The National Broadcasting Company and its affiliated stations present the Pacific Story. This is the story of the Pacific and the millions of people who live around this greatest sea. The drama of the people whose destiny is at stake in the Pacific War. This is the background to the war in the Pacific and its meaning to us and to the generations to come. Tonight's Pacific Story, the B-29, the Japan Express, comes to you from Hollywood and Cincinnati, Ohio as another public service. With drama the past and present and commentary by Brigadier General Laura C. Craigy of the Air Technical Service Command, who took an active part in the development of the B-29 as a combat worthy bomber. The B-29, the Japan Express. The guys over Japan today are filled with B-29 Superforces. But next week there will be more and the week after that, still more. And this is perhaps the greatest single achievement in military history. I can't tell you how many Superforces were with us today, but it was a lot different from that first raid a year ago. A lot different from a year ago and even more different from only two years ago when the first B-29 bombardment wing was organized. The Boeing B-29 was conceived while the shadow of war was falling across the United States. It was developed since the outbreak of the war. It has become the most powerful American offensive weapon and now bids well to be the greatest single factor in winning the war in the Pacific. That's what the top generals say, but more than anything else the B-29 is a symbol of America in action. The creation of a people with all their creative genius, their technical skill, their dogged determination to meet a great emergency. We had an appointment over Japan and there was no time to pick daisies. That's the commander of the B-29, Oppenatom, one of that first group of B-29s to hit Japan. Gentlemen, we have been activated as a 58th bombardment wing. We have no planes, no personnel and no precedents. That's what the general said in June 1943. Our job is to work out new tactical methods of operation for a bomber that is faster, heavier and flies higher than any airplane in our experience. We've been working on the B-29 for several years now. It's far from perfect. It's still got bugs in it. But we're at war. We need the B-29 against Japan. Our task is three-fold. We must get B-29s rolling off the assembly lines. We must organize and train crews. We must establish an overseas force. And we must do all of these at the same time. Along about September 1943, personnel began flowing into the Smoky Hill Army airfield at Salina, Kansas. My name's Olson, Ellsworth Olson. I work in the Boeing plant in Wichita, making these B-29s. Corporal Olson to you, left blister gunner. Weegee Olson to the crew of the Oppenatom. Chuck Lowry's my name, Racine Wisconsin.  Moose Lowry to the crew. John L. Cunningham, Baltimore. Tech Sergeant Cunningham, radio man, ham to the crew. Ambrose Van Dyke, Visalia, California. Corporal Van Dyke, tail gunner, large tail to the crew. Oscar Rasmussen, Red Wing, Minnesota. Corporal Rasmussen, right blister gunner, bucket head to the crew. Dubois, Edward Dubois, Provo, Utah. Second Lieutenant Dubois, flight engineer. Charles Walton, Bloomington, Illinois. Second Lieutenant Walton, special equipment man. Joseph Poplowski, Detroit. First Lieutenant Poplowski, navigator. Ben Carter, Charles in South Carolina. First Lieutenant Carter, bombardier. Holland Brooks, co-pilot. Captain Brooks of Marion, Ohio. James Hawes, Phillips, Wisconsin. Major James Hawes, pilot. Men, we're going to work together. Each of us has a special job to do as a member of the crew. Our lives are going to depend upon each other. We don't yet have a B-29. The ship we'll fly over Japan is not yet built. We'll get it when the time comes. Meantime, we'll train on other airplanes. Dismissed. Hey, Ouija, is this country in the United States? What do you mean? This is Kansas. We ought to get campaign ribbons for foreign service for being out here. Alice and Lottel, just because you're from California. Smoky Hill was the B-29 field. But only once in a while did the men see a B-29. The B-29s will not get off the assembly line. For substitutes, the crews flew tricycle B-26s. The object of this training is to familiarize us with tricycle landing gear and glide characteristics of a high wing load airplane. That's Captain Harlan Brooks, the co-pilot. Later, they got B-17s. Regular flying fortresses. Well, at least this is a four engine job. It is a matter of training crews for super forts with no super forts. We're going to be flying at high altitudes. Very high altitudes. Starting tomorrow, we're going to Wright Field to train in high altitude pressure changes. Hey, Moose. Yeah? What if they pump so much pressure into this box that blows all the pieces? With us in it. Quiet, large tail. To familiarize the gunners with the highly complex fire control system, the gunners were trained on special firing range. Okay, that'll do. Now gather around me, men. Now, the B-29 fire control system is different from the ordinary control. You, Corporal Olson, will have two 50-caliber machine guns in the left blister. Yes, sir. You, Corporal Rasmussen, will have two in the right blister. Oh, boy. You, Sergeant Lowry, will have two in the top turret. Right, sir. And all of these can be brought to bear on one target by remote control. Uh, you didn't mention me, sir. You'll have two 50-caliber machine guns in the tail, Corporal Van Dyke. And you'll also have a 20-millimeter cannon. A cannon? Lucky, large hand. We found out in tests that three times as many hits can be scored with this type of fire control that, with an ordinary control, we'll be able to throw many guns on one target instantly. All right? Continue firing. Hey, Lodge, they'll be careful with the cannon. That's the way they got their training before they had B-29s. And in order to train the ground crews to service the planes when they got them, ground crews were assigned to round-the-clock operations, three eight-hour shifts. At last, the B-29s began to arrive at the field. By taking these planes just as they come off the Boeing assembly line, and putting them through the strains equivalent to combat, we'll be ready to bomb Japan six months earlier. At last, Major Hawes and his crew got their B-29. Gosh, ain't she a beaut? They named her the Uppon Atom. This is the finest piece of mechanism of its kind that has ever been built. Developing the first B-29 costs about $3 million. This one of ours here costs about $400,000. Go home about their experience. My place is way up-forward on the long nose. I sit between the feet of the pilot and the co-pilot. I've just been up for the first time and it feels like I'm riding at the tip of a spear-hutling through space. I've got a lot to learn about dropping bombs from this baby. This was Lieutenant Carter, the bombardier. The pilot, Major Hawes, is the commander of the ship and Captain Brooks, the co-pilot. Both were a little cold toward me, having a little trouble getting used to the idea of having a flight engineer in the crew. Both Major Hawes and Captain Brooks have had combat experience as B-17 pilots in which they themselves handle the power. But I think they're slowly seeing the value of keeping one man's attention on power and the fuel system. I fly back to back with the co-pilot. Turning out to the greatest problem are the engines of the B-29, so I'm having my hands full. This was Lieutenant Du Bois, the flight engineer. They're certainly giving us the work. The commander told us today that to get the most out of the up-and-atom, we'd have to learn all about everything about the plane. Not only that, we're also learning about flying in electrically heated clothing about pressurized cabins. What to do if the pressure suddenly escapes. You see, we're going to apply very high altitude. Another thing, we'll all be getting first aid so that we can take care of anybody that needs it. Somebody might get hurt six or eight hours from the patient. This was Sergeant Lowry, who handles the Central Fire Control. It went on like that around the Kansas fields for months. They theoretically bombed out the industrial center of almost every big city in the Midwest. By the end of 1943, the rumors were flying thick and fast.  For my dough, we're going up to Vladivostok. That place up in Siberia there. Siberia? Russia ain't fighting Japan. If you ask me, we're going to China. China? Ah, you're nuts, Lottale. Okay, Weegee, where do you think we're going? England. The war in Europe ain't over yet. No, it's not. Attention, men, attention. Major Horace has something to tell you. Man, you've been going through some intensive training here in Kansas. This phase of your training is now about over. Now we're going to move. We will operate from rear bases in India and forward bases in China. Our targets will be Japan and Manchuria. Dismissed. What did I tell you, Weegee? I don't get it. The war in Europe ain't over yet. Major General Kenneth B. Wolfe, commander of this first unit, the 58th bombardment wing, flew ahead to India. The ground crews left by ship in January 1944. With them went supplies enough to cover 150 acres piled 100 feet high. Meantime, the air personnel in Kansas were preparing to fly their B-29s to India. All right, all right. Easy on those parts, boys. Maybe needing them. We've got the extra engine secured inside, Lieutenant Du Bois. That's good, Sergeant. Got to get all these parts here aboard and secured too. Yes, sir. Time's getting short, Sergeant. All right, Lottale. Let's get with it. Hey, why are we taking all these engines and parts with us? We ain't going to drop engines onto them. All right, all right. Come on. Give me a lift on this thing. One by one as the B-29s were ready, they took off and headed out across the Atlantic. I wonder what kind of a place India is. What I'm wondering about is their first mission. The sky giant roared through the night over the Atlantic. Brooks, we've got to be making the land fall in about 10 minutes. Roger. I'll be looking for it. Hey, Moose. See land yet? Not yet. See anything down there? Bucket head? Nothing but a lot of darkness and water. Hey, Poplowski. There it is. Landfall. Yes, sir. I find them, don't I? When we get to India, I'll buy you a cobra. The navigator learned to trust his instrument, gained confidence in himself. The co-pilot, given more chance to fly, became more familiar with the airplane. Although some of the ground crews had left two months before by surface vessel, some of the B-29s beat them to India. Their air crews immediately went to work with the ground crews to condition the B-29s for combat. They also resumed their training. Right, sir. I came over here to find a better school. There was an answer to that. You've just begun to learn about the B-29. You've got a background, but you need experience. You need to learn from the experience of others. We'll go on training straight through combat operations. We've got to be so proficient that combat procedures are automatic. We've got to learn to be at home over the target. We've got to know the way to and from the target, as well as we know the way to and from the mess hall. Not only our lives depend on it, our success depends on it. They went on from there. The up-and-atom and the other B-29s of the 58th Bombardment Wing flew over the hump from India at 22,000 feet altitude to Chinese forward bases. They carried maximum loads of gasoline and bombs. In order to make one bombing raid on Japan, three to four round-flips to China had to be made over the hump. Our greatest problem is with the engines. They operated perfectly in the United States, and now they're blocking. This is the flight engineer. We think we found the reason. The B-29 was built to operate at the altitude at which we're now flying, alright? But it had been figured that the airplane had fly relatively low for the first hours, gradually rising to altitude as the fuel was consumed and the plane became lighter. But in flying the hump, we've had to climb to 20,000 feet and more immediately. Now this plus the heavy loads of fuel and bombs that we've been carrying is overburden the engines. Engineers and scientists at the bases in India and at home in the United States went to work. The planes were in India and China. Supplies were arriving in the millions of tons. The personnel was ready. The need for hitting Japan was growing. Exhaustive tests were undertaken. Changes were made. The B-29s were ready for their shakedown raids. The target, Bangkok. We got off, Brooks. Yes, sir. It's going to be tough flying in formation through this rain. Yeah. On soon, season. Thank you. Yes, Paplowski. We're going to fly through all kinds of weather. I've got to be sure to get a fast reading when there's a break in the overcast. Roger. The navigator, the pilot and the flight engineers, sweated out the hours of flying through rain and clouds. This was the real thing. This was for keeps. Keep your eyes open, Buckethead. You too, Weegee. Can hardly see the other B-29s. Those Japs ought to send out an escort, the leaders to the target. Almost. Where is Bangkok? You'll find out, Lartail.  Over the target, the crew of the Uppon Atom found seven-tenths cloud cover. Blackburst about them as they made their run. Japanese fighters, nine of them coming in at two o'clock. Ah, Tony's the next. Mirror. We got one. Look at him. Yeah, he's going down to the smoke. He comes away. Good enough. Let's go home. We're hit, Major. We're hit. Yes, he must have gotten one of our engines. You knocked out number three. That Blackburst got us, sir. Number three engine stop. Yes, Corporal. Attention, entire crew. Number three engine is out. It's 1,100 miles back to base. We can make it. Over. The work of four engines was thrown on the three remaining engines. How are we doing, Du Bois? Number one is heating up pretty badly, sir. Number one engine is sparking, sir. Yes, Corporal. Think it'll hold up, Du Bois? I don't know, sir. The power is falling off. She's... she's following. There she goes. She's stopped. Attention, entire crew. Number one engine is quit. Throw out everything that can be moved. Every item that can be moved was jettisoned. The ship continued to lose altitude. Attention, sir, every piece of equipment that can be unscrewed or unboated. You know this airplane from north to tail. Sir, let's throw overboard. Did you hear that, you guys? We're going to throw everything overboard. The machine guns and even the cannons.  Equipment showered down as the plane limped through the sky. We're going to make it, sir. There's the field. I knew we'd make it. Bob Klauski? I knew it. That was the dress rehearsal. The real show was coming. The minute the upper-natum was in its parking circle, the crews were working on her. In a matter of days, the engines were back in running conditions. The turrets and guns and everything else that had been jettisoned were replaced. Every one of the crew that had made the raid on Bangkok now had had combat experience. Now they were ready for the big show. Japan itself. The target? The Imperial Ironwall. The steel center at your water. Attention. In less than a minute now, we'll get the signal. The most crucial moment will be taking off. We're loaded. Not only with bombs, but with gasoline enough for our 3200-mile round trip. And then some. All of it. Watch it. Takeoff signal coming up. Twenty. Fifteen. Ten. Five. Let's go. Flaps up, Captain. Roger. This was it. This is what they'd been working towards. Mid-afternoon from the fields of China, the B-29s roared into the skies, headed for Japan. Hey, Jahars, to clear the mountains, we'll have to climb immediately to 15,000 feet. Roger. Five hours of furtling through the super-overcast at more than 300 miles an hour. Five hours loaded with the substance of destruction. Target? 11 p.m. Japan time. All gunners alert. We'll be over the Japanese Carter and China in ten minutes. All right, you guys. Warm up your guns. We've only been flying an hour. Yeah. What are they doing? Coming out to meet us? Give your guns a practice first. Mine's okay. Same here. Those mine. Clark, tell about your guns back there. Okay. Now keep your eyes open all you've got. The B-29s headed into the oncoming darkness. They're flying at 15,000 feet now. It's pitch dark. Major Hawes, can you hold a ship steady so I can get a celestial shot? Roger. Thanks, Major. Less than one hour from the target now. Japan is in complete blackout. Major Hawes, that light below at 10 o'clock, that's our IP. IP. Initial point. From this bearing, the B-29s climb up to 18,000 feet and head straight for the target. Target area directly ahead. Bomb bay doors open. Okay, Carter, your airplane. The Bombardier, Crouch Strawberry's bomb site, now has control of the airplanes with the automatic pilot. Hey, searchlights. Searchlights weeping for us. Here, too. There must be dozens of them down there. On the alert, your gunners. Hey, they even land at us. What'd you expect, Buckethead bootcays? They got us bracketed in searchlights, three of them. That's clear. I can't see a thing. It's blind to me. Cut it off, those lads! Been to the sky by the three powerful searchlights. The anti-aircraft explosions burst closer and closer. The up-and-atom does not waver annihilator from its course. Heads straight for the target. We're going to take a look at the B-29s. The up-and-atom does not waver annihilator from its course. Heads straight for the target. Japanese fighters coming at 4 o'clock. Get them. Time's away. Okay, let's go home. That was the start. This was the end of the beginning in the Pacific War. The first assault by B-29s had been made against the Japanese homeland. The steel mills at Yawata had been laid in ruins. This was the pattern. 68 B-29s hit Yawata that night on June 15, 1944. Since then, we have gained bases on Guam, Saipan, and Tinian on Okinawa. The 58th bombardment wing, which made the first raid from China, is now the 20th Air Force and now flies from the Marianas. The 629s are hitting Japan in each raid. The number is growing with each passing day. Hit Japan with bombs at the rate of 2 million tons each year. This is the promise of General of the Army H.H. Arnold. We have worked out a program of complete destruction of Japan. We will hit all of Japan. We are just starting. The B-29, today recognized as the outstanding airplane of the world, has changed the entire aspect of aerial warfare. To tell the role of the B-29 in the war in the Pacific, the national broadcasting company presents Brigadier General Lawrence C. Craigie of the Aerotechnical Service Command, one of the top experts in the development of the super fortress. The next voice you hear will be that of General Craigie. We take you now to Cincinnati. Tonight the Pacific story has created for you a report of our B-29 raids against the JAP homeland. Each new strike packs added punch as the size of our Army Air Forces over Japan grows larger. We are now leveling Niponese industry with flights of more than 600 super fortresses. General Arnold has promised the JAPs aerial armadas of more than a thousand B-29s. A modern miracle of air power which started right here in the United States is slowly devastating the industrial cities of Japan. It seems impossible that this bold plan was begun only six years ago, but in 1939 the Air Force declared its need for a long-range super bomber. No airplane like it existed in the world, starting with a set of military requirements which were virtually beyond the reach of man, material or machines, the Boeing aircraft company, and the organization we now call the Air Technical Service Command cooperated to create this tremendous airplane. Those of us who were the Army Air Force members of that team can testify to the endless research, testing and changes that went into the B-29. More than 1,100 modifications were made before it was accepted for service. Our joint efforts were finally rewarded when the B-29 emerged as a completely new and mighty bombardment airplane with tremendous range and bomb capacity. By virtue of its high operating altitude, the super fort gains considerable protection from flak, and by virtue of its great speed and heavy defensive armament, it is an extremely tough target for enemy fighters. The B-29 stands today as one of the great milestones of progress in the 38-year history of the Army Air Forces. You may ask, why spend the money? Why not wait until they can bring over from Europe the airplanes we use to destroy German industry? Your answer is in the headlines. No other bomber in the world can do the job the B-29 is doing today. Distances are great in the Pacific. If we had only fleets of smaller airplanes, it would be impossible for them to fly from our bases in the Marianas, bomb Japan and return safely. If we were forced to use only B-17s and B-24s, we would have to capture many additional bases close to our objectives. Take them against a strong enemy that is tough and full of fight. Such an operation would be very expensive. Our B-29 super fortress decreases the cost the United States must pay for a road leading to the heart of Japan. It saves time. It saves lives. Even if all our bases were close enough to the Jap mainland to enable B-17s and B-24s to be used, we find that it would take 1,800 of the smaller flying forts and liberators to carry the bomb load that can be carried by 600 of our B-29s. You can estimate for yourself what will happen to Japan when we start hitting our targets with 1,000 or more B-29s. But to increase the strength of these attacks, we must maintain our B-29 production schedule. Every man and woman engaged in aircraft production, subcontracts included, must stay on the job. I've flown with B-29 crews in India and China and I can tell you they are proud of their association with the super force. They are putting their faith in this bomber and they are trusting the American people to keep them coming over in a steady stream. This close cooperation of the production and battle fronts will hasten the arrival of VJ Day and speed the time when that historic flag, which flew over the capital in Washington on December 7th, 1941, was later raised over North Africa, Rome and Berlin, will fly victoriously over Tokyo. This story is presented by the National Broadcasting Company and its affiliated independent stations as a public service to clarify events in the Pacific and to make understandable across currents of life in the Pacific Basin. For a reprint of this specific story program, send 10 cents in stamps or coins to University of California Press, Berkeley, California. May I repeat, for a reprint of this specific story program, send 10 cents in stamps or coins to University of California Press, Berkeley, California. The Pacific story is written and directed by Arnold Marcus. The original musical score was composed and conducted by Thomas Paluso. Your narrator, Gaine Whitman. This program came to you from Cincinnati, Ohio and Hollywood, California. This is the National Broadcasting Company.


This study examined the use of cloud services in distance learning and identified ways of improving their use. A model of distance learning system and cloud services interaction was developed, and the methodological particularities of this interaction were described. On the basis of the results of the experiment, it was concluded that there is a low level of use of cloud technologies in distance learning due to a lack of awareness of teachers in the possibilities of its use. It is therefore recommended that universities should conduct work in familiarization and training of university lecturers using cloud services in professional educational activities. This article was authored by Hennedy M. Kravtsov and Olga Onetkova.


old narratives. That's not us. You know it didn't go away we wanted and blame me and we'll get better from this. We'll learn from this mistake. There's a lot of ways to look at it. They're easy narratives. It is what it is. We lost the game. Didn't make enough plays. We had chances to put them away. We turned the ball in the red zone. We had the penalty. It was probably a four point swing. It really could have put them away and you got to give the Saints credit. They made they made more play than we did and even when the game whatever there's time there's breathing this team's gonna fight till the end which we did. We had a chance try to kick a 63 yarder and they blocked it so that that's that was a message you led you know again it's it's about us we got 16 games and if we have the right mindset we'll improve from this and become a better team. The decision on the play caught third down the Bible and then the fourth down I mean the play called play never developed yeah quarterback center exchange under center so it happened obviously we'd love to have that back but it is what it is and a decision to punt on fourth down yeah I mean obviously in hindsight it's 2020 but when you're in that situation I had faith if you don't get it right there they're even closer so that's what you had and we try to bleed every second sure there's a part of me that wanted to go for it again hindsight is 2020 but the time my thought was at the time let the clock bleed down let's pin them back they had no timeouts we made them use all our timeouts and again if you had to do it over again obviously knowing end result sure make the other call change defensively over the last three drives for you guys what it were where did you all change well I mean we mixed up the calls I mean they made a place and we didn't get to the quarterback and that's essentially what it was well there's a pressure or four man rush different coverages and you got to give them credit they kept them clean at the end we were we were collapsing the pocket most of the game what it mattered we didn't get there and you know the same thing I thought for three and a half quarters we dominated the lines of scrimmage what they were able to make the plays at the end there I mean look good guys like this is a different team every year it's everything that was last year right the game happened oh the collapse what happened they went back down and scored and won it they had opportunity again today we there's clock reading we didn't sit here and say woe is me we practice those situations try to keep try to get what we thought was a coverage thought may you know actually I'm not gonna say anything about that but kept swinging get the ball to CP get it down work our mechanics there's no panic on our sideline try to in that they happen to get a personal foul we had a shot to go in our bang the timeout with two seconds and so I thought we had a chance at least they gave us an opportunity and they made another play and we didn't they blocked it to that message yes again yeah it's the same guys this is the same team you guys wrote our obituary back in in May and you'll continue to write our obituary who cares because we got 16 games and we don't learn from this and get better and we got to go go play LA they got a three game three-day jump on us so we'll watch the tape we'll look for corrections and then we got to get get going on the ramps well you know no to your point Jeff I mean I didn't see the fatigue I mean I thought again I thought we handle the lines of scrimmage well and obviously they made plays down the end and we didn't coach Jason McDonough court 360 sports Corral Patterson had a series where he carried the ball eight times 50 yard including a touchdown but we didn't see much of them a lot of them are so there's a looks that they gave us there's a lot of runs that Marcus had to pretty pretty effective so again some of these guys aren't superhuman I couldn't give them 50 carries but there's a lot of things that go when you when you run run some of the things we we did how many rushing cars we had 201 I'll take that and obviously I mean you wish we had one more you know maybe an on-site you wish you could have gotten a look different look at the spot on Marcus when he put the ball out they didn't and we bobbled the snap and that will lead and gave an opportunity to go down there and for them to kick the field goal is that Marriota's ability to Marriota's ability to get upfield is that kind of try to show the diversity of the team we're trying to use every asset and weapon we got so I thought I've been telling all year we're not gonna play the exact same we play last year we're gonna play the strengths of our team we got we got an edge we want to play with up front and I thought for the most part we play with that edge up front is that what you wanted things to look like for the most part most part other than the turnover in the red zone we had two fumbles of belief OZ the one on the on the explosive and then obviously Marcus got the first down trying to give himself up and got a good job knocked the ball out and then wait that you know the penalty down a low one you know that one bothers me I guess I meant more just the way the way the diversification of packages that was you were kind of that run as you wanted it to yeah when he'll got the explosive in the first half on the short yard situation was that a misalignment on your part with the defense it was it was you get it well I mean really is can we can we protect can we run the football on a defense that was supposed to be the steel curtain in the 85 bearish front that's what I wanted to see the challenge that we come up and manhandle that front which is one of the better fronts in football and so we'll get another shot on down in New Orleans and we can't wait so right whatever y'all want the same guys that you guys ranked as 45th you buried us in May barriers again we don't care we'll get back to work thank you just look at missed opportunities you guys are you know three quarters you guys were dominant and then the last half quarter things kind of slipped away what did you see and what was the difference I would say the biggest difference was just finishing in the red zone you know we had opportunities at multiple opportunities to go in there and score touchdowns and kind of put the game away we allowed them as an offense to stick around and that's something that we have to get back and look at and correct I got you the fumble as you were going toward the end ends on there what what happened there and some of this yeah honestly I just lost track of where I was I thought I needed a few more for a first down so I put my head down not realizing that I already had it looking back on that situation wish I would have just gotten down protected the ball we would have another chance to score points if you were to hear that you had 201 yards rushing as a team and lost would you believe it um no I don't yeah I mean it's tough right like I think if you're able to run the football as well as we did you know make plays in the passing game obviously we just got to find ways to score more points I think we did a great job moving the ball guys up front did an unbelievable job all game of controlling line of scrimmage and when it comes down to it in this league if you're not scoring points in the red zone you leave the door open and gotta give credit to the Saints they found ways to make plays at the end to win the game yeah that was a hundred percent on me you know unfortunately I was trying to we had a great look for the play that we had called and I try to cheat it and get get back a little quicker so I would have an opportunity to read it a little bit better and you know it's something that you take for granted unfortunately you know it kind of got away from us and that's that's completely on me yeah I thought you had a great day and for us it's no surprise we've seen that throughout camp we've seen that in OTAs so I think it's a great stepping stone you know but that's the expectation that's that's the standard we're gonna hold him to but I love playing with these guys you know they continue to find ways to get open and you just got to find ways to get in the ball when it comes and this may be a question for later in the week but when it comes to breaking this game down do you look at it collectively or do you break down you're like we played really well for three quarters and then let's go through the fourth quarter and what went wrong how do you kind of look at it when you're going through it I definitely think you take it as a whole because I do think there was missed opportunities throughout the entire course of the game and you know it's it's part of week one right you kind of iron some things out this is the full first game that we got to play together with that being said I'm not going to look at it specifically you know one quarter or another I really believe if you look at it a whole there's ways that we can improve and find ways to score more points and hopefully win the game Marcus you look real real good out there I mean almost vintage Oregon I thought you may have had a green jersey under there somewhere but you look real good running the ball getting up and down north and south not so much east to west is that something that you know you want to do more of during the season to give the team a different look some teams can't sit on you well yeah I think it just kind of depends on what what they're doing defensively you know the Saints basically were allowing me to pull some of those on zone reads giving me opportunities to get north and south but we'll have to see week to week and that's what's fun about this offense is we can do a lot of different things and we don't we're not very we're not one-dimensional we can kind of do a lot of things we got a bunch of guys are very versatile so if it calls for it yes if not you know I'll do whatever I can help this team with you've been in this league for a while now how hard is it to let go losses like this yeah it is tough but I think as an older player and I think we got some older vets in this in this locker room to understand the nature of the beast it's one of 17 you know there's 16 more of these you know there's a lot of good on the tape there's a lot of things we can get better at but I don't think you got to hang your head at all it's early in this season we will find ways to improve this team will continue to come together and you know I love playing with these guys I think we got a chance to be good Marcus gotten here a little bit late offensively with what you guys were able to do today is that what you envisioned the thing would look like it's kind of hard to say because I do think we're so versatile and a lot of things that we do that it just kind of depends week to week but you know I guess today was one of those days where you know up front we were doing a great job and we're able to run the football so yes I think we are in the right track but we just have to be better in red zone and and some of these start down situations you mentioned the red zone again you may have been asked us already what happened there on the fumble did you just yeah yeah I was saying earlier I just lost track where I was you know I thought I needed a few more yards I put my head down to get what I thought was the first down it's just unfortunate one of those things you know looking back on it if I can understand where I'm at you know I'd love to get down give us another chance to get some points you made mention and coach made mention that 17 games and this is the first can you look out because it's the first time we're looking at 17 games and the importance of a game one in a 17 game season trying to just look forward to it yeah I what's really cool about this team and what's really cool about the culture that they're building here is it's just one day at a time we're doing our best to stay present finding ways to improve on what is going on in that moment I think if you look too far ahead or if you're looking too far back you get yourself in trouble so as a team you know we're gonna find ways to get better from this and we're just gonna take you one day at a time and when things are rolling and we look our or we pick our heads up in December I think we're like we're at absolutely you know there's more opportunities right with 17 games there's more chances to win games and find yourself in a playoff fight thank you guys how we try to lead in this situation for this game today you know what I think the message is simple we just got to go back to work and you know chalk this one up we get to see these guys later in the year definitely unfortunate how you know the game ended today but we still got a lot of work ahead of us gritty what do you think happened in the fourth quarter like well how did this fall apart for you guys you know it's gonna take some going back and looking at tape but um clearly we got some things to fix you know and so we got a you know fix you know I'm saying so pressure wise you guys actually you had more sacks today than you did all last year like what where were you guys able to get pressure and at what point did you realize maybe there were gonna be opportunities to get pressure you know it's good to get get to the quarterback today from the whole front and some and also some bliss as well and we had a couple cover sacks as well so I mean it was a it was a it was a whole defensive effort but um we got to finish the game you know I think I mean if you it was encouraging to get to the quarterback but you know you want to win what did they change maybe protection wise in the fourth quarter because really for up until that really quick strike drive yeah you guys were able to get a quarterback and then you really didn't after that yeah I mean if passes were a little quicker and change some protection slit slit a little bit to me more and then also just some just was moving the pocket a little bit as you can see a couple of plays wasn't just stagnant so they start being a little more mobile as far as moving the pocket and not just sitting there so I mean they made some adjustments and we just got to make some as well did the tempo change enough for the Saints offense that kind of affected how the defense was able to pressure them I'm not sure if it was a temple thing like I said just being being in the present moment you got to go back in and look at see what we was really going on you know and so I don't know if it was a temple thing I mean they they did push the ball down the field towards the end and try to get back I mean obviously they had to go tempo because the time was running out so I don't know if that I mean the temple that was I don't it was great I know it's a new year with a new team but at the elder statesmen of this defense you've seen this script before of the games and your experience in other years what's needed to get out of it so it doesn't become a trend you know what we just got to go back to work man you know I didn't sit up here and sit up before but it's simple you know we got to finish we got to finish the game as a whole team and that's everybody doing the job and and there's more than one play in the game that determines the outcome of a game so everybody takes a part in it so I think that's that's the thing we have to know going forward but I could tell you know I'm encouraged with this team because we came out there and we play we had great energy we had a stadium rocking and you know it's probably one of the most if not the most exciting I've seen the team just making some big plays on offense and defense and the fans just giving us everything they got I mean it was a beautiful scene today and you know what we want to make these fans proud and come out and respond from this win I mean from this loss and then just continue to stack up some wins so we can keep it keep it you know turned up like that I mean it was just a amazing scene I just don't want it to go to waste you know because because this would that's what we can be man we just got to finish the game you know unfortunately we came up short and there's no excuses we gotta go back to work yeah greaty you were talking about the scenes from today you were really animated down there on the sideline I think it's the most probably been in a while what was it about today really that just had you going I mean I miss playing football man it's first game of the season gets a sense you ain't got no blood flowing for that shoot I'm excited making some big plays I just love playing the game you know that's why I do what I do you know at this point in my career it's all about you know being the best I can be and and you know that's what I was putting on display I mean shoot it's fun it's a fun game to play I love this greaty you're a holdover from the Super Bowl team and obviously you didn't go undefeated that year so what were you able to impart on the younger players the players I mean I'm not a hold of I earn my way here to this strike to the third contract to be with this team it's a blessing to play for Atlanta five is my hometown team and I take a year by year and I earn I earn every strike that I that I get going for and that's what I'm gonna continue to do and and I'm gonna see to put good football on the field and I'm focused on 2022 and I don't you know and that's that's what it is greaty this is a really young team as well like how do what do you have to do to kind of keep them from lingering too much on this you know I think like I said earlier the message is clear we got to go back to work you know young vet whatever it is if you on the field you got to be able to be ready to do your job because you know next team we played around don't care about you know us soaking on this we got to go back to work you know I'm saying so the message is simple for anybody got stuck on step on the field and going to prepare for this next game


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Hey guys, this is the Bishop with Radio Rothbard and we've got a great offer only for Radio Rothbard listeners. You've been talking a lot of late about Murray Rothbard's Betrayal of the American Right and if you want to get your own copy, for one you should already have one, but if you don't yet, that's okay. We have a 20% off coupon code at the Mises store. Just hit code Rothpod, R-O-T-H-P-O-D and you'll get 20% off a new copy of Betrayal of the American Right. One of my favorite books of Rothbard, one that I think you'll definitely enjoy, particularly if you're a fan of this show. Welcome back to Radio Rothbard, though Bishop here joined, as always, by Ryan McMakin. We have a special guest for today's episode, Brandon Buck, who I was very happy to meet at this year's RGS. Brandon is getting his PhD at George Mason History, but his focus is on a topic that is unfortunately relevant to today's world, kind of the history of the anti-war right. Before we begin, Ryan, last week's episode, we got a lot of great feedback. Did you get any particular interesting emails from last week's show on the right against the regime? Well, I did get an email from Joshua Tate, who wrote that article we had talked about a lot at the Bull Work. He was very polite. I thought we had trashed the article too much to earn any politeness, but I mean, he was right. We actually had said, right? I said, I basically agree with this article, except that for the framing, right? Because he was talking about how the issue is, is that suddenly the right is waking up to this idea that they actually oppose what the government is doing and not just the welfare state aspect of it. And then so the real area of disagreement was, is that a good thing or a bad thing? Or is it a dangerous thing? I of course think it's a good thing because as we'll talk about today, the right is just so law for so long played real nice with the regime and its wars and its socialism and stuff. Yeah, we criticize Medicaid every now and then, but basically everything else the regime does is fine. Social security, they never actually criticized that. And then of course, openly support wars. And it's been this way since 1945 at least. But our guest, I think, will probably provide a lot more detail there on that. So I'm looking forward to our discussion today specifically on the domestic views on foreign policy. And that's a great lead-in. So Brandon, one of the things I love about your research project is that I'm sure, particularly if you're listening to this podcast, at least you have pasting familiarity with Rothbard's narrative of the betrayal of the American right, how the neo-conservatives were able to take over the right side of American politics and the Republican Party and the dire consequences that it had for the second half of the 20th century and the days we live in now. But your research builds on that narrative with a lot of very empirical work. I know you've spent a lot of research coming through congressional voting records and all that sort of fun stuff. So for our audience, can you just explain a little bit about your research project and kind of the work that you've been doing going through with your PhD? Yes. So my research started with that Rothbard sort of 54-55 sort of window. That is to sort of agreed upon scholarly consensus by people who study both the early national security state and American politics. And of course, it's also held on to by folks like Rothbard, Justin Romondo, Bill Kaufman, and other folks who are certainly closer to these events described. So I came with this project with a question because I also knew about Rothbard, the paleo strategy Buchanan in 92. So I was curious where did right wing non-interventionism go in that after that sort of 54-55 window? And so very quickly, I discovered that it didn't really go anywhere. It survives in a kind of attenuated form, a sort of fortress America vision for the Cold War world. And while Rothbard and Co were certainly right that a lot of changes happened in that sort of 54-55 window, Taft dies in 53, national review begins up in that time frame as well. A lot of folks pass away, Garrett Garrett being one of them. If you turn your gaze towards Congress and towards other forms of conservative media, you'll find that much of the non-interventionism of the interwar period survives despite the necessities of the Cold War world. So very interesting. And can you talk about some of these kind of congressional figures? Because I know with kind of the way that history is written, right? We focus on presidents, right? We focus on the victors of sort of the national inner party debates. But obviously, you know, particularly the 20th century, the regional conflicts are very fascinating from a variety of perspectives, right? You can think about various Southern populists within the Democratic Party that obviously do not fit kind of your standard narrative of the left becoming, you know, the more liberal, you know, culturally left sort of style of things. But I know you highlight within your work some of the right-wing politicians, particularly I think with the Midwest, right, that with their votes, right, with their actions within Congress, you know, they were on the losing side of this gradual ramp up of, you know, second half of the 20th century kind of American imperialism abroad. Can you talk a little bit about, you know, some of the interesting congressional figures that were kind of keeping this fight alive, at least within the halls of Congress? Yes. So the Midwest, so the rural Midwest of the Republican Party hangs on to much of its non-interventionism coming out of the interwar period. So in the interwar period leading up to World War II, the sort of headquarters of American non-interventionism was in the Midwest due to a variety of historical, you know, factors we can get into if you like. But these folks remain largely unchanged after the end of World War II, whereas the Northern Republicans of a more liberal and moderate stripe who go into the hukuhu during the interwar period were more sympathetic to non-interventionism. They're really changed by the events of the war. However, these holdouts in the Midwest are not. They do sort of bend a little bit on protections for Taiwan. Once again, back in importance in the news, but on other aspects, particularly on the issue of foreign aid, they remain every bit as entrenched as they were during earlier periods, even more so. There was a little bit of compromise in the immediate aftermath of World War II via the Marshall Plan. It was sold as a temporary measure. How often have we heard that before? But it becomes institutionalized as the Cold War goes on. And so these holdouts in the Midwest maintain their resistance and try to sabotage these plans in Washington. And the other aspect were some elements of multilateralism and aspects of defense packs and the like. So as late as 1965, the Republican right wanted to pull U.S. troops out of Europe, with the exception of West Berlin nearly as a kind of tripwire for the Soviets. And they wanted to do the same for East Asia, despite having a certain soft spot for certain governments in the Pacific. And throughout all this, they maintained a sort of dissident view of the Second World War. And I think this is really the sort of lifeblood of their dissident view in the Cold War. They did not view the Second World War as this purely righteous accident that was forced upon the United States with the events of Pearl Harbor, but rather it was the inevitable outcome of American involvement in the Philippines and in Europe during World War I. Well, I remember in the... Well, I wasn't there. But in the late 70s, in the wake of Vietnam, and of course what you got is you have Lyndon Johnson basically really starting that war, sustaining it, making the buildup happen. And then of course Truman with Korea, right? So I remember in the late 70s, it became kind of a talking point among some Republicans to refer to those quote-unquote Democrat wars. And so try to position the GOP a little bit as the anti-war party, recognizing, of course, that these wars were very unpopular. But of course that was all pre-Ragan when it became gospel to revive the public relations value of the military and to really play up the value of military intervention. And Grenada, I suppose, is perhaps hailed as a big success. And the next thing you know then in the late 80s, you got Panama and so I think that slow buildup then to Iraq, the first Iraq war. And then I guess in typical dem fashion, Clinton just normalizes all of that as well as the multilateral aspect of it. And then you get 9-11. And so when I were talking about this, I think offline last time on how the anti-interventionist thing never really quite went away on the right. And it wasn't really due too much to theoretical weakness. They had some good arguments and they certainly had people who were sympathetic to the point of view on the right. But 9-11 just was really just devastating to the argument in a similar way that Pearl Harbor was devastating to the America First Committee. And that just convincing people under those conditions that because people just don't understand diplomacy, they don't understand that defensive military is different from just invading a bunch of countries and that those things don't necessarily make you saver. It's real hard to explain those things. So it's just much easier to say, hey, these people attacked us. So let's start a new war. And so just those two events were always devastating to the idea of non-intervention. And it never killed the idea intellectually or theoretically, but you have to then get people beyond those sorts of historical events to start taking seriously the idea of non-intervention again, it seems. Yeah, you mentioned the late 70s. And so in 73, what you might think of is like the last of the old right retires, a man named H.R. Gross. You can kind of think of him as a sort of proto-Ron Paul in a way. And he quite tragically voted for the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution despite being very vocally against the war in Vietnam. But he hung around into the early 70s and opposed rather vehemently the expansion of the war into Laos and Cambodia. And I was just going through his papers a few weeks ago and reading these constituent letters, people like begging him to do what you can to get out of this. We were told this war was going to be ramping down. And he says that he's trying, but there's this kind of sense of futility because what vestiges there were on these kind of issues from the late 50s and early 60s had, through attrition, either they just died in office or there was also, as I'm sort of arguing in my dissertation, the FCC and the IRS were being leveraged against some of these so-called ultra-right broadcasters who held onto some of these dissident views of Vietnam. So one of the quandaries I'm trying to get my arms around is how is it that the old rights view of America and the world becomes the sunset at precisely the same time one would think it would have its most sort of fertile ground? And not just internationally, but also domestically, right? Like all of the revelations of what all the shenanigans to CA and the FBI were up to throughout the 60s. But this seedbed has been basically sort of cleared out first by the sort of Eisenhower wing of the Republican Party at the top and then through folks like William F. Buckley, policing people on his right. So by the time you get to the 70s, what vestiges of this ideology there were have basically been shunted into the libertarian movement and perhaps like the Rockford Institute in Illinois. But what small threads of institutional power which had hung on at the end of 45 are basically cut by the mid 70s and that's how you get reaganism and neoconservatism and the like. This is one of the very interesting and kind of troubling parallels that we see right now. I know you've written about the way, as you mentioned, the FCC and some of these other government institutions. You think back at Pearl Harbor, right? That's an attack on American soil. You think about 9-11. It's an attack on American soil. Some guy comes up to a bar and punches you in the face. It's the emotional response to fight back. It doesn't matter if some other guy that told him that you were hitting on his girl, right? So he felt that he was justified in doing so, right? There's a natural reaction there to kind of fight back. But it seems that the amount of effort the regime requires to get normal Americans to have that sort of emotional buy-in into conflicts that did not start with kind of shedding of American blood on American soil. That requires an incredible amount of propaganda power. And you talked about what are the articles you've written about the way that the living threat of fascism was kind of used as a way of demonizing these sort of non-interventionist right-wingers, which again seems extremely relevant when you have Joe Biden out there actively bragging, taunting. I think yesterday it was these heroic right-wing Americans that want to stand up against the American government. Well, you're going to need F-15s. Again, funny to do that shortly after the anniversary of pulling out of Afghanistan. Or the explicit line of the Democratic Party that the current Republican Party is essentially a neo-fascist movement trying to destroy American democracy, which of course is meant to embody everything good in the world. Can you talk a little bit about that dynamic and maybe some parallels that you see between what's happening in the 60s and that era and the kind of modern political environment we find ourselves in? Yeah, I certainly think we're living through a third brown scare. I think the first brown scare would be the interwar period, as you say, this fear of domestic fascism. Yeah, I mean, there was an American boom, there were silver shirts, there were some people of the, you might call it the far right or the illiberal right, but they were so far few in number, they had no real political power. The Nazis were horrible at domestic espionage in the United States, what few agents they had got captured. But nevertheless, these small groups and their rather tenuous connection to more mainstream figures or bodies like the America First Committee was used to gin up this fear of domestic fascism. And this did attenuate the argument about intervention and then about America in the post-war period. We think of the interwar period as posting essentially just like anti-war right, but there were anti-war progressives, there were liberals who were opposed to intervention, but partially through this sort of brown scare, those people are sort of scared away or severed off from the forces on the right. And this had a bit of a, this is sort of tamped down in the post-war period. I recently came into some great sources where I figured in Robert E. Wood, who was a chief figure amongst the America First Committee, was writing to a senator named Carl Mont asking him to turn the DICE committee, which originally was used to hunt the far right, for tool to go after domestic communists and the people who smeared him during the interwar period. So you can see like the second red scare really is being a form of payback for the brown scare. I think this is something that Rothbard mentions in Betrayal of the American Right quite openly is that he wanted revenge for being accused of being a fascist in the 30s. And then if this boomerangs back, you can argue that there was a second brown scare, which is really what we call the ultra-right fear in the 1960s. Well, once again, the fear of domestic fascism was used to curtail the Overton window.  I think we also know that story. And we're sitting through it again. And I think unlike the earlier periods, so one of the things that I've been writing about is conspiracism and conspiratorial thinking and arguing that the mode that we're living in where people don't trust the institutions is well-grounded in reality, like empirically. A big part of the brown scare and the interwar period were people on the right and others more generally understanding that they are basically deceived into entering World War I, like the British intelligence was trying to gin up American opinion to support intervention. They had suspicions that the same thing was happening. And they didn't know it at the time, but it was.  They wanted to survive as a nation. But they went so far as to interfere in American elections. They actually got a very prominent non-interventionist unceded, many of Hamilton fish the third. So revelations of this came out in the early 60s, right as the SEC and the IRS were launching their war against the first generation of conservative talk radio. So conservatives who were alive in the 30s, now active in the 60s, they're coming to find out that, oh, wait a minute, we were right, like, there really was a conspiracy against us. And so you fast forward 30 years later, the revelations of the SEC and the IRS come out in the 90s. And so now you have two, really three generations of sort of malfeasance on the part of the American establishment feeding into this notion that, yes, the institutions are in fact corrupt and arrayed against us. So I think part of this sort of fear of fascism now is the fact that only half of the country seems to be recognized this history. The fact that the government has used its institutions and its agencies to pin in the overton window, particularly on the issues of foreign policy. Well, and people I think recognize they're being lied to a lot of the time as an important component of the failure of institutions.  You really can't believe what they're telling you there. And that was often the blind spot that you would get on the right is, oh, you know, you can't trust the government, I don't believe anything they say, what's that? What's that? The federal government told me that Iran is planning to invade America and destroy everyone in America. Well, I believe that 100% do whatever it takes to invade and destroy Iran, because the federal government told me. And so it was just kind of this weird sort of self-defeating view of the regime that the right was taking. But I think it's taking more and more to get people worked up. I mean, even in World War Two, Paul Fussell in his book, War Time, notes that even in Europe, they really didn't know why they were there. And because everyone agreed that you have to fight Japan, because Japan bombed us and let's obliterate the Japanese. But Fussell, who served in Europe, said that the kind of the thinking among their common soldiers in Europe was like, I'm not quite sure why we're fighting Germany. And he said, when we would ask the higher ups, it was just some really generic stuff about fighting global fascism and how Nazis didn't like America. And they were fascists, and we're going to liberate Europe and all that stuff. It had nothing to do directly with defending the United States, as you could easily tell people who are fighting in the Pacific. Hey, look, the Japanese, they want to invade America. And so even then it required a bit of effort to get the Americans to buy into the war in Europe side of things. And you probably had continued then the issues with that, like Korea, Vietnam, you had to manufacture the whole domino theory thing. And it was quite delightful then to see finally, when they tried to get the US to the Americans to support the invasion of Syria, nobody seemed particularly enthusiastic about it. Nobody seemed to care. So they ended up putting a few small units in Syria and doing sort of a stealth invasion there. But I think the hope was among the neo-conservative crowd was that, well, this is the new Iran or Iraq, and we'll get everybody buying into this idea. We need troops and boots on the ground in Syria, and the support just never came. So it was at that point that I was wondering, maybe people are starting to kind of learn their lesson on this, that maybe it's getting harder and harder to convince people that this latest war is a good idea. And I think maybe some progress has actually been made in that respect. But I think as some of the point that Brandon is making is that it was never actually totally easy. There was always some effort that had to be made. And I think maybe when you look back on it, you just see the winning side of it. And you just think, well, everybody agreed that this was a great idea. But I think it is important to highlight that there is usually a sizable amount of dissent in a lot of these cases. But then the Washington elites just end up taking a position. And we've known, of course, for decades that elites don't have the same foreign policy positions as most of the taxpayers. There's usually a big gulf there in opinion. And that persists back into the 40s and 50s even. There were some actual disagreements. So I think it's important to keep in mind that this is not a new thing, right? The idea that there's some dissent here as far as foreign policy goes. And of course, the elites also don't have nearly as much skin in the game. I know one of the articles that you wrote, Brandon, you highlight the difference in casualties for Americans in rural America versus the size of the population within elite cities. One of the reasons that so much state capacity is needed to really fund that war machine is because a war machine churns out the bodies of Americans that are not those generally connected to those in power. Can you talk a little bit about that dynamic of your research? Yeah. So American foreign policy is fundamentally liberal. And I use that word advisedly. I don't mean leftist. I mean like a kind of center left liberal technocratic sort of view of the world. So it's always been kind of like a weird graft onto American conservative thinking. I mean, conservatism in America is basically sort of right liberalism. So I think in some way, one of the reasons why this is coming apart now is because since the 70s, with the elimination of the draft and the inflammation of selective service, we've, you know, the US government has basically created a martial cast where you have, you know, smaller and smaller segments of American society, more and more generational service, particularly in the American South, and also in the interior, you know, serving in the United States military. So, you know, as I've argued in some of my work is that, you know, over the past 20 years, you know, the burden of service has been pushed more and more into the exurbs and the rural areas of the United States, all across the United States. I mean, you know, one of the interesting things about this movement is it is sort of decentralized, whereas before the non-interventionist right was mostly Midwestern, not entirely, but mostly.  And, you know, part of what I argue is that this disparity in service has exacerbated other aspects of our cultural war and our domestic, you know, political squabbles, right? You know, regardless of how you feel about immigration, it doesn't make sense to argue that you can't afford to build a border wall or increase, you know, policing of the border while also spending a bajillion dollars to police other, you know, country's borders. Similarly, I think this has exacerbated this, you know, the sort of great sort, as it's been called, this creation of a sort of upper middle class versus sort of everybody else, that most folks who live in high income, you know, zip codes don't join, join the military, they certainly don't enlist. So I think this disparity is being wide and because there is this sort of view of middle America and rural America as being like part of the provinces, right? Like we're seeing this emergence of imperial thinking within the United States, which is fascinating because in the old days, people in the Midwest view themselves as being in a colonial relationship with the East. And I think you're starting to see that reemerge again. But this way, this time it's, it's, it's a two way street where people are openly, openly talking about populism as being like kind of rebellion in America against the sort of metropole. Brian, if I can ask a personal question, you yourself served in the military, can you talk, did you feel, again, obviously this was before diving into, you know, this is this sort of deep research project, but did you feel that sort of class difference serving, you know, versus say the politicians on TV or perhaps certain types of military leaders that do not go the enlisted route? Did you feel that kind of on the ground, or did your colleagues and brothers-in-arms, did they ever kind of comment on that sort of class distinction there that you're kind of talking about? Oh yeah. I mean, so I joined before 9-11. I come from a firmly upper middle-class background, basically enlisted as an actor of rebellion against my like, you know, elite bourgeois background. And yeah, I'm in, you know, in the sort of platoons that I served and I was basically only one or two of a person of my socioeconomic status. Most people were, you know, working-class white people from the rural areas or working-class black folks or Hispanics from the inner cities.  So yeah, I mean, without my military time, I probably never would have been exposed that regularly to working-class people. Just wouldn't have happened. I also served in the National Guard, which is a little bit different because it's a kind of a different socioeconomic strata.  And it's interesting because this is something that I think people, you know, I'm working on a PhD. I'm certainly not a blue-collar guy. But this is one of these aspects of the kind of class divide, which seems to be completely lost on people in my educational cohort that this exists. And unless it's addressed, it could lead to some serious problems in this country. One of the interesting things going on right now is that it seems that the regime is kind of actively provoking precisely the types of people that historically served in the military. I mean, you kind of saw a de facto purge of sorts with the use of vaccine mandates, where you had a lot of people fall out of military service. Because of that, a lot of people felt they had no other option and at the very least harbor an element of resentment to that. And I remember vividly, you know, I thought one of the most telling sort of portraits of modern American politics was the Biden administration, you know, where they bring in all these National Guard members to fortify the inauguration after January 6. And yet they didn't trust military members with ammo, right? So I can imagine a more fitting illustration of the modern regime than a militarized presidential inauguration full of service members that they don't trust to actually fire. It goes to the legitimacy of the standing power arrangements. I know, Ryan, you've talked a little bit about the falling enlistment rates as perhaps one of the positive indications of growing distrust of the regime. I have a feeling that it takes a whole lot of college education in a lot of time in D.C. to think that you're going to replace Georgia Farm Boys with a bunch of trans women of color to make up the backbone of the American military. It seems to be, though, where we are in America 2022. Well, did you see, speaking of that, maybe the plan to ensure that you still have Georgia Farm Boys applying to the military is to tank the economy. Yes, this is an interesting conspiracy theory. And I don't use that as a pejorative. Maybe there's some elements of this. Did you see that tweet? It was some GOP congressman now there are good arguments against loan forgiveness that Biden is doing. Lots of good arguments against it. But this GOP congressman gets there and says loan forgiveness is bad because now we won't have working class people over a barrel paying off student loans. And now they won't have to join the military to get the GI bill. Now people can just pay off their college costs without having to go through the military first. And he thought this was just a brilliant patriotic argument. He's like basically he was saying we aren't screwing poor people enough and forcing them into the military. This is a GOP thing. So I mean, just astounding that he said that part out loud. And I guess obviously he had this thought, right? I guarantee you, he said this to someone else like over lunch already and they all laughed and thought that was a brilliant observation. And then he says it on Twitter, just like truly bizarre. And for context, he's like Jim Banks, he's the head of the Republican Study Committee, which is kind of supposed to be the more conservative, serious wing of the Republican party. It was kind of the precursor to the Freedom Caucus before the Boehner, Ryan types kind of took it over. It was like 2014 or so. But like Banks was someone who he talks a lot about, you know, sort of working class blue collar values. And yet so this is not like Kevin McCarthy or some sort of like obvious dopey person out there. This is someone who in theory is one of the better than average Republicans who has this thought, which again just goes to just how insane that the quality of your average Republican congressman in DC really is even in 2022. Yeah, it's interesting you say that because I, you know, in some sense, I think the right is coming around on this notion of interventionism, but it's not necessarily coming around on this notion of militarism. Because, you know, once upon a time, to be a traditionalist conservative was to sort of do military service with some suspicion, especially for the draft, right? And there's this notion that the war in the draft upsets traditional families, it upsets your local communities, it pulls people out of their desired professions. But in that 48 to 55 window, it's when, you know, the right starts to sort of acquiesce to most aspects of defense spending, and that has been something that has been, you know, stuck. I suspect part of that might be, you know, material, especially in the in the Sun Belt as the center of as the political center of the American right shift south and into the west, you're not in economies that are more firmly in line with with the needs of the Defense Department. And you also just at this point, you have like three or four generations of inertia built up and with this reverence for military service. So that's going to be a difficult thing, I think, to, well, maybe not. That's probably going to be the sort of toughest nut to crack, breaking that aspect of the sort of mind of the American right. And then, and oddly enough, I think that's going to be something that that the center is going to be the most resistant to.  So of course, one of the forces that's been kind of pushing that sort of narrative has been an explicit intellectual figures on the right. As we mentioned earlier, so the purges of the the Buckley rights, and I was going to make a joke about, you know, it's hard to imagine Buckley in a foxhole, but you know, given his perhaps some State Department leanings, you know, he's not completely out of the military industrial complex with some of his real life experiences, perhaps. But it's interesting seeing that dynamic as well, be repeated, kind of with the modern American history.  Again, why in the world Trump didn't purge Kevin McCarthy immediately after that again, another weakness of Trump right there.  You are the one siding with the enemy here, which again, just the propaganda playbook doesn't change, it just kind of repeats throughout the kind of the current political framework. Yeah, and it's, you know, it's just it's just binary thinking. I mean, and unfortunately, I think most people, this is sort of hardwired into us, it takes active effort to think about crises, not merely as the thing that's happening now, but the buildup for, you know, of decades, you know, or longer. So I think that's why this Russia, this accusation of, you know, fidelity to Putin is so effective, because most folks don't know that there was an active debate about, you know, American expansion to the East in the 90s before Putin even came to power, right? I mean, this has been a completely memory hold. So unfortunately, it's one of these tactics that's effective, especially now in the age of social media, which while it gives dissidents a voice, it also gives, you know, the regime, you know, a means of like, memetic power, they can just keep repeating the Putin-Russia thing, Putin-Russia thing, and it sticks, even if it's completely untrue, like, you know, President Trump was not, you know, particularly acrimonious with Russia, but that doesn't matter, because just, you know, the mere repetition of it, unfortunately, has a lot of power. Well, George W. Bush wasn't particularly acrimonious with Russia either, whether that hardly made him an agent of Putin. And of course, Obama too. It wasn't until, boy, when was it that Mitt Romney came out and declared Russia America's most important strategic enemy, basically, and it actually earned some shortals at the time, because it is obviously untrue, unless the U.S. just wants to make Russia its most important enemy. I mean, the fact is the Russia is no threat to the United States, unless the U.S. somehow manages to back it into a corner and provoke a nuclear war. Their conventional military is no match for the defensive capability of the U.S. Sure, if the U.S. decides to invade Central or Eastern Europe, and get involved in the conventional fight with the Russians there, who would be right next to their own supply lines, sure, that could be a problem for American conventional forces. But can you imagine the scenario under which Russia would be a problem for the United States in the Northern North Atlantic, off the coast of North America? I mean, it's just not a plausible scenario. But that's what I guess Mitt Romney wants us all to believe, because for whatever reason, he decided Russia was the problem. I mean, at least the people who are anti-China, they have some, they make some plausible arguments, right? China's this huge country, the huge economy, a huge footprint in the trade world. And I do disagree that the United States needs to confront China and East Asia, and that the United States needs to be a global hegemon, including East Asia. But at least that has some plausibility to it, whereas this idea that Russia was the biggest threat to the U.S. was just never really convincing at all for anyone who can look at some numbers regarding the military capability of this country versus the U.S. Navy and its own nuclear defenses and all of that. But somehow that's become the narrative where Russia is just the big thing. And it's been remarkable then to see how it's just come down on party lines. So if you're a John McCain type, a Mitt Romney type, then the Russia is the enemy.  If you're just a normal tax-paying American from Alabama, you've got other problems that don't include Russia, really. But those people then get denounced as tools of Putin. So it's a real bizarre, something I could not have predicted at all 10 years ago, how this weird thing would break out and that the right would somehow divide upon these lines. The thing is, is that the anti-Russia, the obsessed with Putin thing as a bad guy seems to be just sort of a plaything of the elites on the right, and not really hasn't permeated the populist base at all, whereas the left is now going all in on the national defense state. And there doesn't really seem to be much of an anti-war element left on the left at all beyond the hardcore leftists that I was friends with in graduate school, who we all got along because they were new left types and they liked Rothbard to a certain extent and all of that.  So all that's left now are these sorts of people who shout you down on Twitter and their hardcore anti-Putin crazies, and that just seems to be it now. That's your choice. You can be a left winger who's obsessed with Putin, or you can be a right-wing elite also obsessed with Putin and it seems the only people opposed to World War III against the Russians is this populist right. And boy, in 2005 I would not have guessed that's how we would shake out. But of course that Mitt Romney view of foreign policy makes perfect sense if you understand that the responsibility of the American military is not the protection of the American homeland, but rather the enforcement of global liberalism abroad, particularly when you're dealing with white countries. The objection to Putin I think hits differently. Perhaps there's a little bit of the historical dynamic too, just kind of Cold War nostalgia, but the same sort of arguments are very rarely made with the same sort of passion for Saudi Arabia, because Russia looks European, Russia looks Western. And so therefore if you allow for non-liberal global powers to exist, then that is a threat against the entire purpose of the modern American military state. And of course that's precisely why Ukraine now looking to legalize gay marriage is a top wartime issue, because that is necessary to secure the flank of certain sort of American and European leaders that they are on our side and they are not the others on the cultural issues that are far more important to the current state of Western leaders than anything resembling the actual well-being of our own countries. You know it's fascinating watching this realignment, because in some ways it looks a lot like you know 1947, 1932, where the real intellectual force behind intervention now is the center left, because it's the liberal portion of the Democratic Party. So in some sense they've come home, right, like they're sort of back where they should be. You know the Iraq War kind of derailed that for a while, I mean let's be honest mainly because it was a Republican who watched it. They didn't say anything about Syria or Libya or Yemen or the expansion on wall in Pakistan. So in some sense we're sort of resetting the board back to something that makes a lot more sense. And going to what Tho is saying, I think part of this is because since World War II the very idea of particularism cannot be uttered, right, because fascism, particular Nazism, you know took particularism in its most horrible direction. We can't even think about nation states as being organic things that exist in reality, that had to have histories. So we're stuck in this sort of hyper-cosmopolitanism where it has to be the entire globe, because if the entire globe is not part of one system there will be war. And now that Cold War has ended, the people who are most resistant to the ideology is the right. And perhaps not at a great, you know, at a really deep intellectual level, but just an instinctual one, right? You know why is it that I have to sacrifice for liberties on the other side of the planet, especially as we've seen those projects fail, right? Like Afghanistan. I mean the fact that, I mean there's a reason why that's being memory holds so quickly is because the establishment cannot stand you asking questions, basic questions like is it possible to import liberal democracy? And you know, history show no, right? But the thing that we're told is that World War II, particularly with the Marshall Plan in both Europe and Japan, that modernity can be planned, it can be implemented by technocracy, and that is a model that can be imported elsewhere in the world. And this, I mean, Vietnam was sold this way, right? We think of it nearly as an exercise in anti-communism, but really it was an exercise in liberal internationalism, as was most of the prosecution of the Cold War. But now that the Cold War is over, I mean it's harder and harder to keep the right in line on these questions. They did it for a while with 9-11 and the War on Terror, but now that that scene's gone, it's difficult to see how they're going to be able to reconstitute the sort of paradigms of the Cold War. Yeah, I guess the key is to just keep casting about until you come up with an axis of evil that's sufficiently evil in the minds of a Midwestern American, that they'll subvert all their domestic interest then to the pursuit of this foreign policy goal. And that's what we saw. You would see those great right wing Midwestern guys like Howard Buffett, right? Saying things like, you know what we're being told to do? We're being told to basically give up all American values for the duration of the Cold War for 20, 25, he naively said 20, 25 years on this. And then maybe after it's all over, then we can have American values back, but until then everything's in the service of American foreign policy. And then of course Buckley just came out and said straight up, right? Well, if we need to adopt essentially a totalitarian bureaucracy in America to defeat the communists, well then that's just what we got to do. And so apparently this past muster with a lot of Americans, they thought, yeah that seems legit. We'll just put the US Constitution on hold until we defeat the commies. So you had this amazing blessing of the endless war essentially that lasted through the 40s, 50s, 60s, 70s and 80s. And boy, if you were the interventionist, right? That was just such a gift from the gods. And I think best case scenario is you get something like that back where there's always a huge foreign enemy. And the Chinese haven't managed, they haven't managed to whip that up even with the Chinese yet. Except, I mean you do see that in the people who are always referred, they never refer to the Chinese regime. It's always the CCP, have you noticed this? It's like a certain code you use among China obsessed right-wingers. We don't refer to Beijing like you would to any other regime, right? You refer to Beijing or Berlin or Moscow or whatever. No, no, it's just the CCP, I guess, to emphasize some sort of like tiny group of communists or something were running that country. But so that's like sort of a weird dog whistle that they use. But even those people seem to be pretty small. The number of people who are willing to fight a war with China over this issue. I mean the Taiwan thing doesn't seem to be getting a whole lot of traction. And then of course, I wonder how long it would take to get, to just have a few US battleship blown up with 6,000 sailors on board before people start to have second thoughts. They could go either way, right? They could double down and say, well, we can't stop fighting this war until it's over and I don't care how many hundreds of thousands of Americans have to die. But on the other hand, they might say, well, maybe this is a terrible idea. So I actually can't predict which way that would go. But it does seem like they're going to have to put a lot more effort to it because no new axis of evil seems to be working yet. Well, that definitely is the concern. And I think there's some naivete that you get in certain sort of libertarian circles about some of the actions that China, the Chinese regime has taken. I do think that there's an issue with, I think they commit explicit sort of economic fraud against American interest. I think that there are, I think China is a more explicitly hostile actor than some of these other countries that we've knocked over in kind of recent history in the way that they approach American Americans kind of broadly in that regard. On the other side of it, though, is that the same sort of miscalculation that kind of helped fuel the Soviet Union is, we're kind of seeing it peek out, I think increasingly as time goes on. The economic disarray of China right now, the economic hurdles that Beijing has right now, when you have protests going on, you have the consequences of lockdowns, you have the consequences of very bad debt within the system, you see them doubling down with credit expansion, you have Xi transitioning away from get rich to sustainable lifestyles, you shouldn't have more than one home, etc., etc. China's weakness is the consequences and the results of their own form of over-the-top intervention within the domestic economy. However, Washington seems to be doing everything it can to agitate internationally. I mean, not only do you have the high-profile political photo ops going on in Taiwan right now, which you can, for decades, now the default position of America is that Taiwan belongs to China. We've been playing this sort of proxy war with certain countries trying to get them to ensure that they continue to recognize the Taiwan regime while our official position is Beijing, etc., so this has been kind of an interesting dynamic for a while now, but now they're looking at billions of dollars on arms funding, trying to be proactive with the same sort of policies that we're now doing in Ukraine post-invasion. They're using the excuse of Russia's invasion in Ukraine to be proactive within Taiwan, which of course is going to do nothing but fuel agitation and, in its own right, create a very useful foil for the CCP to rally support amongst Chinese residents who are feeling the pain of the economic follies of that same regime. I do fear that you're going to end up, we were so desperate for a reaction from China, and I'm not sure that China is not kind of within the state of mind to perhaps give us exactly that sort of thing, which it goes back to the potential of something like a Pearl Harbor, like a 9-11, whether it's sinking a ship or doing something like that. If you box in a country like China far enough, I mean it's just like Russia. I mean, there's going to be a time there where their only calculation is going to be going on the offensive. Yeah, you know, going back to the domestic side, so I think as you both sort of mentioned, there is a bill coming up in Congress now for some, you know, a bajillion dollar, you know, arms deal to Taiwan, and it'll be interesting to see how those votes break down. Who opposed Ukraine and Taiwan? Because historically, the Republican Party has been the party of the Pacific, and the Democrats by and large have been the party of the Atlantic that held over even into the early Cold War, right? Some of the non-interventionists that I'm studying were kind of okay with some bilateral security arrangements, including with Taiwan. This goes all the way back to the 1898 with McKinley and the Philippines, so there's a lot of history there. There's a lot of inertia built up with conservatives who are more, you know, suspicious of American relations in Europe, but more kind to this notion of American benevolent empire in the Pacific. So I think if the gains made for the non-interventionists, right, if they're just to go away, it's going to be because of some sort of escalation in Taiwan. But, you know, even if you can't get enough voices to stop it, I don't undersell the notion of just having a very potent minority. You know, in the early national security state, obviously, it's grown into to be what it is today, but there's an argument to be made that it could have been a hell of a lot worse on the docket or programs like National Service, you know, universal military training for all American citizens that was a very real possibility coming out of World War II. There is this notion that the draft and military service was this great liberal project, right? It's almost sort of sold on a kind of new deal, sort of WPA kind of ideology, right? We're going to make American citizens through military service. And that program was killed and then, you know, sort of downgraded to a selective peacetime draft because there was so much anti-statism still left within this system, within Congress.  You know, there are some other aspects of defense spinning and in the early, you know, Cold War period that were either downgraded or killed because there was a intransigent minority. So even if the Republican Party cannot become fully this sort of party of non-intervention, so long as there's a 25-ish percent, you know, of people who really believe and are committed and to know how to use power in Congress, you know, some good things can come from this era in which we live. On that point, and I know we got to wrap up here soon, Tucker Carlson, I think is a very interesting figure within kind of American politics right now because he has the most watch show on cable news, which makes some, you know, I think particularly on the right, you know, particularly after the passing of Rush Limbaugh. I mean, I think it's very easy to argue that Tucker Carlson is the most influential voice within the American right. And he has been, you know, incredibly consistent for many years now on foreign policy, non-interventionism and questioning the regime's narratives and things like that. What do you think, how important do you think is that to help kind of fueling that anti-interventionist kind of minority if we can't get anything more than that? And secondly, are there any sort of historical figures that you would identify as sort of parallels to Tucker Carlson and having that very broad, non-interventionist platform that wasn't being overstated, right, you know, as the impact of like a father coffer or something like that, you know, are there any other sort of figures that you would identify as sort of precursors to Tucker that had a influential impact on maintaining that sort of non-interventionist strain within the right? Yeah. So, I mean, I certainly do think it's important because like you have to give people a narrative and it's not enough.  You have to give them a sort of counter narrative. It's not enough to say that American empire merely is the product of just endless search for markets and, you know, this sort of deterministic notion of American power abroad, but someone like a Tucker or someone like people on the non-interventionist right, going all back to like Garrett Garrett, if you present empire as a matter of contingency, as a matter of choice, you can give people a counter narrative to say that America is better than this. You can give them a kind of civic nationalist idea of what America ought to be and how it ought to sort of behave in this world. So having someone like Tucker Carlson, I know he's controversial for some, I mean, whatever, but he is like a foot in the door to ask some of these more substantive questions while still giving people kind of a national narrative to sort of glob around. And as for like historic figures, I'm looking into someone by the name of Dan Smoot. Smoot, I sort of describe to my colleagues, he's kind of like a more demure version of Alex Jones, but with footnotes. But he had some of the, he asked some of these more substantive questions about America's involvement in the world. He was very critical of U.S.-Israeli relations. You know, he was of the opinion that American involvement in the Middle East was what was actually inflaming tensions in the region. He did not think that communism was a sort of prime mover of problems there. He felt the same way about problems in Europe that it was the presence of American troops, which were inflaming tensions and causing problems. So in some sense, I think Tucker is kind of like him because he has the willingness to say that it is the American regime, it is American government, which is the initiator of crises, or at least an active participant in them, not merely as like this like passive, you know, reluctant hegemon. It's this notion that American power does have agency in the world and that agency can bring about, you know, poor consequences. Well, Brandon, this has been great. Again, love your research. It was great spending time with you at Rothbard Village after RGS sessions. For those out there, if you want to follow Brandon's work, you can find him on Twitter at Brandon underscore buck. Anything else you want to pitch, Brandon? I guess this is the time in which I would normally pitch a book, but I don't have one yet. So just if you want to follow my work, you can follow me on Twitter or check out my website, brandonpbuck.com, all one word. Excellent. Again, for Ryan, for Brandon, this is Stoke Bishop. Thank you for listening, and we'll see you next time.