So, I think I was checking the mic, it functions admirably well, apparently, so we will start our panel. We are privileged with a, I have to say, a very, very impressive panel on this issue of the major mid-term, long-term issues for the global economy, and it is my pleasure to introduce the members of this panel. The first on my left would be Gabrielle Felbenmaier, director of the Austrian Institute of Economic Research, the WIFO, and professor at Vienna University. He is also, he was also the head of the IFO Center for International Economics in Munich, the very famous IFO Institute, and he was also president of the Kiel Institute of the World Economy, so an extraordinary career, if I may, in chairing a very, very important institution. We will then hear what Sébastien Jean has to say. He is senior associate of the IFRI, and professor of economics in Paris at the Conservatoire national des arts et métiers, and he holds the chair Jean-Baptiste Sé, which is a very, very good mentor, if I may, on the industrial economy. He's also a member of many, many councils, and he has previously been director of the CEPI in Paris. So thank you, Sébastien, for coming, we are very honored. John is an old friend, I have to say, I have to declare, John is a friend. Senior fellow of the Foreign Policy Institute at John Hopkins, he was first deputy managing director in the IMF, was also acting managing director of the IMF, and he was, he had a very important position in the private sector.  We see you in Shanghai, in Seoul, everywhere in the world, in Delhi, and you were kind enough to come. Thank you very, very much indeed. And we have Marcus Nolan with us, so thank you, Marcus, very much, executive vice president, director of studies at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, and you have been senior economist at the Council of Economic Advisers in the executive office of the president of the United States, and you held research or held research and teaching position in many universities, top, not universities including Yale and John Hopkins. So here we are, blessed with your presence, and I think we could say that we are prolonging in the economic sphere what Thierry de Montréal said a moment ago at the level of the globe and on all dimension, if I may, including technological dimension, political dimension, social dimension. We will be more modest, we will perhaps try to elucidate what are your main messages as regards precisely the main issues for the global economy in the present time. I would certainly say that there are many, many numerous dimensions to the questions which are asked explicitly in our panel. I will only list those questions, but as I said, each of us has messages, will concentrate on some message, and it is what is important taking into account their experience and what they have done in the world until now. So I would only mention technology, as said, Thierry, is a major, major driving force and we are experiencing with artificial intelligence something which is particularly striking, but it's not near start, it's only a start. Science and technology are progressing on a very large front. I will note climate change, don't insist, green transition, we are on a single spaceship which is planet Earth and we recognize that we have to take care of all of us without any exception. And if there is a domain where it is absolutely clear that all countries concerned have to take care, it is certainly taking care of the single spaceship in which we are. Another point would be, of course, reflecting on global trade, what happens in global trade, what happens in the hedging of the global, long global value chain. The change of attitude with the global change is very striking as a lot of, I would say, counterproductive consequences, both as regards the growth on the planet and as regards also the push for inflation of the planet if we are not optimizing the global value chain as we did before, but clearly this is a very important trend. We have, of course, the fight against inequalities which was also mentioned by Thierry. I think it is something which has generalized the world over, advanced economy, emerging economies, all countries and economies on the planet have this threat which is the looming inequalities. And, of course, I will say a word on inflation which is one of the big, big challenges that we have today. On that, I would only say that I am reasonably confident that the central banks will regain control when time comes. I take it that in the year 25, we will probably have inflation, core inflation say in order not to be too depending on the volatility of some prices, but core inflation around 2% in the medium term, which is the single goal, the single definition of price stability that we presently have the world over. It came out of the crisis of Lehman that, again, Thierry mentioned and I have to say one of the major consequences of the Lehman crisis is that all major central banks that are members of the basket of the SDR whose the currencies are part of the basket of the SDR, so namely the U.S., Europe, Japan and the U.K. have the same definition of price stability. I consider that this is something which is extremely important, under assessed, under estimate by, I would say, academia in general, unfortunately because, again, it's one of the de facto transformation of the international monetary system that should be analyzed and studied much more. That being said, I don't want to take much of the time and I turn to my neighbor. What would you say? How would you send your messages? I know that you have slides and I thank you for that. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for the introduction, Thierry de Montbrial for setting this up, it's always a pleasure to be here, an event that I'm looking forward the whole year. My privileged honor this morning is to start the session off and I'll do so with a number of slides. First of all, the state of the world economy summarized with a very Eurocentric view here for economists, the Eurozone, the United States, the U.K. and China and what we see here is a state of fragility. We see that those bars go up and go down, the Eurozone is not growing, these are quarter on quarter growth rates, the third quarter is just in flash estimates, so quite fresh, the Eurozone is at the brink of a recession. The United States are surprising us with relatively high growth rates, quarter on quarter in the third quarter 2023, the analyzed growth rate would be almost 5%. This is a lot, I'm not sure what you say, but in those times where we need to cool down our economists to get rid of inflation, this looks red hot too much and unsustainable. And China, the engine of growth for so many years is not growing steadily, it's up and down and one of the major impressions that this slide gives to me is how similar the Chinese and the American experience look like if you look at those bars. Even the United Kingdom here looking very much like the Eurozone. The world is such growing with a rate of about 3% in this year, next year, a little bit more, but certainly below the levels that we have seen over the last years. Now that is not surprising given the shocks that we have been under and I would say what we should take away from that is not only divergences across the Atlantic and across China and Europe, but a relative lack of collapse, because resilience is what we should see here. Even for the Eurozone, the feared recession, if it comes, will be a mild one and we're not facing big disaster here. The next year, some improvement in the Eurozone in our estimates, some improvement in the United Kingdom, decline in the United States and the shift side was in China. The big issue for us economists over the last two years or so of course has been inflation. The good news is that headline inflation is coming down on the right-hand side. You see the United States on the left-hand side, the Eurozone in both is coming down. Core inflation is very much the same now in those two areas, surprisingly, something like 4.2, 4.1%, but what you also see is that the Eurozone has a larger trajectory to run through. We have been at higher rates than the Eurozone. And what worries me here is that the 2% target is still quite far away from us. If you look at the green, the green pass in this picture, there's a services inflation and you see it's very high, both still in the United States and also in the Eurozone. The services inflation of course reflects wage growth more than all the other categories. So I think we must say the job's not yet done. The central bankers are gaining back control. That is true, but I fear that we're really in a situation higher for longer as the professionals say and the fight against inflation will be finding the world economy for more than the next one or two years. My fear is that the strong increase in interest rates will feed into financial risks and we have not seen everything yet. So on top of all the EU economic struggles that we're facing, the climate disaster financial risks I think are high. The rates will be higher for longer, I've said so, but we know that monetary policy comes with a lag and the lag can be substantial and my fear is that a large share of what monetary policy will achieve is not yet visible in the data. We see that fiscal policy needs to become sustainable again. That's true in the Eurozone, but it's very much true in the United States and that too will put pressure on growth and on the financial markets. Quantitative tightening has not really fully started and that will also affect interest rates, the long-run interest rates and the growth perspectives. Only 20% according to some estimates of the total impact of monetary policy tightening is yet in the data, so more to come. And what I fear is that the financial crisis that we have seen showing its face earlier this year is not yet over, somewhere all those fixed income assets must be that have come under pressure over the last years with the high interest rates and we only need a big shock that forces insurances, for example, to liquidate their holdings to see more financial stress in the system. So I'm a bit fearful on this side and I'm also a bit fearful about the Eurozone. Inflation differences across the zone are huge in the October inflation rates. The difference between Slovakia and Belgium is something like 950 basis points. It's enormous and something that worries me quite a bit. We are far away from an optimal monetary area in Europe. This should not be possible if we were really having an integrated single market and the interest rates spread across the Eurozone is up. Look at Italy with almost 150% of debt over GDP and the interest payments more than doubling. That puts stress on the system. Now if I may look at the international arena, what we see is that the boom in use of economic sanctions is going on. This is the translation, if you like, in economics what we see in the political world war by other means. The political science colleagues say political conflict that's fought out with economic means. The trend's not good. This is data from the global sanctioned database that I'm putting together with US colleagues at the exponential growth. That is certainly something that's weighing on the gross perspectives of the world economy and shows that the political risks are of course translating into economic risks because sanctions mean disruption of global value chains, mean decoupling at least at the bilateral level. And so that's what we see here in terms of globalization. That's my preferred measure of globalization is just taking a quantity index of international goods traded divided by quantity index of industrial production. So we're hopefully comparing here apples with apples and not bananas. And what we see here is resilience on the one hand, the world has not declobalized but the hyper-clobalization here in blue has stopped and it had stopped like 15 years ago. But what we do see is at the newest data that the world economy is slowing down, a significant decline in this measure. So trades falling faster than industrial production, the world's trade organizations, trade reports are relatively alarmists, not the latest version of it. And I think what we can say is that the decoupling that's happening, for example, at the bilateral level between the United States and China is also eating into the aggregate data. Trade diversion can only go somewhere to mitigate the bilateral effects of less trade, for example, across the Pacific. And then something I would like to bring our attention to is the enlargement of the BRICS group, the two, six more members. I think this is significant, it's under discussed as far as I can say, there are implications on the world financial system as the BRICS have their own bank, for example, setting up more autonomous currency systems. And the enlargement of course involves this country here, the United Arab Emirates. And so I thought it's important to bring it up. In terms of numbers, share of the BRICS plus six in global GDP or in global population, this enlargement is not making a big change, but what it does is it brings in countries that have been outside of the inner circle of policymaking, like Iran, for example, into the BRICS. And I believe that is a challenge for the world order as we've seen it. The hope is that this does not lead to more polarization, but certainly this event tells us something about the situation that we're in, in the world economy and we should take note of this. Here I'll stop. Jean-Claude, thank you for having me again. Thank you very much, Gabriel. You stick to the concept, which is give messages, short, concise messages. Thank you very much indeed. On the inflation, I will only say I share entirely the views. That being said, I will strike myself that core inflation on both sides of the Atlantic is now exactly the same figure, which says something and gives credibility to the fact that they have the same goal, they have the same definition of price stability, which is reassuring, all taken into account even if, as you said very wisely, the challenges are still there, of course. So thank you very much. Can I turn to Sébastien? Thank you, Jean-Claude. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Yes, I'd like to share a few thoughts about the way the world economy interacts with world politics somehow. My starting point would be to observe that what makes probably the present situation quite unique is the intensification of grid power competition in a context of close economic and financial interdependence. This has translated recently in a situation where we see that the multilateral frameworks are somehow destabilised and overwhelmed, as witnessed by the spread of economic restrictions on trade and investment flows, of exceptional duties, the tariff duties on the spread of economic sanctions, and so on. On the witness also by the spread of uncoordinated industrial policies and increased state interventionism. So this is a situation marked by increasing geopolitical tensions. But I think it's fair to say that at least until now, the result has not been, at least not to a large extent, it has not been decoupling or fragmentation. We've seen a kind of plateauing, and Gabriel showed it in figures a moment ago, in terms of the intensity of world trade. But there is no established trend toward decline in economic and financial relations at the world level. There are some cases, some specific places where this is indeed a decline. And this is, for instance, the case in terms of the bilateral trade relationship between the US and China for well-understood reasons. But it is remarkable that even in that case, for instance, study after study, it is shown that when the intensity of direct trade between the US and China is declining, indirect trade is actually increasing, meaning that the US is sourcing less imports from China. It will be sourcing more from a variety of countries, say, Vietnam, Mexico, for instance. And these countries themselves are sourcing more components from China, meaning that aiming at decoupling what we are observing actually is not decoupling a fragmentation, it's more diversion with ensuring costs and opacity. And questions about whether this is reducing in any meaningful terms risk or degree of dependence. So I think somehow we have to live with this inter-economic and financial interdependence. Of course, the situation of geopolitical tensions and economic interdependence create a very strong temptation to leverage interdependencies for political purposes, to weaponize them. And I think that's really a defining feature of the present situation. But it's also a very difficult objective, difficult because economic and financial exchanges are defined by a principle of mutual benefits. They are taking place because they are benefiting both parties, meaning that it is very difficult for one of them to usefully leverage them. When is it possible? Well, when there is a situation with a very pronounced asymmetry. And only in such case is it possible really to efficiently leverage these economic and financial interdependencies. And I think this is a reason why in the recent examples of weaponization of economic dependencies, we are seeing the increasing importance, the overwhelming importance of finance, of information and knowledge. Because these are interdependencies, these are activities that rely upon very concentrated networks. Think about the monetary system with the role of the dollar. Think about international banking transaction with the role of the SWIFT system. Think about information with social networks or about high tech and semiconductors, for instance, with intellectual properties. Each of these cases, you have very complex networks where a few short points, as Henry Farrell and Aimee Newman have called them, are taking central importance and can be leveraged and have been leveraged for many of them recently. So it's a situation that in a recent paper published together with Tomagomar, we define as geofinance, meaning to reflect the fact that it is marked by an increasing politicization of financial and information flows. And it's somehow different from what we used to think in terms of geoeconomic competition in the 1990s or the 2000s, which was mainly taking place within the framework of multilateral institutions. Here, in many cases, this competition and this weaponization is in breach of international commitments. So I think it is not surprising given this situation that economic security is becoming an overarching concern for governments. With many two objectives. The first one is to reduce vulnerability and build leverage with regard to these short points, to these critical notes in the world economy. And the second one is to control or at least master to some extent foundational technologies. And here I think the interaction is very strong with climate change, because climate change is already an ongoing revolution in terms of for industry, for trade, for raw materials and energy. It's redefining the key technologies, it's redefining the way markets are working. So the challenge today for many governments is how to reach, how to improve economic security. In a context where increasingly for the reasons I described, they are not considering international markets, world markets are secure enough. In a context as well, I think it's worth emphasizing that where isolation is clearly not the solution for two main reasons. The first one is efficiency. International division of labor is a sine qua non of efficiency today, especially for sophisticated technologies. And the second one could be a last term relational power by Susan Strange. The need to have allies or at least to have partners to support your views. And we see that in this context of tension, this is increasingly important. So relational power requires openness, requires significant economic and financial relationships. So this is a challenge. I think it is really important to emphasize as well that increasingly the response of governments is using more ambitious, more widespread industrial policies. And it's worth as well emphasizing that while in the 80s, for instance, we'll be economists were commenting a lot, the fact that some policies were used as a way to kind of appropriate rents as rent shifting policies. This is a typical example for that was the competition between Airbus and Boeing as the efforts of government to somehow appropriate the oligopolistic rent in this sector. Today it's more about control, about power than about rent. And but the same kind of logic is taking place, a logic where everyone is trying to appropriate and everyone needs to somehow to retaliate to what others are doing. So I'll conclude just by emphasizing the threats involved in these trends. The threats, of course, are additional and useless costs from an economic point of view linked to these additional obstacles and constraints. It's also in the additional rigidities ensuing from this constraint, and I think that means a lot in terms of adjustment capacity for the world economy in the time to come, with of course, a significant risk of escalation. All this for a benefit which we can discuss it, but I think so far is very limited in terms of de-risking as the term, the fashionable term put it. And finally, the last and probably most dangerous threat is that all these constraints jeopardize the capacity of coordination at the world level. So I think this is a very important challenge in terms of economic governance globally. I think part of the response should lie around somehow ring fencing the security concerns in the world economy and the world finance and as a precondition probably to update coordination and rules in other sectors. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you very much indeed. Sébastien, I take it that your exploration of the impact on global economy and trade in particular and also the overall industrial diversification associated with the tensions associated with this will to de-risk to have a world in which we would incorporate precisely these major changes in the global tensions is something which is very important. I take it that with global trade being under the impact of this French shoring, reshoring or whatever, of course it has a cost first and second it has an impact on the global growth and it has also an impact on inflation to be frank. So all this is intertwined in a way which is very striking. Thank you very much Sébastien. John, you have the floor. Thank you. Thank you very much. And first to Terrie Montbrie, congratulations on this new edition of the World Policy Conference and thanks for including me and having the chance to appear on this panel with my friend Jean-Claude Trichet and his other illustrious colleagues. Let me make a few comments on the outlook. It's quite appropriate that the timing of our conference today comes just weeks after the G20 Leaders Summit meeting in New Delhi and the IMF World Bank annual meetings in Marrakesh and as we heard from the minister and we know in just a few weeks the COP28 will be meeting here in Dubai to discuss progress or hopefully to make progress on climate change issues. I'll take as my starting point for the outlook the world economic outlook of the fund, no offense Gabrielle, they're very similar, they're very similar. The IMF noted that global GDP grew 3.5% last year, 3% this year, their forecast for next year is 2.9%. And that's compared to the, in the space between 2000 and 2019 that's including the global financial crisis, world GDP growth had averaged 3.8% and the IMF's forward looking forecast is for the next five years of growth of 3.1%. In other words, by historical standards, this is a very mediocre outlook at best. They also characterize the outlook is rather uneven and quite uncertain. And notably, they don't expect inflation to return to its pre-COVID performance until at least 2025, not a very pleasing result or forecast. So what are the key issues? To me, one of them is exactly the outlook for inflation. Right now, central banks are advertising that their rate policy is likely to be higher for longer. Of course, that depends on their expectation that inflation is going to be relatively sticky. It certainly seems reasonable at this point, but we also shouldn't forget that it wasn't that long ago that central banks were advertising their policy as lower for longer. It really is going to depend on the outlook for inflation. Here it's possible that there will be not differentiation in target as Jean-Claude underscored, but differentiation in outcomes. And if so, this will have a substantial impact both on global markets, but also on the status of financial risks. Right now, a substantial perception of financial risks is related to the substantial rise in long-term interest rates, especially in the U.S. And the combination of losses that that implies for current holders of these securities and interplay with likelihood of continued high policy rates. So simply to say, I'll leave it with saying, if inflation outlook is more favorable than the consensus, just as it was turned out to be more difficult than had been the previous consensus before the COVID-related inflation hit, these worries could diminish. But it remains quite uncertain. A second key issue, of course, is one of the sources for both the differentiation in economic outcomes, but also the pressure on long-term capital markets, has been the substantial run-up in debt, especially in the fiscal sector, especially among other places in the U.S. And the assumed pressure on budgets going forward that also are an important element of the perception of likely financial and economic risks. Once again, this remains controversial in many countries in Europe, but especially in the U.S. The outlook for the election in the coming year, and I know we'll be having a session on these things later in the conference, could have an impact on the outlook for public deficits and the growth of debt. There's an obvious linkage that is often overlooked. One of the reasons why the run-up in public debt that occurred in the wake of the global financial crisis was not as anywhere near as destabilizing as many thought, was because of the continuation of very low interest rates, including long-term interest rates, which meant for many years following the crisis, despite the increase in the stock of debt, the percentage of government revenues that were dedicated to debt service was declining, not rising. It's only in the last few years, last couple of years, that that trend has been reversed. Hence, the centrality of the future performance of inflation and the outlook for fiscal policy. Another key issue, of course, and one that's been discussed already, is that for trade. For sure, we've seen the following. Essentially, for the 60 years following the formation of the Bretton Wood system, global trade grew faster than global GDP, almost without exception. In other words, just as the architects of the postwar system had anticipated that the restoration of a global trading system was going to be a key element driving global development. Hence the global financial crisis, let's call it the end. For the past ten years, eight of the past ten years, global trade has grown more slowly than global GDP, and that remains the case this year. And the outlook going forward certainly remains problematic. There are various forces that are at work here. One is, for sure, the use of sanctions and protectionist measures that Gabrielle's slide showed us. These are, and the threat of additional use of protectionist measures is an ongoing threat. At the same time, however, in response to COVID, the experience of COVID, there's been a much greater attention paid to the resilience of supply chains. So some of what we see in the changing direction or the changing nature of supply chains in various markets is certainly trade diversion, as Asean was telling us. But some of it is, let's call it more organic, attention to the issue of resilience and reliability of trade and of supply chains in more extreme circumstances. Time will tell, but the recent G20 Leaders Summit pledged to restore the functioning of the WTO and to work towards a more open trading system. However, when you read the content of their undertakings, it is far from certain whether this is going to happen. Why this is particularly important is because of the growth in trade and services that is, of course, complicating because it is not well dealt with in trade legislation. And secondly, the prospect of new technology that could once again bring forth an improvement in productivity growth similar to what we saw in the 1990s. So this, the development of technology and the evolution of the trading system is going to be, is going to be very important. And in that context I should have mentioned already, the increased, the increased use of subsidies and other forms of industrial policy and that's risk of complicating the trading system. So was there something new that has come out of this round of meetings of global leaders? And I would say yes, and that is a much greater focus on the provision of what are called global public goods. Matters to deal with climate change, environment, health, food security, etc. What has happened so far is a much greater attention at the level of intentions to deal with these issues that would imply potentially non-trivial changes in public policy and in the, the provision of these goods at a global level. But what is also clear at this time is the lack of clarity about how this will be accomplished. So it's an intent, a substantial, potentially substantial new public policy initiative at a global level that so far in the, if we look at the latest round of, of meetings is more intention so far than real action. But it's something to watch closely. I'll stop there. Thank, thank you very much indeed, John. I take your point on the longer, higher, for longer coming from the central banks. My interpretation is that they have to fight permanently against market participants that are calling for industries decreasing as rapidly as possible. So it's, it's a way to counter spontaneous that we, I would say move that we understand pretty well because they are talking their books and it's normal that the market would give that signal. And I take from all what you said and it's also valid for the other speakers this idea that de-risking is okay. De-coupling would be totally catastrophic, which is more or less a message coming from Europe also in the difficult circumstances in the geostrategic tensions that we are experiencing. So I turn now to Marcus. We are up to you, Marcus. What would you say? Well, I think we've reached the point in the morning where everything has been said, but I haven't said it. When I was, when I received the invitation to participate in this panel, I eagerly accepted because it's a great honor. I looked at the composition of the panel. I saw that we had so much talent on macroeconomic and financial matters that I thought I would focus on effectively microeconomic issues as kind of a compliment. I think we were in the midst of a transformation of international trade and investment relations driven by the revival of industrial policy in the major economic centers. Compared with the previous international trade regime, this system will be more complex and considerably less transparent. It will be vulnerable to political capture by special interest groups. It will possibly be accompanied by overall reductions in economic efficiency and will give rise to international tensions. So how did we get here? There are two principal drivers. The first, which I hope, if not all, most of us could agree on, is global warming and the need to adopt policies to internalize externalities that the market will not do on its own. The second is more controversial, and that's the geopolitical justification, and I think the best intellectual rationale for this was actually provided by Canadian Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister, Christia Freeland. She argues that, in essence, during the Cold War, the West got lucky. The Soviet Union self-isolated, so the West was free to construct a liberal open order, and there was no contradiction between engaging in trade and investment relations, everyone prospering together, and military security. In contrast, in the present, China has embraced the global economy, and so this creates a tension between economic integration on the one hand and military security concerns on the other. That is the intellectual justification for what was called decoupling. President van de Lijen of the European Commission, more politely called de-risking, which you just referred to. In the case of the United States, these two concerns have been met by two sorts of policy thrusts. In the case of the geopolitical objectives, the concern centers on semiconductor chips, the two main policies have been the CHIPS Act of the United States, and then a set of export controls aimed at restricting export of chips and manufacturing equipment to countries of concern, mainly China and Russia. In the case of climate change, the thrust has been through two big pieces of legislation, the Infrastructure Investment Jobs Act and the Inflation Reduction Act, often called IRA. And for these remarks, I will focus on electric vehicles and batteries. In both cases, the policies are complex. They're not entirely transparent. They make considerable demands on government competency and ability to implement effectively, and they've caused heartburn in partner countries. The CHIPS Act allocates a bit over $50 billion for subsidies for production and research and development over the next four years. It prioritizes supply chain security, that is to say chips currently made in Taiwan. It is open to both domestic and foreign firms, and particularly interest of firms from Taiwan and Korea, and it excludes China and Russia. And companies receiving that funding have to, I cannot build new capacity in China for 10 years. The export controls aim at deterring high-end production in China, which means that the policy is dependent on third-party cooperation. This is a case where the US government got lucky that the nature of the semiconductor industry is there are some choke points that require minimal cooperation from third parties in order to implement. But there's no guarantee that will be the case in the future with industries of very different industrial structure. Think, for example, biotech. The US is not alone. Europe has its own CHIPS Act. Japan has adopted a similar set of reshoring or friend-shoring incentives, and, for example, is providing subsidies for an American firm, Micron Technology, to build a plant in Hiroshima. So while the US is leading the charge, it is not alone. In the climate change, again, I'll just focus on electric vehicles, because that's where a lot of the current trade action is. The US legislation creates consumer incentives. It builds out the charging infrastructure, encourages domestic production. But the way it did it had a strong domestic preferences, which caused problems with our partners. One of the things you need to understand about this legislation is, the IRA is 1,000 pages long. The Congress didn't know every detail of what it was voting for when it enacted it. It has all sorts of unintended consequences. One of these was to make those consumer incentives apply to American-built automobiles, but not ones from Korea or European Union, who understandably got upset. Some enterprising bureaucrat at the Department of Treasury who probably deserved some sort of Nobel Prize on Applied Economics discovered that there was a provision written for trucks, which are normally leased, which if reinterpreted could be applied to cars. And the Koreans and the Europeans could continue to export to the United States and get the consumer subsidies. Likewise, the legislation incentivizes use of non-Chinese minerals and the production of the batteries for those cars. And it's created because of our vision that essentially endorses production and free trade partners. It has created the strange phenomenon in Washington where Korean firms who build the batteries are lobbying the US government to conclude free trade agreements with Indonesia, Philippines, Argentina, and other potential sources of supply. And it appears to be kind of a software patch, so to speak, and it wouldn't be surprising if the Congress went back and revisited some of these provisions if the Congress could actually act, which, given the dysfunction, is an open question. Implementation is complex, it depends significantly on administrative regulations. It's not transparent. It is costly to remain informed and that non-transparency creates opportunities for political capture by special interest. Europe has its own CHIPS Act. It also has the carbon border adjustment mechanism, or CBAM, which is going to create problems as well. So more broadly, the European Union is tackling these problems with an emphasis on taxes. The United States is emphasizing subsidies and tax provisions, and there is a need to bring, to reconcile these differing approaches to generally commonly shared goals. There is a real question to me whether the US government is currently constituted, is up to the task of implementing a policy as complex as this one. And I heard that President Macron has closed ENA, the French School for Training Public Administrators. He might consider reopening it in the United States. Thank you. Excellent conclusion if I may, Marcus. To be frank, the name is different. I'm not sure that the education will be that different, but we will see. So I guess that usually we go for a new round for second remarks to be made, particularly to criticize what had been said by the other members of the panel, or to compliment, or to do anything. But any of us has the will to communicate something that would be complementary to what has been said. Otherwise, I go again, Gabrielle, you would be the first for this second remark. Would you agree? Yes. You have the floor. Yeah, thank you very much. No, there's not much disagreement here, I think, amongst the four of us. Unfortunate for the conference, of course. But I think what we must stress more than we did in these last 45 minutes is the internal frictions that we're facing within the United States and within Europe, probably also within China. We don't see much into it, but I guess it's there as well as an explanation for what we see in our external relationships. And if you look at the regional elections in Germany in the last months, you see the increasing polarization that's fed by inflation, but it pushes countries into a more, let's say, aggressive external policy stance as well. And the conundrum is, on the one hand, to get inflation down, to make sure that the internal cohesion improves. On the other hand, this external assertion-ness or whatever it is, call it decoupling or de-risking or the search for strategic autonomy, all these things, that is actually making it harder to achieve those internal cohesion objectives. As has been said, the fragmentation is costly and that will be borne by whom, most likely, by the most vulnerable and it makes these internal divisions even stronger. So that's a conundrum that I see a little bit out of wits here. I don't know how we can deal with that, but I think the first step has to be to see that those de-risking policies tend to increase inequality and then that fosters polarization with consequences that lead to more external frictions. Thank you. Klerina, Klerina. Sebastian, what would you say? Thank you. First, perhaps a comment about the fact that we are discussing the difficulty of coordination, the difficulty to stick to international commitments and rules. I just want to emphasize that I think it shouldn't come as a surprise that rules, multilateral rules, are not able to contain great power competition because by themselves, as they cannot, rules are unable to contain great power competition as long as there is no political agreement upon the directions, the objectives. So I think that should be reaching some kind of political agreement about the framework of coordination should be the priority. The second point has to do with coordination and inflation. A lot has been said about the financial risks entailed by the policies, monetary policies in advanced economies recently. I think it's a good illustration of the threats involved by the lack of coordination, the fact that it will increase asymmetries in the world economies. In the world economy, it makes it increasingly difficult to take into account a variety of objectives because it will make coordination on various counts less easy. The development, the spread of industrial policies is another example because that's only something that countries with enough financing can sustain. So it's also a source of asymmetry of lack of inclusiveness at the world level. Thank you very much. Your remarks were valid for Europe as well as for the global economy. I have to say I am struck myself by the convergence on both sides of the Atlantic on the monetary policies on the first results of monetary policy, coordination being more or less the same. When we were in very difficult position, the Europeans were hit by the war in Europe much more than the US, obviously, in terms of, I would say, price of oil, price of food, the fact that the US is self-sufficient in many respects, both in fossil fuel and also for food. And that, of course, creates a difference which is very, very substantial, obviously. And nevertheless, I mean, the goal remains the same. The likelihood of reaching the goal is, in my view, as credible as it was before, before war in Europe. And so that is something which is the silver lining if I may in comparison with what you had on both sides of the Atlantic after the first and the second oil shock, which was totally dramatic, inflation unleashed, inflation steady at 14% and interest rates at times at 20%. So we are, I would say, claiming that 5% in the US, 4% in Europe is too much, but I mean, we experienced 20 because we made mistakes in the previous time, in the previous oil shock. Anyway, what would you say, John, yourself? Well, first of all, just to continue on what you've just been saying, it's very positive that we've made progress on inflation, and like you say, that at least for the moment, the progress is quite similar on both sides when we look at core inflation. What may be left as a residual effect of, among other things, the war in Ukraine is a difference, a change in price structure relative to what it was previously. In other words, it's quite likely that relative prices of energy in Europe is gonna remain higher than it was previously. In other words, this is undoubtedly going to be associated with structural change in economic growth in Europe and in trade patterns as well. Another aspect that I wanted to mention was that we've saw an incredible boom in the Chinese economy in past years that was associated with huge increase in demand for basic commodities, metals, et cetera, of imports to the Chinese economy from elsewhere, huge increase in exports of manufactured good from China. My sense for my recent visit is China is changing substantially. The source of their economic growth is going to have to change and it's going to slow down, and the growth in domestic demand in China is slowing down and is likely to remain relatively calm relative to what it's been previously, and that's one reason why trade is going to remain more subdued and different than it was before, not just because of subsidies, of course that's part of it, and not just because of sanctions, but because of some underlying changes in the global economy. That brings me back and wanted to make a quick comment. So we've seen these large challenges, and I would say, and as Yom pointed out, that previously when the G20 was founded in the context of the global financial crisis, it was able to act decisively because among other things, there was a lack of a sense of great power conflict, as you remember, that it wasn't that individual countries forgot their interest, it was a real sense that if we don't hang together, we will hang separately. But time has shown the weakness of the structure or lack of structure of the G20 that it has on the one hand put itself as above the multilateral institutions, but itself has no legal standing and has no voting process other than there's a veto power on the part of every participant. As a result, it's an organization that finds itself very hard, or I don't even want to call it an organization, but it's an entity that finds it hard to reach decisions and command action in a context of either difficult or conflictive issues. And I think it's worth contemplating whether if we're going to make real progress on global public goods that inevitably are going to involve difficult decisions that are not necessarily to everybody's liking if we're going to have to think about whether they need to be reassigned in one way or another to multilateral institutions that do have a structure that leads the decisions and can reach decisions that have legal legitimacy even in issues in which there's not complete consensus. Thank you, John. What you say is certainly true at the level of the United Nations and the Security Council and so forth. I am a little bit more optimistic after the last G20 meeting in Delhi. It seemed to me that the concept of international community was still alive, a little bit alive. That being said, of course, it's not perfect. Marcus, you had already the privilege to hear all of us, so what would you say now? As the second round? One last gasp of international community. So if you set aside the geopolitical concerns and just focus on climate change, there's clearly a need for the United States, European Union and China to get on the same page and find ways of reconciling their diverse approaches to this problem. My institution recently hosted a conference on the macroeconomics of climate change organized by Jean-Passani Ferry. And there was a paper presented there by two of my colleagues, Chad Bown and Kim Clowsing, who argue that relatively minor changes to the WTO rules could go a long way in reducing conflict between the EU, the US and China on climate-related issues. The problem, of course, is even minor changes the WTO rules are gonna require a real diplomatic commitment. And I don't know if we're up to it or not. Well, very good remark indeed. So good cooperation between Peterson and Pissani, Jean-Pissani Ferry. I was myself chair of the board of directors of Bruegel Institute. So I see that, and we have also a friend of the Bruegel Institute who's also in Peterson if I'm not misled, Nicola. Anyway, so perhaps we have a little time to take a question. I see three hands. So, madam, you were the first, please. Ilona Antoniusian from Poland, but I'm working for Volkswagen and you were commenting on the electric cars policies around the world, which is actually concerning me for the last three years, day and night. I wouldn't be so hard on IRA, the Inflation Reduction Act. Actually, I think it is a stroke of genius because it increased the speed of investment in electric car technologies and these are gigafactory size investments each time, which is $5 billion every one of them. So it is making a huge change because the big producers now started to invest quickly. You made the rush, which is actually following the rush from China. So the Chinese have a very stable support mechanism for electric car production and they have made a great industry out of it. So, right now, IRA made it possible to make this kind of support. So actually following China and in high speed in America, which made following by Canada, which made following by Europe. And right now, Europe changed so much the rules that I'm right now, I were able to work with the Polish government to establish in high speed great, really great location parameters for gigafactors and we established one and we are looking for others. So I think, don't be so hard on the IRA, I think it was a good one. Marcus, do you have a response or a comment? Well, as an American speaking, before an international audience, I have an obligation to be more Catholic than the Pope. So I'm very glad that you find IRA to be such a stimulus to important policies around the world. I agree. Okay, John, I know you're American citizen, you don't have to be more Catholic than the Pope. Well, I was, I must say, I've been struck by two things recently with regard to electric vehicles. And I guess I should say it's been clear I own one, but I was struck in China, how common they have become, how rapidly you can tell because the electric and hybrid vehicles have a different color license plate than others. And I was astonished at how common they have become. Given the, it wasn't obvious that how developed the underlying infrastructure is, and we know that China is on a very rapid process of building new electric plants that actually are not necessarily low emission. In the States, in contrast, as you probably have read, after an initial spurt of demand for electric vehicles, they seem to be slowing down. And it's not, although it's the IRA, contemplate some subsidies to things like charging stations. I suppose it's not immediately obvious that the consumer acceptance is going to be so rapid without also sustained and substantial consumer subsidies. So I think the future here remains a bit uncertain that... Okay, thank you. Thank you very much, John. I had other questions over there. Could you get a mic, yeah? Jean Alola from BBE France. Thank you to all panelists for your insightful deep dive into economic outlooks this morning. I find you discuss a lot about security, risk management. My question to you is, what is the good news? What do you see upside in the current situation for whom and where? I'm not sure that I got exactly the question. Who could respond? Gabrielle? If the question was worth the good news, I think there is good news. One is that we are not seeing tea globalization as was feared by many when the US-China trade war broke out and with all this crisis hitting. We see globalization as the economist put it. I think that's clear. But the global system, the trade system has actually been relatively resilient. The other piece of good news is I'm worried about financial risks not yet fully materialized, but what we can say is that this first appearance of bank crisis, the Silicon Valley Bank and these sort of things have been very well managed and contained and there hasn't been any diffusion of those risks yet. I'm not sure whether we've seen the end of it, but that is good news as well. And the third piece of good news is that the subsidy raise that the IRA is part of it, that economists feel uncomfortable with happens in the right area because what we do need is more investment in renewables, in electric vehicles, et cetera. And there is subsidy raise is beneficial. If it was in steel or in, I don't know, in old fashioned industries, something different. But because we are facing a global common good here or bad actually, the climate change that needs to be fought, this investment raise is something that's positive. And so that's three elements of more positive news, I guess. Well, thank you very much. We are not only with bad news, but also good news, Gabrielle is eloquent on that. Let me say, Gabrielle, that I'm not sure that we will be always unsatisfied with the behavior of the non-banks. For the banks, the reaction has been very effective and in Europe, for instance, we had applied by the rule of the Basel committee and so forth on the G20. And so we were reasonably protected until now, as you said, you remain prudent. But on the non-banks area, as you say, we don't have seen all the consequences of the higher rates. Maybe, yeah. Please, Sebastian. Quickly, I think from an economic point of view, the good news is also that so far, despite the immense political tensions, political shocks, the world economy has been pretty resilient. And given the shock it went through, it's true about the economic consequences of the COVID pandemics, about the economic consequences of war in Ukraine as well. So there has been economic cause, but not that much compared to the gravity of the crisis. And I think it's good to emphasize that. The COVID crisis was a moment where vulnerabilities were became more visible for the public. But I think that was actually a moment when these international value chains proved their resilience more than their vulnerabilities. Because within months, weeks in some cases, economic activity rebounded. Thank you very much indeed. I'm turning to our founder. It is 10 o'clock. Shall I consider that we went through all what we had to examine? Or have we got a little time more? No? So I understand that I have to thank all the panelists. They were remarkable.


This kid is unbelievable, very intimidating seeing a guy that big so I can only imagine how hard he throws, how hard he hits the baseball. It's scary to know that there's still men out there that are that big swinging a baseball bat that hard. Man I tell you it is an incredible experience just to be able to get on the field I think it's a dream come true. It's a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity.   So when I think of my dad's legacy and I think of the Yankees you think class, you think tradition, you think winners. Nothing gets more New York than standing on the field at Yankee Stadium especially for me being a generational wrestler and everything has to do with tradition. The Yankees have broke my heart a couple of times because I am a Braves fan but when it comes to America's pastime the Yankees are the first people you know the first baseball team that you think of so being here having their jersey on support the team right now I'm enjoying it.


Hello and welcome back to the craft box. My name is Brent and today I went episode a hundred and eighty of the wizard 101 Death walkthrough last time if you haven't checked it out already you should We finished off this silent market or we went back there and did some more things in it And today we are doing the Tyrion gorge part one You see what must be overlooked ledge, but no easy way to reach it Perhaps this cave will lead you up there So yes If you haven't checked out last episode go do that if you haven't subscribed already And you're watching this video just go hit the subscribe button. That's free There's like 71% of you people who watch my videos and don't subscribe you should especially if you keep watching them Which you should appears occupied. I don't know who you are But please help me before these ground hornets sting me to death Okay We can probably go on this deck here. Yes, we can So yeah, we are basically Finishing off. Well, we're kind of just at the moment going through one area at a time really Last time we did the silent market the time before that we did the last wood and This time we're doing the Tyrion gorge. We kind of just go through and then go to a different area go through and go to a different area So yes, it's cool. It's how Chris losses and we just got to do that until later And then it's kind of more This area this area this area, which is kind of what we've seen in the past, which is nice in my opinion Whatever they can try something different. They did I don't know what worked who knows Yeah But Tyrion gorge today We are going to and bled again and then dinner and then pass and then dinner just because of that is how we do things here and Defeat mobbers battles especially if they're like Because they also boost for us. So we are Definitely Dinner here we go if we crit that's gg, but we probably won't crit will be no It's a bit of a try Hey They're so dead. They're so toast so toast I Mean they have like 300 half 400. Okay. Close. They're dead They're dead. Okay. That was easy peasy as With all more battles that have life Which is what happened in grizzler. So I'm happy with that one Fantastic I Someone like you but I'm grateful for your help. I was sheltering here waiting to meet an ally from Queen myrtle town When these ground hornets decided to move into this cave now that you've driven the ground hornets away We can leave this place Okay, let's go talk to her outside now Kind of just like a go inside talk to a guy outside and talk to her. It's kind of funny But that's how it is What will she make us do it next I wonder where is she she is over down here? Okay, hello Hello, let's place the mines Now what is your story? Sabra was worried. That's my big sister, but I can take care of myself Though I could use a little help your timing is excellent the patrols are so fierce I have not been able to finish surveying the region Can you scout the mine the dragonfly stables and the hundred leger patrols? I'd like your insight Okay, look at that XP juicy That is not that is not a mine And here though is Zeke's cricket. I know that for sure. There it is. Hello Also up there is the chrysanthem, which I'll get in Actually, no, I think it's up here We will find out and it will be a wee little adventure for today Hello, you also find a lot of agave here as well Which is nice We need to go up So it must be up this bridge here. I'm I don't actually know where it is I'm just following what the guide says and this is where it says This is could take a lot of trial and error But we're just going up. Yes, here we go fantastic chrysanthem We've got one cricket and one chrysanthem left and that is in Fort Arachius Which is off this off that way Which we will get when we're there and then that's the end of part one. So That's fun Yeah, and then we do a whole nother one for part two Apparently so extra training points, which is always good Where are we going mine? The arachna are hard at work digging out huge boulders and breaking them down for the volatile liquid metal trapped inside The equipment looks fragile though a well-placed spell our hard-hitting strike might set them back Oh Okay, scout the dragonfly stables Which are over this way from memory Digga drones. Oh, they're death. I remember that for my life. They're gonna be really annoying That was so easy on my life hundred leggers patrol this area aggressively making sure no rebels disrupt their operation But you're pretty sure you could take them Okay, and back to Sidra I'm worried about fighting those guys They're gonna be really annoying to do but we'll get over it. We've got mess prison for a reason. You are seeing the same things I am We need to disrupt their operations as best we can Break some of their mining equipment Yes, I would love to Which is what I thought we were gonna be doing last time, but you know what we can do it now one two Two hello, can you break please two? Three three three three Mandrake is good And where would number four be and number four is probably somewhere close by what's in here? Submining equipment in here probably The sounds like there is so they're probably is then Yes one up here. Hello There we go For fantastic.  Let's go back down here And we will go and talk to Sidra once more Sidra Hello, how are you? Well done that will set them back a bit if she's doing your stretches that's kind of funny I have a wicked little plan, but we will need a few handfuls of lightning bugs to pull it off Sneak over to the lightning bug houses and gather some while I work out the details Okay We will do that then I don't think there's many mob battles in this first But so we just got a we just gonna like not have too many battles It's kind of just doing things this episode sort of thing I didn't know they were lightning bug houses, but that's cool And back to Sidra It's really funny just go go to someplace Collect something or destroy something and go talk to Sidra. Excellent. Those will do perfectly We're going to use these pretty little lights to scatter the dragonflies Before we get to the dragonflies, however, we'll need to scatter the guards defeat some digger drones, so we have an opening You want me to do that do you see how it is Okay, then oh We can probably do that's not too difficult We'll do one better long camera and then I'll finish off the rest off just because five is quite a few It's three battles because five is such a way I don't understand why they do five like five is such a weird number like four is fine because if you're with a Full team that's for a team of three. That's just the whole battlefield Like done if you're doing four with one person. That's just two fights But if you're doing four with Two people and there's three of them. That's two fights and that's slightly annoying, but that's why you don't do two people But five no matter what you do There has to be more than two fights or two or more fights like five is just such an odd number Why five? That's my question. Why five? There's so many examples of like where they do five as well like it's ridiculous Five's just such an odd number. It's like they're like, no, we don't want to do ten. So we'll Harvard Whereas I completely agree with that one ten is ridiculous Like there's five and then there's ten, but like five is just such an odd number. Why? What's it worth to you to do five like seriously what? Of course they would fortify peasants these days Peasant TV mobs, aren't they? Yes, they are Okay, it's nothing But we should be kind of fine. We will hit with the day night. Sure. Why not? See how much this does We might use scare curve for the other ones just because It'll do a bit more And I'll be correct. They did. Okay. That's cool. That's fine. They're probably very dear Okay, that's good That's nice That's a very good. There we go. Oh, yes Fantastic, I'll be back once I've defeated three more of those. Okay.  I've never seen them run so fast on a hundred legs Dragonflies naturally follow lightning bugs to the best food sources the umbra legion uses that to direct the dragonflies flight path Rush up to the dragonfly stables and cut the cords on the pens that will allow the dragonflies to fly free To get them into the air, you're going to have to release the lightning bugs once they are loose the dragonflies will follow Okay, let us hit on over to the dragonflies which are down this way And we'll go cut them free Sit them free There's probably a good idea because who needs to be unfree free You cut the cords, but the dragonflies just mill about seemingly confused by their newfound freedom Yep, I'm gonna release the um lightning bugs, you know, I'm gonna release him lightning bugs. That's always fun. Hello This looks like a good place to release the lightning bugs fly my pretty fly as the lightning bugs rise in the warm air There's a stirrer amongst the dragonflies and soon the great bees take to the air Someone let dragonflies out Hello Okay, let's go talk to Sabra once more and I think we're kind of like at the end of the Tyrion Gorge for this bit That will cost them considerable time rounding them all up again and it causes the distraction The skies are clear and now I can return to the last wood and report back. I'll see you back with sabra at Queen muddle town Well, that is the end of this part of Tyrion Gorge. So I'm gonna end off the episode here next time we will be heading back into the last wooden be doing another episode over there and Then I think we come back here for a long time. So, yeah, this was just kind of like a wee little teaser of Tyrion Gorge So yeah, thank you for watching and to leave a like and subscribe and if you haven't already subscribed you should And remember craft inside the box


Welcome back to the product review. And today I'm going to take a look at the art of the bad guys from DreamWorks. It's an absolutely fantastic movie. I loved it. And the art of book, I think is my favorite in a long time. There's so many awesome elements in it. It's not just concept work, but it's also learning material.  So what I want to do is they're going to be chapters and you will see in the chapter title, it will say spoiler. So you can skip that. I'm going to have a card that says spoiler. So you know what's coming because some of the character reveals and sets and things. It's going to spoil the movie. So I will warn you when we get to it. Now this is the book, the art of the bad guys from back at the spine. Let's check it out. Already loved. I always love rough sketches. So the fact that they include that right away. That's great. That is not a spoiler. There you go. This came from a nucleus. That's where I ordered it from signs. I hear it's sold out already and the next page already has a spoiler. So beware. We have preface here, spoiler image. Then no spoilers here. Awesome. You got an intro origin story. That's cute with original designs. Next page has also spoiler warning. You got more comparisons of the characters, characters and animation. All right. We got wolf school. I like the designs and just the way it's presented. That's pretty cool though. I like seeing this early designs, different explorations, landing tester. Beautiful. Love it. Look at that. Beautiful, different costume designs, rough sketches. Great. Love it already. Same thing here. So appealing. Characters are so appealing. Snake. You also see the character voice, you know, the actor that voices. Oh, so good. Look at this. Come on. Great designs a little bit. Tarantula, another character. Super cute designs. Totally different designs at the beginning for sure. Shark. He was awesome. This is all very cool. No spoilers in here. Piranha also super cute. He was really fun. Great stuff in there. Then we are moving on to the next character. Spoilers. Spoilers ahead and let's go. There you go. Next character. Next page. Also a spoiler. There you go. Very cool and very spoiler-ific. Then we have Professor Rupert. He gets very mad here. Very, very cute. Spoiler ahead. There you go. Very cute. Cuddles. Interesting. Here, I mean, there's that super tall Star Trek character. Doesn't say anything. Police Chief Misty Luggins. She was great, great animation, great poses. See different character designs here. Love that. The police. They had absolutely fantastic poses. She was super cute too. Look at that. It's a great voice too. Character look development, speed lines. See, this is where it gets awesome. Talks about the shape, speed lines, multi-limb, hair and workflow. Love seeing all of this. Look at that. That, probably one of my favorite pages. The do's and don'ts. Musts for animators, eye shapes, body shape and silhouette. Come on. That, those two pages are great. I wish it was more like that in the art of books. Art and VisDev. Film style guide. Again, this is great. So you have your CG aspect, but then you got the 2D elements. Graphic intrusions, animation lines. I love it. Again, those two pages are great. Shape language. How to make it, you know, not so perfect CG like. That's awesome. Squiggles. Look at that. That is great. Effects shape rules. Again, look at this page. I love it. I love it. I wish more were like this. So cool. Also, you know, just that, but then also this here looks great. Color theory. That's awesome too. Color script. There is a pullout page. Very neat. Love it. Cool to see. Los Angeles. Definitely well done. Get your photos here and some designs. Nice colors. The whole world building. Everything was great. That car she's at the beginning. So much fun. Also the physics of the car. There's the latest in when the car chase is done and then the car goes into their layer and their hideouts. All the car physics were animated. It is so good. Great double page. That bad guys live and they go in here and it goes. So good. That was awesome. They are just really, really fun characters and just the whole movie just oozed style. The music was great. Marmalade mansion. Cool designs as well. Next page. Spoiler. Again, you can skip this. Check out the chapters. Cool designs again. Good training. This is a bit of a slight story spoiler, but I think you saw that coming in the trailer. It's not a massive thing because you see all this. It's super cute. Next page. Again, a spoiler. I'll let you wait a bit. Again, you can check out the chapters and skip that part. That's got so many chapters. This continues on with spoilers, but it's an awesome sequence. This is cool. The diner and bank heist. It's a very beginning. It's a really fun opening when they turn around and see all the humans against the walls. They're scared. It's great. Again, love the designs. Super cool here. That's your opening that we saw from the trailer for sure. No spoilers there of this seeing all the props. It's great continuing on more awesomeness. That's pretty cool. Look them in effects. You know, I'm going to love this love this also just a really great car. Cool look. I love animating vehicles. So seeing the car chases and just everything with the vehicles in that movie was great. These are super cool too. Next page. Spoiler warning and there you go. Massive spoiler, cool designs. Crowds. Those were fun. So many fun sequences again. Those designs love them, love them, love them. I really do hope there is a sequel. I want to see more of that crowd renders. Next page again a spoiler and let's go. Definitely spoilery. That's totally the end. Lighting the map paintings. That's cool. Looks neat. It's a little mix of painterly effects and realistic optical stylized lighting lines and splotches. Again, this is super cool to see. Next page also has a bit of a spoiler in there and spoiler and continuing on but has lines splotches. You can see the before afters very cool. Still somewhat in spoiler territory. I'm going to leave that warning on in the chapters. All very cool though. You got map paintings. These are beautiful. Next page also a spoiler through the title. I'm not going to read it out loud. It looked very cool though. It was a really fun reveal full of spoilers but awesome. The apocalypse. It could be anything full of spoilers. I'm going to leave the spoiler warning on and also in the chapters life is great. We are at the end of the movie again.  Here is the crew. Acknowledgements. There you go. Sketches there and back to the end. And again, that is the end of the book and a beautiful front. You can see the details. The relief there beveled very, very nice. Beautiful book. Beautiful art. Hopefully not too disjointed with my spoiler warnings but I just really like the movie. I didn't want to go in there. Hey, here's what we have in here. Oh, whoops. I spoiled the whole thing. Hopefully that was enough in the chapters and again me blending in all that. But anyway, it's a fantastic movie. Go please watch it. If you've seen it, comment. Let me know what you thought. I hope you loved it as much as I did. And again, can't wait to see a sequel. I really hope there is a sequel. Why not? Why wouldn't you do a sequel for that? That is the page through of the book. As always, thank you for watching. If you like all of these, there's more to come. Lots of books here. I said that last time I'm going to do this one not yet but it's going to come. This just came in first and I had to swoop in and show that one but there's more to come. And if you don't want to miss that, of course, the pitch at the end, subscribe and do all that YouTube stuff so you don't miss any of my uploads but that's kind of that. So as always, thank you for watching. Thank you for watching till the very end. I appreciate your time and that's it from me and I'll see you in my next upload.


Hello, okay microphone is on hello. My name is Christoph Musenbrock. I'm from either risk and I want to talk to you on standardized protocols for decentralized insurance as you know either risk is building decentralized insurance and decentralized insurance Of course has many participants which have to interact with each other and this has to be organized in some way And that's where we use protocols for Why protocol a protocol is basically Standard which enables people to communicate you see Angela Merkel and the Queen and they are coming from very different cultural backgrounds And so it's not be very easy to communicate But there is a protocol and this helps them to find the right way and another thing is Protocols and able communication the other thing is also we have protocols Which are very important for security look at this example You know all these famous flight from Captain Sallenberger who managed to land Boeing on the Hudson River and why was this possible? They had birds in their engine and all engine at once stopped and this wasn't pleading in the emergency situation and There were hundreds of people on this plane and such a situation creates much pressure and the only way to Manage such a situation is that they use protocols in the cockpit communication So every single step in the communication is according to a predefined pattern Which has been trained times and times and times again And so it went basically automatically and this was the reason why he could manage such an emergency situation So protocols ensure communication and of course in insurance, which is very critical business We need protocols to ensure the communication between participants Now what are our requirements for good protocols? We want to build a standard for protocols for interaction between Participants in an insurance network these participants can be customers. It can be service providers like oracles data providers At actuaries this can be claims manager sales people so many people act together and To make the communication fluent a good protocol should be it will fill some core aspects and I have written down five of them a good protocol should be minimal. It should not have any overhead At the same time, which is nearly contradictory. It should be complete So it should cover mostly the main cases which can occur and it should not be left open any space for Friction it should be robust. So if there are any errors or some Participant is not behaving exactly according to the protocol. This should not Stop the whole process. So a protocol should be robust. It should be layered. So it should be from a simple generic Layer to more complicated and connected layers and it should be accepted protocol makes only sense if everybody agrees on it and Yeah, we have a perfect example the REC 20 token standard is such a protocol It is minimal because it only contains I think Six functions and two events and that's all and you know, you can build a whole economy on such a simple protocol It's complete because everything you need to manage a token is in it And basically it is only one function the transfer function which makes it running all the other functions are More to to get it to initiate it or to get information, but the transfer function is Most important. So you have a very minimal set. It's robust because you have very few input parameters and so it is mainly mainly impossible to to go against the rules of the protocol and It's secure because it is not possible to manipulate the balance of a token if it's done correctly It's very secure. It's layered also because on top of the REC 20 token You can now build for example 0x exchange or on top of this again other exchange protocols So the REC 20 token is I think in the middle below there is solidity. There are Standards like self-message. We will see this in another example and it's accepted. Everybody uses this of course And we want to do the same for insurance insurance is a bit more complicated than a simple token But the idea is basically the same we have Very low technical layer, which is dark gray. It's a cerium client implementation with parity and guess or other clients Then on top of this we have the EVM which is in between we have a formalized semantics of the EVM I think there was one talk about this which is great. You can now formally prove properties of the EVM and Then on top of the EVM we have higher order languages solidity by Pereska, whatever And there is a small gap between this because the lower two layers are very closely connected and basically you can separate them But then the higher order languages are already choice. You can choose solidity which can choose Viper. It's Mostly used solidity, but of course you can do other languages as well So this is not hardly connected But only a weak connection and on top of the higher order languages and we have the coding practices security standards Libraries and of course we have the first business standards like the REC20 token, which I would count as a technical layer But also has some connection to the business layer and then again a gap and then the green layers are already the business layers in our Architecture we have first layer which is still very generic and does not know business verticals It's a business process engine which follows Maybe some standard BPM and 2 is already very widely accepted standard It also has a clear semantics and so you can prove Properties of such business processes in such an engine And then on top of the business process engine, which is still generic then that come the first Financial processes for example payments assets data identity KYC procedures and Governance procedures which are needed by mainly all financial processes on which we know and then we have the verticals insurance banking and others and Now these can already interact by using these Atomic processes and standards because every insurance needs a bank account It has funds to manage it needs an asset management and of course KYC for example is very widely needed for everybody and one of the big advantages would be that you could use customer which is Identify once in every other business because we just reuse his identification and his Certification of his identity so we have these Verticals now and then of course every company can build proprietary extensions on top of it for example risk models or These The core insurance products which are different from each company but they are still on a very generic framework and Our goal is to develop this framework We have already an example for this and we want to generalize it We want to extend it and we want to invite all of you to work on this to make your own extensions and to To make this a very generally accepted standard. So this is our strategy We want to open source the whole protocol It should not be a proprietary protocol But it should be open-sourced and it should evolve as a work of many in the community The first example is our flight delay. Maybe a third about it. We have the first license insurance on a blockchain Which is working completely on a blockchain. I must Specify this because others have already made some Pro-project protocols and products for insurance on blockchain But they are not processing the whole thing on blockchain. We do we have the complete process on blockchain and you Can now see the layers you have a very low level level the controller registry Which is still on a technical layer. It is a contract where you can register other contracts and you can Store the addresses and the interfaces of these contracts so by Looking in the registry everybody can see how to interact with the upper layers the next layer is still also a generic it Is an access controller database and the ledger we separate these three components because it's good For example, it's good to have all the funds in one very small contract because it reduces the attack vector It's a good thing to have all data in one contract. So every other contract is nearly stateless if you Have the need to exchange one component on the upper level and you can do this without exchanging all the Data so if for example, you need a different product specification and you can exchange it on the upper level and Still all your policies are in the database and you don't have to migrate all the policies to a new level of processing contracts Then we have of course other partners on the which we interact with for example in our we have Oracleize here which connects us to data sources which we need to process our contracts and these can interact with all these contracts and So we have a very flexible model here Interesting thing and again is that we only have one single point of contact to the outer world to the front ends which Is a the connection to our customers? So also a very small attack vector The front ends are very exchangeable. We have our own web front end, but Already other people other teams have built applications which communicate with our insurance contract for example We have an integration in status. It's not on the live net yet, but we hope to do this soon and this status integration is Basically an app in the status client where you can interact with our insurance solution and this This chatbot is a work of a separate team which has nothing to do with either is other than we are friends But they do it on their own and they can as how Make their own sales Infrastructure and on money by selling flight insurance the risk model is a very closed Module and the other modules here the yellow ones are very generic So you can plug in other risk models other products and use the same generic framework and next step would be to to isolate all these generic features and publish them as an open source protocol and invite others to Extend this protocol work on it and So that it becomes better and better Yeah, so if you can if you have this Organization then you can of course exchange a single contract here without changing the database Some of you will maybe argue that this against the immutability paradigm of blockchain, but the immutability is basically here in the database and So we think it's a good idea to make contracts Updatable because as you all know contracts can have arrows can have bugs can have attack vectors and can have breaches and so the ability to exchange as part of the whole system on the fly is a very important feature and For the customer we have still the full transparency and full fairness because every customer can see if we exchange a part of the contract it will be visible and If we are doing anything wrong, then this will be very public and so we have a great economic incentive to play fair with our customers because everybody will see if we are Doing something which is not so good for our customers now we want to Put a view on the role of tokens in this protocol We have our core process and we have now many participants which Take one role for example here our Oracle and the Oracle is providing a service it we we send a query to the Oracle and the Oracle will then request the data source and Put and give us back the result via a call back But of course this process is Sometimes interrupted. There are many reasons But at the moment we have no no means to incentivize the Oracle to deliver certain service level if they pay for the query and we get a call back and it's working perfectly Thomas very you he's the guy and We are very Satisfied with the service but still we we could imagine a situation where this doesn't work and in case he does not deliver we have to fill the gap and now we have invented a mechanism, which is basically a staking mechanism We will incentivize Oracleize to stake some tokens in our contract and in case he delivers Not in their time then he will lose his Tokens and we use this as a way to pay for a fallback mechanism because then somebody else has to deliver the data and this costs a bit of money and He takes the staked tokens to Pay for the fallback solution and this is a very generic mechanism. You can exchange Oracleize against any other Participant in the network and by such a mechanism we Enable many participants to work together in complex products to work together properly and to Agree on service level agreements and to incentivize such service level agreements and this is a new way Traditionally this would be in a company context in the company context We have also in sent incentives Yeah, if somebody doesn't behave well you can fire him or you can reduce his wages in a decentralized context We need other incentives and such a mechanism is a very generic mechanism Which enables complex products on the blockchain with many partisans to be delivered on a very good service level and I think this is a Basic feature of every business network, which is working decentralized on a blockchain We have other mechanism for example instead of staking we can also Reward somebody to behave properly we can say if you deliver in time then you get an additional reward you can of course use our tokens for payments for Staking collaterals for vesting and I will have another point which I will introduce in the next slide So this is the basic rule, but now you can ask after the economic model behind this the economic model is also quite easy in in a traditional context you have Service consumers this can be the end users or this can also be companies and you have service producers or service providers For example think of insurance company, which is using an oracle The insurance company pays a fee for the oracle or for the data source and gets a service for this the service producer Has to build up an infrastructure and for this he takes a bank credit or a loan So the capital provider gives a capital the service producer pays an interest rate And this is all very expensive as you know and for and above all this is very limited this structure Leads to high capital in an infrastructure cost and for it is not censorship resistance. Yeah, people banks can Shut up the loans and then disrupt the business and this happens So this structure leads to centralization effects and monopoles and it leads to exclusion and exploitation So what can we do? We can put the capital in the middle We share the capital and the infrastructure and every service provider becomes a service consumer and so both roles are combined and now these are Interacting and they share this capital and the infrastructure and this is of course a model which is very apt for insurance because insurance works on lots of capital and This is why insurance is such a close Society because the capital requirements are so high Small companies cannot afford the capital and so they are excluded from participating in this network by sharing the capital and the infrastructure be enable many participants to be part of such an insurance network and Then this leads to another question. How can we? How can we restrict the excess to people who have contributed to the capital and then we are Coming to a generator usage token model, which is also emerging I we are not just ready with this but we are thinking about such a model Gnosis has it another very well-known project, which I don't want to speak out as it and So I think generally usage tokens are very apt for such a model with a shared capital and shared infrastructure and We will elaborate on this and hope we will soon be able to present more details on this basically if the capital is outside of such a network the heart is outside this is a artificial heart and we are moving the heart inside so We hope that this is a more convenient and more decentralized solution and That we are working on and of course this takes a big community community building is Important we have lots of challenges and so we hope that we will see adoption of our network We have this is our core business to talk to people to In to invite people to to participate in this network, and this is an emergent process. We can't We can control this completely, so we don't want to control it We want that this is an emergent process, and this is a work of many and So I want to close with this picture many people building on one house. It's a complicated process It's not easy, but as you know it can happen and we are happy to be part of this thank you very much for your attention and Thank you


One thing lockdown has taught me is that you do take things for granted and the great outdoors being one of them so in Wales as I live we're able to get out and about still and I'm up in and making the most of that fresh air but yeah we're gonna look at the golf club we're gonna look at two we're gonna look at the P770 the P790 it's long irons and trying to identify what the difference is don't worry we ain't gonna be hitting any golf balls up here we're down at Conway Golf Club and for golf some data and we'll try and make some sense of this one it's another interesting one and believe me there is a difference between these two irons. Now you all know I love a backdrop and that's a backdrop at Slen Padan for those of you're interested and to my left you won't see it today with this mist is a Snowden but P770 P790 massive irons for tailor-made both some extremely popular in terms of sales what splits them speed foam injection identical they look very similar smaller profile of P770 was introduced for the player and there's a bit of loft difference but there's also another major difference that splits these two clubs when I tried both on testing and out there on the course I need something to eat right back off the mountain onto the course less breezy at Conway Golf Club I can tell you that much I wouldn't have fancied a couple of five irons into the breeze off the top of that hill but the performance out here on the course is interesting is where it starts off the difference that we see two balls of just teed off with what splits them is a few yards which in all honesty we've not got there yet but in terms of dry ball data that's exactly what we've seen and that's relative to loft as you can imagine but the major difference is not where they finish but it's how they get from A to B and you've probably seen it already but that's where the major difference lies and that's where choosing these irons that factor that we're going to get to is what would be it'll play a major part in whether you like or don't like that elements I'll get to it in a minute that was a decent ball in and ball flight again that was the P770 before we talk about that ball flight let's go and have a look at some dry ball data break down the numbers and then we'll have a closer look at exactly what happened with that ball flight and how it perhaps differs from the P790 these two clubs just go like absolute miles of five iron that's what I said you're over a mile I'll keep I think it's really easy to get obsessed with data and almost get misled by it at times but I think what's been interesting in this is that I want to point out this video first of all started off as purely a long iron test trying out five irons in P770 and P790 and I suppose the thing I was looking at was which was the easiest to play for average golfers but once I started recording data which is where this thing started there was something that highlighted straight away I noticed it when I was hitting the balls down at four golf and then when I compared them both together in terms of the data it was it highlighted a massive difference between the two clubs and like I said it then went onto the golf course and the exact same thing happened so is the data that I gathered at four golf and we'll break it down a little bit what I want to say first of all both of these sets of numbers are incredibly good numbers I mean spin rate 4768 4404 I'd take that all day long on a five iron 189 carry on the 770 195 or the 790 I was surprised at the gap wasn't bigger because to be quite honest with you with that sort of one and a half degrees worth of loft I suppose maybe a suppose between five and ten yards in and around there so but yet a little surprised 128 ball speed 132 ball speed and then these are the two numbers that we're now getting down to what these differences are 12.2 launch angle on the P790 15 degrees on the P770 then take a look and jump forward to peak height 96 feet average peak height on the P770 81 peak height on the 790 land angle 45 degrees as opposed to 40 degrees now that's how huge huge difference massively difference in terms of its ball flight and it will like I said make a huge difference to how you decide or to determine what you want from your long irons now for me what I recognize straight away that the P770 just jumped out at me in terms of what it did in terms of ball flight because it's not just that it's launching high the spin number is really good so it's not launching and floating and going nowhere it's still moving forward it's a 189 carry it's got 4768 spin and it's got that land angle and descent angle so for me to be hitting a long iron in with those kind of numbers it was an incredibly positive element to the review that only put them side by side would I recognize they recognize visually what the difference was straight away but it is playing them side by side and that again goes back to that important element of testing clubs and go back to the club before the course before I finish what I did say out there and that was a second part of the test by the way it really did do exactly that out on the test the launch conditions were totally different a lot flatter ball flight on the 790 and again arguably playing down in links conditions that lower ball flight some people might get more benefit from that might prefer that ball flight but for me I really like this P770 in terms of what it did in terms of ball flight surprised in terms of the way that the ball launched high but kept moving forward and then coming down every ball I hit they were pretty much said when they were both hit purely enough the difference in terms of yardage carry was insignificant so the yardage gain of the stronger lofted P790 meant nothing to me I didn't feel as though that was any game whatsoever that I was looking for but that ball flight from the 770 was oddly enough again I preferred the smaller profile I didn't find it any more difficult to hit didn't feel it find it any more difficult to to get airborne in terms of CG I had a look even checked in terms of the offset they said there's less offset on the P770 there's one millimeter at the 5 iron so it's again negligible but for me all around that package again I always say this is where the disclaimer comes in these are all preferences for me and me only so I look I preferred the way the 770 looked more compact didn't fear so I lost anything from it in that smaller profile in fact like I said I preferred it sat behind the ball the way the ball performed in terms of that launch was massive and not losing out anything in terms of yardage so to a 5 iron 190 yards bang on a button for me really good number then you're looking at our next question will be in the future videos is what would you do next would you go to the 4 iron or is that as long as you need to go now perhaps in your 5 iron in the bag and then you start stepping into maybe hybrids maybe seven words those kind of things to make this game a little bit easier but that's another video for another date that's me done like I said the key message is again go out and test the clubs and if you can get all of I know you can't always play the 5 I all the longer irons when you're doing a testing and a custom thick as it's always seven I but these there is the option to go to demo days and you'll get our more accessible range to try and I think that's a really important thing to do Friday afternoon time for the weekend bit of a chill and I'll see you back on Monday