Okay. Good morning everyone. Welcome to this course, VC 106. Today we have two lecture hours in this course. Let's take a moment to pray and then we will get started. Could I please request somebody just to pray with us? And then we will start. Could somebody pray with us? Sid, would you like to pray? Yes, Pastor. We come to the throne of grace, Lord. Thank you for this day. The new day you have given us, Lord. Lord, as we are going to study about your word, Lord, about how to interrupt your word, Lord. Lord, give us understanding and wisdom so that whatever Pastor Rashi is teaching us, Lord, we can learn it, Lord. We can grab it, Lord. Lord, in Proverbs it is written, fear of the Lord is the beginning of knowledge. Lord, give us your freedom. Lord, give us your fear so that we can get that knowledge, Lord. Thank you for this day. Thank you for everyone and thank you for Pastor Rashi's also. In Jesus' name we pray. Amen. Amen. Okay. Thank you. Okay. Good morning, everyone. Thank you for connecting to the class on interpreting scripture. What we have been doing the last few lectures is looking at difficult topics, difficult passages or teams or passages and trying to put, you know, come to some understanding on how to respond to get a biblical understanding on those teams, topics or passages. And so some of the things we've talked about so far, let me just quickly review some of the things we have seen. We have, we started off in this section by talking about asking the answer to the question, is Jesus God and also trying to understand the incarnation and the titles that we use that are used for Jesus, the Son of God or the only begotten of the Father and the firstborn, the first begotten. So we went through that first. Then we talked about the Trinity. How do we understand the Trinity, the triune God brought to us in scripture. Then we talked about a few, this is what we did last week, a few contradictory gospel accounts, you know, so or some accounts in the gospel that may not seem so clear. How do we understand those things? So we just looked at a few examples. I'm not saying we covered all the examples, but the idea is that if we look into it in detail, you know, we can come to a very logical explanation, you know, and what is happening, either in different in the accounts of the gospel stories or the way the gospel writers present the same matter, we can come to a very logical conclusion. Then we also looked at some difficult statements in the Gospels.  We also talked about forgiving people sins and so on. And so we covered till that. Today we will look at one more theme in the Gospels, which is a little difficult to understand, which is about what Jesus said that he would spend three days and three nights in the heart of the earth. So between his crucifixion and resurrection, there would be three days and three nights. Matthew chapter 12 and verse 40. So how do we understand that is what we want to answer. And then we will go on into some other questions from the New Testament, right? So we are mainly focusing on New Testament passages, and we'll try to see, you know, how best to respond. Now, there are a lot of questions, lots and lots of questions, and especially when we have our mentoring hour on Thursdays, you know, over the years, we've had students ask all kinds of questions. And so it's interesting and definitely, you know, we're not going to be able to handle every question there is. But we will cover some of the common ones and then hopefully it'll give us a framework on how to work through difficult questions and, you know, how to approach answering difficult questions. And then, you know, like all that we've learned in this course on interpreting scripture, how we can apply them as we attempt to answer difficult questions. So now we're going to talk about this whole issue of three days and three nights, which we started just looking at towards the end of the lecture hours last week. So what we have been practicing, and I say people in general around the world, you know, Good Friday, Easter Sunday, does not fit into the biblical statement of the Lord Jesus when he said, you know, he would be in the lower parts of the earth three days, three nights. So how do we explain it. And I, and I think last week, Collins also shared a little bit on on this. So there are two possible explanations, two possible explanations. Now, one has to do with the, the Sabbath and the high Sabbath, the day of preparation. So in the typical Jewish weekly calendar, Sabbath, meaning the day of rest was the seventh day of the last day of the week, which was a Saturday. And so if you go by that the day of preparation would be the day before the Sabbath, which would be a Friday. But what we know from scripture is the word Sabbath is not used only for Saturday, that is the day of rest. But it is also used in connection with other feasts that the Jewish people had basically, Sabbath simply means a day of rest. Right. And so there were other feasts. Now, what we know is that there was the feast of unleavened bread that happened just before the day of Passover. So if you go back to Exodus 12, when the first Passover lamb was killed in the land of Egypt, when God told them to kill the Passover lamb, there was the feast of unleavened bread, seven days of preparation, seven days of unleavened bread before the day of Passover. Now, Jesus was killed on the Passover day just about the same time when the real Passover lamb would be sacrificed. But what we see and John the beloved, the Gospel of John brings us out saying that that particular year that there was the high Sabbath, that means this was not the regular Sabbath day, which was a Saturday, but was a high Sabbath, which was had to do with the feast of the Passover. And it was on the day of preparation that Jesus was killed. Right. So if you look, there are some who put out a chart on this, so I'll just share the chart. If you go by this understanding. Yeah. So now the Jewish day and night. So the day for the Jews started at 6pm in the evening. I'm just saying 6pm, meaning it's sundown, the time the sun goes down. So we'll just say 6pm. And it goes through the next day, the hours of the day, till about 6pm, I mean just before 6pm the next day. So the day and night, so the one day in the Jewish calendar starts with sundown in our typical day and continues through the day hours of the next day. Okay. In our English calendar, we would say it starts in the morning midnight 12am to 12pm. So today is Thursday. Thursday began correctly. Thursday began at 12am. And then it'll end at 12pm midnight. So that's our today, April the 7th day. But in the Jewish calendar, it starts off in the previous evening. That is, when is the evening 6pm and goes on till the end of daylight the next day. So this is the preparation day. So one explanation is a Thursday, a Friday, a Saturday and then the Sunday. So the Passover begins, the preparation day begins and it's still Thursday. And it continues on into the next day and on this preparation day, Jesus is killed.   Then there is the Friday, there is Saturday, which is the weekly Sabbath. And then Sunday is when Sunday early morning is when he is raised up. So this is one explanation that most people, if you want to get into very technical. So Jesus was crucified on Thursday, the Passover day on Thursday in the afternoon. He was crucified and he was, so the Passover day begins Thursday, sundown and he's crucified early morning. So early morning on Thursday is crucified. So then you have three nights at the Thursday night, end of Thursday or the beginning of Friday, which would be this first night, second night and third night. Actually, this is pretty confusing here. So Thursday is crucified on Thursday. So that's what we would refer to as our Thursday night, Friday and Saturday night. So Thursday night, Friday night, Saturday night, our Thursday night, Friday night, Saturday night and early Sunday morning he is resurrected. So that's one way of looking at it, that it actually happened on Thursday night when he was put to the tomb. And so people present this as one of the explanations. The other explanation is, even if Jesus was crucified. So Friday, Friday officially begins at 6pm Friday. So Jesus was crucified on before 6pm on Friday night. So our Friday, which is our Friday, he was crucified before 6pm. So it's considered part of the previous day. It's considered part of the previous day. So even if Jesus was crucified on our Friday, it takes it will take into account the previous day because in the Jewish calendar, the previous day night cycle had not yet been over, was not yet over. So he was crucified say the previous day around 3pm on the cross, he was taken down from the cross. So it was still a Thursday. Our calendar date is Friday. And then so you, you include the previous day, one day, day one and night one, day two, night two, that is Friday into Saturday and Saturday into Sunday. So that is a second explanation that means he was actually crucified, even if he was crucified on Friday, our Friday, but happened before 6pm Friday. Then it's considered part of the previous day. And so therefore it works out as three days, three nights or considered as three days, three nights. That's a second explanation. So first explanation is he was crucified on a Thursday. Second explanation is he was crucified on a Friday, our Friday. But because it happened before 6pm, it was considered part of the previous day night cycle. So there are both these explanations. And what I know, I can't, you know, I'm not trying to fight or, you know, prove any either of these because we don't know for sure. One explanation is going off by the fact that John says this was the high Sabbath, not a weekly Sabbath. Therefore they say that high Sabbath, you know, means that this was a preparation date to happen on a Thursday. That's one reasoning behind Jesus, them saying Jesus was crucified on a Thursday. The second is, well, it may have happened on a Friday, but it happened before the beginning of their Friday, which means he actually was crucified on Jewish Thursday. So they take that day and night into account. That's fine. So if you ask me, my position is, you know, look, I don't know for sure. So I don't argue. I am open to both these explanations. But what was most important is that Jesus was crucified and that these three days and nights, either way, both these explanations do satisfy these three days and three nights. It just depends on how you want to look at it. If you want to insist on three days, three nights in our calendar, then yeah, the Thursday crucifixion satisfies that. If you insist on three days, three nights in a from a Jewish calendar perspective, then a Friday, our Friday crucifixion can accommodate that as well. So both can be accommodated just depending on how you want to look at it. So personally, you know, I don't argue either for one or the other. I understand both explanations and for me, it's fine. You know, the actual day is okay. If there's variation between the Thursday and Friday, it's okay. What really matters is Jesus was crucified and he rose up again. And that that is what matters. Okay, I hope I explained it sufficiently for you to understand any follow up questions on this or you want me to explain it once again. Is everybody okay? Any follow up questions? Okay. Is there, is there, can you hear background noise coming through? Or I just want to make sure that because there's some construction work happening around me. I just want to make sure that noise is not coming through. Can you hear that? Voice is perfect. Okay, there's no sound background sounds. No background. Okay, fine. Okay. Colin says a little but not distracting. Okay. Can you hear some construction sound coming? Very mild voice, very mild, but it's fine. Okay. Okay. Oh, you can, you can hear it. Let me try to turn it off now. Passive went on mute. Okay. Should be back now. Yes. Sorry. I'm just working on this. Maybe during break time, I'll try to reset my computer. Yeah. Okay. We will pick up a couple other questions. And also what I want, I want to open up is if there are other questions that you feel you would like us to look at, please feel free to ask me so that we could address that question. All those passages. Okay. So now let's just look at a few passages in the New Testament that are somewhat difficult for us or is often used in a way to challenge the, the, the, the ministry area. So we're going to shift now our focus to ministry area and we will look at that. Okay. So if you go with me to first Corinthians chapter 13. And I want to just discuss about, you know, first Corinthians 13 verse nine through 13, first Corinthians 13, nine through 13, how this passage some is used in some cases in the evangelical world to say that the church of the Holy Spirit are no longer needed in the church. Okay. And then how do we respond to that? So if you will follow with me first Corinthians chapter 13, we're going to look at verses nine to 13. Right. First Corinthians 13, nine to 13. The apostle Paul writes here, he says, for we know when part and we prophesy in part. But when that which is perfect has come, then that which is in part will be done away. When I was a child, I spoke as a child understood as a child. I thought as a child. When I became a man, I put away childish things. But now we see in a mirror dimly, but then face to face. Now I know when part, but then I shall know, just I also am known and now abide faith, hope, love, these three, but the greatest of these is love. Now let me put forward the idea that is presented by certain evangelical sections of the Christian church. They use verse nine and verse 10. What does verse nine say? Verse 10 says, we know when part, we prophesy in part. So talking about the gift of prophesy. Then verse 10 says, but when that which is perfect has come, then that which is in part will be done away. So they use verse 10 saying that which is perfect refers to the scriptures. So today we have the scriptures perfectly. Genesis to Revelation. So the scriptures have come. That which is perfect has come. The scriptures have come. So that which is in part, what is in part verse nine prophesy will be done away. So the gifts of the spirit have been done away because the that which is perfect, which is the complete Bible has come. So that is the way they would present their argument. But now I want us to use what we learned, which is scripture must be interpreted in context, right? And then say, is that statement or is that kind of explanation correct? If it is not correct, how do we correctly explain this passage? What is the apostle Paul talking about? Anybody wants to try? So the question is, are spiritual gifts, are gifts of the spirit in the church today? That's the question. And what I'm saying is that there are some people who would use 1 Corinthians 39 and 10 to say that this gift of the spirit are no longer in the church today because we have the perfect scriptures. Okay. So how would you respond to that based on this passage? Anybody just just feel free to say your thoughts, right? We are all learning. So don't worry about if your answer is not perfect or anything. Don't worry about that from this passage. How would you respond to that? Anyone? So my question is, let's try to break this down. When Paul writes in verse 10, when that which is perfect has come, in the context of all that is written, and we read verses 11 through 13, what does Paul have in mind when he says that when that which is perfect has come? Is he referring to the Bible or is he referring to something else? What do you see? Collins, please go ahead. Yes, Pastor. As far as I can see, when you read through starting from verse 8 to verse 12 to verse 13, according to what I can internalize all what I can think, even elsewhere where I read, I think it deals with when we say if we know in part that means the word of God, which is just part knowledge, and we prophesy in part falls in the same category, but when that which is perfect is come, refers to the rapture of the church, that is resurrection. So that is what I can think. One is before, as we are right now, what we know, we know it in part because we know just knowledge, and when he says that face to face, it actually means after resurrection we shall know everything because we shall be facing face to face with the Christ. Thank you, Pastor. Thank you, Collins. Yeah, correct. You see, in verse 10 when he says when that which is perfect is come. Now, what's he referring to? What does he have in mind? So we have to read on, right? So he says verse 11, when I was a child, I spoke like a child, so I became a man. That means I reached up to say the maturity. I got out of childish things. First, for now, we see in a mirror. So why are we prophesying in part? Why do we know in part? Because now we see dimly through a mirror. That means we are not seeing everything clearly, but then face to face. So the key here is face to face then. So the when of verse 10, when that which is perfect is come, is answered in verse 12, then face to face. So what is the when? When that which is perfect is come? Well, it is when we see him face to face.  And when we see him face to face, what happens? We will know just as we are now. That means we'll know everything. But now we know in part. So we prophesied in part. Why? Because we are seeing dimly, like as we are seeing through a glass. But then when the perfect is come and what is the perfect, he's answering that for us in verse 12, when we see him face to face. So it is wrong, completely wrong to say that when that which is perfect is come refers to the Bible. He's not referring to the Bible. He's referring to seeing Jesus face to face. So until then, until then, the gifts of the spirit, that is prophecy and our knowledge, it'll continue, but it will always be in part. But then we see him face to face, which as Colin said, is going to be after the resurrection. We're going to see him face to face. Then we will know as we are known, we will know everything. Then we don't need these gifts. So to use this passage and say, because the Bible has come, we don't need the gift is an incorrect interpretation. The correct interpretation is found right here in the passage in verse 12, that the perfect he's Paul is talking about is seeing the Lord Jesus face to face. Any questions? Is it clear? So is that clear? It is in resurrection or in eternity. When we reach eternity, we will know. When we reach eternity, we will see everything face to face. We will know everything. Yes. So after we die and we raise, we go into heaven, we will see him face to face. That time we don't need the gifts, basically in eternity. So can you say it after resurrection or in eternity? So when... Okay, let's put it like this. When we see him face to face, when will we see him face to face? So one is after we leave this earth, after we die and we go into heaven. So when we go into heaven, in heaven, we won't need the gifts because we will see him face to face. Right. So when we're in heaven, okay, the resurrection has not yet happened, but we have stepped into eternity. We're seeing him face to face. So after we die, we're seeing him face to face. We won't need the gifts. But everything after death, right? Or it can happen in the rapture. So if we don't die but we are raptured, we're going to see him face to face. We won't need the gifts. Did I answer your question? Yes. So it's both, you know. I was thinking it is in eternity. So Pauline said it is after resurrection. So I wanted to clear it. Yeah. So basically it's after we step out of this world, this physical world. That means when we see him face to face, that's... Yeah. So now I want to put forward another difficult passage, which is in the next chapter, 1 Corinthians chapter 14. And so this is another passage. So let's go to 1 Corinthians chapter 14. And we will read verses 34 and 35. And basically this passage, along with one more passage from 1 Timothy chapter 2, is used to tell that women must not preach the word of God, must not be ministers of the word of God. Okay. So we need to deal with both of these passages and try to understand them in context. So we'll do it one after the other. I want you to please look at 1 Corinthians chapter 14 verses 34 and 35. I will just read it out. But the question is, can women teach the word of God? 1 Corinthians 14, 34 and 35. Notice what Paul writes here. He says, let your women keep silent in the churches, for they are not permitted to speak, but they are to be submissive, as the law also says. And if they want to learn something, let them ask their own husbands at home for a sinful for women to speak in church. Okay. 1 Corinthians chapter 14 verses 34 and 35. So the question is, can we, as some people do, take these two verses, and we will look at 1 Timothy chapter 2 after we explain this. Can these two verses be used to state very categorically that women must not preach in the church? Okay. So take a few moments and just give me, just take a few months to think about it. Just give me two minutes.  I need to just attend to something. I'll come right back, but take a few minutes to think about it and we will take your answer. Okay. I'll be right back. Okay. Any thoughts can be used for Corinthians chapter 14 verses 34 and 35. Is it right to say, based on these two verses, that women cannot speak in church, preach in church, teach the word of God in church, minister the word of God? What are your thoughts? Anyone? Feel free to share your thoughts. Paul, let's go ahead, please. First, I don't know how it is true, but I'm just sharing just like a student in class, but I hear that this is to do partly because of the historical context. In the church those days, women and men used to sit in opposite directions. And whenever there was a question, a woman would have to ask the husband the question. So that would be interrupting the service. So that's why Paul was like, now, ladies, if you have something to ask, ask from your husband as a way of not interrupting the service, because if women were supposed to keep quiet, even if the worship services, they wouldn't keep quiet, they wouldn't be singing, they wouldn't be, because that is also serving the Lord.  It was actually as a fact of historical and cultural context and the way the setup was. Basically, it doesn't mean that. It just meant that what was being done during the historical and the cultural context of that time. Thank you, Pastor. Thank you. Thank you. Yes. I also see Brother Mano was, he mentioned Joel 228, your sons and your daughters shall prophesy so men can speak in church. Okay. Anybody else? Okay. So what Colin shared and what Brother Mano also shared is both are correct. So how do we understand what Paul is saying? Right? So now when we read these two verses, 1 Corinthians 14, 34 and 35, of course, you need to understand it in the passage that he is, that it is given in the context. And of course, we also need to bring in what does the Bible say in the rest of scripture and other places in scripture? Right? Now, what I want us to notice is a couple of things. One is he says, keep silent, keep silent, right? Paul uses this phrase, keep silent in the same chapter three times, right? And so, for example, in about speaking in verse 28, right? In verse 28, in connection with speaking in tongues, right? So he says, if somebody wants to give a message in tongues to the church, he says in verse 27, let them speak, take turns to speak. But verse 28, he says, if there is no interpreter, let him keep silent. So first time, keep silent. Then again, in terms of prophecy, he says, you know, if anybody wants to prophesy, let them prophesy speak two or three. But if anything is revealed to another who sits, let the first keep silent. That's verse 30. So he's using that same phrase, keep silent in respect to prophesy, right? Then third time, he's using keep silent is in verse 34, having to deal with women. So if we say, well, if you use this and say, well, Paul said women, keep silent, keep silent. All the women must keep silent. Then everybody wants to prophesy, must keep silent. Everyone wants to speak in tongues. No, that's not it. He's giving us basically guidance on how to conduct ourselves when we come together for service, what we call a service, when we come together as a church. So when you're speaking in tongues, you take turns and you're giving a message to the church to take turns. And the message has to be interpreted. If there's no interpreter, then you keep silent. Same thing with prophecy. You take turns to prophesy. If somebody else starts prophesying, the previous one must keep silent.  He is not saying don't ever prophesy in church. He's just saying, you know, follow proper order. So therefore verse 34 and 35, when he says women keep silent, again, it must be understood as a way by which Paul is saying there's a proper way to do things in church, proper order. That's why he's saying keep silent. Doesn't mean that women must never preach or speak. Second thing I want to point out is in verse 34 and 35, he's speaking specifically to married women. He's not speaking to all women, right? Because he says let women keep silent. That's verse 34. And if they want to learn something next verse 35, if they want to learn something, let them ask their own husbands at home. But then what about the women who are not married? So he's only speaking to women who are married. That if you are on a question. So that's the second thing. He's not speaking to all women. He's speaking to women who are married. He says, okay, you go and ask your question. And third thing I want to point out is that very specifically, he's talking about, he's not referring to preaching the word of God or ministering the word of God. As Collins pointed out, he's referring to women asking questions. That is the matter he's addressing. So verse 34 and 35 are together, right? And what is the matter he's addressing? He's addressing if they want to learn something, if they want to ask question, then you want something to be explained. Then don't speak in church. Don't ask the question in church. As a married woman, you go home and ask your husband. So that's the matter he's addressing. Okay. So just looking at the context, he's talking about keeping silent three different times. So he is saying, so the intent here is not to forbid this, but to give proper order. Second, he's speaking to married women. Third, the matter he's addressing is about them wanting to learn something, asking questions. So it is in that situation or in that context he's saying, so if you want to paraphrase this, let married women who are having doubts and questions in the church service, let them keep quiet. Don't start talking and having conversation with your husband in the church. Wait till you get home. And when you're at home, you ask your question so that your husband can explain it to you because it's very shameful for married women to start having conversation inside church. It's shameful. It's not proper conduct. It's not proper behavior. So that is understanding these verses in the context. Then of course, when you look at the wider question biblical context, God has always used women.  So if God is pouring out his spirit on women and they can speak his word, then definitely he's not going to forbid them from speaking his word in the church setting. Did we all understand this? It's a break time, so we will go for a break. But this is okay. You got it? How to understand 1 Corinthians chapter 14 verses 34 and 35. Okay. So let's go for a break. We will come back and we'll pick up the other difficult passage in 1 Timothy chapter two. Okay. And I will fix my mic settings. Okay. See you soon. Thank you.


But after an hour, we'll have a very short break and we'll continue the discussion, like you know, more informal and not recorded. Okay, so please remind, let me remind you to please mute yourself. And if you have any questions, you can either use the chat for everyone or just send me, but I think it's better if it's the chat for everyone. So when Mayam is speaking, I think we'll only take clarification questions and you know, more substantive questions will be kept for after. So you mute yourself, you can control the video though, so no one is sure, I mean there's David and only he's showing the video. So I think it would be nicer and maybe if we can see some of the faces, it you know, it gives me the impression that you're speaking to a war. Hi everyone. So Mayam, I guess I've said all I wanted to say and the floor is yours, you have 40 minutes. Okay, okay, thanks a lot. So let me share my screen practice this yesterday. So hopefully it's working. Let's see, make it, the screen. So can everyone see my screen now? Okay, great. Everything's fine. Okay, okay, let me start. Thanks a lot for inviting me. It would have been better if it wasn't to lose. I love dessert, but it's great to be able to present my work. So today what I'm gonna be doing is talking about optimal rating system on platforms and I'm gonna do this, try to do this impossible task of presenting three papers in 40 minutes. We'll see how it goes. So this presentation would be based on three papers. The first one is an empirical work with Sean Cui, Giancarlo Staniolo and Steve Tedelus. So this is about, it's an empirical work where I'm looking at what the impact of certification and what happens when you change a certification to threshold on different parts of the market. So I'm gonna present only the results of these paper and I'm not gonna go through the details. And then the second paper, which I'm gonna be spending most of my time is about optimal quality rating. So in that paper, we are gonna be looking at theoretically what would be optimal when you're designing a reputation system and a rating system. And if I have time, I'm gonna go present some results from a third paper. So the difference between the second and the third is that the second one, we are only looking at adverse selection and we are assuming that the quality of the sellers are fixed. And but in the third one, we allow for moral hazard. So I'm sort of, I will be just presenting you some of the results to see how the results are different when you have to think about moral hazard as well as adverse selection. Okay, so let me get into the presentation. So I guess the audience here know that, all know that asymmetric information is can be very tricky and information design can help when we have markets with asymmetric information. And there are many examples, especially on platforms and two-sided markets. So eBay and Airbnb are some examples, but there are many others like Uber, Upwork, if you're hiring someone from internet, there are a lot of these markets with asymmetric information. And but this is not just a new thing. It has been around for a long time. I can love papers with coins long time ago. And you have this problem in credit ratings for consumers and corporate debt markets. Also you have the certification of doctors and restaurants. The common features for these markets is that you have adverse selection as well as moral hazard and the intermediary. So here you have an intermediary who usually observes more information than one side of the market. So they have a bit more information and they wanna decide what to transmit to the other side. So what I'm gonna be answering in these papers these are some of the main questions. One is that, is there a thing is too much information? Why not just intermediary transmit all the information to the other side and let them decide? Is there a thing that they actually, the other side actually prefers to not see some information? Is there some benefit of hiding some information? And then the question of optimal design comes into play. The second question is, are the both side of the market value the information the same way? So if for example, on eBay you have buyers and sellers are sellers better off sometimes at hiding where buyers prefer to see the information or vice versa. And the same goes through for the other kind of markets. And another question which we answer actually mostly in the first paper is to see how reputation mechanism information system impacts in comments and in trends differently. And we wanna see how these different part segments of the market are impacted. Should we think about them separately or they're sort of impacted the same? And the other one that I'm gonna give you some intuition for is that why we see a lot of simple signals and certifications in a lot of platforms. So a lot of times we see platforms giving different badges or they have like five, one to five ratings. So it's not very elaborate certification mechanism and I'm giving you some intuition of why that might be the case. Okay, so let me start with the first paper. So the first paper is mainly about certification. So there are a lot of market places that labor sellers who meet some minimum quality threshold. So they sort of do give some certification badge. So for eBay, which we are looking at this paper, they have this eBay top-rated seller or ETRS badge. Airbnb had this ABAB Superhost badge that you might have seen when you used to travel back in ancient history now and hopefully sometime in future. And then in Upwork, they have this Upwork top-rated badge. They give two top-rated sellers. Okay, so the benefit of the badge is that it mitigates some of the asymmetric information problem, but on the other hand, it can be a barrier of entry, especially if getting the badge is very hard and it's very valuable, then you might have sellers not wanting to enter the market and that can be a problem. So what do we do in this paper? In this paper, we are going to be looking at some policy that happened, a change of policy and happened on eBay, which they make it seem in this badge much harder. So beforehand, as you can see, about 10% of the sellers on eBay had the badge and afterwards it dropped sharply to 4%. So you might think, okay, 10% is not a lot, but these sellers or 4% afterwards is not a lot, but these sellers are disproportionately selling a lot of items on eBay. So these 10% of sellers beforehand were selling more than 50% of the items on eBay. So this drop was pretty sharp afterwards. So we wanna see what's the impact of this on incumbents, on interns, and also on total vector, especially consumers welfare. So what we see, okay, these are the questions that we try to answer in this paper. So we wanna see how the incentive of new sellers to enter the market has changed. So when you make this, getting the badge much harder, does that pay as a barrier to entry? And does that make it, does it make it harder for new sellers to enter the market? So what we see is actually, it really depends on the quality of the sellers. So the effect is heterogeneous in quality of the sellers. So sellers who which have a high quality actually have now more incentive to enter, the idea here is that these sellers whose quality is higher, now they get the badge still before and after this policy change, but afterwards, given that very few people have this signal, they get much more value from this badge. And as a result, they have more incentive actually to enter the market. And interestingly, the opposite is also true. And we see a little bit not as a strong evidence, but a little bit of evidence of some improvement in incentive on the lower end of the qualities as well. So this is now the case that these very low quality sellers are now pulled with better sellers. So we had these, let me go back to these pictures, we have these sellers who lost their badge, their badge before that are not badge anymore. So now the sellers who were not bad beforehand are pulled with these sellers who are sort of middle quality, high end of quality, and they can be better off. And this has increased their incentive to enter the market. And also we see a bit of disincentive for the sellers in the middle of quality because these guys had higher incentive and higher probability of getting the badge before, but now they don't. And so they are not gonna be entering as much. And we wanna see if we can see the same kind of impact for the incumbents about who are on the exit side. And actually what we see is the mirror effect here. And we see less exit from the two tails of the distribution. So for the higher quality guys who exit less often and we see more exit from the middle. So just exact opposite of what we see above. So we see a lot of actions happening on the selection part here. So for both sellers entering into the market and exiting the market. And we wanna see what kind of impact we see on the quality. So like if people start to improve their quality, as now getting the badges more valuable and the fewer people who are getting the badge, but we don't see a lot of impact. We see some, but the impact is not a lot. So what we see is that the sellers who were very close to getting the badge, but they were just below the threshold to get the badge, they sort of pushed their, some of them pushed their quality a bit higher to get the badge. But we don't see a lot of actions in other parts of the quality spectrum. So one thing, for example, that I expected was to see some more actions on the higher end, but we didn't see a lot of impact there. For the VFR interrogations, we see some improvement for buyers on average, but about two to three percent. Okay, so I think I'm going a bit too slow to make sure that I can get to the second paper, I have enough time for the second paper. So what the main takeaways here is that for digital platform is that the certification policies affects quality distribution. It's not just, you shouldn't just think about the average quality, you have to think about the quality distribution. It can broaden or contract the quality range depending on what you do. And so it depends like if you're a marketplace it really depends on what you want to maximize, what your preference is here. If you care more about the sellers in the middle or sellers on the high end or low end, then it impacts the optimal choice of certification threshold for you. So if you want to have more of the high end sellers, so for example, like if you pick a study, you want to have like this, products that have like a very high number of supporters, you want to be very specific on the high end and try to incentivize those guys to come. But if you're Uber and you don't care about people driving others with Tesla's and you just care about the average quality, you don't want to be giving some signal that gives or like incentives to very high quality drivers. And the other thing was that it seems that the quality control policy seems to be more about affecting selection rather than changing quality. If you saw some impact, but very little. Any questions here or should I continue to the second later? Okay. No, there's no question. So now let me go to this paper that I'm gonna go actually into the model and give you a little bit more detail. So what you have noticed is that in that paper, we had a simple model that sort of guide us into what kind of empirical work we wanted to do, but we didn't have like a very strong, complicated model that we can look at what's the optimal level of information this course. And the model was not, we didn't actually identify the model. So it wasn't, it was a reduced form analysis. So what we didn't answer this question, okay, what is the optimal and as a function of different parts of the assumptions on the market. So what I'm gonna do in the second paper and what we did in the second paper is actually doing that. So we wanna see what's the impact of improving information on welfare and then you can define welfare about consumer, producer, total welfare or some base on consumer and producer and we wanna answer what's gonna be the optimal level of information disclosure. And we wanna see what's the role of supply especially and demand considerations and also on your choice of optimal information disclosure. And also I'm gonna go over some results about what happens when you wanna give four or five signals and what would be the optimal. So for example, if you're just giving one signal, so if you're certifying a set of sellers, so like just this badges that we just talked about what would be the optimal thresholds of food and how much of the gap in the total welfare you can pose by just including one, two, three signals. Okay, so let me start on the model. Let me slow down a little bit. Okay, so here we have a unit mass of firms and we assume that they have a quality Z that's come from distribution F of C and we're assuming that this distribution of quality is fixed. So here we only have other selection no more hazard in this paper. As I said, the third one is the one that includes more hazard. And we're assuming that we have competitive market so you can think of the supply function which is just gonna be first derivative of cost function to be the deciding factor here for the sellers. And you're assuming that the cost function is the same for all producers. So that's the supply side of the market. So for the sellers or producers they have a quality and the cost function is the same for everyone. So depending on the price they're getting they're gonna be deciding what quantity to produce which is going to be S of P and that's just the first order of margin cost. That's the margin. Okay, so the demand side we have a mass M of consumers and they have a unique demand and they have to choose between all the options present to them.  So this theta is gonna come from a distribution psi of theta. So that's the type of the buyer so that determines the demand function. And so they Z you can see is the quality of the item they're getting or the expected quality of the item they think they're getting depending on the signal they see and then they have to pay a price of P so that will be subtracted from their utility. And we are assuming that outside good is normalized to zero. So this is just a fancy way of saying that they have a demand function. So for example, if the quality Z is zero this is gonna be their demand function. And if they know the average quality of a group is ZL this will shift the demand function for them up. And if for example, you have two groups. So for example, you are certifying a group of one group and not the other. And the group that are certified have the average quality on ZH. They will have the red, the upper demand function and the others, the low guys will have the lower, low demand function. So one thing to note here is that in equilibrium these buyers should be in different between the choices. So if you have different sellers with different qualities selling at different prices the Z minus P for everyone should be the same. And the way that we have given that the way that we have modeled this they sort of actually the value of this additional Z would be all consumed in P. So it's not gonna be a big factor for the consumers but it will be important for the whole market. So here we wanna talk about the optimal information disclosure. Okay, so what do we have here? So we have the buyers share a common prior. So let's say they all know the average quality of the sellers. And here we wanted as a planner the planner has to choose what information to these codes. Let's assume that the planner knows F. F was the distribution of quality of the seller. So it can be coming a function of that for simplicity just assume the planner knows all the information they know exactly the type of the seller. And then they have to decide what information to reveal and the information that they're gonna be revealing would be has to have the same mean as F but they can hide some information. So it can be coming any mean preserving contraction of F can be an information that they're gonna be revealing. So they can do some garbling of information. So they can hide some information but they can potentially give exactly F or the other extreme they can just give no information and just give the mean of quality which is known by buyers anyway. So it's like giving no information. Okay, so what's the problem that they're gonna be solving if so they're gonna be choosing a G from this script G set. So they're gonna be maximizing this expression. So here we are assuming that the rate they put on consumers at once is gamma and this Q of G is the quality the equilibrium output quantity set. So the planner problem is gonna be maximizing here. They wanna choose a G member of this script G script G to maximize this weighted welfare. So this is one minus gamma is the weight they put on the profit of the sellers. And here this would be the welfare for a consumer cell phone. Okay, so this is the demand function, the English demand function for the consumers and this P is the price in the market for quality zero. Okay, so let me stop here, see if there is any questions or can I continue? So what do the buyers know? So the buyers see the signal G and let's assume that beforehand they only know the average which is also in G so they don't know anything else. But we have some extensions when they have some prior information but we need to have that to be common prior everyone share that information. It will be sort of similar. But there's something I probably misunderstood. I thought that so when you introduce the originating among sellers, so the buyers observe a seller's type? When? Well, no, so the buyers only see this signal of the seller. So this G can be, okay, badging some sellers. This G can be telling you, okay, one a star, two a star, three a star, four a star or it can be exactly the quality of the seller. So it depends on what the planner is going to disclose. So what I had here was, okay, this Z for the utility that I had here was what was the expected quality that buyers were observing? So it's a function of Q, so it can be the same for everyone if there's only one signal. I mean, if there's no signal and they say, okay, it's just average quality. So it depends on the signal, the G signal that is transmitted. Okay, so any other questions? No. Okay, so here, before I go to the results, let me give you some intuition here what happens in this market. So here when, for example, you only care about the consumers, so here you just, you want to maximize only this part. What happens is that this, you have these two different effects of giving more information about the sellers. One is that as you give more information about the sellers, you're gonna be making more dispersions on the prices in the market. So for example, if you don't give any information, there is only one price in the market and every seller in the market is getting that price. What does that mean? It means that all the sellers in the market are gonna be producing the same level. So high-quality sellers and low-quality sellers are producing exactly the same level. Okay, so when that happens, you, so you have the same level of quantity for each seller, but high-quality and low-quality. So you have a lot of mixing of qualities. So this can be bad for the buyers because the average quality of the items on the market is going down, but what happens actually here is that given that the buyers are paying that extra value on quality, that might not be actually that important. What is more important for the buyers is gonna be coming from this quantity in the market. So when you have no information, we're back to again to no information about the sellers, the total quantity is gonna be a function of this average price, which this average price is coming from the average quality in the market. And the level of this quantity depends on the supply function. So for example, if your supply function is convex, that actually giving no information would reduce the quantity in the market. And the reason here is that, okay, the high-quality and low-quality, they're all getting a price that is on average sort of low and everyone is producing a little bit. When the supply function is convex, if you give some information, now you will have this high-quality sellers getting higher prices and producing a lot more items. And that will push the quantity in the market higher and that would be beneficial for the consumers. So then you will get to a case where it's better to give more information for the consumers and otherwise not. So let me actually go with these effects of information a bit more slowly here because that's sort of the main idea of the paper is that if you give more information, it spreads out the sellers according to their quality. And so here the direct effects is you have this reallocation of output from low to high-quality producers which actually the benefits of this extra quality is arbitrage is a way and it's sort of translated to higher profits because the prices are going to be higher because all the consumers who wanna get this higher quality has to pay higher prices and because they need to be in different, the consumers need to be in different on the margin, they're not getting the benefits actually. The indirect effect is that the total output can change. So the total output is gonna be increased if S is conveyed. So that's actually beneficial for the consumer. What is gonna be bad for producers? And it's bad for the producers because it will decrease the price as a function of Q. So that if you look at the price as a function of Q when you have no quality, so for quality zero that's gonna be going lower and it sort of pushes the prices down for the consumer, for the sellers as bad for the sellers but good for the consumer. So here the indirect effect is sort of goes in two opposite effects for the consumers versus producers and as a result we get some mixing of the result. So here's this picture shows the whole results that we find here and that when S is convex and we care about the consumers more, you wanna do full disclosure and the same is true when S is concave and gamma is less than half but then gamma is, you care more about the consumers and the supply is concave. It depends on if S prime over S double prime is increasing. So for example, if it's increasing you wanna do full disclosure at the beginning and then cooling. And otherwise you wanna do cooling and then full disclosure.  So the first effect when you have the reallocation is more determined by S prime and the second effect is more determined by S double prime. And depending on which direction is, so this would be a lot of positive and negatives here and not gonna go through the details but the disclosure result depends on if S over S prime over S double prime is higher low. So you wanna be disclosing. So for example, here, if you wanna just look at this side when you care about the consumers more but the supply function is concave, you wanna disclose at the beginning and then pull all the sellers. So this is the point that you wanna be when S prime over S double prime is increasing you wanna be pull at the higher end and this goes at the lower end. Okay, so let me, don't have a lot of time. Let me give you some overview of this second result of the paper.   So the best thing to do is to find the Z1, Z2, Z3 and say give the signal that the sellers are between the Z lower bar and Z1, between Z1 and Z2 and so on. So it will give you what is the average quality in between, so what buyers will expect is the average quality of the sellers that are in within each of these intervals. So what we show here is that when you wanna choose this Zs to maximize the total surplus, you have this necessary condition, just forget about the top one for now and what it tells you, this is the average cost and benefit of increasing this Zk, the tertial Zk. The cost is, okay, these guys are gonna be producing higher quantity, but the benefit is how you have some extra production, which is beneficial when you're looking at total surplus because the prices just won't get to the other. So this is the condition that is quite intuitive, but the problem is that all this quantity, the total quantity in the market and the average, the quantity for each seller is gonna be in dodgeness and we show in another proposition how we will find this. So given that I don't have a lot of plans, the main idea here is that this is the k-mean criteria for optimal cost rate and the main idea here is that you wanna put this thresholds at different levels such that you give the most amount of information possible. So this is like the cost freeing thing and that people do all the time. So you wanna sort of cluster the sellers and give clusters of the sellers which are most similar to each other and the different clusters you want to be as far away as possible. So you're sort of giving these signals such that you give the most amount of information and what we show later is about the performance and wanna see how much of these welfare gap even total surplus of total surplus you can give when you give, you move from like how much, like the total of effort gap being between the total of effort gap of full versus no information. I wanna see how much of these welfare gap you cause when with different number of thresholds. And here we show that for example, this is for some different distributions you can see with only one, so when you put only have two groups or one signal sort of like certification with even just one you can get quite a bit of this gap cause with just one signal. And when you get to the point signal so it would be like one to five a star you get to very like more than like 90% and above. And one thing to note here is this is the amount of number of sellers who are gonna be batched and you can see that this number of sellers can be actually quite low. So it can be 5%, 9%, 20% so this is the share of the sellers who are gonna be batched. And so just having one threshold so it can be quite selected. So I think this is a very cool result because it sort of tells you that, okay in this model we didn't have any cause for acquiring information or for the buyers who are seeing these signals trying to understand what the signal means. So we don't have any of those costs in the model but if you include any of them then it might be actually optimal to just give one or two signals because you can see that you can get quite far but just giving one signal. So it can be sort of give you some intuition why you have this way often in a lot of market places and you give just very limited number of signals about the sellers. So the take away of this paper is that the optimal disclosure depends on the curvature of the supply function as well as the slope of supply function. So and when you're maximizing total sales process best disclosure or information because you reallocate market share from low quality to high quality sellers and this increase average quality and overall it's better but when you care for example more for the sellers or more for buyers depending on the supply function you sometimes wanna hide from information. So even for the consumers sometimes it's better they prefer not to see some information. And we show that there is a for the linear supply case there is a simple solution when you wanna give only limited number of signals so this is the came in clustering technique actually and it's very easy to find and the gains from giving this signals decreases fast in the number of thresholds. So when you have more like with only one you get about 50% and with five you get close to 90% most of the time. Any questions? Thank you Maian. Now the floor is open for questions. So if any of you has any questions I guess you can put it in the chat and I'll give you the mic. So I have a couple. So regarding this first bullet point on the takeaway slide I mean this is a broad question but I'm intrigued by the sort of the connection that your work has with the connection on third degree price discrimination and demand curvature. So it seems like you're looking at the sort of the dual problem in a sense that I sort of I can't make precise but I wonder if you have you thought about the connection there? Is there something to say? Actually not, I have to think about that. Thank you. Yeah I think it's sort of is yeah I guess it is sort of similar because like with third degree price discrimination you're sort of thinking about the buyer side and you're doing sort of similar actions here, right? So you're deciding how to prove buyer so it's sort of similar to this one exactly. Yeah, I have to think about this. That might be actually sort of a very dual problem of that. So also another point that I had is that so when you discuss this simple solution for the supply case, the linear supply case, sorry, you assume that basically the platform can really and I mean that this is the assumption of your work that the platform can sort of partition the signals whatever way it wants. So in practice I guess one challenge is that you know even if eBay say gives a five-star scale, the empirical distribution that you observe is not at all sort of uniformly distributed or even normally it's like everyone is like five stars. Yeah, yeah. So is there a way for me? Yeah, so I mean here what I have in mind is not just like for the platform to observe the information and decide what information they're gonna be transmitting. That's one thing that I've noticed or realized is that a lot of times now even Amazon doesn't give you exactly the average ratings of the item. So even the five star rating that you see might be a function of, it is a function of feedbacks that consumers have received but it's not exactly the average. So you can be sort of getting all the information but what you're gonna be transmitting is not just a simple average of them. It can be okay, I'm gonna give four and above to just 10% of the sellers based on these criteria and so on. So it's not just transmitting the information that you get. So one thing actually in all of these papers at the moment, this is something for future research is that for now I have assumed that the platform exactly sees the information about the quality of the sellers and but it needs one other feedback level which is not modeled yet and that's the part that you see some signal from the buyers and then how to translate that to the quality of the sale. So that layer of it is actually missing in all this research at the moment. So that's dynamic part of actually how to get the information, how to solicit this quality information is actually missing here. So does anyone else have a question? So I'm not seeing anything on the chat. So I don't know if my chat is not working or if... I was very clear. Yes. I have a couple of questions. This is Bruno Julien speaking. Do you hear me first? Yeah, we hear you. Yeah, I have a poor microphone. Now I have a question to link the first part and the second part because the first part was a lot about exit and entry of the sellers and the second part is really an intensive margin but there is no extensive margin. So what would happen if you let's say introduce fixed costs in the second part and perfect signal or something like that? Yeah, so we have some extensions for that in this paper as well. So it actually makes it so when we get there, we have to make some further assumptions about supply and we have this linear supply but the results are... Let me think about that. So when we have entry into the market, so here we're assuming that for all the sellers, they're in the market here and there is no entry, but when you do have entry margin, let's see. So the result that we have is mostly for the few thresholds and we don't have a result for the full disclosure part. So for the full disclosure part, you will have a similar thing with wanting to, like when you want to disclose more, you're gonna be having the same kind of results, you're gonna wanting to disclose when you have the entry condition as well. The results probably will be different when you are not gonna be the result without entry margin was no disclosure at some points because when you do that, then you might be impacting entry. And that's the part that we have to work on. So we have some preliminary results but they're not actually very complete, but it sort of makes it a bit harder. Let me see if I remember exactly what's, okay. So here the point is like when you have entry as well as sellers producing, when you give, for example, if you give no information, that will make the average quality a bit higher, average price a bit higher for lower quality sellers. So it will sort of give this lower quality sellers entering the markets in higher rates and increasing your total quantity in the market. So it sort of makes this impacts the results actually make it a bit natural. Stop sharing, so we can see everyone. So it will make the results, the effects a bit stronger. So it sort of goes to the same direction and makes it a bit stronger. But that's for the linear supply case. And we have to do it for the full disclosure for the disclosure condition actually and for the full supply function, we haven't done that. Thank you. Anyone else? Okay, so I guess that was all very clear, Mariam. So thanks a lot. We will have another seminar in two weeks' time. This time it will be André Fratkin. So thanks for joining us and see you in a couple of weeks. Bye-bye. Bye, thank you.


Hi everyone, Sean with jaspyscasebrakes.com here doing 2019-2020 Panini Contenders Optic 2 box break. Pick your team number 31, where we're giving away the pelicans in the break. All you have to do is have two or more teams to be entered. So all cards ship, buy two teams, get one entry, four teams, two entries, six teams, three entries, etc. If you buy one team you are not entered but thank you very much and good luck with the one team. So here is our list of customers and teams. You can see the pelican spot empty right there. We're gonna copy the customer list over to a new sheet and alphabetize it so that we can figure out how many people get those free entries. Dario with two spots gets one. David Almeida gets you one. David Baker gets one. Eric gets one. Nick Stober with ten gets five. Sean Matic gets one. And Sumin gets four. So now all 14 names here from Sumin back up to Dario. Dice roll, name on top after one and a four five times. Gets the pelicans. One. How many times was it? Five. Fifth and final time. Congratulations Sean Matic. You got yourself the pelicans. Perfect. Let's print this and Rick. We've got a new fresh inner case so 32, 33 and 34 and 35 will all be from this same case as well. So maybe keep track of what's coming out. If you think you get a hot case or teams expecting for the next boxes. So here's the new fresh inner case. Cool. So there's ten boxes in here. We just gotta figure out which ten we're gonna be doing. Well Nick, if I hit you something that'll make it easy for you to sell right? There's one stuck. There we go. So here's all ten. So you can see up here one through five, six through ten. Let's randomize and see which ones we're gonna do. So we're gonna come back over here to random.org for a second. Like I said one on top on the left, five on the bottom, six on top on the right, ten on the bottom. So one through ten box. First box we're gonna do is number four and the second box we're gonna do number eight. So let's kick back over here. Box four. It's right here. You can see six, seven, eight. There you go. So those two I'll set aside real quick. I'm gonna write random team on these so that we know or sorry pick your team. PYT. So we know that these are gonna be from that same case for the following breaks. So that way you guys know that these are all from that same inner case. There you go. So like I said those will be for breaks 32, 33, 34 and 35 which 32 I'll load in the store shortly after this. Back to, oh wait no we're already on it. So here is our finalist. Last spot mojo, Nick Galvin, San Antonio Spurs. Cool. Good luck everybody. First up PJ Washington Jr. lottery ticket go to the Hornets David Almeida. I like PJ Washington Jr. I think he and the Hornets have a good bright future or at least he does. Donovan Mitchell, Devin Booker, historical picks 13th overall. That's a nice combo right there. Blue cracked ice no numbering on that. That's between the Phoenix Suns which is Dario and Utah Jazz which is Eric. So that's gonna be a randomizer at the end of the break. Season ticket for the New Orleans Pelicans. Lonzo Ball going to Sean Matic. He won the Pelicans all for having at least two teams. Bojan Bogdanovich Silver season ticket. Going to the Utah Jazz and Eric. Montrezzel Harrell season ticket for the Clippers. Nick Stover. The red is the base so there's no numbering on that. And our auto rookie ticket auto Carson Edwards for Boston Celtics. David Baker. One of the last spots available. There you go David. That's number 39 out of 149. Box two. Yeah right Nick? I mean I'm rooting for everybody but obviously for helping out getting it done. I gotta root for you a little bit too. Here is a redemption for our auto. Throw that back there. Get your guesses in. And starting off with Uniformity Anthony Davis Silver for the Lakers. Nick Stover one of my favorite looking sets. Historical slams for the Minnesota Timberwolves. Zach Levine will crack dice. Timberwolves going to Nick Stover. Mitchell Robinson New York Knicks season ticket. Sue Min Kim. CJ McCollum season ticket. Silver for the Portland Trailblazers. Sue Min Kim. Season ticket blue for the Golden State Warriors. Steph Curry. Nice team color matching blue on that. Warriors. Sue Min. 59 out of 99. Our redemption. 1982 Tribute Autographs Orange. So these are not rookies I believe. I think I pulled one of these the other day and it was a Yonet on the Tacompo. This is card number six. K. V. D. U. R. A. N. T. Kevin Durant. 1982 Tribute Autographs Orange. Now let's look at the checklist and see which version of Kevin Durant that is. Those are very nice. I just saw those for the first time the other day. I know Nick. I'm sorry. I blame myself on that one. All three of them.  He's got the Nets, the Warrior, the Thunder and the Warriors. So no matter what this is going to him but let's take a look for just for for S's and G's. You know what I mean? 1982 Tribute and Parallels Brooklyn Nets which is Sue Min Kim. Orange Parallel Do we know what that's number two, Sue Min? It's a cool looking card. I saw it this the other day. This is what it looks like. This one in the top left corner. It's number to 25. Well there you go. Sue Min says that it's number to 25. So Brooklyn Nets. Brooklyn Nets. Nice Kevin Durant. 1982 Tribute Autograph Orange. Going to you, Sue Min. Thank you very much man for getting in on that. And guys, we have one more randomizer to do. Like I said, between the Jazz and the Sons. Between Eric and for Dario. So let's go back over here to randomizer. Let's do a new list. New dice. Jazz. And Sons. And it's a team on top after a one and a five. Six times. One, five and six and final time. Congratulations to the Sons and Dario Josh Cunnan. You are going to get this historical picks 13th overall pick between Devin Booker and Donovan Mitchell. That's going to you and the Sons. Congrats Dario. And guys, that was 2019-2020. Panini Contenders Optic. Two box break. Pick your team number 31. I'm Sean. JaspysCaseBreaks.com. 32, 33, 34 and 35 are all from the same intercase. They'll be on the site coming up later on. Thanks guys. JaspysCaseBreaks.com. Thanks for hanging out. We'll see you next time.