What's up everybody, once again, it's Brandon, man, Sean, and this video, this special video because it's really dedicated to people who are in high school, artists, managers, or aspiring artists and managers who are in high school, and I'm just going to say what I would do about it in high school. And number one, first and foremost would be I would throw some events or parties as you would probably call it at that time in high school. I would throw parties, get people to love these parties, and be the person responsible for the energy that's created at these parties. I will build my popularity through that. And when I do that, that's going to give me control over a community.  And the better way to even do it than just doing a whole bunch of random parties or events would be to brand it with a certain name. Even if it's in different locations and sometimes it has slightly different energies, if you still call it this part one, this part two, this part three, it's going to allow the word to continuously spread as people hear about that name and say, yo, wait, you're responsible for such and such. I've heard of that before. Even if they haven't been before and they're like, yo, I heard of that. That's going to create additional branding and reputation for you as you meet new people.  I go to this all the time. That's dope. And then that's going to allow you to build your brand with new people and easily make certain connections and just build leverage as a brand as a whole. Not only that, as you control these environments, of course, you can do things like work your music in. But you have to remember the event is about making the event successful, making the event good vibes and good energy that people love. And then from that brand equity, you can then work your music in, right? Don't make the whole thing about your music. You play it for a full 30 minutes. You might play one of your songs per hour, one of your songs per 30 minutes. And you might not even play it at the very first event. Be patient. So that's one thing that I suggest. And I've suggested that to many people in high school and seeing them executed and become successful in their own area and space. And the next thing is you just have to realize the benefit that you have being in high school. Why is high school such a great time to really build a fan base? Because people are in this building. And so they're confined to this population that is on top of each other for a long periods of time. And through that, you can easily share stuff because everybody's listening to music. All these things are spreading quickly, just like all these rumors on this person did, this with that person, how quickly all that stuff spreads. It's an environment that marketers love.  That's like the perfect marketing environment. So you just have to create things that are worth people talking about. So think about what those things might look like. And it could come multiple ways. One way being you do some kind of amazing video or some kind of concept, something weird that just makes people want to talk about it. Whether it's a troll song or whether you did something super cool like a super cool trick or you broke into somewhere to do the video or whatever might be the concept. Do something that will make people tune into you. Maybe even create a series out of that online as well. Just like you would do that with the event. And lastly, if you could figure out something outside of your high school environment, that would help build your brand, like give you more cloud just because of the association. Get that association. Whether that's getting out with certain people in certain environments and maybe taking pictures with them or whether that's getting on a certain platform that people love. And so your music got posted there. Anything that's going to create additional respect for people on the inside because they'll see you got validation from people on the outside. When they see that, that's going to make them really think, oh, this person is doing something. It's a weird thing, but often times for people to be validated by the people that already know them, they need to see some additional validation from the people who have no idea about you. That's why sometimes artists feel like they have to go to certain cities just to get support from their own. But those are just three quick things that I would do if I was in high school. I would throw a branded event. I would leverage the environment and create something that could spread quickly through word of mouth and I'll probably do it multiple times. And last but not least, I would find some outside validation to then flex on the people at my school. So then they'll know how dope I am. And remember, you can only do this with your school but you can use this at other schools too and do this with your friends at other schools and you can partner up with somebody, something like that. But that's it for now. If you liked this video, go ahead and like button. If you like it, might as well share it and if you're not subscribed, you know what to do. Hit that subscribe button.


what's the nature of dynamic friction in a humid hydrophobic nanocontact. So, the floor is yours and I... I would first like to thank all organizers for inviting me to this conference. It's a really pleasure after corona time and this work was done together with colleagues from France, Olivier Noël and Pierre-Manuel Mazran and they performed experiments and I tried to reproduce and to explain these results with my simulations. Okay, so a short overview of this subject. Actually, problem with this subject is that it is very easy to generalize everything but it is a very, very, very various topic with many details and basically, when I started doing this with Olivier, I realized we are filling a puzzle. So, some pieces of the puzzle we know and some pieces of the puzzle we should discover. So, basically, it is really nice to start some early works on sliding and contact in two phases and that's capillary friction. You have air phase, gas phase and liquid phase and that was one of the early simulation done by Mark Robbins. And then I should point experiments of Elisa Riedo with capillary condensation where it was first time proposed the mechanism. Then, recently, relatively recently, there were experiments with tuning fork AFM where they measured mechanical properties of the capillary and then there is a whole, I would say, cluster of research done where people took AFM. They went through or over a layer of water and measured the frictional characteristics of the systems and most recently, a work where humidity was changed and friction was studied in simulation and in experiment. So, what Olivier is doing and in order that you understand how we came to ideas in this talk is circular mode AFM. So, circular mode AFM means that his probe is making a circle and he can measure both lateral and normal force simultaneously and that means that he never interrupts movement by going back and forth with like in classical AFM. And just briefly that you know what is the plan of the talk, I'm going just to tell you something about results by AFM, then talk about results in AFM where we try to see what is happening in these experiments and give just short conclusion and outlook. So, basically what Olivier is doing, he is turning his probe and while he is turning it, he is approaching it to the substrate. In one moment probe touches the substrate or a capillary bridge is formed and then he continues to press increasing the normal force and in opposite direction, he starts to... He reverses direction, the probe goes slowly out of the contact, then he can measure adhesion and then in one moment capillary bridge will snap. So, we can introduce all kinds of different properties like adhesion force, it is different in normal force between going into the contact and out of the contact, you can introduce coefficient of friction, you can also measure jump in friction, so the friction when contact is created. So, first thing which you can already see if you look his experiments on different velocities is that for... A H or O P G that adhesion force doesn't depend on velocity because this distance between approach and retraction curves stays constant when you change the velocity and now I would like really to enter into details of this talk, so it is a model of friction which was proposed by Andres Vernes in the Diagon form, so we have this jump in friction and friction coefficient then connected with the normal force and we could extract all this data and we saw that with velocity this jump in friction so that this left figure depends... It has a power law with velocity very close to linear and coefficient of friction depends linearly on velocity. Of course, adhesion force, the blue points on the red diagram, it doesn't depend on velocity. Okay, so it was a little bit contraintuitive, if you think on condensation, if you move your probe faster, condensation should have less time to act so basically you would expect that friction should fall with velocity and that's something what Eliza Riedl in her work has obtained. So we created these simulations and basically I had a big substrate and I have put water on this substrate and the water has created droplets so we started to move the substrate and then these droplets got attached to the probe and then you could see with the displacement or that these droplets, they accumulate under the probe, it grows and at certain point because the surface tension of the droplet is going to pull it out of this point of the closest approach between probe and the substrate. So now I'm going to introduce you into my simulation. So we had a substrate which was fixed, we had a probe which was attached to the points so that we could measure different forces. We had a relatively large amount of water, at least the most of what I could simulate in some final time and I tried to make a probe to correspond to AFM tip radius which Olivier was using. So here basically I have fixed the view on the probe so substrate looks like as it is moving but actually probe was moving. It rises as it rises there is this snap and the probe is detached from the substrate and before they were connected by capillary bridge. So just once more and then I'm going to go to data. So of course you can evaluate normal force, dependence on contact angle and if you have a hydrophobic system you are going to have a first normal force which is positive and then when you stretch the droplet enough the droplet is going to start to resist to the deformation and you will have adhesion also in hydrophobic systems and in the hydrophilic systems you're going always to have adhesive regime and I made a very simple model for this. I treated capillary bridge as a cylinder and these lines which go through are results of this model so it is also one of the results of Mark Robbins who showed that if your droplet is large enough you can basically describe it very well with continuum results. So basically you see two lines and one line was for moving probe and the other line was for fixed probe where the probe was not moving just going up and down. So basically this is the snapshot so you can see the compressed droplet in hydrophobic case. You can see the stretch droplet in hydrophobic case where it produces adhesion and then the droplet detaches. Okay, so what further I could do is I could calculate dependence of lateral force on the surface and I could see that lateral force depends linearly on the surface. That's an interesting conclusion because some other proposed that it depends on the contact perimeter so just a contact line between substrate and the water liquid. And what we also obtain is that lateral force depends with a power law on velocity. It increases as it experiments, but the power is smaller than what would be expected than what was obtained in experiment. So basically at this point I would like to just get a little bit philosophical. So basically if you have a nice simulation I did these simulations with the constant volume. So basically that could be a lower limit of this dependence of lateral force on the velocity but of course in experiment as in the first slides I showed there could be accumulation so with time the droplet could increase the volume. So basically if you have a higher velocity it would maybe increase larger and then it would be limited, this increase would be limited by other process maybe evaporation but it remains to be investigated. And of course what is interesting is that in experiment we see also that coefficient of friction is dependent linearly on velocity so there is a question how this jump in or initial lateral force is connected to friction coefficient which are processes which are connecting and linking two of them. So just in conclusion so in this talk we introduce another mechanism for creation of calipelar bridge and that's by accumulation of water in a moving contact. So if you have asperity it could come along to a small droplet which is already there at your surface and it just collects her and then around this droplet the capillary bridge could be formed. We show that lateral force in simulations depends on contact surface and increases with velocity and we show also that adhesion force in systems has a complex behavior which can be captured by a model and also we could show that it doesn't depend on velocity. Thank you very much. But let's start with Bo. Why do you have adhesion when you have hydrophobic interface? Well, even in hydrophobic systems you have van der Waals interactions between water and the substrate. It is not completely repelling and that if you stretch the droplet enough it will create adhesion. So it's just van der Waals forces which are playing the role. So if it is hydrophobic that doesn't mean it wants to throw away water from itself and the fact that there is van der Waals force. But you will have a positive plus pressure in the droplet if you have hydrophobic surfaces. You should get repulsion. I understand if you have van der Waals interaction between the two solid walls then that could help you to get attraction. No, but you also can stretch the droplet. So basically deform a droplet and then it turns in. Then it's some dynamic effect due to viscosity and things like that. Yes. Thank you. I had exactly the same question. I'm wondering to follow up. I mean, can you get from your simulation? You have the interactions in your simulation so you can see what is the van der Waals interaction that the market of dynamics is producing, correct? Yes, I can do it. Yeah, so I guess my follow up question is does your system reproduce the fact that there is a Laplace pressure there? And how does the force from that repulsive Laplace pressure compare to the attractive force from the van der Waals? And also I guess you would get some attraction from the surface tension as well. So I would assume you could separate all those contributions because you have the simulation, you have the atomistic detail. So could you break down those different contributions? Actually in this model I did exactly that. So I had a contribution of surface energy of this droplet compared to air. I had a contribution of surface energy of these interactions with the substrate. And then if I calculate energy and calculate the force, I get in the model negative forces and adhesion in the hydrophobic system. Okay, I follow up questions. You said it was a constant volume assumption. The AFM experiments, although it's fast AFM, it's still much slower than the thermodynamic timescales of the system. So a constant chemical potential assumption might be better. So can you do that? Oh, well, I could also turn it on in lamps. I mean, it would be possible. It is just that me personally, when I was designing this simulation, I was aware of your publication with Ashley Martini. Was not quite sure because I see just a few molecules flying around in the simulation. And there should be some equilibrium around in this volume. So I'm not quite sure if adding molecules would just inundate the whole surface with the water. So I decided to design simulations like this. But yes, it is one thing we should consider. So I was more looking into partial pressure inside and partial pressure was okay for this humidity. I have a question. Water at surfaces often ordered over this length scale of a few nanometers, something like one or two nanometers. That's about the size of your droplet. Is the water inside of the droplet ordered? Or can you determine an order parameter or heat capacity of the water? Would it change when you pull at the droplet? I must say, I didn't look at it, but indeed it is a very interesting question. So I should look at the structure of the water at the surface, but I didn't look at it at this point. But yes, it's legitimate and very interesting. Okay, thank you. Thanks a lot. And now we switch to Guillain-Baville-Heine.


So good morning everyone. My name is Arénome Razenajato. I'm a senior engineer at Huawei France in Paris. This presentation I worked on it with Cébric Bastoul who was chief scientist at Huawei France at the time. It was also presented at the Impact workshop in June so the content may be a bit similar but I hope it will be interesting to you all. So today I'm going to talk about mind sport and more specifically AKG which is one of the components of mind sport. So mind sport is an AI framework from Huawei. Its main challenge is to be an old scenario framework. I'll come back to that a bit later. So first of all before I go into details I'd like to very quickly present mind sport. So it's a AI framework from Huawei. Its main feature is to map high-level DNN models to efficient parallel implementations. It does that by hiding the complexity of the architectures to the AI developers and one of its goals is also to support for the fast development of new models. For that there are many components that some of them are completely architecture independent such as type derivation, automatic differential, differentiation, second-order optimization and as you go lower and lower and lower then we get to optimizations that have to be architecture-aware because you have to know the architecture to do automatic parallelism to optimize the memory, to do operator fusion which is what I will talk about later. So operator fusion is important because it enables critical optimizations. We can improve data locality and the use of the processing elements. It allows us to minimize the intermediate results communications and storing and also when the target architecture is an accelerator a GPU, a TPU for example it also allows us to reduce the cost of the kernel launches which can be very costly. For that we need what we call automatic kernel generation because when you are targeting specific operators sometimes you can use optimized libraries but since we want to support the fast development of new models from time to time we encounter new operators that were not encountered before so in that case we need to be able to compile them and to optimize them. In the case of the auto kernel generator we exploit the fact that operators are by nature regular and then hence are fit for polyhedral compilation. However polyhedral compilation for those who are not very familiar with that mostly targets outer parallelism and data locality. Most of the time that's fine but as I said we want to target multiple architectures and it's not always the best strategy for each and every scenario. So here's the outline of this talk. First of all I'd like to present a little bit of the context then I will explain a bit more what AKG is and finally I'll talk about the challenges of polyhedral compilation for AI. So first of all in AI the models they the data and the operators are represented using computational graphs so these graphs are directed graphs the nodes are the operators with input and output tensors which need which may need to be communicated. These operators they can either be framework between built-ins or customer operators that are provided by the users. In these graphs the edges are tensors that can have various shapes and various types and they are used to store input data model parameters or just temporary results. These graphs they are built using the framework input language or they can also be automatically generated. Then these graphs they need to be compiled and executed so usually they are built into subgraphs that would select different operators and prepare them for scheduling and then around time we'll execute those subgraphs and launch the operators whenever the input is ready. So when the input is ready meaning that when the previous nodes have output their results. One of the key optimizations that you can do here is operator fission. The idea is for example we have a graph with several operators and the idea is to fuse those operators to in order to get it a bit more optimized. The benefits are we can get better data access and storage optimization because we can promote intermediate results to fast memory instead of having to communicate those results between operators. We have better hardware usage and occupancy. This enables us to do some more loop level optimizations to reduce the cost of the kernel launch since we end up with a smaller amount of kernels and also sometimes we may also fuse independent operators to better use the available resources. This also allows us to do interoperator analysis and for example this can lead to common suppression elimination or dead code elimination, algebraic simplifications and so on. So here on the right we have a small example where we would have two operators a multiplication and an addition and with that operator fission we would have to execute the first operator, communicate the the output tensor to the second operator whereas using operator fission we can end up with only a single operator. So only one kernel launch, only one loop nest. So in mind for this graph kernel operator fission happens in three phases. There is the partition phase, then the fusion phase and then we can generate a new code for the optimized kernels. I will go a bit faster on that. So here is an example. For example we have a subgraph that we want to optimize using operator fission. We can expand some of the operators and do some analysis to find out how we could fuse them and then apply the fusion. So here is a quick result, a very view of the impact of these graph kernel fission on some key networks for MindsPore. So on the right we have graphs for NLP and recommendation and computer vision networks. We can see that on the lowest we get an average speedup of 30% on recommendation networks we even get to 136% speedups. So this seems very nice. We do manage to get some great speedups using operator fission. Regarding the polyhedral aspects, it's less challenging because we don't have to raise the normal polyhedral compilation. We don't have to raise the code, but it's easier to translate. But unfortunately, this fusion, it highly depends on the impact of this fusion, may depend on the target architecture. So this is what I was talking beforehand, the multi-scenario challenge. In the case of MindsPore, we target three architectures, CPU, GPU and NPU. Doing that is a challenge because we do not want to have a big software fragmentation, but we need to apply different optimization strategies as transparently as possible. For example, here we have a very basic example. We have a matrix multiplication. So on CPU, the naive way to optimize that would be to exploit vectors and cache localities. So we would interchange the two inmost loops. Whereas for GPU, this is less important because there are more threads. So we want to maximize the thread usage. Whereas for NPU, for example, we can just use an interest for that. So here the challenge is we've got a subgraph to optimize. We have a framework to do that. And we want to target multiple architectures. And how do we do that? So this is where IKG, the auto kernel generator, comes in. So I will give a brief overview of the architecture, then talk a bit about polyhedral scheduling inside IKG and some other optimizations that are needed inside. So IKG is one of those components of Mindsport. It supports three inputs, the MindIR, which comes directly from Mindsport, custom operators, which can be defined by users, and the TVM hybrid DSL for fast design. There are three main passes. The first one is the operator normalization. This is necessary to prepare the polyhedral processing. We have to make sure that it complies to linear constraints because the polyhedral scheduling needs linear constraints. It may also apply transformations to reduce complexity, for example, in lining or fusion. Then there's the core of the kernel generator, the polyhedral scheduling, which can do loop optimization, thread polarization, tiling, things like that. And then there's the backend optimization, which generates the code for the target architecture for CPU. We generate LVM IR for GPU. We generate CUDA codes and for NPU, we generate the CCO code. So, for example, in IKG, we have a lot of passes around the polyhedral phase. So as I said, the first phase is the operator normalization, then the polyhedral part, and then the backend optimization. I will not go into detail into all of the passes. It's just to show that there are many passes before and after the polyhedral scheduling. And many of these passes are specific to whatever architecture we are targeting. Then it's the same inside the polyhedral scheduling. We have several common passes, the initial scheduling, the actual polyhedral scheduling, a few analysis, the tiling, and then the final code generation. And then for each target architecture, we also have many, many passes because of whatever is needed for each architecture. So the challenge here is that polyhedral scheduling is responsible for critical actions and decision. It can extract parallelism and expose the parallel loops. It can extract what we call tileable loops, which is important for memory efficiency. And it can also leverage loop level optimizations such as data locality, access patterns, et cetera. However, polyhedral scheduling up until now was not really designed for all scenarios, what we call the whole scenarios context. The current state of the art scheduling algorithm from Pluto and ISL is supposed to be domain and target independent. It extracts outer parallelism and inertial locality. And for example, for when we are targeting NPUs, we end up having to use rescheduling passes to enable specific optimizations. This scheduling algorithm lacks the ability to inject new constraints for specific targets. And that's one of the things that we have done in AKG, the ability to inject new constraints to be able to guide the scheduling algorithm towards a better solution. In our case, in our case, these new constraints that we want to inject, we decide them using nonlinear approaches. We had one application to optimize low store vectorizations on GPU. So this mechanism, we called it MindTricks as a reference to MindSpo. Maybe I will not go too much into detail in that part. But so we enabled that in our AKG and we managed to get sensible speedups on some networks. Thanks to, as opposed to the standard scheduling, which would be the Pluto one, with these new constraints, we managed to get speedups on some operators and some networks because we managed to better to leverage vectorization, better vectorization, better data locality, etc. Another key optimization that is possible thanks to polyhedral scheduling is tidying. So this is another part that is very important for memory locality, for data locality, for memory optimizations, especially on accelerators where we sometimes have limited memory. So determining the best ties is critical because otherwise the kernels do not fit on the memory of the accelerators. Same thing, I'm not sure I can go into details here. But the main key point here is that AKG can both find tile sizes using tuning under automatic systems. And this symbolic tidying is a real-time tile size optimizer. So we don't rely on tuning for that. Then I'd like to talk about the challenges of polyhedral scheduling for machine learning. So this is a call we made a few months ago. It's not public anymore, but the thing is polyhedral scheduling relies on linear programming. It can be very, very slow, depending on the cases, because sometimes we end up with kernels that have hundreds of statements, hundreds of tensors. The polyhedral scheduling for this kind of operators can actually be very slow. So there is a challenge here in terms of compilation time. Another challenge is the ability to support sparse computations because polyhedral scheduling only mostly applies to regular codes. So, for example, when dealing with sparse computations, you don't want to actually iterate over all the steps. Maybe it could be possible to do that using polyhedral scheduling, but it's not very well known for now. Another challenge is speed. So we know that AI is full of approximations. We tend to use lower and lower precision floating poly arithmetic. There's quantization, specification, things like that. So usually in compilers, we want to preserve semantics, but in that case, maybe it's not necessary. So we may be able to approximate things. There has been work on approximate computing. There has been work, more recent work on trying to apply transformations that are actually not equivalent and then then deriving corrections for these transformations. So the key here is that polyhedral compilation right now has generated a lot of interest in the AI community. We have tensor compilations, PLAT ML, MLIR has some polyhedral technology as well, but the problem is that the polyhedral community is actually a very small community. So we need new people coming in and we need help actually to do all of that. So I'll just conclude on that. We have a polyhedral frameworks for AI, but the usual challenge from compilers is not the same because the idea here is that we need to optimize operator fusion. So as opposed to usual codes where we would have to analyze them, just analyze and extract the parts that can be optimized using polyhedral compilation. Here we know it's possible, but the challenge is to select the appropriate fusion strategy. What operators should be fused? What operators should not be fused? There are other bigger challenges because polyhedral scheduling is at the moment not very scalable. Extracting polyism is not the problem here. The problem here is to actually be able to exploit it on each target architecture. We have made new improvements to scheduling for that. We try to inject new constraints that we derive from nonlinear optimization. We have new ways to find tiling sizes, but there's still a lot of work to do, and that's where we would like everyone here to maybe help us. We already have something that's working that's efficient, but we are facing challenges. The code is open source, so you are kindly invited to have a look at it, to test it, and maybe even contribute. That concludes my talk. Thank you for your attention. Any questions? I have a quick question. My question is how well is the quantization for the models, for training, and things like that? How effective is this compared to non-contest version? What's the actual delta between for the efficiency when we have quantization? Sorry, I couldn't hear very well, so could you repeat the question? Yeah, sorry. I was asking what's the actual impact of quantization for your models? Like in terms of efficiency, how well has it improved when you quantized for the training and testing things like that? So the impact of the polyhedral scheduling on the networks, so this is not... First of all, in terms of operator fusion, here we had some results on several networks, so depending on the type of the networks, we have average speed-ups from 30% to 136%. Then if you wanted to know about our specific strategies for polyhedral scheduling, here are some results regarding what I mentioned before about the non-linear injection of constraints. Same thing, it depends on the networks, but on some networks, we managed to get up to a speed-up of seven, thanks to the fact that thanks to our new constraints, we managed to guide the scheduling towards improving vectorization and coalescing on GPU. Okay, so for the quantization alone, how much is the actual impact? Like did you micro-benchmark some of the optimization strategies which you tried to do? Okay, so these measurements, we did that on the execution times of the fuse operator, so we have the... Within MindStore, we have the ability to profile most of the things. In that case, we specifically measured the timespaint in the fuse operators. Any other question? So I guess I'll hand it here. Thank you for your attention.


African migration trends, myth versus reality. Myth. There is little demographic window of opportunity in Africa. Reality? Africa is the youngest continent for international migrants with a median age of 27 years. As these cohorts of children and youth grow older, and as birth rates across the continent are projected to continue to fall, the dependency ratio in Africa will plummet temporarily, presenting the continent for the demographic window of opportunity. Myth. Most Africans intend to migrate outside of the continent. Reality? A 2018 Afrobarometer survey conducted in 35 African countries showed that, on average, one-third of respondents have considered emigrating, especially the young and educated. However, a detailed analysis by Gallup pointed that only a relatively small percentage are actively planning and preparing to migrate. A high percentage of those intending to migrate plan to move to another country in Africa. Only 20% of respondents say they would like to migrate to Europe. Myth. There is enough data on migration in Africa. Reality? African countries have recognized that there is an urgent need to improve data on migration. An African Migration Data Capacity Building Program could help to address several challenges to migration management on the continent. Learn more about the migration trends in Africa in the African Migration Report.


اللهم صلي وسلم و بارك و أنا المعظم مكرم على سيدنا و حبيبنا و طبينا و شفلنا و قائدنا و قرات عيننا سيدنا و محمد صلى الله عليه وسلم و when they say that أنا سيد المالك came to Rasulullah صلى الله عليه وسلم and he had something in his mind that's why he asked this question he said Rasulullah where can I find you on the day of judgment he said you will find me at the hout at the water pool he said if we are not there where can I find you he said you will find me at the surat at the bridge of the hellfire he said if we are not there where are you going to find me he said to find me at the balance at the scale he said if you are not there he said you will never miss me in this place three places he said I will go to Rasulullah and tell him you are the servant of Allah he will not do this actually he will come with this relationship the reason I mentioned this because in Surah Mu'mineen اللهم صلى الله عليه وسلم told us about the balance one of the stages and important and scary stage is the scale and Allah said the one who their balance is heavy that means all these good deeds is their heavy then they are winners but Rasulullah صلى الله عليه وسلم wanted to make it easy for all of us especially the one who is like not doing that all good deeds Rasulullah صلى الله عليه وسلم said on the day of judgment on the balance a person will come with a huge file or record 70 or 90 or 100 files and each one is like a huge file and it's all put in the bad deeds and the scale will go down and that person will think that's خلاص I'm going to the Hellfire and then Allah will tell them no weight you have this small card let's put it on the other balance on the other side of the scale and in it it said and then when they put it because it's very heavy and all other sides will go and all the records will fly and then will go to paradise الحمد لله that's the good news but in Surat Al-Noura الله صلى الله عليه وسلم wanted us to be in a higher level and he came الله صلى الله عليه وسلم talking addressing the best of the Sahaba and he told him because he said he has a relative who is a miskeen and he is relative and he is from the Muhajireen but he did something really terrible سيدنا أبوكر that's what he said I will never forgive him but I will not punish him he used to give him every month some money he gave him money every month he said I will stop this money then Allah told us in the Qur'an Surat Al-Noura he said وَلَا تَلِيُدُ الْفَطْلِ وَالْسَعَبْ مِنْكُمْ وَالْمَسَاكِينْ وَالْمُهَجِفِي سَبِي اللَّهِ don't let the one don't let the one who don't stop what you are giving for relative the miskeen and the one who do hijra وَلِيْعَفُوا الْلَصْفَهُ forgive them أَلَا تُحِبُوا أَنُمَعْفُوا يَفُرُوا اللَّهِ الْكُمْ don't you love that Allah forgive you forgive you if you forgive them I forgive you so Allah is telling us through this that the way you want Allah to deal with you in the day of judgment is the way you deal with people in this life and say now أبوكر he told him just immediately say now come his relative his name is مصطح he said come he start giving back his mind وصلى الله عليه وسلم محمد وعلى أعلى


Remember, 10 years ago, Secretary Baker proposed creation of a new security system from Vancouver to Vladivostok. He didn't know then that his highest point in his career would be to debate Secretary Christopher in Florida. So at the time, the first Bush administration was, in a very vague terms, thinking about a new strategy, and Vancouver to Vladivostok is something where Russia is in. You cannot make it without Russia. And it was not created. Instead, the United States preferred to enlarge Western institutions. Like NATO, the outcome is that Russia, because Russia does not belong to these institutions, has been marginalized, has been reduced in its status. We ended the Cold War 10 years ago, and it was we who ended the Cold War 10 years ago, not to be treated like a defeated nation. The decision on NATO enlargement, despite Russian objection, was a clear case of Russia being presented with a feta-complete, a treatment of Russia as, well, they can howl and growl, but what can they do? They will swallow it, they have no choice. It's a big mistake. Russia will never agree to this kind of a treatment. And when we think about, well, a positive model for Russian-American relations, I think Polo made my task very easy by defining some of the points. Let me concentrate on, let me mention three main components of what real strategic partnership should be, not a declaratory partnership. That's the definition of common interests. And yes, we do have common interests. Very important common interests. Some interests are diverging, but we should agree that we should operate on the basis of common interests. Then we should have the mechanism, when on the basis of the common interest we should make common decisions, institutionalization of the partnership. It cannot be done in a way when the United States decides and gives it to Russia on the basis of, or take it or leave it. And finally, there should be a mechanism for implementation of these decisions. Unfortunately, and that's both Russian and American fall, we failed to create this mechanism, this partnership in the 90s. The result of lack of institutionalization and lack of strategy was extreme fragmentation of Russian-American relations. But each issue is treated separately without thinking what kind of impact it would have on a larger, long-term strategic goal. I'm afraid the United States also did some very bad mistakes. Some of them were related to excessive personalization of American policy. When I was studying in the United States, I heard from my friends that you believe in institutions and checks and balances, not in personality. Unfortunately, in Russia, you did something else. In economy, there was no martial plan. And the United States did support criminal privatization, the result of which is enormous confusion in the Russian economy and economic decline. The United States supported as clever policy to control inflation, creation of financial pyramid, this huge domestic debt, which we accumulated, and also the situation which resulted in enormous capital flight from Russia, not only private capital flight, but Russia is also in a typical foreign debt trap. Last year, which was a very good year in relative terms for Russia, because the economy partially stabilized, the Russian government spent 35% of all its revenues to pay the foreign debt. And that's in a situation when we are not paying the Soviet debt. If we were paying the Soviet debt, then we had to pay 50% of all our revenues. The problem of the foreign debt is like German reparations after the First World War. And in the military field, let's face it, the United States lost its enthusiasm about arms control. Maybe the reason, because Russia is no more equal in power to the United States. But whether we look at American attitude to city beauty, the threat to withdraw from the ABM treaty, lack of enthusiasm about Star 3, it seems that somehow arms control is perceived in this country more and more as a unilateral concession by the United States. Because Russia cannot respond in a symmetrical way. I think it's a very worrisome development. And I think it's time again to think whether the United States policy towards Russia should be integration of Russia into the community of political democracy and market economy. Whether you perceive Russia at some point in the 21st century, I don't know. Maybe not under the second Bush administration, but under the third Bush administration. Because in Russia they say, well, now they have the administration of George Bush, the father. They will be the administration of George Bush, the son. And then it will be replaced by the administration of George Bush, the Holy Spirit. But let us imagine that we agree on the goal. Then in the year 2010, 2015, 2000 X, Russia does belong. Then let's see what kind of steps, what kind of stages we have to go. To achieve this purpose and institutional engagement is absolutely necessary. Yes, Russia may be not qualified to be admitted to many western institutions. But it shouldn't be treated as either or. Japan is not a member of NATO. Israel doesn't have even a mutual security treaty with the United States. There are many countries which belong to the West, quote, unquote. Which are not members of NATO. And thus we should think about some special arrangements between western institutions and Russia. Unfortunately, the founding act was not treated seriously. That's why the dialogue which we have today lacks substance. And clearly, well, Russia is not going to be satisfied with something like partnership for peace, if it's not sufficient for Estonia, why it should be sufficient for the Russian Federation.  This is the crucial issue for Russian recovery. This is the crucial issue for Russian domestic developments and Russian international behavior. And let me make it very clear, without restructuring of the Russian foreign debt, the optimistic scenario in Russia is impossible. I made my parallel with Weimar, Germany. But Russia needs a break, because if we continue to lose all this capital, simply we will always don't have sufficient investment. Yes, a lot depends on Russian government. We should fight against corruption. We should adopt the necessary legislation. But the foreign debt restructuring is something which only the western community can really agree upon. We cannot do it unilaterally. Unilaterally, it only can go on default and announce bankruptcy. That's also related to the terms of Russian integration and the World Trade Organization. If you want to be a part of global economy, we should join. But if we join now, Russian economy would simply collapse because we are not competitive. Mutually should destruction. Why 10 years after the end of the Cold War, Russia and the United States in the strategic field still operate within the rules of mutually should destruction? There are no ideological reasons for continuation of this mechanism. There is no geopolitical competition that existed during the Cold War. So when George W. Bush challenged this notion, there were some parts of his speech which I particularly liked. There were some parts of his speech which I didn't. But if we're serious about going beyond mutually should destruction model, then we should see a transition period when we make steps both in strategic offensive weapons and in strategic defensive weapons. And strategic offensive reductions should be something not simply related to low numbers. The result should be we reach the point when the Cold War scenario of the bolt out of the blue counter-force attack, all this crazy scenario becomes impossible. And in this situation, the whole issue of strategic defenses, ballistic missile defenses, would look different. So if the United States proposes to go to this transition period, I hope Russian response will be positive. But if the United States will unilaterally try to achieve absolute superiority both in offensive and defensive weapons by watching Russia to reduce its missiles unilaterally and by deploying ballistic missile defenses in violation, in unilateral violation of the ABM Treaty, then we're going to have a much more serious scenario. And the last point, geopolitical importance of Russia. Russia is not a superpower anymore. And Russia probably never will be a superpower like the Soviet Union was. But Russia does remain one of the major international players. And let me mention just two examples. One, unfortunately, Brunsk-Alcroft left. But remember his idea about the kind of a security directorate for Europe with the United States, the European Union, and Russia. I'm not sure that should be the exact arrangement. But these are major players on which European security depends much more than on Estonian membership and NATO. China. It is, again, a triangular relationship. Russia, China, the United States. It's not a kind of triangular relationship which exists during the Cold War, because Russia is not the Soviet Union. And China is something different from what it was 20 years ago. But in both these triangles, Russia will be an active player. And that's why the question isn't my final word is, Russia will come back. We don't know when exactly it will happen, how much time it will take. But Russia will come back as a major player. And the question is whether Russia will come back as a major player who is integrated, who is your reliable partner, who shares your main values, who is institutionally connected to you, or as a country, as a great power, which perceives that it was mistreated, that the new world order is detrimental to its national security interests and which will try to undermine this new world order. Michael, we will choose a more optimistic scenario. Thank you. I want to thank our panelists for three very fine presentations. We have, I think, about 15 or 20 minutes. Let's just open it up for questions from any members of the audience. And I guess people want you to step to the microphone if you would, so that we can pick up the questions for the webcast. Yes, ma'am? The missile defense question. Do the panelists, including Mr. Hadley, think that it is possible that it could go forward in a way that would bring Russia in along the lines that Mr. Rogov described? Yes. I think there is a real opportunity here. If you listen to what Sergey said today and what he has said in other forums and read the speech that then Governor Bush made in May, I think there is a real overlap there. Both start from the proposition that the relationship between Russia and the United States has moved beyond the Cold War logic, but our nuclear deterrent posture really has not. Now, we can debate that issue, but I think what we can all agree on is more can be done. And if we could move and have a dialogue at a strategic level that begins to rethink the issue of the strategic relationship between the United States and Russia, for which nuclear weapons has been at the heart, and ask, what is the appropriate strategic relationship in the post-Cold War world? And then look at our strategic force requirements in that light. I think you will see a basis for a lower nuclear posture, a different nuclear posture, a concept which says that for the threats that we both face from in the post-Cold War world, a mix of offensive and defensive forces makes sense, is stabilizing, and can enhance deterrence. And if we could get that common framework, I think we can work out the issues of our force structure on the offensive side and defensive side. It's going to be very difficult. The Allies have a lot of concerns. China has a lot of concerns. This is a major initiative undertaking, very difficult to do, but I think we have an opportunity here. And I think there's some indication of responsiveness on both sides. So I think there's a real opportunity, and I hope we can take advantage of it. Could I add a word, Steve? Trudy, I'd like to give you an answer from my perspective as somebody who is handing the baton off both generally and I think quite specifically to Steve on this. I agree with absolutely everything that Steve just said by way of assessment of the problem and of the potential solution. John Holm, who is here and who served as our Under Secretary for Arms Control until a couple of weeks ago, and I spent much of a year between September of 1999 and September, October of 2000 working this issue within our government, with the Russians, with our Allies, and with others. And on the strength of that experience, particularly with the Russians, I believe that on the terms that Steve just articulated and with that kind of framework in mind, it can happen. It will happen because it makes sense. Now here I'm going to jump the gun a little bit and switch into the role of a commentator, which I won't be for another week or so, but offer an opinion that's entirely my own. And I'll leave it to Ambassador Ushakov and whether he wants to confirm it or not. But my guess is that the reason we ran into the big net from the Putin administration with regard to what we were proposing with regard to NMD, which is very much along the lines of what Steve just said, is very simple. And that is that President Putin and his colleagues decided all things considered. If they were going to do a deal, they wanted to do a deal with the president who would deploy, as opposed to doing a deal with the president who would talk about deploying or tee up deployment for his successor. Well, now they've got one, and we'll test the proposition. But I think Steve is right. Yes, ma'am. Casey Schaefer with the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All of the speakers focused, I think, quite properly on the building blocks that ought to be the basis for a new relationship on the positives. I wonder if any of you would care to comment on the differences in interests that the US and Russia will have to manage in building this new relationship. Do you want to start? Well, in my own comments, I suggested some of the fundamental areas in which we have differences and that I don't think are going to change, one being the whole issue. And you certainly refer to it more extensively in your comments. And that's the question of Russia and Russia's role in the future of Europe. Question of institutions. How Russia fits in that overall scheme? What happens with the issue of NATO enlargement? It's an ironic issue to mention, however, because on one hand, although I see this as being an issue that's going to pose problems in the future, nevertheless, when one looks at the past, I saw it a bit differently. As I suggested, I saw the outcome as being a rather favorable one, maybe not the most optimal one from all parties' concern. But in the first round of NATO enlargement, I did think it was handled very deftly where we pursued our interests. We knew that there were differences at the same time that a mechanism was established for engaging Russia in the process of security-related issues in the future of Europe. The Balkans is certainly an issue in which not only in this country we have differences, but I think with Moscow, we will have differences over the handling of Serbia over questions of Kosovo, over questions of Bosnia. We've had differences to date. That will continue. And then thirdly, I'm repeating myself, but I do see this as a fundamental stumbling block, and that's the question of Chechnya. I don't see any kind of, if one could use the word give, in the outlook and the way in which Russia sees the issue. And we see it, and also our allies, in particular, the French, are the most outspoken on the issue in question of the handling of Chechnya. Those are examples of some of the main differences that I see as continuing in the time ahead. I might make a couple comments on this, and then Straub, I know, may have a comment and Sergey as well. Three things quickly. One, I think one of the problems with Russia is a problem in some sense of our politics, and it's also a problem in our thinking. I mean, we like clarity as Americans, and we like the side, whether somebody is sort of on our side or against us. Is it a friend? Is it a foe? Is it an ally? Is it a potential adversary? And we do less well, and I think our politics does less well when we say this is a country for whom we have some common interests, and on which we can work on common problems. And this is also a country where we have some areas where our interests diverge and where we're going to butt heads, and we need to try and constrain those areas where we're going to butt heads and figure out a way to manage them in a way that don't rupture the relationship. That is a fairly sophisticated approach. It's very easy to want to decide a country is one thing or another and hold the areas of cooperation hostage to the areas where we have differing interests. It's a very difficult relationship to manage. It is, I think, though, what we have to do, the approach we need to adopt with respect to Russia. And I should say I'm speaking personally here now. The new administration has not sorted through all of this. But my own personal view is when you think about it, that's the framework we need. I think it was in October the US Institute of Peace had a session in Europe on Russia where we tried to go through a series of regional and functional issues and ask the question, do we have common interests or not with Russia? And if we do, what are the potential areas of collaboration? And we didn't hit a 10 strike on every issue. But in a number of areas, we found potential areas for common interests and potential areas for common ground, as well as areas where we are going to have differences. And I think we need to focus on how to maximize those. And finally, I think it's important that this dialogue and addressing of these kinds of issues not simply be confined to governments, but that there be track one and a half and tracks two and however many tracks we now have where Americans, Russians, Europeans engage on these issues in a concrete way and try and define potential areas of collaboration. I think that can be very useful to supplement the governmental relations of the parties. Paul? I'm sorry, Sergey? Well, let me add that there are some interests of Russia and the United States which simply don't overlap. We don't pretend we are global superpower. So there are today, unlike the Soviet, there is plenty of areas in this world which we don't care about. But there are, of course, areas we do care about. And Stroh mentioned the difference between CIS and NIS. If we are engaged with the United States in a kind of zero-sum game, I think it would be a very unfortunate misreading of our interests. I don't think that really our interests there compete. But there is one area when I'm afraid we can really develop a very serious problem. I mentioned already this ballistic missile defense. And clearly, it's clear why Russia is concerned about American unilateral deployment. Because Russia sees the United States only potent. You are 10 feet tall. The laws of physics don't exist for you. So Russia is concerned about its nuclear retaliatory capability. But in the real world, it's a much greater challenge to China. And the most unfortunate scenario will be if both Russia and China will interpret that this is a common threat. And they have a common interest to oppose it. In my view, that is something which should be avoided. Steve, I want to come back to the original question. But just one thing, Sergei, in response to what you picked up on in my earlier remarks. We would, as an administration, have been happy to refer to the Commonwealth of Independent States as the umbrella identity for the 12 former republics of the USSR if the 11 non-Russian republics had told us that they were enthusiastic about us doing so. And when the day comes that your fellow CIS members are as comfortable with the CIS as apparently the leadership in Moscow and Minsk are, then I think it would be appropriate for American policy to switch from referring to the NIS to the CIS. Taisy, my response, which I think to your question, which I think is consistent, actually with what all three of my colleagues have said, zeroes in on use of force and particularly use of American force as a generic and continuing point of tension between the United States and Russia. If you look back over the last eight years, as I'm now having occasion to do, the toughest episodes that we went through were where it was necessary we felt as the United States to bomb, whether it was Serbs in Bosnia or Serbs in Serbia or Osama bin Laden targets in Afghanistan or very, very much to the point Saddam Hussein. And I understand why this has been and will continue to be a real challenge for Russia. This is a deeply neurologic issue, but it goes to the institutional point that we're talking about. What we are all trying to do here is put in place post-Cold War structures, including security structures. Those include the United Nations, the OSCE, organizations where Russia was present at the creation, as it were, is on the board of directors. But there are going to be issues that will continue to arise in the future where come let us reason together will not be a sufficient motto, where economic sanctions will not be a sufficient instrumentality and where the use of force will have to come into play. And that will mean the United States, and it will mean NATO, and it will mean disagreements with the Russians. I think that the great accomplishment in the Balkans is that we were able, as a relationship, call it a partnership, to survive the Coastal War. And to do so, that is to have the relationship survive. And to do so in a way where Russia played an instrumental role in bringing about the diplomatic outcome, despite its profound distaste for the bombing. And one reason I wanted to highlight this use of force issue is because of Iraq. I would be fascinated to know what sort of confabs are going on in Baghdad at whatever equivalent of the United States Institute for Peace there is there, as they look forward, to the administration of Bush the Sun, never mind the Holy Ghost. And they wonder what's down the road in, shall we say, military-to-military relations between the United States and Iraq in the coming period. But I know this. Whatever happens, if it involves use of force, it's going to be a problem between the Bush administration and the Putin administration. But I've got a lot of confidence that Steve and his colleagues will handle it as brilliantly as we did. Patrick Cronin is the enforcer here of the clock. And he's about to mount the podium and strike us dead. Patrick, can we have one last question since gentlemen? You're the chair. Final question. Thank you. I'm Bob Khan, president of the Corporation for National Research Initiative. It's widely understood that information technology has broad economic and national security implications. My understanding is that in the former Soviet Union, information technology was viewed somewhat warily, not rapidly accepted with open arms and fairly tightly controlled. I'm just wondering if any of the people on the panel would care to comment about the role of information technology as an instrument in forging a better relationship between the US and Russia? That could probably be a conference in itself, at least a panel. Sergey, you want to try any comments on that? I'm looking for a grant to buy more computers for my institute. Well, I'm not. You've either come to the right place or the wrong place, depending on who you're looking at in the audience. It's all I can say. I suspect more the right place, but not up here at the front of the room. I think that the revolution in information technology, more than any other single factor, is responsible for the collapse of the Soviet system in the Soviet Union, as well as dictatorship in Chile and the opening of China and many other things. The fact that there are people in remote areas of Russia who are now on the web, that there are 50 public access internet sites, is crucial both to what has happened and to my own fundamental optimism about what will happen in the future. I do think, though, it is worrisome, if not ominous, that the president administration in Russia has talked about information security, a phrase and concept which, when elaborated, begins to sound a little bit like beginning to close some of those portals. And I would hope that that issue would be very much on the agenda of the next administration, as well as, now that I'm about to move into it, the NGO community in the United States and its interaction with Russia. Let me thank our panelists and thank the members of the audience for a useful session this morning. Thanks very much.