Yeah, come on. Yeah, I just go Good morning. I'm John Ultraman. I'm the Brzezinski chair and global security and geo strategy here at CSS also direct the Middle East program It is a great pleasure to welcome you all here I want to thank Finna Mechanica for making today possible. I want to remind you to please silence your cell phones I want to remind you will be live tweeting from at CSS underscore org We're using hashtag gsf 2012 That must be meaningful to somebody I'm not sure exactly who Following the panel will take questions from the audience Please wait for a microphone identify yourself and please be sure to ask your question in the form of a question Which is not to make a statement and then say to our distinguished speakers. What do you think of my statement? Lunch will be served during the third session starting at 1230 This panel on Turkey Russia and Iran arises out of a project. We're doing it at CSS Led by Steve Flanagan to look at this part of the world that has been In many ways interrelated in ways that don't necessarily involve us you have three remnants of empires who have been interacting For millennia with each other sometimes his rival sometimes his partners and yet. It's not really at the center of what we think about and We thought it would be Good as Turkey's role changes as Russia's role changes as the world continues to try to Think of what to do with Iran and had to deal with Iran that this would be a good venue Two people who are I think unparalleled in their insight both into this part of the world and also the questions of Geo strategy John Brin sco-croft twice national security advisor in the Ford and Bush administrations Virginia Brzezinski the national security advisor in the Carter administration I think to a Washington audience. They need absolutely no introduction There is a tremendous amount of wisdom on this panel My children will hasten to tell you that I add to that wisdom not one bit So let me go right to asking you Jail sco-croft in the last ten years Turkey's role in the world Has changed dramatically in your view? What are the most important ways that Turkey's role in Turkey's policy has changed in the last ten years and What are the constants in the way Turkey looks at its role in the world? I think the chief change has been that Turkey is no longer facing 90% to the West It has turned east or broadened its scope to the east right after the end of World War two remember our engagement in the Cold War really began in Turkey and Greece with aid to Turkey and Greece and Turkey became a pillar of NATO and a very Close in the military since how high of the United States and They were one of the best members of NATO They helped us In South Korea in the Korean War they said the Turkey sent troops there We had a very good relationship with them. It was a surface relationship with them They would they were good allies and we had this kind of comfortable relationship now Turkey as I say is reaching out to the east the south in all directions and they are their Foreign policy Expression is no enemies anywhere around so it's a very imaginative but very different relationship and I think we need to adjust to that and I think While Turkey is not the comfortable Friend that it was before its role is even more important than it was before and I think the relationship between That has developed between President Obama and Prime Minister Erdogan is really very healthy Dr. Brzezinski Not a comfortable friend anymore. How do we accommodate ourselves to a Turkey that is doing more and more things that that make some of our policies more difficult And I'm thinking particularly about the the growing trade relationship Between Turkey and Iran at a time when the US is trying to cut Iran off from economic support around the world First of all, let me say that Turkey is an independent country, right? So has a right to whatever kind of relationship it wishes to have with any of its neighbors and if we want Turkey And to follow the path that we favor We have to be sensitive also to its interests reciprocity, even if not totally balanced is the name of game in international politics And go a little further. I agree with everything that brand said, but I would add the following to it Turkey's Greater scope of reach today is a reflection of its internal vitality the relative success continuing success of the Ataturk model that they have now been pursuing for 90 years and in the process transforming Turkey much more successfully than the comparable process of change Immediately to the north of Turkey namely in Russia Because the transformation of Russia begun under Lenin in the 1920s the transformation of Turkey begun under ataturk in the 1920s and today Turkey is a More democratic and more stable a democratic country than anything that exists today in Russia and with much less bloodshed and the modernization has been far more comprehensive the change in the alphabet and the style of clothing in the mannerisms and Education of the country modeled very much incidentally on Early 20th century Germany and very deliberately so so Turkey is in that sense a successful case of Modernization and progressive democratization, which still has some shortcomings It's foreign policy in recent years is a byproduct of the success But also something else that I would like to add to what Brent said namely this appointment the Turks took very seriously the European decision to invite Turkey to join the EU and They have been trying to meet the very Tough standards for EU membership, but they have been trying to meet them in the meantime. They have learned from At least two principal European countries that maybe they're not welcome in Europe That's been a real shock to the Turks and in that sense that sense of rebuff has conditioned some of the Turkish idiosyncrasies that we see on the world scene Secondly as you know the Turks were not enamored of our decision to go into Iraq militarily and unilaterally in 2003 They weren't enamored of it and they weren't pleased to have their arms twisted In order to get them to join us that too has affected their outlook. So there are a little bit I would say Inclined to be more assertive in terms of their independence But fundamentally one looks at the geopolitical map of Eurasia Turkey is a pivot state. It's critical in Terms of the security of Europe in so far as the turmoil in the Middle East is concerned It's a source of some Opportunity for the new stance in terms of there becoming More part of the world and as dependent on Russia and then on top of it Turkey has pursued a relatively independent policy towards Russia in which they have reached an accommodation So all of that gives Turkey special prominence All of that and I'll stop right here because probably we'll go into some other aspects of this very soon All I will say additionally is all of that could be very badly threatened If things in Syria go badly and if things with Iran go badly and the worst of all If things go badly both in Syria and in Iran thereby linking these problems Into an escalating dynamic and that would be a major threat to the region a very very Significant threat to Turkey itself. Thank you I was in Ankara a couple of weeks ago and a former army colonel came up to me quietly and said Turkish policy in Syria has been a disaster And what a disaster that Turkey has been much too aggressive Confronting Bashar al-Assad. How do you assess the way Turkey has looked at the problem in Syria and tried to position Itself both in the neighborhood and more broadly in the world. That's a very interesting Examination because I think it tells you a lot about Prime Minister Erdogan Because five years ago Turkey and Syria were very close Their trade across the border was was booming. They were very very close together Erdogan, I believe has now decided that Assad is Amenis and needs to go and Erdogan is now on a Sort of a democracy kick I Say sort of because It you see the results. You don't hear the discussion that much, but I think That Turkey has decided that the internal situation in Syria is serious enough that Assad can't deal with it and needs to go and So he has turned from a not an ally, but but very fairly close to Assad to probably his Worst enemy now. Do you think that was the right the right? way to orient Turkey and Have should Turkey have been more circumspect in your mind than they've been You know, I don't feel I can really fault the Turks first of all I'm sure they know much more about this problem than I do And I'm pretty sure absolutely sure that they know much more about it than the US does So I Kind of defer to the Turks and secondly to the Saudis in so far as Syria is concerned I think we have to drop the practice of Announcing publicly when things start going badly in some country that its leader must go with the emphasis on the word must Because these kind of categorical announcements from on high which aren't then followed by any action Don't produce anything except more tension and conflict It's much better to have some sort of notion of what one is going to do Before one talks and in so far as Syria is concerned my view from the very beginning was That this is not like Iraq Assad is not like Qaddafi and the distribution of forces within the conflicted countries very different in Iraq In in Libya, I'm sorry in Libya in Libya. I was talking about Libya in Libya You had significant opposition to Qaddafi from the very beginning and Territorially based in half of the country which so to speak politically succeeded If you look at the map of the conflict in Syria, it's sporadic. It's here. It's there. It's in this town It's in that town. It's in this region, but it's not clearly divided and or enduring Basically the country is in a kind of Occasional anarchy in some parts of the country, but they're not clear lines and our ability to deal with it from this Area from here is relatively limited So I have been of the view that we should back whatever the Turks and the Saudis decide Period whatever what about the Russians if they decide that they want to go in We'll back them as we did the British and the French in Libya if they decide they want to play it cool We should back them if they want to go to the UN We should back them What about the Russians what the Turks are certainly sensitive to Russian concerns? And we know what the Russian position is it's much more reticent It's much less inclined to write off Assad from the day one The problem is in fact that while Assad has now become a brutal dictator There is no viable alternative to him and he seems to have the elements of power still under his control So unless Turkey is prepared to mobilize his armed forces and send them into Syria and I don't count on the Saudis doing anything like that. They can provide the money Who else is going to do it and how? So I think frankly We just have to let this problem work itself out with the Turks and the Saudis and the Arabs nearby basically taking the initiative Not freezing out the Russians or the Chinese with condemnations to the effect that their conduct is disgraceful Disgusting and so forth which was said publicly by senior US officials But see if we can create some sort of a consensus that would back the Turks and the Saudis in trying to resolve this problem general number of people have talked about the importance of using Syria as a way to isolate Iran cut off Iran's Access to a frontline state against Israel you cut off Iran's access to the Mediterranean Do you see this as a? principle way To isolate Iran and if so, what are the policy prescriptions that follow from that, but I don't I don't See that as a way to isolate Iran I see it's that as a way to prevent Iran through Hezbollah and Hamas in interfering in the Palestinian issue, so I Don't see action in Syria especially as an attempt To deal with with the Iranian question and I I agree with with Sbig You know there are some problems that don't have obvious solutions that Syria is one of the most complicated countries in the region in terms of ethnic religious Cultural traditional splits It's it's badly fractured and that's why you have it's not one center. It's not like the tribal system in In Libya but and we can't treat it that way and You know in a geopolitical sense to bring the Russians in again The Russians and the Chinese abstained on the UN resolution on Libya and The UN resolution said the use of forth is authorized to protect civilians We used the UN authorization to overthrow Gaddafi and so to condemn the Russians and the Chinese for vetoing a similar resolution on Syria is Well, I've had an astonishing Because what they were saying is look, you know you fooled us once you're not going to fool us again You're out for regime change in the region. Well regime change Just ipso facto is anathema to the Chinese and then the Russians For the Russians it is as well, especially since Syria is their last Shall we say client state 30 years ago the US and Russia were struggling for leadership in the Middle East? The last stronghold of that was was in Russia. So that's more what the issue is and I think if The regime changed in Syria. Well, I don't even know what regime would follow if if Assad left tomorrow You would not have a peaceful Syria there is no obvious it and as big says the centers of power in Syria are still largely intact. That is the military structure Is is run by Assad and the Alawites even though the bulk of the ordinary soldiers are probably Sunni not Not she the business community is hurting has not Fundamentally deserved so there there isn't anything there to get hold of You know, let me just add to this We have to think of this problem of Syria Exactly the way Brent looked at it in this larger setting And suppose we were to push harder and suppose we start really seriously arming the scattered opposition It's not going to prevail Certainly not in the short run, but the level of violence will certainly intensify and the tension in the region will grow suppose in this context a Conflict starts with Iran Iran gets bombed by the Israelis The Iranians retaliate against us of course because they'll view us as having inspired it We'll have to do something about it So we get in the conflict also with the Iranians in the setting So we are so to speak supporting an escalation of violence in Syria and now we're retaliating against Iran What did the Iranians do? Well, the easiest thing they can do right now to hurt us is not only to Make life more miserable for us in Western Afghanistan where we are planning to withdraw steadily and peacefully over the next year, but they can destabilize Iraq very quickly By inflaming the Shiite Sunni connection Thereby linking that violence with the violence in Syria And all of a sudden we have violence that spans from Pakistan All the way to the Mediterranean if we're not thoughtful and intelligent and really strategize Before we issue sort of categorical commands to other countries about how they are to run their affairs Now what happens in that context with the Russians? First of all, it's very close to them Secondly, if there is a conflict that involves Iran all the way to Syria There is a real risk and there's some evidence for it now developing of some conflict between Iran and Azerbaijan Because the Iranians are beginning to blame Azerbaijan for some of the subversive activities that have been conducted within Iran and They could lash out at Azerbaijan, which is a very important source of energy for the West and Then to compound this dilemma There are some interesting alerts developing regarding the situation in the Caucasus The Russians in the last few months have upgraded Their 58th Army stationed just north of Georgia to the highest level of technological competence of any one of the Russian armies throughout Russian territory and The Georgians are becoming very much alarmed that if there is a conflict between Iran and Azerbaijan The Russians might do something to take care of the Sakashvili regime Which means that the Baku-Che hand line which is such importance to European energy independence would be cut So we can have all of a sudden an escalating conflict that has many different ramifications and could have very serious Consequences for us. So my sort of basic advice to everyone is play it cool and Think through what this might mean because this is a very Volatile region with potential for explosions in several different spots that could link themselves Now this may sound terribly catastrophic, but the fact of the matter is That is the actual situation Not to mention of course the problematics of Israel and the Palestinians or the Egypt etc etc etc I think we better be aware of the fact that our dominance of the Middle East is rapidly diminishing And our capacity to influence it simply by verbal commands is close to zero And we better work with others intelligently in how to manage this problem General if we're wise enough to avoid an whole arc of crisis Scenario, but you still have an Israeli strike on Iran this summer What do you think that means for Turkish interests both in the near term and in the sort of two to five year time frame? Given that Turkey has relations with both Iran with Israel and also with us And we go back to answer that start with prime minister again Prime Minister Erdogan has had a falling out with the Israelis, and I think it principally Stems from the fact that while he was he met with the Israeli leadership shortly before the operation into Gaza. He was not told anything about it and I think as a result of that and the Interception of of the ship into Gaza Relationships have Have gotten much worse and I think that a An Israeli strike on Iran Would not be taken Kindly by the Turks It would as as big says it would produce almost incalculable Results for the United States It would make the region much more difficult for the Turks Who are really trying now to play a diplomatic role in? the region and I think it's a role, however dubious the prospects may be it's a role that we should welcome Because it is fundamentally in our interest and I think that the Turkish role for example in hosting the Talks in here with with the Iranians is a very useful way That that Turkey can go and so I think that a a step of this character by Israel would Sharply diminish the utility of What Turkey can do and sharply increase the antagonism and Erdogan is is a very Volatile personality And he you know he's walked off the stage In a meeting like this for example at Davos so he he reacts viscerally to what he sees as Injustices or or or hurts and so that also we have to Keep in mind here, and you know frequently Frequently we have a tendency To think this is so complicated You know just let's let's just use a little force. Let's just clean this thing out Well, I think it's big has painted a good picture of the consequences of just doing that and Complicated and difficult though the situation is It can be worse and Almost certainly would be Should somebody take a turn to strong violence You've both talked about China's interest in maintaining the status quo China's involvement in Syria as we look at the relationship between Turkey Russia and Iran does the rise of China affect That relationship Or is it really just outside? It's an external Driver that doesn't affect that the intimacies between these three countries dr. Ransom It probably doesn't affect the intimacies as you put it between these three countries But I think it does affect so the general attitude towards this issue and the Chinese I Don't think have any particular stake in any particular kind of an outcome in Syria They have a stake in the region are blowing up. I think that's the fundamental concern They are fully aware of the fact that the region gets ignited The consequences are unpredictable They will immediately hurt their own economic interests and particularly because of their dependence on Energy from the Middle East But it will also hurt stability more generally in Southwest Asia Including the Islamic element that is a concern to them. They do border of Afghanistan after all and They have problematics in Xinjiang a Conflict in this region will certainly not help Them in coping with the social and economic problems that they confront and which probably on the political level are becoming more Difficult to deal with even within China itself at the society becomes more politically conscious So I think the Chinese have a generally conservative attitude towards this kind of a problem But they don't want to be involved in it themselves because they feel they don't have to be Now the Russians don't quite feel that way because the Russians are closer They could become involved that they could also see opportunities for themselves if things begin to go up in flames So the Russian attitude is inherently different, but the Chinese and the Russians by and large share a common attitude here, which is one of Let's not push the envelope too far that not things get out of hand and this is why there is an International potential that the United States I think could intelligently exploit in order to dampen down the problems of Syria and of Iran Rather than allow itself to be pushed into a situation in which Let's say by late September early October We will be evidently giving the Iranians the choice of either a humiliating capitulation To new demands and restrictions that would be imposed on them only and not in keeping Entirely within the NPT provisions or economic strangulation In which case you don't know how the Iranians themselves might behave they might even lash out It's not a terribly well organized or disciplined government some units in it are more extreme than others We could have all sorts of ways in which the conflict begins not just with an Israeli necessarily attack on Iran But even with the Iranians lashing out Regarding all of that the Chinese simply from a kind of semi aloof position are saying to everyone else just Dampen down the pace Don't make categorical demands don't make extreme threats don't issue orders from the Olympic Heights which you cannot then enforce just cool it and I don't think that's necessarily an unsound approach to this issue I think As big as right and the the Chinese we try to get the Chinese standard being in a lot of places That's not their way This is not their world order And so they only grudgingly Reach out On Iran is a special case The Chinese attitude has been we get about 20% of our oil from Iran. They're a good commercial customer That's all we're interested in But they're beginning to realize that if something happens and there is a conflict Whether the Israelis strike we do something there's a conflict in Iran What does that do to their supply of oil and to the price of oil and So now they're beginning to realize I think That they do have equities that they need To protect there, but in general they are very much against the use of force Especially just endemically the use of force in situations like Syria Because they relate everything to themselves suppose there is an insurrection in Tibet Those kinds of things so they are against intervention in Anybody's affairs, but they cannot avoid in the Middle East They're critical dependence on oil and the consequences for China if things go badly there Can I just add something to it? That's a very important point and I think it bears on something else that's related here Look at who is so to speak in a Occasionally public more often private fashion pushing for more action the British and the French Now from a historical point of view, isn't that food for thought? What are they perceived? How are they perceived in the region as the recent colonial imperial powers and Their kind of you know indicating to us, you know, we tough do this do that It worked in Libya. I supported what they did in Libya because I thought that was doable here I think we'll just produce a big mess. So the Chinese attitude in some respects is more enlightened Then the attitude of some of our friends who seem to think that it's gonna be a cinch Iranian facilities get bombed The Iranians complain hardly do anything and the problem is solved when you were in government The idea is gonna be that way the Chinese would be the status quo power and we'd be the revolutionary power is probably the farthest thing From your mind, but that seems to be yeah seems to be the place. We're in Um Should we be hoping for a change in government in Iran in your view should we be pushing for a change in government and and you were In government when so being Disappeared what what does that experience tell you about how we should treat these kinds of changes in countries? I think one of the worst Policies we have adopted is to solve our problems by regime change first of all We don't know how to do it Secondly, we don't know virtually any country well enough to know what the consequences of regime change would be whether it would be better or worse and It puts a color to a relationship That is very bad, you know when when we for example Said the solution in North Korea's regime change that put the Chinese clear out Regime change that scares them to death in North Korea Are the consequences and now we're working much more closely together because we've abandoned that in in in Iran I Think one of the things that most is most Disconcerting to the Iranian is our implicit regime change Policy and it seems to me that if if we were to go to Iran and say look Your regime is is what it is we're not trying to overthrow it we understand you have security problems and we're prepared to sit down with you and Look at a security structure for the region in which you'll feel comfortable So you don't need to go this route this nuclear route indeed if you do your security situation will be worse not better and Give the Iranians a way out other than abject surrender or conflict and And that is not all that clear to them now, and I hope that in these meetings that go that that will Sort of show the way Iranian government is a very complicated structure. There is the formal government itself Which doesn't have any fundamental? Power there are the there's the religious structure the mullahs who in the Constitution Do have the ultimate political? Power and then there's the revolutionary guard not the army the revolutionary I mean not their formal military strength the revolutionary guard the al-Quds Force who are the enforcers now these three have a relationship with each other that we don't fully understand But playing around with that and decide who the good guys are who the bad guys is I think beyond our intelligence capability Sounds like an algears accord plus is that like what algears accord plus that we tell the Iranians We recognize them we won't intervene, and we actually would help establish a security structure in the region is that Should that be the goal of our policy? Well, I think the goal of our policy right now ought to be An arrangement which is in keeping with the prevailing international norms and the obligations of the non-proliferation treaty me the fact of the matter is that The United States right now is under considerable pressure To demand in the negotiating process things which go far beyond the NPT Which impose far more restrictive and truly humiliating conditions on the Iranians more or less to put them in a cage I Think that Policy if it is pursued by the United States will have the effects first of all not of promoting regime change But regime reinforcement Because it unites the people with the government. I mean the Iranians are proud people 80 million with a really one of the several impressive histories in terms of statecraft and They happen to feel strongly that they're entitled to a nuclear program Which most of them I assume think is not a weapons program It may be a weapons program in some respects It may have even been an actual weapons program several years ago But right now it's unclear as to what it is but in terms of this sort of Iranian perception of the issue domestically It's their right to have a program which stems them as a modern country and which meets their needs So we ought to be negotiating my view on behalf of the international community and not on behalf just of ourselves or of Israel but on behalf of the international community that the Iranians are Fulfilling all of the restrictions and obligations of the NPT and if that is the case I think we perhaps can have an accommodation that meets our needs and In the long run actually in my view promotes political change in Iran Because it reduces the collision that brings the government and the regime together But if we press in these negotiations For ineffective capitulation by the Iranians that is to say that they'll submit to restrictions Which no one else is subject to It's gonna fail and then Well, we have tried to Brent and I have tried to present what some of the consequences might be and I don't think they are in the American national interest. I don't think they're in the interest of the region. I don't think they're interested in major powers involved in this When it comes to changing the nature of governments you've talked about how you feel something is germinating in Russia Something political is germinating that that there is a nostalgia in the current Russian government But your feeling is that Russia in the future is as you've written in your recent book is a Country that we should try to bring into the Western Alliance. What is the timeline in your mind for change in Russia? What does a different kind of Russia mean both for east-west Piece of Russian foreign policy, but also the north-south piece that gets into the Caucasus and into the turkey and Iran relations Well, I do argue in my book that both Russia and Turkey Out to be the countries we seek to engage Into a diversified Euro-Atlantic community I said deliberately diversified because doesn't mean they have to join the EU with all of its obligations But some framework for a Euro-Atlantic community that embraces Russia and Turkey and to respond to you directly First of all, it is my argument that Turkey is meeting the standards of what this community embraces in terms of political values Russia cultural and historically artistically Religiously is a part of the West But there's one aspect of Russian history, which is totally missing in terms of its Western connection And that is political values of constitutionalism rule of law supremacy of law of the state. That's missing But it's beginning to emerge. This is the most interesting aspect of recent developments in Russia You have at the apex a political leadership personalized by Putin that is nostalgic for the recent past He said famously that the greatest calamity of the 20th century was the fragmentation of the Soviet Union a Century in which we had World War one World War two the Holocaust Hiroshima Nagasaki and so forth No, the worst calamity was the dismantling the Soviet Union and he wants to recreate it as a Eurasian Union which is pushing now but Much more important than that is the fact that within Russia. There's now emerging an internationally-minded Middle-class composed of the younger members of the middle class located in the big cities Most of whom have continuous exposure to the West and to the world at large who traveled to the West who study in the West in many cases and Who are partaking of the notion that they are a civic society? That is to say a society Entitled to have the same privileges and rights that democracies in the West have This is something utterly new in Russia and it is getting stronger and stronger And it is accompanied by something which is also without precedent in Russia totally without precedent The absence of political fear The fact that someone now dares to go out on the Red Square and hold up a placard in which they show put in behind bars To me is almost unthinkable since I dealt with the Soviet Union for most of my mature years a person doing that 20 years ago 30 years ago 40 years ago be hold off immediately and 30 or 40 years ago shot probably within a day The new civic society that is emerging politically fearless And that's a new reality and therefore I think both Russia and Turkey can gravitate to the West they were smart But if we draw these categorical lines and particularly if we look within difference That's something that could erupt into really significant violence and we simply kind of Play the game of being basically indifferent to it I think these possibilities could fade away and we could be plunged into a period of considerable uncertainty on the international scene With essentially unpredictable dynamics at work and one thing you know about a war is it's easy to start it You never know how it will end how long it will take and what might be some of the Internal manifestations of what then takes place You have all been very patient with me we have some microphones I want to open it up for questions again if you would Identify yourself to only ask one question because we have a room full of people and also to ask your question in the form Of a question sir right here in the front Dan is coming to you first What's wrong? Hello? For I'm James far. Well special operations command first. Thank you for your remarks I wonder if both of you could in you all commented a little bit on this when you spoke at the Atlantic Council in In December, but I wonder if you all could each comment on how well you think that The administration are not looking for a partisan comment, but just as an assessment how well the administration is doing in Fulfilling the types of policies that both of you Are advocating here today And what do you think they should be doing next? I Don't really know how to get my arms around the question like that The kinds of policies we adopt and how the administration is doing Let me let me let me just say that I think The administration is facing a Very different world and I think we see it we see it in the Arab Spring I think the the Arab Spring in its consequences in in in Russia as big has described Very well the reaction will be different almost every place it happens and so I think fundamentally we have to be agile thoughtful and broad-minded the Atmosphere in Washington today is none of those And that worries me I think for example in In Russia, I agree completely was big and we don't always agree on things relative to Russia, but I think Putin is not a dummy Putin was nostalgic For the Soviet Union Putin was resentful of the West because he thinks we walked all over Russia at the end of the Cold War when they were weak But he's not a dummy and I think he sees in the six years where Medvedev was The president that he got a lot of things done that Putin couldn't get done because he has a different atmosphere He's not nostalgic for For the Cold War and so on Putin when he said well, we're gonna shift and now I'm gonna be the president again, and he's gonna be the Prime Minister I think was actually surprised at the reaction Inside Russia because he just think you know that's the way Russia works Well, it doesn't now, but I don't think he's a dummy And I think you may see a different Putin and a different Russia Which I think as big says is I would say over some period of time, and I would say maybe a generation or more Going to fill in what has been missing in Russia as a European member and that is rule of law and civic I Would just add this I think it's unfortunate that we are confronting this very complex crisis Which I have no doubt the president the secretary of state Secretary of Defense understand well. It's unfortunate that it is compounded by the simultaneous presidential political process That affects everything in the very I think Complicating fashion and that makes a clear cut response And a highly focused response much more difficult for us to mount. So I think that is a Timing problem that really is a negative complication in all of this Question right up here Steve Flanagan from CSIS Dr. Brzezinski you alluded to the changing situation in Afghanistan post-American withdrawal And also a little bit to the caucuses But I wonder if each of you might touch on how you assess the the interests of these three countries Turkey Russia and Iran in Central Asia and the caucuses and in contrast their abilities and Capacities to realize those where they might come into conflict and and where we might see or for the trouble in those regions particularly given some of the shifts that we see particularly after the draw from Afghanistan Russia Turkey and which was in Iran Would you do that in two minutes? Yeah? Well, I would put it this way as long as the situation is non-explosive The interests are not incompatible entirely That is to say there is a kind of modus vivendi between Turks and the Russians and to some extent between the Russians and the Iranians and Turks and the Iranians regarding trade patterns the existing status quo Not necessarily liked by all of them I think the Russians don't like for example the fact that Georgia and Azerbaijan are oriented towards us Turks don't mind it. It's actually useful to them and the Iranians are sort of accommodated to that by necessity But if the situation deteriorates and becomes explosive I fear that the antagonistic interests of the states will surface And this is why very unpleasant things could happen in the caucuses. They could also happen within the stands In which there are some indications of Islamic extremism getting stronger and if the fabric of stability in the entire region It's torn apart by unpredictable events becoming dynamic Then I think conflicts between them could become even sharper further contributing to the negative consequences of an eruption This is why the stakes are so large and this is why I do the floor the kind of limited sloganeering that is taking place at the political level regarding the plub problems of the region and Why I don't sense sufficient serious strategic analysis of the potential for really significant negative turn of events in here in this region in our Political approach strategic approach to these issues You know one just let me add one thing one thing we ought to put it back in our minds of the historic Relationship between Russia and Iran during World War two Russia occupied the northern half of Iran we used Iran as a major conduit for military assistance to Russia in World War two after the war Iran was probably our first crisis With Russia where Iran wanted to wanted to put I mean excuse me Russia wanted to put a satellite regime in Iran and we said no Absolutely, no and instead the Shah Moved in so there there's a lot of history here that we forget about completely Yeah, actually that point. That's a good point We mustn't forget a huge slice of what would be called a Zerry land Forget Azerbaijan, which is the name of the state, but a huge slice of a Zerry land is in Turkey In a very large number. I'm sorry. What am I saying is in Iran and a very large number of Iranians are a series. Yeah, but we're living in the age of nationalism and Nationalism produces state identities that are sometimes in conflict the potential here Of this problem should not be underestimated My name is Nicoletta Jordan. I'm a student at Johns Hopkins University size And I wanted to ask if you can speak a little more about Turkey's strategic stand with Iran Not only from an economic and political standpoint, but also vis-a-vis Iran nuclear program Question had to do with Turkey's position toward the Iranian nuclear program What do you what do you think Turkey is trying to do is it engages with Iran? How how large a piece of its strategy is dealing with the proliferation challenge? And what are its goals when it comes to proliferation with Iran? I don't really know Turkey has not pronounced itself on the Iranian nuclear program I think Turkey and Iran have a sort of a minuet about oil and Turkey is dependent for energy resources on on others I think You know here here are the two Pillars of the region if you include Russia the three for centuries the Iranian Empire the Ottoman Empire and the Russian Empire and these sort of relationships go back and Are intuitive in people's minds and attitudes in the way they think about these I? My guess would be that The Turks are not so concerned about the Iranian program as we are But I think one of the consequences if Iran proceeds and develops a Nuclear weapons program Would almost certainly be that Turkey would follow suit So that would be my answer to the question. I would just add this And we do have some indications of what the Turkish attitude is towards the Iranian nuclear problem Because the Turks and the Brazilians came up with a would-be solution to the problem and they negotiated it on the basis initially of Not instructions, but advice from us as to what they ought to seek and they came out With a solution, but then we changed our mind on the subject and we decided I wasn't good enough it involves essentially a systematic effort to Put Iran within the NPT box no more. No less Yep, all the way back in the corner. Thank you Hi, thank you Alex Grigory voice for American Russian service. I don't know if you mentioned resist any Possibility that's new Russian Georgian war under some circumstances How serious this threat? What do you think I'm sorry? The threat of Thank you without some sort of conflict erupting in the region, I wouldn't say very high But if there is a conflict in the region which begins to escalate then that possibility rises Thank you, my name is Harbourushikov I'm with the chair of the standing committee American Bar Association on law and national security Was sort of conspicuously absent from their ear remarks as always very thoughtful is other than the Reference by dr. Brzezinski of the role of the NPT What do you see is the role of the international organizations the UN? I know both of you have spent a great deal of time trying to make those organizations relevant Are there regional organizations or are they conspicuously not going to play a role as you see in the relationship between this power Negotiations on avoiding and managing conflict in the region Well, I would say that it depends a great deal on how Powerful are the forces that are colliding in some sort of a conflict if they are of secondary or tertiary importance I think regional or international organizations can be quite influential and I think the best Example of that It pertains to the several instances in which international regional organizations have played a pacifying constructive pacifying role in Africa The problem that we're discussing today unfortunately involves powers with more significant regional scope of influence or potential destructiveness and That means in turn that the source of the resolution of these problems can only come from the major powers And this is why it is so important that we and the others who work with us because we cannot solve it by ourselves Have some sort of a shared strategy for coping with the problems that Brent and I have been discussing today Because I don't think we can impose a solution And I'm not sure that we even have the right approach towards a problem Others that say like the Chinese may have the right solution But from more distance and with less engagement so they can't resolve the problem either but if we can contrive a Process in which the five plus one in negotiating with Iran and we talking to the Turks and the Saudis Regarding Syria and engaging the Russians and the Chinese in the background of that perhaps we can cope But unless we do that very systematically with a larger concept in mind I think the situation may slide out of control and then secondary Participants in the problem will set the pace Iran gets attacked Not by us But the consequences are felt by us the situation in Syria deteriorates and Someone overreacts that gets out of control too and this is why a Really serious approach based precisely on the so-called five plus one Has to be pursued but with a sense of collective Responsibility and not only one countries perhaps just our own interests being uppermost in mind Particularly at a time when our policy is bound to be influenced by the presidential race Which gives them a particular short-term? character rather than a strategic perspective General do you think we need more more international organizations and well, I don't know we need more But I think we have to push much harder to make them more viable You know We live in a much more interconnected world now But the international organizations are not Resilient the UN is the best we have but it needs a lot of help it needs restructuring and it needs the efforts of The United States and I think there we would get we could get Russian support and Chinese support in regional organizations The African Union for example Played a useful role in Darfur and so on but have but our support for them has just sort of gone away The Arab League and the GCC played a key role in the success of the Libyan operation Those are things we should build on To use the regional organizations for the kinds of things That aid in a bet what we're trying to do But they have the expertise and the local feel that we don't have so I I believe that's a good question And we need much more effort in that direction Thank you sir Story Bernstein my last job was the American ambassador to Denmark Turkey the largest Muslim country with that's secular But has shown some tendencies to move away from that. Do you see that being a concern and the influence of of Egypt could Egypt become I mean Turkey such a good role model in that area. Do you see that changing? well, I am aware of the shortcomings The Turkish experiment there are problems as you know with the press There are Political trials involving the military which may be justified I do not know but there has been a history of minute recourse. So there's at least some basis for Considering the possibility that there is some justification in these procedures, but they all reflect obviously certain inadequacies on the Democratic political process nonetheless having said this I think an overall assessment of Turkish modernization secularization democratization over the last hundred years has to be quite high and The persistence with which the Turks have pursued it is impressive Really very impressive. So on the whole I think Turkish The Turkish experiment is auspicious in its promise and it behooves the West to encourage it And this is why I deplore the reaction of the Europeans to To the issue of Turkish participation in the EU they raised the Turkish hopes. They have so reduced them But we can be in a sense a supplement and a reinforcement For Turkish aspirations if we think in a larger concept of the Euro-Atlantic community That really does embrace them that embraces Russia eventually as well And I think that would give The Turks who want to play a global role, but they live in a very dangerous neighborhood a greater sense of security and participation In something larger than themselves And I think that is the kind of policy that would in effect. I think reinforce a constructive Turkish role in the region I think that's the challenge we have I think the fact that that President Obama and President Erdogan have a good personal relationship is a major asset here And it helps a great deal But I think we're now being tested in this regional context and a great deal hangs on how we conduct ourselves Over the next several months Literally, it's a conflict that could erupt and become very large, but the time frame Which will determine whether the match is being Set whether the fire is being ignited or not it's relatively short term So it's very important to watch carefully what is being done and how we conduct ourselves and how we avoid The danger that we will be for a variety of domestic reasons abdicating our global responsibility in the short run with much worse consequences in the long run I Think there are questions about the direction Turkey's heading it is probably slightly less Than it was in ten years ago less secular But it's ironic because about ten years ago Turkey undertook a series of deep economic and political reforms and In in response significantly to the attempts to get into the European Union which big discussed before the consequences of those is that The central and eastern part of Turkey is now a part of Turkey In a real sense that it wasn't before Turkey used to be histone bull primarily Western oriented secular Now Turkey is more representative of the whole of Turkey and it and and that is a less Secular move or you can say that is a natural evolution from the harsh secularism of Ataturk to break the power of the Ottomans Or you can say oh, it's a new Islamist movement I don't think we know but I think as big says it's up to us to encourage the evolution of Turkey in a way which is natural for them and the harshness of the Ataturk reforms Maybe don't need to continue so long because they've been successful Now it's taken as big said it's taken 90 years for Turkey Turkey to evolve from the Ottoman Empire to a modern secular Democratic state, but they've done it and I think we should be relaxed about The things we see in Turkey. They're not all perfect, but I imagine the Turks are not all relaxed about what they see in the United States We just have a few more minutes and just as a sort of closing thought You've both talked about the importance of a more modest U.S. Foreign policy less demanding less declaratory more oriented toward international institutions Politically you talked about the evolution Turkey's been politically. How do you get the United States to go to have Politicians support the kinds of policies to have the public support the kinds of policies you've advocated this morning What do you say more modest? I wouldn't I wouldn't buy that word. I don't think it should be more modest It should be in some respects more strategic more visionary More comprehensive that is to say we are living in a world in which turmoil is becoming more pervasive We are living in a world in which therefore global cooperation is more necessary In order to have global cooperation, you have to have larger units cooperating with each other So that their cooperation then begins to spill Into the world of large The global problems are not going to be solved by mechanical votes of very uneven states They're going to be solved in the major entities of the world can cooperate And this is why our policy has to be one in which we create a more stable balance in the far east Not injecting ourselves into the problems of the far east particularly in the mainland through wars But by trying to balance and manipulate the way the British did European politics for a whole century but without entanglement and promoting Japanese-Chinese reconciliation mediating the Indian-Chinese rivalry, but not becoming a protagonist and Last but not least not demonizing China while trying to structure a stable relationship with it Because China and we face an unprecedented challenge namely can two major powers coexist Without antagonism, which has been the predominant historical experience We both realize we'll suffer if we get in conflict But each of us is now tempted to demonize to pinprick the other we have to be alert to that and in Europe And the other half of Eurasia my view is the one that I have been sort of propagating namely Turkey and Russia in a large Eurasian framework in which we Work together to resolve the problems of that region, but engage also the Asian powers that would be affected by it This is why dealing with the problems we face in the immediate future We have to be really conscious of the fact that our central priority is to work with others who share in interest and stability And not in drastic resolution of problems Would they approach from a narrow national perspective without thinking of the larger consequences of the use of force? I think the use of force should not be something that is left to do willful decisions of individual states But it should be something that takes place only in concert particularly with those power powers that share an interest in spreading the degree of stability in international affairs and enhancing their own cooperation with each other general can I peaceful politically? Yes, you know at the end of the Cold War the first reaction of the United States was one of relief No, no more problems. Just relax. Let the world go Then I almost didn't have a job, you know because of that's right Then came 9-11 and we thought well We're the only superpower will remake the world and if you're not with us You're against this and it was a unilateral rush to do a lot of things which didn't work out too well but I think The United States remains the only country Who has the ability to? Mobilize the world on behalf of the kinds of things as big as just described Not to not to direct it Not to run it, but to get together the kinds of Policies the kinds of things that people can resonate to around the world That's a tough role But no one else can do it The Europeans eventually may be able to but certainly not now The Chinese can't do it the Russians can't do it. We're the only ones that can but it will take a farsightedness and a it will take the best instincts of the American people Rather than the worst ones which seem to be prominent at the moment. We're ending on an optimistic note I want to thank you Thank you to our chief participant We've got about 10 minutes 12 minutes time for Bio break and get a cup of coffee and then we will start back in here with the second wave sessions. Thank you


module 51, supply-response-relation. Change in supply might be because of supply-response-relationship. When we talk about supply-response-relationship, it basically relates quantity-supply and price. It basically depicts an association between quantity-supply and price while keeping other things constant. And whenever there is change in product price, it results in a movement along the supply curve. And beside this movement along the supply curve, there is also a shift in supply curve because of change in price of that commodity. This resulting increase in output basically has two effects. One is the effect which you call movement along the supply curve and another effect in which we say supply curve shifts from one position to another. Now to elaborate this, suppose we are showing you a supply curve in this diagram. In this supply curve, what is S naught? This is the original supply curve that depicts association between price and quantity supply. If price of commodity is P1, then producer is willing to produce Q1 quantity of that particular commodity. If we talk about price of commodity increases from P1 to P2, then producer should supply Q2 quantity of that particular commodity. But because of that increase in price, there is also a shift in supply curve from S naught to S n. Because of increase in price, it might be possible for producer it is convenient to use some other technology to carry out the production of that particular commodity. So instead of increase in output from Q1 to Q2, because of increase in price, there is increase in output from Q2 to Qn. And this movement here from point C to point D instead of original supply curve to a new supply curve, it in fact has two effects. One effect is the movement along the supply curve. There is increase in quantity supply because of increase in price of that particular commodity. And the other effect is improvement in quantity supply because of improvement in production process. And now if we assume that the price of commodity decreases, that price moves from P2 to P3, it should move towards now original supply curve. But this will not happen. Now whose movement will be along? The movement will be along the new supply curve. Whatever investment any producer had to do to use some new technology to carry out the production he will stay there. Because of decrease in price, there is decrease in quantity supply along new supply curve. The quantity supply will move against P3, quantity supply will be equal to Qn3. Now why is this happening? Whenever the price increases, because of new technologies are more likely to be adopted. When the price increases, because of increasing the price, what will happen for the producer? It is convenient to adopt some new technology. And when the new technology adapts, he will retain that production, he will retain that technology to carry out the production of output even when there is a decrease in price in subsequent time periods. The investment he made will remain there, even when our price decreases. Now the magnitude of net response to price decline, it is always less than the magnitude of net response to price increase. To increase in output because of increase in price of that commodity is always greater than decrease in output because of decrease in price of output. And what do you call this movement? It always results in movement along new supply function. If we summarize all this, then supply response relationship will be because of increase in price of commodity. There is not only movement along the supply curve, there is also a shift in supply of the commodity. And the shift in supply, what will it refer to? It will refer to increase in supply. If we talk in the reference of agricultural commodities, that if price increases, what will the farmer do? It might be possible he use some other technique of production. Because of that usage of other technique of production, he made an investment. In which form? Maybe in the form of usage of more fertilizer. He decided that if price increases, to increase the output, he will have to use fertilizer. He has developed a habit of that. Even when price decreases, what will happen? His supply function which will move at the new level, will carry out against his production.


Right now we're getting kitted up. We're about to run through some rehearsals with our kids on, get comp checks, and then we'll get our pilots brief. Three, this is five, I need a kid.