Thank you so much. So I'll talk about proofs of replicated storage without timing assumptions, and this is joint work with Yvonne Damgard and Claudio Orlandi. So let's begin with the motivating example. So we have a client here who would like to outsource the storage of a file to a server, and for reasons of availability, would like to store different copies of the file in multiple locations, so that if at some point some servers crash and some copies are unavailable, the client can still retrieve the original file. The problem, however, is that if the servers are corrupt and collude to save costs of space, they can actually only store one copy of the file. So what we need is a way for the client to make sure that there is indeed replicated storage and unique spaces dedicated to store each copy of the file. So this notion of proof of replicated storage is related to some classical notions of proof of storage, and also to a notion of proof of replication that is introduced by the cryptocurrency Filecoin, which gives a method to give a useful proof of space, and I'll say a little bit about why these notions don't solve our problem and how they are different. So Bitcoin uses a proof of work as a method to deal with civil identities, and this is known to be largely wasteful, and the question is, can we instead use a proof of useful resource in place of work? And Filecoin proposes to use storage as this resource, which would allow one to have a distributed storage network where miners dedicate storage to store useful files instead of dedicating work. And this gives a useful proof of space, and I'll say a little bit about why that doesn't solve our problem later, but classical notions of proof of storage are not already proofs of replicated storage for the following reason. So proof of retrievability is a solution to the following problem. So we have a client who would like to outsource the storage of a file to the server, so there is a store algorithm that takes the file F to be stored, returns a Y that is shipped off to the server, and some verification information T that is stored at the client side. And then there is an audit algorithm where the server can actually convince the verifier that it is still storing all of the client's data, and at the end of the audit protocol, the client outputs a bit indicating whether it believes that the server is storing the file or not. Now the notion of security here in proof of retrievability is that of soundness, which essentially says that if the client accepts here in this audit protocol, then there exists an algorithm called the extractor that can actually interact with the server and extract this file. But this notion only shows that the file is stored once and gives no guarantee when there are multiple servers. In particular, if we go back to our original problem and say the client insists that the servers give a proof of storage of F, this still does not solve the replicated storage problem because even if the servers give valid proofs such that the client accepts many different proofs, it could be because the client is simply talking to one adversary, and there is really only one copy of the file still stored. So to be able to talk about proof of replication, we really need different encodings of the file. And one idea that comes to mind is to simply use encryption. So maybe the client can simply have each encoding be a ciphertext of the file to be stored using fresh randomness for every replica. Now as far as the adversary is concerned, each encoding is indeed a different file, and for it to be retrievable later, the server indeed has to store all the ciphertexts. So this does solve the problem, but the issue is that this requires the client to store a secret state, which is the encryption key. And additionally, this is not publicly verifiable. So ideally what we want is not just the client, but everybody else to be able to retrieve the file later. And if we simply use an encryption scheme, the client will have to share the encryption key with other users, and now if one of these users is valued with the server, we don't have security anymore. Another notion of encoding used in this context is that of slow encodings, where the encoding is so slow that a client can distinguish between honest proving time and potentially adversarial proving time that includes the time to re-encode. This looks like the following. So the client computes an encoding of the file to be stored using a slow encoding method, a sense of the encoded file to the server. And now if the server does not store the file, but later actually gives the proof or is retrievable later, then this means that the server had to re-encode, re-compute this encoding. And because this is a slow encoding, the client can detect that this is taking a long time for the response in the challenge response protocol and time out and not accept the proof. So the setup is the following in slow encodings. The client computes a bunch of encodings or replicas, sends it off to the server, and then there is a challenge response protocol. And now there is a notion of time here. And if the response comes within a certain time out, the client accepts the proof as being valid, otherwise it is not. So if the server is actually trying to re-encode, then it incurs a detectably long delay and the client can simply time out. So the problem here with the slow encodings is that they rely on timing assumptions, which means that we have to estimate the time that a very powerful server could take so that it doesn't fool the client into accepting a proof even when it is re-computing the encoding. And this results in difficulty in setting concrete parameters like when should the client actually time out. And the notion that is introduced by Filecoin and all subsequent works actually are time bounded proofs and rely on timing assumptions. So the question we ask here is, can we have a proof of replicated storage that does not rely on timing assumptions? So in this work we introduce a notion of replica encoding and use this notion to give a definition of proof of replication that does not rely on timing assumptions and then give a construction that allows for public verifiability without timing assumption. So I'll begin with our notion of replica encoding scheme. So we have a replica encoding algorithm that takes a file and some randomness and outputs a replica. And there is a decoding algorithm that takes the encoded replica and returns the original file and completeness simply says that decoding should actually retrieve the correct file and the notion of soundness is the following. So to be able to meaningfully talk about space we think of a two-stage adversary A1 and A2. So here the adversary A1 outputs a file to be encoded. The client computes many different replicas, YIs, and gives it to the adversary. And the adversary outputs a certain state. And now the second stage adversary A2 takes the state as input and outputs some perverted encodings, Y-primes. We say that this adversary, this two-stage adversary wins the soundness game if the following holds. If the state is too small, but the number of encodings that A2 returned using only state that was given by A1 did not actually fit in the state. So what this definition says here is, let's say U is the number of encodings that A2 correctly returned, but the state was actually smaller than U times the size of the encoding Y. And here we allow for a small slack C to disallow trivial attacks where the adversary can simply forget a few bits and guess them right before giving the encodings. So this basically says that A2 can only return that many encodings as the state can accommodate. So now to actually build a replica encoding scheme we use as tools a trapdoor permutation and a random permutation. And for the sake of concreteness let's think of RSA as the trapdoor permutation and all our constructions and the adversary will have oracle access to a random permutation T and its inverse. So here is our first attempt at constructing a replica encoding scheme. So we take the file to be encoded M, append some randomness R called the random permutation T and then sample keys for the trapdoor permutation and apply it in the inverse direction using the secret key. And this output Y is said to be the replica encoding along with the public key of the trapdoor permutation. Now if this is our replica everybody can decode by simply applying F in the forward direction using the public key and then calling T inverse and obtaining M. So what about soundness? Why should this work? The intuition is the following. Recall our soundness game, the first stage adversary outputs a file M and this is our construction now we are going to apply a random permutation T and F inverse on the output of T. So Y, I is our encoding.  It has access to T and T inverse and outputs a state that is given to A2. And now if A2 outputs a bunch of perverted encodings let's say for now that the adversary behaves in the following restricted way. A1 forgets all information about one replica. So let's say that A2 returned all N replicas correctly but the size of the state was only as much it could fit N minus one replicas. So the state forgot all information about say the i-th replica which means the state has no information about yi and zi. And now if indeed A2 returned yi we know that state has no information about zi. So A2 must have made a query to the oracle T in the second stage of the soundness game. And here we program the response to the query to embed a challenge image which is the image that we're going to invert in the reduction. But here we assume that the adversary behaves in a restricted way. What about soundness for general adversary that can store arbitrary pre-image information of the replica encoding? We only want to assume that the state that the adversary outputs the size of that state is less than the combined state of the number of replicas that we retrieved from A2. And now we cannot actually embed a trapdoor permutation challenge and the security of the trapdoor permutation does not give us soundness. So what can we do? The final idea towards our construction is to repeat this initial idea sufficiently many times. So this was our initial construction. We applied T and then f inverse on the output of T. Now instead of stopping here and outputting y we take y and apply T and f inverse again.  I'll talk about what r should be later. And after r number of rounds we output y and the public key of the trapdoor permutation as the replica encoding. So this is our final construction to construct a replica. We sample keys for trapdoor permutation and then apply f inverse and T in an iterative fashion and obtain the replica encoding. So what should be the number of rounds and why does this give us soundness? So recall our first construction did not already give us soundness because the adversary could store arbitrary pre-image information. But now since we are calling the random permutation T many times in constructing one replica the hope is that the adversary has to store pre-image information at every round. And if the number of rounds is sufficiently large at some point the amount of information that the adversary should store exceeds the bound that we need for replicated storage. So here is the high level idea of the proof. Recall our construction calls T many times in constructing one replica. And now we argue that if the state that A1 outputs is too small then it cannot remember all the answers to the queries that was made to T by A1 in the first stage of the game. And because decoding is efficient and since A2 actually gave us all the encodings by decoding we could extract from A2 all the outputs of all the intermediate outputs of T from one replica. And what this means is that A2 must have query T in the second stage of the soundness game because we can extract all the Zs. And now we reason about the size of the state and account for the state entropy budget which is small and argue that some response of T to the query that A2 makes must have full entropy in the view of A2 even given state information. And this is the response that we reprogram in our response to the query to T to embed the challenge image in our security reduction. What should R be? What should the number of rounds be in the paper? We show that by suitably setting the parameters in particular if R is greater than KN where K is the security parameter and N is the number of replicas then the amount of information the adversary must store must exceed the replicated storage bound and this gives us our soundness. So how do we deal with large files? What if the file to be encoded M does not fit inside a trapdoor permutation or the random permutation? So what we do is we first apply a large random permutation H on the entire file and now apply our construction which is iterating T and F inverse blockwise. So we split the output of H into multiple blocks and then apply our construction to each block independently. But the H here which is applied on the entire M ensures that the adversary cannot de-duplicate multiple blocks that occurs across different files. Now that we have a replica encoding scheme we can define and construct a proof of replication scheme. So proof of replication has a create algorithm that takes a file, a replication parameter and outputs in different replicas to be stored and some verification information for the client and there is a retrieval algorithm that takes the replica and retrieves the original file and we have the usual notion of completeness that the M prime that retrieved returns must be the same as the original file and there is an audit protocol where the server can convince the client that it is indeed storing all the replicas and then we define a notion of soundness for proof of replication which is the following. So again we think of a two-stage adversary A1 and A2 and A1 outputs a file that is to be stored in a replicated way and we create our replicas and give the YIs to A1. Again like in the replica encoding soundness notion A1 outputs a state which is given to A2 and now we say that the adversary wins the soundness game if the following condition holds. If the state is too small that is smaller than the number of accepting proofs that the prover gives or if the extractor extracts a number of replicas that is smaller than the number of accepting proofs that the adversary gives. So what this, I'm sorry. So what this definition is intuitively saying is that the adversary wins the game only if the number of accepting proofs he gives is smaller than what the, is larger than what the state could accommodate or if the extractor could not extract the number of replicas for which the adversary gave accepting proofs. Now to construct a proof of replication scheme we take our replica encoding scheme and together with the proof of retrievability our construction works. So we take the underlying file, use the replica encoding algorithm to get a replica encoding and then use a proof of retrievability on top of the encoded replica and ship off the encoding to be stored at the server and the verification information for the client. And for soundness we rely on the soundness of the replica encoding scheme and the soundness of the proof of retrievability scheme. So at a very high level we have that each replica is incompressible because of the replica encoding scheme and each of these incompressible replicas are extractable because of the proof of retrievability on top of it. So this is our construction which has public verifiability without timing assumptions. But this is in the setup where the encoding itself is honest. So does this mean that we have to trust the client and can we trust the client? So what this means is the following. In our setting we had a client who constructed a number of replicas sent it to the server and these proofs were publicly verifiable because the server could convince other parties that it was actually storing many replicas. But the soundness here for parties other than the server but the soundness of the proof for parties other than the client who actually encoded holds only if the encoding is honest and this does not work directly in the file coin setting because in the file coin setting the client could actually collude with the server and convince everybody else that it's actually storing many files when it's not dedicating enough space. So one idea to overcome this is to involve multiple users instead of having one client compute the encoding we can have multiple users jointly compute the encoding and the hope is that maybe we will have soundness if at least one user is honest. And in the paper we sketch two approaches to multi-client encoding and I'll say a little bit about what they are. So in sequential encoding we have one party compute an encoding using his own trapdoor permutation key and then a second party comes along takes this output and computes an encoding on top of it. And basically each user can add his or her own layer of encoding and consecutive users can encode the previous output. And if one of the users is honest then the server does not know the trapdoor permutation key of at least one user and it's essentially our main construction but with more number of rounds. I don't have time to talk about parallel encoding but you can see our paper for this. I'll just conclude by saying that in this work we defined a notion of replica encoding scheme gave a definition of proof of replication without timing assumptions under construction that satisfies public verifiability. Thank you. So thank you very much for the nice talk. We have time for one quick question since we already started late. Is there one quick question? Then please go to the mic and say, you're not, okay then let's thank the speaker again.


Silence, please, everyone. Clint Adams is going to be speaking about HOpenPGP, a Haskell OpenPGP implementation. So I'm a little bit sick, so I apologize in advance if I collapse in a coughing fit or something worse. I assume all of you have seen my talk from last year, so this is gonna be a little redundant, but HOpenPGP is an implementation of OpenPGP in Haskell. It's primary consumers, as far as I know, is HOpenPGP tools, which is referred to by RiseUp's OpenPGP best practices, and also now the key signing party instructions at DebConf this year. So the intent of this talk is to explain what's changed since last year's DebConf, which is some bug fixes, some incompatible API changes, dependencies, and I'll go into a little more detail on some of these. So the API changes have mostly been for type safety, so for example, in the olden days of 2013, we used a type synonym timestamp for word 32 because most of time expressions in the OpenPGP standard are 32-bit unsigned integers, but some of them are expressed as seconds since the epoch, or not actually not the API. Some of them are absolute values of time and some of them are durations, so even though the standard calls the key expiration time, the key expiration time, it is number of seconds since the creation time, so I wanted to help the users understand which type is which to reduce confusion. So now we have two new type wrappers, one for duration and one for time, so now you'll get a compile time error if you try to do the wrong thing. And I think I talked about this last year a little instead of allowing you to have a list of MPIs for a key, it doesn't make any sense to have no MPIs at all, so we're gonna enforce at the type level that this list has to be non-empty. And since I was breaking things, I decided to change the type of the user IDs from strings to text, which theoretically will give us a performance boost, but probably doesn't matter at all. So a lot of the dependencies have changed out from underneath, including switching from serial and serial conduit to binary and binary conduit, and CWLP print to WLP print extras, and I accept typed, which is primarily because the former doesn't work with GC7.10, which will be in the WN archive pretty soon. Well, it's already in experimental, but it'll be in CID pretty soon, so I wanna be prepared for that. I was also abusing the show instances for fingerprints, so in order to not violate the principle of read and show around tripping, the show instance now contains no spaces. If you want spaces in your fingerprint output, you need to use the pretty instance. And there's more test coverage, which is still not complete, so if you feel like contributing test cases, that would be great. Now more interestingly, there are now JSON instances for transferable keys and all the types used by transferable keys, so this means you can, if you can parse a transferable OpenPGP key with HOpenPGP, you can output it as JSON or YAML, so this is somebody's key, and hopefully you can read that. So at the top, you'll see the RSA MPIs and the timestamps. The schema of this is clearly suboptimal, so if somebody has strong opinions on how this should actually look, and I see Paul Tagg as a volunteering, feel free to help get this into a sane format, because it is definitely not ideal. Because we're using JSON for the JSON, we get YAML output for free, so depending on which you prefer, you can just swap that out and every bit of data is going to be the same, just in the different format. And so there's some more YAML. This is either Paul Tagg's key or Francesca's, I can't tell them apart anymore. And as you can see, the JPEG is an array of byte values, which I really don't know what the correct way to handle this is, so if anyone else does, that'd be good to know. And the serialization is a bit better. It used to choke on unknown SDK types, and GNU PG has some sort of proprietary SDK type called 101. And so I ran into this in the world and now it can cope with that. So the OpenPGP tools can do filtering either on transferable keys or individual packets, and that code is in the library itself. It used to be split between more evenly, and now it's mostly in the library. And it used to be more poorly designed, so there were separate filtering languages for public keys and signatures and other, and you could not construct a complex query in a sane way if you wanted to do that. So if you were operating on a packet stream, the filters would only apply to the packets of their type, and so you could get surprising results. And that was using Ato Parsec for the parsing and someone convinced me to rewrite it using Alex and Happy, which are the Haskell equivalents of Flex and Bison or Lex and Yak, and the parser is completely redone. And so now you can do queries like, so the first two here are things you could do before, but you can do them with this syntax now. And the last ones are more interesting because now there's, this is using higher order functions, so you can do matching on sub structures of the transferable key, so you can search on all the UIDs or any of the UIDs, not every one of UIDs contains that sign if you wanna look for people that have UIDs that are not obviously email addresses, like Weasel just has his name or a couple other people do this. Or if find any key where the public key algorithm is ECDSA, or where the primary key is less than 2048 bits in size, but you have a sub key larger than that, which is pretty common. So that's probably the thing I'm most excited about. And then at Propo of Nothing, an eBall asked me to do an analysis on the DC-15 key signing party key ring. So I'm just going to segue into that and so this says sort of because there is one defective key in the key ring and HOPN-PGP choked on it. So I got to discover a fun bug. Canoe PG also does buggy things with this key, so that's exciting. And hopefully someone talks to Werner about that pretty soon. So there are actually 283 keys in the key ring, so this does not reflect any of that. And the five unknown, you'll see five other pubkey algorithms and five unknown sizes. Those are type 22, which I believe is ED-2519, no? No? Okay. Yes? Okay, so that is not yet supported, so if somebody wants to do some development, eventually we probably want to support that. And people are still using RIPE MD-160 for self-sigs. And a fair amount are using SHA-1. The longest paths in the self-contained set are six hops long and here they are and if you want to know who these people are, you're going to have to do the analysis yourself. And the strong connectivity analysis shows there's 193 keys in the strong set and a couple of islands and then all, but 215 keys are singletons. So hopefully after the rolling key signing of this conference, those get a lot better. So, right. Okay, so I guess now would be a good time for questions. If anyone has questions? Hello, right. You've mentioned a lot of analysis functionality. Yes. You know, HF and PGP. Is there also mechanisms for creating and manipulating signatures and key material? Sort of. The principle I've been going with thus far is to not implement anything destructive, so there's, if today you want to use a function that'll output a signature, you're going to have to do a little bit of work. The cryptographic support is there for the algorithms that are supported. There's a tiny bit of, there's basically no elliptic curve. There's a tiny stub for it, but that's about it. We can do RSA and DSA. We can't do El Gamal, and that's pretty much the situation. So, that needs a little bit of work, but you could do something. Any more questions, anyone? We have five minutes remaining. There's still chance of questions. What was this problematic key? So the, what about the bug report you sent to the packaging list? Did you send a bug report? Not yet, not yet. Okay, so there was another thing, okay. Yeah, so the key has a subkey packet, a public subkey packet followed by a user ID packet followed by a subkey binding SIG. Yeah, okay. So that sometimes happens and GPG should reorder it. So that's very, very old code. It does reorder it, but not in the right way. So... Yeah, it's not always possible to do this. So it's very limited. It was our bug fix for a key server about 15 years ago or so. Yeah, yeah. So it does not work perfectly. So, and I will delete the speed up now. So I don't know whether it's worth the time for these rare cases to do something about it. Yeah, I don't know what the right thing to do is, but. Yeah. Yeah, of course, because you could just, well, if you find someone who would want to fix this, okay, so expect it. I'll talk to DKG. No, it's a lot of work to test this. Yeah. That's the thing. It's not, it's just possible, but we have to see from where to take the time to fix all the bugs and try to do the same thing. All right. Are we done? Oh, one more. It's being massively self-serving now. Can you show us an example of using HOpenPGP to do something trivial? Something trivial? I know. Input a public key ring and just list the keys. Live demo. So, the font's too small, isn't it? That was not right. And I can't take it. So, let's list of the key ring with new PG-like output. We can also dump the packets. To do graphing or pathfinding, that'll take a few minutes. So... I was actually thinking of a .hs file that you could show us. Oh, oh, I'm not prepared to do that on the spot, but you can look at the OpenPGPTools sources or the test suite. I would like people to help out. So, if there's things I can do to make that easier, please let me know. I think I certainly would like to have a better library for Haskell use and eventually for use by other languages through the FFI. So, if you're interested, but overwhelmed or confused by some of the crazy things, please feel free to approach me. And there are no other questions. Thank you for your time. Thank you very much, Kent.


Hey, this is Brett and this 2015 Dodge Challenger Hellcat is stock number 1-4-4-1-2-Z. I'm here at Summit Automotive in Fond du Lac, Wisconsin, you're new and use sports car and Dodge Challenger headquarters. This 2015 Dodge Challenger has the 6.2 liter supercharged V8 Hemi engine. When paired up the 8-speed automatic transmission and the red key, it puts out 707 horsepower. This car has been fully-safetyed and inspected by our service shop, has a fresh oil and filter change. All the fluids have been checked and topped off. It has brand new front brakes and this car is 100% ready to go. I'm going to go all the way around in this video. Inside, start it up, take a look under the hood, show you all the options. We're going to do a start up here from behind the car and just give you the most accurate representation that I can of the vehicle. Tor Red Clear Coat is the color I shoot all my videos in Tor K. If you like the video, subscribe to the YouTube channel, click the bell notifications, get updates on the videos I do each and every day, and have access to one of the largest catalogs of vehicle and sports car walk-arounds on YouTube. And stay current on our ever-changing and vast sports car inventory here at Summit Auto as it changes quite frequently. This one comes with the 20-inch low-gloss painted black alloy wheels and it has the Brembo brakes with these slotted rotors. Those are brand new rotors on there. We put those on in our safety inspection. Pirelli Scorpion tires, these are 275 40 ZR20s. I would say that they have probably about 60, 70% of the tread left on them. So good tread left on those tires. Front fender is in nice condition. I didn't see any major dents or dings on there. Front bumper and lower valance are in nice condition as well. No major dents or cracks on there. You get the HAD headlamps, LED running lights. I will turn those on at the end of the video so you can see how bright they are. My favorite hood on the Challengers, the Coal induction with the two heat extractors on the side. This one's wrapped as you can see and it is in really nice condition. Didn't see any dents or dings on there. Passengers side front fender, no dents or dings and the passenger side front wheel, no major scuffs or scrapes. Looks really good. As you go down this side of this 2015 Dodge Challenger Hellcat, just take note of how clean the body is, how reflective and mirror-like that paint is. I take these HD videos so if you're far away or even if you're close by and you just cannot make the trip down, but you're still interested in purchasing the vehicle, you can see the car, hear the car and of confidence in the vehicle that you're looking at before you even get here. So when you do get here, there's absolutely no surprises and you can make a smart and informed buying decision from wherever you're at. If this video helps you make that buying decision, let your salesman know that you saw the video, that it was helpful, that Brett sent you and that I can keep doing videos for our great customers all over the United States. Back wheel is in excellent shape. You get the Brembo brakes in back as well. And that's about how much tread is on those back tires. This is a Clean Title History Clean Car Fax, owned mainly in Pennsylvania and Ohio. I forgot to mention that before, but Clean Car Fax on this one. Coming around to the back, the rear bumper is in great shape. It does have the backup parking sensors. The dual rear exhaust, no major dents, dings or cracks on that rear bumper. You get the LED tail lamps as well, and that deck lid is in excellent shape. It has the nice SRT spoiler on there. Trunk area is very clean. You get the Harman Kardon Subwoofers back here as well as the tire inflator kit and a, that's where your battery is located. Comes with a sun shade as well. Shocks are doing a great job holding that trunk lid up. Always something you want to look at on these challengers if you're looking at them used. Those shocks tend to go out, but these are in great shape. Going down the driver's side, just as clean as that passenger's side, no major dents or dings on the rear quarter. Looks really good. And for full disclosure, this back wheel just as nice as the rest. And down the rest of this side of the car, the door looks really good. No major dents or dings. You get the heated power mirrors blind spot monitoring. Enter and go system. You just have to have the key fob in your pocket. It'll automatically unlock.  SRT stitched into the backrest. The bolsters are in really nice condition. Didn't see any rips or tears on there. Power driver's seat with lumbar. Factory floor mats, bright pedals, auto headlamps, power tilt and telescopic steering wheel. Harmon card and sound. You get the suede bolster there as well. Power windows, locks and mirrors. Back seats are in excellent condition as well. You get the latch child safety system. Those seats do fold down for extra storage and no rips or tears back there. Carpettings in really nice condition. Smells very clean inside this car as well. Top inside, check out the miles, the radio and everything this one has to offer on the interior. 23,427 miles on this car. For the miles on this car, it's in really nice condition. You get the digital speedometer, 7 inch LCD display. Instrument cluster is very nice and clean. Comes with the heated leather wrapped flat bottom steering wheel. Cruise controls on the right. Bluetooth and information center controls on the left. Audio controls in the back of the steering wheel and you get the paddle shifters there. This one has the 8.4 3C radio. You get the factory navigation system which is loading right now. You can check out the radio, AM, FM and Sirius XM radio capabilities. You have your heated seats, cooled seats and heated steering wheel controls there as well. And you can do your climate controls here, including the dual climate controls. And then the factory navigation system. There is your factory nav. There is highway 41. So that is working nicely. You always want to make sure that the nav systems are working on these. This one is. So that's good as well. And then you get all your different drive modes. Your different apps on here. Your performance pages which do take a second to load. You get the machine metal finish around the radio that goes all the way around the instrument cluster. And then down on the center stack here as well. Your 8 speed automatic transmission. Your more tactile volume tune and climate controls including those dual climate controls. You get your SRT modes here. And so you get all your different SRT. You got default, sport, track, all your different settings on there. And then you get your performance pages which like I said they do take a second to load. While they're loading, keyless entry and remote start. We're going to remote start this thing in just a second. So the SRT performance pages they load up. So you get your home screen there. Obviously your nice Tor Red Challenger Hellcat. You get your timers on here as well. And they do take a second to load. So while they're loading there they are. You got your gauges, coolant temp, battery voltage. You got your timers on here as well. 0 to 60, 0 to 100, eighth mile, quarter mile. So you got all that stuff. You got your g-force on here too. And then the engine obviously when it's running this will be running as well. Right now everything's off so nothing's working. Passengers side, format and seat are in excellent condition. No rips or tears on there. Headliners in great shape. You do get map lights up here. Home link buttons for your garage door security systems and lane systems and assist and 911 buttons in the mirror. Alright so what I'm going to do is I'm going to remote start it here. So we can hear it start up and then we'll take a look under the hood. And then we'll check out all those HID headlamps as well. So I'm going to lock it and then we're going to remote start. Hellcat's one of my favorite cars. This LED tail lamps as well. Sounds so good. Alright so now we have to active start it. There we go. Now we can go take a look under the hood. Otherwise if you try and open the hood while it's remote started it will shut off on you. I would personally like to thank you for checking out the video today. And hopefully from this HD video you've been able to verify the quality, condition, options and of course cleanliness of this car all the way around inside and out. There those HID headlamps LED running lights they are very bright. Working nicely under the hood. We have the 6.2 liter supercharged V8 engine. Like I said with the red key, 707 horsepower. Engine base very clean, runs very smooth. Once again this car has been fully safe and inspected by our service shop. Has a fresh oil and filter change. Shocks are doing a great job holding that hood up. And this car is 100% ready to go. Two front rotors. There's the emission sticker. Get the Hemi headers there. Hemi orange headers. And like I said this car is 100% ready to go. And for the age and miles on this car I would highly recommend it from a quality and condition standpoint. I think whoever is going to get this car is going to be very happy with it. And to see more pictures of this car or one of other 550 new and used cars, trucks, SCVs, minivans, Wranglers, challengers, Corvettes, chargers, Mustangs, GT500, ZL1s, Z06s. As you name it, we got to go to the website right there, summitauto.com. Full pictures and descriptions of every single vehicle. All at summitauto.com. If you want to check out more HD videos, you can go to youtube.com. Click the bell notifications to get updates on the videos I do each and every day. As well as having access to one of the largest catalogs of vehicle and sports car walk-arounds on YouTube. And stay current on our ever-changing and vast sports car inventory. So you do not miss out on gems like this one. In fact, the second you will see a link to subscribe to my YouTube channel on the upper left. A link to all the Dodge Challenger vehicles I've ever done in the upper right. A link to this vehicle on our website on the lower left. And a link to one of our latest YouTube videos in the lower right. Click those, check us out. We're super excited to help you with this Ultra Clean 2015 Dodge Challenger Hellcat and Tor Red Clear Coat. Thank you so much for checking out the video. Remember to like, subscribe, and share on the YouTube channel. I really appreciate it. Thanks again.