Good afternoon, dear all, ladies and gentlemen, and dear friends and students. This is Dr. Aniruddha Babar, Department of Political Science and Talk Talks Coordinator. Welcome you once again in yet another exciting lecture in the Israel series. So today we have our expert with us, Mr. Jyoti Ranjanji. And he's now going to continue with the Israel series. He will be delivering two more lectures in the coming days. So this is going to be the second lecture in the series, the first lecture we have already done. And now we are going to have his talk on peace and operations in between competing narratives and compelling choices. And we are really eager to listen to Mr. Jyoti Ranjan. Though our students, I believe they are still coming. And without wasting any time, since we really value the time that Jyoti Ranjanji has given to us, without wasting any time, I request Jyoti Ranjanji to kindly please take a charge of this virtual stage and please go ahead with the presentation. Meanwhile, our students and faculty members will join to us. Thank you, sir. Please go ahead. Thank you so much, Dr. Anirudhan. Thank you so much, Tetsu College and all the staff and members and students. So we'll start our presentation straight away. I'm sharing my entire screen. Sure, sir. Wait a second. Okay, can you see my screen? Yes, it's a small opening. Yeah, it's visible now. Okay. Perfect. Yeah. So today we are going to discuss about the operations in between in the larger context of Arab-Israeli conflict. And today's lecture will be more in terms of Israel and Palestinian conflict. In the next lecture, we would go through the 67 war, 73 war and the Israel-Lebanon wars and all those. We'll mention them in this lecture as well. And if some of us might recollect, in the previous lecture or the previous webinar, we had discussed Balfour Declaration in 1917, followed by Peel Commission, the White Paper and the UN resolution that ultimately leads to the formation of Israel. So these are just legal, semi-legal documents. And we also realized how the destruction of state in the ancient times leads to the destruction of Jewish life and scattering of the people and the people of Israel, the Jews, ending up in diaspora for the next 2000 years. However, in the 20th century, what we see is that further destruction, total destruction, annihilation through holocaust is followed by state formation in the land of Israel. So this is an observation. I was expecting someone might have made it. And I show a small image now. This is known as the Clover diagram, the Clover map. It was made in 1581 and it shows the place of Israel in the ancient world, as it is the place in the meeting point of Europe, Asia and Africa. It was prepared by Henrik Bunting. He was a German scholar as well as a priest. So today's objectives, having said all that, is going to be limited to basically giving you a small introduction and opening so that anyone who is listening to it is able to go ahead and carry on a dinner table talk or even able to carry forth a small conversation in the issues of Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the post-48 context. Before we go ahead and enter the political part, let us start with the geographical aspect. Dr. Anirudha, can you hear me and everything is visible? Yes, yes, everything is visible. I can hear you. It's clear. This is the map of Israel. It's like a thematic map of Israel showing us the topography, the blue water body that you see. This is the Dead Sea. It is not a scale. And the blue on the left is the Mediterranean Sea. Here is the city of Tel Aviv. These are the mountains of Judea and Samaria, Samaria in the north, Judea in the south. These are the hills of Hebron and here somewhere here we will find Jerusalem, where my cursor is. And in the north, if we go here, we can see the Golan Heights and below it is the Sea of Galilee, Lake Canary. Here is Haifa, the Kamal Mountains and here are the hills of Galilee, Upper Galilee and further north if you go, we will find Lebanon. On the eastern part, the tall mountains, these are the mountains of Jordan and this valley between Judea, Samaria and Jordanian mountains connecting the Lake Galilee and Dead Sea, that's the Jordan River Valley. And further south if you go below the Dead Sea, it's referred to as the Arawa Valley because this map and these geographical aspects will help us understand further because today we will be using a little bit of maps. So once 1948 goes ahead, Israel fights for its existence against the six neighboring Arab countries and after that what we see is that there's a Resolution 194 that calls for, this is part of the United Nations General Assembly, it calls for the return of the refugees giving them a sort of a right, it forms the bedrock upon which the UNRWA, United Nations Refugee Works Agency for the Palestinians is built. So United Nations has two refugee organizations. One is the UNHCR for covering all refugees in the world and there's the UNRWA which is specifically for the Palestinian people and the Palestinians all are not just covered under UNRWA some are also covered under UNHCR but majority of them come under UNRWA. So UNRWA has its scams, facilities all over in West Bank. So the mountains you see, Judea and Samaria, they encompass much of the West Bank. So they have their camps, schools and everything in West Bank, in Jordan, in Lebanon, in Syria also and then all those countries nearby where Palestinian refugees have gone. And today we'll also discuss about Resolution 242 and Resolution 338. These are images or should we say screenshots of the same. But before we go, we need to talk about an important thing. So we are talking much of it from the Israeli perspective. This doesn't mean that we are discounting the Palestinian perspective and there is a perspective such as the Palestinian perspective, the Arab perspective and it has an equal importance also. But our subject today is Israel and rest of everything else, we are considering that as the predicate. So Palestinians also fighting for their home and in politics and political science, there are no heroes and villains, there are usually political actors and entities. So it's important to understand, maybe it's also equally important to understand both perspectives. It is important so that we have a balanced perspective. But our time frame limits us. So the war of independence in 1948 as we have discussed in last class, there was a civil war. The civil war is followed by a regression from all sides from the neighboring Arab countries. As you can see the map on the left side, Israel is attacked from Syria in the northeast from the Golan side. It is attacked by Iraqi troops here in Bechian region. Jordanian troops also attacked and the Egyptians, the Saudis and all sides in 1948 war. And Israelis at first are not that confident of winning, but there are some factors that ensure that Israel wins. We must also understand that during this war, the Egyptian army was the largest army that took part, but it was more of a parade-round army. It had not seen that much combat. It had engaged a lot of pageantry and marches and all that. But the most professional army, the army from which Israel really felt some degree of threat was the Jordanian Legion or the Jordanian army. And it was initially led by Club Pasha, a British officer at the top, and it had British officers leading the command. And as a result of the war, we also see that the one country that benefits it, apart from Israel, of course, is Jordan. It is able to capture much of West Bank and gets the holy sites of Jerusalem. It is able to get hold of all the Christian and Islamic sites, not just in Jerusalem also nearby, such as Bethlehem and the monasteries in the Kidron Valley. And on the right side, you see the modern map of Israel. As Israel exists today, and it shows all the divisions or the provinces within Israel, it's for reference. And this map again shows us the movement. So how does Israel win? Why does Israel win? To start with, Israel has a unified command. It has fresh volunteers. There is total mobilization of the entire population. Whereas on the Arab side, we see that sometimes they are fighting on counter-purpose, because one army thinks that the other army might get to Jerusalem first. So even though they have been tasked to reach Tel Aviv, they change direction and decide to take another course of action altogether. Also, many of these Arab states are insecure states because they have been facing recent threats. For instance, the sheriff of Mecca, whose descendants have been able to get Jordan and Iraq, he has been removed from power in Saudi Arabia. Similarly, in Egypt also, King Pharaoh fears that he might be removed. The Iraqi government, which sends some few brigades, fears that it might get removed in a coup. What happens is that they result in the death of the troops for internal security. And whatever they can dispense with, they are the ones that are sent. This is an important reason that we must understand. This is like a last chance for Israel. If they lose just once, throughout the history of Israel, if Israel loses once and it loses badly, that's enough because then Israel might cease to exist. Whereas other states, which are not only larger, but also enjoy a strategic death, they can fight on. They can lose territory and fight on. But Israel is so small. For instance, to give a comparison, it is so easy. India, it is smaller than Meghalaya, but it is larger than Mizra of that order. And many of the Palestinians are also misled that once you move away from the house, the Israeli army, the Arab armies that are surrounded Israel, they will take out Israel, they will finish. But this doesn't happen. So the Palestinians who leave Israel actually end up as refugees. And what happens in the aftermath, Israel has to face design attacks from 1948 to 55, mainly from Egypt, but also from along the Jordanian border. And the Syrians who are standing right across the Golan Heights, if you see this map, they have the Golan Heights after 1948. They are able to engage in artillery shelling of the Kibbutz in the north. Thus we see that Israel is fighting for survival even after winning the 1948 war. But Israel also deploys sleeper cells and helper groups and collaborators in the neighboring countries, especially Egypt, the case that we are going to see today. And the infiltrations that we talk about, 40 to 55, Israel soon realizes that if it doesn't ensure that there's a price to pay for such activities, this may go on. And to avoid that, Israel under Sharon creates area Sharon, then a soldier. They create a unit called Unit 101 and Unit 101 leads several raids into the neighboring countries so that the Arab groups that are attacking, who are referred to as Fidain, they're able to attack the villages that support them. So that the villages know if you support the Fidain, there's a price to pay. The Qibiya massacre, as it is referred to in the Arab world, was one of the bigger counterattacks by Israel against the Fidain attacks. And coming to 1958, we see the formation of Fatah. Now Fatah's full formation doesn't start with F, it starts with H. Harqat al-Tahreel al-Watani al-Filastani. But if we shorten and create an acronym, it will become Hataf. Hataf in Arabic would mean end. So you don't want to name your organization. End. You don't want it to end. So what they do is they write it in Arabic, so it is written from right to left. And then they take the first letter of each word from left. So it ends up as Fatah, which means an Arabic victory or conquest. And this is created by this gentleman, Yassir Arafat, and some of his friends. He was a civil engineer who had worked in Egypt and also had served in the Corps of Engineers of Egyptian Army. But he then goes to work in Kuwait and there he forms this organization. But before that, while those Fedain attacks were going on from Egypt and all, and I told you about those secret sleeper cells of Israel, so they were controlled by the military intelligence. And there was one unit called Unit 131, which was controlling a significant group. And they had even sent intelligence officers from Israel. The Israeli intelligence, military intelligence, is like the most important intelligence agency, and other intelligence agencies come or should we say, come to know it or provide information to it. And the love on the foot takes place. What happens is that Israeli, in the Ministry of Defense, a plan is hatched to create some sabotage in Egypt, so that the Europeans and the Americans think that the king, who has been deposed after that, now we have Nasser, who is living in Egypt, then Nasser doesn't have control. And he shouldn't exactly be trusted with a lot of sophisticated weapons and all that. And you see Moshe Dayan, Simon Perez, and this is Lavonne. Initially it's thought that these people, Lavonne is the one who has scapegoated. But you know what this plan is. It is in fact, Ghibli, Perez and Moshe Dayan, who kind of hatch it. And then one of the reasons this Lavonne affair, it fails, the saboteurs fail is because one of the saboteurs, an intelligence officer by the Nef Avrela, he kind of betrays them, whether he does it on purpose or because it fails, we don't know, because Israel senses this information all the way to 2005.  But back then two of those saboteurs committed suicide to Ehang and the rest of them were given sentences. This failure in Lavonne affair took place because Israel miscalculated in some ways and this was followed by the Suez crisis in 1956 and the Suez crisis leads to a situation where Israel is supposed to have the backing of the UK and the French, but they don't exactly pull through the bargain. Israel is supposed to attack the Suez Canal and that is supposed to use as a ruse for the United Kingdom and the French to come in. But the United States intervenes and sees this as a colonial intervention of sorts and so it is basically Israel that takes up all of the Sinai Peninsula and United Kingdom and France are not exactly coming to the rescue. In return what happens is that the French give Israel with the initial nuclear technology because there is trust and the French had also promised them a lot of weaponry. For the much of the first 10, 12 years for Israel, the biggest superpower that supports it is not US, it is in fact France. France gives Israel its nuclear technology because of which Israel is able to develop several capabilities and come up with a Samson doctrine. The Samson doctrine says that should Israel be attacked from all sides again and it comes to the verge of destruction, it will take action. So the French connection here, but yeah, it's more French connection than the United Kingdom. The Suez crisis takes place. And yeah, this map is again for reference reasons, trophy again. You see this rift, this is in fact from the African rift valley and the Dead Sea is at minus 400 meters. And this side is Gaza. This is for reference. Yeah, this is the northern Galilee. So for much of the post 1950s era, we come to this situation where Israel is projected as an entity that is threatening Palestine and all the Arab countries are kind of either intervening or pushing Palestine to go ahead. But what the Palestinian sites think is that sites in fact, because there's not one, there are several along with Fata, they think that they are being used and they don't actually have the agency. And as we go, we see that we had discussed this in the previous lecture. And the reason I said the Palestinians don't think they have an agency is because they are not exactly the focus when the Arab sites are fighting. Jordan fought and got the West Bank. Egypt got the Gaza Strip. And when all this happens, the Jordanians annex the West Bank. They don't declare a state for Palestine. And while the Egyptian side and the larger Umbra of Albi does provide us figment of a state in Gaza Strip, Gaza Strip for all matters is controlled by Egypt. We come back then, coming to 67, we see the six-day war takes place whereby Israel is threatened in a way because Israel detects changes in the Sana'i Peninsula. Because, see, in 56, what happens is Israel captures entire Sana'i Peninsula, but then it moves back with assurances that, okay, there'll be peace. And UN sends its peacekeepers to guard the Sana'i Peninsula. By 67, Nasir removes these UN troops. This forms the rules. This is like how do you say, now there's a Cassis belly and Israel knows that an attack is coming. So in 67, Israel takes the initiative and they understand that if they don't hit first, they might lose the war. So Israel, in fact, goes ahead, takes the first step in response to the preparations of its neighbors and conduct surprise attack over Egypt and Syria and destroys the entire Egyptian air force. We'll discuss this in detail in the next lecture. And as Israel is a civilization, we are discussed. Similarly, Islam, we could say, is also civilization. And we need to, right now, take into consideration the Muslim Brotherhood that started in 1928. So in the Gaza Strip, Egypt has taken hold. They're the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt. The Muslim Brothers of Egypt, they start their local branch also. And for the Egyptian government, the Muslim Brothers are not seen positive, right? Because they are often seen as anti-government entities. And the Muslim Brothers kind of want a theocratic democratic system. And this is Hassan Al-Bana on the right, the founder. And the reason I've discussed this now because these Muslim Brothers would have a big impact on the overall Arab-Israeli conflict. Because in 67, when Nasir, who led the socialism in the Middle East and Syria, these were all Barthas leftist countries. When they lost in 67 wars, the Muslim Brotherhood starts moving up because in the streets of Arab streets, it is believed that where the secular forces have failed, perhaps the religious ones might succeed. The below line, this is their motto. In 58, I have been discussed how Fatah was formed. Coming to 64, several Palestinian organizations are brought together to form PLO. Now, PLO, which is formed in the initial days, the Fatah of Yasser Arafat isn't very confident about PLO. It is in fact suspicious about it, but it goes ahead with it. And after 67 war, what happens is that the Palestinians also lose some degree of faith and they take matters into their own hands. So this is the border of Israel from 49 to 67, all that screen. And on the left side is the post-67 border. All the orangeish light brown area that you see, these are the regions that Israel captures in 67 war. And after that, what happens, Fatah is backed by Egypt now. They give them training and everything, but say that, see, when you attack Israel, you can't use our land. So they can't attack from Egypt. They instead attack from Jordan. The 67 war, you see the victors, the Israeli side at the mount of the mountain. And the right side on the left, you see the Israeli soldiers just sitting near the wall, the Western wall. So as you said, PLO takes charge. It's on the horse. But before it can do anything, the Arab League declares a three-nose. The Arab League gets together in Cairo with Nasir as well. On the right, you can also see King Hussein and left the Saudis. And it says no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel and no negotiations with Israel. So this is not good news for Israel because Israel thought now that they've got territory, we'd be able to exchange them for peace or maybe bargain or negotiate. But nothing of that thing happens. And because the Arab side doesn't, in fact, engage with Israel, the Egyptians go out with the war of attrition from 67 to 70. And even in the north, there is shelling from Syria. But the Syrians have lost the Golan Heights. And in the next lecture, we'll discuss how the war was mismanaged from the Arab side, which led to the loss. This was followed by the 73 Yom Kippur War, where Israel is surprised in a surprise attack. Israel, it seems, comes on the verge of losing the state, in fact. And Moshe Dayan says that perhaps we might lose the Third Temple, the Third Temple referring to the state of Israel itself. But Israel comes back and it's able to secure itself. Between this time, as we mentioned back then, how the Palestinians were attacking from Jordan and Egypt, mainly Jordan, because the Egyptians had to do the military. In 68, yeah, the Battle of Karamit takes place. What happens is that, because continuously the Fideins and the Fatah now, organized, are attacking into the West Bank. They're entering West Bank and then they go ahead and attack Israel's major. What happens is that Israelis think we have to go and put a high price on our blood. And the Israelis go ahead into Karamit and destroy the, this is the Palestinian camp, the training camp. Back then, it would have been called a terror camp and Israel is destroyed. But while the other constituents of PLO, they are running away, Fatah and the Yasser Arafat decides to stay put and fight. While they lose the war, the impression is that just because of 67, the Arabs lost doesn't mean that the Arabs are going to run away. The Arabs are going to stand and fight. Also, the Jordanian army joins in and after the Israelis have achieved their goals, they withdraw back to the Israeli territories. But the war on the Arab street is, Fatah stood, PLO stood and they fought. Because of this, PLO and Fatah get a lot of volunteers and a lot of people join in. But things are not rosy. After this in 1970, one of the constituents of PLO, one of the communist constituents, they hijack a plane and they bring it to a World War II era field in Jordan. It's called the Dawson Seel and then they try to bargain it with the West and Israel that will release the people, the hostages and you should release our members. This is seen as a blot on Jordanian government because you don't have control over your country, it seems. And the Jordanian King Hussein takes charge and from 16 September to 27 September, in response to the hijacking, we see what's referred to as the Black September. There's an offense to fight PLO and drive them out of Jordanian borders. The Syrians try to intervene on behalf of the Palestinians and they're backed by the U.S. as well. But Jordan with support of U.S. and even support of Israel is able to drive the Palestinians out. We see in this war Israeli jets come into the rescue of the Jordanians in the sense that when they see the Syrian tanks are coming towards Jordan and they've crossed Idlib, the Israeli jets fly very close to the tank. The Syrian tanks to let them know that we are here. And in the offensive, whatever takes place, the Syrians lose something like 130 tanks. This is one of the tanks that the Syrians lose and the Jordanian soldiers are standing. In the center we see King of Jordan discussing with his commanders. One of the commanders back then was the future ruler of Pakistan. He led one of the several operations against the Palestinians. Following this, what happens, the Palestinians, the Fatah and the PLO, they relocate to Lebanon. And after that another leftist organization with it calls itself the Black September organization, goes ahead and commits the Munich massacres. And these are the Israeli athletes who are killed in fact. This is one of the kidnappers or the terrorists, if you may, who is involved.  But not before letting the world know in competence of the German side in handling the hostage situation, because 11 Israelis and one German police officer dies in this. What happens is that because the previous Olympics in Mexico, they had a strong military and security component, the Germans wanted to show that the 72 Olympics is the free, carefree Olympics. And also they wanted to show it in contrast to the 1936 Olympics that were held under the Third Reich, Nazi Germany. And they want so that this is more relaxed and freer, better Germany. And they are lax when it comes to security. In fact, one of the situations that the security teams had before organizing the Olympics had come across the 21st scenario, was that the Israelis might be kidnapped or there might be a hostage situation and the Israelis might die. But the German side doesn't invest too much in security. And the result is the Munich massacre. But Israel comes back, it launches the Operation Grapes of Raab. And many of the perpetrators or the planners are in fact punished. After both 67 and the 73 wars, the United Nations comes with resolutions calling for Israel's withdrawal from the territories that it has captured. The 67 calls for peace and lowering of belligerence. But this doesn't actually take into effect. It doesn't actually happen in any way. Instead what we see is that the 194, Reservation 194 which called for bringing back the refugees, that becomes the center stage. In the image that you see, this is the Balata refugee camp. I've been there once. But when they say that all the refugees must come back, if you look at it from 1020 or 2021 perspective, today there are 6 million to 7 million Palestinians in the hospital. Not all of them live in refugee camps. There are some of them who are like heads of states such as President Bukele of El Salvador. There are also rappers, there are artists such as Belly from Canada. So it's not how do you say it's not homogenous. We can't pin them all in a broad stroke. In 77, we see that by this time, Nasser is dead, Anwar Sadat has taken charge and he wants peace. And he's in fact the leader when the 73 war takes place. But having lost the war. But how do we say it even lost? Because Egypt didn't actually plan to get back entire Sana'a peninsula in that war. It wanted to get Israel on the discussion table. And in a way we can say Egypt succeeded. Anwar Sadat visits Israel in 77. This is followed by the 78 Camp David accords facilitated by US President Carter. And finally in 79, we see that Egypt and Israel make peace. This is a big achievement for Egypt, for Israel. Egypt was the largest army. It had big population. It had an agrarian backbone and it could for some of the countries that could keep on fighting Israel for a long time. But this piece ensures that the biggest threat in the radar of Israel is removed. Also during this time the first Lebanon war takes place because as you mentioned, Fatah has moved from Jordan to Lebanon and they continue with terror attacks into Israel. And there's a bus massacre in Haifa where a bus is hijacked and several people are killed. And this keeps on repeating. So first the Israelis go in 78 into Lebanon. In 82, they again go in and they go all the way to Beirut. And finally there's a siege of Beirut and PLO is complied to leave Lebanon and move to Tunisia. On 6th June, in fact, in 1982, the Israeli troops have moved into Lebanon. And by 38th August, PLO had to leave Lebanon. Now in 67, after Israel won the war, Israel annexed the East Jerusalem part. And it was in a way totally annexed and nothing much was needed. But in 1980, they came up with a basic law which cemented Jerusalem as the unified capital of Israel. This faces a position because while the parliament, the Knesset, backs this law, the UN doesn't like this and it passes the resolution 478 opposing annexation of East Jerusalem and keeping Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. So this green part that you see, this is East Jerusalem. The red part, this used to be a UN monitoring campus, you can say. And the black dots, this is the whole city of Jerusalem. The blue, this is the West Jerusalem that was with Israel. Till 1967, the green one was with Jordan. The blue parts were with Israel and there was UN holding the ceasefire of 1948. After 67, Israel takes all of the East Jerusalem annexes it. It also takes up all of the West Bank. But doesn't exactly annex it. What Israel does in West Bank is it creates a military rule under the Kogat, coordinator of government activities in the territories. And it doesn't annex it. What Israel's point of view is that we are not saying that West Bank is all of ours. We have an interest in the West Bank. Some of the territory we like to negotiate upon. And in the initial days, they wanted to negotiate with the King of Jordan. But coming to 1988, the King of Jordan divorces himself from the West Bank territory. And so there is no one basically claiming the West Bank in terms of states. But the Palestinian sites whose evolution we are mapping right now, they are the ones who claim a big stake in West Bank. And for them, East Jerusalem becomes non-negotiable. Because not only does it have this small old city, which is like the heart of Jerusalem, but also has all these neighboring Arab neighborhoods. But because of a lot of settlement activities, many of these neighborhoods are today Jewish neighborhoods like here we have Ramoth. And if you go now, there are more settlements also. But here, when I'm moving my cursor, there's the Mount of Olives. So you see, these are the settlements of Ramoth. The blue ones, these are the Israeli settlements in each Jerusalem. And the brown ones, these are the Arab settlements. And this is the old city I was mentioning. And within the old city, here is the Jewish quarter. And here is the Muslim quarter. There are four quarters, Christian, Muslim, Armenian, Jewish. And this part, this is the historical Temple Mount. This is the Alexamos. This is Temple Mount. And the entire compound is referred to as Haram al-Shari. You see, now we have zoomed it. And on the right side, you should be able to see the Gethsemane. This is the Gethsemane Garden of Gethsemane. And this is the western wall where Jews pray today. Yeah, Alexamos. Often there's confusion that the dome of the rock and the Alexamos are the same. Alexamos is here. It has got a gray stone. And the dome of the rock has got a golden dome. And this is the western wall. Now, after 67, when Israel is able to get all this territory and in 73 nothing much changes, Israel is able to cement its control. What happens? There is a lot of settler movement into West Bank, the West Bank that you see, and also into Sinai Peninsula till the time the Egyptians had in the Israeli side come together and sign the peace treaty. There are settlements even there, even in Gaza. After 79, the settlements from Sinai Peninsula are withdrawn in Gaza, goes ahead, and they keep on building it. And this ultimately culminates into the first in the father. So by the time of first in the father in 87, what we see is that the PLO was first kicked to Jordan. From Jordan it was kicked to Lebanon. Then it went into exile in Tunisia. It kind of loses control from the streets of West Bank. But because it loses control in a way, and there is a lot of Israeli activities, the people in general are very dissatisfied. During this period, also one more thing takes place. There is a growth of education in West Bank. Universities are created, such as the Beir Zayt and Al Ghazi University. And Palestinian population starts getting educated in the initial days. There is sudden rise of income by seven or eight times. In fact, 67 to 72, period, 1967 to 72, is considered the golden age of the settlement of the... If we use the politically loaded term occupation, which the Arab side uses. So because during this time, there is sudden increase of wealth. Unemployment comes down to below 2%. And suddenly the Palestinians are like, they are finding new wealth, new societies being built. But as the educated youth come out of universities, they don't have jobs that can match the level. And in fact, many of them migrate to Gulf countries for jobs or to South America or to US, Canada, Europe. Ultimately, the settlement, settlement movements and several other factors, such as dissatisfaction of the educated. And also the education, many of those people who might have earlier been relegated as peasants, they're able to educate themselves. And many of the campuses become hotbeds of radical youth movements, leftist movements. And these are images from the first in the father. So the reasons why it happened, that we discussed some of them. The Likr also came to power in 1977. And there's also a feeling that the Arab world has forgotten us because in the 80s, with the Iran-Iraq war, much of the focus of the world moves to Iran-Iraq war. During the Sinti father, it begins in December 8, we see that there is also focus shifts from secular leadership to the religious leadership. And in fact, one of the first sparks that leads to the Sinti father is an event that happens in Gaza. So this is the Gaza Strip. This is the map of Israel, Gaza Strip. So this is the satellite map of Gaza Strip. The yellow star that you see, this is the Eris crossing from Israel to Gaza Strip. In 87 and all, the people of Gaza, back in the time, have full access to the Israeli labor market, the Israeli industries. They can go to Israel and get a job, have a good salary, that they can come and then spend it in Gaza. Also Israelis, many of them have settlements here and there are also Israelis who just come there as tourists, enjoy the beach and go back. But of course, within the realms of the settlements. And on December 8, what happens is that there's a truck that is moving towards the Eris crossing from Gaza. And there are two, three cars and there's an accident.  Three of those people are from this place, Jabalia. And because you see the proximity, it's so close. There is sudden uprising in Jabalia and the people rise up and they are fighting, they are throwing stones because people from the villages die. And there's a theory that the Israelis have done this murder of the four people on purpose because the previous day and Israeli was stabbed in Gaza. So this is like revenge. So we are supposed to fight back because they have killed four of us. But later on, the Israeli judiciary comes to the conclusion that it was an accident. Now, as I said, the FATA and the PLO were in exile in Tunisia. So who leads all these movements? It is led by the unified leadership of uprising. But this is not something as well organized as FATA. What happens is that these are local level leaders who had initially got some taste of power in 76 when they had organized for the first time. And now the UNI, the leadership of the intifada, they are taking charge. But by 1988, the FATA understands that if it wants to stay relevant, it must take charge. So it takes on the leadership of the intifada that has started up pretty randomly and it kind of guides it. And because we mentioned that the religious sectors of the Palestinian society also come into the focus, here we see the rise of Hamas. So, Mr. Dr. Aniruddha. Yes, Jyothi ji. So now we will discuss about Hamas and all that in the context of the first intifada. Maybe we will just take a one minute break. Okay. So I am just leaving the screen. We will just take one minute break. I will just grab my water bottle and I will recommend the same. Okay, okay sir. Just give me a second. No problem, no problem. Since sir is taking a break, I really express my gratitude and I am really thankful to all of you for joining this wonderful lecture series. So let me just remind all of you that this is the second lecture in the Israel series. We have planned to develop this series further, right? So there will be two or three more lectures and I hope that you will be interested in them as well. We will welcome you. Thank you. Thank you so much for joining. We will start our lecture within a few seconds I guess. Am I audible now? Hello. Yes, yes, yes, you are. My camera has kind of left me. Give me a second. Yeah, I must be visible now. Yes, you are. Okay, perfect. Yeah. So we see that the first intifada starts and how does it exactly culminate? While it has local leadership and by 1988 the Fatah takes its leadership, something is happening in the background that the Israeli side is not taking due cognizance. Much later the Israeli intelligence sees this as one of its initial failures as well. So what happens is that Hamas rises. Now Hamas, if you might remember, I had mentioned 10, 20 slides ago, the Muslim Brotherhood. Hamas is the local branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip. The full form of Hamas is that Herkat al-Mukammah al-Islamiya. It is basically a theocratic system that they believe in. But does Hamas just suddenly come into existence in 1987? Not so. So from 1978 there was a territory, an Islamic charity that starts functioning in the Gaza Strip, providing education, food to the poor, shelter to the poor. It is known as al-Mujammah al-Islamiya. And there is certain belief in some quarters that in the early 80s, the Israeli government, the coordinator in the territories and certain sectors of the Israeli government in fact supported this charity because they felt that they are doing a good job and also they wanted to undermine Fatha in some way. But once the intifada starts, Hamas actually comes onto the stage from this charity. And many see that this was a mistake having supported the charity that becomes Hamas ultimately. And what we also see is that Hamas in its initial phase is more radical. As we go down the line, we see that Hamas also is willing to talk and coordinate. Hamas, while it was supported in its writings and all by the Muslim brothers, Muslim brotherhood, the financial and the military support for much of the time till 2012, 2013 in fact came from Iran. Now the word intifada, it is the Arabic word for uprising or shakeup. Alongside Hamas comes another organization known as Palestinian Islamic Jihad. It is formed by also people who have originally members of Muslim brothers. But there is something more important about which Palestinian Islamic Jihad. It is much more smaller than Hamas. It has less top-down structure and it doesn't exactly engage in negotiations and talks. For instance, when Hamas today does something, the Israelis can put pressure on them. It is very difficult to put pressure on Palestinian Islamic Jihad because for one, they are very few members. They remain underground. They can launch rockets. They can do what they want and they think they can get away with it as well. So the organization that disciplines Palestinian Islamic Jihad is in fact Hamas in a way today in the Gaza Strip. Just the way Hamas might be a headache for FATA or the PLO. The Pij is a headache for Hamas in a way because let's say Hamas signs a ceasefire and the Pij doesn't respect that, then Israel will say, well, Hamas, you are responsible for any rocket that comes from Gaza. We don't know whether it is your Pij that is doing it. We'll retaliate. This is the logo of Hamas and this is the logo of Pij. Now during the Gulf War, the Palestinian side led by FATA commits a mistake and perhaps it's because of frustration that the Intifada is not going in the course or not giving them the right end that they want. So the Gulf War that takes place in 1891 towards the end of the Cold War, PLO sides with Saddam Hussein. What this happens is that the other Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia, they oppose it and they in fact kick out a lot of the Palestinian workers who are living and working in their countries and PLO loses support. Because PLO loses support, Israel is on, in a weak ground, is shaken because of Intifada. The Americans, they come in and say, see guys, perhaps you might want to talk, make peace. And this is the important point I wanted to make that Israeli side, again, it's much more nuanced. They have made many mistakes as well and we are not talking about the Palestinian side as much, but if we are to do a discussion or lecture on the Palestinian side, I'm pretty sure it's going to be equally interesting. They have their own perspectives as well. So the Americans come in and the Secretary of State James Baker, in fact, initiates this talk between the Palestinian side and the Israeli side. What they want is that Israel should come on to the discussion table and accept the PLO at least as the representative of the Palestinian people so that they can talk for peace. Because without talks, what is going to happen is that both sides are going to keep on fighting, if not in direct conflict, then in a protracted low intensity conflict in which civilians are going to die in large numbers. Israel is at first not so, how do I say? It doesn't take positively to the initiators of the Secretary of State Baker. So in one of the well-televised speeches that Baker gives, he says that this is our phone number. He, in fact, provides a phone number and does this to the side. Whenever you want to come for peace, call on this number. He does that in front of cameras, and so thus there is a lot of pressure on Israel as well as on the PLO to come together to talk. And there is a Madrid conference in 1991. It also involves the other neighboring Arab countries. But not exactly much progress is happening here. So there is side by side a track to deliberation between academics. But also I think I made a small mistake here. So in Madrid conference, one of the preconditions that the Israeli side sets is that it won't talk to PLO, it doesn't budge. So representatives are recruited from the West Bank in Gaza and they come. And Israel has to approve of it. Okay, these are the people who are not linked with PLO that much and we'll talk to them. But the people, they are really academics as well. And when they come and discuss with Israel, they don't even move a pin without instruction from PLO. So every morning they have discussion with the Israeli side and in the evening they go back and report everything to Yasser Arafat, who is sitting in Tunisia. So everybody understands that what the game is going on. Israel won't let PLO on the discussion table and PLO will ensure that it is the only team that gets to have a voice rather than some other. So this leads to a very funny situation. And the track to deliberation that's going on in Oslo, that in fact seems more promising. Progress is made there. And the progress that is made ultimately culminates into PLO and Israel coming onto the table and they talk indeed. So this is the overall context in which all this is happening. US has won the first Gulf War, Soviet Union is weak. And because Soviet Union is weak, it breaks up. And a lot of Jews, numbering more than a million, they immigrate to Israel. Now Israel needs money and financial support to observe all these immigrants. And US puts a condition for the loans. You will have to talk to the Palestinian side if you want the money. So this is the statistic that shows the immigration of Russian speakers to Israel. And you see in 91-90, the immigration is at its peak. So by 1993, Israeli side budges. They meet up in the United States. And it's called Oslo because much of the deliberation for the last three years happened in Oslo. But this picture that you see under Bill Clinton, this is not Oslo. This is United States. Yet it's called Oslo. In 1993, it creates a stage, the basic agreements based on which PLO is able to return to Israel, Palestine, that area. Yasser Arafat in 1994 comes back to Gaza. He's welcomed. This is an image of Yasser Arafat landing back in Palestine. And once the 1994 progress has been made, that PLO has been cognized as the voice of the Palestinian people, as the legitimate representative. What happens is that they move ahead. And we have Oslo too in 1995. This creates a separation of territories. The map that you see is a result of the 1995 Oslo too. In this map, if you see carefully, the West Bank, it seems is divided. So what Oslo one did was it gives the Palestinian side, Gaza and Jericho. In the image on the right side, you can see the Gaza strip. This entire strip except the white ones. The white ones were Israeli settlements. And the Jericho, this is given to the Palestinian side. They are full control there. And now there is discussion for the rest of the West Bank. So the Palestinian has really decided to try to get in a way into three regions, three zones. First is the area A, where the Palestinian side will not only have its government control, but will also have its own military control. Then there is area B. The area in the left side map is basically the dark orange ones. And the area B is the yellowish brownish ones. In area B, it's going to be Palestinian civilian control, government, water, electricity, and all that. But when it came to security matters, the limited Palestinian police and basically Israeli military in area B. And area C, which is much, which is like 60% of the West Bank, all the gray zones that you see, it is going to run the full Israeli control. And in fact, today, if you move through area C, you will see fluttering Israeli flags. And am I audible? Everything is visible? Everything is going well? Yes, yes, yes, yes. Okay. Go ahead. Yeah. On the West Bank, on the left, you see this Tulkaram and Kalkilya. Today, if you take a road along this, and Tulkaram and Kalkilya, this area A, there's a road here. If you go by it, you'll see very big Palestinian flags flying. And you don't have to enter the West Bank. You just have to stay on the Israeli side. Just maybe you are going on a fun trip to the North. You are just zooming past this. And you can see the Palestinian flags in the Palestinian homes. And so in this way, there is a, I don't want to use the S word, but there is like differentiation of territory. And there are also a lot of settlements. And much of these settlements are in fact in area C. The right side image shows you the settlements in the form of blue triangles. And the blue lines, these are the roads. They are often referred to as flyovers because let's say you're in Tel Aviv and you want to go to a settlement. You can just fly across the Palestinian territories and enter that. But yeah, these roads in the West Bank can also be used by the Palestinians, but there can be checkpoints. If there is a suspicion of a terror act or something. So we come to this. The area A that the Palestinian side gets full control consists of 18% of the area and almost 90% of the population because it consists of all the urban areas. Area B has the orchards and villages. It has some population and consists of 22% of the area. Area C is 60%. And much of the reason for this big 60% inflated number is the Jordan Valley that you see here. This is the Dead Sea. And this entire area is here. And Israel wants to retain this because then it can control the interaction of the Palestinian side with the outside world on a land basis. Why? Because if Israel doesn't control this area, then history shows us in 60s and 70s, Yasser Arafat and his folks had crossed and used this to perpetrate terrorism attacks, terrorism being a politically lewd term. So they want to control this area so that in future even if let's say in Jordan, today there's a king in future, let's say because of Arab Spring, Muslim brothers take power in Jordan just the way they had done in Egypt. And when the Muslim brothers are taking power in Egypt, Israel was under a lot of fear because of stress because they felt that we have certain peace agreements with Egypt. What if the Muslim brothers suddenly decide that they are going to abrogate all that? By 94, there's also peace with Jordan. On the left side, there's King Hussein, the warrior king. And in fact, yeah, this King Hussein that you are seeing right now, I've shown you a picture of him a few slides earlier, sir. He was the one who was leading the Jordanian army in the Black September, the meeting with the Palestinian, with the Jordanian commanders. This is again him after the Battle of Karameh, same king. This is him on the right side and he's there here again with us in 1994, signing the peace deal. He is seen as one of the survivors in Middle East. There were several attempts on his life, but he has been very astute politically. Even when he lost territory in the form of West Bank, he kept his calm and he has done what you might say is politically constructive, smart, wise, being dispassionate. He has taken a lot of good steps and today Jordan is seen as one of the most stable countries and while it's not recognized as such, it is a reason for Middle East stability because even in Syrian war, the refugees moved to Jordan. Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the refugees moved to Jordan. ISIS and all that happened. A lot of refugees again moved to Jordan. Jordan is in a way like a sponge in Middle East. It absorbs stress, it absorbs people and it also accepts funding and aid and support from US and European countries. Now what happens is after 1995 Oslo II, Yitzhak Rabin, the Israeli leader, is assassinated. The Israeli right wing takes power and once the right wing is in power, the Palestinians are not sure whether they can go ahead and also there are a lot of, there's a rise of terror attacks and this kind of lowering of tempo when it comes to the peace talk. But finally Bill Clinton is able to push and he gets the Israelis and the Palestinians to come to talks. We have on the left Ehud Barak, the Israeli Prime Minister and on the right is Yasser Arafat and they finally come for the candidate talks in July 2000 but it doesn't go as per expectations. Nothing much comes out of it because Yasser Arafat feels that he has been trapped here. He doesn't exactly trust Bill Clinton or Ehud Barak for that reason. This is what he's offered ultimately there. He's told that okay, you'll get the West Bank but you'll have to give all these territories and even when they talk about West Bank, Israelis mean something and Palestinians mean something else. This is the West Bank that rest of the world accepts that Israeli people want as their state right now but it wasn't always the case. In 1948-67 FATA PLO, they were all seeking the destruction of Israel as in all of Tel Aviv, Waziliya, Netanyah, Nazareth all of that. They wanted all of that for themselves but to move in and off flow and PLO accepts that Israel has a right to existence. Israel accepts that PLO is the representative of the Palestinian people and that we'll talk. and we'll have talks for the creation of a future president. But what is going to be the nature of the state? That is where the talks are stuck, even today. So this is this line that you see on the left. You see a bulge. This is the latrine bulge. And the Israeli side don't exactly think that this is part of West Bank. This is not part of West Bank at all. And this East Jerusalem part, Israelis don't want to part with it. The PLO and the FATA, they are very adamant that they want all of West Bank. And this is where it breaks down. This is where the talks break down in it. And also there is talk of refugees that they want the return of all the refugees and the descendants, as we showed in a previous slide, 6 million to 7 million refugees, Palestinian in the Palestinian diaspora. What happens is finally Yasser El Fatt comes back and we see the second intifada. It starts around 28 September. So there is, I'll tell you three stories now. It is believed that this is how it actually starts. On 27 September, there were terror attacks going on. And on 27 September, a soldier is killed. And on 28 September, another police person is killed. This you can say has already started the second intifada. Because not only were crimes and all that taking place, now even government officers have been targeted. And on 28 September, Arya Sharron with an entourage of frightening politicians decides to go on the Temple Mount. I showed you the maps that I mentioned in the Garden of Gethsemane. So this is Arya Sharron along with this really security. Now, before he goes there, there is really internal security and the Home Minister and the Home Ministry, they are equivalent of that. They are Minister of Interior and all they check it. They say, okay, he can go. There won't be a threat or a uprising. Well, say this was their assessment. But they also have the Palestinian side and pretty chief of the Palestinian Authority. We must understand that in Oslo too, when the Palestinians got that area, Area A, Area B, they also got a government, they're an autonomous government called the Palestinian Authority. It added its own Ministry of Interior and internal intelligence agency. And the gentleman on the right, he was the one who headed it. In his assessment, he said, Arya Sharron can come. There won't be a disruption. You can come and do what you want. But you must not enter the mosque or the dome, gold and gold dome. This is Jibril Rajab and this is the logo of the Palestinian preventive security, the internal intelligence agency of Palestine. But not exactly things go happen. When Arya Sharron is there on top, nothing happens. But once he gets out, 1,500 men almost start throwing stones in different parts of the old city, East Jerusalem. And we see that there's violence. So while the Palestinian side says that this Arya Sharron went there and instigated, recreated this park, it is more nuanced. In the coming days, what happens is that there is another incident this time in Gaza. If you can see this, Dr. Anirudha, is it visible at all? Yes, yes, it is visible. Okay. So what happens in Gaza, there is this small military encampment you see on the map on the left in the Nazarim junction. This is the Nazarim junction. And this military post has been fired upon by the Palestinian, we can say, Israeli side would have referred to them as terrorists for sure. And the Israeli IDF soldiers are holed out here. And there is a father and son who are stuck here. I'll show you an image of the father and son. Give me a second. Okay. Okay. You can see there's a child lying down. This father and son, this image captures the imagination in the Arab streets. There is a, that Nazarim junction that I showed you, this is where they are stuck. And the father and son, the child somehow dies or it is, that's what it appears to us. And the word on the street is that the Israeli side has killed a small child, was hiding with his father to escape the firing. And the Israeli side also is shocked because they then are very remorseful about it. And they said that it appears that in the crossfire and Israeli soldier might have shot the child. But later on, investigations show that it wasn't exactly they might have been the case. There have been contending voices. And if you want a link, I will perhaps maybe post a link to the same in our chat box. This is an Atlantic report. I will leave it for some of us who are interested in reading it. Okay. I'm not able to do it right now. But yeah. And also there are in the Arab world, a lot of stamps are released to commemorate this event. There are gardens and roads waved after the child. And as this goes on and goes ahead, we see that the second and the father has become the Tel Aviv Dolphinarium is bombed, places in Jerusalem are bombed.  In March, there's the black march, because in March, there are like 15 to 20 terror attacks, almost one a day. And then there was a major attack of the Passover massacre in Netanya. The second and the father, it seems, is the peak of violence in the Arab-Israeli conflict. And after Oslo, this was kind of unexpected. There are some repercussions of the same. We see that in 2000, as the in response to the Palestinian activities and attacks and terror attacks, the Israelis increase more policing and security measures. As that increases, so does the attack in a way. And when attacks increase and Palestinians strikes, the Palestinian economy suffers. More Palestinians become unemployed. And these unemployed then go ahead and perpetuate further violence. So there's like a cyclical effect. The Arab side under Prince, saw the Crown Prince back then, the predecessor of current King Salman. He initiates a 2002 Arab peace with Beirut declaration. He's there. And but not much comes out of it. Instead, each Israel goes up with operation defensive shield in 2002. You see on the map, there are some major cities. These are all in area A. Please ignore Hadronia. The other cities that I mentioned here, Nablus, Jenin, Tulkarm, Calculia, Bethlehem, Ramallah, this is where they is really sending the troops in 2002 to break the back of the terror attacks. Because this is where many of the attackers are coming from. The effort is to destroy the terror networks. And this is in a way Israel's own version of war on terror. It is known as defensive shield. And the result is there's an immediate drop. And by 2005 is Israel kind of has managed the second intifada, and it is able to cover its back. The lessons learned from the second intifada, Israel creates the kafir brigade, which is like an urban warfare unit. There is far greater focus on urban warfare. This image on the down that you see, this is a world famous urban warfare training center that Israelis have built in the negative desert. It's called Baladia. This one is like a village that's been built only for military training. Even some Indian troops go there and train in urban warfare. Even American troops go there. Germans also go there. It is here in the map. If you just Google Baladia city, you will be able to see it. It was built with $45 million. Much of it came from United States on the map. This is how it appears. So 7.4 square mile training center. It was completed by 2005-2006. And after that, we see that no more in the fathers have, in fact, taken place. So the kafir brigade is also being modified. And Israel today, in fact, I think last year and this year has started the formation of four more urban training centers aimed at Hezbollah in the north. And one of them has already been inaugurated. It's a north. It's known as Snir. It is like three, four miles or 10 miles away from the Lebanese border. It is very close in the north. This is in the south. And alongside creating the specialized urban warfare forces, Israel also builds the famous thing. There's a famous thing. You might remember the wall. So this is not exactly a wall. This is a security barrier. It doesn't exactly follow the borders between West Bank and rest of Israel. You see, the red lines, this is the security barrier. The green line is, in fact, the internationally recognized border of West Bank. And throughout this red line, the wall doesn't look like this. The security barrier doesn't look like this exactly. It manifests itself in several ways. Sometimes it looks like this. Sometimes it looks like this. Other times it is more wide and not so high. And sometimes it's directly in the line of contact in Gaza, between the Gaza protesters and the Israeli IDF. The second in Tifada, while it is controlled, Gaza keeps on rising back. There's, after the second in Tifada, we see that there have been three Gaza wars. There was, in fact, gone ahead and taken place because once the Israelis withdrew from Gaza in 2005 because they removed all the settlements and they said Gaza is no longer a part of Israeli territory. Israel sees Gaza as an enemy entity, not even a state or anything, an enemy entity. For Israeli side, the one people or the one entity that is supposed to have control over this, Gaza Strip, is the Palestinian Authority, which is dominated by FATA and PLO. But in the 2007-08 elections, Hamas won those elections. And they were not even, they couldn't get a chance at ruling West Bank and the rest of Palestine. But they're over to Gaza in a military coup-like situation because there was delay in transferring power to them. So they took power. Ever since they have been in power, they have dominated the society and economy entirely. And often there are rockets being launched from there. Whenever there is a large stock of rockets being launched onto Israel, it is responded with an operation. And these operations are, if it was the Gaza wars. In 2008-09, there was the first one, the Operation Castle. It took place for several weeks. And then in 2012, there was a one-week war, the Operation Pillow of Defense. But the last one in 2014, which was a 50-day affair, that was a massive one. And this is the first Gaza war, 2008-09, Operation Castle. And here are the statistics for the last two. This is the Pillow of Defense from 2012 and the 2014 Operation Protective Edge. You see that the Protective Edge showed Israel what Hamas is capable of. But after 2014, there has been some relative peace because the Hamas, it wants to be seen as a respectable power broker, an entity of relevance. And if you go to any Hamas press conference, you would see that the Hamas spokesperson are very immacrately dressed, their vehicles, even their forces, they don't dress up like anything. They will ensure that they are properly dressed for ceremonial purposes and all because they want to be seen as a state. They want to be seen as relevant, as respectable people who are capable of governing. And also Gaza is important because in 1948, when the Palestinian side was fighting, the few pretense of a Palestinian state that took place in the Arab world was in Gaza under a different tutelage. And here you see the image. This is a Palestinian passport that was produced in 4850, that era, when Egypt was ruling Gaza. This has been explained. But today we see that Iran and Hezbollah are the prime enemies. And for Israel, Fatah is more or less like entity with which Israel is like a frenemy. They have to collaborate, they have to cooperate for security reasons. And Fatah more or less has kind of given up on directly committing terror acts or any direct violence against Israelis. It might support the families of some terrorists through aid because they are citizens of PA. But in the West Bank, there are these checkpoints that become points of contention. Coming to 2022, the Trump regime, the Trump administration had come up with a Trump plan, vision for peace. Now in 2000, Ehud Barab and Arafat, when they came together and Arafat was given a deal. He said, no, the camp David across 2000 in fact failed. And Arafat was blamed in a way. But Arafat is not exactly the person who should be blamed for it because he came with a set of thoughts and he had told them earlier, see, if this thing doesn't go through, please don't blame me. And he had earlier before and said, I can't accept this, this and I can accept this, this, this. And in 2000, the Israeli sites were in talk with Syrians to return the Golan Heights. And they are willing to return all of the Golan Heights almost leaving a few square miles of land near the lake. But they were not offering the Palestinian side that much leeway. In fact, in 2000, the Palestinian side, you are creating Bantostans, which was like a stretch, but still they had some logic to it. Coming to 2020, what the Trump administration offered was much less. They offered them all these territories. And because in West Bank, if you see the map on the left or the right, all this territory, the brown would go to Israel. So as a compensation, the Palestinian side would get all these territories along the Egyptian border. One of them will be having an agricultural park, another would be a high-tech industrial zone. And this is supposed to compensate for all those lands. And like in 2000, they offered a land bridge connecting Gaza and West Bank. Again, the same has been offered. And like in 2000, the Israeli and Americans had said that they would control the coast initially. And they might slowly give up the control of the land adjoining Jordan River. But now they are saying that this land will go to Israel entirely for secure reasons. And there's going to be a small gap, you see here, connecting Jerusalem to the Dead Sea. So this kind of cuts the Palestinian territory in West Bank, but they will get all these roads and all. What do we see here? We see that in the Palestinian Israeli conflict, there's not so much good. There is basically bad, the ugly, and repetition of the old things. But we must understand in 4860s and the 70s, the Palestinian side was not even willing to acknowledge Israel. They were fighting for the destruction of Israel. So we have moved a lot. We have made progress. Today, Palestinian side agrees that Israel has the right resistance. And even in 2017, when Hamas came out with the revision of its charter, they said that, okay, Israel has a right to exist and give us a state. But then they say that we have the right to destroy that Israeli state later on, should we feel to fight on. With this, we come to an end. We are now open for questions. Thank you so much for a lengthy, informative, and enriching presentation, Jyoti. Now the session is open for question and answer. So please go ahead. If you have any questions, we can take up. I will ask one question to you. It's regarding the role that United States have been playing in the Arab-Israeli peace negotiation. So I just wanted to elaborate as to why the United States role is so indispensable and what exactly its role is. I mean, why the United States is so valuable in Israel out of negotiations. What's your take on it? Thank you. So before we go ahead, I'd like to let everyone know that in the next lecture, in fact, we'll talk about the wars, the Hezbollah-Israel wars, the Lebanon-Israel wars, the Yom Kippur war of 73, the surprise attack and the 67 war. But as Dr. Andrew Dha mentioned, why is the U.S. so important? So even in all those wars, the one thing that was able to protect Israel in a way, we'll have to admit, was the U.S. Because in 67, Israel went ahead with the first attack. It destroyed the Egyptian air force. It destroyed the Syrian brigades. But in 73, when Israel was under attack from the Arab side, when they took the initiative, the Israelis were almost pinned to the wall. There was nothing left in a way. That's where I mentioned that Moshe Diyan said the Third Temple might be lost. That's when U.S. came in. The Jerusalem airport was like busy for three, four days because U.S. C-17 planes, Indian Air Force has recently got those planes as well, C-17, big transport planes. There was one plane landing, I think, every three hours with ammunition and weapons. So in 50s and 60s, the superpower on which Israel was depending for technology weapons and everything might have been France. Today, it's very much U.S. Even today, Israel is able to dominate. It has an air force of 700 planes. It is the only air force in the Middle East that flies the F-35 and it flies it over Tehran or Beirut. And then they take the pictures and then they put them up for propaganda coups. And also the Israeli military, it gets almost $3.8 billion to $4 billion every year as aid from U.S. So U.S. is very relevant for Israel. It is even more relevant for the Palestinian side. Why do we say this? Because the Palestinian side understands that it needs, one thing most importantly is recognition. Who is recognition? It's American recognition because you might have come across formation of new states or deregognition of old state like Taiwan was deregognized. It is once U.S. deregognizes you that other countries get an incentive to deregognize you. Once U.S. recognizes you, other countries get an incentive to recognize you in a way. And also when we are talking about all this road, land bridge, and all these facilities that we are talking about, we are talking about industrial park for Palestinian society and all that, where is the money going to come from? The money is going to come from the Americans. For peace to be possible, we need money. For doing anything this day, we need money. In all this, the one entity that is willing to spend money to ensure peace is United States. It is willing to pay for peace. So while others might say we want peace, United States is the country that can ensure that there is peace. And also it can control the livers in all these countries. The Palestinian authority even today depends on money for its existence. It has to pay salaries. It has to go ahead all that. And when Donald Trump said that we stopped the funding over to PA, it was like the world came apart. Similarly, money is a big thing and U.S. no matter what, even today is one of the richest countries and it has that wear with all. It has the spending power that can push all that. Also when it comes to politics, United States has some degree of legitimacy, much more than other countries because it has been an actor and in 50s and 60s, it was the Department of State, wasn't exactly a friend of Israel. So in U.S., if you play your cards well, U.S. might support you or oppose you, but there is no ideology that U.S. is against you forever. So there is a faith in U.S. in a way you can say. Very interesting. That is very true. You know, the U.S. is a game changer after all. Is there any other question? Okay, from Abibay. And yes, a simple question to you. What if India stand on the roll of peace making between the two countries? What's your take? I mean Israel and, you know, Arab-Israel issue. What does India stand? Yeah, India stands. Yes, what she wants to know. Okay, just, okay. So what does India stand? Okay. So historically, India stood by the Palestinian side. Even today, India stands by the right of the Palestinian state to come into existence. And if you go through the 1970s and 80s, when India held the NAMM conference during Indira Gandhi's time, we'll see that Yasser Al-Fath is present there on the stage with Indira Gandhi. And even today, though in India, we don't have a left-leaning government anymore, and we have a center-right government, if you may. Still, despite all that, India is holding, India has kind of retained a connection to the Palestinian side. But truth be told, economic interests of India are more in convergence with Israel. Because not because Israel has a lot of money or anything or they are going to engage in FDI in India in large numbers, not exactly for that reason. But with Israel, India can collaborate and get things that it can't usually get from other countries, not just in the military, but also in other realms as well. For instance, agriculture development, tech development, and much of it. Israel is not a very inventive economy. It's a very innovative economy. And one of the reasons they have been able to do is this is by freeing up structures. Israel also has a very messy red tape and a bureaucracy. But if you want to start a business, you are more than welcome to do so there. And India wants to retain that connection in Israel. And also, we have a fledging diamond industry in Gujarat and Bombay. There's a diamond boss in Barakula complex in Mumbai. It is very much connected to the diamond complex in the east of Tel Aviv. There's a diamond boss there as well. And you'll see a lot of Indian businessmen who are working there. So economically, you say we are tied to Israelis in several ways. Also, many of the military equipment that India needs, those niche, we can only get it from Israel anyway. For instance, if you look at the Indian Navy, the latest ships of Indian Navy, they have got the MF star radars, multi-functional surveillance threat alert radars. These are Israeli 3D radars. Now, India was not able to get this radar from other countries and Israelis were able to offer it at a cheap price. Again, Israeli innovators, they're able to offer you something at a much cheaper price. Now, the MiG-21s that India has, Israel doesn't have MiG-21s, but if you want to modify them and upgrade them, there are Israeli companies who will go out and do that for you. Similarly, the Jaguar planes that we have for deep penetration strike. Again, modifications you want, contact the Israelis, they'll come and they'll modify it. It doesn't mean that the Israelis have all this technology within them. They come, they try their hand, they'll find a way and they'll come up with a solution after hit and trial, after a few months of labor. If you pose the same question to the Palestinian side, see Israelis have so much to offer to India. What do you have to offer? The Palestinian side is also very correct because the Palestinian side says that we are shackled. How can a person in shackle help you so much? And back in the day, during Param Mukherjee, I think it was, India had sent a lot of computers for the students of Palestinian universities. They got stuck in Israel. They couldn't reach the Palestinians back. So the Palestinian side says, see, even if we don't, our students going to get access to those computers, how will they program, how will they create software that we could then sell to Indian IT companies? Any further questions? That's very true. I think one more question. No, nothing. It came from, okay. So another question from my side. Jyothi ji, just like you, I'm also a student of security studies and I have often done a comparative analysis of, you know, how various intelligence agencies perform at various level in various contexts. And since I'm also a student of international law, I could not ignore the presence of the intelligence agencies and their influence over the international community. So I just want, I'm just curious to understand, I mean, even our viewers also, what is the basic difference between the Mossad, the Shin Bet and the Amman? And how those, you know, the three agencies, the Mossad, the Shin Bet and Amman, they are so coordinated.  What is your take on it?  So what is your take on it? So before I start answering this question, it's an amazing question. And yeah, DMI Amman, okay. So first of all, why these agencies have been very successful? To be honest, they have had the fair share of failures as well. And if I am to be a little bit less courteous to the Israeli side, I would say that the enemies that Israel has faced in conventional wars at least, not necessarily intelligence, they have been less weaker. For instance, if we compare to the Indian example, India has had to face with formidable adversaries. For instance, Pakistan is not something you can take not seriously. Pakistan is a very strong enemy. Israeli 60s and 70s had challenges from Egyptians and Jordanians. But in my assessment, Israelis came a bit lucky also you could say at times, they were innovative. And coming back to the intelligence topic. So Amman, DMI, that is on top. It is the aggregator of all intelligence. It remains on the top. And below it, you could say there are several intelligence agencies, two most famous being Mossad and Shinweth. Now Mossad is like the external intelligence agency. It coordinates with all the foreign governments, like all the embassies they have an intelligence attached there. That will be a Mossad person. So in every Israeli embassy anywhere, there will be some official either directly from Mossad or he's like a liaison for Mossad. But Shinweth, it is no like internal intelligence, like India's equivalent will be the intelligence bureau. And India's equivalent of Mossad will be a rock. America's equivalent will be CIA. And for Shinweth, the American equivalent is not exactly FBI, but it comes close. So Shinweth operates in West Bank, Israel, Gaza. Even it will operate in Jordan when needed. It will operate south of Littani River in Lebanon if needed. It will operate in Golan Heights, the region right across the Golan Heights, even in Sinai if needed. So Shinweth is more oriented towards Israel and its immediate vicinity. Mossad, on the other hand, casts a wider net. Now Israeli intelligence is not very high funded. The funding is not so high. So they have certain amount of funding and they have to make the maximum out of it. And much of the famous operations that we see in TV series such as POWDA, they are showing us an in glimpse of Shinweth. And in the map where I was showing you the operations in West Bank that was launched by Israel after the Second Intifada, I told you don't look at Hebron, look at the Karam Calculia and that's where the Israeli soldiers went. The reason I said so back then was because there was also some intervention in Hebron, but not by IDF. It was done by some Shinweth operatives who are living like Arabs. So Israel has a lot of these units called Dutewan units. Shinweth has it, Israeli army has it, Israeli border police has it. So these are people who can pretend to be Arabs. They will get into the street, behave like Arab, talk like an Arab. Because in Palestine, a person can hear the way you talk the accent and they can tell which village or which region of West Bank or Gaza are you from. So if you are not a good enough Dewani guy, then you'll get caught. So these guys have to, they actually become like Palestinian, think like a Palestinian and they actually do that. Mossad doesn't engage in such activities in the West Bank or Gaza that much. However, if needed it will. Shinweth not only looks at the Arabs, it also looks at the Israeli society as well, the Jewish society as well. It has a bench, a desk, an office, a group that takes care of extremist Jews as well. Because in 1995, the Israeli prime minister, Isaac Rabin, was assassinated by a Jewish extremist and also there is the case of Baruch Goldstein between the Oslo II and Camp David 2000, who had again attacked the mosque in Hebron, the place where all the patriarchs, Abraham, Rebekah, they are all buried there. There's a synagogue mosque, it is combined. So Shinweth also takes care of all kinds of such things. Israel also has a equivalent of India's NTRU and America's NSE. US has the National Security Agency, the whole Singh Eye and India has got its NTRU and UK has got the GCHQ. These are signal intelligence agencies. Israel has its own, it's called Unit 8200. But unlike the other countries which have civilian agencies, Unit 8200 comes under the military. It's a military signal intelligence agency. So they have kept the signal intelligence part, the cyber intelligence part entirely within the military. And this enables them to ensure that the DMI Amman stays on top. Now you might have seen the Operation Traps of RAP that I mentioned after the Munich massacre. The people who are responsible to avenge those deaths, they were Mossad in most cases. Also in many of the Nazis who had run away to Argentina and hidden after World War II, they had to be caught and brought to justice. It was Mossad who did all that. So Mossad today can operate in Uganda. They can operate in Australia. They can operate in any far of country, not just because they have the mandate, but also because they have the ability to do so. One of the ways it has been able to do that is by using the passports of Israeli citizens because a lot of Israeli citizens have dual citizenship. American Israeli, British Israeli, French Israeli and Australian Israeli. So it can always get a cue of how the passports are changing, how water is changing, give fake identities, but we must understand the difference between an agent and a spy. Now the next lecture will also be covering about the 973 war where we can talk about Ali Cohen and also the Angel. The Angel was the person who had warned Israel of the 973 war. Now in 973 war when the Yom Kippur war took place, there was a son-in-law of Nasir who was referred to as the Angel. He is the one who had given 4 warning to Israel that an attack is coming. The Israeli side made some mistake with the intelligence and because of which the 973 surprise attack could take place. So the fault again lies with the Israeli side, but even back then the Mossad was pretty sure that an attack is coming. It was the DMI which was on top which said that no attack is going to happen. So we see that even in their bureaucracy, intelligence bureaucracy, they don't always get it right. There is competition between one club, one group of intelligence, one intelligence and another. There is stuff for there as well. But Mossad somehow gets to be on the top, more powerful. It appears to us because it is directly connected to the prime minister's office. The Mossad chief answers to the prime minister. The military, the Aman intelligence chief has to answer to the military chief, the commander of the IDF, the head of the IDF which is usually three star rank, the equivalent of a lieutenant general. So the Aman wise, structurally it appears on top. Mossad has direct access to the prime minister. Shin Bet on the other hand gets very little popularity outside. But it is the most instrumental for Israel's security because much of the threat to Israel, in fact today stems in the nearby areas. It is not very, how do you say, it doesn't come, it is not that kinetic anymore. So Shin Bet is important but increasingly with the rise of Iran and Israel seeing Iran as a threat, we see that Mossad is venturing a lot and unit 8200 has become even more important. Why unit 8200 has become more important because Israel has used unit 8200, its assets and agencies and its techniques to counter Iran's nuclear program. Because Israel you might remember back in the day, a few years back, Israel was able to sabotage the Iranian nuclear program. It was all made possible with American support but more importantly due to unit 8200. Thank you again for this elaborated response. I mean, we are really enjoying, especially I believe my students are there. They're really learning something which is very new. And now since there is no question, my last question to you is regarding the Israel's policy of targeted killing. So when we think about Israel's policy, I mean the way the Mossad operators operate, their devil's stories are coming out in the media. And on the other hand, as an international lawyer, I come out with certain queries and something that always confuses me regarding the Israel's policy of targeted killing. Jyothiji, you must be aware that there is an international law, there is a principle of hot pursuit, especially in the case of Eurasian convention of law, if you refer that, there is always a possibility of hot pursuit. Your navy can pursue enemy vessel, go into the territory and attack it. Similarly, in the interest of the Indian, the strategic perspective, we have initiated the surgical strike in Pakistan. So somewhere I feel as a lawyer that that is an expansion of the principle of hot pursuit. So what do you think Israel's policy of targeted killing that it has openly advocated is an expansion of the principle of hot pursuit, like running behind the enemy, hunting it down in the interest of the security of the nation. What is your take on it? Could you repeat the last line? I couldn't catch the last line. No, I was just asking you, right, that whether running behind the enemy, pursuing the enemy, okay, and hitting the target in the interest of the Israel security, right, how is it correct or how is it legal from the international legal perspective? What is the legality in short of the Israel's policy of targeted killing? Okay. Or is it just an expansion of the principle of hot pursuit? Yeah. Thank you so much for the amazing question. I would first of all admit my lack of knowledge in legal aspects. But yeah, regarding the Israeli legal aspect, there is something called the Cassis belly international law. If you have a Cassis belly, you can go ahead and attack. So even in 1967, when Israel went ahead and attacked Egypt, Israeli explanation was we had a legal Cassis belly, because Egypt had asked the UN to move away from Sinai. They were exercising, and they had also blocked the Suez Canal and the States of Tehran. That was a Cassis belly for us. We understood they are going to attack. Similarly, when it comes to targeted killing, to say that someone killed our people, then we'll go and kill them. It's very difficult to justify that international law. So what instead they are going to say is we have reason to believe this person is going to kill someone in the future, and they will find a way. They will find his next target or find a document, and then they will go ahead and kill the future killer before they heek or she can kill. And then you have a very nice legal case that see he or she was going to kill someone to save a life we have engaged in killing of a terrorist. So that makes it very much easy. But let's say you don't have that luxury. Then what do you do? Then most of these people, they have those who are out there to be assassinated. They have a long list of crime series. There are already that many number of crimes on their head that they can easily go ahead. Israelis have a case that, okay, we can go ahead and kill them. But even if there was no legal case, even if there was no legal backing, it is very easy to actually justify your killing much later. Because by the time you make it public 10, 20, or 30 years down the line, the legal case is not no longer an issue. But the more difficult and more important thing to talk about here might be the assassination of nuclear scientists or experts or senior officers from the adversary. Because Israel has assassinated several nuclear scientists of Iran. It has even assassinated Qasem Soleimani in the last few years. So how does Israel justify all that? So here comes what's called the law of proportionality. I understand I'm moving away from your odd pursuit answer, but I'll speak a few lines on that towards then. So the law of proportionality is often misunderstood, I would say in international law, because it says that, okay, someone hit me on my shoulder, I should go and hit them on the shoulder. Now that's not law of proportionality in international law. International law instead, proportionality usually means that if let's say I know there is a target, I have to hit it, but there's going to be an associated collateral damage. Then the collateral damage is it proportional to the value of the target? If that is more or less the same, then I can go ahead and kill it. I'm satisfying the law of proportionality. But to say that someone filed one bullet and I should find fire an exact bullet of the same caliber using a similar gun of similar range. That's not necessary. If someone even fires one missile, you have every right to respond using 10 or 100 missiles and hit the target because the aim is to, they fired us, we have a reason to fire back and we fire back. But it becomes different case when more people die and all that because there are political implications. And when we come to the targeted assassination of scientists, Israeli perspective is that the value of the scientist is so high because the scientist is enabling the formation of creation of a nuclear weapon. And if the nuclear weapon comes into being, it can kill hundreds of thousands of people.  So they will say that one scientist, this value is going to, now you can't exactly match the human life's value, but they will say, okay, in our measurement, we said it is worth killing that one scientist. When it came to Qasem Soleimani's killing, Israelis didn't say that Qasem Soleimani has created militias in Iraq. He has done so much damage to us. He's directing groups in Syria against us. That's why we killed him. That wasn't the argument. The argument was Qasem Soleimani was going to plan three or four big operations against Israel to prevent that. We went ahead and we killed him. When it comes to hot pursuit in the law of sea, even that has some limitation, for instance, you can pursue them, I guess, if they are in your, not the territorial, but the EZ, I think, and then you can pursue them further. But also in open seas, today, there are a lot of instruments, international instruments that enable you to pursue them. But when it comes to pursuing targets, terrorists, or even high value individuals, it's more a case of capability. If you have the capability, then you measure the cost-benefit analysis. Okay, we do this. What comes in return? Oh, I made a small mistake. I think I said Qasem Soleimani was targeted by Israel. It was not targeted by Israel. It was targeted by US. So I think if I'm not making a mistake there. And in response to the killing of Qasem Soleimani, Iranians born the US base altogether, the Haider base in Iraq, and the Americans knew that the missiles are coming. So they evacuated a lot of them and no one exactly died. But Iran was going to hit American targets. Americans knew that. So each time Israel's go ahead and kill someone, they have to take this into consideration what's going to be the response and how you are able to absorb it. Thank you so much. It's almost 4.45 now. Okay, almost one and a half hours we have been discussing such a complicated issue. Yeah, absolutely correct. I mean, I really endorse your opinion because see when it comes to the preemptive strike, okay, as you have just mentioned, and the principles of hot pursuit, principles of hot pursuit, definitely it may have its own limitations. So legally, we have to take all those things into consideration. And yes, India also has shown its capability that it can tackle Pakistan and the Pakistani threats. Okay, so from all these angles, right, so we can finally conclude that Israel can teach so many things to all of us, right, right, not only just from the culture, from the biblical history, its politics, but also how it protects its own people from the external aggression. So a big lesson to learn and also we learned a lot from you also, sir. So thank you so much for the time that you gave to all of us and we are eagerly now waiting for the third lecture in this Israel series. Time will be notified and date will be notified to our viewers very soon. Until then, we'll patiently wait for that. So Jyotiji, thank you so much for your time and your knowledge. We learned a lot. Thank you so much. Thank you so much. But before we leave, I have to say one thing. Yes, please. It is also equally important to learn from Israel's mistakes. Yes, yes. Because next lecture we'll be discussing the Lebanon war. I think Israel often sees it as its own Vietnam, the first Lebanon war. And while Israel has done amazing work and we have lot to learn from it, no doubt, our record is also not that bad. And for that matter, the record of other countries is also not that bad. As you also mentioned that India also went ahead and went ahead with the surgical strikes. But how do I say this? There's this Sherlock Holmes novel, right? The Ritma Arthur Conan Doyle talks about the furious case of the dog that did not bark. In intelligence, it's always the case of the dog that did not bark. How do you justify that? And do you repeat it then? Because last time the dog did not bark, right? So can you do it again? Will the dog not bark this time? With these words, sir, we really have to conclude and we are taking away so much from you. Thank you guys. Thank you so much for joining us. Thank you Jyotishi once again. Thank you. Thank you for being here.