Mae'n rhoi'n meddwl i ddim yn fwyaf eu bod yn ein gweithio'r gweithio mewn meddwl yng nghymru, sy'n mynd i gweithio'r gweithio'r Gweithio. Ysgol yn ysgol'i meddwl yno, mae'n gweithio'n mynd i'w cyhoeddwn, y cwmbrindigau yn y ffondi gwaith yng nghymru yma, ac mae'n ziwethaf yn cael eu ffondi'n gweithio, yna'r cyflwyntau'n sgolwyr o'r cyflwyntau, a'r ffordd yma, ychydig yn ei ddweud yn gwneud y gweithio enteredran getting zones and terrorism are overlapping with the other forces that are impacting our world. I think that the report we've all got our hands points to a mixed picture when we're thinking about Trans in violent extremism terrorism. For me it points to a landscape in transition. We see terrorism deaths in decline but exploding the record highs in the number of countries plagued by terrorism. Dyna y 20-gwyl sydd gennym i'r effaeth yn Afganistine. Mae'r Talabann yn sefydlu i Isis yn ymgyrchu dyna'r gyfnodau sydd yn Llyfrgellau ym Mhôr. Yn ymgyrch ymwysig, ond ymgyrchu Llyfrgell ym Mhôr yn gweithi'r gwaith ymdyn nhw, ymgyrchu'r rhagwm ymdyn nhw yn ymgyrchu ymwysig ar gyfer 3 ysgrifeith. a'r amser sydd hynny'n gallu gweithio gyda'r lluniau a'r lluniau ar y gweld. Felly, rydyn ni'n gweithio i'r hynny yn cyfudiant ythafodol, rydyn ni'n mynd i ddim yn ychydig Llywodraeth felly mae'n gweithio'r lluniau ar gyfer hynny'n gweld. Yn cyfnodol, mae'n gweithio i gynhyrch gyda'r aelodau cyffredinol, gyda llunio cerddliadol, a'r suwsgwm bythigir o'r ddaf. Felly, mae'n ddych chi'n mynd i'r hyn sy'n gweld eich hwn ymddangos o'r hyn o'r ganlwg. Mae'n rhoi'r ffordd i ddim yn tari'r ddaf yn fawr o mynd yma, ac mae'n ffwrdd o'r ddataeth. Felly, oedd yn ymwinell yma ymmwinell, mae'n meddwl am y ddechrau a'r an Guild Llywodraeth these challenges including the rising tide of polarisation, hate and extremism we're seeing internationally. We bring ethnographic research, expertise in international extremist movements in a sort of digital policy focus as well to then provide policy advisory support to governments and civil society organisations and companies seeking to challenge this rising tide and by really coming to things like the global terrorism index felly we're able to take data-driven solutions, to scale those, and to provide them with the opportunity to pilot and to almost provide a petri dish for what works in demonstrating attitude and on-behavioural change when it comes to these dynamics we're seeing internationally. As those of you who will flick through this index, there are a number of key trends that I want to unpack in slightly more detail. The three that I want to focus on during this talk ar y pryddweud yr Aesfaolę agolsiadau yng ngyfrifu o Gymru, i groes o'r Pytfyrirau Sgrifoledig. Rwyf am fearswyrledig dros Gymru, ac roedd o'n unrhyw o'r prosiect. Rwyf o'r prosiect ar y cyfrifwyr yn gyfrasedol a gyda rhoi am y cyfrifwyr, wych yn bwysig ymddangos Gwerthi ar gyfer cyfrifwyr. Gwysig hwnnw i'r rai cyfrifwyr ar gyfer cyfrifwyr, hwnnw i'r prosiect fydd. Yn y gwrsfawr, The GTI points to a rise of 300%, I believe, in global, in far-right violence over the past three years. I think that this is something we're seeing as a kind of cresting wave of far-right extremist sentiment that we've seen growing over the past few years. We've seen increasing mobilisation online and offline that is increasingly manifesting now in the political violence sydd wedi'i gwirio gweithio ymlaenau europei ac North America ond yng Nghylau, Ymddangos, Ymddangos, ymddangos, ym Chrysgrifennu am y ddod yma, ymddangos yma yma yn Gweithio. Mae ymddangos cyfion o'r gweithio'r gweithio'r Sreit-Gaith gan Llyfrgell, ymddangos'r gweithio'r gweithio ar gyfer y lleolau cyfrifol ar gyfer ymddangos, ydy'r llanod o'r gweithio ar gyfer ymddangos yn gwneud o'r gweithio. Yn y dyfodol cymaint yn ystwyffau yma, mae'r anhygoelau yn ystwyffio mewn gweld yn ymddangos a'r anhygoelau gweld yn ystwyffio gyda'r hyn ynghwyl, oherwydd esbygwydol gyda'r ystyff yma i Llywodraeth Cresces a'r ataer. Mae hi'n mynd i gyrwch i'r ideologi ar gyfer gweld yn cyd-grysiau a chyfligio'r ideologi oherwydd y gallun gyffredig oherwydd yna'r anhygoelau gyda'r anhygoelau cyffredig ymddangos. Mae bwysig yn cael ei wneud ar gyfer gwahanol i'r wahanol ychydigol, eich gweithio'r gweithio'r gweithio yng nghymru o'r ddod yn y teimlo ni'n gwyllidellu. A'r gweithio'r gweithio ar gyfer gwahanol, mae'n gwneud ar gyfer gwahanol i'r gweithio'r gwahanol, gyda'r modd, yn gweithio y genno sy'n ei wneud argymwysig. Mae'r gweithio'r gweithio'r gweithio'r gweithio'r gweithio'r gweithio ar gyfer gwahanol, gallwn amdd yn y cyfan y gwaith bwyaf burrwyr nesaf beth ymateb yw ymgyrch i ddwyddiadau yng ngwylo. Efo gweithio gydig fel y through ac ymgyrch yma, fel fod yn y cefnodol cyfaint y prifysgol yw'r bydd sy'n ddweud.  Wrth gwrs, mae rhoi'n gwiswyl bod y cantor arall y rhanion o'r rhannu ond erioed yn y llaw iawn. Ond rwy'n rhanion i'r llaw taeth i'r cyhoeddus mewn rhannu o'r rhannu a'r rhanion i mi nhw'n siarad. Ac mae'r rhannu o'r rhannu o'r rhannu i'n rhannu o'r rhannu, The notion of not respecting the rights of others, which I know is one of the indicators that are used for the positive peace index that the Institute for Economics and Peace produced, is premised on this idea that human rights is not a universal factor. When we're speaking about counter-terrorism and counter-extremism, it's useful to bear in mind that at the heart of these efforts is this defence of human rights and the rights of others, and that we can't understand it detached from that. Indeed, if we detach counter-terrorism and counter-extremism from this consideration about human rights, you end up with a highly relativised notion of what terrorism and extremism stands for, where you see the abuse of this kind of terminology to police thought, to re-educate and to essentially curb views that are not conducive to a certain governing party's perspective. So, I think it's really important that we have that human rights angle at the heart there. Whilst we're talking about this growth in far-right terrorism and far-right extremism in parallel, this rises incredibly significant, but it's also worth bearing in mind that this globally is dwarfed quantitatively by the scale of Islamist extremism that we've seen. I think there's a risk that even as we've seen a drop-off in the number of terrorist attacks, which is largely down to the reduction of the area that is governed by ISIS across the Iraq and Syria, that there is a risk in seeing this ideological challenge as a done deal. The way that we need to understand groups such as ISIS and Al Qaeda is in several ways that they bring an ideological, a propaganda and a territorial entity into their operations. Now, the actions, the largely counter-terrorism-framed actions that have been taken by the international community have largely sought to degrade the territorial entity of ISIS across Iraq and Syria and its further provinces, as well as its propaganda machinery, and this has taken place in the online space as well as in targeting its media operations. We need to learn from the history of countering these Salafi jahadi Islamist groups that this also exists as an ideological entity. While the group has been dismantled in terms of its propaganda and territory, we cannot make them a sake of assuming that the ideology has been defeated as well. ISIS was not born out of a vacuum. It was able to thrive in a context where the underlying conditions still remain in its heartlands. We see major failures in governance, sectarian tensions and conflict environments, and surge will speak to the ways that conflict and terrorism are overlapping in key parts of the world, which precipitated ISIS's global rise, as well as the resilience of Al Qaeda affiliates around the world as well. In particular, the Global Terrorism Index points to several key hubs in which this resilience is particularly evident in the Horn of Africa, in West Africa, including the Sahel, and major concerns around joining together of a sort of Sahelian-Migrebian area of operations for these Islamist groups with a broader, lake-chad West African basis in increasing exchanges between Islamist terrorist groups in these contexts, as well as in the Afpak region and the rise in Afghanistan to number one in the index points to the resilience of these groups in that context. I think that we need to bear in mind that the Islamist challenge is not finished and actually we need to be understanding the interaction between Islamism and the far-right when we look at upcoming terrorism and extremism challenges. It's not a zero-sum game that exists between these. We can't flip our entire apparatus and machinery to reflect a far-right challenge at the expense of looking at Islamist terrorism. Instead, these movements thrive off one another, and in fact they are learning from each other regularly. The far-right, for instance, has taken a page out of the Islamic State Book by using its social media platforms to identify people with public propaganda content and they're targeting them for individual private conversations, including on encrypted platforms online, to start the spiral of radicalisation. Showing that our responses need to be three-pronged. We need to be looking at a comprehensive regulation question when it comes to the online space. We need to be competing with these narratives as they manifest online, and we also need to be educating. We need to be doing all these things at the same time and really building out a comprehensive response to violent extremism across the ideological spectrum, whilst also recognising the distinct challenges that these threats pose. Whilst far-right terrorism is on a frightening trajectory, really a major concern that we're seeing is about other tactics that are being used by far-right extremists to mainstream their narratives through media, through politics and through activism. We've seen the proliferation of far-right populist parties across Europe who have been able to successfully enter extremist concepts, ideologies and narratives into mainstream political discourse, and this really does open up a lot of space for these groups to operate in and really sows the seeds for the long-term resilience of these groups in western countries. Of course, in western countries the Islamist challenge is still held up by a lot of security agencies as a primary security threat, but the far-right terrorism threat is the fastest growing and it's very important that we recognise the differing tactics that are being used by these different ideological campaigns. So finally, I want to end on a point about the findings about gender that are prevalent in the report, including the rise of female suicide bombers, not least in West Africa, in the Boko Haram, and late child based extremist groups. Throughout this presentation, I've really been trying to point to the fact that the role of violence is often ambivalent within these terrorist groups. We, for too long as a policymaker community, really thought of women exclusively through the lens of victimhood when it came to their engagement with extremist movements. There's a much greater diversity in drivers for women to be joining these groups. Often they map on to similar drivers that we've seen for men joining extremist organisations, a sense of adventure, perhaps an ideological conviction, and the ability to play upon specific identity features that are prevalent within local communities and extremist groups able to mobilise those highly local factors. But I think underpinning this is really an opportunism when we see the use of women to carry out acts of political violence in this context. We're seeing that violence is being used as a tactic and non-violence is a strategy, sorry, that non-violence is a tactical distinction rather than a strategic distinction. It's important to distinguish between strategic non-violence, which is pragmatic and open to adaption, and principled non-violence, which is consistent and committed. And I think what we've seen very often with women's involvement in extremist movements is about a strategic approach to non-violence rather than the principled approach to non-violence. And really there is this sense of opportunism that extremist groups use to justify the involvement of women within their movement through violent and non-violent means. So I'm going to leave it there. I think those are really just some framing statements to capture some of the key differences we've seen in this year's data. It's really important that we think about political violence and terrorism in terms of trends. I'm really pleased that the Global Terrorism Index allows us to look at the trajectory in the future direction of travel. But I think that we need to be thinking about this mapping of violence and of the manifestations of extremist ideology through violence through that long lens. I'm really anticipating future challenges so that we're not, for instance, catching up with a growing far-right terrorist threat. And we're not assuming that a decline in Islamist-inspired terrorism is therefore the sign of a kind of end of an era. So really over to Serge and to provide a sort of data picture of what we've seen in 2019. Well, thank you very much for having the Institute for Economics and Peace again at this institute being able to present. Thank you very much, Milo, for an excellent keynote address. I'm already looking forward to the UK launch in London at ISD next month and to do this very gig again about the Global Terrorism Index. So yeah, let's start with it. Some of the slides will be very, very quick because I was very well introduced to give my speech. So yes, we measure and quantify the drives of peace and also the benefits, the economic benefits that a more peaceful situation can deliver. So that's why we have a flagship publication Global Peace Index every year in June, but we have other more national indexes, topical indexes like the work we do on the progress on the SG-16. And one of the indicators of the Global Peace Index is terrorism. We have seen more than, I would say, four or five years ago when we experienced the peak of terrorism in the western and throughout the world that when this indicator was fluctuating, it had a very large impact on the overall Global Peace Index. That's why, and because data sets were available, we decided to extract it and to create a specific index called the Global Terrorism Index. We have offices throughout the world. So I appeal to the Institute for Economics and Peace based in Sydney, Australia. We have offices in New York connected to the Office of Mexico City for the Mexico Peace Index that we produce every year. I am heading the office in Brussels. We still have colleagues in the egg. And we opened at the end of 2018 an office in Harare where we tried to implement positive peace with the local government. So we also do a lot of research for international organisations, university kind, professors kind of like, or work to include in their courses and in their classes, a lot of downloads. Basically next to the research we also try to reach out to the entire world and connect people, connect people, we don't work with the results of our research. We created a set or I would say network of IP ambassadors that are really bringing out, especially into specific communities where it is needed the research results. All right. So what is the Global Terrorism Index? Seventh year, 163 countries. Where are the missing 30? Those are countries that are too small in size or in size of population to be statistically relevant or not to have a negative impact on a statistical ranking like the index that we have at hand. We measure and we rank countries according to the relative impact of terrorism. As said, it's an indicator of the GPI. We do it ourselves and overlooked by a panel of international experts. We are in the field of social sciences, so there is no globally accepted definition of terrorism. So that's why in our collaboration with the START consortium that are compiling the global terrorism database we are using the definition you see on the screen. So the use of illegal force and violence by non-state actors. Very important data there to attain a political, economic, religious or social goal through fear, coercion or intimidation. So based on this definition, START consortium, University of Maryland is compiling the global terrorism database. We press this database through the filter of four indicators. The amount of incidents, people injured, people being killed and the damage to property. A different weight to each of those indicators. We also identified terrorism as being a form of violence that is much more persistent than others. So that's why over a period of five years we take half the value of the previous year into the index. I would say we do a job as statistics specialists. We also include social communic indicators to be able to do basically what you did, my always try to analyse the data we produce and also identify the trends and give some I would say more in depth explanation to the results that I'm going to talk about right now. This is so for each index that we produce we also everything is available online on our website called visionofhumanity.org and for each of index you have an interactive map like this one. So you can basically click on each country on the map and get the data, the ranking, the data per indicator really going into the details of each and every country. This map also allows you to already identify I would say the hotspots of terrorism throughout the world or at least those regions that are most impacted and it also allows you to identify those 26 small green patches and those are countries that have not been affected by terrorism in the past five years. So this is the I would say for this index almost the infamous top 10. I mean look at those countries you could have the reaction and say well obvious those are the usual suspects that you would expect to find back in the top 10 of a global terrorism index and it's also the case. But I think the most important change of the past year is the number one ranking. So since 2003 Iraq has been number one on the global terrorism index. This has changed last year and you will see the things afterwards dramatically. So when you look at the key findings, so good news and bad news. So a decrease in the impact of terrorism, decrease in the number of people getting killed by terrorism, down by 15% and if you would open this time window to the past four years or really compare the peak in 2014 to those data collected in 2018 and early 2019, you will clearly see a decrease by more than 50% going down from short of 36,000 getting killed in 2014 to just about 15,000 last year. So clearly 52% in the amount of casualties. More countries improved than the terrorists so that's good news. But we also see that more countries get impacted by the phenomenon terrorism. So we had 67 in the past year, went up to 71 and 71 in the second highest level, second highest number of countries impacted by terrorism. So mylo, as we have said, the impact is going down but the phenomenon is spreading and it's very, very present in the world. I said 26 countries, four Europe, good news and those are the same figures and last year again 70% decreased the amount of casualties, 62 last year. Turkey is inside the Europe basket in the index, 40 occur in Turkey. So if you really look at Europe as we know Europe, only 22. And the three countries most affected by it in the EU would be the UK, France and Belgium. Taking in mind also that you have this half value over five years so that's why those countries are in the top three for Europe. Now when we look at this number one position of Afghanistan we had a decrease last year of the amount of casualties created by the Islamic State by more than 70% in Syria and Iraq. So this is a clear consequence of the military action of the coalition against Daesh or very successful in crushing the capabilities of this organization. On the other hand we saw an increase by more than 70% of the amount of casualties created by the Taliban. And those figures are to be really, really mind blowing. So from the global number of casualties 38% were created by the end of the Taliban and if in the index you will find also a list of the most, it's very difficult to call them successful but the most impactful attacks last year in the top 10, in the top 20 you will see that the vast majority of all of the attacks occurred in Afghanistan. So the most impactful successful attacks last year all occurred in one country Afghanistan. And that's also a huge difference with the previous years because the Islamic State was active in a lot of different countries and were creating casualties in those countries. So those figures that are now comparable to the figures linked to the Taliban the Taliban are only creating those casualties in only one country and this is Afghanistan. And therefore of course Afghanistan is the most affected country by terrorism last year followed by Iraq, Nigeria, Syria and Pakistan out of these top five only Afghanistan and Nigeria at worst figures last year than the year before Iraq, Syria and Pakistan improved so basically decreased the amount of casualties. We also see as you said Milo an exponential growth of the impact of far-right terrorism up 320% in the amount of casualties in the amount of attacks both on both side of the Atlantic but basically we could even say it's a global phenomenon still concentrated in about 19 countries in Northern America, Europe, Western Europe and Oceania. And those figures are going to continue to evolve exponentially again in the past year. So this increase of those figures for 2018 were just short of 30 casualties in 2018. Those are the figures at the end of September when this index was compiled last year 77 plus 2 in Hall of Germany in October 79. So if you go from just short of 30 to 79 in one year you can just imagine how this graph is going to continue to evolve and we have been very lucky in Hall of Germany. The Germans are building very strong doors because if this guy would have the opportunity to enter into the synagogue we might have doubled those figures of 77 and 79. So this is showing you the evolution per country and it's clearly showing you this increase in Afghanistan and Nigeria and a decrease in the other top countries last year. So really 15% between 17 and 18. When you look at this you clearly see 46%. If you take the Taliban but also this horizon chapter of Islamic State in Afghanistan together they are responsible for almost 50% of the casualties worldwide. So almost one out of two people that was killed by terrorists last year fell in Afghanistan by those two organizations. 87% so close to 90% of all terrorist attacks and all terrorist deaths last year was committed in only those 10 countries. So there is a clear concentration of the phenomenon of terrorism and countries with larger impacts than others and it's really when you look at those figures in Afghanistan and Nigeria that are creating the figures in the past year. The rises in the fall so that's good news, so Iraq, Somalia, Egypt so those are the countries that had a clear decrease in the past year and those countries that have been more impacted last year and what is really disturbing for me there is a concentration of African countries in those rises last year. The impact of terrorism, the economic impact, so this is only linked to the four indicators that we use. We do not include there the indirect economic impact for example on tourism after a terrorist attack because those figures are not always correct and very difficult to put together and the other economic impact that we do not have in those statistics are the extra investment made in security and intelligence forces because those data are usually at least confidential if not secret but still 33 billion, the economic impact was 33 billion last year so a lot of money, 33 billion but if you compare these to the overall cost of violence that we basically put together for the global peace index every year we were at $14.1 trillion last year so it's marginal compared to the overall cost of violence but it's still 33 billion, very impactful and you can see that for specific countries like Afghanistan only terrorism is already eating up close to 20% of this country's GDP so if we open the time window to at least a decade this is the graph that you would get starting into 2002 different ways to look at these graphs you can either look at this and identify what we would call the fourth wave of terrorism really impacted by religious motivation at least extreme religious motivation for this type of terrorism and then you could ask yourself have we been successful here? Is this like the end of this fourth wave? Or is this just another sub-wave? and are we going to see another increase in 2020-21? When you look at the different influx of the graph and you go down and you look at the different years in which it happened you can easily link these two decisions or at least movements in international politics and Western foreign policy basically creating as you have said this fertile soil or even windows of opportunity for example 2007 Al-Zarqawi to create a Islamic State in Iraq and 2014 Al-Baghdali doing the same and opening it to the Levant so to Syria also so you can ask yourself is this just another sub-wave and what will be the windows of opportunity that we are going to create in this year, next year or in 2022 and is this going to re-emerge the same type of threat the same type of terrorism, the same groups, other groups other type of terrorism, what are we facing I guess this is something that specialists need to have a look on and discussion about this afterwards in the Q&A The deadliest terrorist groups in the world we clearly see the red line is the Islamic State Boko Haram is the yellow line so they are against the military action against this group very effective a couple of years ago decreases by 70-80% of the impact the brown line, the Taliban and the blue line this Islamic State chapter in Afghanistan are permanently on the rise and really a large, large impact in 2018 This is a slide, I explained to you that 71 countries had been impacted by terrorism last year you clearly see a plateau since 2011-12 of large numbers of countries being impacted by terrorism so this is not just a phenomenon of the past two years but you clearly see a plateau that you can start to identify in 2005-07-08 and then another one starting in 2011-12-13 By region that's a very interesting slide because this is showing you, this is explaining to you a lot of things first of all you can see that South Asia that's basically Afpak as you called it and the Middle East or the MENA region had the same amounts of incidents in the past years or the past decade even 16 years but those incidents were much more effective or create much more casualties close to one of the thousands in the MENA region compared to Afpak so you clearly see more effective attacks over there you also clearly see concentration of the phenomenon of terrorism at least the impact of terrorism in three regions the MENA region, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa and after the crush of Daesh last year you clearly also see a redistribution of the remaining capacities over other conflicts in Nigeria, in the Sahel and also to Afghanistan unfortunately this is also a slide who should do other things it's basically also debunk the political narrative in the west that terrorism is like the number one source of insecurity in our society so of course when you get targeted by terrorist attack every victim that fell under a terrorist attack is one too much do not get me wrong but when you compare this to other regions and the impact of other regions we are really not at the forefront receiving the full impact of terrorism the full impact of terrorism is occurring in other parts of the world in which we are also very active by the way so a lot of information there and it was really really special to talk about this in a country like Mexico that is clearly facing other troubles than terrorist activities back in the days and I was in Mexico and President Trump declared the narco cartels as being terrorist groups so destabilising for this country 320% increase for far-right terrorism you can clearly see there and as I explained before 2019 we will have a figure that will be up there so this graph is really going to skyrocket next year this trend and of course marginal in figures compared to the overall impact of terrorism is there, is vastly growing and is steadily growing and is continuing to grow in the past year we also did an analysis and compared the impact over a period of almost 50 years between far-left and far-right terrorism so the red line on the graphs are for far-left terrorism and the blue lines are for far-right terrorism so the conclusion that you can really draw from this comparison over 50 years is that far-left terrorism has been much more prolific in the amount of attacks but less effective in creating casualties of course those casualties for far-right common peaks and we will have Christchurch in 2019 created a new peak but still we clearly see that far-left terrorism is not really there to create a lot of casualties and if they create casualties those are really targeted casualties and I remember when I was much younger than today for example far-left German groups really targeting CEOs of main multinational companies in Germany you clearly see that for far-right in I would say certain periods of time in certain incidents it's clearly there to create mass casualties so at least have a larger impact of casualties so by the ideology this is a graph that is really really telling you a lot it's clearly showing you that many other forms of terrorism have impacted us in previous decades and this is really going through I was born in 1969 so very depressing slide for me because my year of birth is not even on the slide anymore so yeah when you look at this this is basically my youth it's like on the news every day in the UK with the IRA in France with Action Direct or with this Palestinian Liberation France many many different sources of terrorism that also impacted the west and also impacted our countries in Europe and for many many reasons so of course we saw resurgence of this religious type of terrorism and be careful that's the west so if you would do this for the world the orange fire would be much larger because in those most affected regions this is clearly the motivation for the use of terrorism and in the west you clearly see that nationalist and separatist motivation is on the decrease therefore political violence the use of violence in politics I would say is really the main cause for the use of terrorism and of course the resurgence of religion but still a clear difference with the political motivation for the use of terrorism far right movements big difference with the GRDs movements there is no rush to claim there is no international organization that is going to claim the attacks committed by the lone wolves I don't like the term lone wolves because those guys have been inspired so I like to call them lonely wolves following a larger pack of wolves of influenced wolves but still those are individual actors committing using violence to basically make the point of the narrative that is well organized online and that is well propagated and it's also part unfortunately in many many recognized political formation within the European Parliament within the national governments and even parliament governments also in Europe so you have a narrative political narrative that is extreme it's becoming more and more mainstream even if it's extreme there is a narrative online that is specific and you spoke about this narrative on one actor to the next actor but there is no I would say movement of large organization claiming these individual attacks so that's the main difference with GRDs type of terrorism we have also seen and I guess this is really aiming at Northern America but we have also seen that mass shootings so four casualties and more more and more of those mass shootings have been identified as terrorist attacks why? I mean look at the years of and the start of the increase because terrorism came more and more into the debate we have identified terrorism as a form of violence therefore so yeah closer closer look on those mass shootings having a potential terrorist motivation but the other one to clearly see also that this is still less than 20% of all potential mass shootings one but last point the link between conflict and terrorism so this is an evolution of the amount of casualties falling under the two type of violence so battle death and death from terrorism and you see a clear parallelism between those two graphs showing you that terrorism in most of the conflicts that we see today worldwide is one of the tactics, techniques or procedures that are used by mostly the non-state actors because the conflict that we see today is actually non-state actors facing non-state actors in an environment where the state cannot exercise its power anymore so we clearly see that there is a correlation, more than 90% of all terrorist attacks in the world occurred in a country that is engaging at least one violent conflict of having a violent conflict on its soil the more intense the conflict the more terrorism will be used and the more casualties will fall through the action and the more terrorism the targets are also completely different so a country that is engaging in a violent conflict you will see that the terrorist group or the insurgency group sometimes it's very difficult to make the difference you also see that the same groups can be a terrorist group in one region it can be an insurgency in the other region depending on the pressure that you put on them so it's really morthing a lot but you see in countries that are engaged in a conflict that the targets are hard type of targets for the police military infrastructure, representation of the state but also representation I would say the competition of the terrorist groups and non-state militias on the other hand countries that are not engaged in a violent conflict the targets will be much softer business, journalists, media, tourists and I would say the entire population as such last point before getting to the Q&A it's on gender and terrorism this is a very interesting slide this is showing you that most of the time terrorist group have the element of initiative and surprise a reaction and then of course counter-terrorism adapted and a steep decrease so when you look at those two peaks those are clearly initiative or surprises by some of the terrorist groups reaction by the security intelligence community and then a steep decrease because it's not going to happen anymore just imagine concrete blocks in those streets only came after a truck running to people in this not before so we are always like on our heels and not really predicting what's going to happen next but we are really good at reacting and then providing good answers this is slightly different in the current peak it's much larger and you will see it's going to continue and have more like a plateau so this is against 80% Boko Haram so this is this technique to basically give a new rucksack to a young girl going to school in north eastern Nigeria and you make sure that this girl with a new rucksack passes through the marketplace to go to school and then you remotely detonate the device that is in the rucksack so I would say that a lot of the actors here were not aware that they became a terrorist actor next to this and this is then comparable to the other peaks I remember this preparing and also deploying to Afghanistan in the preparation they were telling us you need to be very careful for haircut, well-shaped perfumed men, well-dressed men because those guys prepared to meet God in the same afternoon so basically those were very dangerous and this evolved during the presentation while deployed and you need to be careful for tall women wearing a burka because those were not women but the focus of security services were not on women so basically the terrorist actors disguised in a woman to not be identified as a potential actor and under a burka you can even place more explosives without being recognized I would say so that's an example of those peaks and also the example of this peak for Boko Haram on the other end we see that in the evolution the more you put the pressure on those terrorist groups the more women can adapt to different roles, there are different motivations for women to join these groups and there again fight for gender equality having the opportunity to also be a fighter for those groups but you also see that the role of women evolves from being a victim of those groups being state builders because while the husbands of the men were fighting for IS they built the society and they built the state as such and becoming actors themselves we clearly saw in the past year past years also transfer of female population from different countries into the Islamic State and one of the main or one of the most remarkable transfer came from China into the Islamic State so I don't have to explain to you which part of China which group in China is very different but you clearly see that this I would call it conflict in China also started a female FTF movement towards the Islamic State or at least groups that were affiliated to the Islamic State last point it's also figures for foreign terrorist fighters or people active in Syria and Iraq leaving the country a completely different for men were able to leave the country basically being arrested and I would say extra right to the country but also leaving to other conflicts in the world so these figures is close to 50% for women this is down to 18% so women are really stuck into the region cannot get out usually have more difficulties to travel having at least one to three kids along with them those kids having different fathers because we have been very good at meeting every husband one by one while she was having them but not fast enough because he was able to create new life so basically she has problems moving out of the region and those figures are completely different between men or men and female in this region last slide the targets are also completely different or slightly different for male suicide bombers and female suicide bombers I would say that they are more active in those places that the groups they are fighting for see a woman active so I don't support this vision of a woman but clearly for the groups they adhere to they see specific places where they can be active and the targets are therefore much softer so that's the end of my presentation that's the propaganda slide so if you like us please make sure we know it and visit us on our website for your attention I'm looking forward to your question


Welcome to another vlogmas video. Today's video is so exciting because I am unboxing my iPhone 12 Pro. This is the 12 Pro, not the 12 Pro Max. The Max is just too big for me personally. I have the XS Max, I know 10S Max, whatever you want to say. It's pretty much the same thing. I don't know all the technical specs, but this is a very large phone and I really wanted the big phone when it came out. I don't really like popsockets, so I don't know. I've just been having a hard time with this phone. I can't text with one hand. You definitely need two hands. I didn't want that, so I decided to go with a smaller version. A quick little side note to include in this video. When they delivered this, they did not ask for a signature. The guy literally just plopped it on my little step to the door. That kind of made me scared. What if someone just came up to my door and stole this? I also got a screen protector. I got a three-pack. I also got the white silicone iPhone 12 case and I'm so mad that they did not have pink sand. They eliminated this color and it made me really sad. Other than that, let's just get on into unboxing this. This is kind of like my Christmas present to myself because it's, you know, why not? All right, I'm gonna open it now. I'm so excited. I don't know. I just geek out over luxury and iPhones. It kind of came attached to like that. It's really good because it's like sturdy and even if the male carrier like threw it on my door, I think it would like stay put. Ooh, it's so pretty. Totally geeking out right now. Okay, let's, okay, there we go. Like everyone says in these videos, this box is like super thin. Like, look at that. Crazy. And it's the black box. Very interesting because I got the pro version. Normally all of the boxes are white, so that's weird. So let's go ahead and do the famous peeling of the plastic. Get a little ASMR in here. There's a reason why I don't do ASMR on this channel. All right, so here we go. This box looks like opening this on up. The anticipation is real. Oh my gosh, it's so pretty. Also, like everyone says, there's a little cut out for the camera in here. And here's the iPhone. Oh my gosh, it's like, I don't want to touch it, even though I just like touched it. All right, it looks more white on camera, just because of like my exposure. But I swear it's the gold one. I just really like the gold. The reason why I chose to get the gold, try not to touch the sides, is because honestly, when you look at the side like this, I mean, look at that. It looks like a gold bar. As superficial as that sounds, this thing is like so freaking pretty. I mean, look at that. Definitely going to get a lot of fingerprints on that if you don't have a case and stuff and maybe scratches. But overall, this is why I got the phone. And the size is phenomenal. I already like it. All right, I'm going to have to get prints on it anyway, because I have to put my sim card in there. They have this little paper or peel thing, which I'll do the peel a little later. In comparison, they kind of weigh the same to me.  I think I said this in my last video about an iPhone. The iPhone 5 was my absolute favorite phone. I love the size. I love the design, just everything about it. And this resembles a lot of the iPhone 5, the size, the design and everything. So I'm really thrilled about it. Actually, before we get into the peeling of the screen, might as well show you the two other things that come in the box. So we have the charger. I didn't get the block, the charging adapter thing, because I didn't want to spend another $20. I have iPhone chargers already. And I know it'll take longer for my phone to charge, but it's fine. I just don't really want to spend the money. If I do end up getting it, I'll get it. It's 20 bucks. But right now, I think I'm fine with what I have.  This is kind of cute. It's like boxish. No one ever said that in the videos. I don't know if you can see too clearly, but it's, I thought it was going to be flatter, but it is just the information. Oh, I'm going to need that to get my SIM card. So it comes with this little tool to get your SIM out of your old phone, the Apple sticker. If you guys didn't know, I collect Apple stickers. I know that's kind of nerdy, but whatever. Before you use this iPhone, safety and handling. So that is the exciting things that come in the box. Kind of anti-climatic. And if you've watched like a million of these videos like I have, that's just like you already skipped over this part. Look how pretty. Oh, before anything like massive gets on the screen, I'm going to put my screen protector on now. It took me literally three tries to get this screen protector on. And I finally did. It's nice and straight. I don't see any hairs. There's no bubbles, but again, it took me three times. And luckily there was three screen protectors that came in the pack. So yeah, this is my new phone. I love it. I just wanted to do a comparison with the two phones. So this is the iPhone 10S Max, and then this one is the iPhone 12 Pro. Honestly, there's not a huge difference in the size. Clearly the XS Max because it's a Max phone is larger. But if you put them back to back, their size isn't too far off. The length is obviously a lot more noticeable. I did want to give thanks to the iPhone XS Max for being such a good phone. I think it's beautiful. I love this gold, but the size is just a little bit big for me. I love the camera. That's why I didn't necessarily upgrade to the 11 when it came out. I love this design. This is a very pretty design, but this phone is a lot more practical and fits my hand a lot better. I just want to show you guys what the silicone Apple case looks like on the 12 Pro. Very clean, very sleek. And I absolutely love that they included the entire border and on the bottom. I really wanted to try the Casify cases, which I might end up just buying one. Loki wished they would reach out to me, but it's fine. I really like these cases though. I love the feeling in my hands. And now I'm going to just transfer everything from my old phone to this phone. It's really weird downsizing as they say, but I just think overall I'll really like this phone a lot better. This is pretty much it for the unboxing. Here is a close-up of the phone. I love the three cameras. I'm really grateful to have been able to get this phone this year. I did in fact wait a couple years before upgrading, which I normally, back in the day, old Alex would get the new phone every time just because I loved the new devices. But I hope you guys enjoyed this video. Let me know down below. The question of the day is what was your favorite iPhone model? I am definitely Team iPhone. And my favorite model was the iPhone 5 series with the traditional home button, the box shape, everything like that. I like the white slash silver version. So let me know down below. If you don't like Apple, you could just put like Team Android or whatever. Don't forget to give this video a thumbs up, subscribe to my channel, and I'll see you guys in my next video. Bye.


It's really a pleasure to be here today with John Linden, Executive Director of the Alliance for Middle East Peace, or ORMAP. ORMAP is a coalition of over 170 Israeli-Palestinian peace-building organizations. We're thrilled to have you here today and we've been thrilled over the years to be able to partner with you here at USIP and engage with you on any number of shared activities and interests. But what I'd like to talk about today is a project that we partnered on starting in 2020 which was a youth poll of Israelis and Palestinians. And I wonder if you could say a little bit about the origins of that project, what your motivations were at ORMAP for engaging in it and how that came about. Thank you, Lucy. I remember talking to you about the project probably three or four years ago at this point and the reason is that many of our members work most acutely with the youngest Israelis and Palestinians. So it felt like we were getting early signs from them about something novel and a little worrying that was happening amongst the youngest Israelis and Palestinians and a sense that the group of people who are coming into the room together, who themselves already are unusual Israelis and Palestinians, were sometimes betraying attitudes that were a little bit more hostile or extreme than we'd seen in previous cohorts. We sensed that separation, dehumanization, growing, and with diplomacy totally collapsed. We wanted to see what the attitudes were amongst these young people. And because we have quite young societies, the attitudes of the youngest people are important electorally and politically as well. I mean, if we ever have elections again in the West Bank and Gaza, it will become more important. But in Israel, we have a lot of elections, so the attitudes of younger people tends to matter. And what we found in the election in spring of 2021 and in the election of November 2022 actually quite a market change more than in any interval between this kind of wave of elections we've had in Israel. So it's interesting in that period of around a year and a half, we've had just under 210,000 new Israeli voters enter the electorate. And that's worth a little over five Knesset seats out of 120 within the parliament. So that really matters, particularly the margins so thin. And I don't want to make this a left versus right thing. I think it actually goes far beyond that. But it is worthwhile noting that the Israeli electorate is the most right-wing youth electorate anywhere we collect that data with upwards of 70% of young Israeli voters self-identifying as right-wing. But actually what's more interesting or more noteworthy is what's happening on the very furthest fringes of the right. Like a right-wing security analysis is completely legitimate and everybody can agree or disagree on different positions of where a border should be, if there should be one, everything else. What's happening on the furthest fringes of the far right in Israeli society is the growth of ideas that should have previously been taboo. I mean, very famously, the Knesset movement when they were in the Knesset were boycotted by the traditional right in Israel. And it's important to know that this is something we're seeing in parallel on the Palestinian side as well. We've seen a huge growth in youth militias developing over the last year. It's the most violent year in the West Bank since 2004 now, so since the Second Intifada. And groups like the Lions Den, which are these youth militias growing up in the north of the West Bank are attracting very young men using automatic weapons, not listening to Hamas, Fatah, the Palestinian Islamic jihad, really harnessing the sort of frustration of young people. And we see on both sides, and I don't want to completely equivocate between them, but young people looking for disruption and extreme answers, very simplistic answers to complex problems that traditional political actors perhaps aren't providing. And that provides a context where unfortunately some of the worst ideas, movements and political tools are going to find much more receptivity. I remember when we saw the results talking about the sobering findings that argued for the kind of urgency of the picture you're painting now, but there were some sense of opportunity to cling to, I think, and to work with there. And of course despair, as we know, is not an option and not a strategy when there's this kind of prospect of violence or actuality of violence. So what for you were the glimmers of opportunity to hold on to? So I'm actually going to give some of the bad news first because I get the political analysis, which is important, but that's the lagging indicator. Okay, you see the consequence of some of the attitudes you measured, but it's important to look at some of the disturbing facts and to acknowledge them, I think, and not shy away. So number one, the finding that most worried and disturbed me, and I think many of us at all met, was an outright denial of the legitimacy of the other to be on the land, their historical connection to the land. That's something we know when interacting with conflict can be devastating and it's also something that allows very bad political figures and actors to be able to find, again, receptive populations with some of those messages. So we have majorities on both sides that rejected the other's historical connection to the land. The second sort of low light, I suppose for one to a better word, was around support for violence and that we saw majorities again of both young Israelis and young Palestinians that favored violence as being the best or the only tool to further their political agenda. And then finally for many of us that favor a two-state solution, which has obviously been the consensus position on how this conflict should be resolved amongst the international community and also locally for most of the last few decades. We've seen a real drop in support for two states amongst the youngest Israelis and Palestinians and a growth in support for undemocratic solutions that would deprive one party or the other, depending on who you're asking, of rights and of self-determination. Now on the positive part, it's worthwhile noting that these attitudes as troubling as they are, they're not fate. They can be disrupted and one of the tools we know is incredibly effective at disrupting them is the work of peace-building programs, so the work of our over 170 members. And one question we really wanted to hear an answer to, because no other pollster will ask it, is how interested are young Israelis and Palestinians in actually participating in these programs. And that's where there was an encouraging finding. So we found that there was around 30%, there was no statistical, meaningful statistical difference between both cohorts. We thought the work was illegitimate and would not participate. And then you're looking at around between 60 and 70% of both populations who under the right conditions may be able to participate and not be unsure, could be persuaded. That gives us a huge potential cohort and on top demand of people that could participate in programs that we know are very effective at disrupting those very same attitudes. You raise a couple of points. Number one, the dynamism of public opinion, something that we know that this is not, as you said, fate. It's not static. We've seen over many years that public opinion shifts in relation to what is happening on the political and diplomatic environment. Sometimes, for example, right at times when there is an active, what was long called the peace process, even when people despaired of the prospect of that peace process, ending in a negotiated solution, the fact that there was some glimmer of possibility that there was some movement happening would often shift the numbers of support for two states or a negotiated solution. And so looking at that idea of dynamism, and as you said, this notion that there's almost a not yet captured but potentially willing audience, what is the potential for scaling up this work and capturing these people right now? Where do you see those avenues? For over 10 years, we've been working with Congress, with political actors around the world, in fact, to create momentum towards this. And two years ago, almost to the day actually, from now, we managed to see passage of legislation thanks to the leadership of then-chairwoman, Nita Lowey, in Congress, in one of her final acts in Congress, to pass bipartisan legislation called Nita M. Lowey, Middle East Partners for Peace Act, or MEPA for short, which will see $250 million invested in this work in civil society and economic tools that can help to shape conflict resolution. And what's wonderful about that is, number one, it's bipartisan, so we're hoping that this is something that can be really sustained. Number two, it has an audience around the world of governments who would like to participate in help as well. And I think, sadly, in Northern Ireland, the population was a lot smaller than it is in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza. So we want to get to the same scale, which is about $44 per person per year in Northern Ireland. It's less than $2 in the Middle East. We need other governments to come in and share the burden with the United States as well. But number three, it's long-term. And I think one of the critiques I would have of advocacy and policymaking in this space is we've been seduced by short-term theories of change too often over the long term. Over 30 years, we've kind of squandered at that time in thinking one more peace process, one more round of elections will come out differently. And actually, we've gone backwards, particularly, I would say, in the last decade and a half. So taking this long-term incremental approach, what's wonderful about it is that, thanks to MEPA and the scale it unlocks to make these programs not a rare privilege, but kind of a right or a right of passage for people, it can get us over time. And it's multi-decades, in my view, to a place where really groundbreaking conflict resolution is possible and politicians are incentivized to move towards it. That's where we're aiming. But it's some way off. Every milestone on the way is so much better than what we have today. Rather than things getting worse, and I think rapidly quite worse right now, we will be able to see gradual incremental improvement years like the one we've just seen become less likely, where violence is a daily occurrence, many more opportunities for engagement between Israelis and Palestinians, as well as Arab and Jewish citizens of the state of Israel, breaking down of barriers, creation of new institutions and ideas based on a quality and Israeli-Palestinian interdependence and partnership. Having that increase year on year for a sustained period, we've never tried that before, and I think it has a greater chance to reconfigure the politics and the diplomacy of almost any strategy I've heard. Well, I think that's probably a good point on which to end right now. So much more to discuss, of course, and we look forward to continuing the work with you and this conversation, and really thank you for joining us today. No, thank you, Lucy, and thank you for USIP's partnership. Thank you.