n of the laws with a view to better deliberation to adopt the custom of oligarchies respecting courts of law for in oligarchies the rich who are wanted to be judges are compelled to attend time whereas in democracies the poor are paid to attend and this practice of oligarchies should be adopted by democracies in their public assemblies for they will advise better if they all deliberate together the people with the notables and the notables with the people it is also a good plan that those who deliberate should be elected by vote or by lot in equal numbers out of the different classes and that if the people greatly exceed in number those who have political training pay should not be given to all but only to as many as would balance the number of the notables whether the number in excess should be eliminated by a lot but in oligarchies either certain persons should be co-opted from the mass or a class of officers should be appointed such as exist in some states who are termed probuli and guardians of the law and the citizens should occupy themselves exclusively with matters on which these have previously deliberated for so the people will have a share in the deliberations of the state but will not be able to disturb the principles of the constitution again in oligarchies either the people ought to accept the measures of the government or not to pass anything contrary to them or if all are allowed to share in council the decision should rest with the magistrates the opposite of what is done in constitutional governments should be the rule in oligarchies the veto of the majority should be final their assent not final but the proposal should be referred back to the magistrates whereas in constitutional governments they take the contrary course the few have the negative not the affirmative power the affirmation of everything rests with the multitude these then are our conclusions the affirmative that is the supreme element in states section 15 next we will proceed to consider the distribution of offices this too being a part of politics concerning which many questions arise what shall their number be over what shall they preside and what shall be their duration sometimes they last for 6 months sometimes for less sometimes they are annual while in other cases offices are held for still longer periods shall they be for life or for a long term of years shall the same persons hold them over and over again or once only also about the appointment to them from whom are they to be chosen and by whom and how we should first be in a position to say what are the possible varieties of them and then we may proceed to determine which are suited to different forms of government but what are to be included in the term offices that is a question not quite so easily answered for a political community requires many offices and not everyone who is chosen by vote or by lot is to be regarded as a ruler in the first place there are the priests who must be distinguished from political offices masses of choruses and heralds even ambassadors are elected by vote some duties of superintendents again are political extending either to all the citizens in a single sphere of action like the office of the general who super intends them when they are in the field or to a section of them only like the inspectorships of women or of youth other offices are concerned with household management like that of the corn measures many states and our elected offices there are also menial offices which the rich have executed by their slaves speaking generally those are to be called offices to which the duties are assigned of deliberating about certain measures and of judging and commanding especially the last for the command is the special duty of a magistrate but the question is not of any importance in practice no one has ever brought into court the meaning of the word although such problems have a speculative interest what kinds of offices and how many are necessary to the existence of a state and which if not necessary yet conduced to its well-being are much more important considerations affecting all constitutions but more especially small states for in great states it is possible and indeed necessary that every office should have a special function where the citizens are numerous many may hold office and so it happens that some offices a man holds a second time only after a long interval and others he holds once only and certainly every work is better done which receives the soul and not the divided attention of the worker but in small states it is necessary to combine many offices in a few hands since the small number of citizens does not admit of many holding office for who will there be to succeed them and yet small states at times require the same offices and laws as large ones the difference is that the one want them often the others only after long intervals hence there is no reason why the care of many offices should not be imposed on the same person for they will not interfere with each other when the population is small offices should be like the spits which also serve to hold a lamp we must first ascertain how many mattresses are necessary in every state and also how many are not exactly necessary but are nevertheless useful and then there will be no difficulty in seeing what offices can be combined in one we should also know over which matters several local tribunals are to have jurisdiction and in which authority should be centralized for example should one person keep order in the market and another in some other place or should the same person be responsible everywhere again should offices be divided according to the subjects with which they deal or according to the persons with whom they deal I mean to say should one person see to good order in general or one look after the boys another after the women and so on further under different constitutions should the magistrates be the same or different for example in democracy olacarchy aristocracy monarchy should there be the same magistrates although they are elected not out of equal or similar classes of citizens but differently under different constitutions in aristocracies for example they are chosen from the educated in olacarchy is from the wealthy and in democracies from the free or are there certain differences in the offices answering to them as well and may the same be suitable to some but different offices to others for in some states it may be convenient that the same office should have a more extensive in other states a narrow sphere special offices are peculiar to certain forms of government for example that of probuli which not a democratic office although appeal or counsel is there must be some body men whose duty is to prepare measures for the people in order that they may not be diverted from their business when these are few in number the state inclines to an olacarchy or rather the probuli must always be few and are therefore an olacarchical element but when both institutions exist in a state the probuli are check on the council for the counselors is a democratic element but the probuli are olacarchical even the power of the council disappears when democracy has taken that extreme form in which the people themselves are always meeting and deliberating about everything this is the case when the members of the assembly receive abundant pay for they have nothing to do and are always holding assemblies and deciding everything for themselves a magistracy which controls the boys or the women or any similar office is suited to an aristocracy rather than to a democracy for how can the magistrates prevent the wives of the poor from going out of those neither is it an olacarchical office for the wives of the olacarchs are too fine to be controlled enough of these matters I will now inquire into appointments to offices the varieties depend on three terms and the combinations of these give all possible modes first who appoints secondly from whom and thirdly how each of these three admits of three varieties capital A or the citizens or capital B only some appoint either one the magistrates are chosen out of all or two out of some who are distinguished either by property qualification or by birth or merit or for some special reason as a Magara only those were eligible who would return from exile and fought together against the democracy they may be appointed either A by vote or B by lot again these several varieties may be coupled I mean that capital C some offices may be elected by some others by all and three some again out of some and others out of all and C some by vote and others by lot each variety of these terms admits of four modes for either capital A one A all may appoint from all by vote or capital A one B all from all by lot or capital A two A all from some by vote or capital A two B all from some by lot and from all either by sections as for example by tribes and wards and fraud trees until all the citizens have been gone through or the citizens may be in all cases eligible indiscriminately or again capital A one C capital A two C to some offices in the one way, to some and the other again if it is only some that point they may do so either capital B one A from all by vote or capital B one B from all by lot or capital B two A from some by vote or capital B to B from some by lot or to some offices in one way to others in the other, i.e capital B one C from all to some offices by vote to some by lot and capital B to capital C sum, to some offices by vote, to some by lot. Thus, the modes that arise apart from 2, capital C, 3, out of the three couplings number 12, of these systems two are popular, that all should appoint from all, capital A1A by vote, or capital A1B by lot, or capital A1C by both. That all should not appoint at once, but should appoint from all or from some, either by lot or by vote or by both, or appoint to some offices from all and to others from some, by both meaning to some offices by lot, to others by vote, is characteristic of a polity, and capital B1C, that some should appoint from all, to some offices by vote, to others by lot, is also characteristic of a polity, but more of a carcical than the former method, and capital A3ABC, capital B3ABC, to appoint from both, to some offices from all, to others from some, is characteristic of a polity with a leaning towards aristocracy, that capital B2, some should appoint from some, is olacarchical, even capital B2B, that some should appoint from some by lot, and if this does not actually occur, it's nonetheless olacarchical in character, or capital B2C, that some should appoint from some by both. Capital B1A, that some should appoint from all, and capital A2A, that all should appoint from some, by vote, is aristocratic. These are the different modes of constituting magistrates, and these correspond to different forms of government, which are proper to which, or how they ought to be established, will be evident when we determine the nature of their powers. By powers I mean such powers as magistrate exercises of the revenue, or in defence of the country, for there are various kinds of power, the power of the general, for example, is not the same with that which regulates contracts in the market. Section 16. Of the three parts of government, the judicial remains to be considered, and this we shall divide on the same principle. There are three points on which the varieties of law courts depend. The persons from whom they are appointed, the methods with which they are concerned, and the manner of their appointment. I mean, one, are the judges taken from all, or from some only? Two, how many kinds of law courts are there? Three, are the judges chosen by vote, or by lot? First, let me determine how many kinds of law courts there are. There are eight in number. One is the Court of Audits or Scruziness. A second takes cognisance of ordinary offenses against the state. A third is concerned with treason against the constitution. The fourth determines disputes respecting penalties, whether raised by magistrates or by private persons. The fifth decides the most important civil cases. The sixth tries cases of homicide, which are of various kinds. A, premeditated, B, involuntary, C, cases in which the guild is confessed but the justice is disputed, and there may be a fourth court, D, in which murderers who are fled from justice are tried after their return, such as the Court of Friato is said to be at evidence. But cases of this sort rarely happen at all, even in large cities. The different kinds of homicide may be tried either by the same or by different courts. Seven, there are courts for strangers. Of these there are two subdivisions. A, for the settlement of their disputes with one another. B, for the settlement of disputes between them and the citizens. And besides all these there must be eight, courts for small suits about sums of a drachma up to five drachmas, or a little more, which have to be determined but they do not require many judges. Nothing more need be said of these small suits nor of the courts for homicide or for strangers. I would rather speak of political cases which, when mismanaged, create division and disturbances in constitutions. Now, if all the citizens judge in all the different cases which I have distinguished, they may be appointed by vote or by lot, or sometimes by lot and sometimes by vote. Or when a single class of causes are tried, the judges who decide they may be appointed some by vote and some by lot. These then are the four modes of appointing judges from the whole people and they will be likewise four modes if they are elected from a part only, for they may be appointed from some by vote and a judge in all causes, or they may be appointed from some by lot and judge in all causes, or they may be elected in some cases by vote and in some cases taken by lot, or some courts, even when judging the same causes, may be composed of members some appointed by vote and some by lot. These modes then, as was said, answer to those previously mentioned. Once more, the modes of appointment may be combined. I mean that some may be chosen out of the whole people, others out of some, some out of both. For example, the same tribunal may be composed of some who are elected out of all and of others who are elected out of some, either by vote or by lot or by both. In how many forms law courts can be established has now been considered. The first form is that in which the judges are taken from all the citizens and in which all causes are tried is democratical. The second, which is composed of a few only who try all causes, or the carcical. The third, in which some courts are taken from all classes and some from certain classes only, aristocratical and constitutional. End of book full, sections 14 through 16. Book five, sections one through four of Politics by Aristotle. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Leon Meyer. Politics by Aristotle. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Book five, sections one through four. One. The design which we propose to ourselves is now nearly completed. Next in order followed the causes of revolution in states, how many and of what nature they are, what modes of destruction apply to particular states and out of what, and into what they mostly change. Also what are the modes of preservation in states generally or in a particular state and by what means each state may be best preserved. These questions remain to be considered. In the first place, we must assume as our starting point that in the many forms of government which have sprung up, there's always been an acknowledgement of justice and proportionate equality, although mankind failed taking them as I've already explained. Democracy, for example, arises out of the notion that those who are equal in any respect are equal in all respects. Because men are equally free, they claim to be absolutely equal. oligarchy is based on the notion that those who are unequal in one respect are in all respects unequal. Being unequal that is in property, they suppose themselves to be unequal absolutely. The Democrats think that as they are equal they ought to be equal in all things, while the oligarchs, under the idea that they are unequal, claim too much, which is one form of inequality. All these forms of government have a kind of justice, but tried by an absolute standard they are faulty, and therefore both parties, whenever their share in the government does not accord with their preconceived ideas, stir up revolution. Those who excel in virtue have the best right of all to rebel, for they alone can with reason be deemed absolutely unequal, but then they are of all men the least inclined to do so. There is also a superiority which is claimed by men of rank, for they are thought noble because they spring from wealthy and virtuous ancestors. Here then, so to speak, are open the very springs and fountains of revolution, and hence arise two sorts of changes in governments, the one affecting the constitution, when men seek to change from an existing form into some other, for example from democracy into oligarchy and from oligarchy into democracy, or from either of them into constitutional government or aristocracy and conversely, the other not affecting the constitution, when without disturbing the form of government, whether oligarchy or monarchy or any other, they try to get the administration into their own hands. Further, there was a question of degree. An oligarchy, for example, may become more or less oligarchical, and a democracy more or less democratical, and in like manner the characteristics of the other forms of government may be more or less strictly maintained. Or, the revolution may be directed against a portion of the constitution only. For example, the establishment or overthrow of a particular office. As at Sparta, it is said that Lysander attempted to overthrow the monarchy, and King Posenius, the everalty. An epidamnus, too, the change was partial, for instead of phylarchs or heads of tribes, a council was appointed, but to this day the magistrates are the only members of the ruling class who are compelled to go to the Helaea when an election takes place, and the office of the single Archon was another oligarchical feature. Everywhere inequality is a cause of revolution, but an inequality in which there is no proportion, for instance a perpetual monarchy among equals, and always it is the desire of equality which rises in rebellion. Now equality is of two kinds, numerical and proportional. By the first I mean sameness or equality in number or size, by the second equality of ratios. For example, the excess of three over two is numerically equal to the excess of two over one, whereas four exceeds two in the same ratio in which two exceeds one, for two is the same part of four that one is of two, namely the half. As I was saying before, men agree that justice and the abstract is proportion, but they differ in that something that if they are equal in any respect they are equal absolutely, others that if they are unequal in any respect they should be unequal in all. Hence there are two principal forms of government, democracy and oligarchy, for good birth and virtue are rare, but wealth and numbers are more common. In what city shall we find a hundred persons of good birth and a virtue, whereas the rich everywhere are bound? That a state should be ordered simply and wholly according to either kind of equality is not a good thing, the proof is the fact that such forms of government never last, they are originally based on a mistake, and as they begin badly cannot fail to end badly. The inference is that both kinds of equality should be employed, numerical in some cases and proportionate in others. Still democracy appears to be safer and less liable to revolution in oligarchy, for in oligarchies there is the double danger of the oligarchs falling out among themselves and also with the people, but in democracies there is only the danger of a quarrel with the oligarchs, no dissension worth mentioning arises among the people themselves, and we may further remark that a government which is composed of the middle class more nearly approximates to democracy than to oligarchy, and is the safest of the imperfect forms of government. Section two. In considering how dissensions and political revolutions arise, we must first of all ascertain the beginnings and causes of them which affect constitutions generally. They may said to be three in number, and we have now to give an outline of each. We want to know one, what is the feeling, two, what are the motives of those who make them, three, whence arise political disturbances and quarrels. The universal and chief cause of this revolutionary feeling has already been mentioned, this the desire of equality, when men think that they are equal to others who have more than themselves, or again the desire of inequality and superiority. When conceiving themselves to be superior, they think that they have not more, but the same or less than their inferiors, pretensions which may and may not be just. Inferiors revolt in order that they may be equal, and equals that they may be superior. Such is the state of mind which creates revolutions. The motives for making them are the desire of gain and honor, or the fear of dishonor and loss. The authors of them want to divert punishment or dishonor from themselves or their friends. The causes and reasons of revolutions, whereby men are themselves affected in the way described, and about the things which I have mentioned, viewed in one way may be regarded as seven, and in another is more than seven. Two of them have already been noticed, but they act in a different manner, for men are excited against one another by the love of gain and honor, not as in the case which I have disopposed, in order to obtain them for themselves, but at seeing others, justly or unjustly, in grossing them. Other causes are insolence, fear, excessive predominance, contempt, disproportionate increase in some part of the state. Causes of another sort are election intrigues, carelessness, neglect about trifles, dissimilarity of elements. Section 3. What share insolence and avarice have in creating revolutions and how they work is plain enough. When the magistrates are insolent and grasping, they conspire against one another, and also against the constitution from which they derive their power, making their gains either at the expense of individuals or of the public. It is evident again, what an influence honor exerts and how it is a cause of revolution. Men who are themselves dishonored and who see others obtaining honors rise in rebellion. The honor or dishonor when undeserved is unjust, and just when awarded according to merit. Again, superiority is a cause of revolution when one or more persons have a power which is too much for the state and the power of the government. This is a condition of affairs out of which there arises a monarchy, or a family oligarchy. And therefore in some places, as at Athens and Argos, they have recourse to ostracism. But how much better to provide from the first that there should be no such preeminent individuals instead of letting them come into existence and then finding remedy. Another cause of revolution is fear. Either men have committed wrong and are afraid of punishment, or they are expecting to suffer wrong and are desirous of anticipating their enemy. Thus at Rhodes the notables conspired against the people through fear of the suits that were brought against them. Contempt is also a cause of insurrection and revolution. For example, in oligarchies, when those who have no share in the state of the majority, they revolt, because they think that they are the stronger. Or again, in democracies, the rich despise the disorder and anarchy of the state. At Thebes, for example, where after the battle of Enotheta, the bad administration of the democracy led to its ruin. At Megaba, the fall of the democracy was due to a defeat occasioned by disorder and anarchy. And at Syracuse, the democracy aroused contempt before the tyranny of Gilo or Rose. At Rhodes, before the insurrection. Political revolutions also spring from a disproportionate increase in any part of the state. For as a body is made up of many members, and every member ought to grow in proportion, that symmetry may be preserved. But loses its nature at the foot before Cupid's long and the rest of the body too spans. And should the abnormal increase be one of quality as well as of quantity, may even take the form of another animal. Even so, a state has many parts of which some one may often grow imperceptibly. For example, the number of poor in democracies and in constitutional states. And this disproportion may sometimes happen by an accident, as a torrentum, from a defeat in which many of the Notables were slain in a battle with the Epigians, just after the Persian War. The constitutional government in consequence becoming a democracy. Or as was the case at Ardos, where the Argyves, after their army had been cut to pieces on the seventh day of the month by Cleomenes the Lacedaemonian, were compelled to admit to citizen some of their Perii Isai. And at Athens, when after frequent debates of their infantry, at the time of the Peloponnesian War, the Notables were reduced in number, because the soldiers had to be taken from the role of citizens. Revolutions arise from this cause as well, in democracies as in other forms of government, but not to so great an extent. When the rich grow numerous or properties increase, the form of government changes into an oligarchy or a government of families. Forms of government also change, sometimes even without revolution, owing to election contests, as at Haria, where instead of electing their magistrates, they took them by lot, because the electors were in the habit of choosing their own partisans. Or owing to carelessness, when disloyal persons are allowed to find their way into the highest offices, as at Orium, where upon the accession of Heracliodorus to office, the oligarchy was overthrown, and changed by him into a constitutional and democratic government. Again, the revolution may be facilitated by the slightness of the change. I mean that a great change may sometimes slip into the constitution through neglect of a small matter. At Embracia, for instance, the qualification for office, small at first, was eventually reduced to nothing. For the Embraciots thought that a small qualification was much the same as none at all. Another cause of revolution is difference of races, which do not at once acquire common spirit. For a state is not the growth of a day, any more than it grows out of a multitude brought together by accident. Hence, the reception of strangers in colonies, either at the time of their foundation or afterwards, has generally produced revolution. For example, the Achaeans who joined the Trezynians in the foundation of Sibiris, becoming later the more numerous expelled them. Hence the curse fell upon Sibiris. At Theriae, the Sibirites quarreled with their fellow colonists, thinking that the land belonged to them. They wanted too much of it and were driven out. At Byzantium, the new colonists were detected in a conspiracy, and were expelled by force of arms. The people of Antissa, who had received the Cayenne exiles, fought with them and drove them out. And the same Cleans, after having received the Samians, were driven by them out of their own city. The citizens of Apollonia, on the Uxsine, after the introduction of a fresh body of colonists, had a revolution. The Seracusans, after the expulsion of their tyrants, having admitted strangers and mercenaries to the rights of citizenship, quarreled and came to blows. The people of Amphipolis, having received Calcidian colonists, were nearly all expelled by them. Now in Algarquies, the masses make revolution under the idea that they are unjustly treated, because, as I said before, they are equals, and have not an equal share. And in democracies, the Notables revolt, because they are not equals, and yet have only an equal share. Again, the situation of cities is a cause of revolution, when the country is not naturally adapted to preserve the unity of the state. For example, the Cytanes at Clasamany did not agree with the people of the island, and the people of Colophon quarreled with the Notians. At Athens, too, the inhabitants of the Pyreas are more democratic than those who live in the city. For just as in war, the impediment of a ditch, though ever so small, may break a regiment, so every cause of difference, however slight, makes a breach in a city. The greatest opposition is confessedly that of virtue and vice. Next comes that of wealth and poverty, and there are other antagonistic elements, greater or less, of which one is the difference of place. In revolutions, the occasions may be trifling, but great interests are at stake. Even trifles are most important when they concern the rulers, as was the case of old at Syracuse. For the Syracusan constitution was once changed by a love quarrel of two young men who were in the government. The story is that while one of them was away from home, his beloved was gained over by his companion, and he, to revenge himself, seduced the other's wife. They then drew in class into their quarrel, and so split all the people into portions. We learn from this story that we should be on our guard against the beginnings of such evils, and should put an end to the quarrels of chiefs in mighty The mistake lies in the beginning, as the proverb says, well begun is half done. So an error at the beginning, though quite small, bears the same ratio to the errors in the other parts. In general, when the notable's quarrel, the whole city is involved, as happened in Hasdia after the Persian War. The occasion was the division of an inheritance, one of two brothers refused to give an account of their father's property and the treasure which he had found, so the poorer of the two quarreled with him and enlisted in his cause the popular party, the other, who was very rich, the wealthy classes. At Delphi again, a quarrel about a marriage was the beginning of all the troubles which followed. In this case, the bridegroom, fancying some occurrence to be of evil omen, came to the bride and went away without taking her, whereupon her relations, thinking that they were insulted by him, put some of the sacred treasure among his offerings while he was sacrificing, and then slew him, pretending that he had been robbing the temple. At Metellini too, a dispute about heiresses was the beginning of many misfortunes, and led to the war with the Athenians in which Pages took their city. A wealthy citizen named Tomophanes left two daughters, Dexander, another citizen, wanted to obtain them for his sons, but he was rejected in a suit whereupon he stirred up a revolution, and instigated the Athenians, of whom he was proxenous, to interfere. A similar quarrel about an heiress arose at Phosas, between Naceus, the father of Nason, and Uthicates, the father of Onomarchus. This was the beginning of the sacred war. A marriage quarrel was also the cause of a change in the government of Epidamnes. A certain man betrothed his daughter to a person whose father, having been made a magistrate, find the father of the girl, and the latter, stung by the insult, conspired with unenfranchised classes to overthrow the state. Governments also changed into oligarchy or into democracy, or into a constitutional government, because the magistrates, or some other section of the state, increase in power or renown. Thus at Athens, the reputation gained by the court of the Areopagus in the Persian war seemed to tighten the reins of government. On the other hand, the victory of Salamis, which was gained by the common people who served in the fleet, and won for the Athenians, the empire due to the command of the sea, strengthened the democracy. At Argos, the Notables, having distinguished themselves against the Lacedemonians and the Battle of Mantania, attempted to put down the democracy. At Syracuse, the people, having been the chief authors of the victory in the war with the Athenians, changed the constitutional government into democracy. At Calces, the people, uniting with the Notables, killed Phosas, the tyrant, and then seized the government. At Ambrosia, the people, in life manner, having joined with the conspirators and expelling the tyrant periander, transferred the government to themselves. And generally it should be remembered that those who have secured power to the state, whether private citizens or magistrates or tribes or any other part or section of the state, are apt to cause revolutions. For either envy of their greatness draws others into rebellion, or they themselves, in their pride of superiority, are unwilling to remain on a level with others. Revolutions also break out when opposite parties, for example the rich and the people, are equally balanced, and there is little or no middle class, for if either party were manifestly superior, the other would not risk an attack upon them. And, for this reason, those who are eminent in virtue usually do not stir up insurrections, always being a minority, such are the beginnings and causes of the disturbances and revolutions to which every form of government is liable. Revolutions are affected in two ways, by force and by fraud. Force may be applied either at the time of making the revolution or afterwards. Fraud again is of two kinds, for one, sometimes the citizens are deceived into acquiescing and a change of government, and afterwards they are held in subjection against their will. This was what happened in the case of the 400, who deceived the people by telling them that the king would provide money for the war against the Lacedaemonians, and, having cheated the people, still endeavored to retain the government. Two, in other cases the people are persuaded at first, and afterwards, by a repetition of the persuasion, their good will and allegiance are retained. The revolutions which affect constitutions generally spring from the above mentioned causes. End of Book 5, Sections 1 through 4. Book 5, Sections 5 through 7, of Politics, by Aristotle. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Leon Meyer. Politics, by Aristotle. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Book 5, Sections 5 through 7. 5. And now, taking each constitution separately, we must see what follows from the principles already laid down. Revolutions and democracies are generally caused by the intemperance of demagogues, who either in their private capacity lay information against rich men until they compel them to combine, for a common danger unites even the bitterest enemies, or, coming forward in public, stir up the people against them. The truth of this remark is proved by a variety of examples. At cost, the democracy was overthrown because wicked demagogues arose and the notables combined. At roads, the demagogues not only provided pay for the multitude, but prevented them from making good to the triorarchs, the sums which had been expended by them, and they, in consequence of the suits which were brought against them, were compelled to combine and put down the democracy. The democracy at Heraclia was overthrown shortly after the foundation of the colony by the injustice of the demagogues, which drove out the notables, who came back in a body and put an end to the democracy. Much in the same manner, the democracy at Megara was overturned. There, the demagogues drove out many of the notables in order that they might be able to confiscate their property. At length, the exiles, becoming numerous, returned, and, engaging in defeating the people, established the oligarchy. The same thing happened with the democracy of Simey, which was overthrown by Thrasymachus. And we may observe that in most states the changes have been of this character, for sometimes the demagogues, in order to curry favor with the people, wrong the notables, and so force them to combine. Either they make a division of their property, or diminish their incomes by the imposition of public services, and sometimes they bring accusations against the rich that they may have their wealth to confiscate. Of old, the demagogue was also a general, and then democracies changed into tyrannies. Most of the ancient tyrants were originally demagogues. They are not so now, but they were then, and the reason is that they were generals and not orators, for oratory had not yet come into fashion. Whereas in Arde, when the art of rhetoric has made such progress, the orators lead the people, but their ignorance of military matters prevents them from usurping power. At any rate, instances to the contrary are few and slight. Tyrannies were more common formerly than now, for this reason also, that great power was placed in the hands of individuals. Thus a tyranny arose at Miletus, out of the office of the Pritonus, who had supreme authority in many important matters. Moreover, in those days, when cities were not large, the people dwelt in the fields, busy at their work, and their chiefs, if they possessed any military talent, seized the opportunity, and, winning the confidence of the masses by professing their hatred of the wealthy, they succeeded in obtaining the tyranny. Thus at Athens, Pysistratus led a faction against the men of the plain, and Theogenes at Megara slaughtered the cattle of the wealthy, which he had found by the riverside, where they had put them to graze and land not their own. Dionysius, again, was thought worthy of the tyranny, because he denounced Daphneus and the rich, his enmity to the notables, one for him the confidence of the people. Changes also take place from the ancient to the latest form of democracy. For, where there is a popular election at the magistrates, and no property qualification, the aspirants for office get hold of the people, and can thrive at last even to set them above the laws. A more or less complete cure for this state of things is for the separate tribes, and not the whole people, to elect the magistrates. These are the principal causes of revolutions in democracies. 6. There are two patent causes of revolutions in oligarchies. 1. First, when the oligarchs oppress the people, for then anybody is good enough to be their champion, especially if he be himself a member of the oligarchy, as Ligdomus at Naxos, who afterwards came to be tyrant. But revolutions which commence outside the governing class may be further subdivided. Sometimes, when the government is very exclusive, the revolution is brought about by persons of the wealthy class who were excluded, as happened at Masalia, in Istras, in Heraklia, and other cities. Those who had no share in the government created a disturbance, until first the elder brothers and then the younger were admitted, for in some places, father and son, in others, elder and younger brothers, do not hold office together. At Masalia the oligarchy became more like a constitutional government, but at Istras ended in a democracy, and at Heraklia was enlarged to six hundred. At Nidos, again, the oligarchy underwent a considerable change, for the Notables fell out among themselves, because only a few shared in the government. There existed among them the rule already mentioned, that father and son not hold office together, and if there were several brothers only the eldest was admitted. The people took advantage of the quarrel, and choosing one of the Notables to be their leader, attacked and conquered the oligarchs who were divided, and division is always a source of weakness. The city of Ere III, too, in old times was ruled and ruled well by the Basility, but the people took offense at the narrowness of the oligarchy, and changed the constitution. Two. Of internal causes of revolutions in oligarchies, one is the personal rivalry of the oligarchs, which leads them to play the demagogue. Now the oligarchal demagogue is of two sorts, either A, he practices upon the oligarchs themselves, for although the oligarchy are quite a small number, there may be a demagogue among them, as at Athens, Caraclies's party won power by courting the thirty, that of Frenicus by courting the four hundred, or B, the oligarchs may play the demagogue with the people. This was the case at Larissa, where the guardians of the citizens endeavored to gain over the people because they were elected by them, and such is the fate of all oligarchies in which the magistrates are elected, as at Abidas, not by the class to which they belong, but by the heavy armed or by the people, although they may be required to have a high qualification, or to be members of a political club. Or, again, where the law courts are composed of persons outside the government, the oligarchs flatter the people in order to obtain a decision in their own favor, and so they change the constitution. This happened at Heraklia in Pontus. Again, oligarchies change whenever any attempt is made to narrow them, for then, those who desire equal rights are compelled to call in the people. Changes in the oligarchy also occur when the oligarchs waste their private property by extravagant living, for then they want to innovate, and either try to make themselves tyrants, or install someone else in the tyranny, as Heparinus did Dionysius at Syracuse, and as at Amphipolis, a man named Cleotomus introduced Calcydian colonists, and when they arrived, stirred them up against the rich. For a like reason in Aginia, the person who carried on the negotiation with Calrys endeavored to revolutionize the state. Sometimes a party among the oligarchs tried directly to create a political change. Sometimes they robbed the treasury, and then either the thieves, or as happened at Apollonia in Pontus, those who resist them in their thieving, quarrel with the rulers. But an oligarchy which is at unity with itself is not easily destroyed from within. Of this we may see an example at Pharsalus, for there, although the rulers are few in number, they govern a large city, because they have a good understanding among themselves. Oligarchies, again, are overthrown when another oligarchy is created within the original one. That is to say, when the whole governing body is small, and yet they do not all share in the highest offices. Thus at Elis, the governing body was a small Senate, and very few ever found their way into it, because the Senators were only 90 in number, and were elected for life, and out of certain families, in a manner similar to the Lacedemonian Elders. Oligarchy is liable to revolutions, alike in war and in peace. In war because, not being able to trust the people, the oligarchs are compelled to hire mercenaries, and the general who is in command of them often ends in becoming a tyrant, as Tomophanes did at Corinth. Or if there are more generals than one, they make themselves into a company of tyrants. Sometimes the oligarchs, fearing this danger, give the people a share in the government because their services are necessary to them. And in time of peace, from mutual distrust, the two parties hand over the defense of the state to the army and to an arbiter between the two factions, who often ends the master of both. This happened at Larissa, when Simas the Iluet had the government, and at Avidus in the days of Afiades and the political clubs. Revolutions also arise out of marriages or lawsuits, which lead to the overthrow of one party among the oligarchs by another. Of quarrels about marriages, I have already mentioned some instances. A nether occurred at Eritrea, where Diagarus overturned the oligarchy of the knights because he had been wronged about a marriage. A revolution at Heraclia and another at Thebes, both erodes out the decisions of law courts upon a charge of adultery. In both cases, the punishment was just, but executed in the spirit of party at Heraclia upon Eritrean and at Thebes upon Arcaias. For their enemies were jealous of them, and so had them pilloried in the Agara. Many oligarchies have been destroyed by some members of the ruling class, taking offense at their excess of despotism. For example, the oligarchy at Naitis and at Caes. Changes of constitutional governments, and also of oligarchies which limit the office of counselor, judge, or other magistrate to persons having a certain money qualification, often incurred by accident. The qualification may have been originally fixed, according to the circumstances of the time, in such a manner as to include in an oligarchy a few only, or in a constitutional government the middle class. But after a time of prosperity, whether arising from peace or some other good fortune, the same property becomes many times as valuable, and then everybody participates in every office. This happens sometimes gradually and insensibly, and sometimes quickly. These are the causes of changes and revolutions in oligarchies. We must remark generally both of democracies and oligarchies that they sometimes change, not into the opposite forms of government, but only into another variety of the same class. I mean to say, from those forms of democracy and oligarchy which are regulated by law, into those which are arbitrary, and conversely. 7. In aristocracies revolutions are stirred up when a few only share in the honors of the state, a cause which has already been shown to affect oligarchies, for an aristocracy is a sort of oligarchy, and like an oligarchy is the government of a few, although few not for the same reason, hence the two are often confounded. And revolutions will be most likely to happen, and must happen, when the mass of the people are of the high-spirited kind, and have a notion that they are as good as their rulers. Thus at Lassa Demon, the so-called Parthenii, who were the illegitimate sons of the Spartan peers, attempted a revolution, and, being detected, were sent away to colonize Tarentum. Again, revolutions occur when great men who are at least of equal merit are dishonored by those higher in office, as Lysander was by the kings of Sparta, or when a brave man is excluded from the honors of the state, like Synodon, who conspired against the Spartans in the reign of a Jeselaus, or again, when some are very poor and others very rich, a state of society which is most often the result of war, as at Lassa Demon in the days of the Messenian War. This is proved from the poem of Tertius, entitled Good Order, for he speaks of certain citizens who were ruined by the war and wanted to have a redistribution of the land. Again, revolutions arise when an individual who is great and might be greater wants to rule alone, as at Lassa Demon, Pausanias, who was general in the Persian War, or like Hanno at Carthage. Constitutional governments and aristocracies are commonly overthrown owing to some deviation from justice in the Constitution itself. The cause of the downfall is, in the former, the ill mingling of the two elements, democracy and oligarchy. In the latter of the three elements, democracy, oligarchy, and virtue, but especially democracy and oligarchy. For, to combine these is the endeavor of constitutional governments, and most of the so-called aristocracies have a like game, but differ from polities in the mode of combination, hence some of them are more and some less permanent. Those which incline more to oligarchy are called aristocracies, and those which incline to democracy, constitutional governments. And therefore, the latter are the safer of the two, for the greater the number, the greater the strength, and when men are equal, they are contented. But the rich, if the Constitution gives them power, are apt to be insolent and avaricious, and in general, whichever way the Constitution inclines, in that direction it changes as either party gains strength, a constitutional government becoming a democracy, an aristocracy, and oligarchy. But the process may be reversed, and aristocracy may change into democracy. This happens when the poor, under the idea that they are being wronged, force the Constitution to take an opposite form. In like manner, constitutional governments change into oligarchies. The only stable principle of government is equality according to proportion, and for every man to enjoy his own. What I've just mentioned actually happened at Theorie I, where the qualification for office, at first high, was therefore reduced, and the magistrates increased in number. The notables had previously acquired the whole of the land contrary to law, for the government tended to oligarchy, and they were able to encroach. But the people, who had been trained by war, soon got the better of the guards kept by the oligarchs, until those who had had too much gave up their land. Again, since all aristocratic governments inclined to oligarchy, the notables are apt to be grasping. Thus at Lassa Demon, where property tends to pass in a few hands, the notables can do too much as they like, and they were allowed to marry whom they please. The city of Lowcry was ruined by a marriage connection with Dionysius, but such a thing could never have happened in a democracy or in a well-balanced aristocracy. I have already remarked that in all states, revolutions are occasioned by trifles. In aristocracies, above all, they are of a gradual and imperceptible nature. The citizens begin by giving up some part of the constitution, and so with greater ease, the government changed something else, which is a little more important, until they have undermined the whole fabric of the state. At Theriae, there was a law that general should only be re-elected after an interval of five years, and some young men who were popular with the soldiers of the guard for their military prowess, despising the magistrates in thinking that they would easily gain their purpose, wanted to abolish this law, and allow their generals to hold perpetual commands, for they well knew that the people would be glad enough to elect them. Whereupon the magistrates who had charged these matters, and who were called councilors, at first determined to resist, but they afterwards consented, thinking that, if only this one law was changed, no further in-road would be made on the constitution. But other changes soon followed, which they in vain attempted to oppose, and the state passed into the hands of the revolutionists, who established a dynastic oligarchy. All constitutions are overthrown either from within or from without, the latter, when there is some government close at hand, having an opposite interest, or at a distance but powerful. This was exemplified in the old times of the Athenians and Elacidemonians, the Athenians everywhere put down the oligarchies and the Elacidemonians, the democracies. I have now explained what are the chief causes of revolutions and dissentions in states. 8. We have next to consider what means there are of preserving constitutions in general and in particular cases. In the first place it is evident that if we know the causes which destroy constitutions, we also know the causes which preserve them, for opposites produce opposites, and destruction is the opposite of preservation.  The expense does not take place at once, and therefore is not observed, the mind is deceived, as in the fallacy which says that if each part is little, then the whole is little. This is true in one way but not in another, for the whole and the all are not little, although they are made up of littles. In the first place then, men should guard against the beginning of change, and in the second place they should not rely upon the political devices of which I have already spoken invented only to deceive the people, for they are proved by experience to be useless. Further, we note that oligarchies as well as aristocracies may last not from any inherent stability in such forms of government, but because the rulers are in good terms, both with the unenfranchised and with the governing classes, not maltreating any who are excluded from the government, but introducing into it the leading spirits among them. They should never wrong the ambitious in a matter of honor, or the common people in a matter of money, and they should treat one another and their fellow citizen in a spirit of equality. The equality which the friends of democracy seek to establish for the multitude is not only just, but likewise expedient among equals. Hence, that the governing class are numerous, many democratic institutions are useful. For example, the restriction of the tenure of offices to six months, that all those who are of equal rank may share in them. Indeed, equals or peers when they are numerous become a kind of democracy, and therefore demagogues are very likely to arise among them, as I have already remarked. The short tenure of office prevents oligarchies and aristocracies from falling into the hands of families. It is not easy for a person to do any great harm when his tenure of office is short, whereas long possession begets tyranny in oligarchies and democracies. For the aspirants to tyranny are either the principal men of the state, who in democracies are demagogues and in oligarchies members of ruling houses, or those who hold great offices, and have a long tenure of them. Constitutions are preserved when their destroyers are at a distance, and sometimes also because they are near, for the fear of them makes the government keep in hand the constitution. Wherefore, the ruler who has a care of the constitution should invent terrors, and bring distant dangers near, in order that the citizens may be on their guard, and, like sentinels in a night-wash, never relax their attention. He should endeavor too, by help of the laws, to control the contentions and quarrels of the notables, and to prevent those who have not hitherto taken part in them from catching the spirit of contention. No ordinary man can discern the beginning of evil, but only the true statesman. As to the change produced in oligarchies and constitutional governments, by the alteration of the qualification, when this arises, not out of any variation in the qualification, but only out of the increase of money, it is well to compare the general valuation of property with that of past years, annually in those cities in which the census is taken annually, and in larger cities every third or fifth year. If the whole is many times greater or many times less, than when the ratings recognized by the constitution were fixed, there should be power given by law to raise or lower the qualification as the amount is greater or less. Where this is not done, a constitutional government passes into an oligarchy, and an oligarchy is narrow to a rule of families, or in the opposite case, constitutional government becomes democracy, and oligarchy either constitutional government or democracy. It is a principle common to democracy, oligarchy, and every other form of government, not to allow the disproportionate increase of any citizen, but to give moderate honor for a long time, rather than great honor for a short time. For men are easily spoiled, not everyone can bear prosperity, but if this rule is not observed, at any rate the honors which are given all at once should be taken away by degrees and not all at once, especially should the laws provide against anyone having too much power, whether derived from friends or money. If he has, he should be sent clean out of the country, and since innovations creep in through the private life of individuals also, there ought to be a magistracy which will have an eye to those whose life is not in harmony with the government, whether oligarchy or democracy or any other. And for a like reason, an increase in prosperity in any part of the state should be carefully watched. The proper remedy for this evil is always to give the management of affairs and offices of state to opposite elements. Such opposites are the virtuous and the many, or the rich and the poor. Another way is to combine the poor and the rich in one body, or to increase the middle class. Thus an end will be put to the revolutions which arise from inequality. But above all, every state should be so administered and so regulated by law that its magistrates cannot possibly make money. In oligarchies, special precautions should be used against this evil. For the people do not take any great offense at being kept out of the government. Indeed, they are rather pleased and otherwise at having leisure for their private business. But what irritates them is to think that their rulers are stealing the public money. Then they are doubly annoyed, for they lose both honor and profit. If office brought no profit, then and then only could democracy and aristocracy be combined, for both notables and people might have their wishes gratified. All would be able to hold office, which is the aim of democracy, and the notables would be magistrates, which is the aim of aristocracy. And this result may be accomplished when there is no possibility of making money out of the offices, for the poor will not want to have them when there was nothing to be gained from them, they would rather be attending to their own concerns, and the rich, who do not want money from the public treasury, will be able to take them, and so the poor will keep to their work and grow rich, and the notables will not be governed by the lower class. In order to avoid speculation of the public money, the transfer of the revenue should be made at a general assembly of the citizens, and duplicates of the accounts deposited with the different brotherhoods, companies, and tribes. In honor should be given by law to magistrates who have the reputation of being incorruptible. In democracies, the rich should be spared, not only should their property not be divided, but their incomes also, which in some states are taken from them imperceptibly, should be protected. It is a good thing to prevent the wealthy citizens, even if they are willing, from undertaking expensive and useless public services, such as the giving of choruses, tort races, and the like. And in oligarchy on the other hand, great care should be taken of the poor, and lucrative offices should go to them. If any of the wealthy classes insult them, the offender should be punished more severely than if he had wronged one of his own class. Provision should be made that the estates pass by inheritance and not by gift, and no person should have more than one inheritance, for in this way properties will be equalized, and more of the poor rise to competency. It is also expedient, both in a democracy and in an oligarchy, to assign to those who have less share in the government, i.e. to the rich in a democracy and to the poor in an oligarchy, in equality or preference, and all but the principal offices of states. The latter should be entrusted chiefly or only to members of the governing class. 9. There are three qualifications required in those who have to fill the highest offices. 1. First of all, loyalty to the established constitution. 2. The greatest administrative capacity. 3. Virtue and justice of the kind proper to each form of government. 4. If what is just is not the same in all governments, the quality of justice must also differ. There may be a doubt, however, when all these qualities do not meet in the same person, how the selection is to be made. Suppose, for example, a good general is a bad man and not a friend to the constitution, and another man is loyal and just, which should we choose? In making the election, ought we not to consider two points, what qualities are common and what are rare? Thus, in the choice of a general, we should regard his skill rather than his virtue, for few have military skill, but many have virtue. In any office of trust or stewardship, on the other hand, the opposite rule should be observed, for more virtue than ordinary is required in the holder of such an office, but the necessary knowledge is of a sort which all men possess. It may, however, be asked, what a man wants with virtue if he have political ability and is loyal, since these two qualities alone will make him do what is for the public interest. But may not men have both of them and yet be deficient in self-control? If, knowing and loving their own interests, they do not always attend to them, may they not be equally negligent of the interests of the public? Speaking generally, we may say that whatever legal enactments are held to be for the interest of various constitutions, all these preserve them, and the great preserving principle is the one which has been repeatedly mentioned, to have a care that the loyal citizen should be stronger than the disloyal. Neither should we forget the mean, which at the present day is lost side of in perverted forms of government, for many practices which appear to be democratic are the ruin of democracies, and many which appear to be oligarchical are the ruin of oligarchies. Those who think that all virtue is to be found in their own party principles push matters to extremes, they do not consider that disproportion destroys a state. A nose, which varies from the ideal of straightness to a hook or snub, may still be of good shape and agreeable to the eye, but if the excess be very great all symmetry is lost, and the nose at last ceases to be a nose at all on account of some excess in one direction or defect in the other, and this is true of every other part of the human body. The same law of proportion equally holds in states. Oligarchy or democracy, although a departure from the most perfect form, may yet be a good enough government, but if anyone attempts to push the principles of either to an extreme, he will begin by spoiling the government and end by having done it all. Wherefore, the legislator and the statesman ought to know what democratic measures save and what destroy a democracy, and what oligarchical measures save or destroy an oligarchy, for neither the one nor the other can exist or continue to exist unless both rich and poor are included in it. If equality of property is introduced, the state must of necessity take another form, for when by laws carried to excess, one or other element in the state is ruined, the constitution is ruined. There is an error common both to oligarchies and to democracies. In the latter, the demagogues, when the multitude or above the law, are always cutting the city in two by quarrels with the rich, whereas they should always profess to be maintaining their cause. Just as in oligarchies, the oligarch should profess to maintaining the cause of the people, and should take oaths the opposite of those which they now take. For there are cities in which they swear, I will be an enemy to the people, and will devise all the harm against them which I can, but they ought to exhibit and to entertain the very opposite feeling. In the form of their oath, there should be an express declaration, I will do no wrong to the people. But of all the things which I had mentioned, that which most contributes to the permanence of constitutions is the adaptation of education to the form of government, and yet in our own day this principle is universally neglected. The best laws, though sanctioned by every citizen of the state, will be of no avail unless the young are trained by habit and education in the spirit of the constitution, if the laws are democratical, democratically, or oligarchically if the laws are oligarchical. For there may be a want of self-discipline in states as well as in individuals. Now, to have been educated in the spirit of the constitution is not to perform the actions in which oligarchs or democrats delight, but those by which the existence of an oligarchy or of a democracy is made possible. Whereas among ourselves, the sons of the ruling class and an oligarchy live in luxury, but the sons of the poor are hardened by exercise and toil, and hence they are both more inclined and better able to make a revolution. And in democracies of the more extreme type, there is arisen a false idea of freedom, which is contradictory to the true interests of the state. For two principles are characteristic of democracy, the government of the majority and freedom. Men think that what is just is equal, and that equality is the supremacy of the popular will, and that freedom means the doing what a man likes. In such democracies everyone lives as he pleases, or in the words of Euripides, according to his fancy. But this is all wrong. Men should not think it's slavery to live according to the rule of the constitution, for it is their salvation. I have now discussed generally the causes of the revolution and destruction of states, and the means of their preservation and continuance. End of Book 5, Sections 8 through 9. Book 5, Section 10 of Politics, by Aristotle. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Leon Meyer. Politics, by Aristotle. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Book 5, Section 10. I have still to speak of monarchy and the causes of its destruction and preservation. What I have said already, respecting forms of constitutional government, applies almost equally to royal and to tyrannical rule. For royal rule is of the nature of an aristocracy, and a tyranny is a compound of oligarchy and democracy and their most extreme forms. It is therefore most injurious to its subjects being made up of two evil forms of government, and having the perversions and errors of both. These two forms of monarchy are contrary in their very origin. The appointment of a king is the resource of the better classes against the people, and he is elected by them out of their own number, because either he himself or his family excel in virtue and virtuous actions, whereas a tyrant is chosen from the people to be their protector against the notables, and in order to prevent them from being injured. History shows that almost all tyrants have been demagogues who gain the favor of the people by their accusation of the notables. At any rate, this was the manner in which the tyrannies arose in the days when cities had increased in power. Others which were older originated in the ambition of kings, wanting to overstep the limits of their hereditary power and become despots. Others again grew out of the class which were chosen to be chief magistrates, for in ancient times the people who elected them gave the magistrates, whether civil or religious, a long tenure. Others arose out of the custom which oligarchies had of making some individual supreme over the highest offices. In any of these ways, an ambitious man had no difficulty if he desired in creating a tyranny, since he had the power in his hands already, either as king or as one of the officers of state. Thus Fiden and Argos and several others were originally kings, and ended by becoming tyrants. Phalaris, on the other hand, and the Ionian tyrants, acquired the tyranny by holding great offices. Whereas Penetrius at Leontinai, Sipselis at Corinth, Posistratus at Athens, Dionysius at Syracuse, and several others who afterwards became tyrants were at first demagogues. And so, as I was saying, royalty ranks with aristocracy, for it is based upon merit, whether of the individual or of his family, or on benefits conferred, or on these claims with power added to them. For all who have obtained this honor have benefited, or had in their power to benefit, states and nations. Some, like Padres, have prevented the state from being enslaved in war. Others, like Cyrus, have given their country freedom, or have settled or gained a territory like the Lacedaemonian, Macedonian, and Milatian kings. The idea of a king is to be a protector of the rich against unjust treatment, of the people against insult and oppression. Whereas a tyrant, as has often been repeated, has no regard to any public interest, except as conducive to his private ends. His aim is pleasure, the aim of a king, honor. Wherefore also in their desires they differ. The tyrant is desirous of riches, the king of what brings honor, and the guards of a king are citizens, but of a tyrant mercenaries. That tyranny has all the vices both of democracy and oligarchy is evident. As of oligarchy, so of tyranny, the end is wealth. For by wealth only can the tyrant maintain either his guard or his luxury. Both mistrust the people, and therefore deprive them of their arms. Both agree too in injuring the people, and driving them out of the city and dispersing them. From democracy, tyrants have borrowed the art of making war upon the notables, and destroying them secretly or openly, or of exiling them because they are rivals and stand in the way of their power, and also because plots against them are contrived by men of this status, who either want to rule or to escape subjection. Hence Periander advised Thrasybulus by cutting off the tops of the tallest years of corn, meaning that he must always put out of the way the citizens who overtopped the rest. And so, as I have already intimated, the beginnings of change are the same in monarchies as in forms of constitutional government. Subjects attack their sovereigns out of fear or contempt, or because they have been unjustly treated by them. And of injustice, the most common form is insult. Another is confiscation of property. The ends sought by conspiracies against monarchies, whether tyrannies or royalties, are the same as the ends sought by conspiracies against other forms of government. Monarchs have great wealth and honor, which are objects of desire to all a mankind. The attacks are made sometimes against their lives, sometimes against the office, where the sense of insult is the motive against their lives. Any sort of insult, and there are many, may stir up anger, and when men are angry, they commonly act out of revenge and not from ambition. For example, the attempt made upon the postastratity arose out of the public dishonor offered to the sister of harmonious, and the insult to himself. He attacked the tyrant for his sister's sake, and Aristigetan joined in the attack for the sake of harmonious. A conspiracy was also formed against Ariander, the tyrant of Ambrosia, because, when drinking with a favorite youth, he asked him whether by this time he was not with child by him. Philip, too, was attacked by Pausanias because he prevented him to be insulted by Adelis and his friends, and Amentis the Little by Dirtis because he boasted of having enjoyed his youth. Avagaris of Cyprus, again, was slain by the eunuch to revenge an insult, for his wife had been carried out by Avagaris' son. Many conspiracies have originated in shameful attempts made by sovereigns on the persons of their subjects. Such was the attack of Cretias upon Archelaus. He had always hated the connection with him, and so when Archelaus, having promised him one of his two daughters in marriage, did not give him either of them, but broke his word and married the elder to the king of Elimea, when he was hard-pressed in a war against Cerys and Arbius, and the younger to his own son Amentis, under the idea that Amentis would then be less likely to quarrel with his son by Cleopatra, Cretias made this slight a pretext for attacking Archelaus, though even a less reason would have sufficed, for the real cause of the estrangement was the disgust which he felt at his connection with the king. And from a like motive, Hellenocrates of Larissa conspired with him, for when Archelaus, who was his lover, did not fulfill his promise of restoring him to his country, he thought that the connection between them had originated not in affection, but in the wantonness of power. Hitho too and Heraclides of Enes slew Coddis in order to avenge their father, and Atimus revolted from Coddis in revenge for the wanton outrage which he had committed in mutilating him when a child. Many, too, irritated at blows inflicted on the person which they deemed an insult, have either killed or attempted to kill officers of state and royal princes by whom they have been injured. Thus, at Metellini, Megacles and his friends attacked and slew the pentility, as they were going about in striking people with clubs. At a later date, Coddis Mirtis, who had been beaten and torn away from his wife by Pontillus, slew him. In the conspiracy against Archelaus, Decannecus stimulated the fury of the assassins and led the attack. He was enraged because Archelaus had delivered him to Euripides to be scourged, for the poet had been irritated at some remark made by Decannecus on the foulness of his breath. Many other examples might be cited of murders and conspiracies which have arisen from similar causes. Fear is another motive which, as we have said, has caused conspiracies as well in monarchies, as in more popular forms of government. Thus, Archiphanes conspired against Xerxes and slew him, fearing that he would be accused of hanging Darius against his orders. He, having been under the impression that Xerxes would forget what he had said in the middle of a meal, and that the offense would be forgiven. Another motive is contempt, as in the case of Sardinopelus, whom someone saw according wool with his women, if the storytellers stay truly. And the tale may be true, if not of him, of someone else. Dion attacked the younger Dionysius because he despised him, and saw that he was equally despised by his own subjects, and that he was always drunk. Even the friends of a tyrant will sometimes attack him out of contempt, for the confidence which he reposes in them breeds contempt, and they think that they will not be found out. The expectation of success is likewise a sort of contempt. The assailants are ready to strike, and think nothing of the danger, because they seem to have the power in their hands. Thus, generals of armies attack monarchs, as, for example, Cyrus attacked the sastrategies, despising the effeminency of his life, and believing that his power was worn out. Thus again, Seuthis, the Thracian, conspired against Amaticus, whose general he was. And sometimes men are actuated by more than one motive, like Mithridates, who conspired against Ariobarzenes, partly out of contempt, and partly from the love of gain. Bold natures, placed by their sovereigns on a high military position, are most likely to make the attempt in the expectation of success. For courage is emboldened by power, and the union of the two inspires them with the hope of an easy victory. Attempts of which the motive is ambition arise in a different way, as well as in those already mentioned. There are men who will not risk their lives in the hope of gains and honors, however great, but who nevertheless regard the killing of a tyrant simply as an extraordinary action, which will make them famous and honorable in the world. They wish to acquire not a kingdom, but a name. It is rare, however, to find such men.  He must have the resolution of Dion, who, when he made war upon Dionysius, took with him very few troops, saying that whatever measure of success he might attain would be enough for him, even if he were to die the moment he landed. Such a death would be welcome to him. This is a temper to which few can attain. Once more, tyrannies, like all other governments, are destroyed from without by some opposite and more powerful form of government. That such a government will have the will to attack them is clear, for the two are opposed in principle, and all men, if they can, do what they will. Democracy is antagonistic to tyranny, on the principle of Hesiod, Hatter hates Potter, because they are nearly a kin, for the extreme form of democracy is tyranny, and royalty and aristocracy are both alike opposed to tyranny, because they are constitutions of a different type. And therefore the Lassidemonians put down most of the tyrannies, and so did the Syracusans during the time when they were well governed. Again, tyrannies are destroyed from within when the reigning family are divided among themselves, as that of Gilo was, and more recently that of Dionysius. In the case of Gilo, because Thrasybulus, the brother of Hiro, flattered the son of Gilo, and led him into excesses in order that he might rule in his name, whereupon the family got together a party to get rid of Thrasybulus and save the tyranny. But those of the people who conspired with them seized the opportunity and drove them all out. In the case of Dionysius, Dion, his own relative, attacked and expelled him with the assistance of the people. He afterwards perished himself. There are two chief motives which induce men to attack tyrannies, hatred and contempt. Hatred of tyrants is inevitable, and contempt is also a frequent cause of their destruction. Thus we see that most of those who have acquired have retained their power, but those who have inherited have lost it almost at once. For, living in luxurious ease, they become contemptible, and offer many opportunities to their assailants. Anger, too, must be included under hatred, and produces the same effects. It is, often times, even more ready to strike. The angry are more impetuous in making an attack, for they do not follow rational principle. And men are very apt to give way to their passions when they are insulted. To this cause is to be attributed the fall of the posistratity, and of many others. Hatred is more reasonable, for anger is accompanied by pain, which is an impediment to reason, whereas hatred is painless. In a word, all the causes which I have mentioned as destroying the last and most unmixed form of all darky, and the extreme form of democracy, may be assumed to affect tyranny. Indeed, the extreme forms of both are only tyrannies distributed among several persons. Kingly rule is little affected by external causes, and is therefore lasting. It is generally destroyed from within. There are two ways in which destruction may come about. One, when the members of the royal family quarrel among themselves, and two, when the kings attempt to administer the state too much after the fashion of a tyranny, and to extend their authority contrary to the law. Royalties do not now come into existence where such forms of government arise, they are rather monarchies or tyrannies. For the rule of a king is over voluntary subjects, and he is supreme in all important matters. But in our own day, men are more upon an equality, and no one is so immeasurably superior to others as to represent adequately the greatness and dignity of the office. Hence mankind will not, if they can help, endure it, and anyone who obtains power by force or fraud is at once thought to be a tyrant. In hereditary monarchies, a further cause of destruction is the fact that kings often fall into contempt, and although possessing not tyrannical powers, but only royal dignity, are apt to outrage others. Their overthrow is then readily affected, for there is an end to the king when his subjects do not want to have him, but the tyrant lasts whether they like him or not. The destruction of monarchies is to be attributed to these and the like causes. And of Book 5, Section 10. Book 5, Sections 11-12 of Politics by Aristotle. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Leon Meyer. Politics by Aristotle. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Book 5, Sections 11-12. 11. And they are preserved to speak generally by the opposite causes. Or if we consider them separately, one, royalty is preserved by the limitation of its powers. The more restricted the functions of kings, the longer their power will last unimpaired. For then they are more moderate and not so despotic in their ways, and they are less envied by their subjects. This is the reason why the kingly office has lasted so long among the Miloshians. And for a similar reason, it is continued among the Lacedaemonians, because there it was always divided between two, and afterwards further limited by the O'Papas, in various respects, more particularly by the establishment of the efferalty. He diminished the power of the kings, but established on a more lasting basis the kingly office, which was thus made in a certain sense not less, but greater. There is a story that, when his wife once asked him whether he was not ashamed to leave to his sons a royal power which was less than he had inherited from his father, no indeed he replied, for the power which I leave to them will be more lasting. As to two tyrannies, they are preserved in two most opposite ways. One of them is the old traditional method in which most tyrants administer their government. Of such arts, periander of Corinth is said to have been the great master, and many similar devices may be gathered from the Persians and the administration of their government. There are firstly the prescriptions mentioned some distance back for the preservation of a tyranny in so far as this is possible, vis that the tyrant should lob off those who are too high. He must put to death men of spirit. He must not allow common meals, clubs, education, and the like. He must be upon his guard against anything which is likely to inspire either courage or confidence among subjects. He must prohibit literary assemblies or other meetings for discussion, and he must take every means to prevent people from knowing one another. For acquaintance begets mutual confidence. Further, he must compel all persons staying in the city to appear in public and live at his gates. Then he will know what they are doing. If they are always kept under, they will learn to be humble. In short, he should practice these and the like Persian and barbaric arts, which all have the same object. A tyrant should also endeavor to know what each of the subjects says or does and should employ spies like the female detectives at Syracuse and the eavesdroppers whom Hyero was in the habit of sending to any place of resort or meeting. For the fear of informers prevents people from speaking their minds, and if they do they're more easily found out. Another art of the tyrant is to sew quarrels among the citizens. Friends should be embroiled with friends, the people with notables, and the rich with one another. Also, he should impoverish his subjects. He thus provides against the maintenance of a guard by the citizen, and the people having to keep hard at work are prevented from conspiring. The pyramids of Egypt afford an example of this policy. Also the offerings of the family of Sipsilis, and the building of the Temple of Olympian Zeus by the Puzestratidae, and the Great Polycrotene Monuments at Samus. All these works were like intended to occupy the people and keep them poor. Another practice of tyrants is to multiply taxes after the manner of Dionysius at Syracuse, who contrived that within five years his subjects should bring into treasury their whole property. The tyrant is also fond of making war in order that his subjects may have something to do and be always in want of a leader. And whereas the power of a king is preserved by his friends, the characteristic of a tyrant is to distrust his friends, because he knows that all men want to ever throw him, and they above all have the power. Again, the evil practices of the last and worst form of democracy are all found in tyrannies. Such are the power given to women and their families in the hope that they will inform against their husbands, and the license which is allowed to slaves in order that they may betray their masters. For slaves and women do not conspire against tyrants, and they are of course friendly to tyrannies and also to democracies, since under them they have a good time. For the people too would fame be a monarch, and therefore by them as well as by the tyrant the flatterer is held in honor. In democracies he is the demagogue, and the tyrant also has those who associate with him in a humble spirit, which is a work of flattery. Hence tyrants are always fond of bad men, because they love to be flattered, but no man who has a spirit of a free man in him will lower himself by flattery. Good men love others, or at any rate do not flatter them. Moreover, the bad are useful for bad purposes. Nail knocks out nail as the proverb says. It is characteristic of a tyrant to dislike everyone who has dignity or independence. He wants to be alone in his glory, but anyone who claims a like dignity or asserts his independence encroaches upon his prerogative, and is hated by him as an enemy to his power. Another mark of a tyrant is that he likes foreigners better than citizens, and lives with them and invites them to his table, for the one are enemies, but the others enter into no rivalry with him. Such are the notes of the tyrant and the arts by which he preserves his power. There is no wickedness too great for him. All that we have said may be summed up under three heads, which answer to the three aims of the tyrant. These are, one, the humiliation of his subjects. He knows that a mean spirited man will not conspire against anybody. Two, the creation of mistrust among them, for a tyrant is not overthrown until men begin to have confidence in one another. And this is the reason why tyrants are at war with the good. They are under the idea that their power is endangered by them, not only because they would not be ruled despotically, but also because they are loyal to one another, and to other men, and do not inform against one another or against other men. Three, the tyrant desires that his subjects shall be incapable of action. Four, no one attempts what is impossible, and they will not attempt to overthrow tyranny if they are powerless. Under these three heads, the whole policy of a tyrant may be summed up, and to one or other of them all his ideas may be referred. One, he sows distrust among his subjects. Two, he takes away their power. Three, he humbles them. This then is one of the two methods by which tyrannies are preserved, and there is another which proceeds upon an almost opposite principle of action. The nature of this latter method may be gathered from a comparison of the causes which destroyed kingdoms. Four, as one mode of destroying kingly power is to make the office of king more tyrannical, so the salvation of a tyranny is to make it more like the rule of a king. But of one thing the tyrant must be careful. He must keep power enough to rule over his subjects, whether they like him or not. For if he once gives this up, he gives up his tyranny. But though power must be retained as the foundation, in all else the tyrant should act or appear to act in the character of a king. In the first place, he should pretend to care the public revenues, and not waste money in making presence of a sort at which the common people get excited when they see their hard-won earnings snatched from them, and lavished on courtesans, and strangers, and artists. He should give an account of what he receives and of what he spends, a practice which has been adopted by some tyrants, for then he will seem to be a steward of the public rather than a tyrant. Nor need he fear that, while he is lord of the city, he will ever be in want of money. Such a policy is, at all events, much more advantageous for the tyrant when he goes from home than to leave behind him a horde, for then the garrison who remain in the city will be less likely to attack his power, and a tyrant when he is absent from home has more reason to fear the guardians of his treasure than the citizens, for the one accompany him, but the others remain behind. In the second place, he should be seen to collect taxes and to require public services only for state purposes, and that he may form a fund in case of war, and generally he ought to make himself the guardian and treasurer of them, as if they belong not to him, but to the public. He should appear not harsh but dignified, and when men meet him, they should look upon him with reverence and not with fear. Yet it is hard for him to be respected if he inspires no respect, and therefore whatever virtues he may neglect, at least he should maintain the character of a great soldier, and produce the impression that he is one. Neither he nor any of his associates should ever be guilty of the least defense against modesty towards the young of either sex who are his subjects, and the women of his family should observe alike self-control towards other women. The insolence of women has ruined many tyrannies. In the indulgence of pleasures, he should be the opposite of our modern tyrants, who not only begin at dawn and pass whole days in sensuality, but want other men to see them, that they may admire their happy and blessed lot. In these things, a tyrant should, if possible, be moderate, or at any rate, should not parade his vices to the world. For a drunken and drowsy tyrant is soon despised in attack, not so he who is temperate and wide awake. His conduct should be the very reverse of nearly everything which has been said before about tyrants. He ought to adorn and improve his city, as though he were not a tyrant but the guardian of the state. Also, he should appear to be particularly earnest in the service of the gods. For if men think that a ruler is religious, and has a reverence for the gods, they are less afraid of suffering injustice at his hands, and they are less disposed to conspire against him, because they believe him to have the very gods fighting on his side. At the same time, his religion must not be thought foolish, and he should honor men of merit, and make them think that they would not be held in more honor by the citizens if they had a free government. The honor he should distribute himself, but the punishment should be inflicted by officers and courts of law. It is a precaution which is taken by all monarchs not to make one person great, but if one, then two or more should be raised, that they may look sharply after one another. If after all someone has to be made great, he should not be a man of bold spirit, for such dispositions are ever most inclined to strike. And if anyone is to be deprived of his power, let it be diminished gradually, not taken from him all at once. The tyrant should abstain from all outrage, in particular from personal violence and from wanton conduct towards the young. He should be especially careful of his behavior to men who are lovers of honor, for as the lovers of money are offended when their property is touched, so are the lovers of honor and the virtuous when their honor is affected. Therefore, a tyrant ought either not to commit such acts at all, or he should be thought only to employ fatherly correction, and not to trample upon others. And his acquaintance with youth should be supposed to arise from affection, and not from the insolence of power, and in general he should compensate the appearance of dishonor by the increase of honor. Of those who attempt assassination, they are the most dangerous, and require to be most carefully watched, who do not care to survive if they affect their purpose. Therefore, special precaution should be taken about any who think that either they or those for whom they care have been insulted, for when men are led away by passion to assault others, they are regardless of themselves. As Heraclitus says, it is difficult to fight against anger, for a man will buy revenge with his soul. And whereas states consist of two classes, a poor man and a rich, the tyrant should lead both to imagine that they are preserved and prevented from harming one another by his rule, and whichever of the two is stronger, he should attach to his government. For, having this advantage, he has no need either to emancipate slaves or to disarm the citizens. Either party added to the force which he already has will make him stronger than his assailants. But enough of these details. What should be the general policy of the tyrant is obvious. He ought to show himself to his subjects in the light, not of a tyrant, but of a steward and a king. He should not appropriate what is theirs, but should be their guardian. He should be moderate, not extravagant in his way of life. He should win the notables by companionship, and the multitude by flattery. For then his rule will of necessity be nobler and happier, because he will rule over better men whose spirits are not crushed, over men to whom he himself is not an object of hatred, and of whom he is not afraid. His power too will be more lasting. His disposition will be virtuous, or at least half-virtuous, and he will not be wicked, but half-wicked only. 12. Yet no forms of government are so short-lived as oligarchy and tyranny. The tyranny which lasted the longest was that of Orthagoras and his sons at Sisyon. This continued for a hundred years. The reason was that they treated their subjects with moderation, and to a great extent observed the laws, and in various ways gained the favor of the people by the care which they took of them. Hysthenes, in particular, was respected for his military ability. If the report may be believed, he crowned the judge who decided against him in the games, and as some say, the sitting statue in the Agorah of Sisyon is the likeness of this person. A similar story is told of Pisistratus, who has said on one occasion to have allowed himself to be summoned and tried before the Areopagus. Next, in duration, to the tyranny of Orthagoras, was that of the Sepsility at Corinth, which lasted 73 years and 6 months. Sepsilis reigned 30 years, Periander 40 and a half, and Semiticus, the son of Gorgas III. Their continuance was due to similar causes. Sepsilis was a popular man, who during the whole time of his rule, never had a bodyguard, and Periander, although he was a tyrant, was a great soldier. Third in duration was the rule of the Pisistrati and Athens, but it was interrupted, for Pisistratus was twice driven out, so that during 3 and 30 years he reigned only 17, and his sons reigned 18 altogether 35 years. Of other tyrannies, that of Hyero and Gilo at Syracuse was the most lasting. Even this, however, was short, not more than 18 years and all, for Gilo continued tyrant for 7 years, and died in the 8th, Hyero reigned for 10 years, and Thrasibulus was driven out in the 11th month. In fact, tyrannies generally have been a quite short duration. I have now gone through almost all the causes by which constitutional governments and monarchies are either destroyed or preserved. In the Republic of Plato, Socrates treats of revolutions, but not well, for he mentions no cause of change which peculiarly affects the first or perfect state. He only says that the cause is that nothing is abiding, but all things change in a certain cycle, and that the origin of the change consists in those numbers of which 4 and 3, married with 5, furnished two harmonies. He means when the number of this figure becomes solid. He can see as that nature, at certain times, produces bad men who will not submit to education, in which latter particular he may very likely be not far wrong, for there may well be some men who cannot be educated to make virtuous. But why is such a cause of change peculiar to his ideal state and not rather common to all states made to everything which comes into being at all? And is it by the agency of time which as he declares makes all things change, that things which did not begin together change together? For example, if something has come into being the day before the completion of the cycle, will it change with things that came into being before? Further, why should the perfect state change into the Spartan? For governments more often take an opposite form than one akin to them. The same remark is applicable to the other changes. He says that the Spartan constitution changes into an oligarchy and this into a democracy and this again into a tyranny. And yet the contrary happens quite as often. For a democracy is even more likely to change into an oligarchy than into a monarchy. Further, he never says whether tyranny is or is not liable to revolutions and if it is what is the cause of them or into what form it changes. And the reason is that he could not very well have told for there is no rule. According to him it should revert to the first and best and then there would be a complete cycle. But in point of fact a tyranny often changes into a tyranny as that excision changed from the tyranny of Myron into that of Klycenes into oligarchy as the tyranny of Antilion did to Calces into democracy and that of Gilo's family did at Syracuse into aristocracy as at Carthage and the tyranny of Carleus and Lassadiman. Often an oligarchy changes into a tyranny like most of the ancient oligarchies in Sicily. For example the oligarchy and the Antini change into the tyranny of Penetius that at Gila into the tyranny of Cleander that at Regium into the tyranny of Anaxelaus. The same thing has happened in many other states. And it is absurd to suppose that the state changes into an oligarchy merely because the ruling class are lovers and makers of money and not because the very rich think it unfair that the very poor should have an equal share in the government with themselves. Moreover in many oligarchies there are laws against making money and trade. But at Carthage which is a democracy there is no such prohibition and yet to this day the Carthaginians have never had a revolution. It is absurd too for him to say that an oligarchy is two cities one of the rich and the other of the poor. Is not this just as much the case in the Spartan Constitution or in any other in which either all do not possess equal property or all are not equally good men? Nobody need be poorer than he was before and yet the oligarchy may change all the same into a democracy if the poor form the majority and a democracy may change into an oligarchy if the wealthy class are stronger than the people and the one are energetic the other indifferent. Once more although the causes of the change are very numerous he mentions only one which is that the citizens become poor through dissipation and debt as though he thought that all or the majority of them were originally rich. This is not true though it is true that when any of the leaders lose their property they are right for revolution. But when anybody else it is no great matter and an oligarchy does not even then more often pass into a democracy than into any other form of government. Again if men are deprived of the honors of state and are wronged and insulted they make revolutions and change forms of government even although they have not wasted their substance because they might do what they liked of which extravagance he declares excessive freedom to be the cause. Finally although there are many forms of oligarchies and democracies Sakriti speaks of their revolutions as though there were only one form of either of them. End of Book 5 Sections 11 through 12 Book 6 Sections 1 through 4 of Politics by Aristotle This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Recording by Leon Meyer Politics by Aristotle Translated by Benjamin Jowett Book 6 Section 1 We have now considered the varieties of the deliberative or supreme power in states and the various arrangements of law courts in state offices and which of them are adapted to different forms of government. We have also spoken of the destruction and preservation of constitutions how and from what causes they arise. Of democracy and all other forms of government there are many kinds and it will be well to assign to them separately the modes of organization which are proper and advantageous to each adding what remains to be said about them. Moreover we ought to consider the various combinations of these modes themselves for such combinations make constitutions overlap one another so that aristocracies have an oligarchical character and constitutional governments inclined to democracies. When I speak of the combinations which remain to be considered and thus far have not been considered by us I mean such as these when the deliberative part of the government and the election of officers is constituted oligarchically and the law courts aristocratically or when the courts and the deliberative part of the state are oligarchical and the election to office aristocratical or when in any other way there is a want of harmony in the composition of a state. I have shown already what forms of democracy are suited to particular cities and what of oligarchy to particular peoples and to whom each of the other forms of government is suited. Further we must not only show which of these governments is the best for each state but also briefly proceed to consider how these and other forms of government are to be established. First of all let us speak of democracy which will also bring to light the opposite form of government commonly called oligarchy. For the purposes of this inquiry we need to ascertain all the elements and characteristics of democracy since from the combinations of these the varieties of democratic government arise. There are several of these differing from each other and the difference is due to two causes. One has already been mentioned differences of population for the popular element may consist of husband men or of mechanics or of laborers and if the first of these be added to the second or the third to the two others not only does the democracy become better or worse but its very nature has changed. A second cause remains to be mentioned. The various properties and characteristics of democracy when variously combined make a difference. For one democracy will have less and another will have more and another will have all of these characteristics. There is an advantage in knowing them all whether a man wishes to establish some new form of democracy or only to remodel an existing one. Founders of state try to bring together all the elements which accord with the ideas of the several constitutions but this is a mistake of theirs as I've already remarked when speaking of the destruction and preservation of states. We will now set forward the principles characteristics and aims of such states. Section 2 The basis of a democratic state is liberty which according to the common opinion of men can only be enjoyed in such a state. This they affirm to be the great end of every democracy. One principle of liberty is for all to rule and be ruled in turn and indeed democratic justice is the application of numerical not proportionate to quality. Whence it follows that the majority must be supreme and that whatever the majority approve must be the end and the just. Every citizen it is said must have equality and therefore in a democracy the poor have more power than the rich because there are more of them and the will of the majority is supreme. This then is one note of liberty which all democrats affirm to be the principle of their state. Another is that a man should live as he likes. This they say is the privilege of a free man since on the other hand not to live as a man likes is the mark of a slave. This is the second characteristic of democracy. Whence has arisen the claim of men to be ruled by none if possible or if this is impossible to rule and be ruled in turns and so it contributes to the freedom based upon equality. Such being our foundation and such the principle from which we start the characteristics of democracy are as follows the election of officers by all out of all and that all should rule over each and each in his turn over all that the appointment to all officers or to all but those which require experience and skill should be made by lot that no property qualification should be required for offices or only a very low one that a man should not hold the same office twice or not often or in the case of a few except military offices that the tenure of all offices or of as many as possible should be brief that all men should sit in judgment or that judges selected out of all should judge in all matters or in most and in the greatest and most important such as the scrutiny of accounts the constitution and private contracts that the assembly should be supreme over all causes or at any rate over the most important and a magistrates over none or only over a very few of all magistracies a council is the most democratic when there is not the means of paying all the citizens but when they are paid even this is robbed of its power for the people then draw all cases to themselves as I said in the previous discussion the next characteristic of democracy is payment for services assembly law courts magistrates everybody receives pay when it is to be had or when it is not to be had for all then it is given to the law courts and to the stated assemblies to the council and to the magistrates or at least to any of them who are compelled to have their meals together and whereas oligarchy is characterized by birth wealth and education the notes of democracy appear to be the opposite of these low birth poverty mean employment another note is that no magistracy is perpetual but if any such have survived some ancient change in the constitution it should be stripped of its power and the holder should be elected by lot and no longer by vote these are the points common to all democracies but democracy and demos in their truest form are based upon the recognized principle of democratic justice that all should count equally for equality implies that the poor should have no more share in the government than the rich and should not be the only rulers but that all should rule equally according to their numbers and in this way men think that they will secure equality and freedom in their state section three next comes the question how is this equality to be obtained? are we to assign to a thousand poor men the property qualifications of five hundred rich men? and shall we give the thousand a power equal to that of the five hundred? or if this is not to be the mode ought we still retaining the same ratio to take equal numbers from each and give them the control of the elections and of the courts? which, according to the democratic notion is the juster form of the constitution this or one based on numbers only democrats say that justice is that to which the majority agree oligarchs that to which the wealthier class in their opinion the decision should be given according to the amount of property in both principles there is some inequality and injustice for if justice is the will of the few any one person who has more wealth than all the rest of the rich put together ought upon the oligarchical principle to have the sole power but this would be tyranny or if justice is the will of the majority as I was before saying they will unjustly confiscate the property of the wealthy minority to find a principle of equality which they both agree we must inquire into their respective ideas of justice now they agree in saying that whatever is decided by the majority of the citizens is to be deemed law granted but not without some reserve since there are two classes out of which a state is composed the poor and the rich that is to be deemed law on which both or the greater part of both agree and if they disagree that which is approved by the greater number and by those that have the higher qualification for example suppose that they are ten rich and twenty poor and some measure is approved by six of the rich and is disapproved by fifteen of the poor and the remaining four of the rich join with the party of the poor and the remaining five of the poor with that of the rich in such a case the will of those whose qualifications when both sides are added up are the greatest should prevail if they turn out to be equal there is no greater difficulty than at present when if the assembly or the courts are divided recourses had to the lot or to some similar expedient but although it may be difficult in theory to know what is just and equal the practical difficulty of inducing those to forbear who can if they like encroach is far greater for the weaker are always asking for equality and justice but the stronger care for none of these things section four of the four kinds of democracy as was said in the previous discussion the best is that which comes first in order it is also the oldest of them all i'm speaking of them according to the natural classification of their inhabitants for the best material of democracy is an agricultural population there is no difficulty in forming a democracy where the mass of the people live by agriculture or tending of cattle being poor they have no leisure and therefore do not often attend the assembly and not having the necessaries of life they are always at work and do not cover the property of others indeed they find their employment pleasanter than the cares of government or office where no great gains can be made out of them for the many are more desires of gain than of honor a proof is that even the ancient tyrannies were patiently endured by them as they still endure oligarchies if they are allowed to work and are not deprived of their property for some of them grow quickly rich and the others are well enough off moreover they have the power of electing the magistrates and calling them to account their ambition if they have any is thus satisfied and in some democracies although they do not all share in the appointment of offices except the representatives elected in turn out of the whole people as at Mantinea yet if they have the power of deliberating the many are contented even this form of government may be regarded as a democracy and was such at Mantinea hence it is both expedient and customary in the aforementioned type of democracy that all should elect to offices and conduct scrutinies and sit in the law courts but that the great offices should be filled up by election and from persons having a qualification the greater requiring a greater qualification or if there be no offices for which qualification is required then those who are marked out by special ability should be appointed under such a form of government the citizens are sure to be governed well for the offices will always be held by the best persons the people are willing enough to elect them and are not jealous of the good the good and the notables will then be satisfied for they will not be governed by men who are their inferiors and the persons elected will rule justly because others will call them to account every man should be responsible to others nor should anyone be allowed to do justice he pleases for where absolute freedom is allowed there is nothing to restrain the evil which is inherent in every man but the principle of responsibility secures that which is the greatest good in states the right persons rule and are prevented from doing wrong and the people have their due it is evident that this is the best kind of democracy and why because the people are drawn from a certain class some of the ancient laws of most states were all of them useful with a view to making the people husband men they provided either that no one should possess more than a certain quantity of land or that if he did the land should not be within a certain distance from the town or the acropolis formally in many states there was a law forbidding anyone to sell his original allotment of land there is a similar law attributed to oxylus which is to the effect that there should be a certain portion of every man's land on which he could not borrow money a useful corrective to the evil of which I am speaking would be the law of the aphydians who although they are numerous and do not possess much land are all of them husband men for their properties are reckoned in the census not entire but only in such small portions that even the poor may have more than the amount required next best to an agricultural and in many respects similar are a pastoral people who live by their flocks they are the best trained of any for war robust in body and able to camp out the people of whom other democracies consist are far inferior to them for their life is inferior there is no room for moral excellence in any of their employments whether they be mechanics or traders or laborers besides people of this class can readily come to the assembly because they are continually moving about in the city and in the agorah whereas husband men are scattered over the country and do not meet or equally feel the want of assembling together where the territory also happens to extend to a distance from the city there is no difficulty in making an excellent democracy or constitutional government for the people are compelled to settle in the country and even if there is a town population the assembly ought not to meet in democracies when the country people cannot come we have thus explained how the first and best form of democracy should be constituted it is clear that the other or inferior sorts will deviate in a regular order and the population which is excluded will at each stage be of a lower kind the last form of democracy that in which all share alike is one which cannot be born by all states and will not last long unless well regulated by laws and customs the more general causes which tend to destroy this or other kinds of government have been pretty fully considered in order to constitute such a democracy and strengthen the people the leaders have been in the habit including as many as they can and making citizens not only of those who are legitimate but even of the illegitimate and of those who have only one parent a citizen whether father or mother for nothing of this sort comes amiss to such a democracy this is the way in which demagogues proceed whereas the right thing would be to make no more additions when the number of the commonality exceeds that of the notables and of the middle class beyond this not to go when in excess of this point the constitution becomes disorderly and the notables grow excited and impatient of the democracy as in the insurrection at sirene for no notice is taken of a little evil but when it increases it strikes the eye measures like those which Kleisthenes passed when he wanted to increase the power of the democracy at Athens or such as were taken by the founders of popular government at sirene are useful in the extreme form of democracy fresh tribes and brotherhood should be established the private rights of families should be restricted and converted into public ones in short every contrivance should be adopted which will mingle the citizens with one another and get rid of old connections again the measures which are taken by tyrants appear all of them to be democratic such for instance as the license permitted to slaves which may be to a certain extent advantageous and also that of women and children and the flowing everybody to live as he likes such a government will have many supporters for most persons would rather live in a disorderly then in a sober manner and of book six sections one through four book six sections five through eight of politics by Aristotle this is a libervox recording all libervox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit libervox.org recording by Leon Meyer politics by Aristotle translated by Benjamin Jowett book six section five the mere establishment of a democracy is not the only or principal business of the legislator or of those who wish to create such a state for any state however badly constituted may last one two or three days a far greater difficulty is the preservation of it the legislator should therefore endeavor to have a firm foundation according to the principles already laid down concerning the preservation and destruction of states he should guard against the destructive elements and should make laws whether written or unwritten which will contain all the preservatives of states he must not think the truly democratical or oligarchical measure to be that which will give the greatest amount of democracy or oligarchy but that which will make them last longest the demagogues of our own day often get property confiscated in the law courts in order to please the people but those who have the welfare of the state at heart should counteract them and make a law that the property of the condemned should not be public and go into the treasury but be sacred thus offenders will be as much afraid for they will be punished all the same and the people having nothing to gain will not be so ready to condemn the accused care should also be taken that state trials are as few as possible and heavy penalties should be inflicted on those who bring groundless accusations for it is the practice to indict not members of the popular party but the notables although the citizens ought to be all attached to the constitution as well or at any rate should not regard their rulers as enemies now since in the last and worst form of democracy the citizens are very numerous and can hardly be made to assemble unless they are paid and to pay them where there are no revenues presses hardly upon the notables for the money must be obtained by property tax and confiscations and corrupt practices of the courts things which have before now overthrown many democracies where I say there are no revenues the government should hold few assemblies and the law court should consist of many persons but said for a few days only this system has two advantages first the rich do not fear the expense even although they are unpaid themselves when the poor are paid and secondly causes are better tried for wealthy persons although they do not like to be long absent from their own affairs do not mind going for a few days to the law courts where there are revenues the demagogue should not be allowed after their manner to distribute the surplus the poor are always receiving and always wanting more and more for such help is like water poured into a leaky cask yet the true friend of the people should see that they be not too poor for extreme poverty lowers the character of the democracy measures therefore should be taken which will give them lasting prosperity and as this is equally the interest of all classes the proceeds of the public revenues should be accumulated and distributed among its poor if possible in such quantities as may enable them to purchase a little farm or at any rate make a beginning in trade or husbandry and if this benevolence cannot be extended to all money should be distributed in turn according to tribes or other divisions and in the meantime the rich should pay the fee for the attendance of the poor at the necessary assemblies and should in return be excused from useless public services by administering the state in this spirit the carthaginians retain the affections of the people their policy is from time to time to send some of them into their dependent towns where they grow rich it is also worthy of a generous and sensible nobility to divide the poor amongst them and give them the means of going to work the example of the people of Tarentum is also well deserving of imitation for by sharing the use of their own property with the poor they gain their goodwill moreover they divide all their offices into two classes some of them being elected by vote the others by lot the latter that the people may participate in them and the former that the state may be better administered a like result may be gained by dividing the same offices so as to have two classes of magistrates one chosen by vote the other by lot enough has been said of the manner in which democracies ought to be constituted section six from these considerations there will be no difficulty in seeing what should be the constitution of oligarchies we have only to reason from opposites and compare each form of oligarchy with the corresponding form of democracy the first and best tempered of oligarchies is akin to a constitutional government in this there ought to be two standards of qualification the one high the other low the lower qualifying for the humbler yet indispensable offices and the higher for the superior ones he who acquires the prescribed qualification should have the rights of citizenship the number of those admitted should be such as will make the entire governing body stronger than those who are excluded and the new citizen should always be taken out of the better class of the people the principal narrowed a little gives another form of oligarchy until at length we reach the most clickish and tyrannical of them all answering to the extreme democracy which being the worst requires vigilance in proportion to its badness for as healthy bodies and ships well provided with sailors may undergo many mishaps and survive them whereas sickly constitutions and rotten ill man ships are ruined by the very least mistake so do the worst forms of government require the greatest care the populist nests of democracies generally preserves them for the state need not be much increased since there is no necessity that number is to democracy in the place of justice based on proportion whereas the preservation of an oligarchy clearly depends on an opposite principle viz good order section seven as there are four chief divisions of the common people husband men mechanics retail traders laborers so also there are four kinds of military forces the cavalry the heavy infantry the light armed troops the navy when the country is adapted for cavalry then a strong oligarchy is likely to be established for the security of the inhabitants depends upon a force of this sort and only rich men can afford to keep horses the second form of oligarchy prevails when the country is adapted to heavy infantry for this service is better suited to the rich than to the poor but the light armed and the naval element are wholly democratic and nowadays where they are numerous if the two parties quarrel the oligarchy are often worsted by them in the struggle a remedy for the state of things may be found in the practice of generals who combine a proper contingent of light armed troops with cavalry and heavy armed and this is the way in which the poor get the better of the rich in civil contests being lightly armed they fight with advantage against cavalry and heavy infantry an oligarchy which raises such a force out of the lower classes raises a power against itself and therefore since the ages of the citizens fairy and some are older and some younger the fathers should have their own sons while they are still young taught the agile movements of light armed troops and these when they have been taken out of the ranks of the youth should become light armed warriors in reality the oligarchy should also yield a share in the government to the people either as I said before to those who have a property qualification or as in the case of thieves to those who have abstained for a certain number of years from mean employments or as at misalia to men of merit who are selected for their worthiness whether previously citizens or not the magistracies of the highest rank which ought to be in the hands of the governing body should have expensive duties attached to them and then the people will not desire them and will take no offense at the privileges of the rulers when they see that they pay a heavy fine for their dignity it is fitting also that the magistrates on entering office should offer magnificent sacrifices or erect some public edifice and then the people who participate in the entertainments and see the city decorated with vote of offerings and buildings will not desire an alteration in the government and the notables will have memorials of their munificence this however is anything but the fashion of our modern oligarchs who are as covetous of gain as they are of honor oligarchies like theirs may well be described as petty democracies enough of the manner in which democracies and oligarchies should be organized section eight next in order follows the right distribution of offices their number their nature their duties of which indeed we have already spoken no state can exist not having the necessary offices and no state can be well administered not having the offices which tend to preserve harmony and good order in small states as we have already remarked there must not be many of them but in larger there must be a larger number and we should carefully consider which offices may properly be united and which separated first among necessary offices is that which has the care of the market a magistrate should be appointed to inspect contracts and to maintain order for in every state there must inevitably be buyers and sellers who will supply one another's wants this is the readiest way to make a state self-sufficing and so fulfill the purpose for which men come together into one state a second office of a similar kind undertakes the supervision and embellishment of public and private buildings the maintaining and repairing of houses and roads the prevention of disputes about boundaries and other concerns of alike nature this is commonly called the office of city warden and has various departments which in more populous towns are shared among different persons one for example taking charge of the walls another of the fountains a third of harbors there is another equally necessary office and of a similar kind having to do with the same matters without the walls and in the country the magistrates who hold this office are called wardens of the country or inspectors of the woods besides these three there is a fourth office of receivers of taxes who have under their charge the revenue which is distributed among the various departments these are called receivers or treasurers another officer registers all private contracts and decisions of the courts all public indictments and also all preliminary proceedings this office again is sometimes subdivided in which case one officer is appointed over all the rest these officers are called recorders or sacred recorders presidents and the like next to these comes an office of which the duties are the most necessary and also the most difficult vis that to which is committed the execution of punishments or the exaction of fines from those who are posted up according to the registers and also the custody of prisoners the difficulty of this office arises out of the odium which is attached to it no one will undertake it unless great profits are made and anyone who does is loath to execute the law still the office is necessary for judicial decisions are useless if they take no effect and if society cannot exist without them neither can it exist without the execution of them it is an office which being so unpopular should not be entrusted to one person but divided among several taken from different courts in like manner an effort should be made to distribute among different persons the writing up of those who are on register of public debtors some sentences should be executed by the magistrates also and in particular penalties due to the outgoing magistrates should be exacted by the incoming ones and as regards those due to magistrates already in office when one co