Good afternoon, everyone. I'm Doug Swanson, visitor services manager for the National Archives Museum and producer for the Noontime Lecture Series. Excuse me. On behalf of David Ferriero Archivist of the United States, I'd like to welcome you all to the William G. McGowan Theater located in the National Archives building in Washington, D.C. And I'd also like to give a special shout out to our good friends from C-SPAN who are also joining us today. Before we hear from Philip Mudd about his new book, Black Sight, the CIA and the Post-911 World, I'd like to tell you about two upcoming programs taking place in this theater. This Friday, August 16th at noon, William G. Highland Jr. will tell us about a forgotten founding father, George Mason, the founding father who gave us the Bill of Rights. And then on Tuesday, September 10th at noon, Sidney Blumenthal will tell us about his recently released Volume 3 of his biography of Abraham Lincoln, All the Powers of Earth, the Political Life of Abraham Lincoln, 1856 to 1863. To find out more about these programs and our exhibits, please visit our website at www.archives.gov. You'll also find some printed materials out in the theater lobby about upcoming events as well as a sign-up sheet so that you can receive an electronic version of our monthly calendar. Philip Mudd joined the Central Intelligence Agency in 1985 as an analyst specializing in South Asia and then the Middle East. After the September 11th attacks, he was the CIA member of the small diplomatic team that helped piece together a new government for Afghanistan. After returning to the CIA, he became deputy director of the Counterterrorist Center and served there until 2005. He was the first deputy director of the Federal Bureau of Investigations National Security Branch and later became the FBI's senior intelligence advisor. Philip Mudd has received numerous CIA awards and accommodations and has commented about terrorism in congressional testimony and been featured in broadcast and print news. He is now the president of Mudd Management, a company specializing in security consulting, analytic training, and public speaking about security issues. He is a senior fellow at the New America Foundation and the George Washington University's Homeland Security Policy Institute and serves as senior global advisor to Oxford Analytica, a British-based firm specializing in advising multinational companies. He sits on the advisory board for the National Counterterrorism Center and for the director of National Intelligence and he serves on the Aspen Institute's Homeland Security Group. Ladies and gentlemen, please welcome Philip Mudd to the National Archives. You missed the most important part of that, which is I live part-time in Memphis, Tennessee, the Bluff City. Well, thank you. Stick with Payne's barbecue. I was running there in a place called Midtown Memphis, which is a historic part of Memphis. It must be now three or four years ago wondering whether to write another book. I've written a couple and reflecting on some of what I witnessed at the CIA, particularly during that excruciating time after 9-11 and realizing some of my colleagues, many of whom were friends, had written their stories, but many of the people that I worked with would never speak, would never write, and their stories would never be told if no one talked to them, put their stories together in one simple narrative and explained what happened. So I decided that morning running my five miles in Midtown Memphis, I would do that. This is mostly their story. It's not a history. It's not every document that ever appeared related to what we call the program, the secret to tension and interrogation of all kind of prisoners. It's the story of men and women that I served with and who decided to speak to me because they trusted me. Step back in time with me. This is we're going into a time machine. If you go back to the 1990s, a lot of my colleagues talk about the peace to be ended. The time to paraphrase one of them when we thought we had killed the dragon, the Soviet Union, and only snakes were left. That's a time after the fall of the Soviet Union, the fall of the wall where people thought the intelligence challenges of the future may not reach the magnitude that they reached during the time of the Soviet Union. But the counter terrorism people knew they had a problem. That problem started mostly when bin Laden was in Sudan, accelerated when he moved to Afghanistan. But when I spoke to them, when I spoke to 35 or 40, again, most of whom will never speak, when I spoke to them about those times, about the peace dividend, there's a great sense of frustration in some ways, sadness. That they witnessed the rise of a global network and that the tools they had were so limited when you look back in retrospect, realize that's only 20 years ago. That's less than a full generation. The tools the CIA had were limited. If you think about loss of budget and personnel, I'm not accusing the national security infrastructure of doing anything wrong. All of us thought the same thing, the dragon is gone. But if you think about any organization, whether it's a tech organization or a manufacturing organization, if you lose substantial pieces of money and people, your ability to operate declines. There was also the attitude about terrorism. Think back again, only 20 years. Nobody I spoke with could have imagined a world when somebody said we could conduct lightning raids in Afghanistan day after day after day. The thought that a raid would happen where there was high risk of American soldiers' lives was almost unthinkable before 9-11. Forget about a U.S. invasion, just a raid against an al-Qaeda compound. And we knew, they knew where some of the compounds were. Much less, much less an armed drone that could kill a terrorist overseas. In debate for years, never happened. Meanwhile, there's atrophy, a bit of atrophy at the CIA. For example, training. Training spies declined. The number of spies in CIA training programs declined. And the attitude about terrorism was mixed. Remember, after 1947, the targets that the CIA typically chased were big targets. The Soviets, the Chinese, the Cuban Missile Crisis, big targets. I served. I returned from taking a leave of absence to the CIA in 1992 and was told to go to the counter-terror center because it was seen as a place where you sent people who maybe weren't ready for prime time, which, of course, was a model I fit. That changed over time. Like any organization, even large organizations, people make a difference. In the personalities, the colorful personalities that I read about in the book and that I knew so well were critical in keeping counter-terrorism from declining further in the 90s. George Tenet, the CIA director, was immersed in counter-terrorism and insisted that counter-terrorism gets some level of primacy. He insisted on budget. And he insisted on ensuring that there was leadership there that was well-regarded across the agency. Not common in the 1990s, including the director of the center, a guy named Kofor Black, legendary in my business, who raised the profile of counter-terrorism, increasing the quality of people who were going over there, increasing the respect of counter-terrorism at CIA before 9-11. But make no mistake, the peace dividend for intelligence, the lack of focus on terrorism meant that on that day, on that day, the CIA and the counter-terrorist world was not only not prepared, they could not be prepared. They all talked to me about feeling before, but especially in the searing months and years after 9-11, about feeling like they're on the back foot. On that day, and this is not over-dramatized, everything changed. Years of debate about armed drones done. Years of debate about raids in Afghanistan. Forget about raids. The CIA will be first in with operatives with money, technology, guidance within weeks of 9-11. Forget about raids. The U.S. Army, Big Green, will invade Afghanistan. The transition not only in resources, but in attitude was foundational. The CIA director used to ask us, I sat in on the nightly threat briefings for years. We had about five or six briefers. I was trading back and forth with another one of my colleagues opening the meeting with the threat briefing, a matrix of 10 or 15 or 20 threats, people who would write in threats to a website, foreign security services who would tell us that they uncovered a threat. Intercepted communications where Al Qaeda was talking about coming to the United States. I started those briefings and one of the things that was so evident and that was spoken around some of those tables was a simple concept. We anticipated a second wave, what we call the second wave for years. The second wave was what we anticipated would be another 9-11, but perhaps worse because Al Qaeda had an anthrax program that we did not fully understand. For months, months and longer, we did not understand the research and development. We did not understand whether they had taken strains of anthrax out of Afghanistan. There was concern that the second wave might not be aircraft, that it might be anthrax. And added to that was a fundamental problem. We did not understand the adversary. The human source penetration, that's the bread and butter of a human source, of a human informant organization like CIA, the human source penetration and this is operative speaking to me, this is not me speaking. The people who ran operations against Al Qaeda would tell you that human source penetration was modest. So in the midst of America watching horrific videos of people jumping off buildings and watching pages in the newspapers of faces of the fallen, we were sitting behind the scenes with the director saying, if there is that second wave tomorrow and you say, I wish I had done this, that or the other thing, why don't you do it today? In the midst of all this, there was a drumbeat in the spring of 2002 and I witnessed a lot of this firsthand that was intense and getting louder. And that drumbeat was the hunt for the first major CIA captive, Abu Zubeda. One of the challenges Al Qaeda had was they miscalculated what the U.S. response to 9-11 would be. They did not anticipate A, such a huge response, they thought it might be, they didn't anticipate they would take the towers down, but they thought the response might be more cruise missiles. They also anticipated that if the U.S. military went in, they working with the Taliban would believe the U.S. military just as they had bled the Soviets. They did not have an exit plan. The military operations, intelligence operations, the cooperation with the Afghans the U.S. was working with, an element of Afghanistan, a group called the Northern Alliance, were so successful that Al Qaeda had to flee before they ever developed a plan. And many of them fled east into Pakistan where they started making mistakes. Mistakes that allowed us in a part of the business, in intelligence that we call targeting, that is having individual analysts responsible for an individual terrorist to the tactical level where you know what that terrorist communications patterns are, you know what his family is, you know what the courier network is. We had individual analysts in a growing intelligence profession called targeting analysts who were watching Abu Zubaydah. In the briefings, the growing drum beat was the sense that the circle around him almost by the day was getting tighter. And then in the spring the raid happened. He almost died, suffered wounds from the gunfight that ensued, particularly a grievous wound to his leg.  Another bit of the agility after 9-11 that made the U.S. response so powerful. You could, could you imagine calling a medical center before 9-11 and saying we'd like you to loan us some of your physicians to go treat a terrorist overseas now and we're going to put them on a plane. Unimaginable before 9-11. That began the search for what a detainee could tell the CIA about an organization the CIA did not fully understand. Forget about plots. Those are important. The counterterrorism business, a lot of what I witnessed was not about plots. That's what you saw in the newspapers. Our business was a people business. People, if you stop a plot, if you harden a building, if you harden an aircraft, people who are committed to the murder of innocence will simply go on to create another plot so unless you can take down the architects of an al-Qaeda or an ISIS, you will face plots forever. Ours was a people business. Had to find, fix, and finish a human being typically by staging a raid operation. Abu Zubaydah was the first one who went down. The reason he was significant was I mentioned the lack of understanding of al-Qaeda. If counterterrorism is often a people business, obviously the first questions you might have for a terrorist would be can you tell us about plots? Can you tell us about this second wave? Can you tell us about whether there are further hijackers in the United States? But the stuff behind the scenes, can you tell us what the organization looks like? Can you tell us what the hierarchy looks like? Who are the key players? Who are the trainers? Who are the facilitators? Who's creating the false documents? Who comes up with the propaganda? Who are the couriers? Critically important for intelligence. Who carries messages between al-Qaeda leaders who don't want to communicate by electrons? That basic material, I call it bits of sand that make a beach, that basic material is critical and we did not have a good understanding of that in spring of 2002. Abu Zubaydah talked, but then in the memory of the people I spoke with he shut down. And he told his interviewers, his interrogators, go home, have babies, don't come back because I'm not speaking anymore. So in the intensity of that time when America was saying make sure this doesn't happen again, when a president of the United States said make sure this doesn't happen again, when a congress said how did you fail to catch it the first time, when the anticipation at the CIA was a second wave that might include anthrax, CIA officers in the cauldron of decision making that was the spring and summer of 2002 said well, if Abu Zubaydah we think is shutting down what are our options? We can send him into the U.S. justice system where he will lawyer up and never speak again. We can send him to another foreign country that might have charges against him. The prospect is that that other country will interrogate him themselves. We will not sit in the room and they will shield from us critical intelligence that we need. They also will not have the same priorities that we have. They're going to want to ask questions about their country. We want to ask questions about America. So through a series of conversations among CIA leaders there is a fateful decision that is the subject of this book and that is should we develop our own secret facilities called black sites, clandestine facilities in friendly countries overseas where we will transfer al-Qaeda prisoners in this case an al-Qaeda prisoner and interrogate them using the harsh techniques that have been splashed across every page in newspapers and in America for more than a decade. There's another piece of this process. Everybody knew when I was there that people would ask questions later on and everybody knew that this was not only sensitive but would be controversial. That is the program, the secret black site network. So there are conversations between the inspector general and at the CIA and the lawyers at the Department of Justice who set law and interpret law for America to say what is appropriate in terms of interrogation for a CIA black site, what complies with the U.S. Constitution, and what complies with federal law. And we want it on paper and we ain't moving until it's on paper. Through the summer of 2002, CIA lawyers in the Department of Justice discussed what could be done with Abu Zubaydah. He was already transferred stable and transferred to a black site but the formal authorization from the Department of Justice did not arrive until August of 2002. August of 2002 is when my colleagues marked the beginning of the black site program. Abu Zubaydah went through tough interrogation techniques. People talk about waterboarding. There are more than 100 detainees at CIA facilities, black sites. Three of them were waterboarded. Abu Zubaydah was one of them. One of the challenges of talking to a detainee and one of the challenges of discussing this in a public environment where we don't have the luxury of time that we have in this auditorium is people will look at me every day and say, well, come on. If you put somebody under duress, they're going to lie. So let me explain as we went through that process with Abu Zubaydah, why? And I'm not here to defend the program. I'm here because I thought that the views of the CIA should be explained so Americans on either end of the spectrum, those who want to attack what was done and those who support it and I hear both when I'm on the streets will understand what happened and why. We'll be able to walk the shoes my colleagues walk through and say I understand what they did regardless of whether I like it or not. But on this foundational question of why would you pressure someone to speak with techniques like sleep deprivation because you know they're going to lie. My answer is straightforward. First of all, people not under duress lie too. That's not the full answer, but an al-Qaeda terrorist who's not under duress is going to make up stories all day long. That's not the real point. The real point is an analytic effort I mentioned earlier called targeting. You cannot have a successful high-end interrogation of a high-end al-Qaeda prisoner unless you know so much about that prisoner. Not a mid-level guy, not a low-level guy, but so much because you've been following for so long that you can come up with in concert with other experts, physicians, psychologists, interrogators, that you can come up with a package of questions over weeks where that detainee starts to realize, A, these guys know a lot more than I know, and B, they seem to know when I'm lying. When that prisoner is under duress, when that prisoner has been in a confined box, when that prisoner has been under sleep deprivation is exhausted, when that prisoner starts to realize that he can't lie his way out, you start to get answers. Not truth. Not truth.  Some answers never came, particularly, for example, locational information about Osama bin Laden. But you get what we call compliance. Someone will try to give you bits and pieces of information that they think are less valuable. Yeah, there was a guy we trained a few years ago who was a German at our camp. I think his name was Hans. I'm making up these stories, but that kind of material, those bits and pieces are invaluable gold for an intel guy. If a prisoner is compliant and he gives you what he thinks is throw away information about somebody who trained a German or a Frenchman or a Brit or an American, just one example, who trained three years ago, game on for people in my world. I'm going to bounce that against every bit of data we've had, against every bit of travel data we can acquire, against every other detainee who might know, and all of a sudden, over the course of time, those bits of sand are going to tell us who that person was who trained three years ago. Based on one tiny shred of evidence, shred of information from a compliant detainee who was giving you stuff he thought was irrelevant. The point I'm making is, of course, people lie.  And that lifeline was the CIA. A lot happened after the initial stages of the Abu Zubayd interrogation. When I spoke with lawyers and managers of Black Sites, managers of the program, they talk about the maturation of the program. The first months and years were tough. Remember, you have an agency that's trained to collect information from spies overseas that is now serving as a prison, conducting interrogations that the CIA had never done. The CIA values agility, but sometimes they step into programs because they believe nobody will ever do it despite the fact that we don't have experience do it, we'll do it. That was part of the genesis, part of the ethos that led to the Black Sites and the interrogation program. But because of conversations with lawyers who were meticulous, and I know some of these people, the Black Sites matured into 03, 04. Policies and procedures tightened, training changed. There were some individuals involved in the program early on who should not have been involved. Typically over time, people who were recruited if they walked in the room and said, I really want to get in this, because I want to go after with vengeance the people that committed the acts of 9-11, those people were weeded out. You would not pass the application process as the program matured, unless you could be assured that you were in there to be professional. I realized there were weaknesses, they were outlined in the book and mistakes early in the program, but as lawyers, training, leadership got involved, particularly after some egregious mistakes the program matured. Other things happened that were surprising. I can tell you, sitting at the threat table in 2002, 2003, 2004, until I shifted to the FBI in 2005, I thought we were losing. That may come as a surprise to you. The U.S. Army had invaded Afghanistan, support by the CIA. I saw a breadth of a network that I did not think we were in front of for years, and a volume of threats and attacks that we could not contain. Nonetheless, the people I spoke with uniformly said business was good. They never anticipated the volume of high-end prisoners that happened because of the accelerating raids around the world. For example, the architect of 9-11, Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, the highest-end prisoner the CIA ever held, captured in 2003, architect of the Yemen bombing against the USS Cole. Time and time again, raids happened faster and faster as the intelligence picture clarified, and not only did the program in terms of policies and procedures mature, the sites matured, the CIA needed more sites. They started developing their own custom-built sites. The first site was not custom-built. It was a remote location that a foreign government offered the agency. The expertise the agency had in training people to talk to prisoners and determining what techniques were most effective and determining how to build a psychological package around each individual terrorist so that you could go in and maximize the prospect that that terrorist would say, wow, they know more than I ever expected. I'd better speak. Better and better and better. But there was a flip side. And that was the Iraq War, the declining unity America after the remarkable unity of 9-11 leading up to the Iraq War, and increasing questions about whether the CIA program was sustainable, especially, and many of my colleagues would view this with some sense of pride, especially since the second wave never happened. Let me put it this way. The fact that America had the time and space to discuss what should be done in a democratic society resulted partly from the fact that there was not another major attack. Many of my colleagues are persuaded that if there had been more catastrophic attacks, people would have asked far fewer questions about what techniques America used against terrorists. Let me make it simpler. The decline of the program was partly due to the success in keeping America safe. And the debate was a good thing. The word that was used by my colleagues was simple. That word was end game. As early as 2002, 2003, early on, the CIA was starting to say, our job is to extract intelligence from a human being, from a terrorist. We are not jailers. We are not the Bureau of Prisons. And once we extract that intelligence, we are not going to be holding people for 20 years. We don't even necessarily want to hold them for two years or one year. We want to extract intelligence and move them on to people who are professionals in incarcerating individuals. Nobody wanted to answer that question. Nobody. Because as soon as you answer that question, A, you acknowledge that there is a CIA Black Side program and B, you acknowledge publicly what happened in that Black Side program. Leaks contributed to the end game. Questions. Major leaks about locations. At least one location was closed because it was disclosed in a leak. But also more questions in the American public and among members of Congress who had not been briefed on the program, very few were briefed. I was among those who briefed them. We told them what we were doing. We told them in some detail, but very few were briefed. Increasing questions about within the CIA what the end game is and outside the CIA what are they doing, whatever happened to College Shake Mohammed. The White House, in the memory of my colleagues, was not too excited about dealing with these questions. I don't blame them. I understand that once you open the door on the Black Sides, you have to answer every single question about how and why you authorized that. But this led to increasing frustration at the CIA, including frustration at White House meetings where CIA officials time and time again told me, they were saying, we cannot be put in the position of being jailers. You, the American policymakers, asked us to go down this road of detentions. You have to participate in the painful conversation about what happens after. The questions continued and got more intense. Directors transitioned. One director who transitioned, going back to about 2006, was Michael Hayden, a legendary director among CIA officials, former director of the National Security Agency, a man of steeped in experience and intelligence in the military, highly respected for his discipline, for his mind at the CIA. He came into the CIA in 2006, four years after the first detainee and said, we have to put this on more solid ground. Let me read everything. And he was a voracious reader of information about the program so that he could master the detail. Let me read everything and figure out what the right path is. I think in talking to my colleagues, his effort led to a few more interrogations. But by that point, even in 2006, the writing was on the wall. Just five years after 9-11, just four years after the 2002 capture of Abu Zubei, the program, was already declining. The appetite wasn't there. Hayden asked questions about what worked, what didn't. Waterboarding was dropped. The interrogator said, we don't think, despite all the national conversation about this, we don't think this is the most significant technique we have and we don't think we need to use it anymore. Sleep deprivation, for example, again and again comes up as a technique that was successful. People don't like to be tired and they start to lose their will to not speak. So Hayden scaled back the program. There are more and more conversations with the Department of Justice. Sometimes the program was shut down, including by Director Tenet before, because Department of Justice officials were starting to scale back on their original opinions. Every time they scale back, CIA leadership a couple of times rightly said, if you want to change the documentation, we're not moving until you change it. We don't move without paper. And that paper has to explain how what we're doing is in compliance with the Constitution and U.S. federal law. But the writing was on the wall. And then, of course, George Bush made his announcement, famous announcement, and said, we have these prisoners. There were these black sites. And we're transitioning them to Guantanamo. Where some of them, including College Shake Muhammad, still are. That was not the final end of the program, including under General Hayden. There are a couple more prisoners authorized to go through the program. But once the President made that announcement, I think in retrospect you could say that was the beginning of the end, the final chapter. Now, widely reported, some CIA officers went to brief President-elect Obama on what the program was. And shortly after the President came to office, he said that the United States had committed what he called torturing some folks. I think the colleagues I spoke with bristled at that for a simple reason. Every President has the right to change policy. But we had been told, and this is a lesson of covert action from the beginning of time, we had been told by one administration that this is not only the policy of the land, but this is complies with the law of the land. And then told that what you did doesn't comply with the law of the land and doesn't comply with basic values that we all signed up for. That was painful, and the program was done. I did spend time with every one of the individuals I spoke with. Some of them had unique questions because of their jobs. Interrogators, I asked about interrogations. Senior managers I asked about, including I interviewed two, three, four CIA directors, most of whom I knew. About White House deliberations, but I asked some common questions of all of them, which is the final piece of the book. Ethics and reflections. I think when my colleagues look back, they look back in one sense with the knowledge that anybody on September 12th of 2001 would have said there will be a second wave. We weren't prepared for this. And if you argued against a second wave, if you'd said there will not be another catastrophic attack in this country, people would have said, you're crazy. So in terms of reflecting, many of my, and there was a fair amount of unanimity in this.  They look back on the program itself. I would say not with regret. They feel that that was a piece again, a piece of the puzzle that might have helped keep Americans safe. But they do look back, I think, with a knowledge that an America that once said, do anything to ensure there's not a second event, very quickly, I think surprisingly quickly, said what you did, some Americans, what you did was wrong. That's painful for my colleagues. Many of them would look at the program and say, that will never happen again in my lifetime. Not, not because they regret it or because they're embarrassed about it or because they thought it was ineffective, but because they know, as people who have experience through these searing moments, they know that if a program like that were ordered by another president years down the road, three years, five years, 10 years, people would say, what did you do? Why did you do it? And now you may be even culpable for legal action by the next administration. Some of my friends were investigated for years by the Department of Justice. So in terms of the program itself, I think my friends look back and say, we were a piece of a difficult time in America that will never happen again. And maybe, maybe we helped ensure that another kid gets to grow up with their parents. In terms of the ethics, I think the best capture of this was with one of the more the most thoughtful officers. I don't name people into the book typically because I told them I would not and because I don't want them getting hate mail. One of the most thoughtful officers I ever worked with gave me a snapshot of ethical thinking that I think captured a lot of what I witnessed. And that was, there's technical pieces of ethical thinking. What is the law of the U.S. government? Does the law allow you to do something? That's a Department of Justice piece of paper that says what you're doing complies with the Constitution and federal law. What is the regulation of your agency say? Is there formal guidance that says what you're doing complies with what this agency has written down as formal policy? Then you start getting tough. Those are pretty straightforward. There's a classic question as you step down a list of ethical questions. How clearly can you explain this in a public audience? We used to call this the Washington Post Test. If you're in front of a journalist, I now do CNN for a living, so it's similar to the Washington Post Test, can you capture what you're doing and why in one sentence that your mother would understand? And if you can't, be careful. In the last tests, did I think my friends have to think about regularly? I still think about it. What would your mother say? I don't care what the law says.  I don't care what the Washington Post says. What would your mother say? Using those litmus tests to look back on the program, I think most people still look back and say, I'm not sure I can give you a perfect answer every question, but I am sure of one thing.  Thanks for listening to my story. We'll take questions. Because there's a televised component of this, I'm going to insist, I was told to insist, so don't blame me. I'm going to insist that you go to the microphone so this can be captured on audio for the TV audience. Yes, please, sir. For the talk, I would like to ask you where you started about the dragon being slayed and the snakes that remained. From the perspective of there's always the what if aspect. The what if aspect. The Soviets, Russians, whatever departed Afghanistan, however they had infrastructure there and new aspects that could have been interesting and tapped on, was that possible from any perspective of people that were there that the U.S. could have somehow relied on to get intel prior to 9-11? That's a great question. I don't remember anybody ever raising that, ever. The relationship with the Russian security service, I don't want to get too much into detail, was and I assume still is obviously with Russian intervention in American elections, tenuous even after 9-11. There was a lot of talk about we face common threats, etc. I don't think the Russians were a great partner even after 9-11. So the prospect that they would be extremely helpful at a tactical level, which is really what the CIA needed. I don't remember, it's a great question and I'm going to have to now secretly ask my friends. I don't remember that coming up at all. Man, you started strong. I was, thank you. I never thought about that. If everybody else could do that, that'd be great. Yes, please, go ahead. Oh, I'm sorry. Thanks so much for your fascinating story. As somebody who grew up, I mean, I was in first grade in 2001. It's really something to hear from somebody who was there at the time, fully formed member of the intelligence community, making hard decisions about just the tragedy that occurred on that day. I'm really curious to know if in your view, you think that counter-terrorism is on its way out. I know that these days the discussion is really, I think, rightfully focusing on great power competition and also domestic instances of what could be called terrorism, the proliferation of right-wing extremists in the US. Is this counter-terrorism really on its way out? This is a rare moment. I'll say this. I don't know. I'm going to give you an answer. Typically, I'll give you yes or no. I'm not sure for the simple reason that terrorism, obviously, is declined dramatically. Remember, it was only like 2014 when ISIS was in the news every single day. You look for two characteristics in a terrorist organization that's a threat, breaking through all the noise. I typically look for leadership that's visionary. Don't just take out the local police station or the military. The Americans are the threat. And I look for leadership that has safe haven, the time and space to act. You don't see that today, the safe haven and leadership. Some of the leadership has gone from Syria and Iraq. But the speed with which an organization can constitute leadership and safe haven in a place like the Sahel in Africa, I wouldn't rule out. And I'm a pretty optimistic person. I wouldn't rule out that a group rapidly reemerges to seize America's attention. Another thing I agree with you, by the way, on the shift in focus to the more traditional post-1947, what about Iran? What about North Korea? What about Russia? What about China? The South China Sea? But it's not hard to envision a world where within a year some group emerges in a place where the local government doesn't have the capability or will to take them out. Just two quick things, finally, I would say on that. Some of the tactics in chasing people I could see, I'm not talking about laws. I'm just talking about analytic capability. I could see easily transferred to, for example, white supremacist groups. I'm not suggesting the CIA would do that. They do not do that. I'm not suggesting we should do that. I'm talking about the techniques of how you chase somebody down. So if America starts to say we have a different thread, and maybe the American Intel community, including the FBI, learned a lot about how to look at people and not just big threats. Yeah, I see it changing, but I'm not sure that America has a stomach if there's some terrorist from the Sahel who goes and shoots up something in America that Americans have any stomach to say anything, but now we've got to do this all over again. I'm not sure. Hi, thank you for your talk. I wanted to ask you about the language used around what happened at the black sites. My personal view would be that regardless of the ethics of it, what occurred fits with the dictionary definition of torture, and that using words like enhanced interrogation is more just a euphemism. So I'm wondering what language do you prefer to use, and how do you see this debate around enhanced interrogation versus torture? And by the way, most people don't ask that question politely. I really appreciate that. No, I'm serious. I get attacked a lot in public sessions. I never went to a black site. I'm not denying that I didn't know everything that was going on. I never interrogated a prisoner, but I'm the one speaking and speaking partly as a result of my conversations with colleagues. That is a fair question. I can give you a couple of answers. Just technically speaking, we didn't use the word torture as illegal. So if you say, let's go, you're acknowledging that you should be in a federal prison. The technical way people looked at it, there are a couple of phrases used and legal concepts. One legal concept is knowingly doing something that would result in long-term physical or psychological damage to a human being so that you can say, I'm uncomfortable with waterboarding. I think it meets my sort of human definition of torture. Technically it doesn't meet a legal definition. I'm not excusing it. I'm just giving you an explanation. There was another phrase that was used called shock the conscience. That's a legal phrase, meaning if you pick up someone for stealing gum, you're not going to put them in a black site. If you pick up someone who was participating in the murder of almost 3,000 Americans, that doesn't shock the conscience if you submit them to sleep deprivation. So I would close by saying I think the right conversation to have is not what the law is. And of course, this is from someone who never got close to a law school. It's where you're headed, which is, and where the Congress has been headed, which is, are we, please don't look back. We did this and the Congress said, okay, look forward. Is this where we want America to be? If the answer is no, simply create laws to stop it. But if you're asking your technical question about how we talked about it, that's a quick snapshot of some of the language that was used in some of the philosophy behind the program. Thank you. Thanks for being polite. That's a fair question. Hi. So it's been about 17 years since the beginning of these black sites were established. This year, the Intel Authorization Act dramatically expanded the Identity Protections Act in kind of a broad way. And so, and one of the reasons that the CIA justified it was saying that because of past going issues due to RDI, and so just based on your experience- RDI is the Rendition and Detention, he's talking about the black site program. Yes, thank you. And I'm just wondering from your experience like what those issues could be and why that would come up now in 2019. I've seen commentary, what you're talking about is the Congress saying, you know, trying to protect the identities of secret officers more aggressively. I have not looked at the law. I've read some of it. I can just tell you from a personal perspective, let me put two things together. The anger in this culture is something I have not seen before. That anger is fueled by both sides of a political debate. And the second piece of that is I see character, I see elements of that, sparks of that in, I have a website in, for example, a hate mail that I receive. The level of anger and violence in culture today is high. So if you just do mathematics, 330 million Americans, if you start exposing X number of CI officers, what's your statistical chance that one person who's angry isn't going to show up at somebody's door because you can find people's residences by public records? I don't worry about it because I work in a public world, I'm on CNN, I think about it a lot, people come up a lot, but I can understand just from a, I don't know the law, but just looking at the world as I see it and knowing my colleagues in this culture with a number of people who want to send mail that says, you should die of cancer, that people might say, maybe we should work harder to protect those who took great risks because in culture today, I wouldn't, even in contrast to 10 years ago, I wouldn't guarantee that somebody's not going to knock on the front door.  If my mail is any indication, that bill is worth it because the volume of people who write and the language they use is unprintable every day, every day. People say, and so I mean, my address is public knowledge, I think about that and I can understand why people would want to be protected. Anyway, yes, please. Yeah, you had mentioned the first wave, of course, being 9-11, that we waited for the second wave that never came being anthrax. In the intelligence community, is it thought of that we are now on a wave three or wave four and that we just skipped a wave and that these are different modes of terror or is it that the second wave is just the one that never came? Let me see, man, that's a good question. I'm going to give up soon because I'm tired. We focused on a large group-based threat, Al Qaeda. Nobody talked about homegrowns in 2002 when I was doing threat briefings for Director Tenet. I'm not sure we used the word. Our concept of second wave was another major organization creating another hijacking catastrophe with 20 people. To answer your question, I think what happened and what I would characterize as a third wave was the realization and for me this starts and I'm going to say 06, 0708, that there was a diverse, disparate movement of like-minded individuals who didn't really understand the ideology but thought that their anger was validated. Typically young people who were not connected to the central group except by watching a YouTube video. The third wave was people who are less strategically scary. They're not going to conduct an anthrax attack but harder to track because they're not really part of an organization. I thought the homegrowns in some ways were the third wave and then you start all over again almost repeating the process of going after a large organization and seeing it morph into individual actors with ISIS. Big organization then all of a sudden you start to see people who want to see an ISIS video and say in Colorado or New York I'm in. But we would not have defined the third wave or the second wave in any terms other than this is the next big one from Al Qaeda. Yes, why don't we do one more and then I'll disappear, sign books and disappear and go sell more books. Yes, please. This may somewhat pick up on what you were just talking about but I'm interested in what you learned about the motivations of the people you interrogated and to what degree that might help us in the future anticipate or dispel you know the forming of more and more groups. There's two basic groups of people. The original Al Qaeda guys were very smart. College Sheikh Mohammed the book talks about this would sit in front of a white board at a black side and explain to you the ideology of Al Qaeda. He was very proud of it. They're also very proud of 9-11. They thought this was they were not apologetic. Again, it's one explanation for why it was hard to get them to speak. They're like, I didn't do anything wrong. The motivation was interesting from an American perspective which typically is short-sighted and in some ways selfish what's in it for me. Their motivation would be they would say it won't come in my generation. It will not come in my children's generation but maybe in my grandchildren's generation there will be an acknowledgement that the only way to live is by the rule of the book that nations across the Arab world like they would say Saudi Arabia in Egypt don't rule by the rule of the book because the leaders there are corrupt and that the only way to take out those governments is to get rid of the Americans because the Americans are the backstop to these corrupt regimes. So their philosophy was if you get the Americans out and they thought we were weak, they strike at an economic target in New York, a military target at the Pentagon, a political target at the Congress, a very strategic strike. They said the Americans are so soft in the underbelly they'll get out of support for these regimes and then we can move in more aggressively and take out these regimes in a place like Egypt and Saudi Arabia over 50, 75 years. That was their philosophy. Now, one huge caveat and of course they would say violence is justified because the Americans are simply preventing the rise of people who live by the book. This changed when the homegrown movement started in earnest and again whatever it was the late 2000s, the mid to late 2000s. My experience and this is, I think similar with ISIS is that the further you get away from the nucleus of the organization into homegrowns, a 17-year-old in Colorado, a 20-year-old in California, an 18-year-old in Georgia, the less likely that person is to really understand what the ideology is. They're going to come at this with some curiosity. They might be angry about something that they've witnessed at school and society. The organization, think of this as a cult culture, not as a religious group. The organization validates their anger.  But in contrast to Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, if you ask them about three questions about ideology, they can't get you there. They're just ticked off. The group says, come into our organization, we'll validate your anger and we'll give you a YouTube video that helps you understand why we exist. So real differences between core organizations that can give you chapter and verse on ideology in homegrowns where the ideology is really razor thin. The final thing I'd say on this has to do with a practitioner's issue. You can't tell Khaled Sheikh Mohammed what he did was wrong. You can't. He'll explain to you otherwise. When you're dealing with law enforcement action or a social services organization dealing with a homegrown who's been indoctrinated over the course of two months, the likelihood you can turn that person is much, much, much higher. Simply because they don't have the depth of ideological indoctrination or understanding. And someone who's an expert might be able to talk to them and say, you know, what were you thinking? And after a while, they can't explain what they were thinking. So the approaches to someone who's a committed years-long terrorist and a homegrown kid who went the wrong way when he was 17 in terms of how you de- indoctrinate significantly different. Khaled Sheikh Mohammed will be proud of 9-11 forever, I suspect. Thank you again. I think I'll be leaving to sign a few books in. Thanks for the questions. Thank you.


I've never seen things that weren't there before, and they all look, yeah after seeing this film I might have to change my mind if I ever want to go to an escape room. My name is Brandon Keith Avery, and this is just my opinion, and what's going on everyone thank you so much for tuning in to my opinion slash review for escape room I really do appreciate it. Man when I went to go see this I was this close to going into this film completely blind seeing no trailers but literally like five or ten minutes before it started I pulled up my phone I looked at the truck I was like oh snap this is what I'm in for so if you don't know escape room is a belt an escape room you've heard it before in marketing maybe you have maybe you haven't but escape rooms is where it's like a real-life mysterious event to where you go into a room you know you pay you go sign up you go into a room and you try to escape but when you go into the room like the obvious escape may not be the door you may pull the door handle the door handle may come off you have to find clues to get out of the room now I've never done one before but I heard about them and I hear that they can be pretty fun and pretty difficult I also hear that if you're claustrophobic you probably don't want to do it because that would just be bad but that's what this film right here centers around now when I was watching the film ease of description that you can sum it up to is a new age reinvention of the saw movie or the saw franchise and I like that and you can say that you it does have those similarities without it being a complete copycat of that film now this film right here is being directed by Adam Robbitell I've never heard of him before but he is behind the the insidious films he's done a number of short films but the last insidious film that came out the insidious the last key which came out earlier this year January nearly a year ago he is behind that film and so he also did direct this film right here escape room and the cast you know it I'm not too familiar with the cast other than mr. J. Ellis he plays somebody named Jason if you know J. Ellis he would he's in insecure or I don't know if he's really in insecure season three I'm behind on that season he was in season one and season two and I liked I think his acting was pretty good and in that series I also think he's acting was pretty good in the game which used to be on BET and I think another channel before that and you know you're not the best actor in the world but you know it's service but I liked him and this film right here I really wasn't feeling his role the acting just was not the best it's actually kind of bad at some point in times I mean he's trying to play some corporate you know big boss executive and he comes across like oh yes Larry after the board meeting we're gonna go over to Bangkok then fly over to Miami and have hot dogs and hummus with avocados you know I that's just how he came across and I just really wasn't feeling him in this role but everybody else I think they did a great job the the next main character in this film is by the name of Taylor Russell she plays Zoe and she's more of the thinker she thinks outside the box you know she is one of the other main protagonists in this film and she was fine but the rest of the characters I mean they're fine too it's just a gang of random people that actually I was about to spoil the film I don't want to spoil it for you but it's just a gang of random citizens that are thrown into the situation they have to put all the differences aside and just come together to make it out because and when they if they follow the clues in these escape rooms if they don't get it in the in the right nick of time they're gonna die or whatever so it is fatal you know I'm saying and the deaths that they come up with in this film are very creative just like the soft films you know always when I go into those films I want to see something new and every time these characters go into a new escape room it is extravagant it is concise it's scary and it's mysterious you know and and you just like man how they're gonna get out of this situation who in the world is thinking of these traps and like how long did it take I mean and it's also just goes to show how sick people are to where they would come up with some type of thing and I like at the very beginning of the film and just throughout you're kind of asking yourself okay who is behind all this what is the reasoning and all this and as you're going through the film you're as the characters are trying to find out the clues to get to the next room to survive you're trying to get clues and piece together stuff in here and there and sometimes the camera tricks you it focuses on one object a little bit longer than other and you're like okay that's gonna come back later you know I'm saying and maybe it does it maybe it doesn't and I like how the film plays I like how the film teases you and it does that because they mean there were a lot of elements in this film that were just new and fresh that I didn't see before and I was entertained throughout I mean these escape rooms are very extra extravagant and elaborate and you know they're really hustling trying to survive and get through this and what times the acting was poor with the public characters other times they really just shine through as far as the severity of the situation and just how you know like man they are they are in a twister and they just need to get out of here whatever now the disappointing thing in it that just kind of really ruins the whole film to me is this the ending is sucked but before I elaborate on that just also just something the budget of this film was ten million dollars which is fairly cheap I thought with the cast it could have been even cheaper but you know that was fairly cheap and I don't care about a budget I mean as long as you can get a if you can get a job done with a hundred dollars you can get a job done with a hundred dollars and for the majority of the time you really couldn't tell that the budget was cheap in this film up until there was a few flashback scenes where they tried to dev a little bit deeper into the characters of backup and not backup but a backstory I was like oh okay you can really tell that this is a low budget but the ending of this film pretty much ruined it for me I was really pissed off the ending of saw paid off to me there was another ending there was another film I forgot the the name of it the Belcore experiment where people are locked in and they have to escape I like the ending the ending in that film was so so but it was much better than this film right here when this film and I mean you're wanting answers you want to know how everything ties together and who is behind everything and they do answer that for you but the way it comes off on screen it's like really that's cheap you guys just really couldn't think of anything better to do and you just kind of wrote up some beats to the end it was okay here we don't know what to do but we're just gonna finish the film you know whatever I did my best I don't really think you did your best with this ending but you know hey it is what it is and I was gonna give this film high praises but you know because of the suck face ending and and and I just have to give this film if I had to rate escape room out of a one of ten I'm gonna give it a six out of ten yes a six out of ten that's my lowest passing grade when this film ended everybody was like you know but hey guys do you want to see it that is just my opinion for a escape room or have you already seen it have I turned you on have I turned you off do you agree with me or do you disagree with me let me know down in the comment section below let's get this conversation going and keep flowing if you liked this video go ahead and give me the thumbs up if you don't this fine but you can still subscribe to my channel and also look me up on social media Facebook Instagram and Twitter all that good stuff it's right there the bottom of the screen and I made it very easy by providing a link to all that good stuff down in the description box below but guys I just want to thank you again for tuning into my opinion slash review for escape room and before you go don't forget then my name is Brennan Keith Avery and that's just my opinion peace


Yeah, man, lay off the sisters, man. How did you meet Pym C? Give me the story. Man, I meant to get them all at Shop Tom, man. Wait a minute, before you start, I got something to add on to that after you finish. So I meant to get them all at Shop Tom, man. And I see this dude, right? And he got on some mint shoes. I got on the mint coat. I said, man, those some cold shoes. He said, man, that's a cold coat. So I looked up and he looked at me. He said, man, you pivot kid, ain't you? I said, you Pym C, ain't you? Yeah, we on boss talk one on one, one on one. Yeah, we gonna talk. Man, I wanted to just stop and talk, you know, for a minute about Pym C, man. You know, ever since I started this show, that's something that I always valued. I always would bring that element into the show. You seen it. That's how you discover me. Yeah, that's right. Because I always would just say, hey, man, we in Texas. I ain't never really seen nobody rep the South or Texas like Pym C in this hip hop thing. So that's what really stuck with me when I first started listening to him. Cause I'm a little older than him. So I really, that's what really made me, you know, pretty much understand that how much he put out to be, you know, pretty much to hold on to that title for me. The underground king, you know what I mean? Exactly. So he really held that down. He did. He represented it to the fullest, man. Yeah, and Pym C in here, man. This right here, this here go way back with me. I told him about this story every time I seen him afterwards, man. We was at DGs one night. I had the blue hat on. And I told him I didn't want the DVD. I didn't want it at the time. I was like, I don't want it, man. I get it, man. I'm trying to shuck and jive. I'm gonna get it from you, man. He said, man, I'm gonna follow that blue hat to you by this DVD. Yeah, that's me, that's me. And the next morning we ended up in Tunica, Mississippi. I don't know how, I didn't plan it. I didn't know him. So there ain't no way we could have planned it. The next morning he was going to some, I think they had something at that casino for pimps. And he seen me in the store and he said, hey, I told y'all gonna follow that blue hat. Man, I brought our hair up and bought that DVD.  We didn't even plan it. It was like, dang, man, I couldn't see it happening. But Pemkin, I heard you on that one song, man. Boy, that song right there. Man, listen, man. That two type of this is Coca Pepsi. But the part that tripped me out when you say it about the black girl pushing the car, man. I don't know how you come up with this stuff, man. I don't know if you meant that this is easier to work with her or yours. Let's see, in the game, right?  That's what you see. But it's not that we don't like the black bitches. We love our sisters.  That's that Peruvian flake. So that means that white girls can go into the high or the holiday end of the height and they not gonna get sweaty. But if a black girl coming in, they gonna say, excuse me, might help you, man. So that's why we say they that Peruvian flake that all American hunky. We call it the funky hunky. The Caucasian went to the Swages, you know what I'm saying? So that we call that for a reason because white girls really do make more money. You know what I mean?    They look at a white girl like they might look at their wife or they daughter or they girlfriend. And they want a girlfriend experience with the white girl but they know the black girl is only a temporary pleasure. You see what I'm saying? So, you know what I mean?   We do some reverse slavery.  You know what I'm saying? Yo, give it to her. You know what I'm saying? Give it to her. Give it to her. Give it to her. So how did that happen? Lay out the sisters, man. Yeah, man, lay out the sisters, man. How did you meet Pimp C? Give me the story. Man, I meant to get them all sharp time, man. Wait a minute before you start. I got something to add on to that after you finish. So I meant to get them all sharp time, man. And I see this dude, right? And he got on some mint shoes. I got on the mint coat. I said, man, those some cold shoes. He said, man, that's a coat. So I looked up and he looked at me. He said, man, you Pimp a kid, ain't you?  We never separated for that point. I went over to Mama House, man. And we was over there, man. We watching some of the movies I had coming out. And we just talked, man. And we just, you know, he just, man. He wanted me to break the game down for him. He said, Ken, how you do this? Ken, how you do that? And, you know, he was amazed with my skills and my knowledge of the game, you know? Because Pimp knew the game, but he didn't understand it in depth. You know what I'm saying? I may have been into some encounters with some pimps, but, you know, I mean, anybody to tell the truth, I was the best, it really didn't get away with it.  So, you know what I'm saying? Do you remember what year it was? Man, you know, I can't, I can't, it might, now it might have been, I don't want to quote this, but I know it had to be after 99. Okay, okay.  So if you listen to that instruction album, that was in 2000, but Jermaine Dupri did it in 99. It came out in 2000. So, you know, before I ever met Pimp, we was on the album together. Yeah, okay, okay. And when you had you heard of Pimpsy? Well, you know, I used to ride in the pocket of stones. Yeah, I used to ride in the pocket of stones. Man, that pocket of stones was the one, wasn't it? But you know, I didn't know him, and I didn't even know who them niggas was. You know what I mean?  Yes.


10 p.m. B.U.L.O.V.A. Boulevard watch time for supreme accuracy expert design and outstanding value choose a boulevard watch of a lifetime W.E.A.F. New York Rinseau R.I.N.S.O. Soapy Rich Rinseau presents Boston Blankey starring Chester Morris Did you check your hat and coat? I have my coat miss. Here's the check. Thank you number 503. Yes a camel's hair coat Oh, yes, I remember Here you are sir. Help you on with it. No, thanks. I'll carry it. Here you are miss. Thank you, sir. Check here, please check your hat Well, taxi taxi, what's your hurry blackie? Oh, well Faraday my favorite cop won't be so happy to see me blackie You're going with me. Oh goody. What are we celebrating tonight your birthday? No celebration for you blackie I want you for the murder of Andrew Lawrence.  The caretaker of the Devon estate now look inspector I don't know any caretakers and I never even heard of the Devon estate. I know blackie What about those stains on that coat you're carrying there? They look like blood stains. Yes, they wait a minute This isn't my coat. Let me see. Well now. What's this on the label? It says here Boston blackie Yes, that's my label all right, but this isn't my coat. Oh, I suppose somebody sold that label in another coat Well, that's not bad for you inspector could be Well, all I know is you're going down to headquarters and the coat is going to the lab And I hope those stains prove to be blood. Well, I hope you don't get your hope Once again Boston blackie and inspector Faraday have tangled Boston blackie enemy to those who make him an enemy friend to those who have no friend Is there anything prettier these hot summer days that a nice-looking girl in a crisp bright colored cotton dress Well to us men those dresses always look fresh and cool as peppermint ice cream And it's almost as easy as snapping your fingers to keep those pretty printed washables bright and gay with Rinseau helping out Yes, indeed those hard-working Rinseau suds make dirt disappear in a jiffy whether you're using a tub or a washing machine Rinseau's mighty easy on your pretty washable colors, too. They stay fresh and bright even after dozens of washings So take a tip from Bob white for easier wash days and brighter cleaner clothes That's Rinseau white and Rinseau bright for your colored clothes. If you value them better use Rinseau every time you wash them And now back to Chester morris as Boston blackie who is in inspector Faraday's office Waiting word on the laboratory tests of the blood stains found on the coat he was wearing Likey for a smart guy you get in a morse great look inspector. Can't you think without pacing the floor? I've got a little proposition to make you all but how about the blood stains on the coat inspector Remember you wanted me for murder. Well not just in case those blood stains turn out not to be bloodstain Oh, you don't need to apologize inspector. Who's apologizing? What are you laughing at your shoelaces are untied. Yeah, why don't you tie them be? Now wait a minute this is going to be fun. Yes, I'd you tie them blackie. What now really inspect you quite humiliating I I never fancied myself as a gentleman's gentleman gentlemen's gentlemen cut out the double-talking come on time I shoelaces likey.  Yes, but not begging inspector By the way, don't you ever get your shoes shine what for oh, there you are I hope you realize it's a privilege to be tied by Boston black wonderful Here's a report inspector. Okay, let's have it. That'll be all Matthews. I suspect it. Goodbye Matthews.  What's the verdict? I'll read it here blackie. It says quote Stains taken from the coat of Boston blackie analyze Yes tests show them to be human blood matching that of Andrew Lawrence murdered caretaker of Devon estate signed Murphy police laboratory Unquote well, that's it blackie. I'm locking you up right now Oh, and I'm not taking any chances on you're getting out of here first. Hold out your hands Oh now inspector cuffs for me.  All right? Let's get going and just to make sure I'm going to escort you personally to yourself That'll be nice. All right down the hall and don't try anything funny. Well, will you sit with me a while and hold my hand? I'm sorry. I had to tie your shoelaces together Faraday and thanks for the gun You know you look very funny. Generally, you're only flat on your feet, but now you're flat on your face Don't the answer yet flaky not yet shorty Hello. Oh, hello Savoy cafe. Yes. This is the manager speaking. Well. My name is Jones Yes, my niece works in your check room I just arrived in town and I'd like to talk to her, please. You mean Mary and Macy? Yes. Well, she's not here I'm sorry. She's gone home and a headache. She said left here about an hour ago Oh, she did too bad by the way, could you give me her address? Well, yes, the Lincoln apartment the Lincoln, huh? Well, thank you very much. Goodbye You know, I still can't figure out blackie why that hatchet girl would take the label out of your coat and then sew it in Another one. Well, she was probably following orders. That's what we're going to find out We're going to leave this hot out plastic. Yes, we're going to the Lincoln apartments Here's the apartment shorty that's funny probably asleep, but I've got to talk to it. Can you can you open that door boss? Are you kidding? I've got it shorty There it is. Come on. I'm getting a creepy feeling boss. Like I always oh shorty. Would you relax? Hey, what's this? Holy mackerel the dame boss that feeling of mine was right as it's the check room girl a girl all right shorty She's dead. Come on over here and take a look. Oh, no, no, no, I'll take your word for it. Oh, kid Stand to death Somebody's playing for keeps shorty Somebody wanted to make sure I didn't find out who told her to switch coats if Fadi walks in now He'll try to pin us on you sure come on. We better get out here. Come on. That's right There's nothing around here will help us shorty. Yeah That caretaker was murdered out at the Devon estate. So that's where I'm going Oh, I think you're pardoned miss. I I didn't see you. I was doing here on my grounds Well, this is the Devon estate, isn't it? Yes, and you're trespassing Well, I hope that means looking for a job because that's what I'm doing It doesn't and even if it did it wouldn't matter. There's no job open here. Well, you know, I'm a pretty handy fellow I can do a lot of things. I'm really not interested There's a policeman on the ground if you don't leave immediately I'll call him and have you thrown off. Oh, please don't do that. I understood there was a job open here Uh, a caretaker's job your caretaker was was murdered. Yes, he was Now please leave. I already have a new caretaker Jerry Yes, miss Morrison's coming miss Morrison. I offer pretty name over here Jerry Will you go now, please? Mr. I'm sorry miss Morrison. My name is Jones John J. Jones. I'm a detective.  Oh, I uh, I don't need you Jerry. I just wanted to know you were around Oh, okay, man. If you want me just sing out Well, where did you get him?  Jones. Have your credentials? Well, uh, you see I never carry them when I'm on a case Things can happen, you know, that's what I'm afraid of. Oh miss Morrison. Please believe me. I Believe you, but I'll never know why Thanks The house is up this way What can I tell you that might help you mr. Jones? Well for one thing I'm puzzled Now your name is Morrison and this is the Devon estate. Well, I bought it six months ago Oh, it was formerly owned by a man named John Devon when he died this place was sold for taxes I see. Well, why are you still living here miss Morrison?  Yes Yes, I am a little But where could I go? Besides I'm anxious to know the answer to a lot of things for instance. Well Right after I bought this estate strange things began to happen One morning the chimney was torn apart a few days later I found the cellar ran set then one night the whole living room was turned upside down I see well, where was your old caretaker during all this? He was down the road sleeping in his own cottage Oh But after the living room was ran set he slept in the house on a couch That is until last night or rather early this morning when we found him murdered Here we are Please come in. Thank you. You're pretty calm about all this miss Morrison.  Yes, I'm sure anything else you can tell me that might help possibly I've had two offers to sell recently The agent who negotiated the sale of this house made me an offer the day before yesterday to buy it back Oh, and what's the agent's name Arthur Moran? I see go on Well, when I refused he said his client in any case would like to buy the gun collection that was here when I took possession Oh Well, are you interested in guns? Yes, and it's a wonderful collection. It came with the house Well, it's obvious somebody is looking for something in this house when he couldn't find it He wanted to buy the house when he couldn't do that. He wanted to buy your gun collection And of course he was looking for the gun collection. I'll bet your caretaker surprised him while he was searching for it Uh, how long had the caretaker been here a long time. I thought it inherited him with place. I see You mentioned there was a policeman on the grounds. Where is he? He's around somewhere. He's staying with Jerry in the caretaker's cottage. Miss Morrison Could you arrange for the policeman and your new caretaker to sleep downstairs here and for me to take over the Cottage for the night. Certainly I can do that. Oh, fine. And can you reach me in a hurry if you need me? Yes, there's an extension phone between here and the caretaker's place. Good. I'll call Jerry and tell him he's sleeping down here tonight Thanks. Oh, uh, Miss Morrison, what are your best friends call you? Polly. Good night Polly. You see I'm one of your best friends Good morning. Hey, what's this? Hey, wait Jerry. Jerry, I'll have you untied in a minute. Oh, even my aunt Hattie couldn't talk with that gag on. I better take it off. There. Now what happened? I don't know. I went to sleep last night on the couch here and during the night somebody tapped me on the bean And when I woke up a little while ago, I was tied up and gagged. Oh, they, you're not tied up anymore. Now where's the cop that was with you? I don't know. Uh-oh. There he is over in the corner. He's tied up too. Get him loose, Jerry. Oh, take a look at this place. It's a mess. Everything's turned upside down. Well, never mind that. I want to find out about Miss Morrison. Polly. Polly. Polly. Polly, what's happened? Wake up Polly. Wake up. What?  Come on now. Up. That's a girl. Come on now. Now walk around the room with me.  That's right. Now tell me what happened. Well, I don't know. You've been drugged Polly. Now come on. Try and think. I'm tired. I want to lie down. Now look Polly. You've got to keep walking. Come on. We'll go downstairs and then you'll feel better in a minute. Hey. Hey. You upstairs? Yes. What is it? Miss Morrison okay? Yes. How's the policeman? He's hurt pretty bad. I'm taking him to the doctors down the road. Okay Jerry. I'll see you when you get back. Now Polly come on. Walk. Come on now. Down the stairs. That's right. I'm beginning to remember now. Good. I put a glass of milk on my night table and then I went downstairs for a book. When I came back I drank the milk and then I got terribly drowsy. Well that explains the drug but you're getting over it all right. What's happened down here? The whole place has turned inside out. Well I don't know what happened yet. I can't stand this any longer. I can't. Oh now Polly take it easy please. Here sit down for a minute. Come on. There that's better. Well now isn't that a pretty picture? Well Inspector Faraday. Yes Inspector Faraday.  Blackie? Certainly Miss Morrison. Boston Blackie. You've heard of him. But he said his name was Jones. That he was a detective. I can tell you why Polly if you'll only give me a chance. Not a chance Blackie. I figured you'd come up here after we found the hat check girl murdered him. You've got a killing complex lately. Faraday will you take it easy. I'm really getting close to the murder. Yeah me too.  Right. Get guns up on the floor. Faraday drop it. Hey who are you? Let the gun go or I'll let a bullet go. Copper come on. That's being smart. Hey Danny get Blackie's rod. Step on it. Okay Eddie. Alright what is all this fuss about Blackie hero stuff? You're gonna knock out these two guys and show off for the girl? I'd like to Faraday. Only a bullet moves faster than I can.  I don't mean to be inquisitive but what's all this about? You'll know soon enough. How about it Danny? I got Blackie's rod and the inspectors. Okay. Put the straight jackets on them Danny. Yeah. See I didn't think we'd get the inspector too. You better go call the boss. Yeah he said to follow orders to the letter. Where's the phone lady? Well I... Yeah you better tell him Paulie. Wait it's just outside the door. Thanks Eddie. Keep them all under the gun muzzle Danny. Okay. Watch that Blackie especially. Yeah. Right back. And watch that Blackie especially. What is a guy? A gunman or a press agent?  Well after all I haven't established a reputation for nothing. Even you appreciate me sometimes Blackie. Hey Danny. I talked to the boss. Stick the straight jackets on them. What size straight jacket you take Blackie? I always have my straight jackets made to order. Yeah. After we get through searching the house we'll stick their feet in concrete and toss them in the river. Feet in concrete. Now you wouldn't dare to do that. Oh don't worry Faraday. At least we won't get our feet wet. Very funny Blackie. Very funny. Don't do it the hard way ladies. Take it easy. What am I talking about? Wide dishwashing of course. And the way to take it easy is to let soapy rich rinse-o take over. Because those lively hard working rinse-o suds get right after every little bit of clinging grease and all those sticky food particles and chase them away quick as a wink. Just try it. And by all means have rinse-o handy for wash day. This hot weather you certainly don't want to knock yourself out doing your wash the hard way either. Well remember rinse-o not only makes wash day a cinch it helps you turn out a wash you're really proud of. I'll bet you'll be singing your way through wash day like this. Rinse-o wait, rinse-o wait Happy little wash day song. Rinse-o wait, rinse-o wait Do you think it all day long?  Rinse-o wait, rinse-o wait Happy little wash day song. So get rinse-o tomorrow. And now back to Chester Morris as Boston Blackie. Boston Blackie, Polly Morrison and Inspector Faraday have been put in straight jackets by two thugs after Blackie has been accused of the murder of the caretaker of the Devon estate. One of the gunmen is on guard while the other is searching the Devon house. What are you twisting around for, Blackie? Straight jackets were made to hold people. Yes, handy little things, aren't they? Now here you can get out of ropes and handcuffs and things. Why don't you try to get out of that canvas coach you're wearing? You're due to get a bath, you know. All three of you. That's the boss's orders. Well that's charming. By the way, Danny, who is the boss? What's his name? Didn't he give you his car? No. I guess he went to forget, huh? See, you look funny down there lying on the floor. You know, if I felt like it, I could step all over you. How'd you like to have your face stepped on, Blackie? Like this. Hey, let go of my feet. I don't want to step on anybody, Sturge. This will make sure you stay on the floor till I leave. Well, how in the world did you get out of that straight jacket, Blackie? Never mind that. Get us out of ours. How did you get out, Blackie? Well, it's simple. I had my pocket knife in my hand, and while they were putting this jacket on me, I... Well, I just sliced right through the canvas. Hey, hurry up, Blackie. That other guy will be back in a minute. I'll let you out, Inspector, if you'll give me a ten-minute start after I do. What for? Well, I think I can find the man responsible for the two murders, but I've got to have time to do it. Now I want ten minutes, Faraday. Come on, what about it? Ten minutes? Okay, you've got it. Thanks. Polly. Yes, Blackie? Tell me, what was the agent's name again?  Arthur Moran. Why? Arthur Moran, huh? Okay. He's due for a phone call. Hello? Mr. Moran? Yes? This is John J. Jones. I'm working with the police department, and I'd like some information. Yes? Who instructed you to try to buy the Devon estate back, and who wanted to get the gun collection? The client of mine in South America. I see. Well, what's his name? Parker Adams. Why, uh, what's this all about? All just checking, Mr. Moran. Who is Adams? Well, uh, he was involved in a scrape here five years ago and went to South America to live. Well, why did he want to buy the Devon estate and the gun collection? Well, I haven't the slightest idea. All I know is that he sent a check every week to Mr. Devon from Brazil. I, uh, I believe he owned a coffee plantation or something. Well, thank you, Mr. Moran. That's all I wanted to know. Did, uh, did you get all that dope I wanted, Shorty? Yeah, yeah, sure, boss. It was a cinch. Look, I go into the files at the Daily Globe and I pulled out this stuff about this, uh, Parker Adams. Ha! No trouble at all. And say, no wonder this guy Adams had to go to South America. Just put your peepers on this clipping, will ya? Yeah. Oh-ho. Yeah. Yeah, I see what you mean. Come on, Shorty. We're going up to the Devon estate. Here in the bushes. Is the coast clear? Well, there, there are two policemen in the house and one outside. Okay. Polly, I think I found out something. I know who the murderer is and I know why he's ransacking your house. But, Blackie, how did you find that out? Well, I checked the newspaper files on a man named Parker Adams who asked Moran to buy this house from you and then wanted to buy your gun collection. He's in South America now, but he was a suspect in a murder case five years ago. But what is that to do with what's happened at my house? Well, you see, this Adams wasn't convicted because the police couldn't prove him guilty. They couldn't find the gun. And you think the gun is in my house? Yes. And the Devon was blackmailing Adams with it. Polly, I've got to get by those two policemen and get into the house and find that gun. But, Blackie, how? Oh, let's see. I'll tell you what I'll do. I'll climb that tree by your window and then drop to the first floor roof. Yes, I know, but the policeman outside. I know. I'll throw a rock in the pool. That'll keep him busy while I get in the house. Uh, where is the gun collection, Polly? In the library. Fine. I'll meet you there. Blackie, be careful. Sure. Well, here goes. Oh. Is that you, Blackie? Yes, Polly. Oh, I'm so glad. Where's the library? Over here. The gun collection's in this room. Come in, Blackie. Good. Now, we've got to work fast. Now, where are they? In a box in this desk. I'll show them to you. There's a drawer here, but you'd never find it unless you knew it was there. Here they are. Take a look at them. Ooh. Say, this is a fine collection, Polly. All old-timers, too. You know, I was pretty sure that one of them was the gun that Parker Adams killed a man with five years ago. But I can see now that I was wrong. But you said you knew who the murderer was. Oh, sure I do, and I know why he did it, but I can't prove it. I'm just a dummy. I'm... dummy. Hey, wait a minute. That gives me an idea. Look at this. This isn't a real gun at all. What? No. No, it's a dummy. It's hollow. Oh, look what's inside. A Colt 25 pistol. This must be the one Parker Adams used. And we can easily prove that by the serial number on it. Polly, I think this is our ace in the hole. You don't mind if I trump the days, do you, Blackie? I'll take that gun. Gary! I'm not surprised, Polly. I had a pretty good idea it was this fellow who was in back of these murders. Oh, you did, eh? Smart guy, huh? How did you know? Well, when one of your thugs went to call the boss before he put us in straight jackets, he just casually picked up the telephone and didn't bother to dial. There's a direct connection between the house and the caretaker's cottage, and that's where you were, Jerry. You were the boss. You only took this job so you could sitch for this gun. Nice figuring, pal. Well, as long as compliments are being handed out, that was pretty clever of you to get yourself tied up here this morning. But not clever enough. Why, any good boy scout could tell you tied yourself up, Mr. Parker Adams. Adams? Yes. He went down to South America and planted somebody to take his phone calls and pretend to be him. It was simple, but effective. Listen, I've spent a lot of time and money trying to get that gun back, Blackie. Yes, and killed two people trying. And now it's going to be four. And Miss Morrison, don't keep looking over my shoulder for your cops. My boys are taking care of them. Okay, Blackie, give me the gun. Now, just a minute. Let me get this straight.  Well, and you had to get rid of the bloodstained camel's hair coat you were wearing.  Oh, she didn't pick your coat on purpose. It could have been any camel's hair coat. Oh, well, I know the rest. Devon was blackmailing you because he had this gun. When you found out he died, you tried to buy this house, but Miss Morrison got it first. So you came to the States and began operations to get the only evidence that could convict you of murder. Oh, you've said enough. You're stalling. Hey, Eddie. Eddie! Yeah, Vosh. Oh, you got taste, too, huh? Get the gun. Blackie's got in his hand, Eddie. Got it. Okay, Vosh. Come on, Blackie, give it. Sure. Here. Oh. Polly, she's fainting, Vosh. Catch it. Hey, stand up. Stop leaning on her. Get off of me, will you? I'll get her, Vosh. Go to sleep, Eddie. Hey, let go of my hand, will you? I'm holding Gary's gun, and Blackie, hurry. Look, and let go now. Ow! Oh, thanks, Polly.  Thank you, Blackie, but I think I feel a real one coming on. Oh, you're wonderful. Do you want to be more wonderful? Oh. Call Faraday and tell him what you've heard. That will be enough to clear me. Of course I will. Oh. Oh. What's matter, Blackie? Hold me. Hold me. I think I'm going to faint. Faint? A big, strong man like you? Well, it seems to be the only way I can get your arms around me. Boston Blackie will be back in just a moment with an interesting preview of next week's program. Now, you've heard about the language of music, ladies. Do you know what this means? That's right, rinse-o white. And it means the cleanest, freshest, whitest wash you could ask to see.  You need a hard-working, lively soap, like rinse-o, because rinse-o actually gets out more dirt while rinse-o just soaks clothes clean, often in as little as 10 minutes.  Yes, for a wash that you'll be really proud to hang up on your line, get soapy-rich rinse-o. And now a brief glimpse of next week's adventure. Hello? Hello. Say, I'm supposed to meet a young lady in your lobby there, and I've been delayed. Would you mind having a page, please? Why, sure, sure. What's the young lady's name? Her name is Alice Manletter. That's right. Well, she left here just a minute ago. She met someone she was expecting and left with him. Well, that's impossible. Miss Manletter didn't know a soul in New York. Well, I wouldn't know about that, but she told me she had an appointment with a Mr. Boston Blackie. And that's the man she left here with. Well, but that can't be possible. And why not? Because I'm Boston Blackie. We'd like to take a moment here to congratulate the women of the United States Navy, the waves, who are presently celebrating two years of service to their country. In two years, approximately 70,000 of America's finest young women have volunteered for the most important jobs of their lives serving in the Navy. Waves work hard at important war tasks, but they keep their individuality, have plenty of fun and enjoyment with good companions, and have great pride and satisfaction for a job well done. If you'd like to help get this war over and bring your loved one home sooner, here's your chance. Join the waves. Be sure to listen at this same time next week for another exciting adventure with Boston Blackie. You can see Chester Morris as Boston Blackie on the screen at your favorite movie theater. Boston Blackie's latest Columbia picture is one mysterious night soon to be released. Richard Lane appears as Inspector Faraday, music by Charles Connell. This is Hollow Wilcox saying good night for Boston Blackie brought to you by the makers of Rinseau. The soap that gets clothes Summertime means warm weather, and that means more perspiration. Use Life Boy in your daily bath or shower to protect yourself. You'll love its rich, purifying leather. Remember, too, that of seven leading brands, Life Boy gives you the most soap for your money. And besides, it's the only soap especially made to stop... This is the National Broadcasting Company.


this is really luxury and I know for sure that some of you wouldn't believe that places like this do exist in a country like Gambia I'm saying this because anytime I do videos like this I get attacked people attack me telling me that why am I lying to the people because only one percent of Gambians live like that only one percent of the people living in that particular country lives like that but let me ask you a question are these houses in this country called Gambia yes this is in the Gambia I'm not lying to you because I'm here myself so what I'm trying to show you is that even though we got places like this that's what all of you have been seeing in the media so you think that the entire Africa or the entire continent looks like this that is why I am here to show you the other part that is this one which also exists in various countries on the continent this is just beautiful you know what if you keep on saying that Africans live on trees Africans live on that trust me you are just an ignorant folk and you also believe that everyone living in Africa is poor than my brother you need to start going to school again because I have lived in China and I will tell you that places like this do exist and poor places like this also exist in China so you cannot let me change my mind on what I have decided to do to show the positive images of the continent this is really beautiful oh my goodness I know you are enjoying I know definitely you are not seeing this part of Gambia but hey your boy Mr Maya is ready to take Africa to the world not just to the world but tell Africans that places like this do exist in their continent so it's about time they appreciate it's time for us to stop what complaining and look for solutions and what think about the positive image of the continent I believe that Africa is the future and young Africans are the future it's time for us to tell our own story and make this continent great again high up Maya I said you can't live luxury in Africa my brother my sister let me sip my Sprite man when you come to Africa even houses in Africa go poor not just hotels man this is somebody's house bro this is really luxury but they will never show you this part of Africa so you think that places like this do not exist but brother you don't even need a lot of money to live luxury in Africa you don't need too much money to live good in Africa trust me that one room that you are sleeping the one room that you paid so much money can help you live luxury in Africa so why have you decided to avoid the continent Africa it's time for we Africans to reclaim our land and if ever thing that the entire continent looks like this I am here to tell you that the continent also have this part so boy Mr Ghana baby I hope you guys enjoy this amazing episode don't forget to share, like and tell somebody that my brother what the Maya is saying that places like this do exist in Africa but I am not just in Africa let me just make it clear I mean the Gambia don't forget to smile because you are on the smiling coast of Africa you wanna save my it's right I am sorry brother life is good in Africa I am Maya