The main purpose of this talk is to show how American officials sought to translate victory over Japan into a lasting peace in Asia. I'm primarily concerned with the interaction between military planning operations and foreign policy. I'll state my thesis early. The US was unprepared for victory in the summer of 1945. There you have it. The demands of a two front war had dictated American objectives, the achievement of a united China friendly to the United States and a liberated Korea fell into the category of aspirational goals that were likely to be beyond the reach of American military power. Franklin Roosevelt also supported a gradual end to European colonialism in Southeast Asia but strategic necessity placed those areas out of the reach of US operations. On the other hand, control of Japan and Western Pacific were deemed essential to American security. So American strategy concentrated on achieving those goals above all others. So I'll say American strategy was linear and sequential. Japan came first everything else came later. It was a strategy that was informed by aware and awareness of limits and restraint. And then the war abruptly ended months before the Americans expected it to suddenly the Asian mainland was in reach of US military power. It's one of the ironies of the war and certainly Chiang Kai check China's leader must have thought so that American power on the Asian mainland crested in the months after the war had ended. The American position and post war East Asia resulted from a fundamental from fundamental strategic choices made early in the war. I'll talk about those in a minute and then a series of ad hoc decisions and improvised responses to the chaos that followed in the wake of Japan's collapse. So the stage was set by its fundamental objectives, but then this sudden opportunity was created by Japan surrender. And the decisions the Americans took at that point would then kind of enmeshed on the United States on the Asian mainland. Those decisions did much to influence the course of events in Asia for decades to come. But despite the surge in American power, the US could not make those developments on the mainland conform to American interests. There was no clean break with the past when Japan surrender. Japan's rampage through Asia had shattered old empires and abetted the growth of revolutionary movements throughout the region. Total war had produced Japan's defeat but at the time of Japan surrender, more than 3 million undefeated Japanese troops remain at their posts in the field. As a force in being the Japanese Imperial Army held its ground in a political no man's land standing somewhere between the restoration of the pre war order and the forces of revolution. Taking a surrender of Japanese troops was a military operation fraught with political implications. The reasons made to affect Japan surrender entangled US forces on the mainland of Asia for the next two years so between 45 and 47 and help to shape the next several decades of international relations in Asia. So I want to talk about the sort of fundamentals American strategy first and begin with the tensions that existed within that strategy. The American strategy for victory. Was focused on your first I mean everybody's aware of that that meant resources went primarily towards defeating the Germans with the understanding that the Japanese were not be able to stand for very long. Once Germany was defeated. At the time the United States adopted the policy of unconditional surrender. Now unconditional surrender was meant to be a prelude to the transformation of the defeated enemy and unconditional surrender could only be achieved through the invasion of Japan's home islands. You know there would have to be a large military operation in order to achieve the goal of unconditional surrender which was just the first step towards securing peace in the Pacific. Now, as Americans developed this strategy, they were also American military leaders Franklin Roosevelt George Marshall in particular the chairman of the Joint Chief Staff. He was aware of the likelihood of war weariness entering into the American public. Thinking about the war. The longer it dragged on and the more the casualties mounted. So in order to fend off this war we are in this from developing as long as possible. And a joint chiefs made concessions to the home front. One was the what's known as the 90 division gamble, which was basically a decision to mobilize fewer divisions than originally expected and the thought here was that that would allow the US to provide supplies to its allies. The Russians to Chinese and the British primarily. Right, but it would also reduce the strain on a domestic economy and allow for the availability of more consumer goods, which it was hoped would then you know sort of in a sense buy off American support for the war, a little bit longer. The problem is of course the reliance on 90 divisions meant that by the end of the war the Americans were getting pretty thin with their frontline troops. And that was particularly the case during the battle the bulge. Okay, so. The joint concession to the home front was a program of partial demobilization that was going to begin when Germany surrendered. And this is the idea that GIs would have accumulated points through their length of service, how many dependence military valor if you won medals, time in a combat zone you got bonus points and bonus points for being overseas that sort of thing. And once you cross this threshold and points you would be sent home. After Germany surrender. Well, I mean that was, you know, a concession to the public. And also to the GIs to let them know that, you know, they would not be expected to fight the duration of the war if they landed in North Africa say in 1942. Okay, this whole idea of Europe first unconditional surrender which required an invasion and concessions the home front on mobilization. They were all political choices that tip the scales against the achievement of a timely victory in the Pacific and another big problem was geography and and logistics and I sort of always like this. I like this map here. You know this one really is worth the thousand words. I think it gives you a pretty clear idea of the challenges that the Americans were facing notice you can't even see Japan in this map and nor can you see Hawaii this is just a Southwest West Pacific which gives you an idea of the demands that would be placed upon the Americans as they westward across the Pacific. There's a sort of old cliche that amateurs talk strategy and professionals talk logistics. And I think this map sort of drives home the logistical challenges that the Americans are facing and waging war against Japan. Alright, despite that by. In the beginning of 1944. You could see a rising tempo of operations. The addition of fast carriers. The implementation of leap frogging along for example the northern coast of New Guinea by General MacArthur and then also island hopping through the Central Pacific by Admiral Nimitz. The capture of the Marianas will all had begun to take place and this is a pretty handy chart showing you can see how the pace of operations increases in 1944. And continues through 1945 as well so you can get a sense of kind of increasing momentum. And as the Americans move the cross into Pacific now at the same time. China was on the verge of collapse. The Japanese had launched an operation each ago, in which they really put Chiang Kai checks regime in peril. Several years of a kind of stalemated conflict it was, it was clear from this operation in this offensive that Japanese had the ability to move when they wanted to in China. And they had been provoked by long range bombing. I think that the US with conducting out of China and they attack the bases and. And in doing so as I said they imperiled Chiang Kai checks regime. This precipitated a crisis in China. Between Americans and the Chinese and it led to the recall of General Joseph still well, who was the general staff to Chiang Kai check. And so Chiang Kai check sort of one that round, but at the same time China moved into strategic irrelevance. As the Americans began to run their bombing raids on Japan from the Marianas and they pulled out of China. China remain politically important. The Americans were determined not to commit one of the classic blunders in history and we all know that that is that it's, it's no land war in Asia, right. So the Americans, we're going to leave Chiang Kai check and the nationalists to their own devices for the, for the time being. The Russians would have to defeat the Japanese. And that gets settled and worked out at Yalta in 1945. Now I want to stop here for a minute and just point out that you know the United States had been a great power in Asia. Before World War two by virtue of its possession of the Philippines. And the treaty rights it held in China. The U.S. didn't control, you know territorial concessions in China. They didn't have huge investment in China. Intermittently beginning with Theodore Roosevelt, the Americans had appeased or deferred to Japan. In Northeast Asia and Manchuria and especially Korea. So, in effect, you know, was what you know Americans certainly were sympathetic to the Chinese when they were attacked by Japan. They remain so although less so as war dragged on supportive of China, you know, something you might call the open door constituency that consisted of missionaries. Henry Loos, the publisher of Time Magazine, who was a child of missionaries. Some business leaders, not a lot of them. You know saw a future in China and they talked about China all the time in the sort of future tense. But, you know, in the midst of the war, the United States wasn't going to commit. You know, a lot of its resources to assisting China at that time and so Russia was going to handle the Japanese army in Northeast Asia. So, beginning in 1945. We see the final campaigns as the United States was closing in on Japan. Land in the Philippines, take Iwo Jima in February and battle Okinawa begins in April on April 1. Right. And all this is in preparation for operation downfall this two stage. This is an occasion of Japan's home islands with the first one you can see the sort of green arrows pointing toward the southern most of the main islands to use you. And the second operation was going to car and that was going to aim at the Tokyo plane, and that would require. The invasion of troops from Europe. Those troops who were not demobilized would be transported out to the Pacific. And follow on in the invasion of the Tokyo plane. This is just at this moment. As the Americans were gearing up for the invasion of Japan that Germany surrendered in May. And that triggered the demobilization that I had mentioned earlier and this is where the home front began to weigh in. Americans sort of started looking. Once Germany surrendered started looking past Japan and and towards peace. And they started demanding the rapid demobilization of troops bring daddy home was the cry that went up people sent baby shoes to their congressman. You know telling them try and get this demobilization to move more quickly. The whole process of demobilization was complicated because it was going to take place simultaneously with redeployment that redeployment from Europe that I talked about and so what you had to do. Sift out those soldiers who had the requisite number of points to be demobilized and returned home out of active divisions and then take what was left basically and shape those units up. Give them training for combat in the Pacific, transport them across the Atlantic, across the continental United States and out to the Pacific. The head of the services of supply, like in this to moving the entire city of Philadelphia to the Philippines. Which actually would probably sounds like a good idea to some people that but um, General Marshall who was not given to exaggeration said this was the biggest administrative task in history that what needed to be done. And you had so you had this problem you had to figure out how many points everybody had and and as it turns out a lot of people who had the highest points where the company clerks, and they were the ones who kept the records. Right. And so if they left, then you had to, you know, you were left trying to figure out who else qualify and on top of that points were always being adjusted because your army was awarding campaign ribbons. On the fly and so some divisions that were getting ready to move back across the Atlantic. Suddenly would lose as much as 2000 infantry men who who now had direct was a point and had to be pulled out. And then somehow replacements we're going to have to be found for them so this is a incredibly complex situation which was taking place in the mix of the demobilization of the soldiers and trying to get them back. I've got the declassified plan for that right here. As you can see this is an intensely complex operation here a rule Goldberg like operation somebody might actually be thinking. On top of this. There was a growing demand from the business community from labor. From the president's new president, Harry Truman his economic advisors were all demanding that the United States had to pay more attention to the idea of economic reconversion. They had to begin shifting to a peacetime economy, if they waited too long until the war ended, they would be hit with a massive depression, people wouldn't be able to find jobs, factories wouldn't be able to retool the peacetime production fast enough. And so the idea was that the argument was they need to do this more gradually and that meant, you know, letting some soldiers out early coal miners for example railroad workers, which the army refused to do. It also meant a loosening of these restrictions on their production of consumer goods. Again, the army was insistent that their needs came first and it was primarily the army that was placing these demands on the home front economy. So these all these factors were converging and creating a sort of sense of strategic perplexity right I mean how is the United States going to keep everything together for the invasion of Japan that is going to be coming soon. Add into this then I mean some people said well you know here's the shortcut. So why don't we deal with this issue. Why don't we modify unconditional surrender. And in particular, the key argument was let the Japanese keep the emperor. Right. The modification of unconditional surrender but it was really a modification it was a compromise that was being argued this way we can get the war over with sooner wouldn't have to invade the home islands. Well, that might pay other dividends as well there was a growing chorus within the administration. And they're saying you know, we get the war over with. Soon enough, we can get it done without the help of the Russians. And the Russians won't get a foothold in Northeast Asia. And that's this cartoon kind of captures that argument because defenders of unconditional surrender. So they condemned what they saw as this kind of appeasement on the, on the part of you can call them sort of proto cold warriors, and you can see this sign you know this is a sort of country five congressman labeled our Russophobes and Russia can't be trusted will have to fight them sooner or later right your congressman and then the Japanese propagandist is carrying his placard impossible for Russian allies to stick together. Eventual bust up will make for opportunity for illustrious sons of heaven to negotiate a soft peace. So this cartoon and obviously is critical of the those people who wanted to modify on conditional surrender and they, they have the character saying it's remarkable coincidence we're both working the same side of street and so they were accusing people they refer to some of them privately as emperor worshippers of really almost conniving with the Japanese. You know, forming a sort of secret alliance against the Russians. The debate that took place at this time got pretty bitter. So all this was taking place on the eve of the last summit conference that would be in Potsdam right. And on the eve of that conference, sizing up the strategic situation the army's top planning group reminded General Marshall would quote the US as a matter of public will positively supports the integrity of China as a nation. They went on to say, however, whether the future will bring a different definition of what constitutes China proper cannot be said with certainty. So they were acknowledging as they plan for the invasion of Japan that China might turn out to be a lost cause for the Americans chunk I check might go under they couldn't confront the Russians on the mainland. But the army was saying, as long as we control Japan and the offshore islands will succeed in our main goal, which is to keep the rest of the world out of the Pacific. So that was the idea. Alright, so the operational boundaries that were agreed to at Potsdam between the British and the Russians and the Americans. So we've confirmed this single minded emphasis on the invasion of Japan. To prepare for the Soviet Union's entry into the war, the American Joint Chiefs and the Soviets established an operational boundary to prevent clashes between the converging forces. Right, and this line ran through the career islands and bisected Korea at the 41st parallel. That line fell into the American zone of operations. But that boundary was just for air and see operations only the Americans were not expected to bring troops assure on the Asian mainland or the Korean Peninsula. In order to further pair down American responsibilities in Asia the Americans and the British agreed to expand the boundaries of the Southeast Asia command Americans referred to this Southeast Asia command its acronym was SEAC. They said it really stood for save England's Asian colonies. And they included Indochina below the 16 parallel, all of Thailand, Java, the Celebes and Borneo. The British also wanted to add Indochina north of the 16 parallel, but the Americans said that had to stay in the China Theater, because at some point, the Chinese were going to mount an offensive and they would need to control that flank of their offensive. And so that they said they might, you know, at a later date, change the eliminate that division of Indochina for operational purposes. But for the time being it would stay in place and that turns out to be pretty crucial for the history of Vietnam. Right, so the Potsdam declaration issued at the conference settled with bait over the emperor. There was nothing no promises to the emperor at that point. But American strategy was thrown into disarray by the Japanese reinforcement of Kyushu by these problems of redeployment that I mentioned and the insistence by Truman's closest advisors. The army's invasion plans were risking economic disaster at home. At the 11th hour, the Navy joined in by calling for a reexamination of the plans for downfall, which had, it had only tentatively approved back earlier in the summer. All right, so the US, the use of the atomic bomb in August cut short then a growing debate over the war's purpose on conditional surrender or something less. The swift decision where none had seemed likely. It also obscured the extent to which American strategy had been unhinged by Japanese resistance and the fishering of unity at home, which is something I think on the 75th anniversary of the end of the war we need to remember. So what followed then was on the night of August 10th and 11th members of what was called the state war Navy coordinating committee. The US planners began to draft documents that would spell out the steps to be taken by Japan in order to complete the surrender and key among them was what was known as general order, number one. By the morning of August 11, the territorial provisions of the general order were completed. According to the draft all Japanese troops in China, not counting Manchuria, Formosa and Indochina north of the 16 parallel were to surrender to the representatives of Changkai check. The Russians would take the surrender of Japanese forces in Manchuria, Korea north of the 38th parallel. Southern Soccaline and British forces would then get Southeast Asia. And the Americans would divide up the Pacific MacArthur taking Japan Nimitz taking central Pacific islands. Okay, this is what's known as general order number one and you can see the division here at a clip Korea to 38th parallel. The division was made by a couple of kernels looking at a wall map and actually a national geographic map of Korea. One of those kernels was Dean Rusk who would subsequently be John Kennedy's secretary of state. And you can see that the idea is to sort of divide up the surrender areas. And the staff officers were able to do this pretty quickly, because they simply took those operational boundaries that have been devised in Potsdam, and then turn them into general order number one. The one exception was Korea the State Department wanted American forces to occupy a portion of Korea to ensure that the United States play a role in determining the political future of that former Japanese colony. That wouldn't have been possible. Had Japan continued the war, but now all of a sudden the idea of moving into Korea. Seemed like a possibility. General order number one was written as if all in the anticipated allied operations were proceeding as planned. That wasn't a case, the Chinese were still tucked way back in sort of Southwestern China. And now battens forces were nowhere near Malaya, Singapore, or Indonesia at that point. Nevertheless, Japanese troops in those areas had would be ordered to surrender to the designated allied commanders. That is whenever they showed up. Every time the Japanese were expected to retain control of the areas occupied and that's crucial. On a geopolitical level to do the general order favored the interest of the great powers at the expense of the insurgent anti colonial forces in China, meaning communist, but also Korea, Indochina and Indonesia. The order number one provided the means through which the United States, Britain and China sought to employ Japanese military forces for allied purposes now. It soon became apparent in China, for example, that it would take weeks for the nationalists Chinese to move into the key coastal areas held by the Japanese. In the meantime, the communists said they were going to ignore general order number one and take to surrender wherever they could. Ultimately, to forestall the communist efforts, the US dispatched Marines into northern China, somewhere between 40 and ultimately 60,000 of them, but they also relied on the Japanese troops to hold their ground. Until the nationalists took over. And some of you may be familiar with this memoir of EP sledge about the Pacific war in fact it became I think for that televised series, one of the basic sources. Sledge's memoir actually continued beyond the surrender of Japan and talked about his experience in North China when he entered with the Marines. He referred to him and his fellow Marines as fugitives from the law of averages, you know they had, they had survived combat in the Pacific and now all of a sudden they were being thrust into the midst of a civil war between the communists and nationalists and they didn't particularly like it. As it turns out. Here they are arriving. In Tianxin and as sledge points out and that they finally published that portion of the memoir separately. It was published posthumously as I think China Marine, or China memoir I can't remember exact title. It notes that as the Marines entered Tianxin there was a sign up that said welcome US Army. They didn't really care for that. Okay, so there are other complications with the general order, particularly in Indochina the French mistrusted Chinese intentions and they had objected immediately. The Americans decided to let the Chinese occupy northern Indochina. And French concerns were born out when the Chinese nationalist troops occupied the colony north of the 16 parallel. The Chinese enriched themselves at French expense, and more significantly, they allowed the Vietnam that is the communist led Vietnamese resistance movement to declare independence from France through the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and so they actually gave Ho Chi Minh kind of a head start in this period. General order number one was written in haste and revised the process of ad hoc negotiation between the allies. In the process of trying to arrange an orderly surrender that can ported with the great powers interests. The United States became more deeply involved in China's civil strife and and I'll show you they were there ostensibly to oversee the repatriation of the Japanese but they admitted. Dean Atchison for example who was under Secretary of State said well, you know, the, all we had to do is, is, you know, have pointed Japanese in direction of the ships, and they would have marched right on them it's not as if they needed the Marines there for that. So the United States became enmeshed in China's civil strife and you can see they were shipping nationalists north then, and again they were supposed to be there to relieve the Marines and assume control of the Japanese but instead they began to march north into Manchuria to try and to and hold that area. The US had also partitioned the Korean Peninsula and unexpectedly aided the revolutionary movement in Indochina. The general orders impact is still felt today in the division of the Korean Peninsula, the ongoing dispute between Japan and Russia over the occupation of the southern Korean islands what Tokyo calls the northern territories. One collapse of Japanese resistance in August, 45 created an unexpected opportunity to influence events on the mainland and possibly check Soviet power in the region. And seeking to shape events on the mainland, the administration of Harry Truman confronted the anomalous nature of American power, it amassed invasion forces. It's a, excuse me, it's amassed invasion forces are models and planes and ships. And of course it's nuclear monopoly gave the United States the appearance of irresistible might. The American public, which had brought that juggernaut into being and the soldiers sailors and Marines who wielded it against the enemy had a voice in how it would be used. In the final months of the conflict we saw Americans had begun debating the purposes of the war, and the price, they were prepared to pay to achieve those ends. The abrupt end of the conflict provided only a brief interlude in that debate. In the aftermath of Japan's defeat public debate over American aims in Asia, resumed in an atmosphere of growing dissatisfaction with the disposition of American forces overseas and this leads to what become known as the GI mutinies in late 1945. Eventually protest replaced debate as Americans voice their contending views on the meaning of victory and the obligations of world leadership and here's the protest in actually 46 and vanilla. I keep looking for my former mentor in here, he was in this group. He says we shall never forget what you have done words are cheap, get us home. seismic forces were at work in Asia at the end of the war the civil conflict that roiled Asia was the consequence of vast inequalities and social dislocation rooted in hundreds of years of exploitation by imperialist and indigenous elites. The bid to dominate Asia was the latest chapter in that saga and banishing the older imperialist however Japan and shattered the myth of white supremacy and nourished nationalist aspirations throughout the region. Japan's defeat reopened the question of who would rule Asia, the surrender touched off a frenzy of expectation and opportunistic maneuvering by the great powers seeking to reclaim lost empires or create new ones. The end of the war also created new opportunities for those revolutionary nationalists. Between 45 and 47 American military and political officials struggle to build a stable Japan and non Communist China and a newly independent Korea free from independent turmoil and great power manipulation. Americans also hope that the example of Philippine independence would serve as a model for the creation of an independent non Communist Vietnam. Instead, French obduracy led to the admin insurgency. The Philippine government's protection of entrenched interest provoked a rebellion among the peasants of central Luzon, and in South Korea and authoritarian government took power and held on to it by brutally suppressing its opposition. Japan in contrast seemed a haven of tranquility in the midst of all this turmoil and looming overall was the problem of China. In 2007 US was moving towards a return to this strategic priorities, it had adopted at the beginning of the war. The Truman doctor and a Marshall plan, aim to secure Europe. Japan once again became a chief priority in the Pacific, the beginnings of a reverse course in the occupation signal that security there took precedence over reform.  South Korea was handed off to the UN still the American presence lingered on the mainland military advisory groups in China and South Korea and a small marine contingent in Qingdao revealed an ambivalent attitude towards the Truman administration's new offshore policy. The administration support for South the South Korean government and its continued congressional endorsement of Tonkai sex national regime further frustrated any attempts to make a clean break from the mainland. For the moment, the situation seen manageable more critical problems elsewhere in Europe and the Middle East claim the administration's attention and its resources. So we're kind of back to where we started few Americans could imagine that within three years United States would become France's chief source of aid in a war against the Vietnam. Or the United States would be thrust once more into the middle of the Chinese Civil War, while American troops battle a dead to a deadly stalemate on the Korean Peninsula. Okay, that's, that's it. Thank you so much. That was a wonderful presentation. Thank you. If anyone in the, any attendees have any questions please put them in the q amp a section and I can see them and I can ask. Professor go here. In the meantime, I had a few questions. I was wondering if you could answer. Yeah. My first is from an American perspective, historically looking at how they viewed the South, primarily South Asian European colonies. How did that differ from how they viewed Japan's colonial holdings like Korea. And I, you know the Americans had deferred to the Japanese and Korea. For much of that. The first half of the 20th century. And in fact in the summer of 1945. Herbert Hoover recommended to Truman that the Japanese be allowed to keep Korea, even after they surrender. Roosevelt believe that the war had demonstrated that the caught that these colonial empires were a thing of the past and and really had instead of contributing to kind of international stability had become a source of conflict. And so it was his hope that he could at least begin I mean he was constantly on Churchill to, for example, Grand Independence to India, and the like and you know and exactly how do you force an ally to do that of courses. You know that Roosevelt never figured out. But I think, you know, it. I think Americans were probably to the extent that they thought about this, they were probably split. You know those people who were generally sympathetic towards the Japanese leaders who had governed in the 1920s or so. Professor Joseph grew and some of the Japan specialists felt like Hoover, you know the Koreans couldn't govern themselves. And Japan had done a good job in Korea, you know they had led this civilizing mission, but same token a lot of the members of what was known as the old diplomatic corps and foreign service the people who served in European posts. They had the same feeling about the British in Southeast Asia and the Dutch you know they, they dismissed the idea that these revolutionary movements were real they, they said it's really Japanese propaganda. And so they took the European point of view, but you know elsewhere in foreign service. People who were like part of what they refer to as the YMCA crowd, you know these people who had had experience. Maybe in China they had grown up as children of missionaries, there's a definite kind of social kind of class difference cultural difference and you know they might have gone to public universities rather than Ivy League schools. They were more sympathetic to these revolutionary movements they saw them as real. And I think, for the most part, you know what Americans, the public demonstrated for example, at the end of war was they, whatever happened to those places they didn't want Americans involved. Right, so I don't know if that answers your question but I think it doesn't. I have another question here. Okay. Generally, how would you say that the lasting perception of America in East Asia, how East Asians perceived Americans. How would you say that that was reflected by the eventual unconditional surrender by Japan and the kind of forcefully that the US went about getting that surrender. You mean, how did other people in Asia see America's commitment to unconditional surrender or how did other East Asian countries and other East Asian people feel lasting beyond the end of the war about America given that they had committed so far. I think attitudes were positive, except, of course, the US lost some of that goodwill through use of the atomic bombs and the fire bombing of Japan I mean sort of famously in the Tokyo work crimes trial there are, I think you know for example the representative from India. You know pointed out that that the the allies were colonial powers to and they had committed what could be considered atrocities in the war. And so there was I think a draining off of some of that goodwill. I think the Chinese Chinese leadership certainly welcome the US defeat of China complete defeat of Japan rather. But Chiang Kai-shek remained bitter that he had not gotten more support from the United States during the war. And he expected that when the war ended, and I think was surprised and disappointed that it didn't didn't arrive when it did so. And you know there was a considerable I think dismay in Korea at you know the American decision the idea was Roosevelt thought well we'll have a four power trust issue that his main goal was to make sure that China and Russia didn't fight over Korea. So I mean the British had to do with Korea in fact the Americans were surprised when the war ended. That the British didn't plan to send troops there. I mean that came as a total surprise to army planners and and and they didn't until the Korean War actually. And Koreans themselves and I said you know this we're ready for independence and there was a pretty significant grassroots resistance movement. on the peninsula to Japanese colonialism and the Americans kind of when they came in they took the side of a lot of the people who had collaborated with the Japanese. So I think they missed opportunities in there to get more support than they then they did actually I mean probably that the closest to unanimous support they got was in Japan. You know, through the occupation. Thank you here we have another question here. Did the Chinese nationalist government think that the US should have helped them more to fight the CCP during the Chinese Civil War. I don't know if if. I'm sure John Kasek hope that would be the case. But at the very least, he expected to get the, you know, supplies, the armaments he needed to wage war against the communists and one of the reasons why he was a very enthusiastic about this plan to use China as a base to bomb Japan and the sea lanes around Japan is, of course that the he hoped that the Chinese would get an Air Force out of that, which would assist him, measurably against the communists. So I think he was distressed that he didn't get more support I don't think he say expected necessarily Americans to fight the communist but but the idea that I mean he was appalled when American suggested that he, you know, negotiate a coalition government with the communists and that sort of thing. So yeah, that, that added to his bitterness. Thank you. We have another question here. Was there any relationship between the US and Mao Zedong in the immediate post war period, and in the plan for preserving the peace kind of like we were talking about. Well, the, you know, on and off I mean American diplomats in Chongqing met with Joe and lie, who was there during the war. And there was what was known as the Dixie mission. There was an observer group that had been sent to the communist base camp, you know, and sort of Northwest China, and they, the people who were there had a very high opinion of the communists and what they had accomplished in the war. I think Mao hope that they might exercise some influence on the American government but a series of events in the summer of 45 I think convinced Mao that that wasn't going to happen. And that the sort of, you know, reactionaries as he described them in the Truman administration we're going to prevent the Chinese communists from achieving their goals short of, you know, going without having to go to war and the, you know, when General Marshall goes to negotiate to mediate between his two sides. The communists recognize that the Americans have their thumb on the scale in favor of Chiang Kai-shek that that even if Chiang Kai-shek sort of violates all the agreements that are reached the Americans wouldn't abandon him. And those were Marshall's instructions and he helped write them himself and so, you know, I think Mao realized at that point that the best he could hope was that the Americans wouldn't intervene, although he, both he and Chiang Kai-shek expected at some point, the Americans would intervene because they thought China was so important. That's the one thing they both agreed on, to the United States. And in that sense they were both surprised that it didn't happen. In the end. So, thank you so much. Thank you so much for joining us tonight. If you would like to take a moment to talk about your book on conditional. Oh, well, yeah, thanks. The, well, I'll start with the, a lot of this sort of discussion of this idea of the strategic limits and choices the Americans made and the problems of reconversion and demobilization. When I went into in pre, the previous book I wrote that with my former mentor, Walter Waldo Heinrichs this book called Implacable Foes. And, and then the most recent one on conditional. I looked at the sort of partisan debates the ideological dispute over unconditional surrender and it and it really was a, I think it kind of spilled out into American public life as a political debate. The virtues of that book is you can lift it with one hand, as opposed to Implacable Foes, which is about 600 pages but but um, but it's kind of tightly focused on this idea of the politics of America's war aims, which I think had been neglected I mean we, it's sort of famous dictum by Klausowitz you know war is politics I think it's through other means or the continuation of politics through other means. But, you know we think of that as kind of meaning seeking political objectives but it, but it was actually a continuation of politics, because unconditional surrender I argue was a, a new deal I mean what it, it sought to do was to create a new deal for Japan. Economic and political reform rewriting the constitution all those things. You know, were indicative of a confidence in governments ability. You know to bring about positive change in a society and, you know, with good reason I mean not without good reason certainly conservatives who are mainly Republicans at that time were highly skeptical that the United States could successfully accomplish what it was setting out to do. I talk about that and I talk about the way in which the debate over unconditional surrender lingered and got caught up in a whole who lost China thing and, and I was sort of interested in the way that debate gets transformed over you know the kind of history, you know lives on really even to this day. So that's what that's what that book is about. And it, it'll make a great gift to bring home your parents at Thanksgiving. So. Thank you so much for joining us tonight and thank you everyone in the audience for coming in on a Wednesday night about wraps it up for tonight. Thank you again. Okay, oh, you're very welcome and thank you for the invitation. I enjoyed it.


presents Jean Crane, Dale Robertson, Maureen O'Sullivan, and Margaret Sheridan. The Mutual Network in Cooperation with Family Theatre presents The Heart Also Sees, starring Jean Crane, Dale Robertson, and Margaret Sheridan. To introduce the program, here is your hostess, Maureen O'Sullivan. Thank you, Tony LaFranco. Family Theatre's only purpose is to bring to everyone's attention a practice that must become an important part of our lives if we are to win peace for ourselves, peace for our families, and peace for the world. Family Theatre urges you to pray, pray together as a family. And now to our drama, The Heart Also Sees, starring Jean Crane as Jane, Dale Robertson as Paul, and Margaret Sheridan as Eve. Okay, just because this is my data cook, don't rub it in. How'd the morning go? Slow. Or is it slowly? I don't know. Anyway, the only thing good about that filing department is a half day off on Saturday. What's for lunch? Well, if you really want to know, company. Company? Who is she? Anybody I know? She is a he. No. No, Eve, you said you weren't going to do that anymore when I'm here. Oh, Jane, you can't go on avoiding people forever. Eve, let's not go over all that again. If you'd only let me know, I could have eaten out somewhere. I suppose it still isn't too late. But I've told him you were going to be here, Jane. You shouldn't have. You know our agreement. But this is different. He knows you. Knows me? Well, has he been here before? No, but he... Has he seen me?  It's Paul Norman, the boy I grew up with in my hometown. You know, the one who types his letters. Oh, then he hasn't seen me. Well, I've told him all about you and my letters, Jane. He's coming here to take a library job. He'll be just like all the others, Eve. And I couldn't take that again. Oh, not Paul, Jane. I think you'll find him very nice. Oh, they're all polite enough, but it's in their eyes. What they think of me when they see me, it's in their voices, too. Oh, you only imagine that. I don't imagine what I've seen for myself, Eve. I'm nothing any man wants to look at, and you know it. Men want their girls to be pretty. You think this Paul Norman is an exception? Well, I don't, that's all. As far as I'm concerned, our little understanding still goes. All right, Jane. I made a mistake. But what can I do about it?  Well, I hardly think I can do that now. I've invited him for lunch, and besides, he liked to meet you. He said so. I'm not going through that again, Eve. You two have your lunch, and why don't you suggest going to a movie or something? I'll come back afterward. I don't think he'd want to go to a movie. You see, Jane, Paul is blind. But you said he was going to take a library job. How can he when he... He's going to work in the Braille Library at the college. Oh, I see. I'm sorry I made such a fuss, Eve. I'll stay, of course. Anybody would think you two had known each other since the revolution. Didn't I tell you we started it? Well, if a revolution means a change in things, I think you did it that, Eve. Look, you two go ahead and make with the words. I'll go into the kitchen and clean up these dishes. No, let me go, Eve, please. You cook the lunch. Well, you ate it, and that's heroism enough for one day. If I get tired of the dishes, I'll just break them up and throw them away. She's a good kid. We used to make mud pies together. Was that all there was to it, Paul? Oh, no. Well, then we threw them at each other. That's what I get for asking something that's really none of my business. If you mean what I think you do, Jane, Eve and I have never had any brothers or sisters, and we just sort of adopted each other. I didn't mean to ask anything like that, Paul, but I'm glad you told me. You know, Jane, what Eve said about our talking like we had known each other a long time, it does seem like that. To you too, Paul. Tomorrow's Sunday. The park is nice on Sunday. Would you like to go walking with me? Oh, I'd love to. It's been so long since I've been there. We can see that... See? Of course, Jane. I don't need an eyes to see lots of things in the park, and we'll see them together tomorrow. Now you look around you, Jane, and see whether I'm right. From this bench, I see a street about 100 yards to our left, and a bus goes by about every 12 minutes. And between us and the street is a small dog. What color? You're trying to make it tough.  Oh, I got you that time. He's brown. Well, I get half on that. And right near us is a tree that has red berries on it, or ought to have if it's a season for red berries. What kind of talk is that? I smell a pepper tree, silly. Well, you're right. I hadn't even seen it. And over our left shoulder's a bright sun, and the sky is blue.  Right again. And beside me, there's someone very sweet, whose eyes are bluer than the summer sky. That's beautiful, Paul, but I'm sorry. I only wish I were like that. Are you telling me I can't see, Jane? Oh, no, Paul, but you just... I didn't say enough. But poets sometimes can't find the words either. I can prove it. There's a sonnet. It starts... Shall I compare thee to a summer's day? Thou art more lovely. Lovely? No, Paul. I'm afraid I'm not exactly what you read about in your library. I knew you'd be lovely when my mother read Eve's letters to me. When she told me about you and the things you do. Now I know it for myself. Oh, Paul? I've known what you look like, Jane, ever since I first heard you speak. Well, if you want to think so, Paul... I know, Jane. And when I see you, you'll be just as I picture you. You want a bet on it? When...when you...what, Paul? When I see you. It'll be pretty soon now. Didn't Eve tell you? No. No, Eve didn't tell me. Well, I've been this way only about three months. I came back from Korea in May. It was a gun blast. There have been two operations already, and well, the next one will do it. I'm having it done here next week. But then that you'll...you'll see after that? You don't sound very happy about it. Oh, that isn't it. I...of course I'm happy for you. I...I... Jane, you aren't here with me just because you felt sorry for me. Because I... Oh, no, Paul. You mustn't say that. Or you mustn't even think of it. Then what is it? Why did my saying I was going to see again make such a difference to you? It's...nothing we can talk about. Paul, I think I'd like to go home now. But we have half a day ahead of us yet. No. No, I'd like to go home now, Paul. Please, I'd just like to go home now. Jane, what are you trying to do to yourself and Paul?  Eve, you should have told me he was going to see again. Well, I thought you knew it was in his letters. I thought I told you. No, I'm sure you didn't. Well, anyway, you can't go on acting like this. And I can't go on being with him, letting us mean something to each other and then have him see me as I am. I couldn't bear to have him look at me with disappointment. Not him. You love Paul, don't you, Jane? Yes, I love him. But I'd rather not ever see him again than... No, listen to me. He's there at the hospital. They've already taken the bandages off, and he can have visitors. There's only one person he wants to see, and that's you. Surely you aren't going to let him down. You can. But Eve, try to understand. He thinks of me as something that I'm not. He said he pictured me as lovely. That's a laugh, isn't it? Okay, wait a minute. He said he pictured you as lovely, did he? Well, little chum, you're going to be lovely till it hurts. What on earth are you talking about? When I get through with you, you'll be lucky if men even let you get to the hospital. Eve, will you please tell me what this is all about? What time is it? We can make it. Come on. There's no time for questions, and don't forget your purse. But Eve, I... Maybe Rome wasn't built in a day, sister, but you're about to see one of the wonders of the world built in one morning.   I beg your pardon, nurse. Can you tell me where Mr. Norman's room is? Certainly. It's that one right there. Thank you. You must be Jane. Yes. Oh, he's done nothing but ask for you. I'm glad you're here. How... How is he? No, he's feeling fine. He's sitting in his chair, now facing the window. I think he's been watching for you, but he can't see the walk from here. Then he... he can see as well as ever. He'll probably be leaving today as soon as the doctor has seen him. Shall I tell him you're here? No. Thank you. I'll just go right on in. Have you seen her yet, nurse? Maybe they sent her to the wrong floor. Could you call downstairs or something? It's Jane, Paul. Jane! Don't turn around, Paul. Let me just stand behind your chair for a moment, first, Paul. I know it's been long. It's been long for me, too. I was so foolish, Paul. I'm sorry. Well, you're here now. That's all that matters.  All right, Paul. Well, it's good to see you after all this time, Jane. Is it, Paul? That's quite a dress. How's Eve? Did she come with you? No, she wanted me to come alone, but she'll be seeing you soon, she said.  Thank you. I guess it's good to be seeing again, isn't it, Paul? Yeah, I'd kind of forgotten what it was like. I'm glad for you, Paul. Is that everything I... I mean, things have turned out right for you. Thanks. I don't think I ought to stay too long. You should rest, and Eve will want to know how you are. And everything. As you can tell her, I'll be leaving the hospital today. All right. I think I'd better be going now, Paul. Thanks for coming, Jane. Very thoughtful of you. I'll be dropping around soon. Oh, and Jane, do you mind snapping off the lights which serve at the door? Thanks a lot. Take care of yourself, Paul. Sure. Thanks. I thought you were coming through that door without opening it. What would it matter if I did? Hey, what's gotten into you? Sit down and relax, will you? All right. Did you see Paul? Yes, I saw Paul, and he saw me too. What in the world happened to make you like this? He saw me, that's what happened. He looked at me. What always happens when they look at me? He didn't like what he saw, that's all. That's his privilege, isn't it? Oh, I don't understand, Jane, but whatever it was, it must have been a mistake. Mistake? Yes, it was a mistake. Was a mistake ever to think that beauty parlors and pretty clothes could make me look attractive to him? It just isn't there. Oh, Jane. Not even a magician could bring it out of it, isn't there? The next time you want to make a princess, Eve, you'd better start with better material. Oh, Jane, dear. Oh, it doesn't matter. It couldn't help happening. It wasn't your fault, only this time it had to be Paul. Oh, I'm sorry. Really, I am Jane. Oh, let's not talk about it anymore. You were only trying to help me, I know. It's no use, Eve, it's just no use. Now, if you'll excuse me. Jane, Paul phoned a few minutes after you left the hospital. He wants to talk to you, he's coming over. Well, that's nice of him. I suppose he'd like to say he's sorry. I don't know, he didn't tell me any more than that. Just that he was leaving right away to come to see you and talk to you. I don't think that'll be necessary, Eve. Everything about him as he saw me for the first time told me all I want to know. Words aren't going to help now. But you'll give him a chance to explain, won't you? Explain what? Would you want to listen to polite words spoken out of kindness, sympathy, because he realizes now that his eyes and the tone of his voice told the truth? No, Eve, I'm going out now. When Paul comes, I won't be here. Jane, don't do this. He wanted to see me. Well, he did. He won't again. Do you hear me, Eve? He never will again. But what'd she say, Eve? Just what I told you, Paul. She simply wasn't going to be here. Do you know where she went? I wouldn't have the slightest idea. But if I know Jane, she won't be back as long as there's any chance that you're still here. Sorry to be so subtle about it, but I'm afraid that's it. I guess I've got it coming. I feel rotten about it, Eve, but I just couldn't say anything. She was so, so different from what I expected. I couldn't help showing it, I suppose. But after she had gone, I got to thinking it isn't so much how she looks. That's not what's important. Do you understand that? Well, I'm not sure I understand anything, Paul. I'm thinking of taking a walk around the block and talking to myself. Who's this? Who's who? This picture. The girl. Who is it? Who am I supposed to know? Oh, it's just Jane. That's all. This is Jane? Don't tell me you don't recognize her. But this isn't the girl I saw, Eve. How long since she's looked like this? Until this morning, Paul, until she tried to do something about it for you. But she wasn't a bit like this. She looked artificial and affected. Well, the paint was an inch thick in that dress. I hadn't thought of it that way at all. She sounded so natural, so simple, like this picture. Do you mean she did all that to try to please me? Well, it wasn't her idea. It was mine. Yours? Well, it seemed like a good idea. Now, begin and understand a few things. Eve, are you sure you don't know where she went? Think. Didn't she say anything at all? Only that she wouldn't be here when you came. But where could she go? Where could I go if... Wait. I think I know where I'd go. Maybe that's where Jane's went. I'm going to go now and see. Well, go to it, mister. I'm going to look for someone I've never even met. Someone I've never even seen before. I beg your pardon, miss.  No, that's right. It was brown. Paul. Hello, Jane. Oh, Paul, why did you come here? I just wanted to find out of what I see in the park and read it the way I thought I saw it. I was just leaving. If you'll excuse me. No, wait, Jane. Please, I can't talk to you. Goodbye, Paul. Jane, wait. Let me take you back to your apartment. See, it's going to rain. You get drenched if you stay here. I can take care of myself. Thank you. Paul, I wish you wouldn't follow me. Look at me. I'm soaking wet. My hair and my dress. Just look. I am looking, Jane. And I'm glad you decided to stop running away from me. Well, I had to get under cover, didn't I? Do you know where you are? Well, of course I know where I am. Where are you? Under a tree. Anyone can see that. Under what tree? Under a... a pepper tree. Not just a pepper tree. The pepper tree. The one we saw together when we were here the last time. Paul, do you have to see me this way? I'm just soaked after running in that rain. I'm afraid your face is still running. Have you got a handkerchief? Here you are. Oh, maybe you can see where to wipe it better than I can. Sure. Let me have your handkerchief. And don't try to turn away.  You know, I like you better this way. With my face in streaks? But it isn't now. It looks fresh and clean.  Oh, but look at my hair. Your hair? It has the lust of the rain put in it. Oh, Paul, you can't mean you... Well, look, the sun's coming out again. Sure enough it is. And here's our bench, Jane. Remember? Yes. This is the first time I've already seen the park. With my eyes. Won't you see it with me? From our bench here? You really want me to? Wouldn't be the same without you. For a minute, then. Now, you see, it's just as I saw it, Jane. Not just a pepper tree, but... Well, there's a street the buses run on. About a hundred yards to our left. And the sun. It's just as it was then. Over our left shoulder. And the sky? It's blue. With those white billowy clouds I could feel were there. Just as I saw you, Jane. Please, Paul, you don't need to feel you have to say anything to... It wasn't you at all that came to me this morning. That wasn't you. Eve told me what you did and why. Eve told you? Yes. You did that only to please me, so as not to disappoint me.  As I see you now. Oh, Paul, you can't mean that. I mean exactly that, Jane. This is the you that I saw when we sat here together that first time. As you spoke to me, and then as I dreamed of you now. Oh, Paul. I saw you with a charm that nobody can put on Jane. The loveliness that was you all the time. Oh, I wanted so much to please you. Look at me, Jane. Your eyes do have the blue of the sky in them. A soft, warm blue. Just as I saw them. But remember what the sonnet says. Shall I compare thee to a summer's day? Oh, Paul. No, Jane, darling. You're lovelier than that to me. Oh, I've been so foolish, Paul. I thought I knew. I thought I could see what you wanted to make you happy. It's funny, isn't it? All along I was the one who was blind, and you were the one who could see. Paul, you know Sullivan again. What is your favorite word in the English tongue? Of course, many of you will say your favorite word is mother. Others will choose home. I'm sure still others will declare that the most powerful word in the language is peace. Each of these words is beautiful indeed, but there's another word that appears again and again on every list. The word is prayer. Here, too, is a strikingly beautiful word. Beautiful not only in its soft syllables, but in the rich train of thought that it provokes. And note how the word prayer is linked closely with the other favorites. It's linked to mother. For it is she who first teaches us to pray. It is linked to home. For the home is the first classroom of prayer. And it is linked by an equally powerful link to peace. For peace is the fruit of prayer among men of good will. These favorite words put us all in mind of another word, family. It is family prayer that brings the family to God to ask His help and His blessings. Yes, it is family prayer that brings unity and happiness to the home. For the family that prays together stays together. Lonely Blackman was also heard in tonight's play. The script was written by Jean Emmett Clark with music composed and conducted by Harry Zimmerman and was directed for Family Theater by Joseph F. Mansfield. This series of Family Theater broadcasts is made possible by the thousands of you who feel the need for this type of program, by the mutual network which has responded to this need and by the hundreds of stars of stage, screen and radio who give so unselfishly of their time and talent to appear on our Family Theater stage.  This is Tony Lofrano expressing the wish of Family Theater that the blessing of God may be upon you and your home and inviting you to be with us next week when Family Theater will present the clip with Stephen McNally and Charles Ruggles. Join us, won't you? Family Theater is broadcast throughout the world and originates in the Hollywood studios of the world's largest network. This is the Mutual Broadcasting System.


The defense headquarters has stated that, for the country to win the war against terrorists and other adversaries, citizens must be patriotic to their country. It said the fight against terrorism and insurgency requires all hands to be on deck. The military high command spoke through the director of defense media operations, Major-General Edward Bubba, during a press briefing today. Bubba said the military would continue to fulfill its mission of hunting and destroying terrorists and their cohorts across the country in the most professional manner. In the month of January, troops recorded the following. We neutralized 266 terrorists. We arrested 463 of them and we rescued 116 kidnapped hostages. We also recovered 447 assorted weapons and over 6,690 assorted ammunition. We denied the oil tax of close to 3 billion Naira just in the month of January. When we talk about counter insurgency, one thing should come to mind. Like I said, though it might not seem as such, what a lot is ongoing and a lot is being done. One thing that should come to mind is the fact that counter insurgency is not a sprint. It is a marathon.