Dear colleagues, today, it is my pleasure to open the IEA's workshop on gas supply security, which aims to provide an assessment of the long lasting impacts of the global gas crisis triggered in 2022, and identify policy options to mitigate risks and uncertainty, so weighing on the gas supply security. The historic context cannot be ignored. So besides the human tragedy and suffering, it is causing the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, profoundly transformed the European and global gas markets. While the immediate effects of last year's supply shock have eased since the beginning of this year, the structural changes which emerged in 2022 will persist for years and should be carefully assessed both by policymakers and market participants, market players. In this context, the architecture of global gas supply security and the underlying flexibility mechanisms need to be reassessed throughout an ever closer dialogue between the responsible producers and consumers. The International Energy Agency reacted swiftly to the unfolding the energy crisis. The agency coordinated to emergency oil stock releases 4th and 5th in its history and published a series of special reports to provide advice to policymakers on how to mitigate impacts on gas market and reduce reliance on Russian natural gas. IA also started the task force on gas and clean fields market monitoring and supply security. In February of this year, the IA hosted a special ministerial on natural gas markets and supply security. 40 government took part in the meeting to discuss how to foster gas supply security and they highlighting the need for structural gas demand reduction and enhanced dialogue between consumers and responsible gas producers. In July, Japan's METI, Mr. Economy, Trade and Industry, in cooperation with us, IA, hosted the LNG producer consumer conference to promote dialogue on gas supply security and the mitigation of methane emissions along the LNG value chains. The International Energy Agency, IA will continue to lead on energy and gas supply security. So today's workshop organized with the kind support of Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides a special focus on Asia and its past growing markets where the natural gas is closely linked to policies aiming to phase out coal-fired power generation. So thank you for your participation and I look forward to active and productive discussion today. Thank you for your attention. First of all, I would like to extend my sincere appreciation to the IA for their special efforts in organizing this wonderful opportunity for the workshop. I also would like to thank all the speakers and the audience who are participating today. Last year, the natural gas market experienced significant volatility during the energy crisis triggered by Russia's aggression in Ukraine. It affected not only the European market, but also the global gas market, including the Asian market. While the carbonization efforts are accelerating globally, natural gas will continue to be necessary for the stable transition to clean energy. Particularly, it will play an important role in Asia and region. Under these circumstances, it is timely that the IA is hosting this webinar focusing on the importance of natural gas supply security for the clean energy transition. The Government of Japan is happy to support this webinar financially. Japan emphasizes the perspective of energy access, believing that access to affordable energy forms the basis of people's lives. In addition to the introduction of renewable energy, Japan believes that it is necessary to diversify sources of crude oil and natural gas supply, promote investment in upstream development, and utilize all appropriate energy sources and technologies, including hydrogen, ammonia, renewable energy, and further use of nuclear power. In particular, natural gas has an important role as a transition field. If the supply demand balance becomes tight due to the future shortage of natural gas, not only will the energy transition toward carbon neutrality in the world, especially in Asia, be stored, but energy security will also be jeopardized. Security of natural gas supply is important for promoting energy security and the stable energy transition in the world and Asia. At the G7 Hiroshima Summit, G7 countries confirmed that they will pursue the same goal of net zero energy consumption under several paths, utilizing all technologies and energy sources according to each country's circumstances, so as not to impede economic growth. With regard to natural gas, G7 emphasized the important role of increasing the supply of LNG and confirmed that investment in the gas sector could be appropriate to address the current crisis and future shortages in the gas market caused by this crisis. We look forward to informative and lively discussion during today's webinar on the challenges faced. Measures taken and experiences of governments and the private sector to achieve the common goal of natural gas supply security and market stability. Thank you very much for your attention, and I hope you have a good discussion today. Thank you very much, Mr. Katahira. Maybe I should take over from here for the first session. My name is Dennis Hesseling. I'm heading the Gas Call and Power Markets Division at the IEA, and I'll be your chair for the first session, which deals with global gas supply and security. And I think we're very grateful for the Japanese Ministry to support this webinar on gas security supply with a focus on Asia. Now, for this first session, we have four speakers. I'm very happy to have them here in this session. The first one to speak will be my colleague Greg Molnar. He is a gas analyst and his very informative posts there, and he will speak about, he will set the scene, basically, towards a new global gas market. After him will come Andrew Walker. He's the Vice President for Strategy and Communication at Cheneer, and he will deal with the outlook for U.S. LNG, flexibility and supply security. Then we'll have Tatjana Mitrovam, who is not only research fellow at the Center of Global Energy Policy, but also the founder of New Energy Advancement Hub, and she will deal with the outlook for Russian gas and energy. And then finally in this session, the fourth speaker will be Marcej Tsyshevsky, who is Deputy Head of Unit at DGNR, DG Energy at the European Commission, and he will speak about enhancing gas supply security in the European Union. We have about an hour and a half for this session. I would ask each of the speakers to speak for around 15 minutes, quarter of an hour, and then we'll have, after that, about 20 minutes left for the Q&A. With that, I hope we can now start, and I will hand over to my colleague Greg. Many thanks, Dennis. Dear colleagues, good morning, good afternoon, and good evening, depending on from where you are joining us. Today, my name is Gergaj Moner, and I'm a Gastonist at the International Energy Agency, and in today's presentation we really would like to set the scene ahead of the discussion of today on the different supply security issues, challenges, which are emerging with this new global gas market. And this slide is really our starting point, providing a look back to the gas supply shock of 2022 when Russia's pipe gas deliveries to Europe halved, translating into a drop of 80 BCM in absolute terms, which roughly equates to 15% of global energy trade. And this, of course, drove up mature gas prices both in Asia and Europe to record highs, led to a reconfiguration of global energy flows and necessitated a readjustment in natural gas demand, especially in the large import markets of Asia and Europe. The growing flexibility and liquidity of the global energy market was really crucial in the response to the 2022 gas supply shock. And on this slide, we are showing the implications on global energy trade. Europe's energy imports surged by around 60% or 65 BCM in absolute terms. This was more than double of the increase in global energy supply, and as such, it necessitated the reshuffling of energy flows away from other import markets towards the European shores. And we clearly see on this slide the very important role played by the Asian market in that picture. Asia's energy imports declined by about 7% in 2020 to primarily driven by the lower inflows into China, which saw its energy procurements dropping by about 20%. Now, without this strong energy inflow, the European market would have been in a significantly more vulnerable state in 2020. And gas supply disruptions would not have been excluded. Now, this being said, more price sensitive markets with a large exposure to spot LNG, especially in Southeast Asia, have seen a steady deterioration of their gas and electricity supply security in both Bangladesh and Pakistan, recording rotating power cuts amidst the inadequacy of gas supplies. This slide gives us an overview of the price roller coaster in which we have been living in the last two years. During the steep increase in natural gas prices in 2022, gas market tensions have gradually moderated in 2023 due to a combination of timely policy action, effectively working market forces, and favorable weather conditions. Asian and European gas prices are now trading about 80% below their all-time highs recorded in the summer of 2022, but this being said, they remain valuable about two to three times above their historic averages. And if we look at the green line at the bottom of this slide, we also see that European gas prices are still about five times higher than US gas prices, which raises a number of question marks around the cost competitiveness and the long-term future of European gas intensive industry. But I think it is also important to highlight that the demand side was really the key driving force behind the easing of market fundamentals in 2023. On this slide, we are showing how natural gas consumption evolved in the major import markets over the last three quarters in 2023. In Europe, natural gas demand declined by around 9% or 33 BCM, and this has been really driven by all end-user sectors. In addition, European storage injection needs were about 20 BCM lower than in 2022 because of the higher initial stocks after a mild 2022-23 winter season. And when we are looking at the major Asian markets, we also see that gas demand has been declining by an estimated 4%, partly because of lower electricity demand, but also due to improving nuclear availability, particularly in Japan. When we look at China, we see that gas demand is clearly back on a gross trajectory. Our estimates indicate that China's gas consumption increased by about 7% compared to 2022, and this is driven by the expansion of commercial and industrial activity, as well as higher gas burn in the power sector. And we also see gas demand returning to gross in India and other emerging Asian markets. But altogether, when we combine the demand in all these major import markets, we see that it has been down by about 20 BCM compared to 2022, and also the storage injection needs were about 20 BCM lower compared to the year before, and as such, this was playing a key role in easing up market fundamentals in 2023. But we should not forget that the market remains fundamentally tight from a supply perspective. On this slide, we are showing the main trade channels behind global gas trade, namely European and China's pipeline imports, as well as global energy supply. And I think what is really key here is to follow the red dot, which shows that the overall supply to the global gas market has been declining both in 2022 and 2023, simply because the sea production in Russia's pipeline deliveries to Europe, we are talking about 120 BCM in just two years, was not offset by the rather mere increase in global energy supply, which increased by about 40 BCM in these two years. But when we are looking at the medium term, the prospects are somewhat brighter altogether, we expect that energy supply will expand by about 25% or 130 BCM between 2022 and 2026. And the United States alone will account for half of incremental energy supply during this period, reinforcing its position as the world's largest energy exporter. About 70% of this incremental energy supply is expected to arrive to the market between 2025 and 2026. And this strong growth in energy supply could of course, loosen market fundamentals and also ease up some of the supply security concerns. Despite this softening of market fundamentals, as highlighted by my director, Mr. Keisuke Estadamari, the structure changes which emerged in 2021 will persist for years. And this night shows us the key building bricks of this new global gas market, which is gradually taking shape after last year's gas supply shock. LNG became a new base load supply for Europe, while China's balancing role in the global gas market is set to increase. And while gas demand reductions are set to accelerate in the mature markets of the Asia Pacific and Europe, there are question marks on how to do risk investment in gas infrastructure and the role of long term contracts. And there is also a clear need to assess the value of new gas supply flexibility mechanisms, both via physical gas reserves and enhanced international cooperation. The share of LNG in Europe primary gas supply rose from an average 10% during the 2010s to around 33% in 2022, and this really highlights the drastic shift in the role of LNG over the last two years. In the past, LNG was really the marginal molecule in the European context. Today it became really a base load source of supply, and its share in Europe total primary gas supply is expected to average at just above 35% between 2020 to 2026, a share similar to Russia's five gas before the invasion of Ukraine. But of course there are changes on how this gas is being procured. Historically long term contracts together with domestic production met around 80 to 90% of EU gas demand on an annual basis. The non observance of Russian five gas contracts steeply increased the European Union's reliance on spot procurements rising from just 20% in 2021 to around 50% in 2023. And the share of spot is expected to increase to 70% by 2030 if expiring contracts are not renewed and no new contracts are signed. And this will naturally increase Europe exposure to the greater price volatility of spot markets in the coming years. Hence a fine balance should be struck between non Russian long term contracts and procurements from an increasingly liquid spot market. In contrast, China's role as a balancing market is set to grow. China alone accounted for about 30% of all energy contracts signed in the past five years. And as such China share in the total active energy contracts is expected to increase from around 12% in 2025 to close to 25% by 2030. And this will naturally boost the role of Chinese companies in energy trading and in the optimization of global energy flows. Nevertheless, China's potential role as a balancing market comes with several caveats, including the fact that the majority of China's energy importers are state owned companies. And as such market driven decision making might be overwritten by security concerns or geopolitical considerations. Now the global energy crisis triggered by Russia's invasion of Ukraine put also the spotlight on natural gas storage and its regulation. And this slide gives us a summary of the underground storage outlook over the medium term. And it shows that storage capacity is expected to expand by around 9% or 35 BCM with porous reservoirs accounting for more than 75 of total capacity additions. And in addition to that energy storage capacity is expected to increase by close to 10 BCM over the forecast period. What is also worth to note is that China is expected alone to account for more than half of these capacity additions with around many BCM of underground storage capacity being constructed in the country and around 5 BCM of energy storage is also being developed in China. In Europe, most of the additional underground storage capacity comes from the expansion of the Tuzgulu storage facility in Turkey as well as storage products in Bulgaria, Poland and the reopening of the rough storage facility in the UK. This map provides us with a high level overview of the different storage policies and regulatory frameworks which have been initiated over the last two years including the European Union's new storage regulation, Japan's strategic buffer energy initiative and Australia's East Coast gas system framework. But in an increasingly globalised gas market, storage regulations can have extra regional implications. Hence, we believe that a closer dialogue and improved transparency on storage regulations is needed. I would like to close this presentation with this picture with Minister Nishimura at the 2003 Energy Producer Consumer Conference in Tokyo. A new global gas market is taking shape, bringing new challenges, new question marks, which necessitates a closer cooperation between responsible producers and consumers on a number of issues including the reduction of methane emissions, commercial structures enabling more flexible energy supply and gas storage voluntary reserves mechanisms. The IEA stands ready to facilitate such dialogue by providing data, analysis, special insights and using the task force on gas and clean fuels market monitoring and supply security as an effective platform for information sharing. I would like to thank you for your kind attention. Thank you. Thank you for that introduction, Dennis. I didn't hear all of it quite, but my pleasure to be here today to participate in this discussion. These, as Gurge said, these discussions are important in terms of understanding what's happening and thinking about how we take best control of the situation moving forward. And as Dennis said, over the next 15 minutes or so, we'll do a slightly deeper dive into USLNG flexibility and supply security. I think Gurge covered a number of the key points that I want to bring out. Firstly, we are a market, the global gas market, we're a market significantly out of balance after the supply shock last year. LNG has been instrumental in getting markets in particular Europe through that supply shock so far, although obviously we're not out of the woods yet. USLNG playing a key and important role in that and I think an important role in bringing the markets back into balance as Gurge alluded to as we look forward from where we are. So if you can go through the next slide and to the next one, Gurge. So firstly, an acknowledgement of the importance of Asia to LNG, a lot of discussion about Europe at the moment, but as we look out in terms of primary energy growth, natural gas demand growth and LNG growth. We see the longer term really about Asia. Asia is the key demand driver primary energy demand, 56% of positive growth, natural gas demand growth, that's 6% positive growth. And then that plays through into LNG demand growth and this is the Shania outlook to 2040 and you can see the big growth demand drivers South Asia, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Southeast Asia and China. Asia accounting for about 80% of the future growth outlook over the broadly next two decades. So really Asia critical to LNG, LNG and the evolving global model flexibility critical to Asia. Gurge the next slide and USLNG has been critical in underpinning the current supply wave you can see from this chart which is capacity in place or under construction. You can see as Gurge said the US now the largest exporting nation, largest capacity in place 90 million tons. The US running year to date is the largest exporter through October. And I think that inevitably means that the US will become the largest exporting country this year on an annual basis for the first time. And you can see we are rather unusually in 2023 in a year where there are no capacity additions the we reach the end of the first supply wave and as of 2024 we will start ramping up a new set of capacities across four new projects one expansion. Another 80 million tons under under construction which will take us broadly to 170 million tons of capacity. Obviously that is the capacity under construction much more planned beyond that next slide Gurge. Here's a few details of what's happening at Shania we have a 10 million ton expansion under construction at our Corpus Christi facility which will add about 10 million 10 million tons of capacity about 44% complete as of September. We have another two trains broadly 5 million tons currently filed for addition to that expansion. And then we turn our attention to an expansion that's been passed which we have been busy commercializing recently. Next slide Gurge and you can see based on our demand projection that the US playing a significant role in filling the gap through the next supply wave the third supply wave. But our belief is that there's still room on the 2030 timescale for for more capacity to be added. And by 2040 we estimate taking into account declines in legacy projects that will need around about 135 million tons of new supply to keep the market in balance. But no doubt as Gurge said the large wave that's under construction will help mitigate the supply shock that we saw last year with the containment of Russian supplies and will help the market rebalance as we go through that significant building capacity from 25 through to 30. Next slide Gurge. One I think slightly unique aspect of the US is the multi project landscape that you see there. Almost uniquely in LNG. There are many project developers developing many projects all of whom are in competition with each other there's no sovereign entity no government kind of determining which project progresses. In the way that you find in other places or indeed suggesting that there should only be one national project is a very competitive landscape. Obviously the government sets the permitting process that the projects need to go through the the licensing. But it's a multi multi project landscape project on project competition make sure that not only do costs from have to remain competitive against other projects. But also it's a an environment that drives innovation. Go to the next slide Gurge. The underpinning element I think in terms of the growth of the US the success of the US has been has of course been the growth in the significant resource space. From kind of 2004 onwards plotted on the left hand chart showing the impact that shale gas has had on the natural gas resources of the US. This is the potential gas committee who assess the US resources on a by annual basis. Technically recoverable resources shown here they estimate about 4000 TCF of gas technically recoverable in the US so this is the US not not North America. And the synchronous with that increase in resource has been a huge increase in gas production broadly a doubling since 2006 from 50 BCF a day to now running at about 104 BCF a day. 1040 BCN per annum equivalent in European terms and those resources being monetized at lower prices than we saw prior to 2006. You can see some ups and downs as the market responds to short term dynamics but broadly natural gas prices have come down over time. Currently the forward curve sitting at around about $4 average through the next decade or so. And if you look at the cost curve for the US a lot of gas that can be produced at $4 to $5 out along that long flat cost curve. So we're very confident that the resource base is there to underpin both the significant domestic market but also exports over many decades. We go to the next slide. So if we look at US LNG we'll find that as that first wave and indeed the second wave has grown. And we've seen a lot of people buy LNG US LNG into their portfolios on the left hand side. These are the Shania long term counterparties we now have 33 long term counterparties in terms of geography spread across the globe. In terms of functionality we have gas utilities power utilities but also portfolio players traders. And if you look at the right hand side you can see when we take a snapshot of 2030 contracts you can see a quick look at who has purchased US LNG so that's US in total not just Shania. And again you can see a broad range of geographies Europe and Asia and functionalities traders portfolio players. If you look at the last the contracting for the last couple of years you'll get a slightly different high chart with a greater emphasis on Asian off takers and portfolio players. So we've really seen Asia and international players contracting a lot of US LNG in the last two years. In response to the supply shock. Go to the next slide go. So I think one of the things that US LNG has undoubtedly done is it has created not only supply availability but a more flexible more liquid more global gas market. Here we see a overview of the development of the industry right back from its inception the slow speed at which it's over time added spot and short term volumes to its to its trade. Initially a bilateral trade based on bilateral point to point deals. We started to see some initial slow evolution of that through between 1985 and 2000. And then we really started to see a growing flexibility in the trade through the 2000s. And actually that that was kind of happening through the first supply wave 2009 10 you can see there's a step up. But really the US since 2016 has driven a lot more flexibility liquidity into the into the marketplace. And these are the gignal numbers for 2022 they estimate about 35% of global trade was done on a spot and short term IE contracts durations of less than four years four years or less.  Now there are no real primary indicators of liquidity. So here are some secondary indicators of just how liquidity has has developed on the back of that flexibility top left you can see the gignal data again but I've picked out the true spot volumes in red. So cargo is delivered within 90 days. And so the real spot cargo is in the industry and you can see how those have grown to become the major share of that spot and short term category. On the top right you can see trading house activity volumes accounted for by the four largest trading houses in LNG grew significantly over that synchronisation. So firstly with that growth in US LNG so 2016 through to 2020 cargo by cargo is awarded by tender so these are markets tendering for volumes you can see almost no cargo is tended prior to 2014 growing to a significant share through 2022. And then JKM derivatives shown trading derivatives shown in the bottom right and you can see a gain that growing synchronously with that growth in flexible US volumes. Although I think it's everyone's aware the supply shop and more importantly the volatility that took place in 2022 kind of a setback for the market. A lot of traders reduce their trading positions within that market volatility. And you can see we're now starting to grow again although nowhere close to where we were. So all of the indicators show growing liquidity I would caution if we look at the churn rate of JKM which is the ratio of the derivative to the underlying physical you can see we've got round about a churn of 1.6 at the moment at 2021 peak it was 2.2. That is far below what you would consider as a fully liquid marketplace which would typically be a churn of 10 to 11 plus to be considered liquid and and even then not hugely liquid. So you can see we're very far from being commoditized, but we do have a lot of growing flexibility, growing liquidity in the marketplace which has helped the the market get through the current supply shock. If we go to the next slide Gurgay and really as Gurgay was saying US LNG flexible US LNG has been critical in helping Europe get through its supply shop last year. In 2022 we saw an incremental 45 million tons of LNG flow into Europe. The United States accounted for about 64% of the incremental flows into the marketplace. So although we are far from being a commoditized and fully flexible global trade. The flexibility that we do have has inherently helped the the global system get through the Russian supply supply shock that we saw last year. As indeed it did back on the Fukushima disaster and going way back to 2007 the Choetsu earthquake. The scale of flexibility the inflow of volumes larger for each of those supply shocks indicating the ability of the system to accommodate the shock improving as we've gone through time. Next slide Gurgay. I've talked a bit about security of supply or I focused on security of supply. I think it's also important to acknowledge the other two legs of the trilemma affordability which will come back as markets come back into balance and also sustainability. So an indicator really here that certainly Shania but I would I would assert the rest of the industry haven't forgotten about the sustainability leg and continuing to work in terms of improving the sustainability of LNG supply in the case of Shania through our QMRV program where we're working with various partners in the upstream shipping midstream sector. We go to the next slide. So I'm going to end with two slides which really just give a bit of a broad overview of the industry. The US you can see the top five suppliers in 2040 plotted in the chart on the left the US set to become the largest exporter this year overtaking Australia and Qatar. I'm playing a critical role in terms of providing future supplies into the global marketplace along with Qatar helping to keep the market in balance. On the right hand side we can see how critical that is for Asia although there's been a lot of focus on Europe. And I've plotted the 27 plus one as a kind of a regional market to show the extent of the supply shop that we've seen and the huge pool on volumes. But you can see the top five in 2040 in terms of nations are all Asian countries different trajectories in terms of growth in terms of plateau in terms of declining. Depending on how mature those markets are depending on the role of gas in those markets. And I've got a couple of quotes at the bottom go gay which actually come from the IEA 2017 which I don't think have been bettered the US helping to create a shift towards a more flexible liquid and global gas market. Transformation of LNG markets in terms of flexibility liquidity creates a huge opportunity for gas users in Asia. And I still think although those were 2017 quotes I still think those are as true today as they were back in 2017 when the IEA first put them forward. Final slide. I'm not going to go through all of the bullet points but just to kind of bring out some of the highlights US growth has been rapid and influential. Flexible US volumes now consistently reaching over 30 markets around the world almost all buyers have some US LNG in their portfolios. Additional US capacity growth will be material we already have 80 million tons under construction and that is not the end. Shania amongst others have plans to continue to grow and flexible US LNG is enhancing global market resilience making the global marketplace more responsive more flexible more liquid. And I think it's going to continue to do that as US continues to grow. However bad we find the situation we find ourselves in it would have been a lot better without the scale and the flexibility of US exports over the past couple of years. So that's ends my sorry slightly over 50 15 minutes but back to you Dennis. Many thanks Andrew for this excellent presentation and Dennis can you hear us. It might be colleagues it might be that that Dennis is experiencing some connection issues. So I would like really to thank you again Andrew for this excellent overview on on on the growing role of of the US in the global energy market. And I would like now to give the floor to to take an intro and to give us an overview of the recent developments around Russian natural gas. Thank you so much and thanks to colleagues from the IEA for this invitation. It's great pleasure and honor for me. You know what I'm going to present to you is not natural gas. Thank you. And thank you to the colleagues from IEA for this invitation. It's great pleasure and honor for me. What I'm going to present to you is a bit different. It's a different perspective. It's not like a baseline scenario which we were discussing previously. And it's just my understanding of what the new Russian gas export strategy is. So it's a guess. It's actually prepared from the open sources. I might be mistaken. Yeah. So I'm specifically making a disclaimer. But I think that talking about the global gas security it's extremely important. These days to take into account these potential developments which can challenge the baseline scenario. Therefore I will take these 15 minutes to navigate you through this new vision, which is quite different from all the graphs and charts that Gergy and Andrew were showing in their presentations regarding Russia. So as you know, and Gergy has explained it greatly, the results of 2022 invasion, Russia's invasion of Ukraine were extremely painful for Russia itself. So Russian pipeline gas exports to Europe have collapsed, while actually Russian LNG exports were doing quite well. Actually, they've increased. Yeah. In 2023, we are at rather low pipeline gas exports still, while there are already several interesting trends visible. Trend number one. Actually, for the first time, the West oriented LNG gas exports are taking over West oriented Russian gas pipeline exports. More than 50%, you can see it on the left hand side chart. Second trend is that pipeline gas supplies to the East equal pipeline gas supplies to the West. So now in 2023, power of Siberia will deliver approximately 22 BCM to China, while pipeline gas exports to Europe are expected at 25 BCM. So nearly equal volumes. And LNG supplies to the East equaled LNG supplies to the West. So these, even to the East, which Russia has announced for many years, it suddenly happened. Not in a way it was intended, but it is there. And basically what I'm trying to argue is that it might have very significant implications for the global markets. The question which I'm asked quite frequently is, okay, huge volumes of these 80 BCM, which Georgie has mentioned, they got locked inside Russia in Western Siberia. So what is Russia going to do with all these gas? There was a reduction in production, obviously last year 12% and most likely 10% this year, mainly taken by Gazprom, while the other gas producers were actually increasing their output. There is some growth of the domestic demand, but obviously it's not able to absorb all these excess gas. There are all these discussions about developing gas chemistry, which frankly seem to be quite questionable for me. There is some growth which is happening already in gas exports to the CIS countries. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, there were some exports to Azerbaijan, which are now opposed. Actually, they are talking now about approximately 10 billion cubic meters going to Central Asian markets, potentially some volumes transiting through Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to China. So initially, these countries in Central Asia were extremely skeptical about these developments, but now they seem to be quite enthusiastic. One year later, they are all getting engaged in this Central Asian trade. But again, the volumes are not that big. The key pillars of the new Russian gas export strategy, which is just evolving, it is not yet fixed officially, but at least I can see already some clear outlines. So the first pillar is pipeline exports to Asia, which are widely discussed. I mean, everybody is talking about power of Siberia to pipeline, which is, I mean, the limbo, the deal itself is still in limbo. But if the deal is achieved, it is about 50 billion cubic meters. And power of Siberia one meanwhile is building up its capacity. So in a few years, it will reach its projected 38 BCM nominal capacity. And Eastern gas pipeline deal, which was signed right before the war for 10 billion cubic meters, it is proceeding so most likely it will be completed in time. So these are already quite considerable volumes, all going through pipelines to China, which is, by the way, corresponding to what Georgie was saying about Chinese strategy to build up trading. LNG trading first of all, but if you are China and you have all these backup of pipeline gas supplies from Russia, trading positions are becoming much stronger. It will not be extremely high margins, high profits for Russia. But preliminary calculations are showing that bringing gas from Western Siberia to China, it still makes some economic sense for Russia. So it's not loss making. And as long as it is supporting national economy, providing not dollars but R&Bs to the Russian budget, it's okay. So it's mutually beneficial both for Russia and for China. So far, China is very cautious with making any announcements. And it is not in a hurry, obviously. But frankly, I expect that in the next few years, most likely we will see progress with this particular deal on power of Siberia too, which is already then changing the global gas balance. But the next pillar, in my understanding, is significantly underestimated. It is LNG exports. Actually, what is happening now in Russia is the discussion on LNG export liberalization and quite significant state support for these projects. The official target of 100 million tons LNG exports by 2030, which is just in six years, is reinstated again and again by all the officials. And on the next few slides, I will show to you that theoretically it's achievable. I wouldn't put a bet that it will be definitely achieved, but there is some probability there are some chances that Russia can manage to do it. And in this case, so I would say LNG exports, they will be probably the most important potential game changer for the Russian gas export strategy. So in this case, if you look at this map, you can see that all these very well developed pipeline network to Europe, it is becoming nearly obsolete. While the new pipelines to Asia, the red ones and including transit through Central Asia, together with the new LNG plants and existing LNG plants in Yemal and Sakhalin, they are indeed diverting all Russian flows to the Asian market, which, as Andrew has stressed several times, is the fastest growing market. So most of the new gas consumption is going to be there, and Russia is turning there. And given the financial constraints and financial pressure and inability of Russia to trade in dollars or euros, actually building up relations with Bangladesh, Pakistan, Vietnam, you name it, all these new consumers, new markets in Asia Pacific, it makes a lot of sense. And Russia, potentially, is able to provide rather stable supplies, rather low prices. And moreover, I can see already a discussion of providing LNG to power, building the whole supply chain, not just delivering LNG but also building power plants, which is very much reminding me of the Soviet strategy in the developing countries. Because Russia now not only needs money, but it also needs badly allies.  So here is the last slide where I want to spend a bit more time. And once again, it's quite speculative. I made it myself, so there is no reference to an external source. It's just a rough estimate. What could be done if Russia is really serious about all these new developments? And it seems to be very serious about all these new developments. And you can see that basically our after significant decline in 2022-2023, already in the next couple of years, with the expansion of power of Siberia I, first of all, with the construction of Arctic LNG II, Russia is in a good position to increase its gas exports again. And if we are talking about the time horizon of 2030, if you put together the exports to CIS countries, which are most likely to stay there and to expand, I frankly do not see why shouldn't they, if you assume that TARG Stream is still there, even if Ukrainian transit deal is not prolonged and the only gas which flows through pipelines to Europe is TARG Stream. Yeah, but it's still 16 BCM. And if there is no other gas going to Europe by pipelines, but there are new LNG projects, Arctic LNG II, for which all the supplies are, all the equipment is secured. And I mean, nobody is in a very good position to finish the project. There might be some delays, there might be problems with spare parts and with software, but I'm sure that they can do it. Yeah, Baltic LNG pipeline, the project was always quite questionable, but they are proceeding, they're building it up. Newly announced project, Murmansk LNG, which is supposed actually to grab gas from gas prompts pipelines in western part of Russia and liquefied in Murmansk. It really has very good chances for construction. And then on top of that, all these pipelines in Siberia going to China, power of Siberia I, far eastern route, and even the beginning of the construction of power of Siberia II. Here I put just 15 BCM by 2030 out of 50, which is the full capacity because it takes time to reach this full capacity. So it's quite, I would say, modest estimate of what could be done. I'm not taking into account Op-LNG or Yikutsk LNG or several other projects, which are also under discussion. But these are like the most realistic ones. And altogether, it gives us 235 BCM, which is already comparable to the pre-war volumes. So it is quite a significant part of the international gas trade. And if Russia succeeds with this strategy, which is definitely subject to sanctions, and we see already that the sanctions on transshipment in Murmansk and Kamchatka and sanctions on Article LNG too are there. But if you follow all the developments with the sanctions on Russian oil, you can see that actually Russian companies are quite successful in finding some bypassing routes. Here, I assume, given the whole importance of this LNG development for the Russian state, there will be a lot of support and a lot of efforts. And by the way, quite a lot of interest from the potential consumers in non-ACD Asia. So I think I'll stop on that. But the very last message which I want to give to you, just imagine this world. 2030-2035, when most of the Russian gas is not going to Europe, but it's going to China, and China is becoming the biggest, not only LNG, generally gas trader in the world. And Russia is also building up long-term relations with a significant number of Asian developing countries, providing to them LNG to power. So that might be quite a different picture. And I'm not insisting that that's the way it's going to be, but just as one of the hypothesis, I think we should think about it. And the last but not least part of this puzzle. In this case, it will be extremely fragmented market. Part of it being traded most likely under sanctions. Part of it in dollars, part of it in yuan. With different transaction infrastructure, with some of the participants of the markets not being able to deal with each other, with some alliances inside it. So this fragmented market is also, I would say, quite a threat for the global gas security. And yeah, just think about it. Meanwhile, I'll stop on that. Thank you. Many thanks for this fascinating presentation. While I was listening to you, I was thinking about this very old saying, according to which Russia is never as strong as it seems from the distance, but it is also never so weak as it seems from the distance. And I think it is, to some extent, it is also true when we are considering Russia's energy and gas sector. The second thought I had is that before the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russia's strategy was really about diversification, about diversifying its exports between Europe, Asia and the global energy market. It seems now that Russia strategy is now not about diversification, but really to trying to forge some sort of long term relationships with these dynamically growing markets in Asia. And of course, maybe the negotiation power of Russia has weakened compared to before the 2022 period, but it is indeed a fascinating discussion. With that, I would like to give the floor to Mr. Maciej Ciesewski, who will present on another very resilient market, the European Union. And Maciej, the floor is yours. Thank you. Thank you, Gary. Thank you, IEA colleagues for organizing this very important workshop. As you have, the previous speakers have already outlined, we've been witnessing a big shock to the markets and Europe was in the very center of this shock. So let me give you also a European perspective on the events since 2021, where we stand now and where we believe we are going. Thank you, Gary, for the presentation. If we could move to the first slide. I will not spend much time on the market situation, main drivers in 2022 mostly, because I think previous panelists presented it in a perfect way. I just want to highlight that Europe was already very much dependent on gas imports with domestic production declining in the last 10 years. So the readjustment that some of the speakers mentioned had to be very quick and was rather dramatic. Although maybe this is not the right words when comparing to the invasion, but the disappearing pipeline gas from Russia after the invasion of Ukraine, which until then was the backbone of EU's supply was something that was impossible to immediately replace with only one a single source of alternative supplies. Despite years of efforts to diversify supplies to Europe, we have managed to ensure that each part of Europe had different options, but the scale of the disruption was just too big to not create a big shock for the market. So with these two graphs, you only see the disappearing pipeline gas from Russia and the pickup of LNG supplies. The graph on the right, it always looks back 12 months showing that since end of 2022, we are at a very different level of LNG supplies around 120 BCM for the last 12 months. The trend is likely to continue. Moving to the next one. As the European Commission, European Union, but not only us also in close collaboration with EU member states. This was an example of an extremely quick and efficient cooperation between the EU and EU member states. And I had to signal here this very strongly also with international partners. We have had a very good cooperation with the United States. We have good cooperation with Japan and other partners, IEA as well. We have left no domain of energy policy untouched in terms of regulation. We were looking, as you can see here, through demand side, supply side, security of supply measures, transparency, both at EU level but also at the level of the member states. We can move on. I will not bore you with all the details of all the measures we applied, but to give you now a bit of a flavor. Gary at the very beginning already discussed the issue of storage in Europe. A big asset we have, a big source of flexibility, around 100 BCM of underground storage providing a lot of flexibility and stability for the winter season. In 2021, we entered through winter before the invasion still with a relatively low storage level, which in addition was aggravating the situation. And for the first time in history, as the European Union, we have decided to gather with member states to give more prominence and to the strategic value of the underground storage in Europe. We have set targets and trajectories for member states and for the EU level as a whole to make sure that for the winter, for the next winter, we will have at least 80% in storage and for the subsequent winters, 90% of storage. As you can see, ahead of 2022-23 winter, we have achieved, by mid-November, 95% of gas in storage, which exceeded the target actually. And this year, at this very moment, mid-November, we are almost at 100% of storage. In addition, which for people not following gas issues closely, also Ukrainian storage is hosting quite some gas of European companies and international companies. Now moving on to the next aspect of our intervention and trying to support the markets in tackling the shock of 2022 was the gas demand reduction. As a continent, which is so much dependent on supplies from outside of the Union, we had to look at demand reduction measures, energy efficiency. We have set a target of 15% across the Union and with the latest data I can share with you, we keep actually exceeding the 15% demand reduction level, which between August 2022 and September 2023 is equivalent to quite a big amount, which is 77 BCM of gas equivalent. As you can see, among member states of the European Union, there is very different energy savings or gas savings, which contributes to this percentage. Here with colleagues from IA, we are looking very closely into what this exactly means. Was it behavioral changes? Was it impact of the weather or of industry? Maybe too early, it's not also focus of today's workshop, but it's not all positive because of course part of this demand reduction is more structural, could constitute demand destruction because of high prices. But more assessment is needed and whatever is efficiency, I think is pretty welcome. And we are also seeing this as a positive signal in terms of flexibility of our gas demand side. Moving on to the supply side. Here with colleagues in DG Energy, we have compared the data for supply of gas, both pipeline and LNG between 2021, 2022 and 2023. Here I see there's a little mistake, it's up to September 2023. You can see very much changing role of Russian gas in EU's LNG mix and increasing role of LNG, which is also gargling described at the beginning from an important role of around 20%, but definitely not a major role. Now increased in 2022 to being around 40%. This year, we also expect around 180-120 BCM of LNG in EU's gas mix, which as IEA presented would be maybe around 36, 37, maybe towards 40% of the mix. So the backbone of the LNG of the EU gas market. What is interesting and where more assessment is needed also with colleagues from IEA is Europe is now between 2021 and 2023, contesting much more of the free on board and flexible volumes of LNG. At the same time, we are also observing that long-term contracts for LNG are being signed. So what is important to notice is that in this discussion about long-term contracts, it's not that Europe is not participating. Signing long-term contracts is not against long-term decarbonisation objectives where Europe is leading the efforts. This is actually happening, so Europe will not be only relying on spot cargos, as I think Schenyer and Andrew also signalled on its graph. Moving on, one more graph on LNG, complementing a little bit what was said before. We expect this year still increase of LNG imports to the European Union, a more less dramatic increase by 6%, because beginning of last year, LNG imports did not pick up yet. So this is why despite monthly LNG imports being slightly lower than at the same time last year, we will most likely reach a record imports of LNG to European Union. Now, let me insist that as European Union and EU member states, we have been trying to use all the toolbox we have had on the demand side and on the supply side. And if you could please pass to the next slide. We have also tried to test some new and innovative tools on the supply side, the demand aggregation and joint purchasing mechanism called aggregated EU. We have introduced it earlier this year. We have so far conducted three rounds of tenders when buyers from the European Union but also energy community are actually bringing the demand together through the mechanism. And then this is tended out to suppliers from Europe, from outside of Europe. Everyone can participate except for the Russian suppliers. This is a tool supporting diversification, optionality and security of supply with products ranging from really short term products until March 2025. On the next slide, I will just give you a preview how it is going. It is a very innovative tool. It created a lot of discussion, also criticism, but also a lot of interest and positive comments. So far, after three rounds, we consider that the tool was rather welcomed by the market. We have managed to attract 44 BCM of demand from European and energy community buyers, which was met or responded to by 52 BCM on the supply side. We have matched volumes around 34 BCM, which is around 10% of total EU consumption in 2022. We are slowly approaching 200 participants on the EU energy platform. So as an experience, we try to make it as useful and as good as possible. And it is rather a good story in making sure that we support markets and transparency of the markets. Next slide, please. I will not spend much time on this, but very important message. We have seen that the fact European Union and the EU market after several waves of liberalization is a very transparent market. Every market player, every other country in the world can check exactly how much gas is in storage, are we on trajectory, how is availability of LNG terminals in the European Union. Policy making Europe is a transparent open book for gas markets. We think this is an important element, which contributed to Europe actually adjusting to this shock of supply of 2022. And on the next slide, to even further support this transparency to also European players, we have introduced together with Acer LNG benchmark, which was publishing daily LNG price assessments, never too little transparency. This would be my message here. Moving on to general conclusions and I will finish on that to make sure we have also time for questions and answers. My last slide, please. As it was also presented by other speakers, we believe that EU's role on LNG markets, the exposure on LNG markets in the next three, four years of the 2026, at least, will remain at quite stable levels. This will be one of the biggest participants on global LNG markets. With the experience of 2022, we believe, and this is really a place where I think we could be discussing this as well, we believe there is a lot of space for collaboration for more transparency between different regions. We already are working with IA partners on making sure that both energy data, gas markets, stocks, flexibility reserves across the globe are better coordinated. There's more transparency about them. And of course, this discussion cannot take place without methane reduction measures, and we are actively cooperating with like-minded partners with, for example, IA, Japan, Korea, of course, the US as well, on making sure that the markets of tomorrow are more transparent. There's more collaboration between us and methane reduction measures are very high on the agenda. Finally, as the workshop is about security of supply, we believe that the security of supply of tomorrow will evolve, has to capture the complexity of the energy markets, not only of gas markets, but also increased electrification, increased globalization. The threats, including to critical infrastructure, are becoming more complex to assess because they are more intertwined. So the future security of supply has to be much more holistic and take all this into account. So a lot of work ahead of us regulators, but I think IA and like-minded partners are really well placed to help us build secure system and gas markets of the future on the way to transition. Thank you very much. Much, many thanks for the very insightful presentation and also for the excellent cooperation between the IA and the European Commission. This is very much appreciated and valued. I think now we can open up the floor for the Q&A and we would like to maybe start with one round of questions about the midstream infrastructure because we have been talking a lot about the supply side, the large energy pipeline projects. I'm wondering that because behind every around the developments of those pipelines, which could have negatively impact the scale up of US LNG in the medium term, and I have a similar question to Tatiana. Tatiana, you mentioned the Murmansk LNG project in Russia, which I believe is being developed by Novatec, but in a way it has to be also fed from the gas transmission system of Gazprom. So I'm wondering that where the two companies stand on that? Is there a compromise being found on this issue? I have also one midstream infrastructure related question to you. The European Union and its member countries have been building up very quickly additional regressification capacity in the last two years. We hear some voices that maybe this could create some lock-in effects and I'm wondering if there is sort of speak any guidelines on how to avoid that we create any lock-in effects by investing in gas-related infrastructure, which is at the moment needed to tackle the immediate gas supply. And thank you. So maybe Andrew, could we start with you? Okay, thank you. Thank you, Gurga. I lost you for a moment there. I'm afraid I'm not sure whether it was my link or yours, but I can guess what you asked me. Infrastructure pipelines. So yes, I talked about the resource base. There's a resource base that can underpin both domestic demand and exports for many decades. But there is no doubt that permitting pipelines, large infrastructure has got harder in the U.S. of late. And I think we're seeing most consultants, commentators make the assumption that actually when we look at the big resources in the U.S. So obviously Marcellus Utica up in the northeast, Permian and kind of the midcon down in the Gulf Coast region with the growth in, with the difficulty of putting in place in particular long distance interstate pipelines that we've seen recently. But actually the solution is going to be more biased towards the southern resources in terms of supplying the LNG demand, export demand growth, which is going to be the key demand driver as we look out over, over the coming decades. So most commentators will have a view in which the Marcellus Utica is not growing significantly, even though that's the kind of the largest resource. And then, and actually the LNG facilities will rely on the southern resources, which in most cases means interstate solutions which are easier to permit or shorter pipelines. I think there is still a need for the LNG developers to make sure they have their particular solutions sorted out in advance. Shania obviously has eight years of experience of buying and transporting gas in the U.S. system, so we believe we're well placed. Others will be going kind of up the learning curve that we have come up over time. Overall, I think it is the U.S. has proven itself to be very flexible, very intuitive, very economically responsive as a gas system in terms of the gas network, in terms of linking up resources and demand, and I think it will continue to do that. So I believe there won't be a problem. The last element I would put in, I don't think the U.S., if it's going to achieve some of its energy transition targets will be a flat line gas demand system in terms of domestic demand. So as we see domestic demand reduce over time, whatever trajectory that is, there are many different views. We'll also naturally see some of the system become more available for the export component as exports grow as domestic demand reduces. So I think I acknowledge the challenges. I think the U.S. is well set to overcome those challenges, and I don't see it being a constraining factor on exports. Many thanks, Andrew, and that's my reassuring. Tatiana, so maybe if you could elaborate a bit on the Murmansk energy and on the pipeline issues. And also there is one question from the Q&A regarding the sort of financing of Russia's energy projects and how this could be financed in the future, taking into consideration the sanctions regime. Sure. So first of all, I think I will start with the second question on financing because it actually corresponds to the first one as well. Russian oil and gas companies last year have earned record profits. And even this year their revenues are still very high. So they have their own funds, which will slowly be reduced, but so far they're really in a very good financial position to finance new investments. Plus, there is basically unlimited state support from the state banks like VTB, VEP, SBR. So the whole state is ready to provide money and actually Russia domestically is now spending enormous amounts of money for different infrastructure projects and for the military purposes, obviously. So I don't see any problem for at least a decade or so with attracting finances, even without any foreign involvement. Regarding the pipeline and this very difficult relationship between Gazprom and Novotek, you know, very interesting thing that I'm observing right now is actually this trend towards liberalization in Russian domestic gas market. As Gazprom lost the main argument it was using for many decades that we are responsible for European gas contracts. Therefore, we cannot be touched. No more European long term gas contracts and the appetite for unbundling, for LNG export liberalization, which I've mentioned for different reforms domestically now, it became much higher. In this particular case with the Murmansk plant, the idea is that Novotek will build itself, it will finance from its own funds pipeline from St. Petersburg to Murmansk, and then transfer this pipeline to Gazprom and paid just a tariff, regulated tariff for it. And another very interesting part of the story is that they are actually planning to use a nuclear plant. Instead of gas turbines for liquefaction, they plan to use nuclear energy for liquefaction, which is also quite an innovative solution explained by the lack of Russia's own gas turbines. At the same time, they are building up very actively relationships with Iran, which is good in producing gas turbines. So you see there are very interesting and unexpected alliances evolving here. But as with the Murmansk LNG there was direct order of the president to find the solution between Gazprom and Novotek, they have no other choice than to deliver to Putin what he is asking for. Thank you very much, Tatjana. And moving to Maciej, and there is one question partly interlinked with the questions being asked. In your opinion, is Europe currently building overcapacities in terms of energy infrastructure? And a second question relates to the volumes which have been actually contracted under the EU joint procurement mechanism if we could elaborate on those volumes. Sure, very relevant points. Thank you. So first on the overcapacity, we have to put the recent addition of infrastructure into perspective. Since 2009, the EU was supporting a lot to diversification and building interconnectors infrastructure, not only in Central and Europe, in Southeast Europe, to make sure that we are not faced with a situation like in 2009-2010 where parts of Europe basically were relying on a single source of supply. So bulk of investment into necessary infrastructure was already made. The same was the case for LNG, but the crisis of 2022 kind of exceeded the imagination of what would be needed. So in such a big crisis, it was normal that both the EU and member states had to exceptionally invest in infrastructure to make sure that the big gap is covered. This is LNG terminals, but there is a lot of floating terminals which have a certain date of expiry date, I would say, or potentially are basically rented and they could be moved away. So we believe that through 2030-2035 they will be used, and most likely some of them will not become stranded assets, but will be able to basically be moved to a place where they are more needed. So as such, we don't see that there is a big risk of stranded assets, also because the usual channels of building energy infrastructure in Europe with the support of the European Union, the PCI process, for example, projects of common interest already since a few years are focusing on electrification, on new energy vectors, and on the past projects which were already decided for gas are being completed. So this wave of additional projects, this eight FSR use, for example, we believe they give the necessary flexibility for the next years. And some of them, potentially, especially the LNG terminals which are fixed, could even be hydrogen ready, for example, or be ready for the future vectors. So that's on infrastructure, but a relevant point, of course, on aggregate EU. So the numbers which I presented to you, these are of course the numbers, the total demand, the total supply and total matched volumes. As the European Commission, we did not go as far as to actually participate in negotiations or to contract gas. We believe the market is best place to do that. We just tried to support the negotiations, which means we have limited knowledge about how many contracts were contracted and which volumes exactly. We are asking and requesting the undertakings to inform us about this. We have some idea about it. We know that there is around six BCM of gas being negotiated or declared as in negotiations. We have around one BCM, a bit less than one BCM of contracts declared as contracted already. However, there's no legal obligation for the entities, so these numbers are not complete. We have information on half of the matched positions and there's no legal obligation. So I have to say that these numbers, I mean, I can give you an idea. It gives us some idea, but this is definitely not full knowledge. We have to be very careful as regulators not to come too close to the negotiations because we do not want market players to actually feel not safe or not... I mean, in their commercial negotiations, they should be left alone basically and without interference of the regulators. So this is what I can say on that. Thank you very much. We are nearing the close of the first part of the workshop, but there is one very interesting question I would like to address to the China and to Andrew. So if Russian exports to China and Asia increase as planned by Russia, what would be the implications for U.S. energy exports? What could be the implications for prices, for demand, but also in terms of supply coming from the U.S.? Will I go first? Go, go. If you wish so, yes. Okay. In simple terms, we come back to supply and demand 101. If there's more supply, then the market will be more balanced, prices will be better, gas will be more available. That's not a bad thing. I don't think for suppliers, even though it's perhaps sometimes counterintuitive, we want our product to be used to be considered favorably. And there have clearly been a lot of concerns through the last year in terms of availability and affordability. How much Russian supply there will be, I think, is kind of hard to estimate at the moment, as Tatiana said. I think there's quite a lot of Asian demand, so I'm pretty relaxed. I think Paris, Siberia, too, will happen. I'm not sure how much of the LNG will happen, given the technical challenges, given the sanctions. So with the amount of Russian gas that goes into Asia, I don't think we'll create an impact on the amount of U.S. volumes that we see coming out over the longer term. There may be short-term impacts, but the U.S. supply is very flexible and can ebb and flow between different marketplaces, which means that it's able to accommodate short-term supply demand imbalances. I would agree with Andrea that actually these additional volumes from Russia going to non-ACD Asia most likely will be targeted to the markets with very low credit ratings, with low prices, with high risks. So the markets which anyway are not the first choice of the suppliers. And Russia, as I've mentioned, most likely will be able to provide a rather low fixed price. So I assume they will trade not on spot, but just make old-style long-term contracts. And especially if it is LNG to power, then it will be like a contract for the electricity price, not even for LNG. So it's a bit different market. And indeed, I don't think that there will be a lot of direct competition between Russian LNG and the U.S. LNG back to my point of fragmentation. That actually there will be special segments in this market evolving with different rules, different pricing mechanisms, different insurance, different legal system even most likely. Can I just make one point on that? I think LNG is slightly different, say, from the oil market and the oil products market. There's less of a, I'm not sure what to call it, grey trade in LNG, twilight trade. There are very few LNG carriers that are available to kind of trade off radar off system, none I imagine. So actually, I think it will be a lot harder to avoid scrutiny in terms of the owners, the ship owners, the traders. So I think it will be a very different outcome than we're seeing perhaps with some of the other commodities. Okay, well, thank you very much, dear colleagues for your excellent and very insightful presentations today and for this lively discussion. Now, this brings us to the next part of the workshop which really focuses on the Asian market. And I would like now to invite the colleagues who are speaking in the second part of the workshop to turn on their screens so we can introduce them. So first we will hear a presentation from my colleague, John Takashiro, who is one of our consultants within the World Energy Outlook Team. Then Mr Hashimoto, senior fellow at the Energy Security Unit of the Institute of Energy Economics of Japan will present on the energy supply security challenges of the Asia Pacific region. And this will be followed by a presentation by Mr Sebastian Grieb from Total Energies, who will give us more perspective from a trader. And then last but not least, Mr Madhiraptar, the CEO of the Indian Gas Exchange, will present on how traded markets can enhance gas supply security. With that I would like to give the floor to my colleague, John Takashiro. John, the floor is yours. Oh, can you hear me? We can hear you and we can see you. Okay, thank you. Can you see my slide as well? We can see it very well. Thank you very much, Gargay, for introducing me. Good morning, good afternoon, everyone, connecting from Asia and elsewhere. I'm John Takashiro, senior energy analyst focusing on Asia in the World Energy Outlook Team in the IA. I'm in charge of the Southeast Asia Energy Outlook, which has the longest history among IA's or regional energy outlooks, regularly published in every two or three years since 2013. I attach a huge amount of importance to the relationship with Asia. So today it's great pleasure for me to join this comprehensive and timely workshop on gas supply security with other distinguished speakers. I really enjoyed the first half of the session. As has been pointed out in that session, over the past few years we have witnessed a number of events affecting the gas supply security. In this regard, I'd like to start my presentation by highlighting other structural changes that are essential when considering long-term gas supply security. So the first of these is clean energy technologies, and first among them solar PV and EVs. In 2020, EVs accounted for 1 in 25 car cells. This year we expect it to be around 1 in 5. The exponential growth in EVs is set to continue, reaching at least half of cells in the major markets of China, EU, and the US by 2030. Solar PV has become a huge industry. Invested capital in global solar PV manufacturing is one quarter as much as invested capital in the global automobile manufacturing industry. Before 2030, solar PV and wind overtake coal to become the largest source of electricity generation globally. And by 2030, there will be more heat pumps and other electric heaters sold globally than fossil fuel boilers. The final force shaping the outlook is the slowdown and rebalancing in the Chinese economy. As the Chinese government produces what it calls high-quality development. The working age population has peaked and so has cement production, and still production is at or close to the peak. We therefore see China's economic growth slowing down and rebalancing. The energy world in 2030 will look quite different from today. First, the number of EV cars on the road will have grown nearly 10 times and the number of ice cars on the road will have peaked and be in decline. Solar PV and wind will be the largest source of electricity generation. And there will be more heat pumps and other electric heaters sold globally than fossil fuel boilers. And instead of growing at breakneck speed, China's total energy demand will be slowly falling. Now let's look at what this means for energy, starting again with China. Between 2012 and 2022, China has been responsible for roughly a half of global energy demand growth. Two-thirds of global oil demand growth. One-third of global gas demand growth. And China was by far the dominant player in global coal markets. China's growth has surprised the energy world once already, but now its economy and energy sector are changing. The energy sector should be ready for this or face a second surprise. As a result of this growth in renewable energy and nuclear power in the electricity sector, China's coal demand is set to peak in the next few years and decline. With EVs already accounting for nearly one-third of the car sales, the number of ice cars on the road in China will peak by 2030. This leads to a peak in China's oil demand this decade. And China's gas demand continues to go across the following two decades, but more slowly than the past decades. Let's now look at the advanced economies where energy demand has already statuated. The decline of coal demand is set to accelerate in the steps as the load of coal commissioning increased from 20 gigawatt per year to 30 gigawatt per year in the coming decades. Oil demand in advanced economies peaked in 2005 and its decline becomes more pronounced in the coming decades. In the longer term, the growth of renewables in power and heat pumps in buildings starts to make inroads in gas demand. So let's now look at emerging markets and developing economies other than China where trends are a little bit different. Coal demand continues to grow in the developing world outside of China, driving by countries such as India with still large energy needs. Oil continues to grow up to 2050 with a growing population and weaker ownership in regions such as Southeast Asia and India. Natural gas demand is particularly driven by the Middle East, which will be the largest source of demand growth over the coming decades. By the early 2030s, per capita gas consumption in the Middle East is set to exceed that of the United States. Gas demand also grows strongly in Africa to support sectors like industry and fertilizer production. Combining these different regional trends leads to a peak for each of the fossil fuels by 2030 without additional climate voices in steps scenario. So now let's take a closer look at the natural gas demand. In all scenarios, gas demand peaks before 2030. However, you can immediately see the pace of the decline is largely dependent on progress in clean energy in the power sector, electrification of the industry and building sectors and grossing energy efficiency. Wind and solar play essential roles in reducing natural gas demand in the power sector. Leaving gas plants on the system is often necessary to support a renewable rich grid, especially to manage sustainable variabilities in demand. This requires an appropriate market design to remunerate balancing services. Then let's see regional uptrends. Natural gas demand declines in advanced economies in all scenarios again. Robust support for clean energy deductions reduces the share of natural gas in energy supply by 2030 in the power sector and then increasingly in buildings. On the contrary, there is a wider range of possible outcomes for natural gas demand in emerging markets and developing economies including Asia. Major differences emerged by 2030 at a time when, as in the first session as appointed, a new energy supplies are anticipated. Keeping gas prices low and potentially stimulating robust demand growth. In the APS and energy scenario, this possibility is precluded by rapid growth of renewables in the power sector in all regions, which starts to reduce the market share of natural gas after 2030. So now let's take a look at today's main subject, natural gas demand in Asia. An increasing population and strong economic growth sustained this increase in natural gas consumption in emerging markets and developing economies in Asia over the next decades. Notably in industry, despite the near-term risks brought about by the recent supply squeeze. As prices come down from the mid-2020s, these markets see a big increase in natural gas use by 2030 as a result of coal-to-gas switching. And this helps countries with net-zell emissions targets to rapidly transition away from coal. With a crowded outlook for the use of natural gas in transport, industry remains the anchor for demand growth and the focal point for large-scale infrastructure investment in energy import capacity, storage and onshore transmission and distribution grids. Ultimately, however, the prospects for natural gas in emerging markets and developing economies in Asia have a limited situation. Although the trajectory varies, demand peaks in all emerging gas markets in Asia before 2030 in the APS and also steps. The share of natural gas in total power generation remains flat in the years ahead, but then falls to less than 5% by 2050 as other sources of power system flexibility drop in price and step into replaced gas. So now let's move on to the supply side. In 2010, emerging markets and developing economies in Asia were in aggregate net gas exporters. Flat or declining production in mature gas fields in countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia, along with strong demand growth in China and India, brings gas import growth quickly to cover 30% of total gas demand by 2022. And in the steps and APS, import dependence increases further to cover 40% by 2030 in this region. I'd like to see a deeper look at trade in energy. In 2010, energy trade was already a major global industry largely governed by point-to-point contracts between exporters and importers. The US was among the importers. First forward to the last year, and we had an industry transformed. A much deeper and more liquid global energy market prompted by the rise of the US as a major exporter was vital to ride out the stock of Russia's cuts to supply. The share of energy in Europe demand rose to 35% similar to the contribution from piped gas from Russia before its invasion of Ukraine. But gas consumers around the world were left with the bruises from a turbulent year. And for the moment, the conversation about gas remains dominated by fears over price spikes and the security of supply. But that is said to change. Prospects that have started construction or taking a final investment decision are set to add 250 billion cubic meters per year of liquefaction capacity by 2030, equal to around 45% of today's global energy supply. Announced timelines suggest a particularly large increase between 2055 and 2027, more than half of the new projects in the United States and Qatar. The strong increase in energy production capacity is its prices and gas supply concern, but Europe is not going to take more, neither will the long-established market in Japan and Korea. So the key consumers for this gas are in China and other emerging countries in Asia. Sorry, can you see my screen? Yes, we can see your screen, John. Something happened to my screen. It disappeared. Sorry for the interruption. No worries. Sorry, Gergay. Can you hear me? Yes, we can hear you well. My display turns off. Would you like me to share your slides? Sorry for the technical problem. Can you see my screen? Yes, we can see it back now. Sorry, something happens. So let's start again. Okay, so we talked about, yes, construction of the new energy capacity. So let me start. So who takes the increase of energy capacity? So the key consumers is China and Asia, especially Southeast Asia and India in particular. So promises to be very strong competition among suppliers for these markets, especially if China growth is weaker than expected. So ample supplies of energy in the second half of the decade means, in our view, very limited opportunities for Russia to secure additional markets in Asia. Russia's share of internationally traded gas used to be 30%. This is halved by 2030. So in this result, global oil and gas trade is set to become increasingly concentrated on flows between the Middle East and Asia. In the steps, Shibon crude oil trade from the Middle East Asia rises from around 40% of total global trade today to around 50% by 2050. Asia is also the final destination for three quarters of incremental Middle East energy supply between 2022 and 2030. High reliance on single countries, companies or trade route makes the system vulnerable to unexpected events. Whether this relates to individual national policy choices, natural disasters, technological failures or corporate decisions. These risks are inevitably heightened at times of geopolitical risks and stresses. So fragmented approaches by gas producers and consumers could heighten energy security risks and geopolitical tensions during the transition. Any mismatch in the pace of demand and supply reductions could cause very high and low prices, leading to turbulent and violent markets. Uncoordinated policy implementation could lead to overinvestment in new gas capacity or premature retirement of existing infrastructure. And either of these could undermine efforts to bring about secure energy transitions. A lack of cooperation could also hamper the development and smooth functioning of the complex values change that are needed for long scale trade in low emission fuels. Avoiding these practicals will require countries and companies to work together. So as a closing part of my presentation, I would like to highlight that there are several ways for them to do this. First, clear long-term plans on the part of major consuming countries and sectors would help producers to make informed infrastructure and capital investment decisions. Second, consumers and prosumers could in addition explore joint investment to bring clean energy supply with demand. Third, bilateral and multilateral dialogues could further improve mutual understanding of policy goals, help avoid potential disruptions and reduce the risks of stranded capital. So government around the world have an important part to play in facilitating coordinated and timely investment. And this means in particular setting closer policy frameworks that are compatible across borders. So that's all for me. Sorry for the inconvenience about technical issues, but thank you very much for your attention. Dear June, many thanks for this very insightful presentation and giving us a glimpse on the future of the energy outlook of Asia, which is as you said is most dynamically developing region in terms of energy demand.  And with that, I would like to give the floor to Mr. Hashimoto, who will discuss the energy supply security challenges in the Asia Pacific region. Mr. Hashimoto, the floor is yours. Okay, thank you very much, Mr. Morda. Can you hear me? We can hear you well and we can see you. Okay, thank you. And the screen is okay. And we can see also your screen. It's all perfect. Okay. My name is Hiroshi Hashimoto. I belong to the Institute of Energy Economics in Japan, one of the largest energy sink tanks of the world. And in fact, before joining the Institute, I worked for the International Energy Agency for four years, so it's like coming home meeting today. Thank you very much for including me. This is my storyline. I'm starting with factors affecting energy supply security in the Asia Pacific region. And then status of energy market, historical and current context with perspective from Asia and consideration of future energy production project. And I will touch on logistical issues that is very important for energy transportation and production connection between production and consumers. And for total energy market stabilization, I have some issues related to policy and role of IEA here. Now elements that affects energy supply security in the region, first, supply sources. In the region, major gas consumers do not have a lot of their own sources or vicinity of their market. There are not so many resources. So production and consumers, consumption centers are not often connected by big pipelines. With this, diversification of supply sources have been well developed because of different procurement sources from big consuming countries like Japan or Korea. Now availability and affordability of supply is not only depending on supply sources, but also we have to think about demand fluctuation in other major consuming markets, notably in recent years, the European Union is affecting availability of supply. And in terms of transportation infrastructure, bulk of transportation is dependent on LNG, marine transported LNG, the big pipelines. So LNG terminals have been developed. But in this region, those terminals have been constructed attached to major consuming centers, basically separated from each other rather than part of integrated infrastructure with frontline transmission pipelines. The region does not have a lot of gas storage capacity. Most countries do not have them. And some countries have already developed significant LNG storage tanks instead. Well functioning market. Some experts says well functioning market can provide security of supply. So these several years, the global LNG market has functioned well. But this is infavorable to Europe, but not necessarily so to some Asia Pacific markets. Also flexibility of LNG contact. Most notably regarding destination restrictions. Flexibility is certainly increasing. But again, this is infavorable to Europe, at least for the last two years. Historical context. This chart shows major consuming and producing regions in the last 50 years. And Asia always has dominated consuming side. In 2011, Japan, China, Korea were the largest consumers. Now also Japan, China, Korea are also the largest consumers. And more than half, more than 60% of the global supply coming to those Asian market. Now we should also look at the global total market size of LNG and orange stack. Orange stacks show the volumes of LNG in million tons. And blue stacks show market size in money amount. So in 2022, significant price rise resulted in significant growth, doubling the size of the market in terms of economic value to more than 430 billion US dollars. So this is a significant development. So a lot of market paid more money than previous years for smaller volumes. And this is to show the changes in LNG import in major consuming countries and regions in the first 10 months of the year. So the top left shows importing side and the top bottom left shows changes in exporting side. Of course, we saw some significant growth in LNG export from the United States, but the consuming side. In 2022, we saw some declines in LNG import in China and Japan and significant increase in European LNG import. But compared to the, comparing the last two years, 2022-2023, changes in LNG import have been modest in this year. The world traded 326 million tons in 10 months, just almost same as last year. So this is a rather quieter year for the LNG market changes. And now this top right chart shows three major LNG import markets, monthly import. The blue stack shows European Union plus United Kingdom and all in Japan and Great China. So the European blocks importing more LNGs than China and Japan. Now looking at Southeast Asia and South Asia, those are major emerging markets, but we saw some significant contrast last year. Southeast Asia increased LNG import, but Pakistan and Bangladesh combined decreased LNG import by 2.5 million tons. This year, we saw newcomers, Philippines, Hong Kong and Vietnam have imported first LNG cargoes. So significant changes are going on in this market. And Bangladesh and Pakistan also reduced LNG import significantly last year. They are showing some signs of recovery of more import this year. Now for looking at the global situation on the long term basis, previous speaker mentioned decline in gas demand in the long term. But this chart is based on IEJ's own outlook until 2050. We expect significant growth in LNG trade volumes until 2050. So those gray stacks shows the existing capacity, taking into account of natural decline of capacity, production capacity, as well as reduction capacity. And yellow stacks shows already sanctioned capacity. So there may be some space to increase LNG consumption in the global basis around 2030, but around 2050 we see some gaps between existing and expected demand. So we need more investment in LNG project. This table is to look at the production project development trend from 2010. First we saw significant concentration of LNG production project development in Australia, leading to some cost escalations. Then latter half of 2010, we saw significant shift of project development activities to the United States. We are now seeing some logistical constraints caused by pandemic as well as the war. Logistical issues are constraining some project development activities. But we are also seeing some innovations like floating LNG production or modular and design one and built many strategies that could lead to some cost reduction or containment. And we are seeing escalation of cost of basic materials that could also contribute to the escalation of project development cost. And we are seeing some trend to make LNG project cleaner, including electrification as well as CCS. So talking about the green LNG production project, electrification trend, using some green power sources are now gaining momentum, but it has its own challenges matching demand and supply of renewable power sources. And also backing up intermittent nature of renewables will be the challenge in the future. For the CCS, there is also a big trend of incorporating CCS in LNG project development. But also this has challenges like suitable location for CO2 storage as well as finding synergies with other industrial facilities. Now looking at current and major future LNG supply sources, considering supply potential to the Asian market, United States is already big. And we expect more FIDs and project development activities with increasing commitment, off-take commitment. But it has challenges like long distances from Gulf Gulf of Mexico to Asia and certain troubles at production facilities could disrupt supply impacting situation, global situation significantly. Because of long distance from Gulf of Mexico, there may be some epoch making development in Canada, opening up west coast of North America's major LNG supply source will have significant impact. We still expect Australia to continue being major supply sources to the region, but we see some issues to be considered, labor issues and climate policy issues, which could affect LNG project development. East Africa is expected to be a major source of LNG supply and it has some challenges in continuing construction activities. In terms of Russia, Saharan 2 is in 2022. In fact, it was the largest single supply project. Australia has a lot of LNG supply, but it is coming from different projects. As a single project, Saharan 2 was the largest last year. In Qatar, we are seeing major development activities and 21 million tons per year out of 48 has been sold to international partners under very long-term commitment and very long-term deals. So the remaining volumes should be sold into the other market, so we expect some deals in the future. LNG production activities, investment development activities are now gaining momentum because of a lot of long-term commitment in 2022 and 2023. And United States as supply sources, China, Asia, Europe and portfolio players as buyers represent majority of term contracts parties in 2022 and 2023. Turning to the Japanese market. At this moment, Japan imports around 70 million tons per year of LNG, but the contracted volumes are declining towards the end of 2030s. So we still expect significant demand around 60 million tons per year around this time. So the question is how to fill the gap between the committed volumes and expected demand. So we are expecting some different procurement activities depending on portfolio players as well as short-term deals. Turning to the logistical issues of LNG project, major contributors to the LNG trade between the United States and the Asian market is expanded Panama Canal. So this chart shows increasing volumes of LNG and LPG from the Gulf of Mexico to the Asian market, transiting through Panama Canal. So this is a major factor of increasing traded volumes of LNG. This chart shows the number of congos in birth and lines show waiting time for Panama Canal transit. So the waiting time is increasing. This is due to larger volumes to be transported as well as congestion. And recently, drought conditions are constraining the transit through the canal. So this should find solutions. And also the larger transportation distances. This chart shows transported distances, Japan combined average as well as global average in blue. And now we are seeing major volumes from the United States and especially to the Asian market, volumes from the United States travel a lot more than global average. So this is inevitably a need for optimization of LNG transportation. Turning to the political matters, previous speakers, one of the, yeah, Mr. Katahira talked about the G7 summit development confirming the importance of LNG. And this table shows some important clauses relating to natural gas and LNG from the ministerial communique. And it also underwrites importance of natural gas, but particularly important is we need to, the industry needs to establish international standards of emission measurement and international population. And also important. So this is a significant point containing or mitigating mitigating emissions, including methane. Now, turning to the role of IEA. This table compares the elements of IEA's role in oil security as well as natural gas and LNG security. Mr. Mordner mentioned IEA's willingness to support energy security by providing more information, transparent information. I agree with that. And it's important to enhance functions of provision of market information, including non-IEA member countries, as well as the advisory function from the IEA should be important in the future. Now, this is the last slide. I have five elements here towards the long-term stability of the LNG market. Now, in the supply side, momentum is built, but stronger support is desirable to make project happen. And demand issues, shifting the shifting of demand centers to the emerging market will create opportunity to provide support from traditional LNG consuming countries like Japan. And it is also important because of the flexibility of the market. It is good, but also LNG production project needs long-term commitment. So some forms of long-term commitment should be established in different arrangements. Pricing, appropriate balances between different pricing indexes are important.  Now, climate issues, clarification of clean or transition compatible LNG products standards should be established. Financing is particularly important in the future because of anticipated increasing costs or anticipated expansion of the LNG market. Arrangement that can accommodate shorter LNG sales contracts. And this is all needed for both matured and emerging markets in the Asia Pacific region. Thank you very much for your attention. And now I would like to give the floor to Mr. Mehdi Rata, the CEO of the Indian Gas Exchange. Mr. Mehdi Rata, good to see you. The floor is yours. Thanks, Mr. Molnar. And it was really great to hear all my previous speakers from Pultupan and Natesh from Fortal, Mr. Sebastian. What he said is very, very relevant. I agree, Pultupan, that Asian markets are having some peculiarities as compared to European and other markets. State-owned companies are actually mostly doing the long-term contracts and they are not so dynamic in terms of making market moves. And that we have seen the issues and challenges in creating a dynamic spot market in India itself. So I would be talking about India having heard from my previous speakers from global to Asia. And now we will be talking about the very small market as compared to global, but of course, fastest emerging market in Asia. In terms of gas, I am not sure to what extent we will grow. But we have ambition. Today, gas is only 6% in the total energy mix in India. But we have ambition to make it 15%. Of course, it's much less than global average of 25%. And I think East Asian average of maybe 40%. But of course, we are different from other countries in terms like we have very limited gas to power opportunity. Our size of gas being used for power sector is very limited. And I will just come to that point later in the slides. So where you can move to next one. So I will just briefly talk about what is the overall structure in the Indian market. In terms of infrastructure, still that's growing. We have 20,000 km of high, big diameter pipeline. We call it trunk pipeline. And that is about to grow to 33,000 km in two years time, one year now. We have a large number of LNG terminals already there. So about 6 terminals are there and then we may grow to 9 terminals. And the capacity today is about 40 million tons. Expect to grow to 75 in the next three years. So no, no depth of import capacity. We understand that we have limited domestic gas play. So we have about our total, out of total consumption, we consume 55% from domestic gas.  In the last three years, there has been growth in domestic gas production. So we have now 55% and 45% imports. But we expect that after a few years, our domestic production will plateau. And later whatever expansion is going to take place, that will be met only through imports. For that reason, LNG terminals are, we have planned a lot of LNG terminals and we expect all of them to be commissioned. In terms of domestic gas production, today we are about 35, later we'll go to 45. But beyond 45, we have a limited play. We don't see a large play beyond that. So whatever else we need, that will come from imports. And another major thing which we have taken initiative is expanding our city gas distribution. So far, there was a limited play in city gas. Large part of the country was not served through pipelines and network for households, industries and for industry and then transport. But now in last two years or three years, a lot of licenses have been issued. So almost 98% population today is covered through licensees. And we are going to do another set of another round of licensing in next three to four months. And that will cover the 100% of the country in terms of city gas coverage. But otherwise all of our power plants, gas-based power plants, the fertilizer plants and few of course refineries, they were covered under this trunk roots. But all of them today, maybe in the next two years, even all the refineries will be connected through pipeline network, petrochemical plants will be connected through pipeline network and of course EGD companies. So you can see that a lot of dotted lines on the eastern side and our southern side. But all of those dotted lines will be fully commissioned in next two to three years. So we are hopeful that whatever infrastructure we require for growth of this market, we will have in next two to three years. Greg, maybe next slide. In terms of gas consumption, our gas consumption is largely fertilizer plants that use for as a feedstock, gas is a feedstock. And that segment is actually not price sensitive. So that actually takes care of a lot of growth, even when there was high prices last year in 2022. But this sector has continued to grow and most of this LNG imports were done by fertilizer segment. But unfortunately, power sector, which otherwise is a major contributor to gas demand is not the case in India. We have over 25 gigawatt of capacity, which is used only 20% of the time. The reason is that coal is our major power producing fuel. Besides now renewables are coming up. We have very ambitious plan for putting up renewable plants. So besides that, coal still is expected to grow and maybe that will peak by 2030. After that, they will stabilize and later, and maybe in later part of this decade, we will have more power being produced from gas. So we are hopeful that more gas will flow to power sector. Given that when peaking will need some capacity, when you have high renewables, your peak demand still will be left with some fossil fuel generation. That time, that will become possible. Second important element which is going to ramp up demand in the, maybe after 2026 will be lower prices. Because since we have coal dominating the power sector, the power prices is lower. And when we use imported gas for producing power, then cost is more and that doesn't fit in the merit order dispatch used by the power sector. So transition is expected to increase utilization of gas. And a lot of degrowth happened in the last two years, but now we expect the power sector will take up more gas. On the city gas side, transport and household demand is met from domestic gas because domestic gas prices are artificially regulated, buys through some formula and then that's not using the pre-market gas. So that gets the cheapest gas in the system and cheapest gas is the domestic gas. But only thing is this has got very large potential. This particular segment will become very important as we grow. We go in by 2030, which currently the city gas is consuming something like 30 mm Cmd. Maybe by 2030, we expect it to consume 150 mm Cmd. So five times growth is likely to happen in this sector. Other sectors like refinery, petrochem, other industries which use it as fuel, they all are very price sensitive and they have alternate fuels, which they switch to whenever prices go above $15. So last year there was a lot of degrowth switching happened. This year also since it is not coming down below $10, so still there are few industries still using the other fuels. But we expect as we go along, there will be higher utilization of gas with the cheaper gas available. And as we have seen in all our previous sessions that globally gas supplies will improve and prices are going to soften. And further soften below $10 then probably we will see major degrowth is expected will happen in Indian gas demand. So our gas markets are basically LNG imports about 45%. Again there is a long-term market and long-term market has got both. We generally get long-term gas from Qatar, US and Australia and contracts are linked to mostly oil. And then JKM link contracts are also there. For Spot LNG we have gas coming linked with JKM and VIM both. And all of these gas are freely tradable. Only thing is we have not seen, I am not aware if Mr. Sebastian is aware that we have any contract which is linked to TTF. As I understand there is no gas which is either long-term or Spot which generally gets linked with European gas in life. On the domestic gas we have 55% is the total contribution from domestic gas. And about 30% of that is at industry price gas which is whose price is regulated and it is not freely tradable. It is allocated by government. But other gas which is one is difficult high-pressure high-temperature gas. There it is tradable, it has got market freedom. Only thing is it has got limited resale margin. And this also actually has got some priority for CTT, power plants and fertilizer plants. But otherwise the other part of domestic gas which is very small may be about 20% that has got totally free market gas. Mostly it is CBM or discovered small field gas which is really marketable. And there is no ceiling price on that and they can be sold without any limitation. We will go to the next one. So within all of these parameters and structure and market conditions we started our transparent marketplace. Indian gas exchange about 2 years back in December 20. And of course we are going to complete 3 years in next month. And there this is basically physical spot market. We have gas hubs created at different locations where delivery points where the gas production is happening or the LNG imports are coming. So LNG terminal and mostly domestic gas fields, they are the locations for our delivery points. And since our transmission pricing is still not is contractually linked to contractual path and distance based. So for that reason we need to identify them as a physical delivery points. And we have contracts which are available for up to 6 months, a monthly, fortnightly, weekly and day. But largely our transactions are found on monthly basis but they are all physical contracts. And the delivery is also taken care by exchange and settlement is also done through exchange. So it is a pure delivery based market. Go to next. This is these have been the prices discovered on the exchange. So as we will see in the next slide, these prices are very close to the international spot prices. Because we have a mix of gas which is traded on the exchange. So some part of gas is imports and some part is domestic free market gas. And some part is the resale of difficult gas which is having some kind of capping. So all of them put together we discover a price of gas within the Indian borders is go to next. So these have been the trend of our prices. Our price we are calling it as a Jixi. This is also now we broadcast it as index and this is called as gas exchange, gas index of India. And if you see this red curve, you can see that generally this is a discount to JKM and WIMP, which is international spot price in Japan Korea market. And then another WIMP is our West India market which is published by Plats. And only thing is this discount you may see that when the prices are very high discount was much more. As prices are generally in the range of $10 to $20, the discount is much lower. So they are linked with the international spot prices, but they have their own discounting because of other gas which is being sold in the market. These have been our overall you can say liquidity parameter. We may not call ourselves a very well functioning market, but of course in terms of period of 2 to 3 years, we have grown sufficiently well and we are hopeful that better liquidity will happen. Of course for a few more liquidity measures we need from the government and regulator. So we have over 200 plus participants and we did a trade of 1.3 BCM last financial year. And this year also we have grown in terms of volume last year. Next, I am sorry that we are using in this slide terms which are more of Indian audience, because lakhs crores and probably that is not very you won't be able to get anything out of it. But just telling you the numbers like 10 lakh is equal to 1 million. So normally in India for Indian audience we use lakh and crores. So I am coming to the last few slides where what the topic was like how this marketplace has allowed or created a gas security for the country. So I will tell you that as Sebastian said that before 15 years most of the markets were not transparent. Same thing was there in India even 2 years before whatever you used to buy only those prices were visible whatever we used to import. These are generally available on the public domain but otherwise there was no way to know that what is the transparent price getting discovered or what is the competitive price for gas. So big thing we got on platform is since this is the index which we are discovering and we discovered this price index from getting sellers of domestic gas, long term contracts, spot contracts, mid term contract all of them put together. So that gives a quite a good mix of sale volume and then we discovered this price. So basically when we discover a price as any economist would agree that this price signals which are transparent they really give direction. They are actually very useful for sectors. So those sectors who value this commodity most the gas must go to them. There are more incentives now today because when they see prices are good they see incentives for increasing the production and they also are ready to sell more gas which is market based discovered through market based mechanism. Then of course when the cost is prices more than they look for some cheaper fuse though they are dirtier that is the particular customer behavior that we expect to happen and that is happening. Another thing which now we see that since last year we saw that prices have fluctuated a lot so there is no underground gas storage in India today. So now there is discussion started to commission a few strategic and commercial reserves for gas storages. And then if you see that there is another thing which is happening in the Indian market is that we are seeing the shift from short term contracts to long term. So long versus spot which was earlier 70-30 or maybe now it is going to 80-20 something like that because people are afraid to get exposed to very high spot prices. Investment signals and new capacities are anyway there. We also see that since we have our delivery points of hops in different parts of the country. So people use the arbitrage opportunities for going to different hops looking at the transmission and taxation which is different for different states. We also see higher churn in trade as Sebastian said that cargo itself actually changes hands more than 10 times. In India we also have seen that gas titles are changing hands now more exchange being there and the most competitive gas actually blows finally to the customer. And then there is an opportunity today for cross-border trade because exchange is there, market place is there. Bangladesh is one of the biggest gas user. They have 60% of gas part of their energy consumption. We are hopeful that they also will participate. We have started the dialogue. We expect maybe in a year or two they would also be participating using the same market platform. We will go to next. I think this is all what I thought I will share. I will stop here and many thanks for kind attention. Thank you. Dear Mr. Madhirata, many thanks for this very insightful presentation. So I would like to thank you all the attendees today because the workshop on gas supply security is coming to an end today. And many, many thanks for all our speakers for the excellent and insightful presentations. We say that following the gas supply shock of 2022, the architecture of global gas supply security and the flexibility needs to be reassessed both by policymakers and market players. This new global gas market is taking shape and is bringing up new challenges, new question marks, which necessitate a closer cooperation between responsible producers and consumers on a number of issues, including the reduction of methane emissions, commercial structures enabling more flexible energy supply, and gas storage, including voluntary reserve mechanisms. I would like to thank you, Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs for its dedicated support for such a dialogue and for enabling today's workshop. Today's workshop focused on Asia and its fast-growing markets where natural gas is closely linked to policies aiming to phase out coal-fired power generation. Ensuring gas supply security will be crucial to accelerate the phase out of coal in the coming years. The IEA stands ready to facilitate the dialogue between producers, consumers by providing data analysis, special insights, and also using the task force on gas and clean fuels, market monitoring and supply security as an effective platform for information sharing. I would like to thank you for your kind attention today and we look forward for your comments, questions and future interactions. Many thanks and have a good day, have a good evening. Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you.