I will open the floor then for a conversation about model uncertainty. So I'd love to hear from folks out there questions for the three speakers or comments in general. Thanks very much to the panelists for providing some really provocative and interesting comments early this morning. I actually had a question, I think, for Lauren. And that's related to the models. I wonder if you integrated modeling you talked about. And I wonder if you could talk a little bit about the sweet spot for the time scales of applicability of the modeling that you're doing. Because it becomes challenging when looking at different systems we talked about yesterday, the fact that the surface, what we understand about surface water and the time scale for water flowing through a surface system is different than a shallow groundwater system is different from a deep groundwater system. And if one is combining those models, for example, with some of the climate modeling, we know that, say, seasonal to sub-seasonal modeling is very challenging right now. So you have a better view for the longer term and some of the climate models. So when you're combining these models together, do you see a sweet spot for the applicability of the time scale for the results of that model or where there are challenges in terms of bringing the modeling results into time scales that have applicability when we're trying to use them for decision-making? Sure, so I think that there's a couple of important time scales to consider. So I think that they're already showing, like with the modeling that they're doing in Europe, that if you're thinking about weather time scale forecasting, that having the anti-season moisture condition correct is really important. And that's where they do get benefits from having this deeper subsurface included. I think that's probably the easiest one to achieve in a lot of ways because we can do a lot of data assimilation with that. I think that incorporating better storage terms into the global models for decadal scale forecast is really important, and that's where there's been a lot of work recently. I showed the example of Bridget's paper, but there's been a lot of other papers mostly using grace, showing that these longer-term storage trends that we're missing in our global models can be really important for controlling whether we have water energy limited systems. So I think that's where we can get the biggest gain from incorporating the larger storage term with respect to whether we do that with integrated modeling as opposed to some other more simplified approach that we incorporate into our land surface models. I think that probably we'll end up somewhere kind of in the middle because we maybe don't need to be doing all of the complexity of a really high resolution integrated model for our decadal projections when we have so much uncertainty in what we're going to do with pumping and all of those things anyway. But I think that we can use the integrated models to do a better job of understanding how we want those more simplified storage terms to behave. I mean, right now, if you look at what we're doing with that paper I showed from Bridget, we're all over the place in how we're incorporating storage and what that's actually meaning for those trends. So I think that's a big important area. Matt, Rayelle, and Asa got her. So since Bridget's papers come up a couple of times, I feel like I have to say a little bit about it. So Bridget and I are good friends. And she's not here, so I can say this. But when she was writing that paper, I had some serious misgivings about it because she's basically testing some models that were never meant to simulate trends on how well they could simulate trends. It's kind of like, I'm going to test these right around lawn mowers and which one's the best commuter vehicle. And of course, they're all terrible because that's not what they're built to be used for. So I think when we're looking at those models I mean, of course, if we want to be better at simulating trends, then we need to focus on that. But there's no expectation of what the ones that are out there right now should be any good at that. And it doesn't mean that we don't know what the trends are.  And that gives us a target. But I just want to make that point that just because this set of models that Bridget examined was all over the place in terms of trends that is really no surprise because that's not what they were designed to do. Yeah, so just a quick response to that. Yeah, I totally agree with you. And it's not my intention to throw those models under the bus. And they weren't built for that. And that's OK if they're not necessarily matching that at this point. But a lot of people want to start doing that with models. And that's what people want to start applying these models for. So I think Bridget's paper is really important to still highlight the fact that we're not really ready for that. And I agree with you that we have the Grace data to compare to. So we do know what the right answer is over large scales for the period that we have the Grace observations for. But I don't think that the period of record that we have Grace observations for necessarily represents the variability of the system. And so I'm not sure that just using that period of record to test whether we're getting low frequency variability and storage dynamics correct, that we could be really confident in our models just if we did a good job from 2002 to present. And I'm curious to hear your reaction to that. Yeah, I agree with you. I mean, it's a short period. So obviously we don't have a good understanding of the longer period variability because we just don't have the observations at the global scale. And if that's something we want to be better understanding, then we need to develop models whose purpose is to understand long term variability. And starting with a lot of the models in that paper didn't even have a representation of groundwater. So why even bother if you can't represent groundwater, of course you're not going to get the long period variability right. And as you well know, there are newer models that do represent groundwater. And those are the ones that we really should be focusing on. But it also comes back to the inputs. So we can develop a model that's really good at representing groundwater or trash or water storage variability. But if we don't have good precipitation data for the last half century or whatever, then you're still not going to get the right answer. Yeah. No, I totally agree. I mean, I think it's a challenge. And I think that as we're trying to add storage to our long term projections, that's like a big area of uncertainty. And that having the grace data for the period of record that we can evaluate our models that are really actually, because we do have, I mean, that was kind of the beginning of what I was showing, is we do have large scale models that are actually incorporating groundwater now. But as we move forward to figure out whether we're doing the right job when we're projecting out 100 years as we have a climate that's changing and recharge regimes that are changing and different recharge mechanisms, I think that's like a big uncertainty and an open challenge. I mean, when we go back to a more classical groundwater modeling type framework, like the use of mud flow type models for groundwater management, historically, there's been an approach to parameter estimation inverse modeling, whatever, with in-situ data that people had some sense of what the data really meant. Where is the state of the art in terms of, in data simulation, clearly, you'd like to have a model prediction with prediction uncertainty, a measurement with less uncertainty, that then hopes that you get closer to what may be a right answer. With remote sensing based observations that are hard to understand, a lot of surrogates that they're measuring, and then you're processing that down to come up with an inferred quantity, where is the state of the art in terms of using large scale remotely sensed observations in a data simulation or inverse modeling approach for the classical groundwater modeling? Or are there any examples of that that? Sure. So I'm not an expert in data assimilation. So maybe someone else here will have a better answer than me. Oh, I have an answer. Oh, great. Terrific. Go for it, Jackie. So we just had a, so this is underway right now. So it's just getting started. But we just had a project funded by NASA's applied sciences program, a water resources program with Brad Doar, and he's the program manager there, to work in California with the USGS and the California Department of Water Resources, CWR. You know, California has this, I'm sure you guys have talked about it over the past few days, but this sigma sustainable groundwater management act coming up, where a lot of these critical groundwater management regions need to demonstrate compliance with sustainable levels of groundwater withdrawals by 2022, I believe it is, and timeline varies for different reasons, which include mitigation of subsidence. The subsidence is happening and is associated with unsustainable groundwater withdrawals. And so what this project does is we're going to be taking the Central Valley hydrological model, which is run by Claudia Fons at USGS in San Diego. And that is essentially a version of mod flow, as I understand it, and not my expertise, but as I understand it, that's a version of mod flow, where they built actually a routine in the model to simulate subsidence. And I don't know exactly yet how they do that. I think it just has to do with what's, I can't remember the phrase, is the relationship between the two activities. You're thinking of the coral elasticity and assuming 1D vertical deformation, they can make a calculation with just fluid pressures alone. Yes, exactly. So the goal for the project is literally that is to take great observations across scale. Of course, they already incorporate well observations when they have them, and in far observations of subsidence. And to, the model's already kind of parameterized. So just to kind of calibrate the model for different regions and get something, especially with subsidence, that is kind of spun up for different groundwater management regions, and it's calibrated so that it can work properly. With sigma, each of these regions is responsible to do their own groundwater modeling. So even though the USGS and DWR provide models, each groundwater management region is responsible to come up with their own plan and some projections of how they're going to reduce, make pumping sustainable and mitigate. So that's one project that's just been started, but I'm not aware of many others. So this is a follow-on to what JT was talking about, not as much an answer to your data assimilation question. But I do think that there's a big disconnect in the data sets and the methods that are used for our really large scale models and what we do for regional and smaller scale models. And that's true not just with respect to inversion and what we're doing with geostatistics, but also with respect to what we do to water management, because we have a lot of really great groundwater models that are built on watershed scales that are built in collaboration with the stakeholders of those areas that are using the water, and some of them are using litigation, or management, or all these things. So I actually think there's a big opportunity to have a better communication between all of the models we've already built at small scales and what we do at large scales where we're limited to just much worse data sets, but we know in places like the Central Valley or the High Plains, or we have a bunch of really heavily studied regions where we could do a better job. Yeah, just to add, that's something that the surface water community, the continental scale and global scale surface water community is also struggling with is these kind of different modeling communities, land surface modeling community, catchment modeling communities, they're all hurtling towards having scales at which could be applied to management, to answer management questions and the struggle then is are there common areas that can be tackled by all communities to try to make efficiencies in that? Things like data assimilation is certainly one of them, but that is something the surface water community is gonna be facing as well. So why don't the, I'm sorry, go ahead. Tonya Garberson, NGA, I guess the question I have for you then is the ability to do that data assimilation and that is that the lack of the data itself or is the lack of maybe metadata so that way people understand the data that is available and whether it can or can't work in their models? I don't know that I wanna answer for the whole, I mean, I know that we already, so like the group in Europe, they're doing data assimilation for soil moisture and I don't know the details of exactly how they're doing that. So I think, I'm not sure that there's like a huge barrier to entry just like with respect to data not being available or they're not being methods. I mean, there's great data assimilation techniques. I think it's probably the limiting factor with respect to recharge and groundwater flow is that we just don't have a lot of datasets to assimilate. So we have grace, we have soil moisture, but in terms of like deep groundwater, it's like what is the data that you're going to assimilate? So one of the questions I always wondered was depth to water table, very simple question, is how easily is it available and can we figure this out not just in U.S. but globally? So, Shreya, go for if you want. Well I just, USGS collects this data, we have it even at a 15 minute resolution and groundwater wells across the United States but I think there is, I would argue in the USGS, we haven't had a lot of effort to try to understand how to extrapolate that across large continental scales. So I would say that the data is there but the point you had made earlier, Venkat, about taking the data and then knowing what we're collecting it for and then understanding how it would assimilate into models I think is well taken in that respect. So I think there has to be more work in those areas done. We also have areas where we do have groundwater, surface water, stream gauging and groundwater set up next to each other so we know exactly what's happening between those two data series and there hasn't been much analysis of that. I think that's one of the criticisms we have internally at the USGS is we collect a lot of data but we tend to not always be the best analyzers of our data so I think there's a lot of opportunity there. Yeah and I would also point out there is a global, Yingfan did a global groundwater map. That's like, I would say, that's like kind of the gold standard I guess in terms of collecting all of the water table depth observations globally and she has put them all together. She has a map showing the point observations and then created a water table depth surface with just a simple model. So that's like what we have and then all of the other large scale models that get developed get compared to this which is good and bad. I mean those are the observations we have but also we know that like in the US if you collect all of the water table depth observations those are gonna be biased to the places that we've drilled a lot of wells which are the places where we wanted to use water so we drilled a lot of wells. So I don't know if that really answers your question or not but. I think that brings up another point that I had in my written comments which is really a lot of this comes back to like understanding data gaps and where there are funding or there is potential opportunity to put that next well or put that next stream gauge. That is an area where I've always I don't think has felt there's a lot of attention paid to that is really understanding the data sets that we have not just using them but understanding where the gaps are and then trying to look for opportunities to fill those gaps and particularly in places where you could where there are challenging hydrology or hydrogeology or hydroclimactic regions that can then be used for extrapolation to other areas where we also don't have that data. So I think that's a big opportunity in general in our field is really how do we understand gaps in the network and then fill those gaps. And the USGS does have the, I can't remember the name of it, but the set of groundwater observations that should be used for climate that are. They do, yes. Yeah, yeah. I can't remember the name of it right now. Right, yes, right. They do have a set of wells that they've kind of filtered out that right only have effects of climate in them. But there aren't that many. Great, exactly. There are not, yeah, there are not, correct. So Laura and Stacy, do you think that if you were to be able to pull together just for the US to begin with, all the well data, not just the USGS data, but the state-permitted wells that people are actually operating and had the strategy associated with them, our flow or more flow models that are run at the continental scale might actually show some different results? Like is it worth doing to go through the effort of really pulling together all the vertical information that's in there? Yeah, I think that we would get different results because I think that what we're limited to, I would say more with respect to the hydrostatigraphy than the wells, because the wells would really be, we have to know a lot more about management in conjunction with those wells if you're gonna use the well information meaningfully. But I think the hydrostatigraphy is really a limiting factor in terms of mapping where we have alluvial aquifers, understanding the depth to confining units, that's really important for getting groundwater configuration right over large scales. So if I could get one thing that that would be it, that would actually change what the model results look like. Should we put that on the engineer? Yeah, great, thanks. Actually, I'd like to step in and throw Burke under the bus for a second, which is that actually there's a really good example of this from Nebraska, right? Where the USGS had, I don't know how many wells, but a ton of wells and tried to calibrate a mod flow model, I believe, and still couldn't get those pieces right, would you? Yeah, it's sort of, I think one of the challenges is in missing sort of the non-linear features in the subsurface, a little window in a confining layer that promotes flow through, it might be missed with even a thousand wells. So that was the value in providing high-resolution geophysics was to identify the geometry of the aquifer system so that you can reduce uncertainties in making predictions in, say, for example, a flow through a lens in a sand aquifer or something like that. That example was pretty compelling in terms of the difference in the model performance after introducing those geophysical data, at least. And I guess just to counter my own argument a little bit, I think a lot of these questions, and we talked about this in one of the breakouts yesterday, is that all of this depends on the question they're asking, right? In some cases, maybe the hydrostatic if it doesn't matter for a specific question. And so we try to produce models that can do everything, and that's nearly impossible because the world is too complicated to do everything. So we have to define these uncertainties, I feel like, about surrounding specific management questions, and how do you do that effectively? Sure, yeah, and just to follow up on that, it really depends what scale you're at, too, because we talked about preferential flow paths. Those are really important, depending on the questions you're trying to answer. But also, if we're modeling at one kilometer resolution, like, what does that even mean, and what is the hydraulic conductivity, like, what does that even mean physically, like? I think that if you can at least get a better job of getting the structure, like the geometry of it right at large scales, that that will matter. But then at smaller scales, then we have like a whole other mess of complication, too. Yeah, so that's exactly the issue that we're in, what I showed in the Mississippi alluvial plane yesterday, is that we have one kilometer grid cells in detail at much finer scales that shows there are features that are important. And so how do you bring in those uncertainties into a groundwater model? So is it gaps in physical processes that you can't represent, or scales that you can't represent? What are the biggest challenges? I'm just wondering to, oh, sorry, I didn't know if someone else had their hand. But I'm wondering yesterday, since I wasn't here, was there a discussion about the role of airborne geophysics or geophysics in general, and the, okay, so yeah, because I feel like we spent a lot of the morning talking about different types of data, but that seems to be one I know, particularly for this Mississippi alluvial plane, airborne geophysics has been really helpful in resolving a lot of the discrepancies in the hydrogeology, so. Manu, I think you get the closing, closing video. This is a very simple one. Much of the discussion yesterday and also today didn't actually get into the types of aquifers, because traditionally we have also thought about the fact that you have sedimentary versus hard rock versus cars, and most of the comments seem to generally apply to sedimentary systems. So now I'm wondering that in many areas that are critical around the world, it's hard rock or cars. Do you guys have any thoughts on whether you have a decent representation of issues with those, or this needs to be a special attention to those? So that's a great point. I think that a lot of the integrated modeling work is really focused on shallow groundwater because the focus is on understanding what that means for our land surface connections and connecting from the atmosphere down and working our way down, but there's a whole other mess of questions for our deep confined aquifers where probably we don't need to have the land surface coupled for our deep confined aquifers for the time scales we care about. Carst systems, that's like another giant can of worms. I think also, I mean, we can represent like mountain block recharge and mountain front recharge in our integrated models, but I think that's also more of a frontier area of understanding what, how important those really deep long flow paths are and the relative importance of mountain front versus mountain block recharge. So that's a really good point. And I think that the tools and the modeling for those other systems are probably a little different. And I don't wanna imply that that's also not being done. Like there's groundwater hydrology and groundwater hydrologists have worked on car systems and deep confined systems, but it's like kind of a different group, I would say. Now my main reason to highlight that again is Tony's question from yesterday. It really becomes critical, from the human perspective, that the areas which are important and, you know. Yeah. Yeah, there's a bias. In the interest of time, I will unfortunately have to cut this conversation off, but thank you guys very much for your participation.  And I think we all know, hopefully, where we're going. So take a few minutes, take a break and we'll see you in those rooms. Thank you.


Can folks hear me? I think that's positioned for John. So since he's the more important speaker, I should leave it that way. Good afternoon. I'm Susan Collins. I'm the Joan and Sanford Wildein here at the Gerald Darford School of Public Policy. And this is an event that I've been looking forward to and that I'm delighted to introduce. It's always a real pleasure to be able to invite a member of our faculty who has a new book to share that book and the work with us. But it's particularly a pleasure as part of our centennial year events when we are showcasing the work that our faculty is engaged with. And so it's really a particular pleasure to be able to hear about hybrid justice, which is work that is joint with John's co-author Ann Heindel. Now, as you may know, John is a Fulbright scholar. He has a Harvard law degree as well as a PhD from Oxford. He joined the Ford School faculty in 2009. And I have to say, he very immediately became a very active member of our faculty. He's a phenomenal teacher. He is a wonderful colleague. And he's been engaged in so many dimensions of the work that's here at the Ford School. His work specializes in international law politics as well as international finance. His recent work focuses on the Asia-Pacific region as well as human rights issues. And many of the courses, he's taught a lot of courses for us. And I'm just going to highlight in particular that he has taught values and ethics and public policy. And he's also teaching a new mini course, the series called Peace Building. And in that course, John and his students use Cambodia and other country case studies in order to explore approaches to reconstructing societies and institutions in the wake of conflict or in some cases in the presence of ongoing conflict. Since 1999, he served as legal advisor to the Documentation Center of Cambodia. And that has an enormous archive that documents crimes and atrocities of the Khmer Rouge era. He's written lots of articles which are focused using the center's archives and also the legal challenges associated with accountability issues and reconciliation. Well, hybrid justice explores a number of these issues in considerable detail and uses various approaches to make the story real to us and to be able to really highlight some of the issues and implications. More importantly, I think it's important to mention that John's book also furthers the goal of helping the survivors, which is an important objective for the center. And so before we begin, I wanted to thank the Ford School's International Policy Center, in particular, Dean Yang, as well as John, are currently our interim co-chairs. And we are delighted for the work that they are doing related to that. And we thank the IPC for cosponsoring the lecture today. Just a quick note on format. John is going to give an overview of his book and some of the main points. And then we'll take questions from the audience. For those watching online, you're welcome to tweak questions in. Please use the hashtag policy talks. And then after the program, there are copies of the book that will be available for purchase and signing. And so, John, we're so proud of you in your new book. Welcome. The floor is yours. Thanks very much, Susan. Thanks to Cliff and Erin and others who have helped to organize the book talk. I'm really grateful to have the opportunity to share some of our findings from hybrid justice. Now, as many of you know, if you've taken my classes or seen me before, I tend to like to walk around. But on this occasion, to keep myself to time and also to facilitate the video streaming, I'll stand behind the podium. And I'll just offer a few brief remarks. Ann and I were motivated, as Susan suggested, to write this book. By the basic question, how can we help make mass crimes proceedings more effective? Criminal trials certainly aren't the only important facet of transitional justice proceedings and dealing with widespread violence and abuse, but they're important parts of that process in many societies. We decided to focus on one important tribunal. And that's the tribunal created by the United Nations and the Cambodian government to try crimes of the Pol Pot regime. This tribunal was created to hold senior leaders and others who were deemed, quote unquote, most responsible for atrocities between 1975 and 79. And after decades of impunity in that country, the trials gave hope to millions of survivors that some justice would be done and that official acknowledgments and official revelations of suffering would help to foster healing and reconciliation. The Khmerus Tribunal, which has the official name of the extraordinary chambers in the courts of Cambodia, you'll hear me refer to it as the ECCC, is part of a family of hybrid courts that mixed national and international laws, procedures, and personnel. Other examples include courts for Sierra Leone, Kosovo, East Timor, Lebanon, and more recently, Senegal. You can think of these as being sort of midway along the spectrum between ordinary domestic criminal courts and fully international ones like the International Criminal Court or the tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. In hybrid justice, Ann and I are trying to do two things. First, we've tried to give a very thorough account of the origins, nature, evolution, and performance of this particular tribunal, photographed on the cover of the book. But we've also tried to draw a lot of comparisons to other tribunals so that we can generate more general lessons for mass crimes, proceedings, be they fully international, hybrid, or in some cases even domestic. For purposes of today's very brief remarks, I'll focus mainly on the Cambodian Court. Let me say, though, that the hybrid model arose in the late 1990s after the Yugoslav and Rwanda tribunals had operated for some time due to concerns among some UN member states that the fully international tribunals were too costly, taking too long, and were too removed from the survivor populations such that they lacked both a connection to victims and also some degree of local legitimacy. Mixed tribunals, at least in theory, offered the possibility of having justice that was cheaper, faster, more closely connected to survivors, but with some of the indicia of credibility and legitimacy associated with a UN-led international process. Now undoubtedly, building effective hybrid courts is not easy. The UN and other international actors have entered into these kinds of hybrid arrangement precisely in the types of countries where domestic systems are thought to be lacking. And managing relationships between national and international authorities adds to what is already a very difficult business of adjudicating complex, numerous, and inevitably politically charged cases. The UN was right to pursue justice for Khmer Rouge atrocities, but a hybrid arrangement in Cambodia was undoubtedly going to be a risky enterprise. The negotiations to create the court were highly contentious, with mistrust on both sides between the UN and the Cambodian government, and that led to a compromised solution on a tribunal that had a number of problematic institutional features that have contributed to some serious operational shortcomings. Country context very widely, of course, and there's no single formula for designing and managing hybrid courts, but that said the Cambodian experience can help us to identify some problems to avoid and also some principles to follow in reforming existing courts and in designing and operating new ones. So what I'll do is organize the rest of my brief remarks around a series of eight principles that emerge from our lengthy analysis in the book and that I think should inform the design and operation of future mass crimes proceedings. Principle one pertains to the overall organizational control, specifically of hybrid courts. In general, the UN has insisted on the upper hand and there are good reasons for this. The UN has typically been the principal financial sponsor of hybrid courts and has a fiduciary duty to steward those resources responsibly. The UN also has accumulated institutional expertise in international criminal justice and technical specialists who can assist in the effectiveness of a process. In most cases, the UN also has a somewhat greater political distance from the atrocities in question and although no actor in these contexts is really apolitical, at least the UN has a stronger relative claim in many contexts to a capacity to conduct independent or credible trials. The majority domestic structure that I've described is popular among developing countries because they're concerned about sovereignty and maintaining ownership of the process but there are problems with it. It leaves the UN reputationally and financially liable for processes that they're in which they're too involved to be considered mere technical assistance providers but not necessarily positioned to lead the process decisively and that's been the case in Cambodia where there have been both ownership problems and also repeated instances of relative UN passivity in the face of problems originating on the Cambodian side. Now if we compare this to other hybrid courts in places like Sierra Leone, Lebanon, even East Timor and Kosovo, in each of those instances international appointees had majorities on the bench and occupied many of the key administrative positions. That's not the case in Cambodia where the Cambodian government for a variety of reasons I can address in Q&A had an upper hand in negotiations and was able to secure majority control. In many respects this is the most domestically oriented of the hybrid courts that have been established to date and it's carried with it a number of risks and problems. I mentioned that developing countries see this, many developing countries see this model as attractive and there's no reason to believe that it can't be effective in some contexts but as I'll discuss there are a number of reasons stemming from the Cambodian case to be suspicious of a model that is led by a domestic government and why the UN should be reluctant to commit such resources and to attach its name to a process over which it doesn't exercise a stronger degree of control. The second principle is that justice and efficiency are inextricably intertwined and if you wanna promote justice you also have to prioritize efficiency. At the ECCC only three people have been convicted to date for crimes that resulted in the loss of about 1.7 million lives between 1975 and 1979. One of the reasons why only three people have been convicted is that there have been a number of different delays in the process since the court opened its doors in 2006. As an aside the three people who have been convicted one, Deuk was the head of an infamous toll slang secret prison in Phnom Penh responsible for torture and interrogation of suspected political enemies and two more recent, two defendants more recently convicted are Q. Sampan who was the nominal head of state in that period and Nguyen Chia who was Pol Pot's quote unquote brother number two or the second in command in the Communist Party of Kampuchea which governed during that period. In fact it's not only that only three people have been convicted it's also inefficiency has led the court to split the second case against Nguyen Chia Q. Sampan and others who have been either severed or who have died over the passage of time because the court was afraid that it wouldn't be able to reach a judgment against these defendants and so instead of having a single large trial against this group of senior leaders the court has decided to have a series of mini trials adjudicating specific alleged offenses the first of which pertain to the evacuation of Phnom Penh by the Khmer Rouge in 1975 and a few other specific offenses. Why is this relevant because if one of the goals and certainly it was one of the expressed goals of this process is to give a sense of official truth and a revelation by an official judicial body of what happened during that tormented period of time severing into mini trials means that we'll get it best a very, very partial view of history that will clearly limit the court's potential impact. The ECCC's inefficiency owes not entirely but in large part to an unnecessarily complex structure. One aspect of that structure is that there's two of everything at this court. In response to Cambodian sovereignty concerns the court has not just one prosecutor but two co-prosecutors, two co-investigating judges, two defense teams for the defendants and obviously that requires coordination and impedes efficiency at some level. An even more significant efficiency challenge arises from the inclusion of investigating judges. This is a somewhat outmoded position that exists in the French civil law tradition on which Cambodia's domestic system is based. An investigating judge shares investigating duties with the prosecutors and it was thought at least theoretically that an investigating judge and the reliance on the civil law tradition which is part of the Cambodian domestic system would allow trials to proceed more efficiently because the judge could conduct a professional and confidential investigation. At the end of that judicial investigation hand the case file to the trial chamber judges who could then conduct a very swift courtroom proceeding before pronouncing on the innocent or the guilt of the defendants. But that wasn't realistic or even desirable from the start. In a mass crimes context like this survivors have a legitimate interest in seeing the courtroom process play out. It was also unrealistic to believe that judges could get a sufficient handle on the enormity of the case file in cases that involve thousands and thousands of alleged crimes and defendants. And so what we've got is sort of the worst of both worlds. A lengthy investigation followed by a lengthy courtroom trial. When I say the worst of both worlds I'm talking about from an efficiency standpoint. The reliance on investigating judges also by the way makes the court very vulnerable to allegations of bias because so much hinges on this confidential investigation by a couple of appointed co-investigating judges. There's also a complex system of appeals in large part designed to adjudicate disputes between Cambodian and international personnel at the courts. And so an issue in theory could be adjudicated first by co-investigating judges then by a pretrial chamber established to deal with disputes between them then by the trial chamber and then by the Supreme Court chamber. This is a terrifically inefficient structure and is partly responsible for the limits of the court's judicial progress to date. These complex features were important at the outset during the negotiations in putting Cambodian officials at ease from a sovereignty standpoint that they wouldn't be forfeiting too much control to the UN. But a very important lesson to draw from this process is that these features can't be replicated elsewhere. The efficiency costs and the fair trial costs of having these duplicative structures far outweigh I think legitimate concerns of sovereignty on the state's part. The third principle relates to the second and has to do with the perils of divided administration. In this court there's a Cambodian and international side of the office of administration and Cambodian and international staffers work figuratively but often also literally on opposite sides of the hallway in separate offices and have to coordinate all of their activities up respective chains of command. They're divided financing divided oversight mechanisms and so that effectively you have a kind of Siamese twin type arrangement inside of what is ostensibly a unified institution. This has had all kinds of problems. It's not only been problematic in terms of efficiency it's also opened the court to risks of inability to deal with problems that arise on either side of that wall. The best example were a series of very credible and well documented kickback allegations on the Cambodian side of the court that the UN had very little power to address because of the structure of the court and the respective reporting lines. In the end the Cambodian government agreed on a compromise solution to deal with corruption which indeed is one of the things that people feared might arise at a hybrid court but it wasn't a very satisfactory one and involved the appointment of a person whose independence and credentials in this area are questionable. Another way in which it's been problematic to have a divided administration is that it leads to at least a possibility of lopsided funding of the two sides of the court and when problems such as the corruption allegations have arisen donors have tended to continue contributing more to the international side and less to the national side and so there have been at least a few periods when Cambodian staffers at the court have gone months without pay. That's a very difficult problem to address in terms of morale. It also leads to difficulties in advanced planning since at least one side of the court is unable to know how many people that it will be able to fund and how lengthy the engagement as a whole will be. Institutional bifurcation also contributes of course to perceptions of politicization and above all it undermines one of the key goals of a hybrid court which is to get national and international personnel together to share expertise and to transfer knowledge. For future proceedings unified leadership administratively is essential and indeed a few other hybrid courts in Lebanon and Sierra Leone have followed the unified approach with greater success. A fourth principle is about procedural rules. This court again in deference to Cambodian sovereignty chose to apply Cambodian rules of procedure but to insert reference to international procedures when there were lecunae in Cambodian rules. This has been very difficult to implement in practice for a variety of reasons the most important of which is that most domestic systems of criminal procedure don't account for the special challenges of mass crimes proceedings and there are lots of examples but among them would be questions about how you handle large numbers of witnesses, time limits, how people are questioned, who has to be questioned in court and out of court and the like. These types of questions simply weren't considered in drafting the Cambodian domestic code and as a result there's had to be repeated reference to international rules and the court has been accused I think with good reason for cherry picking in different instances which rules to apply. Clearly there needs to be some reflection of domestic rules and norms when arranging hybrid courts but it's much preferable to start with internationally tested and operationalized rules and to contour them to local conditions than to begin with wholly inappropriate domestic systems of rules and try to fill in the gaps with international. A fifth principle is that hybrid courts have to address claims for reparative justice carefully. They have to manage expectations and they have to weigh the aims of reparation besides the requirement of a fair and expedient judicial process. The Khmer Rouge Tribunal has the most ambitious scheme to date for involving victims directly in the proceedings and victims unlike in some other internationalized criminal courts are allowed to join as civil parties which you can think of as physically the civil party sits next to the prosecutor but in the US system for example you might have a criminal trial followed by a civil trial. In this particular system civil parties are people who have alleged that they were victimized by the defendant and are able to claim collective and moral reparations as part of the case against the defendant and they enter evidence and they have represented by lawyers in the courtroom. But think about that in the mass crimes context how many potential civil parties there are. This feature was drawn in by judges not by the political architects of the tribunal and in practice it proved extremely difficult to implement in the courtroom. There were four different teams of lawyers representing different groups of civil parties in the first case and very often civil party lawyers and civil parties themselves would make arguments duplicative of the prosecutions very often introducing similar evidence at least arguably prejudicing the defendant's right to a fair and efficient trial. Moreover there was the question of equality equality of arms is just a reference to sort of does each side have sort of a fair stake in the proceedings when lots of people are on one side of the courtroom and simply the defense team is on the other. There are legitimate critiques of civil parties as potentially upsetting this. And in the second court case at the Khmer Rouge tribunal because the number of civil parties is even greater the courts had to streamline their participation reducing them in many ways to a role more akin to observer participants than to direct daily engaged participants in the courtroom. In a way the Khmer Rouge tribunal's modification brings it closer in to line with the international criminal court scheme for involving survivors in the proceedings. And we regard this as a necessary if unfortunate concession to the imperatives of managing a swift and fair judicial process. Another thing I'll mention quickly on victims the idea of promising reparations of some form to victims raised hopes and expectations. Sometimes NGOs interviewing victims further raised those expectations. Many of those expectations were badly dashed when at the end of the first trial the court said this wasn't funded therefore the best we can do is publish online statements of apology by the defendant and mention your names in the verdict. Many defendants saw that as terribly insulting and a really grave injustice. Certainly the court didn't have resources based on the defendant's independent wealth to give financial reparations but victims expected something substantially more than having their names read in the courtroom or in the judgment. And in the second trial what the court has begun to implement is a scheme whereby it grants its seal of approval to NGO funded projects or NGO implemented foreign funded often projects that address civil parties needs. That also raises some complications that I'm happy to discuss in Q and A. But in general mass crimes proceedings have found it very, very hard to address reparative justice as opposed to retributive justice. This one although the most ambitious in its effort to do so has demonstrated more of the limitations of that process than the positive potentialities. The sixth lesson or principle is the importance of measures to safeguard judicial independence both during the design of the tribunals and during the conduct of them. The ECCC has been plagued by a feud over the last several years whereby the Cambodian government from the prime minister on down has publicly asserted that it objects to additional prosecutions. The government's reasons for objecting are dubious at best. The government alleges that additional prosecutions would jeopardize national stability. Also that the prime suspects that are under consideration fall outside of this personal jurisdictional envelope of those most responsible. In fact, the people who have been considered are widely documented to have been supervisors of Khmer Rouge units that were responsible for thousands of deaths and other atrocities. And so the government's arguments appear weak. What's even more troubling is that all of the Cambodian judges, the Cambodian prosecutor, administrators have fallen into line with the prime minister's pronouncements and blocked the movement forward of these additional prosecutions. This interference clearly undermines the perceived legitimacy and independence of the tribunal. And while it's inevitable that at some level in dealing with mass crimes proceedings that political considerations will enter into the discussion of how broad the tribunal's jurisdiction should be, it's very important that the parties that design a tribunal of this kind arrange in advance a relatively sound mutual understanding of what those parameters are and within those parameters grant discretion for the prosecutor to be able to act independently. In this instance, the prosecutors, that the international prosecutor who's trying to bring forward additional prosecutions is clearly not able to exercise independence in the performance of his duties to the extent that we believe is necessary for the court's legitimacy. Seventh and penultimate principle is that these courts have to be designed and staffed to capitalize on natural advantages in outreach and survivor participation. Outreach has been one of the relative strong points of this tribunal. Its in-country location means that it's much better connected to victims than other tribunals that have been situated in the Hague or elsewhere outside of the afflicted society. Hundreds of thousands of people have been able to visit the courtroom and sit and watch proceedings in galleries similar to the one you're seated in now. There have also been lots of programs that connect local civil society organizations to the court to share information about what's happening, media, and other mechanisms for getting the word out about the Khmer Rouge Tribunal. Partly for that reason, this tribunal has retained a very strong popular support throughout the years of its existence. That said, one can't take strong outreach programs for granted. In Cambodia, much of the success owes to the fact that there was already a pre-existing civil society network ready to supplement the court's activities. The court itself had very, very small budget and staffing devoted to these activities. And so it's something that needs to be more explicitly designed or built into the mandates of courts going forward. The last principle and one that applies to all mass crimes courts is the design of realistic mandates and then adequate funding and resources to achieve them. The ECCC was sold on the basis that it would have broad transformative effects in Cambodia, effects on justice, on the revelation of truth, reconciliation, capacity building, and even development of a local rule of law. That's an awful lot to ask of a criminal court. And like the Sierra Leone court, the Khmer Rouge Tribunal has been funded primarily by voluntary contributions. I mentioned that there have been delays and uncertainty about the funding, which of course constrains the court's ability to plan for these many and diverse functions. In practice, what happens is that funding tends to be concentrated on what are seen as the core judicial functions, which is holding trials and pronouncing guilt or innocence of the accused. And other functions that are very much part of the court's express justification, such as outreach to victims, counseling survivors, helping to build capacity, serving as a model for the rule of law development, tend to be underfunded. In particular, legacy and capacity building, which is such a core part of the rationale for hybrid courts, has been consistently underfunded in hybrid courts, including the one in Cambodia. In fact, there's no provision in the budget for legacy, except one very small scale training for local defense counsel who are part of the Cambodian teams. There's also no explicit provision in the court's internal mandate documents for capacity building functions. Now it may well be, and Ann and I believe that it probably is, too much to ask a court of this kind to have a robust and extensive capacity building function. But to the extent that that's how it is advertised, and those are the expectations that are raised, certainly needs to be reflected in its mandate and its budget. We do think that this court has had some positive impact on rule of law development in Cambodia. There are features of this proceeding that are very strikingly different than what typically happens in Cambodian courtrooms. For example, there's a zealous defense. There's an organized case file. There's reference to precedence in decisions that are made. There are regular considerations about the rights of the accused and the procedural rules that are in place to protect those rights. And as I mentioned, there are also special mechanisms to account for victims grievances. These are all things that are lacking in the domestic system. And this process, which involves many of Cambodia's senior judicial officials and lawyers, can be instrumental in a small way in helping to translate those practice back into the domestic judicial system. We can also say that this tribunal has had some success in managing its hybrid composition in terms of the jurisprudence that's been issued on most issues. Outside of beyond issues on which the Cambodian executive has taken a strong position, the Cambodian judges, like the international judges, appear to have made a good faith effort to render decisions that are in line with international standards. And so, within a certain envelope or a certain frame that's been established by political leadership on either side, this court has had some important successes. But I think you can see that the overall thrust of our analysis is to look more at the shortcomings of the process. We regard this as an important opportunity for institutional learning. And also that our analysis highlights the importance of including individuals, both in the design and the operation of hybrid courts who have had that past experience and who have had this opportunity to learn from prior engagements, including the one in Cambodia. The ECCC's troubles don't mean hybrid courts are doomed to failure, but they do certainly show us special hazards. The features of any hybrid court will inevitably reflect some of the specific context of the country in which the court is designed. But what we try to analyze and what many of the pages in this thick book are dedicated to is trying to separate out relatively technical, less politicized issues that can be meaningfully addressed and that can help to make these more effective even with the realization that any individual court is going to be subject to some degree to political constraints and pressures. Nobody's claiming that the design or operation of hybrid tribunals or mass crimes trials in general is easy. I was lucky enough to be able to present a very similar set of principles at an unprecedented session of the UN General Assembly last year that considered lessons learned after 20 years of modern international criminal justice. And what Anna and I hope is that the analysis in the book contributes to that conversation in a meaningful way and ensures that lessons from the Cambodian process are taken into account as officials consider how to reform or create new mass crimes proceedings going forward. So thank you very much. So if anyone has questions, just click. At the outset of the process in 2006, the leadership of the tribunal, especially on the Cambodian side, clearly thought of public affairs, there is a public affairs section, clearly thought of public affairs as more akin to donor relations than to broad grassroots outreach. But I think in fairness, the court learned quickly that it needed to broaden its outreach and that because civil society organizations like the Documentation Center that I advise were already active in villages around the country conducting outreach forums, that the court paired with them in many instances so that in areas that don't have internet connectivity, television and radio access, court officials went to different areas of the country with NGOs who were already well known in those environments and shared lessons about what was happening in the court. Other NGOs have done outreach programs including sharing leaflets, the court has its own leaflet, high school classroom outreach events, welcoming large numbers of people on buses to come into the tribunal and yes, the government has broadcast some of the more important hearings on television, their regular radio shows and so over time what we see is that public awareness of this process which was the awareness that there was a trial of Khmer Rouge happening was high from the outset, the awareness of what the specifics were was negligible at the outset but climbed rapidly in around 2009 when the first tribunal, a trial reached its crescendo with the conviction of Doik and in the last few years it's fair to say that most Cambodians are aware that there's a trial going on in Phnom Penh that involves you and Cambodian judges that it's issued a few verdicts, they've probably seen television shows, heard radio broadcasts and been to a village forum talking about it. Their level of detailed knowledge is of course limited. They aren't able necessarily to follow it on a day to day basis, very few are but it's improved dramatically because there's been a general openness to sharing what's going on at the tribunal. Susan? Very much for the overview, it was great to hear it in a succinct way and I also really appreciated the, laying out the general principles and helping us to see into what some of the complexities are when you translate those principles and try to implement them and that kind of leads to the question about how sanguine you are about the future of these hybrid courts. We've had quite a number of them and if I'm not mistaken, it's only Lebanon that deals with the case that happened after the International Criminal Court came into effect but even if I've got that a little bit off, the question is if we were now to think about a country that had problems that could be crimes that were committed of this sort that could be addressed by the International Criminal Court like maybe Central African Republic, would you be more inclined to think that those should be referred to the ICC or would you be in favor of a hybrid court and if the answer isn't clear cut, what kind of considerations would you advise? It's a great question. I should start by saying that in the United Nations Secretariat in the Office of Legal Affairs, the idea of a hybrid court was described to me by people as radioactive and other similar adjectives because this and other experiences have been very difficult for the UN. The ICC of course exercises its jurisdiction on the basis of complementarity as you know well and steps in at least in theory only when the domestic courts are unable or unwilling to prosecute. One thing that we discuss a fair amount in the book that I didn't address is how complementarity can be implemented in practice and there's a sort of spectrum between a fully international process in the Hague at the ICC and a fully domestic process with very limited international engagement. Now of course the next step up from a domestic process would be one that's primarily domestic but has technical assistance provided from the ICC or from another international agency. And then further up, we have sort of predominantly domestic hybrid court, predominantly international. I think that it is probably both necessary and appropriate that hybrid courts remain on the menu of options. Certainly they are not a favored option by almost any of the international lawyers I spoke to. They're seen as something that may occasionally be requisite because it's not politically possible to have a case at the ICC because the host country or the country in which the crime was committed doesn't consent to ICC jurisdiction but also undesirable to leave the matter entirely in the hands of the domestic government. And so it's conceivable that we could see more of these negotiated in the future. It's also very much the case that some developing countries who are suspicious of course of the ICC have taken steps to create hybrid models of their own. In Senegal, the new extraordinary African chambers are modeled vaguely on the ICCC model except the UN isn't the international counterparty. It's another African international presence. I don't think it's formally African Union but I think that it's a coalition of neighboring African states who are represented. And this analysis can also give us a little bit of insight into how those may be managed effectively. And so the short answer to your question is difficult. I suppose I would say that I would prefer in all instances for the proceeding to be domestic if it can be done effectively. I would rather have international support of an effective domestic process than have a case removed to the ICC. And if I think that neither of those options is available then the UN or the ICC will have to negotiate in that middle space as almost occurred in Libya. You're right to pick up on that tension. The Cambodian government's interest in this is, well let me start by saying that many of the people who are in the Cambodian government, like most Cambodians at large, were victims of Khmer Rouge brutality. And so there are very strong individual level reasons why many elites in the Cambodian government are genuinely interested in seeing convictions of key Khmer Rouge leaders. That said, the Cambodian government's bigger concern throughout the process has been to manage it in a way that accrues to the political benefit of the government that's in power. And managing it in that way has meant at least Hun Sen, the prime minister and his key leaders sock on the deputy prime ministers, very involved in this, regard expansive prosecutions as dangerous. A limited universe they believe that's focused on a handful of the senior surviving, the most senior surviving Khmer Rouge leaders is one that allows the incumbent government to communicate to the public that we indeed are not just the government that brought the Khmer Rouge to heel through counterinsurgency means, but we're the government that has delivered you justice for their atrocities and it's part of their narrative of legitimacy. An expansive prosecution gets dicey from the perspective of the incumbents because an expansive prosecution may start to target people in senior government positions who are former Khmer Rouge members who were either late defectors from the Khmer Rouge into the movement that later became the current government or people who were given those positions as part of amnesty reconciliation type deals about 15, 20 years ago. And so the incumbent leadership believes, I think correctly, that there are at least some in the international side of the operation who would be happy to expand prosecutions in a way that would not only smear the, not only, sorry, not only target Khmer Rouge but also have the effect of delegitimating the incumbent regime. And so that I think has caused them to be particularly keen to control this and keep the prosecutions very narrow. I'm just wondering if you can give some examples of feasible but also sufficient reparations, maybe ones that aren't financial, if funding is so limited, that would still appease the victims and grant the court more legitimacy. Yeah, good question. When collective and moral reparations were mentioned as a possibility, the NGO I advise and many others suggested a range of things that might meet those criteria. A national day of remembrance, a modest memorial, the funding of which could come from voluntary contributions if the defendant was indigent and if the court didn't have the budget to do it. Voluntary, voluntarily programs with voluntary civil society participation that would be arranged with the blessing of the court but that wouldn't obligate resources from the court. These were all possibilities and I still don't know, I've asked a number of people, I still don't know why the court didn't put those remedies in place at the end of the first trial because I thought that they were lawfully well within its discretion and that they would have had the effect that you just mentioned of being much more meaningful to survivors. What is clear is that the court officials in question learned after the first trial that they had to look for these types of remedies, things that wouldn't commit judicial funds or require the defendants to be non-indigent but that would nevertheless be meaningful and that's how they came up with this idea of allowing NGOs to essentially apply for court stamp of approval for projects that would be implemented with other sources of funding. Yes, sir. Two quick questions. One is over the years when I've read about Cambodia, I mean whatever e-wrest paper or covered it, you know the range of deaths, you know at one point I read it was four million people and then somebody did an article that said all, it was less than 40,000. Is the 1.7 million, is that a pretty hard number or is it, how do you figure out how many people were affected? And the second thing is, is the process facilitating a more open society where this won't recur in the future? Both excellent questions. The question about the 1.7 million. So 1.7 million is an estimate generated by the Yale historian Ben Kiernan. Other historians and political scientists have estimated 1.5 million, two million. The documentation center that I advise has evidence to suggest the figure might be slightly higher than that, but you're right that there's a tremendous range. Nobody knows exactly how many people died during that period. And one of the reasons why is that so many people died immediately preceding that period and so many died in conflict immediately after that period and village level inquiries into times of death are often met with response as well. It was around 1979 or it was around 1975 that so-and-so passed away and your question gets to something really important here, which is that I said at the outset that this is a narrow process. It's only looking at a little part of Cambodia's tormented history. And the debate over numbers is reflective of the political contestation over what happened in Cambodia's past. Very resonant with comments that my colleague Yazir made yesterday about how stories are told about transitional justice processes. In the 1970s and thereafter, scholars that were highly critical of the US engagement of Indochina tended to derive lower figures of estimated deaths in the Pol Pot regime and to assign larger numbers of deaths to the Civil War period in the early 70s, which was the period in which the United States bombed Cambodia and supported a right wing government. Others have tended to emphasize a higher figure such as the incumbent Cambodian government in part to diminish a sense of loss of life in the early 1980s when that government was a protagonist in the Third Indochina War. So nobody knows exactly how hard the 1.7 million figure is. The second question is about, can you remind me just two words? Is the process of the going through, is it going to do something about open society yet? Because Cambodia is a breakthrough example of how many times or the central in the Congo. These things tend to go like this and never stop. Is this process going to help that process or? This process has, let me start with sort of its effects on the government or on the sort of political institutions and then the sort of non-state effects that I see. Political institutions, I don't think that this process has had a major catalytic effect. There's no major reform of the judiciary or of other elements of government. There continue to be human rights abuses, violations of the rights of workers, of displaced persons, political activists and so forth. That said, this process has enabled people to talk much more openly about the particular subject that it addresses, which is the Khmer Rouge period. Up until about seven or eight years ago, there was just one line in history textbooks in Cambodian text about the Khmer Rouge period. It said something like, and then the terrible three-year periods of Pol Pot occurred, period. Next chapter, many people didn't know is it was so painful to address in classrooms and so contentious politically that it simply was swept under the rug in official histories and in educational programs. The advent of this process was instrumental in opening up some of that space because the government was going on record and saying this is now a topic that can be openly discussed. We even broadcast it on national TV and that enabled people, including a colleague of mine who wrote a textbook that has now been introduced in every Cambodian secondary school and university and a nationwide program to educate people on that period. That's very important, not just for non-recurrent. It's also important for individual people's lives because you had so many people whose parents or aunts and uncles or grandparents were suffering from terrible after-effects of the tragedy who simply didn't either believe them or didn't understand what they had gone through. And so opening space to talk about this period hasn't transformed the rule along the country, but it has addressed an important subset of social needs. I was curious how much the domestic politics within Cambodia influenced all of this. You talked about the regime that was running things in there and obviously they played the greatest role in determining what the court could do, but they must have had opponents in the domestic politics. And honestly, I can't, are there both opponents who wanted more prosecutions broader as well as others that wanted less? Or how did that all fit together? There's a small portion of the country in the Northwest near the Thai border that is still home to many people who are former Khmer Rouge members. And interestingly, although that community has been suspicious of this process for fear that other community leaders would be indicted, there hasn't been a grassroots campaign against it. By and large, that community made it to peace with the incumbent government in the 1990s and thereafter and hasn't abstracted strenuously to the trials. The main opposition party is a liberal, comparatively liberal party that tends to have support from the U.S. and other Western governments. And it has likewise supported Khmer Rouge prosecutions but has found fault with the government for impeding progress toward additional prosecutions. Unfortunately, that political opposition has been operating in an environment as I characterized earlier that is still not very tolerant of dissent and so it's been difficult at times for opposition political figures to make this case successfully. But there is a domestic political dimension. So it's not just, you're right to point that out. It's not just internationals who are criticizing the prime minister for blocking additional prosecutions. It's also his principal domestic opponents. And those opponents scored surprisingly large gains in the last national election which happened last July. And since then there have been a series of demonstrations not focused mainly on this court but focused on other political grievances. Whether this court was a partial catalyst for that process of the opposition gaining votes and coming out into the streets, I doubt that it was a major factor. I think that current day social grievances were much more important but certainly one of the issues that the protesters and that the opposition have focused on is the perception that the government is heavy-handedly managing this process just like it manages data-dangers, judicial functions in the country. But so far the opposition hasn't become the government that they think that it's in the same regime all through this. Correct, correct. And so no major change, I know it's one. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you for joining us to hear about John Chorchari's new book. I invite you to stay. We have refreshments and continue the conversation. There's also the book signing. And so just as a final round if you'll join me in thanking John once again.


Welcome, folks. This is Tom O'Brien at TFNN. We go five days a week. We go seven hours a day. We go 24 hours a day in the Internet at TFNN.com. Always remember, folks, whatever you think about, you bring about whatever. You focus on growth. Hope everyone's having a great day, safe day. It's making a great night, folks. We're kicking into a good weekend. I like this three-day weekend too, by the way, and it's Father's Day. Happy Father's Day, everyone out there, man. Assume nothing. Don't make assumptions. In any kind of relationship, we can make the assumption that others know what we think. And we don't have to say what we want. We assume they're going to do what we want because they know what we're thinking. If they don't do what we want, we feel hurt. And then we say, how could you do that? You should know. Bottom line, don't make assumptions, folks. Market wise, let's take a look at it out here. We have the Dow Industries down 100, 800. Nasdaq's down 479. S&Ps are off 33. Gold contract trading up $33 at 18.52 an ounce. We have silver up 49 cents, $21.99 an ounce. Platinum up 20 bucks, 9.45 an ounce. Light sweet crude up $2.48, $117.79 an ounce. Notes and bonds, a 10-year note. Up 23 ticks, trading $1.15, $28, the 30-year up a full point. Plus 6 ticks at $133.19, and $king dollar. $king dollar is taken to the woodshed out here. Both time, bottom line. Down 1,500 ticks, $103.643. The euro out here is trading at a price point of $105. The yen is out here at $132 and the British pound is at $123 to $1 at U.S. dollar. iPhone numbers 877, 9276648. Give us a call, folks. Want to know what's going on in your world. In the world of the S&Ps, let's take a look at them. What do we have? Well, bottom line, folks, is that you get a down market. You have an ABC structure in the way down. That, you know, has been happening. You take out the B point. We blew that B point away with volume. We did that on the 13th, okay? Now what you're facing is it. You get an ABC inside an ABC. And I can tell you, bottom line, I've been doing this for quite some time. And when you get an ABC structure inside an ABC, your probabilities go up a lot higher that you're going to reach the first price projection. So first price projection on the spy is at a price point of the $335, okay? When we take a look at the smaller one, it's $337. So what you have happening here, $383, one second. Whoops. So bottom line is if we go take a look at where we are. This is, there's plenty of equities that are down at these levels. This is where this market wants to go. And, you know, we'll see whether, you know, at this point, the problem is, of course, is that that's only a one-to-one. But bottom line is that that number, the $335, that's going to be the highest of the lows. $313 is the high of the low. It's going to go test the high of the low. That's how this thing is shaking out. So NDX100, we take a look at the NDX. You get the same type of set up inside the NDX. Bottom line is that this NDX out here, where are we? There we are. So you get the NDX trading out right now at $271. This structure here, you can see it's taken out of the B point out today. It's already taken it out. It only needs another million shares for another ABC structure on the way down. And in this one here, so you get this, the smaller one, the A point is $314.56. You get your B point down there, which is the low of, what day is today? It was the lowest Tuesday. So that's $273.33, gets you a 41A to B. Your C point is the high from yesterday, which is at $286.33, which you get your $245. So what you have here is that, let me see, where did I have this other one? $222. There is $222 and $245. Yeah, it's pretty intense. So you have a small ABC down to $245. The small one is inside the larger one. And you put this up, you're going to see you're basically at the same place, man. Yeah, $219 is the highest of the low. And something to remember is that ABC structures, the A to B is a straight line move. The C to D normally goes all over the place. What we did with the C to D on the monthly basis, we did trade sideways for two months and then blew right by it again. Bottom line is that, that's where we're going. Gold, gold contract out here. We take a look at gold. This is going to get kind of intriguing here, watching to see if we can get some follow through on gold.  Bottom line, that's on a shorter term basis. The longer term basis, gold has a beautiful setup. I mean, the bottom line is that when you take a look at this, what you're going to see on a much larger basis, that you're going to see that we only did watch this. I'm going to take this all the way because when you see this, it's pretty impressive.  This was at the beginning, you know, that lows when gold was bouncing around 250, did that for like 10 years. Then start taking off in 2002, okay. So you had the accumulation at lows with light volume. You start taking off, the volume expands dramatically.  We take off again. Now watch this. This is the one that I want you to see because this is pretty amazing. And if we bring this back to, I'm just going to do it on a 10-year now, what you're going to see is that the last retracement, you know, yeah, this is the longer-term deal, but the last retracement was only a .382 retracement in the marketplace. There you go. It's a .382 retracement. So it wasn't like you have an ABC structure in the way out. This is where patience is a big deal. There's no two ways about that. And we'll see. We'll see if this can get this baby here. There's no two ways about it. And if we go take a look at the dollar, what you have with the dollar right now is this. Take a look at the dollar. The dollar basically gave it up in spades, and that's going to be about the British pound out here today, because I think what they, jeeping, what evidently the market figured is that they wouldn't go up on rates at all, and the Bank of England did. Yeah, that's the move. And the Bank of England did, and, you know, they haven't gone up in a long period of time. So they are on board with higher rates also. Stay right there, folks, we'll come right back. We have the Dow Industrials down 750. Nasdaq down 470. S&Ps down 129.


Hey guys realistic game here today. We're gonna be doing some scary stories of game blocks that we're here with tweeter Say hi, buddy. There you go. We're here with Bendy Timeless and my god, he has the same shirt as me Isn't that awesome? All right, so I saw FNAF story So let's begin with them because he doesn't like FNAF right where's it at? Where's that show me up there this and the story is named too much FNAF my god Well, how much FNAF can you have? Okay, let's find out My god, okay, he got jumpscare playing FNAF or you get to watching it on YouTube. I don't know man Hey, what's up blocks King Nate? Okay, so I think I played too much for now. Oh man My god, don't what are you doing stop playing that game. It's so evil.  It's like he custom built it Oh my god, that PC is a beast yeet Falls asleep Oh, no, I think the door is opening by itself. Oh my god Well, what okay, he definitely heard that good because you do not want to be asleep and that happens What was that? This seems to be nothing. Let's go check it out Okay, let's see I don't see anything man. I think you're good. I think these are broken would happen.  Oh my god Dude this guy looks this guy looks horrifying if you tell me man. Oh Man It was only a nightmare. We will see oh god I don't think it was a nightmare my friend because he's definitely outside your window. Oh That was it So it was not it was an nightmare after all my god poor guy See guys don't play too much for that or that will happen to you. It was a Thomas Thomas the Scary engine because I was going to say what's up, man? What's up boy? Let's go see terror trip or Imaginary gift what since called I am you Thirsty house. Oh that one sounds interesting. I'm gonna go in this one Okay. Yeah. Oh my god. Where do we start off? It says a new house Don't be upset the city is near and we and here we can rest better here Whatever listen to music. She's not even bothered by this like I don't care. There is more healthy here. Yay The first room is mine. Oh nice house guys. So it seems like they moved houses Okay, yeah, let's see my new room Have you heard about the last family who stayed here? Yeah, they remain in the house and died But I think these are stories. Oh god Well, that's creepy man. Wait, no, that's not door. It's this one. Okay, dad Hey, you need to go to sleep tomorrow. We're going into the city and then okay, dad And then yes, we are in a rural zone and we need to buy supplies while the girl is not saying anything Okay, there you go. So finally speaks and all she said was okay. Wow Good morning prepare yourselves and we can go it's so beautiful outside. We need to go Good morning. I'm going to the bathroom Oh Why does the girl never say anything? She just has that same face Like come on say something girl Hmm brushes teeth. Oh, don't tell me something's gonna happen. It's a little boy right here. What's that noise? Oh, no, it's raining. Is it really don't open that window man Don't be upset. We are going tomorrow. Yeah, I can't be raining forever How did that happen? It was sunny 10 minutes ago. Oh, no, maybe the house is cursed What is she eating? Oh egg and bacon and she has a big old iPhone. Wow That's how she does attack Okay, just a little visit for me But as I say, it's just bad luck son anyway I need to go to work and this won't keep me here forever The storms won't stay here now. It's worse than yesterday. It's a storm outside. Oh, man So now there's a giant storm going on outside and this girl's still eating the same breakfast.  It's It starts scaring me soon. I will lose my job if it continues. Yeah, we remain without food So they're like trapped in their house and no food because they haven't gone to the city steals food Oh, he stole her food. Why me she has been eating the same food for like the past two scenes So take it. I don't think she's gonna eat it man. Oh God what happened you fell asleep What happened to the dad is he okay? I think he's sleeping man.  Wait, what's going on with the people? Dude, I think there's something wrong with your parents That is sleeping for three days. I've never seen a man sleep who sleeps so much before. Oh God, I don't think your dad's sleeping, Julia. Oh My god, he little does he not know Sis, can I enter what is going on here? Everybody's like brainwashing or something. She didn't even notice that her phone battery died days ago Oh my god, what happened to girl too? Is there like something going on in the air or something? I Can't stand this anymore. I'll go on the flood or I'll die in this house because of hunger Oh, no, he's tired of all this weirdness. Whatever it's going on. Oh my god It's a flood outside. Oh god. I need to reach to the streets. No Oh, no, dude, you can't even go out. It's like flooded. I need to reach the streets Dude, you're not gonna make it.  Oh my god Look at this guy. He's going for it.  Oh my god So this house takes lives. That's why what's called thirsty house. Wow, that is crazy But I don't know man.  Oh, that's out. Oh, baby. Okay, let's go on here Mike Let's play football Jack. Yes. Okay, so they're gonna play soccer while they call it football link other countries But yes, it's football. Yeah, you can say it. Okay, Mike. No Jack our ball. Oh, no, they kicked it over. You see that's why you never play to rock man To keep your legs buddy, okay, Mike is not saying anything Jack I'm going to find it Mike didn't say anything, but he's not stopping you. Oh god What is it? Oh, well, that's the demon wait his head is backwards because six back is on this side But his head is twisted. Oh Man Jack I found it buddy. Do you not see that demon over there? Are you blind?  He was just trying to play some football Okay Mike Jack, are you okay? Yes, I am. Oh, no, he possessed him. That is not long That is no longer Jack Mike, but he doesn't know that and he has a knife. So why it's running. Oh, man Oh, look to the cop car Okay, uh sleepboat friend. Oh, he stabbed them dies He stabbed them right in the chest. Oh, no, but that was not your friend at the demon. Oh, man What did he say? officer hands up Mike dies. He didn't say anything. He's just staring there At his dead friend. Oh god. That is pure evil. I will escape Oh, no, that dude is Officer that is not a person anymore. That is a demon of some sort He is crazy Which one you want to go now on the demon? Oh, let's go to this one then Okay, let's start off here wait with the dialogue go it disappeared. Oh The demons are real. That's what he said.   They are real Whoo Come to my house and let's see if they are real Who was so they're like mocking her now? Uh-oh. Oh, man, okay This does not look like something you guys should be doing man. You guys should just stop right now Okay, I don't know if they have dialogues or not because I can't see them I don't think they don't so let's move on to the next. Okay. They don't who would vote me The demons are real. Oh my god. Oh, no You see that you guys get for messing with this stuff.  Oh, man. Oh Dice what not to nerd girl She was like she was gonna show them that they were real dies dies dies Skates.  Okay, uh, mom dad. Let's move from this town Oh, so now you think now you believe in demons, right? Are you okay? Tell us why Just do it. Oh dude Well, it's here. Oh, let's go to a doctor.  Let's see here. Ah, I will be fine.  Oh, man He's in the TV doctor Mom the mirror and the walls what okay, so is he just seeing stuff? What is going on? Don't let her play Roblox anymore. No Thanks, okay. Oh, so they're blaming the song Roblox, huh? How could you so evil? No, don't let me in here. Stay with doctor. He'll make you feel fine. Oh Tony just came out of nowhere. Yes, stay with me.  He's possessed. He's a demon. Oh man No, well, that's the rest of her. All right. Well, we're gonna end this video here. Say bye tweeter There you go, buddy. Well, thank you guys for watching. Thank you guys for making support If you're new to the channel remember to subscribe turn down the notification bell Snap the like button if you enjoyed the video. I'll see you guys next time