Good afternoon and good evening. My name is Susan Stagant and I am the Director of the Africa Program at the United States Institute of Peace. Welcome to our first conversation in the series Why All the Coos. This week, the Biden-Harris administration will host the Summit for Democracy to activate its commitment to renew democracy in the United States and around the world as an essential priority to meet the unprecedented challenges of our times. As conversations take place about addressing and fighting corruption, promoting respect for human rights, and defending against authoritarianism, it is impossible to ignore what the UN Secretary-General has called an epidemic of coos. The number of coos and coot attempts in 2021 matches the highest point in this 21st century. And we are concerned about the impacts of instability, undermining democratic progress in human rights, and the acceleration of cycles of violence in countries grappling with conflict. While the headlines about coos often point to a backsliding of democracy or political transition gone wrong, there is no one narrative, particularly in Africa. We are also interested in drawing forward the stories of the responses to coos. These include narratives about the organizing and mobilization by youth, women, civic and political organizations, the decisions by international, continental and regional organizations to uphold norms of constitutional change of government, the mediation efforts to facilitate negotiations and reach new political agreement about how to move forward together, and intense discussions about what security means, for whom, and who provides it. In short, the narratives about the hard, courageous work of peace and democracy. So today we will focus on Sudan, and I am delighted to be joined by three distinguished panelists. Ahmed Keduda, the former sea and your policy advisor in the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs in the government of Sudan. Hala El-Karib, the Regional Director for the Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa, and speaking today in her capacity as an independent activist, and Joe Tucker, senior expert for the Greater Horn of Africa at the United States Institute of Peace. For Sudan, we are not just talking about one coup that you may have been tracking in the media on October 25th, but in fact two critical coups over the last two years and several attempts in between. So let's dive right into our conversation and start with some reflection on the 2019 coup. Joe, I'm going to turn to you first and ask if you can help us to set the scene starting back in 2018-2019, when the political transition in Sudan started. What in your view sparked that 2019 coup? Thank you, Susan. It's really an important question because in Sudan, like everywhere else in the region, history and political history especially definitely matters, and I want to sort of focus on two things. What came technically before the coup and what led to this frankly opening for the military to act as it did. So as many people know, there were a lot of protests that led to what happened in 2019. And on the surface, these protests that began in December of the previous year were really grounded in extreme frustrations among the population of various elements of society on what on the surface was economic reasons, a real sharp rise in the cost of bread and basic commodities, a reduction in subsidies, inflation really across the board. So that aspect of the protest that led up to what in effect was a coup that overthrew the Bashir government, really grounded in that frustration from the public. And I want to note here what others have documented is that a lot of those protests were from relatively prosperous areas in and around Khartoum, that some say benefited from the previous regime in sort of a knock-on economic impact. Some people refer to this as sort of the inner periphery areas that were hit hard, places like Aparah, Bob Medany, Port Sudan, Gadareff. And so those places that really are sometimes out of the international eye, so to speak. And I think a question we might come to after is what did that mean for areas in the more traditional periphery, Darfur, Southern Court of Flam, Blue Nile? What impact did what was happening there have on this, given that a lot of the focus was on protests related to the economy. In these areas that people don't see as that, quote, normal periphery. I don't really want, of course, to want to discount the fact that there was, of course, a lot of popular anger, resentment of the Bashir regime, decades of real depredation, and significant crackdowns on political and civic forces. Obviously, that did play a role into this. And here I also want to note that as the protests advanced, as 2019 started and got underway, there was a real sense of a growing organization unity among political and civic forces among unions on the ground. And I think that that was taking things to the next level, so to speak, as opposed to prior protests in the years following South Sudan's independence in 2011. I think that really got the attention of the military and the ruling elites. And so, of course, then we saw what has happened prior times in Sudanese history, the military intervening on the surface, intervening on the side of the street, so to speak. And I think just to note briefly here, I think it's important to know that there were a lot of fractures among regime elements, among the ruling party going back years, also sort of jockeying and differences of opinion among the military and the intelligence services. And I think that sort of a lot of those gray areas, frankly, created space for the military to act as it did. I think in retrospect, they did act to take sort of the side of the streets to unseat President Bashir and the top tier of the National Congress Party. I think they were acting in their economic interest. I think they were acting in the sense that they always liked to be seen as a protector of the nation. They obviously wanted to seat at the table as this went forward. There was also some internal discontent on President Bashir making the decision to run in the 2020 elections. So again, I think we'll leave it there briefly. But the last thing I would say is that in the years prior to this, they were always the threats of coups, especially one incident, particularly November 2012. So sort of taking stock of those internal fissures among the key elites is important then. And I think it's important now. And I think this highlights one big question that Hala and Kadoota can speak to more correctly than I can, is that this really gets to the point of what is the ultimate role, if any, of the Sudanese military and security services in politics in the country? That's this underlying theme throughout all this. So I'll leave it at there. But thanks again for the question because it's important. Thanks, Joe. Kadoota, I want to turn to you because we talk about the protests as requiring a tremendous amount of organization. But I don't think anybody who hasn't been part of that organizing in the years that go into it can really grasp the intensity and the structure and the courage and energy that has to go into that. And I'm particularly interested in hearing a bit more from you about what was happening in the organizing of the mass protest movement. What was the response where, as Joe said, so often military say you're stepping in to defend the people? And what happened to really take the position and push forward with the necessary political negotiations? I remember at the time Sudanese kept saying, we are not Egypt. We will not act in the same way that the street acted in Egypt. And it was this weight of history, not just Sudan's history, but some global history in terms of mass movements and the trajectory of who's really sat on the shoulders of Sudanese. So take us back a little bit to that time. Sure. First of all, thank you for organizing this panel. You're absolutely right. I think the political mobilization has really had an accumulated legacy over the years. Throughout the 30 years of Bashir's rule, whether it was the student movements and the universities moving forward to the establishment of youth groups, such as Gidefna and Change Now, and then the series of, you know, aborted mobilization against the regime, whether in 2012, 2013, in September, and again, moving forward, leading up to 2018. I think what made the mobilization different in 2018 is the fact that it really began organically in many ways. It was not driven by the political elites or, you know, the street was basically, as Joe said, reacting to the context on the ground. It was clear that the regime had basically reached the end of its lifespan. What we did see, however, was the fact that there was a consensus amongst the political elite to really let the Sudan Professional Association take the forefront when it came to mobilizing. And what was interesting is that, you know, I worked on some research with a colleague of mine, Dr. Meh Hassan at the University of Michigan, looking at the mobilization at the street. And what we found was that there were two distinct periods in the uprising itself, starting from late December until the end of January. So for a period of about a month and a half, the mobilization was largely driven and organized through a series of centralized protests. So the Sudan Professional Association would call for protests at a particular time, at a particular location that was known to both the protesters and the regime itself. And that, in many ways, gave the advantage to the regime because you declared the location in the time, and it was a disadvantage to the protesters because as people came to protest, they were, in many ways, dislocated from the areas that they know. They were coming to a centralized place, whether it was downtown Khurtum or Umdurman or Bahri or other central market places in other cities around the country. And that gave an advantage to the regime and its ability to suppress the protest without any sort of concern for the people doing the oppression. However, the second phase was beginning from about January 19th, 20th, up until April 5th. And that period was marked by the protests being relocated to the neighborhoods. And every neighborhood would actually declare a day that they're going to be going out. And the nature of the mobilization also changed in ways that wasn't easily suppressed. So whether it was Burri, whether it was Shambat, Calakla, these various neighborhoods around Khurtum, for example. And I'm focusing here on Khurtum because of its importance to the revolution. Obviously, other cities also were central in draining the energy of the security apparatus. But if we look at the mobilization in Khurtum, the move of the protest to the neighborhoods did several things. First, it allowed the protesters to have the upper hand because they knew the territory. They were more knowledgeable. And it actually gave the advantage, took the advantage from the security apparatus. And what we found in the research is that oftentimes, whether it's the police or even the security, the national dungeon service, the people that were deployed in the neighborhoods were of those neighborhoods. So there were social ties that made it difficult for them to oppress as severely as they would have been able to do in central Khurtum, for example. So several people told us that the police would come to them and they would know these police officers. And they would say, please burn the tires in the street and get out of our way.  We don't want to arrest you. So that social network, moving the protests to the neighborhoods really allowed the protest movement to start building these intra-neighborhood networks, which were the seeds of what later became the resistance committees and the neighborhood committees. And these neighborhood committees then started creating bonds of trust and eventually allowed them to better mobilize and organize. That period continued until April 5th, until the call by the Sudan Professional Association for a centralized protest on April 6th. That call for centralized protest was, again, aimed at basically confronting the military and directing people to go to the general command of the armed forces. The beginning of that day, there was actually no plan to have a sit-in. The sit-in was called for later in the afternoon when there were hundreds of thousands, arguably upwards of close to a million people, showed up in central Khorkulim and occupying this central place. Then the third phase of the mobilization began at that point. The people who came to the protest came with those networks that they built in the neighborhoods. So when they would come to the protest in the sit-in, they would come with several people. It wasn't just themselves or their friends. It was a whole network almost. And that sit-in created an opportunity for those, at that point, isolated neighborhood networks to then create intra-neighborhood linkages. And it created this culture of the resistance committees as really being able to operate independently. And I think that's what marks Sudan's uprising and makes it unique is that the street is now almost autonomous. It has its own brain trust in the neighborhood committees, in their ability to communicate, in their ability to organize and facilitate. Of course, the role of the internet is central here. The internet was central initially through the use of social media with the Sudan Professionals Association, but it really helped in helping coordinate. However, the sit-in made it possible for these networks to intermingle that allowed them to even survive a month-long shutdown of the internet in June of 2013 after the massacre. So I think the protests really are now going to build on this legacy of the uprising and continue to create a very strong resistance to both the military and the Putschers, but as well as to any elite that are interested in co-opting the protest movement moving forward as a reaction to the October 21 coup. Thank you. Thanks. Thanks, Kuduta. Hala, I want to bring you into the conversation. And Joe's talked about the political history that led to the drivers for the coup itself. Kuduta's talked about some of the organizing that took place. And I'd love to hear more from you about what were the aspirations of the Sudanese people going into the mass protest movement in resisting the coup and in setting forth this really, I think, singular political agreement between civilians and the military that, in theory, set forth this plan for the political transition in the country. Because I think we often get so focused on those who lead the coup and their interests and the norms and values that they may or may not be violating. We sometimes forget what are the aspirations of the people, men and women, young and old, across entire geographies, who are really seeking to see a change in their country and for the region, and I think as an example globally. Thanks, Susan. And thanks for bringing that up. Well, I always, you know, I'm someone who has been traveling across Sudan for the past 20 years. And I, you know, as a Sudanese, I would definitely I'd be able to say that Sudanese has a very unique appreciation for the blur and nature of their culture and identity, which is something that's, it's very interesting that it's always been assumed it's the opposite. But I think what happened in 2019 and the whole scene of the sittings, you know, in terms of how people they came together from across the country, and it's actually beyond neighborhoods because if we look at and clearly remember then documented that many times, you know, seeing villages, whole villages, they migrated from Darfur, they migrated from the mountains, migrated from Blue Niles, and they set their tents and they came there with a hope for justice with the hope.  It was it was amazing how, you know, as if those 30 years never happened. And one of the stories that I remember very well because I used to go and, you know, and engage in political debates and things like that. And I remember I was speaking about women rights and one of the young men who is from the Far North, he came in and he said, I think women can never be equal to men. I think, you know, and and he was saying that and he was very calm. And and he said, I'm saying that because this is what my religion told me and I strongly believe in that. So I started arguing with him. And then the crowds kept increasing around me. And we are standing in front of the army, had commanders, there were soldiers passing by, there were a lot of people. And it was such an interesting debate that went on for for more than two hours. And in my mind, I was debating religion, a very sensitive topic. This is the country that has been controlled by militant Islamists for 30 years.    So this level of tolerance and ability to engage and to speak to each other, you know, I think this is one of the most remarkable legacy of Sudan, Sudan political history. It has to be impressed. And this is, you know, what's actually, this is why Sudan is very much insisting, despite the disparity, despite what's happening, you know, to navigate a peaceful route for their democracy. And I think, you know, what's happening in Sudan at the moment, you know, is that it's clearly challenging the concept of strongmen that Western institutions and Western countries and mindset has been kind of adopting since, you know, the best colonial modern states in terms of how we should be ruled. I think Sudanese are currently challenging that mindset. And I think they are clearly enabling not only the world, but also Sudanese elites, you know, to see and to reflect, you know, on the fact that, you know, this is a country that's, you know, culturally and is very much prepared to impress plurality. It's very much willing to impress, you know, its diversity. And, you know, Sudanese has proven, you know, for the past two years, we have endured a very, very harsh times. Every trick on the book has been played on, you know, on the potentials of democracy by the military. Having said that, you know, people has been extremely patient and they are willing to endure with the hope that they are going to move forward into a democratic system. Yeah. I think we often get so uncomfortable with those sense of difficult debates and conflicts and also thinking about our own respective role. It's so important to remember to listen to those many narratives. And before we turn entirely to what's happening today to the coup that just happened in October, I want to shift us to talk about the role of external actors back in 2019. I remember as the protest movement was developing, I was sitting in Addis Ababa at the chair of the African Union and we were watching so closely to see what the African Union Peace and Security Council would do. And I think we're struck that at that moment they suspended Sudan immediately following the coup, deployed mediators and continued to engage. And I think in many ways it was held up as a way for the AU to stand behind its charter and its principles. At the same time, there was engagement from Gulf countries, from Egypt. I'm using engagement, not making any judgment yet, so I'm going to turn to all of you to help me to understand and help our listeners to understand whether what those roles were. The United States was deeply engaged, the Troika, UK, Norway and the US, the EU, the regional actors. Russia has been involved in Sudan. China has interest in Sudan. So I'd like to turn to each of you and hear a little bit about your perspective of what was that external influence role. And at a moment where we're thinking about the global construct and how that's shifting, where did different powers play into what was eventually the resolution in the agreement that was reached in 2019 and the conflicts that led up to it itself. Kuduta, I'm going to turn to you first for this question. Sure. I think the international community played a central role in 2019. I mean, largely, I would say driven by the African Union and the role of Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, as well as the role of the Troika led by the US, there was a significant exerted pressure in order to come to an agreement. But I think one of the issues is that the international community really did not understand the complexities, didn't have the complexities of the various problems facing Sudan at that point and the transition. And there was this urgency to push for an agreement regardless of what it looked like. And initially, after the June 30th protest, which really forced the Transitional Military Council to come back to the negotiating table, the FFC at the time really had the upper hand. And they could have leveraged that popular support for a much better agreement. And in fact, there were negotiations that immediately began after that in Addis Ababa with the Sudan Revolutionary Front in July of 2019. For about three weeks, there was momentum to come to a really big tent position. However, the international community really pushed very hard to come to any sort of agreement that would basically create this partnership that gave the upper hand in some ways to the military. I think that pressure doesn't, again, understand the complexities of Sudanese politics. As I like to say, in Sudan, as in many parts of Africa, the bus leaves when it is full. It does not leave on time. And unfortunately, the bus was not full for a proper agreement to really create the necessary institutions for a successful transition to democracy. Transitions to democracy are very difficult. In fact, with a legacy of autocracy for so long, they're possibly impossible in a place like Sudan. But when the international community comes and puts pressure in a way that gives the military more or less all that it wants, then that's certainly not pushing for democratic transition. Adding to that, I think complexities of the region, there is a contagion effect of democracy. Sudan is surrounded entirely by non-democratic countries. And the region prefers autocracy. And for democracy to flourish, it's very difficult in a context in which all the countries around you have an interest to control the destiny of the country and to install an autocracy that will serve their own interests. And finally, I think when it comes to the international dynamics, I think the role of the United States was also very, very important historically and even today. I think we'll talk about that later when we talk about the current coup. Thank you. Thanks, Kuduta. Hello. I want to open it up to you and I wanted to share that I remember seeing signs in the protests that were specifically resisting interference by the UAE, by Saudi Arabia in some instances, by the United States, by Russia. And I'm wondering if you can tell us a bit about the feeling in the midst of those demonstrations about the role that external actors were playing. And was there a sense that they were standing beside the aspirations of the Sudanese people that you so articulately laid out? Well, I definitely think there is an issue of trust, particularly when it comes to the role of the United States and the other Troika country from the streets. And I do remember in 2019, the extensive conversations about the soft landing and the reconciliation with elements of Bashir's regime of the Muslim Brotherhood. That was very intense and serious conversations. And some of the activists, like myself, who were not part of that conversation, we were actually isolated and sort of as being quote-unquote radical. And the truth is, we were and anyone who knows Sudan very well, we'll definitely understand that there is no soft landing with the Muslim Brotherhood. Those are really a very determined group that they are there to stay. And what we're living through at the moment speaks to that this persistence, I definitely believe. And the obsession with preservation of the political organization of the Muslim Brotherhood, even if changing allies and masking new forces and all those things. So to a large extent, I think the international community at some point has played that game at a time where the Sudanese were completely at a point where they had no acceptance, not only for Bashir, but for the Muslim Brotherhood as in our organizations and for politically slimmest. And this is a very important part of the conversation that often not being addressed. That the 30 years of Bashir's regime, it wasn't Bashir, it was a political structure that has its laws, has its policies, and it was 100% focused on repressing Sudanese people. And then this led to eventually, of course, the secession of South Sudan that has created a lot of grievances and anger among many Sudanese and what happened in Darfur and the war crimes that was committed in communities that has been stable communities, productive communities, they became displaced. And and then that discourse of polarization that constantly the Islamist has continued to create and to generate. So for Sudanese people, they felt that a sense of betrayal that is happening in terms of an engineering of political change and sidelining the people, which is basically something that is, I would say, it's extremely of colonial nature. It doesn't match concepts of democracy, it doesn't match concepts of human rights and civil rights. So that was one of the, when you talk about the intervention, the other important thing, we need to remember also that UAE and Saudi Arabia, they always dealt with Sudan as a proxy country. So their perception store, which is quite interesting, such a massive country like Sudan that has all this complexity to be minimized into a source of mercenary soldiers or lands where they could cultivate to generate more weeds or to get gold or so that perception that has been actually, because this is how Bashir ruled Sudan. Bashir constructed that for his own survivor and his group and his political organization, that's Sudan for him to stay. He would do whatever it takes. And he made out of Sudan a country that's actually a proxy country where they provided services for the neighbors. I mean, the situation with Egypt, I believe it's completely different and it has its historical dimension and the whole issue of the Nile water and all those things. But just in brief, I think there is definitely basis for the distrust by the Sudanese streets on international regional actors. And this is basically coming from the fact that they constantly feel that they are not regarded as part of the conversation. Thanks, Lila. Before we return to 2021, I want to turn to Joe. I think you're sitting in Washington at the time that this was playing out and at a moment where conversations about global power competition and the role of various actors is incredibly live and in many ways centered Africa policy under the previous administration. So I'd like to hear from you about your perspective on the role that international actors played in that 2019 period. I think when one looks at the U.S. and the Troika, I think as I sort of alluded to before, very much informed by U.S. and the Troika's prior sort of engagement and thoughts on Sudan, especially the very contentious relationship that the U.S., Troika, other Western countries had with President Bashir and the NCP regime. And so I think it's key here to look at and to sort of mine, so to speak, what was public signaling and messaging and what were sort of private actions. I think when it came to public messaging, I think one saw back then what frankly one expected to see and sort of what we're seeing right now in terms of statements, condemning violence, noting the respect of the will of the people, noting that there is a close eye on what's happening. I think those are things that will happen regardless, I think, and we've seen that for a long time. I think the Sudanese were very, very savvy and should take credit for this of watching and analyzing, parsing the public signaling from the U.S. and others, what meetings were held. I remember the significant outcry when there was a meeting with Hamedi from the RSF in the midst of all this. And I think that might have caught some people in the West off guard that there's the assumption that it's important to have dialogue to discuss what's going on to keep channels open. But the Sudanese reaction to that I think was very telling and worth looking at as it goes forward is what is that public signaling and what does that symbolism mean? It's very powerful given social media and whatnot. And I think when it comes to private engagement and messaging, I think we get to where both Koduta and Hala have mentioned. When diplomats, when special envoys engage sort of with parties, it's extremely difficult obviously and it's tempting and perhaps in some quarters understandable to want dialogue, to want mediation, to want negotiation in the interest of accommodation of incremental progress. That is a normal diplomatic process. Managing the perceptions of that incredibly important. I wonder when one looks at those international diplomatic undertakings, I wonder what those actors think of that in terms of could more have been pushed for? Could there have been more time taken on this? I think and again Koduta spoke to this a little more eloquently than I can. I think there was an understanding among many in the West that there was a Sudanese way so to speak, that there was a need for given the contested legacy of the military, the need for this military civilian hybrid. And it's not to me to sort of say that that was the original sin so to speak. But I think looking at that and the international engagement with that is critical. I think I'll note here is that one thing I think that through a lot of international diplomats for the loop is all of a sudden they were forced to engage with political and civic actors that they never really had engaged in a diplomatic and political way here. Here I'm talking about the sectarian political parties, the Communist Party, the Bath Party factions, the FFC as a block, the SPA in the unions, they're very I think unique and in some ways impressive organizations that I think required a real deep understanding of where they're coming from at that period. And I think that might have been a missed opportunity to really understand and have those actors understand where the US and others were coming from. To go back to what I said before, I think one has to look at the US and the Troika and others' relationship to the NCP and the Bashir regime. I mean let's not forget that this all came in the midst of a push, an engagement between the United States and the NCP and normalization. That is all part of this. The pause on that, how that played out behind the scenes, it's not quite clear to me that that's of course part of this dynamic. I think I'll close by saying here that perceptions matter and I think there are more questions than answers on terms of how the military, the RSF, the political elements really viewed, excuse me, the US and others at that time. I think some on the ground in Sudan might have thought it was a little too reactive but I want to say something here that I've often sort of tried to think about and I would urge Keduta and Hala to let me know if I'm completely off base here. But I think that when political security actors in Sudan really when it comes down to when they have their backs against the wall, when really things are on the table, the either sharp gain or loss of power, I think in those moments, I think many on the ground got tunnel vision and that they look at this real zero-sum nature of this and perhaps they don't look so much at the role of the international community and what leverage the international may or may not have. I think they get very narrow in looking at how does one preserve those interests that are either on the rise or not. So I think that's worth discussing also in the context of how the military after this most recent coup, how they viewed international messages and threats and so I'll leave it at that but happy to hear from others on that last point. Thanks Joe. I think the complexity of who the players are and the time and the creative approaches that are required to effectively understand and listen is something that we really can't underestimate. I want to get to 2021. Susan, can I jump here? Sure. I would just like to speak about the political parties and political organizations versus a very strong and a structured power that has been in control for 30 years and of course, the international community, they would be much more comfortable and of course they have the capacity to engage with international actors as opposed to political parties who has been in hiding or scattered or polarized for years but I also think that there is a long-term vision that's needed when we are looking and working on Sudan beyond what's comfortable for the technocrats of the international community or not and I think that's really very important to take into consideration and I'd just like to stress that whatever has happened in 2019 under the circumstances and everything, I think it it would be very difficult to assume that it could have happened differently in terms of the preparedness and the readiness as well of Sudanese political organizations but I think something that Sudanese have learned and as I said earlier which really strikes me how they have been patient and enduring with the transitional government so that means that we are ready for the fact that democracy is a very long-term process. It's not something that happens magically. Thanks for that. I think that's incredibly important because our anchor here is around the summit for democracy not just around coups and around political transitions and how complex those are, how they don't move in one direction, they often move forward and they almost always move backwards and the politics of that is incredibly complex to navigate effectively so thank you for bringing that forward. I want to turn to you because as we think about 2021 unless we just academic here for a short moment some people really claim that it's not just democracy that's contagious but indeed coups are contagious across the region and that even if a country experiences a coup it never really recovers and is in fact more vulnerable in the future. I'm not I'm not quite sure the academic literature bears this out but there's certainly this sense that it's almost expected that if there's a coup once you'll see it again and we've talked about 2019 but of course Sudan has seen many coups and it's its own history but Khadiri you had a frontline view of what was happening in the the transition in 2021 and this really delicate and maybe increasingly contentious relationship between security elements and the civilians and within each of those those groups so I ask was was the coup a surprise to you? Absolutely not you know in fact the government had warned of the coup weeks and months before the coup actually took place in fact even before the supposedly failed coup attempt that took place a month before October 25th. I think you know you're absolutely right the the legacy of Sudan and the involvement of the military Sudan has been under military rule for 53 of its 65 plus years of independence and that legacy has created a culture within the military institution that it was in many ways made to govern you know and I think the important context here is of the the balance of power between the military and the civilians. I think you know the coup planning for the coup in fact began on April 11th as soon as the military deposed Bashir in fact June 3rd the massacre of the protesters in the city was a coup in and of itself against the transition process and the negotiation that was a coup attempt and they attempted to govern they in fact brought in the so-called native administration they said we're going to create a transitional government we're going to you know create a you know or put in place a prime minister and the balance of power shifted after June 30th which is arguably the largest protest in Sudan's history we saw the military walk back and in fact come to the negotiating table once more and as soon as the constitutional declaration or constitutional document was signed again the planning for the coup began again and we saw this in the I guess creeping into the role of the executive and I think here the civilians have a share of the blame because the military under the constitutional document had you know its share of power was in the sovereignty council which was supposed to be a ceremonial body but as we saw from day one the military created parallel institutions in order to make sure that it controlled the trajectory of the transition itself and I think you know the military's number one concern has been the fact that it does not believe that it can actually function under civilian oversight you know I think any officer that goes through the officer ranks of the military and graduates from the military academy is trained to to think of civilian life as being disorganized and the only way that Sudan can be managed is through the strong orderly institution that is the military and in many ways you know any officer that reaches the rank of brigadier automatically starts planning to to coup in some ways a lot of people there's this culture of the military having this this destiny in some ways the other thing was the fact that you know throughout the transitional period there were certain benchmarks that needed to be met and the most important of these is security sector reform and civilian oversight over military industries and once the government started to seriously talk about these issues and bring these issues up it became clear that the military is unwilling to actually give up its control over these these big corporations and companies and I think here you know the drivers of the 21 coup had their roots back in in 2019 and of course we knew that there were certain issues that that you know were coming up for example the transition of the presidency of the sovereignty council which you know was supposed to happen either in November 2021 or in mid 2022 was a serious point of concern for the military the issue of accountability and justice that was also something that kept coming back up again and again and it was very clear that you know the the coup was a way to you know abort that and I think finally the success in some ways of the government's reforms it was clear that by you know July and August 2021 Sudan had reached you know the the plateau if you will of the economic crisis and had begun to enter the phase of stability and eventually starting next year of economic growth and I think it was clear that the military wanted to intervene just at that point in order to make sure that credit for the economic recovery which is inevitable because of the reforms that were put in place by the civilian government uh that credit goes to the military when in fact obviously all of that was put in place as a result of the Sudanese people's patience during the past two years because of these very difficult reforms that really were borne by the people in the form of very severe austerity the the rationing of subsidies the you know unification of the exchange rate these are very difficult reforms and the people were willing to give the government a chance to implement these policies but now the military basically allowed the civilian government to remove Sudan's name from the state sponsors of terrorism list begin the process of debt relief and arrears clearance stabilize the exchange rate and now the military once that difficult set of reforms was implemented is now ready to take over and it was it was clear and I think the final thing which made it clear is that the context regionally I think the ongoing civil war in Ethiopia gave cover to the military thinking that you know the region is so in meshed or concerned with what's going on in Ethiopia that there wouldn't be much interest in actually countering the coup and of course the series of coups that had taken place before then whether the coup in in Mali the coup in Chad the coup in in Guinea so possibly seeing that as kind of momentum the military you know made it clear that their interest is in in cooling and and I think the final thing domestically was the the initiative that was started by Prime Minister Khandog really put them on the on the defensive because that put that started to do two things first it started to raise the concern of the security sector reform as a question and it laid the groundwork for the unification of FFC you know FFC by mid 2021 was very fragmented but in september FFC had signed a political declaration which brought back the umma party for example one of the biggest parties in Sudan under the umbrella of FFC it brought all of the rsf safe the srf sorry the the rapid the revolutionary front safe for the movement led by Minni and Jibril and that made the military very concerned because if people started to unify then then they won't be able to coup very easily and finally you know again going back to this question of the transition if the sovereignty council had gone to the civilians then there would be no excuse you know it would it would definitely be a coup because they would have removed a civilian head of the sovereignty council because the military was in charge of the sovereignty council they can simply say oh this is just a changing government so there were many factors i think that made it clear that this is this is coming hey dude i think that's i mean it's a really interesting um and maybe a bit of an academic debate about when is a coup a coup um and that is something that's it's very live in the conversation um i also want to acknowledge that we don't we don't have anybody from the military represented here today as part of this conversation and that i think we would we would welcome at any point a follow-on discussion to to hear directly about some of the the calculations the concerns the fears the the vision and the perspective something that's always struck me is that there are a number of former military officials who have have been advising and thinking through this pathway towards some sort of security sector transformation and i think those are voices that that we really value hearing from um and that i think as we as as souvenees negotiate a way forward um it's not just a a single conversation it involves all of those complicated conversations that took place during during the revolution as well um hello we've heard a lot from kuduta in terms of of the drivers um i'm curious if you agree um that the coup was not a surprise and and if you can share anything about your your insights on what what shifted in terms of either people's aspirations for what they hoped to see in the transition and then the organizing that was taking place in both civic and political spaces to to safeguard or to resist or to respond to or address um the coup that that seemed to be on people's radar and and on the horizon well um for me i think the coup was a surprise and not a surprise it was not a surprise um you know exactly as kuduta has said um you know we are dealing with an institution that's accustomed to and structured around privilege you know particularly when it comes to economic privilege access to resources lack of accountability um and so on so this is how the Sudan military has been functioning um for decades um and um and and and it's basically happened because um you know they were um assigned um assigned themselves you know by the by the power they hold at the guardians of the states and and and so on but also i'd like to highlight something very very important you know which is the phenomena of um you know of the SLA and the justice and equality movement joining forces which is it's basically speaks to a mindset you know that's actually being shared among you know militarized groups whether being um in the opposition or being part of the state structure and this is something that i've always you know for me personally i'm very interested in because i you know we have done research and we worked with women who lived under armed groups controlled areas and um we saw the level of repression that's happening you know not only to the women but also to the youth you know to other groups and yet you know um um thinking about you know the four or you know global mountains or Blue Nile or other areas that um the violation that keeps occurring within those territories you know um we always saw as a feminist uh groups and and you know myself we saw that it mirror you know the same type of violation that happens outside of that however you know um there is um this notion that as long as you are opposing you know um Bashir's regime that means you know you are exempted from accountability and so we ended up you know in this um um very strange setup that we are rewarding through what's called peace agreements you know we are rewarding um you know um militarized elites who committed massive violations uh by uh giving them power by giving them positions and and giving them access to resources so there is no um surprise actually that um you know they were really easily because um you know integrated into the current um structure so so that's uh that's I think is um it's something that's very very important um to um to pay attention to um in um in this um in this conversation um there is a another question if I'm looking for it if you remind me no it's um I was curious if you noticed any change in terms of the way that that people were organizing to either continue to hold the space for democratic transformation or to resist the risks of of a coup or of this this exercise of power okay yeah so so fantastic so so basically you know it's uh it's absolutely a military coup and I would like to say that you know adding honey adding hamdok to the equation you know it's still poisoned it's still a coup you know and it's not going to help itself and and and I and I talked earlier about I was surprised so the element of me being surprised it's coming from the weakness of this structure you know historically all the military coups that are taking place in Sudan they don't uh successful coups I mean um um and and basically if we look at 1969 numeric coup who took um who ruled Sudan for 16 years you know and then um and then after that Bashir you know those military coups they come with their own uh political incubators they come with their own constituencies and they come with their own roots on the ground this is the most random uprooted you know coup I would say I have seen in the history of Sudan doesn't have a political incubator it doesn't have any um support um not only politically but I mean even ethnically it's extremely random you know and very uprooted and it's very difficult for it to identify with any faction of the Sudanese people and it's it's really telling that um and I'm quite surprised you know I'm I'm literally surprised by the um you know by the choices that Abdullah Hamdoch has made you know um um joining this um this and and so so I'm thinking is it he himself internalizing the idea that he as the man as the one man you know um would make a massive difference which is it doesn't make any sense it's absolutely irresponsible to think that way um military coups in Sudan who come taking advantage of political organizations very strong political organizations like the Muslim brotherhoods at the end of the day the military ended up you know having the upper hand on the military organization because then you are positioning yourself in a power equation that it you cannot match it under any circumstances as a political institution and and that keeps happening that the military you know they utilize um you know uh political um uh political groups and so on to take control uh but that's very interesting that they assume that they could utilize one person who himself doesn't have any affiliation to any of the political structure in Sudan so so on that I'm quite surprised that actually um this school is happening from from that it's um fascinating that in these moments of crisis um the decision making is always complicated to track and Joe I want to turn to you because um I think if we look at the regional and international dimensions of of this you know the the African Union Peace and Security Council again suspended Sudan um they met recently and they um deferred the decision about whether to reinstate Sudan or not after this latest agreement between General Burhan and and Prime Minister Hamdok um others in the international community um seem to be sending signals that this may be the best pathway that Sudan has forward um and and there's been a lot of writing about the decreased influence of international partners to shape where where this how this developed and where it's going and so I I'd love to hear some of your reflections on in this again in this moment of global power competition in this um the regional dynamics that Kajuda and Halal and you have talked about um what's what is what is driving right now and what should be what should we be watching in the coming weeks about where this this agreement may land or may not land very briefly I want to sort of double down on something Halal mentioned because it's absolutely important and it's been frankly I think overlooked is the armed movements in the Jewish peace agreement I think you know looking back at U.S. and international engagement in peace processes in the Sudan's plural I think that basic assumptions of international actors about the nature of armed movements and rebels I think there desperately needs to be a relook at those assumptions I mean obviously gone are the days of viewing them as good bad as as that split you know I just think that we absolutely need to to look at that again I think you know what's fascinating is that was frankly a military-to-military negotiation the you know RSF the SAF um you know really militarized elites in South Sudan the armed movements and I think that relatively went went unnoticed and what does that mean what does that mean for the Sudan South Sudan dynamic again very overlooked but but extremely critical and I think is going to play a perhaps a greater role um as this goes forward I think it's absolutely fascinating that there's been some very good academic research and and activists sort of messaging on the fact that you know the legacy of internationally mediated peace agreements and peace processes in the Sudan's is basically failed due to sort of the focus on power-sharing elite bargains sort of commissions and institutions that never get off the ground what does it mean that the Sudanese and the South Sudanese brokered an agreement that basically mirrored those internationally brokered peace processes I think that's that's worth a PhD Kadoota looking at you here if you want to go back to but it's just really critical and it raises so many questions that are hard because it's so easy for an Ash community diplomats to say we have a peace process we've got benchmarks you know but unfortunately this it's such a sort of ethereal debate that I just hope there's space for that because it's it's really really complicated you know I think I think a lot of the pathways forward are going to be um in cartoon in the big cities where protests are going on in places like Darfur because I think what will perhaps drive what's going forward is the semblance or reality of unity among civilian political actors among military actors not again to go back to the arm movements I was really really struck I was able to go to west and central Darfur in August we met with the arm movements a lot of divergent opinions a lot of differences of opinions among their leadership in in cartoon among the stakeholders on the ground not even to mention sort of IDPs and and more politicized civilians and so um you know I think if one looks at the political civic landscape right now the street the resurgence of the nrcs the sort of Sudanese political elite who had tried to broker Sudanese um mediation of what happened um I think looking at sort of that from the coup until now what is the level of unity and is that level of unity going to keep decreasing is it possible to roll it back because I think the fundamental unity cohesion among civilian elements will be key to to this going forward I I'm not sure I'm I'm that optimistic that the level of uh civilian political unity will will increase or or or pause for now and and sort of you know I think what what I mean by that is there's a great desire among internationalists to say Sudanese led processes are the best I I'm not going to disagree with that but what does it mean that there were a few Sudanese led processes from the the day after the coup up until the the meeting with handbock was that a positive Sudanese led process not really for me to say but but what is what does that mean that there are there perhaps isn't as much unity as one would like among the civilian political elements going forward what impact um is that going to happen you know I I think it's it's really complicated about this the level of sort of regional influence great power competition I think you know it's difficult example was um last week there was a UAE national day the 15th anniversary of the UAE here in Washington and and at an event like that you know it's it's hard to see how an issue like Sudan rises to the top of of of these agendas of these great powers yet we see we see them having an impact on the ground the regional dynamic and I think that it's it's incumbent on the national community um to to sort of walk and chew gum at the same time to do more things and once I think there's need to be greater example of engagement with the political elements of cartoon with the civilians of cartoon with the street sort of look at what that means and then also you know make that more diplomatic engagement with the AU admits the great crises in the horn more engagement with the gulf it's it's hard right these are these are multiple strands of a complex problem but I think as both Kaduta and Hala have said when prime minister handbook released that new initiative in in June and July of this year he I think it's a seminal political document in Sudanese political history is one line he said there is not only divisions between the military and the civilians there's divisions within the military there's divisions within the civilians it's that that level of complexity that that the internationals I think need to engage on because you know I think again these things can be very very zero sum and we need to try to help preserve any samples of unity that there is now so in the 10 minutes that remain to us I'm going to ask all of you who have this incredible depth of understanding of that complexity and ability to ask really incisive questions to think of our audience who may not know Sudan all of that all that well who may be in a position to make policy decisions or influence policy decisions and so we're going to do a little bit of a lightning round and we're going to focus a bit on what external actors can be doing and all of that said with a clear recognition that Sudan's political future belongs to Sudanese and also in an acknowledgement that what others do will fundamentally shape what that what that looks like so I'm going to go quickly to each of you on on each of these and would ask if you could be as as quick and concise as possible recognizing that we're we're missing a lot of of the nuance that's necessary and so my first question is if you could identify one thing that could have been done differently to avoid the coup on October 25th by the United States an international partner even even USIP we'll put ourselves onto the table what would that be Kadut are you willing to lead sure I think it's difficult to win the way down to one thing but um I think broadly broadly initially from the get go of the beginning of the transition the civilian government needed significant support and I'm talking here financial support and the reality is for a good year and a half the government was forced to deal with all of the economic challenges Sudan faced uh by on its own and to put the burden on the Sudanese people the delays that were uh you know the the foot dragging frankly on the removing of Sudan from the sstl that really put so much pressure on the on the Sudanese government I think you know this whole wait and see approach you know the people had come and agreed this transitional process and you know the international community should have really been forceful in um you know giving the civilians this this this push but I don't want to put it just on international community there's there's domestic dynamics as well here I think there was significant political capital in the hands of the civilian government that wasn't properly expended you know putting pressure on security sector reform that was the number one key to prevent the coup uh but also thanks Krita hello if you could identify one thing right I'll identify once right now that the international community should do you know one that we are still um being controlled by a military coup that adding humdog to this I would say a rotten recipe will not make it not it's a coup you know and and it's it's absolutely engineered and controlled by the military it's based on the 14 articles of agreement that was signed between humdog and the military which is absolutely giving the military the upper hand over every single detail of the state from the judiciary to the economy you know to the justice to every aspects of life my last message will be that Sudan is the vast and complex country and um you know as Americans you know you understand very well you know the value of decentralization and the value of literally you know and and just try to reflect on that on a country like Sudan you know um we definitely need to you know support Sudanese people to reach out or to reach into a path or to craft that would enable them you know to reach a level of stability and it's not going to be easy it's not going to be smooth it would be very turbulent but we need that support to reach there and and and I think that's that's that's really very important there is as I said it won't it won't be easy and I think that's not only good for Sudan I think Sudan is much easier case compared to other countries within the region and I think investing in Sudan will definitely long term influence the region thanks Helen Jo over to you you know I just think as soon as the coup happened in October people said we have to go back to the day before the coup the the transition before the coup was in grave was it was tenuous it was fragile it was in jeopardy and you know why if this following statement is true why did it happen why was there a sense that it was just the civilians versus the military that's way too superficial and why wasn't there a greater recognition that institution building was frozen what happened to the legislative council you know what about the status of the tanking tanking committee I mean all the things were not going well and I think you know perhaps what if my clouded clouded the vision among the internationals is this was not a civilian led transition it was it was a hybrid by design and I think that there might have been a little bit more of wishful thinking than necessary about the level of who was leading this and what that meant and you know I think labels and words matter in that you know well thank you to all three of you I know that we tried to boil something incredibly complex down to some some quick ideas and recommendations but I walk away with a pretty clear message that in addition to asking why all the coups we also need to be asking why all the resistance why all the democrats why all the social movements why why all the political parties and if we really want to get to the heart of what does that incredibly messy incredibly courageous incredibly long-term work of democratic transition political transition looks like and we have to be asking about what happens when people exercise power in lots of different ways so so let me thank all of you for for your generosity of of insights I hope we can can have a follow-up conversation at some point with with colleagues from the security sector from the political parties from the armed movements and to our Sudanese colleagues we wish you good courage in this this time of political transition so thank you everybody and thanks to everybody who joined us today thank you thank you so much thanks very much so I wanted to thank everyone for joining today's discussion of the 2020 and 2021 coups in Mali which is part of the US Institute of Peace's larger series on the recent spate of coups I'm Inna Dion I'm part of USIP's governance justice and security team where I've been running programs on human security and security sector reform in Mali and the Sahel for over the past five years I'd like to start by introducing our distinguished analysts first we have with us Ambassador Jay Peter Femme he's a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council where he previously served as vice president for research and regional initiatives and director of the council's ethical center in 2020 is appointed the first ever US special envoy for the Sahel assuming the lead in shaping devising and coordinating a strategy on the cross borders security political economic assistance and social issues arising in the Sahel as well as coordinating with both international partners and US government stakeholders to help the Sahel return to stability through programs to enhance security governance political liberalization social progress and economic development he's also served as the US special envoy for the great lakes region of Africa and has previously held positions including senior vice president of the national committee on American foreign policy and editor of its bi-monthly journal American foreign policy interests and as a tenured professor of justice studies political science in Parkana studies at James Madison University where he directed the Nelson Institute for international and public affairs he served on the senior advisory group of the US Africa command and as vice president of the association for the study of the Middle East and Africa he's also the author of more than 300 essays and reviews and the author editor translator of over a dozen books as well as from 2009 to 2017 acting as editor-in-chief of the peer reviewed quarterly journal journal of the Middle East and Africa welcome here next we have with us Dr. Ibrahim Yahya Ibrahim he's a consulting senior Sahel analyst based in Dakar he holds a PhD in political science from the University of Florida where his dissertation focused on Islam and political contestation in the Sahel region it's a comparative study of the phenomenon of protests riots and jihadist insurgencies in Mauritania, Tunia, Niger and Mali he is a co-founder and research associate with the Sahel research group and an alumnus of the full-bite program an analyst for freedom in the world as a Nigerian and Mauritania expert he's also worked for four years with the Islamic NGOs in Niger including two years as the executive director of the Niger based office of al-Basar international foundation he has a background in sociology Islamic jurisprudence and management with degrees from the Islamic University of Say and Abu Muni University of Nyame and finally we have Maryam Diya Lojwame who holds a degree in political science from the University of Montreal and certificate from Harvard's Kennedy School of Government in Women and Power she has more than 10 years of experience in promoting gender equality and girls empowerment previously she was regional coordinator of I know politics for the South Saharan Africa region she's committed to peacebuilding and transitional justice in Mali she was a member of the UN Women's Civil Society advisory group and spent three years advising the prime minister on gender and governance issues currently she leads the NGO women leadership and sustainability she received the award of national merit and was recognized as woman of the year in 2017 and 2020 again welcome to all of our panelists and thank you each for being with us and now I'd like to invite each of our panelists to give oh short opening remarks on different aspects of the two coups and Maryam if you could start by giving us an overview of the leader of the events to the first coup in august 2020 and then that period of the coup itself and the period of transitional governance that followed up until the may 2021 coup thank you very much and there was there were several events that led up to the first coup you could even say that from the beginning of the protests against president ibrahim bubukar bubukar keta the coup was nearly inevitable people wanted him to leave the office of president he was reelected in 2018 but after his election the security situation in the center of the country got worse and worse there were terrorist attacks and intercommunity conflicts some were bloodier than others there were other violent attacks on military camps which invited the emotion of the population there were also corruption scandals people who are close to the presidential regime were receiving favorable treatment and there were always new scandals some of the military brass and military commanders were not able to respond to these attacks the way they wanted to and many of these protest movements contributed to what later became the june 5th movement the m5th movement there were often protests with thousands hundreds of thousands of malians and this wave of uprisings eventually led to a military coup in august 2020 so that's the the background or that's a bit the list of events that led up to the military coup so there was the security crisis there was corruption and scandals involving the government there was an inability to prevent various attacks and of course economic crises the economic crisis present throughout the country all of these factors led to the coup. Thank you very much Maryam and I'd like to turn to you Ibrahim to talk a little bit about the second coup some of what happened in the lead up in the second coup itself and then the second period of transitional governance from this May 2021 coup to the present. Well thank you very much so I mean following the first coup in august 2021 the international community exercised pressure on the malian government on the transition on the junta to appoint civilian leaders including my president Baindao and the prime minister Mokhtar Wan to lead the transition with the leader of the junta as the vice president so they formed the government and they functioned until the moment when the civilian leaders tried to reshuffle the government and attempted to out two main leaders of the junta including the minister of defense Sajio Kamara and another leader of who was at that time minister of security that decision by the civilian authorities to do that government reshuffle prompted a crisis between them and the junta leading the junta to actually arrest the two leaders and to engage to detect control over the government and this is what was considered as the second coup and following that we had a new prime minister that was appointed who is Shogelko Kalamega and with a new government that was put in place since then we have seen that the crisis has only deepened I mean the political crisis my environmental with the international community trying to still pressure the junta to organize election and I mean keep their words regarding the time limits of the transition which is supposed to end by April so they had to organize an election by February so far that deadline seemed to be untenable and the junta has made it clear that they cannot organize election by February so there is now discussions about the extension of the transition the transition periods and they also want to organize the assist national delirium foundation which is a broad consultation between Malians to decide about how to reorganize and the refunds the states and its institution and they said only after that assist national they will be able to decide what would be the timeline of the transition moving forward and this is a prompting crisis between them the international community but also with political leaders domestically thank you for that background and you mentioned a little bit about the role of international actors following the second coup but now I'd like to turn to you Peter to give us a bit more background on what role international and regional actors play both in the lead up and then in the first and second coup since thank you again for convening us together and to your colleagues you know at USIP for making this possible and especially delighted that Kamisa Kamara was involved in this since the day of the first coup I was in repeated contact with her as things were unfolding so it in a way brings things full circle I can make just a few points and picking up from where Merriam began dating the crisis back to before the coup of August 18 2020 but I think it's very important both in the discussion of what happened in Mali but also in the other conversations that the institute is having around military actions in this part of the world is that the crisis didn't begin with the coup or the event whatever you want to call it the crisis began much earlier and was the the manifestation or process that been underway and one could argue that in many respects the Mali and crisis was one that predates not just the second mandate of President Keita or even his first mandate but really going back quite a ways certainly to the flawed elections which took place after the French military intervention in 2013 but even well beyond before recently we had during the recent celebration of Mali's independence in September there was a news item from Mali where the government made a great deal about a village which had finally received a visitation from the national government for the first time since independence imagine if they've not had any contact with the national government for more than six decades and that goes to a point that I made repeatedly when I was special envoy that the the crisis in the Sahel is not a crisis of violence although violence is a manifestation of it it's not an economic crisis although poor economies certainly exacerbate the situation ultimately it's a crisis of state legitimacy and we really have to go back to that crisis of the state it's connection with the citizens provision or lack thereof of goods and services and really revisit that issue because without attempting to at least understand that dilemma once condemned to almost repeat it second point I'd like to make is also the importance of the regional in this you know the Sahel itself the shore between north Africa and sub-Saharan Africa the linkage is therefore and the regional actors and the question of and the other importance uh and one could say that the regional actors especially echo was but also the g5 Sahel the african union and broader international community were very engaged not only in the aftermath of the coup of august uh 2020 but also involved in a different way in the lead up to the removal of the president and prime minister of the transition and this is a little known episode at that time I had left government but I was still in contact with many of the actors in the region as well as in molly and I was concerned as were many observers of where the confrontation between the military members of the transition and the civilian were headed and I spoke with actually several regional presidents at the time and they sure made that things were under control because president out had promised them that at the when they all met in the conference in paris that he would do nothing until after the echo was mediator former Nigerian president good luck jonathan uh had an opportunity to visit and consult with stakeholders that's what he promised to no fewer than three african presidents uh in paris but then he went home and did the exact opposite and before good luck jonathan even gotten on the plane he had removed the two ministers as maria mentioned and we are where we are today I'm not justifying that action but there was a context to why the current president of the transition asimi goita responded the way he did and why regional leaders were muted uh at that time because a number of them felt that they had been actually deceived so the the importance of the regional third point I like to make is that ultimately what is going to be sustainable whether it be in molly or anywhere else in the region is what has local buy-in it has to be a locally owned so it can't be dictated by the international community as a law as a whole or even by the neighbors although they certainly have their influence and their role to play fourth point very briefly we need sustained engagement and I have to say observing now from outside government that that's sustained engagement has it was there certainly in the first months after the 2022 when the african union uh eqwas stood up a group to support the transition in molly gst molly group to su tian ala transition on molly and had a first meeting in bombaco which i attended and then further meetings uh second meeting in lome and onward the international participation that dropped off and with the change in eqwas presidencies it also petered out and so there's a lack of engagement which i think leads to some of these issues we see today and finally uh kind of coming full circle my earlier point there's no quick fix and that's to be kept in mind uh i think it was ambitious to want elections in 18 months when elections were the were the approximate cause of the crisis in molly in 2020 that it would all be fixed in 18 months granted one has to set deadlines one has to establish benchmarks but one also has to be realistic about it and so i'll stop there thank you thank you very much and and thanks to all of our panelists for that introduction to the the events leading up to the crews and and what's followed since um in the first few questions i wanted to talk a little bit more about some of the drivers of of the coup or some of the factors that contributed to the coups that have been mentioned by our panelists um and i'd like to go back to you peter um i think you sort of indicated in this direction but maybe to put a finer point on it uh there's been a lot of talk in light of the recent series of coups not just in molly but elsewhere in africa and really in other places in the world as well uh about a wave of democratic backsliding or uh you know whether there's coup contagion going on taking the case of molly to what extent do you think that that's a helpful characterization or an accurate characterization in trying to help us understand what's going on there well i think let me be very clear let me preface this by saying i do not justify defend or uh encourage military intervention in political affairs or military takeovers uh strong civilian oversight of the military is a cornerstone of liberal democracy that being said however uh the the contrast is not between democracy before and military takeover uh i think it's an erroneous presumption to make that now there were elements of democracy there are elements uh of those things but to say that what was before whether it be in molly or other countries was as democratic as perceived uh i think there were flaws let's put it that way it's human every human system has its weaknesses and so one has to accurately benchmark what came before to step away from molly for just a moment to another country i know well because i lived there earlier in my career guinea conicry uh there was a coup undoubtedly there was a coup in september of this year but what came before the coup was a questionably uh legal third term for the president which came before that was a 2015 election where ethnic hatred was stoked uh uh in order to manipulate the vote and what came before that was an election that occurred 2010 that was highly contested and whose outcome to this day speak as a political scientist i have trouble finding credible so not to justify a coup but one has to acknowledge that what was overthrown was not necessarily a democratic regime as most of us would recognize either so i think that's an important thing to keep in mind that being said that's why it's important to go back address the root causes that takes a long time i realized we're very impatient as an international community we'd like to get things done and proclaim a success and move on that's some call it pragmatism you know i i call it kicking the can down the road uh so i think that's important to keep in mind so has it been a bad period in africa especially west africa in recent years yes unfortunately uh is it necessarily backsliding somewhat but not to the extent to which i think the comparing contrast would lead us to and then you know the final point i would make here is what's important is that having learned these lessons we look for ways to sustainably restore democratic institutions and make sure that they have a real chance and not simply a short lifespan before we're back to where we are today thank you um and and along those lines i'd like to turn to miriam uh you know you mentioned in in your introduction or your your opening remarks that the popular protests uh in your words made the coup almost inevitable um and i think that that is as well reflected in in um peter's remarks just now saying that this you know this coup didn't come out of nowhere there there were a lot of pre-existing issues with the previous government could you expand a bit more on how how those pre-existing issues and some of the issues that you mentioned the economy the corruption the rise in insecurity really did make you know maybe if not this coup such as it was inevitable that it played out exactly like that um but you know put us put put molly maybe on a path to um to something along these lines well the second coup when we don't normally call it a coup d'etat it's more the return um because it was just the people in power fighting for power amongst themselves of course there were people in political power removed by the second coup but they have only been named by the military to begin with so people were i would say surprised that these two political figures were removed from power and later we heard reasons that they were removed from power and those reasons surprised us as well there wasn't any popular unhappiness with the acting president of the of the transition there were no protests against him or against the the prime minister things were going forward things were progressing and then there was the rectification as we call it rather than a second coup and we it really made me wonder about the underlying reasons for this coup and for its justifications and there are several in terms of the partnerships that were chosen international partnerships some people wanted to be closer to France some people wanted to reach out to other partners like Russia perhaps that may have been one point of disagreement so these are the possible areas for disagreement they also disagreed about the composition of the government that was being put together the prime minister had announced a new government a new cabinet just before the second coup and Asimi Goeta was not in agreement with the composition of this new government so was it a problem with leadership or did Asimi Goeta feel like he had been pushed aside is that why he decided to make what could be called a unilateral decision to take control of the government he was vice president at the time who was unsatisfied with the choice of people for the new government for the new cabinet and so he decided to remove that government from power and the population did not have a very violent reaction to this rectification it wasn't something the population had asked for that the people had asked for of course some of the population uh wanted Asimi Goeta to become president and they in the end were satisfied thank you and maybe to turn to a bit of a different factor that that may have contributed to the coup so I think it's it's very clear that there's been a lot of international attention and a good amount of international assistance focused on Mali and a lot of that has focused maybe not on some of the underlying issues that Peter mentioned but particularly on counterterrorism objectives and specifically strengthening the security sector um what role may this have played in in the two coups and what does it tell us about our prevailing approach to trying to stabilize Mali and to counterterrorism security sector assistance and if I could address that to Ibrahim so I think that is today a broad consensus among international actors observers that counterterrorism approach is limited and it cannot be the lasting solution to the problem of insecurity in the area it has been almost a decade now since this crisis has passed um airport has concentrated on military interventions to try to defeat insurgent groups but I mean it is clear that crisis has expanded it has intensified and it's clear that this all military solution is not is not exactly the lasting solution but this is well now what is less known I think the new dynamic that we see emerging in the region is the ability of this security crisis to feel disorder in political disorder in capital cities on the one hand and this is the first point that I would like to make um the jihadist crisis has so far been a rural insurgency right jihadists have not been able since 2012 they have not been able to overtake big urban centers and it is still the case today but the insecurity that they created the political the security crisis that they created in rural areas has been fueling disorder in urban cities I think um Miriam mentioned how the intercommunal violence and the jihadist violence and the attacks that the jihadist conducted on military in 2018 2019 demoralized the Malian public and pushed them to come out and start to manifest to protest against the government and this protest is what led to the fall of president ibeca this is not only in mali we see also similar trends in Burkina Faso right now over the last few days we have seen a lot of protests due to the security crisis in the rural areas that people are manifesting to try to call their government to to take strong actions to but this is destabilizing the capital cities I think in Niger we see a lot of concern about what could happen if this crisis continue to to um to deepen so it is I think this is really important to the real threat is yes the security the insecurity but also the ability of this security um to feel disordered in the capital cities I think this is something that we really need to be focusing a lot of attention on the second point that I would like to make is about how this insecurity is is is creating is reinforcing the military segments or the military constitution if you remember I mean these countries have been in democracy only 30 years and before democracy in the 1990s the ship toward democracy we had a military dictatorship and so democratization and the political class came to replace try to replace the military it had different trajectories in in in in mali I think the political class were able to actually control to some extent to unsubjugate the the military in Niger it wasn't the case we had a decade of political instability between military trying to take over and political classes trying to come back what this crisis is doing now is to pump a lot of resources to the military a lot of financial and and and the human resources actually because all these countries are recruiting a lot of increasing the military capacity fueling mali in etc under the military have come to the forefront of politics you know and I think it is shifting a little bit the balance between these two main political between these two main states actors the political class and the military so I do think that this may have a strong impact in the future in the sense that the politicians the political class is going to get weakened because they are being they're losing credibility because they are losing legitimacy at the time when the military are gaining more resources and the being put to the forefront and asked to act to do the job of securing the country and this is going to legitimize them even more than before so I do think that this is one of this is this is two trends that we need to be observing new trends that need to be focused on thank you and maybe now to turn a little bit to some of the reaction to the coups having talked a bit about somewhat about the drivers Miriam in the introduction Peter and and I think others as well mentioned the role played by the economic community of west african states so eco was and they were playing a big part in trying to encourage a transition back to civilian leadership how well do you think they played this role and if we're looking forward what can we learn from the success or failure of of their efforts so far yes okay well eco was was fairly complacent with regard to Mali in between the first and second cruise but the problem today at least from a Malian standpoint the problem with a co-ass is that it is more an organization of heads of state and government than it is an organization of the peoples the of in ivory coast and guine we have presidents who are taking a third term and eco was has accepted that and the people are unhappy with that state of affairs when it comes to their own power they make decisions that are favorable to themselves but they don't listen to the people when the people are crying out it's true in guine where there were protests against a third term for the president but still he was was made president for a third term and so in Mali people don't like the eco was sanctions they think that okay eco was came in to support ibrahim bubu karketa or to get what they could and so maybe that's a bit of a misperception on the part of the Malian people but there's at least this perception that it's an organization that is for promoting the power and influence of heads of state and government and not for listening to their peoples in general in Mali people feel defiant towards the eco was sanctions they think that these sanctions they really make people angry people don't understand them people reject them so ultimately that strengthens the bond between the people and the military leaders who are in power because the people feel victimized themselves by these sanctions so today echo was has lost a lot of credibility because if you want to have other people respect certain principles you need to respect them yourself and apply them evenly across all contexts but that's not what echo was has been doing and the sanctions that have been put into place or travel restrictions other things like that asset seizures of course that affects the government and the committee for the the transitional committee but the malians wonder will it all end in a complete embargo of our country and some malians are even calling for mali to leave echo was so there's a lot of tension and the relationship between echo was and mali is very very tense right now if i could just jump in uh right right after mariam there is i think she really captured an important thing to keep in mind is it's a it's often a mantra in washington to say we deferred to the regional organizations or to the african-led solution which uh is a nice principle in the abstract but one has to look at how it's viewed on the ground i think she made a very good point there and i think even with echo was its moral authority evolved over time and it not necessarily in a positive way at the beginning of the malian crisis a year and a half ago uh echo was was at that time chaired by president isuf of niger a leader who was respecting the two term limit and stepping down so there was a bit of moral authority there to be exercised and being from a country that bordered mali and was impacted by what happened there he was very seized with the matter and so for the months that he was still in his role as chair of the of echo was i think we did get a lot of effective action out of the regional organization but then there was a change in leadership uh and not saying that the current chair of echo was president akufado of gana is not engaged but something different his country is not border state to the the crisis uh the echo was mediator former nigerian president good luck jonathan was a well-meaning former head of state but you know the role of mediator is not an employment scheme for underutilized ex-heads of state the poor man doesn't speak french how he gets communicates the malian people is you know through a translator is certainly not ideal to put it mildly and as mario i think pointed very correctly the sanctions first are they effective or do they punish people in many cases these military gentlemen who take over they don't have bank accounts abroad they don't have assets abroad so you're not really doing anything to them uh i've met with uh colonel acivi going to in his home the home he had before becoming vice president president and you know that was not the home of someone who had real estate purchase in other countries or bank accounts that were going to be frozen so the sanctions were meaningless except to you know pick picket him but the embargo on the country that was aimed very much kind of hurt ordinary people and that's why it doesn't have the credibility and i think institutions really need to think and so responding with the default setting so yeah thank you for that i think it is a really interesting and important point and i think it ties back as well to some of the things that you were saying earlier um about understanding what the baseline was pre coup um and there is certainly a tendency to look towards these institutions as you can see processes the democratic process in molly um or institutions like equal loss and how comes the default but when the legitimacy isn't there the popular legitimacy i think it raises interesting questions about um about you know for the u.s what our role is and who who we're interacting with and what we're what we're trying to support and how we'll respond to these kinds of things um if i could pick up on something marion that you said in in your response about equal loss you know that the their response is actually driving people closer to to the military government and talk a little bit more about the government itself and its relationship with the malian people uh you know the performance of the government um so i mean this spot thus far they've come in and they were faced with all of the same set of issues that have been confronting the previous government in security um the weak economy the corruption issues um and it doesn't seem like there's been a lot of progress on these as it looks more and more like their time in power is going to stand beyond early 2022 how well equipped do you think they are to actually respond to the the needs of of the people in molly and what will that mean for them and what what will that mean for the country um yes i will do my best to answer your question so when i was studying political silence science we looked at molly and we looked at benine as case studies this was in the 90s and at the time you wouldn't have been able to imagine that molly would have evolved the way it has just imagine that you're living under a kind of psychological shock and you can't get away from it you're today malians are living in a country where we've been through three uh multiple coups in just a few years and just look at what happened to libya and we cannot disconnect our situation from what happened and what is happening in libya and when we started talking about these issues and we talked about the peace agreement that also helped contribute to the current crisis because the peace agreement took a lot of time to put together and the government had to work with lots of different armed groups and so the crisis only continued so for malians we said ourselves okay we lived under a dictatorship for 20 years then we had a bit of democracy but under democracy what happened we had corruption we had a lack of transparency we had elections that were contested and so that's what's going on in malian's minds what's important in the end transparency good governance and what does it matter whether it's civilians or army officers malians just want leaders that you could call strong we want strong institutions we want good governance we want transparency because the greatest evil in mali right now is corruption and unfortunately if you look at the at malian politicians and it's been the same class of politicians for years most of them have well let's call it a history a history with corruption so people are saying okay at least these new military leaders they don't have any major financial scandals yet and hopefully they will be able to act under the former president there are projects that cost millions and millions and never got off the ground all the money went to corruption but the military government has tried to show a little more what's doing with the money but you have to understand malians are incredibly frustrated they are fed up with corruption when i've worked with NGOs i was able to go into some of the smaller villages in some of these very remote areas and there was someone i went to a village in a area that's suffering from terrorism and someone tried to sell me a phone card for 10 000 cfa thanks but that card should be free normally so the authorities they there's so much corruption they aren't able to have connections and relationships with all of these villages and all of the parts of mali so malians in general are rejecting the political class in general and people are saying why not why not a military government why not in the end we've tried everything else and we have so-called intellectuals who are telling us that they can govern without corruption but they wind up falling into corruption scandals over and over malians are caught between feeling many different ways about their country but in the end they just say let's try something new let's try something different maybe that will get us out of this crisis and there are still attacks throughout the country the economic crisis is ongoing and how can you have a good economy in a country where there are regular attacks no one can do any economic development in places in areas that are insecure so it's very difficult for everyone there are villages under siege by jihadists what are they to do in spite of all of that the malians are saying well let's try it and there was so much hope in ibrahim bubu karketa when he came to power with more than 75 percent of the vote everyone trusted him but after three months he lost the trust of the people he lost the confidence of the people so if and when we do have elections who will we elect and what will that person do all of these factors contribute to the popularity of the military leaders because the malians are ready to trust them thank you that's uh i think that's a very helpful perspective and and provides i think a really interesting contrast to some of the next couple of questions in terms of of how we're viewing the events if i can direct the next question to you peter i think there is a growing tendency to view events in africa and in mali as well through the lens of competition between on one hand the e u the us and other allies and then russia and china on the other um what impact do you think that this strategic competition has actually had on the events in mali and what kind of response and how should international actors respond to russia and other involvement in mali well i think we have to disentangle a couple things in that uh in that that question uh one is what many of our competitors uh rivals of you will geopolitically have come to recognize is that for a very small investment on their part they can tie up significant strategic resources either from some of our european partners or the united states or others uh and therefore those resources aren't available to be used against them in other theaters so it becomes actually a quite interesting from a political science point of view quite interesting asymmetric competition a good example stepping away from mali perhaps to give us a little bit of detachment is what happened in the central african republic uh it didn't really matter to russia whether it made money out of uh its engagement there but for a few million dollars worth of arms it gained influence and it certainly frustrated paris a great deal to the extent that paris has spent arguably although we don't know for sure because it's black budgets a lot more money in trying to counter it and so even if they made no money and evidence seems to be that they are making some money through uh the private military companies that are there uh and the resources they've gained control of but even if they didn't it would have been worth the investment and i think we have to keep that in mind uh not that every case is like that but keep that in mind secondly i think it's also important is where our conduct again not to encourage bad behavior i think the united states is a very clear line when there is a coup until constitutional government is restored by law obedience to our laws and our principles the u.s cuts military and security assistance to uh the regime that takes power until constitutional order is restored in fact at the u.s embassy in bombago today because of a decision made when i was in government about the nature of the overthrow of president kata a year and a half ago there are a number of vehicles that would have otherwise been handed over to the molly and military but they sit there in the taking up space in the parking lot quite literally because they can't be handed over in terms of assistance that's fidelity to our principles on the other hand that can be taken too far uh in cases where the security challenge remains i think mariam uh underscored how much state legitimacy is tied up with providing security aprim's point is well taken that their counterterrorism seems to be disproportionate that's effects on the other hand people demand as they are demanding and Burkina fossil currently as they demanded molly security so the international community needs also be be careful about what it does uh and how it blocks for example i'm aware of a situation that occurred after i left government where the molly and government is seeking to acquire with its own resources some equipment necessary for i think in my unprofessional opinion since i'm not a military man it's fight against the extremists and the armed groups but that's held up because there's a small us component to the whole thing uh and that's caused a bit of tension and in those tensions i'm not surprised uh uh that they would look to other partners including ones that trouble us so i think that has to be born in mind as well it's a balancing act all these things every one of the dilemmas you've uh brought up presents us with a tension between and that we have to balance very finely enough thank you uh thank you for that nuanced answer um and maybe to take a similar question but look at it from the perspective of the molly and government imbrahim uh so the transitional government's negotiations with the Wagner group the the Russian mercenary group with with Kremlin ties uh you know they've been talking about revolutionary training and this has raised a lot of concerns in France elsewhere um how would you characterize the aims of the transitional government in speaking with the Wagner group and how should France the US and others respond to the molly and government's actions well thank you um so i think there are two to two sides to that question first is a question about Wagner um the second is how the uh i think um the international community reacted to it and the third i think it is how the US and the French should um i think position themselves regarding that so let me start with the Wagner um question i think regarding Wagner there is there are um facts and there are a lot of rumors the fact is that the malian government has decided to diversify um their partners in terms of um this effort to engage with to to um address the problem of security among those new actors that they are speaking with are russians um they have bought helicopters uh i think military equipment from including helicopters from russia um they but they are not only talking with russians and this is with the russian governments and they're not only talking to the russian government they are talking to other actors including algeria even morocco etc uh regarding Wagner itself they have denied any engagements with the Wagner group per se saying that there is nothing yet uh there is no deal between the malian government and the Wagner group and they said if there is any deal with any actors they will make it um um public so these are the facts now there are a lot of rumors and uh among the rumors uh are the i mean i think the latest one are the arrival of um some russian um mercenaries or militaries that came to Bamako i think there are different ideas about how how many there are there are people who said that there are like a handful of them or they're saying that there are dozens of um um russian um mercenaries who already arrived in in in Bamako there are also rumors about what these groups will be charged off what are they be what what would they be doing are they going to engage the jihadis in central balia and in the north or are they going to be protecting the institutions um and the transitional authorities um so that they continue with um their will to put to um i think to um expand extends the people the the transitional period and then they are uh uh uh stay peacefully in power um so but so far really anything that we have on these are only um rumors i think that sometimes there are credible details about um these rumors but we do not have facts i'm a clear facts available or statements from the malian government on it um so now what what would um i think that the the other side of the question is how are the uh international communities reacting to it that eukos has said that there is no have rejected the idea of bringing in buggler and um i say that they would not accept it um uh and perhaps this is going to increase the the crisis between the malian government and um the the the regional organization but it's not only the regional organization other countries including a lot of malian neighboring countries to mali including nijair senegal akut diva they have expressed clearly that they will not accept the presence of um russian mercenaries in mali so this is going to actually i think accentuate the crisis between um these countries and the malian transitional authorities uh france um germany and the european union have also rejected the idea of having buggler in the gunter and say that if the transitional authorities in malia are to move forward with that there will be consequences some have said that this is going to be incompatible um with their presence and the support uh to the malian governments um now what what should be what should the international community uh or the france and i think moving to your third the third part of the question what what france and the united states should be doing i think ambassador um um farm put it clearly but we need really is more engagement not less we need more engagement from these foreign um uh powers uh to support the the malian governments um i think in in in locally uh accepted solutions let us not impose solutions on the malians i i like all what mariam is saying um which i i think really a nuance this type of discourse that you hear from outside that lets the malians i'll go quickly organize elections so that we have um a new elected officials in mali that would be um i think um acceptable to the international community but from the malian side if you hear a lot of malians are saying that i mean if you look at in the political scene we do not see any credible alternative today our politicians that would come if we organize election is for what it's to have a new government that will lack credibility and legitimacy and that um will look more like the the the ibeca government or do we need really to refund um the countries institutions and have a good international uh have good i think um uh uh government that will take care of of people's needs um the other side is the security how do we deal with insecurity i do think that this is also a question that international community should be um working closely with the malian government so far i think if we talk about the the way we see that they are sorry i think that i think the volumes cut out uh ibrahim sorry can you hear me now yes that's much better thank you all right so let me wrap up i'm saying that we need the international community to be back in the malian government in dealing with this insecurity even by changing that in the way that we have approached we have approached the government you mentioned previously the military solution we need to go beyond the military solution and try to think about other solutions we have been talking a lot about the need to go for dialogue between the malian government and jihadists this is actually one of the indigenous one of the locally supported idea which is to engage um some of the jihadist groups um to try to find solutions to them um but so far there is i think if the malians if the malians are to engage in dialogue with the jihadist the jihadists are likely to have the upper hand that the malian authorities um need to have the support of the international community back in them so that they reinforce their positions in case there is any um uh such a diagonal to happen and i think this is really one of the solutions that i can can can can um i think uh uh bring us beyond the impacts in which we are um currently stopped if i can just uh uh you know i could if i could just make a brief point following on supreme's excellent points uh i could agree completely with him on the need for engagement and by engaging we learn more about the needs the wishes the ideas of the malian partners and can better reflect them i think one of the things that has not been very helpful in recent weeks and months has been an almost hectoring tone by which parts of the international community uh including former colonial powers have lectured the malians it it works exactly the opposite direction uh treating them that way disrespectfully i would argue instead of listening to them uh and i think that that hurts and if anything will drive them further into the arms of people who i think are would be unhelpful including the russians i think so that listening to that engagement i think is is very very critical and but let's face it uh they know how to get a rise out of us and you know the the re overreaction one would say uh of certain former colonial powers to for malian foreign minister abdulai jyops visit the Moscow i think just proved the point uh i thought it was an overreaction and uh it all it did was serve to reinforce the very things we don't want to reinforce so i think we have to be very very careful we're seeing that in the sahel in protest in Burkina Faso that blocked a french convoy a week ago the protest that they've been met with a Niger uh and so for the united states final point to your question i think although we stand by our allies including our oldest ally the french on the other hand i think it's healthy as the united states and my advice to the current administration to maintain a little bit of sunlight between the two thank you yeah um and i think all of the the panelists at this point have have said a lot about this um but maybe as we as we get towards the end of the panel to invite um any additional points people wanted to make about what you think the outlook for elections the outlook for transition is and what what you know if there's anything that you haven't already underlined uh what the international and regional actors should be focusing on so i'll invite any of the panelists that would like to add to their their previous points to to jump in on that and if not that maybe i can ask specifically to you Miriam um you know there's there's been a lot of emphasis in our conversation and i think rightly on localized solutions and legitimacy and local buy-in um and i think it would be interesting if you could talk a little bit about how civil society and other Malian institutions you know shifting the emphasis away from regional and international actors can or would hope to be involved in this transition and then what support they might need to to play that role yes well first i want to answer your question about the community it's an important question because if we are able to organize elections that will allow us to create pressure to preserve our democratic institutions but Mali has become really a special case we have had two and now we're in the middle of having a third coup d'etat so we need people to hold Mali to the rules and as Ambassador Pham was saying we can think of all kinds of solutions but we have to make a difference between what needs to happen under the rules and what can happen in reality we also have to be careful to not add to the tension that already exists with further sanctions things like that as for your question about civil society it has an incredibly important role to play today any solution must go beyond a military solution so of course civil society has an important role to play especially on the ground all kinds of humanitarian projects need to continue all kinds of projects that offer training and education of young people need to continue there's also various financial support programs for young people for women to help them try to pull themselves out of the economic stagnation that they're surrounded by and we need this kind of support in parts of the country that are not occupied served by the government once again when we talk about negotiating with the jihadists they're not necessarily foreigners or foreign groups these are people from these communities who may have strayed from the path but who don't have any other opportunities or any other economic outlets and so people either join jihadist groups or try to cross the Mediterranean and get to Europe so we need to be able to provide economic alternatives to young people in the Sahel and in Mali if we are to really undercut jihadist groups and when people do leave to join these groups oftentimes their families will protect them so it's hard to track them down because they're protected by their communities the role of civil society in this context is surveillance we need a new pattern a new system one that since we're under a military regime right now we're not and that's not a situation that will last we cannot rely on our current laws because our laws will change and people are saying oh there's no there's no alternative way but we don't trust the political class and that's when you risk falling into authoritarianism so civil society needs to stand guard and make sure that rights are being respected internally within the country and civil society also needs to put pressure on the military regime so that they're not doing whatever they feel like so that's the very important role that civil society has to play alongside all of the humanitarian and development projects that they already do we also need them to help us ensure that our human rights are respected and to make sure that the assis national that will lead to a good new government thank you maryem and i'd like to offer one final invitation peter or abraham if there's anything that you'd like to add on the that question uh just briefly you bring brought up an important point uh earlier that we really don't have the time to delve into but the question of the widespread support within molly and society of seeking a dialogue even with extremist groups and release parts of them and with the exclusion of those who are transnational terrorists who represent a danger to the world as a whole or by the community i mean i think it's a question that should be left open within certain guardrails but it's best to engage with uh locally and certainly i can say during my time when i was special envoy i didn't preclude that uh and we tried to listen to that voice of civil civil society as maryem uh brought up i even spent three hours one day over at his house with imam dico himself uh uh we had a very good and frank conversation uh i don't think i walked away convinced by much and i'm sure i didn't convert him to anything but at least the the channels of dialogue were open and we had actually a fruitful discussion and i think that's important and so i think there should be within the bounds of certain guardrails uh the international community should facilitate rather than hector uh the mountains because what ultimately is going to be sustainable is what mollions themselves agreed to accept as legitimate and uh and can live with ibrahim it looks like you might be trying to jump it oh great okay yes um uh so i would like to make two additional points here the first one is regarding the term limits of the the the transition i think there is a lot of focus on um make it quick uh finish it give power back to civilians etc um the focus should not be on organizing election for the sake of organizing them the focus the focus should be on how do we produce institutions that would be able to face the challenges that mali um is facing today to avoid falling in the vicious cycle of political crisis um after political crisis and and security so i do think that there need to be a focus on um on the reforms the necessary reforms that the mali that that mali needs to to to to put forward including reforms that will make um that that will make it possible to implement that that the peace agreement um and i'm talking about the the revision of the constitution um the the redistributionary reforms etc i do think that those are really needed so the focus should be on the quality of of those elections and the institutions that are that will come out of it um or rather well it seems like we've lost his connection unfortunately um but i think maybe given that we're we're almost out of time here i'd just like to thank uh the panelists again for a really interesting discussion i think you raised a lot of really important themes around legitimacy and trust in national and regional and international institutions and the need for for us to think about solutions that respect the the complexity of the political situation of the security situation um that address it maybe more holistically um and that are you know really driven by malian actors and and by the needs on the ground i think that's a a lot for us to think about and so so thank you again and i will be there thank you