Good afternoon everybody. My name is Alastair Eid and I'm the executive director of the Resolve Network and a senior expert for the program on Binance Extremism at United States Institute of Peace. I'd like to welcome everyone to part four of our fifth annual Resolve Network Global Forum, which today is being co-hosted by USIP and by Resolve Member Organization Institute for Security Studies. I'd like to take the opportunity to thank the Institute for Security Studies for being a founding member of our network. The Resolve Network is an international consortium of organizations and experts committed to better research, informed practice, improved policy and via extremism. We provide key insights through establishing global connections, asking critical questions to enhance and inform work in this field. Our work spans thematic and geographic themes with projects focused on Sub-Saharan Africa, the Western Boltons, racially African-made-mated violent extremism, and building expertise on via extremism research. For more on our work and to get involved, please visit our website and follow us on Twitter. USIP is proud to house Resolve Secretariat and make possible through partnerships with US Department of State, Year of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, the Global Engagement Center and the US Agency for International Development. We would like to recognize and thank them for their consistent support, partnership and commitment to Resolve, and for championing the importance of research and growing evidence-based for policies and programs. This fifth annual forum is very different from our previous ones. Instead of a day-long conference this year, we prepared a series of virtual discussions spread out over a number of months. This is the fourth of those discussions, Security Challenges in Africa 2021 and beyond. So please be on the lookout for upcoming events in the 2021 Resolve forum series. Today's event focuses on the upcoming emerging security challenges in Africa and the role in countering violent extremism in addressing these challenges. Resolve has led a number of projects in Africa working with local researchers, including our previous late Chad Basin project, looking at community and state responses to extremism and current ongoing projects on community-based armed groups and on learning from local peace-building initiatives. Today we have three incredible experts who will give insights and perspectives on lessons learned and challenges at Liehead before I hand over to our speakers some general housekeeping. During today's event, we encourage you to ask questions to the speakers. You can submit your questions on the USIP event page, where you're watching this webcast or on USIP's YouTube or on Twitter using the hashtag Resolve forum. This session moderates to incorporate some of the questions into the broader conversation of the speakers. As a reminder, the event is on the record and will be available on USIP's YouTube afterwards. Thank you all, thank you to all of you who have joined us today, and don't forget to join us on Twitter at ResolveNet and at USIP and with the hashtag Resolve forum. I'll now hand over to today's moderator, Dr. Joseph Sani, USIP vice president at the Africa Center. Thank you Alistair. Good afternoon, good morning. My name is Joseph Sani, vice president at USIP, and I lead the Africa Center. I would like to welcome everyone here with us today, but let me begin by presenting the United States Institute of Peace. The US Congress founded USIP in 1984 as an independent nonpartisan national institute dedicated to preventing, mitigating, and resolving violent conflict. In October 2020, the United States Institute of Peace established the Africa Center. This decision reflected our institute's commitment to expand and transform its already considerable work in Africa. Our mission here at the Africa Center is to inform US policy toward Africa and strengthen peace and security with innovative and effective programming throughout the continent. In fact, in the Greater Horn of Africa, the Sahel, Littoral West Africa, countless communities suffer terrorist and extremist violence perpetrated by actors ranging from ISIS and al-Qaeda affiliates to locally driven movement. After nearly two decades of ongoing efforts to defeat terrorism, the international community has realized the necessity to engage with groups that were often sidelined, such as women and young people, to serve as positive actors in contributing to strategies to tackle drivers of violent extremism. As threats of violent extremism endure, change, and grow throughout East, West, and Southern Africa, community-led organizations are working to limit extremist groups' impact and inform national policy and strategies. However, information sharing gaps exist among community members, security actors, and policy makers, calling for trust-building initiatives to improve communication and collaboration. In the US IP Africa Center, we tackle these dynamics through programs that elevates women's roles in informing policy and designing strategies for preventing and countering violence extremism. In our work, we aim to reduce the conditions that enable violence extremism in local communities and establish connection and collaboration with key security decision makers locally, nationally, and regionally. Today's discussion on security challenges in Africa speaks to Results Network and the Africa Center's commitment to expanding the boundaries of peace-building knowledge and practice on issues of peace and security in Africa. We are fortunate to be joined in today's conversation by two distinguished and accomplished scholars and researchers, Dr. Akinola Olujo and Dr. Phoebe Donnelly. Dr. Akinola is a senior researcher in the lecture-based program at the Institute for Security Studies in Dakar, Senegal. His research and policy engagements have focused on community resilience, the role of history and preventing and countering violence extremism, and the question of dialogue and violent extremist groups. Dr. Donnelly is a research fellow at the International Peace Institute, where she helps lead the Women's Peace and Security Program. She is also a fellow at the Women's and Public Policy Program at Harvard Kennedy School. Dr. Donnelly's research is at the intersection of gender and conflict with a focus on gender-based violence and countering violence extremism. Dr. Donnelly, Dr. Akinola, thank you for joining us today. I would like to set the stage by asking you, Dr. Akinola, in a previous conversation organized by the Reserve Network, one question that came up in the brainstorming session was on the framing and terminology around violence extremism. So let me ask you this. Does the framing around violence extremism matter? If so, how? Thank you very much. That's a real subject, and I think we can look at this on several levels. I would say yes, and I'm actually not surprised that in the past this has come up because framing, the use of terms, the use of language has a bearing on not only the way we conceptualize the problem in focus, but also the way we respond. And it also has a bearing as well on the nature of actors or entities we engage in the process of responding to the problem or addressing the problem. Now, if we take a close look at what has happened in the past, in a number of countries on the continent, we've seen where responses to terrorism or efforts to counter it sort of has attracted a variety of ways that sort of exploit political motives. We see the abuse of political power. So what some actors may call counterterrorism, for instance, may actually be an abuse of power. On another level, when we emphasize preventing violence extremism in distinction from just countering it, in a sense, it sort of forces us to reflect more on risk factors, to reflect more on perhaps early warning mechanisms and even looking at things such as trying to not only look at those risk factors, but also address the root causes. So we're looking at governance gaps, for instance. So as opposed to just fighting the fires that were erupt in all the countries in terms of violent extremism. We're looking at how to really make sure the risk factors do not transcend into something that will begin to just apply immediate responses to. I think if we take this even a bit deeper and we look at the very specific thematic areas. Now, when we look at, for instance, the idea of foreign terrorist fighters, and this is something which colleagues at the ISS and myself, you know, we debated this, you know, in I think in 2018, when we look at foreign terrorist fighters, the very idea of foreign, you know, we asked the question of how foreign really are these fighters on the continent, especially on the continent where a lot of countries have a complicated history as a result of colonialism. So what we see as fighters crossing borders are actually crossing borders that are valid reminders of a pre-colonial past that connects all these affected states or regions, you know, in an ethno-religious way, in a cultural way, you know, historically, on several levels. So I think it's the framing of the language is so key. And if you look very closely, for instance, at the Horn of Africa, you know, the Eastern Horn of Africa, for instance, in Kenya, you have ethnic Somalis who are within Kenya, of course, they are Kenyan citizens, but then they have roots, you know, dating back to connecting them to present Somalia. If you look at the Lake Chad Basin region, you look at countries like Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, I mean Niger. We look at the Canary ethnic group, for instance, and you see some individuals who have joined Boko Haram in the group that is active there. Those who cross the borders are actually, we have Kit and Kin across those borders. So I think reflecting on this idea, you know, the framing is really key in the way we respond and how we're able to, you know, ensure that there's relevance for the context we're looking at, especially in Africa. This is really important because you are raising another fundamental issue, the issue of the discrepancy between the geographic boundaries and the ethno-cultural boundaries in the continent. Absolutely. What does that mean? Dr. Dene, do you have anything to add from this? Thank you. Thank you, Dr. Sani. I think this is a really important place to start the conversation. And I think we often think about terminology in terms of definition and from a very academic perspective. But I want to take us to thinking more about on the ground and who it matters to. And I would argue that it matters a lot to local groups on the ground. In particular, women's groups have raised concerns about the threats that come to them by being associated with PVE or CVE programming. So I think that's a really important part to start with those labels and how they matter to groups on the ground. A second point is I think when we have a bit narrower framing of CVE and PVE, it prevents us from listening to local actors on the ground.  And then it's very hard to listen to communities when they say the security threat is something different that might not match with what we see as PVE or CVE. So the more we've been thinking about it, I've been thinking about it. I think we need to broaden our approaches and our terms and think more about violence prevention and kind of a broader approach that helps protect groups on the ground and gives them ownership over the work they're doing. I think the point you are raising is also important in the sense that what I'm hearing is important for local communities and local actors to own the framing itself. And it's important for us to listen and understand where they are coming from. I think the South Africans say, if you want to work with people, go to them, start with what they know, build on what they have and together make the journey. And so what I'm hearing from you is please listen and then let's start with how they are calling the issue, how they are framing the issue. So I will take a different path here. I think last year, 2020 until now, was dominated by the COVID pandemic, as a big elephant in the home, unfortunately. And so Dr. Kinola, what will you say how the COVID effect on violence extremism on the continent? How will you describe that effect? Okay, no, thanks. Let's cast our minds back to 2020. And like you rightly said, I mean, the pandemic has unfolded and a lot has been revealed. Now let's situate that within the context of PCV. For those of you who recall, middle of last year, we all heard the call by the UN Secretary General when he mentioned he literally made a global call for ceasefire of conflicts. And in other words, he was making a call for opening windows of diplomacy and even dialogue. He hinted at that. Opportunities for dialogue between combatants and in countries where you have violent extremism, where you have armed conflict. And in a sense, for me, I think it's sort of laid bare or exposed almost the futility of armed conflict, as well as the needless resources that has also been invested in trying to, you know, you know, engage in conflict and resolve it as well, because we were faced with an existential threat and we're still faced with this till, I mean, till this day. You know, you begin to question the meaning under the purpose, the value of life itself. Now, on another level, when we observe the actions of some of the violent extremist groups on certain parts of the continent. For instance, in the Lake Chad Basin region, where you have groups like Bukuharam and its faction, we see how some of these groups found new narratives to reinforce the kind of propaganda that used to push in. So for example, there is a faction of Bukuharam led by someone called Abubakar Shakao. I mean, almost everyone has heard that name. And, you know, somehow you see how they were not only aware of the global trends, but they actually were able to exploit it.  And these are these are things which they've been doing, but then COVID presented an opportunity for them to exploit this. Now, if you shift the attention slightly away from the Lake Chad Basin to the Horn of Africa. There's something quite interesting which caught my attention and when we look at the group that is active there, which is Al-Shabaab. In the middle of last year, there were reports about Al-Shabaab actually establishing a COVID-19 center in Jilib. Jilib is in the southern part of Somalia, not too far from Kismayu for those perhaps familiar with the geography there. And, you know, they actually had, according to reports, a coronavirus prevention and treatment committee within the group, you know. And what does that tell us? It underscores the issue of governance, governance gaps. And while we prescribe the group, of course, the violence committed by Al-Shabaab is obviously what we're all trying to address or manage at least. But then it underscores the issue of governance gaps. And in a sense, during the pandemic period and as it unfolds, we see how attention is drawn to the need to address governance gaps. So the violent extremist groups is actually not just responding to the threats in its own way, but then also trying to use that rhetoric or that narrative even in practical terms to draw members. And this is a call for governments, of course, in Somalia as well as, you know, by extension across the continent to be aware of how these groups are adapting in terms of their thinking, aware of how they respond and also how we respond to the trends as they unfold. Thank you. Dr. O'Connelly, is there anything we have learned in 2020 that forces us to rethink the role of women, particularly when it comes to preventing and countering violence extremism and any adaptations you have seen in your research? Yeah, I think we learned two broad lessons. And one is a very feminist lesson, also people in the human security space that peace is not just about levels of violence, right? We saw this has been an extremely insecure year for the globe, and it was because of a global pandemic, not just because of violence. So I think we really need to start paying closer attention to the intersections of health, of security, of economics, and how they affect a broader understanding of security. I think another big lesson we learned and Dr. O'Connelly spoke to it a bit is we, you know, we saw these government gaps and there were areas where we saw violent extremist groups filling them, but there were also areas where we saw women peace builders stepping up and filling them too. And so IPI, my organization has a report about peace building during the pandemic and the work of women peace builders. And we really saw how women are experts in this space and how they were stepping up and leading. In particular, we did a case study on Yemen and some of the training women were doing women peace builders were training medics. They were coming up with creative ways of sharing information about COVID-19. So where these were where the government's gaps were women really stepped in to help fill them. And I mean we know globally women are 70% of healthcare workers, so they've really been kind of at the forefront of this response. So I think it highlights the need that women have expertise and they're key actors in their community, and we need to listen to them, pay attention to them, as well as support them. Given we saw women really step up to fill these gaps but we also saw the ways in which global inequality really harmed women and a lot was placed on their shoulders without support. So I think it really taught us these two lessons of the interconnections between different forms of violence and paying attention to other actors like women's groups that can step in and fill some of these governance gaps. And so just to stay on that topic, in terms of women contributions, right? What do you think are the most concerning issues related to the future of DECVE as we call it peace and security on the continent? So there are three issues that I'm thinking a lot about and following closely. The first of course because I study al-Shabaab which we've talked a bit about is the elections in Somalia. And just hoping that al-Shabaab isn't able to disrupt the elections and especially not inflict violence on women's groups who have been hugely important in the elections and really advocating for political participation and a 30% quota. So I'm really following that closely and very concerned about how this moment of crisis could kind of brush away some of the activism of women. And so I hope we still keep an eye on that. The second issue which I think a lot about is the reintegration of women into communities. And we can talk more about this but I think this is an area where programming and policy has really failed. I think we have so little creative ways to help women trying to exit extremist organizations. And so I'm really concerned about the state of women who are trying to leave these groups and not having any support and not being able to integrate in their communities. And then finally somewhat related is children who have either been born in the group or associated with extremist groups. For example we know about the large number of children being detained in Nigeria for having links with Boko Haram. So I'm concerned about kind of this generational trauma and how societies can recover from violent extremism when we aren't necessarily taking a rehabilitation approach to the communities and all of the members. So are we actually the same question Dr. Kinola? So what are the most concerning issues for you as we look the horizon 2021 in terms of peace and security on the continent? That's a very broad, I mean it presents a very broad perspective. There are lots of things to bear in mind as we move forward. One thing which I think really happens a lot when Dr. Donnelly talked about women for instance and how efforts should not be wasted and how we need to not overlook some of the efforts that have been made in the past. And something that struck me was that a lot of times it's when something major happens, that is when you know all of a sudden we begin to pay closer attention. Look at Nigeria for instance, there was the Chibok abduction in 2014, the mass abduction of hundreds of schoolgirls and all of a sudden it seemed as if this issue was something that does appear out of nowhere but it's always been there. Overlooking the role of women, not only in terms of the multiple ways they are affected or involved with violent extremists who are within them, but also how they can be engaged is something which I think we shouldn't just wait for moments when something happens before we begin to act. Second, there are power dynamics involved and I think taking all these into account is very key especially in the way we negotiate for open spaces for not just men but also women of course in this. Now moving forward I think I'm keen on seeing a deeper engagement of the private sector as we think about more effective ways of addressing violent extremism. And I mentioned the private sector very specifically because for instance we've had since 2017 the UN Security Council Resolution 2396, which already drew attention of member states to a deeper engagement with the private sector. And not in terms of private military companies now but the private sector in how they can contribute to technological solutions. So for instance managing borders more effectively we're dealing with the transnational crisis. And if you look at where these things are happening it's not only one country. Boko Haram is not a Nigerian problem it's a regional crisis. So the private sector coming in here can play an important role in the Horn of Africa or in East Africa. There is what we call you know the Silicon Savannah you know like a billion dollar hub of tech startups. You know what are we doing about that how can we capitalize on that and ensure that some of the inputs from some of the startups in terms of thinking of solutions can be brought can be integrated to our approaches. I think there's a lot to talk about I mean we're looking at the criminal justice sector Dr. Donnelly talked about that very briefly. That's a very important component I think there is a need to even pay more attention to that as well. We've seen a lot of examples of the continent and even of course beyond Africa because Africa is not isolated. But then the fact that the criminal justice dimension of this problem is very key. Not only in terms of how people are near to join these groups because of abuses of violations of rights but how we also address what is crystallizing even in places like Mozambique for instance and how the security forces or agencies are responding to the crisis. There are lessons to be learned I mean I could go on there are so many aspects of this to talk about. I will push us a little bit to change I will change lanes here to explore one key aspect of the conversation is the role of communities. Dr. Donnelly there are increased calls to prioritize or give equal priorities to community solutions given solutions community led solutions. People see a huge potential into those solutions so there is a call for a paradigm shift. Do you have example of successes where community led solutions have made a difference. Yeah I think that's a great question and I think the framing of taking it beyond military approaches and looking at the community level is really important. And I hope Dr. Aquino will talk more about this idea of dialogue because I see a lot of potential and hope in that. But I think the heart of CVE and why it was formed was to take some take the bad parts of CT and change kind of the CT framework because it wasn't working. And because in fact not only is it not working but it's counterproductive. We see military approaches pushing communities into violent extremism. So I think the creative solutions and engaging with the community level is top priority. I think when we when we think about success stories especially with women and gender work related to CVE. It's really hard to point out in general it's always hard to kind of show a success in terms of prevention. But it's especially hard because we don't have great community level data on what's working on the ground. And that's something I'm really interested in researching is trying to figure out best practices. I think there is some appetite within the international community to engage with the community level to engage with women groups. But I think they're not getting enough guidance about what works. I think we need to really hear from people on the ground. And I think some of the work USIP is doing with local leaders. I know I've been in touch with some of the local leaders in Kenya that have gone through the USIP peace fellows training. I think there's really great research coming out contextually based research. But it's not feeding up to the international level. So I think that's definitely an area we need to keep pushing for data and information. Dr. Akinola, you have been called. Anything to add? Yes, I heard that loud and clear and I'll respond. Thanks, Donald. No, indeed. I like the fact that you mentioned dialogue. I mean, it points to the frustration we all feel when we look at what is happening. Most of the approaches are uncalled on the use of force. I think we start from there and then what I try to do, I look at this whole thing like this. Let me just give an illustration very quickly. I'm a big fan of chess. When you play chess, chess is a game of strategy. That's common knowledge. Chess is a game of battles.  Chess is a game of timing. You have a specific time limits within which you are supposed to make a move to gain the upper hand against your opponent. But chess is also a game of consequences. Failure to act timely within the strategy you have would lead to consequences. Now, why am I saying this? In the real world, you have battles involving violent extremist groups and states. Communities are affected. The center of all this feeling the full impact. You also have strategies. You have the military approach, which I mentioned earlier is really at the heart of most of the approaches. You also have a time limit, but of course it looks as if it's on ending. But in actual fact, lots of lives are being lost and that tells us about the consequences. So now we need to be very deliberate. And the idea of dialogue, I think it's not only about thinking of it in terms of states and terror groups or violent extremist groups. That can be part of the conversation, but then it has to be context specific and tailored according to the realities of the region of the country we're looking at. So what will work in the case of Al-Shabaab may not necessarily work with Boko Haram or with JNIM and Sahel. Now, the second thing about the idea of dialogue is that we need to look at it in terms of phases and not as a one-off event. It's not going to be a single event if it is explored. It needs to be examined or reflected on in terms of stages. Now, in Colombia, between 2012 and 2016 with the FARC, now that whole process of trying to negotiate, you know, both parties try to negotiate, it happened over a period of four years. So if we're thinking about dialogue or exploring this idea, irrespective of the region, I think it shouldn't be seen as something that will happen as a single event. Now, the third thing is that there must be a common or shared vision. And like Dr. Donnelly mentioned, she made reference to Somalia and the elections. We saw what happened recently and it's unfortunate because we have Al-Shabaab on the sidelines simply watching and waiting for an opportunity to exploit, you know, the political vacuum. And the thing is that there must be a common vision among political actors, even if dialogue is to be explored. And for instance, in the case of Somalia, between the central government and the federal member states, we've seen cases in the past, like last year, for instance, where the Somali National Army troops of the army were engaged in clashes with federal member states in Jubala, I believe. That shouldn't be happening. So there must be a shared vision in terms of how state actors mobilized themselves or the idea of even exploring dialogue. Communities, and I'll end here, communities need to be at the center of this. There are four things which we must bear in mind when we speak about focusing on communities because this whole event is really about central, placing center stage communities. I talk of impact, experience, expectation and responsibility. Communities experience the worst of the worst in terms of the impact of this crisis we're talking about. So there is something very intrinsic about the way they articulate their experiences because they feel the impact. And this is where research comes in. We engage communities when we go to the field or go to these communities. We provide a platform in a sense to be able to not just get the data, but also to provide a stage for communities to express themselves. And then when we talk of expectation, policymakers shouldn't just assume that they know what communities want or what to give them. We must consult communities. And the fourth thing about responsibility, we all have a responsibility in terms of how we relate with communities. Not only in terms of the policies, but also in terms of the ethical aspect. How do we represent communities even in our publications in terms of how we, you know, the visuals we use. The language we use, the framing of communities in the, in the, in the output and activities we engage in. All these are very key. Thanks. And I would just like to be a little bit specific regarding women here because generally we use community and at the end of the day we have a bunch of men. Right. So, so in this context, Dr. Donnelly, how should we be thinking the role of women as we look at community solutions? I'm actually going to take that question in a different direction and thinking more about gender and how that can be a tool for us. Because we do need to think about women and of course listen to their voices, which are so often ignored in these spaces. But they also think there's a lot of potential to think about masculinity because as we know women aren't the only people with a gender. And so a gender lens helps us look at power dynamics at the community level in a new way. So IPI has a report coming out with the counterterrorism executive directorate at the UN on the links between masculinities and extremism. And I think this is a really rich way to change the conversation and rethink gender is by looking at different types of masculinities, how extremist groups are using them, how security sectors are using them. My second point in taking it back to thinking of the role of women and especially women's engagement and extremism is I think we have to add more nuance to our categories. And I recognize when I call for nuance, that's a that's a push with the policy community. Nobody likes nuance.  But the category of victim versus perpetrator in terms of women's engagement in terms of women's experiences where violent extremist groups are active has just not helped us kind of move into smarter policy solutions. So we have to hold the idea that women are victims of violent extremism as our men and women are supporters of violent extremism, and we need to look deeper at the context to understand kind of where they fit. And we have to hold both of those at the same time. And then finally, when we think about women and PVE and CVE, as I mentioned at the beginning of the conversation, we need to think about the potential negative effects of these policy right at the start. So how can PVE and CVE policies potentially negatively affect women. And I think the report of the special rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and while countering terrorism does a lot of in depth look at how counter terrorism PVE and CVE is entering the home and harming women. So I think we really need to start thinking about that early stages into into policy planning any negative effects. And thank you for pushing us towards policy recommendations, Phoebe. But before we get there, Dr Akinola, there is the question of dialogue or negotiation with terror groups, which keeps coming up while we hear it a lot. Some countries even say we don't even negotiate with terrorists. But is this an option that we should even consider as we look forward negotiating with these violent groups? Thank you. I'll make reference to some of the things I mentioned in the last intervention. It's a very sensitive topic. It's one which like rightly mentioned, most states or state actors would normally not want to openly or officially state that they are negotiating with some of these groups. What I think the first thing to acknowledge is that the nature of the crisis we're dealing with is a multi-dimensional. It's not limited to the battlefield. And I tried to illustrate what I was speaking about earlier with the illustration of our shoulder. And part of what I was trying to say was you get to a point where it appears as if there is a stalemate. And neither opponent is able to actually gain the upper hand. And then it forces you to think and reflect on how else you can approach this problem or what else you can use to complement the existing approach. So when we mentioned dialogue or exploring dialogue, it's really about how we can complement the current approach which is anchored on the use of force and of course other approaches focusing on the criminal justice component and so on. It's about complementing those approaches. So we must overcome the assumption that the use of force will actually be the silver bullet or what will eventually solve the problem. There is also the ideological aspect. And I think this is very key. We need to talk about this. Ideology is part of the equation. It's not only about senseless violence, quote, unquote. There is an ideological aspect to this. In fact, for those who remember back in, if you cast your mind back to 2005, that's about 16 years ago. I'm taking this beyond Africa now. In 2005, we had the London bombings. And the reason why I'm mentioning this is because immediately after the series of attacks in London then, there was a publication that came out. It was written by a cleric and Islamic cleric. I think it was based at the University of Oxford. I believe his name is Sheikh Afifi Alakiti. He wrote sort of a fatwa publication condemning the assailants and trying to deconstruct the ideological narrative they use to sort of substantiate or to defend the attack. Now, engaging local community actors, especially the religious institutions or organizations is very key in trying to deconstruct the kind of narratives or ideological narratives these groups use. So beyond the use of force, even in talking about dialogue, we must engage the right kind of actors who are familiar with the essential doctrinal elements that are required to deconstruct the ideas of these groups. I talked about the shared vision among political actors. It's very key. There is absolutely no way we can explore dialogue if we do not have a common vision in terms of the approach. I mentioned about the tailored approach to the context. It's not only about applying a one-size-fits-all, there must be a very careful reflection on the specific reality and the situation that we're dealing with. When we talk about dialogue again and I'll end here, it's also not about a classic engagement between the state or terror groups or unterror groups. It's also about between communities and justice actors. We've done research in Uganda and Kenya, the ISS, and we've seen how the data has told us about how some population groups in parts of the country have suffered abuses. So the justice sector is very key and I think it's important to pay attention to that. Communities and security agencies, there must be dialogue on that level as well. It's also very key. We've seen instances of human rights violations. All these are part of the outlines of dialogue. Thank you. Before turning now to the audience, I have a last question for you, Dr. O'Donnelly. What policy implications stem from incorporating gender into CVE? Because you mentioned gender and rightly so. And so where do you see this going? Yeah, I mean, first thing which I've mentioned before is rethinking disengagement programs from extremist groups and making sure right now they're very focused on men, man perpetrating violence in extremist groups, how we can disengage them and de-radicalize them. But there are very few programs for women and I think this goes back to the idea that we have trouble holding that women can be victims of extremism. I study forced marriage in particular by rebel groups, so we know women can be forcibly married into rebel groups. Yet at the same time, because women are not a monolithic category, we know that women can also play active roles in these groups. So I think we really need to rethink what disengagement programs look like and how they can be better support women. Somewhat related is the idea that many women are leaving armed groups with children. So how are we thinking about women and children and the community level reintegration? So in my research on al-Shabaab and Qismayo, there was a lot of discussion around stigma that children who were leaving with their moms from al-Shabaab were not accepted into communities. And they didn't have a lot of the kinship networks that are really important in Somali society. So I think that's just one example, but that focus on kind of the generational impact really concerns me. Finally, I think we need to think more creatively, as I mentioned before, about policies. So again, going back to the al-Shabaab case in Qismayo, al-Shabaab governed Qismayo for five years, and they acted really like a totalitarian government. So in thinking about and talking to women there, how do you resist a group like that? There was a lot of thought of, we can't resist this, they're the government. So that made me think a lot about some of the work around strategic non-violence. So Maria Steffen and Erica Chenele's work and how that could be leveraged to think about resistance and mobilizing women's groups, mobilizing civil society to creatively, collectively resist some of these actors. Thank you. I will now turn to the audience. I've been told by my colleagues that they are questions from the audience. And I will take the first question. So thank you again, and if you are right, language not based on our assumption is important when working with local communities. Can you provide an example of how you overcame this issue? I'm happy to start. I actually have an example of how I did badly overcoming this issue and why now I'm rethinking this. So I worked in the informal settlements in Nairobi and I was doing research trying to understand al-Shabaab recruitment. And I mean, I think I had an awareness to kind of start the discussion with what are the security threats. But I was really surprised when the security threats weren't about al-Shabaab. And I think I had trouble adapting to that within my research to understand a lot of the security threats were from feelings of being attacked by counterterrorism forces in Kenya. There was a lot of fear within communities around that. And so I think that actually was the lesson to me of how you need to be more flexible. And when you ask what these security threats are, you have to be prepared to hear an answer you're not expecting. Do you have something to add? Yes, I'll add a bit to that and I'll make reference to what I actually mentioned at the beginning in terms of the lessons from history. I think when we think about PCV or city, there is something about history and the lessons that emerge from it that inform our understanding of the context. And when we look at the Lake Chad Basin or even East Africa, I mentioned earlier about the ethnic groups there. So in the Lake Chad Basin, you have the Kanuri ethnic group. And from this ethnic group, you've had quite a number of individuals who have been lured into Boko Haram to join Boko Haram over the years. Now, without an understanding of the historical trajectory of the people there, you would not be able to challenge this whole framing around, for instance, foreign terrorist fighters. I talked about this earlier. So challenging that notion and trying to see how it fits in the African context where you mentioned that there is a very complex or complicated colonial history or past that defines the current borders or the way the state is constituted. The very idea of what we call the state itself is challenged when you think about the historical trajectory of the current spaces we're looking at and the way these groups operate. In the Lake Chad Basin, much of that pattern in the northeast of Nigeria, parts of Niger Chad actually traced back to what was known as the Canembro new empire hundreds of years ago. And without an understanding of how that has evolved into what we're witnessing today and how even Boko Haram actually exploits history and uses that language of history, you will not be able to address the problem or even conceptualize it properly. So it looks like Boko Haram, they make reference to even what is known as the Soko to Caliphate, for instance, that language of even the caliphate itself and making reference to the historical past, you know, what existed in present day Nigeria, for instance, they make reference to it and they use it in their narratives. And without an understanding of that, I think for me personally, having the need to dig deeper and understand that has helped me to better frame the way my approach in this whole dilemma and how I even understand the realities of the ethno-religious makeup of the region. There's another question. Please, if you can, maybe people just to put their names and affiliation that will also be helpful as they ask their questions. So in this challenge this time, we've traveled restrictions in the Sahel due to insecurity and COVID-19. What are the research innovations in place to ensure the local realities are still being documented? Dr. Konni. Thank you. I really like this question because it's something I think about a lot as someone trying to research Somalia where access to outsiders is often very limited outside Mogadishu. I think a lot about how we can be more innovative in our research and I think an approach I take in my research is collaboration and partnerships. So I work really closely with academics and Nairobi, and then I work closely with different women's groups in Somalia. And so I think having built these networks kind of before COVID-19 is helpful because we have relationships now where I'm constantly asking them what's happening on the ground, how are you, what are you writing about, what are you thinking about, and thinking about how I can amplify their voices is really important. So I think my biggest takeaway in terms of research innovation is that we shouldn't be doing research alone. And of course, we have to think about how to make these partnerships equitable. But I think building relationships and partnerships with people on the ground asking these questions and then taking advantage of, you know, as we know in Nairobi and Somalia, they have excellent internet capabilities most of the time. So using the resources we have and we're using to conduct this meeting and engaging with local partners and relying on their local knowledge. It's a different model. So you're not out there speaking to a wide swath of the population, but these researchers are. And so it's a really great opportunity to learn from them, collaborate and tap into local expertise. And it's also an important fact that the role of relationships and social capital and the experience, local experiences. I mean, this is, I will say, unfortunately, COVID also gives us an opportunity to appreciate the value that local researchers, local partners will bring, right? Because we can't be there. So we have to rely on them. So this situation really shift power dynamics and power arrangements the way we used to look at it. Like if I don't fly, the research will not move. Now we know we can make progress in this research because we have reliable partners. I only hope that this sense of humility and gratitude will continue and we'll shift the film moving forward. Dr Akinu, do you have something to add with that? Any tricks you have used? Yeah, I mean, absolutely. I agree with what you've said, what Dr Donnelly mentioned about emphasizing partnerships because it's really about partnerships. It's not about a case where because we think research as, you know, trained with all the language and the knowledge and platforms simply go into communities, you know, in the pre-COVID period.  Now it's also about actually involving the local stakeholders and those in the communities in the process of not just data collection but even co-authoring with them. So the second point, that co-authoring is something which in the last one year I can give an example where we co-authored a paper, the ISS with actually two partners, partner institutions in Kenya and Uganda. It was a theme on resilience, on community engagement and we actually co-authored with them.  In the Lake Chad Basin, for instance, again, in terms of partnerships, we have a network of civil society organizations across four countries, Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Niger. And it's a very wide network of CSOs that we constantly nurture a relationship with and a partnership with, you know, and I've personally been involved in, you know, a study again last year when COVID started where we actually were able to work with, you know, some of these CSOs on issues of resilience again. You know, I'm very big on resilience because I think it's something which is often overlooked when we emphasize the narratives of violence a lot. So partnerships during this period has been highlighted and I'm hoping that even as we move beyond hopefully the COVID period, we actually hold on to this lesson and actually take it even a step further. And what would that be the step further? I mean, it's simply continuing to engage with them, continuing to engage with them and also providing a platform for them. In some of these communities, it's quite a challenge for them to engage online. So we may need to think of ways we can still carry them along, even beyond, you know, the kind of platform we're using right now to have this seminar. I imagine most of the communities we're speaking about may not even be able to register and join. They may not have the resources, they may not have even the time because they are dealing with existential issues, you know, comparatively.  You know, even through them, their networks is also very key. If I may add, we have in the region in the Lake Chad Basin region, we have what is, I mean, the Lake Chad Basin Commission itself, which is a platform connecting the four member states affected by the Boko Haram crisis. So with our strategic engagement with the Lake Chad Basin Commission, we can also think about how we can leverage their own outreach or their own connections in reaching out to communities and also using that to, you know, further engage communities. I will pick on something, a team you mentioned resilience and then this question is from some colleagues of mine from Kenya. And the question is how have women been able to increase resiliency of their communities to VE. So, Dr. Donnelly, do you have evidence or experience the role of women increasing resiliency and then the same question will go to Dr. Aquino as well. Yeah, so I, as I mentioned, I learn a lot from a local researcher in Kenya and shoot her name is Rahima Zaid and she works for the integrative initiative for community empowerment. And what I see that she's been doing in Kenya is a lot of dialogue and a lot of context analysis. So I think coming in with an understanding of what would resiliency look like in this community and her. She has been producing research around specific counties in Kenya trying to understand what are their needs, and even asking in what way do women want to be involved in PVE and CVE. Should they be involved in these ways? What's the kind of meeting them where they're at. So I think, and then she's been amplifying these messages by training a lot of local activists. I think that's a way to build resiliency, starting these conversations, listening to voices on the ground and kind of bringing community organizers early into the conversation and then letting them amplify voices. So I think having really key women activists and stakeholders who are then training, sharing, creating these conversations is a really positive first step in building resilience. Yes, I actually have an example from 2014, 2015. There was a study which we did in the northwest of Nigeria in a place called Sokoto State and there's a very deep history to that place. It's a place that actually much of northern Nigeria, parts of Niger, a part of Burkina Faso, back in the 19th century was actually referred to as the Sokoto Caliphate. Now, why am I making references to this? The terror groups we're talking about, Bukohara, they make reference to some of these historical narratives in trying to reinforce their own appeal to these groups. They challenge the states, they talk about replacing the states with a caliphate from the past. Now, within the community where this study was conducted, one of the lessons learned was about how even women groups within those communities were able to contribute to reinforcing resilience of women and girls on an ideological level. And how they did this was that we had, for instance, groups like the Muslim Sisters Organization, we had the Federation of Muslim Women's Organization of Nigeria, for instance, and they brought or they invoked narratives from history. They made reference to historical figures or women from the past who played very powerful roles. And in that way, we're able to sort of demonstrate to the present generation about how they do not need to join some of these present day, you know, this violent extremist groups. So Bukohara is here coming with its own ideology, talking about its own jihad. But then we have all these women organizations in this part of the country actually reinforcing resilience of women and girls on an ideological level and saying that the jihad of Bukohara is actually counterfeit. And at the 19th century caliphates which they come from, they evolved from, actually had its own jihad actually. It's a whole, it's a very deep history. And I think, for me, it struck me how history can play a role in actually, you know, reinforcing resilience. And if I can add this example, beyond Africa, when you look at the attacks that happened in France in Paris in 2015, there was the Charlie Hebdo attack early that year and then the Bataclan in late 2015. Each time the attacks happened, you had the people of Paris mobilizing themselves around the historical monuments, the historical monuments. They didn't go to the Eiffel Tower, which normally would have large crowds, but they went to a historical monument, which is the Place de la République. And that is where there was a lot of speech and talk about speaking against violent extremism and so on. So there's something about history and the role which not only men but women can play when we explore this on a very deep level and in terms of countering the ideology of these groups. It's interesting that we mentioned a lot of history. I think of Gryu in the Sahel, right, the tradition of Gryu, where people are, these are the institutional memory in the countries and how we can use those Gryu, those stories, right, to build up that resilience. And so I will ask a different question. This is not from the audience, but just from what I'm hearing, even in the literature, I don't think we are asking, we are discounting the added value of military or security intervention, right? So we are just saying we need to give more priority to community-led responses, right? But in the situation like in Mozambique, Cabo del Gal, for example, where you have active, you have kinetic activities happening, where you have attacks, and at the same time there is a need to engage the community. How do you marry or how can security sector actors, particularly the military, work with civilians in this type of environment? Do you have scenarios? Because I don't think it's an either-or, right? Both can work, but how? Do you have any suggestions? Sure. I'll start it off. I think one role I see for military intervention or military engagement is security sector reform and training local security forces. And I see a lot of potential of what the UN is doing with different missions. I think that IPI were thinking a lot about engaging women, police, and military, and how that can be a part of security sector reform and make engagements more effective. So I think we have to think about it in a real partnership and in the capacity-building way. So really figuring out what the security forces on the ground need and how external international actors can step in and support them. And I think that goes to not only just security training, but also training around gender, around human rights, also engaging with the justice mechanism, which we've talked a bit about. So I think to me that's the most effective way of international partners, especially on the military side, engaging with local communities. So just, yes, Dr. Kinola, if you can go in there, I have more questions for you. Yes, very quickly. So we have time for other questions. I mean, I absolutely agree with you. It's not about discarding the utility of armed force or the use of force. No, it's about complimenting it and reflecting on aspects where we can actually have a comprehensive approach. And when you mention how do we go about this, there must be a framework. There must be an institutional framework. And a very good example is what we have in the Lake Chad Basin Commission. You know, there is the what is called the regional strategy for stabilization of the Bukuharam affected areas in the Lake Chad Basin. And that has been in existence for a few years now. That regional strategy, which is the framework I'm referring to as an example of something that not just focuses on the use of force. It actually has nine intervention pillars, some of which involve, for instance, the mutual political cooperation between countries or among countries in the region. You know, there is a part of the one of the pillars that looks at the inclusion of women, something we've talked about already, you know, you know, quite at length, you know, there are nine pillars there. And they sort of tell us that even the affected states are also learning the lessons, the hard lessons that while we know that the use of force is insufficient, of course, we have other aspects we must look at. So I think it's about having that framework. And also in the case of Mozambique, learning the lessons from other regions that have gone through what hopefully we don't want them to go through the same thing, but then they must learn the lessons, especially in terms of the criminal justice aspect of this. Thanks. So we have talked about the impact of COVID. So there's one question here. How will you describe the role of climate change in exacerbating violence extremism? Dr. Donnelly, and maybe Dr. Akuna, if you have something to add. But Dr. Donnelly, take the lead on this one, please. Yeah, I mean, I think we know the ways in which climate change can destabilize societies. And so we can look at the effect of climate change on governance, on resources, on livelihoods, and I think that's where it ties into violent extremism. So when climate change is affecting communities and they're becoming desperate, these violent extremist groups can come in with a solution, with a way for resources. So I think it's not necessarily a linear path, but we need to look at the effect of climate change, how it's hurting communities, how violent extremist groups are then seizing upon the hurt within communities so that people are then more inclined to support these groups and join these groups. Dr. Akuna, if you have something to add or that was I have a question for you, Dr. Akuna. No, no, that's fine. I mean, I think Dr. Donnelly has actually echoed my thoughts. It's really about how changing the climate, you know, the trends are actually impacting on livelihoods in communities and how that can create new areas of vulnerability and how violent extremist groups can exploit that. So it's really about that and I think she's captured it quite well. So a question for you, Dr. Akuna. In relation to community-based groups, in thinking about the relationship between state communities and local actors, can you talk a little bit about the function of legitimacy and how external actors can identify the right actors to engage in effort to reduce violence? It's a complex question. Let me give you a shot. Now, when we speak about the involvement of external actors, I think we must speak about it from a place where we acknowledge what is within and the agency of communities as well as even the countries, you know, the leadership of those countries affected by the crisis and what they can do first. And, you know, just recently when we had the inauguration of, you know, the U.S. president, I mean, you know, there was a lot of talk about, okay, perhaps there might be a change in terms of the approach compared to the previous administration, maybe there will be more resources invested in Africa, you know, aid and assistance and so on. But I'm more about what can the countries themselves within Africa do, and how can they approach this without constantly waiting for assistance from outside? And there is absolutely nothing wrong in having external actors on the continent. There are problematic areas, but then there is nothing wrong in having a mutual beneficial partnership. We've seen that in the case of Kenya where last year, in 2020, there was the launch of the Joint Task Force involving the U.S. and Kenya encountering terrorism, and we see a mutual beneficial partnership there. But then we shouldn't, Africa should not constantly wait for countries or entities from outside when it comes to actually taking charge of what can be addressed within. Now, just to add further to this, when we speak of legitimacy, I mentioned something earlier about, I mentioned something about impact, about experience, expectation, responsibility. Now, communities themselves understand the impact of the crisis. They know how to articulate the problem. So when we engage them, we're able to also provide a platform, as I mentioned earlier, and we're also able to consult them. And based on the consultation with communities, we're able to have a sense of what they expect and how to also involve them in the process of responding. And then we also have a responsibility. Legitimacy is also built on trust. There must be trust. If there isn't any trust between communities and even the state's leadership has been affected, then there's no platform to even build on any partnership. So trust is very key. And I think external actors involve, while that is good, while it's good for sharing lessons, it's important that the trust and the issues of perception and how all this play out with power dynamics is very key that we have this in mind when we approach communities. Can I add something to that? Of course. I just want to make sure when we think about a phrasing like right actors, we just have to make sure we're not only talking about people, people and usually men who are perpetrating violence. So we have to make sure, regardless of what the negotiating party says, and this is a really important step within the women, peace and security community, we have to make sure women are part of these negotiations. And maybe that is a little externally imposed and a little forceful, but I think we just can't tolerate negotiations that don't include women when the international community thinks the right actors are the people and men usually perpetrating violence. So just a word of caution is that we have to make sure people in these discussions reflect the diversity in society and I'm flagging women, but I think we can think more broadly about diversity. But I will stay on women. There is a question here, particularly on women. Can you share some tactics that have been successful in PCV, peace building work that could be used when designing these engagement programs focusing on women? Yeah, I think the disengagement programs is a part of peace. I'm really stumped because I think we don't have great models. I think the model right now is kind of take the higher ups men within the organization, they go through the criminal justice system, and then kind of the lower level of the factors can go through more of a rehabilitation approach. I also think the framing around de-radicalization assumes that everybody is radicalized when, as we saw in Somalia and particularly in Kismayah, there were plenty of people who weren't radicalized, they were just, you know, supporting because it was their livelihood. So I think that we need to think away from maybe just this criminal justice or just this rehabilitation approach and think more at the community level and what is the community level need to be rehabilitated and stop these cycles of violence. So I think better kind of categorization around women's involvement. I think maybe instead of thinking of kind of a level of perpetration of violence, we need to think of level of engagement with the group and those women are the ones who will probably need different levels of support than a woman working part-time with the group. So I think listening to women and being more careful about the categories and moving away from kind of a punitive approach and thinking more about how do we actually counter violent extremism when we think of it as a cycle. So looking at women, children, families, and how will that actually stop violent extremism versus just go through the system, be de-radicalized, go through the system. So taking a step back more broadly at disengagement programs. I know we are almost out of time. This is fascinating conversation. But I have one last question before the concluding remarks from you both. But one last question for you, Dr. Akinola. Please tell us how do you negotiate with state actors when there is a lack of empathy around attacks? How do you increase empathy? So violence is not the primary option even after peace talks start. So this notion of empathy and negotiation, how do you square that? No, I think there is a level of subjectivity involved here. I like to look at it this way. Before we speak of negotiation, the countries affected themselves. They must get their house together. So before we get to the point where we begin to, I mean, if I get the question right, I'm not sure. But before we get to the point where we actually begin to engage in this violent extremist groups, the state actors and the various entities within the state need to have a shared vision. And I mentioned this earlier. It's absolutely key that there is a common understanding of the problem. And so far we haven't quite seen this in some cases. And I gave the example of Somalia where the center of the government actually clashed with those in the federal member states. So that should be happening. And there must be a political component of this needs to be really addressed. So without a shared understanding, then we won't even get to the point where we begin to talk about negotiation. So I'm not sure if that really speaks to the question I was asked. But so because you insisted a lot on how do we negotiate with these groups, right? And so how do you do that? What are the prerequisites? What needs to happen? It seems that there is a shared vision, but who creates it, right? So the question I guess is challenging the assumption. So why would you cognize the importance of negotiation? But how do you negotiate with the groups? There is no one size fits all approach. There isn't one single approach. The context needs to be taken into consideration very specifically. That's the first thing we must acknowledge. And then secondly, we must look at this in terms of stages, in terms of phases. We cannot see it as a single event or a one off event. It wouldn't happen that way. So it has to be in terms of phases. There must be that approach where we gradually engage actors within that state actors themselves, having that common understanding that I mentioned earlier before we get to the next stage of even reaching out to terror groups. Now we've had instances where key members of these groups, even at the high level, have actually defected. So how does the state even take advantage of that, for instance? We've seen that happen in Somalia a few years ago. And we've seen how that was handled by the states and how that was actually an opportunity that was lost. So in instances where we have the high level defections, how does the state handle that? And that is not for the terror groups to handle this. For the state itself, the responsibility to really have an approach that is really credible and shared understanding is very key. And then learning lessons from other countries. I made reference to Colombia, for instance. The context might be different, but then there are lessons that can be learned. And then I think finally there is also something about the convening power of maybe not just the UN, but also the convening power of external actors, for instance. I mean, there's a question about what can the US do and so on. So the convening power of some of these countries and how we can invest in conversations, even the conversation we're having here today, in this whole idea of dialogue and seeing what other ideas can be inspired. Because I do not believe I have all the answers. But I think a starting point is to begin to place this center stage and actually acknowledge that we cannot address this problem with bombs and bullets. So we have 30 seconds before your own concluding remarks, but I want to squeeze another question. Last one, because we talk about prevention and Dr. Akinola, you mentioned early warning and that's something dear to my heart. So how do we build, how early warning system look like for CVE or PVE? How do we build those early warning system and make them sustainable? So Dr. Akinola and then Dr. Donnelly, if you want to squeeze in the role of women, that will be great. 30 seconds. This is very, I mean, I'm not an expert when it comes to early warning, but one thing I would say when we speak of sustainability, we must mention monitoring and evaluation. So when we have an early warning system, how do you sustain it? When you use it, how do you measure success, for instance? How do you even have established a threshold for what is successful? So having an M and E system as well can help with sustainability. And then based on that, we apply the lessons that emerge from one context and see how that can be adapted to others based on the realities. That's my 30 seconds. Dr. Donnelly, 50 seconds. Yeah, I just want to, I want to add to that. I mean, in terms of early warning, we know what the drivers of extremism are, right? We know many of them. And so I think we can't just wait until groups are perpetrating violence. We have to wait until we see these governance gaps, these communities that are suffering and becoming vulnerable to extremism as part of early warning. So not just waiting for violence, but really paying attention to what is happening on the ground that might drive an audience for violent extremism. Thank you so much. Any final thoughts, Dr. Akinola, Dr. Donnelly, to wrap up this conversation? Sure. I mean, I think we've exhausted everything. I will simply say we must learn lessons. We cannot continue in this cycle. We cannot continue investing and, you know, in our approach and expect to see the same, you know, a different result. We must think in a multidisciplinary way as well and not limit, you know, working silos. They must be stronger or, you know, must, you know, strengthen coordination and thinking around these issues. So less learning lessons is very key for us here. Yeah, I think similarly, this is a time when we're looking back on the past year, the global pandemic, where we need to start thinking creatively. And we need to move out of these cycles that haven't been working. And so I see gender and relying on women's expertise, seeing them as political actors. That is something that we're doing because it's right, which of course, you know, it is in line with our human rights commitments. But because it helps security interventions, it will make us more effective. So I think now is the time to take a step back and figure out, like Akina Lo was saying, Dr. Akina Lo was saying, what lessons have we learned? How can we think creatively and be more effective? And how can we learn and listen from communities in these environments? Fascinating conversation. Thank you so much for your words of wisdom and for sharing your experience with us. And with more than 600 people watching this now, really, thank you very much. On behalf of the ISS and the Resolve Network and the Africa Center at USIP, we are very grateful, unfortunately. Now I will pass it over to my colleague and friend, Betany Magan for concluding remarks. Thank you all so much to Dr. Sani Alojo and Donnelly for this engaging discussion and for the thought-provoking insights you shared. Thanks also to our audience for the excellent questions. I truly wish we had more time to cover them all. As Dr. Sani noted, I'm Betany Magan, Program Officer for the Resolve Network and lead for our Africa portfolio since 2018. It's clear from our discussion that external actors have just as much to learn from our friends and partners in Africa as we have to contribute to supporting their efforts to improve governance, reinforce the social contract between citizens and the state, and address the ongoing challenges of violent extremism and a volatile ecosystem of state and non-state armed actors. A couple of things stood out to me, though I'd be loath to try and synthesize such a rich conversation. First, the language and framings that we use matter. As they say, if the only tool you have is hammer, everything becomes a nail. And so the persons and entities we support have their own stake in conflict, both in its perpetration and solutions, and resourcing them can have unforeseen consequences on the ground, and our language is part of that resourcing. At the same time, vast networks of actors are engaged in work with incredible potential to contribute to peace and security, but association with PCV programming or other frameworks can put these individuals and organizations at risk. In short, the securitization of peace risks undermining the entire endeavor. External actors can be important in sharing lessons, but perceptions of trust and power must be kept in mind. We know that communities understand the impacts of crises and they know how to articulate the nature of their challenges. Legitimacy is built on trust, and if there isn't trust between communities, the state and us, then there's no platform upon which to build effective coordination and engagement. Local ownership needs to be paired with impactful partnerships. One such partnership is between local actors and researchers. We must deepen our engagement and create opportunities and platforms to walk together in the development of information and analysis. Resolve has engaged local researchers for years across our efforts, but it's something that needs deeper and ongoing investment. It takes time, creativity, and affirmative actions to increase access to produce rich, locally informed research. I'll end with this. Peace is not just about levels of violence. The pandemic has made clear that the intersections of health, economics, and other issues are integral to governance and security. Women are experts in this space. Their caregiving roles make them adept at stepping in to fill governance gaps. They need to be at the decision-making table. It deserves saying over and over and over again. Support women, support mothers, support elder women, support younger women, support women of color. So thank you again to the ISS and to all of our Resolve Network partners who've made this event possible. We hope that you enjoyed part four of the 2020 Resolve Global Forum series. We'll be reaching out to you following this via email on Twitter for a quick follow-up survey, and we hope that you'll let us know how we did. We really do appreciate you taking the time to join us today and hope that you'll share your feedback with us. So with that, please stay in touch on our website at www.resolvenet.org and on our Twitter at atresolvenet, where you can find all of our publications, our upcoming activities, and other events in the forum series. So thank you, everyone. Stay safe, stay well, and have a great day. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you very much, and see you. Bye. Bye. Bye.