Good morning. Morning. Morning. What's better? My name is Peter Loge. I'm the Vice President for External Relations here at the U.S. Institute of Peace. Thank you very much for coming. I want to welcome all of you to this morning's session, Preventing and Mitigating Conflict Role of International Courts. The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, non-partisan institution established by Congress to increase the nation's capacity to manage international conflict without violence. Our core mission is to prevent, mitigate, and resolve violent conflict around the world by engaging directly in conflict zones and providing analysis, education, and resources to those working for peace. Because of our prevention and mitigation mandate, we at USIP are very pleased this morning to join with our co-sponsors, the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace, and Security, and the Hague Institute for Global Justice to host this important and unique dialogue featuring the prosecutor from the International Criminal Court and jurist from the International Court of Justice to discuss an under-examined aspect of international conflict management, the role of international courts in preventing and mitigating conflicts. I need to give a special thanks here, actually, to USIP Center for Gender and Peace Building, without which we would not be here this morning. And I'd like to personally thank Nicoleta Barbera for all of her work pulling together this important event. We're very pleased that this event is being held with the support of the Foreign Ministry, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and the American Bar Association's ICC project. The focus of the discussion will be on the role of the courts based in the Hague, the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court, in preventing and resolving conflicts and ensuring accountability for war crimes, and in the contribution of women to peaceful settlement of disputes and strengthening the international rule of law. To introduce our panel and set the ground rules for the discussion, it is my pleasure to introduce Dr. Abbey Williams as our moderator. Abbey is a former vice president of USIP, watching him come in this morning. It's clear he knows more people here than I do, actually, I believe. And he now serves as the president of the Hague Institute for Global Justice. Please join me in welcoming Dr. Williams. Well, many thanks, Peter, for the introduction. It's really a personal pleasure for me to be back at USIP and to see so many old colleagues and friends and to share the building with three organizations which I have close ties. I began my own academic career at Georgetown University as a professor and have been enormously impressed by the important work which the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security has spearheaded since its establishment in 2011. I also, as Peter said, spent four happy years here as senior vice president at USIP. And in my new role as president of the Hague Institute for Global Justice, I've been delighted to work closely with the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and particularly with the Royal Netherlands Embassy here in Washington. And I'm pleased to see H.P. Schreinmacher as the counselor of the Embassy to realize our common aims in the fields of peace, justice and security. The Hague is the international capital of peace and justice. But it is not a judicial center only because of the warm hospitality of the Netherlands and because of the fame of its storied institutions, including the Peace Palace, which celebrated its centenary last year. Ultimately, the Hague's international reputation depends on the quality of the leaders, judges, lawyers and diplomats that staff its unique constellation of international courts and tribunals. Four of these leaders join us for this morning's discussion. And it is a particular honor to share the stage with these esteemed colleagues from the Hague. And behalf of all the convening organizations, I would like to bid them a warm welcome. Judge Joan Donahue was elected to the court in 2010, prior to which she served as principal deputy legal advisor to the U.S. State Department across the street. She has also had a distinguished career as a professor, including at Georgetown and George Washington universities. Judge Schway was elected to the court in 2010, prior to which she served as in senior legal and diplomatic posts in China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These posts included Director General of the Department of Treaty Law, and she also served as Chinese ambassador to the Netherlands. Judge Julia Sebotinde was prior to joining the ICJ in 2011 a judge at the special court of Sierra Leone. She joined the special court following an impressive career in Uganda, where she began her career in the Ministry of Justice and ultimately served as a high court judge. And of course the prosecutor has had a distinguished career in her native Gambia, rising to very senior judicial positions, and also served at the tribunal in Rwanda, and now holds the distinguished post as the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court at the Hague. So it's a tremendous honor for me to share the stage with all of them. The format for this morning's discussion is as follows. I will begin by posing initial questions to the judges and the prosecutor designed to frame the conversation and to highlight critical challenges that the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court are currently facing. I will then provide an early opportunity for you, the members of the audience, to engage in the discussion. And I will take your questions in groups of three to maximize the conversation. So let me start off first with Judge Donahue and the prosecutor. Could you tell us a little about how the roles of the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court differ, and how they each fit within the wider system of international law? Judge Donahue? Thank you to you for moderating this event, to our hosts here at USIP, and to the Dutch government for sponsoring our trip. It's especially interesting to me to be sponsored in my own capital, where I lived for many years via another government, and I sort of see the world, foreign policy apparatus through the lens of an institution that is not part of the United States and where my job is very decidedly not to represent the United States. So we were chatting informally before about the fact that because the Hague is the center for peace and justice, there are multiple courts there, and there are people who are expert in those courts and can immediately distinguish them, but many people don't have that expertise, so we wanted to take some time at the beginning just to lay out what these courts are, what we each do. The common theme, I think, obviously, is these are institutions, the International Court of Justice for us, and the International Criminal Court for the prosecutor that seek to achieve peace and justice, but we do it in very different ways. Our court is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. We are nicknamed the World Court, and we had a predecessor court that was established under League of Nations auspices, but the court where we sit, the International Court of Justice in the Peace Palace, was set up as part of the United Nations apparatus after World War II, and we decide two kinds of cases. We decide contentious cases where one country brings a case against another country, and the question is about whether the defendant country, if you will, has met its obligations under international law, and we also answer requests from other UN organs for advisory opinions on questions of international law. So neither of those functions involves a decision about whether an individual is accountable under criminal law. You'll hear more about that when the prosecutor talks. That is how our roles differ fundamentally. Other things you might want to know about our court, there are 15 of us. We come from around the world, and traditionally there is a practice of regional representation on the court. The court is required to be representative in terms of the major legal systems of the world, and so you see that dimension as well. The three of us are three of the 15 judges. We are the three women on the court now, and you see we look pretty diverse other than our gender. And our court does not automatically have jurisdiction over contentious cases. States have to consent in advance to our jurisdiction. They can do that generally, and at the moment about a third of UN member states have done that, which means two-thirds haven't. But in addition, they can consent to the court's jurisdiction in particular treaties. A treaty can have a provision that says the parties agree that if there is a dispute, that dispute can be referred to the International Court of Justice for resolution. So many of the cases that come to our court come to us through that kind of a mechanism. And two states can also agree jointly to bring cases to us. So in a nutshell, that's what we do. I'll just tell you about two of our recent cases to give you a flavor. Our most recent judgment was in a case that Australia brought against Japan. Japan had a program of whaling in the Southern Ocean, and it said that that whaling program was lawful because it was whaling for purposes of scientific research, which is allowed under the whaling convention. Australia's view was no, it's unlawful. The court agreed with Australia and ordered Japan to end the program. Japan has said that it will do so. Soon earlier before that, we resolved a maritime boundary dispute between Chile and Peru. And in that case as well, the parties have quite recently announced that they have agreed to a coordinates that fill in the details on the boundary that we delimited. I'll stop there and turn it over to the prosecutor, but that's an overview of our court. Yes, I think it's extremely important that we draw this distinction at the very beginning, because the confusion is really everywhere. And I know that wherever we go, we get called the International Court of Justice. Why are you not asking us questions relating to what you are doing instead of what we are doing? And as the judge has said, the jurisdictions, of course, are different. You deal with border disputes, you deal with maritime, submitted by states. Ours is an individual criminal responsibility. We deal with individuals. And our jurisdiction covers war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. And this, even the way the jurisdiction of the ICC is triggered, is different. Currently, the ICC can only intervene in territories of states parties. That is those who have signed and ratified the Rome Statute. Or over nationals of states parties who commit these crimes. As I said, it's war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. And potentially the crime of aggression, but this will only happen after 2007. This may happen after 2007. The ICC, as opposed to the ICJ, which, as you know, taking over from the Permanent Court of International Justice, is a long time, long standing court, at least has a long history. But the ICC is a relatively young institution. It was only, as you know, came into, was established in 2002, after the Rome Statute was signed in 1998 in Rome. The ICC is a treaty based institution. It has currently 122 states that have signed and ratified the Rome Statute. It is not an organ of the United Nations as opposed to the ICJ. It's a treaty based institution. And as I said, even with the jurisdiction, the way the ICC can exercise its jurisdiction is where, as opposed to a state refers a situation to the ICC, requesting ICC's intervention, or where the United Nations Security Council acting under Chapter 7 and also mandated under the Rome Statute to refer situations, war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide to the ICC for investigations and prosecutions like it did in the case of Libya and also in the case of Sudan, therefore, the ICC's prosecutor can exercise jurisdiction. Again, I think one fundamental distinction that we can talk about is the powers, the appropriate motor powers that has been given under the statute, given to the prosecutor under the statute. And this powers means that if these crimes are taking place on the territory, on the territory of a state party. The ICC prosecutor, by her own motion, can intervene if that particular state is not already genuinely investigating and prosecuting. And this is what happened in this situation in Kenya. The primary responsibility to investigate and prosecute always remains with the state. But if that responsibility is not taken up by the state to investigate and prosecute genuinely, the ICC prosecutor can move in. So these are really the fundamental differences that you have between the ICC being an arm, the judicial arm of the United Nations and the ICC being an independent international treaty based institution. Well, you've both, Judge Donahue and Madam Prosecutor, mentioned the different jurisdictional basis for the work of both the ICJ and the ICC. For example, in the case of the ICJ, you know, the voluntary consent of member states. And I was wondering whether Judge Shuei could, whether you could reflect on how the jurisdictional challenges which both courts face, for example, the ICJ basis of voluntary submission of states to its jurisdiction, and the ICC's lack of universal jurisdiction subject to the provisions of the Rome Statute, which the prosecutor has underlined, how both of these compare and is it possible to make analogies between the strengths and the limitations of both? First of all, I think, can you hear me? That's my work. Sorry. This microphone is on the mic. That's the work. It's OK? OK. OK, if my voice fails me at the back, please just indicate. I'll try to speak as loud as possible. First of all, regarding ICJ, indeed, ICJ's jurisprudence depends on the consent of the states. And as Judge Donahue introduced a moment ago, there are three types of the basis for states to accept jurisdiction of the court. One, we call it Article 30 to compulsory jurisdiction. States declare it will accept jurisdiction beforehand to another state who has also accepted the same jurisdiction of the court regarding certain international disputes. Second one is by international agreements. And certain agreements regarding the interpretation application of that particular agreement at the request of the one party that they can bring the case to the court. And the third type is the agreement by the parties. And then you would say, suppose if states don't accept jurisdiction of the court, has it weakened the role of ICJ? So far there are 69 states who have made declaration to accept compulsory jurisdiction of the court. And then many others have accepted jurisdiction of the court through agreements, bilateral or multilateral. And around over 80 countries have appeared before the court in contentious cases. So far since the outside of the court, over 150 cases that have been brought to court in contentious dispute. And also around over 30 cases about advisor opinions. I don't think that principle of consent is really a challenge to the court. Why so? First of all, we know according to article 33 of the charter, there are various types of means, or various types of peaceful settlement means available to the states from negotiation, good offices, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, then judicial settlement. What kind of means will be suitable for state parties concerned to settle certain dispute? Very much to the states to decide. This is the first point. Second, is the question of states trust in the third party settlement? If you look at the cases before the court, you could tell why some states are so ready to submit their cases to ICJ. Why some states choose to have bilateral negotiations, maybe through help of regional organization or certain kind of third party, but not compulsory settlement by the court. So it's very much depend on the case. Then you would ask question, if that is the case, only 69 states that accept the compulsory court, what's the role of the court as the principle judicial organ of the state? I would say part from the judgments itself, actually states party or not to the dispute always attach great importance to the judgments of the court and particularly its jurisprudence. For instance, I was negotiating with our neighbor Vietnam on the maritime demutation case. In our negotiations, we often look at international principles, established the cases and established maritime principles from the court. So this is very important. I would not at the beginning say it's really the weakness. I would say actually the court role is much larger than people generally think. So it's not a simple matter of jurisdiction. ICC I think is a little bit different from ICJ. It's really the forum that pursue, persecute individual criminal responsibility. It's quite a different role. But in whole framework of international law, both have their own role and both contribute to international peace and justice. Thank you. Madam prosecutor, Judge Shui has suggested that the voluntary basis of the ICJ's jurisdiction is not fundamentally a weakness. How do you see the ICJ's lack of universal jurisdiction? And do you have any thoughts on her assessment of the basis of the ICJ's jurisdiction? I think with respect to jurisdiction. The strength of the ICC, I believe it's in so many ways, it's also its limitations. Because it is an independent judicial institution, its strength, its legitimacy relies on applying our judicial mandate in an independent and impartial manner. I think that is the only way the ICC will be able to build its credibility, always respecting the jurisdiction of the court and never going beyond the jurisdiction of the court. As a lawyer, I strongly believe in the power of the law as a tool and a tool to bring accountability for the perpetrators of this crime but also for the victims of these crimes. I think the equalizing factor is that no one is above the law and that one standard should be applied to all. But the ICC operates, even though we are an independent judicial institution, we operate in a political environment. An environment in which there are many priorities for the states, sometimes in which we operate. And it is not always that the judicial mandate is a priority for that state. So we operate in that and we suffer from the consequences of these political priorities that we have in states. But the jurisdiction of the ICC, we always should remind ourselves, it depends a lot, the effectiveness, I should say, depends a lot on cooperation with states. Because this is how the ICC was created. The ICC was created to perform its judicial work and for the states who are parties to the Rome Statute to be the enforcing arm of the ICC. And it is only through that cooperation that we will be able to effectively function as a judicial institution. Without that cooperation, we have difficulties in having the rulings of the judges executed having arrest warrants executed on persons found in states parties or even elsewhere and brought before the court. And this is, as I said, a limitation for the court. Many always say, you don't have a police force, you don't have an army, so how can you function? How can you be effective? But I think the important aspect of this is to look at the role that the international community has decided to play in international criminal justice by creating this permanent independent international institution to do judicial work to prosecute crimes, war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. And by becoming state parties undertaking to execute the decisions that the court will take. I think this is very important. And this is why we always say that we did not create a court. The Rome Statute did not create a court. It created a system, a system of international criminal justice in which the ICC will do its work and the states will be the enforcing of the government, of the court. State universality is very important for the court because what we have seen happening is that there is this double standard that has been created for those who are parties to the Rome Statute. The Rome Statute is able to intervene and investigate and prosecute and bring justice for the victims of those in member states, whereas on the other hand, non-member states are not able to, the victims of non-member states are not able to benefit from this, the intervention of the court unless there is a UN Security Council referral or perhaps there is a declaration by that state accepting ICC jurisdiction. So it creates these double standards in which the court is definitely not responsible for, but it is the system. And this is why universality is important that every state that is concerned about impunity should come on board. This is the hope that they should come on board and become members of the ICC, become states parties and I think that way the court will be able to be as effective as we wanted it to be in the first instance by eradicating everywhere where it happens impunity, everywhere where these perpetrators commit these crimes will be held accountable, that there will be no safe haven anywhere, no one will be able to hide from being held to account. I think the victims yearn for this day to come. Judge Sabitundi, I want to follow up on the point that the prosecutor mentioned about the challenges which the ICC has to confront in working in a political environment, she put it. Would you say that the ICJ has a greater luxury than the ICC in operating in a less political environment? No, I wouldn't say so. I think there's actually remarkable resemblance or similarity. Both institutions were born or birthed out of a situation where the international community was looking at a human tragedy that happened in the case of the ICJ, the Second World War, in the case of the ICC, the two genocides that we're quite aware of, Randa and the Yugoslav genocide. And I think both courts were birthed out of a sense of duty that the international community had to come up with an apparatus, one to deal with the impunity or to prevent the impunity, and also to build an apparatus whereby in future situations like those would be averted. Unfortunately, I think when it comes to implementing on a case-by-case basis, that is where the rubber hits the road. And it's really where individual states have to rise up to the occasion and to be tested, those that either acceded to the Rome Statute or have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of our court to see how they will enforce at the end of the day the judgments of the court. And I think both courts depend on the state's parties and on the international community to enforce the judgments. So when there's difficulty, when there's a grinding of the teeth in the implementation of the court's judgments, then it's very easy to turn on the institutions and accuse them of ineffectiveness. But instead I think that the international community ought to turn on itself and ask itself, why are these institutions that are our creations, why are they not functioning effectively? Now, the ICJ has been perhaps fortunate, perhaps because of its size, because of the fact that is the judicial organ of the UN, that its judgments are generally respected and enforced. Sometimes begrudgingly, sometimes more begrudgingly than not. And also we're a bit more fortunate in that we do not depend on the state's parties for investigations, which unfortunately the prosecutor has to depend upon. But I mean, all said and done, for me the similarities I see is that these institutions are creatures of the international community and their well-being and efficiency depends on the international community that set them up. And so if they fail or if there's any failing, any weakness in implementation, I think it's a good thing to reexamine where in the international community has the weakness occurred. Judge Sabotunde, you mentioned the similar circumstances which gave birth to both courts, the ICJ and the ICC. But of course the ICJ has been in existence for nearly 70 years now and the ICC for 10. And I was wondering, starting with you, and I'd like the views of the other judges as well, as to the extent to which you think the advent of the ICC has affected the jurisprudence of the ICJ, starting with you, Judge Sabotunde. Okay, in the field of cases concerning genocide, for instance, and other human rights abuses, there is a kind of a gray, I wouldn't even call it a gray area, but an overlap, let me say, an interesting overlap between the roles of the two courts in that whilst the ICJ may examine, for instance, whether state A has reached its obligations under the Genocide Convention, if it happens to be a signatory, it may look at a number of factors. The prosecutor on the other hand, and not just the ICC prosecutor, but prosecutors in the ICTY, ICTR, have already dealt with the individuals, the individual players in the alleged genocide. And so the findings of the criminal tribunals at some stage will become relevant before the ICJ as part of the pieces of the puzzle that will determine whether factually genocide did happen in country A, but they will not help, those pieces will not help the court, the ICJ determine whether the state A was responsible for the genocide. So there's that interesting overlap I found, especially in the field of human rights abuse, things like torture, things like mass murder and so on, but of course these, apart from torture, there are these other things that are not governed by treaty, so they probably would be covered under customer international law, but definitely it's an interesting overlap between state responsibility on the one hand for these abuses and individual criminal responsibility on the other hand in the tribunals. And I think this is an interesting overplay where the ICJ, perhaps they could before the establishment of these courts, ignore the judgments and findings of these courts, but not anymore. They are important findings that have been established by judges, international judges after much inquiry, after much investigation and often if the conflict is the same conflict that the ICJ is dealing with, this is already wheels that have been invented that we do not need to reinvent, although we need to carefully look at what kind of findings were made, in what context were they made and many other things before we will apply or be persuaded by the findings of the other court. But we do work in tandem. Just your views on this? Can I take a little bit different approach? I will start with the ICC. Nowadays international lawyers tend to say, oh, criticize ICC for being not as effective as it's desired. I would say from international law perspective, we cannot look at ICC isolation. It's only a continuation. If you look at the course of ICC, you have to see human rights course. Where human rights course started? Not today. Not after Cold War. If you trace international humanitarian law long before, right? And if you talk about international criminal court, at least you would think of Nuremberg Tribunal. We succeeded a lot of principles from there, from Tokyo military tribunal. So this is only a revival. It's part of human rights course for the protection of victims of war, victims of serious international crimes. As a permanent institution for international criminal court, certainly the beginning would not be easy. Because in light of current state of international affairs, in light of current state of states, certainly it will encounter a lot of challenges. And this is what we are working for. But for ICJ is a different institution, but it's part of international law framework. Its task is to settle disputes between states, not only focus on human rights. But human rights is part of its work. For instance, we have cases relating to the application, interpretation application of international conventions on torture, on genocide, and in any other. We promote the course simply from different angle. Just down to you. No, I was thinking about the title of this panel. It's preventing and mitigating conflicts, the role of international courts. And you've heard a bit about our work. And if you think about it, in both cases, a significant amount of our work is backward looking. So in both cases, the day-to-day work of the institution is to look at a problem that has already occurred, in our case, to decide on questions that one state brings with a claim of a breach of law against the other state. And in the ICC, a question about whether a particular individual is accountable for certain kinds of crimes that are allegedly committed. So you could say, hmm, that doesn't sound like it has much to do at all with preventing and mitigating conflicts. By the time these two institutions come along, the conflict has already occurred. And it's important to think about that. We don't control our inbox at all. So states decide what cases to bring to us. So if we see a conflict out there, and we as individuals think, oh, that's terrible. We're really worried about it, your institution can set up a group to try to intervene. Other actors can get into the action. We can only watch. However, in both cases, and this is important, these institutions do more and contribute more, we hope, than simply settling those specific disputes. The prosecutor referred to the idea that the Rome Statute set up a system. And if you look more generally at the international legal system, the first thing you have to say about it is, there's no boss. It's an incredibly disorderly, disorganized system. There's no CEO of the system. But the whole system has to be understood by looking at all the players in it. Our jurisprudence, we hope, influences the behavior of states. People often talk about the fact that states operate in the shadow of ICJ decision-making. And it is not only a shadow that is relevant to the states that have consented to our jurisdiction. On Judge Shway's point about compulsory jurisdiction earlier, while the judges were speaking, I took a quick look at our recent cases, and I just wanted to point out of the 10 most recent decisions we've rendered, only three of those were cases in which the jurisdictional basis was the general acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction. Most of our cases come to us through other means, and I thought it was worthy of mentioning that. So think of it as a system, a chaotic system, but where our day-to-day work of looking back, we hope also influences the mitigation and prevention of disputes by articulating norms that are forward-looking and by dialing down the temperature on the kinds of disputes that we get. If we settle a dispute about a... When you hear the expression border skirmish, it means people are getting killed in some border area. If we can settle the boundary peacefully and the two states can then work to implement it, that can dial back the kinds of tensions that can potentially escalate and find their way into the ICC. So they're all pieces that need to be tied together. Prosecutor Ben Souda, let me follow up on that point with George. Donahue has made about the preventive role of the court, the ICJ in particular, and that is not just backward-looking in its work. In an op-ed last year, I think it was still called the International Herald Tribune at the time, you used a phrase which George Donahue mentioned, where you spoke about the long shadow of the court, its preventive role and its capacity to diffuse potentially tense situations that could lead to violence by setting, you said, a clear line of accountability. How does the ICC work to fulfill this role? And is it intention, for example, with a growing controversy over the ICC's role in Africa? I think prosecuting these crimes, these international crimes, should be seen as both as satisfying conceptions of retribution, but also as a means to prevent the perpetration of crimes. And I think that the very knowledge that of the existence of this enforceable law and the fact that it is applied consistently, it is applied independently and systematically, can really act as a deterrence for violators and also to stop even would-be violators from committing these crimes. I mean, we've seen this being confirmed by academic empirical work, but also from our very own experience, we have seen that this can act as a deterrence. And I would just like to give a couple of examples. But first of all, to say that we should not look at the ICC court, its successes, its challenges, whether it is going to deter or not just by what is happening in court or by the number of convictions or by the number of acquittals. I think the impact of the court, as I said in that article, is really what we want to call, borrowing from the words of Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, the shadow of the court, the impact that the court has is already having in the international arena. I believe that the ICC has already become a relevant player in the international arena. And to give the example of Lubanga, Lubanga is our first case. And it is a case that we brought charges against Thomas Lubanga, D.L.O. for conscripting and enlisting children and using them to actively participate in hostilities. Children below the age of 15. But even before the end of the Lubanga trial, we see, for instance, the former SRSG for Children and Armed Conflict Radica using this as a potential to factor in when she does her negotiations for the demobilization of children. And in fact, she did report to the court when she came that she was able to use the Lubanga case to get Nepal to demobilize 3,000 children, children below the age of 15, and also that in all of her negotiations, whether it is with heads of states, governments, or whether it is with heads of militia, she uses the example of the Lubanga trial to convince them to demobilize these children. So I think this is the impact. Because not only does the decisions or the cases that happen in court reflect in 122 states of the Rome Statute today, but as you can see Nepal is a non-state party. So even in other countries and who are not parties to the Rome Statute, the impact is being felt there. She did report also that it has triggered the Lubanga case, has triggered debates in various countries that are not even part of the Rome Statute. So I think this is what we look at. This is the impact. The other example that I can give now is in the Kenya cases. These are cases that we are receiving tremendous challenges in prosecuting them, but I think we need to look at the impact that the fact that ICC is intervening in Kenya has played in the last elections of 2013. Kenya is a country we all know that for the past 21 years, all the elections that took place are marked by various degrees of violence. But certainly this did not happen in 2013 and I'm not saying that nothing happened, but I think it was compared to what was happening. Certainly compared to 2007, 2008 what happened in 2013 was, you can call it scuffles. It's really not what used to happen. And I always say that I don't claim that it is the ICC that is solely responsible for that, but I believe that certainly the fact that ICC has intervened in Kenya has played a role for the violence not to escalate into 2013 elections. Côte d'Ivoire, in 2004 we know that Côte d'Ivoire was heading also to serious post-election violence. And the former SRSG Juan Mendez also came publicly to warn about the ICC, especially those who are giving hate speeches on the radio and inciting people to go into violence. And I think that that warning of ICC's intervention has de-escalated the violence that could have taken place at least for a couple of years. So for me this is the impact, this is the shadow that the court has. This is what we should be looking at. We shouldn't be judging ICC's successes or ICC's failures just by what happens in the courtroom. I think the impact is important. But coming to the Africa bias, as they say, I mean this comes all the time. I get this question all the time on the continent, even outside of the continent. It is always said that ICC is focusing only on Africa and not elsewhere. And I think this is unfortunate, really. It is unfortunate that we should think ICC is doing that. Because what we are forgetting today is that Africa has demonstrated a need and a support for the ICC, but also has demonstrated leadership in advancing accountability on the continent. And I'm not saying these statements lightly. I think if we step back and go and look at the establishment of the court, how did the court become established? And I want to say, and I think all of those who are involved in the negotiations of the Rome Statute will know that Africa played a big role for this court to be established. Africa then showed the need for this court, the ICC, to be established. And we all know that the first state to ratify the Rome Statute is Senegal, an African state. We also know that today the largest block, the largest number of countries in any regional block is from Africa. 34 states in Africa have ratified the Rome Statute. And I also say that if it had not been for Africa and African states, probably the ICC will start work. Obviously, we will start work, but we would not perhaps have started it as soon as we did. Because the first referrals requesting for ICC's intervention came from African states. Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, and as recent as last year Mali requested the intervention of the ICC. Which, by the way, I just want to highlight that it is not ICC that is going to Africa, it is actually Africa that is coming to the ICC, that is requesting ICC's intervention. And those who talk about this, make these criticisms against the ICC completely ignore the facts. They ignore the facts that this is what is happening and not the other way around. The Kampala Conference was held in Uganda in 2010 in an African state. And where the crime of aggression was adopted, that's another African state showing leadership. So this accusation that ICC is targeting Africa is completely wrong. I think we should be honest. We should look at what Africa is doing currently. Yes, we do have difficulties at the moment. We have disagreements here and there. I just want to say that the largest part of the requests for assistance that we make as an office goes to African states. And in fact, I can say that over 70% of those requests comes back positive. So it is not that Africa has completely shut down against the ICC. We work with them every day. We make missions every day. We make requests for assistance every day. And this is important to show that Africa is showing need, is showing support, but it's also showing taking leadership in the advancement of international criminal justice. Well, in that spirit, let me move beyond Africa to two current situations, Syria and the Crimea. And the newspapers are filled with stories about what is going on in those two places. And we see a diversity of views on the applicable international law. But neither the ICC nor the ICJ is playing any role in respect of either matter. Does this suggest that these courts have nothing to contribute when the stakes are especially high? And when the international community is sharply divided, and you have various invocations of international law? George Sabatini, do you want to start? I was hoping you wouldn't start with me. I have my personal views, and I think personally, before I look at the courts, I always want to look at the international community. I want to look to New York. I want to look at the Security Council and sort of say, guys, what are you doing? We're facing fire here. What are you doing? But as Joan said earlier, these are situations that we in the court are individually watching with interest, but unless and until we're seized with an actual case in either of the situations, we can only watch. Just like any other court would just watch. I cannot speak for the ICC because I don't know what would happen there. But surely in the apparatus that the international community has put up, we're just one player. The ICJ is one player to settle disputes, and we settle where the states allow us to do that. We're like a clinic, if you like, where the patient has to come to the clinic to be treated. I think the Security Council has a large part to play. I have my own views as to whether or not they've let us all down, which I would not care to express here. Please do. No. And I pull my hair, what's left of it every day, just wondering. But you know, states are strange animals, and if we're to all peacefully coexist and to move forward into the next decade and the next century and so on, we move but we move very slowly. And whoever came up with this idea of a Security Council, its combination, the idea of veto powers, I don't know who came up with it. I don't know that it works, but I don't like it. I can tell you that much. But I have no better solutions. But as a member of the court sitting, maybe I'm glad I'm not a member of the Security Council. It's much easier for me to sit and criticize the Security Council. It's much easier when the case is referred to the court for me to then sit in the quietness of my chamber and to try to figure out where the pieces of the puzzle fit in, to give a judgment, and to leave it to the states to implement or not to implement. But definitely these are hot issues on the table for which you cannot look like a worm at one institution and say, you guys are ineffective. You've got to have a bird's eye view where some of these conflicts are concerned and to see with a bird's eyes, if you like, as to where you think the solution could lie. Judge Donahue? Well, it's a good question and worthy of reflection. And here I'll play devil's advocate a bit with what Judge Shuei said earlier about the effect on our court of the limited acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction. To critics of our court's effectiveness often point to the fact that, if you will, two-thirds of member states have not accepted compulsory jurisdiction. Now if there's any kind of a dispute and a state that considers itself aggrieved is trying to figure out what should we do about this problem. Having been a foreign ministry lawyer, I can say what they do is they develop a set of options and they may look to see, is there a court that would have jurisdiction over this case? Can we bring this case to a court? And it is true that some of the largest and most powerful states have avoided ICJA jurisdiction and that creates a limitation. It doesn't mean that any of us could say sitting here there would never be jurisdiction over a case A or case B. That's a question we would only decide if the case were brought to us. The United States has actually appeared before the International Court of Justice more than any other state, but has in recent years limited its exposure to jurisdiction. And so that would suggest that one wouldn't see the U.S. before our court as frequently in the future. So I think that it can leave a feeling of frustration when one looks at disputes and says, why aren't they in our court? Sometimes that is a consequence of a judgment of an aggrieved state that our court wouldn't have jurisdiction. And sometimes it is simply the case that the judgment of an affected state or both of the affected states separately or collectively is that the best way to make progress to achieve their objectives, what they see in their national interest, is not to come to a court for resolution but to pursue other avenues. It's a complicated question and an important one. There is nothing in principle that precludes those kinds of hot conflicts of being brought to our court. Our court has jurisdiction in principle to settle any cases arising under international law from anywhere in the world. But the state that brings the case to us has to establish a basis for the court's jurisdiction. I'm glad I'm no longer the legal advisor in foreign ministry. I will face this question as a member of the court. I think I may put the question in a better perspective more objectively. First of all, I agree with both of my colleagues. The court has this jurisdictional limitation. Unless it's given, it's asked to pronounce its legal position either in a contentious case or advised opinion case, it cannot take an initiative to give its views on any contemporary issues. This is the first point. Second one, at the national front for judiciary, there is always a question of non-judiciability and the American constitution, the question of political issues. For such hot issues like Syria or Crimea, we have to consider whether the case is a right for a judicial settlement, whether it's really a legal issue at this stage. I agree with Judge Subtandi, perhaps the Security Council at the moment. UN is the best forum to discuss the matter. And because at the end of the day, it's not that everybody wants to seek legal view on the matter. All you want is a peaceful settlement between the parties, either for Syria or for Crimea for Ukraine, is the international community's common task to see whether we can find a proper solution to settle the dispute for the benefit of Ukraine people, for the region and for the world. So this is a common task for all of us. So when you talk about effectiveness of international law, it doesn't mean only one court can apply the law, so the law is effective. It's the states, the international community, the legal community, you have to think of the matter, where international law lies. And I'm glad that this institution is not only about international, you are from different disciplines. There's a multi-discipline approach would be better solution. Thank you. Thank you. Well, I'd like to give an opportunity, as I said, to you, the members of the audience. The prosecutor, before I give you an opportunity to engage in the discussion and the two mics, the prosecutor said that she wants to clarify the role of the ICC and Syria, which I think would be quite opposite. Madam prosecutor. Yes, because I think our court gets more called on to intervene than even the ICJ in view of all the crimes that are allegedly taking place in Syria. It is thought that ICC should intervene. But I think I just want to clarify that, as I said at the very beginning, ICC can only intervene on the territories of state parties, which Syria is not. Or Ukraine, for that matter. So we cannot intervene. Or over nationals of state parties, which also is not the case here. I think the only other, not I think, but according to the statute, the only other way in which ICC's jurisdiction can come into play is if any state, that is not a party, but once ICC's jurisdiction decides to make a declaration under article 12-3 accepting ICC's jurisdiction and requesting for intervention. That's one way. The other way is if the United Nations Security Council were to make a resolution referring the situation to the ICC as is mandated under the statute, which even in that case it doesn't mean automatic intervention by the ICC because we have to look at the facts and see that if we do act, we are acting within the legal framework of the Rome statute before the ICC can intervene. So in this particular case, I know that every time we get asked, why are you not intervening? Why do you concentrate on Africa and you are not concerned about the victims in Syria? But this is not the instance. As I said, it is a matter of jurisdictional limitations. This is why the ICC cannot intervene. Thank you, Madam Prosecutor, for that clarification. Now let's take some questions. I see there are roving mics and as I said, I'll take the questions in groups of three to maximize the discussion. Start with the lady closest. And if you give your name and institutional affiliation, that will be helpful. Hi, I'm Tolu Oduquia. I'm from American University doing an LLM in criminal law and politics and legislation. Can you hear me? Okay, my name is Tolu Oduquia. I'm from American University in Washington DC here and I'm doing an LLM in criminal law and politics and legislation. So my question is for the ICC, when you see the state are investigating, what system do you have in place to confirm what they report to you as the report of the investigation? And in case those situations re-arise, what do you do? Can you re-instruct the state to do another set of investigations or do you wait to see what steps they take and then step in? Okay, thank you. Thank you. My name is Zora Rasekh. I'm Director of Global Watch Group and former advisor on human rights to Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The question I have is Afghanistan has been a member, at least the last that I was at the Foreign Ministry a couple of years ago in Afghanistan. The Rome Statute was signed. Now, since then, many violations and crimes against humanity has happened in Afghanistan, specifically by the group called Taliban. What is the role of ICC in actually a member state in bringing these perpetrators into justice? Thank you. Thank you. And I think go to that side of the room. Hi, my name is Carolyn. I'm a student at the School for Conflict Resolution at George Mason University. My question is relating to the mandates of the courts. The ICTR had a specific mandate to contribute to reconciliation in Rwanda and the ICC has a more general mandate to contribute to peace and security. I was wondering what kind of outreach the courts have to help promote reconciliation or if there's any NGO partners that you work with to help promote those missions. Thank you. Well, it seems as if we have three questions directed to the prosecutor. So hopefully we'll have a more balanced range of questions in the second round. Madam prosecutor? Yeah, I hope. The first question concerns complementarity. As you know, one of the principles enshrined in the room statute is the principle of complementarity, which means that national systems retain the responsibility to investigate and prosecute crimes. It is only when they are unable to do so, you know, genuinely or when they are unwilling to do so, that the ICC, by being members of the ICC, the ICC steps in. And we have been trying to ensure that the principle of complementarity works through our own policy of even positive complementarity. In your particular question, probably it would be better answered if I give you examples. In Guinea, Guinea is a state party to the room statute. It has ratified the room statute for some time now. But in 2008, 2009, you know, there were this stadium, how would I call it? It's not a conflict, but there was attack against civilians at the stadium when they attempted to demonstrate. And potentially crimes against humanity were committed. So the ICC, we decided to open preliminary examinations in Guinea as we have done in Colombia, as we have done in Afghanistan. Maybe I'll just take those three questions together. And under preliminary examinations, we assess whether, first of all, whether our crimes have been committed, war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. We also assess whether that particular state is investigating and prosecuting the crimes. In the absence of which, if that is not happening, we potentially ICC would intervene. But also we assessed whether it would be in the interest of justice for the intervention of ICC. You know, whether it would not be against the interest of justice if we were to intervene in those situations. And in Guinea, it has been under preliminary examinations for four years now. You know, and we are working closely with them. We are attempting to get partners who will assist them, because sometimes it's not always a question of unwillingness. Sometimes it's lack of capacity. And this is where I'm still calling on states that we need to think about ways in which we can assist those countries who may be willing to investigate and prosecute but lack the capacity. In the case of Afghanistan, it is under preliminary examination. In fact, for some time now, I believe 2005 to now, if I'm not mistaken, it's under preliminary examinations. And we are checking all these aspects, whether the crimes are taking place and whether anything has been done to address them. But the problem we have been having in our preliminary examinations in Afghanistan is security. You know, security not only for those people who we meet, because we have an obligation to protect them, but also security for our staff in deploying to the field. We have been attempting to go. We've been making requests. But notwithstanding, we have been collecting information, you know, which the office is analyzing because we have to analyze and make sure that this criteria, all this criteria is met before we can even go to a next phase or even decide to ask for authorization from the chamber to open investigations. I think the last question is about what kind of outreach. As you know, NGOs have played an important role in the establishment of the ICC, a very important role. And I think we still continue to work with NGOs. We also work with states, parties. We work with civil society for outreach. We realize now that outreach is, okay, we realized before, but even now, more so now, especially when we have all this propaganda against the court. We realize that it is crucially important to have a good structure in which we can do effective outreach. Because one thing that harms the court, that is harming the court is this misperception, this misinformation that keeps going around about the ICC, which as I said earlier in my intervention, that if you look at the facts, it is not the case. But I think it's important that especially in situation countries, those who are affected by these crimes know what to expect. It is important. But also, even outside of the situation countries, I think it is important for people to understand what the limitations of the court is, where the court can intervene and where the court cannot intervene. As you know, at the International Criminal Court, we have victim participation. We have victim participation for those who are affected by the crimes that the ICC is trying. And it's absolutely crucial that those victims also know that this is what they should expect. At the ICC, we have the Office of the Public Council for Victims. That goes to the situation countries and try to reach out to the victims to speak to them and tell them their expectations. Also, we have what is known as the PIDs. It's a public information unit for the whole of the ICC. But definitely it is important to have additional resources for the PIDs to be able to do its work properly. I mean, it's a small number of staff, but we have seen last year, we have seen what is happening in the media. We have seen what is happening in Kenya, which the ICC alone cannot match. We cannot. It's a reality. And we've been talking to states, we've been looking for assistance, we've been talking to civil society to see what we can put in place so that the outreach that is necessary for the effectiveness of the court is there. Well, in the interest of judicial fairness, I want to give a preference in the second round to questions which are either aimed directly at the judges of the International Court of Justice or a question which both the prosecutor and the judges in the ICC could address for the second round. Chantal, Dionne Audrat. Thank you, Abby. I'm Chantal Lyon-Autat with CPRI North America and Women in International Security, also known as WISE. I have indeed a question for the judges and my question is, how do you see has the ICC evolved over time? Both in terms of the types of cases that you have seen coming in front of the court, as well as the ratio of judgment versus advisory opinions. And a second question, if I may, is both courts, a lot of states have not signed on to these courts. And so what can you do or what should one do to beef up the states adhering or signing on to either the statutes or the court? And maybe for Judge Xi, it seems to me that China has been very critical of the ICC and I wonder if you could explain the objections of China. Okay, thank you. Let's go to that. Hi, I'm Robert Lord. I'm a master's candidate at American University studying transitional justice and specifically genocide prevention and punishment. I have a question for all of the panelists. In the Bosnia v. Serbia decision at the ICJ, there was a very narrow conception of the effective control test and a very narrow delineation of the actual occurrence of genocide to three days in July at Srebrenica. In making those decisions, which were relatively conservative decisions, was the court in a sense making a political calculation to enhance its legitimacy in certain contexts? Did those calculations have a political aspect generally? And more specifically, I guess, for the prosecutor and as well as the judges, is there a need with such a nascent court at the ICC to preserve or perpetuate such a nascent institution by making calculations that may have political aspects? Thank you. Good. And let's stay on this side and the third question. Good morning. My name is Larissa Mihalisco with the Department of State. My question is for all the panelists. Of course, the topic today is about how the courts mitigate and prevent justice, but in some instances states may use criminal tribunals, for example, to actually inflame problems in their own countries. The example that comes to mind is Bangladesh. And I was wondering maybe you could provide some guidance or some guidance really for practitioners of how to encourage states not to overly politicize criminal tribunals as well as cases that go to court. Well, a range of questions. Thank you. Judge Donahue, why don't we start with you? Well, I think I'll just touch on an aspect of the last question speaking of courts that resolve disputes between states, like ours. And I would question the phrase overly politicized. And essentially, I would say the kinds of disputes that come to our court are always political. And think about it this way. Let's say you've got a question about who owns an island, state A or state B. It looks really technical. The legal aspects are really technical. But do you want to be the leader in a state that's been claiming in all kinds of speeches for years and years? That's our island. It doesn't belong to the neighbor. Do you want to be the leader who gives that island to the other state? Maybe not. So one reason why you might actually want that dispute to go into our process is to manage your domestic political issue. How do I get re-elected? Well, giving away our island might not be a good idea. So having this case settled by the ICJ or another tribunal might be a different approach. I think many of the disputes that find their way to our court are nested within a broader, inevitably political dispute. Sometimes it has a domestic political dimension, as in my example. But usually we think about the bigger disputes between the two states, the broader disputes within a state, maybe ethnic tensions, etc. So our cases, we settle legal disputes, but they're always nested within bigger, weighty political disputes, inevitably. Joshua? I think this is a question more directed to me as to China's practice. First of all, I would say for ICJ, there are only about 69 countries that accept Composite Jews and articles 36 paragraph 2 of the statute. And many countries have not yet. So how you see the involvement of the court. I would say actually as international lawyer, when we think about the third party settlement, we have to look at the history of the court. Third party settlement, actually if you compare the history of international law, only came very recently. And if you look at arbitration, the first arbitration, Alabama case, only in the middle of the 19th century. And if you look at the permanent court, and the League of Nations and later UN, the principle judicial organ of the organization, still you have to see why so many states have a reservation regarding third party settlement, this first point. Second, after having worked in the court for nearly four years from inside, I cannot better appreciate why some states do not come to the court to submit their dispute to the organ for third party settlement. This is the organ very different from other organs of the United Nations, where the court works in two languages, English and the French. And it also carried very much the practice of common law and civil law, the major two forms legal system in the world, very much by the Anglo-Saxon and Francophone practice. And even if under statute, judges are elected from different or major forms of legal system under civilization. Still, once states decide to come to the court for third party settlement, they have to, you know, at least a certain confidence and the certainty that the court would deliver judgment that it can accept. So all these background explained the hesitation on part of states why they do not come. Now the question relating to the political aspect, I agree with just under you, each case has its political element. And oftentimes if you look at the cases with territorial dispute, you can easily tell because the domestic pressure for boundary issues, for territorial issues, they cannot settle through negotiations. So they have to come to third party settlement. This is one thing. Secondly, about Bosnia versus Serbia case, so happened neither of the three judges were present on the bench when the case was conceded and the judgements delivered. I wouldn't call it the judgment as a conservative. You have to distinguish state responsibility for violations of international convention from cases of individual criminal responsibility. I have to say as a reader of the judgment, I think the court has given quite sufficient consideration of the legal and the factual funding of ICTY, especially in case of Supervisor. But when you interpret the convention on general side, the court has to really follow the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties, the rules of interpretation. So that's the result. Now come to the question of China's attitude or criticism of ICC. Indeed, even China has taken active part in the consideration and conclusion of Roman Statute from day one and still an observer of the convention. It has been quite critical about the court simply because of this African element. And actually, I just want to take this opportunity to ask Madam Prosecutor a question. At African Union, the leaders of African leaders made a joint declaration on ICC's work for focusing primarily on African leaders. And if the court goes on like this, focusing on African leaders, and we may ask ourselves whether this kind of a persecution really indeed contribute stability and peace of the region. And this is, I think, the China's major concern. You may say some of the referrals, voluntary referrals from African country, but we can't see a court. The Western country provided judges and lawyers. The African country prevented defenders. What kind of justice that could be, right? It doesn't mean up till now, in the past 10 years, only African countries, leaders, violate international law. There are no other commitment, offenses of seriously international crime. Why those cases are not referred to ICC? I think these are legitimate questions. If we really care about ICC, really care about international criminal justice, we have to think this seriously. So far China is outside the Statute, Roman Statute. But it really wish all the success of this international endeavor and be persuaded to join it. But at the end of my speech, I think it's a break to do a little bit of promotion of the Hague. ICJ is the longest permanent court in the Hague, in the Peace Palace. But nowadays every international lawyer referred to ICC. But I have to say this is the success of the Hague. So I think that as a center of international law, the Dutch government really has made a great contribution. I want to take this opportunity to make that acknowledgement. Thank you. Yes, maybe I'll endorse everything my colleagues have said. But maybe a word on the interesting question that somebody asked about why do states politicize criminal courts and what can be done to discourage this? States are political animals and they will politicize anything to suit themselves. In the case of Africa, forgive me if I also speak about Africa, but I've had the privilege of serving in another criminal tribunal where we were trying a former head of state and that didn't sit very well with a number of people. For me, the way I see it is there's a bit of a double standards where in the case of the ICC, the INDIT is not a head of state or former head of state. It's just an ordinary person. That is okay. Nobody has a quarrel with that.  These are the double standards that I see and I have a problem with. The Rome Statute is very clear in saying that the political standing of a person shall not be used as a defense against an indictment. And when member states sign on such a treaty, they absolutely undertake to abide by that provision. And to say, well, it doesn't matter, come what may, if it's a head of state, you are not above the law, so to speak. So for it to now become a problem after the event, for me I think it's very, very unfortunate. And I, for one, take the opportunity, whenever it arises like this, to try and put things in perspective. To say, as the prosecutor has belabored, examine the cases on each one's cases merits. Do not generalize. It's very easy to say the institution is being faltered because it's looking at one continent. And therefore it must be persecuting. Look at who's making the accusation, in respect of which indictees, and how did the referral, how was the referral made? And examine each case on the facts. But unfortunately the majority of our people, even lawyers, educated people, do not care to examine the facts. And they just carry the torch of criticism. And it's a very disruptive, very destructive kind of attitude that can destroy an otherwise good, well-intended institution. Such that instead of this institution being nurtured and being effective and being allowed to perform the duties for which it was birthed, it's instead torn down, bruised, battered and broken. And for me, I see this as an issue of impunity by another name. This attack on the court, even the idea of another ad hoc tribunal being politicized, of course they will always be some state or other wanting to politicize and control the system. And for some countries, some are more prone to controlling the judiciary than others, unfortunately. But I think the challenge is for the judges, the prosecutors in those courts to stand up and be independent and work as independently as possible and deliver the judgments as they should. Let me just give the final word to the prosecutor. First of all, I think I talked about earlier on the issue of politicization, I believe I mentioned it, because this is one of the challenges that the ICC faces today. ICC's decisions are politicized, our interventions are politicized, of course not by the ICC, but those who want to do that. And I always say that this is one area that we as officials, I as prosecutors, cannot go into, will never go into, will not even contemplate of going into. I've always said that the considerations I have for opening a case, for bringing prosecutions, for closing a case, for opening preliminary examinations will entirely and solely be dependent on the statute, on the facts, on the evidence that I have. Because I am convinced, and I'm sure all of you here are convinced that the minute I take political considerations as criteria for opening cases or closing cases or intervening, then we might as well just close the ICC and go. I think this will not work, this is not why the court was set up, and I as prosecutor will never take political considerations as what would make me intervene or not intervene. I am very resolute about that, and I think I've made it quite clear. But having said that, I just want to, with due respect, respond to the issues that have been raised by George Shui. George Shui talks about the judges and the lawyers being from the West, and that the defendants or the accused persons being from Africa. I am the prosecutor of the ICC, and the last time I checked I am from Africa. And this is what, with due respect, this is what I mean when I say that we should look at the facts and criticize based on the facts. And this we expect that those who are really concerned about human rights, they are concerned about stopping impunity on the continent, they are concerned about giving justice to the victims. The victims we have to remember, they are African victims. You know, all these people who are being killed, being raped, being displaced, being pillaged, they are African victims. This is what the court was set up to do, to protect these victims, not to protect the leaders who are perpetrating the crimes. This is why this court, that's not why the court was set up. And I think we need assistance, even from non-state parties. For instance, I know that China is a power economic house in Africa. And we have to remember, those of us who are from the court and are Africans, we care deeply about the continent. We do. We want it to be stable, we want it to be secure, and we want that justice is done. Being an economic power house in Africa, I think China can play a big role in ensuring that human rights are respected, that crime perpetrated on the continent is tried. Because when you talk, most of Africa listen. We listen. So I think this is something that you can help us to do. But coming back to this idea of this is what the West is doing, that the ICC is a tool in the hands of the West that, you know, only the defendants are from Africa. I don't need to go back to what I said earlier on. We all know how the cases came to ICC. We all know, unless you are saying that if Africa, an African state, needs the ICC and refers a case to the ICC, we should reject it because it's from Africa. If that is what you are saying, it's a different story. But I think that if an African state party needs the court, once the court intervenes, wants to ensure that there is no impunity on their territory and as state parties request the intervention of the ICC, the court should go there based on the facts, on the evidence and on the law. And I think this is what we have been doing. Under my watch, this is what we will continue to do. Thank you very much, judges and the prosecutor. I'm conscious, of course, of the time. So I'd like to ask Professor Jane Stomseth of the Georgetown Law Center and the U.S. Department of State to give the closing remarks. Jane? Thank you very much. I'd like to thank our distinguished panelists, first of all, for your public service, for all that you do to advance justice and the peaceful settlement of disputes in a world that's so full of violent conflict. It's inspiring to see such exceptional lawyers and jurists, such exceptional women, working day in and day out to apply international law to some of the worst and most difficult challenges of the day. As a professor of international law at Georgetown for over 20 years, I'm particularly pleased that Georgetown's Institute for Women, Peace and Security is cosponsoring this event. And I'd like to thank our panelists and our skilled moderator for the tour de force that really, I think, exposed us to some of the most interesting and thought-provoking issues in international justice. I'd like to just make two brief comments by way of conclusion. One about the architecture of international justice and the sort of impact that was alluded to by several of the speakers. And second to the question that I often refer to as the challenge of justice on the ground, the sort of role of reaching out and building domestic capacity and reaching out to those most affected at the local level. So I think the discussion has made clear first that international courts are an essential part of the architecture of international peace and security. As we've talked about today, the ICJ and the ICC are part of a dynamic system that's evolving, that's developing. It also includes an array of specialized international courts, regional courts. I'm thinking here, for example, of the European, inter-American and African human rights courts to sub-regional courts, including developing sub-regional courts in Africa. So we have, I think, a very interesting array of international and regional courts of which the two we've discussed today are a part. And as Judge Donahue put it, a lot of these courts can play a role in dialing back the temperature of conflicts and trying to resolve conflicts that if left unaddressed could erupt into armed conflict. And I think, as we all know, armed conflicts are breeding grounds often for horrific atrocities. So there's a way in which all these courts, I think, can work together in their own particular way to try to address conflict, to try to limit and minimize the chances of the most egregious international crimes. In the field of global criminal justice, which is the work of my current office at the State Department, I think it's really remarkable if you look back over the last 20 years to see how the architecture of international criminal justice has developed. I mean, from the ad hoc tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda to some of the mixed or hybrid courts like the Special Court for Sierra Leone which brought together international and national judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and administrators to the establishment of the ICC to some very innovative hybrid arrangements today that continue. It's really been remarkable to think about what's been developed in the last 20 years of our lives. And I think as the prosecutor so eloquently stated, these mechanisms and the law that they enforce provide a kind of shadow of the law that has a larger impact than even the individual cases that come before them. And one, I think, very concrete example is the work of these courts to address the problem of sexual and gender-based violence which disproportionately affects women and girls. And I think I'd like to personally commend the prosecutor for her commitment and her important work in this area. If you look at the way in which these courts, these criminal courts over the last 20 years have engaged on this issue, if you look at the way they've developed the law from the very early law applied in the Tokyo Tribunal, the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and protocols to the jurisprudence of the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunal and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, much of this incorporated into the ICC statute, we now have a body of law that recognizes as crimes not only rape but also enforced prostitution, sexual slavery, forced pregnancy, forced marriage, and other forms of sexual violence as distinct crimes. So I think just the development of the law and the development of courts to enforce it is just a very tangible example of this important impact of these courts. But of course there's a lot of work to be done in enforcing this body of law and protecting the victims of these horrible forms of violence. And that brings me to my second point, which is that fair and effective national justice systems are also crucial to peace and security. Building the capacity of domestic judiciaries to provide accountability for atrocity crimes, for example, is a critical component of the global justice system. And as the prosecutor said, although the ICC plays an important role in the system, the principle of complementarity at the heart of the Rome Statute recognizes that states have the primary role and they should be encouraged to genuinely investigate and prosecute these worst international crimes and when domestic justice works, it demonstrates powerfully at the local and national level and bears witness to the lesson that grave international crimes carry consequences. So there are many, many opportunities, and some of them have been discussed here today, for states and NGOs to work together with national authorities to strengthen domestic justice systems across a whole host of areas from forensic investigations, witness protection, educating prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys on international criminal law and due process principles. And I think there are many opportunities for innovative mixed forms of courts. The Special Court for Sierra Leone was one of those. There's a proposal now for a mixed chambers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which would be in the national justice system but with some amount of international participation. So there are many different innovative kinds of tribunals that can be established. But building some capacity within domestic justice systems I think will be critically important to bolstering peace and security in the years ahead and to preventing egregious international crimes. And let me just mention one particular example where my office has been involved in providing support and those are the mobile courts in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo where these are domestic courts that have international assistance that travel to remote areas and hold sessions where cases are heard against Congolese soldiers and armed groups for war crimes and crimes against humanity with most trials involving charges of rape and sexual violence. So this is an example of what I call supply-side capacity building that is such an important part of international criminal justice but also crucial and here I was pleased to see a number of the questioners raised this is what I would call demand-side capacity building outreach to affected communities, right? Strengthening public understanding of their rights and of judicial remedies and in this regard it's especially important that victims and aggrieved and vulnerable populations see that justice is being done and I would like to commend the Special Court for Sierra Leone for their I think very ambitious outreach program that traveled throughout the country engaging the population talking about the tough issues of justice because often these courts try only a small number of perpetrators and the victims see a lot of people who are never brought to justice and so engaging in these outreach programs that really grapple with these difficult issues I think is a very important part of the project of international criminal justice and I think here we can learn from Eleanor Roosevelt who is one of my personal heroes and a leader in developing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights she stressed the importance of education and she stressed that the protection of human rights begins with communities it begins with changing the hearts and minds of individuals working in their communities in small places where rights are protected where people learn about what's truly important in life and as a professional educator I believe education about rights is power and I think education about international justice is empowering so I'd like to thank the panelists today for their very learned discussion I think we've all benefited from hearing from them and I'd like to commend them for their contribution to international justice and for their important and tireless work so thank you very much


Rifleman goes way back in American tradition. He helped form the nation, preserve it. He fired the shot heard round the world by the rude bridge at Concord. Two months later at Bunker Hill, American Rifleman perforated British hopes for a quick end to the rebellion. They made it clear that Concord was no flash in the pan. While no one knew it then, the end of the revolution was implicit in its beginning. Frontier Rifleman, some led by Colonel Dan Morgan, were instrumental in the British surrender at Saratoga, a turning point in the Revolutionary War. The tradition has been carried to us by such legendary, but real figures as Daniel Boone, an early Westward pioneer. Davy Crockett, the irrepressible bear hunter, storyteller, congressman, and Alamo fighter, by anonymous and unremembered men across the years. Indeed, it's a far cry from those rifleman on Bunker Hill to their successors today.  But they have become such a devastating force that they would surely seem fighters newly landed from Mars to those sure-sighted men on Bunker Hill. This is the story of today's infantry rifleman. He presents an official report produced for the armed forces. The M-14 rifle, adopted by the army after 10 years of testing, gives today's infantryman more firepower than any rifleman in history. The M-14 has a shorter barrel and is nearly one pound lighter than its predecessor, the M-1, making it easier to handle. The magazine holds 20 rounds, two and a half times as many as the M-1. With the flick of a switch, the M-14 can be made to fire automatically and pour out the 20 rounds in less than two seconds, which is faster than a machine gun. This sleek rifle is a far cry from Bunker Hill and the Revolutionary War musket. The brown best, this one was called, used by the British. But we copied the French Charleville musket model of 1763. To load the flintlock, the soldier poured about 10 grains of black powder into the pan and put the rest of the powder, the ball, and wadded cartridge paper down the smooth barrel. Then he fully cocked the hammer, holding the flint. If all went well, the flash in the pan set off the main charge and sent the ball flying in the general direction the musket was pointed. The soldier would be ready to fire again, oh, in the time it takes to say Jack Robinson, 50 times. But we had a secret weapon in the Revolutionary War, a uniquely frontier American rifle. It's known as the Kentucky Rifle. But actually, it was made by the Pennsylvania Dutch long before it found its way to the woodsmen of Kentucky. Its long barrel is rifled or grooved to give the bullet spin and much greater accuracy. Wherever this rifle appeared in the Revolutionary War, Bunker Hill, Saratoga, King's Mountain, it made a deadly impression on the enemy. However, it and its dead eye users made only intermittent appearances in the War for Independence. The model 1861 Springfield was the foot soldier's workhorse of the Civil War. It fired with a percussion cap replacing the cumbersome flintlock operation. Even though it still required laborious muzzle loading, it was a far more lethal weapon than the musket used in the Revolution. The model 1873 Springfield was used by the cavalry during the Indian Wars. It still fired only a single round, but was an infinitely simpler weapon to operate. It fired a bullet that had its own metal cased cartridge and was loaded at the breach. New veterans of the First World War remember this one, the Springfield 1903. Its magazine held five rounds. After firing, the spent shell was ejected. And the next bullet placed into the firing chamber by one simple operation. But even back in 1903, the army was looking for a rifle that fired a new round with each squeeze of the trigger. The quest lasted more than three decades before the adoption of the trail blazing Garonne M1, semi-automatic. Ask any World War II infantryman, and he'll vouch for the equation. M1 equals VE plus VJ. The M1 yielded only to the new M14 that we just showed you. But it takes more than a good weapon to make an effective rifleman. Marksmanship, for instance. Until the end of the 19th century, the army drew liberally on a reservoir of sharpshooters, hunters, men who used the rifle for their livelihood. But the myth of natural marksmen disappeared, along with the frontier. Marksmen had to be made. The army authorized its first systematic target practice in 1858. Its importance and refinements accumulated through the years. But an effective rifleman needs more than a good weapon and the ability to use it. During the early periods of shoulder arms, in order to concentrate inaccurate fire, this was the standard infantry formation. The word platoon sometimes meant volley fire. After the men had fired, they made a bayonet charge. But these kneeling and standing ducks would not last long enough against today's weapons to make a charge. Frontal assault was unavoidable by the nature of World War I. But unlike these dough boys, today's riflemen are taught to keep moving on the attack, with stopping and bunching up in bite's murderous counterfire. In World War II, analysis showed, attacking GIs were so preoccupied with battle chaos and anxieties for survival that only about 25% used their weapons. Today's riflemen are trained to utilize every bit of the tremendous firepower given. In the Korean War, still another problem was discovered. Troops trained under ideal conditions recognized only one third of concealed enemy targets in combat conditions. Rifle marksmen now are made through a method called train fire. Riflemen know it once how well they're doing it, because targets fall when hit properly. Riflemen are taught to recognize and hit concealed targets. In order to equip men for potential reality, the army emphasizes realism in its training. To show you what we mean, let's turn to a brand new training film. The story of the third platoon, D Company, 87th Infantry. The platoon has just received orders to carry out the still basic job of the military, attack the enemy, and destroy him. With platoon leader Lieutenant Hadley rests primary responsibility for success and for the security of his 43 men, three rifle squads of 11 men each, a nine-man weapons squad, and the platoon sergeant, Sergeant First Class Brooks. Take over, Sergeant. I'm going to get the attack order. As soon as you reach the assembly area, recheck the ammo, and make sure the men clean and check their weapons. Also, be sure the men you post as security stay alert. Now, we should move prior to 10 o'clock. I'll send Roberts to guide you and the squad leaders forward. Yes, sir. Captain Weber's D Company has been assigned to clearing the enemy from a strongly defended ridge as part of a renewed assault by the division. The attack begins at 100 hours. We will attack with two platoons online and one in reserve. The first platoon will attack to seize the southeast portion of the ridge here. Lieutenant Hadley, your third platoon will attack and seize the left portion of the objective and be prepared to continue the attack to seize the high ground here on order. You have a frontage of 300 meters on the line of departure from this trail junction. Your left flank is open. An ambulance will be in the vicinity of the second platoon. Aid station and company distribution point will remain in the same location. Emergency signal to shift indirect supporting fires, green star cluster. Initially, I'll be with the second platoon. The time is now 0736. Any questions? Sir, could we have the artillery mark the last round on the objective? Yes. Carter, make sure your artillery people mark their last round. Find out what color smoke and let me know. I'll have the 4.2 motors shift their fires first. Yes, sir. Any other questions? No, sir. Well, that's it then. I'll be at my OP at 0815 for final coordination. Lieutenant Hadley has about two hours to organize the best way to seize from a determined, well dug in enemy, a ridge neither he nor his rifleman ever saw before. The formidable task becomes manageable by following six vital steps. The first, with no time to lose, is begin planning, then make arrangements, make reconnaissance, then complete plan of attack, and issue attack order to squad leaders, supervise the attack. First, Lieutenant Hadley decides how he will allot his time, then begins preliminary planning of the attack. After arranging to meet with the squad leaders and coordinating plans with other platoon leaders, it's time to study the battleground. Let's see now. If we move up on the right, initially we'll be in the open. That's bad. But there's good concealment once we cross the road, and it's a direct route to the objective. But we'll be approaching the enemy from the front, and the terrain looks pretty rough, so control will be difficult. How about straight up the middle? Initially, we'll be in the open here, too. It's the most direct route, but it's a low ground approach, and we'd have to hit them from the front. We could get clobbered that way. Now, what about the left? It's a long route that we can get up to high ground fast, as good cover and concealment all the way. Then we can hit them from the flank. Yes, that's it. With his attack plan formed, the Lieutenant briefs his squad leaders first by showing them the terrain, then by issuing his detailed attack order. Here's the story. The enemy holds the ridge with an estimated reinforced rifle platoon. They're well dug in. Our company will attack with two platoons abreast to seize the ridge. First platoon, on our right, will seize the southeast portion of the ridge. Our left flank is open. Mortars from the combat support company and direct supporting artillery will begin preparatory fires and smoke at H minus 5. 81-millimeter mortars in general support will begin preparatory fires at H minus 2. Our platoon will attack at 100 hours to seize the left portion of the objective. 900 meters to our front. We will cross the line of departure in platoon column and move along this route. First squad, weapon squad minus one machine gun. Second squad, third squad. One machine gun will support the attack initially from a position in the vicinity of the OP. We will assault from the right flank of the objective with three squads followed by the rocket launcher team. Both machine guns will support the assault from this knoll. Sergeant Jackson? Lieutenant Hadley now spells out the job of each squad to Sergeant Jackson of the first squad, Sergeant Harrison of the second squad, Sergeant Leonard of the third squad, and Sergeant Corelli of the weapon squad. The rifle squads are divided into two five-man teams, the smallest unit. The weapon squad packs two machine guns and a 3.5-inch rocket launcher or bazooka. The tentative assault line is at the base of the objective about here. Initially, I'll move at the head of the weapon squad minus. I plan to be with the second squad during the assault. Sergeant Brooks, you'll move at the head of the second squad. Follow the first squad in the assault. The time is now 0849. Any questions? No, sir. All right, I'll be in this vicinity if you want me. Move out. Sergeant Brooks, when you get back to the assembly area, check the number two machine gun and make sure the barrel's been replaced. Have the men move out by 0940. Yes, sir. Now let's get rid of this. OK, let's go. The lieutenant has left his squad leaders ample time to form their own plans and instruct their men before the platoon moves out at 0940. At H-5, the artillery opens up, along with mortars from the combat support company. H-2, D company's 81-millimeter mortars go into action. At 100 hours, the attack commences. The first squad leads the platoon across the line of departure. The enemy is 1,000 yards away, waiting. Dispersion is an ally of the attackers. The rifleman advance more than half the appointed distance when suddenly the first squad's alpha team returns fire while the rest of the platoon takes cover. Sergeant Jackson of the first squad discovers the source of the enemy fire, a well-hidden outpost. He believes that the platoon cannot continue attacking until the resistance point has been eliminated. And his squad cannot do the job by itself. He radios his report to Lieutenant Hadley. The platoon leader goes to the advance point to size up the situation and decide what action to take. He decides to use one squad to pin down the enemy outpost with rifle fire while the rest of the platoon maneuvers toward it from the left. He radios his orders while the platoon's sergeant and all squad leaders listen. Hadley then instructs the mortar forward observer to have his fire shifted to the outpost. And that instruction is relayed. He then reports what he's done to Company Commander Captain Weber and gets his approval. Here we see another innovation, an immediate battlefield response to an unexpected situation through a radio communications net that links all elements of the platoon and the platoon with other units. And the metal screen of supporting fire, Lieutenant Hadley leads the rest of the platoon to close with the enemy. Enemy position. Lieutenant Hadley signals a platoon line formation for the assault. Assault fire is characterized by volume, accuracy, and violence of action. Fire aimed shots every two or three steps at known or suspected enemy targets. The M14s on full automatic fire from the hip in short bursts, covering the squad front. For personal protection, the riflemen wear body armor. The support fire teams now move forward to join the assault force. And the enemy outpost is taken. Lieutenant Hadley reports to Captain Weber. And the platoon resumes its advance against the main objective. M.E. artillery and mortars have other ideas. When an attack force is hit by such fire, it must move quickly through or around the impact area. The platoon approaches the assault line. Lieutenant Hadley orders his machine guns into position to support the attack. And once again, he orders the platoon line formation for the final assault. He positions himself for optimum control of this final phase. Full control, as we have seen, is an earmark of today's infantry operation. It is the antidote for the nemesis of battle since the dawn of history, confusion. As our troops near the enemy line, supporting fires are shifted, and the enemy takes advantage of the situation. These are today's riflemen in action. Effective taken, the platoon immediately prepares to press its advantage or repel an enemy counterattack. This is where the tradition of American riflemen stands today, carried forward by great advances in weapons, training, and tactics, but still relying on the same character of the men. If there is a moral to all that we have seen, it's this. Despite sophisticated weapon systems and thunderclap warheads, land still is seized and held by men on foot with the weapons they can carry. The big picture is an official report for the armed forces and the American people, produced by the Army Pictorial Center, presented by the Department of the Army in cooperation with this station.