$Hot牛 Voilà Oh Sorris whatever you want to call it, but we had it again. I fricken. Oh my god I spent all day today playing the Because I hadn't done any of the tournament and it was like I Even I like I went to the gym in the morning and I was like, oh god, I need to get this done. So for the first time ever, I enlisted Whitney. What do you think of the battle system? Stupid. Bring zero joy. What do you think they could do to improve it? Delete it. And you've been playing it for, like, 10 minutes? Imagine doing this for like two or two to three hours straight. Can you imagine? I would just stop playing. It's not fun anymore. Is that right? Games are meant to be fun. You know, people have mentioned this for the longest time of, like, oh, you should have Whitney play Dress Up with the Game. No. This is really not like that idea anymore. Oh, 29 cups, because you made that quite a close one, because I told you, he was a weak one. That posted circus. I only have eight more hours to go. Whoop, whoop, whoop, whoop. Oh, she hated it. I think she did about an hour and a half of just, like, I should have had the basic premise of putting in a common first, and then a good one, then a common. She got, like, 1,200 trophies, so it was quite impressed. Really saved me a lot of time. And I probably wouldn't have been able to do it if she hadn't have got that as well. But she didn't enjoy it, so. Anyway, here we are. We got 2,500 boogeries, and finally unlocked Temanodontisaur. Oh, my God, as well as the coveted 2,600 of that. Not only have we unlocked that, but because I've been doing a lot of the, yeah, me and Whitney, I suppose, we did a lot of the battles, there was a lot of these missions that we just knocked out at the park. It was like, use 60 amphibians, use 25 amphibians, battle this many times, PVPs. So, we now have all of this unlocked. Damn. Now, we still have 11 days, and if we get, how much is it? There's a Megatherium diorama as well up there, which is interesting. Titanoboa diorama. There is, really, that's what you want. You want 16,000. Double. Double, which is almost impossible, let's be honest. And then if you get 18,000, you get another one. Instant hatched as well, I think. No hatching required. And then if you get 20,000, you get another one. Instant hatched. So, this is for the Goroniasaurus. I think there was a thing for a pack for it. Also, just quickly do this. Five of these will get the 10-on-to-da-da-da-da-da-da-da-da. So, this up to max level, because why wouldn't you? And I want Gastronis. I think I need this for a mission, so we'll just get that.   I can't remember this. What's that? And like, I just put the 10 in every time, because normally the prizes are quite good. I don't even need to think about it. Oh, Silver Fidelity! That's what I'm talking about! Although it was a Stegosaurus. Oh, not the best of prizes, I suppose, but really, I did it for this! Nothing. Like, this is all I've got left is 18,000, basically. 18,000, oh sorry, 1,800. 18,000 would be amazing. 1,800 of this, 600 of that, so like 2,000 an odd, and then of course the Daily Roads. So really, I'm only gonna be able to get about that much, like 11,000 at a push if I keep on doing for 11 days straight. I might be able to unlock that one, but really, to get all the way to the end for the 20,000 you need to have done every mission and log in every day to get every reward. Got to get every reward. There it is, reach the domineering, woo! Really, look at this, look at this. Look at what I had to use to get this far. Any creature? No, that's any glacier creature. Only amphibians, amphibians. Okay, we'll just do this one. Yeah, look at this. I had to use every freaking dinosaur, basically. All the ones, sorry, let's go Jurassic, because that's all it was. Look at those. Apart from the ones that I've timed out. Oh my, I do so many freaking dinosaurs to get this. I mean, doing all in a day is probably not the best thing because, you know, dinosaurs, some dinosaurs, you can get back within a day and it's about two or three days was the tournament requirement. But oh my God, who's horrendous? Lydia, Jam City, whatever you wanna call yourselves. Stop it. Not only is this horrendous to do, basically all day, it's boring as, and every battle is in the same arena. It's the visitor center, it's dark, it's miserable, the lighting's terrible, please change it. I wouldn't care if it was the helipad. Don't mind it, at least I can see the dinosaurs. But I'm like, just change it. Simple but a code. Have it change to the helipad or something or randomize it because it is not only doing the same battles over and over and over again. It is monotonous, at least with this, you'd see something different. I'd actually get to see my puns, I'd see the nice lighting but if you're not changing, I'm gonna send a message, honestly, because they're obviously not watching my videos because they don't care about the game apparently.   It is dark, it's gloomy, it's miserable, and it's monotonous. Please change it for the love of God, for the people who actually do legit play this and don't just hack the game because apparently they don't care about that. For the sake of our sanity, please change it. Anything. Anyway, enough of that, we're being too sad. Right, Aquatics. I got that Deteminidontosaurus Instant Hatch for $2.50. Oh my God, it's actually quite big. Is this? It's got huge eyes. This one, oh, look at it, that's so cute. It's got big eyeballs. This one looks like it was more based on the one from Walking With Dinosaurs actually, which is quite fascinating.  Just gonna swim around? Oh, did you not, oh, where you going? We're just swimming around. Look at this lagoon. This is what Just a World of Lucian II needs.  You know, maybe you can't construct the arch yourself like you would in Planet Zoo, but just have a placeable one. So at least creatures could interact with it a certain way. Could be great, could be fantastic even. Anyway, what are you doing?  Let's feed you. Hold on, there we go. Fishy comes out, yum! Oh, there's a weird little glitch there, okay. Right, well, we're gonna have to make seven more.  And the books, this really helps, but the moment I'm paying for VIP and I'm getting no perks every month anymore, they should keep on adding the perks, but obviously they're not gonna do that. I don't know, oh, oh! Pucks off on there, on the hatchery, that's great. I obviously don't know how much I need to whinge about this game anymore, because I don't even know if they watch the videos. I think all I'm gonna do is just put it in a post, say this is what you need to change or what I would like you to change, because, you know, I'm one dude. I don't know, I played this game for eight years, nine almost. Woo, daddy, there, it's a lot of time. But luckily, 50% of that, this is VIP exclusive. Hatchery speed up 50% off offer. So that is very good. Instead of 1,680, it's only costing me 840. I'd like if they did this after every creature, because there are some ones that I'd love to just get, but at the same time, for a video, it'd be great after every tournament creature they did this for VIPs. Maybe that would increase the amount of people that would want to spend for VIPs? I don't know, that's just me. Okay, you, all these level tens. Level 10, and, oh my God, I have eight. Eight's what you need, isn't it? So after all this, we've spent 60-ish thousand DNA, and as far as books go, what, like 1,000 plus 1, 2,600 books. Which isn't too bad when you consider just hatching one is about 1,600. For the price of speeding up two, we got eight. We got level 40. Now it is a tournament creature, and fusing as well isn't gonna cost us any books. Right, so we'll get you at level 11. What do you look like at level 11? Any different? Oh, you have a little, yeah, a little bit of difference. You've got a pattern on the back there. Fortunately, with the lagoon creatures, you can't tap to change anything about them. I love the show of fish in the background as well. After now spending time in Evolution 2, I'm like, what is it missing? What makes the lagoons more alive, you know? This looks cool. It's a bit stiff in the animation, but let's be honest. This is an old game, so I'll instant fuse this. I've got nothing else to really use instant fuses for, so I may as well do it for this. And really, I think it's only five or six. I think I need to fuse.  So that is four speed ups. I think maybe it's six. Yeah, well, let's feed you. Let's see a level 20. Hunt down its prey. Is it gonna glitch? The fish disappears. It goes, boom. It's like the fish gets pulled off somewhere else, but then because they do it within two frames, you see one frame of it moving to its other reset position. So we'll get you, get you, and instant fuse, boom. Oh, nice coloring. So we're going for a purple. I like it. And there it is. Purple flavored, blueberries. We'll see it do its eating animation level 30, 2,301 health and 700 naught attack. It's looking pretty like for a tournament creature. It's looking really promising. So I'm gonna be left with two extra fuses. We'll see if there's anything we really wanna fuse and speed that up, because I'm sure I've got some. And finally, instant fuse. Oh, it's a spiky boy. Something we've come to see from Luda and Jam City in the past. There it is, at level 31 to 40. It's, the model doesn't change much. It just gets a bit more spiky. That is, that's interesting though, I suppose. Grr. It got like a geographic park thing going on for its mouth there, which is a bit odd. Let's feed it once. Have a look at ya. Yes, yum, and yum. And then let's feed you one more time. And there we go, 3,256 health and 1,017 attack. For a tournament creature, that's really good. Especially land tournament creatures, 1,000. I mean, that's, I don't know if many land creatures that are level 1,000 get those, but Temanodontosaurus is one of the oldest and largest ichthyosaurs known to science. More than Shonosaurus, or Shonosaurus? I don't know, I always get that wrong. Temanodontosaurus means cutting toothed lizard named for its rows of jagged teeth. It ate ammonites, cephalopods, and sometimes even their own young. And their teeth had deep strong roots to prevent loss or breakage while cracking ammonite shells. Gorgeous, ichthyosaurs were a family of marine aquatic reptiles that unfortunately went extinct before the time of the dinosaurs ended. I think their peak was in the Jurassic and then by the Cretaceous, I think they went extinct. Or if they didn't, there was like only one or two species clinging to life in a world that was completely dominated by mosasaws and stuff like that and other bigger creatures or the pleasesaws, which is a bit of a shame because they're such cool looking creatures. Oh, before we go, I completely forgot to showcase it in a battle. So here we are. This is where it lines up in the roster, just below U-Moon, so it has 300 more health in U-Moon, but 100 less attack. So it's like, do you want 300 more health or 100 more attack? It's up to you. But we'll put in a weak creature, then we'll put in very good creature, and then another weak creature, and then we get to see a different battle arena because the PVP one for the aquatic, I don't think it's a knight. I think it's, whoa, oh, that's perfect. Heck, 60 attack on that thing. Oh, is it? No, I, oh, you know what, I have no idea. Okay, yeah, so it goes first and it's 1 million percent going to kill me. The Mosaurus. At least we're gonna see it's entrance animation. That's cool. Do you do the tornado for your eight attack? I don't even know. Yeah, look at you. We can actually just go for reserves and make it waste one of its moves to switch out. I think that's probably the best bet. He gets happy. Little shimmy chowms. The dolly are up. Right, okay, so you've got one block. So I'm gonna do that, and you'll definitely, oh, there it is though. Oh, tail slam. I die. Right, proggy. Proggy, proggy, proggy, huh? What are you gonna do? Oh, okay, we're gonna switch. We're wasting all our moves, are we? Oh, yes we are. Right, this is great. So we've seen the one to two attack. Right, we'll do this. So this is the three to four attack. Oh, slay, a shoulder barge. And should we save for these seven to eight? Because we can't go to the five to six, because we'll just kill it. So I think I'll, we could, but we're not gonna die. It's gonna do 30 damage to us. Bless it. Oh, I like that. Oh, and then you just tail to get back into action. So we'll go for that. We'll use our seven to eight attack animation. I feel like the other one was like the tornado where it span around and then came out, but maybe I'm thinking that because it was, that was the animation of it when it was in Jurassic Park, though, we had the tornado. But here we go. Eight attack, you can do a max of 30,500 damage, and it's gonna do it.  This is leaves it, it's like, oh yeah, it's not dead. Ah. Oh, look at you, gorgeous. Woo. Oh, it's brilliant. Okay, well, I'm glad, I'm glad we got to showcase. I was like, hold on a minute. We haven't even seen it. Should probably do that. And I only have a week six, mid 6,000 food. Anyway, back to the video. Coral Crusett, is that the one with the chance yet? This is, we opened this pack and we got it last time, but there's no point really like, oh, a helicopter and at level 11. Ooh, don't even need to hatch that guy. We collect a little bit of that, yes. If we get one more, we get 150,000 food, which really isn't worth it. 230, you know, as a VIP, we don't double it unfortunately and some wasted coin, but let's have a look what we got going in the trade harbor. Always worth a little bit of a look, but 12,000 bucks for one at Montessori. Don't think I'm gonna be doing that one. Anything else in the news? Nothing in the news, it says it wants me to claim. Okay, we participated in something, but while I'm here, nothing to collect there. Let's set off something in the, yeah, whatever amphibians we need to use, but we got three more incubators. I wanna have a look at the super hybrids because I ran out of creatures to use, but I bought two Indoraptors back and they would get ready to battle again super quick. So more of those, and they're quite cheap I think. 2000, yeah, six days, don't care, don't care. Let's get more Indoraptors. I think I've got plenty of thousands upon thousands of DNA. Oh, there we go, that's the most we can get for that. Okay, the next one I'm really not too sure what I have. I don't have any ready. The next best one according to this is Monostegatops. Don't think it'll be six days though, three days. How many Monostegatops do you know? Do I have eight house? I could get another eight Monostegatops. Monostegatops is a good creature. I mean, if I have a look at the other ones, like what are they? I mean, that's it. I haven't had a new super hybrid in such a long time. It's like honestly it feels like this game, apart from adding tournament creatures, I'm hoping for something big soon, because otherwise they're really struggling to keep the game alive I feel. Pun intended, they're focused on Jurassic World alive. They're updating that game like every month, adding new things, new, and everything that's being added to it is just making the game worse. That's why I'm no longer covering Jurassic World alive. I mean, I'm not good, I'm played, but I'm not making videos on it basically, until something comes out that I want to check out or they change, because the amount of free publicity I've given them and money, because I spent like a thousand, thousands it was on Rexy. I've given them far too much money, more money than I would ever give any game and company. Well, saying that, for what they've given back, I'll be honest, but this game, you know, I bought the VIP because I wanted to and it gave me something, right, this one. Let's have a look, Battle Stage Infinite. Oh, I don't have any. Wait, do I have, nevermind, I can't even do, what else do we actually have going on? Got a battle for survivor. I never do these and for exactly the reason you've seen, I need all my creatures to do the tournament and these are gone in 23 hours, so there's no point, but what do you get? You'd unlock a Darwinopterus, as well as some pretty decent rewards and all you need is to do 28 of these battles. And it's really not that hard, especially a battle for survival. We can easily do that if we so wished. Earth Shattering is only amphibians, but is doable, is doable, and the Earth Shattering for the Utah Raptor is also amphibians, but it's, I mean, I would assume it's less of a prize. Maybe the rewards are the same. No, they're not. Okay, we're gonna do this one. We'll put in a terrible one and then we've got, we've got so many battles, oh, like I need to fuse these. Okay, okay, okay. Before we do that, let's have a look. Let's look at VIPs. Can we look at VIPs? Okay, we can't just look at VIPs. We can't feed this guy? Oh, right, but it takes DNA to feed the bosses. Oh, right. Yeah, we'll not do that. Go back to Nooblon, back into here. What is a VIP? A Metapasaurus is a VIP creature, but Macedon, so if you have four of those, you have three of those. Yeah, at level 10, now let's fuse them. We have one instant fuse, there's one user. I'm not gonna use it for anything else, and now we get level 11. So going from 1296 health, 400 in odd attack, to 2220 health and 694. So a big increase. Oh, I love that sound effect. That is such a stark sound effect, like the gore sound effect. So yeah, it's getting an extra 1,000 health and then an extra 200, basically 300. 300 attack and 1,000 health. I'm not really gonna use Mastodonosaurus too much.  And honestly, those two are probably gonna do it for me. And you see, this is the arena, right? I can't even, for a start, the opponent is so far away. And two, it's in the shadows. Like, not only have I spent all day battling in this absolutely horrid to look at a battle arena, but I'm also having to do the battle events in it as well. The best one they have. Arena, in my personal opinion, is used for PVP and the rewards for PVP aren't very good. At least that I remember them being, they weren't very good. And yet here we are in something that the player would want to do, to get good rewards, which basically you get a free pack. You know, in spite of battles, you don't have to spend any money or anything like that. And yet you're forced to battle in this arena over and over. The only saving grace is that I can speed it up to get this horrid assault on my eyeballs out of the way as quickly as possible. So we'll do those two, quickly speed up, boom, done. And luckily, because it's not trying to pretend that these are real people, it'll do all the inputs like instantly. Like, there you go, done. So that'll be dead.  Might as well just go for two reserves, one attack. Boom, get it over, whoosh. Honestly, if the PVPs had speed up, I could have saved hours, hours of time. Honestly, it's bad for the environment because my iPad burns up when I'm playing this game. And I need to charge it. So it's wasting electricity when you can just put a speed up. Honestly, Lydia, can we just stop pretending that the PVP is PVP? For like, all you're doing is wasting my battery and wasting my time. Instead of getting 2,500 cups in about four to five hours, I can get it in about two. Oh, it would be so nice. And I'd feel like progressing, I'd be progressing so much quicker. Be so nice, Lydia, please. Right, is that honestly the best creature I have? I'm gonna put you in and then you in. I think that's, I don't need to put in anything that's better than that. Spine Lord, you ever win? Spine is so getting this thing to level four. I was like, oh my God, that looks so cool. Oh, I love it. Luckily in this arena, it's such a big dinosaur, you can actually see it. Like half of it you can't see because it's in the shadow, but the rest of it you can. This arena is not so bad for Spinosaurus. Then we go to Rage and you can't really see him because he's far away and he's in the shadow. Honestly, whoa, I forgot. Oh, okay. So we actually don't kill him.   It's so horrible. BBB, PTSD for BBB. Right, go on then. I think this is the last battle. Who's at four battles? I think this might be the fourth. Let's have a check. Come on, give me, I get a hundred bucks for this, which is great. Imagine you're getting a hundred bucks in Jurassic World Live. Imagine. I think they had it where, oh, that's right, the book transition. Oh yeah, just give me one of those. From Jurassic Park Builder to Jurassic World the game was they made one more valuable and if you trade it over, I can't remember what it was. There was some sort of equivalent. I remember when the games were both going at the same time. But they've made the amount of books you need in Jurassic World the live to do anything in particular. Far ridiculous.  I think they've kept the same rewards that's in this game in Jurassic World, like 10 books. But the thing is, 10 books can't get you anything in that game. This game, maybe, especially early on, but that game, nah. You want to open up an incubator quickly? Here's like, give me 800. Give me 800 books. That's about to buy an incubator, but ridiculous. The market is flooded. I'm using this as a way to air my grievances with Jurassic World live. That's the problem with it. There's so many things you can buy in the market, but you actually can't buy it because it's just not worth it.  But this game is fun. Like, I can't really find anything apart from the PVP. Tremendous. And look, here we go. 1,300 VIP points. Oh, it's so good. As well as the free Ostrifika source. And we're won towards Clash of Tines, but we're not going to get that probably because, well, two weeks, actually. I think we could get Darwin up to us. We'll do Earth Shattering as well because this was also amphibians. And we probably, we've got three battles. Ooh, that's a bit crap. This guy, though. Maybe, maybe. They are crazy levels in this one, however. A level 74 Contourist. Why even use a Contourist at that point? Just use an Epic or a Legendary. Right, I can't kill it in one hit. That's fantastic. Oh, Ophacodon. That's got a lot of attack. To kill me, though. Let's have a look. Please go for two. Ooh, I would have loved it to have gone for two Okay, so one does kill it. Factor in the, I'm going to factor in the two just in case, but it's always safe. Ooh, maybe not anymore, though. Three hits can kill me? Nah. I'm good. I'm good. Oh, it's going to go for it. Oh, yeah, cheeky, get me. You are sub-corning. Yeah. Ha, ha, ha. Look at you. Amthiostagreth, or ichthyostagre. No, not ichthyostagre. What even are you? Oh, no, there's too many amphibians. Okay. Right, what we got? Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah, let's just use these guys. They're good enough. I've only got three more battles. I've got three good ones to use and I can switch my brain off. I don't even need to worry about it. They changed the animation for him dying. I think they've changed how far away it gets flung because it used to face the other direction. Just the face behind you so you couldn't see it now. It's like, you see me now? See how dead I am? This thing is blooming a clown. It's got the weird little horns that I would assume a clown wears. Yes.  That's right. It's like the hair. That's why I'm seeing it. Like, crusty the clown except for evil or icht. Does icht have the hair at the side? I feel like it must do. Whoa, cheeky git.  Now you must die. Yes. I'm gorgeous. Yum, yum, yum. Evil. Evil. And we get DNA every time we do a battle. Right, next one. Yeah, whatevs. Prestosuchus level 20. I had three Prestosuchus. One was a level 40. Be interesting to see what the other one was because I had four mastered on a Sorus. Fluffy. Fluffy. Right, there we go. Kill it. Wallop. Right, Rajasaurus comes in. You see what I mean? You've had to make calm Taurus level 78 to be at the same level as a level 31. Rajasaurus. Just use Rajasaur then. Right, one will kill it. And the final one. No, like this is free as well. This is so good. Honestly, the rewards you get in this are so much better. Jurassic World alive. We'll just go for it all out. Kill it. Like your carnitaurus' eyes are just like looking in different directions. Like a freaking Chihuahua. Honestly, carnitaurus' design in this is so weird. I have no idea what they would think when they designed it. Give it weird horns and make it purpley pink. Oh my God, a guanlon. At level 165. Fluffy. I haven't decided any creature that's above level 40 has smoke coming from it. I thought I already killed one. Oh, okay, never mind. Wasted that. Not that I'm worried. I got 2,000 health and nothing can do more than like 200 attack on a single one. You've went for two out of your three so, yeah, definitely dead. I think it was three. Maybe it was just two. And Spino has even less than the T-Rex. A little bit more health, but again, still dies in two. Spinosaur's design? Sick. Sick. Really good. I remember when I evolved at level 40 I was like, oh, so good. It's nice, I guess, to see all the old dinos as well in events like this. So the 50 bucks. The Utah Raptor. But how much about the VIP? Yeah. Okay. Not so much. About a regular pack. Utah Raptor! Oh my god! So you kind of want to do these battles because you unlock the dinosaurs from it. Interesting. Okay, two out of 28. If you wanted to, we could even do the battle for survival. You know what? Why? This is super easy. I love this one. Put in that and that and done. Literally. Two turns, it's over. And again, in this same battle arena can we please stop? Like, I... I beg of you! No. Hold on. No. Is it that? I don't know. I just want to do more. I just want to do just the megaphone effect. But is that... Is that a thing? No. Lydia, please stop what you're doing and change the battle arena, damn it! They never will, though. Alright. Okay. And then the next one's super easy as well. You just go for those two. That's what you need. You need three dinos that can kill a level 40 Raptor in one hit. That's all you need. Technically. Hopefully survive some hits. But, like, I couldn't... As long as I don't go for block. Literally. 15 seconds. And it's over. I love that. I get, like, 50 DNA. Then I can just do that. Straight back in. Another hit. So good. It's clean. It's fast. It's good reward. It's clean fun. That's what it is. I like it. They don't do any voices, because obviously they'd have to speed it up. And it would sound a bit stupid, because they'd sound like cheeky mooks. God! I'll do the voices. That'll work better. Me. Right. There we go. Food pack. Who really cares about the food? I'll be honest. I do. 260. That's what we want. And another one. Three out of 28. We haven't even made progress in the bar yet. It's hidden behind the metal. And we've also got events in here, but the VIP events are always so rubbish, because they cost books to enter, or VIP points to enter. The opponents are so freakin' hard, and the reward is terrible. It's basically you just do this for DNA, and if you've got any dinosaurs to use. But that, we use pretty much everything. We could even do this one, but they're super hard creatures. So we're not going to... But that... Oh! Hold up. We've got something to collect here? Oh, it's just a card pack. Oh, we've done... Oh my God. And all of that as well. Going towards more mono-stegatops. More indoor raptors. I cannot praise it enough. It's so good. I just want something like an endgame. That's what I'm after. I want an endgame. I don't know what the endgame should be, but I'm not going to touch this till tomorrow, so I may as well just shove in Rajasaur, done in eight hours. But anyway, guys, if you enjoyed this video, we'll stick with the aquatic theme, having that thing max level. Leave a like, and until next time, I'll see you guys later. Oh, bye-bye.


We're the innovators, the border makers, the round-the-world record breakers, the only university on the list It's a drive, a heartbeat, a drumbeat that moves our feet in small steps toward giant leaps We keep going, dreaming and doing, always building, instigating, persistently pursuing We're ever grateful and ever true. That's why we sing out. All hail Purdue


Hi everyone, my name is Otto Bentigainen, I'm the CEO and co-founder at Jester Detection Company DoublePoint. Hi everyone, I'm Thomas Joseph and I'm the VP of product here at DoublePoint. We're a company founded in 2020 based in Helsinki and we founded this company because my co-founder Jamie had a personal project that he just needed to get done. This is a set of wristbands that he built. He's a classical championist and a biomedical engineer and he had this tendency to type his thoughts in midair by twitching his fingers. So we began from the electric shops from Alta University, building our first wristbands. Of course not a lot of people type their thoughts in midair like Jamie does so we didn't really have a market but then we started to look around. We saw that augmented and virtual realities were being built. We saw that IoT was becoming a thing. We saw that wearables were becoming part of most people's, a lot of people's, computation. However, there's something that's joined with these devices. We don't have a clear way of inputting to them. Currently when we look at the way we input to our devices we have the mouse but the mouse is only good for personal computing. We also have the touch screen which is currently used to control all sorts of devices but it's mainly used for two-dimensional screens. So how do we control augmented reality, IoT or wearables? How do we control these new platforms? Thomas, take it away. So this question right here is one that we obsess over at double point. And when coming up with solutions for this problem and how to address it we base this on five key principles. The solution would have to be intuitive just like the mouse and the touch screen. It would have to be accurate. Accuracy is table stakes for any good input solution. It would also have to be discreet. So just like these AR headsets that we have sort of coming on to market the input mechanism would have to be discreet like those same headsets. Always on, always available. This is a non-starter. This had to be in from the beginning. And then lastly low cost. So when thinking about these five principles over the last three years as a company our explorations have taken us far and wide. So here's just a short selection of some of the prototypes and hardware form factors that we've explored. And this includes Jamin's prototype that belongs with some gloves, smartwatches, rings, and thimbles. But we keep coming back to the smartwatch. As a tech industry we're on track to ship 300 million smartwatches just this year. And this device category is growing double digit growth year on year. They're ubiquitous. In fact I would gather that about 60% of you in the audience have some sort of smartwatch on your wrist right now. Whether it's an Apple watch, a Fitbit, or a Sunto. And we wanted to focus our attention on this because we believe that this form factor is capable of a lot, lot more. Now all of those devices, all those manufacturers, they have two sensors in common that are of particular interest to us at DoublePoint. So the PPG sensor or the sensor that tracks your heart rate for health activities, and then the IMU for orientation data. Now when we look at these two sensors we see a lot more capability. So what we actually have here are some traces of some raw data coming off these signals. And what we found was there's a fundamental machine learning problem here. And we could pick up on minute gestures that a user performs just by looking at these sensor data. So we built some custom algorithms, trained this on a lot of people, tested it on a lot of people. And what we came down with are a few key gestures. And I'm kind of going to go through these right now. So we have tap, which is very simple action in which the index finger comes into contact with the thumb. And these small deformations in the skin, we're able to pick these up with these off the shelf smartwatch sensors. As Otto is going to demonstrate right here. Right here. So let's see if the network is working. But there you go. And I can turn on my lights. And then you can also sort of multi-tap. So pick up multiple gestures like this. And probably most importantly is pinch and hold. Now this is actually a world's first demonstration of this gesture using commercially available off the shelf sensors. Now on the surface, those gestures seems fairly simple. And that's kind of by design. We wanted these to be intuitive and easy. But those three gestures also enable a lot, lot more. So I'm going to talk about it in the context of a few key use cases. XR, which we're really excited about.  We believe this is a solved input problem. Sure, hand tracking can get better. Controllers can get better. But these are the modalities to control VR headsets. But what about AR? We're yet to see these devices come on market, they're lightweight, they're always on. Using hands is fundamentally problematic. Because we're now going to be in public settings. You don't want to be gesticulating wildly like Tom Cruise in Minority Report. Not to mention that that's expensive. So you have cameras that are high resource power hungry, and they don't fit with that form factor. Voice privacy concerns. And then obviously you don't want to be using a controller out in public settings. That's a non-starter. So let me show you what we can do with a smartwatch that we built at DoublePoint.  There are no cameras involved here. Just by pointing his watch, we're able to use the IMU sensor data to figure out exactly where he's pointing and the click gestures to sort of select these items. And he effortlessly sort of scrolls through these interfaces just by using pinch and hold, tap, and multi-tap. Here we see Simon playing a game, just pointing at bubbles and popping them. And then we have a smartwatch. And then we have a smartwatch. And then we have a smartwatch. But you can take this to another level. So if device manufacturers have eye tracking built, we can take this interaction scheme and put it on steroids. Here you see Simon using the same sort of smartwatch, except he's using eyes to focus his attention. And you'll notice how much quicker he is just by pointing and selecting. Now, this is super-fast, super-intuitive, and very fast. So we're not using inside-out cameras for tracking. Just the smartwatch. And just the sensors that exist on your smartwatches today. Outside of XR, there are a few other applications we're excited about. IOT. We have countless smart devices in our homes. And what you see here is our interaction designer just manipulating the devices around him with the smartwatch. Intuitively turning up the brightness using the accelerometer and IMU, turning up the brightness on his TV, and even turning on the music. And lastly, smartwatch control itself. So here, using these algorithms, we're simply manipulating the menu. So clicking through a menu, double-click to select, and pinch and hold for high-consequence actions, like making a phone call or making a payment. Now, this is just a snippet and a view into what we can do, but we can't wait to see what developers do with this technology. We are convinced this is the best input solution for spatial, metaverse, ambient computing, whatever you want to call it. For these reasons, it's fast. It's cheap. It's comfortable. You don't have to wear the smartwatch any tighter than you currently wear your smartwatch. No calibration, generalizable from person to person. High sensitivity, high accuracy, and lastly, no field of view limitations. We demonstrated all of this with existing smartwatches. But we needed to take this further. To turn all of this up to 11, we had to build our own hardware using these sensors. And I'm excited to pass this off to Otto to tell you all about it. So at DoublePoint, we decided to build DoublePoint Kit. The DoublePoint Kit is another piece of hardware now from Finland. And what it does, it enables the world with micro gestures. It provides the ultimate input solution for extended reality, augmented reality, lightweight headsets, wearables, and IoT control, among many other use cases. We built this DoublePoint Kit to provide everyone developing these interactions with micro gestures in a licenseable form. So people can license this technology straight from us onto their existing wearables. Or they can license this technology and build their own hardware. It's built for developers. So we're enabling a bunch of UI tools to help people build these new device paradigms. We're also providing a rapid prototyping experience, and it's easy to get started and will reduce your time to market. We're shipping in the first half of 2024. You'll get to experience it in CES in Las Vegas in January. Join the waitlist at doublepoint.com. And thanks for having us. Thank you.


Ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon and welcome to 31 Bly Street. I'm Hervé Lemieux, the director of research at the Lowy Institute. And I want to dedicate the next hour to a fascinating discussion on China's changing economic fortunes and its implications for its global power and ambitions. But first, let me begin by acknowledging the traditional custodians of the land on which the Institute stands, the Gadigal of the Euro Nation. I pay my respects to the elders past and present. Now, the rise of China has been a defining feature of the world for the past four decades. Since the country began to open up and reform its economy in 1978, its GDP has grown by close to 10% a year on average. Today, China accounts for almost a fifth of global output. The sheer size of its market and manufacturing base has reshaped the global economy. But China's economic transformation has also reshaped the global distribution of power with profound implications for war and peace in the 21st century. President Xi Jinping, who has ruled China for the past decade and many more to come, probably, hopes to use his countries increasing heft to reshape the geopolitical order. There is, though, just one catch. And that is that China's rapid rise is slowing down. At the Lowy Institute, this trend and its implications has animated a great deal of pioneering research and thought. In fact, a recent edition of The Economist on Peak China references two pieces of original Lowy research. The first, revising Down the Rise of China, which was a paper authored by Roland Raja to my left, makes clear that China will struggle to avoid a future of significantly slower, longer-term growth. The second, the Asia Power Index, which is our comprehensive annual assessment of the distribution of power. We launched in 2018, looks at China's military gap and how that's narrowing with the United States. So it's an opportune moment to unpack some of this research and analysis, the kinds of lunchtime conversations we would normally have amongst ourselves and bring it out in the public. And I have with me to discuss this important topic. Two of Australia's preeminent economic brains, as well as one of the world's most respected sinologists. All of them I'm proud to call my colleagues. Roland Raja is lead economist at Lowy Institute and director of the Indo-Pacific Development Center. He's also the co-author of Revising Down the Rise of China. Dr. Jenny Gordon here to my immediate left is non-resident fellow at the Lowy Institute, former chief economist at DFAT, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, as well as a member of the Asian Development Bank's Institute's Advisory Committee. She's also an honorary professor at ANU. And finally, in the middle here, we've got Richard McGregor, senior fellow for East Asia and China at the Lowy Institute, former FT correspondent in Beijing and Washington. Also the author of numerous books, including Xi Jinping, The Backlash, Asia's Reckoning, and perhaps his most famous The Party on the Inner Workings of the Chinese Communist Party. So let's begin with the economists and let's go to Roland. It does seem clear the meteoric rise of China's economy is ending. Some have called us peak China. Or have we reached, or are we reaching peak China? What does this mean in terms of the heights at which China's economy is expected to peak? Thanks, Herve.  I think, you know, hopefully what we can do in this session is really unpacking what exactly does that mean. I don't think people are necessarily, some might, but I don't think most are necessarily saying that China's economic rise has peaked yet at this point. And I do think there's still some way to go. But the sense is that China's sort of rise was more likely, seems more likely now to peak at a much earlier point than people probably thought just say a few years ago, right? So, you know, partly what motivated the paper that you mentioned that co-authored with our former colleague here, Alyssa Lange. Was that, you know, if you went back a few years and you look at the range of kind of projections and what people were talking about, people were talking amongst economists of China being able to sustain in their sort of baseline expectations, China being able to sustain growth of say four to five percent a year over the coming decades. And then if you talk, you know, in terms of geopolitical analysts, which are very important to this conversation, the kinds of expectations that they had in mind amongst the leading thinkers was often in the range of five to six percent growth, right? In terms of thinking, what's the future of the world going to look like? Now, if China was actually able to achieve those kinds of growth rates, something, you know, the four to five or even more kind of range, then, you know, the results are really quite striking in terms of what it means for the way the world would actually look. I mean, by the time you get out to the future decades, China would, you know, on its own basically be an economic block unto itself, right? It would be twice the size, you know, of the U.S. economy, possibly larger. That's on market exchange rates. It would be as big or bigger than the G7 economies combined, as big as, you know, the United States and the entire, you know, Western economies combined in that sort of world. That's a, you know, that's a very stark picture when you talk, and you're just talking about growth rates in the four to five percent range, which is what people were thinking just a few years ago. And it certainly means that when we start trying to think about what the geopolitical implications of that might be, well then, of course, that provides them a strong basis to make a play for some kind of global hegemony, right? In terms of their ability to spend a lot on their military, in terms of their ability of their currency to challenge the U.S. dollar. I don't think it would be a cakewalk even in that scenario, but nonetheless, an ability to challenge it. Their ability to invest in technology and be dominant in a wide range of technologies, their ability to invest in things like the Belt and Road Initiative and supporting infrastructure investment overseas and generally just having this economic gravity that would pull more and more countries closer into some kind of alignment. You know, I think, you know, the argument now in talking about peak China is that that doesn't seem like the most likely trajectory anymore. That's the argument that we made in that paper.  The only countries that had experienced and demonstrated that kind of growth in the past were the previous Asian miracle economies, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and then the city-state, Singapore and Hong Kong. So it's a very rare experience. China was doing something that looked to emulate that in the past, but that's, you know, that's a very significant and difficult thing to achieve. And I think when you compare sort of China's fundamentals and its ability to continue along that kind of path, they've got a very different situation to what those economies faced in the past. You know, starting with demographics, everyone knows China faces significant demographic challenges in terms of rapid population aging, you know, reflecting the previous one-child policy. And I've entered a period of demographic decline with its workforce essentially shrinking. Contrast that to, say, Korea and Taiwan at a similar stage of development, they were in the midst of the demographic dividend, right? Immediately there, you can find about two percentage points and differences in potential growth rate. The other big element is that China has really relied very heavily on investment in order to drive its growth. Now, all the Asian miracle economies did the same thing. It's just that China has done so to a much greater extent, right? China's investing over 40% of its GDP in capital investment. The original miracle economies were doing something closer to around 30%. You added up over a long period of time. Now, suddenly, China has got, you know, some of the world's best infrastructure, but it's still a developing country, right, on average, right? So its productivity levels are still way lower. That shows a high degree of inefficiency, but also that they've just really exhausted the ability to use that in order to drive their growth. And we also know housing. You know, there's always a lot of speculative speculation going on in terms of the housing market in China. You hear about the ghost cities and all that sort of thing and empty lots. But one way or another, the housing market is entering into structural decline because, you know, the urban population is basically, that urban population growth is tailing off very, very rapidly. So they can't rely on that anymore either. That basically leaves them with trying to drive things through what economists would call productivity, right? Which is almost everything else. The quality of your policies, the qualities of your institutions, technology, these kinds of things. And, you know, I think the reality is that when you look carefully at this, there are strict limits as to what can be achieved. China has never done that well on that pure productivity front, especially compared to the original East Asian miracle economies. And so you add all of this up and, you know, what we tried to do in that paper was do that, bring together all of this in a very careful way. And I think that's why it's had influence. We conclude that China's economy is likely to decelerate to around 3% growth later this decade. It could come even earlier, given the troubles that they're experiencing now. And would, you know, basically reach roughly parity with the United States sometime, probably at this point in the early 2030s. Now the key thing I'd like to say here though is that, you know, what does that mean in terms of peak China? And what are we saying here? I mean, one China is still gonna be either the second largest or the largest economy in the world, right? So there's not a China collapse type story. It's also not a China collapse story where you consider that what we're talking about is actually quite impressive rates of per capita economic growth, right? If China is doing about 3% per capita growth, according to our, you know, in terms of around 2030, in terms of our view, well, that's actually quite fast. You know, that's not too far off what quite successful economies like Indonesia or even India are able to achieve, right? So they're actually doing quite well. They're just not in that hyper growth sort of path that the original miracle economies were able to achieve and what people thought China was gonna be able to deliver as well. So I think, you know, that's the kind of shift I think that's going on and it's a very sort of different world, but, you know, it's not a China collapse story. It's, you know, it's a different story. So unpacking what this means, I mean, I think that's the rest of our conversation here, but I think that's, you know, where they're going. You know, there's a particular short run situation, but I'll leave that off for now. Yeah, that's right. So this is, so that's the baseline assessment. You heard it from Roland, read his paper, you know, and you're sort of saying, we don't think China's gonna overtake the US until well into the 2030s. And once it does, it will never sort of peel ahead in a way that was once conventionally assumed, even as, you know, as recently as five years ago.  We've heard a lot about the economic troubles and the short-term outlook in China following or during COVID and then now sort of a short-term recovery versus some of these long-term fundamentals that Roland is focused on. Roland's argument is almost that, irrespective of what China does, even a fairly successful economic stewardship of the economy going forward, these structural factors, these tailwinds are not gonna go away. Demographics, productivity, and so forth. Do you agree with Roland's assessment and how do you disaggregate the short-term from the long-term picture? I think, thank you for the question. I agree overall with the assessment that Roland is making, but I just would push it out a bit further. But I think his prognosis that they are, you know, not going to sort of have that, recapture that massive growth is absolutely right on, but for different reasons, right? So they actually still have an awful lot of surplus labor. So they've got a whole bunch of, you know, 500 million people sitting there in rural areas on average incomes of around 260, you know, 2,600 US dollars per year. So, you know, that's sort of almost a quarter of what it is in the major cities. So you could imagine you've got a lot of labor sitting there, but they're not educating them well and they're not, you know, using them well. They've got the Hoku system, which means they can't move to those urban areas. So you've got sort of rules in place that are still strangling their own growth. The other thing, of course, is the move for greater state control over the private sector. So China's history's been fascinating. They've done experiments and whenever they experimented on really sort of letting the market allocate resources, they boomed, very entrepreneurial society, right? But what they're doing now and what Xi Jinping has been doing is saying, you know, we're going to put more resources into the state-owned enterprises. We're going to put, you know, people on the boards in the private companies and so, and we're going to sort of guide your innovation. And we know guiding innovation, Australia's been trying to do that for a yonk's hopeless, right, so you're going to kind of let the market do that. So for those reasons, China's not doing, Japan grew like topsy till it was the richest per capita income in the world, right? China potentially could have done that, but it needed a whole bunch of different policies, including more inclusive policies to bring all its population along so it didn't leave so many behind. So I think, you know, they've got to hit this demographic problem period that's inevitable. Their source of growth has been so much focused on infrastructure that eventually runs out of puff. And so they were in this situation where it was going to have to be the sort of productivity growth. And you look at Japan and how it struggled to do that innovation, you know, and then it's also hit its declining population problems. So from that perspective, I feel a bit like they could have actually, the prognosis were actually not inherently flawed saying China was going to do better, but China's own policy settings have been holding it back and may in fact hold it back more and more. And I'm not quite so convinced that this guy, I mean, once you're big, you're big, and if you have a government that can allocate resources where it wants to allocate resources, then it can commandeer and grow its military if it wants to, it's got less constraints on it than other countries have that might face more of a kind of, you know, a popular backlash against those kinds of allocation decisions. So I think the debate about, you know, the relative size of the US economy versus the Chinese economy is not actually what's important. It's about the extent to which those economies are engaging with the global economy and hence the influence they get, not just through military might, but the influence they get through economic engagement and power. Did the connectivity aspects of things, and let me shamelessly plug another piece of low-e research that we've launched in recent weeks, the Southeast Asia aid map, which actually shows and demonstrates that China's development financing to the region has diminished in the last few years, and so there does seem to be something afoot here. But let me turn to Richard now, and we'll come back to the implications for Australia. Oh, yeah, I missed that one, that's all right. No, no, that's all right. In the later sections of the discussion, but let me turn to Richard here because this is also, you know, this change in economic trajectory has really, or is the subject of fierce debate among China watchers in Australia and abroad. Firstly, I mean, do you think that everyone has cottoned on to how quickly predictions have been revised? Secondly, there's a second set of analysts that appear to suggest that essentially China's running out of time, and that makes China more dangerous rather than less of a threat. In fact, more dangerous, more prone to making miscalculations or to acting on longstanding ambitions such as reunification with Taiwan because it realizes it's running out of time, it's an hour-never-type moment. So give us a sense of what's happening in the debate among China watchers where you stand on that debate, and then we'll go to how perhaps the Chinese themselves see this. Yeah, well, Jenny's right that the mere size of relative size of the US and China is not entirely determinative, but it matters a lot. And it has profound, I think, implications for US-China. It also does for Australia as well. And getting ready for this panel and this question actually dragged out an old article from that August website, Pearls and Irritations, that many of us might have a bookmark. And this is Hugh White in 2017. Now, Hugh has been a very influential figure in the strategic bait in Australia. And I'm not here today to either praise or bury him, but the truth is that Hugh's theory is based on economic strength. And to go back to this article in 2017 in which he quotes the foreign policy white paper using Australian Treasury figures based on PPP purchasing price parity estimates of economic size, I don't want to get into that debate. But Hugh writes in 2017, he says, only 13 years from now, the Australian government is telling us China's economy will have left America's far behind in the rear view mirror. In other words, on this measure, China by 2030, this is the prediction made in 2017, China by 2030 will be double the size of America's economy. And what's changed I think these days is that nobody really thinks that anymore. Or very few people think that anymore. It's not, there's no consensus, but if you're looking for an emerging consensus, is that China will grow more slowly. So if you look at the span of debate about China, and I'm slightly parroting it here, but on the one hand you've got, we'll fight them in the trenches, and all the way the other side to resistance is futile. So the resistance is futile camp is really based on Chinese economic strength. And you see this particularly internalized in Southeast Asia. So if China is going to be growing much more slowly, then that has a big impact, I think on the psychology of US-China great power competition. Of course, it depends on what happens in the US as well. It has a great deal of impact on China. One of China's biggest problems, it's not just growth, it's a fiscal problem, it's an undertaxed country. They've got all sorts of debts, things they have to pay for, and less and less income coming in. So they face much more difficult choices than they've had to face for decades really on how they allocate state resources, and that includes on military spending. Now, I think the final point is, and I think Roland is, I agree with Roland here, we're not talking about China collapse.  China's political system, if it sticks together, also allows the leadership to leverage its strengths in perhaps ways that America struggles to do. So China will be big enough, it will be powerful enough, but I think the notion that they will overwhelm the US and its allies collectively by its size, I think that's what's disappearing into the rear view mirror now, not old notions about the US and China. Yeah, absolutely, and how do you think the Chinese themselves are looking on to this, policy makers in Beijing, you think how worried are they? Is this keeping them up at night? Is this along the lines of what's in the book authored by Hal Brands and Michael Beckley? I mean, basically they argue that China faces decay, has reached a point where it's strong enough to aggressively disrupt the existing order, but is losing confidence that time is on its side. Is it losing confidence that time is on its side? Well, I don't know, it's very hard to say that with any certainty. Of course, the whole sort of public projection of China is the opposite, you know, the phrase in China, the east is rising, the west is declining. In theory, they're much more confident in their political system relative to democracies than ever. So I think that's, you know, but it's hard, you know, but it's definitely true right now, China's coming out of COVID, there's a bit of a bounce back this year in GDP terms, they're struggling to work out what the new settling point and what the model is that produces that is in coming years.  Look at the talk of stimulus. If you look at the Chinese economists debating this issue, you know, debates on the Chinese economy, on economics in China have obviously always been much more open than debates on politics, but under Xi Jinping, all debates are more subterranean or suppressed, but certainly the old prevailing camp, led by Justin Lin of Peking University, who used to be an alumni of the ANU, was that China could grow 7% annually well into the 30s. And I've met some of his colleagues who used to write papers, we both did, a while back on this, and they say, forget it. So I think the eye, you know, it's very hard for Chinese economists to publicly, in a very clear fashion admit this, but I think you see a lot more concern coming through. I don't mean to say there's a consensus amongst them, but I think the old optimistic projections are pretty well gone. Can I just add something here? I mean, I think, you know, I agree a lot with the different aspects of what Jenny and Richard have said here, and I think, you know, putting it in my framework, I think particularly going to what Jenny said, you know, a lot of these things are really important downside risks for China that we should also be conscious of. I think the baseline outlook is one along the lines that I've sketched out, which sees them sort of slowing down significantly and then but able to reach some sort of parity with the United States. But that's assuming they get a lot of things right, actually, so I think in order to deliver that, they do need to undertake a range of reforms. You know, they need to deal with inequality, they need to boost household spending, they do need to plug a range of the technological disruptions that they're now facing, such as on semiconductors, they need to deal with excessive amounts of debt, which is extremely hard to do when your economy is slowing down rapidly. And so I think actually the most likely scenario is that they potentially undershoot that, even the baseline that we're talking about here. Now, the other element is in the short run, right now, they are really struggling to get out of the COVID lockdown and to have that rebound back. I think everyone thought they were gonna have a much stronger rebound when you look back at the rebound from the 2020 lockdowns, they came back quite strongly. They made up for the lost growth. This time, they don't seem to be doing that. And part of that, I think, is got to do with the confidence, right? Now you're facing an outlook. If you're a business or a household, you're facing a much darker economic outlook, a much more constrained outlook, then stimulus can start to lose its effect. It's also true that they need to look at a different kind of stimulus this time, supporting households much more rather than the nutritional infrastructure or the housing sector. But this is a problem. I think it starts paving to where do we go from here as well in terms of the broader economic implications. One thing we have seen is that China is as a result of all of this, leaned very heavily on exports again, right? Chinese exports are something like a trillion dollars higher than they were pre-pandemic. It's a very normal economic adjustment. You would expect that your economy is weakening and you're having struggling to find new sources of demand. The exchange rate will weaken and you will end up using exports to get yourself out of that hole. Normally that's what economists suggest would be a good idea. It just means something very different when you're talking about an economy as large as China's. And so I think that's also going to be something that we're going to have to watch. That's a good pickup for where we go with Australia and what this means in Australia. But also the issue around Chinese sort of economic power in the region. And one of the big differences though between China and the US is that China trades a lot. It's got supply chain linkages all through Asia. And so at that very high rate of, and it is a problem for them, so it's their due circulation economy is not going to work as well as they were hoping. But that actually gives them a lot of economic power. So you've got those economic relationships. And that's quite different because the US share of trade is much smaller as a share of the US economy. So it's much easier for the US economy and there are some downside risks that they could close even more particularly if they get a change in president. It's been the investment that's been the key thing for the US. It's been the capital flows and that outward investment that has given you and inward investment that has given them that outreach and power. So it's a very different structure. So one is an investment based relationship and the other is much more a partnership and in both receiving and supplying inputs as part of a supply chain. And for Australia, it's been wonderful for us because it's been this massive growing market. I mean, Japan's boom got us out of the doldrums in the 70s and into the 80s. Korea's boom helped us further and China's boom rescued us from the GFC and it's continuing, you know, the commodity prices at the moment aren't high because China's strong, they're high for a whole bunch of alternative reasons, one of which is the war in Ukraine. But when we're looking out that China's shift in, if they take the policy option to try and expand domestic demand, it won't be in commodity intensive. And then so the big question for us will be, will it be in the sorts of things we also export on the agricultural side? So do we have opportunities in terms of our agricultural exports if they're particularly at the higher value end, if we could restore wine exports and beef exports and things like that, then the opportunities for Australia are more about this lot and not that lot, but the big opportunities for Australia are all around what's China's investment in the green economy going to look like, the extent to which they're going to be doing that structural transformation and hence needing the inputs for that, that we can also supply. So it's also, are we going to be capable of responding and supplying those? So for Australia, it's kind of like- And whether we'll be allowed to. And whether we'll be allowed to, yeah. It's the other thing, but it actually brings to mind, you said earlier in the piece, you said, look, the US-China GDP comparison is not the most relevant one. And there is a frame of reference here. So performance is all relative and relative to the US as a global benchmark for global power, but relative to the rest of the region for Australia's trade as well, because if you find that other Southeast Asian economies are facing similar problems as China, that is to say their populations may also start to age, their productivity growth rates may also start to flatline. Who knows about India? So the possibility of opening up alternative markets really is dependent not just on China's performance, but on the relative performance of everyone else that we trade with. So China's shares overall, there's a, the overall pie of Australia's trade is dependent on the fortunes of ages. So how much of China's problems here that we've identified correctly, I think, afflict China uniquely versus our original problem that you could say may apply to other countries as well. Is everyone facing slower growth rates? Well, I think that the challenge is that, in my mind, some of China's slower growth rates is because of its policies. And so those are uniquely China, but there are definitely the other headwinds. And it's also depends where you're at in that sort of development cycle.  And Shanghai is kind of like this massive, modern city, you know, you would think that it would be much higher than that. And yet you look at other, you know, you look at Korea or Japan and they're already very high income per capita. So they're at a different place. And then you've got Cambodia and Laos that are also in a very different place, right? And then really most problems, you've got the demographic issue, but Indonesia has this demographic dividend potential that it could, you know, and it's big, right? As does India. And as does India. But again, it's going to be the domestic policies. So it's a bit like we're all a bit problematic in our own ways. But so I wouldn't really take the sort of, the China model and say, I can just apply that everywhere else. I think there's different policy issues in different places. But the China tentacles, economic tentacles, we need to understand. And when you start talking about technology, those tentacles could be very strong if they're linked into technology and they're not just about building widgets that don't have a lot of technology embedded in them. And so that's going to be where the competition is really going to heat up. Yeah, and I think the other, you know, that China is already very well established. It's not going anywhere. It's this economic behemoth in our region. And that under no assessment does that fundamentally change. Now, the other, if I'm looking at the world from Beijing's perspective, the other thing that gives me optimism is that economics alone or GDP alone is not just the universal proxy for my power. I mean, power is derived from many other sources, part of which is the economic connectivity piece, but part of which is, of course, military capability. And we know that there's still a lot of catch-up growth for China on this front. China's military budgets forecast to rise by over 7% this year. It's more or less been tracking with GDP growth rates. It's still much lower than America's, the overall defense spending totals. But its navy could be 50% bigger than America's by 2030. And it's not just conventional. It's nuclear arsenal will almost quadruple by 2035. And the point that the Asia Power Index makes is that catch-up growth hasn't finished. In some sense, the economics comes first, but everything, the flow-on effects in other ways of conceiving of power are delayed by some time. And the parity that China can reach on military capabilities with the US, certainly in our own region, that opportunity has not gone out the window, even with slowing growth rates, which brings us back, I think, to the geopolitics of this all, Richard. I suppose what we're saying in talking about peak China is not necessarily that China is about to fall off a cliff. It's not about to collapse. It may well start to plateau. So perhaps the better way of conceiving of this is not peak China, but more great power parity. And we're still adjusting to that. I think we've probably got a dangerous decade ahead in terms of the growth in China's military capability, the potential for miscalculation, hubris, fear, et cetera, et cetera. But could I not optimistically put to you a case wherein, because we are closer to reaching a settling point in the global balance of power between US and China, at least 10 years hence, and the economic factors, the China's growth rate, will start to level down. That created a lot of instability, unpredictability, was the source of China's rise. That greater degree of stability within the global economic balance of power could also create a window of opportunity for potential stability, settling point between US and China insofar as they coexist as great powers, more or less evenly sized. Yeah, I don't think so, frankly. That would be nice. China catches up economically to the US, but that's not what they want. They want to be the regional hegemon that's utterly unsurprising fact. Of course, that's the case. They're the biggest country in the region. There's all sorts of historical antecedents and baggage that goes with that. The core of the core Chinese interest, as they often tell us, is Taiwan. And I think they have to be believed on that. So they're not, and the South China Sea, the East China Sea. So it's not just about catching up with America. It's doing all sorts of other things with that power. And so that's why we face a dangerous decade, not just because of superpower competition. The other point about military spending, you know, it's often stated that America spends four times as much as China on the military. I think that's an extremely misleading figure. I'm not saying they're not the biggest military in the world, but there's many things that the Chinese budget doesn't count, procurement for one. And the budget itself is much more opaque than the Pentagon's budget. You cannot compare the sorts of salaries paid in both systems. You can't count the legacy effects, you know, all the sort of cost of military pensions and hospitalization because of the previous wars they've been involved in. Plus, and I know we had this discussion before, there's a PPP adjustment for the economy and for military spending. But broadly speaking, you know, China can build an aluminium plant, you know, three times as fast and at half the cost of capital than America, and the same broadly applies if they're building frigates. So that's how we come to the fact that China has a bigger Navy, just in numbers of ships, it might not be as capable than the US has. So merely quoting the budget, so I think is not a good comparison. Now, Chinese military is untested, et cetera, et cetera, all of that, but just like their economy, they're big enough. So they're a real challenger to the United States. Now, I mean, turning back to what this means for the global economy, you know, this is somewhat related to the fact that the United States, I think, wants in some way to hobble China's capabilities in some foundational technologies, and those technologies have military applications, but broader applications economically as well, and will hurt Chinese productivity to an extent. So I'm thinking here about the export bands on certain semiconductors and machines to Chinese firms. That's expected to cut into Chinese GDP to a degree. So, Roland, I mean, you've done some thinking about what decoupling or what's now referred to as de-risking might mean for the ability of China's economy to continue to grow, what it means for their ability to continue to innovate in frontier technologies. What's your assessment in terms of, how will this actually impact China's fortunes? Is it very marginal or is it somewhat more substantive? Yeah, but before I get to that, I wanted to just very quickly say, I mean, following up on what Richard said, I do think there's a couple of different ways to think of this peak China thing, which is one that China can be the regional hedging one. It's got the economic heft it needs to do a lot of things in the region, and so those sorts of the issues related to that, and China's rising power in the region, that's one thing, and that hasn't really changed dramatically. The other one is in the global south. China can also do a lot of things and be a lot of things, compete very effectively in the global south through things like Belt and Road, through trying to spread the use of its currency as well, which provides a way to evade sanctions as another thing through its technology. And I do think the final point on this is simply that the slowing Chinese economy, the likelihood that they rely on exports, the fact is they're going to your point, can there be a nice settling point? Well, the transition might involve increased economic tensions as a result with the western countries. We're seeing the story play out now with EVs and car exports say into Europe, and so I think these are difficult, very difficult political economy issues, and in the transition from, we might think where China is now to where we think it is going, these things could really heat up. So I think actually, unfortunately, there's quite a lot of, there are quite a lot of barbs rather than the benign kind of scenario that one might otherwise hope for. Now, partly why I did that little D to her base because I think you oversold how much thinking and insight I can provide on decoupling because I do think that it's very, very hard to say, John Edwards has tried to write on this as well, and I think a lot of the questions on this goes to, if it is the sort of as Jake Sullivan puts it, America is a national security advisor, the small yard, high fence, in other words, if it's very, very targeted specifically to China and to specific areas where there's a clear national security related risk, then you could sort of think of that well then the broader economic ramifications of this are not necessarily going to be so large, conditional on China's ability to plug those, ultimately plug those gaps, which is still a point of uncertainty. I think a key point to always remember with China and its growth prospects is that it is, while they're extremely advanced components of China and people in China and companies in China operating at the frontier, on average it is still a developing country and therefore a lot of what it needs in order to generate economic growth and to improve its living standards but also increases economic power are things like increased household spending, improved social safety nets and social security at home, reform, state-owned enterprises, deal with the intergovernmental fiscal transfer system. All of these things are internal sort of reforms for China and they're not necessarily driven by technology, right? Technology is not going to be the driving force and that's still where the majority of Chinese growth needs to come from. So that makes me think that, you know, the small and targeted, the small yard high fence stuff, if it was genuinely implemented like that, may not ultimately crimp China's overall economic performance that much and it's the overall trajectory of its living standards but it will hit some parts hard and it could obviously, as intended, have security implications and benefits from the American perspective. The question is, how far does it go? Where do you draw the line on AI and internet of things? All of these sorts of things, the digitalization which is permeating, depending on who you listen to, permeating more and more of the economy. So then the question is really, where does it end and how far does it go and that's how things can easily escalate. I think it's also worth mentioning again the difference that we have to draw between comparative performance in Asia versus the global economy. So, you know, a lot of these things may well be beneficial for the G7 economies but if China's already very entrenched in Asia, I think Richard and I were a few years ago, we wrote a piece about how decoupling, as it was termed then, the risk for America here is that you actually contribute to America's decoupling from the rest of Asia, given how closely tethered Asia is to China. So, I mean, have your views on this changed in the intervening years? Yeah, I mean, I think decoupling is obviously overrated. You know, it was a buzzword. That's why people now talk about de-risking because decoupling's impossible. The term invented by the Europeans and not often the Europeans can actually create a buzzword that permeates globally. Hard of, Europe's regulatory influence. I think some of you might have seen in recent days an interview with the head of the US defense company, Raytheon, and he said decoupling's impossible. They source literally thousands of parts from China. So if Raytheon, I think they're gonna build Australia's new missiles or something, if they can't decouple from China, then I think very few countries can. And of course, it's not about US and China decoupling from each other. The East Asian supply chain goes through Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, some Southeast Asian countries as well. So you have to unhook China not just from the US, but from multiple countries and that's impossible. So it's going to be very limited. Some people say the small yard, high fence thing, the yard keeps getting bigger. But I don't think that's really going to be possible. And China itself is obviously going to miss out on some particularly semiconductors, the most advanced semiconductors and they're going to struggle to catch up because they won't have the lithographic equipment to make them, et cetera, et cetera. That's from the Netherlands. So, yes, it will hurt them. That's obvious, but the idea that we'll hold them back, I don't think anybody thinks that. I think the aim of the US is just to delay China's capabilities. I don't think people in the US think it's going to sort of destroy them forever and a day. There is another risk though that comes in with this, which is that if they're not getting access to those same platform technologies, they'll develop their own platform technologies and have been putting huge amounts of effort into doing that. And then the extent to which they're asking their trading partners to choose, to the extent to which those platforms are required to, I mean, everybody knows your Tesla car gets updated, the software gets updated, and if you can't have a motor vehicle that's not talking to the software provider. So you're going to have to sort of, we need to decide how do we get this interoperability between the platforms, and that's going to be, China would, I think in this case, because this is what Southeast Asia want, is they want interoperability. They want platforms that they can choose to, whether it comes from China, whether it comes from the US. And so it's really going to be that US decision about where it's sticking that yard and walls as to how much interoperability you're going to be. There's another thing that the US is doing, which is the Europeans, and we quite frankly should be worried about, is things like the Inflation Reduction Act. And so what that is saying is, for their green technologies, they want all of it to be built in the United States. And first of all, that raises the cost, even though their companies are getting subsidies, other companies aren't getting subsidies who are trying to compete with those. And so you're just raising the cost to other countries of going green and trying to block China out, which has been a source of solar, cheap solar panels. The reason the cost of solar has come down is because China, we didn't want to develop the technology that was developed, I think it was University of New South Wales. They went to China and China developed that technology and built this enormous solar panel industry. And so, but that brought the cost down. So for a global economy that's trying to have massive investment to deal with climate emission reduction, these are not good things. And then for productivity and whether we're going to use digital to actually boost productivity across a whole bunch of things, that's about embedding digital technology in a lots of stuff, as well as services and technology to enable quality service delivery. And if our platforms can't talk to each other because they're not interoperable and you've got to pick one or the other, then for the Australian economy, we're a bit like most of Southeast Asia, we don't want to have to pick one or the other. We'd like to be able to have the smorgasbord to choose so that we don't get abuse of market power because we're locked into one particular set of providers. And we know that they've abused market power and I've said this a few times, but older people will remember on VHS, the geo blockers on VHS and how we paid so much more for our VHS tapes because we could, they could, right? So we don't want to get ourselves in that. So we want a competitive market for technology out there based on interoperable platforms and that's what we should be pushing for if we want Australia to be able to thrive in this circumstance. Yeah, no, it's really interesting. In the Inflation Reduction Act, the RRA, I mean, it's clearly motivated by more than just the green transition. That's very clear. And I would just plug John Edwards' paper. It's called Chips, Subsidies, Security and Great Power Competition, in which he argues, it's not clear what rules, if any, will apply in this new era of industry competition. This is not just a U.S. story, it's not just a China story, it's also the Europeans. But he's also looking at this from the perspective of Australia and smaller countries, the cognitive dissonance somewhat between us as a sort of proudly free-trading nation and then the rise of this new era of export controls and industry subsidies. I mean, some of which he argues may actually be beneficial for us in terms of spurring technological innovation but in other ways also harmful, detrimental insofar as it splits the global economy into competing blocks. So it's well worth reading that paper. Now, I'm realizing the time, so I wanna, we've got about 14 minutes left in the hour and I wanna open it up to audience questions at this point. I'm sure there are plenty of questions and many ways we could take the discussion. So, I saw a hand at the back there. Yes, if you can just identify yourself. Yeah, hi, John Harvey from DMTC. Thanks for the presentation. It's a double barrel question. I didn't hear any real reference to rural materials or resources to allow that almost continuing 3% a year growth you seem to settle on for the future. Are the resources out there and can China get access to them? And the second part of it, with its military spending, is that a net drag on the economy or is it spur growth and stimulate the economy? Thanks. Do you wanna go for that one? Yeah, I'll go quickly. I mean, I think in terms of, you know, expecting this transition in their economy to a new normal and a slower growth path that is predicated on the idea that there would be, it would be less ultimately commodity intensive at the end of the day. That's partly because they do need to shift away from investment-driven growth and it's also just that, you know, when the growth rate is lower then the demand is gonna be ultimately lower as well.  I think the demand is not going to tail off necessarily. I mean, fossil fuel is yes, of course, right? We hope to see that. But in terms of other raw commodities, it should still, I would expect it to still stay very elevated. And as Jenny mentioned earlier, of course there is all the green minerals that are gonna be enabled and it's gonna require a huge amount of its own investment to enable that as well. So I think the story is that there's still gonna be a huge commodity, a consumer, an importer. So I'll give two, sorry, you go. Oh, I was just gonna say, they've also been investing very heavily in Africa, Brazil and other places to, you know, ensure those supplies of raw materials and that's something for Australia is sort of going to, you know, we've been the great supplier and a very, you know, low cost based supplier as well. But as those countries' production comes online, we'll face more competition and the question will be around, they do actually currently do most of the processing of critical minerals relative to the amount. So that's going to be for the rest of the world to catch up to some degree rather than the other way around. Yeah, so lots of big answers to those questions. I'll just give you some brief ones. The, you know, the Chinese version of the military industrial complex is called Civil Military Fusion. That's a policy about as old as Xi Jinping coming to power. So if it adds to US GDP, I'm sure the same is the case in China. It's not just about growth, of course. It's about, you know, technology, incubators for military purposes. That's always been a driver of technology in the States. And I think the same is the case in China. Secondly, a rather, might sound tangential on raw materials. If you look at a Taiwan scenario, contingency, as one says, and, you know, leaving aside war, I think that's a low possibility. But, you know, the way that China would bring Taiwan to heal is a blockade, for example. And they practice this often. They most recently practice this when Nancy Pelosi travelled to Taiwan. So China cuts off Taiwan, and then overnight declares Taiwan as part of China's custom zone and sort of, you know, brings it into the fold. So if you have a Taiwan blockade, what about a counter blockade?  Most of Chinese oil comes from Saudi these days, not Russia. They're building up from Russia. They've got iron ore from Australia, which they still depend on. You have soybeans and all manner of foodstuffs coming from Brazil, Argentina and the like. LNG tankers from Australia and Qatar that makes up the bulk of their LNG exports. So they are highly vulnerable, I think, on the issue of raw materials. They can't produce it all themselves. And in the event, you know, of a potential conflict or a blockade of Taiwan, China can be blockaded as well in an extremely damaging way. So I think that is something that they really worry about. So question up front, yeah. Thank you for the discussion. So I want to ask about the cause of peak China. So I wonder to what extent is this peak China intentionally engineered to preserve the political security of the Communist Party rule? And if that's an important reason, is it possible it is reversible if a reform-minded leader will come to power for whatever reason? That's certainly what I think. I think that it's more the policies. I think the fundamental factors of demographics, the shift towards more service economy, you know, those sorts of things will inevitably slow growth. But as you get richer, you slow growth anyway. You know, Japan is not growing it. You know, 7% per annum and hasn't done since, you know, I think the whatever was mid 80s. Yeah. So I think if they actually did reverse policies, they would actually improve growth again. It's still got enormous potential for growth, both in the domestic market. Henry Ford learnt that.  They buy stuff and, you know, they can get scale. They can get productivity through scale and specialisation simply because it's such an enormous market, which is why Western firms wanted to be in there. But it is the policy change, even though it ultimately fell slow. Can I, I mean, I do think, yes, that there are policy changes they could make that would enable quite rapid growth. So even say back up to 5%, that can theoretically, I think, be sustained. The question is, you know, around the politics of whether or not they will actually make those choices. But to give it a sort of more international perspective, I mean, there's a sort of term you invariably have heard of the middle income trap. And this is an over abused kind of term, right? But I think one key nugget from this is that, you know, as countries sort of transition through various stages and, you know, from being, you know, starting off at a relatively poor country, trying to get to high income status, you know, the economic model they need to use, the policy settings that they need, the overall sort of economic regime needs to change, and that's actually really hard. And so that's basically what happens when countries get trapped, right? Is that they had that success with a particular model, then the vested interests start to arise, the technical difficulties are there, and the growth strategies that you thought were working really well just don't work so well anymore and shifting to something new is really hard. A lot of people look at China and economists like me would wonder, why don't they improve social safety nets? Why don't they support households more? That's the obvious thing to do. You could do some stimulus right now that would immediately start rebalancing that right there. No one thinks Hukou is a good system, and it's definitely, you know, has bad social and definitely economic consequences, right? But there are obviously sensitivities around this of a wide variety, but that's one way to think about it, shifting the economic regime is really hard, and the nature of growth that even the current political regime might want, you know, they want to prioritize national security, yes, but they also want a higher quality growth, right? But less environmentally damaging, less common prosperity, some more equal, you know, these sorts of things. But then how do you achieve that? Actually, that involves regulating the economy more, which is actually really hard again.  So there's a lot of risks, even if you decided you wanted to go down, you know, a more sort of reformist kind of path. But very briefly, I mean, they make choices. Everybody's critical of the Hukou system, you know, like a past law system. China probably thinks it's worked well because, you know, Beijing doesn't look like Manila. You know, that's the whole point of it, to stop urban slums. So we might think it's a drag on productivity over time. They might think it's managed stability. Secondly, have we reached peak China? I don't think Xi Jinping thinks that. The question is what economic policies he wants, and I think that's in flux at the moment. There's a lot of conflicting signals coming out. In theory, peak China is 2049, right? You know that, it's when we reach the China dream and the big way station on the way to that is in 2035. So what does Xi Jinping believe the policy setting should be to get there? And that's, I think, a very open question. But growing risks, diminishing returns, there is scope for improving performance, but there are also inherent structural limitations on that. I think that seems to be the consensus. And that some of these tailwinds are becoming headwinds. I mean, irrespective of who's in power or what their motivations are in terms of their economic management of the economy, you know, you're facing a lot of these impediments which will naturally start to slow any economy as it goes from developing rapidly emerging to something more in the middle income bracket, which is the interesting thing here. Now, further questions? Yes, I see just a gentleman at the front here and then I saw a couple of other hands to try to get two or three more questions in for wrapping up. What impact do you think? Yeah, we'll do them at the same time. Sorry, go ahead. What impact do you think AI technology is going to have? Thanks very much. We'll go to, yes, two seats, two rows back. Yeah, if the dead weight in China seems to me to be the educational system. If you compare it with Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, and Japan, all of them had a very, from early on had very extensive and all embracing educational systems. Something like 60% of Chinese kids are woefully maleducated because they live in the middle of the country. Trying to drag that along seems to be, until that's cured, and I doubt if it ever will be, then that's an almost intolerable burden for that place to survive. Particularly given also, you can't really develop a consumer economy when 60% of your population is incapable of really being part of it. Okay, so we're AI education and the final question here. Thank you. There's roughly three billion people between us and China, including India. I've met Filipinos who are very pro-Chinese versus America. Singaporeans who are very proud of Chinese heritage, and I was recently in Japan, and this is covered in Huawei material and products and so on. So just wondering what your view is across the rest of that three billion people, they pro-Chinese or pro-American? Big questions, all three of them. So don't feel obliged to answer all of them. Why don't we cherry pick? We've got about a minute to go, so. Oh, okay. Can I jump in on? That would be your concluding statement as well. On AI and education. And it's really interesting because, one of the challenges for China is youth unemployment, and they've got this college system producing huge numbers of graduates who are struggling to find employment and AI is gonna make that more challenging because it's reducing the number of entry level jobs. And so one of the challenges for AI is actually what that job structure looks like. It's not that you won't find employment, but you've got this, and you're absolutely right about the education system, and I think that is a major challenge for them because they've left so many behind, is that how are you going to get this highly educated group take jobs lower level because AI is doing the normal entry level jobs and that is a big challenge policy wise, not just for China, but for everywhere. Yeah, so we need to chat GTP to answer that question. But look, I mean, John, on education system, I'm just trying to Google the name of the book and I've forgotten the name of the book, you're right, up to a point. Sorry? Invisible China. Invisible China, yeah. But the book also acknowledges that that's changing. I mean, just, you know, the world does get dazzled by a few schools in Shanghai, which are the best in the world, but it doesn't reflect the entire country, and there's been a remarkable lack of spending in education in rural China, which is dominant China and health for decades, and that's a really amazing book to read about that. But I think the book also says that's changing, maybe it's too late, maybe not. Also, the question about the three billion people, Singaporeans are proud of their Chinese heritage, they're also proud to be Singaporean. In fact, one of the slogans in Singapore is we are not Chinese, you know, so they are pro-Singapore, I think, as much as they are, you know, pro-China in that contest, but it's definitely, it's certainly true, though, that Chinese heritage right through the region, not in India, obviously. India, I think, is not pro-China. Chinese heritage in all of those Southeast Asian countries is extremely influential in ways we don't always visibly see in making them a lot. What's the right way of putting it? More likely to be sympathetic towards China itself, but Chinese policies in some respects are turning many people in those countries against China or making it more wary. But yes, I think there's an interesting thread to be done there. Ron? Yeah, I mean, I'll be very brief. I mean, I agree with what Jenny has said about the issues with AI and youth unemployment is a real, I think, a real sort of tinderbox, potentially. And the only other point to add, though, I think on education, while there is a, you know, swath of undereducated and underutilized people in China, I think actually, you know, the numbers that I look at, you've got to always, you know, there's always backward parts of every country and it can look, China is a place of extremes, but on average, actually, on schooling, they're not doing too badly if you compare them to some of the career in Taiwan 30, 40 years ago, right? And so that's often the more accurate comparison to understand things. I think it's the sum of the gaps and the nuances where problems start to emerge. And on Richard's point, I mean, I think there's a, you know, there's a reality that the rest of Asia is, you know, we're sort of in Asia, but we're on one sort of extremity of it. We're much further away, basically, from China. And, you know, we think we're very closely integrated economically with China in many ways. We'll, you know, talk to those economies that you mentioned, right? And it's much more all-encompassing and much more deeply ingrained, as Richard liked to say, we do business with China, but not necessarily in China and it's vice versa. And the rest of Asia, it's very different, right? And so, you know, I think that invariably creates some difference in how people are gonna see. Right, okay. Well, if we wanna sum up some of the basic conclusions, I think it's China and America will approach economic parity under these revised models, including our own in the next decade or so, but, and they'll remain locked in that position for decades to come, but that does not necessarily mean or economic parity does not necessarily mean power parity, certainly not in Asia. I think that's an important differentiation. And in terms of military capability, China still has a lot of headway in terms of narrowing that gap. Even a weaker Chinese economy will be among the world's largest, in fact, the second largest, if not the largest, and the state can continue to mobilize vast resources in strategic areas, such as producing its own semiconductors as well as weapons. So, lots of different ways in which this discussion could have evolved, but I'm very proud of all my colleagues and very pleased with this discussion. Please thank them, and thank you for your time. Thank you.