although most of his time was spent prior to this in the intelligence agencies as well as in the US military. Let me just say that I think Sid's academic work is also worth praising. I mean people always talk about policy but his academic work is quite good. I'm actually reading a forthcoming book about Kim Il-sung where his book on Kim Il-sung has been cited quite often. I noticed it was cited by this author much more than my book was cited but I'm not counting citations or anything. And then finally I would like to say that this is this is one of our Korea Platform series in the Korea Chair and we are grateful to Samsung Electronics America for their support of the Korea Platform at the Korea Chair. So Sid I will give the floor to you. You may use the podium to make some remarks. Well thank you again for joining us. Well thank you Victor for that kind introduction. You know it's an honor to be speaking here today on this particular issue of unification. I know it's an issue that for our Republic of Korea friends here you've grown up your whole lives thinking about virtually and for those who are not Korean who come here via Korean studies, US government work, academic work, journalism from the very time you encounter the Korea issue unification of the Korea Peninsula is something we've all given thought through. Personally having followed this and studied it for a few decades myself I'm really glad to see that the discussion is moving beyond the abstract and the theoretical various formulae for unification that when you look back on them had very little to do with the geopolitical or security realities at the time. Instead we're in the realm of the concrete the real. Moving to concrete conceptualization and planning for reality we all know is coming. It's also encouraging to see the shift in the discussion of the economic dimensions of unification which I know you just covered. The idea that unification need not be feared simply because of some unverifiable and alarmist forecast of potential cost is certainly not a new one but in this regard the bold vision and leadership of President Park in declaring that unification is a bonanza or windfall or a tabock to keep it easy in the Korean. And that it might bring a bonanza to Korea in the region is certainly an overdue a long overdue and encouraging proclamation and a reframing of the unification discussion. Finally one other encouraging development related to this issue is that there are few people out there today that question the commitment of the United States to unified Korean Peninsula. There may have been a time when many Koreans thought that the U.S. may have thought saw some advantage in a divided Korea Peninsula but that's certainly not the case any longer. Our Korean friends realize that unification is indeed a central tenet of our overall Korea policy and that's what I'd like to speak to today by providing a holistic if brief overview of our broader Korea Peninsula and regional policy goals. I think we can see how the interaction of our various lines of effort on our current approach to the North Korea issue all come together and how all this by extension therefore ties to the issue of reunification. So let me start with a broad but brief regional context in his August 13th East West Center speech on the United States vision for Asia Pacific agreement and Hawaii. Secretary Kerry described how America's security and prosperity are closely and increasingly linked to the Asia Pacific. An Asia marked by democratic governance, free markets, a rules-based security order and a respect for human rights is in everybody's interest. First and foremost for those who make the Asia Pacific their home and certainly to the United States which has been and always will be a Pacific nation. It's natural therefore that the United States seeks a stable and economically vibrant Asia and is actively involved throughout the region toward that end. And of course it should come as no surprise then that these broader goals are the very foundation for our Korea policy as well. You know as we watch these goals materialized in the Republic of Korea a vibrant free market democracy we never lost sight we never lost sight of the fact that our ultimate goal is of a unified Korea where all 70 million or so Koreans can enjoy democracy, free markets a respect for human rights and dignity. Our efforts in this regard were never designed to stop at the 38th parallel and nor are they today. In the broadest sense we see a unified Korea with these goals democracy, free market economy, prosperity a respect for human rights and dignity as the natural end state toward which the Korean people, we and in fact history itself are heading. That's why the President in comments alongside President Park in April of this year stated that the United States, and this is a quote, the United States supports the Korean people's desire for unification and I share President Park's vision of a unified Korea that's free from the fear of war, free from nuclear weapons and where people throughout the peninsula enjoy the political and economic freedoms that exist here speaking from Seoul in the South. As President Park's own Dresden speech made clear there are planned strategies and actions that we must devise and implement today that lay the foundation for and create the conditions conducive to a peaceful path toward those ends. Actions we take today that lead toward a democratic Korean Peninsula where everybody can enjoy political freedom and have a voice in their future. Actions we can take today that lead to a Korea Peninsula with a vibrant economy where the prosperity enjoyed by people throughout the peninsula contributes to regional and global economic growth and prosperity. Actions we can take today that contribute to a peaceful Korea unification free from weapons of mass destruction, a peaceful Korea Peninsula free from weapons of mass destruction benefiting regional and global security as well. And then finally actions we can take today that can lead toward a Korea free of gulags, free of repression and free of the other cruelties that the UN Commission of Inquiry so well documented. Is this ambitious? Yes. Is it too much to handle particularly given the importance of denuclearization and stability? I don't think so. Secretary Kerry in his speech in Hawaii noted that our efforts to denuclearize North Korea and deter and defend against the nuclear missile threat are important and he also emphasized our commitment to speak out against the horrific human rights situation in the North. In doing so the secretary made clear that denuclearization and improved human rights are not mutually exclusive contradictory policy objectives. As the leadership of North Korea begins to make the right strategic choices that can bring the peace and prosperity its people deserve we will see progress on denuclearization. We will see progress on human rights. We will see economic growth and a better standard of living for the North Korea people. The same type of peace and prosperity that we see marks the rest of the region. Again, too difficult impossible contrary to the facts on the ground, contrary to the lessons of the last 70 years almost. No I don't think so at all. I mean look at the example of Burma. The example of Burma stands proof of what can happen. A transformation that unfolded thanks to a broad strategic decision by its leadership that then translated into a transformation of Burma's relations with the outside world. A transformation that unfolded with the international community with the United States in the lead with the international community ready to encourage and enable the changes on the ground that we've seen there. Transformation driven by a pragmatic and clear-eyed recognition that democratic and free market societies flourish while authoritarian repressive regimes wither. A transformation that does remain a work in progress, a work in process, but that shows the potential for a nation when its leadership makes the right decisions to move down a fundamentally different path that may have seen beforehand unimaginable, impossible, too hard, too difficult. And as the United States has demonstrated by the speed and agility with which it responded diplomatically to these developments in Burma, the same option is available to the leadership of the DPRK. But until that day comes, how do we today move to that future we've identified as our goal? How do we translate this aspirational into practical policy objectives and goals? This is a good segue into a brief discussion of our current North Korea policy. North Korea, the United States remains committed to a peaceful denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula through authentic and credible negotiations. Let me emphasize, again, we want to resolve denuclearization via negotiations. We're not ideologically opposed to dialogue with North Korea, nor have we placed insurmountable obstacles to negotiations in our insisting that North Korea simply demonstrate a willingness to live up to its international obligations and abide by international norms of behavior. The bar has not been set too high by insisting that denuclearization talks be about denuclearization and that they would progress along the lines of the September 19, 2005 joint statement of the Six-Party talks. Now, of course, talks are not an end to themselves, they are a means to an end. Talks must lead to a stated purpose, in this case denuclearization, in order to be authentic. Talks must demonstrate a possibility for concrete actions, for concrete progress to be credible. And even as we pursue a path to authentic and credible talks leading to complete verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, our broader policy goes beyond talks, goes beyond just dialogue and integrates three major lines of effort, diplomacy, pressure and deterrence which I would like to speak to today because together these three lines of effort, diplomacy, pressure and deterrence, seek to roll back the North Korea nuclear program while countering, deterring and defending against the threat. Let me start with the latter, deterrence. I see some representatives of the Republic of Korea military here active, duty and retired who have spent their careers working in the defense of Republic of Korea. It's good to see you here. General Chung, General Shim.  Our U.S. and ROK forces go together on a daily basis and our counter provocation planning ensures that Pyongyang clearly knows that as it contemplates its next set of provocations or its next actions it faces a rock solid U.S. ROK alliance.  Firm yet calm responses coupled with our seamless and transparent U.S. ROK cooperation remain the foundation of our success in denying North Korea the benefits of its provocative behavior in attempts at coercive diplomacy. Deterrence is working. Security is insured. Unpressure is important to know. Our sanctions are not designed to hurt the North Korean people. They are designed instead for a number of purposes that contribute to peace and stability on the peninsula. Our sanctions are a key element of our efforts to constrain the growth of the North's WMD program to curtail its proliferation activities worldwide and by impeding the exports and repatriation of profits from illicit sales abroad, we're able to deny North Korea the resources. It needs to sustain and advance its nuclear and missile programs by inflicting an economic and diplomatic diplomatic cost for behavior that clearly runs counter to international norms and DPRK's own international obligations. We also sharpen the DPRK's choices and lead the leadership in Pyongyang to make better choices that will benefit its country and its people. We also make clear that Pyongyang's aspirations for improving its economy and improving the livelihood of its people are fundamentally inconsistent with this pursuit of nuclear weapons. Thereby moving forward, we will continue to seek robust implementation of UN Security Council resolutions and U.S. sanctions on North Korea. If the DPRK makes the right choice, returns to the negotiating table and embarks on a credible path of a reversible denuclearization and begins to come into compliance with its international obligations and commitments, the appropriateness of these sanctions would of course be reviewed. But with our ultimate goal being denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula through peaceful means, we continue to believe that a dual-track approach, dialogue as possible, pressure as necessary, is the best path to authentic, incredible negotiations. Which brings us to the role of diplomacy and the question that I'm sure many of you have, how do we get DPRK, how do we get North Korea back on the denuclearization path? First, let me say that we believe the Six-Party Talks framework has provided and continues to provide a useful platform for diplomacy. It has over the past several years helped us bring a consensus to the need for North Korea to return to a credible path of denuclearization and will continue to use this framework moving forward. We've built a strong international consensus on the need for North Korea to denuclearize. We strengthened cooperation with the other four parties within that framework and most importantly we've maintained five-party commitment and consensus on the September 19, 2005 joint statement as the bedrock framework for a path toward denuclearization that in return would bring a range of diplomatic economic and security benefits to the DPRK. With the September 19 statement there is remarkable clarity to the expectations of the DPRK in terms of denuclearization and the potential benefits to Pyongyang should it choose this path. And of course the United States for the past five years has demonstrated a willingness to engage North Korea. We did so with Ambassador Bosworth's trip to Pyongyang in December 2009 after the events earlier that year of a table don't launch in a nuclear test. With the process that began in 2011 after the Cheonanam and the Yongpyeong Shelling with the process that led to the February 29, 2012 understanding which was shortly thereafter walked away from by the North and of course with our contacts through the New York Channel. Our policy is not one of not talking for the sake of not talking if you can handle the triple negative. We have been and will continue to be willing to engage Pyongyang. Engage Pyongyang to probe its intentions to push and urge it to make the right decision by presenting to the leadership an alternative path and to prove to prove our sincere commitment to improve U.S. DPRK relations once North Korea begins to move down the path of denuclearization but clearly the ball is in Pyongyang's court. So of course one can see how this three-pillar approach deterrence pressure diplomacy also contributes to creating the types of conditions favorable to the future we all envision that we're all talking about here today a unified Korea peninsula that's free of war free of nuclear weapons and just plain free. We engage in diplomacy to seek a breakthrough on denuclearization and to ensure that the international community speaks with one voice and that Pyongyang hears one voice telling Pyongyang that the peace security and prosperity it seeks remain possible only once the leadership makes the decision to move down the path of denuclearization we can use pressure as needed to constrain those aspects of North Korea behavior that are destabilizing and detrimental to our goal of laying the groundwork for peace prosperity and security that enables unification down the road and then finally until we get to that day we will seek to ensure a safe Korean peninsula through deterrence looking for the day when the threat posed on the peninsula no longer exist. We will speak out on the human rights issue as we look toward the day when Koreans throughout the peninsula enjoy the same political and economic freedoms now enjoyed in the Republic of Korea to the day when human rights are guaranteed to the day when political prison camps are emptied and we stand ready as president Park also has made quite clear we stand ready to engage with a denuclearizing North Korea to help its leadership move the country down a different path in which ultimately a transformed DPRK can begin to join in and enjoy the dynamic prosperity that marks the rest of the region the conversations you're having here today uh... look forward to a process we all hope a unification process we all hope will unfold in the not too distant future the mere fact that we are here today reflects our shared understanding and by our I mean including that of U.S. official policy our shared understanding that planning for this day as you're doing here today is a task that we can not put off we simply cannot afford to wait thank you well thank you Sid for uh... very helpful the statement of where our policy is and what U.S. aspirations are uh... for the peninsula uh... Dr. Sile has time for a couple of questions before he has to go back to work in his new office uh... so uh... we'll open the floor to a couple of questions and then please identify yourself and be brief and ask a question yes sir hello uh... my name is Mitch Michiniowski and I'm a student at the Elliott School you know we we talk that the leadership uh... in Pyongyang is irrational and that it does things that are counter to its interests but uh... what I think we could all agree on is that Pyongyang works to protect itself in the nineteen nineties uh... the country of Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons for a security agreement with uh... Russia and the United States uh... to protect it in the event of an attack uh... since then one of them has attacked Ukraine and the other one has failed to protect it uh... given that do you think that North Korea uh... in protecting its own interest has any intention or can see any credibility in an agreement from the U.S. or by that extent to six-party talks thank you very much well that's an excellent question but uh... I think it's one really that you would have to uh... ask the leadership of Pyongyang but let me say that you know the the framework of the six-party talks uh... approach to denuclearization and why uh... we have sought for the past several years uh... going back to previous administration that to pursue a multilateral approach is because the type of environment in which North Korea could move forward uh... confident of its uh... sovereignty is respected its interests are are reflected that uh... nobody teams up or bullies it uh... is found in the six-party talks process you have the major surrounding powers uh... uh... all the relevant parties there at the table it provides aside from the question of of security guarantees and what might be generated through the process the very process itself provides an indictment environment that i believe that we believe is conducive to north korea moving down the path of denuclearization without having fears for its security along the lines of uh... you know the example you provided uh... dr green bring a mic up to the front uh... so thank you for coming in congratulations on a new job and you're the right man for the job and um... and i don't know what you did wrong to get it but it's gonna be hard but i think all of us who follow this issue have great confidence uh... in the fact you're there in the presentation you gave uh... it was a good speech i agree with all of it the only thing i would say is victor charo michael green could have given that speech in two thousand six in the bush administration and since then things have happened uh... nuclear tests in the north korean uh... change the constitution and declaration that they are a nuclear weapons state uh... so how is the administration explaining that piece of it we want to get back on the path of unionization six-party talks of the right framework but what do we do about cheating and perforation that has occurred since the six-party talks for last uh... meeting uh... michael that's an excellent question i this is why i i put the synthesis on the three pillars because the they they do they're mutually complementary uh... they taken to concerns the realities of the difficulties we're facing uh... in terms of getting authentic incredible negotiations restarted at this time uh... take advantage of of the the international uh... consensus in terms of an unacceptable of the nuclear north korea and the and the threat posed by proliferation to build the type of uh... international cooperation necessary to strengthen the political account of proliferation regime to to limit it's not perfect it's not a you know uh... a loophole free system out there but to limit north korea's ability to benefit from its elicit activities abroad this proliferation activities reduce its benefits and also in terms of of taking the actions necessary in terms of our military posture our military training our missile defense capabilities so that we counter the threat to whatever degree it's developed so it's it's prophylactic in terms of of uh... trying to counter the threat that's emerged and so we will continue to try to seek a negotiated uh... settlement to this issue we will continue to apply the pressure necessary so that the leadership in pyeongyang realizes that it's true security and prosperity will only come when it walks away from not when it you know holds on to uh... these capabilities and in the meantime uh... take the actions necessary for the defense of the united states defense of the republic of korea the defense of japan and and defense of others uh... many many uh... who are threatened by these uh... capabilities as they develop uh... i'm gonna i'm gonna have to close the floor i'm sorry but let me just ask you one question before i do is the prerogative of the chair so as you know said that you know the news story today about north korea about these three americans that are detained there uh... can you tell us what the u.s. administration is doing to get these folks out uh... what the prospects of that are very likely at this moment well you know it goes without saying but it's it's worth repeating that you know the top priority of the united states government is a safety safety of our citizens abroad and it's uh... we have three cases there that have been ongoing for some time we have uh... worked to secure the release of of all three through uh... new york channel through the swedes and uh... you know i think you would appreciate uh... and i think everybody here would appreciate that the sensitive details of our negotiations uh... in our efforts uh... aren't really going to be played out through this room but uh... you know the uh... these three cases have have uh... posed a significant obstacle to an improvement of u.s. dpr k relations and we hope that uh... north korea would act uh... in a in a humane and uh... right way in helping us resolve these in the near future well um... i think on behalf of everyone here we want to thank you for joining us today allowing us to be part of your coming out party and uh... we know you have to get back to work so thanks very much really appreciate it ladies and gentlemen ready to break begin the third panel so we're shifting from the morning discussion which was a focus on the economic business and investment synergies in a unification scenario now to the uh... politics and the security uh... issues related to unification again looking at both the uh... the cautionary notes but as well as the optimistic ones when we think about uh... unification of the korean peninsula i guess for the three of you uh... this morning you know the theme that's been going through and it started with ambassador on stock was he kept referring to everybody on these panels as the so-called dream team using the basketball analogy and so because you dream of getting someone else could be could be but i do think we do i i do think we have a uh... dream team for this particular panel on the northeast asian perspective uh... uh... our first presenter is uh... doctor michael green who is the senior vice president for asia and japan chair at the c s i s he is also an associate professor of international relations in asian studies at the wall school of foreign service at georgetown and as many of you know he served uh... in the bush administration as senior director for asian affairs on the national security council uh... speaking after him will be doctor park in we uh... you are university you are women's university he's a professor in the division of international studies at hewha university uh... has an expertise that is quite broad ranging across u.s. foreign policy northeast asian issues uh... he's currently on the advisory committee for the ministry of unification and received his phd in international politics from northwestern uh... and then we have two discussions on the panel the first is uh... mister chris christopher johnson the senior advisor and holds the freeman chair in china studies here at c s i s chris is one of the foremost was uh... within the u.s. government one of the foremost experts on china policy with a long and distinguished career in the c i a and i know that i and mike and others were very happy that he came out of government to join us here at c s i s so welcome chris and then batting cleanup before continuing at the sports analogies is uh... uh... bruce clinger uh... who is at the heritage foundation is a senior research fellow there in the asian studies center and he too comes from a very long and distinguished career working in the intelligence agencies both at the central intelligence agency as well as defense intelligence agency and he was the c i a's deputy division chief for korea uh... so we will begin with our two presenters uh... will start with mike uh... please feel free to use the podium uh... thank you victor i'm at my mic so i don't need this but i have a cough so if you hear the sound of artillery that's my that's my microphone going off uh... this is an important topic uh... unification of the korean peninsula could end the suffering of twenty five million north koreans uh... an unpredictable threat not only to know what the stage of it to the entire world uh... and could produce ultimately a piece jack jackpot not just the economic uh... potential jackpot that was discussed this morning uh... but when powers collapse and in my view and perhaps i'm not consistent with the other speakers but in my view really notification happens only when north korea has collapsed and when clinton powers collapse you can't always predict the changes in the second world war the collapse of the axis power uh... in europe and in in asia uh... freed tens of millions of people uh... ended the war that left a vacuum in manchuria the korean peninsula southeast asia central and eastern europe uh... they created the new tensions and new suffering in the cold war and then the collapse of the soviet union at the end of the cold war brought freedom to tens of millions of people's in eastern and central europe but opened up historic wounds in places like ugo slavia and as we see today uh... ukraine so the question for uh... korean unification is whether the unification will open new patterns of cooperation in northeast asia based on twenty-first century norms reawaken uh... nineteenth and eighteenth century patterns of rivalry and competition that have been so tragic for northeast asia and particularly for the korean peninsula and on the whole i'm optimistic that the former scenario will be the one we see i think ultimately the mutual interest among the major powers in northeast asia will align but there are a lot of reasons uh... to worry that they might not and to avoid complacency and think now uh... not only about economic aspects of unification but what will be national security and geopolitical uh... requirements be uh... i'm going to go through the major powers briefly i think chris will certainly uh... add more detail on china and bruce will uh... uh... commentators uh... china i've spent uh... about twenty years uh... in and out of government talking to uh... japanese korean chinese russian counterparts about what unification would look like and in some cases you have official statements in china's case one e the foreign minister said in march the china supports denuclearization but china's red line is no war no instability uh... i think chris uh... should comment on this that while the uh... she jimping government has openly displayed its disdain for kim jong-un uh... it has in effect double down on stability in the north uh... in terms of uh... investment and support she jimping uh... has said reportedly to president park that he supports unification but in my discussion with chinese government officials uh... and scholars uh... there's an important caveat which is quote-unquote independent unification which means when you borrow in uh... no outside powers to the u.s uh... driving it it has to be mutual north korea in effect uh... gets about and i've had chinese counterparts argue that if there is unification there would someday have to be a way to represent the views of the twenty five million people in north korea to which i ask you mean a national referendum and then my chinese counterparts change the subject uh... i think it's less about the north korean people and more about uh... preserving uh... as long as possible a uh... structure and institutions in the north uh... that are more favorable to china's interests china clearly is concerned about instability about refugees uh... and about the implications of a unified korean peninsula that is democratic and aligned that with the u.s and and and and by implication therefore japan uh... not only because of the geo strategy of it but because of the demonstration effect of democratization uh... and the impact that might have on views in taiwan or elsewhere within china uh... there's i think a very robust debate within china the best evidence was the uh... famous financial times article by dung u n of the central party schools china or study times uh... suggesting that china should abandon north korea that regime collapse was better he was of course sacked but i still think within the chinese system there is robust debate it's just not as public as it was a year or two ago my uh... belief is that uh... Beijing ultimately sees a delay in unification as being in china's interests because of the concerns about instability and because of an assumption that time is on china's side that trade patterns with both north and south korea are moving in a way that china will have in effect the casting vote or decisive vote the longer uh... this takes the more economic interdependence there is uh... from both korea's on china i think that's the chinese assumption uh... as they look at i also think that that the chinese uh... uh... government the pl a uh... worry about some of the consequences of unification there's evidence uh... that uh... the pl a has prepared for consequence management of chemical other incidents along the border that uh... in two thousand nine the migration of fifty thousand colt armed colt kong uh... militiamen from northern berma into china was a test case for disarming and returning them that pl a officers and officials look at as a trial run for a much larger case if north korea collapses so the chinese are not putting their heads in the sand on this question of my view they want to wait uh... they wanted to be quote-unquote independent uh... and and i believe will do whatever is possible to preserve institutions in north korea even if the kim jong-un regime uh... goes so for korea what this means is that rapprochement with beijing and and president part of the relationship with chijin ping are good thing but i think they are okay has to think carefully about how it is framing chinese expectations and chinese leverage over this process and how successfully soul is indicating it's red line and it's bottom line for unification uh... japan uh... i started this business as a japan guy and uh... i think today strategic thinking in japan about the korean peninsula is the weakest i've seen in twenty years it's ironic because the abbey government is very strategic about the maritime domain about values about diplomacy when it comes to the korean peninsula japan the country where yama got the aritomo a hundred some years ago famously said the korean peninsula is a dagger aimed at the heart of anartica japan has developed a bit of a blind spot strategically on the korean peninsula a lot of this is because of the tensions uh... between uh... tokyo and sol the political tensions uh... yomi or ishimu and paul in december indicated that well over eighty percent of japanese that they don't trust korea which is by far the lowest number and the problem with japanese public opinion polling is unlike korean public opinion polling which bounces all over japanese public opinion polling sticks uh... and so uh... this is a bit worrisome uh... genron npo a japanese organization that does pretty effective popular polling uh... indicated that seventy four percent this just came out couple weeks ago seventy percent seventy four percent of japanese think that korea is to blame for the problems in japan correlations another bad sign and on the question of unification the genron npo poll found it's available in japanese online that only twelve percent of japanese thought a process of unification had begun unification was was happening that the jackpot speech was leading to a process of unification twenty six percent of korean said they thought process of unification had begun polling on japanese views of unification is hard to find in two thousand seven uh... i think it was uh... nike but i may be wrong uh... i couldn't find it before today did a poll asking the best way to solve the north korea problem uh... of america they pulled americans japanese and uh... japanese overwhelmingly said the best way is regime change which was third choice at the time for koreans second choice for americans after diplomacy and uh... and pressure but there hasn't been much polling since in part because japanese newspaper editors were criticized uh... at the time and have uh... have avoided it in general i think the japanese view is favorable to unification ambassador mutto the japanese ambassador in soul is given speeches saying japan would like to have a democratic peaceful stable neighbor that's open for business that's all good for japan uh... but there's anxiety about whether unified korean peninsula would become anti-japanese and there's a narrative in tokyo which i think is wrong but it's quite strong in academia and journalism and parts of government that korea is sliding into china's orbit and so that creates some anxiety in japan that was not there say five ten years ago russia i think it would be hard for russia to have a coherent asia policy uh... it always has been uh... but particularly now given what's happened in ukraine putin is obsessed with nato and obsessed with the west uh... the consistent things we've seen from mosco and i think we can continue to see our russia posh's nuclear weapons on the korean peninsula uh... russia likes a six-party talks and russia would like to build a pipeline through north and south korea to sell l and g japan korea that third point by the way when i was in government was usually the only one president putin made in summits when the north korea issue came up but i think the dominant feature of russian policy in asia is going to be alignment with china because of the preoccupation with nato and the west of the united states and that we'll see russia try to appeal japan and korea off from the western camp to try to break up uh... pressure on them for ukraine at the end of the day though i think russia will play a very important role in unification uh... as a repository state russia uh... is able to accept the silent nuclear material in the denuclearization process and they've experienced doing it with the united states uh... and that's an asset uh... the russians are pretty experienced diplomatically in the six-party process uh... as a permanent member of the un security council will have an important role to play diplomatically uh... so russia's long-term investment but in the near term i think it's going to be difficult uh... for russia to play a positive role the united states last but hardly least an asia pacific power uh... as as said in his excellent presentation the u.s. has been the most consistent supporter of unification of the korean peninsula outside of republic of korea itself uh... the administration strongly supports president pox uh... policies on unification as you heard the uh... the expectations i think for any u.s. government would be uh... that uh... the korean peninsula when unified would be non-nuclear democratic uh... although government officials tend not to say it because it's presumptuous continuing the u.s. alliance uh... non-nuclear uh... means uh... in the near term the very difficult job of preventing the leaking of nuclear uh... material weapons chemical biological and engineers uh... were weapons officers who know how to use them that's going to be a very very tough near-term problem uh... a career in the next level that's friendly with china and japan is in u.s. interests uh... at korean peninsula that is in the process of unification not destabilizing the international economy uh... and therefore the i'm at world bank adb all the things that probably came up this morning would be important and uh... a process of unification that uh... that is legitimate in the eyes of the world i have to say it in the eyes of the congress in terms of transparency denuclearization uh... property rights uh... rule of law uh... in the process of integrating north korea into the r-o-k at the end of the day the u.s. has a big stake in successful democratic unification of the korean peninsula not just to get rid of the north korea problem not just to turn northeast asia power relations in a positive direction but to set an example which korea has done before korea's democratization in the nineteen eighties when i travel indonesia or meandmar is the one that military officers who agreed to democratization point to they don't point to the u.s. they don't point to japan they point to korea which successfully transition to democratic rule from military uh... leadership and did so uh... smoothly and created an enormous economic uh... growth process uh... along the way that's pretty darn attractive to uh... the tn i or to the current military and on my and i heard this in spades as chris when we were in napadon rangoon uh... year ago uh... so uh... it getting this right will have a powerful demonstration effect in the cross-strait situation and elsewhere just as unification of germany and the democratization process in eastern europe had a powerful effect on korea and a powerful effect in asia this could be a very very important demonstration effect korea has the toolkits to do this uh... to align the major powers behind a view of unification as a jackpot not only economically but for peace i think that key tools will be the alliance of the united states which is in good shape i agree with said uh... the the right balance of relations between japan and china which is which korea does not have right now uh... high standards for human rights democracy unionization strong leadership in international organizations which korea is demonstrating right now uh... and then korea is going to have to fortify its own democracy uh... healing internal divisions building consensus uh... and i would credit president park for doing this i think one of the most important aspects of her speeches on unification issues she is building a middle ground in a very divisive political environment where people can talk about unification begin that consensus with korea which will at the end of the day be the most important because korea's coherence stability vision and determination on this will set how china russia japan the u.s. and all the rest of us uh... play our parts in this important process of unification i am indivisible teaching is working i'm indivisible teaching at your woman's university uh... you know this is always exciting and honorable chance to share uh... the peace the possibility of peace on the korean peninsula people from both countries you know korea united states well considering the main the subject of the panel and the subsection uh... i will mostly discuss about the connectiveness between interdependence between the korean peninsula and north east asian region well uh... every reason such as north east asian middle east west europe they have a very unique political and economic and sometimes social unique connotation so regarding you know the uniqueness of north east asian region as an independent region who has a very unique uh... security and economic and social and cultural background uh... what was the main difference between you know the region such as middle east or other regions and and and north east asia uh... people say that north east asia as an independent region who has unique sense of security connotation uh... that has a very critical reflection of the global powers obviously such as u.s. and china and also north east asian region uh... it has a very interesting coexistence between global scale competition possibly be to u.s. and china uh... whether you agree or not and also very uh... unique regional level competition such as you know sino-japan competition lively or uh... these days interesting lively competition between korea and japan as well and also most importantly regarding the main issue of the state conference north east asia has very unique you know uh... security concern which is north korea's nuclear problem and you know still divided the condition of the korean peninsula uh... the uniqueness of north korean nuclear issue as you all understand there are five countries normally known as you know nuclear club recognized by npt regime and the other three countries who never recognized by the npt regime such as israel uh... pakistan india but uh... there is a very interesting difference fundamental difference between north korean case and those three countries of pakistan israel and india which is as you all understand uh... those three countries they never joins the npt regime but as you know north korea is the only countries if we recognize north korea as a nuclear state the only and the first countries who uh... you know the successfully conduct uh... nuclear capability as a former member of the npt regime that means international recognition of the nuclear condition of north korea uh... theoretically speaking means you know the very fundamental undermining justification of the npt regime that is the major concern about uh... north korean problem in terms of npt regime and also not only the npt security concern but also the whole global you know concern as well uh... interesting enough this year uh... after nineteen ninety four june of agri framework which was the first diplomatic negotiation between us and north korea and exactly we have two decades since you know uh... the first negotiation conduct is if i remember correctly october ten first in nineteen ninety four uh... i reckon enough for the past two decades we have you know four regimes in south korea such as interesting enough two conjunctive regimes and two relatively speaking liberal regimes that means we tried not only south korea but also under the name of the international cooperation with united states we conducted a lot of policy towards north korea not only to achieve denuclearization but also to achieve north korean their their economic reform or their change in their social openness etc etc but you know the trial in times was not that much successful uh... within that condition parkour neo-demonstration began you know the newly conducted last year uh... in terms of the security condition of north korea station region when parkour neo-demonstration uh... began a slightly before one and a half years ago uh... as you remember the year two thousand twelve and two thousand thirteen was critically important not only because of their you know the regional and global dynamic battles so interesting enough all the six member countries under the name of the six party talks and even included in mongol they all change new leadership as you remember you know if we include obama demonstration beginning of the second term we have the president's election end of the two thousand twelve and also it was end of two thousand twelve avial demonstration began in japan and in season king they began their very unique third the fifth leadership in china sometime beginning of the two thousand thirteen and even put in they began another term the middle of the two thousand twelve and etc etc so not only south korea even theoretically speaking also north korea and japan china they all tried to do something in terms of the you know changing the structure condition of north east asian to maximize and to expand their national interest and their security interest well uh... and within that circumstance uh... north korea they conducted third nuclear test which was February 13th two thousand thirteen interesting enough that was exactly two weeks before the integration of the park uh... so people say that uh... this is kind of interesting time and and uh... opportunity to begin kind of new approaches to handle uh... north korea problem and also to achieve fundamental security and economic prosperity in north east asian region well within that context it is very interesting you know findings regarding you know the prosperity and security condition of north east asian region which is uh... people say that one of the interesting opportunity to bring uh... stability on within the reason is to to to learn something from european countries you know uh... simply speaking kind of north east asian version of uh... Helsinki process whatever you may call within you know based on that argument it is very interesting findings again in north east which is uh... if you include only three countries gdp i mean china japan and korea's gdp is almost to twenty five percent of the whole global gdp okay so in terms of economic and social and cultural happenings it is very interesting inter dependence and very close indivisible integration between those three countries if you move to security and political condition you know that such kind of the invisible economic social integration never easily transferred to positive outcomes of positive uh... mutual respect between those countries it's theoretically speaking as you know people say that there's no spillover effect from you know social and economic condition and to political and security condition uh... not only south korean president east asian north east asian leaders they have very interesting uh... articulation of naming to describe such kind of wider gap between political area and economic area for instance president Park Geun-hye mentioned according to her terminology it is kind of uh... asia paradox known as outside of korea to describe interesting and ironical gap between those two realities uh... as long as we have such kind of wider gap between political area and economic area you know the establishment and permanent peace between the two koreas and unification on the korean peninsula may be not easily achievable so again you know the in terms of the you know the connectiveness and link is between korean peninsula and north east asian region one of the critical approach or solution to figure out the permanent stability stability and the economic prosperity in north east asian region is to achieve unification on the korean peninsula uh... interesting enough uh... you know the divided condition on the korean peninsula uh... some kinds of could be arguably should but the body condition of korean peninsula is kind of uh... outcomes of consequence of the international politics in one sense so that means uh... to achieve peace and unification of the korean peninsula also should be something conducted from international circumstance and international cooperation uh... if you think about the beginning of the modern international relations in north east asia i'd say that someone may have different view point but i would say that beginning of the modern international relations only after world war two you know every country each member state may have different background but modern sense of the sovereignty, modern sense of nation state shared, broadly shared only after world war two that means unified korea you know north east asian having unified korea never experienced in the time of the modern international relations in east asia, in north east asia again that means uh... to fundamentally handle uh... the structure problem wider gap between security condition and economic reality uh... may be achieved by the unification of the korean peninsula by saying unification jackpot whatever by saying unification breakthrough you know specifically means uh... in terms of the political sense, such kind of expansion uh... and and positive interdependence between peace on the korean peninsula and peace and stability in north east asian region well to achieve that goals and to achieve such kind of future process we have also you know couple of concerns and problems as well uh... one of the critical concern is you know as mentioned, positively mentioned uh... the special envoy uh... mister sailor during the luncheon session but still all the discussion that we had in the morning session on the name of the economic benefit you know the economic uh... the rosy outcome future outcomes after the unification those are all kind of third or second or even fifth of you know the fourth buttons we just assume that the first button will be easily uh... handled which is denuclearization of north korea and which is the possibility of regime change or whatever in north korea so uh... the unification should include you know more specific conditions and more specific policy suggestions you know that may bring uh... the positive uh... process of north korea's denuclearization uh... again also in terms of the concern to achieve korea unification within the context of north east asian region uh... i also think about how to visualize the neighboring states benefit from the unification of the korean peninsula uh... that means uh... theoretically we whenever we have a chance we say that unification could be beneficially not only to the two koreas but also you know uh... us china japan and even russia but it is still a very tough question how to visualize or specifically you know show the specific future benefit of the unification to those neighborhood countries not only in terms of the theoretical you know terrain but also in terms of the specific benefit going to those countries those member countries uh... and and uh... back in the station to expand okay again to expand such kind of uh... you know the peace on the level of the pain of korea peninsula to uh... north east asian region for instance back in the station uh... they uh... you know whenever they have chance to articulate north east asian peace and cooperation in each initiative but again uh... it is very you know uh... persuasive and and meaningful uh... suggestion uh... but at the same time uh... we not only about the administration but previous korean south korea such as kim de jung and etc etc uh... they suggested many regional policies to bring peace on the korea peninsula such as new asian policy or even i personally understand during the normal administration balancing between us and china is also uh... you know kind of the south korea's trial to do something to achieve uh... positive outcomes in the region uh... whenever i have a chance to discuss between the connectiveness korea and north east asian uh... region i say that uh... as all the human beings does the state individual country i i believe they have a unique identity of a dna as well uh... for for theoretical term or for policy you know uh... the connotation we quite often mention uh... the names such as north east asia but i don't think uh... no one other than korea can be identified as a north east asian state i don't believe obviously u s i don't believe china or japan they they try to describe themselves as north east asian state if we have to use only one state in the world who is under the name of the north east asian state i would say that that is korea that means again original stability and prosperity of north east asian region is the most critical condition uh... to you know to to to guarantee a maximized south korea's in the future korea's national interest uh... finally i i would say that uh... if you think about the end of the world of two how many countries divide it uh... people say including germany korea china vietnam and and and then but yemen can be categorized within different you know the meanings and significance so you know countries were divided after world war two such as germany china vietnam and korea after the unification of the vietnam south korea we we we tried we did our best to avoid vietnam way of the unification after the germany unification easily assume north korea they are doing their best to avoid germany way of the unification and no one say no one you know uh... it is kind of international recognition to understand one china palace that means no one identify china and taiwan condition in terms of the competition or i believe we just assume you know recognize many china on the name of one china policy so that means uh... we are doing a lot to to figure out to to to take some lessons from germany vacation obviously but if you take a look at you know the process of germany vacation not only the between the two german you know integration of the process but also uh... european the primary condition in the global the primary circumstance was pretty critical factor to uh... to to bring the permanent in the case of germany that means uh... korean unification which is obviously positive to neighborhood countries and to global society as well but you have to uh... visualize that and again because of the unique interdependence between korean case and no cessation region uh... international cooperation and efficient you know diplomatic assistance between u.s. and korea definitely meaningful factor and foundation to achieve unification thank you very much to discuss and starting with christian thank you and uh... vicar thank you for inviting uh... to participate on this panel it's a very interesting topic in the interest of time i think i'm gonna truncate my remarks a little bit so we can get on to bruce and get on to some discussion uh... let me just raise a couple of points uh... first i'd like to just sort of echo in mike's presentation the emphasis on stability obviously for china uh... as they look at reunification unification of the peninsula uh... under what terms that would take place china's core principles really haven't changed on that front uh... they do want it as mike said to sort of be independent they want the north koreans uh... to have a heavy say in obviously the thing they want the least is u.s. troops right on their border uh... that's really been a long time concern there's been a lot of debate since she's in paying the new chinese president took over uh... power in the fall of two thousand twelve about whether or not china's north korea policy has been changing and therefore it's general approach to the peninsula writ large kind of the key indicators that people often site on that is the reordering of the phrase ology if you will for the chinese in terms of its priorities on the peninsula moving denuclearization to the front rather than its former position in the third of some discussion about whether or not there's a more robust debate now inside china with regard to the role north korea place for china as a buffer state and in fact whether or not that continues to be the case uh... that debate was really quite strong early on in uh... in shijun pings tenure some sides arguing it doesn't really matter what type of regime we have there as long as there's something physical there uh... that uh... serves as this buffer and others arguing that that may have been true in the past but increasingly provocative north korean behavior maybe making that last true and damaging our position in uh... in the wider region it's my sense that this debate has largely quieted if not completely gone away uh... and i don't think that's because one side of the other necessarily one i just think they moved on to uh... to other subjects and this really is the the core issue is to think about a lot of this ink and commentary in other word things that have been spilled on whether or not china has changed its policy to me that's not really the point uh... and you can argue the uh... the merits and uh... difficulties of that point as much as you want i think the key factor is to look at how shijun ping has changed the relationship with the north koreans and it's really this idea of moving the relationship from the traditional special relationship between china and north korea to a normal bilateral relationship and i think this is a very strong theme that we've seen under shijun ping's leadership and there's several things to me that indicate that this is in fact uh... going on the first of course the lack of high-level visits cemetery between the chinese and the north koreans uh... kim jong-un has yet to visit beijing uh... shijun ping has no inclination to go to uh... to north korea at this particular time there are still high-level dialogues at the at the sort of next year down between the two sides but there's been no major cemetery not only that but shijun ping has uh... turned a bunch more towards south korea in his diplomacy and uh... seems to have a very solid working relationship with president park a very uh... successful summit here recently and some of this is driven by this idea that uh... some in china perceive that there is an opportunity giving the close economic interdependence growing interdependence between china and the republic of korea's economies that there's an opportunity for lack of a better term to peel south korea off from the united states as mike had mentioned in his remarks i agree with mike that i think that's ridiculous especially when you look at uh... the way the summit unfolded between uh... president park and shijun ping while there was a lot of positive uh... to the summit there was also some behavior by the chinese uh... with regard to how the summit was arranged and and the things shijun ping said in various speeches and so on that clearly ruffled the uh... the south korean feathers so i think those in beijing who seem to think that there's this is working with a huge opportunity here uh... should be more cautious i think the other thing that we see uh... that sort of emphasizes this issue of special to normal is their whole approach in the region and this is where we come to uh... shijun ping sort of thoughts about a new style of major country relations with the united states but that only the united states merits a new style of major country relations for all the other regional players and everyone else uh... it's more this sort of great power diplomacy approach that is emerging so gone is the is the sort of rhetoric of dunk chow pang of fighting their time and keeping a low profile internationally and instead we see much more of a philosophy where the idea is china is already uh... a great power rising great power but is already arrived at that status and should act like a traditional great power in its foreign relations and this has a real impact on its approach to the korean peninsula i think with north korea the message we see from the new chinese leadership is basically we are the big brother in the partnership you are the little brother uh... your behaviors should not be such that cause us problems as the larger party uh... and we're not going to make special uh... special sort of arrangements for the traditional special relationship such as making sure every time we have a visit with the south koreans there's a parallel visit with the north korean side and so on uh... and in fact it appears to me that relations between the two leaders in particular well they're basically non-existent between uh... between she and kim jong un uh... and i don't see them radically improving in the near future likewise we see the the similar approach with south korea where the economic interest uh... the other interests of china's have on the peninsula right now lean in that direction so we see him emphasizing that relationship and i think this is going to continue going into the future so what does this mean for how the chinese might be thinking about unification i very much agree with mike that the the sort of idea of delayed unification is is in their interest they don't want to see this happen anytime soon certainly they believe that time is on their side in both pieces of the of the relationship especially i think with south korea where they do believe that over time the economics and other factors will allow them to have uh... stronger sway with uh... with the south koreans and the sense as well that this way they'll have a better sort of set of eyes and ears if you will by re-emphasizing the relationship with south korea getting a better feel on both sides of the peninsula for how they're approaching uh... korean peninsula issues and the and the potential for unification i do think over time that the chinese don't uh... reflexively uh... deny the interest in or opportunity for reunification but uh... for now the debate about whether or not that can happen under what terms has largely been shelved and i think that's the other thing to stress just in closing with china's approach is that it's my opinion that uh... shijun ping actually is not paying a lot of attention to uh... to north korea policy or to korean policy writ large other than this warming to south korea he set out the tenants of their approach and he's kind of letting it uh... letting it hold for now while he works on issues with russia relationship of the united states and so on so whereas under who jintao the issue was a little more uh... on the front lines and a lot of that was due to north korea's behavior i think with the shijun ping administration we're seeing obviously the need to continue to manage a relationship very carefully strong concern about what happens on the peninsula but it's not going to be a strong driver uh... for their uh... diplomacy going forward likewise i think the fundamental reason for why we've been able to see this change is because of shijun ping's rapid consolidation of power and the fact that he is running chinese foreign policy pretty much unilaterally uh... the formal mechanisms of chinese diplomacy are not operating uh... as much as they were under the previous leadership foreign ministry has very little uh... say on these policies uh... even the uh... the party's international liaison department which was very influential in shaping the relationship with north korea under the previous administration doesn't have a whole lot to do with it uh... at this stage is certainly not the independent influence that they had before we see this in the fact that the chinese foreign ministry has begun taking more of a role in managing at least the mechanics of bilateral visits and so on with uh... the china north korea relationship and that the ilds influence really has has been sort of downgraded and i expect that to continue likewise there's no one on the standing committee yeah as there was in the previous poll bureau standing committee leadership who really has a say on north korean policy uh... you know joe yong kong now famously uh... in trouble with this corruption investigation uh... had been educated in north korea and even though he was number nine of nine on the former poll bureau standing committee he had undue influence on on shaping north korea policy and you had several members of that standing committee who frankly were very conservative on north korea policy and wanted to see uh... very little change that's not the case in the new poll bureau standing committee and she is uh... certainly calling the tune on that night expected to continue doing so going for it i'll stop there thanks much and then uh... well thank you very much uh... victor referred to me as the cleanup batter which sort of gives the image of my predecessors would simply try to get on base and i would bring them all home with a mighty cloud of my analytic bat i think it's more a case of each of them is not only hit home runs they've hit the ball out of the park and now the crowd sort of collectively looks at me and says okay laughing boy let's see what you got i think when we talk about unification we have to be clear it really is absorption of the north by the south uh... you know and indeed the article for the south korean constitution uh... calls upon the republic of korea to uh... formulate and carry out a policy of peaceful unification based on the principles of freedom and democracy neither of which exist in north korea so this is not a case of trying to average out two systems uh... indeed you can for example on human rights north korea is a zero in south korea is a ten you can't have a as your quest to get a five you're not just gonna keep some of the gulags in order to end up with a five in human rights and similarly uh... you can't you know equate or or average a command economy in free market principles uh... so really south korea shouldn't really be striving to uh... average these two countries out but it really is indeed having the south korean system of freedom and democracy free market principles in respect for for law and human rights prevail uh... there's there's nothing to save in the north korean system so and north korean knows this and that's why they're so resistant to the dresden declaration president park uh... or really opening up their economy or their political system to what they see as the contagion of outside influence so i think really there would be perhaps three scenarios for unification uh... the first is uh... the blue house gets a phone call from pyeongyang they say you know we've been talking it over amongst ourselves and you know you guys when it's believe the lights on well they can't leave the lights on because they have no electricity but you know you you guys when it's it's yours uh... we're all heading across the border in china uh... that's not gonna happen the second one is a gradual reconciliation gradual reform uh... gradual meeting in the middle between the korea's and that's not gonna happen because uh... kim cheong unlike his predecessors have made very very clear uh... that they have no interest in making any kind of political economic reform they made that clear in their new year's day speeches in their central committee comments they even became so frustrated uh... with speculation of impending reform under kim cheong and that they you know issued statements of sort of foolish politicians of the world particularly in the south should not expect us to change one iota from uh... kim cheong illism and kim il song ism so uh... we know that they're they're not going to change now as we look around uh... the area as as our speakers have done is at some of the other uh... players you know with china uh... you know i i agree that uh... china has not changed its policy and certainly china even though it said it accepts korean unification i think there's a very big asterisk as to what conditions they would accepted upon uh... when shi sheng ping was in soul and spoke at soul national university you know he made a great uh... you know sort of declaration of how korean china share interests and he cited the engine war and i might have said sir there's a more recent war where uh... china fought against south korea and also when you know as some koreans will blame the united states for dividing the peninsula but the u n c forces the allied forces were on the cusp of uniting the korean peninsula uh... when china was the one that prevented that so i think that's something to keep in mind when uh... beijing has its latest charm offensive uh... toward soul uh... and certainly it doesn't have south korea's best interests in in heart at in their heart uh... when they push against south korea better defending its population against north korean missile threat uh... trying to pressure south korea against adopting bill better ballistic missile defense uh... the other great players the the u s and and i think it's important to include us what even when we just talk about northeast asian perspectives i think we're very very much involved and and people have asked over time what is the u s policy on unification and i think u s diplomats we have several in here you know will sort of be frustrated say the u s policy has always been you know protecting korea uh... as it works towards a peaceful unification as the father of a teenage daughter i sort of think it's you know it's fine for the korea's to talk it's fine for the korea's to date our role is sort of the the protective father walking ten steps behind with a shotgun uh... making sure korea's not taken advantage of so we are korea should be in the driver's seat it's a matter for the korean people we just are there to make sure that uh... south korean interests are are protected and when people ask what would be the role of u s forces korea after unification really i think it's too early to say it would depend on the timing it would depend on the circumstances of when that happens perhaps both the u s in south korea would see no more need for u s forces korea and we would come home uh... or there may be growing concern as there is now about chinese intentions or or other things so you know i think that's an issue we can you know sort of skip over for now uh... there's also been a lot of talk today about the jackpot and i think really that was an appeal by president pock to the south korean populace there's been declining support domestically for korean unification particularly amongst the youth uh... and i saw recent polls that for i think in the first time in my memory a majority of south koreans did not support unification number i believe was forty nine percent in support of unification and i uh... i believe that's the first time i've seen it dip below fifty percent so i think really uh... particularly the the the younger generation you know sees the the negative economic impact that unification would have on their economy and the national economy and so i think in a way president pock's appeal that uh... unification would not be a drain on the economy but would be a jackpot really was a way of trying to reverse this downward trend in south korean uh... public support for unification you know i i think we can all be hopeful for unification i don't see it happening anytime soon i i'm reminded in two thousand the year two thousand uh... when after the first in a korean summit and the uh... sort of the very emotional uh... joint north south korean walking into the sydney olympics uh... a very senior cia official was chastising those of us who worked uh... the korea issue uh... that we were missing it with that the koreas were on the cusp of unification that just like the soviet analysts have missed the collapse of the soviet union like the german analysts have missed the the rapid unification of germany that that we were getting it wrong and that we really had to understand that uh... you know korea was on the cusp of unification he was wrong although he got highly promoted you know it it's as we pointed out at the time that you know if this was like the germany's it wasn't the germany's right after the fall of the berlin wall it was more like the germany's in nineteen seventy when they're started to be engagement so i i think we can hope for unification uh... certainly we should be prepared for it but i think uh... you know i don't see it happening anytime soon and and i think really as as michael pointed out unification is going to happen with the collapse not that anyone it wants to induce collapse because we're afraid of what could happen i i think it's as if we're all on one side of the swamp uh... we're in a stable stable environment on the other side of the swamp we see the quest we see a peaceful unification of the korean people the problem is between here and there is a very messy potentially dangerous swamp and no one wants to jump into that swamp in order to get to the other side so right now it tends to be sort of a passive you know the devil you know rather than the devil you don't know uh... but that's not to say we can't still be preparing for it and certainly still hoping for it comes up thank you bruce i want to thank all of our panelists in particular for saying whether in their time constraints because we actually have some time for a question and discussion so i'm going to open the floor in a minute but before i do i want to put one question in the queue for our two presenters and that is that uh... in the morning session when we talked about some of the economic and business and investment synergies uh... the term peace dividend came up a number of times and uh... obviously no one can quantify that but they deferred to the panelists in the afternoon uh... to try to explain what a piece that and would look like so i would i would uh... and ask our two presenters to think about that and specifically how they would uh... imagine a piece dividend from unification and i'd like to open it to the floor for uh... for questions can we get a mic over here and uh... please identify yourself and please ask a question hi uh... chen weihua and chen and daily chris you talked about uh... she's new policy from special to normal so has uh... president park on mister park here also you know you're advising the ministry of unification so has president park return uh... with the message that that you know a reunified career will not be you know a minute u.s military base which means the u.s troops will not move from dmz to the yellow river and uh... second court you know is you know a lot of people talk about uh... the reunification is impact on china's probably across the relations as mike mentioned but according to the panel's discussion this morning the conditions of exchange of economic activities people's exchange that seems to be more mature on the chinese mainland taiwan side so could chinese unification actually happen early that's directed to you chris specifically why don't you take that one okay i i'm happy to answer the second question you guys might be more qualified to answer the first question uh... you know on on whether or not uh... china taiwan reunification could happen more quickly uh... i think as mike was suggesting in his comments certainly if there was Korean peninsula reunification and as bruce suggested it was done uh... in the in the direction coming from the south uh... this would be an issue i think more importantly uh... the more pressing issue maybe what we've been seeing in hong kong policy uh... in the last week or two where uh... folks sitting in taipei are certainly having a hard time understanding uh... one country two systems uh... you know and and the benefits of that given what's happening in hong kong uh... so i think we have to watch and see what happens of the course of uh... cross-strait relations in the coming months you know if we have a situation where uh... in the upcoming local elections in taiwan uh... the democratic progressive party is seen as doing particularly well and so on then the trend line maybe in fact uh... toward another period of more difficulty in the in the cross-strait relationship uh... certainly if as i said there was some sort of uh... you know massive movement on the on the Korean peninsula this would then put some pressure i suppose you could say on the two sides uh... as they would then be the really the one remaining uh... world war two unresolved uh... unresolved issue as far as madame pox assurances uh... to president she uh... i don't have a sense for that others i don't know and press would come i i pretty much doubt that president pock would say to me too she didn't think that there would be no u.s bases north of the dmz or anything specific at all about uh... u.s four military posture on the Korean Peninsula after unification uh... for a whole host of reasons one is uh... there's no guarantee the u.s congress will want u.s forces on the Korean Peninsula uh... it depends on what the security environment is what are the threats uh... is is the korean peninsula uh... going to uh... face a security threat from china or not and if it is what kind of alliance uh... what kind of posture would be best for korea's interests intolerable for the u.s and so uh... it is someone i think uh... bruce said earlier we you know that i i think that an alliance without some military presence uh... is is uh... is is is just not as credible or useful to the republic of korea uh... we have an alliance without bases with australia but i think that's a unique exception uh... i think uh... because korea would rely on the u.s extended nuclear deterrent and the credibility of deterrence uh... where it really is in a critical situation means you have to have boots on the ground you've got to have some you know physical demonstration some people call it a tripwire on my friends in the second infusion called themselves a speed bump whatever it is i i think there would be some kind of presence militarily i don't think the u.s who knows who will be running the pentagon at the time but i don't think the u.s want troops on the hella river politically and operationally it doesn't make sense but i think there could be some presence but what that would be nobody can say and so it would be foolish to put that as a chip for that reason it also would be foolish because it would suggest uh... that the r-o-k uh... will not determine its own security requirements and i think it's very important for president park or any korean leader to make it very clear uh... that the r-o-k uh... is going to determine what it needs for its security uh... and uh... including alliance of u.s including multilateral whatever approaches it is uh... and it would be she wouldn't get much for it and it would send the wrong signals and you couldn't really say one way or the other what the presence would be now i don't know what actually happens professor you may know the inside story well i again as you mentioned you know the future the possible changing nature of the korean alliance quite depends on what kind of you know security circumstances when we have the process of unification obviously but at the same time you have to we need to think about that uh... the theoretically speaking the alliance partnership you know the korea from the korean side u.s is the only alliance partner at the same time but from the u.s side i'm not sure how many alliance partners more than thirty or forty i assume about that number but in terms of the north korean north korean and china relations uh... from from chinese side north korea is the only country who described as alliance partner at the same time from north korean side china is only one country who is on the name of the alliance partnership so it's a very complicated situation you know all the alliance partners but again quite depends on the you know what kind of security circumstances around the korean peninsula uh... is spending on the process of unification on this peace dividend question i'm a little more skeptical that there's going to be a big peace dividend we don't know but i'm i'm not sure uh... uh... that we can uh... predict it for a couple if i could yeah one reason is uh... significant uh... part of korea's defense is now handled by the united states and after unification i think the pressure from the u.s congress would be uh... as it has been for decades for korea to take much more of a role in its own defense so there are going to be some uh... requirements of intelligence and is our and so forth that we've been trying to get the korean government to pay for that they would be more likely to have to pay for why because uh... the pl a defense buildup military budget has been increasing over a decade of double-digit numbers uh... japan uh... although i don't think japan's a threat to korea has a pretty considerable defense force and russia and so uh... there's still going to be an environment of uncertainty that's going to require an investment in defense and new capabilities uh... i would like to see it in alliance with the u.s and embedded in a multilateral process that builds confidence but uh... i don't think that any korean president's going to say because the north korean threat is gone we don't have to worry about the other large militaries in this region uh... now there will be defense cuts and i suspect the draft may go away and things like that but uh... there will be other requirements that will have to be filled so is the peace dividend twenty or thirty percent is it fifty percent? i doubt it groups? yeah i would just say the disposition of u.s forces on or near the korean peninsula is a matter for the washington and seoul thank you very much uh... and it'll be determined by the best national interests of the u.s and its ally in the meantime we might seek reassurance from beijing that they will not seek to impede the reunification of the korean people uh... and also seek greater transparency as to what beijing's intent is in fulfilling its military alliance with north korea and wondered what conditions it would do so uh... greater transparency as to what it might do during the unifications or collapse scenarios which so far it has been very reticent to do so uh... while we're at it we might look for greater transparency in chinese military policy uh... and intentions in northeast asia and then on the peace dividend i remember after the collapse of the soviet union people said what what are we going to spend the peace dividend on it was sort of fifty percent for greater infrastructure fifty percent for reduced taxes fifty percent for greater welfare spending fifty percent it's sort of very quickly goes away uh... michael marshall global peace foundation uh... michael green said in his uh... presentation uh... spoke about uh... certain circles in japan who are very concerned about the growing closeness of relationship between korea and china and thought that uh... basically korea was being seduced by china i have uh... japanese uh... colleagues who very much share that view uh... you said you disagree with that one of you could give us the reasons why you disagree with that view i think that the uh... the japanese observers of republic of korea's foreign policy strategy do not fully appreciate how strong u.s korea alliances and so they're looking at everything this is a bit of an exaggeration but largely to the problem of china and asia and they're seeing that uh... japan has ninety six percent population southeast asia modi of india just had a tybalt jackpot summit with abbey uh... he has the best relations with putin of any of the democracies uh... but korea it seems is playing the china's game to isolate japan seems to be the only one but what they don't see is the depth of support in korea and in the u.s for a bilateral alliance the strength of our common values our ability to manage provocations to deal with wartime op-con transitions all these very hard alliance issues which in the u.s. japan alliance might freeze everybody we just tilt but u.s and korea have managed them very well and i think our japanese friends don't always see that and the mirror is true i don't think our korean friends appreciate how much u.s japan alliance is critical to the u.s and how what abbey is doing not on the history side or ideologically but in terms of these from u.s perspective quite modest defense reforms along overdue and are good for the security of korea and so that too the politics don't the blind both sides both tokyo and soul to the fundamental strength a necessity of u.s alliance with each over the other uh... but it is a powerful narrative and uh... i think it's changing i think it's slowly beginning to change and i'm hopeful that we'll have a uh... reasonably good uh... park abbey summit when these apic and ea s uh... meetings happen in november pick the biggest cost please uh... regarding that cast and you know uh... not only from the japanese side because of the increasing cooperation between korea and china uh... someone may have a i'm not sure how many of you but someone may have some negative understanding but i i i do clearly say that if you have the same policy inside of the u.s i would say that i don't think that close news between korea china definitely replace korea u.s alliance i mean obviously we we share uh... a lot of meaningful values and democracy and freedom and market principle as well if you think about the last year sixties uh... u.s alliance you know we agree with new statement within that statement we all we agreed and we showed that very you know the meaningful positive mission and function of you know uh... the goals as well but uh... comparing the the neighborhood country such as u.s china and japan south korea we have very limited palace options and we very relatively speaking limited you know diplomatic asset because of such kind of condition uh... sometimes you may interpret you know we we are a little bit aggressing you know jumping to to china side but again uh... we are not replacing something or comparing something just on the name of the korea's national interest but under the principle of the you know values and and fun fundamental you know ideas and human life thank you the uh... listening to the panels this morning and now seems to be couple of conclusions can be drawn some said some not said some not said is if korea wants to be united and we wanted to be free free enterprise democratic human rights if korea ever is going to move that way there's no other country except south korea they can that must take the initiative with the panel agree with that nobody else will take the initiative to bring korean peninsula to the kind of country one korea we talk about the second thing that emerges kind of as a commonality that's been said many times is uh... cost and benefits everyone agrees that seems to be the benefits uh... great and it's perpetual and cost is a very heavy but it's short term in terms of time the cost is a lot heavier first and you'll take twelve fifteen years and then stock markets emerge and so on the bonanza may or may not happen it's a time in the middle that i want to ask some questions about the panel the japan china russia all has very heavily nuanced attitude towards korea's unification issue their position is now with the current situation of divided korea with all the histories culminating to this point now let's say we are at about half point into that somebody characterized with two scenario very uh... perpetual uh... you know consensual approach and then uh... abrupt and drastic uh... decline collapse of north korean regime but in all reality it'll be some combination of the two it'll be a perpetual dialogue consensual uh... way and at some point i think it'll be coming down to some drastic by the standards of today's view it's not so drastic it may be a little bit less shocking than what can be anticipated from the collapse of the regime now but let's say there is some movement there's some peace uh... direction and five six years past and somehow ideal emerges unification is an irreversible invincible direction it's the way to go it's gonna it's it's a set and there's no way to turn around korean situation somehow reached that point what then with the attitude of japan china and russia would be what i see in the panel is all experts you have a china chair, korea chair, and japan chair so i cannot see where else i can go to get a better opinion so at that point some five six seven years from now suppose that ideally an idea is established korea is going to be united there's a lot of problems, a lot of problems, a lot of hassle chaos but that's the history that's a stream, it's going at that point let's get an answer from our panelists, let's get an answer from so uh... dr park well uh... yes obviously you know uh... it's our problem okay, it's our, you know, under the uh... our mission and you know that's korea's approach to a full degree of authority in terms of how to achieve the you know, unification uh... but again as i briefly mentioned in the presentation you know if you think about the divided condition, the beginning of the divided condition, the process and development of the divided condition obviously intentional cooperation, intentional circumstance is one of the critical factors to achieve peace and prosperity in the korean peninsula so i'm not missing, you know, i'm not saying that the you know international players is is more important than korea you know the independent authority but i'm just saying that uh... you know international factor is very critical uh... the identity and nature of no-situation region and at the same time uh... in the middle of the, in the center of the no-situation region south korea's problem is existing yes, you know, just that i'm saying um... i like bruce's uh... one to ten you know uh... because you can't get unification by having five i thought that was a good way to put it another way to think about it is what keeps the kim il-sung kim jong-il kim jong-un uh... dynasty in power unparalleled coercive tools yodok the gulags criminal syndicates nuclear weapons largest biological chemical arsenals in the world and the premise that north korea is legitimate in south korea doesn't have a right to exist so how does it maintain those four instruments of of rule when we get to the point you're talking about where unification is now inevitable because none of those will be acceptable to the international community and to change any one of them is potentially suicidal for the regime so that's why i'm with bruce i think it's possible as you say there could be a sort of process of dialogue but i think at some point uh... it rapidly uh... that the north rapidly loses control uh... or plays that game to see what you can get and stops the process on uh... on the big powers and uh... unification i think i ended with this but the tragic geo-strategic history of the korean peninsula is that uh... when korea isn't is divided uh... the big powers are drawn in and historically when korea's divided different camps invite in big powers into their internal struggle and that's the that's the source of much of the that and geography and the related to the source of much of the tragedy of the korean peninsula so if the big powers think there's not consensus within the south or that there's a wobbliness they will be tempted to come in and try to dominate the process at the expense of the other big powers and so that's why as i said i think park when a although bruce is right she did this because i think of the polls about unification but what she's potentially done is created a basis for discussing unification that will narrow the gaps within korean politics and society because it's so important that that in this process the republic of korea demonstrate its willpower to unify and its principles and conviction and what is not up for negotiation which would be democracy think alliance with the u.s. at least uh... a uh... democratic system aligned with western values in international organizations and and demonstrating a consensus behind that is critical pacune cannot say what bruce and i are saying although i suspect she thinks it because that would break that safe middle ground to talk about unification in a way that builds consensus uh... and so i don't blame her for that i think she's doing the right thing but i think for those of us who are planning what this will look like we should be expecting not a five but uh... whatever the one but you know all gone in the north maybe i'm just word smithing but when you said rock uh... south korea should take the unification initiative uh... you can take an initiative and you may want it sort of implies taking initiative today well you can do that by eloping uh... and going down the path of federation and confederation where i don't think it's in souls self-interest i might work with and say i i think south korea should be in the driver's seat once conditions are right for unification uh... but it's right now maybe being in the driver's seat means the engine is idling and that there's not necessarily a push to move forward uh... but i think when the conditions are are right for unification i think the south korea should be the one in the driver's seat uh... and i guess at that point taking the initiative great that's a great place on which to end this panel i want you to thank our panelists very much for uh... is interesting uh... will now take a break i think there's coffee set up outside for you and then we'll reconvene fifteen minutes to the last panel


Russia is trying to form an army of 2 million soldiers, a new mobilization will be announced. According to Ukraine's military intelligence report, Russia plans to build a 2 million strong army through consecutive waves of mobilization. Russia plans to launch a new wave of mobilization of 500,000 conscripts for the war against Ukraine on January 15th. Ukraine's military intelligence said, mobilization setups include legislative amendments and the preparation of educational centers are already underway in Russia according to Ukraine's intelligence. Quote, in the first wave of mobilization, 300,000 people were drafted into the Russian armed forces. Following a brief training period, the conscripts are deployed to the combat zone in Ukraine. Ukraine's defense intelligence does not rule out that the Russian leadership will announce the next wave of mobilization in the coming days. About 500,000 more Russians will join the Russian armed forces, which will allow the terrorist country to create strategic reserves. According to intelligence estimates, the scale of the enlistment activities conducted by the aggressor country indicates the plans of its leadership to create an army of about 2 million people. Ukraine's military intelligence previously reported that Russia's Federal Security Service, FSB, had banned all potential conscripts. Apparently, a majority of conscription age men from leaving the country in all directions since January 9th. The Kremlin's spokesperson Dmitry Peskov later denied the report, but if true, this ban appears to be more wide-ranging than before. Most conscription age men had previously been allowed to leave Russia, but those who had received summons from a military enlistment officer or were about to get one were banned from leaving.