Could we quickly test the audio of Mr. Juan Gomez Carvino? Yes, I'm here online. Very good, thank you. And Ms. Andrea Mesa. So, thank you so much. And now we go to the first panel. What do we know, climate change, food insecurity, animal mobility, and the role of oceans, water, and land? We have three speakers. The first one being is excellence, Mr. Juan Gomez Carvino, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Portugal, that is joining us online. Minister, you have the floor. Thank you very much. Good morning. Good morning, Director-General and Don Vittrino. Good morning to all of my co-panelists and all of the audience. Ladies and gentlemen, the intersection between climate change, food insecurity, and human mobility cannot be overestimated. It is a major challenge for the global community, one which will remain with us for the foreseeable future. A decade or two ago, the overwhelming attitude of the international community was that climate change would be a major problem for the next generation, or the ones after that. We did not act with sufficient commitment in the face of even that knowledge. Now we understand that the catastrophic consequences have already arrived in the world that we inhabit today, and they will only get worse in the coming years. On the positive side, we welcome the fact that this relationship between climate change and migration has gained increasing visibility, and we salute the efforts of the international organization of migrations in this direction. The 2030 Agenda, the Paris Agreement, the Sendall Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, the Global Compact for Migration, all of these include global principles viewing migration as an adaptation strategy. During the First International Migration Review Forum, in May, we were able to consensually agree language on the effects of climate change on human mobility. This is key to capturing the complexity and the significance of population movements in today's world. Just last year, the World Bank Grantswell reports warned that by 2050, as many as 216 million people could be internal climate migrants. Sub-Saharan Africa could see as many as 85.7 million internal climate migrants. For North Africa, that figure could reach 19.3 million people, which is 9% of the region's total population. And although most of the mobility in the context of environmental and climate change occurs within the borders of countries, an increasing number of people will be forced to move abroad, as Director-General Banjwit Rino has just pointed out. Indeed, according to the 2022 United in Science report, about 3.3 billion people, around 40% of the world's population, are living in countries highly vulnerable to climate change. These are mainly projections. But according to the Displacement Migration Center, in 2021, from the total of 38 million new internal displacements that were registered, more than 60%, 23.7 million, have been triggered by disasters. The UNHCR corroborates these figures, estimating more than 20 million people, possibly displaced each year, due to climate change effects. Other studies point out that climate disasters cost the global economy around $250 billion per year. Sorry, $520 billion per year. My own country isn't immune to these risks. In 2022, Portugal saw one of the hottest summers on record and an increase in wildfires. In June of this year, 96% of my country was classified as being an extreme or severe drought. Rising sea levels not only stressed the physical coastline, but also coastal ecosystems. Saltwater intrusions contaminate freshwater aquifers, many of which sustain drinking and agricultural water supplies, and natural ecosystems. Even in the absence of natural disasters, climate change and its slow-moving consequences affect the livelihoods of populations, undermining the ability of already vulnerable economic and social systems to cope. Water scarcity and sea level rises lead to lower crop productivity in regions where agricultural accounts for large shares of employment. Coastal countries, particularly small island nations, feel their livelihoods threatened by rising sea waters and by ocean acidification. Let us not overlook how once-in-a-generation challenges have been further exacerbated, namely in terms of food and energy security by high energy and fertilizer costs. This is directly related to Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. And it is important to underline that it is the illegal unjustified actions of Russia and not sanctions that is responsible for exacerbating food insecurity due to the destruction of substantial food stocks, disruption of production, and transportation capacities. We must remain vigilant that rising costs of energy and food items do not further price out developing countries, especially the most vulnerable communities, from energy and food markets resulting in unacceptable poverty levels, which may cause social and political unrest. To fight food insecurity, we need to support small-scale farmers in weathering the crisis and in planting for upcoming seasons. Reintegrating food production in Ukraine and food and fertilizers from the Russian Federation into global markets despite the war must continue to be pursued. We call on the renewal of the Black Sea Grain Initiative in November. Putting an end to this agreement, as is being threatened by the Russian side, will only cause further unnecessary suffering across the world. In the context of these multiple and interconnected crises over the past years, we may be tempted to draw attention away from the climate crisis. This would be a mistake. We need policies that balance the need for urgency and sustainability to prevent developing countries from setting on an easier but self-defeating course for a high-emission and expensive energy future. In the next COP 27 in Egypt, safeguarding our joint commitments to the Paris Agreement on Climate Change must be our first line of response. An ambitious renewable energy transition that includes skills training could create an additional 85 million jobs by 2030. Promoting digital and green transitions must go hand in hand with supporting people and businesses, advancing social fairness, decent work and social protection, and fighting poverty. This is why we are fully behind initiatives such as the International Labor Organization's Global Accelerator on Jobs and social protection for just transitions as a long-term global framework to facilitate social protection investment and policies. At the same time that we fight climate change and its consequences, we need to strengthen our efforts to enhance and diversify the availability of pathways for safe, orderly and regular migration. Human mobility is a natural response. It is an adaptation strategy and it is a survival strategy. When confronted with demographic and labor market realities and for migrants in vulnerable situations, including those affected by disasters, climate change and environmental degradation, very often there will be no return. In this regard, we welcome Director-General Antonio Vittorino's leadership in putting climate change higher on the agenda of the IOM with the adoption of the institutional strategy on migration, environment and climate change for 2021 to 2030. As the international community, our responses should be in line with the IOM's strategic objectives. By, number one, developing strategies for people to move by managing migration in the context of climate change and other drivers. Number two, supporting people who are on the move by concluding labor mobility agreements, optimizing education opportunities, facilitating access to procedures for family reunification. And three, also by helping people to stay by making migration a choice rather than an obligation by addressing the adverse climatic drivers that compel people to move. We encourage the IOM and all partners to continue enhancing their work in this field as it is growing in relevance and will all but increase in importance in the future. Devising indicators that better demonstrate work on climate, migration and policy will be of high added value for our countries and for the IOM. My country has been a champion country of the global compact on migration since its launching. It is well known that safe and sustainable migration is a priority for Portugal, at home and abroad. Migrants play a vital part in our communities and provide positive contributions both in countries of origin and destination. Our commitment and efforts towards the implementation are just another aspect of our full commitment to the implementation of the 2030 agenda for sustainable development. After the GCM's adoption in 2018, Portugal was one of the first countries to develop a national implementation plan. Three years after the launch of our national implementation plan, 96% of its measures are either under implementation or fully achieved. In the IMRF last May, Portugal pledged to take practical steps to review the national implementation plan of the GCM in consultation with the comprehensive spectrum of stakeholders. Ladies and gentlemen, migration has been a strong defining factor for social change in my country over the past decade. Permanent type migration to Portugal quadrupled from 26,000 people who entered the country in 2013 to 100,000 in 2019. Among the OECD countries, on average 2.2% of the foreign population required host country citizenship in 2020. Portugal ranked second overall with 6.7%. A rate three times higher than the OECD average. Highlighting the positive consequences brought by migration, almost half of OECD countries have a higher participation rate among migrants than among the native born. This gap is particularly high in Portugal where the employment rate of migrants is eight points higher. This positive outlook towards migration has been a political choice for us, even in difficult context. Over the past years, we have faced fiscal constraints that limit the resources available for public policies. We have faced the COVID-19 pandemic and more recently, we have faced a challenging economic output. However, our commitment to a humanistic approach to migration does not qualify. In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, and despite the strain that this global health crisis has placed on all of us, Portugal granted universal access to vaccination against COVID, which was reflected in the vaccination of 600,000 migrants, including undocumented persons. Portugal signed bilateral labor mobility contracts with agreements with partner countries to facilitate legal and safe harbor migration flows, including a mobility agreement among the member states of the community of Portuguese-speaking countries. Since July, 2021, 187,000 residence permits have been automatically renewed, providing migrants full access to healthcare and social support, regardless of migration status. More recently, as a result of the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, we have welcomed over 53,000 Ukrainian refugees, most of them children and women. The adverse effects of climate change, environmental degradation, and natural disasters are increasingly among the present-day dive drivers of migration. We must step up efforts to mitigate and to adapt to the adverse effects of climate change, including in climate finance. But we also need to strengthen our efforts to enhance and to diversify safe, orderly, and regular migration. This is a challenge shared by all and one in which my country is ready to contribute, continue doing its very best. Thank you very much. Thank you so much, Your Excellency, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Portugal. Now it is my privilege to give the floor to Mrs. Loretta Jever Girarde, Chief of Risk, Knowledge, Monitoring, and Capacity Development Branch of the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction. You have the floor, Madam. Thank you very much. It's an honor to be here. And I'd like to speak a bit about this issue from a disaster risk reduction lens. So at the midpoint of the Sendai framework implementation, some alarming trends are coming to light. In 2020, COVID-19 increased global disaster mortality rates to a total of more than the previous five years combined. Now these rates had been previously decreasing thanks to better preparedness and disaster management. COVID has reversed this trend. The rate of people affected by disasters has risen dramatically over the past decade from one to six out of every 100,000 people. Climate change is the biggest driver of disaster risk, and 80 to 90% of disasters from natural hazards are due to extreme weather events. Climate change is increasing the frequency and intensity of hazards, but also the exposure and vulnerability of communities and individuals, and the stress on water and food insecurity. A most recent example is Pakistan, where provinces that were hardest hit by floods received up to eight times more rain than usual. Millions of people live in flood prone areas with outdated drainage. Upgrading drainage, moving homes and reinforcing bridges and roads would all help prevent such catastrophic damage in the future. But like elsewhere in the world, risk reduction in Pakistan and many other countries has not been sufficiently prioritized. Already up to 3.6 billion people are estimated to live in situations that are highly vulnerable to climate change. We are seeing climate impacts here in Europe, of course, where we face heat waves this summer and wildfires, but the countries that are most at risk of climate change are those that are already facing multiple other threats. Notably, of the world's 25 nations most vulnerable to climate change, more than a dozen are affected by conflict or civil unrest. Let me just take the example of Afghanistan, a country where I lived and worked for several years. Since 1950, temperatures have increased by 1.8 degrees in Afghanistan, and the country is now highly prone to floods, drought, as well as extensive environmental degradation. Unmanaged mobility and displacement have become entrenched coping mechanisms, and those who cannot move remain exposed to continued environmental stress with the ensuing consequences on their lives and livelihoods, including high levels of food insecurity. Climate change is also increasing the exposure of populations to disasters. Around 89% of Bangladeshis, this is approximately 143 million people, live in high or very high climate exposure areas. Over 96% of Haitians are at risk when a disaster occurs. The difference is that in Bangladesh, they have succeeded in putting in place a successful cyclone preparedness program, whereas Haiti, like many other countries, still requires significant support to protect its population against the climate future. The reality is, current mitigation trajectories are leading to unmanageable disaster risk, and this is happening at a time where investments in risk reduction and adaptation are wholly inadequate. Our projections show that the number of disasters per year globally may increase by 40% by 2030, and this is less than a decade away. We know that these impacts are felt at the local level. They are what we call high-frequency, low-intensity events, localized storms, floods, mudslides, that erode development gains and challenge coping capacities at the community level. You won't hear about many of these events in the international media, but the cumulative impact is devastating. We believe that drought may increase by 30% between 2001 and 2030, and extreme temperature events may triple during the same period. And these projections tell us that we need to dramatically overhaul how we address growing climate-related disaster risks. Let's just start with drought management. Sub-Saharan Africa experiences one-third of the world's droughts and is highly vulnerable to rising temperatures because of its dependence on rain-fed agriculture. In UNDRR's special report on drought, we emphasize that the true cost of drought to societies and ecosystems is substantially underestimated. The impacts can linger far longer than the drought, and its harms extend beyond the agriculture sector. There needs to be a greater focus on prospective and proactive drought risk management that includes drought monitoring, forecasting, and increased cooperation across different sectors and scales. Thinking ahead and acting in advance of drought has far lower costs than reacting and responding to the impacts once a drought occurs. Therefore, we need to shift from dealing with drought impacts to getting ahead of the curve to address underlying risk drivers to prevent and manage drought risks. There are other actions that we can and must take now to address the challenges ahead. First, many extreme weather events can be forecast in advance, giving people time to evacuate safely. However, currently, half of the world's countries do not have early warning systems. This means that one out of three persons globally, primarily in small island development states and least developed countries, and six out of every 10 Africans are not protected by early warning systems. This is unacceptable. We know that early warnings by 24 hours can cut the ensuing damage by 30%. It is also one of the most cost-effective adaptation measures with a return on investment of one to 10. The action plan for the Secretary General's call for early warning for all will be launched at COP 27, and it will kickstart an interagency process to fast-track early warning in the next five years. And I would really like to emphasize the importance of engaging with the private sector to achieve this goal. At the same time, we need to scale up ex ante, otherwise before the disaster occurs, measures to address displacement. Displacement by disasters fueled by extreme weather, such as drought, has become endemic in many parts of the world. And globally now, three times more people are displaced by climate-related disasters than war. Many of these extreme weather events, floods, cyclones are recurrent, and it is often the same populations that are losing their lives and their livelihoods repeatedly. When I was regional director of the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction in Asia-Pacifics, I met families in central Luzon, Philippines that had been displaced multiple times. But I also saw how early warning and anticipatory action can prevent displacement. Just one example is Mongolia, where a scale-up in cash-based assistance in the face of the Zood, a winter drought, was designed to help herders withstand the impact so they would not be forced to migrate and move to the outskirts of Ulaanbaatar. These experiences led me to work with IOM colleagues and more than a dozen other agencies in Asia-Pacific to establish a regional task force to look at how we could join forces to address displacement before it occurs, to limit its duration, and to safeguard livelihoods. Such partnerships are key. UNDRR, along with the World Meteorological Organization and 13 other agencies, has established the Center of Excellence for Climate and Disaster Resilience. We all believe that no one single agency can tackle the climate crisis on its own, and the Center is bringing together humanitarian development, climate change, and disaster risk management agencies to identify practical solutions for effective multi-risk management in the face of the climate emergency. Our starting point is that building resilience requires a whole of society, whole of government, and multi-risk approach. And to achieve this, we need to break down the institutional silos and barriers to allow us to work better together, especially in highly vulnerable and fragile contexts. At COP 27, the Center will release a report called Moving Back from the Edge, which highlights transformative interventions that can help avert, minimize, and address loss and damage from climate change. What we are seeing is the need to focus on a common denominator, vulnerability reduction. By placing vulnerability at the center of all of our interventions, we can cut across the traditional silos that persist across our different disciplines. In practice, this would mean jointly identifying the most vulnerable, giving them a voice and agency, and ensuring common joint-up action. We believe this approach, along with a greater focus on the local level and prioritization of activities designed to save and promote nature, are showing good results and need to be scaled up, especially in fragile contexts. But to do this, we need to advocate for an increase in the amount of climate financing directed towards highly vulnerable and fragile contexts. We cannot rely on humanitarian resources alone to address the need to build resilience. New financing is required, and it needs to go to those countries on the front line of the climate emergency and where people are already suffering from high levels of food insecurity. And finally, I'd like to share with you that the UNDRR, with the Centre of Excellence, is launching a zero climate disasters campaign at COP 27. Climate and extreme weather events do not have to become disasters. Disaster risk is a function of hazards, but also vulnerability and exposure. It is our collective duty to reduce vulnerability and minimize exposure to climate risks, including through effective early warning, anticipatory action, adaptation, and DRR. We have the tools at hand, but we need more political leadership and goodwill to succeed. Thank you. Thank you so much, Loreta, and the last speaker with the introductory remarks will be Mrs. Andrea Meza Murillo, Deputy Executive Secretary of the United Nations Convention to combat desertification that joins us online. Andrea, you have the floor, thank you. Andrea, you are muted, I'm sorry. Not yet. There must be some connection problem. I'm looking to the table that masterminds these things. So just one minute. I hear that I seen on the chat box that online is perfectly clear. So there must be a problem in the connection to the room. Testing one, two, three. Testing one, two, three. So now we know that the testing goes up to three. Good, very good, you can hear now. And now, can you hear me now, Antonio? Absolutely, successfully. Thank you, Andrea. No, thank you. It's my really, an honor and my pleasure to be here with you virtually, but, and I will really like to bring other perspective to add to this conversation and really to first, congratulations for convening this important dialogue in a very timely moment. And first also to really echo a lot of the aspects that were mentioned by the minister and also by Loretta, I was having this one speech, but I would like to not really stick to the speech and bring more concrete elements on the role of land nature degradation and how it's a key driver for migration. And I've been, we've been hearing a lot of these messages, the importance of the start building resilience and what does land restoration, protecting nature, having good water management practices means when we want to build resilience. And the first key message here is that they place a central role. But what we are seeing right now, the way we are having this relationship with nature, we're not going in the right track. And we know that up to 40% of the planet's land is degraded now. And this is directly affecting half of humanity and it's threatening, and it's threateningly roughly half of global GDP. This means that at the end, what we are seeing is that we continue in this pathway of having more land degradation, we will be having more migration. And we are seeing this all over the world in places in the Sahara, in the dry corridor in Central America. But this is the element to bring to the attention. If we continue in this business as usual through 2050, an additional degradation of an area the size of South America. Again, the size of South America could be degraded. So this element and what we are seeing is that we cannot guarantee food security, water security if we don't have a healthy land and a healthy soil. And this is the element again, this could be a very cost effective measure to start and to continue enhancing resilience in different communities in different countries. Now, we know that climate change, it's really affecting a lot of tendencies and this is also very related to drought. So we have land degradation in certain areas and we have and what we are seeing the impacts on drought. And we know that climate change is causing more severe droughts and trends and that drought frequency and duration will increase. And this is, we have been hearing the previous speakers and this has been one of the elements that we are hearing again and again. So science is clear, but one element that it's important to bring to the table is the drought. It's not just the absence of rain. It is often the result of poor land management. So here again, this connection, this nexus, so important that we build and continue investing in land restoration in protecting nature in good water management practices. These aspect and there are very different numbers that we are hearing all over the place. For example, that climate change is suspected to increase drought frequency, severity and duration in the short term by 2030 and drought will displace 1700 million people in Africa alone. And this is the numbers that we are hearing and hearing. So what we should do, it's really a stop with this visual cycle of land degradation and drought and forced migration and really start investing in this resilience because what we are seeing is that land restoration helps vulnerable communities to adopt to droughts increasing water infiltration and rotation. And land restoration can really be then a very cost effective way to continue addressing this multiple crisis. And in one way what we are seeing because we're hearing climate change crisis, biodiversity crisis and we know that land is the nexus, the operative nexus to address this both crisis. So it's investing in land restoration, it's a win-win condition because it also contributes to generate resilience to the different communities. One good news is that we are seeing a lot of these effective land restoration projects in the Great Green Wall in Africa. We are seeing also very good examples in Asia, in Latin America with small investments of having these multiple benefits. And it's again, and I've been hearing this echo, it's critical to continue mobilizing more resources towards the adaptation agenda for sure and to continue building in this integrated approach of breaking silos of working together and totally agree on what Loretta was mentioning of this importance of working together of the different agencies. And this brings me to the other point and this is why we're also welcoming an initiative that will be launched by the government of Spain and Senegal at COP 27 to consolidate the International Drought Resilience Alliance. And it's also to continue to work as this collaborative platform to catalyze more political momentum towards this agenda on drought resilience and mobilizes resources for targeted actions to enhance drought resilience in countries, cities and communities. And it's basically to really do what Loretta was just describing, to really move from this reactive approach to this proactive approach. And it's how to reconnect with these other initiatives and the importance of having and consolidate the early warning systems, which is a key piece of this initiative. But then how and what is the elements that we do when we receive and when we have the information, how can we connect this information with the producers and facilitate the adoption of a lot of these measures, like land restoration, like good water management practices at the local community level and the national level and enhancing the policy framework because we know that it is also critical to continue building and generate these policy frameworks. Because it's about this, it's about understanding that it's a development issue that we need to have this whole of a government approach and this whole of society approach. And it is also to understand and see if we can bring new innovations on the finance part, because it's critical to continue mobilizing additional funding, but we know that we will be also need to mobilize the private sector, which is a hard thing to do, but we need to be bringing innovation to this agenda so we can bring the different stakeholders and continue building resilience. So as a nutshell, investing in land restoration is a very cost-effective manner to continue building resilience. We really need to continue investing in drought resilience as this other critical component and initiatives to work together to collaborate are needed and are welcome. And we as UNCCD, as this voice for land, for drought issue, we really welcome these initiatives and we're here to collaborate and work with all of you. I will leave my initial remarks here. Antonio, over to you. Thank you so much, Andrea. I think we got the scenario pretty clear and now I will open the floor. I will ask Deanne to conduct us through the list of speakers. Deanne, you have the floor. Thank you, Director General. At this moment, we have four intervenes from the floor. The first on our list is His Excellency Ambassador of Turkey followed by Ambassador Excellency from Maldives. Excellency, the floor is yours. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would like to greet His Excellency, Honorable Foreign Minister of Portugal and Miss Loretta Heiber Giarde, Miss Meza and also our Director General, Mr. Vittorino for addressing to us and convening this important meeting. It is indeed a pleasure for me to be here again. Turkey as the largest refugee hosting country in the world contributes to migration governance at all levels and will continue to support the IOM's efforts in this regard. Since migration is a global and complex phenomenon, it is not realistic to disregard the root causes of human mobility by using policies of externalization, responsibility shifting, and or even pushbacks. Today, food security has a huge impact and food security has become one of the most critical peace and security issues at the global level. Furthermore, food insecurity can also be seen as one of the critical push factors for migration. Unfortunately, the war in Ukraine once again has shown how interdependent our world is. While Ukrainians suffer from its devastating impacts the most, we also feel it is spillover effects in several areas such as energy, transportation, and agriculture. Increased energy prices, global food insecurity, shortages in fertilizers, disrupted employment, and global inflation are sending ripple waves across world economies. Our position has been consistent since the beginning of the conflict. We remain committed to Ukraine's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Then we have been engaging both sides diplomatically to bring an end to the hostilities. The Turkey-U.N. brokered deal on the export of Ukrainian grain is a concrete example of our efforts within this framework. Thanks to the agreement, more than 8.5 million tons of various grain products have reached the world markets since August the 1st. This has been a major achievement that has helped to elevate rising food insecurity and global hunger concerns as well as to call markets and limit food price inflation. Thus, countries with the lowest income were able to have easier access to the products. Billions of people in the world have benefited directly or indirectly from the positive impact of this initiative. Of course, nowadays, our priority is the renewal of the same deal for another four months period. We intensified our efforts to secure such a deal, but in the meantime, we also trying to face stemming from the export of fertilizers and if we can manage both tracks, that will be enormous help to improve the food security all around the world. The Black Sea Grain Initiative is the perfect example for collective efforts which show how to take action for elevating the sufferings of billions of people in vulnerable situations. Climate change has also become a challenge that cannot be ignored anymore. Climate induced extreme weather events affect every country regardless of the size of their territory, population or economy. And as some of the speakers briefed us, I mean, we have seen the devastating effects of these floods in Pakistan and my country also dispatched a lot of effective, let's say, help efforts to Pakistan and we are still continuing on. And our understanding is that climate change should be regarded as a risk multiplier. We believe that there is an urgent need for adaptation and resilience building to support the effective countries and it should be considered as a notion of justice because most of those countries did nothing to create such terrible conditions or carbon consumptions. I mean, when it comes to creating these climate change conditions. So we need to be fair to the effective countries because it is our joint responsibility. Ladies and gentlemen, today, because of the lack of collective understanding, we are seeing that many humanitarian actions in protracted crisis regions have become underfunded. Discriminatory policies between refugee groups at international borders, unfortunately continue and we protest these kind of discriminatory approaches to the desperate people. As long as the international community refrains from taking collective action to address the root causes of triggering migration in its source countries, we can expect that these migratory crises will not diminish. Before I conclude, I would like to underline again the need for human rights-centered collective efforts to address the root causes of migration. No country can shoulder the burden of migration on its own. The most critical point is to put into practice burden and responsibility sharing. Thank you very much. Thank you, Excellency. Our next intervention from the floor is coming from Prometresentative Omaldives who is also with us in person. Excellency, floor is yours. Thank you, Chair, for giving me the floor and good morning. May I also thank the Director General, Mr. Antonio Viterino, for convening this important dialogue today. It gives me great pleasure to thank the distinguished panelists for their insightful presentations on this pressing issue to understand human mobility in the context of climate change. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC, continues to highlight ongoing changes in global climatic and ecological systems in the context of human mobility. The rising sea levels, water salination and increase in temperatures are having an adverse impact on the ability of populations to secure a livelihood and their very survival. Adverse climatic conditions contributes to water shortages, food insecurity and increase in diseases with the potential of displacement and migration of communities. According to the World Bank, there will be 200 million climate refugees by the end of 2050. We need concise and immediate action to minimize climate-induced displacements. Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, the Maldives continues to experience the effects of climate change, such as coastal erosion, sea level rise, salinity intrusion and changes in monsoon patterns and rainfall, which leads to flooding and storm surges. The Maldives have had some firsthand experience in disaster displacement following the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004. A number of islands had to be evacuated at that time and the population resettled on other islands. With 80% of our islands less than a meter above the sea level and 98% of our territory consisting of ocean leaves the Maldives vulnerable to the slightest change in global temperatures. The Maldives, however, will always be at the forefront in fostering global consensus on action to stop and reverse the effects of climate change. Much more needs to be done to ensure that our response to climate change and displacement are adequate. We therefore call on the international community for greater multilateral engagement and cooperation to implement climate adaptation measures aimed at effective management of human mobility in the context of climate change. I thank you. Thank you, Excellency. Next on our list is Nuncio, permanent representative of Holy See, followed by Japan. Excellency, floor is yours. Thank you, Mr. Director General. Permit me to begin by addressing our solidarity and best wishes to the peoples of Nigeria, especially the southern part of the country where I was personally born. Who are experiencing currently, for some days now, heavy floods that have provoked painful losses of lives and property. I would also like to extend the same feelings to the people of Pakistan who are just emerging from similar painful experiences. Mr. Director General, Pope Francis has repeatedly denounced the effects of climate change and environmental degradation, while also highlighting the evident link between environmental instability, food security, and migratory movements. While climate change occurs everywhere, the capacity to respond and adapt varies. As it's becoming more apparent, it tends to be the poor and vulnerable who are disproportionately affected by the ecological and climate crisis. When people are forced to flee because their local environment has become uninhabitable, it might look like a process of nature, something inevitable. However, the deteriorating climate is very often the result of poor choices and destructive activity of selfishness and neglect that set humankind at odds with creation of a common home. Mr. Director General, everything is connected. Poverty, food insecurity, climate change, migration. At a time when the consequences of the conflict in Ukraine and elsewhere are causing spikes in energy and food prices, it is shameful and worrying that so many do not have access to adequate food or the means to provide for themselves. Climate change also has far-reaching effects on agricultural productivity and livestock, which often cause movements of people across borders and within countries. For rural communities, which rely on the productivity of crops in particular, the impact is much stronger. It is important to ensure the resilience of displaced communities. This can be done through international cooperation, including by encouraging the adoption of agriculture and fishing techniques that are sustainable, thus reducing the risks of human-induced ecological degradation and loss of biodiversity. These issues are not simply of a political or economic nature. They are a matter of justice. They are moral obligations towards future generations. While fully respecting the human rights and fundamental freedoms of people in the move, it is also important to create conditions that allow communities and individuals to live in safety and dignity in their countries of origin, consistent with paragraph 13 of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration. In this regard, it is past time to acknowledge that when people must flee, it is not enough to encourage, increase the coordination among states in the area of their search and rescue, SAR, disembarkation, and resettlement. Instead, there is serious need to reconsider and reform the current approach to managing mixed flows at international borders and at sea. If not, the current chaos that continues to result in countless acts of violence, abuse, and increasing loss of life, particularly in the Mediterranean, will only get worse. Mr. Director General, I am pleased to share that last July, the Holy See in the name, and on behalf of the Vatican City State, acceded to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, UNFCCC, and to the Paris Agreement. With a view to the upcoming 27th Conference of the State's Parties, the UNFCCC, how can we harmonize approaches at international level to ensure that the rights of persons displaced due to climate change and natural disasters are adequately protected? I thank you, Mr. Director General. Thank you, Excellency. Next on our list is a representative of Japan followed by a representative of Ukraine. Thank you, DG. Today, we hear very important, serious stories about the devastating impact of climate change and other relevant issues from many speakers. Climate change is an important issue that should be addressed by international community as a whole. Japan comments IOM for providing a forum today for comprehensive discussion on important topics we are all affected, and we appreciate the important remarks by DG, Victorino, and other leaders. We are also concerned about the situation where a number of people facing food insecurities at an all-time high caused by the combination of the climate crisis, prolonged conflicts, and climate change impact of COVID-19. Japan as a responsible member of the international community announced in June this year to provide approximately 200 million U.S. dollar in assistance to provide food in Middle East and Africa and to resume grain exports from Ukraine. Japan will continue to support people in need. Regarding the climate change, last year Japan announced its commitment to provide support in both private and public sector of up to 70 billion in five years to assist developing countries in addressing the impact of climate change. Japan also committed 14.8 billion U.S. dollar both in public and private sector in assistance to support adaptation to double our effort. As part of this commitment, Japan already dispersed 42 million U.S. dollar to support carbonization and also 6 million U.S. dollar to the adaptation fund. Japan will continue to implement this commitment. Furthermore, Japan is working closely with IOM to provide assistance to vulnerable people affected by climate change and to reduce disaster risks to prevent irregular and forced migration. To this end, Sendai Declaration is important for disaster prevention. For example, in East Timor, we implement a rehabilitation of evacuation centers and capacity building of disaster preparedness for government agencies. In Somalia, we support vulnerable communities affected by conflict and natural disasters in order to strengthen their disaster preparedness and resilience. We have a handle of examples of this kind. Japan will continue to respond to the urgent needs of countries affected and will work closely with IOM as a trustful and important partner. To this end, we welcome IOM's intention to focus on triple nexus approach and also we appreciate the idea of nexus between climate change and mobility. Japan direct explore more possibilities with IOM to save and stabilize the life of people in need as well as to prevent people from displacement. Thank you. Thank you, Japan. Our next speaker on the list is Ukraine followed by Iraq. Ukraine. Thank you, Chair. Dear Director General Vitorino, Excellencies, I wish to thank the distinguished panelists from previous session. And this session, in particular, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Portugal, João Gomes Cravinho, for raising the issue of the impact of Russia's ongoing aggression against Ukraine on displacement and food and food security. Today marks exactly eight months since Russia unleashed its unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine. Russia's invasion uprooted some 14 million Ukrainians or one third of the population. About 6.2 million of our citizens have been displaced within Ukraine and more than 7.5 million have been forced to seek safety abroad. This is the fastest and one of the largest displacement crises in recent history. While the unfolding humanitarian catastrophe remained in the focus, the Russian invasion of Ukraine is also having an outsized impact on the global economy. Its ripple effects have been felt worldwide in numerous sectors, energy, food and agriculture, finance, migration. The most immediate effect of an invasion has been a global food supply and prices. All of you remember how Russia's naval blockade halted grain experts at Ukrainian Black Sea ports earlier this year. This was a deliberate attack on the global food security. Signing of the UN and Turkey-brokered Black Sea grain initiative in July allowed the resumption of vital grain experts from Ukrainian Black Sea ports, bringing relief to developing countries. It is already stabilizing global market, decreasing prices and reducing chaos caused by lack of food around the world. Since its start, 362 vessels with 8 million tons of food on board left Ukrainian ports to the countries of Asia, Europe and Africa. However, the situation around the grain initiative has become increasingly alarming in recent weeks. Russia is doing everything to slow down our food experts. Today, more than 150 ships are lining up, awaiting to fulfill contractual obligations for the supply of our agricultural products. This is an artificial line caused by Russia's deliberate delaying of ships passage. Every day of stalled shipments means a shortage of food and social tension in many countries of Asia and Africa that import our agricultural products. Russia is delaying grain delivery to Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon, Iraq, China, Bangladesh, Indonesia, to name a few. As Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelensky said on 21 October in his address to the nation, the right to food and to life without hunger are fundamental rights for absolutely every person on Earth. And that is why Russia's attempts to aggravate food crisis is also an aggression against every person on Earth. We call on all member states of the United Nations to do everything possible so that the grain initiative is not only preserved, but also works at full capacity. We should focus on holding Russia accountable for implementing this agreement. For its part, Ukraine remains committed to the work of grain corridor and supports its extension after 22 November, when the initial 120 days period will expire. Despite ongoing Russian aggression, Ukraine remains committed to providing support to those in need by providing 50,000 tons of wheat to Ethiopia and Somalia. Mr. Chair, Director General, Excellencies, hunger games played by Russia, which threaten increased migration flows worldwide. Its continued massive attacks on Ukraine's critical infrastructure, which damaged or destroyed at least 30% of our energy facilities, raising concerns of increased displacement with winter approaching. Having witnessed all of this, we, the IOM members, should ask ourselves whether a hasty decision to accept Russia two years ago as a new IOM member has contributed to the realization of the goals and objectives of this organization, or has it undermined our resolve and ability to address pressing challenges and prevent global displacement crisis from worsening further? For us, the answer is obvious. I thank you. Thank you, Ukraine. Our next speaker on the list is Ambassador of Iraq, Prime Minister, Excellency, Floridjors. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And thank you, Mr. Digi, Antonio Viterino, to give me the opportunity to intervene on this important issue. In this regard, I would like to take advantage of the availability of Arabic language interpretation to deliver my statement in my mother tongue. Thank you. I would like to take advantage of the availability of Arabic language interpretation to deliver my statement in my mother tongue. I would like to take advantage of the availability of Arabic language interpretation to deliver my statement in my mother tongue. Ladies and gentlemen, the issue of climate change and its effects on the internal elements is a challenge that affects all countries in the world. But notice that the countries that cause climate change are less affected by its effects than the rest of the affected countries. And that is why we emphasize the importance of the international organization to help countries that are more affected by climate change. Finally, Iraq calls for the need to continue the joint work with the important public institutions regarding migration, refugees, and the rest of the international organizations to focus on helping countries that are more affected and to enhance their capabilities on the face of the disasters and to prevent and prevent them from causing human suffering. This is caused by the presence of the internal elements that cause migration, which are usually affected by climate change and the lack of food security. Thank you so much. Thank you, Excellency. Next on our list is Ambassador of Nigeria who is with us online. Your Excellency, the floor is yours. My delegation, congratulations to the IEM and particularly to the Director General for the leadership in the management of migratory questions in this context of multi-form crises, including security, health, climate, food, and the consequences of human mobility. At the request of the Sahelian State, the Nigerians of the three quarters of the territory in the desert area are among the countries most affected by the effects of climate change. The majority of its agricultural and pastoral population has followed the plunge of environmental and climate shocks that deal with the consequences such as drought, floods, land degradation, irregular precipitation, and desertification, which continue to negatively impact the annual agricultural and pastoral income by constantly replacing the majority of the population in the pre-quality and food security. For example, this year, more than 200 months and more than 300,000 people have come to Nigeria. These different factors combined with the insecurity in certain regions of the country are to eliminate people who have moved to the interior or exterior. To continue the global effects of climate change and to fight environmental security. The Nigerians have more strategic mechanisms and devices such as prevention, national food crisis prevention and food security initiative, national immigration policy. The objective is to strengthen the resilience of the population and to strengthen their ability to adapt. To conclude, Mr. the moderator, we would like to address as well as the organizers all of the organizations for this initiative. My delegation believes that international cooperation must focus its efforts on the support of national initiatives in terms of determination, adaptation and the search for resolution and the resilience of the population. To strengthen its support at the IM in order to allow them to adapt their strategic strategy to these new immigration causes in order to estimate these efforts in terms of the exterior of the country and in terms of immigration in relation to the impact. In terms of the state or in terms of international institutions such as the IM, in terms of the humanitarian phenomenon associated with the development of the necessary programs. Thank you, Excellency. We have three more speakers on our list. The next is representative of Brazil here in the room. Thank you, Chair. First of all, let me congratulate IOM for convening this year's international dialogue on migration. Historically, the Brazilian position has been to have discussions on climate change linked to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and its Paris Agreement. Thus, Brazil would like to highlight that any commitments and goals assumed by states with regard to climate action must be governed by the rules and principles of the UNFCCC. In particular, the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities always take into account the different national circumstances. The existing climate regime has a universal character and allows the participation of all state parties in its initiatives and decision-making processes. Despite the cross-cut nature of the climate change issue, its treatment in international forums other than that of the UNFCCC opens pace for duplication of efforts. It is also paramount to bear in mind that the adoption of decisions in this agreement with the climate regime's rules and principles can compromise the balance obtaining negotiations in that area. Thank you. Thank you. Next on our list is the representative of Food and Agriculture Organization who is with us online. Thank you. If you can hear me. I thank Mr. Director General and the organizers for inviting the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN delivering the opening remarks this morning but especially for convening the international dialogue on migration on these important and overlapping challenges of our time. I would also like to thank these team speakers for drawing attention on these issues of climate change, food insecurity, water scarcity, land degradation, the forest station and degradation of forest ecosystems which affect indeed millions of people and contribute to drive migration and displacement. These issues are at the heart of FAO's work. FAO works at the intersection of climate change, food security, agri-food systems and migration and thanks to its unique technical expertise FAO helps member states coping with the overlapping crisis of food insecurity and climate change and its impact on human mobility and agri-food systems. FAO is pleased that this event is contributing to raise attention on rural people. We had today several times rural people are exceptionally vulnerable as their livelihoods depend on natural resources. We indeed also welcome attention on both extreme weather events but also the slow onset changes and what needs to be done by the international community together to prevent displacement along the humanitarian development nexus. We appreciate also this discussion as not only covering talking about international migrants but also migrants and people that have been displaced within their own countries. In 2018, FAO has estimated in 1.3 billion the number of migrants migrating internally within countries. Climate change and food insecurity calls for urgent actions. FAO helps rural communities to better manage climate-related risks by promoting the uptake of climate-adaptive practices and the sustainable use and management of natural resources as well as the restoration of degraded ecosystems. Let me just give you a few examples in El Salvador where changes in weather and climate conditions are affecting agricultural production and pushing farmers to migrate. FAO is working with the government to protect water sources for 1 million people and enhance the climate resilience of 50,000 small older farmers. This is done through the app-scaling climate resilience measures in the dry corridor agro-ecosystem of El Salvador. The green-green wall has also been mentioned by the panelists earlier in this panel. The green-green wall is Africa's flagship initiative to combat climate change and the certification and address food insecurity and poverty. The green wall covers 780 million actors of arid and semi-arid land around the Sahara and over 10 million actors around the Sahara must be restored every year to achieve land neutrality by 2030. So building on the vast and long-standing support FAO has provided on the green-green wall another project on scaling up resilience in Africa green-green world aims to carry out a major paradigm shift and address land restoration climate change and sustainable livelihood simultaneously building ecological and nutritional resilience in eight Sahara countries that are recognized as the most vulnerable to climate change. FAO does so by scaling up successful restoration practices with native species supporting the development of climate resilient low emission value chains of non-timber foster products in support of vulnerable communities livelihoods and strengthening the green-green world's regional and national institutions. This was just to name a few FAO. We are committed and we stand ready to work together with partners and countries to address food insecurity, climate change, build resilient and sustainable livelihoods for rural population and make migration safe and work for all. Thank you. Thank you FAO. Now the last speaker on the list is Prime Representative Chad Ambassador Excellency Kuzvasov on the line, please. You have the floor. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. President for the floor. I would like to of course say hello to all the panelists. I would also like to thank the Director General Mr. Cotterino for the organization of this important dialogue at the moment all so decisive. Mr. Director General Chad share your happy initiative to associate migration to climate change. There is a manifest link between mobility and climate change. In the context of the increase in water level and today a real concern for the government. The important amount of water is reversed by creating inundations as well as living spaces but also cultivable spaces for the population of the harvest which probably will be used by families in the Republic of Chad. Today the water level is 7.5 meters still the water from the south continues to flow to the Kivet located all around the city of Nga Mena which is a prevision of the scientists this level is never reached of memory and so it is a real concern for the government my country wants to take advantage of the content of this dialogue to sound the alert and to say how much we are in an emergency situation and of the international community of course with the crisis around the world the question of food insecurity on the whole of the Sahel countries as my colleague the permanent representative of the Niger should continue to be a concern in a way to avoid all humanitarian disasters I want to say thank you thank you we have one more intervention floor thank you for giving me the floor we kindly ask our colleagues to respect the humanitarian nature of today's meeting we strongly believe that all those attempts of nationalization of our discussion do not contribute to the constructive dialogue which as we understand is the main goal of our meeting political assessments statements and accusations are much more relevant for a number of other specific platforms international platforms which we have at our disposal we see that today some countries are trying to accuse Russia and make our country responsible for all negative trends in agricultural markets and gloomy prospects in terms of access to food whether the truth is more complicated and it is well illustrated by comprehensive analysis of the roots and drivers of this crisis it is vital to understand them properly without emotions and political prejudice agricultural production is indeed among the most injured sectors because of the global economic instability the key point is that the problems in the global agricultural markets are multi-faced in origin and deep rooted in the long-lasting economic instability they are linked to a number of factors including the Covid-19 pandemic and the related consequences the current situation on food markets is not a result of recent months but a steady trend of at least last two years we are deeply concerned about the current food crisis and are well aware of the importance of supplying essential goods for the social and economic development of the states of Asia Africa, Latin America and the Middle East Western measures of economic coercion against Russia undoubtedly exacerbated already existing global food market energy and industry despite this pressure our country as a responsible participant of the global food market intends to continue to fulfill its obligations under international commitments in terms of expert deliveries of agricultural products, fertilizers energy and other vital products at the same time we continue to make vigorous efforts to ensure the implementation of the Black Sea Grain initiative, a deal signed in Istanbul on the expert of the Ukrainian grain as well as the Russian UN member-random and promoting Russian food products and fertilizers to the world markets we emphasize the package nature of the agreements reached in Istanbul and underscore the importance of ensuring full and reciprocal implementation of the above mentioned agreements also underline the importance of establishing sustainable fertilizer and grain supplies primarily to the African Asian and Latin American countries that are in critical need of these supplies as the nations that are most vulnerable to threats of famine and food insecurity. Thank you for your attention. Thank you. Thank you, Russian Federation. Now actually we are exhausted the list of intervention for the floor and I would like to return to you. Thank you. Thank you very much. I will be very brief. First of all to thank all the participants for their very valuable contribution. When we launched this first panel, our idea was first to call your attention upon the different dimensions of climate change and its impact in food security. Yes, there are some overlapings but there are also very clear signs of interaction between the different dimensions of climate change and at the end of the day we need to look at the in a comprehensive way so that we can identify what are the best actions to address each of the components where it is the rise of the water in the oceans that has a very important conference that took place fairly recently whether it is land degradation whether it is the water scarcity whether it is the need to deal with risks and disaster risk reduction. If we do not address the old spectrum of the problem we will not be able to identify what are the best solutions to guarantee adaptation mitigation and building resilience in the communities. Our second purpose was to give you a sense of urgency. We believe that we understand fully the discussions about reduction of emissions in 2030, 2040 and 2050. That's fine. But what we want to call your attention upon is that there are people who are already suffering the impacts of climate change every day. And therefore we very much align with the Secretary General initiative on a system of early warning because definitely there is a sense of urgency but some cases are more urgent than others and we need to have a clear picture about where are the odd spots that need to be addressed right away, immediate action. And secondly, I recall you that the Secretary General in the speech that he made to the General Assembly last September, he included three paragraphs on exactly the impact of food insecurity, climate change and human mobility. Well, you are much more used than me on the reports of Secretary Generals. I am an enemy of a report of the Secretary General of the United Nations having three paragraphs in a report on this issue shows clearly the sense of urgency that the Secretary General himself attributes to this subject. And last but not least yes, I think that from everyone there is a clear message. There is a need to work together. There is a need to enhance international cooperation to tackle the challenge. But if I may have a husk to you at the conclusion of this first panel please convey to your capitals that this sense of urgency is extremely important to be taken on board on your national statements during COP 27. It is not just an issue for a conference. No matter how successful is the conference. If you do not bring to the forum the message of the Secretary General in Charmel Shay this message and this link between climate change, food insecurity and human mobility we will lose a unique opportunity to raise awareness and to strengthen the support of the international community to those countries that are more in need of action in terms of adaptation, mitigation disaster risk resilience in the communities. So please join us in Charmel Shay. Thank you so much. Thank you all. I just would like to remind everybody that the 130 will have a side event that is with the title how gender responsive approach can better equip us to respond to climate change, food security and immigration. We'll be in the same room 132 other than that we are continuing our work at 3pm in the very same room also tonight. Thank you.


A fresh move by the National Assembly to grant life pension for each presiding officer, including the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as well as their deputies, is packed outreach among civil society groups and some senior advocates. And this is according to the National Assembly's joint special ad hoc committee on the review of the 1999 constitution, which laid its reports containing 68 recommendations in the respective chambers. If the proposal is passed by the legislature, the current Senate President Ahmad Lawan, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and their deputies will benefit. Meanwhile, the Deputy Director of Social Economic Rights and Accountability Project, Kola Dari, has called the Nigerians to ask their various representatives at the National Assembly to kick against such provisions, adding that it was selfish of them to have considered such a provision in the first place. The Serap Director stated that the proposal amendment, if that is true, cannot be said to be in the interest of Nigeria. Serap is in court challenging the payment of life pensions to some governors and deputy governors in their states.


In this lecture, we continue the introduction to statistical inference. Previously, we covered estimation. And in this one, we introduce you to the concept of testing hypotheses. Well, we learned about estimation as part of inference. Now we're going to learn about hypothesis testing. With testing some kind of hypothesis or a claim. Claims are always about parameters. Let's say a company makes a claim about its product. An example we have here is a frozen yogurt company says their yogurt has no more than 90 calories per cup. Now they're not talking about one particular cup of yogurt. They're talking about, it's a parameter, about the mu. That the population mean, you know, when it comes to calories per cup, the mu is less than or greater than 90. We're going to do a hypothesis test using the same kind of sample evidence we saw in estimation. Remember the sample evidence is N, X bar and S. Okay, that's called the sample evidence. So we're going to use that sample evidence to test the claim. Claims, which we call hypothesis, is always about a parameter. So we're going to take a sample. Suppose the sample is N equals 100 cups. That way you get the sample mean. Now again, if the sample mean is 90 or less, 90 calories or less, that's it. If we can't accuse the company of lying, their claim was that they had, you know, 90, no more than 90 calories per cup. The sample evidence supports that. You don't need statistics then. Everything is done for you. The sample evidence supports the claim. What happens if it's more than 90? Again, the question is how much more? Could it be slightly more? Could it be a lot more? In statistics, you know, we have to do a test so that we can ascertain whether the company has basically lied about their yogurt. And again, if you look at it, let's say, we all agree it would be tiny problem. Let's say 90.1 calories. Probably they're not lying. That could be sampling error. So they, you know, they're telling the truth. What happens if it's really more? A lot more. Suppose it's 500 calories a cup. Then even a non-statition would say, there's no way that the yogurts have less than 90 calories per cup. When our sample n equals 100, found the average was 500. It's clear the company has not been telling us the truth. So this is essentially the basis of hypothesis testing. There's going to be some kind of claim. And it's always about a parameter. We've been looking at claims about mu. We're going to take some sample mean. We're going to get the sample evidence. We're going to get the mean, the standard deviation based on n. And we're going to see if this claim is reasonable or not. Now let's learn some of the language of hypothesis testing. So we're going to talk about the claim. As we said before, there's a claim. There's a claim about a parameter. The actual claim we're going to call the null hypothesis h and little zero. That's called the null hypothesis. That's what we're going to put the hypothesized parameter value. And that eventually will be compared with the sample value. So we have ho, in this case mu, about mu. Then we have h1. That's called the alternate hypothesis. That's only accepted if you reject ho. And that's a decision that's based on looking at the sample evidence. So either we're going to reject ho, essentially tell the company they're lying, or we don't reject, call it accepted in quotes. Because we technically don't really accept ho. We just don't have the evidence to reject. So we're going to have a claim about a parameter as ho. And the alternative, in case ho gets rejected, we have an alternative hypothesis. And the sample evidence is going to be used to make this decision. Let's take a look at some of the things that can happen when we test the hypothesis. You'll see that we have something we call the state of nature, the columns. Either the null hypothesis really is true, or it really is false. We don't know. Why don't we know? Because we only collected a sample. All we know is the sample evidence. We don't know the population parameter. On the other hand, the rows, we can look at the decision that we make. As a result of the hypothesis test, either we will reject the null hypothesis, or we won't reject the null hypothesis. So there's two possible outcomes of our decision, and there's also two possible things that could be true about the null hypothesis. Let's take a look. If the null hypothesis is true and we don't reject it, that's good. We made the correct decision. On the other side, if the null hypothesis is false and we do reject it, there's another good. We did another correct decision. The other two cells represent possible errors that can occur. We call those errors alpha and beta, or sometimes type one error and type two error. If the null hypothesis is false, but we end up not rejecting it, we say the evidence doesn't let us reject this null hypothesis. We made a boo boo, and it's called a beta error, or an error of type two. If the null hypothesis is true and we reject it anyway, then we've made an alpha error. That's an error of type one. If you were wondering if this alpha is the same alpha that we looked at when we talked about estimation, confidence interval estimations, and the level of confidence was also called one minus alpha, it is indeed exactly the same quantity. It's exactly the same alpha. If we have an alpha error of 0.05, meaning the error that we make when we reject the null hypothesis, even if it's true, that's equivalent to, if we were doing a confidence interval, it's equivalent to using a confidence level of 95%, one minus alpha. There is a trade-off between these two types of errors, the alpha error and the beta error. We would love to be able to say, oh, error is a bad thing. I want all my errors to be very, very small. Can I get both alpha and beta errors down to 0? How do I do that? Of course, even though we would love to do that, we can't. This is a trade-off very much like the one we saw in the estimation lecture between the level of confidence, which was related to alpha, and the size of the interval. You can't keep on increasing the amount of confidence, which you would like, and narrowing the size of the interval, which you would also like. We can't do both of those. Well, in this case, we can't keep reducing the alpha error and keep reducing the beta error at the same time. It doesn't work that way. They work counter to each other. Let's think about it. With the alpha error, what we're doing is we're rejecting the null hypothesis when we should not reject it, when it's true. Well, as the probability of this type of error goes down because we're trying to lower it, we're reducing the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it's true, and we're reducing it lower, lower, lower as much as we can. Well, what happens? What happens is we're going to be rejecting less. We're going to be reducing the chance of rejecting altogether, which automatically is going to raise the beta error, the error that we make when we accept the null hypothesis, even if it's false. I don't understand the trade-off between the alpha and the beta error. Remember, the alpha error is the error of rejecting HO. It's the error of rejection. You've rejected HO when it's true. The beta error is the error of acceptance. You've accepted HO when HO is false. So we're going to see there's a trade-off, and the legal system understands the trade-off very well. You can have a legal system where it's extremely difficult to convict criminals. The so afraid of incarcerating innocent people, we make it very hard. You've got to be super certain. The judge says, I want absolute certainty before I put anyone in prison. Well, that system will be committing another kind of error.  You don't convict anyone. On the other hand, you can try the other approach. You make it very easy to convict. So you're going to have a legal system that's so easy to convict. Well, guess what's going to happen? A lot of innocent people end up behind bars. So what do you do? You have the error of acceptance and the error of rejection. Putting people in prison and making it impossible to put people in prison. So our legal system actually kind of compromises. We do. We try to keep the alpha error low, but we also worry about the beta error. So what our legal system says, we don't require complete certainty. We don't say beyond the shadow of a doubt. We don't require complete certainty. But you do want beyond reasonable depth. So again, we're trading off the alpha error with the beta error. The key point is you can't make both zero. It's impossible because they're not the different kinds of errors. We can see this trade-off between the alpha and the beta errors in quality control. Suppose you have a company and they buy computer chips for their smartphones and they buy 50,000 at a time. All right. Now, what a smart company does, no pun intended, what they'll do is they'll take a sample of 100 chips and decide on the basis of the sample whether to reject the entire shipment. The huge shipment comes in and now they take a random sample of 100 chips and make a decision. Now, if they're going to reject on the basis of even like one chip in the sample of 100 that's defective and they're going to use that as, you know, we found one defective chip in 100 and so they reject immediately. They could end up rejecting a lot of good shipments. On the other hand, if the firm is too liberal, say, a couple chips here and there, what do we care? And they accept the entire shipment and they make it very easy to accept the shipment and they always assume, oh, it's a sampling error. Then they're going to make the error of acceptance. This is why government and industry generally work with an alpha of .05. They will need to make errors occasionally but they don't want to end up rejecting shipment after shipment. Because again, you have to realize when you're talking about quality control there's always going to be a few defective chips. They'll have a standard that they know they can't have zero. So again, notice how the acceptance error and the rejection error kind of is a tension between the two and there's a trade-off. So we try to keep the alpha error low but we don't make it zero because we don't want to shoot up the beta error. If the alpha error goes down too much, the beta error goes up a lot. So we try to keep the alpha error at .05. Let me give you some steps in hypothesis testing. You may not need it. In fact, most people don't need the steps but if you need it, here they are. Step one, you formulate HO and H1. HO again is the null hypothesis. It's about a parameter and H1 is the alternative hypothesis. For example, you might say HO is a mu is 12.7 years. H1 is mu is not. Then we specify the level of significance, the alpha to be used. Generally, the government likes .05 once in a while you'll see .01 and very rarely .10. But you're going to have to have a level of significance to decide on when you're going to reject HO. Step three, select the test statistic. Now we're going to be learning about Z. But later on we'll learn about a T test. You're not limited to Z. You might use a T distribution. You may learn about the F distribution. That's step three, decide what test statistic. Rule of thumb, large samples. When you're testing the mean, you're going to be using Z. Very small samples, you might have to use T. Step four, you establish the critical value of values of the test statistic needed to reject HO. And you'll draw the picture and you must draw that picture. Then you'll take the sample evidence and you'll actually turn it into a test statistic. You'll get the actual value. We call that the computed value of the test statistic. So when you're all finished, you'll write Z equals. It'll be some number or T if you're working with small samples. You'll write Z equals. And that's the value, the computed value or actual value of the test statistic. And based on this, you're going to make a decision either going to reject HO or not reject HO. And again, this is all going to be done by drawing the diagram. You can have what we call critical values and you're going to see where the sample evidence falls. Does it fall into what we call the acceptance region? Or will it be in the rejection region? Let's see how we set up a hypothesis test. A company claims that its soda vending machines deliver exactly on the average eight ounces of soda. So that's a claim about Mew. The population parameter from the production process of the vending machines. Why does it have to be exactly within certain limits? Well, if we have too much, if we find out that on average, these vending machines really deliver way too much soda. For one thing, it could ruin the machine. It'll overflow the cup for another thing. We're wasting product. What if we find out that these machines deliver too little, much less than the eight ounces average of soda it's supposed to be delivering to the customers? We're short changing our customers. We're going to have issues in the public relations and in government watchdog agencies. So we don't want it either way. We want to make sure that the true population parameter is what it's supposed to be. We have our claim, eight ounces. That's what we use for the null hypothesis. The null hypothesis is that Mew, the population average amount of soda delivered is eight ounces. What's the alternate hypothesis? That it's not eight ounces. How could it be not eight ounces? Well, look at the picture. Either it can be very, very much larger than the hypothesized mean. And you see the red region of rejection on the right side. Or it could be much smaller than the hypothesized mean. And then it would fall into the region of rejection on the left side. So you can see why you have to draw a picture. And we're going to see more problems with this. Don't worry. But in this case, all we're doing is formulating it to show you what a two-tail test looks like. In this problem, we're going to be rejecting either in the right tail or the left tail. If you're too far away from the hypothesized mean on the high side, or if you're too far away from the hypothesized mean on the low side. So both of those tails contain the region of rejection. And it's called a two-tail test. Suppose we're testing at an alpha level of 0.01. That means that we're willing to reject 1% of the time if the null hypothesis is true. And what you see in front of you is a picture of the null hypothesis being true. So that means if the null hypothesis is true, we want to be able to reject 1% of the time. We take that alpha, split it in half, put half of a percent in one tail, half of a percent in the other tail, and look up in the Z table to see what Z values will split the distribution like that. Beyond what Z value on the right does the region of rejection start, and beyond what Z value on the left does the region of rejection start. Well, with 0.005 in the tail, we have seen this before in the estimation lecture and in the normal distribution lecture. We end up with the Z value of plus 2.575 and minus 2.575. The rest of the problem will do eventually, but for now we just want to show you a few problems in terms of how you set them up. So we just saw an example of setting up a problem, a hypothesis testing problem, when we're doing a two-tail test. So you can get the idea that one of the first things we have to do is decide on whether we have a one-tail test or a two-tail test, and that's going to be reflected in HO, in the null and the alternate hypotheses. So it's one of the very first things you have to do because formulate HO and H1, if you remember, was part of step one in hypothesis testing. With a two-tail test, as we saw, the null hypothesis is that the parameter value is equal to a certain value. Then the alternate hypothesis is simply that it's not equal. We don't have to say a different value, what value we think it is. All we have to say is that we reject the null hypothesis, so it's not. And that's why when you have a two-tail test, you split the difference and you say, I can either reject because it's too large, larger than it should be, or I can reject because it's smaller than it should be. With a one-tail test, as you'll see, we're only rejecting on one side of the distribution, either on the high side or on the low side, but not on both. And in that case, our alpha region is all in one tail. Let's look at the difference between one-tail test of hypothesis and two-tail test. We already saw that with a two-tail test, one of the key words in the word problem is probably going to be exactly. Not necessarily, sometimes you may have to figure it out, but certainly if the word exactly is in there, like a company claims that it's a pharmaceutical product has exactly one milligram of aspirin. You really don't want too little because it won't be effective. You don't want too much because it could be dangerous. Obviously, we're not going to get an average of exactly 1.00 milligrams of aspirin, but there's going to be some wiggle room. And what we're saying is that the mean mu of the distribution is exactly one milligram. And how far away would we have to be on either the high side or the low side in order to reject this hypothesis, to reject this claim? With a one-tail test, here's an example. A company claims that its raisin brand has at least 100 raisins in each box. And of course, again, we're talking about an average. And another thing we're looking at is we're assuming that that's a good thing. We're assuming that if somebody does a collection, does the experiment, collects data and finds that on the average, there are more than 100 raisins per box. That's okay, no one's going to have a problem with that. They're not going to reject it. Imagine if you're testing, doing quality control to see if you want to accept the shipment. You're going to accept the shipment. So the problem only arises if you find that the sample mean is less than, in this case, 100. We know that since we're working with the normal distribution, that there's always going to be a certain probability, a positive probability that the sample we took really did come from the distribution with the mean in the null hypothesis. But we're asking, is it reasonable? Could it have been that this distribution is true and we got a different value just because of sampling error? Or perhaps that something happened to the machinery and the production process no longer turns out boxes with at least 100 raisins. And that's really going to be the key. Is it sampling error that we're observing? Or is there really a significant difference from what HO is supposed to be? All right, here are some more examples. We're going to be looking at both two-tail tests and one-tail tests, different problems, to see how the null hypothesis gets set up. This is purely to look at the setup. In the first problem here, a company claims that its bolts have a circumference of exactly 12 and a half inches. Well, if these bolts are, let's say, there to connect the wing to an airplane, that's kind of important. You don't want it to be too large.  That's pretty bad. So in this case, the null hypothesis would be that mu is 12.5 inches, exactly what it's supposed to be. The null hypothesis, which we accept if we reject the null hypothesis, is that mu is not 12 and a half inches. The second problem is saying a company claims that its slice of bread has exactly two grams of fiber. And again, from looking at the problem, you get the feeling that you're going to reject if you see that you have an average much higher than 2 so that it's not sampling error. You're going to reject if you see that you have a sample average much lower than 2. And the null hypothesis is that mu is exactly two grams. The alternate hypothesis, that it's not. And remember, the alternate hypothesis, is what we accept if we reject HO. We're going to see an example now of a one-tail test. A company claims that its batteries have an average life at least. When you see words like at least or at most, you know you're dealing with a one-tail test. So they said at least 500 hours, which means anything after 500, 600, 7, 8, it's all good. The only problem is if it's a little bit below 500, you want to know is it sampling error or not. So the rejection region goes to the left, right, the left tail. And here's how we set it up. HO mu is greater than or equal to 500 hours. H1 mu is less than 500. Notice H1 is always pointing to where the rejection region goes. So if you're testing at an alpha of 05, the entire 05 now has to be in the left tail. You don't split it up because of a one-tail test. The only problem is on the left when you're below 500. If you're too far below and it can't be sampling error, we're going to reject HO. So again, notice that hint? H1 always points to where the rejection region should be. And by the way, the critical value, if you check your 0 to Z table, if you want to have 5% in the tail, that means you have between 0 and Z, you have 45%, 0.4500. So you look at your Z table, 0 to Z, and you want 0.4500, 45% of the area, and you find out the value is, in this case, minus 1.645. It's also a one-tail test. A company claims that its overpriced bottled water has no more than 1 microgram of benzene, which is poisonous. How do you formulate that? Remember, the company's claiming it's no more than. So we write that on HO, mu is less than 1 microgram. H1, if we reject HO with left with H1, is that mu is greater than 1 microgram, which is problematic if more than 1 microgram of benzene. Again, notice, we're going to test at the 0.5 level. So we have to put the entire, it's a one-tail test. That means the entire 0.5 goes on one-tail, and in this case, the right-tail. Remember, H1's pointing to it. It's only a problem when you have too much, less. If you have, let's say, a trillionth of a microgram, the government's going to be even happier, or zero benzene, and it's even good. Anything on the left is good. It's on the right side where you're getting problems. All right, so since we're testing on 0.5, the entire 0.5 is in the right-tail, and the critical value is plus 1.645. Here's an example of a two-tail test, and we're going to do the whole problem for you. A pharmaceutical company claims that each of its pills contains exactly 20 milligrams of kumadin. That's a blood thinner. And you see why it's a two-tail test.  Too little, it won't work. So you want it to be exactly 20 milligrams of kumadin. Okay, so you take a sample of 64 pills, and you find, here's your sample evidence. Based on your sample of 64, X bar is 20.50, and the standard deviation is 0.80 milligrams. So the question is, should the company's claim be rejected? A test at alpha equals 0.5. So notice how the steps are set up. Formulate the hypotheses. First of all, you realize it's a two-tail test. It's not at least or at most. It's exactly. So HO is that mu is exactly equals 20 milligrams. H1 is mu is not equal to 20 milligrams. Okay, now we're going to choose the test statistic and find the critical values. Now we're testing at alpha 0.5, but this is a two-tail test. We're going to take the alpha and cut it into two. Half of 0.5 is 0.25. Put 0.25 in the right side, right tail. 0.25 in the left tail. And again, we've seen this a number of times, that's from the 0 to Z table. If you have 0.25 in the tails, let me get 0.470 in the 0 to Z part, the fat part, and that critical value for Z is 1.96. Those are called the critical values. Anything between minus 1.96 and 1.96, we accept. That white region is accept. If you fall on the right tail, you're going to reject, and if you fall on the left tail, you're going to reject. Remember, you're rejecting if there's too much coumadine and too little coumadine. So you need to have two rejection regions. That's where we cut the alpha in half. Okay, so if we fall into that red area, and the shaded red area, then that's called a rejection region. So if you get a plus 2 or a plus 3 or a plus 4, you're rejecting on the right side too much. If you get on the left side too little, that's like a minus 2 or a minus 3 or a minus 4, we reject on the left side. Now what we're going to do is take the sample evidence, turn it into a Z value, and see where the Z value takes us. We're in the acceptance region, which means it could very well be sampled here, or we're going to be in the rejection region. So here's where we convert the sample evidence into a Z score, Z value. 20.50 minus 20 over 0.80, that's your standard deviation, over the square root of n. What we end up with is 0.50 over 0.10, and that's equal to 5. Okay, so now we have a Z score of 5. Now what does that tell us? Now we're way into the rejection region. Okay, so we're going to reject the HO. Notice, we would have rejected that 1.97, 1.98, 1.92, 3, 4, we're at 5. That's basically telling us that the probability of getting this kind of sample evidence, if the claim is true, is very low. It's very unlikely that this is going to happen. This sample evidence is not what you expect if your mu is 20 milligrams. We've just shown you how to do a hypothesis test, but let's show you another way of looking at this data. Remember, we're always working with the sample evidence. With a hypothesis test, we're testing the claim using the sample evidence. But suppose there's no claim made, and all you want to do is estimation, and that's constructing a confidence interval, watch how we do the same, almost the same thing, but from a different perspective. Okay, we take the sample evidence, and we want to construct a 95% confidence interval. Okay, so we take the sample evidence, the X bar, 20.50 milligrams, plus or minus 1.96, because that gives you two-sided confidence interval if you want 95% confidence. So you do plus or minus 1.96 times the standard error of the mean, which we computed before, S over the square root of N, which was 0.10. And now we have constructed a 95% confidence interval, and we would have, based on that, we would have said we're 95% sure that the mu is a fixed value, but it's somewhere with 95% confidence between 20.304 milligrams and 20.696 milligrams. And notice, just on the basis of that, we would have known 20 is not in that interval. So you can see that hypothesis testing and confidence intervals are basically almost the same thing, the two sides of the same coin, because both rely on the sample evidence. So if a claim is made about a parameter, if there's a claim made, you do a hypothesis test, because you're going to test that claim. And if you won't test it, the government's going to test it in some cases. If no claim is made, all you want to do is use sample evidence to estimate a parameter, and maybe even to determine what claims may be made in the future, then you can do a confidence interval. In both cases, you're relying on the sample evidence. So these are really two ways of looking at things, but as far as you're concerned in the course, if we actually construct a confidence interval, there's no claim was made.  But once you hear a claim, once you hear somebody making a claim about a parameter, you're going to take the sample evidence to test the claim and to see if the claim makes any sense and is reasonable. This is an example of a one-tail test. The company claims, notice you hear the word claim. The minute you hear that word claim, you know it's going to be a hypothesis test. They're claiming that their LED bulbs will last at least 8,000 hours. So you can take the sample evidence, if you, the government, somebody's going to be testing the claim. You sample 100 bulbs, find that X bar, the sample mean is 7,800 hours, and the sample standard deviation is 800 hours. So should we reject the company's claim, we're going to test at an alpha of 0.05. Okay, so first we have to write down the HO and the H1. HO, the claim is mu is greater than 8,000 hours. Again, notice, anything more than that is fine. 9, 10, no one's going to get upset if they're claiming 8,000 hours and now the bulbs last 14,000 hours. Good news. It's on the left side where there's a problem. And that's why HO's amuse less than 8,000 hours. And that's why we need a statistical test, but it's all going to be on the left. It's a one-tail test. So we take the entire alpha of 5%, it goes to the left, that means you have between 0 and Z you have 45%, 0.4500. And now your critical value, since you're on the left, is minus 1.645. That's called the critical value. So we reject if you fall into that rejection region that's shaded in red. So anything less than minus 1.645, minus 2, minus 3, minus 4, that's rejecting. Anything to the right of that, like let's say plus 4, you don't have to do a test. You're definitely okay. But let's say between 0 and minus 1.645, you don't reject, that could be sampling error. Now we're going to take the sample evidence and turn it into a Z score. 7800 minus 8000, which is minus 200. Over 800, the standard error of the mean, 800 of the squared of 100, that's 80. Minus 200 over 80 is minus 2.50. Now the computed Z value, that's called computed or calculated Z value, that's basically your sample evidence converted into a Z score. That sample evidence now is a Z score minus 2.50 and I see it's in the rejection region. So we reject HO because the probability of getting this sample evidence, if the claim is true and that mu is 8000 or more, this is called 8000 hours, the probability of getting this kind of sample evidence of 7800 based on the sample size of 100 with a standard deviation of 800, the probability of getting all that is less than 5%. You can actually figure it out. Certainly if you do it by computer, the computer will tell you the probability, but it's going to be less than 5%. There are a lot more problems on our website. Do as many problems as you can find. As always, practice, practice, practice. The more practice you get doing the problems, the better off you'll be on exams.