So, my name is Murray Hebert from the Southeast Asia Chair here at CSIS, we're delighted you're all here. We have our first panel which is going to talk about recent developments in the South China Sea. We're going to change the order up a little bit from what you saw in the program. Our first speaker will be Patrick Ronan, then Alan Dupont, then Dr. Tui and then Chris Johnson. But I'll introduce them as we go through the panel. So, Dr. Patrick Ronan is a Senior Advisor and Senior Director of the Asia Pacific Security Program at the Center for New American Security. Earlier he was a Senior Director of the Institute for National Security Studies, National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. For more details on his bio, you can look in their booklet. Well, Murray, thank you and Ernie and CSIS, congratulations on another tremendously attended conference. I've just flown in from Hawaii, so I apologize if I'm half asleep. What has changed, the update on the South China Sea from a U.S. perspective in the past year, is the deepening and persistent pattern of Chinese assertiveness, something I've called tailored coercion. And I was in Da Nang just a few weeks ago with Professor Jerry Cohen and Carl Thayer and a number of others, Greg Polling here from CSIS and we had a long dialogue about this, but it's not just the oil rig, the reclamation of the Johnson South Reef, the assertiveness in the Second Thomas Shoal, the action since 2012 in particular at Scarborough Shoal, intruding into waters disputed with Malaysia, domestic legal enforcement regime that's been put in place. The concern about the East China Sea aid is air defense identification zone that might be replicated in the South China Sea, potential unilateral energy and resource exploitation and challenges to other portions of the Nine Dash Line area, including even possibly waters around Indonesia's Natuna gas field. So that's in a nutshell sort of a lot of the things that have happened in the last couple of years, part of this really five year pattern of more assertiveness on the part of China. It's complex, we heard a very pugnacious introduction from Chairman Rogers, he's getting down to the point about American commitment. In my paper I prepared, I'm fairly critical of China but I do try to set it into a broader context and including trying to understand what the Chinese are doing and including their tremendous uncertainty internally. And internal security is a huge question for them. But bottom line, in fact the United States does need to work with the region to figure out how to change the calculus. So I think on the fundamental point, I would agree with Chairman Rogers, our aim is US policy in general, and I'm not a policy maker, I'm a think tanker, but I think the US policy overall is indeed still to expand cooperation with China and yet hedge. Unfortunately, when it comes to these gray zone areas where there's this tailored coercion, we're not having an impact, as Chairman Rogers suggested, on changing Chinese assertiveness. And so now the question is, whether it's the East China Sea, South China Sea, different areas, but same kind of Chinese behavior, what is exactly the way to impose costs on bad behavior or not abiding by rules that are mutually agreed to? And that's sort of what I want to focus on, which is a few points for US thinking. And I guess, again, another change in the past year from US policy perspective is simply that the United States government is more serious this year than it was even a year ago about cost imposition strategies against bad behavior in the South China Sea. One, we have to keep engaging China, right? I mean, so the administration is right not to back off, this is persistent, this is going to continue, China is not going to be contained or isolated, we have to deal with China, we have to have a relationship with China, we know that. And we're going to seek a peaceful resolution to dispute in disputed areas, but we have to be firm at the same time that unilateral changes to the status quo through coercion or force should not be acceptable. And that's the area we have to work on. So these other points basically try to truss up this response to tailored coercion. First, maintaining greater presence in and around the South China Sea. I think the United States is doing this. It's gradual, it's not a fundamental change, but it is a step up in US presence. And we're doing this in a number of ways. We've seen the enhanced defense cooperation agreement with the Philippines. We've already continued to now deploy, we're now going to be stationed in the second littoral combat ship up to four, potentially at Singapore, which is also an important hub for inclusive security dialogue like the Shangri-La Dialogue. We're expanding defense cooperation with Vietnam. I've argued recently and I would argue again today for including lifting even the lethal arms ban on Vietnam. Not because we have dramatic things we want to sell Vietnam right away, but I think it's an important symbolic step to start engaging Vietnam on that discussion. I think we need some muscle in our diplomacy to show that others are entitled to protect their interests as well. Not because we want them to go to war with China, but simply because we want to make sure that there are deterrence from assertiveness and that people have to find diplomatic ways and legal ways to deal with their differences. We should be expanding cooperation with Malaysian Indonesia. We're basically doing that, especially in the wake of the very contested election in Indonesia. It's going to be important to build on that. Countries outside of the South China Sea use the South China Sea. So India, Japan, Australia, others, they need to be part of this dialogue. The United States also needs to be following up probably next year on the future presence in Guam, training areas in the common wealth of Northern Mariana Islands, as well as Australia where the air training fields are going to become more important than the marine presence in Darwin over time. And the next defense white paper that will be out next year in Australia with the Abbott administration, I think will highlight and should highlight the alliance's importance as a regional public good, including in the South China Sea. Second thing we should be doing, this calculated shows a force, not a big believer that this has a big impact, but there are times when having your presence around at a time when there's mischief going on, including largely surveillance though, or port visits to countries, including allies, the way we had a submarine in Philippines during some of the Scarborough Shoal dust-up in 2012 in particular, more bilateral and multilateral exercises, naval air amphibious, law enforcement, all of these can be ways to demonstrate the U.S. operationalizing that presence. Talking about incremental changes, not fundamental big changes. Third thing is building partnership capacity. Again, this is ongoing, it's been ongoing for a long time, so it's not fundamentally new, but we're doing more of it, Coast Guard and Law Enforcement, Maritime Domain Awareness, Naval Air Professionalism, and then finally, regional efforts. So supporting ASEAN claimant cooperation, especially among Malaysia, as well as Vietnam, Philippines. I and I would be nice, but I think they'll go along with those three if they can reach a conclusion about how to, for instance, support things like the International Arbitration case. Supporting an ASEAN binding code of conduct. This is something that I think Carl Thayer will talk about. Keeping maritime issues on the ASEAN-centered institutions, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defense Minister's Meeting Plus, the East Asia Summit, and finally, a regional information sharing regime based on airborne intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance. Chairman Rogers hinted at this, but the time has come for this. We need to start basically declassifying really not very sensitive information. It's more abundantly available and basically put everything on C-span in the South China Sea, if you will, so that at least people are aware and can see what's going on and have information to debate what's going on. So that's why the footage of the Vietnamese fishing trawler that got rammed and sunk, seeing that was very impressive, just like the Japanese Coast Guard Cutter that got rammed by a fishing trawler a few years ago, also makes a case. I don't think the trend is very positive for the year ahead. I don't think that the tensions are actually going to subside. I don't think anything I've given you here is an answer in the next year to this problem, but I think it rebalances the U.S. ability to help shape and to help keep engaged with all of the key actors, including China, including our allies, including new partners like Vietnam, including actors outside of the South China Sea to try to come to good order at sea, to try to come to the rules of the road and the inclusive, open rules-based system we want. So thank you, and I'll be happy to expand on the Q&A. Thank you. Sorry, apologies. Thank you very much, Patrick. Our next speaker is Dr. Alan Dupont, who is a non-resident fellow at the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Australia. He's also a professor of international security at the University of South Wales. Alan, please. Thanks very much, Murray. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I know that in Washington one has to keep things short and sweet. So I intend to do that. I have 10 minutes. I've been asked to talk about the perspective of the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and ASEAN towards the South China Sea disputes. I'm not actually going to do that. I'm going to give you a couple of overarching comments about the significance of the South China Sea, and then I'm going to draw out some of the key points from the paper that I've written that is available to you. I think the first point I want to make about the South China Sea is that Westerners generally have not appreciated the significance and the importance of the South China Sea, notwithstanding the fact that in recent years it's been in the news a lot. If you go back and have a look at writings about the South China Sea, you'll see that it's really from a very Eurocentric and Atlantis perspective. You often see references to the South China Sea couched in European or North American terms. Nicholas Spikeman, for example, calls the South China Sea the Asia's Mediterranean, or others refer to it as the Chinese Caribbean. So I think this is not a very helpful way of looking at the South China Sea. One, because it devalues the significance of it, the fact that it's a completely different sea to the European hotspots that we're used to looking at historically. And most importantly, my argument is that the South China Sea has become the most important sea globally now, not only because of international trade flows, but also because of energy flows and because of the strategic issues that are now at risk in the South China Sea over these disputed islands. So I think we need to elevate the importance of the South China Sea in terms of international perspectives and understandings about where the future hotspots of the world are going to be in the future.  If you think about those trade flows, if you think about the strategic issues at stake here, if there is a conflict, a serious conflict in the South China Sea, it's definitely going to have global implications. Because if you have any disruption of that trade through the Malacca Strait into the South China Sea, the implications will not be confined to Southeast Asia. I can assure you of that. And just to illustrate that point, the Malacca Strait has arguably become now the world's critical waterway. The amount of oil going through the Malacca Strait by way of example is about three times that of the Suez Canal and about 15 times that which flows through the Panama Canal. So I would argue that the Malacca Strait has become more critical than the Suez, Panama Canal and the Straits of Hormuz. Now, that is why these disputes over a group of really quite unprepossessing the lylons of coral reefs has become so important. Because this is not just about territorial issues, it's about who owns these islands. But it's about if you own the islands, you own all the resources underneath the sea. Not only oil and gas, but importantly, marine living resources, fish. Now, I wrote about this for the Washington Quarter a few months ago. I think this is one factor that's been missing in a lot of the conventional explanations about the drivers of conflict in the South China Sea. That fish is an important resource. It also feeds into the drivers of this conflict. But it's much more than territory. It's much more than resources. It's about the shifting power balance in the region. It's about China's rise. It's about increasing nationalism. And these are all playing out in the South China Sea because these island disputes have become triggers for a much broader conflict between the great powers in the region. So put simply, China clearly views the South China Sea as its sea, not just in name, but in fact, that it wishes to push the U.S. out of that western Pacific because it sees its rightful patronage as to dominate the South China Sea. So it's about China's rise and it's about other countries resisting that rise. And that is why these disputes have assumed far greater importance than that would appear when you just look at them. By the way, can we have my first slide up? It's always useful to have a map up if we can get one. That's possible later on. Okay, I just want to draw out five big points about the conflicts in the South China Sea. My first one is that when you look at it from an ASEAN perspective, in the initial stages of the conflicts, much of the concern among the ASEAN states were about the intramural conflicts between the ASEAN states, remembering that there are four ASEAN states which claim islands and reefs in the South China Sea. So this was a big issue for ASEAN. But what became apparent to most ASEAN countries was that China was going to be the bigger long-term concern simply because of its growing strategic weight and because it was showing a much greater degree of activism than anyone could have anticipated 10 or 15 years ago. So we've gone from concerns about intra-ASEAN cohesion and fragility being affected by these disputes to ASEAN concerned about China's territorial claims in the South China Sea, which I think as most of you know covers almost 90% of the sea. We finally have you up here. Thank you. I'm afraid this doesn't come out quite as well with all these lights on, but when I start talking about a few of the issues here, it might give you some sense of where they're located. The second point I want to make is that while Vietnam and the Philippines have been quite isolated in their attempts to elevate the South China Sea in ASEAN's concerns, I think that sentiment is starting to shift within ASEAN to a more robust and more united position vis-a-vis China. Now, China has been very successful in picking off each of the ASEAN countries and bringing a lot of pressure to bear on them to either settle these disputes or to concede to China's claims. And China has been, as I said, quite successful in doing that over the last five years, but I think it's going to be more difficult for it to do in the future because the ASEAN countries are now becoming extremely anxious and insecure about some of China's, what I call, muscular unilateralism over the last couple of years. The third point I want to make is about Indonesia's position as the key swing state in ASEAN. Now, most of you know that Indonesia is not a claimant state to the Spratlys, but Indonesia does come into this dispute increasingly because it owns a group of islands called the Natuna Islands, which I'm afraid doesn't show up too well on this map, but it's in the southern part of the South China Sea and the Indonesians now believe and have come out and said this publicly that China's territorial claims may actually intersect the exclusive economic zone of the Natuna Islands. So now Indonesia's interests are being engaged, and Indonesia, which has adopted a very softly approach China, is now starting to take a much more robust position in drawing China's attention to the fact that Indonesia is not going to resolve from defending its territorial claims on the Natuna Islands. The fourth point I want to make is that some ASEAN states are increasingly looking outside ASEAN for their counter-strategies. Now, this is a very significant development given the broad consensus over the last 30 or 40 years within ASEAN that ASEAN must work together consensus decision-making and a great reluctance to go outside ASEAN. I think that is starting to change and you see this with Vietnam and the Philippines in particular where they're now seeking to draw in other larger powers to balance China, and that's the shift that's starting to take place. The final point I want to make, and this will be my last point, is that while I do not believe that there is yet an arms race in Southeast Asia, there is no doubt that the militarisation of the Spratly Island and the South China Sea disputes is of great concern to the region and is propelling and forcing countries to look at their defence spending and particularly their spending on the maritime space. So we're starting to see ASEAN countries increase their defence spending, putting more money into maritime capabilities, and unfortunately, in my view, this is likely to worsen the disputes over time because the triggers for future military conflict are going to multiply and become more dangerous. So that is not a very positive development, but it's an understandable one if you're sitting in the shoes of the ASEAN states and you're looking at what China is doing in the South China Sea. So that's my final point. Thank you very much. Great, Eln, that was great. Thank you very much. Our next speaker, and he's going to use PowerPoint, so can we get it up quickly? Our next speaker is Dr. Tran Trung Thuy, who is the research fellow and director of the foundation for the EC. As the Vietnamese call it, some of us call it South China Sea studies at the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam. He's also deputy director of the Center for Foreign Policy and Regional Studies at the Diplomatic Academy. Dr. Thuy, over to you. Good morning. It's a great honour for me to speak again here. I think one of the most important conference on the South China Sea issue. I will speak on some recent development reasons and provide some of my personal observations on its implications of the region. I agree with the Chairman and also with previous speakers on the increasing assertiveness of China in the South China Sea in last year and in the first half of this year. And we can see China's deepening claims by scopes of its claims and also by sophisticated methods of the field on diplomacy and also in domestic affairs. And if you see, for example, on the air, after establishing the ADIS in the East China Sea, China also announced the possibilities of establishing ADIS in the South China Seas. And to prepare for possible ADIS in the South China Sea, China has now invested huge resources on expanding the reef in Johnson to build an air strip in the South China Sea. And if you see here, with the combination with air strip in Goody Islands in the Paracels and air strip in Spratly, China can provide air coverage for their enforcement of possible ADIS in the South China Sea. And also they conduct more offshore patrols and enforce China maritime laws by the State Ocean League Administration. On the other hand, China also deepening the claims on the seabed and a little notice on this development. We can see China already actually announced their claims on more than 200 ship grids in the seabed of the South China Sea. And they also claim to conduct archeology in the South China Seas and plans to protect this size and in order to register maritime seagrows for UNESCO, one heritage test. On diplomacy, China continue with divide and rule strategies. More and more investment from China to offer economic incentives to South Asian countries, especially to non-Clement countries. And you can see in recent two and three years, China offer a lot of initiative. For example, maritime seagrows, Asia infrastructure investment bank. China also upgrade China-ASEAN free trade agreement and also offer Asian-China charity on good nobleness and cooperation. And I think it's that indication of China offer alternative for COC. And China also actively pushing diplomatic pressure to prevent ASEAN from forming a common position on the South China Sea issue. And they single out specific countries in specific times. And you can see after Philippines, they turn to Japan. After Japan, they turn to Vietnam and they try to single out specific countries. They don't want to deal with two or three countries at the same time. They continue with cabbage strategy in the South China Sea for salami slicing or as Chairman Mike Roger mentioned, just leaf by leaf and step by step. So we can see after Second Thomas Solst, we see new incident with scabrows. With China fight the water cannons on Philippines fishing boats. And we can see also the exercise, military exercise in James Shaw's. And we can see incident with the U.S. ship corpents, the most near collisions between U.S. and China's impeccable incidents. And China also increased military activities in the South China Seas. On other hand, they also adopted a lot of domestic measures to strengthen their claims in the South China Seas. For example, new passports with nine dashed lines, search and boss rules, and fishing rules adopted by Hainan province. And they also announced new fishing bans. They also published a new horizontal map with ten dashed lines. And you can see the map of China now is similar to the map of Southeast Asia already. And they also enhanced the activity in so-called sansacity. And if we put the recent incident into broader picture that we compute since 2007, we can see the continuation of China assertiveness on the South China Sea. Almost incident happened anyway within the nine dashed line with almost every country, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the U.S. and so on. But the turning point is the ongoing tension between China and Vietnam relating to placement of China deep sea drilling orach within Vietnamese EEZ. This is a new level of assertiveness. In various criteria, it's the first time China drinks in disputed waters. The project just prevents other countries from conducting oil and gas exploration. But here is the first time China actually drinks in the continental shelf. And second is that it's a high level of mobilization of protecting force. For the first time, they deploy more than 100 government and civilians ships to protecting the oil rates including military ships. And the first time, so long duration of tension, more than three months. And China continue with and more in term of mass, in term of location about ramming and later cannon firing techniques. And here's a video you can see China using water, paddling, and China and so on. And the position of parties regarding to these incidents, China considers the Paracels belong to China and China sovereignty is undisputable. That the oil rate location is within contiguous zones of Triton-Island. And the position of parties regarding to these incidents, China considers the Paracels belong to China and China sovereignty is undisputable. The position is within contiguous zones of Triton-Island, the most southwest future of Paracels. Vietnam position is that Vietnam has sovereignty over Paracels and China illegally occupies the Paracels by force in 1974. And China during activity violates Vietnam sovereignty rights is the error within its own easy measure from its coastlines. And we can see some weaknesses of China's argument. First, the argument is that China Paracels is indisputable. We can see no affirmative evidence proving China sovereignty. Even China official maps until 1929 did not include Paracels. And you can see two maps here, one by Western and one by China official China maps in 1929. The most southern point is Hainan Islands. For Vietnam, Vietnam also maintain claims and so evident at least in 17th century. So two countries maintain claims in the region. So occupation by military force violates international law of course. But here is also more significant this location of the rig is outside of Paracels waters. You can see here on the map, the equidistant lines between Vietnam and China and you can see the location of the rig is on the Vietnamese side of equidistant lines. For example, if Paracels can generate any kind of water, you can see also the location of the rig is outside the waters of Paracels. So some observation, my personal observation, China approaches the continuation of Salamis slicing strategy with more centralized and coordinated approach with garbage strategies, three levels of forces. And now we see some developments that state-owned enterprise is strategic weapons for foreign policy. And China now moving from reactive assertiveness to active aggressiveness. You see, in this incident, Vietnam did not conduct any activity before that. And the implication, deterioration of Vietnam-China relationship because the implication for freedom of navigation, ASEAN is more concerned on the issue. And for the first time since 1995, they released a statement on South China Sea issue. And we see U.S. is more active in this region on this issue. And U.S. positions also have spillover efforts on influence on positions of other parties. And Japan is also more active in voicing and in maritime cooperation with ASEAN claimant. And but so far, all of these coordinated or different approach could not prevent China from expansion. And we can see bilateral and multilateral approaches are effective in preventing China. And we need, I agree with previous speaker, we need more creative thinking on that. We need concerted efforts to impose more costs for China. China's calculation is based on costs and benefits in short term and long term. And in this aspect, ASEAN and U.S. should take a list on that issue with more coordination, with more rule-sensing, including more engagement from U.S. in this region. Thank you very much. Dr. Tui, thank you very much. Our next speaker is our colleague from CSIS, Chris Johnson. Chris is the Freeman chair in China Studies here at CSIS. And he has spent prior to coming to CSS, he spent nearly two decades working in the intelligence and foreign policy communities here in Washington. Chris. Thanks, Bernie. And I'd just like to thank my fellow panelists. I had a really rich discussion this morning and certainly that last presentation gives us a lot to think about in terms of what China's up to. I think what I'm going to try to do and in order to be in keeping with Chairman Rogers' suggestion that we not leave any ideas in the pocket, so we want to get to the audience actually as quickly as we can, get you guys engaged, I'm just going to offer a couple of brief overview comments. And I'm going to try to focus not on some of these details because I think they've been really well laid out already, but try to do ways we can think about why the Chinese are doing this. And how we should think about, how we should respond. And I think what's been driving my thinking on this recently is just that, you know, like any other problem one might look at as an analyst, I think you need to have an analytic construct that helps you filter the data to create some kind of a reality that has some explanatory power with any luck. And so I'll be honest in saying I would differ slightly with Congressman Rogers this morning in terms of my core analytic construct has been with China on most issues that generally speaking, they don't do things where they're shooting themselves in the face on a regular basis. They're generally pretty pragmatic in their approach, not wanting to create a lot of difficulty. And so when they're doing things like we've just been walking through that at least to us through our western lens seems so blatantly contradictory to their own interests and would seem to create a response in the region that is precisely the opposite of what they seek to have happen. I have to ask myself a couple of questions. I think one of those questions is what do the Chinese know or perhaps better what do they assess that makes them think this is a good idea when in fact I don't or at least a viable idea. And two, and I think perhaps more worrisome for all of us if it's true, is this being driven by some sort of sense that the Chinese over time have begun to buy into a self-generated narrative about their rising power and influence in the region and therefore that the kind of the sucking sound, if you will, of that phenomenon is sufficient to allow them to be very forthright in asserting their sovereignty and not face much of a response. So in recent trips to China I've kind of asked these questions of people I was meeting with and it was interesting. I got answers really in both of those directions so it's kind of interesting. I guess I would just offer three sort of big points to help us think about how we would frame a discussion on this. The first I think that helps us understand why they're doing this is to acknowledge that this is a defined strategy, not a series of tactical developments or responses to things that the neighbors are doing or the U.S. is doing and so on. And so I think it's quite dangerous actually if we find ourselves focusing on the possible tactical motivations such as, you know, CNOC or others want to advance their commercial interests or the military is fighting with the civilian leadership or in fact has the civilian leadership on the defensive. I mean my own view is just ridiculous given Xi Jinping's emerging power within the system. So we have to understand it as a strategy and as each one of these episodes linking together to advance that strategy. I don't think this is a blueprint, step-by-step grand strategy of some sort where they know exactly each move they want to make but there's an end point to all of this that is clear and obvious. So I think that's an important factor. The second I think frankly is really to focus much more on this issue of the mind of Xi Jinping as the new Chinese leader and I think that's very important now. I mean myself as a sort of Morgenthau realist in terms of how I approach international relations I don't like to dwell on pop psychology but I do think with Xi Jinping it's much more important and it's more important precisely because he has accrued so much power to himself inside the system and has really changed the machine if you will of how the Chinese crap their foreign policy and frankly I think it's much more difficult opaque system now than it was under his predecessor Hu Jintao who relied very heavily on the bureaucracy to get things done precisely because he didn't have a whole lot of intrinsic power to himself and so I think in some ways given that there were so many agencies in the know if you will about policy decisions it was easier perhaps for those of us as researchers to be able to pick up a general picture of what was going on. My sense now is so much of what's happening in these incidents is she makes a decision it's communicated to the relative the related arm of the Chinese government and it's executed and so therefore his thinking his approach I think is much more important perhaps for us to focus on. So what can we say about his thinking on these issues? I think two points that I would just stress the first is that I think Xi Jinping has a much more sort of ideological view of the world of China's position in the world than his predecessors have had and you know this is a difficult subject to sort of discuss here in Washington because sometimes we don't do nuance particularly well and there's an interest to sort of say oh ideological he must be a hardline communist it's Mao Zedong you know that sort of thing no not at all but he is a Marxist and he looks at things in dialectical terms and I think if you focus on and you think about things through a lens of historical determinism and the correlation of material forces in these kind of Marxist concepts and your China you're feeling pretty good about your position you don't see a real challenge to your position and as my colleague Ernie Bauer is so fond of saying in Asia economics is security and so to the degree that the Chinese feel that they're the only economic game in town as Chairman Rogers said this morning that I think makes them feel that the ASEAN countries others involved might complain a lot along this process but ultimately they will sort of stand aside because of their dependence and interest in China's economic prospects and so I really think this is where things like the Trans-Pacific Partnership getting our own house in order here domestically to provide that alternative economic entity for countries in the region to be able to rely on reliably is very important. The second point I would make is just to note that it's also clear I think so far from his actions that Xi Jinping's appetite for risk both domestically and internationally is much higher than his predecessors. I try to say that in a very value neutral way. I think it's important that we not say that this is implicitly bad I think it has a lot of potentially bad consequences but right now it's just a statement to suggest that he has this higher appetite for risk and we need to be aware of that and my own sense is that when you combine that higher appetite for risk with what I described earlier about changes to the way foreign policy decisions are made it means that indications and warning sort of indicators are much harder to see now and maybe much less likely. So for PECOM or for other folks who are tracking these developments you may not have the kind of warning that you might have previously that something is about to happen. So I guess I'll wrap it up there in the audience then. Excellent, thanks a lot Chris. Okay, so we've had four excellent panelists they've thrown a lot of ideas out there and so we're now over to you the audience. If you have a question we would prefer you have a question if you have a statement please keep it short and try to end with a question mark if possible. So please identify yourself and there are going to be mic runners who are going to give you the mic. Chris? Thanks, Chris Nelson, Nelson Report. Just a quick comment and then a question. Just imagine five years ago we had heard Chairman Rogers' speech what would we be thinking? We'd all be going holy cow what a winger you know and now here we are listening to that and we're following the analysis and we're all kind of there. You know the discussions are about how do we counter these things not oh my god what are you talking about? You know just five years ago it's stunning actually and I think we need to remind ourselves we should be stunned by what's going on. My question, this is a constant chicken and egg we all kind of agree that ASEAN and the Australians and Singapore and everybody that they've got to act collectively in order to have a chance of an effective counter to China but we also agree that especially given the narrative of U.S. decline and some of the false lessons that are drawn from the Crimea and Syria and all that that the U.S. has to lead in order to give the neighbors the power to do something. How do you bridge this gap? How do you what do we need to be doing actively beyond some of the things we're doing is it time for a more active Seventh Fleet presence? A symbolic use of actual force so to deter the possibility of having to actually use the damn force. Are we at that point yet? How do we work together? Who goes first? Can it only be collective or must we go first? That's my question. Thanks. I don't know. Patrick that's sort of seem to be your almost you want to start? Jump in if you like. Chris this is an ongoing saga that I think will continue for some time and I think it's going to take us multiple years to try to put in place a broader set of effective tools bilaterally, multilaterally including our relationship with China to hopefully ratchet down some of the rising tensions that are complex that we've heard about why these are ongoing. So I've outlined some of those tools I've even talked about flexing some muscle at the right time but I don't think that get into tactical solutions I don't think that's a solution per se I just want to give policy makers I think policy makers need more leverage more tools to gain leverage and the participating the claimants states themselves need more capacity for military defense and coast guard law enforcement defense up to a certain point yes that does introduce the complication of more triggers as Alan pointed out but I also think it introduces more deterrence. United States like every other country in this region including China is really less interested in conflict than it is with influence and the US doesn't have a particularly high appetite for confrontation on these issues but it needs to be willing to accept some greater risk including those shows of force at the right time to help dissuade Chinese leaders from thinking that this is an easy benefit that is making the nine dash line de facto reality Chris I know you've probably heard this phrase leading from behind and I know it's been disparaged a lot in the US it's actually happens to be an Indonesian phrase leading from behind but there's a lot to be said for the US not being out in front on the South China Sea disputes. It's not saying you shouldn't perhaps nuance your strategy a bit more and I can suggest some ways of doing that but I think it would be a mistake for the US to leap out here and do exactly the things the Chinese are accusing you of doing. At the moment if you look at this objectively the US is really in a pretty strong position. You've got all the countries in the region pretty much lining up the US to hedge against China's rise. The region is doing a lot itself to respond maybe not that effectively at the moment but it's difficult for China to really get traction on this argument that you're trying to contain China when you look at what US policy responses have been over the last three or four years. So I would have thought you could achieve your strategic objectives which is to maintain the safety of its international sea lands and global commons, provide support for your allies and friends in the region but do it in a low key non-confrontational way and be seen to be responding to requests from the region rather than the US pushing its own interest. That's the way I would go with the US strategy. I'll just add a couple points. I think again to think about it from sort of the 50,000 foot level I think one of the issues and it picks up on what Alan just said is that while we do need to think carefully about how we approach it you know ASEAN I think as demonstrated in an earlier round of this debate needs a ringleader it doesn't necessarily need to be the United States it can be an ASEAN country as Alan suggested earlier the role of Indonesia I think is very interesting going forward but there needs to be some sort of an organizing presence and I do think that for good or for ill they do look to us to play that role regardless of whether that's the case or not you know whether we deserve the influence we have or not they do watch what we do and listen to what we say very carefully on these issues as do the Chinese so my feeling is that if you want to get this right the first big step is to make sure that everything you're saying and doing is being crafted and thought about in the context not just of the political or the particular bilateral relationship you might be focusing on because of a presidential trip or something like that at that given time but how that decision is going to be viewed by the other players in the region and that requires I think then a lot of pre-briefing and post-briefing of allies about what we're doing because if you don't then those countries will you know do what we all do to craft their own narrative to explain what's happening and as we all know that when we're crafting our own narrative about something as usually the darkest possible narrative possible Michael Michael Yehuda from GW I think in the last week or so there's been signs of usual commentators, academics and think tankers in Beijing talking to western reporters in a rather questioning way about the way China has behaved and one at least has said that the United States should in some sense show that China has to pay a cost for its behaving others have raised questions about the fact that Asians do not seem to accept the official Chinese view about its history of humiliation and so on. Now I'd be interested in how the panelists assess this and whether or not they see this as some kind of domestic constraints upon China's recent actions. I think I've been reading the same articles you have and one thing that struck me about them while given anonymously in a few cases was how these Chinese think tankers I think primarily have been suggesting that there's a debate or at least some criticism inside the system about whether or not this is the right approach and that's pretty rare for them to do that especially with western journalists so I find that to be very interesting. I'm not sure the debate matters that much because I think those comments tend to conclude with but the boss has decided this is the way we're going to do it and they have a choice. So I think that's an important factor to underscore but it does suggest that there are at least some inside the system who are sort of wondering just like we're all wondering whether or not this is ultimately going to backfire on the Chinese and you know we hear a lot of discussion about the scoring of own goals and this sort of thing. I just like to emphasize that relying on the other side to consistently score own goals is not a strategy. It's wishful thinking and also I think that we should keep our minds open to the idea that indeed they may not be scoring own goals on themselves and they know exactly what they're doing with this strategy because they think it will be effective. I mean I think we have to at least keep our minds open to that possibility. We've heard some very valuable introductory remarks and I just want to try to get the speakers to broaden it even further. We're concerned with trends. I'd like to see where you think the South China Sea strategy and you're right it is a strategy fits in the China's overall foreign policy and its domestic policy. For example it's obvious that Hong Kong is going to be a crisis soon. Taiwan two years down the road will once again become perhaps more important than the current concerns over what are still just piles of rock. With Ma stepping down it's going to be very hard whoever succeeds him to continue the success cross trade agreements etc. When we look at China's domestic policy we see Xi Jinping is indeed a high roller a risk taker. He's engaging in more repression than we've seen his predecessors engage in. Can you relate the South China Sea strategy to these other emerging trends as well as to the East China Sea? How broad can the picture be meaningfully made? Sure. And no I did not pay Jerry to ask that question. Just so we're clear. Let me, I hope I didn't misspeak in my opening remarks. I wasn't simply trying to describe a South China Sea strategy. It's a comprehensive foreign policy strategy. When I say there's a defined strategy I mean in Toto. And the East China Sea and the South China Sea are linked. The behavior there clearly is linked. Again my concern is that if we focus on tactical explanations for individual episodes we're going to miss the big picture. And if your construct is wrong you're going to have wrong conclusions and therefore wrong policy recommendations. You asked if I could tie the domestic situation to this foreign policy strategy I could very easily do that but I tend to disagree with that sort of thinking that somehow there are concerns about the economy slowing and the need for distraction with bread and circuses and so on is driving this foreign policy. It tends to cheapen the idea that no, it's a defined strategy for its own purposes. The domestic obviously influences the external but I don't think it's being driven by that. What I think we see is the parallelism in the way Xi Jinping is running the country both domestically and abroad. And one key theme to kind of tie the two together is that he's trying to pursue a series of reforms that are very, very hard that have lots of opponents inside the system. This is true domestically but people forget that the third plenum document last fall also had a lot of reforms of the judicial system, social reforms, military structural reform which I think is playing a very big part in what's going on in their external behavior. And there seems to be a sense that's developing that because these challenges are difficult to be able to justify what he wants to do and get people on board he needs to create a certain sense of urgency or crisis with regard to both the domestic situation and the external situation. So in terms of how we can understand that as outside observers I guess one of my points would be what does it mean for the rest of us including the regional claimants and everyone else in the region that she appears to have concluded that he needs to maintain a certain level of tension both domestically and externally in order to be successful with what he's trying to do. Hong Kong and Taiwan I agree completely. I think Hong Kong is headed in a very dangerous direction in part because Xi Jinping seems to take a much harder view on Hong Kong than his predecessors. I tried to get to the bottom of why that is. It's been hard to do. I do find it interesting that his father was the party secretary in southern Guangdong province when in fact Hong Kong was a hostile base of subversion and the British were running in there and so on. I do think if I'm sitting in Taipei and I'm watching what's happening in Hong Kong I do find myself saying why is one country two systems a good idea? It's kind of difficult to see. We'll see whether they do the right thing on universal suffrage or not. But all these things certainly are should be seen as a cohesive net and I think the way to tie it all together is Xi Jinping's idea that it's about the party and its continued hold on power and it's about China's return to great power status and as such they're going to exercise their sort of behaviors both internally and externally as if they are a confident strong great power. I think that's the best way to try to tie it together. Can I just add a couple of points to Chris's analysis I think he's absolutely right on those questions but I'd say from a broader strategic perspective I think the South China Sea has become a critical element of Chinese strategy for a couple of reasons. One is if you look at their last two five-year plans you'll see they've given great emphasis to the maritime domain because essentially the South China Sea has become the major conduit and maritime highway for China's future economic growth. All the resources it needs the energy and so on have to come through that sea. It's become critical to Chinese thinking whether it's economic or geostrategic. Secondly you're aware of the fact that the Chinese and Hu Jintao in particular have referred to the Malacca dilemma that is the concerns that in a future conflict with the United States for example that the U.S. may choose to cut off the flow of goods to China through the Malacca Strait. And that's been specifically mentioned and PLA strategists look at this now all the time as to how they can find ways around that. So I think if you see it in terms of the military strategy they're putting enormous resources into their maritime capabilities. They're not doing that just for fun. They're doing that because that's where they see most likely sources of contention. These are the vital sea lanes for China and they're tired of outsourcing Chinese economic security to the U.S. 7th fleet. They want the PLA and the U.S. 7th fleet down there providing protection for Chinese goods and energy. So I think all those factors play into Chinese strategic thinking about the importance of the South China Sea. Can I just throw in one more comment on that because I think what Alan just said is really important. The other piece here is as Chris was saying earlier we're sort of saying what happened here what's going on. This is very shocking and so on. They've actually told us exactly what they were going to do starting from the 18th party congress in 2012 in the work report the political work report that the predecessor Hu Jintao delivered said China's now is a maritime power and people say it's one sentence who cares. They hadn't said that for several hundred years so they were very clearly indicating a direction with that. They also said in that document that the size and composition and so on of the People's Liberation Army should be consistent with China's growing national power and strength and interest abroad. That's a pretty broad sort of definition for how you're going to build your military and then Xi Jinping himself has held several of these Politburo level study sessions on the maritime issue where he's also been very clear about the direction. So to me they haven't been exactly hiding how they're thinking about this issue and we should read what they say very carefully. My name is Nguyen Ngoc big with the National Congress of Vietnamese Americans. I have a remark and then a quick questions addressed to Dr. Chan-Chung Thuy. My remark is that we are sometimes trapped by our language by calling this massive international water the South China Sea somehow it predisposes people to think that somehow it belongs to China whereas even the Chinese named for it Nanhai doesn't say anything about China it just says Southern Sea. So I think that's why there's a Vietnamese foundation called the Nguyen Thai Hock Foundation that has been circulating a petition that said now receive over 100,000 international signatures calling it the South Asian Sea. I think that would probably can have consensus on that. So that's one issue. The second issue is that we are also trapped by our representation. The Chinese I think the weakest claim of the Chinese to that South Asian Sea is their so-called nine dotted line. It started out as 11 and then it becomes nine recently it becomes 10. So I think the responsibility of the Chinese government is to try to define what does that mean? If this discontinues so then what does the discontinued part means? Do they claim to the discontinued part or only those that has a line? By representation as we saw in Dr. Tui's representation as a continuous line or as you can see in Vietnam know you it's a continuous line. I think we are giving the Chinese some credit because they themselves do not claim to the whole continuous line. Why should we give it to them at that advantage? Thank you. Dr. Tui? Thank you for question. First on the name of the sea I think the name is not indication of sovereignty over the sea for China for example the Gulf of Mexico is not belong to Mexico or Gulf of Thailand is not belong to Thailand. So for international audience of course we use the more well-known of South China Sea. Of course for Vietnam we call it is Vietnam sea is sea in Vietnam. Sorry. It's Vietnam sea in Vietnam. Regarding to the China Nidus lies first we don't have any clear explanation from China on the meanings especially the meaning of the Nidus lies. We talk a lot with Chinese scholars and they give different meanings on the Nidus lies it's lie to indicates sovereignty over islands or lie to indicates waters within the lies but since 2009 and 2010 after communication regarding to joint submission of continental shop between Vietnam and Malaysia and when China attached a map to United Nations, we see China is more clear in defining the lies. Now they are more rely on the concept of sovereignty over islands also on the economic zone and continental shop of islands and besides that also they claim the historic rise for China in resources exploitation as a fish or oil and gas. But more important I think it's not about China claims but about China activity within the Nidus lies and as I mentioned in the map we see a lot of incidents a lot of activity that China conducted within the lies and in reality they want to change Nidus lies to the factor China waters and turn the China scene to China lake. So I think in my map I also draw a lot of lies and it's maps just for illustration and not for claiming something. Hi my name is Paul Pham from the Federation of Vietnamese American communities of the USA we all know that China and Vietnam are alive for long time and Vietnam depends heavily on China treat but Vietnam doesn't have defense agreement with the United States in the case of Vietnam request or ask for help from the United States will the United States will the United States be willing to just Vietnam enough in order to help Vietnam. Secondly the United States behave differently or act differently on several cases the United States did not respond on the China China invasion of Paracel Island in 1974 and the United States did not respond concretely on the China occupied of Scarborough of the Philippines but the United States support completely the case of of Japan. So the question is that will Asian country trust the United States determination in helping them to protect themselves. Thank you. Patrick maybe that's an idea with this issue in part in the paper that I've written that should be circulated later. It's a fair question it's obviously the context of history matters a great deal so let's take the Senkaku island issue this was part of the Okinawa prefecture from the US perspective first World War II US occupied Japan and Okinawa and it only negotiated the reversion of Okinawa and Okinawa prefecture in 1971 to begin in 72 and under the Mutual Security Treaty with Japan territories occupied or administered by Japan are included under Article 5 of the treaty. So it's a statement of fact that the United States has over time reverted territory back said you're now administering this territory and yes it's included in the alliance so that's sort of a statement of fact it's also true that we were fighting a war in Vietnam and then we were losing that war and retreating from Vietnam and there were much higher stakes in the Cold War that Dr. Kissinger and others and these are documented and I cite some of the documents that have been declassified in my paper basically cited completely with being soft on China and it was a valuable sort of partner in breaking what we thought was a consolidated communist phalanx with the Soviet Union and it was in that division that separation was strategically valuable at the time so that was the context in which 74 parasols we looked the other way essentially as did other countries Indonesia thought they had private agreements with Joe and I and it's only recently now as we've just heard that they're wondering whether those agreements really still stand right now because it's not as clear so we're all reinterpreting China in the context of a risen China China that has risen so quickly has so much more capacity and so much more capacity than its neighbors and yet is trying to exert economic and political influence as well perhaps in line with more historical context or framework that we're concerned about this so now we do want to increase the US-Vietnam security relationship and that went through a period of normalization that took time went through a period of creating a serious strategic dialogue and returning with port visits that's taken time and I think this next phase needs to step up a notch and it will take time but it will not be an alliance we will not look for bases but we can increase engagement we can increase as I mentioned as well as potentially especially ones that are oriented toward maritime information, intelligence security of defense just as we support what Japan is doing in terms of patrol boats for instance to Vietnam and we want to see that turn back on as quickly as possible there's been a concern over corruption on the defense on the development assistance account so it's not going to be a guarantee but there's going to be willing support going back to Alan Dupont's admonition US is responding to what we're hearing out of Hanoi we're responding to what we're hearing out of Manila the United States is not suddenly pushing this approach we are indeed responding to this and we do have to if not lead from behind because that's a phrase that does not go well in Washington we are listening and working with others in the region and that's important so Vietnam is a critical partner and I think it's going to be a more important partner in the decade ahead than it has been even in the past Can I just ask the same question to you what's the Vietnamese perspective what are you prepared to accept from the United States in terms of support what are the limits I mean your country has a long tradition of independent foreign policy how much US assistance will your country accept I think we could put the US within the foreign policy of Vietnam of diversification and multi-religion of eastern relations Vietnam since 1986 adopted the Skype policy to expand relationship with own countries including major powers but in that aspect I think US now play more and more important roles in foreign policy of Vietnam in security and also development aspects and in South China Sea issue I think Vietnam and US share a lot of common interests in South China Sea namely respect of international law freedom of navigation peaceful system of disputes ASEAN centrality and also China rise will be peaceful it's one of their share common interests on practical aspect I think US and Vietnam have a lot of thing to do in improving cooperation in just aspects I don't expect Vietnam and US will become allies because of a lot of issues but until the level of ally I think a lot of issues we can develop including military paramilitary, economic aspect law enforcement capability and I think in just aspect economic and law enforcement capability I think the most important one in terms of South China Sea issues Pacific Fleece or Southern Fleece travel around South China Sea but it will not create any significant impact on current contests for resources in the region it's mainly with law enforcement agencies within Clemens countries and China of course goes far away from that we cannot interfere on the context of the issue but on economic aspect I think US can play more and more important role US now puts more important on TPP negotiation but I think it's still a long time of negotiation still a long time to come but on bilateral economic relation I think we can improve a lot and as demonstrated in the case of Philippines and China tension after Scarborough incident for example China imposed a convention on Philippines but US and Japan promote cooperation with Philippines and we see now Philippines economic growth is even higher than previous tension so by that way US can promote diversified economic relations with and strengthening Vietnam overall capability in dealing with China so unfortunately the time is up for this panel I see there's many questioners still out there but we're having a day and a half of meetings I'm sure you'll have a chance to ask your questions in the other panels please we're going to pause now for five minutes to transition this panel to the next one but before we do that please join me in thanking Dr. Tui, Patrick, Chris and Alan thank you


Hello, I'm Hans van der Kwas, senior lecturer at IHE Delft Institute for Water Education. In this video I'm going to show you how to calculate the Topographic Wetness Index. The Topographic Wetness Index is also known as the Compound Topographic Index, which is a steady state wetness index. It is commonly used to quantify topographic control on hydrological processes. The index is a function of both the slope and the upstream contributing area per unit width orthogonal to the flow direction. You can apply the Topographic Wetness Index to whole catchments and subcatchments but also to parcels. In this example I will apply it to a parcel. The first thing we need to do is to calculate the slope of this digital elevation model. In the main menu we go to Raster, Analysis, Slope. There we can choose to save and bear a torn formula instead of the horns one if you have more smooth areas. If you have steep areas you don't check the box, you can check this box. And we want slope in degrees. So we'll choose an output folder to save the file. And let's call it slope degrees. Then we can run the algorithm and you can see that it uses the GDALDAM function. Let's do a bit of styling. We can see already in the map canvas that we lose the sites that is inherent on these kind of calculations. So it's better to choose a larger area than the area you need. So if we apply some styling we can see already which areas are steeper and which are flatter. The next step is to correct this slope map and situate that we don't have zeros in the map. So therefore we go to Raster Calculator. This is needed because later we take the logarithm, the natural logarithm. So we start with the bracket. We add slope in degrees and we say when it's less than zero or equal to zero that we have to correct it. So we do times one and for the other values we keep the slope. And we call this one slope degrees modified. We run it and we can copy the style. There it is. And now we need to convert it to radians. So we go back to the Raster Calculator. To convert it to radians we use zero, zero, one, seven, four, five. And then it's slope radians.tiff. We can also style these layers. Nob and pseudo color, color ramp, inverted so the higher slopes become red. So the next step is to calculate the upslope contributing area. And we can do that with the flow accumulation tool from Saga. As an input we choose our DTM. We keep the default fills things temporarily. And we save it to an output file which we call upslope area. This will basically calculate for each pixel the contributing upslope area. So it's done so we can also style this one. And we can keep the red to blue ramp. But maybe we can use another way of dividing the classes to get a bit more contrast. Now the final step is to apply the Topographic Wetness Index Equation. It starts with a natural logarithm, a few brackets. We add the upslope area. And we need to correct it for the pixel size. In this case we have a five meter digital terrain model. So we multiply it by five. And then we need to divide it by the tangent of the slope in radians that we previously calculated. And we can save the output as twi.tiff. And when we run it, we have our Topographic Wetness Index. We can style it to make more sense out of the contrast. And we can keep the red to blue ramp as we see here. And this will give us the wetter and the drier areas in this parcel. There are some other tools in QDS to calculate the Topographic Wetness Index. But this is the basic equation that you can simply build up in the raster calculator. The other tools you can find under the saga tools.


My name is Senior Airman Dominguez-Reyes and I am an A-10 crew chief and I am the mission. So what I do is the day-to-day maintenance of the A-10 aircraft inspections, servicing, launch to recover, refuel, jopes, which that's taking an oil sample. Should anything break, just gather the tools and fix it. From where I'm standing, everyone knows the pilots fly, but we crew chiefs, we are the reason it flies. It is a big responsibility. If we don't do the maintenance, the pilots don't play with their toys. So I view launches as showtime for two reasons. One, mainly it helps me focus and two, it's basically my way to give to the maintenance community. My crew chief call sign is actually junior. Basically, it's pretty much because of my flamboyant nature. I'm a man of many talents, what can I say?


Hello and welcome to this presentation of the STM32U5 RAM Configuration Controller. The RAM Configuration Controller is in charge of handling the error code correction, or ECC, supported by SRAM2, SRAM3 and backup SRAM, disabling ECC through a software sequence based on a key register, performing global SRAM erasure through a software sequence also based on a key register, protecting SRAM2 against right accesses for each 1 kilobyte chunk, and programming the number of weight states according to the actual frequency when the microcontroller is in voltage range number 4. This table summarizes the features of the internal SRAMs. Let us start with the features supported by all internal SRAMs. Low power background autonomous mode in stop 0 and stop 1 modes. Erasure with the readout protection level is decreased. Software erase. Adjustment of the number of weight states in voltage range 4. Low power background autonomous mode in stop 2 is only supported by SRAM4 because it belongs to the smart run domain. The smart run domain architecture relies on a DMA allowing autonomous operation during low power modes down to stop 2. The contents of SRAM2 and backup SRAM can be retained in standby mode. The contents of backup SRAM can be retained in VBAT mode. SRAM2 and optionally backup SRAM are protected by the tamper detection circuit and are erased by hardware in case of tamper detection. The ECC is supported by SRAM2, SRAM3 and backup SRAM when enabled with the SRAM2 ECC, SRAM3 ECC and BKP SRAM ECC user option bits. The SRAM2 is made of 64 1 kilobyte pages. Each 1 kilobyte page can be write protected by setting its corresponding PXWP bit in configuration registers. SRAM2, SRAM3 and backup SRAM implement a unit capable of detecting and correcting single bit errors and detecting double bit errors thanks to 7 ECC bits that are added per 32 bits of data. For 64 kilobytes blocks of SRAM3 and the 64 kilobytes of SRAM2 are ECC protected. Regarding SRAM3, the ECC codes are stored in a dedicated part of the SRAM, the upper 64 kilobyte part of SRAM3. This area shall not be used by applications when ECC is enabled. Regarding SRAM2, the information which is stored in 39 bit wide, 32 bit data plus 7 bit ECC. Consequently, the entire SRAM2 is always accessible. ECC error detection is reported to the Cortex-M33 as follows. Single error detection and correction cause an interrupt request. Double error detection causes an interrupt or non-mascable interrupt. The failing address is latched in a register. Optionally, the full SRAM2 or 8 kilobytes or 56 kilobytes can be retained in standby in stop 3 modes supplied by the low power regulator. This is called standby with SRAM2 retention mode. ECC can be automatically enabled by programming user option bits in the flash memory. ECC can be disabled by executing a software sequence that writes keys into ECC key registers. Since ECC requires a read-modify-write operation, when writing partial data, byte or half-word, the performance can be measured with and without ECC. When ECC is disabled in SRAM3, the last 64 kilobyte block containing the ECC codes is accessible by masters. This can be used for error injection. When ECC is enabled in SRAM3, this area is reserved and cannot be accessed by masters. To correctly read data from SRAMs, the appropriate number of weight states must be programmed depending on the AHB clock frequency, HCLK and voltage scaling range as shown in this table. Note that one weight state is required in range 4 when the frequency exceeds 12 MHz. The SRAM2 is made of 64 1 kilobyte pages. Each 1 kilobyte page can be write protected by setting its corresponding PXWP bit in the RAM CFG memory to write protection 1 and 2 registers. Two registers are necessary to form a bitmap of 64 bits. The consequence of attempting to write a bitwrite protected page is that the SRAM controller returns an error response to the AHB master. When this master is the Cortex M33 CPU, this error causes a bus fault exception. When this master is a DMA channel, this error is interpreted as a DMA transfer error. SRAM erase can be requested by executing a software sequence based on keys that have to be written to key registers. SRAM busy flag is set in the related SRAM interrupt status register as long as the erase is ongoing. The total duration of each SRAM erase is equal to NHB clock cycles where N is the size of the SRAM in 32-bit word units. If the SRAM is read or written while an erase is ongoing, weight states are inserted on the AHB bus until the end of the erase operation. The RAM configuration controller generates the following interrupt requests. A regular interrupt in the event of a single error detection and correction. The non-mascable interrupt in the event of a double error detection. Status registers provide the current status of these events, the address at which a correctable error has been detected, and the address at which a non-correctable error has been detected. Note that these addresses are locked until software clears the address latch enable bit in the control register. The table indicates the effect of low power modes on the RAM configuration controller. Sleep mode has no effect. RAM CFG interrupts cause the microcontroller to exit the sleep mode. In stop mode, the contents of RAM CFG registers and SRAM contents are kept. The ECC is functional and ECC error interrupt or NMI causes the microcontroller to exit the stop zero and stop one modes. In stop three, no SRAM access is possible. In stop two, only SRAM four remains accessible in the smart run domain by implementing the low power background autonomous mode or LP BAM. So in stop two and stop three, no ECC error can occur because SRAM four is not ECC protected. In standby mode, the RAM CFG module is powered down and must be re-initialized after exiting standby. Thank you for following this online training.


I am a repeat visitor of Socap. I've been coming for well over 10 years and I've always enjoyed Socap for the people I meet here. What keeps me coming back? The people. No, I'm going to stick with the people. It is a unique event in that it draws entrepreneurs and investors from all over the world and they conveniently all congregate in one place at least once a year and that makes it pretty special.


A fiery horse with a speed of light, a cloud of dust, and a hearty high old silver, the Lone Ranger. Rather, the planes led the fight for law and order in the early days of the Western United States. The local sheriffs and even federal officers learned to depend on his strength and courage, his daring and resourcefulness. No greater champion of justice can be found in the pages of history. Return with us now to those thrilling days when the West was young. From out of the past, from the Thundering Hooke Beach to the Great Horse Silver, the Lone Ranger rides again. While one of his men watched him with a grin on his face, Purvis, the owner of a small and scrubby cattle outfit near the town of Redwood, paced the floor of his two-room shack. Finally, he paused to stare out of the window. I won't see anything out there to help you, boys. Do not go dark anyway. Max, you've got to do this for me. Most of your dirty work, sure. But killings are might out of my line. I ought to give you your time and send you packing. Yeah? With all I could tell about you, if I so minded, I reckon you won't. Ah, you... Nobody cut off your trigger finger, did they? You want the kid's dry guts, do it yourself. That don't sound so good, huh? I didn't think it would. You always was a right careful, Ambrie.  Why, shucks, boss. You're just paying me cause I got a strong back. You're the gent that's the thinking around here.  You go right ahead. What am I going to tell Scar when he gets here? Tell him. What can you? Just tell him the truth. You sold them beaves, all right? Then found out that Stud poker weren't your game. But I've got to be able to pay him. Looks like you can't. He'll kill me. He's likely to do most anything.  Huh?  From what I've seen as Scar and his parts, when they deliver beef to you to sell and you sell it, why, well, they kind of hanker to get their share. Why, that upsets them something awful. They find out a fellow they trusted gambled their cash away.  Don't this mean nothing to you at all? Ain't my idol getting out of the wall. It's yours. I tell you then, for the matter of that, you got a way out. You're just too yellow to take it. I ain't standing for much more of your lip, Max. I ain't worried. And if it was me that had been related to old man Jackson and all that stood between me and that ranch he had, it was a punk kid. I'd do something about it. I wouldn't waste time grouching about what a tight spot I was in. You'd do plenty. Well, it's a lead pipe since you won't. Just the same. Yeah? If I could just show Scar the diamond J was going to be mine. You could stall him, eh? Sure. What's his kid's name? You said it's Jackson's nephew? Tim Perry. You and Jackson sure weren't close kin, were you? Uh-huh. Goes way back. Guess he'd even forgot we was. You can't blame him for not wanting to recollect it, can you? You're too dog-gone funny. Just a second. You sure with this Perry fell it out of the way. You'd be next to kin. Ain't there nobody else comes before you? There ain't a had it looked up. Well, I don't know what you're waiting for. Drill the gin. Or ain't he showed up to take the place over yet? The diamond J straw boss says you'll get here tomorrow. And then? I don't know. If anything went wrong... You'd hang. Yeah. But that's just in case you found out. On the other hand, you know what Skye's going to find out. And if it was me, between him and the law, I'd let the law get after me any day. I know, but just a second. Wait a minute. There's someone run up the steps. Wait. Listen. Drill, I won't hurry. You've got to hide. What in places? Listen, I tell you. Where's Thunder Arya? Where'd you come from? I ain't got time. They'll be here. I'll tell you afterwards. Hide me first. Who's they? The law? I'll take the law. A masked man, a rich kin. Major, where's your horse? He got fagged. I had a ditch of him and put it. He ain't outside, huh? No. Them fellas see you come in here? They couldn't have. They'll stop to find out. I know they will. Look, mister, you're going to let me hide, or ain't you? If you ain't, I'll have to hide till I'll go up it. That's him now. Quick. Get under that heap of gear and blankets in the corner there. Oh, yeah. Hurry. Cover yourself up. What do you think you're doing?  I'm not... You can't come in here. Come on, Thunder. Just a second. What do you figure you're up to? He's for a man who may have come in here. They've no time to waste getting your permission. Taddo, see you was in the next room there. Come to do it. Nobody's there. We'll find that out for ourselves. There's two rooms in there, Shaq, huh? You ain't blind. Empty, Taddo. Have a look at those bunks. Huh, me look. Stranger, just who do you and the engine take you after? Flash Norris. What's that? You heard me. There's a reward of $1,000 on his head. When we find him, he goes to the law. I get it. Reward, honey, is there? You wouldn't understand that. I swear you would. Quiet. Well, Kimisabi? No, him not here.  Damn, we'll pick up his trail yet, huh? When you leave here, just keep traveling, mister. Next time we meet, I'll be ready for you. Good. See you at first for these. Now they're gone.  Now you can keep still for a while. The coast is clear, Flash. You can come out. You sure they're gone? Reward off. Come here. Gotcha, fellas. You know how much I'm appreciating this. Grateful, huh? Have I been caught? Sure. I know what's waiting for you once the law has you. We ain't never met before. But I've heard of you plenty.  Shucks, I know the whole story. Well, Flash, if you're grateful, like you say, you're going to get the chance to prove it.  What? Maybe me and Max here will be collecting that $1,000 reward. The following day, the new owner of the Diamond Jay, Jim Perry, a young man in his early 20s, arrived in Redwood by stage. He was met by the Diamond Jay's foreman and driven out to the ranch. After the evening meal, the two men seated themselves on the steps of the rear porch. Well, young fella, how do you think you're going to like it here? I'm going to like this fine. Oh, you'll travel quite a spell before you'll find a better outfit than this one is. I ain't seen nothing anywhere that compares with it. Nope, and the little you've seen today ain't a speck on the whole of it.  It was the only thing he ever lived for. You worked for him long? Since the first year we come here. I've been range boss for the past 15. You'll stay on and work for me, won't you? Well, I sure if you want it. I do. Well, then we'll call that settle then. I got to admit, I'd been wondering what would happen when you took over. I want things to go on just like they did when Uncle Frank was alive. To be able to show me around tomorrow. Over the whole place? Yeah. Son, you aim to see it all where it'll take us the best part of a week. Is that much land? Look to the west there. Can you still make out them hills? Uh-huh. Well, your range goes up to them and beyond. To the north, it runs clear to the sweetwater. And to the south, as far as Mustang Canyon. All that stops you on the east is town. Well, I'm rich. You sure are. Gosh, coming from a Kansas homestead to something like this, I just don't know what to make of it. Well, now, son, you listen to me. You've got plenty to feel pleased about. A fine range and a heap of it. Best beef, feeding on it in the state. Mostly new buildings here and a doggone good saddle string. And a crew of hands set the second to none. Uh-huh. But like everything else, there's got to be something to keep it from being too good to be true. Yeah? What's that? Your kin here. Kin? I didn't know there was any. Oh, you have, all right. Well, her name of Purvis, other side of town. Guess he had a grandma, was third cousin to a second cousin, or your uncles or something like that. Anyhow, he's kin to you. Oh, but that ain't the half of it. No. He's mostly skunk. Crooked too, I'll bet if it could be proved on him. Anyhow, there's got to be something wrong with a fella that would let an outfit run down the way he's let hisen. You don't sound like nobody I care much to know. No, but here's the point. If you hadn't inherited this ranch, he would have. Oh. And it could still be his, if so be it, something happened to you. He never made out a will, have you? Me? Gosh, no. Oh, most young fellas don't. Got the full notion they're going to live forever. Well, you take my advice and don't put it off no longer. Don't want to frighten on, but till you've done it, Purvis is likely to have ideas. I reckon you savvy. You're trying to tell me he might have me killed? Yes, sir. But why would he? Who won't? I'm your friend. There's no need to slap, are there?  No. Just listen to what I have to say. It'll take only a moment. You're not the only one who's thought of the possibility of Purvis attempting Tim's life. Who in blieses are you? That doesn't matter. Remember just this, Tim is safe, and Purvis has just about reached the end of his string. Huh? Later, you'll know what I meant. Here's over. That horse. Look at that horse. Golly. In the meantime, don't worry. Well, who's that? Come on, old fellow. Hurry, Silver. Hurry. Silver. I don't savvy. What do you want? Who is he? I didn't savvy at first myself, young fellow. Huh? But now I reckon I do. The lone ranger halted his great stallion at the hidden camp, but Kato awaited him. Oh, oh, there's nobody. Oh, what? Hold it. I think the game's in our hands, tunnel. Not good. I spoke to Tim Perry and his foreman. I doubt it'll take that foreman long to realize who I am. He'll tell Tim. When Tim sees me again, he'll know me. That's all I wanted. Not good. We're going to kill two birds with one stone this time, Kimosabe. Huh? Scar and Purvis. And we won't have long to wait. It was still later that night that a single horseman dismounted at the rear of Purvis's shack. He moved toward the back door and then wrapped lightly three times. Is that you, Scar? Who'd you think it was? Open up. Just a second. Come in. Hurry. Hey, who's this gent? Flash Norris. You've heard of him? Oh. Flash, this is Scar. Howdy. Howdy. Now, Purvis, give me the cash. Can't stay long this time. I have to get back. Oh, shucks.  I am. Oh, sit down for a spell. Here. Sit down here. Can't. Just give me the cash. Well, anyhow, you'll stop long enough for a drink, won't you? Flash, get down that jug off the top shelf there. Scar'd like a drink. Leave that blessed jug where it is. Purvis, what in thunder's wrong with you? Huh? Wrong? Me? You're acting as fidgety as I hound with fleas. Just get that cash. Hey. Huh? Have you got that cash? Well, that is... Hey, Scar, now listen. Me and the boys got over 10,000 coming. Where is it? Scar, you'll get the cash. Just wait a second, won't you? Purvis, did you lose our cash along with your own when you was gambling?  How'd you know that? I ain't trusting you as far as I got through a post hole. You're watched all the time. Scar, I lost, but... But you can't pay here. Not right now, but... You skunk. Oh, wait. You know what I said, but it happened to you the first time you ever crossed me. Now this is the guy you want to help now. Scar! Drop that gun. The curtain falls on the first act of our Lone Ranger story. Before the next exciting scenes, please permit us to pause for just a few moments. How to continue our story. Scar, the cold at his side, half gone from his holster, turned himself staring into the muzzle of a 45, held by Flesh Norse. You wick! Drop it back where it belongs. I have to do your bosses fighting for a man. That's my business. Just don't reach for that gun again while I'm around. Thanks, Flesh. I won't be forgetting this. That's all right. You helped me out earlier tonight. Now why don't you two fellas get together and straighten this out? You're supposed to be partners, ain't you?  Fervis, just because this hombre got the drop on me don't mean you're getting out of paying what you owe me and the boys. You'll get it, Scar. Honest you will. You just didn't give me time to explain. Well, I'm giving you time now. Shoot.  About that kid getting it instead of you? Uh-huh. Yeah, I recollect. What about it? Oh, Flash here is going to do a job for me. Ain't that right, Flash? Said I would, didn't I? You see, Scar? I won't till you tell me what this is all about. He's going to get rid of the kid from me. Then the ranch will be mine. I'll be able to pay you easy. This here a fact? You will get what's coming to you. You're going to drill the Kansas homesteader? In my own time and in my own way. That's something you'll have to leave to me. Killing's my business. You want to see results dropped back in a couple of days.  Don't that sound all right? You worried about your cash now? The Diamond J is going to be yours. I reckon you'll be good for a hundred times with you. So we'll leave that to lay for a while. Something else more important on hand now, anyhow. Yeah? We're all set for the big drive. You mean... It's a cleanup. We've gathered in every cow wearing a brand that can be changed to yours. The boys are bringing them through the hills in two herds now. When did I get here? Four or five days. Two herds?  Said it was a cleanup, didn't I? Said at least and I'm clearing out. If you don't have to worry. I'm already wearing your brand. You're going to buy her waiting to take delivery. All you've got to do is put your John Henry to the bill of sale, collect the cash, and hand it over for the Divi. And this time no gambling with cash that ain't yours, Savvy. I reckon I like my lesson. Good enough. And that's settled. Anything else you want to know before I leave? Well, I... Yeah? I was just thinking. A deal like this is going to be mighty hard to make look straight. There's likely to be questions asked. For you, it's all right. A deal. But I got to stay. Quit you worrying. Said you was going to get the diamond jade, didn't you? Yeah, but just to say... You won't net. You'll be the biggest ombre around these parts. Won't the lawn or anybody else go out of its way to bother you? How do you use it? Flash. Yeah? The sooner you drill that kid, the better pleased I'm going to be. I'm making my plans. But when you're going through with them? The way it looks now... Huh? It's saying about four days. During the next four days, the Lone Ranger and Tato stayed close to their camp. Gave them a clear view of a distant rocky shell halfway up a cliff. It was on the night of the fourth day that the Lone Ranger suddenly jumped to his feet and... Look there, Tato. Look toward the cliff. Ah, you see him. The signal fire. Ah, now waiting's over. Now's the time for action. Call scout. Here's scout. Here's silver. You write too? Yes, but on a different era in Kimosabi. Huh? You carry out the plan we arranged before. Huh? Time to do it. I'm calling on Tim Perry. Huh? Now on your way, Tato Perry.  Get him out. All right, Silver, old fellow.  Hail, Silver! Away! There was an era of tense expectancy in the shack belonging to Purvis. Not only was the rancher looking forward to the arrival of the stolen cattle, but he and Max were also... waiting for the return of Flesh Norris. Max, how long has that fellow been gone? Huh? Now let me see. Six hours about. Hey, that'd be just about it. Six hours. Well, Gersh, how long do you figure you ought to take? It's any hour, a couple hours right at the Diamond's Age. It's one way. You want him back in 30 minutes or so? How do we know he ain't skipped? We don't. We saved him from that masked fellow. But that's all he wanted. But anything you want to name, he's on his way for the border this very minute. What are you laughing at? Honest boss, you can worry worse than a woman. Of course we don't know that he ain't skipped out. For guys' sakes, use your head. If he wanted to skip, there was nothing keeping him from doing it before now, was it? Ah, you. Ah, you're just barring trouble. Sit down and pour yourself a drink. I'll fix that, fella. Huh? You think I won't? Just wait and see. See, have you talked to yourself into believing he's done you dirt some way? You don't know that he ain't. Ah, yes, you're the limit. What are you two gents looking at me like I was some kind of a freak for me? Did you? Get the kid? Yeah, sure. I never missed. Well, now, dawg, granted, boss, maybe we'll get some peace around here. You won't. Huh? How do we know he ain't lying to us? How do we know whether he drilled a kid or not? You're sad enough and riding to town. I'll look, boss. You stay there, you find out if the kid's alive or dead. If he's killed, it won't take long for the news to get around. What purpose? Then get back and let me know. Max was gone only a few hours. When he returned to the shack, he... Boss! I'll let you find out. Flash told you the truth. He done it. The news all over town. Maybe next time you won't doubt me. They... They don't suspicion nothing. Uh, about you being behind it? Yeah. Well, they know you never fired the shot that done it, because they know you're well enough to savvy you wouldn't have the nerve. Answer my question. Well, of course they suspicion you. Why wouldn't they?  So you can set back and take a deep breath. Uh-huh. Flash. What's that there? There behind you by the window. That'll do. Heist your hands. And don't come a step closer unless you want to get shot. Boss, now what and thunder you up to? This fella's a wanted crook. There's a thousand dollars reward on his head if he's delivered to the law alive. You mean to say... I'm collecting. Well, of all the dirty double-crossing pole cats I ever heard tell of, you take the prize. Who asked your opinion? A thousand dollars is a thousand dollars, ain't it? Ain't you overlooking something, Purvis? What? I could tell the law you put me up to drill in the cave. And confess to murder? I reckon not. You wouldn't get a trial in these parts, mister. There'd be a mob ready and willing to tell you to pieces. Nope. I'm collecting that thousand.  It was almost midnight when Purvis and Max entered town with Flash Norris securely tied to the pommel of his saddle. They drew rain before the office of the sheriff. All right, Max. Help me get this fella out of the saddle and onto his feet. Yeah. Sorry, Flash.  It's a boss. I just work for him. Save the talk. Oh, sure. Down with you. You able to walk? I'll make out. Come on, let's get him inside. I want to put in my claim for that reward before anything can go wrong. Only one thing could go wrong that I know of. What is it? You might forget and double-cross yourself. One of these days...  Where's the sheriff? What do you want him for? Got a prisoner here for him. That's what? A crook with a price on his head. Now get the sheriff and get him pronto. Mm-hmm. He's just out back. And the sheriff? Hey, sheriff. Service is here with the fella to turn over to the law. And collect on. Yeah, sure. You wouldn't forget that. Oh, evening. Where is this prisoner you say? Leap and catfish. Greg Davis. What in thunder they got you tied up for? Better ask them, Sheriff. What'd you call his fella? Why Davis? I don't know what name you call him. But he's Flash Norris. There's a price on his head. He's who? Flash Norris. Why, you dog-gone fool? This fella is United States Marshal. Oh, what? Untie my hands, will you, Sheriff. Why are you back? Then put both these men under arrest. Hey, wait. No, you can't. There's something wrong. There's a mistake here.  And we made it. But don't you... Charge him with rustling and attempted murder. You can't do that. I think, uh, find out more later. No, wait, hold on. Sheriff, this fella killed young Tim Perry over to the Diamond J. I don't care whether he's a lawman or not. He's a killer. I can prove it. Oh. Why, by the... Tim Perry. Sure, Purvis. An alive and kicking thanks to the masked man in the Marshal here. Which is more than you'll be in a few sure days, Purvis. But, what, in case you're... How did you... Wondering, Purvis, all this was part of the scheme of that masked man you saw the night you met me.  We spread that story about Tim being drilled just to fall in with the scheme. Boss, they got you tied up, tied in a ball of yarn. It's a blasted trick. Yeah, but it worked. You've poisoned the scenery around these parts long enough, Purvis. I reckon it's just about time there was a house cleaner. What's that? Look there, Texas Rangers. A dozen of them. What are they doing here? There's the masked man in that red skin. Hey, look at the fellas they brought with them. Scars, man. And here comes that masked jet with Scar himself. Get in there. Scar.  Did you get them Texas Rangers and this masked fellow to lay for us when we showed up with the cattle? I never told nobody. Then who did? There's the jet right there. The one you thought was Flash Norris. United States Marshal Davis. A lawman? Right.  That's why we planted Davis with Purvis, convincing him Davis was a crook. We had to know your plan so that we could be prepared. And the law made the biggest cleanup these parts ever seen. This is your fault, Purvis. You wouldn't let them fill his ticket with me. Blast your hide, Scar. How's it any more my fault than yours? You met this fellow calling himself Flash, didn't you? If you're such a dog gone smart, why didn't you see what he was up to? Hold it, Jans, hold it. But that is just... You was at fault, and you claimed he was. He was as much as me. Nope. If you really want to blame somebody, put the blame where it belongs. Huh? Oh, and that ombre just went outside. Who? On the Lone Ranger. Oh, you have just heard as a copyrighted feature of the Lone Ranger Incorporated.


We are joined by a special guest. So before we get to the moderated panel, I'd like to, I can't really see him from here, but we're joined by Representative Emmanuel Cleaver, who represents the great people of the Fifth District of Missouri. Representative Cleaver has to get to a committee hearing, but happy to welcome you at the lectern if you'd like to say a few words, sir. Thank you. Good morning. Let me just say this quickly. I think, I don't know what your theology of life is, but what you are doing is God's work. However you see God, whether you see God as a Super Bowl champion or something like the chiefs, the Kansas chiefs, but it is very seriously. When you think about the fact that this is the hottest year on record, at least since we have inhabited the planet with the ability to measure and you look at the things that are happening all around the nation, including floods in Southern California, it would tell just about anyone with an IQ at room temperature that something has gone awry, that something has happened to this planet. I happen to believe that it is still reversible, and obviously you do too, or you wouldn't be here. It is reversible. The earth has amazing healing ability, but we can't continue to do what we've been doing. I will probably, there'll probably a lynch mob after me before the summer is over, because I'm proposing that we restrict traffic on one of the main arteries going through Kansas City, Missouri. In 10 years, we'll start now. The average car is kept by Americans for eight years, and so it gives people an opportunity to make decisions on what they want in the community. But I think we can do all kinds of things, little bitty things that will change the direction that we're headed. I appreciate what you're doing. I appreciate the opportunity to come by and just say that you are the leaders of the planet right now, and we need you to continue. Change has almost always been brought about by young people. I mean, you have very few old folk with liniment rubbing on their shoulders and so forth making changes. You go back in history, and it's always young people making the change. And so when I leave, there'll be still young people here, and you are the future. You got to make the change. You got to very easily and quietly nudge old people out of the way, who's thinking is in 1920s. So thank you, Kansas Chiefs.