Welcome, everyone, and good afternoon. Thank you for joining us today for a discussion of recent developments between India and Pakistan. My name is Thamonna Salikuddin. I'm the director for South Asia programs at the US Institute of Peace. USIP is a national nonpartisan independent institute founded by Congress and dedicated to the proposition that a world without violent conflict is possible, practical, and essential for US and global security. In February of this year, surprisingly, India and Pakistan announced the resumption of a 2003 ceasefire along the line of control. And this came as a surprise to many people because the two nuclear powers had basically cut off almost all dialogue and diplomatic engagement since 2019. And as many of you recall, 2019 was a particularly bad year. It was marked by a militant attack against Indian security forces in Palawama Kashmir and then Indian retaliation in Balakot Pakistan. And later that year, India repealed Article 370 and bifurcated the state of Jammu and Kashmir into two union territories. So tensions since that year have remained quite high. And for the last two years, we really haven't seen any real developments between the two countries. And then this year, we saw the resumption of the ceasefire agreement, positive remarks by the Pakistani Army Chief Bajwa regarding normalization, Indian Prime Minister Modi sending Pakistan Day greetings to Prime Minister Ran Khan and an exchange of positive letters between the two. And then last month, we even saw the meeting of the Permanent Indiscommission in New Delhi after a period of three years of not meeting. So is this really a thought? Is there something more here? What's driving these attempts and is it sustainable? Today, we want to talk about these issues. And we acknowledge what bilateral progress has proven short-lived in the past and long-standing political and security obstacles remain. Could these developments open space to address the underlying drivers of conflict? Notably, we also want to talk about the US. The US didn't play a role in facilitating this somewhat of a rapprochement or dialogue between India and Pakistan, yet it very much benefits from any normalization in their relations. So the speakers today will also address, is there anything for the US to do? Is there any way the US can play a constructive role between India and Pakistan? I'm delighted today to welcome an esteemed panel to discuss these recent events. Each panelist will offer opening thoughts and then we'll have a discussion. Please feel free to submit your questions on our USIP event page. You can also join the conversation on Twitter with the hashtag quiet on the LOC. I'd like to introduce our wonderful speakers today. First of all, we'll have Shujan Nawaz. Shujan was the first director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council and he currently serves as a distinguished fellow at the center. Previously, he's worked with RAN, he's worked with USIP, CSIS and a host of other think tanks on projects dealing with Pakistan and the Middle East. He's the author of several books, including his latest, The Battle for Pakistan, The Bitter US Friendship and a Tough Neighborhood. Next, we'll turn to Mediha Absal who is a Rubenstein fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution. Her research lies at the intersection of political economy, development, security and with a focus on Pakistan. And she's the author of Pakistan under siege, extremism, society and the state. Next, we'll turn and we're very happy to have him, Ashley Tellis who holds the Tata chair for strategic affairs and is currently a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He has lots of experience in India and when he was senior advisor to undersecretary of state for political affairs, he was intimately involved in negotiating the civil nuclear agreement with India. He's the author of several books, including India's Emerging Nuclear Posture, co-author of Interpreting China's Grand Strategy, Past, Present and Future. And last, but certainly not least, Tanvi Madan. Tanvi is a senior fellow at the Project on International Order and Strategy and Director of the India Project at the Brookings Institution. Her work explores India's role in the world and its foreign policy, focusing on India's relationship with China and with the United States. She recently published Fateful Triangle, How China Shaped US India Relations During the Cold War. So thank you to all of you for joining us today and a special thanks to our speakers. We'll start off by turning to Shijia to give us a little bit of insight on what's going on behind the scenes in Pakistan and how we've come to this point. You're muted, Shijia. Thank you very much, Tamanna. It's great to be on the same panel as Ashley and Madhya and Tanvi. And I hope that we can all shed some light on what's happening. Although what's happening behind closed doors is really not known to any one of us. I think very few people know exactly what's going on. And sometimes I wonder whether even the people behind closed doors know what's going on. So we will be able to collectively shed some light on the events. Let me first state my priors. And my priors are that I have, ever since I launched the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council, been waging peace, trying to get India and Pakistan to talk to each other. We were involved in setting up a track to military to military dialogue, a dialogue on water issues, as well as one on trade and business. So having said that, I should warn against irrational exuberance, particularly after one speech, which seems to have been the trigger point when General Madhya made his speech in Pakistan. It seemed to raise hopes all of a sudden, but like most things that happened between India and Pakistan, this was followed immediately with a kind of a mini U-turn with the announcement of opening of trade and then the cancellation of that order. It reminded me of the old joke about General Ziaul Haqsari government when he had the title of Chief Martial Law Administrator, which stood for CMLA. And people started saying, cancel my last announcement. So this is the same kind of U-turn that occurred. Now there are unconfirmed reports of back-general contacts. There are unconfirmed reports of third-party assistance. And I can sort of semi-confirm that some of the third-party activities are going on, but nobody wants to talk about that because they don't want to jinx the outcome. India, as you know, has traditionally spurned third-party involvement. Why would it want to accept it now? That remains a big mystery. Let me address a few key points from the Pakistani point of view. I'm simply reflecting what I think is going on there because as I said, I don't know what's going on behind those closed doors. But we must first see this against the backdrop of what I call a misalliance that currently exists in Pakistan, an unequal marriage between the government of Prime Minister Imran Khan and the Pakistan military. And there's also a sign of a fractured government. Parts of the government don't agree with each other, mainly because it is a coalition and they have brought together disparate groups and it's a party essentially of political turn-courts who left many other traditional parties to join this new front. And they're trying to make a go of it now. Now the key player in all of this as has often been seen in the history of Pakistan is the military. But we have to understand that it is no longer a monolith that the military does have different generations now. And in fact, the majority of the junior officers and the commanders of the military are people that have now seen nothing but war. I haven't seen war, nothing but war for the last two decades. Only a few of the senior commanders, including the chief, actually were not in FATA during this period. And so they don't have that direct experience, but everyone does. And many doors of duty in the federally administered tribal area, fighting insurgency there, as well as in Balochistan. And so it's a very different breed of people that is now running the Pakistan military. And they don't always agree with each other. So even though it's a disciplined organization, what you're seeing is a group that is coalescing behind the chief, but that is obviously feeding him different points of view. And I think if he's smart, we'll understand that he can't turn this institution that has been bred on a certain attitude towards India in particular for decades and decades that you can't turn it around and say that the hostility has gone away and we must now be friends. So there'll have to be a gradual shifting. There's also a disadvantage in dealing with the emotional attachment of Islamist thinking within the lower ranks. And that is, to my mind, a blind spot in the military's thinking. The majority see the trouble in FATA as well as in Balochistan as being instigated by India in collusion with Afghanistan. They see even Iran being used as a base, particularly with the capture of the Indian naval officer, Kulbashan Yadav. So Pakistan sees Afghanistan as a very hostile cousin. People who seek refuge in Pakistan but who have no love and in fact are resentful of Pakistani assistance and involvement and an obvious patronizing attitude towards their Afghan cousins. Now, the October 2011 Afghanistan, India strategic agreement also looms very large in the Pakistani psyche. But if you remember, President Karzai had to declare after the signing of that agreement specifically, and I quote, this treaty is not directed against any country. That was supposed to assuage the fares of Pakistan. But he accepted training for Afghan personnel by India. Having earlier spurned a similar offer by General Kehany and the Air Force Chief in Pakistan. And I still remember vividly of my conversation with Defense Minister Wardak when he was at the Atlantic Council. And I asked him, why wouldn't you accept assistance? It'll give you language training, people training in Dari and Pashto. And it would give you much greater throughput so you'd have more people trained than the Americans can provide you. And he said, no, we've learned our lessons from the Soviet experience. We don't want our people to be indoctrinated by Pakistan. Now, interestingly, on the Pakistan side, there's a very strong perception that in fact the indoctrination has already worked against Pakistan. They see the NDS, the National Intelligence Directorate, as a tool of primarily the Northern Alliance. And they see the Northern Alliance as primarily an ally of India in Afghanistan. And they're finding they see themselves sandwiched in between these two forces. Now, as you well know, Pakistan sees the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor as a game changer. And I just want to mention that because there's now a general that is running the authority responsible for CPAC. So the military has a big hand in that. But India is seen as trying to highlight the difficulties with CPAC with the view to damaging that relationship. And it's also accused occasionally by the Pakistan authorities of supporting attacks on CPAC activities, especially in Balochistan. Now, Indian active support of FATF also rankles with Pakistan. Now, FATF is the Financial Action Task Force that has put Pakistan on the gray list of countries that need to do more to control terrorist financing and illicit movement of monies across the globe. And Pakistan is desperately trying to get off the gray list and not risk getting onto the black list which would have serious repercussions for its economy. Pakistan also sees, and this is particularly on the military when you talk to them, they see the Indian order of battle as threatening. They see three strike corps arrayed against Pakistan. They see three dozen airfields with planes that are within a range of Pakistan's border. They also see the construction of integrated battle group locations along the Pakistan border so that they would be much less warning in case India decides on a punitive or preemptive strike into Pakistan, which as you well know, has a very narrow strategic depth inside its country. So all of these things, at a time when India is probably the largest, if not, or perhaps the second largest importer of arms in the world, India has a developed defense industry whereas Pakistan sees itself dependent on allies and particularly the United States which has shut off defense equipment and supplies to Pakistan. So this is creating concerns within Pakistan. Finally, a massive rightward shift within India is a big concern for people in Pakistan because they fear and we're already seeing signs of it that this will be met by a similar rightward shift in thinking and agitation on the streets by right-wing groups, which the government is now negotiating with instead of trying to control them with the full strength of the law. Now, as I said, the Army keeps speech, signals of thought, but I think it may prove to be a false crest. There's a very long hard climb ahead and talks of opening trade and then the cancellation is really should be measured against the opportunity cost of that lost trade. Could be anywhere from $37 billion to even $100 billion a year for India and Pakistan. The creation of a new Grand Trunk Road initiative, as I call it, would link Afghanistan, Pakistan and India together and benefit all three countries. The Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline would benefit all those three countries. The Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline would benefit the whole region and the Asian Development Bank has put money on that. So there's a lot that can be done and I'm sure that my friends and I will be able to shed some more light on it as we go forward. Thank you. Thanks very much for that opening. Next, I'd like to turn to Madhya and should I raise the issues of where the military might not be a monolith, but it really was the military that made, they're the ones, the DGMOs are the ones who resumed the ceasefire, the General Bajor is the one who came out in front and all the stories are that the civilian government is not as far leaning. So I'd love to hear from you where the politics about any sort of thought with India are, where the public opinion is, what are, where is their opportunity in Pakistan and where are the obstacles? Absolutely. Thanks. Thanks for convening this really timely and important discussion. On sort of the politics of the matter in Pakistan, I think there is a common perception in Pakistan that the military tends to block a civilian government's overtures to India or somehow or the other something else happens, right? There's a terrorist attack that blocks civilian government's overtures. And if there ever, if Pakistan ever wants peace or if the military ever wants peace, it wants to be the one making the overture. So I'll just walk you through this logic and then show how the current moment sort of shows us a different dynamic. So, you know, we had Nawaz Sharif and Bajpayee's historic meeting in 1999 followed by the cargo crisis that year. And, you know, Musharraf and the army not too happy about Bajpayee and Nawaz Sharif's meeting. Of course, then Musharraf made an attempt at peace, right? In 2001, and that was followed by an attack on the Indian parliament that year. So as I said, there's a sense that the Pakistani military is not too happy when the civilian government is the one making the overtures and that it wants the credit for any such overture. In that sense, this is a really opportune time, right? Because while, you know, there's a civilian government in charge, this is quite a unique setup with Imran Khan and Bajwa and the Pakistani military and the civilian government, you know, we're told repeatedly being on the same page. So in that sense, this was a really opportune time for this kind of speech that General Bajwa made. And I'll come to that in a little bit, but basically saying, you know, we want to bury the past. It's time to extend the hand of peace in all directions and so on. But I think what this current moment shows is that while the military can make overtures and while the civilian government can be on the same page as the military, politics and public opinion can play a role that blocks this, right? So it's not just the military blocking the civilian government's overtures, but politics and public opinion, in this case blocking a civilian military kind of regime that's on the same page, it's overtures. And that is something underappreciated, I think. So Bajwa made his historic speech, General Bajwa made the speech at the Islamabad Security Dialogue and then soon after that, there was an announcement by the Economic Coordination Committee in Pakistan, basically saying that they would reduce, they would start trade within India. Again, in particular, they would start importing cotton and sugar for Pakistan's needs. Pakistan sort of badly needs these two items. And this is trade that had been cut off after the revocation of Kashmir's autonomy in August, 2019. And so the ECC, the Economic Coordination Committee comes forward with this decision publicly in Ron Khan as the minister in charge of commerce and textile oversees this, right? So in that role, he okays it. And then the next day, the cabinet says no. This is a no-go. And in Ron Khan as the person who heads the cabinet basically signs off on reversing this. And the cabinet sort of comes forward and says no trade with India. And there are ministers tripping over themselves basically in terms of rhetoric saying, we're not gonna trade with India until the Kashmir issue is resolved. And so one step forward, one back and the rhetoric was there for everyone to see. So this shows there were three sort of possible factors. So one I would say is politics, plain old politics where opposition parties are there to undermine the ruling party in Pakistan where the parties are broadly non-ideological. I mean, there are some ideological differences. What the opposition really amounts to doing is sort of trying to take down the ruling party's decisions. But in this case, this is not just, here they're trying to take down both and Ron Khan and Bajwa's kind of joint overture. So that's just politics. To public opinion, I'll come to public opinion a little bit more in detail in a minute. But they're responding to public opinion. They're sort of, the rhetoric is you're selling out Kashmir for some cotton and sugar. Don't do it. And so that's what they're sort of responding to public opinion. The issue of India is inextricably tied with Kashmir and it is something that the Pakistani state has over 70 plus years made sure is the case, right? And then the third, I think, issue there is sort of divisions in the military establishment. Are there people in the top ranks of the military who are not happy? Are there officers who are not happy with General Bajwa's overtures, right? The his would be successors, are they not happy with this? And is there a sort of pushback there? So those are sort of some things to note. So politics, public opinion and the divisions in the military establishment. And that's something that should obviously spoke to a little bit more as well. I'll just, I'm told my time is coming to an end in terms of my five minutes. So I'll try to wrap up in terms of sort of three things I wanna mention. The first I've already mentioned is Kashmir, is public opinion and how it's tied up with Kashmir. I mean, I was in Pakistan visiting in August, 2019 and it was everywhere, sort of the issue of Kashmir on 14th August, it sort of tied up with Pakistan's identity in many ways. And if one looks at views on India and Pakistan, I mean, unsurprisingly, views are very unfavorable. The Pew polls will show you vast majorities of Pakistani 70% saying they have unfavorable views of India. But what's important to note is that an equal percentage will say that they favor talks between India and Pakistan. The problem is I think the sticking point tends to be Kashmir. And here's my sort of second point, the factors that are the sticking point between the two remain the same. For India, it's terrorism and militancy coming from Pakistan, for Pakistan it's Kashmir. And the issue that they say they want to resolve core issues in this sort of latest thought, they've, or potential thought, they've said that, but they don't agree on what the core issues are, right? And so that is the problem. Of course, there is the threat of a terrorist attack that might take place at any point, though there seems to be a lid on that kind of activity since 2019. And I will also say that Pakistan has been quite vocal in blaming or linking India with the TTP. It released a dossier last year in the fall and that was quite an aggressive move in terms of sort of making it public. My final point, and I'm sure we'll come to this later, so I won't belabor it, but I think there are a lot of factors, in some sense I've spoken to the factors that block forward movement, but there are a lot of factors that push forward movement. And those tend to be sort of, I think those can go broadly under this new umbrella of geo-economics, you know, Pakistan wants this kind of geo-economics reset and sort of peace with India is a corollary to that, right? So I think internally both countries are facing a lot of pressure economically because of the pandemic. So that sort of helps Pakistan, that helps in them not wanting war with the other. Pakistan of course, given that the UAE is said to be the external third party mediator, it has realized that the Gulf is moving away from Pakistan economically and towards India. And so that worries Pakistan in its geo-economics reset. And the final point I'll mention is of course, this coincides with the new US administration and this geo-economics push and the overtures with India. It is no surprise that they coincide with that. You know, Pakistan is being very deliberate about how it's sort of putting this forward. I'll stop there. Thank you so much, Madiha. Those very interesting comments. And now I'd like to turn to Ashley to sort of give us the other perspective in terms of where is the Indian government in terms of responding? I mean, we saw the positive letter from Prime Minister Modi, but really what is the domestic calculus in India? Both political, public opinion, but really national security-wise. So please, Ashley. Well, thanks, Simana, for having me here. And it's wonderful to be with friends and colleagues I've known over the years. The fact that we're actually having this discussion to my mind is a testament to how bad India-Pakistan relations have been in the last two years, right? That we are struggling to find fragments of hope amidst what is still ambiguous information on a lot of the details. I think the one thing that can be said, the confidence is that obviously we all welcome any thought that occurs in the relationship.  Obviously, that's something that we all share. But I think we need to be rather sober in our expectations. And certainly when I look at Delhi's calculations and the way Delhi has been thinking about the issues relating to Pakistan, I'm more sober than usual. And I want to make three basic points to sort of speak to that. The first is that this initiative, which led up to the developments that were announced between the two DGMOs, came from Pakistan. It was a Pakistani initiative that really was personified by General Bajwa's efforts to reach out to Indian counterparts in various ways. And I emphasize the word various because he really did make diverse efforts. And it was almost as if he fired a broad spread of torpedoes in the hope that one would hit and one did hit. And so there was a conversation that came about as a result of Bajwa's initiative. So from Delhi's point of view, I think India sees itself as responding to a Pakistani initiative. And that initiative arose because the Indian government believes that this initiative was driven very much by Pakistan's own sense of external beleaguement and its internal crises. So no one in Delhi believes that there is a transformation that has taken place in the Pakistani state. They see this as Pakistan looking for a reprieve in a very difficult situation. And both Suja and Madhya have identified different aspects of these difficulties that had a pattern to all of us. So that's point number one. India sees itself not as the demandor of a peace process but rather responding to an initiative that comes from Pakistan. The second point I wanna make is that the government of India and the Modi government in particular believes that the combative policy towards Pakistan of the last two years has actually been successful. But that it has also run its course. Modi has secured the international and domestic gains that he wanted. There has been no serious international pushback on India's decisions on J&K. Even within India itself, the decisions about initiating 370 have been endorsed across the political spectrum, even by those who are ambivalent about it. And so at the end of the day, I think Prime Minister Modi feels that his broad approach towards Pakistan, which is being muscular, tough, both at the diplomatic level and at the military level has paid off. But I think he's also astute enough to recognize that this muscularity and this pugnaciousness cannot be the norm forever. And so when the moment presented itself, and this is where Badva's outreach was critical, I think this government decided to explore what that overture entails. And so from an Indian point of view, I see the government of India sort of sitting pretty in the face of this Pakistani effort. Point number three, I think the thought that we see, and that has been described in various ways, from an Indian point of view is an opportunity for stabilizing what is a difficult relationship rather than any expectations of transformation. I don't think the Modi government believes that this is a moment for a new transformative, high-profile initiative towards Pakistan. And there are many reasons for this. I mean, the first and most important point is that I think the Modi government doesn't believe it has an effective partner on the Pakistani side to begin a conversation that would be transformative. They don't have faith in the current civilian government. There are great uncertainties in the Pakistan military beyond General Badjwa himself. And even General Badjwa has said the right things, but there is a huge gap from an Indian point of view between Badjwa's articulations and then behavior as seen on the ground. And the two elements that I think India is still uncertain about is what is the future of the Pakistan military's investment in various Jihadi groups? So they welcome the statements that have been made, but will that will actually translate into a confrontation with these groups, a suppression of these groups? I think there's an open question. They don't have an answer. And the second issue that is now hanging out on the horizon there is what is Pakistan's strategy towards Afghanistan going to be in the context of our own exit? And will Afghanistan once again be a new front? Assuming that it had ceased to be a front for some point at some time, will it be a new front in the India-Pakistan relationship? So the third point just to keep in mind is that from an Indian point of view, this is a moment to stabilize a relationship, to bring a semblance of normalcy, even if it's not real normalcy, and just test the waters, right? It's a testing of the waters to see where this relationship can go. And I think I want to end with just the point that nobody has great expectations at this juncture for any fundamental change in the relationship. But I think everyone is just satisfied that a pause may be good enough for the moment. And if the pause creates new opportunities down the line, then I think both sides will have to look for ways to seize those opportunities. But at the moment, I would not be uncorking the champagne. That's something dramatic has changed in South Asia. Yeah, thank you, Ashley. I think we all share your informed cynicism as Thenvi outlined it. So if we are looking at this as trying to find some semblance of normalcy, I think there are other trends beyond just New Delhi and Islamabad. So I'd like to turn to Thenvi to talk about the effect of global and regional trends on any possibility of moving towards normalcy or any possibility of continuing dialogue. Thanks, Tamanna. And it's great to be on this panel with Shujja and Madiha and Ashley. I'm going to draw on some of the themes that have already been mentioned. But I also want to, and also kind of subscribe to many of the caveats that others have given, I would also want to say is one of the things we don't know, and Shujja said and made sure we started ourselves from that point, was that I think it's because we don't also know the timing of this. In some ways, it's important to recognize that this kind of thought didn't suddenly happen and it's been the outcome of an ongoing process. So I want to be careful not to overinterpret proximate events. But I think you can identify certain global and regional trends that have contributed to creating a confluence of conditions that might have facilitated this window of opportunity between India and Pakistan at the very least. I'll lay out kind of, I think there are three broad trends and kind of a three and a half one, which is more proximate. I think that the three broad trends that have had second and third order effects on India and Pakistan, I think one is major power competition. And I think this is both US China competition intensifying, as well as India China competition. Then the second broad trend has been COVID and it's fallout, including the constraints that has placed on both governments. And the third is the US drawdown in Afghanistan that it will happen has been evident for the last two years, even if kind of the announcement was only made recently. And I think the final kind of the half additional factor that I would add is that I think it doesn't hurt either side to demonstrate to a new Biden administration with which they are trying to establish a good kind of working relationship that they are being the responsible stakeholder. And so I think that's kind of a half thing, half factor that I'd point out. How are these factors playing out? I'll speak to it from kind of the India side and then perhaps Pakistan side. I think for India, you know, for a Modi government that is facing a trifecta of crises, national security crisis with China, the health crisis with COVID and the economic crisis because of the fallout of COVID, in some ways kind of this creates an opportune moment and you know, Ashley said, why accept it? It makes the incentive, gives the Modi government an incentive to say, you know, yes, let's try this out, even if it's short-term. And it does in some ways reinforce Modi's initial instinct if you go back to 2014 to at that time, he was I think more ambitious, but to seek stability. So you can deal with more imperative issues, including kind of economic growth and development, playing a larger role in the region, et cetera. Now in 2014, he tried it with both China and Pakistan. China doesn't seem to be an option. So at the very least, even if it's just kind of creating a short-term stability, it does, it could ease the burden on kind of, even if it's just bandwidth and resources for the short-term. I think for India, the situation in Afghanistan as well, not that, you know, stabilizing or at least hitting pause, not just in and of itself, but it is the situation of Afghanistan is affecting India's partnerships and the choices of India's partners are making. And so if you can actually get into a better situation with Pakistan, even again, if it's short-term in this critical point, it could be helpful. I think I will say though, in some ways, for the reasons that actually laid out, it is easier even with these two kind of factors only make it, it got him to yes. But it is easier for him to explore this opportunity because in many ways, India is the status quo of power in the sense that the government largely has what it wants, particularly vis-a-vis Jammu and Kashmir. I think for the Pakistan side, how are these kind of global trends playing out? I think along with the pressure that COVID is putting on the system, I think there's Pakistan's partnership landscape to consider while India's non-alignment, historic non-alignment gets attention, it's true that since Ayukand, Pakistan has also benefited when it has had multiple patriots and partners at various times until a few years ago, that included China, the US, the Saudis and the UAE. But today that partnership landscape is quite different. US competition with China and focus on the Indo-Pacific plus the Afghanistan drawdown has meant that Pakistan's relevance to US strategy is somewhat more limited than it used to be, whereas India's has been elevated with the Saudi and UAE as Madiha mentioned, these countries are looking to India, which has become important to them as an energy market, especially as their Western markets have kind of shrunk, but also in terms of their efforts to diversify their sources of revenue. That leaves China, which will remain Pakistan's key partner, but as Pakistan is itself experienced in its history and India has too, having just one major partner limits one's options strategically and economically. And for Pakistan it could also limit, there'll be limits in terms of benefits, but also limits in terms of alleviating pressure on itself. And I think the financial action task force, even China's decisions vis-a-vis that show that when you have only one partner, they don't necessarily have to kind of listen to you or see to your request. And then finally, being dependent on just one partner means you're over dependent and that comes with its own pressures. Pakistan's efforts to create space with kind of an alt OIC an alternative to the organization of Islamic countries didn't really take off. And there are new partners like Iran and Russia, but those are limited. And also, to some extent, they have relationships with India and they have fish to fry with India that could also limit how much they would partner with Pakistan. I'll just briefly kind of mention that while I've talked about why these might have created that window of opportunity, these factors, some of these very factors that I mentioned could also complicate the situation. For instance, on India-China tensions could also leave the Modi government to be less willing. It cannot be seen to be compromising given that the Modi government has been open to criticism already on the China front. There's also the situation in Afghanistan, which has actually become a renewed area of cooperation, competition, sorry. And then major power competition, as it intensifies, both U.S.-China competition and in particular that, but also China and India, especially as U.S.-China competition intensifies, it demands some things of alliances and partnerships in both directions. So in the context of India-China competition, Beijing might set or expect limits to what Pakistan might be willing to do with India because it likes in some ways to see a competitive India-Pakistan relationship. It keeps India tied down. China and the U.S., in terms of their competition, see Pakistan and India's partners, including as they compete. And their desire to keep their partners on side might shape their decisions and whether or not they decide to use leverage to get these partners to do certain things or not do certain things when there's a crisis. So you could see this effect down the line, Beijing and Washington's crisis management approach down the line. And you already saw this to some extent in the aftermath of the Pulwama terrorist attack, but also after India's Article 370 decision, where you saw limited cooperation, especially compared to the past, Kargil in 1999 between the U.S. and China, and there was even a sense in the U.S. that not only was Beijing not being helpful in the escalation, but taking actions that were impeding others' efforts, including the UAE's and Washington's. How is my play out? I would recommend the U.S. IP did a China study group on China and South Asia has more on this. And so I won't say more, but I will end with saying there have been these moments before when global and regional factors have presented, have helped us or facilitated this opportunity, but at the end of the day, and I think, you know, Ashley and Shujia and Madi have all reflected on this, it is at the end of the day, the bilateral and domestic factors that will be key, and will be kind of either what creates conditions or frankly, are the spoilers in any effort to come to a kind of a modus for then be with each other. Thanks very much, then be there. Thank you all for a great opening remarks. We have about a little, about 20 minutes for questions and I welcome the audience to submit questions we've been getting some. Please feel free to use our event page or Twitter to do that. I'll start off with just, you know, thinking about everything you all have said, you know, it might be useful to compare this moment to previous thoughts. I mean, if we think about the original 2003 ceasefire agreement, it was followed by direct dialogue between India and Pakistan. It was followed also by internal dialogue between New Delhi and Kashmiri groups internally. And it was marked really by significant engagement between President Musharraf and Prime Minister Vajpayee at the time. And the result was that there was a reduction in militancy. You saw some benefit on the ground especially in terms of situation in Jammu and Kashmir. So I don't think we're anywhere near that level but even if it is due to regional factors or as Ashley said, maybe it's the, you know, the this is a moment that Pakistan needs this due to internal factors or this is just something General Bajra wants to do as one of his last acts. I mean, whatever the reasoning may be what is actually in the realm of possible here? Is there any space for continuing this dialogue? Whether it's, I mean, Vajpayee has publicly, Ambassador Ateba has said at the Hoover Institute that they are committed to this dialogue. So what do you all see as going forward? That's in the realm of possible, even if it is just stabilizing a difficult relationship? Let me see if I can pick up on Tanvi's last point, Tamanda. Sure, go ahead Shaja. I think that's a very critical one, which is that it's really domestic politics and economics that is going to be the springboard for whatever happens next because elections are going on within India and misting a severe crisis in terms of the COVID epidemic pandemic. And so is Pakistan. I mean, both of them have gone as low as 0.4% GDP growth for Pakistan in the last financial year and India plummeted, you know, in the minus range from a height of seven and 8% which used to be the norm. And they both need to create jobs. So you have India seeking to add 12 to 15 million new jobs a year, Pakistan seeking to add at least a million new jobs a year and both have been on the negative side. So these pressures are going to be enormous. And the one way in which they could alleviate these pressures is to do what economics one-on-one dictates, you trade with your neighbors. Now remember, you talked about previous instances. President Zardari was in a position to extend, return the favor of an MFN to India and he failed because his own government messed up in not talking to the Punjabi agriculturalists and they came to him at the last minute and said, Indian agricultural products are going to kill our industry, the agricultural industry in Pakistan. So, you know, all the agricultural products and their processing, et cetera, will disappear. The Chinese had already taken care of consumer goods in Pakistan by flooding the market with cheap goods. And so that put an end to that particular effort, even though at that time the military had signed off on this. And later the people's party representatives including foreign minister in Arubani Kar who was not involved in many of these decisions but she said that it was the military that pulled us back, turned out not to be the case. It was President Zardari's decision because an election was coming up and he didn't want to lose the Punjab. Well, he lost the Punjab, he lost the election and he lost the opportunity with India. So my point is it's domestic politics that will do it and it's domestic economics. If both countries are supposed to go back on the path of development and growth, they need their economies to stabilize and they need to show the electorate that they're doing the right thing. But that statesmanship will emerge out of this depth of poor economic performance and out of the depth of COVID. Thank you, Shajja. I mean, unfortunately in both countries you see a lot of political gains by actually arguing against any normalization. So let me turn to Tanvi if you, I mean, even if we can leverage any of the circumstances be they domestic or a regional, what do you see in the realm of possible here? So I think, you know, in some ways Shajja pointed out, just because this has been, this is kind of at 70, almost now 75 year old, the solutions, what would be ideal is clear, I think, to everybody, including kind of the economic relationship, et cetera. I think the, you know, one thing in terms of, so it's just a question of how do you make sure that the momentum continues and the incentive structure remains and works in the right direction. So the factors I talked about, for example, they can, as I laid out, they can play in very different direction. And so these are political judgment calls as well. And sometimes they're risky, as we've seen in India Pakistan history for the leaders involved. I will say that, you know, there are possibilities in terms of, even if not solving or resolving, but stabilizing the situation in a way that could actually keep it from de-escalating. In some ways, India and China have more mechanisms and rules of engagement in place, for example, than Indian Pakistanism.  Having said that, I will kind of go back to one political factor, which is, you know, the very things, the, going back to that 2014, early 2015 point, even for a Prime Minister like Prime Minister Modi, who, you know, is the portrays himself as a strong on national security person. His base was not very pleased with his kind of initiatives in 2014-20, particularly his stopover in Pakistan. And once the Bhutan court incident happened, a lot of his base said, I told you so. And so it always comes back to what Madiha mentioned, which is where one attack away from this opportunity dissipating. And that is always kind of hanging over these processes. So I think you can stabilize the situation, but that it is also very, always kind of a very delicate situation, which there isn't that much of a foundation beneath it that could keep it going. The COVID situation in India could play both ways. It could either cause Prime Minister Modi to say, you know, let's handle this a different way, or it could be seen as a sign of certain parties kind of taking advantage of the situation, and then he will feel the need to respond. Because there is a sense in India, for example, that China did take advantage of COVID situation this time last year to make its moves. Thanks so much, Sandeep. We've had a couple of questions actually on, in terms of climate and environmental degradation in the region. And it's really interesting. I mean, the Permanent Indis Commission meeting was probably the most frank and sort of technical meeting between the two countries and offer some space. Interestingly, the recent DNI's report on world global trends also recognizes that it's environmental and climate issues between India and Pakistan that in the future may spark escalation. So, you know, the questions from the audience really are, what is the scope of India and Pakistan coming together to counter any climate, water sharing, smog, all of these environmental issues that plague both nations? Is there any scope on that? I open it to, is there? Ashley, would you like to take that one? Well, I would just make the general point that for the next several months, you know, the best options are to think small. And to the degree that both sides can work on things that are not controversial, that don't capture and polarize populations either in their own countries or in the other countries. That's really the best thing that both sides can do and probably will do if they are serious. To me, the intermediate goal must be normalization of diplomatic relations where, you know, the missions are actually staffed with ambassadors and so on and so forth because that is the normal channel of communication in practice anyway. And we can get to that point where both sides actually, you know, send their ambassadors back to their respective positions. Then I think you have the institutional architecture for a conversation. But I do not imagine, anytime in the near future, something that is even remotely similar to what happened between 2002 and 2007. I mean, we are very, very far away from that. What India is going to be looking for is really going to be on the terrorism front, right? And again, I don't think there's an expectation that they won't guaranteed outcomes. That is, nobody is expecting Pakistan to guarantee that there will be no terrorist attacks. But I think they want to see the equivalent of what Musharraf did between 2002 and 2004 where within his own country, he began to openly make the case that extremism is not in Pakistan's advantage. Now, Bajwa has said things to that effect and he said them quite forcefully in private. I think if he were to take a more public stance on these issues, I think it would just build Indian confidence and encourage them to move along the lines that have begun in small ways. Can I just? A word of warning, sorry. No, sorry. I just want to make some point of the kind of climate change in water. Thank you, Hatami. At the end of the day, for all the, yes, there was some controversy with India going to kind of walk away from the Indus Water Treaty or things. It's held for an enormous amount of time over kind of since 1960. And so, that is the kind of cooperation that I also mentioned in another one. Again, going to Ashley's point about starting small. Indian and Pakistani scientists and other experts coordinating over this plague of locusts that came, they shared information, they gave warnings, Pakistani experts gave warning to, it helped, it helped deal with the problem. And so, even in terms of COVID and health situation, if that doesn't get bogged down, you could start these conversations, not high expectations, because I think one of the problems with the India-Pakistan case is always extremely high. You could actually find ways. Delhi and Lahore or Delhi and Lahore, for example, face the same, because they're at the same level, evolution problem. Why not both have complaints about agricultural areas and stubble burning? You know, that's the kind of thing you could actually start to have a conversation about. And it doesn't, it's not connected to some of these larger issues, but people's daily lives. So even starting small, you know, dealing with kind of how fishermen who are official women, for that matter, who are detained, those kind of things, I think don't hurt. And they don't reach the level of everybody starting to complain, why are you doing this with somebody else? Because it's a bit of a no-brainer. I can just make, you know, I guess the broader point that I see here is that this really sort of seems to fit into a cycle, right? Of, you know, the relationship worsening and then getting a little bit better to, you know, what all of us have called stabilization and then worsening again and getting to a little bit better. And then I think the question is, can we get to a stabilization in the longer term? The big issues, you know, the issues that are sort of out there, the moonshots, Kashmir, terrorism even, but in particular Kashmir, those aren't going to be easy to resolve and that's not necessarily the goal and that should not be the goal right now. I think the question is whether the two governments can figure out a way to not talk about those two issues and cooperate on other issues to sort of carve out the space for talking about trade or climate change and water and so on without necessarily going to the controversial issues right away because that's going to dampen any prospects that might exist. And, you know, if I can just sort of sum up, you know, what I see as the incentives here, in some sense, the economic incentives are clear. They're pushing on both sides really, but in particular on Pakistan side, they're pushing towards sort of normalization. And politics is the pull, which is taking both countries away. Yeah, thank you, Madiha. We've been getting a lot of questions, but we are running out of time and I feel free to comment on the two kryptonites as I call them in the relationship, Kashmir and terrorism. I mean, they're all saying we shouldn't address those first. If you look at all the statements, they're all caveated with those two things, right? So we set these boundaries from the very beginning. Another question, so feel free to comment on those but another question obviously is, where can the U.S. play a constructive role? As U.S. policymakers, the attention is really on Afghanistan and then on China, but this conflict between India Pakistan is, you know, very important and looms large, I think, in terms of national security. So how can we actually play a positive or constructive role with them? You know, India Pakistan differ on how the U.S. should or should not be involved. Also the U.S. has changed in terms of you look at between the Mumbai attack and Palawama, the level or the type of U.S. involvement is very different. So I welcome you all to talk about that as, and then as last shots, you know, if there is some advice you would give to either leaders in New Delhi or Islamabad, what would it be, you know, how can they keep this sustainable to get to that semblance of normalcy? And then if I could go back to the water issue. Yeah. Because I think that remains attainable. And as Tanvi said, it is also something that is at a technical level. And there's a lot of work that has been going on in both India and Pakistan over the years separately and the question is getting it together. And the U.S. has also been doing a lot of work on this. And so the U.S. can certainly help with the technology and so can the Chinese because they've been doing a lot of work in the upper reaches of the river, the catchment areas which form the Indus River basin as it were. And not just the surface water, but how to deal with recharging the aquifers that cross the border from India into Pakistan and that have been badly damaged. If you could continue that kind of cooperation and work, there will be international support for that for both countries. And I think that is something that's worth doing. But the other point is a more general one which is politically, it is very critical to bring the people into this exchange. And by opening travel, going back to the implementation of the SOC visa, for instance, allowing middle-sized enterprises, particularly along the border region to be able to trade and move goods as they're doing by smuggling currently but making it official will give people ownership and will in many ways counter the political rhetoric that all opposition parties, whether in India or in Pakistan, use against the current government. This just makes eminent sense. Final point regarding General Bajram. I think his window of opportunity is now limited. He has probably till the end of this year in which he can effectively do something because after that, he's on the down slope to the end of his second term and then that will be an issue for him. How does he start dealing with people who are now positioning themselves to be selected as his replacement? Because the third term is probably most unlikely unless Imran Khan really runs out of all options. So the question really is one of timing and you may learn something from President Musharraf who doesn't get enough credit for the fact that his whole scheme was to try and make Kashmir slightly irrelevant in the public realm so that it kind of resolved on itself whereas you open up trade and other possibilities between India and Pakistan. Let the Kashmiris talk to each other and find a way of making that LLC an open border a bit like Andhra. Thank you. Ashley, I wanna turn to you for some closing remarks in terms of some of the questions that have been raised, please. So I think the basic point that we have agreement on is that for the foreseeable future, it's really low politics that is going to be both productive because it deals with important things in people's lives and in terms of creating the context that paves the way for addressing some of the more contentious issues in the future, right? Because I don't think these contentious issues can be addressed today and Pakistan is not prepared itself for essentially accepting what India wants which is the status quo in some form or shape. And there'll be a lot of work that Pakistani leaders will have to do to get to that point but I think they will feel empowered if there is a semblance of normalcy in the relationship and so the kinds of things trade science and technology cooperation, environmental cooperation. I think these are the building blocks that create the context within which some bitter pills will have to be swallowed and those bitter pills will have to be swallowed by the way on both sides because India has also now got a long history of its own rhetoric and what it believes to be its own claims on Pakistan cashmere and so on and so forth. But we're not gonna get to that point in a hurry anyway. So let's focus on what we can do which is really create the context for just keeping the peace. Thank you Ashley. Mithiha very briefly, any closing comments from you? Sure, I'll be very brief. I think you said advice to Islamabad for instance. My advice would be to not have an incident like the ECC one recur, right? So make politics work for you. Now with Imran Khan and his contentious relationship with the opposition, of course that's harder to do and easier to say, but his own minister, Shiri Mazzari came out and said, no trade with India. I mean, that really get your own ministers on board at the very least and bring the opposition parties on board before announcing these decisions. So as not to have the seesaw of expectations. So work the politics of it for the sort of the trade purposes, the small purposes that Pakistan sort of wants to start with before coming out. So that's a very, that's a sort of a humble, small goal but an important one because it's not been coming, not happened actually. And then I think on the US side, ironically, I mean, this is something I've sort of written about as well, Pakistan has this sort of paranoia on the US-India relationship, right? And worries about the closeness between the US and India. And in some ways, that sort of defines it's how it behaves with India and regionally. And so if the US can decouple the Biden administration, if it decouples that relationship very overtly the Pakistan-India relationships that it has. So the US-Pakistan relationship is decoupled from the US-India relationship in as much as possible, that will actually sort of be something that will sort of put Pakistan more at ease in its neighborhood. And I'll stop there because we could go on. Thank you, and then you get the last word. Very quickly, and I would suggest for what the US should do and not, and also expect the US-IP China and South Asia study group, I assure your audience, I have not been asked to say this, I do think it's a very good report. And it's- I'll pay you later. It's worth reading. I will say just in terms of advice for Slava, for Bindi, for Delhi, which is don't do things, don't do and say things that will make it harder for the other side to see this through. And we can talk about why, but I think in various occasions, we've seen this including recently, there are certain things that you want to do and say for your own domestic political audience, but they will make it harder for the other side to carry through. So resist. Thank you so much, Bindi, and with that, I wanna thank all our panelists for a wonderful discussion. Thank you for your time. Thank you to audience for tuning in. And as Shajah said, let's all try to continue to wage peace and hopefully we can make some headway. Thank you all and take care.


Hi, I'm Plomar Kez for CalTV Entertainment. We're here at Outside Lance at Golden Gate Park. It was like the thing that you guys are looking for. 10-year-old Cesar for sure. Alenium. Alenium. I'm looking for a 10-year-old with my friends today. So cool. Oh, so glad. Oh, so glad. I'm so excited. Excited to see today. I'm really excited to see future. Future? What's your favorite song? Stick Song. Can you sing a little snippet of it? Um... How's Gogan, guys? What's your favorite song from the weekend? Wasted Times. Can you sing a little bit of it? Oh, God. Wasted Times. Use that with someone else. Abel or D. Jesse? This is why I have Googles. Abel. Abel. Give me a sec. Yeah, Abel. This one should be easy. OK. What famous celebrity has a brother named Michael? A. Florence. B. Jesse Reyes. C. Janet Jackson. OK. C. Janet Jackson. Which one is Daniel Caesar's song? A. Get You. B. Best Part. C. Blessed or D. All of the above. You know your music. Janet Jackson ever made. Hopefully. That's like before my time. Don't we try guessing? OK, we'll go for it. OK, so A. Young Love. B. That's the way. C. Scream or D. Together Again. B. Yes. This is for CalTV Entertainment. Thank you so much for watching. And one, two, three, go Bears!


So what is the Vickery-Clark-Groves mechanism for? Essentially, it solves a problem that we encounter in mechanism design pretty often, where I, as the designer, am interested in implementing an efficient outcome. What that means is I've got a set of self-interested agents, each of whom has private information about how much they value each of the different things that could happen in the world. And what I'm desiring to do is always to pick the thing that maximizes the sum of the ways that the agents actually feel about these different things, which, of course, is something that I, as the designer, don't know. So what I need is for the agents to tell me how much they value different things, and I want them to pick the thing that maximizes the sum of their values. This would all be fine, except that, of course, the agents could lie to me about how much they value different things. So what I want to do in a transferable utility setting here is to impose a set of payments that make it the right thing for the agents to tell me the truth so that I can then solve the pretty simple problem of maximizing the sum of how they feel about the different things. The trick is to set up these payments in the right way so that the agents really will want to tell me the truth. The great success of the VCG mechanism is that telling the truth for the agents is a dominant strategy. So it's a really strong kind of implementation. The agents really will want to tell me the truth, and they don't even have to think about what the other agents will do. It's simply the right thing for every agent to tell me the truth about their own valuation, and then if I run the VCG mechanism, the payments will be such that the agents will feel like they've done the right thing by just telling me the truth. I'm going to show you a number of different examples that gives you a sense of what this means in practice and why it's exciting. Let's start with the simplest example where I'm going to allocate a single thing among a set of agents. So imagine a government that wants to privatize a public utility like a power plant. Now, when a government wants to privatize something, it's not usually because it just wants to collect a bunch of money, but instead it's that the government thinks that this public utility could be more efficiently operated by somebody in the private sector than by the government. If this is the case, the government typically wants to figure out which among a set of potential buyers values the utility the most, because that's the buyer that would then most efficiently operate the utility afterwards. So you could sort of think the government could go to each of these potential buyers and ask them how much do you value the power plant, and it could then just give the power plant to the utility that values it the most. The problem, of course, is that if it just did this, the buyers would lie, they would all claim very, very high values in the hopes of being the highest, and the government would probably not end up giving the power plant to the red company. So instead the government has to sell the power plant even if it doesn't care about collecting the money. The question then is what rules should it use for imposing payments on the different potential buyers? And if we were to use the VCG mechanism here, this would give us a way of imposing payments on the different buyers so that we would ensure that each of the buyers would simply tell the government the truth about how much the power plant is worth to them. This is a simple example, because here the outcome space is just giving the power plant to each of the potential buyers, and we're just allocating a single good, essentially, the power plant here. But VCG also works in other settings that look pretty different from this. Let me give you an example of that. Let's imagine here the simplest possible outcome space. There are just two things that could happen. I have a set of businesses on two sides of a river, and the two outcomes are that a bridge could be built or could not be built. And what I want to do here is to build the bridge if the sum of values that the agents have for the bridge exceeds the cost of its construction and not build the bridge otherwise. And again, what I want to do here is collect information from all the businesses that has them tell me how much it's worth to them to have the bridge be constructed. And it may well be that they have a negative value for the bridge being constructed because maybe they're better off in the world where there's no bridge. So I want to look at all of this aggregate information, and I want then to figure out payments where I might compensate some businesses that are hurt by the construction of the bridge. I might charge some businesses that are benefited by the cost of the bridge and eventually collect enough money that I can actually pay the construction workers who, of course, have a negative value for the bridge being constructed because they have to do work and overall decide whether the bridge in fact should be built or not. So again, the VCG mechanism would just do the right thing here. It would come up with payments that work out in the right way as we'll see when we do this example a bit more formally later. Here's a third example, which is again pretty different from the first two. It's a little bit more like the bridge example. I need to make kind of a social choice here rather than allocating one thing among different people. Here the problem is scheduling meetings. So imagine that you're in a problem, which I really face in my life all the time where it's necessary to schedule meetings between people who have different values for different times in their calendar and who may not tell you the truth about whether they're available or not. So for example, they may lie to you and tell you, I'm busy first thing in the morning just because they don't actually want to come in first thing in the morning. And in principle, it's fine that they have a bad value for that time, but it may be that that turns out to be the only time that everybody else is available. So it may be better to be able to reward that person strongly for coming in first thing in the morning rather than not being able to have the meeting at all. So here what I want to do, again, now I have to do this in a setting where payments are possible. So I have to imagine either that I really am going to pay people bonuses for coming to their meetings or I have to imagine that I have some kind of artificial currency, which is still scarce, which is used for meeting scheduling and people care about. So maybe in my case where somebody has to come in at a really undesirable time for them, they accumulate a lot of credit that they can use for something else that they value. But again, the way the VCG mechanism would work here is it would give everyone a dominant strategy for telling me all of the values they have for the different times at which meetings might happen. And it will then come up with payments that make everybody happy about having told me this and allow me to implement the social welfare maximizing meeting schedule. So let's look at one more example, which indeed will work through numerically in later videos in a stylized form. This is the problem of buying a path in a network. And the network I want to think about here is a railroad network from the American Midwest in 1881. So each of these red lines here corresponds to a rail link that existed in this area in 1881. And I don't know if this is actually true, but I want to claim that each of these red lines corresponds to a privately owned railroad that is owned by a different railroad operator. Certainly is the case that in the early days of railroads in the United States, there were lots of different privately owned railroads. So I want to imagine that each of these railroad links has its own private cost for what it would cost to ship something along the link. Over here is the Hawking Valley Coal Field, which was an area of coal production. And of course, over here is the city of Chicago. And the problem that I'm interested in is the problem of shipping something, shipping a bunch of coal from the Hawking Valley Coal Field to Chicago. So I as the coal company need to buy a sequence of links in the network that would get me all the way from the Coal Field to Chicago. Now, if I was to use the VCG mechanism, I could solve this problem by asking each of the coal companies what their utility is for being selected to ship coal. And for each of them, this would be a negative number because it actually costs them something to do the shipping. So each of them would tell me a negative number. They would have a dominant strategy to tell me the truth about what their real cost is. I can then look at these numbers and the social welfare maximizing outcome here is the shortest path in the network. It's the set of paths that together get me from the Hawking Valley Coal Field to Chicago and imposes the least negative cost on all of the agents. Now, why would they be willing to be chosen if they're in a situation that they negatively value? Well, to make this a dominant strategy, VCG in this case is going to end up paying all of the agents rather than imposing payments on them as it did, for example, in the privatization example. So in this example, it's going to figure out a way to pay the agents that makes them willing to have told me the truth and ends up buying the shortest path. So overall, what have we seen here? The VCG mechanism is an amazing way of solving all of these apparently very different problems and indeed lots more. And again, to remind you, the property that it has is that it chooses the efficient or social welfare maximizing outcome in a transferable utility setting in a way that gives agents dominant strategies to tell the truth. We'll spend the rest of this week telling you in more formal detail how the VCG mechanism is defined, how it works, and what its strengths and weaknesses are.


T F N N headline news update Good morning, everybody. I'm Tommy O'Brien coming to you live from T F N N headquarters in St. Petersburg, Florida 9 a.m. Eastern time on Monday morning 30 minutes to go until the opening bell And we got markets starting off to the negative side right now Dow futures negative 74 points trading at 26,001 positive week last week big day on Friday But we lost a lot right towards the end of Friday and this morning some negative news in terms of the details of the China deal That may be extended another month. We'll get into that in a moment You've got SMP negative by eight points at 29 62 Nasdaq negative by 23 points That's a trading at 78 35 all the indices off about three tenths of a percent We'll start things off with a chart of the SMP because the thinkorswim platform up there 2994 the high on Friday we climb right back up to that area just shy of 4 p.m. That's 335 p.m. Eastern time and then kaboom a little bit of a sell-off I believe that's when you had President Trump speaking with the vice-premier of China you go from 2994 You end the date approximately call it 2970 and we're about eight points below that just keeping in mind We're more than 30 SMP points from that high on Friday. That's a solid 1% jumping over to some of the indices We'll pull up the charts. There's your SMP. We went over that chart already Nasdaq 100 similar story you see the sell-off towards the end of Friday. Nasdaq 100 was up there at 79 14 We're now a solid almost 80 points off that level at 78 37 and you can see the markets have gotten a little bit of a Pop from 6 a.m. Dow 30 we were up there at 26,970 I believe the high on Friday she about 270 Dow points from that level 2704 there's crude oil you open Sunday night really right where you were at at the end of Friday But nonetheless crude trades from 54 89. We're down a buck 50 at 53 43 There's your gold contract as the markets pulled back a bit gold getting a pop was just above 1500 within about the last hour and a half 1501 currently at 1495 and the euro us dollar train at one ten twenty five Terms of what the news is out there Maybe this driving at China wants another round of talks before signing phase one of the trade deal China looking for details A lot of the rhetoric we'll get that off there a lot of the rhetoric Friday Not having to do with a lot of details and just that we made a deal on a core agreement Nonetheless, and then you have Treasury Secretary Mnuchin saying that he expects tariff to go up in December If there's no China deal so the rhetoric not too well and the market not like in that Stay tuned folks. We got a man Larry Pezzavento coming up right now I'll be back at 10 o'clock with Tom and we have fast market by TD Ameritrade think or swim at 11 Basil Chapman Steve Rhodes Dave White Tom O'Brien all this afternoon. Stay tuned folks. We'll be right back