This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. The Federalist Papers by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison. Federalist number 55 by James Madison. The total number of the House of Representatives for the Independent Journal Wednesday, February 13, 1788. To the people of the State of New York. The number of which the House of Representatives is to consist forms another and a very interesting point of view under which this branch of the federal legislature may be contemplated. Scarce any article indeed in the whole Constitution seems to be rendered more worthy of attention by the weight of character and the apparent force of argument with which it has been assailed. The charges exhibited against it are, first, that so small a number of representatives will be an unsafe depository of the public interests. Secondly, that they will not possess a proper knowledge of the local circumstances of their numerous constituents. Thirdly, that they will be taken from that class of citizens which will sympathize least with the feelings of the mass of the people and be most likely to aim at a permanent elevation of the few on the depression of the many. Fourthly, that defective as the number will be in the first instance it will be more and more disproportionate by the increase of the people and the obstacles which will prevent a corresponding increase of the representatives. In general it may be remarked on the subject that no political problem is less susceptible of a precise solution than that which relates to the number most convenient for a representative legislature. Nor is there any point on which the policy of the several states is more at variance. Whether we compare their legislative assemblies directly with each other or consider the proportions which they respectively bear to the number of their constituents. Passing over the difference between the smallest and largest states as Delaware whose most numerous branch consists of 21 representatives and Massachusetts where it amounts to between 3 and 400 a very considerable difference is observable among states nearly equal in population. The number of representatives in Pennsylvania is not more than one fifth of that in the state last mentioned. New York whose population is to that of South Carolina as 6 to 5 has little more than one third of the number of representatives. As greater disparity prevails between the states of Georgia and Delaware or Rhode Island in Pennsylvania the representatives do not bear a greater proportion to their constituents than one for every four or five thousand. In Rhode Island they bear a proportion of at least one for every thousand and according to the Constitution of Georgia the proportion may be carried to one to every ten electors and must unavoidably far exceed the proportion in any of the other states. A general remark to be made is that the ratio between the representatives and the people ought not to be the same where the latter are very numerous as where they are few. Where the representatives in Virginia to be regulated by the standard in Rhode Island they would at this time amount to between 4 and 500 and 20 or 30 years hence to a thousand. On the other hand the ratio of Pennsylvania if applied to the state of Delaware would reduce the representative assembly of the latter to seven or eight members. Nothing can be more fallacious than to found our political calculations on arithmetical principles. Six or seventy men may be more properly trusted with a given degree of power than six or seven men but it does not follow that six or seven hundred would be proportionally a better depository. And if we carry on the supposition to six or seven thousand the whole reasoning ought to be reversed. The truth is that in all cases a certain number at least seems to be necessary to secure the benefits of free consultation and discussion and to guard against too easy a combination for improper purposes as on the other hand the number ought at most to be kept within a certain limit in order to avoid the confusion and intemperance of a multitude. In all very numerous assemblies of whatever character composed passion never fails to rest the scepter from reason. Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates Athenian assembly would still have been a mob. It is necessary also to recollect here the observations which were applied to the case of biennial elections. For the same reason that the limited powers of the Congress and the control of the state legislature justify less frequent elections than the public safety might otherwise require the members of the Congress need be less numerous than if they possessed the whole power of legislation and were under no other than the ordinary restraints of other legislative bodies. With these general ideas in our mind let us weigh the objections which have been stated against the number of members proposed for the House of Representatives. It is said in the first place that so small a number cannot be safely trusted with so much power. The number of which this branch of legislature is to consist at the onset of government will be 65. Within three years a census is to be taken when the number may be augmented to one for every 30,000 habitants and within every successive period of 10 years the census is to be renewed and augmentations may continue to be made under the above limitation. It will not be thought an extravagant conjecture that the first census will at the rate of one for every 30,000 raise the number of representatives to at least 100. Estimating the Negroes in the proportion of three-fifths it can scarcely be doubted that the population of the United States will by that time if it does not already amount to three millions. At the expiration of 25 years according to the computed rate of increase the number of representatives will amount to 200 and of 50 years to 400. This is a number which I presume will put an end to all fears arising from the smallness of the body. I take for granted here what I shall in answering the fourth objection hereafter show that the number of representatives will be augmented from time to time in the manner provided by the Constitution. On a contrary supposition I should admit the objection to have very great weight indeed. The two question to be decided then is whether the smallness of the number as a temporary regulation should be dangerous to the public liberty. Whether 65 members for a few years and 100 or 200 for a few more be a safe depository for a limited and well guarded power of legislating for the United States. I must own that I could not give a negative answer to this question without first obliterating every impression which I have received with regard to the present genius of the people of America. The spirit which actuates the state legislatures and the principles which are incorporated with the political character of every class of citizens I am unable to conceive that the people of America in their present temper or under any circumstances which can speedily happen will choose and every second year repeat the choice of 65 or 100 men who would be disposed to form and pursue a scheme of tyranny or treachery. I am unable to conceive that state legislatures which must feel so many motives to watch and which possess so many means of counteracting the federal legislature would fail either to detect or defeat a conspiracy of the latter against the liberties of their common constituents. I am equally unable to conceive that there are at this time or can be in any short time in the United States any 65 or 100 men capable of recommending themselves to the choice of the people at large who would either desire or dare within the short space of two years to betray the solemn trust committed to them. What change of circumstances, time, and fuller population of our country may produce requires a prophetic spirit to declare which makes no part of my pretensions. But judging from the circumstances now before us and from the probable state of them within a moderate period of time I must pronounce that the liberties of America cannot be unsafe in the number of hands opposed by the federal constitution. From what quarter can the danger proceed? Are we afraid of foreign gold? If foreign gold could so easily corrupt our federal rulers and enable them to ensnare and betray their constituents, how has it happened that we are at this time a free and independent nation? The Congress which conducted us through the Revolution was a less numerous body than their successors will be. They were not chosen by nor responsible to their fellow citizens at large, though appointed from year to year and recallable at pleasure. They were generally continued for three years and prior to the ratification of the federal articles for a still longer term. They held their consultations always under the veil of secrecy. They had the sole transaction of our affairs with foreign nations. Through the whole course of the war they had the fate of their country more in their hands than it is to be hoped will ever be the case with our future representatives. And from the greatness of the prize at stake and the eagerness of the party which lost it, it may well be supposed that the use of other means than force would not have been scrupled. Yet we know by happy experience that the public trust was not betrayed, nor has the purity of our public councils in this particular ever suffered, even from the whispers of calamity. Is the danger apprehended from the other branches of the federal government? But where are the means to be found by the President or the Senate or both? Their emoluments of office that is to be presumed will not, and without a previous corruption of the House of Representatives, cannot more than suffice for very different purposes. Their private fortunes, as they must all be American citizens, cannot possibly be sources of danger. The only means then which they can possess will be in the dispensation of appointments. Is it here that suspicion rests her charge? Sometimes we are told that this fund of corruption is to be exhausted by the President in subduing the virtue of the Senate. Now, the fidelity of the other House is to be the victim. The improbability of such a mercenary and perfidious combination of the several members of government, standing on as different foundations as Republican principles will well admit, and at the same time accountable to the society over which they are placed, ought alone to quiet the apprehension. But fortunately, the Constitution has provided a still further safeguard. The members of the Congress are rendered ineligible to any civil offices that may be created, or of which the emoluments may be increased during the term of their election. No offices, therefore, can be dealt out to the existing members, but such as may become vacant by ordinary casualties. And to suppose that these would be sufficient to purchase the guardians of the people, selected by the people themselves, is to renounce every rule by which events ought to be calculated, and to substitute an indiscriminate and unbound jealousy with which all reasoning must be vain. The sincere friends of Liberty who give themselves up to the extravagancies of this passion are not aware of the injury they do to their own cause. As there is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires a certain degree of circumspection and distrust, so there are other qualities in human nature which justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence. Republican government presupposes the existence of these qualities in a higher degree than any other form, where the pictures which have been drawn by the political jealousies of some among faithful likenesses of the human character. The inference would be that there is not sufficient virtue among men for self-government, and that nothing less than the chains of despotism can restrain them from destroying and devouring one another. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recorded by Brent Humphries and Darcy Baston, Des Moines, Iowa. November 2006. The Federalist Papers. Federalist No. 56. The Federalist Papers. The Federalist Papers. Federalist No. 56. By James Madison. Federalist No. 56. The same subject continued the total number of the House of Representatives for the Independent Journal Saturday, February 16th, 1788. Madison to the people of the State of New York. The second charge against the House of Representatives is that it will be too small to possess a due knowledge of the interest of its constituents. As this objection evidently proceeds from a comparison of the proposed number of representatives with the great extent of the United States, the number of their inhabitants, and the diversity of their interests, without taking into view at the same time the circumstances which will distinguish the Congress from other legislative bodies, the best answer that can be given to it will be a brief explanation of these peculiarities. It is a sound and important principle that the representative ought to be acquainted with the interests and circumstances of his constituents. But this principle can extend no further than to those circumstances and interests to which the authority and care of the representative relate. An ignorance of a variety of minute and particular objects, which do not lie within the compass of legislation, is consistent with every attribute necessary to a due legislative trust. In determining the extent of information required in the exercise of a particular authority, recourse then must be hand to the objects within the purview of that authority. What are to be the objects of federal legislation? Those which are of most importance, and which seem most to require local knowledge, are commerce, taxation, and the militia. A proper regulation of commerce requires much information, as has been elsewhere remarked. But as far as this information relates to the laws and local situation of each individual state, a very few representatives would be very sufficient vehicles of it to the federal councils. Taxation will consist in a great measure of duties which will be involved in the regulation of commerce. So far the proceeding remark is applicable to this object. As far as it may consist of internal collections, a more diffusive knowledge of the circumstances of the state may be necessary. But will not this also be possessed in sufficient degree by a very few intelligent men diffusively elected within the state? Divide the largest state into ten or twelve districts and it will be found that there will be no peculiar local interests in either which will not be within the knowledge of the representative of that district. Besides this source of information, the laws of the state and by representatives from every part of it will be almost of themselves a sufficient guide. In every state there have been made and must continue to be made regulations on this subject which will in many cases leave little more to be done by the federal legislature than to review the different laws and reduce them in one general act. A skillful individual in his closet with all the local codes before him might compile a law of taxation for the whole union without any aid from oral information and it may be expected that whenever internal taxes may be necessary and particularly in cases requiring uniformity throughout the states the more simple objects will be preferred. To be fully sensible of the facility which will be given to this branch of federal legislation by the assistance of the state codes we need only suppose for a moment that this or any other state will have more of parts each having and exercising within itself a power of local legislation. Is it not evident that a degree of local information and preparatory labor would be found in the several volumes of their proceedings which would very much shorten the labors of the general legislature and render a much smaller number of members sufficient for it? The federal councils will derive great advantage from another circumstance the representatives of each state will bring with them a considerable knowledge of its laws and a local knowledge of their respective districts but will probably in all cases have been members and may even at the very time be members of the state legislature where all the local information and interests of the state are assembled and from once they may easily be conveyed by a very few hands into the legislature of the United States. Two versions of the next paragraph appear in different editions of version 1. The observations made on the subject of taxation apply with greater force to the case of the militia. For however different the rules of discipline may be in different states they are the same throughout each particular state and depend on circumstances which can differ but little in different parts of the same state. Version 2. With regard to the regulation of the militia there are scarcely any circumstances in reference to which local knowledge is necessary. The general face of the country whether mountainous or level most fit for the operations of infantry or cavalry is almost the only consideration of this nature that can occur. The art of war teaches general principles of organization movement and discipline which apply universally. The attentive reader will discern that the reasoning here used to prove the sufficiency of a moderate number of representatives does not contradict what was urged on another occasion with regard to the extensive information which the representatives ought to possess and the time that might be necessary for acquiring it. This information so far as it may relate to local objects is rendered necessary and difficult not by a difference of laws and local circumstances within a single state but of those among different states. Taking each state by itself its laws are the same but little diversified. A few men, therefore, will possess all of the knowledge requisite for a proper representation of them. Were the interests and affairs of each individual state perfectly simple and uniform, a knowledge of them in one part would involve a knowledge of them in every other and the whole state might be competently represented by a single member taken from any part of it. On a comparison of the different states together we find a great dissimilarity in their laws and in many other circumstances connect with the objects of federal legislation with all of which the federal representatives ought to have some acquaintance. Whilst a few representatives therefore from each state may bring with them a due knowledge of their own state, every representative will have much information to acquire concerning all the other states. The changes of time as was formally remarked on the comparative situation of the different states will have an assimilating effect. The effect of time on the internal affairs of the states taken singly will be just the contrary. At present some of the states are little more than a society of husbandmen. Few of them have made much progress in those branches of industry which give a variety and complexity to the affairs of a nation. These however will in all of them be the fruits of a more advanced population and will require on the part of each state a fuller representation. The foresight of the convention has accordingly taken care that the progress of population may be accompanied with a proper increase of the representative branch of the government. The experience of Great Britain which presents to mankind so many political lessons both of the monetary and exemplary kind and which has been frequently consulted in the course of these inquiries corroborates the result of the reflections which we have just made. The number of inhabitants in the two kingdoms of England and Scotland cannot be stated at less than eight millions. The representatives of these eight millions in the House of Commons amount to 558. Of this number, one ninth are elected by 364 persons and one half by 5,723 persons. Footnote one from Berg's political disquisitions. It cannot be supposed that the half thus elected and who do not even reside among the people at large can add anything either to the security of the people against the government or to the knowledge of their circumstances and interests in the legislative councils. On the contrary, it is notorious that there are more frequently the representatives and instruments of the executive magistrate than the guardians and advocates of the popular rights. They might therefore with great propriety be considered as something more than a mere deduction from the real representatives of the nation. We will, however, consider them in this light alone and will not extend the deduction to a considerable number of others who do not reside among their constituents are very faintly connected with them and have very little particular knowledge of their affairs. With all these concessions, 279 persons only will be the depository of the safety, interests and happiness of eight millions that is to say, definitive only to maintain the rights and explain the situation of 28,670 constituents in an assembly exposed to the whole force of executive influence and extending its authority to every object of legislation within a nation whose affairs are in the highest degree diversified and complicated. Yet it is very certain not only that a valuable portion of freedom has been preserved under all these circumstances, but that the defects in the British Code are chargeable in a very small proportion on the ignorance of the legislature concerning the circumstances of the people. Allowing to this case the weight which is due to it and comparing it with that of the House of Representatives as above explained, it seems to give the fullest assurance that a representative for every 30,000 inhabitants will render the latter both a safe and competent guardian of the interests that will be confided to it. End of Federalist No. 56 Tuesday, February 19th, 1788 To the people of the state of New York The third charge against the House of Representatives is that it will be taken from that class of citizens which will have least sympathy with the mass of the people and be most likely to aim at an ambitious sacrifice of the many to the aggrandizement of the few. Of all the objections which have been framed against the Federal Constitution this is perhaps the most extraordinary. Whilst the objection itself is leveled against a pretended oligarchy the principle of it strikes at the very root of Republican government. The aim of every political Constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern and most virtue to pursue the common good of the society and in the next place take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they continue to hold their public trust. The elective mode of obtaining rulers is the characteristic policy of Republican government. The means relied on in this form of government for preventing their degeneracy are numerous and various. The most effectual one is such a limitation of the term of appointments as will maintain a proper responsibility to the people. Let me now ask what circumstance there is in the Constitution of the House of Representatives that violates the principles of Republican government or favors the elevation of the few on the ruins of the many. Let me ask whether every circumstance is not on the contrary strictly conformable to these principles and scrupulously impartial to the rights and pretensions of every class and description of citizens. Who are to be the electors of the federal representatives? Not the rich, more than the poor? Not the learned, more than the ignorant? Not the haughty heirs of distinguished names more than the humble sons of obscurity and unpropitious fortune? The electors are to be the same body of the people of the United States. They are to be the same who exercise the right in every state of electing the corresponding branch of the legislature of the state. Who are to be the objects of popular choice? Every citizen whose merit may recommend him to the esteem and confidence of his country. No qualification of wealth, of birth, of religious faith or of civil profession is permitted to feather the judgment or disappoint the inclination of the people. If we consider the situation of the men on whom the free suffrages of their fellow citizens and their representative trust, we shall find it involving every security which can be devised or desired for their fidelity to their constituents. In the first place, as they will have been distinguished by the preference of their fellow citizens, we are to presume that in general they will be somewhat distinguished also by those qualities which entitle them to it and which promise a sincere and scrupulous regard to the nature In the second place, they will enter into the public service under circumstances which cannot fail to produce a temporary affection at least to their constituents. There is in every breast a sensibility to marks of honor of favor of esteem and of confidence which apart from all considerations of interest is some pledge for grateful and benevolent returns. In gratitude is a common topic of declamation in nature, and it must be confessed that instances of it are but too frequent and flagrant both in public and in private life, but the universal and extreme indignation which it inspires is itself a proof of the energy and prevalence of the contrary sentiment. In the third place, those ties which bind the representative to his constituents are strengthened by motives of a more selfish nature. His pride and humanity attach him to a form of government which favors his pretensions and gives him a share in its honors and distinctions. Whatever hopes or projects might be entertained by a few aspiring characters, it must generally happen that a great proportion of the men driving their advancement from their influence with the people would have more to hope from the preservation of the favor than from innovations of the government subversive of the people. All these securities, however, would be found very insufficient without the restraint of frequent elections. Hence, in the fourth place, the House of Representatives is so constituted as to support in the members a habitual recollection of their dependence on the people. Before the sentiments impressed on their minds by the mode of their elevation can be effaced by the exercise of power, they will be compelled to anticipate when their power is to cease, when their exercise of it is to be reviewed, and when they must descend to the level from which they were raised, their forever to remain unless a faithful discharge of their trust shall have established their title to a renewal of it. I will add, as a fifth circumstance in the situation of the House of Representatives, restraining them from oppressive measures that they can make no law which will not have its full operation themselves and their friends as well as on the great mass of the society. This has always been deemed one of the strongest bonds by which human policy can connect the rulers and the people together. It creates between them that communion of interests and sympathy of sentiments of which few governments have furnished examples, but without which every government degenerates into tyranny. If it be asked what is to restrain the House of Representatives from making legal discriminations in favor of themselves and a particular class of the society, I answer the genius of the whole system, the nature of just and constitutional laws, and above all the vigilant and manly spirit which actuates the people of America, a spirit which nourishes freedom and in return is nourished by it. If this spirit shall ever be so far debased as to tolerate a law not obligatory on the legislature as well as on the people, the people will be prepared to tolerate anything but liberty. Such will be the relation between the House of Representatives and their constituents. Duty, gratitude, interest, ambition itself are the chords by which they will be bound to fidelity and sympathy with the great mass of the people. It's possible that these may all be insufficient to control the caprice and wickedness of man, but are they not all the government will admit and that human prudence can devise? Are they not the genuine and the characteristic means by which Republican government provides for the liberty and happiness of the people? Are they not the identical means on which every state government in the Union relies for the attainment of these important ends? What then are we to understand by the objection which this paper we to say to the men who profess the most flaming zeal for Republican government, yet boldly impeach the fundamental principle of it, who pretend to be champions for the right and the capacity of the people to choose their own rulers, yet maintain that they will prefer those only who will immediately and infallibly betray the trust committed to them? Were the objection to be read by one who had not seen the mode prescribed by the Constitution for the choice of representatives, he could suppose nothing less than that some unreasonable qualification of property was annexed to the right of suffrage, or that the right of eligibility was limited to persons of particular families or fortunes, or at least that the mode prescribed by the state constitutions was in some respect or other very grossly departed from. We have seen how far such a supposition would air as to the first two points, nor would in fact be less erroneous as to the last. The only difference discoverable between the two cases is that each representative of the United States will be elected by five or six thousand citizens, whilst in the individual states the election of a representative is left to about as many hundreds. Will it be pretended that this difference is sufficient to justify an attachment to the state governments, and an abhorrence to the federal government? If this be the point on which the objection turns, it deserves to be examined. Is it supported by reason? This cannot be said without maintaining that five or six thousand citizens are less capable of choosing a fit representative or more liable to be corrupted by an unfit one than five or six hundred. Reason, on the contrary, assures us that as in so great a number, a fit representative would be most likely to be found. So the choice would be less likely to be diverted from him by the intrigues of the ambitious or the bribes of the rich. Is the consequence from this doctrine admissible? If we say that five or six hundred citizens are as many as can jointly exercise their right of suffrage, must we not deprive the people of the immediate choice of their public servants? In every instance where the administration of the government does not require as many of them as will amount to one for that number of citizens? Is the doctrine warranted by facts? It was shown in the last paper that the real representation in the British House of Commons very little exceeds the proportion of one for every thirty thousand inhabitants. Besides a variety of powerful causes not existing here and which favor in that country the pretensions of rank and wealth, no person is eligible as a representative of a county unless he possess real estate of the clear value of six hundred pounds sterling per year nor of a city or a borough unless he possess a like a state of half that annual value. To this qualification on the part of the county representatives is added another on the part of the county electors which restrains the right of suffrage to persons having a free hold of state of the annual value of more than twenty pounds sterling according to the present rate of money. Notwithstanding these unfavorable circumstances and notwithstanding some very unequal laws in the British Code it cannot be said that the representatives of the nation have elevated the few on the ruins of the many. But we need not resort to foreign experience on the subject. Our own is explicit and decisive. The districts in New Hampshire and which the senators are chosen immediately by the people are nearly as large as will be necessary for her representatives in the Congress. Those of Massachusetts are larger than will be necessary for that purpose and those of New York still more so. In the last state the members of assembly for the cities and counties of New York and Albany are elected by very nearly as many voters as will be entitled to a representative in the Congress calculating on the number of 65 representatives only. It makes no difference that in these senatorial districts and counties a number of representatives are voted for by each elector at the same time. If the same electors at the same time are capable of choosing four or five representatives they cannot be incapable of choosing one. Pennsylvania is an additional example. Some of her counties that elect her state representatives are almost as large as her districts will be by which her federal representatives will be elected. The city of Philadelphia is supposed to contain between 50 and 60,000 souls. It will therefore form nearly two districts for the choice of federal representatives. It forms however but one county in which every elector votes for each of its representatives in the state legislature and what may appear to be still more directly to our purpose the whole city actually elects a single member for the Executive Council. This is the case in all the other counties of the state. Are not these facts the most satisfactory proofs of the fallacy which has been employed against the branch of the federal government under consideration? Has it appeared on trial that the Senators of New Hampshire Massachusetts and New York or the Executive Council of Pennsylvania or the members of the Assembly in the last two states have betrayed any peculiar disposition to sacrifice the many to the few? Or are in any respect less worthy of their places than the representatives and magistrates appointed in other states by very small divisions of the people? But there are cases of a stronger complexion than any which I have yet quoted. One branch of the legislature of Connecticut is so constituted that each member of it is elected by the whole state. So is the Governor of that state of Massachusetts and of this state and the President of New Hampshire. I leave every man to decide whether the results of any one of these experiments can be said to countenance a suspicion that a diffusive mode of choosing representatives of the people tends to elevate traders and to undermine the public liberty. Publius End of Federalist No. 57 This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org The Federalist Papers Federalist No. 58 by James Madison Objection that the number of members will not be augmented as the progress of population demands consist of the number of population demands considered for the Independent Journal Wednesday, February 20th 1788 to the people of the State of New York The remaining charge against the House of Representatives which I am to examine is grounded on a supposition that the number of members will not be augmented from time to time as the progress of population may demand. It has been admitted that this objection, if well supported, would have great weight. The following observations will show that like most other objections against the Constitution it can only proceed from a partial view of the subject, or from a jealousy which discolors and disfigures every object which is beheld. 1. Those who urge the objection seem not to have recollected that the Federal Constitution did not suffer by a comparison with the State Constitutions in the security provided for a gradual augmentation of the number of representatives. The number which is to prevail in the first instance is declared to be temporary. Its duration is limited to the short term of three years. Within every successive term of ten years a census of inhabitants is to be repeated. The unequivocal objects to readjust, from time to time, the apportionment of representatives to the number of inhabitants under the single exception that each State shall have one representative at least. Secondly, to augment the number of representatives at the same periods under the sole limitation that the whole number shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand inhabitants. If we review the Constitutions of the several States we shall find that some of them contain no determinate regulations on this subject, that others correspond pretty much on this point with the Federal Constitution, and that the most effectual security in any of them is resolvable into a mere directory provision. Two. As far as experience has taken place on this subject, a gradual increase of representatives under the State Constitutions has at least kept pace with that of the Constituents, that the former have been as ready to concur in such measures as the latter have been to call for them. Three. There is a peculiarity in the Federal Constitution which ensures a watchful attention in a majority both of the people and of their representatives to a constitutional augmentation of the latter. The peculiarity lies in this that one branch of the Legislature is a representation of citizens, the other of the States. In the former, consequently, the larger States will have most weight. In the latter, the advantage will be in favour of the smaller States. From this circumstance it may with certainty be inferred that the larger States will be strenuous advocates for increasing the number and weight of that part of the Legislature in which their influence predominates. And it so happens that four only of the largest will have a majority of all votes in the House of Representatives. Should the representatives or people therefore of the smaller States oppose at any time a reasonable addition of members a coalition of a very few States will be sufficient to overrule the opposition. A coalition which, notwithstanding the rivalship and local prejudices which might prevent it on ordinary occasions would not fail to take place when not merely prompted by common interest but justified by equity and the principles of the Constitution. It may be alleged, perhaps, that the Senate would be prompted by like motives to an adverse coalition, and as their concurrence would be indispensable, the just and constitutional views of the other branch might be defeated. This is the difficulty which has probably created the most serious apprehensions in the jealous friends of a numerous representation. Fortunately it is among the difficulties which, existing only in appearance, vanish on a close and accurate inspection. The following reflections will, if I mistake not, be admitted to be conclusive and satisfactory on this point. Notwithstanding the equal authority which will subsist between the two houses on all legislative subjects except the originating of money bills, it cannot be doubted that the House, composed of the greater number of members, when supported by the more powerful states and speaking the known and determined sense of a majority of the people will have no small advantage in a question depending on the comparative firmness of the two houses. This advantage must be increased by the consciousness built by the same side of being supported in its demands by right, by reason, and by the Constitution, and the consciousness on the opposite side of contending against the force of considerations. It is farther to be considered that in the gradation between the smallest and largest states there are several which, though most likely in general to arrange themselves among the former, are too little removed in extent and population from the latter to second an opposition to their just and legitimate pretensions. Hence it is by no means certain that a majority of votes, even in the Senate, will cover augmentations in the number of representatives. It will not be looking too far to add that the Senators from all the new states may be gained over to the just views of the House of Representatives by an expedient too obvious to be overlooked. As these states will, for a great length of time advance in population with peculiar rapidity, they will be interested in frequent reapportionments of the representatives to the states. The large states, therefore, who will prevail in the House of Representatives will have nothing to do but to make reapportionments and augmentations mutually conditions of each other, and the Senators from all the most growing states will be bound to contend for the latter by the interest which their states will feel in the former. These considerations seem to afford ample security on the subject and ought alone to satisfy all the doubts and fears that have been indulged with regard to it. Admitting, however, that they should all be insufficient to subdue the unjust policy of the smaller states or their predominant influence in the councils of the Senate, a constitutional and infallible resource still remains with the larger states by which they will be able at all times to accomplish their just purposes. The House of Representatives cannot only refuse, but they alone can propose the supplies requisite for the support of government. They, in a word, hold the purse, that powerful instrument by which we behold in the history of the British Constitution an infant and humble representation of the people gradually enlarging the sphere of its activity and importance and finally reducing, as far as it seems to have wished, all the overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of the government. This power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the people for obtaining a redress of every grievance and for carrying into effect every just and salutary measure. But will not the House of Representatives be as much interested as the Senate in maintaining the government in its proper functions and will they not therefore be unwilling to stake its existence for its reputation on the pliancy of the Senate? Or, if such a trial of firmness between the two branches were hazarded, would not the one be as likely first to yield as the other? These questions will create no difficulty with those who reflect that in all cases the smaller the number and the more permanent and conspicuous the station of men in power the stronger must be the interest which they will individually feel in whatever concerns the government. Those who represent the dignity of their country in the eyes of other nations will be particularly sensible to every prospect of public danger or of dishonorable stagnation in public affairs. To those causes we are to ascribe the continual triumph of the British House of Commons over the other branches of the government whenever the engine of a money bill has been employed. An absolute inflexibility on the side of the latter cannot have failed to involve every department of the state in the general confusion has neither been apprehended nor experienced. The utmost degree of firmness that can be displayed by the Federal Senate or President will not be more than equal to a resistance in which they will be supported by constitutional and patriotic principles. In this review of the Constitution of the House of Representatives I have passed over the circumstances of economy which, in the present state of affairs, might have had some effect in lessening the temporary number of representatives and a disregard of which would probably have been as rich a theme of declamation against the Constitution as has been shown by the smallness of the number proposed. I omit also any remarks on the difficulty which might be found under present circumstances in engaging in the Federal Service a large number of such characters will probably elect. One observation, however, I must be permitted to add on this subject as claiming, in my judgment, a very serious attention. It is that in all legislative assemblies the greater the number composing them may be the fewer will be the men who will in fact direct their proceedings. In the first place the more numerous an assembly may be of whatever characters compose the greater is known to be of passion over reason. In the next place, the larger the number, the greater will be the proportion of members of limited information and of weak capacities. Now it is precisely on characters of this description that the eloquence and address of the few are known to act with all their force. In the ancient republics where the whole body of the people assembled in person a single orator or an artful statesman generally seen to rule with as complete a sway as if a scepter had been placed in his single hand. On the same principle the more multitudinous a representative assembly may be rendered the more it will partake of the infirmity's incident to collective meetings of the people. Ignorance will be the dupe of cunning and passion the slave of sophistry and declamation. The people can never air more than in supposing that by multiplying just beyond a certain limit they strengthen the barrier against the government of a few. Experience will forever admonish them that, on the contrary, after securing a sufficient number for the purposes of safety of local information and of diffusive sympathy with the whole society they will counteract their own views by every addition to their representatives. The countenance of the government may become more democratic but the fact that it remains it will be more oligarchic. The machine will be enlarged but the fewer, and often the more secret, will be the springs by which its motions are directed. As connected with the objection against the number of representatives may properly be here noticed that which has been suggested against the number made competent for legislative business. It has been said that more than a majority ought to have been in particular cases, if not in all, more than a majority of a quorum for a decision. That some advantages might have resulted from such a precaution cannot be denied. It might have been an additional shield to some particular interests and another obstacle generally to hasty and partial measures. But these considerations are outweighed by the inconveniences in the opposite scale. In all cases where justice or the general good might require new laws to be passed or active measures to be pursued the fundamental principle of free government would be reversed. It would be no longer the majority that would rule. The power would be transferred to the minority. Were the defensive privilege limited to particular cases an interested minority might take advantage of it to screen themselves from equitable sacrifices to the general wheel or in particular emergencies to extort unreasonable indulgences. Lastly it would facilitate and foster the baneful practice of secessions, a practice which has shown itself even in states where a majority only is required, a practice subversive to all the principles of order and regular government, a practice which leads more directly to public convulsions and the ruin of popular governments than any other which has yet been displayed among us. Publius End of Federalist No. 58 This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org The Federalist Papers Federalist No. 59 by Alexander Hamilton Concerning the power of Congress to regulate the election of members from the New York packet Friday, February 22nd, 1788 to the people of the state of New York The natural order of the subject leads us to consider in this place that provision of the Constitution which authorizes the National Legislature to regulate in the last resort the election of its own members. It is in these words that times, places, and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof. But the Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations except as to the places of choosing senators. Footnote First Clause Fourth Section of the first article This provision has not only been declaimed against by those who condemn the Constitution in the gross, but it has been censured by those who have objected with less latitude and greater moderation, and, in one instance, it has been thought exceptional by a gentleman who has declared himself the advocate of every other part of the system. I am greatly mistaken, notwithstanding, if there be any article in the whole plan more completely defensible than its propriety rests upon the evidence of this plain proposition that every government ought to contain in itself the means of its own preservation. Every just reason or will at first sight approve an adherence to this rule in the work of the convention and will disapprove every deviation from it which may not appear to have been dictated by the necessity of incorporating into the work some particular ingredient with which a rigid conformity to the rule was incompatible. Even in this case, though he may acquiesce in the necessity, yet he will not cease to regard and to regret a departure from so fundamental a principle as a portion of imperfection in the system which may prove the seed of future weakness and perhaps anarchy. It will not be alleged that an election law could have been framed institution which would have been always applicable to every probable change in the situation of the country, and it will therefore not be denied that a discretionary power over elections ought to exist somewhere. It will, I presume, be as readily conceded that there were only three ways in which this power could have been reasonably modified and disposed, that it must either have been lodged wholly in the national legislature wholly in the state legislatures or primarily in the latter and ultimately in the former. The last mode has, with reason, been preferred by the convention. They have submitted the regulation of elections for the federal government in the first instance to the local administrations, which, in ordinary cases, and when no improper views prevail, may be both more convenient and more satisfactory. But they have reserved to the national authority a right to interpose whenever extraordinary circumstances might render that interposition necessary to its safety. Nothing can be more evident than that an exclusive power of regulating elections for the national government in the hands of the state legislatures would leave the existence of the union entirely at their mercy. They could, at any moment, annihilate it by neglecting to provide for the citizens to administer its affairs. It is to little purpose to say that a neglect or omission of this kind would not be likely to take place. The constitutional possibility of the thing, without an equivalent for the risk, is an unanswerable objection. Nor has any satisfactory reason been yet assigned for incurring that risk. The extravagance surmises of a distempered jealousy can never be dignified with that character. If we are in a humor to presume abuses of power, it is as fair to presume them on the part of the state governments as on the part of the general government. And, as it is more consonant to the rules of a just theory, to trust the union with the care of its own existence than to transfer that care to any other hands, if abuses of power are to be hazarded on the one side or on the other, it is more rational to hazard them where the power would naturally be placed than where it would unnaturally be placed. Suppose an article had been introduced into the Constitution, empowering the United States to regulate the elections for the particular states would any man have hesitated to condemn it, both as an unwarrantable transposition of power and as a premeditated engine for the destruction of the state governments, the violation of the principle, in this case, would have required no comment, and as an unbiased observer it will not be less apparent in the project of subjecting the existence of the national government in a similar respect to the pleasure of the state governments. An impartial view of the matter cannot fail to result in a conviction that each, as far as possible, ought to depend on itself for its own preservation. As an objection to this position it may be remarked that the Constitution of the National Senate would at this extent the danger which it is suggested might flow from an exclusive power in the state legislatures to regulate the federal elections. It may be alleged that by declining the appointment of senators they might at any time give a fatal blow to the Union, and from this it may be inferred that as its existence would be thus rendered dependent upon them in so essential a point there can be no objection to entrusting them this under consideration. The interest of each state, it may be added, to maintain its representation in the national councils, would be a complete security against an abuse of the trust. This argument, though specious, will not upon examination be found solid. It is certainly true that the state legislatures, by forebearing the appointment of senators, may destroy the national government, but it is the power to do this in one instance, they ought to have it in every other. There are cases in which the pernicious tendency of such a power may be far more decisive, without any motive equally cogent with that which must have regulated the conduct of the convention in respect to the formation of the Senate, to recommend their admission into the system. So far as that construction may expose the Union to the possibility of injury from the national government, it is an evil. But it is an evil which could not have been avoided without excluding the states in their political capacities wholly from a place in the organization of the national government. If this had been done, it would doubtless have been interpreted into an entire dereliction of the federal principle, and would certainly have deprived the state governments of that absolute safeguard which they will enjoy under this provision. As stated in this instance to an inconvenience for the attainment of a necessary advantage or a greater good, no inference can be drawn from thence to favor an accumulation of the evil, where no necessity urges, nor any greater good invites. It may be easily discerned also that the national government would run a much greater risk from a power in the state legislatures over the election of its house of representatives, then from their power of appointing the members of its Senate. The Senators are to be chosen for the period of six years. There is to be a rotation by which the seats of a third part of them are to be vacated and replenished every two years, and no state is to be entitled to more than two Senators. A quorum of the body is to consist of sixteen members. The joint result of these circumstances would be that a temporary combination of a few states to intermit the appointment of Senators couldn't either annul the existence nor impair the activity of the body, and it is not from a general and permanent combination of the states that we can have anything to fear. The first might proceed from sinister designs in the leading members of a few of the state legislatures. The last would suppose a fixed and rooted disaffection in the great body of the people, which will either never exist at all, or will the possibility proceed from an experience of the inaptitude of the general government to the advancement of their happiness, in which event no good citizen could desire its continuance. But with regard to the Federal House of Representatives there is intended to be a general election of members once in two years. If the state legislatures were to be invested with an exclusive power of regulating those elections, every period of time would be a delicate crisis in the national situation, which might issue in a dissolution of the union if the leaders of a few of the most important states should have entered into a previous conspiracy to prevent an election. I shall not deny that there is a degree of weight in the observation that the interests of each state, to be represented in the Federal councils, will be a security against the abuse of a power over its elections in the state legislatures. But the security will not be considered as complete by those who attend to the force of an obvious distinction between the interest of the people in the public felicity and the interest of their local rulers in the power and consequence of their offices. The people of America may be warmly attached to the government of the union at times when the particular rulers of particular states stimulated by the natural rivalship of power against the interests of personal aggrandizement and supported by a strong faction in each of those states may be in a very opposite temper. This diversity of sentiment between the majority of the people and the individuals who have the greatest credit in their councils is exemplified in some of the states at the present moment on the present question. The scheme of separate confederacies which will always multiply the chances of ambition being bait to all such influential characters in the state administrations as are capable of preferring their own emolument and advancement to the public wheel. With so effectual a weapon in their hands as the exclusive power of regulating elections for the national government, a combination of a few such men in a few of the most considerable states where the temptation will always be the strongest might accomplish the destruction of the union by taking the opportunity of some casual dissatisfaction among the people and which perhaps they may themselves have excited to discontinue the choice of members for the federal House of Representatives. It ought never to be forgotten that a firm union of this country under an efficient government will probably be an increasing object of jealousy to more than one nation of Europe and that enterprises to subvert it will sometimes originate in the sovereign powers and will seldom fail to be patronized and abetted by some of them. Its preservation therefore ought in no case that can be avoided to be committed to the guardianship of any but those whose situation will uniformly beget an immediate interest in the faithful and vigilant performance of the trust. Publius and of Federalist No. 59 This is our LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org The Federalist Papers Federalist No. 60 by Alexander Hamilton The same subject continued concerning the power of Congress to regulate the election of members from the Independent Journal Saturday, February 23 1788 to the people of the State of New York We have seen that an uncontrollable power over the elections to the Federal Government could not, without hazard, be committed to the State Legislatures Let us now see what would be the danger on the other side that is, from confiding the ultimate right of regulating its own elections to the Union itself It is not pretended that this right would ever be used for the exclusion of any State from its share in the representation The interest of all would, in this respect at least, be the security of all. But it is alleged that it might be employed in such a manner as to promote the election of some favorite class of men in exclusion of others, by confining the places of election to particular districts and rendering it impracticable for elections at large to partake in the choice. Of all numerical suppositions, this seems to be the most numerical. On the one hand, no rational calculation of probabilities would lead us to imagine that the disposition which a conduct so violent and extraordinary would imply could ever find its way into the National Councils, and on the other, it may be concluded with certainty that if so into them it would display itself in a form altogether different and far more decisive. The improbability of the attempt may be satisfactorily inferred from this single reflection, that it could never be made without causing an immediate revolt of the great body of the people headed and directed by the State Governments. It is not difficult to conceive that this characteristic right of freedom may, in certain turbulent factious seasons, be violated in respect to a particular class of citizens by a victorious and overbearing majority. But that so fundamental a privilege in a country so situated and enlightened should be invaded to the prejudice of the great mass of the people by the deliberate policy of the Government without occasioning a popular revolution is altogether inconceivable and incredible. In addition to this general reflection there are considerations of a more precise nature which forbid all apprehension on the subject. The dissimilarity in the ingredients which will compose the National Government and still more in the manner in which they will be brought into action in its various branches must form a powerful obstacle to a concert of views in any particular scheme of elections. There is sufficient diversity in the state of property, in the genius, manners and habits of the people of the different parts of the Union to occasion a material diversity of disposition in their representatives towards the different ranks and conditions in society. And though an intimate intercourse under the same Government will promote a gradual assimilation in some of these respects, yet there are causes as well physical as moral which may in a greater or less degree permanently nourish different intensities and inclinations in this respect. But the circumstance which will be likely to have the greatest influence in the matter will be the dissimilar modes of constituting the several component parts of the Government. The House of Representatives being to be elected immediately by the people, the Senate by the state legislatures, the President by electors chosen for that purpose by the people. There would be little probability of a common interest to cement these different branches in a predilection for any particular class of electors. As to the Senate, it is impossible that any regulation of time and manner, which is all that is proposed to be submitted to the National Government in respect to that body, can affect the spirit which will direct the choice of its members. The collective sense of the state legislatures can never be influenced by extraneous circumstances of that sort, a consideration which alone ought to satisfy us that the discrimination apprehended would never be attempted. For what inducement could the Senate have to concur in a preference in which itself would not be included? Or to what purpose would it be established in reference to one branch of the legislature if it could not be extended to the other? The composition of the one would in this case counteract that of the other. And we can never suppose that it would embrace the commitments to the Senate unless we can at the same time suppose the voluntary co-operation of the state legislatures. If we make the latter's opposition it then becomes immaterial where the power in question is placed whether in their hands or those of the Union. But what is to be the object of this capricious partiality of the National Councils? Is it to be exercised in a discrimination between the different departments and the different kinds of property or between the different degrees of property? Will it lean in favor of the landed interest or the monied interest or the mercantile interest or the manufacturing interest? Or to speak in the fashionable language of the adversaries to the Constitution will it court the elevation of the wealthy and well-born to the exclusion and debasement of all the rest of society? If this partiality is to be exerted in favor of those who are concerned in any particular description of industry or property I presume it will readily be admitted that the competition for it will lie between landed men and merchants. And I scruple not to affirm that it is infinitely less likely that either of them should gain an ascendant in the National Councils than that the one or the other of them should predominate in all the local councils. The inference will be that a conduct tending to give this to either is much less to be dreaded from the former than from the latter. The several states are in various degrees addicted to agriculture and commerce. In most, if not all of them, agriculture is predominant. In a few of them, however, commerce nearly divides its empire and in most of them has a considerable share of influence. In proportion as either prevails it will be conveyed into the national representation and for the very reason that this will be an emanation from a greater variety of interests and in much more various proportions than are to be found in any single state it will be much less apt to espouse either of them with a decided partiality than the representation of any single state. In a country consisting chiefly of the cultivators of land where the rules of an equal representation obtain the landed interest must upon the whole preponderate in the government. As long as this interest prevails in most of the state legislatures so long it must maintain a correspondent superiority in the national senate which will generally be a faithful copy of the majorities of those assemblies. It cannot therefore be presumed that a sacrifice of the landed to the mercantile class will ever be a favorite object of this branch of the federal legislature. In applying thus particularly to the senate a general observation suggested by the situation of the country I am governed by the consideration that the credulous votaries of state power cannot upon their own principles suspect that the state legislatures would be warped from their duty by any external influence. But in reality the same situation must have the same effect in the primative composition at least of the federal House of Representatives an improper bias toward the mercantile class is as little to be expected from this quarter as from the other. In order perhaps to give countenance to the objection at any rate it may be asked is there not danger of an opposite bias in the national government which may dispose it to endeavor to secure a monopoly of the federal administration to the landed class as there is little likelihood that the supposition of such a bias will have any terrors for those who are severely injured by it a labored answer to this question will be dispensed with. It will be sufficient to remark first that for the reasons elsewhere assigned it is less likely that any decided partiality should prevail in the councils of the union than in those of any of its members. Secondly that there would be no temptation to violate the constitution in favor of the landed class because that class would in the natural course of things would create a preponderancy as itself could desire. And thirdly that men accustomed to investigate the sources of public prosperity upon a large scale must be too well convinced of the utility of commerce to be inclined to inflict upon it so deep a wound as would result from the entire exclusion of those who would best understand its interest from a share in the management of them. The importance of commerce is continually guarded against the enmity of a body which would be continually important in its favor by the urgent calls of public necessity. I, the rather, consult brevity in discussing the probability of a preference founded upon a discrimination between the different kinds of industry and property because, as far as I understand the meaning of the objectors they contemplate a discrimination of another kind. They appear to have in view the importance of the preference with which they endeavor to alarm us those whom they designate by the description of the wealthy and the well-born. These, it seems, are to be exalted to an odious preeminence over the rest of their fellow citizens. At one time, however, their elevation is to be a necessary consequence of the smallness of the representative body. At another time it is to be affected by depriving the people at large of the opportunity of exercising their right of suffrage in the choice of that body. But upon what principle is the discrimination of the places of election to be made in order to answer the purpose of the meditated preference? Are the wealthy and the well-born, as they are called, confined to particular spots in the several states? Have they, by some miraculous instinct or foresight, set apart in each of them a common place of residence? Are they only to be met with grounds or cities? Or are they, on the contrary, scattered over the face of the country as avarice or chance may have happened to cast their own lot or that of their predecessors? If the latter is the case, as every intelligent man knows it to be footnote particularly in the southern states and in this state and footnote If the latter is the case, as every intelligent man knows it to be, is it not evident that the policy of confining the places of election to particular districts would be as subversive of its own aim as it would be exceptionable on every other account? The truth is that there is no method of securing to the rich the preference apprehended but by prescribing qualifications of property either for those who may elect or be elected. But this forms no part of the power to be conferred upon the national government. Its authority would be expressly restricted to the regulation of the times, the places, the manner of elections. The qualifications of the persons who may choose or be chosen, as has been remarked upon other occasions, are defined and fixed in the Constitution and are unalterable by the legislature. Let it, however, be admitted for argument's sake that the expedient suggestion might be successful and let it at the same time be equally taken for granted that all the scruples which a sense of duty or an apprehension of the danger of the experiment might inspire were overcome in the breasts of the national rulers. Still I imagine it will hardly be pretended that they could ever hope to carry such an enterprise into execution without the aid of a military force sufficient to subdue the resistance of the great body of the people. The improbability of the existence of a force equal to that object has been discussed and demonstrated in different parts of these papers, but that the futility of the objection under consideration may appear in the strongest light, it shall be conceded for a moment that such a force might exist and the national government shall be supposed to be in the actual possession of it. What will be the conclusion? With a disposition to invade the essential rights of the community and with the means of gratifying that disposition, is it presumable that the persons who were actuated by it would amuse themselves in the ridiculous task of fabricating election laws for securing a preference to a favorite class of men? Would they not be likely to prefer a conduct better adapted to their own immediate aggrandizement? Would they not rather boldly resolve to perpetuate themselves in office by one decisive act of usurpation than to trust to precarious expedience which, in spite of all the precautions that might accompany them, might terminate in the dismission, disgrace, and ruin of their authors? Would they not fear that citizens not less tenacious than conscious of their rights would flock from the remote extremes of their respective states to the places of election, to overthrow their tyrants, and to substitute men who would be disposed to avenge the violated majesty of the people? Publius. End of Federalist No. 60 This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org The Federalist Papers Federalist No. 61 by Alexander Hamilton The same subject continued concerning the power of Congress to regulate the election of members from the New York packet Tuesday, February 26th, 1788 to the people of the state of New York The more candid opposers of the provision respecting elections contained in the plan of the convention when pressed in argument will sometimes concede the propriety of that provision with this qualification, however, that it ought to have been accompanied with a declaration that all elections should be had in the counties where the electors resided. This, say they, was a necessary precaution against an abuse of the power. A declaration of this nature would certainly have been harmless so far as it would have had the effect of quieting apprehensions it might not have been undesirable. But it would, in fact, have afforded little or no additional security against the danger apprehended and the want of it will never be considered by an impartial and judicious examiner as a serious, still less as an insuperable objection to the plan. The different views taken of the subject in the two preceding papers must be sufficient to satisfy all dispassionate and discerning men that if the public liberty should ever be the victim of the ambition of the national rulers the power under examination, at least will be guiltless of the sacrifice. If those who are inclined to consult their jealousy only would exercise it in a careful inspection of the several state constitutions they would find little less room for disquietude and alarm from the latitude which most of them allow in respect to elections than from the latitude which is proposed to be allowed to the national government in the same respect. A review of their situation in particular would tend greatly to remove any ill impressions which may remain in regard to this matter. But as that view would lead into long and tedious details I shall content myself with the single example of the state in which I write. The Constitution of New York makes no other provision for locality of elections than that the members of the assembly shall be elected in the counties, those of the senate in the great districts into which the state is or may be divided. These at present are four in number and comprehend each from two to six counties. It may readily be perceived that it would not be more difficult to the legislature of New York to defeat the suffrages of the citizens of New York by confining elections to particular places than for the legislature of the United States to defeat the suffrages of the citizens of the Union by the like expedient. Suppose, for instance, the city of Albany was to be appointed the sole place of election for the county and district of which it is a part. Would not the inhabitants of that city speedily become the only electors of the members both of the senate and assembly for that county and district? Can we imagine that the electors who reside in the remote subdivisions of the counties of Albany, Saratoga, Cambridge, etc., or in any part of the county of Montgomery would take the trouble to come to the city of Albany to give their votes for members of the assembly or senate sooner than they would repair to the city of New York to participate in the choice of the members of the Federal House of Representatives? The alarming indifference discoverable in the exercise of so invaluable a privilege under the existing laws which afford every facility to it furnishes a ready answer to this question. And, abstracted from any experience of the subject, we can be at no loss to determine that when the place of election is at an inconvenient distance from the elector, the effect upon his conduct will be the same whether that distance be twenty miles or twenty thousand miles. Hence it must appear that objections to the particular modification of the Federal power of regulating elections will, in substance, apply with equal force to the modification of the like power in the Constitution of this State, and for this reason it will be impossible to equip the one and to condemn the other. A similar comparison would lead to the same conclusion in respect to the constitutions of most of the other States. If it should be said that defects in the State constitutions furnish no apology for those which are to be found in the plan proposed, I answer, that as the former have never been thought chargeable with inattention to the security where the imputations thrown on the latter can be shown to be applicable to them also, the presumption is that they are rather the caviling refinements of a predetermined opposition than the well-founded inferences of a candid research after truth. To those who are disposed to consider, as innocent omissions in the State constitutions, what they regard as unpardonable blemishes in the plan of the convention, nothing can be said. Or at most they can only be asked to assign subsubstantial reason why the representatives of the people in a single State should be more impregnable to the lust of power or other sinister motives than the representatives of the people of the United States. If they cannot do this, they ought at least to prove to us that it is easier to subvert the liberties of three millions of people with the advantage of local governments to have their opposition than of two hundred thousand people who are destitute of that advantage. And in relation to the point immediately under consideration, they ought to convince us that it is less probable that a predominant faction in a single State should, in order to maintain its superiority, incline to a preference of a particular class of electors, than that a similar spirit should take possession of the representatives of thirteen States, spread over a vast region, and in several respects distinguishable from each other by diversity of local circumstances, prejudices, and interests. Hitherto my observations have only aimed at a vindication of the provision in question on the ground of theoretic propriety, on that of the danger of placing the power elsewhere, and on that of the safety of placing it in the manner proposed. But there remains to be mentioned a positive advantage which will result from this disposition, and which could not, as well, have been obtained from any other. I allude to the circumstance of uniformity in the time of elections for the Federal House of Representatives. It is more than possible that this uniformity may be found by experience to be of great importance to the public welfare, both as a security against the perpetuation of the same spirit in the body, and as a cure for the diseases of faction. If each State may choose its own time of election, it is possible that there may be at least as many different periods as there are months in the year. The times of election in the several states as they are now established for local purposes vary between extremes as wide as March and November. The consequence of this diversity would be that there could never happen a total dissolution or renovation of the body at one time. If an improper spirit of any kind should happen to prevail in it, that spirit would be apt to infuse itself with the new members as they come forward in succession. The mass would be likely to remain nearly the same assimilating constantly to itself its gradual accretions. There is a contagion in example which few men have sufficient force of mind to resist. I am inclined to think that treble the duration in office with the condition of a total dissolution of the body at the same time might be less formidable to liberty than one third of that duration compared to gradual and successive alterations. Uniformity in the time of elections seems not less requisite for executing the idea of a regular rotation in the Senate and for conveniently assembling the legislature at a stated period in each year. It may be asked why then could not a time have been fixed in the Constitution as the most zealous adversaries of the plan of the convention in this state are, in general, less zealous admirers of the Constitution of the state. The question may be retorted, and it may be asked why was not a time for the like purpose fixed in the Constitution of this state? No better answer can be given than that it was a matter which might safely be entrusted to legislative discretion, and that if a time had been appointed it might, upon experiment, have been found less convenient than some other time. The same answer may be given to the question of whether or not the election would have been successful on the other side, and it may be added that the supposed danger of a gradual change being merely speculative it would have been hardly advisable upon that speculation to establish as a fundamental point what would deprive several states of the convenience of having the elections for their own governments and for the national government at the same epics. Fublius This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org The Federalist Papers Federalist Number 62 By James Madison The Senate For The Independent Journal Wednesday, February 27th, 1780 To the People of the State of New York Having examined the Constitution of the House of Representatives and answered such of the objections against it as seemed to merit notice I enter next on the examination of the Senate. The heads into which this member of the government may be considered are 1. The Qualification of Senators 2. The Appointment of them by the State Legislature 3. The Equality of Representation in the Senate 4. The Number of Senators and the Term for which they are to be elected 5. The Powers Vested in the Senate 1. The Qualifications proposed for Senators as distinguished from those of representatives consist in a more advanced age and a longer period of citizenship a senator must be 30 years of age at least as a representative must be 25 and the former must have been a citizen nine years as seven years are required for the latter. The propriety of these distinctions is explained by the nature of the senatorial trust which, requiring greater extent of information and stability of character, requires at the same time reached a period of life most likely to supply these advantages and which, participating immediately in transactions with foreign nations ought to be exercised by none who are not thoroughly weaned from the prepossessions and habits incident to foreign birth and education. The term of nine years appears to be a prudent mediocrity between a total exclusion of adopted citizens whose merits and talents may claim a share in the public confidence and an indiscriminate and hasty admission of them which might create a channel for foreign influence on the national councils. 2. It is equally unnecessary to dilate on the appointment of senators by the state legislatures among the various modes which might have been devised for constituting this branch of the government that which has been proposed by the convention is probably the most congenial with the public opinion. It is recommended by the double advantage of favouring a select appointment and of giving to the state governments such an agency in the formation of the federal government as must secure the authority of the former and may form a convenient link between the two systems. 3. The equality of representation in the senate is another point which being evidently the result of compromise between the opposite pretensions of the large and the small states that call for much discussion. If indeed it be right that among a people thoroughly incorporated into one nation every district ought to have a proportional share in the government and that among independent and sovereign states bound together by a simple league the parties however unequal in size ought to have an equal share in the common councils it does not appear to be without some reason that in a compound republic making both of the national and federal character the government ought to be founded on a mixture of the principles of proportional and equal representation but it is superfluous to try by the standard of theory a part of the constitution which is allowed on all hands to be the result not of theory but of a spirit of amity and that mutual deference and concession which the peculiarity of our political situation rendered indispensable in government with powers equal to its objects is called for by the voice and still more loudly by the political situation of America a government founded on principles more consonant to the wishes of the larger states is not likely to be obtained from the smaller states the only option then for the former lies between the proposed government and a government still more objectionable under this alternative is that the evidence must be to embrace the lesser evil and instead of indulging a fruitless anticipation of the possible mischiefs which may ensue to contemplate rather the advantageous consequences which may qualify the sacrifice in this spirit it may be remarked that the equal vote allowed to each state is at once a constitutional recognition of the portion of sovereignty remaining in the individual states and an instrument for preserving so far the equality ought to be no less acceptable to the large than to the small states since they are not less solicitous to guard by every possible expedient against an improper consolidation of the states into one simple republic another advantage accruing from this ingredient in the constitution of the senate is the additional impediment it must prove against improper acts of legislation no law or resolution can now be passed without the concurrence first of a majority of the people and then of a majority of the states it must be acknowledged that this complicated check on legislation may in some instances be injurious as well as beneficial and that the peculiar defense which it involves in favor of the smaller states would be more rational if any interests common to them and distinct from those of the other states would otherwise be exposed to peculiar danger but as the larger states will always be able by their power over the supplies to defeat unreasonable exertions of this prerogative of the lesser states and as the faculty and excess of lawmaking seems to be the diseases to which our governments are most liable it is not impossible that this part of the constitution may be more convenient in practice than it appears to many in contemplation 4 the number of senators and the duration of their appointment come next to be considered in order to form an accurate judgment on both of these points it will be proper to inquire into the purposes which are to be answered by a senate and in order to ascertain these it will be necessary to review the inconveniences which a republic must suffer from the want of such an institution first it is a misfortune incident to republican government though in a less degree than to other governments that those who administer it may forget their obligations to their constituents and prove unfaithful to their important trust in this point of view a senate as a second branch of the legislative assembly distinct from and dividing the power with a first must be in all cases a salutary check on the government it doubles the security to the people by requiring the concurrence of two distinct bodies in schemes of usurpation or perfidy where the ambition or corruption of one would otherwise be sufficient this is a precaution founded on such clear principles and now so well understood in the united states that it would be more than superfluous to enlarge on it I will barely remark that as the improbability of sinister combinations will be in proportion to the dissimilarity in the genius of the two bodies it must be politic to distinguish them from each other by every circumstance which will consist with a due harmony in all proper measures and with the genuine principles of republican government second the necessity of a senate is not less indicated by the propensity of all single and numerous assemblies to yield to the impulse of sudden and violent passions and to be seduced by factious leaders into intemperate and pernicious resolutions examples on this subject might be cited without number and from proceedings within the united states as well as from the history of other nations but a position that will not be contradicted need not be proved all that need be remarked is that a body which is to correct this infirmity ought itself to be free from it and consequently ought to be less numerous it ought, moreover firmness and consequently ought to hold its authority by a tenure of considerable duration third another defect to be supplied by a senate lies in a want of due acquaintance with the objects and principles of legislation it is not possible that an assembly of men called for the most part from pursuits of a private nature continued in appointment for a short time and led by no permanent motive to devote the intervals of public occupation to a study of the laws the affairs and the comprehensive interests of their country should, if left wholly to themselves escape a variety of important errors in the exercise of their legislative trust it may be affirmed on the best grounds that no small share of the present embarrassments of America is to be charged on the blunders of our governments and that these have proceeded from the heads rather than the hearts of most of the authors of them what indeed are all the repealing explaining and amending laws which fill and disgrace our voluminous codes but so many monuments of deficient wisdom so many impeachments exhibited by each succeeding against each preceding session so many admonitions to the people of the value of those aides which may be expected from a well constituted senate a good government implies two things first fidelity to the object of government which is the happiness of the people secondly a knowledge of the means by which that object can be best attained some governments are deficient in both of these qualities most governments are deficient in the first I scruple not to assert that an American government too little attention has been paid to the last the federal constitution avoids this error it provides for the last in a mode which increases the security for the first fourth the mutability in the public councils arising from a rapid succession of new members however qualified they may be points out in the strongest manner the necessity of some stable institution in the government every new election in the states is found to change one half of the representatives from this change of men must proceed to change opinions and from a change of opinions a change of measures but a continual change even of good measures is inconsistent with every rule of prudence and every prospect of success the remark is verified in private life and becomes more just as well as more important in national transactions to trace the mischievous effects of a mutable government would fill a volume I will hint a few only innumerable others in the first place it forfeits the respect and confidence of other nations and all the advantages connected with national character an individual who is observed to be inconstant to his plans or perhaps to carry on his affairs without any plan at all is marked at once by all prudent people as a speedy victim to his own unsteadiness and folly his more friendly neighbors may pity him but all will decline to connect their fortunes with his and not a few will seize the opportunity of making their fortunes out of his one nation is to another what one individual is to another with this melancholy distinction perhaps that the former with fewer of the benevolent emotions than the latter are under fewer restraints also from taking undue advantage from the indiscretions of each other every nation consequently whose affairs betray a want stability may calculate on every loss which can be sustained from the more systematic policy of their wiser neighbors but the best instruction on this subject is unhappily conveyed to America by the example of her own situation she finds that she is held in no respect by her friends that she is the derision of her enemies and that she is a prey to every nation which has an interest in speculating on her fluctuating councils and embarrassed affairs the internal effects of a mutable policy are still more calamitous it poisons the blessing of liberty itself it will be of little avail to the people that the laws are made by men of their own choice if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read or so incoherent that they cannot be understood if they be repealed or revised before they are promulgated or undergo such incessant changes that no man who knows what the law is today can guess what it will be tomorrow law is defined to be a rule of action but how can that be a rule which is little known and less fixed another effect of public instability is the unreasonable advantage it gives to the sagacious the enterprising and the moneyed few over the industrious and uninformed mass of the people every new regulation concerning commerce or revenue or in any way affecting the value of the different species of property presents a new harvest to those who watch the change and can trace its consequences a harvest reared not by themselves but by the toils and cares of the great body of their fellow citizens this is a state of things in which it may be said with some truth that laws are made for the few not for the many in another point of view great injury results from an unstable government a front of confidence in the public councils stamps every useful undertaking the success and profit of which may depend on a continuance of existing arrangements what prudent merchant will hazard his fortunes in any new branch of commerce when he knows not but that his plans may be rendered unlawful before they can be executed what farmer or manufacturer will lay himself out for the encouragement given to any particular cultivation or establishment no assurance that his preparatory labours and advances will not render him a victim to an inconstant government in a word no great improvement or laudable enterprise can go forward which requires the auspices of a steady system of national policy but the most deplorable effect of all is that diminution of attachment and reverence which steals into the hearts of the people towards a political system which betrays so many marks of stability and disappoints so many of their flattering hopes no government any more than an individual will long be respected without being truly respectable nor be truly respectable without possessing a certain portion of order and stability Publius End of Federalist No. 62