dr. Salmon was vice president for research and technology transfer at Case Western Reserve University and an associate professor of electrical engineering and physics at Brigham Young University, BYU, where his research includes CMOS processes, micro-battery research, packaging, and MEMS. Never sure which one to pronounce, anyway. Anyway, thank you, thank you for joining us, and I will see you in the mic. Thank you, I appreciate that. Can everyone hear me okay? One of the requirements for DARPA program manager is you have to have a booming voice so that they can hear you anywhere. So I'd be surprised if you couldn't, but if you don't, somebody just waved at me. I can get too engaged sometimes. It's a real pleasure to come and talk to you a little bit, not just about the Scythe program, and yes, we do know what that means. And I'll tell you what the acronym means in just a second. But actually, what it's doing here at DEFCON and why we're here, because I think that's the important thing for all of you to hear. Although I'd love to talk about the program, another thing you should know about DARPA program managers is our programs are our children, and we all love to talk about our children. So any of you that have questions, I'd love to answer them. So the outline of the talk, I'll talk a little bit about what Scythe is and probably something about what it isn't. I'll then talk a little bit about the demonstration we're doing here at DEFCON and then why we're here. And then I'll just put it together a summary. Be a fairly short presentation and then I'll open it up for a little bit of questions if there's time. So Scythe stands for system security integrated through hardware and firmware. And yes, I did kind of make that fit inside the acronym. Yeah. In case any of you were wondering whether we thought of the name and then the acronym, no, no, we think of the acronym and then the name. But at any rate, I like the name for obvious reasons for those of you that have Star Wars background in the room and those of you who don't, I don't know what you're doing here, but at any rate, the purpose is to, as it says up there, the goal is to develop hardware design tools. For those of you that have worked at all, most of you probably haven't, we're building integrated circuits. There's a set of design software that's used to build these extremely complex systems. I just spent the last couple of weeks at workshops where people are talking about six to 60 billion transistors in a given piece of silicon. So the concept is that those are extremely complex. If you come up to somebody and say, hey, I want you to build in security, they go, give me a tool, give me some way I can do this, or I won't do it. So the goal of the program is to develop those tools to provide security against hardware vulnerabilities that are exploited through software. As I was explaining to someone just this past week, another way to think of these is I'm trying to protect them against remote hacks. There are hacks that happen because you have physical connection with the hardware. You can probe it, you can power glitch it with the power supply. You're all familiar with those kinds of protections or those kinds of attacks. Those are not the specific goal of SIF. It's to protect against remote attacks which I happen to think are extremely important. All of them are, but those are the particularly important ones because the person doing the hack does not have to be anywhere close to the location of the hardware. And they're exploited in electronic systems of any type. We're not focused just on the Department of Defense hardware, that's why one of the important reasons why we're here. The goal of the SIF program is to increase security throughout the microelectronics enterprise. Whether you're talking about a small IoT device, my favorite one is the toilet seat detector that detects whether the toilet seat's up or down. Those of you that have children understand why that's important, but or whether you're talking about a high-performance computing system that costs hundreds of millions of dollars. So our goal is to use open source as much as possible specifically to encourage that kind of use across the electronics enterprise. We're building, because as you all know, you can have all the kinds of theoretical estimations of why something's protected. Unless you put it out for people to actually try and attack it, you can't really know whether it's protected because quite simply no group of people can have the corner on creative ideas of how to bypass security mechanisms. You need to have a broad range of extremely creative people to do that. To make that happen, we have to have a hardware demonstrator and that's what is being built in SIF. We're using an open source microprocessor core called a RISC-5. For those of you that don't know what that is, all you need to know is that the core itself, unlike an Intel or an ARM processor, is completely open source and anyone can know what the RTL is. We have six teams developing 15 different secure processors that span all the way from an embedded 32-bit processor all the way up to a very high-performance speculative of execution. Once again, those of you that know, know that speculation was the source of the spectrum meltdown attacks that were trapped recently and only occurs in high-performance systems, but by golly, you're just as susceptible if you have this little IoT device as well. Each team augments three baseline RISC-5 processors to make them secure. I've already talked about the different kinds. The teams employ a wide range of security approaches, including things like metadata tagging, tagging the data and the pointers, secure enclaves, novel cryptography, as well as machine learning to detect attacks. And each team augments what we call a baseline RISC-5 processor to make it secure. So what are we doing differently? Pardon me, you're gonna get some animation. Hopefully I keep up with myself. So what we do today is we do a patch and pray is what I call it. I think that somebody got together and said, well, hardware, you can't go fast enough at low enough power, so we'll take care of security in the software. And my colleagues that were in this mythical meeting that were from the hardware knew a good thing when they heard it and they ran out the door because they didn't want to have to handle security because it's hard. I think all of us recognize that this is a problem which is huge across the enterprise. And by the enterprise, I mean everything electronic, which in my bias opinion means almost everything, that we need all the help we can get and just asking software to solve the total problem isn't appropriate. And one of the reasons is demonstrated here. So if there's a software weakness, it comes in exploits a hardware vulnerability like buffer overflow, it's the most common one. So you have an attack, you have a patch, you go on to the common vulnerability exposure index at NIST. This is the attack on that software and here's the patch to fix it. But the problem is somebody finds another way through that same software to exploit that same hardware weakness and they do it again. Now you get another software patch and each time you get a software patch, of course there's this period between the time it is actually employed and it's actually protected against for people to break in. And a lot of this community learns very quickly how to, I mean there's even, I saw something over, it was called, someone got a contest called buffer overflow. I mean buffer overflow has been known as a weakness for at least 20 years and yet there's still buffer overflow attacks all the time. The goal of the SIF program is for that and other hardware related vulnerabilities to block them at the hardware. So the result of this is in 2015, this is old data, I'm sorry, I haven't updated it, 28, 800 vulnerability instances with 28 software patches to fix it. What we wanna do in SIF is when you have an attack, instead of protecting it at the software level, now remember this is only attacks that are hardware vulnerabilities. It doesn't include leakage between virtual machines that are all up in the software level. But for things like buffer overflow and other similar kinds of hardware vulnerabilities, we block it at the hardware and then when the person comes up with the next attack, it's still blocked by the same mechanism. So theoretically, instead of trying to patch all those 2800 vulnerability instances, you instead go to seven vulnerability classes with seven basic approaches to how to do the protection. This means you have a much more tractable problem. Now, I repeat, this is not all attacks. This is, depending on how you calculated, if you took the number of CDEs in 2015, it was 43%, doesn't talk about how serious they were, just the numbers. So at best, we're talking about fixing 43% of the problem. But I would argue that fixing 43% of the cybersecurity problem, if we could do that, boy, I gotta get something for that. And all my performers ought to get something. That's awesome. But I repeat, please don't misunderstand me. If anybody says, SIF is going to make an unhackable computer, you know right then that they're not a performer because that can't be right. And they know it's not right. We are trying to make an important step forward in how to make electronic systems secure. So once again, we address the hardware vulnerabilities at their source and reduce the protection domain, the attack surface, if you will, from thousands of independent software patches to a few basic hardware approaches. At its core, that's what SIF is about. So, why is the SIF program using election security as a demonstrator? The first thing I'd like to say is it is a demonstrator. The purpose of SIF is not to make a secure voting system. A, that isn't what DARPA does. B, that's not the purpose of the program. And C, it really isn't in the purview of a technical program like SIF to do it. Can everybody still hear me okay? Okay, good. What we are trying to do is to demonstrate SIF capabilities in a given application. And the question would be, well, why did you pick voting security? Well, there are three major reasons that I had. First of all, it can be discussed in an open forum. Remember DARPA, the first word in DARPA is defense, advanced research projects agency. I have a bunch of applications that are very important that if I went and addressed them, I could never discuss in this crowd, let alone any other crowd that's open. So, one thing is I can discuss election security openly. Second, it attracts all of you. This room is full. If I was talking about protecting a, you know, I don't know, a small IoT device, you know, maybe one or two of you would be interested, but it wouldn't fill this room. And the third reason actually is it is a critical national infrastructure. There are lots of other ones, power grid, you know, transportation, the financial industry, but election security is a critical national need. And we'd love to be a part of helping to solve that critical need. We are not the solution, but we hopefully will be a part of it. So what are some other advantages? Well, if you look at this particular architecture, and by the way, we did not generate that architecture. It's an open domain architecture called StarVote. If I remember correctly, it was actually motivated by a particular municipality or county in Texas. They went and put together that application. We're just piggybacking on that completely. We're not trying to replicate it or expand on it or improve it. We're trying to implement it. And the reason we want to is if you look up there, you'll see a bunch of P1s, P2s and P3s. Those are those three different kinds of processors and embedded 32-bit microcontroller, small, a 64-bit in-order execution, medium, and an out-of-order execution speculative, super scalar, think high performance. And if you look at the parts of the StarVote system, it includes all three of those processors. And that's a critical thing for us to be able to do. We want to exercise all of it. And the system architecture is already open source. We don't have to develop it A and B. It's already open source, so it's available to all of you. Now, what we'll do in 2019 is not the whole enchilada. I wish it could be. I would have loved to have been here where we could have shown the entire system. What happens is this was not the idea at the beginning of SIF. SIF started about a year and a half ago, so it's in the early stages of the program. And therefore, we only have a few P1 processors that are complete, not any P2s or P3s. So what we'll be talking about is only the smart ballot box. When you go into the voting booth and go to the portion of it that's doing the SIF processors, you'll find it's only the smart ballot box. But it is the smart ballot box. It's open for attack. In 2020, however, next year, we plan on doing this again. You can call this phase A and that's phase B. Then we hope to have all three kinds of secure processors. We hope to implement the entire system and an entire software stack that exists on top of that as well. But will also not be provided by the SIF program by a separate activity funded by a separate organization. So this is the other thing I wanna make sure is when people walk over, they go, wait a minute, I saw this whole star vote system. How come it's not implementing the whole star vote system? It's not because we don't think it's a good thing. It's because we don't have the processors to do it yet. We're trying to walk first and then we'll try and run. This is such an important forum for us to be able to present this so people can make the attacks. Let me ace into ad. There will be that P1 processor which includes the SIF protections that people will be able to attack and show us any and all problems with it. So this is the actual demonstration. You'll see that this obviously wasn't from DEF CON because I submitted these slides to get approved a long time ago. Well, not long enough, but anyway. It's early in the SIF program. The methodologies are on P1. So there'll be a smart ballot box. The important thing to recognize is that smart ballot box. It's a box you can see at the bottom that takes your vote in. It has a button that says acceptable ballot or I want to reject that ballot. It has a statement. It reads the ballot through a barcode. That's the only thing that's secure. The actual ballot marking device, which is the one up above, is just done with COTS hardware. So it's no more secure than anything else would be. And we did this all out of cheap COTS parts because after DEF CON, and after DEF CON 2019 and before 2020, we're going to do what's called a university road show where this will be taken by Galois around to a variety of universities and public forums for people to attack as well. Let me see. Okay, so that was that one. So why are we here? So the program, what the program is doing at DEF CON. We're here to develop tools and methods to secure hardware against malicious attacks. The program is building prototype electronic hardware, in this particular case, risk-fied microprocessors. The program needs the best hackers in the world to provide a real-world evaluation of the hardware. And I can't think of a better place than here at DEF CON to do it, and I can't think of a better group to set up that evaluation than Galois, for Portland and Sith. The program is using a secure voting system as a demonstration vehicle. Once again, don't confuse the demonstration vehicle with the program. It is only a demonstrator for the program, and the demonstration is limited in 2019 because it's early in the program, but it will be more complete in 2020. And after DEF CON 2019, there'll be other open forums. Perhaps even more importantly is what we're not doing at DEF CON. We're not building a deployable election voting system and we won't in 2020 either. That isn't what DARPA does. We're building a prototype open-source system. We do projects when the project is over, we're done. We leave a toolbox for other people to use. We're not solving all election security issues. I know this group wouldn't think so, at least I hope this group wouldn't think so, but believe it or not, there's some people inside the beltway that think that this is an easy problem. I don't know where they got that idea. We're limited to the security of the microprocessors used in the election system. That's what we demonstrate. We are not proposing an election system architecture. We're not getting into the metaphysical argument about the use of paper ballots and you'll hear lots of those wonderful, appropriate, personally very interesting arguments. That's not what we're about. We're implementing the star vote system. We're not proponents for it, we're not changing. We're not proponents for it, we're not trying to change it. We're just trying to use one that's open and available. And we're not recommending any election policy. None, no, none, none, no, no. Everybody know what no means, nine, no, nix, whatever. We are focused on hardware security only. That's really important because DARPA is not a policy-setting body and if I ever tried to do anything like that, well, suffice it to say I do not look good in orange and we'd be able to see that. So, we're not recommending any election policy. There are other organizations here that may have that responsibility. We absolutely and totally do not. So, what I'd like to say is we are very pleased to be here. I'm very appreciative to the voting village to giving us this opportunity. I'm also very appreciative for all the work all of you do to help make elections more secure. As a personal person, I'm very thankful for that. As a DARPA program manager, thank you for letting us come and do this here. We welcome the opportunity to expose our secure hardware and let everybody go at it. By the way, a good result is nobody finds any weaknesses but also a good result is they find weaknesses and then we can go back and fix them. It's a lot better to fix it. The way I like to say it is you wanna hear your bad points from your friends, not your enemies, right? So, in this case, if you guys find a weakness, that's a lot better than if it's in some critical infrastructure and we find it. We expect secure SIF hardware to be a crucial critical part of national infrastructure security, including elections. And we're welcome, we look forward to feedback on our technology. And we really appreciate the effort you and many other people around here will spend looking at and breaking our hardware. Thank you very much. Is there time for any questions? Cool. Yes. So, what I was talking about was virtual machines which is a software construct where you build different containers and software. And one of the problems with that is the number of connections between those containers is, I don't know. I'm not a software guy but it feels like it's infinite. It isn't, obviously. It's just I prefer wires to software code. That's my bias. So it doesn't help with that problem because we assume, we don't fix software in general. We fix hardware. And those virtual containers in software are isolated by software constructs which we can't address. However, I will absolutely say that the hardware assists with compartmentalization. A lot of what happens in those performers is they in hardware separate containers. Now that is something we can do is build hardware-enforced containers. You can get that in current processors as well with secure enclaves like SGX or Trust Zone. SGX is an Intel. Trust Zone is an ARM cores. But when I made my statement it was about software constructs. Does that help? There was another hand. Yes. So, we have classes of vulnerability for example, buffer overflow. It happens because, the way I describe it is, hardware, and I designed and built hardware for 15 years in commercial industry. And we just tried to make sure that any software command got executed as quickly and at lowest power as possible. We assumed if the software asked us to do it, I was okay because the software was responsible for the security. What we do inside of Scythe is we actually go check certain activities. Buffer overflow should never be done, period. It's done in regular non-malicious sorts. In fact, one of the things we found out is free RTOS can't load unless you do a buffer overflow which is, it's a real-time operating system. But it shouldn't do that. And so what happens in the hardware is we can check to make sure, do bounce checks, to make sure that it never exceeds the buffer. That if you have a buffer overflow, you get an error. It just doesn't overflow the buffer, for example. Or if there's a permission that's supposed to be done a command comes in off of an IO port that wants root access. We can say, no, that's not permitted. Anything that comes off of an IO port is labeled and I'm gonna use the colors, but blue and blue can't get to red regions of memory which are root. Yes, not necessarily. If I look at memory security, it isn't as simple as we protect against overflows. We also protect against return-oriented programming. Things where you're trying to do stuff with, let me put it this way. There are pointers and there's memory and we have rules on how they can interact. That applies to buffer overflow. It applies to a lot of other memory problems. One example might be something that's called row hammer. If it's physical for those of you who don't know, that's fine, but it's where you physically, through the network hammer, a particular portion of the memory until it flips and then that gives you visibility. That would be covered by the same technical method that's used to stop buffer overflow would also stop row hammer. So it covers a variety of different memory security problems. At the worst, you'd have to write a new set of rules on how they interact and that's why it's got firmware in the title. Low-level software that would change how the hardware works. Yes, in the back. So any updates, I mean, this is a critical problem, is anytime you build in hardware, if you wanna update hardware per se, in other words, reroute the wires, it's another year. You gotta go back and refabricate it and everything else. So we use firmware, low-level software to actually do those updates, to address, for example, we find Spectre and Meltdown, for example. If Scythe had been in place, we would have had to change the policies to make many of these systems work. That would have to have been done through firmware and of course that opens up another attack vector which we have to protect through other methods. Yes, maybe it would be easier, I don't know, but it wasn't obvious to us six months ago when we started this. So we just picked it, I must admit, I am not an election security expert by any stretch of the imagination. If you try and talk to me about verification of six billion transistors or how to build them or how to get transistor uniformity, I'm your man, but so we picked it, I would argue it's got some big advantages to it that I can see, the number of processors that you use that it's described in papers, so you don't have to worry about that. If there was another system that would be more effective, sorry, that's the best I can say. Yes, so those of you that know about it, we talk about power, performance, and area, that's a circuit term, it's called PPA, the whole industry knows about it. We want to call P-Pass, and it's power, performance, area, security, and software compatibility. So the requirement for all of these performers is that they can run software, they can run the software, legacy software on their code. The worst they'd have to do is recompile it, no manual intervention, but it won't necessarily take advantage of all of the security features. Sometimes the programmer needs to be aware of those to utilize them. So the software will run for maximum security, you may have to rewrite portions of it, or recompile it. Yes, the gentleman standing there. So we're using off the shelf processors only this year, simply because we don't have the more complex processors ready and sith. In 2020, the intention is for all of the processors in the system will be those secure processors. We have time for maybe one, maybe two more questions. Yes, here. So I think the quick answer to your question is yes. I think you caught the essence. However, I would say in 2020, we plan on using a secure software made with a different program that I don't, not at DARPA, that I don't feel comfortable talking about because it's another program. Electronic systems are not secure with secure hardware. It takes secure hardware, it takes secure software, it takes secure combination of the two, and whether that's election security or at a high performance computing or that mythical toilet seat detector. I mean, it's the whole system, it's the whole enchilada, and we recognize that. We just can't fix it all. So sith is focused on the hardware, but our intention in 2020 is to have software that will merge with that and make an entire system that's secure. Well, one last question. So what I would say, I hope I never implied that we would do away with all software patches. If I did, I hope you would run me out on a rail. No, what we're trying to do is reduce them dramatically. So trying to take those 2,800, by the way, there were 2,800 that were listed with hardware vulnerabilities. There were a total of 6,800 patches for software, and my argument would be 4,000 of them remain. What we're trying to do is take those 2,800 and pull them down. I believe, I don't know what the number is, but a large portion of the successful attacks in the past few years are still buffer overflow. If we could take care of buffer overflow and it could not happen, you still have software patches but you don't have nearly as many. Okay, so what you're saying is there's malicious buffer overflow and there is programmer bugs overflow. Some of our programs actually will detect, in some ways I say they may even be better as debuggers than they are as security, because they'll find this unspecified semantics is what we call it, that shouldn't be done but is done. So in some cases, that may happen. We may have software that can't run because it is inherently insecure, and then we'll have to decide what to do when that occurs. The purpose is that we will be able, we have a lot of legacy software in DoD, and it costs billions of dollars to rewrite. So what we first of all say is first do no harm, make it so they can run that buggy, insecure software that's no more secure or very little more secure than it always was, but then give programmers an opportunity to make it very secure. That's all we have time for. I think I got a sign, I got a hook, but I'd like to just say I'll be happy to talk with people afterwards. And once again, thank you very much.


I am Josef Omol Koviti, a patient who came to Manipol Hospital here after being referred by a medical doctor in prime care Nairobi Hospital in Kenya. He concluded that I had blockage of three coronary vessels and he felt that the best center where that can be handled would be Manipol Hospital in Bangalore in India. So I arrived here and several tests were done before the operation. I was taken to the theatre, coronary artery bypass graft surgery carried out. So now as I am speaking to you, my recovery is almost complete. The wounds have healed. 59-year-old Mr. Josef came to our hospital in last month with symptoms of chest pain and breathing difficulty and we evaluated him with our regular investigations like ECG, ECO and thorough history and all. So on evaluation we identified that he is having triple vessel coronary artery disease and a weakly functioning heart and the heart was also equally dilated because of the recent heart attack. On evaluation we found out that he needed to undergo a bypass operation and obviously because of the triple vessel coronary artery disease he was not a suitable candidate for angioplasty and stenting. He underwent coronary artery bypass grafting what we call CABJ and open heart surgery and he tolerated the procedure very well. My experience in this hospital was all good. There is nothing really negative I can talk about. Me as a patient and even my wife as a caretaker, our experience is all good.


Vaccines are my top priority. I know premiers feel the same. Durant la campagne de vaccination, on continue de faire tout ce qu'on peut pour maîtriser la propagation de la COVID-19. Pour les vaccins, j'ai discuté avec les premiers ministres des provinces et des territoires de la façon qu'on peut administrer les vaccins le plus vite possible quand on les reçoit. Pour le dépistage, on a envoyé des millions de tests de dépistage rapide aux provinces et aux territoires. On va notamment travailler en partenariat avec le secteur privé pour le dépistage. De plus, le gouvernement fédéral donne l'exemple. On accélère les efforts de dépistage dans les milieux de travaux fédéraux. This is a tough virus to beat, but I know it's no match for Canadian teamwork and innovation. Just look at the results we're already seeing from our partnership with the CDL Rapid Screening Consortium to roll out tests to workplaces. 21 pilots, 26 pilot sites, 12 employers across the country, and more than 5,000 screening tests done so far. Already, they've caught positive cases. That means that people who otherwise might not have known were able to take the right steps to protect themselves, their families, and their coworkers. We have to use every tool in the toolbox to keep people safe, because we're not out of the woods yet. As Dr Tam and Dr New outlined earlier today, what provinces, cities, and mostly Canadians have done over the past few weeks, has worked. Cases are down, hospitalisations are down, the number of deaths is down. But here's the thing. Variants are real and they're already here. So we have to keep taking strong public health measures. And remember, even with vaccines, we need to do everything we can to protect vulnerable populations like our seniors in long-term care. Otherwise, we could see a third wave that is even worse than the second or the first. I know that's not the news you want to hear. But we will get through this. I'm focused on testing vaccines and public health measures. The premiers and I spoke last night about not opening up too fast. Canadians, you know what we need to keep doing, all of us. We need to keep focusing on those measures that keep us and our loved ones safe. Like wearing a mask, washing your hands, keeping your distance, using the COVID Alert app and avoiding gatherings. Together, we have the power to keep bending the curve and prevent these variants from taking hold. Beating this pandemic and keeping you and your family safe will always be our top priority.


It's really great to be here to share our experiences and to hear and share with others who facing very similar challenges I think to what we are. The way you pronounce the company is pujli sani, it means to develop. It's really an instruction to people to develop. Okay, the rights of the poor who live on and make use of communal land across the globe are increasingly insecure and under threat. The vulnerability is heightened when firstly land governance and administration systems are weak, when land is managed by external officials and when there is inadequate record of rights. Insecure land rights opens the door for elite capture and makes right holders reluctant to invest their labor and money into that land. Land activists across the world are in search of remedies to reverse this toxic trend and we argue that partial immunity lies in the development and legal recognition of local land governance and recorder systems which enhance local control and which are backed by legal reforms that provide legally secure rights. We're busy doing this in Ebenezer with the Ebenezer community on the west coast of South Africa and I want to talk about this experience with the Ebenezer community who've been living on this land for many centuries. But before I talk about Ebenezer specifically I want to contextualize this process in three ways. Firstly by looking at the broad history of dispossession in South Africa. Secondly by looking at land reform program in South Africa and thirdly by looking a bit at the history of Ebenezer itself. The San and Koi people are considered to be the indigenous people of South Africa and when the Europeans first set up a naval supply station in Cape Town in 1652 the San and Koi were living across various parts of South Africa. Colonial expansion and the development of agriculture in the Cape relied on slave labor and the Koi San fought many wars of resistance but were either turned into slaves or vagrants on their own land and until 1834, most farm labor was based either on slavery or on restrictions, vagrancy with restrictions contained in the various Koi codes and vagrancy ordinances. Many of the Koi San settled on mission stations which became established across South Africa and they did this to resist the pressure of laws and to retain at least some access to land. Wars of conquest waged in the 19th century meant that by 1900 most of South Africa was under colonial control. The process of creating black homelands and colored or mixed race reserves was the cornerstone of apartheid and it meant that when by 1994 just 13% of South Africa was in the hands of black people and the remaining 87% was either owned by white owned companies individuals and the states. Let's talk to turn to land reform in South Africa. With the end of a formula apartheid in 1994 we introduced a land reform program which was based in the property clause in the Constitution and it has three legs of the land reform of land reform. Firstly restitution that is where individuals or groups or communities that were dispossessed of land under the previous government could claim restitution of that land either restoration of the land alternative land or cash compensation. The second component of land reform is around redistribution. Those people that had never had any access to land can apply and get access to land for a variety of needs and the third is tenure reform where those that are living on land currently but with very insecure rights are able to then access support to strengthen those rights the tenure reform. There has however been significant failure of land reform since 1994. Over 8 million hectares have been transferred and at least 50% of that land is either un or under utilized. Importantly the majority of this land is held by communal entities land property entities either trusts or communal property associations. The Department of Rural Development and Land Reform that is responsible for these CPAs reported in 2016 that only 208 of 1490 of these entities were compliant with the law the rest were not. This failure of land reform is extremely complex and involves many factors but we argue that the lack of governance and administration of land rights is one of the most important factors in this regard. Let's turn to Ibn Isa's history. The Ibn Isa community descended primarily from the Khoi people the indigenous people of South Africa and when the whites arrived in that area in the early 1800s they found the community there. The state allocated some crown land to the Mission Church and to the community under the management of the church and so at that time that the first time the Ibn Isa community got access and rights formal rights to land was in 1837 but that land access was under the management of the church the Rainish Mission Church at that point. In 1909 a law was passed which transferred the land allocated to many mission stations back under the control of the state. The policy priority this is early 1900 what sort of 1900 to 1930 the policy priority for government was creating opportunities for poor whites many of whom were dispossessed of land in the wars between the British and the Boers in the late right at the end of the 19th century. For Ibn Isa this focus had devastating consequences for the community. The state decided to build a dam and a canal system to provide an affirmative action land reform program for poor whites and this targeted the Ibn Isa community which was located at the end of the canal system. So the state passed a law which dispossessed the community of the most productive part of their land and removed them to alternative but inferior land over the hill adding a number of other portions of land in the process. On this reallocated land 153 families were allocated a plot a house plot an arable plot with water and communal grazing land and that number of land rights holders remains today. So there's still 153 plot holders with 1.6 hectares of land and eight grazing camps which are subdivided into sub camps for rotational grazing purposes. The community in the meantime has grown to 2500 people. This land continues to be owned at the moment by the national state and the land rights have been managed with various degrees of success by the municipality. When we began our work at Ibn Isa in 2013 we found the following. There was no management of land rights by the municipality. 65 of the 153 plot rights holders had not been formally allocated after the death of the former rights holders and disputes were aplenty amongst the rights holders and within the community generally. On the grazing areas communal grazing areas 97 individuals without formal rights were on that land farming with sheep and cattle and there was significant elite capture by some people who were able to keep others out of the areas that they were allocated. So for Ibn Isa there are two land reform processes. One is restitution for the land that they were dispossessed of. The second is tenure reform strengthening the rights on the land that they are on. I'm only going to deal with the tenure reform processes given the focus of today's discussion. The applicable legislation there is the transformation of certain rural areas act and that really is focused on all these mixed race or colored reserves of which there are 23 in South Africa and it requires the community to decide who will be the future owner of that land and management of that land. They can decide to cut it up and divide it amongst them. They can decide to hand it over to the municipality for the municipality to manage it on their behalf or they can decide to hold it as a community establishing a communal property entity which is what Ibn Isa decided to do. They established what's called a communal property association. So there are two focuses of our interventions who one is on the ground developing local tenure arrangements at Ibn Isa. The second focus is at a national level a broader policy intervention to develop a national record system which recognizes communal land rights within a land rights continuum. So there were three processes that we then undertook at Ibn Isa. The first was to manage a land rights inquiry process to clarify who has what rights to the different portions of land. The second was to facilitate the design a participatory design of a new tenure of new tenure arrangements at Ibn Isa which would be under community control. And the third was to design an appropriate local land rights record system on the land. The land rights inquiry involved five processes. The first was the enumeration of rights holders who says that they have a right to a land. The second was adjudication. With adjudication it was very important for us to understand the difference in the relationship between customary understanding of land rights and the formal legislative manner in which land rights were obtained and transferred. We looked at certification and in adjudicating did the person have a certificate? Who's actually using the land now? So who has the de facto rights to the land on the ground? And then we looked at was this person who says that they had a right eligible to be a member of the CPA the communal property association according to the membership criteria. The third component in our land rights inquiry was around mediation and arbitration. There were a number of conflicts and disputes around the allocations that were made. The fourth was to then take that to the municipality who is the formal administrator of the land to get that confirmed and passed in a municipal council resolution. Once that had happened then we facilitated on the ground agreements around boundaries. So we got neighbors to come together at the boundaries and say is this their agreed place? Yes and we took the coordinates and then got them to sign an agreement that that is where it was. The second component was developing what we call the land use management system. Essentially the tenure arrangements for the future. What we did there was firstly we researched and provided technical detail about each of the different land parcels on the land. We then conducted a community process which involved people dividing up into two focus groups. Those focus groups then visited the different portions of land, came back and developed proposals around what kind of land rights, what kind of management systems, what are the responsibilities for each individual and so forth. And then presented that to the plenary which was then critiqued. We as Putlissane then wrote that up into proposals which are in the process of going through the community for final acceptance. This participatory process that we ran was extremely successful. For the first time community felt that they were involved in determining their future of how the land should be, what rights should be there, how it should be managed and so forth. And for the municipality and the Department of Agriculture it was the first time that they'd been involved in a process and they were also very excited about it. Some of the key issues that emerged out of this process were the following. Firstly, how do we clarify individual rights on community land, communal land? And it was agreed in the absence of other forms of formal rights. It was agreed to provide members with title but with restrictions in that title deed. That if they wanted to sell or transfer that land it had to go to a member of the communal property association. The second was how to clarify given the nature that grazing rights, that it was communal grazing. How to clarify that right? What kind of rights should it be? Eventually a fully tradable communal grazing right was agreed to. And then finally it was around management. How should this land be managed given its community land? So in that process the CPA appoints a manager but there is an association of users that works with the manager. With regard to the recorder system there is currently no system of recording communal rights in a local and national register in South Africa. So for Ebenezer we're drawing on the thinking and development of such systems internationally. And we've decided to go with the social tenure domain model which has been designed and developed by the Global Land Tool Network connected to the UN Habitat. This approach seeks to clarify the nature of the rights that a person or group has to a specific spatial unit. A piece of land, water body or natural resource. The design of this at Ebenezer has been quite challenging but we're making progress working very closely with the GLTN. The objective is that this recorder and management system of rights will be locally controlled by the CPA so that there's community control. This requires a recorder system which is cheap, which is locally operated and easy to update but which is linked into the national system to allow oversight and further formalization if required. Our work at Ebenezer is linked to our national policy interventions to find remedies against elite capture. South African property law does not easily accommodate communal land rights and the absence of such a law is one of the reasons that the rights of people in such circumstances are so vulnerable. Pujlisane is playing a leading role in a broader intervention to reform property law in South Africa and the aim would be to provide for local management and registered rights but which cascades up through the municipality into the national deeds office. The intervention is located within a national titling debate where individual title is is considered the apex of property rights. Oh that's it. So the jury is still out about how successful this intervention will be but it's critical in South Africa where over 30 million people live in contexts where their rights fall outside of the formal property system. So our aim has been to avoid capture of land by elites in communities and to achieve the land security, land tenure security objective which is espoused in our constitution and the key lessons that we've drawn from this experience of firstly within with land rights inquiries we must really spend time to understand the nature of the rights in custom in law and on the ground. Secondly the process to clarify and formalize the land rights and tenure arrangements must be participatory in design involving as many of the community members as possible to ensure and enable sufficient consensus. These processes must be practical affordable and supported by adequate technical information so that people can make proper decisions. The record systems must be sufficiently flexible to capture and certify the range of rights making up the continuum in each context. Fourthly the land rights management and record systems must be supported by the local state in order to enable local level land holding entities to implement the agreed tenure system and to contain the power of local elites to appropriate resources beneficial to the poor. Finally the record systems must link into national formal record systems otherwise the nature of these local rights will be undermined and relegated to secondary status second class status. So these have been our experiences at Ibeniza. I'm really putting it out there we're in the process of establishing these the days are still early and but really looking forward to sharing and hearing some more on the the processes involved in other areas. Thank you.


Manwear world leaders, particularly Nigerian governments, have been charged to show real ambition for the next seven years and to set forth a clear pathway to delivering the sustainable development goals, stimulus package of $500 billion, a move which embodies the transformative vision of the 2030 agenda. The coordinator of a civil society organization, Brain Builders Youth Development Initiative, Olashuko Abidin, made the call in alluring the quarry state capital during a press briefing where he demanded a more equitable, just and sustainable future through financial, social and climate justice. We are calling on world leaders, particularly the Nigerian government, to show real ambition for the next seven years and to set forth a clear pathway to deliver the SDG stimulus package of $500 billion. This package embodies the transformative vision of the 2030 agenda, financial justice. We urge government to cancel the debt, deliver new special drawing rights for lower middle income countries. Two, social justice. We must tackle authoritarianism, inequality and all form of violence. Then three, climate justice. The urgency of climate action cannot be overstated. The group which maintained that the clarion call extends beyond government noted that the challenges facing the nation is manageable but requires radical and collective shift in approach by all. But our call to action extends beyond governments.  Our challenges are manageable but require a radical shift in our approach. For example, as far as climate change is concerned, there are little things that we can do in our own homes as well. How often do we switch on our light and electricity when we are not using them? How often do we manage water resources? Are we trying to complement the efforts of the government in terms of not blocking the waterways?


What's good everybody Chris from jassescasebrace.com doing the last filler we needed for this revolution basketball This is 21 22 NBA prism hobby one pack random team number 38 30 spots, you know random pack break But at the very very end we're gonna wait for two random team spots each in that eight box revolution Intercase all right, let's rock and roll fresh dice and our list from Jason K Going all the way down to Michael O grab in the last seven or eight spots Michael, thank you for hosting out everyone else. Thanks for getting in as well appreciate you either way and our 30 teams Let's roll our dice and randomize our list five and six eleven times. Let's do it. All right one two three four five six seven eight nine ten and eleven eleven the final time boom Michael aged on to Ronnie And eleven times for our teams. Thanks again everyone. Good luck one two three four five six seven eight nine Ten and eleven eleven than final time From the spurs down to the T walls so such as just a filler No trade window, but we'll do a little recap and review of our teams So the first half excuse me Michael H with the spurs just okay with the blazers Michael L with the pistons Andrew with the Raptors Michael L with the Nets and Lakers Robert with the Kings Nicholas with the Hornets Anthony with the Jazz Robert with the Suns Michael with L with the Warriors Nicholas with the Pelicans Matt with the Hawks Michael H with the heat Michael L with the Quippers Nicholas with the Wizards Michael L with the Bucks Andrew with the Pacers Nick Sixers and Bulls Robert with the Thunder Andrew with the Celtics Mickey with the Magic Bennett with the Cavs Matt with the Mavs Andrew with the Rockets Matt with the Nuggets Michael L with the Grizzles and Ronnie with the T-Wolves all right let's Get this printed and let's get to ripping switch screens real quick 121 22 hobby pack To one Dodgers Lee in the top of the ninth once he gets hits a lead off the inning, but here we go There's a number 38 Matt with the Hawks all The way down Nicholas with the Wizards all right, let's do it one pack never give away those four spots at the end red wave THT and A blue Andrew Wiggins one of three out of 199 for the Gold State Warriors Michael L Wiggins Bones Highland rookie Coral mobile quick and easy one hobby pack which switch screens. Let's grab our names one more time Right here Michael down to Ronnie fresh dice and fresh list Top four teams get in Thanks again y'all good luck. We roll a randomized six to six twelve times of course for a filler always fun that way Let's do it one two three four five six seven eight nine Ten eleven and twelve twelfth and final time Five to thirty sad times. Thanks for getting in but fourth one congrats Let's see though at five is Matt Thanks for getting in those if you get in see you snuck in Michael L gets in Michael H gets in Matt does get in Matt nice congrats man and Andrew there it is one to four Gonna be Priz Nice and you Matt Michael H Michael L congrats. Thanks again It's up all this video when we come back we're gonna do an eight box inner case of 22 23 revolution basketball. Thanks again. Bye. Bye


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