Hi everyone, it's MJ and welcome back to this course on R. In this video, we're gonna look at how to install R as well as RStudio. And we're gonna have a little walkthrough on how to do it, but let's first look at the various steps. So the first step is we need to visit the following website. Once we're in this website, we then need to click on a link that corresponds to your region. Once you've done that, you choose your operating system. And you're gonna see I choose the Mac. We then click the latest package to download, which is R4.0.3 at the time of recording, although notes a later version might be available for you. You then open the package on your computer, you follow the installation steps, and then you install RStudio by clicking on the following link. But what we're gonna be doing now is actually walking through this process. And, Jack, let me know if you need any more help in getting this thing installed.  You can click on that and you can see the homepage isn't the most user-friendly, but you wanna click on C-R-A-N. And now this stands for the Comprehensive R Archive Networks. And what we wanna do is we wanna select the one that's closest to our region. So for me, fortunately, there is one for South Africa. So I simply click on this one here. You'll choose that one. And then what you wanna do is pick your operating system. So I've got a Mac, so I'm going with that. Then again, there's a lot of links, and you're like, well, which one do I choose? You wanna choose this one over here. And essentially, when you're watching this video, you might see our 4.0.5 or 4.1. something else. That's just gonna be the latest version. And it's always a good, good practice to have the latest one downloaded. So keep your R updated. Then you'll see in the bottom corner, it has finished installing. Once you've got the install, you wanna click on it. And what it'll do is you can then just go through the installation guide. So there's an introduction, there's the read me, there's the license, then you just click agree. Make sure you read it, though. We all know that you have to read it. I'm not gonna finish with the installation types and stuff because I already do have it, but it'll take around 169 megabytes of space on your computer. Then once you have got R installed, you also wanna get something called RStudio. Then you can come back to Google and type in RStudio, and you'll get the very first one over here. You wanna click throughout the top, there is a button called download. And then again, you wanna choose your version. I mean, the free version is more than enough. And then you simply click this button over here and you will download RStudio, which again, I have already done. So let's open RStudio and see what it looks like. And what we're gonna be doing in the later video is discussing what each of these four corners do. But in the very next video, we're gonna look at how to install packages in R. And then we're gonna come back to this and familiarize ourselves with this interface. Anyway, thank you so much for watching. And I will see you in the next video.


So, I'm going to open up for audience questions and comments. I'm going to borrow, by the way, 10 minutes from your lunch, because we started late. So, somebody's going to, okay, I think, yeah, go ahead. I think you were the one who, yeah, to Raphael. I watched the match, I watched the match, too, but I was, I'm only groggy now, because I didn't have any emotional attachment. Coming to East Asia, I agree. In fact, I was quite impressed with your presentation just now. Even East Asia regulated external borrowing extensively that actually assisted in the way they control non-performing loans. But my concern is, again, coming from my own country, Malaysia, is what have these countries in Latin America done to avoid the possibility of getting into this Dutch disease resource curse? Because during the global financial crisis, primary commodities prices just soared, and it did actually help them. But I think in countries like Brazil, it also squeezed manufacturing. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I'm Thierry Camerabila from University of Hongdae-Chung. Attends to all the presenters for their stimuli in presentation. I have just one question for Raphael. What are the key lessons developing countries face, the adverse effect of the global financial crisis to learn from the experience of the 1982 Latin American debt-country crisis? The key lesson, the advanced economic unlearned from the experience of the Latin American 1982 debt crisis. Thank you. Thank you very much, Peter Huote, from University of Ghana. My question also goes to the presenter in Chile. How did Chile address the problem of credit boom, or easy money, as Lagart rightly put it? Because I recall for most developed countries in Europe and America, there was easy money. You could easily, you were being chased with money, credit, banks were calling you, you get letters through your post. Money was easily available, and that prompted this financial crisis. Did you have a similar experience, and how did you address that problem? Then secondly, to both presenters, the governor and to you, we know, we are told that the degree of integration with the global financial system will determine whether you'll be affected by the crisis or not. To what extent are your respective countries integrated to the global economy, and how did you manage that integration to ensure that you were not affected by the crisis? Thank you, Peter. No, no, not Chile. I don't know how to put this. I'm not sure it's a question, but it's more like a comment. The more we talk about financial reform, the more I see it as a multi-objective exercise. And then that implies that you need to balance among the different objectives. Inclusiveness is one of the objectives. How do you ensure that the reform is going to include those who are not currently covered? Stability of the system is also there. The strengthening of regulation is also another kind of balancing. But all along, my own experience, maybe because of where I'm coming from, we tend to emphasize one element of the objective over the other. And in such cases, we create problems. For example, if you say stability is the issue, and you raise the capital beyond the level that will not allow banks to actually want to go to rural areas. To me, yes, it's reformed for you, but it's more of a reversal in some cases. Because years ago, we were talking about rural banking. The need to make sure you get people to get into the system. You can also do regulation. That is also stability and development. Thank God you mentioned is the crowding out effect in your opening remark. Where you say, okay, I can do this. I can face trading or commerce instead of actually facing production. I think it's a delicate balance that won't need to strike the balance if you are to make progress. Thank you. Can I? Save time. Yes, thank you very much. Yes, on India, can you reflect a bit on how India avoided the 1997 financial crisis which affected many other countries in Asia? Secondly, Africa, it's a bit surprising that actually the experience of Africa is very similar to that of India. But India has managed to do financial sector reform on their own without being without the duress. In Africa, we really put under pressure by international institutions initially. Maybe later, then the dynamics were different, but we really pushed into it and I would expect differences to appear. And within Africa, countries which are more aid dependent from countries which are less aid dependent like Kenya would expect differences to emerge. I'm not sure whether you've observed that. Last observation is in Kenya. There was a financial crisis in a way in which banks were failing quite conspicuously in the 90s. What lessons immediately from there would probably be useful. And EMPESA, is it having impact on savings already? And in what ways is it linked to integration in the banking system? Because there was a fear that may run parallel to the banking system. So that element of integration, if you can comment a bit more linkage between EMPESA and the banking system and savings mobilization. Thank you very much. I think this question will go to Lema, to you. I'm wondering why the innovation, the financial innovation in Kenya, the EMPESA innovation hasn't taken root in other African countries. Has any research been done to verify that? And another quick observation is that when I was in Ghana, I've been in Ghana for some months now and you see this young men and women going around trying to convince you to open accounts at banks and also give you the prospects of getting loans from banks. And when I talk to them, what I realize is happening is that some of them are even willing to overpriced collateral securities so you can get higher loans from the bank. Are these not recipes for some disaster that is impending to come? Thank you. Let me start by saying something that you may not like because it seems more like an excuse, but it's important to have in mind is that the experience of Chile at least is the one of a country that was really, really poor, okay, for Latin American standards when things starting to go right in the early 80s. I mean, really poor in the following sense when I'm not talking, I'm talking at a country that had about $22, $2300 per capita in 1980 in real terms. That's fairly low. So what I'm trying to say, and today is a $20,000 per capita country. So what I'm saying is that what we had done during the last 20 or 30 years is basically closing the gap with development. We're still four, I mean, just half the way, right? I mean, we think about 40,000, we think about, I don't know, Ireland or whatever. So what I'm trying to say is that there was a lot of space for doing things without having restrictions been binding. So, for instance, you were asking about the Dutch disease. Do you remember who you were? Yeah, sorry. Sure, that's an issue there. And in fact, there are some people who believe that we have been facing a Dutch disease at several points because Chile is an exception. I don't know if you know this, but the World Bank had a paper in 2001. Maybe it was not 2001, but I'm making a point. It was 1999 then. Saying that only two countries in the world, only two and two had been successful during the previous 15 years, this was the early 2000, been monarchs porters. And one was Chile with copper. The other one was in Bauer with diamonds. So this is why I started saying you may not like this because I'm not saying that you're gonna take Chile and say, wow, I mean, everything that they have, it had a lot to do with some hydrosyncratic things. A very, very specialized country where, okay, so then copper, which is a very important part of the story, and I have a couple of friends, a professor called Calvo, Guillermo Calvo in Argentina, who was a professor in Columbia, Maryland, when he was invited to Chile in the mid-90s to talk about the miracle, he will say, there is no miracle here. Just look at the copper. So copper is an important part of the story. Come on, I understand that we have increased our productivity in a traumatic way during 30 years, so we have done also an important job, but we have had, at the same time, a lot of luck. Now, you asked me, so that disease, just one line, an important part of the money that was coming in, and this is endogenous, what I'm gonna say, so this is not luck, was money that was going to the government because the government owned most of the copper mines, now that's not so too, now it's about 40%, but it used to be 90%. So the government had the control of the money, and that money was not coming into the economy because, and this is the endogenous part, and I make the link with the next question about lessons. I mean, I'm a macro economist. I don't think that macro economy is still, I mean, it's not dead yet. So I mean, I still understand that the macro economy is important. Chile had basically a sound macroeconomic policy that started in the early 80s. That is the combination of one, and that helped not to have the Dutch disease given that all the money was in the government. One, a fiscal rule, the fiscal rule is from the year 2000, but that's the jury, but the fact was there since the mid 80s. A fiscal rule, since 2000 is predictable, so that helps. So the money was basically being saved. We could do that because we were grown so fast that we had enough money so we could do that at the same time, but it's a fiscal rule. Two, flexible monetary policy with inflation targeting with an independent, all the things happened at some point in the mid 80s and early 90s. And three, and tomorrow I'm supposed to discuss the presentation with respect to the Nordic countries. Three, a flexible exchange rate. I mean, we had a huge crisis in 82 which in part was a result of a fixed exchange rate that at some point was not able to be sustained. And that was kept too long, too low, given what was happening. And then when it was free, I mean the crisis in part, you know, so flexibility of the exchange rate is an important part. So those are the three macro pillars. The flexible exchange rate and inflation targeting and the fiscal rule is a beautiful combination from the macroeconomic perspective. Now that combined with what I was trying to express in my talk today, which is doing the homework at the micro prudential level, which I understand is not sufficient, but it's a necessary condition to have a decent individual assessment of risk. Come on, 1101. That combination of factors, the micro financial part with the macro one is key. One more comment and I finish because I make the link with the macro part. Sorry that I am. And the last comment, you were talking about easy money, right? You were talking about, yeah. So in some sense, I answered that. It's also concerned that we have, and in Chile, something interesting happened, which is happening in many places. Since there was a huge gap in terms of financial inclusion, so there were so many people that you could incorporate to the market. We could have a huge increase in money and at the same time having people, you know, and an economy growing at 7% with mostly increasing productivity, there was space for getting more money in the economy without having inflation, and okay, it wasn't just the result of what was happening in the real economy. But we had most of that increasing money was a result of a sector that is not well regulated even today in Chile, which is the retail finance companies. These are the Walmart's, they have credit cards that account for like 80% of credit debt, of consumption credit for the people who are in the middle of the income distribution. 80%, these are not banking people, I mean, and those guys are not regulating, they don't take deposits, so they don't have the high leverage, but they're still systemic and so on, and they can build a crisis in terms of easy money and so on, so they play a key role. But I think, and this is my last line, I think that the reason why, just to have a country that is growing at 7%, that is starting from so low, it's like when you talk about China, you have a lot of space to do things that in the margin may be a reason for concern, but where you are just growing so fast and you have so much to catch up, they're not binding those restrictions. In the future it's a different story, I don't know if I explained myself, thanks. Thank you, Robert. Governor Anand. I think the question was about to what extent we are integrated and if we are integrated, how did we avoid the crisis of 2008? Now, we are fully open on current account and over a period of time our integration with the rest of the world has increased. On capital account, we are to a very large extent open for non-residents. For residents we are not, though it has been liberalized quite a bit. And we believe in capital account management policies. The recent IMF thinking is that capital account management policies are more specifically the capital controls should be used as a last resort, but we believe that it should be an integrated part of the macroeconomic management. And that is how we have been doing. We have a hierarchy of flows. We encourage more permanent flows, longer-term flows. There are quantitative limits, administrative limits. So various kinds of schemes are there. And we do not encourage dollarization of the Indian balance sheets beyond certain limits. On banks also, on their currency mismatches, et cetera. There are limits. So in short, we have substantially integrated with the world economy, though we are not fully open. So what happened is that when the crisis hit, the financial markets were affected immediately. In the sense that, as I said, we are virtually open on capital account for non-residents. So there was a lot of outflow. Because of that liquidity constraint came into the system, both forex as well as rupee liquidity. And finding money in the overseas markets for Indian banks or for anybody else became very difficult because the financial markets were severely constrained. So what we did, in fact, in my presentation, there is a long list of items as to what we did to deal with the crisis. In short, what we did was to promise liquidity support to both rupee as well as forex. And the result was that it sufficiently calmed down the markets and hardly much of it was used. So the essential issue was to restore confidence into the financial system that they will not be constrained by liquidity, liquidity, whatever needed will be provided by the central bank. And that ensured that the financial system did work reasonably smoothly. There were certain pockets of stresses, but that could be managed. Thank you, Governor Anand. Rose, just very briefly, somebody asked about the impact of MFESO. Yeah, briefly. With regard to MFESO and the saving mobilization, I don't have the figures, but there are two products that are in the market for saving mobilization. There is one we call M-Sharie and M-Kesho. They are very, very recent, but there are figures that show that the micro accounts have actually increased from about a value of 1.5 million in 2002 to about 19.9 million in the recent period. So I'll take that as just an indicator that there is an increase in the use of bank accounts, but in terms of the value, the level of savings, I don't think I can give that answer now. In relationship to integrating to the banking system, as I said in the presentation, M-Pesa is operated by SafariCom and Vodacom on a mobile network operation, but it works together with other banking institutions. For example, at the moment, it's partnering with about 10 banks. And with these 10 banks, they are able to work together in terms of the various facilities that they are having. In terms of opening accounts, in terms of the transfers and the like, it's able to get integrated. But at the same time, one of the things that I didn't mention, but I think it's very important to mention, is that the M-Pesa is also held, has a trust account with a banking institution so that we can separate the SafariCom and the communication element of it with the platform that it's creating, such that if SafariCom was to go bankrupt today, the money that is being transcended would actually not get lost because there is a trust account that is held by a commercial bank. I just wanted to say something on the institution's 1980s. And yeah, yeah, yeah. Just remind about lunch, you know? Yes, yes, yes. In 1980s, that's when we had a lot of, late 1980s, when we had a lot of bank failures. And they were coming in because of banks were able, you know, circumventing the legulations. And again, supervision was very low, was not as tight. But in the recent time, what has happened with the financial reform process, there's been tightening of the licensing process. There's been also a strengthened supervision. And the other element is the prudential legulations also came in very strongly. Thank you, Rose. I'll actually remind about lunch. There are several questions. I'm going to just respond with one liner. Okay, we don't have enough time. So there was a question about multiple functions of financial systems and the trade off. That is a very good question on point. Now, when we talk about regulation, there is this thing called optimal regulation. So regulating is not regulating to get the bank to go to zero risk. Regulating is to regulate the bank to go to optimal risk because you have to have risk in the system for the bank to function and serve as informed agent. That's very important. And the second is, I think you mentioned very interesting point. So yeah, there's a lot of similarity between Africa and India in terms of the package of financial sector reforms. I think the point that Simon is suggesting is that look, one difference is that there is imposition. There's influence coming from the outside world on Africa, right? So it didn't happen the same way. And then I think you're also right about Kenya. Kenya actually got rationed out out of foreign aid. And a lot of what was happening in Kenya is really in-house, okay? So that's a very important point, by the way, because basically there is a difference in terms of ownership, right? Ownership of the schemes that seem to be looking like another scheme which is owned by the other country. And the other has to do with why isn't that this financial innovation taking root in other countries? That's a very, very important question, by the way. And I think the only thing that have come up so far is really the way this is being regulated. And so one thing that is true of Kenya is that they have actually differentiated system of regulation for banking and in FESA. So that's why when you talk about trade-offs, regulation is not unitary. It has to be differentiated depending on the kinds of innovative mechanisms that you have. And then last, on integration. I want to say something beyond what was said earlier. I think that in the context of Africa, it is very important that we get regional consolidation of African stock markets for them to be viable, to be integrated into global financial economy. And also important for us to have regional integration in the real sector. So one thing that I've noticed since I moved to Africa is that everyone seems to know what it takes to be regionally integrated. But they don't get integrated. So there is another dimension that we haven't discussed today. The whole area of political economy and political will. You could have good reforms, you could have great regulations. The question is who is going to implement it? So I think I'm going to end here. I think this turned out to be very, very delightful conversation. Three different experiences, although there's a lot of similarity. And I think they were right when the organizers say that this is an incredible occasion for sharing of experiences. Now you can actually share conversation at lunch. Thank you. Okay. Thank you.


If you take many things for granted, they are difficult to explain and you have to be asked the question by someone like Rob, why are you European, why democracy? But if they are in danger suddenly, then you think very hard. It's a variation of the American, if it ain't broke, don't fix it. But if it is broke, you have to fix it, and to fix it, you have to think about it. So I was thinking that if I wanted to begin from today my contribution to this coffee house discussion, thinking for a moment about Ukraine, think about the energy that was suddenly created in the Ukraine, what was it about a year and a half ago, two years ago, when the trouble started, where there were demonstrations that turned violent and turned into this terrible war, civil war and non-civil as well with Russia. It started with people who wanted passionately to belong to Europe. That should be something to caution us. That should be something to go against the apathy and the inertia of, ah, Europe has many problems, so why bother with it, or let's see what's wrong in it rather than what's good in it. And think that people were protesting with passion and then started dying for it. And if people are dying for something and they're not mere opportunists or people looking after material gain, there must be something in that idea that deserves at least our attention, I think. Rob, you said that the Greece is about to, probably will go out of the European Union. The UK is in the process, possibly, of going out through the European Union. Well, both those statements I contest. Greece may go out of the European Union, but there are very many Greeks who are against that option and are willing to work for this not to happen. And Mr. Cameron wants to have a referendum, and I don't know why not. I'm not British, but I think the outcome of that is not at all certain that it will be that we go out. So rather than say why I would feel like a European under normal circumstances, like say five, ten years ago, if I was speaking to you, I would refer to the culture and the values and the old civilization and the new civilization and my culture, which is a combination of Greek culture and the gnold language and a modern Western education, and stay on the present situation where, to me, the battle for Europe is for you, it is being fought for Europeans, I mean, well-intentioned Europeans, even the best friends of Greece. It is being fought regarding Greece in Brussels, in Germany, in Berlin, in London, in Paris, in Athens, between Greek and politicians from, Greek politicians and politicians from other European countries. To me, the battle for Europe at this moment is being fought inside Greece by those of us like myself, who accept a strong part or the biggest part of the blame, both for the crisis, which was led us to the program for eight, five years ago. We accept the responsibility both for what happened in those years that led us to the crisis for our partial ability and partial inability to try and solve the problem with the European Union for five years, and then who accept fully the responsibility now and think that our present government is going the wrong way trying to solve this problem, because I think that one of the core values of a Western, let's say, Enlightenment-type culture is self-criticism and rational analysis, so I think by those tools we see the great responsibilities of Greece also, and we feel that fighting inside Greece, the populist tendency that is essentially anti-European, I hear the argument again and again and again in Greece that Europe is not democratic. To those who say Europe is not democratic, I say, go and live in a country which is really not democratic, and then come back and tell me that Europe is not democratic. I will accept that Europe is not democratic only if I accept that democracy does not exist anywhere in the world, but democracy is not a culture or an institution of extremes. It is a culture of collaboration, and collaboration has to do with making many mistakes and living with them. It is a tragic, in the ancient sense, polity and not an ideal, not a false utopia. So those of us who are fighting for the ideal of Europe at the moment, in Greece, against ourselves, against our worst part, as I think, which is essentially anti-European, and I think a big part of that is in government at the moment, expressed in anti-European essentially populist rhetoric, are really feeling that we are European, we want to be European, we are fighting to be European in defense of Western liberal democracy.


Professor Meijer, I'm a professor in global health and we're at Matchpoints at Aarhus University. It's been excellent. There's been a lot of very good speakers, a lot of interaction from a lively audience, a good turnout from international researchers and NGOs working in the field. So I'm really happy about how it's all going. We drafted a declaration on key aspects in global health that we need to address and be aware of and we've had many comments from the audience in the conference and now this afternoon we'll wrap up and see if we can add to the declaration from some of these comments and I'm sure we will be able to do that and improve it.